U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

36–061 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

GAO’s 2019 High Risk Report 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 6, 2019 

Serial No. 116–06 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform 

( 

Available on: http://www.govinfo.gov 

http://www.oversight.house.govor 

http://www.docs.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Chairman 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHI, Illinois 

JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland 

HARLEY ROUDA, California 

KATIE HILL, California 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

PETER WELCH, VERMONT

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

RO KHANNA, California 

JIMMY GOMEZ, California 

ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York 

AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts 

RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Ranking Minority Member 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

JAMES COMER, Kentucky 

MICHAEL CLOUD, Texas 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

CHIP ROY, Texas 

CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia 

MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee 

KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota 

W. GREGORY STEUBE, Florida 

DAVID RAPALLO, Staff Director 

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ELISA LANIER, Chief Clerk and Director of Operations 

RUSSELL ANELLO, Chief Oversight Counsel 

MARC BROADY, Counsel/Policy Advisor 

LAURA RUSH, Deputy Chief Clerk/Security Manager 

CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Minority Staff Director 

CONTACT NUMBER: 202-225-5051 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on March 6, 2019 .............................................................................. 5 

WITNESS

Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 9 

INDEX OF DOCUMENTS

Page 

Written Statement of Gene L. Dodaro ............................................................ 60 

Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, General Counsel, GAO to White 

House Counsel, submitted by Chairman Cummings ................................. 130 

(1) 

GAO’S 2019 HIGH RISK REPORT 

Wednesday, March 6, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM

Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m., in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elijah Cummings 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Clay, 

Lynch, Cooper, Connolly, Krishnamoorthi, Raskin, Rouda, Hill, 

Wasserman Schultz, Kelly, DeSaulnier, Plaskett, Gomez, OcasioCortez, Pressley, Tlaib, Jordan, Amash, Meadows, Hice, Grothman, 

Comer, Cloud, Gibbs, Higgins, Norman, Miller, Green, Armstrong, 

and Steube. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. The committee will come to order. 

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of 

the committee at any time. 

The full committee hearing is convening to review the GAO 2019 

high risk report. 

I now recognize myself for five minutes. 

Good afternoon. Today, the committee is pleased to welcome 

Gene Dodaro, the Comptroller General of the United States and 

head of the Government Accountability Office. 

Mr. Dodaro is here to discuss GAO’s high risk report. GAO issues 

this report at the beginning of each Congress to highlight programs 

that are most vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. The high risk report also recommends solutions to save taxpayer funds, improve public services, and hold our government accountable. 

Over the past 13 years, improvement to high risk programs have 

saved us nearly $350 billion, or about $27 billion a year. Improving 

high risk programs can have a very real effect on Americans’ lives. 

If implemented correctly, this year’s recommendations would improve healthcare for veterans, protect Americans from toxic chemicals, make our food safer, and help stem the deadly tide of opioid 

addiction, which we will be addressing tomorrow. 

And, Mr. Dodaro, I want to thank you from the bottom of my 

heart, and I want to thank all the people that are here with you 

and those that in your office for all the hard work that you do in 

a very nonpartisan way and the professionalism that you all bring 

to the job. We know that when you issue a report, you dot your i’s, 

you cross your t’s, and you give us information that is indeed usable. And so, on behalf of a grateful Congress, I thank you. 
2 

Today, we will discuss many issues, and I’d like to highlight a 

few. And I want you to listen up, because this is important information. 

First, inaction on climate change. Perhaps the most concerning 

issue in this year’s report relates to climate change. According to 

this report, the Trump administration, and I quote—I didn’t say 

this; GAO said this—‘‘has not made measurable progress since 

2017 to reduce its fiscal exposure to climate change and, in some 

cases, has revoked prior policies designed to do so,’’ end of quote. 

Instead of confronting this existential threat with science and ingenuity, the President is denying the threat and the problem exists 

and it continues. He revoked President Obama’s Climate Action 

Plan and is now creating a new White House panel to counter the 

idea that burning fossil fuels is harming the planet. 

Inadequate strategy for cybersecurity. Today’s report also warns 

that the Trump administration lacks a comprehensive strategy to 

address cybersecurity threats across Federal Government. 

Inexplicably, the President eliminated the Cybersecurity Coordinator position at the White House last year—these are the facts— 

leaving our Federal Government without any White House leader 

devoted to protecting us with regard to cybersecurity. 

