Issue Date: 04/29/15 1 0609

NRC INSPECTION MANUAL IPAB

MANUAL CHAPTER 0609

SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS

0609-01 PURPOSE

The Significance Determination Process (SDP) uses risk insights, where appropriate, to assist

NRC staff in determining the safety or security significance of inspection findings identified 

within the seven cornerstones of safety at operating reactors. The SDP is a risk-informed 

process and the resulting safety or security significance of findings, combined with the results of 

the risk-informed performance indicator program, is used to determine a licensee’s level of 

safety performance and the level of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission engagement with the 

licensee in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0305, “Operating Reactor 

Assessment Program”. Each appendix to IMC 0609 supports a cornerstone(s) associated with 

the strategic performance areas as defined in Management Directive (MD) 8.13, “Reactor 

Oversight Process” and the baseline inspection program as outlined in Inspection Manual 

Chapter (IMC) 2515, “Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase” and IMC 

2201, “Security and Safeguard Inspection Program for Commercial Power Reactors.” 

0609-02 OBJECTIVES

02.01 To characterize the safety or security significance of inspection findings for the NRC 

Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), using best available risk insights as appropriate.

02.02 To provide all stakeholders an objective and common framework for communicating the 

potential safety or security significance of inspection findings.

02.03 To provide a basis for timely assessment and/or enforcement actions associated with 

an inspection finding.

02.04 To provide inspectors with plant-specific risk information for use in risk-informing the 

inspection program.

0609-03 APPLICABILITY

03.01 The SDP tools described in appendices to this IMC are applicable to inspection findings 

identified through the implementation of the NRC inspection program described in IMC 2515 

and IMC 2201. Before determining safety or security significance of an inspection finding, each 

performance deficiency must be screened and determined to be “more than minor” using the 

guidance provided in IMC 0612, Appendix B, “Issue Screening” and Appendix E, “Examples of 

Minor Issues”, as applicable. Violations with no associated performance deficiency cannot 
Issue Date: 04/29/15 2 0609

become inspection findings and therefore will not be processed by the SDP. In addition, safety 

significant degraded conditions with no associated performance deficiency are not processed by 

the SDP, however, these degraded conditions may need to be addressed by other NRC 

processes (e.g., 10 CFR 50.109, Generic Safety Issue Program, rule-making).

03.02 A subtle yet extremely important and fundamental tenet of the SDP framework is that

the deficient licensee performance (as later described and documented as the inspection 

finding) is the proximate cause of the degraded condition(s). As such, the degraded condition in 

and of itself (e.g., a non-functional safety-related pump) is not the deficient licensee 

performance, rather, the deficient licensee performance (e.g., inadequate maintenance 

procedure) is the proximate cause that led to the particular degraded condition(s). The SDP is 

designed to estimate the safety or security significance of a degraded condition(s) that was 

caused by deficient licensee performance above the baseline risk profile (see IMC 0308, 

Attachment 3, “Significance Determination Process Basis Document” for more details). 

03.03 Nothing in this guidance relieves any licensee from fully complying with Technical 

Specifications, licensing basis commitments, or other applicable regulatory requirements. 

Continued compliance with regulatory requirements maintains the requisite defense-in-depth 

and safety margins necessary to achieve adequate protection of public health and safety. 

03.04 The safety significance of reactor events caused or complicated by equipment 

malfunction and/or operator error are initially assessed by NRC staff in accordance with IMC 

0309, “Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors” and Management Directive (MD) 8.3, 

“NRC Incident Investigation Program.” Although the product of this risk evaluation may provide 

useful risk insights to NRC staff for event response or follow-up, it was not designed to 

determine the safety or security significance of inspection findings. Since the SDP is used to 

estimate the safety or security significance of degraded conditions caused by deficient licensee 

performance, including those that manifest themselves during events, any inspection findings

associated with a reactor event should be processed in accordance with IMC 0609 and its 

associated attachments and appendices. 

