Protecting People and the 

Environment 

SEMIANNUAL STATUS REPORT ON THE 

LICENSING ACTIVITIES AND REGULATORY DUTIES OF THE 

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

April–September 2015 

Note: The period of performance covered by this report includes activities that occurred from the first day of April to 

the last day of September 2015. The transmittal letter to Congress accompanying this report provides additional 

information to keep Congress fully and currently informed of the licensing and regulatory activities of the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. 
i 

CONTENTS 

I. Reactor Oversight Process ............................................................................................... 1

II. Implementing Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulations ................................. 1

III. Status of Issues Tracked in the Reactor Generic Issues Program.................................... 2

IV. Licensing Actions and Other Licensing Tasks .................................................................. 4

V. Status of License Renewal Activities ................................................................................ 5

VI. Summary of Reactor Enforcement Action ......................................................................... 8

VII. Power Reactor Security and Emergency and Incident Response Activities ................... 14

VIII. Power Uprates ................................................................................................................ 17

IX. New Reactor Licensing ................................................................................................... 17

X. Response to Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Accident in Japan ......................... 26
1 

I. Reactor Oversight Process 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continues to use the Reactor Oversight 

Process (ROP) at all nuclear power plants to assess performance of reactor licensees and to 

guide assignment of inspection resources. NRC staff meets with interested stakeholders 

periodically to collect feedback on the effectiveness of the process, which is then considered in 

making future refinements to the ROP. Additionally, the NRC is making progress on the ROP 

Enhancement Project, which is focused on enhancing the effectiveness of the ROP using inputs 

from both self-assessments and independent evaluations. 

The agency’s most recent performance assessments show that all plants continue to operate 

safely. The NRC issued a press release on September 3, 2015, summarizing the 2015 

mid-cycle performance assessments for all nuclear plants and associated mid-cycle 

assessment letters, which are publicly available on the NRC Web site. The Web site also has 

been updated to reflect the latest performance assessments as of the end of the third quarter of 

calendar year 2015. 

II. Implementing Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulations 

Currently, 46 operating nuclear power reactors have made the transition, or are committed to 

making a transition, to the risk-informed, performance-based fire protection licensing basis 

permitted under Title 10, “Energy,” of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) section 

50.48(c). This licensing basis is also known as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 

Standard 805, “Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric 

Generating Plants.” Of the 46 reactor units, 20 have already transitioned to an NFPA 805 

licensing basis; 23 are under active review by the NRC; and three have expressed their 

intention to submit license amendment applications to the NRC. The NRC anticipates that it will 

complete its review of the 23 reactors currently under review by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2016. 

The agency expects to receive license amendment applications for the remaining three reactors 

in FY 2016 (for one reactor) and FY 2017 (for the final two reactors). 

On November 5, 2012, the Commission directed the staff to develop an approach for allowing 

licensees to propose to the NRC a prioritization of the implementation of regulatory actions as 

an integrated set and in a way that reflects their risk significance on a plant-specific basis for 

Commission review and approval. NRC staff refers to this initiative as the risk-prioritization 

initiative (RPI) and worked with external stakeholders to develop a proposed process for 

Commission review. In May 2015, NRC staff and an external panel consisting of members of 

the public briefed the Commission on issues related to RPI. The briefing included the staff’s 

lessons learned from RPI pilot projects, possible approaches for implementing the RPI, as well 

as licensees’ experiences with RPI pilot projects. In its direction to staff (SRM-SECY-15-0050, 

“Cumulative Effects of Regulation Process Enhancements and Risk Prioritization Initiative”), the 

Commission did not approve the staff proposal that would create new processes. However, the 

Commission stated that risk insights should be considered in regulatory decisionmaking through 

existing agency processes. The staff is exploring the development of other guidance to 

enhance licensees’ ability to use risk information in existing agency processes, such as 10 CFR 

50.12, “Specific Exemptions.” 

Southern Nuclear Operating Co. (“Southern”) submitted its proposal to implement 

10 CFR 50.69, “Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and 

Components for Nuclear Power Reactors,” for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Units 1 

and 2, on August 31, 2012. The staff completed the technical review and issued a safety 
2 

evaluation in December 2014. Southern submitted a second proposal to implement 

risk-informed allowed outage times for VEGP’s technical specifications on September 13, 2012. 

This submittal is under staff review, and NRC staff is completing the safety evaluation. 

III. Status of Issues Tracked in the Reactor Generic Issues Program 

The Generic Issues Program is evaluating four open generic issues (GIs) and tracking their 

resolution. Three GIs are in regulatory office implementation stage, which is the final stage of 

the NRC staff’s process to develop and perform an appropriate regulatory action to implement 

resolution of a generic issue: GI-191, GI-199, and GI-204. One GI - GI-93 - is in the GI 

program assessment stage, which is the second stage of the NRC staff’s process to perform an 

assessment of the proposed generic issue to determine if it merits further regulatory action. The 

status of each open generic issue is described below: 

GI-191, “Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor (PWR) Sump 

Performance”

This GI concerns the possibility that, after a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in a PWR, debris 

accumulating on the emergency core-cooling system (ECCS) sump screen may result in 

clogging and restrict water flow to the pumps. 

Because of this GI and the related Generic Letter 2004-02, “Potential Impact of Debris Blockage 

on Emergency Recirculation during Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors,” 

dated September 13, 2004, all PWR licensees increased the size of their containment sump 

strainers, significantly reducing the risk of strainer clogging. A related issue, which needs to be 

resolved to close GI-191, is the potential for debris to bypass the sump strainers and enter the 

reactor core. In 2008, NRC staff determined that more testing was necessary to resolve this 

issue. In 2012, the industry performed and completed the extra testing and submitted a topical 

report to the NRC. In 2013, NRC staff issued a safety evaluation of the topical report, finding it 

an acceptable model for assessing the effect of sump-strainer-bypassed fibrous, particulate, 

and chemical debris on core cooling in PWRs. 

In December 2010, the Commission determined that it was prudent to allow the nuclear industry 

to complete testing on in-vessel effects and zone of influence and to develop a path forward by 

mid-2012. The Commission directed NRC staff to evaluate alternative approaches, including 

risk-informed approaches, for resolving GI-191 and to present them to the Commission by 

mid-2012. Based on the interactions with stakeholders and the results of the industry testing, 

NRC staff in 2012 developed three options for licensees to resolve GI-191. These options were 

documented and proposed to the Commission in SECY-12-0093, “Closure Options for Generic 

Safety Issue 191, ‘Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump 

Performance’,” dated July 9, 2012. All options require licensees to demonstrate compliance 

with 10 CFR 50.46, “Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light-Water 

Nuclear Power Reactors.” The options allow industry alternative approaches for resolving 

GI-191. The Commission issued a Staff Requirements Memorandum on December 14, 2012, 

approving the options for closure of GI-191. 

Licensees have since notified the NRC of the option that they have selected and are developing 

proposed technical resolutions based on the option selected. NRC staff is reviewing the 

proposed technical resolutions as they are submitted by licensees. To date, seven sites have 

successfully resolved GI-191. 
3 

GI-193, “Boiling-Water Reactor (BWR) Emergency Core Cooling System Suction Concerns”

GI-193 involves an evaluation of the consequences of LOCA causing a blowdown of 

containment gas into the suppression pool. The noncondensable gas could enter into the 

suction piping of the ECCS pumps, causing gas binding, vapor locking, or cavitation, leading to 

a possible failure or degraded performance. The Office of Regulatory Research (RES) has 

completed a technical report providing a basic understanding of the overall phenomena. The 

results of the study provide the “exclusion zone” and a quantification of the time-dependent gas 

void fraction present at different locations in the suppression pool after a large-break LOCA. 

RES has now completed computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models and analyses for several 

tests at two smaller scale test facilities that model the post-LOCA noncondensable gas behavior 

in a suppression pool. Using the computational methods employed for the two test programs, 

the agency completed CFD analyses to simulate full-scale Mark I suppression pool behavior 

after a large-break LOCA. The results from the full-scale CFD analyses can be used to 

determine the location of a time dependent “exclusion zone” in the suppression pool. The 

“exclusion zone” is the volume below and around the downcomer exhaust that is expected to 

contain a large concentration of noncondensable gas from the drywell for a few seconds after a 

LOCA. If an ECCS pump suction strainer is in the “exclusion zone,” the ECCS pump could be 

vulnerable to gas entrainment if it is operated in the time period during which the large 

noncondensable gas volume is present. 

The completed RES technical report supplies a means to assess the post-LOCA vulnerability 

of an ECCS pump based upon pump strainer location and an ECCS pump start time. Now that 

the technical report is complete, the GI assessment can determine whether the issue should 

proceed to regulatory office implementation. A new generic issue review panel has been 

formed and is working on completing the GI program assessment. 