The GAO report calls on Federal agencies to take, quote, ‘‘urgent 

actions,’’ end of quote, to address this threat, which could affect our 

Nation’s most closely held secrets, our energy grid, our banks, our 

communications systems, and nearly every aspect of Americans’ 

lives. 

Today’s report also warns that the Trump administration, quote, 

‘‘has not established measures to ensure the quality of background 

investigations and adjudications,’’ end of quote, for security clearances and faces—listen to this one—and faces a current backlog of 

565,000 security clearance applications. Let that sink in. 

Instead of fixing these problems, the President, unfortunately, 

has undermined the security clearance process. According to recent 

reports, he ignored the concerns of his own White House advisors, 

career national security officials, to give his son-in-law, Jared 

Kushner, a security clearance. 

Today’s report also highlights the risks facing the upcoming census, which is of special interest to our committee. The report highlights the rising costs, hundreds of unresolved security weaknesses, 

a scaled-back testing under the Trump administration that, quote, 

‘‘increases the risk that innovations in IT systems will not function 

as intended during the 2020 census,’’ end of quote. I didn’t say 

that; GAO said it. 

Today’s report also highlights the epidemic of drug addiction in 

this country, which is one of this committee’s highest priorities. 

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 

70,000—70,000 people—the number of people that will fit into 

Ravens stadium in my district—70,000 Americans, died from drug 

overdoses in 2017. About 191 people die every day in this country. 

Yet the President had no—no—national drug control strategy or 

White House Drug Czar for the past two years. The GAO has identified this as a, quote, ‘‘emerging issue requiring close attention,’’ 

end of quote. 
3 

We’re holding a hearing on this topic tomorrow with the Director 

of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and experts from 

GAO. 

Today’s report provides a roadmap for improving our Federal 

Government, but GAO’s recommendations can be turned into effective reforms only with the cooperation and leadership from the 

President and executive branch agencies. Unfortunately, President 

Trump and the White House have refused to even cooperate with 

GAO—refusing to cooperate with them—so they can get—I want 

you to talk about that, because that’s important. 

If we can’t get information, we can’t do our job. If we can’t get 

information, we can’t hold the executive branch accountable, which 

we have sworn to do and which is mandated under the Constitution of the United States of America. 

Last year, GAO sent an extraordinary letter to the White House 

Counsel expressing concern that White House officials quote—listen to this—‘‘would not respond to inquiries or otherwise engage 

with GAO staff during the course of our reviews.’’ Wow. The letter 

noted, and I quote, ‘‘This approach represents a clear departure 

from past practice,’’ end of quote. 

Nevertheless, the obstruction has continued. Last month, GAO 

issued a report finding the President spent $13.6 million of taxpayer money on trips to Mar-a-Lago. The White House refused— 

refused—to provide any information to assist with GAO’s review. 

The GAO is part of the legislative branch, and the White House 

refusing to cooperate with GAO’s request is an insult to this Congress. We will be following up directly with the White House, of 

course. 

I look forward to hearing today from Mr. Dodaro on each of these 

issues and many others. I also look forward to continuing to work 

closely with GAO and our colleagues to hold our Federal Government accountable to the American people. 

And, with that, I yield to the distinguished ranking member of 

our committee, Mr. Jordan of Ohio. 

[Prepared Statement of Chairman Cummings is available on: follows: https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/gaos-2019- 

high-risk-report] 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this hearing. 

Mr. Dodaro, good to see you again. You’ve been here numerous 

times over the years, and we appreciate your work and you taking 

the time to brief us today. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine government programs that the Government Accountability Office has determined 

as, quote, ‘‘high risk’’—that is, programs that are faulty and risk 

substantial loss of taxpayer money. 

‘‘Substantial’’ means at risk of losing at least a minimum of $1 

billion. That certainly is a lot of money, but it is still an out-of-date 

figure. There are so many big government programs that now meet 

this threshold that GAO cannot solely rely on that criteria. 

This topic is at the core of this committee’s mission. It is oversight of Federal dollars and the examination of mismanagement by 

the government. 
4 

As you have said before, Mr. Chairman, this committee should 

focus on the issues that affect the American people every single 

day, not those that only serve to fill campaign war chests. What 

we have gathered here today to discuss is just that—examples of 

waste, fraud, and abuse that affect everyday Americans. 

The list should be our marching orders. Thirty-five examples of 

government inefficiency. Unfortunately, many of these are not new 

to us. Five who have been included on the list since its conception 

in 1990. There are some agencies that just—they got on and they 

have never got off. 