0609-04 DEFINITIONS

04.01 Applicable definitions are located in IMC 0612, “Power Reactor Inspection Reports” and 

supporting technical and program bases are located in IMC 0308, Attachment 3, “Significance 

Determination Process Basis Document”

04.02 Inspection findings are assigned a color representing the safety or security significance 

of the finding. The following definitions (04.02.a thru 04.02.d) include the quantitative and 

qualitative descriptions for each color and need to be applied appropriately to each SDP 

appendix listed at the end of this document. The symbol “Δ”, as used in the quantitative SDP 

appendices that use core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) 

as metrics, refers to the difference between the CDF (or LERF) resulting from the degraded 

condition(s) caused by deficient licensee performance and the nominal CDF (or LERF) of the 

unit. In other words, the quantitative SDP appendices are estimating the increase in risk 

resulting from a degraded condition(s) caused by deficient licensee performance (as articulated 

in the inspection finding) above a baseline risk profile. A graphical representation of the 

quantitative significance of findings is displayed in Exhibit 1.
Issue Date: 04/29/15 3 0609

a. Red (high safety or security significance) is quantitatively greater than 10-4ΔCDF or 

10-5 ΔLERF. Qualitatively, a Red significance indicates a decline in licensee 

performance that is associated with an unacceptable loss of safety margin. Sufficient 

safety margin still exists to prevent undue risk to public health and safety.

b. Yellow (substantial safety or security significance) is quantitatively greater than 10-5and 

less than or equal to 10-4 ΔCDF or greater than 10-6and less than or equal to 10-5

ΔLERF. Qualitatively, a Yellow significance indicates a decline in licensee performance 

that is still acceptable with cornerstone objectives met, but with significant reduction in 

safety margin.

c. White (low to moderate safety or security significance) is quantitatively greater than 10-6

and less than or equal to 10-5ΔCDF or greater than 10-7and less than or equal to 10-6

ΔLERF. Qualitatively, a White significance indicates an acceptable level of performance 

by the licensee, but outside the nominal risk range. Cornerstone objectives are met with 

minimal reduction in safety margin.

d. Green (very low safety or security significance) is quantitatively less than or equal to 10-6

ΔCDF or 10-7 ΔLERF. Qualitatively, a Green significance indicates that licensee 

performance is acceptable and cornerstone objectives are fully met with nominal risk 

and deviation. 

04.03 Risk-Based - An approach to regulatory decision-making that is solely based on the 

quantitative results of a risk assessment. 

04.04 Risk-Informed – An approach to regulatory decision-making that considers both 

quantitative and qualitative risk insights.

0609-05 RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES

All NRC inspectors are required to assess the significance of inspection findings in accordance 

with the guidance provided in this IMC. General and specific responsibilities are listed below.

05.01 Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).

a. Provide overall program direction for the ROP.

b. Develop and direct the implementation of policies, programs, and procedures for 

regional application of the SDP guidance.

c. Assess the effectiveness, uniformity, and completeness of regional implementation of 

the SDP.

05.02 Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR).

a. Provide overall program direction for the emergency preparedness and security 

cornerstones of the ROP.
Issue Date: 04/29/15 4 0609

b. Develop and direct the implementation of policies, programs, and procedures for 

regional application of the emergency preparedness and security SDP guidance.

c. Provide oversight and representatives as necessary to support the SERP in order to 

ensure consistent and timely application of the process.

d. Support the development, maintenance, and periodic implementation of appropriate 

training to ensure both technical staff and SERP decision-makers understand the 

program and process guidance.

05.03 Director, Division of Inspection and Regional Support.

a. Approve all revisions to SDP appendices and direct the development of future SDP

appendices and improvements through periodic revisions based on new risk insights 

and feedback from users.

b. Provide oversight and representatives as necessary to support the Significance and 

Enforcement Review Panel (SERP) in order to ensure consistent and timely application 

of the process.

c. Develop, maintain, and periodically provide appropriate training to ensure both technical 

staff and SERP decision-makers understand the program and process guidance, risk 

analysis techniques, and the treatment of uncertainty.

