Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, 

Border Security and Claims, Committee 

on the Judiciary, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, April 10, 2003 HOMELAND SECURITY

Challenges to Implementing 

the Immigration Interior 

Enforcement Strategy 

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice 

GAO-03-660T 
Page 1 GAO-03-660T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy, whose 

implementation is now the responsibility of the Bureau of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (BICE). As you know, this strategy was originally 

created by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This 

statement discusses the interior enforcement strategy and selected issues 

pertaining to its implementation and management. 

In the 1990s, INS developed a strategy to control illegal immigration across 

the U.S. border and a strategy to address enforcement priorities within the 

country’s interior. In 1994, INS’s Border Patrol issued a strategy to deter 

illegal entry. The strategy called for “prevention through deterrence”; that 

is, to raise the risk of being apprehended for illegal aliens to a point where 

they would consider it futile to try to enter. The plan called for targeting 

resources in a phased approach, starting first with the areas of greatest 

illegal activity. In 1999, the INS issued its interior enforcement strategy 

designed to deter illegal immigration, prevent immigration-related crimes, 

and remove those illegally in the United States. Historically, Congress and 

INS have devoted over five times more resources in terms of staff and 

budget on border enforcement than on interior enforcement. 

In my statement today, I make the following points: 

• INS’s interior enforcement strategy was designed to address (1) the 

detention and removal of criminal aliens, (2) the dismantling and 

diminishing of alien smuggling operations, (3) community complaints 

about illegal immigration, (4) immigration benefit and document fraud, 

and (5) employers’ access to undocumented workers. These 

components remain in the BICE strategy. 

• INS faced numerous challenges in implementing the strategy. For 

example, INS lacked reliable data to determine staff needs, reliable 

information technology, clear and consistent guidelines and procedures 

for working-level staff, effective collaboration and coordination within 

INS and with other agencies, and appropriate performance measures to 

help assess program results. As BICE assumes responsibility for 

strategy implementation, it should consider how to address these 

challenges by improving resource allocation, information technology, 

program guidance, and performance measurement. 
Page 2 GAO-03-660T 

• The creation of DHS has focused attention on other challenges to 

implementing the strategy. For example, BICE needs to coordinate and 

collaborate with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(BCIS) for the timely and proper adjudication of benefit applications, 

and with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) to 

assist in antismuggling investigations and sharing intelligence. In 

addition, BICE needs to assure that training and internal controls are 

sufficient to govern investigators’ antiterrorism activities when dealing 

with citizens and aliens. 

My testimony today is based primarily on the results of work that we have 

completed in recent years, namely, our February 1999 testimony on INS’s 

efforts to identify and remove criminal aliens,1

 our April 1999 report on 

INS’s worksite enforcement program,2

 our May 2000 report on alien 

smuggling,3

 our May 2001 report on the processing of immigration 

benefits,4

 our January 2002 report on immigration benefit fraud,5 our 

March 2002 report on INS’ Forensic Document Laboratory,6

 our November 

2002 report on INS’s alien address information7

, and our January 2003 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Criminal Aliens: INS’ Efforts to Identify and Remove 

Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement, GAO/T-GGD-99-47 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 25, 1999). 

2

U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing 

Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist, GAO/GGD-99-33 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999). 

3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational 

Improvements Needed to Address Growing Problem, GAO/GGD-00-103 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 1, 2000). 

4

U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede the 

Timeliness of Application Processing, GAO-01-488 (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001). 

5

U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is 

Needed to Address Problems, GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002). 

6

U.S. General Accounting Office, INS Forensic Document Laboratory: Several Factors 

Impeded Timeliness of Case Processing, GAO-02-410 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2002) 

7

U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens 

Because It Lacks Reliable Address Information, GAO-03-188 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 21, 

2002). 
Page 3 GAO-03-660T 

reports on major management challenges and program risks at the 

Departments of Homeland Security and Justice.8

In these reports we made many recommendations to improve INS 

operations. INS had implemented or was in the process of implementing 

some of these recommendations. We plan to follow up on DHS plans to 

improve the various programs. 

In January 1999, INS issued its Interior Enforcement Strategy. This 

strategy focused resources on areas that would have the greatest impact 

on reducing the size and annual growth of the illegal resident population. 

