UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

REGION III 

2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210 

LISLE, IL 60532-4352 

December 2, 2016 

Mr. Charles Arnone 

Vice President, Operations 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Palisades Nuclear Plant 

27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway 

Covert, MI 49043–9530 

SUBJECT: PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT—NRC TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/191, 

MITIGATION STRATEGIES, SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION AND 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION REPORT 05000255/2016008 

Dear Mr. Arnone: 

On November 16, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed 

Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/191, “Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies 

and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness 

Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans” inspection at your Palisades 

Nuclear Plant. The NRC inspection team discussed the results of this inspection with 

Mr. M. Lee and other members of your staff. The enclosed report represents the results of this 

inspection. 

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the 

implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA–12–049 

and EA–12–051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose 

Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commission’s rules and regulations, and with the 

conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of 

selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station 

personnel. 

The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
C. Arnone -2- 

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, “Public 

Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding,” of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of 

this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public 

inspection in the NRC’s Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records 

System (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). 

Sincerely, 

/RA/ 

Ann Marie Stone, Team Leader 

Technical Support Staff 

Division of Reactor Projects 

Docket No. 50–255 

License No. DPR–20 

Enclosure: 

Inspection Report 05000255/2016008 

cc: Distribution via LISTSERV®
Enclosure 

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

REGION III 

Docket No: 50–255 

License No: DPR–20 

Report No: 05000255/2016008 

Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Facility: Palisades Nuclear Plant 

Location: Covert, MI 

Dates: September 26 through November 16, 2016 

Inspectors: J. Boettcher, Resident Inspector (Team Lead) 

 B. Bartlett, Project Engineer 

 J. Benjamin, Senior Reactor Inspector 

 S. Sheldon, Project Engineer 

Approved by: A. Stone, Team Leader 

Technical Support Staff 

Division of Reactor Projects 
2 

SUMMARY 

Inspection Report 05000255/2016008, 09/26/2016 – 09/30/2016, Palisades Nuclear Plant; 

Temporary Instruction 2515/191 Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool 

Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose 

Assessment Plans. 

This inspection was performed by a resident inspector and three U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) regional inspectors. No findings of significance or violations of NRC 

requirements were identified during this inspection. The significance of inspection findings is 

indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined 

using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated 

April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 

(IMC) 0310, "Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014. The NRC's 

program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in 

NUREG–1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," dated July 2016. 

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings 

None 
3 

REPORT DETAILS 

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 

4OA5 Other Activities (Temporary Instruction 2515/191) 

The objective of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/191, “Inspection of the Implementation 

of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency 

Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans,” is to verify 

the licensee has adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the 

licensee’s Final Integrated Plan (Agencywide Documents Access Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML15351A351), the licensee’s supplement to the notification of 

full compliance (ADAMS Accession No. ML16083A285), and the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML16014A318) and to verify the licensee installed reliable water-level measurement 

instrumentation in their spent fuel pool (SFP). The purpose of this TI was also to verify 

the licensee had implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as 

described in their site-specific submittals and NRC safety assessments, including 

multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure staffing is sufficient 

and communications can be maintained during such an event. 

The inspection also verifies plans for complying with NRC Orders EA–12–049, “Order 

Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for 

Beyond-Design-Basis External Events” (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and 

EA–12–051, “Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool 

Instrumentation” (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being 

implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of 

staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, 

request for information letter and multiunit dose assessment information provided per 

COMSECY–13–0010, “Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency 

Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned,” dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML12339A262). 

The inspectors discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed 

documentation, and where appropriate, performed plant walk downs to verify the 

strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensee’s submittals and the NRC staff 

prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the 

strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had 

been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. 

Specific details of the team’s inspection activities are described in the following sections. 

.1 Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events 

a. Inspection Scope 

The inspectors examined the licensee’s established guidelines and implementing 

procedures for the beyond-design basis mitigation strategies. The inspectors assessed 

how the licensee coordinated and documented the interface/transition between existing 

off-normal and emergency operating procedures with the newly developed mitigation 

strategies. The inspectors selected a number of mitigation strategies and conducted 

plant walk downs with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to assess: the 

adequacy and completeness of the procedures; familiarity of operators with the 
4 

procedure objectives and specific guidance; staging and compatibility of equipment; and 

the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the 

postulated scenarios. 