05.04 Director, Division of Risk Assessment.

a. Recommends improvements to all SDP tools using a probabilistic risk framework and 

approves changes to plant-specific risk insight information used by the SDP, based on 

new risk insights and feedback from users.

b. Provide oversight and representatives as necessary to support the SERP in order to 

ensure consistent and timely application of the process.

c. Support the development, maintenance, and periodic implementation of appropriate 

training to ensure both technical staff and SERP decision-makers understand the 

program and process guidance, risk analysis techniques, and the treatment of 

uncertainty.

d. As applicable, provide risk analysts with a general expectation that balances the 

amount of time and resources allocated in determining the safety significance of an 

inspection finding and the goal of providing a timely response.

05.05 Director, Office of Enforcement.

a. Ensure consistent application of the enforcement process to violations of NRC 

regulations with the appropriate focus on the significance of the finding.
Issue Date: 04/29/15 5 0609

b. Provide representatives as necessary to support the SERP in order to ensure 

consistent application of the enforcement process. 

c. Coordinate with NRR (and NSIR when necessary) when revising agency documents 

used for communicating to the licensee about apparent violations and final 

determinations associated with the ROP.

d. Support the development, maintenance, and periodic implementation of appropriate 

training to ensure both technical staff and SERP decision-makers understand the 

program and process guidance, risk analysis techniques, and the treatment of 

uncertainty.

05.06 Director, Office of Research.

a. Based on user need requests, provide support in the development and refinement of 

the SDP tools and research activities (e.g., SAPHIRE, SPAR Models, NUREGs, 

NURER/CRs) to enhance the overall implementation of the SDP.

b. Provide representatives, when requested, to support the SERP.

05.07 Regional Administrators.

a. Provide program direction for management and implementation of the SDP to activities 

performed by the Regional Office.

b. Maintain overall responsibility for, and apply regional resources as necessary, to 

determine the significance of specific inspection findings in a timely manner, using best 

available information consistent with the SDP timeliness goal and associated SDP 

timeliness metrics.

05.08 Director, Division of Reactor Projects and Reactor Safety.

a. Provide oversight and representatives as necessary to support the SERP in order to 

ensure consistent and timely application of the process.

b. Support the development, maintenance, and periodic implementation of appropriate 

training to ensure both technical staff and SERP decision-makers understand the 

program and process guidance, risk analysis techniques, and the treatment of 

uncertainty.

c. Provide regional staff with a general expectation to balance the amount of time and 

resources allocated in determining the safety significance of an inspection finding and 

the goal of providing a timely response.

05.09 Senior Reactor Analysts (SRAs).

a. Support NRC objectives related to the utilization of risk insights in the reactor inspection 

program, the SDP, and other risk-informed applications in the ROP. 
Issue Date: 04/29/15 6 0609

b. Provide regional management with updates on the expected amount of resources 

needed to appropriately characterize the safety significance of an inspection finding.

c. Support the specific objectives as presented in Attachment 3 to this IMC.

0609-06 BACKGROUND

SECY-99-007, dated January 8, 1999, described the need for a method of assigning a risk 

characterization to inspection findings. This risk characterization is necessary so that inspection 

findings can be equivalently combined with risk-informed plant performance indicators (PIs)

during the plant performance assessment process.

SECY-99-007A, dated March 22, 1999, provided a set of draft cornerstone SDP appendices for 

the purpose of initiating a pilot program at nine reactor sites to evaluate the efficacy of the 

proposed revisions for risk-informing the reactor inspection program. Other safety cornerstone 

SDP appendices that could not be related to core damage or containment failure risk used other 

rationale for assigning significance, as discussed in the respective appendices to this IMC.