GI-199, “Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern 

United States on Existing Plants”

This GI addresses the estimated seismic hazard levels at current nuclear sites in the central 

and eastern United States that might be higher than the values used in designs and previous 

evaluations. 

The NRC evaluated the effects of new seismic hazard data and methods on U.S. nuclear plants 

and collaborated with the Electric Power Research Institute to ensure a sound technical 

approach was developed. The Safety/Risk Assessment Panel issued its report on 

September 2, 2010. The panel recommended taking further actions to address GI-199 outside 

the GI program. The NRC issued Information Notice 2010-18, “Implications of Updated 

Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States on Existing 

Plants,” on September 2, 2010, to inform stakeholders that the GI-199 Safety/Risk Assessment 

Report had been issued. The information notice also stated that the NRC will follow the 

appropriate regulatory process to request that operating plants and independent spent fuel 

storage installations offer specific information about their facilities to enable NRC staff to 

complete the regulatory assessment and identify and evaluate candidate backfits. After the 

accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, 

Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the NRC incorporated GI-199 into the work 

responding to the accident. Activities since that time are discussed in Section X of this report, 

“Response to Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Accident in Japan.” 
4 

GI-204, “Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures”

This GI relates to potential flooding effects from upstream dam failure(s) on nuclear power plant 

sites, spent fuel pools, and sites undergoing decommissioning with spent fuel stored in spent 

fuel pools. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) proposed this GI in July 2010, and 

it has been subsumed as part of the implementation of the recommendations from the agency’s 

Japan Near-Term Task Force. See Section X of this report for additional information. 

IV. Licensing Actions and Other Licensing Tasks 

Operating power reactor licensing actions are orders, license amendments, exemptions 

from regulations, relief from inspection or component testing, topical reports submitted on a 

plant-specific basis, or other actions requiring NRC review and approval before they can be 

carried out by licensees. The FY 2015 NRC Performance Budget plan incorporates two output 

measures related to licensing actions: the number of licensing actions completed per year and 

the age of the licensing action inventory. 

Other licensing tasks for operating power reactors include: 

• licensee responses to NRC requests for information through generic letters or bulletins 

• NRC responses to petitions filed for enforcement action under 10 CFR 2.206 

• NRC review of generic topical reports 

• responses by NRR to NRC regional office requests for assistance 

• NRC inspection of licensee analyses under 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests 

and Experiments” 

• final safety analysis report updates 

• other licensee actions not requiring NRC review and approval before licensees can carry 

them out 

The FY 2015 NRC Performance Budget plan incorporates two output measures related to other 

licensing tasks: the number of other licensing tasks completed each year and the age of the 

other licensing task inventory. 

The table below shows the actual FY 2012, FY 2013, and FY 2014 results and the FY 2015 

goals for the NRC Congressional Budget plan performance indicators for operating power 

reactor licensing actions and other licensing tasks. The NRC continues to work on the 

Fukushima Tier 1 activities under aggressive schedules that require close monitoring to ensure 

that implementation of the activities is successful. The agency prioritizes all licensing action 

reviews in accordance with their safety significance; however, because of Fukushima-related 

work competing for the same critical skill sets, the backlog inventory of operating reactor 

licensing actions has increased. In late FY 2014, the staff redistributed resources to support 

stabilizing and reducing the licensing action backlog, and as a result the NRC has seen the 

backlog inventory stabilize in FY 2015 and has seen improvement towards reducing the backlog 

this FY. To improve the agency’s projections, manage workload, and identify needed skills, the 
5 

NRC issued a regulatory information summary to request that licensees supply information on 

their plans to submit licensing actions over the next 3 years. The agency plans to request 

updates to this information later this year. The NRC’s senior management remains heavily 

engaged in monitoring the licensing action workload towards an objective of achieving target 

performance goals. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 

Output 

Measure

FY 2012 

Actual

FY 2013 

Actual

FY 2014 

Actual 

FY 2015 

Goals 

FY 2015 

Actual 

Licensing 

actions 

completed 

per year 

770 668 607 7371

 792 

Age of 

inventory of 

licensing 

actions 

95.8% 

≤ 1 year and 

100% 

≤ 2 years 

95% 

≤ 1 year and 

100% 

≤ 2 years 

87% 

≤ 1 year and 

99% 

≤ 2 years 

95% 

≤ 1 year and 

100% 

≤ 2 years 

88% 

≤ 1 year and 

99% 

≤ 2 years 

Other 

licensing 

tasks 

completed 

per year 

674 529 402 500 461 

Age of 

inventory of 

other 

licensing 

tasks 

94.6% 

≤ 1 year and 

100% 

≤ 2 years 

97.6% 

≤ 1 year and 

100% 

≤ 2 years 

87% 

≤ 1 year and 

100% 

≤ 2 years 

90% 

≤ 1 year and 

100% 

≤ 2 years 

87% 

≤ 1 year and 

97% 

≤ 2 years 

V. Status of License Renewal Activities 

The NRC has issued renewed licenses to 78 power reactor units licensed to operate. The NRC 

has nine license renewal applications (LRAs) for 16 reactor units under review. 

Applications Currently under Review 

The following is the status of each application under review during the reporting period. 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 

On April 30, 2007, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (“Entergy”), submitted an LRA for Indian 

Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 to extend the operating licenses for 20 years beyond 

the current license periods. In July 2014, the staff announced its intent to prepare a second 

supplement to the December 2010 final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) 

to address new information and other developments since Final Environmental Impact 

Statement (FEIS) Supplement 1 was issued in June 2013. The staff expects to publish the draft 

 

1

 Congressional Budget Performance indicator is limited by the number of licensing action requests 

submitted or accepted the previous FY. 
6 

supplement in January 2016 and the final supplement in September 2016. On November 6, 

2014, staff issued Supplement 2 to the safety evaluation report (SER). The staff briefed the 

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) on SER Supplement 2 on April 23, 2015. 

Additionally, activities related to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing process 

continued. Hearings on the three remaining safety contentions are scheduled to be held in 

Tarrytown, NY, November 16-20, 2015. 

The operating license for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 was set to expire on 

September 28, 2013. Given the timely submittal of the LRA, Unit 2’s continued operation is 

permitted under NRC regulations and the Administrative Procedure Act until the NRC 

determines whether to issue a renewed license. The operating license for Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit 3 is set to expire on December 12, 2015; inasmuch as the Unit 3 LRA was 

timely submitted, the staff anticipates that Unit 3 also will continue to operate under its existing 

license until the NRC makes a final determination on whether to issue a renewed license. 

A final determination will be made once the staff’s review is complete and the ASLB hearing is 

concluded. Entergy has implemented aging management programs for both Units 2 and 3, as 

described in the LRA, and the NRC continues normal reactor oversight to ensure 

safe operations.

Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 

On November 24, 2009, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E) submitted an LRA for the Diablo 

Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, to extend the operating licenses for 20 years beyond the 

current license periods. In April 2011, PG&E requested that the NRC delay its final licensing 

decision to allow PG&E to satisfy State of California requests for studies made under the 

Coastal Zone Management Act. In December 2014 and February 2015, in response to staff 

requests, PG&E submitted updates to its LRA, which provided most of the information the staff 

identified as necessary to complete its review. During the reporting period, staff conducted 

public environmental scoping meetings and onsite audits related to the environmental review 

of the application. In addition, activities related to the ASLB hearing process are completed 

although an appeal on several proposed contentions is pending before the Commission. 

Seabrook Station, Unit 1 

On June 1, 2010, NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, submitted an LRA for the Seabrook Station, 

Unit 1, to extend the operating license for 20 years beyond the current license period. 

In April 2013, the staff issued a second draft SEIS, which included a revised severe accident 

mitigation alternatives analysis and updates to comply with the NRC’s revised environmental 

protection regulations. During the reporting period, the staff also worked toward resolution of 

the open items identified in the staff’s June 2012 SER with Open Items. In July 2015, the staff 

issued the final SEIS. Additionally, activities related to the ASLB hearing process are 

completed. 

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 

On August 30, 2010, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. submitted an LRA for the Davis-Besse 

Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, to extend the operating license for 20 years beyond the current 

license period. The staff issued the draft SEIS in February 2014 and published the final 

supplement in April 2015. Activities related to the ASLB hearing process are completed. During 

the current reporting period, the staff issued a supplemental SER in August 2015 and in 

September 2015, the staff presented the supplemental SER before the ACRS.
7 

South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 

On October 28, 2010, South Texas Project (STP) Nuclear Operating Co. submitted an LRA for 

STP Units 1 and 2, to extend the operating licenses for 20 years beyond the current license 

periods. The staff issued the final SEIS in November 2013. During the reporting period, the 

staff continued its work toward resolution of the open items identified in the staff’s 

February 2013 SER with open items.