Overall, only 26 programs have ever been removed. Congressional oversight is the central theme to success, and congressional 

oversight has led to over $350 billion being saved over the last decade. 

It’s not as if it is extremely difficult for a program to be removed 

from the list. GAO clearly outlines what needs to be done to 

achieve their objective. And this hearing should help us better understand these recommendations to ensure programs are removed. 

With hundreds of recommendations still open, it is clear that the 

convoluted and extensive bureaucracy accepts the status quo. Agencies and Congress must do better, and there is much to be done. 

Progress has been palpable since the new administration took office, especially at the Department of Defense. Two DOD programs 

were removed, including one, supply chain management, that had 

been on the list since 1990. So there’s one who made it. Been there 

forever in our Defense Department and now no longer on the high 

risk list. 

Supply chain management is simply knowing how much stuff to 

buy and where it is. This has been an issue for 30 years. Removing 

this is an impressive step for this administration and will lead to 

a safer, more secure, and more efficient military. 

In the past two years, another three DOD programs have improved, and I am encouraged by these improvements, but I’m also 

aware that this is just the beginning. Federal agencies continue to 

mismanage and waste money of hardworking Americans that we 

all get the privilege of representing. 

Finally, I look forward to our discussion today and continued 

progress, but I’d also point out that I think this is exactly what this 

committee is supposed to do. Even though we’ve taken ‘‘government’’ out of the name of the committee, we are supposed to provide oversight of government agencies. This goes to the heart and 

the soul and the core of what the Oversight—Government Oversight Committee is supposed to be doing. 

So, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for having us here today, 

and, Mr. Dodaro, for your testimony. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Jordan is available on: https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/gaos-2019-high-risk-report ] 

Chairman CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Now I want to welcome the Honorable Gene Dodaro, and I want 

to thank him again for participating in today’s hearing. 

Comptroller General Dodaro, if you and your staff would please 

rise, I will begin by swearing you in. 
5 

Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give 

is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 

you God? 

Thank you very much. You may be seated. 

Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

I want to thank you very much. The microphones are sensitive, 

so please speak directly into them. Without objection, your written 

statement will be made part of the record. 

With that, Comptroller General Dodaro, you are now recognized 

to give an oral presentation of your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. GENE L. DODARO, COMPTROLLER 

GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. DODARO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon to you, Ranking Member Congressman Jordan, members of 

the committee. It’s a pleasure to be here to discuss the latest update to GAO’s High Risk List. 

This high risk program continues to be a valuable congressional 

tool for oversight and produces tangible benefits for the American 

people, as both, Mr. Chairman, you and Ranking Member Jordan 

outlined in your opening statements. 

I’m pleased to report that, of the 35 areas, 7 have made progress 

since our last update in 2017. Four of the seven, Congressman Jordan, were DOD areas. I’m pleased with the management team over 

there. They’re doing a good job addressing some of these issues. 

Two have progressed far enough for us to take them off the list. 

DOD supply chain management. As a result of improvements, 

there are millions of dollars being saved now in inventory management, asset visibility, material distribution. And it’s improved 

DOD’s ability to carry out its mission, because it needs to have the 

supplies at the right time at the right place to do a good job. 

The other area is mitigating gaps in weather satellites. We were 

very concerned about this years ago because it would diminish the 

ability to get long-term and short-term weather forecasts, which 

are so necessary to protect life and property. 

As a result of being on the High Risk List and actions taken by 

the Congress, NOAA has launched a new satellite, and it’s already 

operational, and it’s producing better weather information than 

what we’ve had before. And DOD, which operates the other polar 

orbiting satellite, is scheduled to release a new satellite within the 

next couple years. So this is back on track. 

Now, unfortunately, many of the areas on that 35 list haven’t 

really changed that much since our last update in 2017. There have 

been some improvements but not enough to change the rating 

against our five criteria for coming off the list, which are leadership commitment, the ability to have the capacity, the resources, 

and the people, have an action plan with milestones and measures 

to do a monitoring effort, and actually demonstrate some progress 

in that area. 

Three areas have regressed, which we’re concerned about. One is 

NASA’s acquisitions. Second is EPA’s assessments of toxic chemi-
6 

cals. And the third is limiting the Federal Government’s fiscal exposure by better managing climate-change risk. 

Now, we have added two areas in the update. One is governmentwide personnel security clearances, as has been mentioned. 