Certain criteria were used to develop the priorities and activities of the 

strategy. The criteria focused on potential risks to U.S. communities and 

persons, costs, capacity to be effective, impact on communities, potential 

impact on reducing the size of the problem, and potential value for 

prevention and deterrence. The strategy established the following five 

areas in priority order: 

1. Identify and remove criminal aliens and minimize recidivism. Under 

this strategic priority, INS was to identify and remove criminal aliens 

as they come out of the federal and state prison systems and those 

convicted of aggravated felonies currently in probation and parole 

status. 

2. Deter, dismantle, and diminish smuggling or trafficking of aliens. This 

strategic priority called for INS to disrupt and dismantle the criminal 

infrastructure that encourages and benefits from illegal migration. INS 

efforts were to start in source and transit countries and continue inside 

the United States, focusing on smugglers, counterfeit document 

producers, transporters, and employers who exploit and benefit from 

illegal migration. 

3. Respond to community reports and complaints about illegal 

immigration. In addition to responding to local law enforcement issues 

and needs, this strategic priority emphasizes working with local 

 8

U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: 

Department of Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, D.C., Jan. 2003); and Major 

Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice, GAO-03-105

(Washington, D.C., Jan. 2003). 

Components of the 

Interior Enforcement 

Strategy 
Page 4 GAO-03-660T 

communities to identify and address problems that arise from the 

impact of illegal immigration, based on local threat assessments. 

4. Minimize immigration benefit fraud and other document abuse. Under 

this strategic priority, INS was to aggressively investigate and 

prosecute benefit fraud and document abuse to promote integrity of 

the legal immigration system. 

5. Block and remove employers’ access to undocumented workers. The 

strategy emphasizes denying employers access to unauthorized 

workers by checking their compliance with the employment 

verification requirements in the Immigration Reform and Control Act 

of 1986. Coupled with its efforts to control smuggling activity, this 

effort could have a multiplier effect on access of employers to illegal 

workers and on the overall number of illegal residents in the country. 

Figure 1 shows that INS had generally allocated its interior enforcement 

resources consistent with these priorities and that the workyears devoted 

to several of INS’s interior enforcement efforts had either declined or 

stayed about the same between fiscal years 1998 and 2002. 
Page 5 GAO-03-660T 

Figure 1: INS Investigations Workyears 

Source: GAO’s analysis of INS’s data. 

Note: Workyear totals do not include administrative time. 

Our work has shown that INS faced numerous daunting enforcement 

issues, as will BICE as it assumes responsibility for the strategy. For 

example, the potential pool of removable criminal aliens and fugitives 

numbers in the hundreds of thousands. Many are incarcerated in hundreds 

of federal, state, and local facilities, while others are fugitives at large 

across the country. The number of individuals smuggled into the United 

States has increased dramatically, and alien smuggling has become more 

sophisticated, complex, organized, and flexible. Thousands of aliens 

annually illegally seek immigration benefits, such as work authorization 

and change of status, and some of these aliens use these benefits to enable 

them to conduct criminal activities. Hundreds of thousands of aliens 

unauthorized to work in the United States have used fraudulent 

Challenges to 

Implementing the 

Interior Enforcement 

Programs 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Criminal alien removal Alien smuggling Noncriminal removals Benefit and other fraud Employer investigations

Program

Workyears

FY 1998

FY 1999

FY 2000

FY 2001

FY 2002
Page 6 GAO-03-660T 

documents to circumvent the process designed to prevent employers from 

hiring them. In many instances, employers are complicit in this activity. 

Given the nature, scope, and magnitude of these activities, BICE needs to 

ensure that it is making the best use of its limited enforcement resources. 

We found that fundamental management challenges exist in several of the 

interior enforcement programs and that addressing them will require the 

high-level attention and concerted efforts of BICE. 