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 

On November 1, 2011, Entergy submitted an LRA for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, to 

extend the operating license for 20 years beyond the current license period. During the current 

reporting period, the staff continued its work toward resolution of the open items identified in the 

staff’s January 2013 SER with Open Items. The staff issued the draft SEIS in November 2013 

and the final SEIS in November 2014. 

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 

On January 7, 2013, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) submitted an LRA for Sequoyah 

Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, to extend the operating licenses for 20 years beyond the current 

license periods. The staff issued the draft SEIS in July 2014 and the SER with Open Items in 

September 2014. The staff issued the final SER in January 2015 and the final SEIS in 

March 2015. On September 28, 2015, NRR issued a renewed operating license to Tennessee 

Valley Authority for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. 

Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, and Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 

On May 29, 2013, Exelon submitted LRAs for Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, and Braidwood 

Station, Units 1 and 2, to extend the operating licenses for 20 years beyond the current license 

periods. The staff issued the Byron draft SEIS in December 2014 and the Braidwood draft SEIS 

in March 2015. The staff issued its SER with Open Items on October 30, 2014. During the 

reporting period, the staff continued work on the environmental and safety reviews of the 

application, completing the final SER in July 2015 and the final SEIS for Byron in July 2015. 

Staff plans to issue the final SEIS for Braidwood in November 2015.

Fermi, Unit 2 

On April 30, 2014, DTE Electric Co. (“DTE Electric”) submitted an LRA for Fermi, Unit 2, to 

extend the operating license for 20 years beyond the current license period. During the 

reporting period, the staff continued work on the environmental and safety reviews of the 

application. The staff plans to publish the draft SEIS for comment in October 2015. Activities 

related to the ASLB hearing process are completed. 

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 

On December 9, 2014, Exelon Generation Co., LLC submitted an LRA for LaSalle County 

Station, Units 1 and 2 to extend the operating licenses for an additional 20 years beyond the 

current license periods. During the reporting period, the staff continued work on the 

environmental and safety reviews of the application. The staff plans to publish the draft 

SEIS for comment in February 2016. 
8 

VI. Summary of Reactor Enforcement Action 

The reactor enforcement statistics in the tables below are arranged by region, half year, most 

recent half year, fiscal year to date, and two previous fiscal years for comparison purposes. 

Separate tables provide the non-escalated and escalated reactor enforcement data, as well 

as the escalated enforcement data associated with traditional enforcement and the ROP. The 

severity level assigned to the violation (i.e., traditional enforcement) generally reflects the 

significance of a violation. However, for most violations, the significance of a violation is 

assessed using the significance determination process under the ROP, which uses risk insights, 

where appropriate, to help the NRC in determining the safety or security significance of 

inspection findings identified within the ROP. 

These tables are followed by brief descriptions of the escalated reactor enforcement actions 

associated with traditional enforcement and the ROP (as well as any other significant actions) 

taken during the applicable half-year period. 

NON-ESCALATED REACTOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Region I Region II Region III Region IV TOTAL 

Cited 

Severity 

Level IV 

or Green 

1st Half FY 15 4 1 1 9 15 

2nd Half FY 15 0 6 0 1 7 

FY 15 YTD Total 4 7 1 10 22 

FY 14 Total 8 5 3 2 18 

FY 13 Total 6 8 1 4 19 

Non-Cited 

Severity 

Level IV 

or Green 

1st Half FY 15 57 53 96 93 299 

2nd Half FY 15 80 50 86 131 347 

FY 15 YTD Total 137 103 182 224 646 

FY 14 Total 124 147 223 257 751 

FY 13 Total 155 117 201 203 676 

TOTAL 

Cited and 

Non-Cited 

Severity 

Level IV 

or Green 

1st Half FY 15 61 54 97 102 314 

2nd Half FY 15 80 56 86 132 354 

FY 15 YTD Total 141 110 183 234 668 

FY 14 Total 132 152 226 259 769 

FY 13 Total 161 125 202 207 695 

NOTE: The non-escalated enforcement data above reflect the cited and non-cited violations 

either categorized at Severity Level IV, the lowest level, or associated with green findings during 

the indicated time periods. The numbers of cited violations are based on Enforcement Action 

Tracking System data that may be subject to minor changes following verification. The monthly 

totals generally lag by 30 days because of the time needed for inspection report and 

enforcement development. These data do not include green findings that do not have 

associated violations. 
9 

ESCALATED REACTOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 

ASSOCIATED WITH TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT 

Region I Region II Region III Region IV TOTAL 

Severity 

Level I 

1st Half FY 15 0 0 0 0 0 

2nd Half FY 15 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 15 YTD Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 14 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 13 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

Severity 

Level II 

1st Half FY 15 0 0 0 0 0 

2nd Half FY 15 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 15 YTD Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 14 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 13 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

Severity 

Level III 

1st Half FY 15 2 1 0 1 4 

2nd Half FY 15 1 1 0 0 2 

FY 15 YTD Total 3 2 0 1 6 

FY 14 Total 1 0 0 0 1 

FY 13 Total 1 6 1 2 10 

TOTAL 

Violations 

Cited at 

Severity 

Level I, II, 

or III 

1st Half FY 15 2 1 0 1 4 

2nd Half FY 15 1 1 0 0 2 

FY 15 YTD Total 3 2 0 1 6 

FY 14 Total 1 0 0 0 1 

FY 13 Total 1 6 1 2 10 
10 

ESCALATED REACTOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 

ASSOCIATED WITH THE REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

Region I Region II Region III Region IV TOTAL 

Violations 

Related to 

Red 

Findings 

1st Half FY 15 0 0 0 0 0 

2nd Half FY 15 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 15 YTD Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 14 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 13 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

Violations 

Related to 

Yellow 

Findings 

1st Half FY 15 0 0 0 2 2 

2nd Half FY 15 1 0 0 0 1 

FY 15 YTD Total 1 0 0 0 3 

FY 14 Total 0 0 0 2 2 

FY 13 Total 0 1 1 0 2 

Violations 

Related to 

White 

Findings 

1st Half FY 15 2 1 2 0 5 

2nd Half FY 15 2 0 3 0 5 

FY 15 YTD Total 4 1 5 0 10 

FY 14 Total 1 2 3 4 10 

FY 13 Total 2 7 7 2 18 

TOTAL 

Related to 

Red, 

Yellow, or 

White 

Findings 

1st Half FY 15 2 1 2 2 7 

2nd Half FY 15 3 0 3 0 6 

FY 15 YTD Total 5 1 5 2 13 

FY 14 Total 1 2 3 6 12 

FY 13 Total 2 8 8 2 20 

NOTE: The escalated enforcement data above reflect the violations or problems cited during 

the indicated time periods that were associated with either red, yellow, or white findings. These 

data do not include red, yellow, or white findings that do not have associated violations. 

Reactor Escalated Enforcement Actions and Other Significant Actions Taken 

The list below includes Severity Level I, II and III Notices of Violation (NOV) associated with an 

inspection finding that the Significance Determination Process evaluates as having low to 

moderate (white) or greater safety significance; civil penalties; NOVs to individuals; and 

enforcement-related orders. The list also includes security-related actions and confirmatory 

actions not included in the tables above. The NRC does not make details of security-related 

violations publicly available. 
11 

Energy Northwest (Columbia Generating Station) EA-14-240 

On September 28, 2015, the NRC issued a confirmatory order to Energy Northwest, to formalize 

commitments made because of an alternative dispute mediation session on August 6, 2015. 

The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between Energy Northwest 

and the NRC regarding a violation that involved Nuclear Security Officers at Columbia 

Generating Station being willfully inattentive while on duty, which resulted in them not meeting 

the requirement to be available at all times inside the protected areas for their assigned 

response duties, contrary to 10 CFR 73.55(k)(5)(iii). In light of the significant corrective actions 

Energy Northwest had taken and subject to the satisfactory completion of the additional actions 

committed to take, as described in the Confirmatory Order, the NRC will not issue a notice of 

violation for the apparent violation. Those corrective actions include, but are not limited to: (1) 

conducting a common cause evaluation, (2) revising its annual compliance and ethics 

computer-based training to address deliberate misconduct, (3) presenting at an industry forum 

to discuss the events that led to the confirmatory order, (4) conducting a targeted nuclear safety 

culture assessment, and (5) paying a civil penalty of $35,000. 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2) EA-15-115 

On September 16, 2015, the NRC issued a notice of violation associated with a white 

significance determination process finding to Exelon Generation Co., LLC, for a violation of 

10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” Appendix B, 

“Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” 