We added that in January 2018, and at that time the backlog was 

700,000. So the backlog has been lowered to 565,000 now, so we’re 

making some progress in that regard. 

Second, what we’re adding today is the acquisition programs at 

the Veterans Administration, their outdated policies and practices. 

They haven’t been able to save a lot of money. It’s one of the largest procurement budgets in the government. Many purchases are 

being made under emergency situations when they should be able 

to more routinely identify what kind of medical supplies and services that they need for the hospital. So that’s an important area. 

There are a number of areas that I want to single out for this 

committee that I think are very important. 

One is the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. The multiemployer portion of that pension system is likely to be insolvent by 

2025. That means about 11 million Americans will only be able to 

likely receive $2,000 a year for a pension. This is not adequate, so 

that’s a big problem. 

Second is the Federal role in housing finance. Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac are still under Federal conservatorship from the global financial crisis. Ginnie Mae’s portfolio now is over $2 trillion. 

The FHA portfolio is $1.2 trillion. A lot of lending now is made by 

non-banks, which are not very well regulated, and all the risk has 

moved to the Federal Government. Seventy-one percent of the 

loans now for individual mortgages are supported by the Federal 

Government either directly or indirectly. 

Cybersecurity needs to be addressed. We did a special update 

last year, and we testified before two subcommittees of this committee on the urgent actions that are needed to be required in that 

area. 

Veterans’ healthcare remains a problematic area, as well as a lot 

of improper payments across Medicare, Medicaid; the earned income tax credit; and, of course, the tax gap, which is very significant. 

So I thank you for the opportunity to be here, Mr. Chairman, and 

I look forward to answering all your questions. 

[For Prepared Statement of Mr. Dodaro, see Appendix:] 

Chairman CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

I will now yield to Mr. Rouda for five minutes. 

Mr. ROUDA. Thank you. 

Mr. Dodaro, I wanted to ask you about one of those most important issues addressed in the GAO’s high risk report, climate 

change. 

Over the past two years, the U.S. Global Change Research Program released its ‘‘Fourth National Climate Assessment,’’ which is 

the Federal Government’s definitive statement on climate science. 

Volume I of the assessment confirmed that climate change is real, 

it is happening now, and humans are the primary cause. 

Volume II looked at the serious impacts of climate change and 

projected that rising temperatures, flooding, and extreme weather 

caused by climate change will result in economic losses of, quote, 
7 

‘‘hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of this century,’’ unquote. 

Mr. Dodaro, do you agree that climate change is occurring? 

Mr. DODARO. Our work relies on the Global Climate Change Research Program and the National Academy studies that have occurred that have concluded that climate change is having a significant effect on the economy and on environmental issues. And based 

on the result of that, that’s one of the reasons we added it to the 

High Risk List. 

But our focus is on limiting the Federal Government’s fiscal exposure to climate change. You know, since 2005, the Federal Government’s had to outlay close to half a trillion dollars to recover 

from disasters. We believe there needs to be more focus on adaptation and resilience-building in the first place to mitigate these substantial disasters. 

Mr. ROUDA. So talk about that in twofold: one, the cost of doing 

nothing, if you can talk a little bit about that—— 

Mr. DODARO. Sure. 

Mr. ROUDA [continuing]. and the cost of actually doing something. Because my sense is it costs a lot less to do something 

versus doing nothing. 

Mr. DODARO. The cost of inaction is sort of incalculable, but it’s 

very high. Let me put it that way. 

The National Institute of Building Sciences has estimated that, 

for every dollar spent on hazard mitigation and resilience-building, 

it will save $6 down the road. It also estimates every dollar spent 

to institute new international building code requirements could 

save $11 down the road. So, clearly, there’s a lot of evidence to say 

that if you provide more money up front. 

We’ve seen that very recently in the hurricanes that happened 

in 2017, and you see the difference between what happened to Florida compared to Puerto Rico. Florida was well-prepared. They had 

built a lot of resilience efforts in over the years. Puerto Rico really 

had not done that. And the devastation was, you know, almost 

complete in Puerto Rico, where Florida was able to recover, you 

know, with difficulty, obviously, but it makes a real difference. 

With disasters predicted to be more frequent and more severe, 

the Federal Government needs to do this. That’s why we put this 

on in 2013. 

Mr. ROUDA. Okay. 

The Department of Defense has identified climate change as one 

of the top threats. And I’d like to ask you, how is climate change 

impacting our national security? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, it’s twofold. 