SECY-00-49, dated February 24, 2000, provided the results of the pilot program for 

risk-informing the reactor inspection program and recommended proceeding with initial 

implementation of the new process at all licensed power reactor sites. The guidance in this IMC

and related reactor inspection program guidance in IMC 2515 and IMC 2201 were subsequently 

issued in support of initial implementation. Enforcement associated with violations of 

regulatory requirements will continue to be processed in accordance with the current revision of 

the NRC Enforcement Policy, Enforcement Manual, and any applicable Enforcement Guidance 

Memoranda (EGMs). 

0609-07 SDP DEVELOPMENT AND FEEDBACK PROCESS

07.01 SDP Development. The development of a new SDP or significant modification of an 

existing SDP should follow the general process used for original SDP development. This 

process should include the following general steps:

a. The draft of the new SDP (or the significant modification) should receive a robust

internal stakeholder review from both the regions and headquarters via periodic 

meetings, site visits, surveys, etc. Early external stakeholder input should also be 

solicited through public meetings (or closed meetings if discussions involve sensitive 

security-related information).

b. A feasibility review should be performed by the lead organization (e.g., NRR, NSIR) to 

assess the adequacy of the proposed new SDP or significant modification. This review 

should specifically involve regional representation and should test the SDP (preferably 

with real examples, however, hypothetical inspection findings and violations can be 

used). Based on the results of the feasibility review, a pilot should be considered to 

evaluate the robustness of the proposed SDP and to ensure that appropriate outcomes
Issue Date: 04/29/15 7 0609

are achieved. The feasibility and/or pilot results should be documented in the 

applicable SDP technical basis document.

c. Upon reconciliation of both internal and external feedback from the feasibility review 

and/or pilot, appropriate training on the SDP will be provided to NRC staff.

d. After items 07.01a – c have been completed, the final SDP will be issued consistent 

with the requirements in IMC 0040, “Preparing, Revising, and Issuing Documents for 

the NRC Inspection Manual.”

07.02 SDP Feedback and Improvement. IMC 0801, “Reactor Oversight Process Feedback 

Program,” describes in detail the feedback process and feedback form used by the Office of 

NRR/Division of Inspection and Regional Support, to document problems, concerns, or 

difficulties encountered during implementation of the ROP guidance.

0609-08 SIGNIFICANCE AND ENFORCEMENT REVIEW PANEL (SERP) 

PROCEDURES

The following basic process is described in detail in Attachment 1 to this IMC.

08.01 Development of and Initial Characterization of Inspection Findings. All operating 

reactor inspection findings are generally discussed with licensee representatives during the 

inspection process and are formally presented at an exit meeting with licensee management at 

the conclusion of the inspection period. Initial significance determination is normally performed 

by the inspector using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, “Initial Characterization of Findings” and the 

applicable appendix of IMC 0609.

a. If the inspector, with support from management as appropriate, determines that the 

finding is Green, then this would represent a final determination and be characterized 

as such at the exit meeting and in the inspection report. 

b. If the inspector cannot determine that the finding is Green, then the inspection finding 

will receive additional review(s) by the regional and/or headquarters staff. The staff will 

use the best available information to evaluate the significance of each finding in 

parallel with continuous inspection efforts to further develop the facts surrounding the 

finding. If, after further review by regional and/or headquarters staff, the significance of 

the finding is determined to be Green, then this would represent a final determination 

and characterized as such at the exit meeting and in the inspection report. However, if 

the organization responsible for the inspection finding evaluates the significance as 

either White, Yellow, Red, or Greater-than-Green (GTG), the significance 

determination is pending until an official review and decision by a SERP is completed.