Criterion III, “Design Control.” This violation involved the failure to review the suitability of 

application of the automatic depressurization system (ADS) electromatic relief valve (ERV) 

actuators, which are essential to the safety-related reactor vessel depressurization and 

overpressure protection functions. This resulted in a failure of ERV, and an indeterminate 

period of inoperability and unavailability greater than allowed by technical specifications (TS) 

during the operating cycle. The ERV inoperability during the operating cycle was identified after 

the failure of the valve during its first operational test in a mid-cycle outage. Additionally, 

because the licensee was not aware of the valve’s inoperability between 2013 and 2015, the 

required TS actions were not followed. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) EA-15-081 

On September 1, 2015, the NRC issued a notice of violation associated with a white 

significance determination process finding to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a violation of 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action.” This violation involved the 

failure to establish measures to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to 

quality, or take corrective actions to prevent repetition, relating to a component that is essential 

to the ADS safety-related functions. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that the ADS 

safety/relief valve (SRV) did not open upon manual actuation on February 9, 2013. The 

licensee therefore did not take action to prevent repetition, which resulted in the failure of 

another ADS SRV to operate upon manual actuation on January 27, 2015. Additionally, 

because the licensee was not aware of the SRV’s inoperability from February 9, 2013, until 

January 27, 2015, a period greater than the allowed TS outage time, the required actions of the 

TS were not followed. 
12 

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Power Station, Unit 2) EA-13-188 

On August 26, 2015, the NRC issued a confirmatory order to Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, 

Inc. (DNC), to formalize commitments made because of an alternative dispute resolution 

mediation session on July 15, 2015, and two follow up conference calls. The commitments 

were made as part of a settlement agreement between DNC and the NRC regarding apparent 

violations of 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests, and Experiments.” The apparent violations 

involved implementing changes to documents related to Millstone Unit 2 spent fuel decay time 

limits and the Millstone Unit 2 chemical and volume control system charging pumps without the 

NRC’s approval and providing incomplete and inaccurate information to the NRC. The NRC 

considered one of the apparent violations to have been willful. In response to these apparent 

violations, DNC agreed to complete a number of actions memorialized in the confirmatory order. 

In consideration for those actions, the NRC agreed not to pursue further enforcement action. 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Clinton PowerStation) EA-15-064 

On August 11, 2015, the NRC issued a notice of violation associated with a white significance 

determination process finding to Exelon Generation Co., LLC for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix B, Criterion III. This violation involved the failure to review the suitability of application 

of the Division 3 Shutdown Service Water pump modifications, which were essential to the 

safety-related functions of the High Pressure Core Spray system. Specifically, on or about 

October 3, 1995, the licensee failed to ensure the modified pump internals would not degrade 

under expected operating conditions in a way that affected the safety function. The licensee 

determined the pump failed at the conclusion of its surveillance run on May 30, 2014, but this 

condition did not reveal itself until the pump failed to start on September 16, 2014. This resulted 

in the pump being inoperable for more than 100 days, a period greater than the allowed limiting 

condition for operation outage times provided in the plant technical specifications. Additionally, 

because the licensee was not aware of the pump’s inoperability during the unit’s operation 

cycle, the required actions of the TS were not followed. 

Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) EA-15-022 

On June 22, 2015, the NRC issued a notice of violation associated with a white significance 

determination process finding to Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC. The finding was associated with 

the failure to implement the 15-minute assessment, classification, and declaration period for a 

potential loss of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) barrier emergency action level (EAL) at the 

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (Susquehanna), Units 1 and 2. Specifically, Susquehanna 

interpreted the 15-minute assessment, classification, and declaration clock to start when 

operator actions were, or were expected to be, unsuccessful in isolating an RCS leak rather 

than upon the time when the EAL thresholds were exceeded. Susquehanna’s incorrect 

interpretation of the 15-minute assessment and declaration period degraded its ability to make 

a timely site area emergency declaration. The notice of violation involved the failure to comply 

with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), “Emergency Plans,” 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2), 

“Conditions of License,” and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, “Emergency Planning and Preparedness 

for Production and Utilization Facilities,” Section IV.C.2. 

Luminant Generation Co., LLC (Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant) EA-14-234 

On April 28, 2015, a notice of violation was issued to Luminant Generation Co., LLC for a 

violation associated with a greater-than-green significance determination process finding at 
13 

the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. The details of the finding are not publicly available, 

as they contain information marked as “Official Use Only—Security-Related Information.” 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station) EA-14-178 

On April 27, 2015, the NRC issued a notice of violation associated with a yellow significance 

determination process finding to the Exelon Generation Co., LLC for a violation identified at its 

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The violation involved the failure to comply with 10 

CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, which required the licensee to establish measures for the 

selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes 

that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components. 

Specifically, from original installation of ERVs in 1969, until the valves were redesigned and 

reinstalled during the 2014 refueling outage, the ERV actuators were inadequate because when 

they were placed in an environment where the actuator was subject to vibration associated with 

plant operation, the mechanical tolerance between posts and guides created a condition where 

the springs could wedge between the guides and the posts, jamming the actuator plunger 

assembly. In addition, given the original design of the valve, the maintenance refurbishing 

processes were not adequate to maintain the required internal tolerances to prevent excessive 

fretting and wear of the internal components. As a consequence, two of the five total ERVs 

were inoperable for greater than 24 hours in violation of TS 3.4.B. 

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (Duane Arnold Energy Center) EA-14-237 

On April 16, 2015, the NRC issued a notice of violation associated with a white significance 

determination process finding to NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for a violation identified at 

its Duane Arnold Energy Center involving the failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 

B, Criterion IX, “Control of Special Processes,” which required the licensee to maintain 

measures to ensure that special processes are controlled and accomplished by qualified 

personnel using qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes, standards, 

specifications, criteria, and other special requirements. Specifically, between November 5 and 

November 10, 2012, the licensee did not adequately control the application of the torus coating, 

because the requirements associated with wet film thickness measurements and conditions for 

recoat application were not contained in design specifications and vendor documentation, nor 

were they included in qualified procedures. The licensee’s failure to establish adequate quality 

controls during the application of a torus coating resulted in an unqualified torus coating in 

excess of the emergency core cooling system suction strainer design debris loading margin. 

This finding did not present an immediate safety concern because the unqualified torus coating 

in excess of the design margin was removed during an outage before the reactor resumed 

operation. 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station) EA-14-192 

On April 10, 2015, the NRC issued a notice of violation to Exelon Generation Co., LLC for a 

Severity Level III Problem involving two related violations identified because of an inspection 

at its Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMP). The first violation involved the failure on multiple 

occasions to notify the NRC within 30 days of medical conditions of licensed reactor operators 

and senior reactor operators that involved permanent disabilities/illnesses as required by 

10 CFR 50.74(c). Specifically, between June 2001 and September 2014, NMP staff was 

informed that operators were taking prescribed medication for such conditions as hypertension, 

post-traumatic stress disorder, attention deficit disorder, and asthma. The NMP staff did not 

report these permanent medical conditions to the NRC when they submitted NRC Form 396 as 
14 

part of the operators’ license application process. Additionally, NMP did not restrict these same 

licensed reactor operators and senior reactor operators from licensed duties when the 

individuals had disqualifying medical conditions, in accordance with 10 CFR 55.25, 

“Incapacitation because of Disability or Illness.” The second violation involved the submittal by 

NMP of information to the NRC that was not complete and accurate in all material respects as 

required by 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information.” Specifically, on multiple 

occasions between September 2002 and February 2012, NMP submitted applications for 

operators that certified the medical fitness of the applicants and that did not identify any needed 

license operator restrictions regarding disqualifying medical conditions or related prescription 

medication. Each of the applicants had medical conditions that did not meet the minimum 

standards of 10 CFR 55.33(a)(1). Based in part on this inaccurate information, the NRC issued 

reactor operator licenses without the required restricting license conditions. 

Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar, Unit 2) EA-14-179 

On April 7, 2015, the NRC issued a notice of violation to TVA, for a Severity Level III violation, 

identified because of an inspection and investigation at its Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, 

involving the licensee employees’ willful failure to follow a procedure for activities affecting 

quality in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and 

Drawings.” Specifically, on or about December 19, 2011, contract employees assigned to install 

anchor bolts for overhead base plates, which support safety-related ventilation in the 

containment building, willfully failed to remove and replace, or obtain site engineering approval 

for, newly installed wedge bolt anchors that exceeded 5 degrees of perpendicular, as required 

by the licensee’s procedure. Out of tolerance anchor bolts on two hangers were bent 

(straightened) to within 5 degrees of perpendicular utilizing a non-approved modified tool. All 

four overhead base plates of the two hangers had at least one bent (and therefore weakened) 

bolt. 

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Power Station) EA-14-159 

On April 2, 2015, a notice of violation was issued to Dominion Resources, for a violation 

associated with a greater-than-green significance determination process finding at the Millstone 

Power Station. The details of the finding are not publicly available, as they contain information 

marked as “Official Use Only—Security-Related Information.” 