One is that it is affecting DOD’s own operations, both domestically and internationally. You know, a lot of their facilities are in 

coastal areas, and with rising sea levels, it poses difficulties. 

They’ve already had some experiences. The Hurricane Florence in 

2018 caused over $3 billion of damage to Camp Lejeune in North 

Carolina. Hurricane Michael caused the Air Force base down there 

over $3 billion in damage. So it’s affecting DOD right now. 

The other aspect, though, from the national security standpoint 

is how it might be changing global migration patterns and how 

droughts and other things might be destabilizing factors as it re-
8 

lates to the social and economic and political status of countries—— 

Mr. ROUDA. Right. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. which could then create some national 

security concerns. 

Mr. ROUDA. Yes, there are some suggestions that if we do not 

combat climate change, at the current rate, that there will be 200 

million climate-change refugees by the year 2050, the largest mass 

migration of human beings since World War II. 

Let me ask you also about—as you know, we are the only country now not part of the Paris climate accord. And President Trump 

is apparently trying to set up a new White House panel, led by a 

climate denier, to counter the clear findings of the National Climate Assessment and National Threat Assessment. 

Do you think that the White House panel that denies climate 

change will help the Federal Government better manage climatechange risk? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, you know, we do our work based on facts. 

And this group hasn’t met yet, and I don’t know really much about 

it, so I, you know, reserve judgment until they produce something. 

The President certainly has a right to get advise from whoever he 

chooses. But there’s a lot of studies already done by the Federal 

Government and the National Academy of Sciences. And so, you 

know—but I’ll reserve judgment until they produce something. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. The gentleman’s time has—— 

Mr. ROUDA. Okay. For the sake of America and the rest of the 

country, thank you. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Hice. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I get to my questions, I’d like to just take a moment, Mr. 

Chairman, to personally say thank you. I think we had a pretty 

contentious hearing last week, and I just want to say thank you 

for your leadership and how you led this committee with fairness 

and reasonableness. 

Particularly as it related to Mr. Meadows, I just appreciate the 

way you handled that and really set a standard for this committee 

to deal with issues and not personalities. And I just felt it appropriate to publicly say thank you for your leadership in that regard. 

Mr. Dodaro, thank you again for your leadership as well. It’s always good to see you. Appreciate all that you do for the American 

people. 

As you well know and mentioned a while ago, this committee has 

been active in the past dealing with cyber issues and the OPM and 

Equifax and all these types of issues that we’ve had. 

In July of last year, we had a hearing with you about an interim 

high risk update on Federal cybersecurity, and we discussed in the 

nature of the cyber threat and the role of the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Teams. 

Just curious how that is going, if we’re seeing improvements. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, I’d like to bring up Nick Marinos, who’s our 

cybersecurity expert in that area. 

You know, still, there’s a lot of room for improvement in this 

area. I’m very concerned about it. The actions might have been 
9 

being taken, but they’re not being addressed with the sense of urgency I believe is needed. 

But Nick can give you details, Congressman. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. 

Nick? 

Mr. MARINOS. Mr. Congressman, I think we would say that, you 

know, as mentioned in our update last year, one of the four challenges that we highlighted was the important role and responsibility that Department of Homeland Security has for organizing 

Federal Government efforts to protect their systems from cybersecurity threats. 

We have seen some progress, for example, in addressing many of 

the recommendations that we’ve made. We’ve made nearly 3,000 

recommendations over the last 10 years related to cybersecurity 

issues. We’ve seen that number come from 1,000 down to 700. But 

that still represents a very substantial amount of work that has to 

be done. 

Mr. HICE. So what is the holdup? Who’s best to answer that? I 

mean, what’s going on? Seven hundred, like you said, is still a lot. 

What’s the issue? 

Mr. DODARO. I just don’t think there’s enough management attention at the top levels of the departments and agencies of the 

Federal Government and across Federal Government to deal with 

this. 

There are a lot of plans that are put in place—and I want to 

commend the administration; they’ve added some national strategies—but there’s no detailed implementation plans of what kind of 

milestones, when are we going to have these fixes, how can we tell 

if we’re making progress, what are the resources needed in order 

to address these issues. 

You know, I put cybersecurity on the governmentwide High Risk 

List, first time we ever said anything governmentwide, in 1997. I 

mean, I’ve been on this quest for a long time. 

We’ve expanded it to critical infrastructure protection, as the 

chairman mentioned, electricity grid, the markets. I mean, we have 

a big issue. Congress also needs to pass comprehensive privacy legislation, which we’ve recommended as well. 