NOTE: Although the official correspondence between the NRC and the licensee begins 

with the issuance of the inspection report and/or preliminary determination letter, the 

NRC should encourage licensees to provide information (e.g., existing engineering 

evaluations, risk analyses) during the inspection process to improve overall timeliness. 
Issue Date: 04/29/15 8 0609

Documentation of the finding is performed in accordance with IMC 0612, “Power Reactor 

Inspection Reports.” If the staff’s significance determination of a finding is not complete at the 

time of issuance of the inspection report the finding will be characterized in the inspection report 

as “to be determined (TBD)”. No inspection finding can be characterized as a color other than 

Green in official NRC correspondence without the review and decision by a SERP. 

08.02 Preliminary Significance Review and Decision. Any finding with a pending significance

(see IMC 0612 for definition) of White, Yellow, Red, or GTG, will be reviewed and decided by 

the SERP (see Attachment 1 to this IMC for more detail). The result of the SERP review and 

decision represents the staff’s preliminary safety or security significance characterization. 

However, when a pending White, Yellow, or Red finding is determined to be Green by the 

SERP, this will represent a final determination and will be characterized as such in the 

inspection report.

08.03 Planning SERP. The purpose of the Planning SERP is to ensure the SERP decisionmakers achieve alignment on the overall approach to characterize the significance of the 

inspection finding. Since the SERP decision-makers are involved, the Planning SERP is 

reserved for cases in which the Sponsor is planning to propose a GTG, White, Yellow, or Red 

significance characterization. Guidelines for conducting a Planning SERP are detailed in Exhibit 

3 of IMC 0609 Attachment 1.

A Planning SERP should be convened as early as possible if: 

1) The Inspection finding meets the entry criteria for IMC 0609, Appendix M, “The 

Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria” AND another SDP 

appendix (e.g., 0609, Appendix A, Exhibits 2 and 3) does not explicitly direct the use of 

IMC 0609, Appendix M, OR

2) The finding and associated degraded condition(s) are complex and involve extremely

technical phenomena that require a significant amount of resources and coordination.

08.04 Obtaining Licensee Perspectives on Preliminary Significance. If the preliminary 

significance assessment of a finding is White, Yellow, Red, or Greater than Green, then the 

licensee will be given the opportunity to formally present additional information and perspectives

at a public Regulatory Conference or in a written response on the docket. This opportunity will 

be offered in the cover letter of the inspection report or in the Preliminary Significance 

Determination letter (refer to Attachment 1). Either the cover letter or the Preliminary 

Significance Determination letter, should clearly state, with sufficient detail, the basis for the 

finding, preliminary significance determination, and any associated enforcement. The letter 

should also identify additional information and/or analyses that, if received in a timely manner in 

consideration of the SDP timeliness goal, could add fidelity to the final significance 

determination evaluation. The focus of the Regulatory Conference is to discuss the 

significance of the finding and not necessarily the root causes or corrective actions associated 

with the finding. The licensee may present differing views on the staff’s preliminary significance, 

present new facts, clarify existing information, and provide their evaluation of significance. 

Security-related matters will normally not be public, either at a conference or in correspondence.
Issue Date: 04/29/15 9 0609

The NRC should receive all additional information at a minimum of seven calendar days prior to 

the Regulatory Conference to allow the staff adequate time to review the information. In cases 

where a significant amount of information is provided, the licensee should consider providing the 

information earlier than seven calendar days. In determining an appropriate level of review, the 

NRC staff will consider the scope and breadth of the new information provided and the goal of 

making a timely regulatory decision. All written or electronic correspondence received from the 

licensee communicating their official response will be docketed. Any non-sensitive information 

provided by the licensee during the Regulatory Conference will be made public. 

08.05 Final Significance Review and Decision. If the licensee accepts the staff’s preliminary 

significance determination and does not intend to present additional information, then the staff 

will issue a final significance determination letter. If the licensee provides information on the 

docket by letter or participation in a Regulatory Conference, then the staff will convene either a 

Post-Conference Review or a Final SERP prior to making a final significance decision. If the 

SERP, after considering the licensee’s additional information, determines that a preliminary 

White, Yellow, Red, or GTG finding is of Green significance, this is the final determination and 

will be communicated in the final significance determination letter in keeping with the SDP 

timeliness goals. 