VII. Power Reactor Security and Emergency and Incident Response Activities 

The NRC continues to maintain an appropriate regulatory infrastructure and perform its 

licensing and oversight functions to ensure protection of public health and safety, promote the 

common defense and security, and protect the environment. NRC security and emergency 

preparedness (EP) programs contribute to fulfilling this mission. 

The NRC continues to conduct force-on-force (FOF) inspections at each nuclear power reactor 

and Category I fuel cycle facility on a regular 3-year cycle. Each FOF inspection includes both 

tabletop drills and exercises that simulate combat between a mock adversary force and the 

licensee’s security force. FOF inspections assess the ability of power reactor facilities to defend 

against the design-basis threat (DBT) of radiological sabotage. They also provide valuable 

insights that enable the NRC to evaluate the effectiveness of licensee security programs. At 

Category I fuel cycle facilities, a similar process is used to assess the effectiveness of the 

licensees’ protective strategy against two DBTs—one for radiological sabotage and another 

to prevent the theft or diversion of special nuclear material. 
15 

The NRC is developing a final rule that amends security requirements in 10 CFR Part 73, 

“Physical Protection of Plants and Materials,” to implement the new statutory authority related to 

firearms, provided to the Commission under Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended. These new regulations will allow certain classes of Commission-designated facilities 

and activities to apply for NRC authorization to use various weapons and large-capacity 

ammunition-feeding devices, notwithstanding State, local, and other Federal firearms laws. The 

NRC has taken these actions in consultation and coordination with the U.S. Department of 

Justice’s Office of the Attorney General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. In advance of the final rulemaking, the 

NRC has designated, through orders, seven power reactor licensees, one Category I strategic 

special nuclear material licensee, and one “at-reactor” independent spent fuel storage 

installation licensee as being eligible to apply for Section 161A preemption authority to address 

the site-specific needs of these facilities. In conjunction with this final rule implementing Section 

161A, the NRC is also revising the requirements for physical security event notifications. 

The NRC plans to publish a proposed rule in 2015 that amends the drug-testing requirements of 

10 CFR Part 26, “Fitness-for-Duty Programs,” to better align NRC drug-testing requirements 

with those of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ 2008 version of “Mandatory 

Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs.” Specifically, the proposed changes 

will broaden the panel of drugs to be tested during required drug testing, enhance medical 

review officer guidance, and improve the clarity of the organization and language of the rule. 

The NRC continues to be an active participant in the Integrated Response Program, which is 

a partnership between the Federal Government (the NRC and FBI) and the nuclear industry to 

improve Federal, State, and local law enforcement tactical responses to beyond-DBT events at 

nuclear power plant sites. 

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 73.54, “Protection of Digital Computer and Communication 

Systems and Networks,” nuclear power plant licensees and new license applicants are required 

to put a cybersecurity program into place to ensure safety, important-to-safety, security, and 

emergency preparedness functions are protected from cyber attacks. Because of the significant 

amount of work and lead time required to fully implement the provisions called for in the 

licensees’ NRC-approved cybersecurity plans, interim milestones were established to focus 

efforts on the highest-priority activities. Licensees completed the highest-priority activities in 

December 2012. 

The NRC has developed an oversight program for cybersecurity that includes an inspection 

program, inspector training, and a process for evaluating the significance of inspection findings. 

This was accomplished collaboratively with stakeholders, including members of industry and 

representatives from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The NRC has begun 

inspecting activities related to the interim milestones and will complete these inspections in 

calendar year 2015. 

The NRC is implementing a cybersecurity roadmap (SECY-12-0088, “The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission Cyber Security Roadmap”) to evaluate the need for cybersecurity requirements for 

non-power reactors, independent spent fuel storage installations, and byproduct materials 

licensees. Implementation of the roadmap will help ensure that appropriate levels of 

cybersecurity actions are carried out promptly and efficiently at all NRC-licensed facilities. 

Additionally, implementation of the roadmap will identify whether, or to what extent, the program 
16 

needs to be improved. In March 2015, the Commission directed the staff to initiate a cyber 

security rulemaking for fuel cycle facilities. The NRC published the regulatory basis for this 

rulemaking in September 2015 and will start developing the proposed rule and draft guidance in 

late 2015. 

The agency plans to further amend 10 CFR Part 73 by adding timely notification requirements 

for certain cybersecurity events. This final rule will make generically applicable certain voluntary 

reporting activities associated with cybersecurity events contained in security advisories. The 

final rule also will establish new cybersecurity event notifications that will contribute to the 

NRC’s analysis of the reliability and effectiveness of licensees’ cybersecurity programs, playing 

an important role in the continuing effort to provide high assurance that digital computer and 

communication systems and networks are adequately protected against cyber attacks, up to 

and including the DBT. This rulemaking will increase the NRC’s ability to respond to 

emergencies, monitor ongoing events, assess trends and patterns, and identify precursors of 

more significant events. This rulemaking will also enhance NRC’s ability to inform other 

licensees, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Federal intelligence and law 

enforcement agencies of cybersecurity-related events and will enhance the agency’s safety and 

security efforts. 

Prior status reports provided updates on the NRC’s path forward on EP communications and 

staffing issues identified in the NRC’s assessment of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

nuclear power plant in Japan. In addition, during this reporting period all sixty-two power reactor 

sites implemented multiunit/multisource dose assessment capabilities. The NRC staff 

incorporated these enhancements related to emergency preparedness into the proposed 

rulemaking on mitigation of beyond design bases events discussed further in Section X of this 

report. 

The NRC revised EP regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 effective December 23, 2011. This was the 

first significant revision to the EP rules in over 30 years; implementation continued throughout 

FY 2014. Specifically, during this reporting period, the staff focused on hostile-action-based 

(HAB) exercises at all nuclear power reactor sites. Power reactor licensees are required to 

demonstrate response to a HAB event as part of a biennial exercise by December 31, 2015. 

As of September 30, 2015, 55 HAB exercises have been completed. Licensees have 

demonstrated their ability to respond to a HAB event; implement their emergency plans in 

response to the event; and coordinate onsite security, operations, and emergency response 

personnel with offsite response organizations. 

In April 2012, the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) began 

a multiyear initiative to revise NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, “Criteria for Preparation and 

Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear 

Power Plants,” one of the key guidance documents for developing and evaluating onsite and 

offsite emergency plans for nuclear power plants and for the State and local governments 

whose personnel would respond to the plant sites. In FY 2014, the joint NRC/FEMA working 

group completed initial drafts of the introductory information and the emergency plan evaluation 

criteria. NRC and FEMA staff met publicly in FY 2014 to solicit feedback from stakeholders and 

members of the public on these initial drafts. A final draft of this document was completed in FY 

2015 and issued for a 90-day public comment period on May 29, 2015. This comment period 

was extended to October 13, 2015, in response to requests from external stakeholders. 
17 

The NRC continues to work with States to replenish potassium iodide supplies for use as a 

supplement to public protective actions within the 10-mile emergency planning zones around 

nuclear power plants. 

All physical security and EP program licensing reviews for new power reactor applications 

remain on schedule. NRC staff is using its established licensing process to ensure that the 

safety and environmental reviews meet all milestones and provide appropriate opportunities 

for stakeholder input. 

VIII. Power Uprates 

There are three types of power uprates. A measurement uncertainty recapture power uprate 

is a power uprate of less than 2 percent and is based on using more accurate feedwater flow 

measurement techniques. Stretch power uprates are power uprates that are typically up to 

7 percent and are within the design capacity of the plant. Stretch power uprates require only 

minor plant modifications. Extended power uprates are power uprates beyond the original 

design capacity of the plant and require major plant modifications. 

Licensees have applied for and implemented power uprates since the 1970s as a way to 

increase the power output of their plants. NRC staff has reviewed and approved 156 power 

uprates to date. Approximately 21,979 megawatts thermal (MWt) or 7,326 megawatts electric 

(MWe) in electric generating capacity (the equivalent of about seven large nuclear power plant 

units) have been gained through power uprates at existing plants. The NRC currently has 

two power uprate applications under review, which would add an additional 1,674 MWt or 

558 MWe to the nation’s electrical grid, if approved. 

In December 2014, NRC staff conducted its most recent survey of nuclear power plant 

licensees’ plans to submit power uprate applications over the next 5 years. This latest 

information indicates that licensees plan to request power uprates for seven nuclear power 

plants during the next 5 years. 

IX. New Reactor Licensing 

The NRC is focusing on licensing and construction activities that support large light-water 

reactor applicants and licensees and is investing in activities to enhance the regulatory 

framework and infrastructure for advanced reactors. The NRC’s new reactor program is also 

actively engaged in several international cooperative activities to promote enhanced safety in 

new reactor designs, strengthen reactor siting reviews, and improve the effectiveness and 

efficiency of inspections and the collection and sharing of construction experience. 