But in the Federal departments and agencies, year after year 

after year, there are the same material weaknesses in their information technology systems. Now, a lot of this is—a millstone 

around their neck—a lot of legacy systems. Of the $90 billion every 

year spent on IT, 75 percent of it goes to support legacy systems. 

I mean, some of these systems have been around since the 1960’s 

and 1970’s, and so they inherently have vulnerabilities that address them. So we have to replace the legacy systems. 

This committee’s had some leadership in that area and the modernization fund. Now they have working capital funds with the intention of replacing legacy systems. And this committee’s been focused on trying to make sure chief information officers have the 

proper authorities. 

Mr. HICE. I share your concern. We have Fort Gordon, the Cyber 

Command headquarters, in our district, and this has become a 

huge issue to me as well. 
10 

Regarding, something a little different, the IRS dealing with so 

much sensitive taxpayer information, what’s the latest on that 

front? 

Mr. DODARO. Do you know? 

Mr. MARINOS. With respect to the taxpayer information? 

Mr. HICE. And the cybersecurity issue, the threat that’s there. 

Mr. MARINOS. With respect to IRS’s own systems, we continue to 

see deficiencies as we do our annual evaluation of their financial 

statement activities. 

And we recognize that taxpayer information represents a very 

important element in performing IRS’s mission. It’s personal information about every individual, and so it represents a significant 

risk. And so it does require IRS to be very careful with the actions 

it takes with respect to that data. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Hice, I thank you for your kind words. I really mean 

that. 

Mr. Dodaro, I’m going to ask you a few questions. 

GAO is an extension of Congress. You are Congress’s investigative arm. Is that right? 

Mr. DODARO. That’s correct. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. And we rely on you to do thorough and detailed reports and investigations like the one we are discussing 

today. 

But your work and, by extension, our work is frustrated when 

you did not get the cooperation you need. So I want to ask you 

about multiple refusals by the Trump White House to respond to 

GAO’s legitimate requests. 

I have a letter here that was sent from the General Counsel at 

GAO, Thomas Armstrong, to the White House Counsel, Don 

McGahn. This letter was sent on May 9, 2018. It says this, and I 

quote: 

‘‘I write to express concern about the policy of certain White 

House officers regarding communication with the Government Accountability Office. Specifically, I understand that attorneys from 

your office and the National Security Council will not respond to 

inquiries or otherwise engage with the GAO staff during the course 

of our reviews. This approach represents a clear departure from 

past practice,’’ end of quote. 

Mr. Dodaro, I’ve been on this committee for 23 years now, and 

I’ve never seen a letter like this. Why did you—why did the GAO 

send this letter? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, you know, typically, our work involves examining government programs and agencies, and, generally, we get 

good cooperation in conducting about 800 audits a year for the Congress. 

Historically, you know, from time to time, we have to contact the 

White House in a few instances. And, generally, over the years, 

historically, while we didn’t always get cooperation from the White 

House staff, we at least were able to have good communications 

with them. 

In this case, you know, they were clear from the beginning they 

weren’t even going to talk to us about these issues. And so we were 
11 

very concerned that we were not at least having lines of communication where we could try to work out some accommodations. 

Now, since we sent the letter, we’ve continued to have conversations with them, and we made some headway in dealing with the 

National Security Council. We actually have a meeting next week 

to talk to them about a current review. We’re looking at the International Atomic Energy Administration. And a couple other instances, National Security Council has, you know, agreed to give us 

some information. 

But the White House Counsel’s Office has not. We’ll continue to 

talk with them on an as-needed basis going forward and enlist the 

support of Congress. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. Let me switch to another example. Last 

month, you issued a report that I requested with Representative 

Speier. You reported that President Trump spent $13.6 million of 

taxpayer money in just his first four trips to Mar-a-Lago. 

However, in that same report, GAO also said this, and I quote: 

‘‘We contacted White House Counsel’s Office in April 2017 and January 2018 to solicit information from the Executive Office of the 

President related to coordinating travel for the President and any 

costs associated with White House staff traveling with the President. As of January 2019, the White House had not responded to 

our request for information.’’ 

Is that what your report said? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. You also issued another report I requested 

on security protocols at Mar-a-Lago. Your report said: GAO contacted the White House Counsel’s Office in May 2017 and January 

2018, but—and I quote—as of January 2019, the White House 

Counsel’s Office had not responded to our request for information. 