In the case where the staff has issued a preliminary significance determination of GTG and the 

licensee has not or cannot provide sufficient information to better inform the staff’s significance 

determination in a reasonable period of time, then the staff should determine the final 

significance using the best available information rationale and document this rationale fully in a 

letter to the licensee. After the SERP reviews and decides on the final significance 

determination, the licensee will be informed of the results in a final significance determination 

letter in which the licensee will be informed of the SDP appeal process described in Attachment 

2 of this IMC.

08.06 SDP Timeliness. The goal for SDP timeliness is to complete all final significance 

determinations within 90 days from the issue date of the first official correspondence that 

describes the finding. In order for the staff to effectively monitor, track, and trend SDP 

timeliness, the SDP timeliness goal is a metric in IMC 0307, Appendix A, “Reactor Oversight 

Process Self-Assessment Metrics.”

The timeliness criteria below represent several time limits for each process milestone to support 

meeting the 90 day goal.

T0 - The issue date of the first official correspondence describing the finding, either in an 

inspection report and/or preliminary significance determination letter

T30 - Latest date to issue the preliminary significance determination letter

T70 - Latest date for completing the Regulatory Conference with licensee

T85 - Latest date to complete final SERP

T87 - Latest date to issue Enforcement Notification (EN) to the Commission

T90 - Final Determination letter issued
Issue Date: 04/29/15 10 0609

Successfully completing this process within 90 days can be dependent upon the timely 

completion of a public Regulatory Conference or review of a written response. As such, the 

timeliness criteria below represent additional time limits for each process milestone to support 

meeting the 90-day goal.

TL0 - Issue date of the preliminary significance determination letter issued in an inspection 

report cover letter or as separate correspondence

TL10 - Licensee informs the NRC within 10 days from the issue date of the notification of the 

preliminary significance determination, by phone or other means, of its intent to request 

a regulatory conference, to respond with a written submittal, or to decline the 

opportunity to provide additional information. 

TL33 - Licensee submits materials to be presented at the Regulatory Conference

TL40 - Regulatory Conference completed or licensee’s written response received by NRC no 

later than 40 days from the issue date of the preliminary significance determination

letter. 

08.07 Office of Investigation (OI) and Department of Justice (DOJ). Some findings may 

involve a formal OI or DOJ investigation. When an inspection finding involves a formal OI/DOJ 

investigation and it is known that the results of the investigation will not impact further evaluation 

of the finding’s significance and/or follow-up inspection, then the finding should be resolved per 

the normal SDP process. If the OI/DOJ investigation does impact the timely resolution of the 

finding, then the guidance for a planning SERP should be implemented.

0609-09 PROCESS FOR LICENSEE APPEAL OF A STAFF SDP DETERMINATION

If a licensee disagrees with the staff’s final determination of significance, the licensee may 

appeal the determination to the appropriate NRC Regional Administrator as described in 

Attachment 2 of this IMC. Any such review must meet the requirements stated in the 

Prerequisites and Limitations sections of Attachment 2 to merit further staff consideration. 

0609-10 REFERENCES

1. IMC 0612, “Power Reactor Inspection Reports”

2. IMC 0612, Appendix B, “Issue Screening”

3. IMC 0308, Attachment 3, “Significance Determination Process Basis Document”

4. IMC 0609, Attachment 1, “The Significance and Enforcement Review Panel (SERP) 

Process”