Large Light-Water Reactor Application Reviews 

Although most new reactor applications have been or will be submitted and reviewed under 

the provisions of 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power 

Plants,” the NRC is reviewing one large light-water reactor application for an operating license 

using 10 CFR Part 50, which is discussed below. 
18 

10 CFR Part 50 Operating License Reviews 

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 was the only nuclear plant being reviewed for an operating 

license using the 10 CFR Part 50 process, which includes a construction permit followed by an 

operating license. TVA received a construction permit for Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, in 1973 and 

submitted operating license applications for both units in 1976. Because of the identification of 

a large number of deficiencies, Unit 2 construction was suspended in the mid-1980s, with major 

structures in place and equipment such as reactor coolant system piping installed. TVA 

resumed construction on Unit 2 in late 2007 and submitted an updated operating license 

application in 2009. 

NRC staff has issued eight supplemental safety evaluation reports (SSERs) documenting its 

safety review and published a supplement to the FEIS. During the reporting period, the staff 

completed the majority of the planned construction inspections including recent inspections of 

hot functional testing, pre-operational testing activities, and an operational readiness 

assessment inspection. Activities related to the ASLB hearing process are completed. After the 

reporting period ended, the NRC staff completed its safety review and the Director of NRR 

issued the operating license for Watts Bar Unit 2 on October 22, 2015. 

Early Site Permit Reviews 

PSEG Power, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear, LLC

PSEG Power, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear, LLC, submitted an early site permit (ESP) application 

on May 25, 2010. This application uses the plant parameter envelope approach, which includes 

design parameter information from four reactor designs, namely the U.S. EPR (formerly the 

U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor), the Advanced Boiling-Water Reactor (ABWR), the 

U.S. Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor (US-APWR), and the AP1000®. 

In September 2015, NRC staff issued the final safety evaluation report (FSER) for the 

PSEG ESP application, completing the final milestone for the staff’s safety review. 

NRC staff issued the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) for the PSEG ESP 

application in August 2014. NRC staff is actively engaged with the National Marine Fisheries 

Service to complete consultation under the Endangered Species Act (Section 7) as well as with 

the New Jersey State Historic Preservation Officer to complete consultation under the National 

Historic Preservation Act (section 106). NRC staff completed a supplemental biological 

assessment and submitted it to the National Marine Fisheries Service for review. NRC staff 

also published a Federal Register notice on the draft memorandum of agreement pertaining to 

Section 106 consultation. These actions are important steps toward completing requisite 

consultation for the PSEG ESP review. NRC staff anticipates publishing its FEIS by the end of 

2015. 

TVA Clinch River Early Site Permit Application

TVA has stated that it plans to apply for an ESP for the Clinch River site near Oak Ridge, TN, in 

early calendar year 2016. This application will be based on a plant parameter envelope 

characterizing several light-water small modular reactor designs. NRC staff conducted pre-
19 

application readiness assessments for both environmental and safety in August and September 

2015. 

Design Certification Reviews 

U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor

AREVA, Inc., submitted the U.S. EPR design certification (DC) application on 

December 11, 2007. 

On February 25, 2015, AREVA requested that the NRC suspend the application review. 

AREVA further requested that the NRC post no new charges to the docket after March 27, 

2015, unless specifically authorized by AREVA. AREVA did not define an end date for the 

suspension period and said that it will contact the NRC before restarting the DC review. NRC 

staff’s review of the U.S. EPR DC application remains in suspension. 

U.S. Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., (MHI) submitted its US-APWR DC application on 

December 31, 2007. On November 5, 2013, MHI issued a letter informing the NRC of its 

plans to implement a coordinated slowdown of licensing activities related to the application 

review. MHI stated that the slowdown is necessary to focus its resources on supporting 

Japanese utilities in restarting Mitsubishi-designed PWRs in Japan. NRC staff has been 

performing a limited scope review of the US-APWR DC application since March 24, 2014, and 

will continue with this limited review until further notice from the applicant. 

Advanced Power Reactor 1400

On December 23, 2014, Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO) and Korea Hydro & Nuclear 

Power Co., Ltd., (KHNP) submitted to the NRC their application for the certification of the 

Advanced Power Reactor 1400 (APR1400) standard plant design. On March 4, 2015, NRC 

staff accepted the APR1400 design certification application for docketing and the docketing 

decision was published in the Federal Register on March 12, 2015. NRC staff developed a sixphase milestone schedule for completing the application review within a 42-month timeframe 

and is making good progress on Phase 1 (Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report) of its detailed 

technical review. NRC staff expects to complete Phase 1 of its technical review in February 

2016. 

DC Renewals 

ABWR Renewal (Toshiba)

On November 2, 2010, Toshiba tendered an ABWR DC renewal application and submitted 

Revision 1 of its application on June 22, 2012. In a letter to the NRC dated December 13, 2013, 

Toshiba stated that it plans to submit Revision 2 of the renewal application no sooner than 

mid-2016 and requested that the NRC postpone its review of the application until Toshiba 

submits Revision 2. By letter dated May 25, 2015, Toshiba requested that NRC staff postpone 

further review of its application until July 2016. 
20 

ABWR Renewal (GEH)

On December 7, 2010, GEH tendered an ABWR DC renewal application. NRC staff issued 

a letter to GEH on July 20, 2012, describing certain design changes (28 items) that the staff 

stated should be considered for inclusion in the application. On May 7, 2015, NRC staff met 

with the applicant to discuss how GEH intends to address the 28 items as well as several 

requests for additional information (RAIs) issued on other topics. The applicant has submitted 

information to address 27 of the 32 open items and NRC staff has communicated to GEH that 

13 items are considered closed. The staff plans to issue supplemental RAIs or hold public 

meetings, if needed, to close the remaining open items. 

Combined License (COL) Application Activities 

As of September 30, 2015, NRC staff has received 18 COL applications for review. Four of the 

COL application reviews are suspended at the request of the applicants because of changes in 

the applicants’ business strategies (River Bend, Bellefonte, Harris, and Comanche Peak). Five 

COL applications have been withdrawn (Victoria, Nine Mile Point 3, Callaway, Calvert Cliffs, and 

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 3). COLs were issued for the Vogtle and Virgil C. Summer 

sites in 2012, and for the Fermi Unit 3 site in May 2015. 

NRC staff is actively reviewing six COL applications for a total of 10 units, as discussed below. 

Levy County COL Application

On July 30, 2008, Progress Energy Florida, Inc. submitted a COL application for two AP1000 

units to be located at its site in Levy County, FL. 

NRC staff issued its FEIS for the Levy County COL application on April 27, 2012.

On December 8, 2014, NRC staff issued a letter to Duke Energy Florida. In the letter, NRC staff 

informed the applicant that because it has not provided the necessary information to resolve the 

outstanding technical issues on the Levy Units 1 and 2, COL application, the current safety 

review schedule cannot be achieved. The letter listed the specific unresolved technical issues 

that the applicant needs to address to establish a revised review schedule. These unresolved 

technical issues relate to design modifications to the containment condensate return system as 

well as emerging AP1000 design issues that Westinghouse is addressing for the Vogtle and 

V.C. Summer COL licensees. The staff believes that three of these issues could be applicable 

to the Levy COL application safety review. The three issues involve main control room dose, 

main control room temperature during design-basis accidents, and the location of a hydrogen 

vent in containment. NRC staff is finalizing all other aspects of the Levy COL safety 

evaluations. 

Lee III COL Application

On December 13, 2007, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, submitted a COL application for 

two AP1000 units at its Lee site near Charlotte in Cherokee County, SC. 

The NRC issued the FEIS on December 27, 2013. 

The Lee COL application review may be affected by the same AP1000 design issues described 

above for the Levy COL application review. By letter dated January 21, 2015, Duke Energy 
21 

designated the Levy COL application as the lead for these AP1000 generic issues and 

acknowledged the potential schedule effects for the Lee COL application review. The NRC 

staff is finalizing all other aspects of the Lee COL safety evaluations. 

Turkey Point COL Application

On June 30, 2009, Florida Power & Light submitted a COL application for two AP1000 units at 

the existing Turkey Point Nuclear Generating site in Miami–Dade County, FL. 

On June 16, 2015, NRC staff completed the Phase A public milestone for the Turkey Point 

Units 6 and 7 COL review by issuing all RAIs and supplemental RAIs. The NRC staff expects to 

complete Phase B (Advanced final safety evaluation report without open items) in January 

2016. 