The inspectors verified a preventive maintenance program had been established for the 

Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) portable equipment and periodic 

equipment inventories were in place and being conducted. Additionally, the inspectors 

examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the 

Operations staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation 

strategies. The inspectors also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training 

provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are 

listed in the attachment. 

b. Assessment 

Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily 

implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant 

specific submittal(s) and the associated safety evaluation and determined the licensee is 

generally in compliance with NRC Order EA–12–049. The inspectors verified the 

licensee satisfactorily: 

• developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX 

strategies for postulated external events; 

• integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and 

departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures; 

• protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards; 

• developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX 

equipment to ensure their availability and capability; 

• trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of 

beyond-design basis events; and 

• developed the means to ensure the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be 

available from off-site locations. 

The inspectors verified non-compliances with current licensing requirements, and other 

issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action 

program as appropriate. 

c. Findings 

No findings were identified. 

.2 Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation 

a. Inspection Scope 

The inspectors examined the licensee’s newly installed SFP instrumentation. 

Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant 

specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the 

power supplies and the indications for each channel were physically and electrically 

separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments 

were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. 
5 

b. Assessment 

Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined the licensee 

satisfactorily installed and established control of the SFP instrumentation as described in 

the plant specific submittal(s) and the associated safety evaluation and determined the 

licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA–12–051. The inspectors verified 

the licensee satisfactorily: 

• installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide 

physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittal(s) 

and safety evaluation; 

• installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental 

conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittal(s); and 

• trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, 

and use of the SFP instrumentation. 

The inspectors verified non-compliances with current licensing requirements, and other 

issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action 

program. 

c. Findings 

No findings were identified. 

.3 Staffing and Communication Request for Information 

a. Inspection Scope 

Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walk downs, the 

inspectors verified the licensee has implemented required changes to staffing, 

communications equipment and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of 

alternating current power (ELAP) scenario as described in the licensee’s staffing 

assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The inspectors also verified the licensee 

has implemented multi-unit dose assessment (including releases from SFPs) capability 

using the licensee’s site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described 

in the licensee’s multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed 

in the attachment. 

b. Assessment 

The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensee’s multi-unit dose submittal 

and in response to the NRC’s March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified 

that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task 

Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that 

results in an extended loss of all alternating current power to all site units and impedes 

access to the site. The inspectors verified the following: 

• the licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing change(s) to support a 

multi-unit ELAP scenario; 

• EP communications equipment and facilities are sufficient for dealing with a 

multi-unit ELAP scenario; and 
6 

• the licensee implemented multi-unit dose assessment capabilities (including 

releases from SFPs) using the licensee’s site-specific dose assessment software 

and approach. 

The inspectors verified non-compliances with current licensing requirements, and other 

issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action 

program. 

c. Findings 

No findings were identified. 

4OA6 Management Meeting 

Exit Meeting Summary 

On November 16, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Lee 

and other members of the licensee’s staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues 

presented. The inspectors confirmed none of the potential report input discussed was 

considered proprietary. 

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
 Attachment 

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT 

Licensee 

C. Arnone, Site Vice President 

A. Williams, General Manager Plant Operations 

T. Mulford, Operations Manager 

B. Baker, Operations Manager – Shift 

J. Borah, Engineering Manager, Systems and Components 

T. Davis, Regulatory Assurance 

B. Dotson, Regulatory Assurance 

J. Erickson, Regulatory Assurance 

O. Gustafson, Director of Regulatory and Performance Improvement 

J. Hardy, Regulatory Assurance Manager 

J. Haumersen, Site Projects and Maintenance Services Manager 

G. Heisterman, Maintenance Manager 

M. Lee, Operations Manager – Support 

D. Lucy, Outage Manager 

D. Malone, Emergency Planning Manager 

W. Nelson, Training Manager 

D. Nestle, Radiation Protection Manager 

K. O’Connor, Engineering Manager, Design and Programs 

C. Plachta, Nuclear Independent Oversight Manager 

P. Russell, Site Engineering Director 

M. Schultheis, Performance Improvement Manager 

M. Soja, Chemistry Manager 

J. Tharp, Security Manager 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

A. Stone, Team Leader, Technical Support Staff 
2 

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED 

Opened 

None 

Closed 

None 

Discussed 

None 
3 

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list 

does not imply the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that 

selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection 

effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or 

any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report. 