In several reports we noted that INS did not believe it had sufficient staff 

to reach its program goals. Having data on how to effectively allocate staff 

and placing sufficient staff in the right locations is important if BICE is to 

achieve program goals. Staff shortages had contributed to INS’s inability to 

promptly remove the majority of criminal aliens after they have completed 

their prison sentences. In 1997 INS did not place into removal proceedings 

50 percent of potentially deportable criminal aliens who were released 

from federal prisons and state prisons from 5 states. In 1999 we reported 

that, although the removal of criminal aliens was an INS management 

priority, INS faced the same staff shortage issues in 1997 as it had in 1995. 

In particular, agent attrition – about one-third of the workforce - continued 

to impede INS’s ability to meet its program goals. INS had told us that 

since 1997, the attrition rates of agents in this program has stabilized and 

that, in fiscal year 2003, the agents from this program would be reclassified 

as detention removal officers, which INS believed should further help 

reduce attrition. 

Even if INS had additional staff working in these program areas, it lacked 

good management information to determine how many staff it needed to 

meet its program goals and how best to allocate staff given the limited 

resources it did have. With respect to its program for removing 

incarcerated criminal aliens, INS told us that beginning in fiscal year 2002, 

the agency implemented our recommendation to use a workload analysis 

model. This was to help identify the resources the agency needed for its 

criminal alien program in order to achieve overall program goals and 

support its funding and staffing requests. We have not reviewed this new 

model to ascertain its usefulness. 

With respect to alien smuggling, INS lacked field intelligence staff to 

collect and analyze information. Both 1998 and 1999 INS Annual 

Performance Plan reports stated that the lack of intelligence personnel 

hampered the collection, reporting, and analysis of intelligence 

information. Although INS’s Intelligence Program proposed that each 

Need for Better Staff 

Levels and Allocations 
Page 7 GAO-03-660T 

district office have an intelligence unit, as of January 2000, 21 of INS’s 33 

districts did not have anyone assigned full-time to intelligence-related 

duties. Our ongoing work at land ports of entry shows this to be a 

continuing problem. 

The worksite enforcement program received a relatively small portion of 

INS’s staffing and budget. In fiscal year 1998, INS completed a total of 

6,500 worksite investigations, which equated to about 3 percent of the 

estimated number of employers of unauthorized aliens. Given limited 

enforcement resources, BICE needs to assure that it targets those 

industries where employment of illegal aliens poses the greatest potential 

risk to national security. The program now has several initiatives 

underway that target sensitive industries. 

INS had long-standing difficulty developing and fielding information 

systems to support its program operations, and effectively using 

information technology continued to remain a challenge. For example, in 

2002 we reported that benefit fraud investigations had been hampered by a 

lack of integrated information systems. The operations units at the four 

INS service centers that investigate benefit fraud operate different 

information systems that did not interface with each other or with the 

units that investigate benefit fraud at INS district offices. As a result, 

sharing information about benefit applicants is difficult. The INS staff who 

adjudicate applications did not have routine access to INS’s National 

Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS). Not having access to or 

not using NAILS essentially means that officers may be making decisions 

without access to or using significant information and that benefits may be 

granted to individuals not entitled to receive them. Thus, INS was not in 

the best position to review numerous applications and detect patterns, 

trends, and potential schemes for benefit fraud. 

Further, in 2002 we reported that another INS database, the Forensic 

Automated Case and Evidence Tracking System (FACETS), did not 

contain sufficient data for managers to know the exact size and status of 

the laboratory’s pending workload or how much time is spent on each 

forensic case by priority category. As a result, managers were not in the 

best position to make fact-based decisions about case priorities, staffing, 

and budgetary resource needs. 

With respect to the criminal alien program, in 1999 we reported that INS 

lacked a nationwide data system containing the universe of foreign-born 

inmates for tracking the hearing status of each inmate. In response to our 

Need for Better 

Information Technology 
Page 8 GAO-03-660T 

recommendation, INS developed a nationwide automated tracking system 

for the Bureau of Prisons and deployed the system to all federal 

institutional hearing program sites. INS said that it was working with the 

Florida Department of Corrections to integrate that state’s system with 

INS’s automated tracking system. INS also said that it planned to begin 

working with New York, New Jersey, and Texas to integrate their systems 

and then work with California, Illinois, and Massachusetts. We have not 

examined these new systems to determine whether they were completed 

as planned or to ascertain their effectiveness. 