On February 27, 2015, NRC staff submitted the DEIS for the Turkey Point, Units 6 and 7, 

COL application to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The DEIS was developed 

in cooperation with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, and the National 

Park Service (NPS). The NRC and EPA notices of availability of the DEIS were published in the 

Federal Register on March 5 and March 6, 2015, respectively. Public meetings solicited 

comments on the DEIS on April 22, 2015, in Miami, FL, and on April 23, 2015, in 

Homestead, FL. The DEIS comment period closed on May 22, 2015. However, NRC staff 

reopened the public comment period in response to requests from the Seminole Tribe of 

Florida, the NPS, and EPA. The new comment period closed on July 17, 2015. NRC staff is 

working to address the comments, which include comments from the NPS and the U.S. Fish 

and Wildlife Service. 

South Texas Project COL Application

On September 20, 2007, STP Nuclear Operating Co. submitted a COL application for 

two ABWR units at its site near Bay City, in Matagorda County, TX. Subsequently, Nuclear 

Innovation North America LLC became the lead applicant for STP, Units 3 and 4. The NRC 

published the FEIS on February 24, 2011. 

NRC staff issued its FSER for the STP COL application on September 29, 2015, and 

is preparing for the mandatory hearing that will occur in November 2015 and is required before 

issuance of a license. 

Bell Bend COL Application

On October 10, 2008, PPL Bell Bend, LLC (PPL), submitted a COL application for a U.S. EPR 

at a new site adjacent to its Susquehanna Steam Electric Station in Luzerne County, PA. 

On January 9, 2014, PPL requested that the NRC withhold further review of the safety portion of 

the Bell Bend COL application until further notice. PPL also requested that the NRC continue to 

support the necessary work leading to the issuance of the FEIS. NRC staff has suspended its 

review of the safety portion of the COL application as requested by the applicant. By letter 

dated March 4, 2015, PPL reiterated its request to withhold further review of the safety portion 

of the Bell Bend COL application, in light of the suspension of the U.S. EPR design 

certification application. 
22 

On April 17, 2015, NRC staff submitted the DEIS for the Bell Bend Nuclear Power Plant COL 

application to the EPA. The DEIS was developed in cooperation with the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Baltimore District. The NRC notice of availability of the DEIS was published in the 

Federal Register on Tuesday, April 21, 2015, and the EPA notice of availability was published in 

the Federal Register on Friday, April 24, 2015, which opened the 75-day public comment 

period. The comment period closed on July 7, 2015, and NRC staff is addressing comments 

received on the DEIS in order to issue its FEIS by April 2016. 

North Anna Unit 3 COL Application

On November 27, 2007, Dominion Virginia Power submitted a COL application for an ESBWR 

at its North Anna Power Station site near Richmond, in Louisa County, VA. The FEIS was 

issued in February 2010. 

On June 28, 2010, Dominion submitted a revised application to cite the US-APWR design. 

However, on April 25, 2013, Dominion notified the NRC of its intent to revert back to the 

ESBWR design. Dominion submitted its partially revised COL application in July 2013 to reflect 

its revised nuclear technology decision and submitted all remaining application sections to the 

NRC in December 2013. 

On October 22, 2014, Dominion submitted a seismic closure plan that described a modified 

approach to certain aspects of its seismic analysis to address exceedances to the ESBWR 

seismic design limitations. The schedule that Dominion outlined in its closure plan includes 

issuing technical reports and responses to staff questions through calendar year 2015. On 

September 15, 2015, NRC staff issued a revised review schedule for the North Anna 3 COL 

application in response to Dominion’s October 2014 seismic closure plan. NRC staff expects 

to complete its safety review and issue its FSER for the North Anna 3 COL application in 

April 2017. 

Light-Water Small Modular Reactor Activities 

NuScale Small Modular Reactor Design Certification Application

By letter dated June 17, 2015, NuScale announced a DC application submittal date by 

December 2016. On May 28, 2014, NuScale and DOE completed a cooperative agreement in 

which DOE will award up to $217 million to support NuScale’s DC application. 

On June 30, 2015, NRC staff issued in the Federal Register the draft design-specific review 

standard for the NuScale design. NRC staff is reviewing 680 public comments and expects to 

issue the final design-specific review standard in the summer of 2016. 

Personnel from the NRC and NuScale continue to meet to discuss various aspects of the 

design, such as steam and power conversion systems, electrical systems, control room and 

plant staffing, source term, auxiliary systems, instrumentation and controls, severe accident 

analysis, emergency planning zones, and containment design. 

Regulatory Infrastructure 

The NRC continues to enhance its regulatory infrastructure to support planning, licensing, and 

oversight of new and advanced reactor applications by carrying out timely and effective policy 

decisions and by enhancing and updating regulatory guidance for light-water reactors. In 
23 

addition to updating regulatory guidance, the NRC is also reviewing its internal processes to 

enhance the efficiency and effectiveness in its application review process. The NRC conducts 

these regulatory infrastructure enhancements openly and transparently with several 

opportunities for external stakeholder input. In addition, the NRC rigorously assesses licensing 

and oversight performance and uses the results to inform these regulatory infrastructure 

activities. 

Examples of infrastructure activities completed during the reporting period are described below. 

Revision to the June 2007 Version of Regulatory Guide 1.206, “Combined License Applications 

for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR [light-water reactor] Edition)” 

NRC staff is preparing an important revision to Regulatory Guide 1.206, “Combined License 

Application for Nuclear Power Plants.” The revision will clarify the guidance to encompass 

applicants for all licensing processes under 10 CFR Part 52, including design certifications and 

early site permits. The revision also will capture important lessons learned from recent licensing 

actions. The revision is being informed by interactions with stakeholders and the public, 

including public meetings held in March and June 2015 to obtain feedback on revised sections 

as well as the overall approach to the update. 

Standard Review Plan Updates 

NRC staff continues its systematic update of NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the 

Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition,” to support reviews 

of COL, DC, ESP, limited work authorization applications, and license amendment requests. 

The staff published several notices in the Federal Register requesting public comment on 

proposed revisions, or finalizing previously issued proposed guidance, during the reporting 

period. These include sections on seismic and structural analysis, and severe accident and 

probabilistic risk assessment evaluation. The staff is working toward finalizing several other 

proposed revisions issued in 2014. Additionally, the staff is revising guidance on site 

characteristics and parameters, balance of plant systems, digital instrumentation and controls, 

and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC). The staff issued over 45 

proposed revisions and 5 final revisions in the Federal Register during 2015. 

Construction Oversight 

Construction under 10 CFR Part 50 

Watts Bar Unit 2 is the only nuclear power plant being constructed under 10 CFR Part 50. 

TVA estimates that the unit will be complete and ready for operation in late 2015 or early 2016. 

Many of the required NRC construction inspections for Watts Bar, Unit 2 were completed or 

partially completed before suspension of construction in the mid-1980s. When construction 

resumed, NRC staff reassessed the inspection program for Unit 2 and identified more than 

500 items that required inspection and closure. Over the past year, construction inspections 

have continued and about 500 of the 550 inspection items have been closed. Several of these 

inspections cannot be completed until after issuance of an operating license. Construction 

resident inspectors and inspectors from the NRC regional office in Atlanta, GA, conducted the 

inspections. TVA has substantially completed construction and the NRC issued an operating 

license on October 22, 2015. Most of the preoperational testing inspections are completed. 
24 

The remaining preoperational testing inspections, along with startup testing inspections, are 

anticipated to take place in late 2015. 

Construction under 10 CFR Part 52 

The NRC issued COLs to Southern Nuclear Operating Co. and several co-owners on 

February 10, 2012, for two AP1000 units at the Vogtle site near Augusta, GA, and to 

South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. on March 30, 2012, for two AP1000 units at the V.C. Summer 

site near Columbia, SC. As construction progresses, the NRC has increased the pace of 

construction inspections to verify compliance with the agency’s regulations and to ensure that 

the new plants are constructed in accordance with their combined licenses. The inspections are 

conducted by four permanently assigned construction resident inspectors at each site and by 

inspectors from the NRC regional office in Atlanta, GA, with help from headquarters staff, as 

needed. 

Safety-related construction activities at Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 

have focused on the construction of the nuclear island walls, fabrication of steel containments, 

and the fabrication and placement of structural modules for the Summer 2 and Vogtle 3 auxiliary 

building and containment. In addition, both licensees have a wide variety of nonsafety-related 

construction activity ongoing. Recent NRC inspections have focused on activities such as 

concrete placement, welding, module fabrication, and civil or structural engineering activities. 

NRC inspection activities will continue to increase as licensees broaden the scope of 

construction activities. 

NRC staff and industry have refined the processes and guidance developed for closure 

verification of ITAAC based on lessons learned from the review of submitted ITAAC closure 

notifications (ICNs). The staff has facilitated several public workshops to solicit input, exchange 

views, and reach consensus on several construction inspection issues, including the 

development of additional ICN examples for inclusion in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 

guidance document on the ITAAC closure process. NRC staff reviewed the NEI guidance 

document for ITAAC closure and, on July 31, 2014, issued a letter stating that licensees could 

accept the document during the formal NRC endorsement process. The staff has been revising 

the associated regulatory guide. 