Condition Reports Initiated as a Result of the Inspection 

- CR-HQN-2016-01215, It Was Discovered that Two Copies of the Palisades FLEX FIP Exist, 

September 27, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-04603, It Was Discovered that the Labels on Both the FLEX Diesel Generators 

are Incorrect, September 28, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-04610, Walkdown Discovered that the Labels on the FLEX Diesel Generators 

are Incorrect, September 28, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-04638, Flooding Level in A Flex Building Question, September 29, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-04641, A Later Version of Staffing Assessment, Revision 2, was Discovered, 

September 29, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-04643, NRC Identified, Incorrect Value to Fill Tank T-81, September 29, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-04650, No Specific Operator Guidance for Flex Hose Minimum Bend Radius, 

September 29, 2016 

Condition Reports Reviewed 

- CR-HQN-2015-00345, Potential Concern with the Instrumentation for Spent Fuel Pool Level 

Monitoring, April 9, 2015 

- CR-HQN-2016-00164, Fukushima Project: Uninterruptable Power Supply Rated Battery Life, 

February 9, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2015-02436, Cables do not Appear to Connect to the Generator, June 11, 2015 

- CR-PLP-2015-02482, Tracking of NRC FLEX/SFPI Audit Follow-up Items, June 16, 2015 

- CR-PLP-2015-05627, Broken Weld on “A” FLEX Generator, November 11, 2015 

- CR-PLP-2015-05750, Breaker 11 was Found in Trip Free Condition, November 19, 2015 

- CR-PLP-2016-00127, LI-2141 Spent Fuel Level Indicator Blank Screen, January 7, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-01079, Uninterruptable Power Supply Battery Life Error, March 2, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-01224, The Rating of the Generators in the FIP are Wrong, March 10, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-01364, K-2 FLEX Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Level Low, March 19, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-01655, LI-2141 Spent Fuel Level Indicator Blank Screen, April 5, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-01740, Trend with LI-2141 Spent Fuel Level Indicator Blank Screen, 

April 12, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-01902, LI-2141 Spent Fuel Level Indicator Time Incorrect, April 21, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-02248, K-1 FLEX Diesel Generator Trailer Wiring Harness is Damaged, 

May 14, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-02451, Satellite Phone Cords Failed, May 26, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-02985, LI-2141 Spent Fuel Level Indicator Blank Screen, June 29, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-03992, LI-2141 Spent Fuel Level Indicator Time Incorrect, August 25, 2016 

- CR-PLP-2016-04564, NSRCs Declared Degraded but Operational due to the Inability of Two 

or More 4160VAC Portable Generators to Perform Load Sharing, September 26, 2016
4 

Calculations 

- EA-GOTHIC-AFW-01, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Heat Up Analysis, Revision 0 

- EA-EC46465-08, Freezing of Coolant Sources for FLEX Event, Revision 0 

- EA-EC46465-14, T-2 Inventory Makeup Capability of AFW with T-81 Gravity Feed, Revision 0 

- EA-EC46467-04, Sliding and Rocking Evaluation of FLEX Storage Building-A Equipment, 

Revision 1 

Drawings 

- B213781, 2500 kVA Transformer Outline Drawing for Graybar, Revision 0 

- E-1 Sh. A, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram, Revision 12 

- E-44 Sh. 156, Lighting Panel Schedule Panel L-76, Revision 7 

- E-44 Sh. 105, Lighting Panel Schedule Panel L-258, Revision 6 

Miscellaneous Documents 

- Enercon Report, Flex Portable Hose Failure Extent of Condition Review 

- Letter of Agreement Between Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., as Agent for Entergy Nuclear 

Palisades, LLC, Owner of Palisades Nuclear Power Plant and Andrews University Airpark 

Airport Authority, September 15, 2014 

- Letter to the NRC from Anthony J. Vitale, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant 

to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness – Staffing, 

Requested Information Items 1, 2, and 6 – Phase 2 Staffing Assessment, May 19, 2015 

- Letter to the NRC from Anthony J. Vitale, Notification of Full Compliance with NRC Order 

EA-12-049, “Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies 

for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,” December 16, 2015 

- Letter to the NRC from Anthony J. Vitale, Notification of Full Compliance with NRC Order 