So GAO tried to reach the White House for almost two years 

about these reports and received no response? 

Mr. DODARO. That’s correct. 

What I also, though, did with the—I asked the teams to make 

sure we sent the draft reports over there, you know, once we complete our work at the agencies. And we got a lot of the information 

we needed from the agencies. 

There are two parts of this. One, you know, the White House is 

not taking advantage of the opportunity to give us their perspective 

on these issues and any relevant information. 

But even though they didn’t give us the information, I made sure 

they had an opportunity to comment on the draft reports, thereby 

giving them a last chance to give us additional information if they, 

you know, felt compelled to do it. And they received the drafts. 

They took custody of the drafts, but they didn’t provide any comments on the draft reports. But I didn’t want them surprised. 

You know, we’re going to follow our procedures and be fair and 

nonpartisan in our approach, but we did not receive any information. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. Did that surprise you? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. Although, in all fairness, I mean, we’ve had 

problems in prior administrations when it comes to the White 

House. I mean, there’s just a unique set of situations there. 
12 

But what surprised us this time was, you know, not even want 

to have discussions. You know, in the past, we’ve at least had discussions. Sometimes they’ve been contentious discussions. But, you 

know, we usually are able to work through things. But, in some 

cases, you know, the White House didn’t do it. 

I mean, our most famous instance is when we actually sued Vice 

President Cheney to get information years ago. Now, we didn’t prevail on that, but, you know, these things occur. But at least in that 

case, they were talking to us. You know, in this case, there hasn’t 

been any, you know, meaningful contributions. 

Although, I am, as I said earlier, you know, pleased that we’ve, 

at least with the National Security Council—because they have responsibilities now for coordinating cybersecurity. So if we can’t get 

information from them about how they’ve taken over the responsibilities from the Cybersecurity Coordinator position that was 

eliminated, we’re not going to be able to inform the Congress on 

how this administration is—clarify its roles and responsibilities in 

cybersecurity. I will be very concerned about that. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Since President Trump took office, about how many times has 

GAO requested information from the White House Counsel’s Office? 

Mr. DODARO. Five. Five times. Five different audit engagements. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. And as of today, has GAO received information from the White House Counsel’s Office in response to any 

of those requests? 

Mr. DODARO. No. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. Very well. 

My time is up. I yield now to the ranking member. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dodaro, have previous Presidents traveled as well? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, many times, back to their hometown or wherever. 

I mean, the chairman talked about—I think the figure you gave 

was $13 million that President Trump has spent traveling to Mara-Lago. Do you have any idea how much President Obama spent 

traveling to Hawaii? 

Mr. DODARO. We have those figures that I could provide—— 

Mr. JORDAN. How about President Bush when he went back to 

Texas? 

Mr. DODARO. I’m not sure we did Bush. I know we did Clinton’s 

travel. 

Mr. JORDAN. Clinton when he went to Martha’s Vineyard? 

Mr. DODARO. Pardon me? 

Mr. JORDAN. Clinton when he traveled to Martha’s Vineyard? 

You probably got President Clinton when he traveled there? 

Mr. DODARO. We had a request to look at—he had a trip to Africa, you know, years ago. So it’s different kinds of trips. But I’d be 

happy to provide all those to the committee. 

Mr. JORDAN. I just—the perception is that this is the only time 

it’s happened, that someone traveled to their home or vacation 

spot. Previous Presidents have done this time and time again. 
13 

Mr. DODARO. That’s correct. And we’ve done studies on most of 

the Presidents. 

Mr. JORDAN. Can you define ‘‘high risk’’ for me? When you say 

‘‘high risk,’’ define what that is. 

Mr. DODARO. We have published criteria we put out in 2000 

which is—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Give me the shorthand version. 

Mr. DODARO. But it’s basically—I mean, you mentioned one of 

the elements we consider is more than a billion dollars at risk. 

Mr. JORDAN. Right. 

Mr. DODARO. But we also consider whether or not there’s public 

safety, security issues, national security issues, homeland security 

issues, the potential impact on the economy. And so there’s a lot 

of qualitative factors that we consider as well. 

We also consider whether the area’s already receiving attention 

or not, and we try to focus our list—— 

Mr. JORDAN. On improvement. Yes. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. on improvement—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Sure. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. but focus attention on areas that are 

not getting a lot of attention. 