A total of 54 ICNs have been submitted for Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and V.C. Summer Units 2 

and 3. The staff reviews all ICNs to determine whether they contain sufficient information to 

demonstrate that the ITAAC have been successfully completed by the licensee. The staff has 

completed its review of 53 of the submitted ICNs and has published notices in the Federal 

Register to document NRC staff’s verification that the associated ITAAC have been completed. 

NRC staff is reviewing the remaining submitted ICNs. 

The NRC has established the Construction Reactor Oversight Process (cROP) at the four new 

reactor units. Using practices similar to those of the ROP, the NRC will continue to meet 

periodically with interested stakeholders to collect feedback on the effectiveness of the process, 

which is then considered in making future refinements to the cROP. The agency’s most recent 

performance assessments demonstrate that reactor construction is being conducted safely and 

all four units are in the licensee response band of the construction action matrix. Plant 

assessments and the latest cROP-related information are publicly available on the 

NRC Web site. 
25 

Vendor Inspections 

NRC staff is implementing a vendor inspection program for vendors supporting operating plants 

and plants under construction. Inspection activities for new reactors include continued testing of 

the design and qualification of key AP1000 valves, the development and verification of the 

AP1000 digital instrumentation and control system, monitoring resolution of reactor coolant 

pump testing and design, and continued inspection of modular construction at vendor facilities. 

Through these efforts, the staff has identified issues and raised those to industry promptly to 

ensure that the new plants will meet all requirements. Inspections related to operating reactors 

identified issues such as inadequate dedication of safety-related crane components, improperly 

calculated radiation doses used to age equipment for environmental qualification, and improper 

control of the manufacturing process for safety-related wire and cables. NRC staff leverage the 

work of international regulators through the Multinational Design Evaluation Program Vendor 

Inspection Cooperation Working Group and have participated in 6 inspections involving 

international regulators in FY 2015. 

Non-Light-Water Reactors 

The NRC’s expectations for advanced reactors were set forth in October 2008 in the Policy 

Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors. NRC staff is undertaking activities to 

prepare for applications for non-light-water reactors in the future. 

The NRC and DOE are engaged in a joint initiative to formulate guidance for developing 

principal design criteria for advanced non-light-water reactor designs. DOE completed a report 

titled, “Guidance for Developing Principal Design Criteria for Advanced (Non-Light Water) 

Reactors,” and submitted it to the NRC in December 2014. The NRC is reviewing the 

information in the report and using it to develop NRC’s version of design criteria for advanced 

non-light-water reactors. The intended outcome of this initiative is NRC-issued regulatory 

guidance for NRC staff and future non-light-water reactor applicants. 

The NRC and DOE hosted a 2-day Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors Workshop in 

September 2015. The focus of the workshop was to open a dialogue between key stakeholders 

to discuss challenges in the commercialization of non-light-water reactor technologies and to 

begin to formulate possible solutions. 

Internationally, the NRC chairs the Nuclear Energy Agency’s ad hoc group for international 

regulators of non-light-water reactors known as the Group on the Safety of Advanced Reactors 

(GSAR). The purpose of the GSAR is to bring interested regulators together to discuss 

common interests, practices, and problems and address both the regulatory interests and 

needs for research to support the regulators. The NRC also participates in technical meetings 

hosted by the Generation IV International Forum. 

The NRC meets with potential applicants upon request. Over the last 2 years, the NRC has 

met with approximately 13 different non-light-water reactor companies. The NRC participates 

in American Nuclear Society standards development working groups for non-light-water reactor 

designs. NRC staff maintains awareness of DOE’s research programs, funding opportunity 

announcements and planning studies for non-light-water reactor technologies. 
26 

X. Response to Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Accident in Japan 

The NRC’s response to the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident in Japan during the 

period has focused on the highest-priority (Tier 1) activities, and work on the other activities 

(Tiers 2 and 3) also progressed consistent with the agency’s established schedules. 

Additionally, some intermediate activities (Tier 2) have been integrated into activities related to 

the highest priority actions. The agency continued to assign resources to address these 

activities while ensuring a balance between putting lessons learned from Fukushima into place 

and the need to ensure that those efforts do not displace ongoing work of greater safety benefit, 

work that is necessary to maintain safety, or other higher-priority work. 

The NRC continues to review nuclear power plant licensees’ plans to achieve compliance with 

the mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders, which were issued in 

March 2012. The NRC has issued interim staff evaluations and is auditing licensees’ 

implementation of these important safety improvements. On October 4, 2014, the first licensee 

informed NRC staff that a nuclear plant was fully compliant with both orders, and as of 

September 2015, approximately 20 units are in compliance with the mitigating strategies order 

and about 45 units are in compliance with the spent fuel pool instrumentation order. By the end 

of calendar year 2015, approximately 50 units are expected to be in compliance with the 

mitigation strategies order, and about 80 are expected to be in compliance with the spent fuel 

pool instrumentation order. 

In June 2014, NRC staff received the licensees’ integrated plans for compliance with Phase 1 

of the revised severe accident capable hardened vents order, which was issued in June 2013. 

The staff has issued interim staff evaluations of those plans. Licensees are required to submit 

their plans for Phase 2 of the revised severe accident capable hardened vents order by 

December 31, 2015, and to complete full implementation by June 2019. 

The NRC requested that nuclear power plant licensees reevaluate seismic and flooding hazards 

that could affect their sites. If these newly reevaluated hazards are not bound by the current 

design basis, licensees are required to determine whether interim protective measures are 

needed while a longer-term evaluation of the impact of the hazard on the plant is completed. 

NRC staff is reviewing flood hazard reevaluation reports submitted by licensees and is issuing 

its assessment of those reports. Several licensees whose hazard reevaluation report was 

originally scheduled to be submitted by March 2014 have been granted extensions to allow for 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to supply input needed to complete the analyses. These 

licensees are expected to submit their reports before February 2016. Following Commission 

direction, NRC staff is now implementing the closure plan for the flooding hazard reevaluations. 

Under this plan, licensees will assess their mitigating strategies to ensure that they can be 

implemented under reevaluated hazard conditions. Licensees are expected to complete the 

mitigation strategies assessment by December 2016. Other evaluations may be required, 

beyond those associated with mitigating strategies, depending on site-specific considerations. 

In October 2015, the NRC issued a letter establishing the final list of operating reactor sites that 

will be required to perform a full seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA). Twenty sites (36 

units) screened in to perform an SPRA. The first SPRAs will be due to the NRC in March 2017. 

Of the remaining sites, 32 will perform limited-scope evaluations (i.e., a high-frequency 

evaluation, low-frequency evaluation, or spent fuel pool evaluation). Nine sites have screened 

out and will not need any further seismic evaluations. 
27 

Sites that are required to conduct a seismic risk evaluation submitted interim actions or 

evaluations in December 2014 as part of the expedited seismic evaluation process. These 

evaluations looked at the systems and components used to safely shut down a plant under 

certain accident conditions to either confirm that a plant has sufficient margin to continue with a 

longer-term evaluation without any plant modifications or identify the need to enhance the 

seismic capacity of the plant. NRC staff has completed its review of expedited seismic 

evaluation process submittals for most sites and is in the process of issuing the remaining 

assessments. 

The Commission previously approved consolidating the station blackout mitigation strategies 

rulemaking with the onsite emergency response capabilities rulemaking, as well as including 

portions of the emergency planning recommendations. The consolidation enables the NRC to 

use resources more efficiently to produce an integrated and coherent set of requirements for 

addressing beyond-design-basis accidents. In August 2015, the Commission approved the 

draft proposed rule, subject to some changes and to the removal of certain requirements. The 

staff is revising the rulemaking package and will make it available for public comment by the end 

of 2015. The Commission also directed the staff not to proceed with a separate rulemaking 

associated with containment protection and release reduction. The potential safety benefit from 

that rulemaking is already being achieved through the revised severe accident capable 

hardened vents order. 

The NRC is also moving forward with resolving the lower-priority Tier 2 and 3 recommendations 

that have not already been addressed. The staff plans to deliver a paper to the Commission in 

the Fall of 2015 that will describe the resolution paths for these recommendations. 

 

The NRC continues to place a high level of importance on public interaction for all of the 

activities stemming from the Fukushima lessons learned. In FY 2015, the NRC held more than 

25 public meetings discussing Fukushima lessons learned, and these opportunities for 

collaboration with the public, industry, and other stakeholders have improved the effectiveness 

and efficiency of the NRC’s actions. 

The Fukushima activities described above demonstrate consistent progress in completing safety 

enhancements at U.S. facilities in response to lessons learned from the accident. The NRC 

expects that most licensees will complete implementation of the majority of the most safetysignificant enhancements by December 31, 2016.