EA-12-049, “Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies 

for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,” December 16, 2015 

- Letter to Vice President, Operations at Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. from Mandy Halter, 

NRC/NRR, Palisades Nuclear Plant – Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of 

Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Instrumentation Related to Orders EA–12–049 

and EA–12–051 (CAC Nos. MF0768 and MF0769), August 22, 2016 

- LO-HWNLO-2015-0001, Phase 2 Communications Assessment Fukushima Project, 

April 19, 2016 

- M0204-0161, MOHR Vendor Manual SFPI Level Indication, Revision 0 

- Memorandum of Understanding Between West Michigan Airport Authority and Entergy 

Nuclear Operations, Inc., as Agent for Entergy Nuclear Palisades, LLC, Owner of Palisades 

Nuclear Power Plant, September 15, 2014 

- MSP/EMHSD Response Procedure #22 b, Emergency Operation Center Extended Loss AC 

Power Response Plan, August 2015 

- Mutual Assistance Agreement Between DTE Energy Electric Company, Entergy Nuclear 

Palisades, LLC and Indiana Michigan Power 

- PLP-RPT-13-00050, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Upgrade Evaluation for 

FLEX, Revision 0 

- PLP-RPT-14-00030, Report of Geotechnical Exploration FLEX Equipment Storage Building, 

Revision 0 

- PLP-RPT-15-00049, Palisades Final Integrated Plan for FLEX Implementation, Revision 0 

- PLP-RPT-15-00049, Palisades Final Integrated Plan for FLEX Implementation, Revision 1 

- Palisades Nuclear Plant FLEX Validation, September 28, 2015 
5 

- Palisades Nuclear Plant IPEEE, Revision 1 

- Palisades Nuclear Plant NEI 12-01 / Phase 2 Staffing Assessment, Revision 1 

- Palisades Nuclear Plant NEI 12-01 / Phase 2 Staffing Assessment, Revision 2 

- SAFER Response Plan for Palisades Nuclear Plant, Revision 1 

- Snapshot Assessment: Pre-NRC Fukushima Lessons Learned, Une 21, 2016 

- WCAP-17601-P, Reactor Coolant System Response to the Extended Loss of AC Power Event 

for Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering, and Babcock & Wilcox NSSS Designs, 

Revision 0 

Modifications 

- EC 46465, FLEX Basis (Base/Parent EC), Revision 0 

- EC 46466, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, Revision 0 

- EC 46467, Storage Buildings, Revision 0 

- EC 47490, EP Communications, Revision 0 

- EC 63992, Capacity of Turbine Building Uninterruptable Power Supply, Revision 0 

- EC 66731, FLEX Hose Bend Radius Evaluation, Revision 0 

Procedures 

- AOP-26, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, Revision 3 

- AOP-30, Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Revision 2 

- AOP-38, Acts of Nature, Revision 6 

- ARP-7, Auxiliary Systems Scheme EK-11 (C-13), Revision 96 

- EI-6.0, Palisades Nuclear Plant Emergency Implementing Procedure Rapid Dose Calculation, 

Revision 16 

- EI-6.9, Palisades Nuclear Plant Emergency Implementing Procedure Automated Dose 

Assessment Program, Revision 8 

- EN-OP-201, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Fleet Program Document, 

Revision 2 

- EN-OP-201-05, Palisades FLEX Program Document, Revision 1 

- EN-OP-202, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Program Document Bases, 