In 2000 we reported that INS lacked an agencywide automated case 

tracking and management system that prevented antismuggling program 

managers from being able to monitor their ongoing investigations, 

determine if other antismuggling units were investigating the same target, 

or know if previous investigations had been conducted on a particular 

target. In response to our recommendation, INS deployed an automated 

case tracking and management system for all of its criminal investigations, 

including alien smuggling investigations. Again, we have not examined the 

new system to ascertain its effectiveness. 

Our review of the various program components of the interior 

enforcement strategy found that working-level guidance was sometimes 

lacking or nonexistent. INS had not established guidance for opening 

benefit fraud investigations or for prioritizing investigative leads. Without 

such criteria, INS could not be ensured that the highest-priority cases were 

investigated and resources were used optimally. 

INS’s interior enforcement strategy did not define the criteria for opening 

investigations of employers suspected of criminal activities. In response to 

our recommendation, INS clarified the types of employer-related criminal 

activities that should be the focus of INS investigations. 

INS’s alien smuggling intelligence program had been impeded by a lack of 

understanding among field staff about how to report intelligence 

information. Staff were unclear about guidelines, procedures, and effective 

techniques for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence 

information. They said that training in this area was critically needed. 

INS had not established outcome-based performance measures that would 

have helped it assess the results of its interior enforcement strategy. For 

example, in 2000 we reported that while INS had met its numeric goals for 

Need for Better Guidance 

to Program Staff 

Need for Better 

Performance Measures 
Page 9 GAO-03-660T 

the number of smuggling cases presented for prosecution in its 

antismuggling program, it had not yet developed outcome-based measures 

that would indicate progress toward the strategy’s objective of identifying, 

deterring, disrupting, and dismantling alien smuggling. This was also the 

case for the INS intelligence program. INS had not developed outcomebased performance measures to gauge the success of the intelligence 

program to optimize the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 

intelligence information. 

In 2002 we reported that INS had not yet established outcome-based 

performance measures that would help it assess the results of its benefit 

fraud investigations. Additionally, INS had not established goals or 

measurement criteria for the service center operations units that conduct 

fraud investigation activities. INS’s interior enforcement strategy did not 

clearly describe the specific measures INS would use to gauge its 

performance in worksite enforcement. For example, in 1999 we reported 

that the strategy stated that INS would evaluate its performance on the 

basis of such things as changes in the behavior or business practices of 

persons and organizations, but did not explain how they expected the 

behavior and practices to change. And although INS indicated that it 

would gauge effectiveness in the worksite area by measuring change in the 

wage scales of certain targeted industries, it left unclear a number of 

questions related to how it would do this. For example, INS did not specify 

how wage scales would be measured; what constituted a targeted industry; 

and how it would relate any changes found to its enforcement efforts or 

other immigration-related causes. The strategy stated that specific 

performance measurements would be developed in the annual 

performance plans required by the Government Performance and Results 

Act. 

According to INS’s fiscal year 2003 budget submission, the events of 

September 11th required INS to reexamine strategies and approaches to 

ensure that INS efforts fully addressed threats to the United States by 

organizations engaging in national security crime. As a result, with regard 

to investigating employers who may be hiring undocumented workers, INS 

planned to target investigations of industries and businesses where there 

is a threat of harm to the public interest. However, INS had not set any 

performance measures for these types of worksite investigations. 
Page 10 GAO-03-660T 

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and with the formation of DHS, a 

number of management challenges are evident. Some of the challenges 

discussed above carry over from the INS, such as the need for sound 

intelligence information, efficient use of resources and management of 

workloads, information systems that generate timely and reliable 

information, clear and current guidance, and appropriate performance 

measures. Other challenges are emerging. These include creating 

appropriate cooperation and collaboration mechanisms to assure effective 

program management, and reinforcing training and management controls 

to help assure compliance with DHS policies and procedures and the 

proper treatment of citizens and aliens. 