5. IMC 0609, Attachment 2, “Process for Appealing NRC Characterization of Inspection 

Findings (SDP Appeal Process)”
Issue Date: 04/29/15 11 0609

6. IMC 0609, Attachment 3, “Senior Reactor Analyst Support Objectives”

7. IMC 0609, Attachment 4, “Initial Characterization of Findings”

8. IMC 0609, Appendix A, “Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power”

9. IMC 0609, Appendix M, “Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria”

10. IMC 0040, “Preparing, Revising, and Issuing Documents for the NRC Inspection Manual”

11. SECY-99-007, “Recommendations for Reactor Oversight Process Improvements”

12. SECY-99-007A, “Recommendations for Reactor Oversight Process Improvements 

(Follow-up to SECY-99-007)”

13. SECY-00-0049, “Results of the Revised Reactor Oversight Process Pilot Program”

END

Exhibits:

Exhibit 1 Graphical Representation of the Quantitative Significance of Findings

Attachments:

Attachment 1 Significance and Enforcement Review Panel Process

Attachment 2 Process for Appealing NRC Characterization of Inspection Findings

 (SDP Appeal Process)

Attachment 3 Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) and Risk Analyst Support Expectations

Attachment 4 Initial Characterization of Findings

Appendices:

Appendix A Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power

 

Appendix B Emergency Preparedness SDP

Appendix C Occupational Radiation Safety SDP

Appendix D Public Radiation Safety SDP
Issue Date: 04/29/15 12 0609

Appendix E Part I, Baseline Security SDP for Power Reactors and 

Part II, Force-on-Force Security SDP for Power Reactors

Part III, Construction Fitness-for-Duty Significance Determination Process 

for New Reactors (Pilot)

Part IV, Cyber Security Significance Determination Process for Power 

Reactors

Appendix F Fire Protection and Post-Fire Safe Shutdown SDP

Appendix G Shutdown Safety SDP

Appendix H Containment Integrity SDP

Appendix I Operator Requalification, Human Performance

Appendix J Steam Generator Tube Integrity SDP

Appendix K Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management SDP

Appendix L Significance Determination Process for B.5.b

Appendix M Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria
Issue Date: 04/29/15 Exh 1-1 0609

Exhibit 1

Graphical Representation of the Quantitative Significance of Findings

NOTE: Not applicable to all safety cornerstones and IMC 0609 appendices

Yellow – Substantial Safety Significance

White - Low to Moderate Safety Significance

Green – Very Low Safety Significance

RED – High Safety Significance

Increase in CDF (/yr) Increase in LERF (/yr)

1E-6 1E-7

1E-5

1E-4

1E-5

1E-6
Issue Date: 04/29/15 Att1-1 0609

Attachment 1

Revision History - IMC 0609

Commitment 

Tracking 

Number

Accession 

Number 

Issue Date

Change Notice

Description of Change Description of 

Training 

Required and 

Completion 

Date

Comment and 

Feedback Resolution 

Accession Number

(Pre-Decisional, NonPublic)

N/A 10/13/2006 Revision history reviewed for the last four years N/A N/A

N/A 04/21/2000 

CN 00-007

This manual chapter supports the New Reactor 

Oversight Program for significant determination of 

findings. The significance determination process 

detailed in the manual chapter is designed to 

characterize the significance of inspection findings 

for the NRC licensee performance assessment 

process using risk insights, as appropriate.

N/A N/A

N/A 02/27/2001

CN 01-005

0609 has been revised to correct minor errors and 

inconsistencies, and to clarify the overall SDP 

description.

N/A N/A

N/A 08/16/2001

CN 01-015

0609 has been revised to correct the title of 

Attachment 2 (0609.02) as listed in the attachments 

to this manual chapter.

N/A N/A

N/A 04/30/2002

CN 02-022

0609 has been revised to reflect revisions to 

Attachments 1 and 2, and changes to the recently 

issued Appendix A to IMC 0609. 

N/A N/A

N/A 05/19/2005

CN 05-014

0609 is revised to add Appendix K, “Maintenance 

Rule Risk Assessment and Risk Management” as 

an attachment. 