Revision 0 

- EN-OU-103, Long Range Outage Planning, Revision 3 

- EN-WM-105, Planning, Revision 16 

- EN-WM-109, Scheduling, Revision 10 

- EOP-1.0, Standard Post-Trip Actions, Revision 18 

- EOP-2.0, Reactor Trip Recovery, Revision 14 

- EOP-3.0, Station Blackout Recovery, Revision 17 

- EOP 8.0, Loss of Offsite PWR – Forced Circulation Recovery, Revision 19 

- EOP 9.0, PC-2 PCS Press Control PORVS PC-2 Tree D, Revision 19 

- FIG-1, FLEX Generator Staging and Operation, Revision 1 

- FIG-2, FLEX Pump Staging and Operations, Revision 0 

- FIG-3, Alternate SFP Makeup and Cooling, Revision 0 

- FIG-4, Low Pressure Feedwater, Revision 0 

- FIG-5, FLEX T-77 Boration Blending, Revision 0 

- FIG-7, FLEX PCS Injection, Revision 0 

- FIG-8, Alternate Ventilation, Revision 0 

- FIG-9, Backup ADV Nitrogen Station 9 Operation, Revision 0 

- FIG-10, Fuel Oil Transfer, Revision 0 

- FIG-11, Service Water – NSRC (Phase 3), Revision 0 
6 

- FIG-12, 4160 VAC Generator – NSRC (Phase 3), Revision 2 

- FSG-1, Long Term Inventory Control, Revision 0 

- FSG-4, ELAP DC Bus Load Shed and Management, Revision 0 

- FSG-5, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging, Revision 0 

- FSG-5, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging – Attachment 4, Ops Flowchart, 

Revision 0 

- FSG-7, Loss of Vital Instrument or Control Power, Revision 1 

- FSG-8, Alternate PCS Boration, Revision 0 

- FSG-11, Alternate SFP Makeup and Cooling, Revision 0 

- FSG-13, Transition from Flex Equipment, Revision 0 

- FSG-14, Shutdown PCS Makeup, Revision 0 

- FSG-15, Shutdown ELAP, Revision 0 

- FSG-100, Beyond Design Bases External Event (BDBEE) with an Extended Loss of Offsite 

and Onsite Power (ELAP) Emergency Response, Revision 0 

- FSG-101, BDBEE / EP Communications, Revision 1 

- SOP-2A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 86 

- SOP-14, Service Water System, Revision 65 

- Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation (SFPI) Boric Acid Mitigation, January 14, 2014 

- Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation (SFPI) Channel Functional Check, January 14, 2014 

Training Documents 

- PLLP-NLO Training, FLEX Loader, Revision 0 

- PLLP-OPS-FLEXOVER, FLEX Process & Equipment, Training Cycle 15B 

- PLLP-OPS-15D-01, Palisades Operations Cycle 15D Kickoff 

- PLLP-OPS-FLEXGAP, FLEX Process & Equipment, Cycle 15E GAP Training 

Work Orders 

- 00374145 04, FUK, EC-47345, BUS 19 Voltage & Phase Rotation Checks, October 4, 2015 

- 00374147 04, FUK, EC-47345, BUS 20 Voltage & Phase Rotation Checks, 

September 29, 2015 

- 00378594 16, FUK, (FLEX EC-46465) Verification of FLEX Pumps/Equip, August 26, 2015 

- 00378594 17, FUK, (FLEX EC-46465) Verification of PH 2 Generator/Equip, August 27, 2015 

- 00424932 01, FLEX Standby Periodic Maintenance (PM) - 6 Month Inspection - FEL-FLEX1B, 

April 19, 2016 

- 00424934 01, FLEX Standby PM - 6 Month Functional - K-4-FLEX Generator, March 19, 2016 

- 00424939 01, FLEX Standby PM - 6 Month Inspection - Tow Vehicle A, April 19, 2016 

- 00424941 01, FLEX Standby PM - 6 Month Functional - C-910 Air Comp, April 19, 2016 

- 52676484 01, FLEX Standby PM - 1 Yr Operational Test - P-1002 Pump (FSB B), 

April 19, 2016 

- 52676487 01, FLEX Standby PM - 1 Yr Operational Test - K-1-FLEX Generator, April 19, 2016 

- 52676489 01, FLEX Standby PM - 1 Yr Operational Test - K-2-FLEX Generator, April 19, 2016 

- 52709100 01, Emergency Communications Test, Monthly, August 31, 2016 
7 

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED 

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access Management System 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

ELAP Extended Loss of AC Power 

EP Emergency Preparedness 

FLEX Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies 

FSG FLEX Support Guidelines 

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter 

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

PARS Publicly Available Records System 

PM Periodic Maintenance 

SFP Spent Fuel Pool 

TI Temporary Instruction 
C. Arnone -2- 

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, “Public 

Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding,” of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of 

this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public 

inspection in the NRC’s Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records 

System (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). 

Sincerely, 

/RA/ 

Ann Marie Stone, Team Leader 

Technical Support Staff 

Division of Reactor Projects 

Docket No. 50–255 

License No. DPR–20 

Enclosure: 

Inspection Report 05000255/2016008 

cc: Distribution via LISTSERV®

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DRSIII 

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DATE 12/02/2016 12/02/2016 

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