BICE will need to assure that appropriate cooperation and collaboration 

occurs between it and other DHS bureaus. For example, both the Border 

Patrol, now located in the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 

(BCBP), and BICE’s immigration investigations program conducted alien 

smuggling investigations prior to the merger into DHS. These units 

operated through different chains of command with different reporting 

structures. As a result, INS’s antismuggling program lacked coordination, 

resulting in multiple antismuggling units overlapping in their jurisdictions, 

making inconsistent decisions about which cases to open, and functioning 

autonomously and without a single chain of command. It’s unclear at this 

time how the anti-smuggling program will operate under DHS. Should both 

BCBP’s Border Patrol and BICE’s Investigations program continue to 

conduct alien smuggling investigations, Under Secretary Hutchinson will 

need to assure that coordination and collaboration exists to overcome 

previous program deficiencies. 

The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) is responsible 

for administering services such as immigrant and nonimmigrant 

sponsorship, work authorization, naturalization of qualified applicants for 

U.S. citizenship, and asylum. Processing benefit applications is an 

important DHS function that should be done in a timely and consistent 

manner. Those who are eligible should receive benefits in a reasonable 

period of time. However, some try to obtain these benefits through fraud, 

and investigating fraud is the responsibility of BICE’s Immigration 

Investigations program. INS’ approach to addressing benefit fraud was 

fragmented and unfocused. INS’ interior enforcement strategy did not 

address how the different INS components that conducted benefit fraud 

investigations were to coordinate their investigations. Also, INS had not 

established guidance to ensure the highest-priority cases are investigated. 

Secretary Ridge will need to ensure the two bureaus work closely to 

Challenges Faced by 

DHS Relating to 

Interior Enforcement 

Need for Program 

Collaboration/ 

Coordination 
Page 11 GAO-03-660T 

assure timely adjudication for eligible applicants while identifying and 

investigating potential immigration benefit fraud cases. 

BICE’s Intelligence Program is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and 

disseminating immigration-related intelligence. Immigration-related 

intelligence is needed by other DHS components such as Border Patrol 

agents and inspectors within BCBP and personnel within BCIS 

adjudicating immigration benefits. BICE will need to develop an 

intelligence program structure to ensure intelligence information is 

disseminated to the appropriate components within DHS’s other bureaus. 

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and with the formation of DHS, 

the linkages between immigration enforcement and national security have 

been brought to the fore. Immigration personnel have been tapped to 

perform many duties that previously were not part of their normal routine. 

For example, as part of a special registration program for visitors from 

selected foreign countries, immigration investigators have been 

fingerprinting, photographing, and interviewing aliens upon entry to the 

U.S. Immigration investigators have also participated in anti-terrorism task 

forces across the country and helped interview thousands of nonimmigrant aliens to determine what knowledge they may have had about 

terrorists and terrorist activities. As part of its investigation of the attacks 

of September 11, the Justice Department detained aliens on immigration 

charges while investigating their potential connection with terrorism. An 

integrated Entry/Exit System, intended to enable the government to 

determine which aliens have entered and left the country, and which have 

overstayed their visas, is currently under development and will rely on 

BICE investigators to locate those who violate the terms of their entry 

visas. 

All of these efforts attest to the pivotal role of immigration interior 

enforcement in national security and expanded roles of investigators in 

the fight against terrorism. It is important that BICE investigators receive 

training to perform these expanded duties and help assure that they 

effectively enforce immigration laws while recognizing the rights of 

citizens and aliens. It is also important that DHS reinforce its management 

controls to help assure compliance with DHS policies and procedures. 

Need to Reinforce Training 

and Internal Controls 
Page 12 GAO-03-660T 

Having an effective interior enforcement strategy is an essential 

complement to having an effective border strategy. To be sure, BICE’s 

tasks with regard to interior enforcement are considerable given the 

nature, scope, and magnitude of illegal activity. INS faced significant 

challenges in appropriately staffing program areas, providing reliable 

information for program management, establishing clear and consistent 

guidance for working-level staff to do their jobs consistent with the goals 

of the program, and developing outcome-based measures that would 

indicate progress toward the strategy’s objectives. With the creation of 

DHS, immigration functions are now in several different bureaus that will 

require enhanced coordination. Addressing these issues are important if 

BICE is to achieve full program potential. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement, I would be pleased 

to answer any questions that you or other members of the subcommittees 

may have. 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Richard 

M. Stana at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony included Evi L. Rezmovic and Michael P. Dino. 

Concluding 

Observations 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(440199)