N/A N/A
Issue Date: 04/29/15 Att1-2 0609

Commitment 

Tracking 

Number

Accession 

Number 

Issue Date

Change Notice

Description of Change Description of 

Training 

Required and 

Completion 

Date

Comment and 

Feedback Resolution 

Accession Number

(Pre-Decisional, NonPublic)

NA 11/22/05

CN 02-030

0609 has been revised to reflect a concerted effort 

to provide guidance which will help meet the 

Commission’s guidance on the timeliness for 

finalizing the significant determination of inspection 

findings. The revision includes the regional 

comments on the proposed guidance on how to 

meet the timeliness goal. The document continues 

to emphasize the importance of timely issuance of 

the final SDP result. However, complexity of 

issues, lack of evaluation tools, lack of expertise, 

and findings of high safety significance can 

contribute to delays in finalizing findings. To that 

affect, new guidance is provided in Section 08.05 of 

the document on how to approach such findings 

using the Planning SERP process.

N/A ML061590493

N/A 01/10/08

CN 08-002

This revision provides the staff clarification to use 

IMC 0309, “Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for 

Reactors” in place of MD-8.3, to use Attachment 4 

to perform SDP Phase 1 screenings, to incorporate 

feedback responses to add NSIR requirements, 

clarify guidance for SDP timeliness in regard to 

OI/DOJ investigations, and to add references to 

SDP Appendix M and the Attachment 4 for Phase 1 

Initial Screening and Characterization attachment.

N/A ML073460588
Issue Date: 04/29/15 Att1-3 0609

Commitment 

Tracking 

Number

Accession 

Number 

Issue Date

Change Notice

Description of Change Description of 

Training 

Required and 

Completion 

Date

Comment and 

Feedback Resolution 

Accession Number

(Pre-Decisional, NonPublic)

N/A 08/05/08 CN 08-

023

This revision changes the term “choice” letter to 

“preliminary significance determination” letter and 

adds a third responsibility to OE in Section 05.05. 

The section on SDP Timeliness was clarified to 

eliminate literal interpretation of timeliness goals by

the licensee. Replaced term AV(TBD) with (TBD) 

due to changes in IMC0612. Repetitive guidance 

that appears in both this IMC and Attachment 1 was 

removed and is in Attachment 1 only.

N/A ML081720377

N/A ML101400479

06/02/11

CN 11-009

This revision adds the new SDP Appendix L to list 

of SDP attachments, provides definitions for riskbased, risk-informed, and of the four color 

significance levels. A new Exhibit 1 was added that 

graphically describes the SDP. The IMC is better 

aligned with Attachment 1 – SERP, to remove 

redundancy. General clarifications of the guidance 

including receipt of additional information from the 

licensee within a reasonable period of time agreed 

upon between the staff and licensee. Clarifications 

were made that findings that originally SERP had 

reviewed as potential White, Yellow, Red, or > 

Green issues, then resulted in a final Green 

significance will not be counted in the timeliness 

goal. The IMC will reflect that the region be allowed 

to communicate the final result of these findings in 

the cover letter of the following quarterly inspection 

report or by separate letter. (ROPFF 0609-1480). 

N/A ML103490485
Issue Date: 04/29/15 Att1-4 0609

Commitment 

Tracking 

Number

Accession 

Number 

Issue Date

Change Notice

Description of Change Description of 

Training 

Required and 

Completion 

Date

Comment and 

Feedback Resolution 

Accession Number

(Pre-Decisional, NonPublic)

N/A ML14153A633

04/29/15

CN 15-008

Several significant changes to the guidance were 

made based on recommendations from the SDP 

Business Process Improvement (BPI) Report 

(ML14318A512) and the ROP Independent 

Assessment Report (ML14035A571). Incorporated 

recommendations from ROPFF 0609-1676, 1886,

and 1894.

N/A ML15072A160

ML15082A305

ML14099A275

ML13197A402