Mr. JORDAN. Not getting a lot of attention, still faulty, haven’t 

improved. Tell me those—I think you said there were five or six 

that have been on the list since 1990. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. So since you’ve started this thing, some people 

started there and they have never got off. 

Mr. DODARO. That’s correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. And who are those agencies? 

Mr. DODARO. The ones I can recall off the top of my head—and 

I’ll get the complete list—is the Medicare program; tax administration issues have been an issue, both from an initial standpoint of 

the tax gap as well as now we added identity theft concerns; DOD 

weapons systems are on the list; and the other two are DOE, Department of Energy, contract management—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Yep. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing].—and NASA—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. acquisition management. 

Mr. JORDAN. Those are the five I had. But the first two are the 

ones that I think jump out to me. Because you got the IRS, which 

just about every single American has to interface with, you know, 

particularly this time of year for most families, and then you got 

Medicare, which is pretty darn important as well. And they have 

been on the list forever. 

And we got some folks in the Congress who want a big expansion 

of Medicare. In fact, they call it Medicare for All. And yet there’s 

all kinds of improper payments and all kinds of problems, and 

that’s been the case since 1990, right? 

Mr. DODARO. There’s been issues, yes. That’s why they’re on the 

list. Exactly right. 

Mr. JORDAN. And what about the IRS? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, the IRS—— 
14 

Mr. JORDAN. This is largely the tax gap, right? People who owe 

taxes who aren’t paying them, and—— 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN [continuing]. money due to the United States Treasury. 

Mr. DODARO. Absolutely. The current estimate of the gap between taxes owed and taxes paid is about net tax gap of $406 billion. That’s an annual figure. So I’ve been very concerned about 

that. We think IRS—— 

Mr. JORDAN. What’s the improper payment level—I’ll come back 

to the IRS in a minute—the improper payment level on Medicare? 

Mr. DODARO. It’s $48 billion. $48 billion for this last fiscal year. 

Mr. JORDAN. You’re talking half a trillion dollars, right? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, when you add—— 

Mr. JORDAN. When you add those two together. 

Mr. DODARO. When you add all the—governmentwide, it’s 

over—— 

Mr. JORDAN. I’m just talking about these top two programs. 

Mr. DODARO. The top two programs are Medicare and Medicaid. 

Mr. JORDAN. I’m talking about the IRS and Medicare, two that 

have been on the list since 1990. The tax gap at the IRS, and the 

Medicare faulty payments, those two total up to half a trillion dollars. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. No, you’re right. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. That’s significant. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. All right. 

Mr. DODARO. It’s material. 

Mr. JORDAN. I have to run to the floor and give my speech, but 

I wanted to just get that in. 

If I could, Mr. Chairman, I’ll yield back, and Mr. Comer is going 

to sit in for us. Thank you. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. All right. Fine. 

Before I leave—I’ve got to go to the floor, too, to speak on H.R. 

1. Mr. Dodaro, I will be back. And I’m going to ask Ms. Hill, our 

vice chair, to take over from here. All right? 

Mr. DODARO. Okay. 

Chairman CUMMINGS. But, again, I say to you, thank you very 

much. And hopefully you’ll get the kind of cooperation that you 

need to do your job. We don’t want to be paying people who can’t 

get the information they need to carry out their job. That’s all 

they’re trying to do. 

With that, we will now go to Ms. Kelly for five minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And welcome. 

I’m concerned that the VA is failing to make progress on reforms 

that are desperately needed to better serve our veterans. 

Today’s report finds that these problems start at the top. Your 

report cites, and I quote, ‘‘Leadership instability at the VA as a 

major risk factor. As of last July, the positions of Secretary, Under 

Secretary for Health, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer, and the Deputy Under Secretary for Health for Community 

Care were all vacant.’’ 
15 

Mr. Dodaro or whoever you designate, how has unstable leadership impacted the VA’s ability to serve veterans? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. I’ve been joined by Ms. Nikki Clowers, who’s 

our healthcare expert. But I’ll take a first shot at that. 

You know, since we put the VA on the High Risk List, I’ve met 

with three different Secretaries: Secretary McDonald, Shulkin, and 

now Secretary Wilkie. So you’ve had—and we put them on the 

healthcare in 2015. So that shows you, at the very top of the Department, how much turnover there’s been there. And you mention 

problems throughout the Department. 

As a result of that, we really—the VA, to this day, does not yet 

have a good plan for addressing the fundamental causes of why we 

put them on the High Risk List. They’re working on it. They have 

a modernization approach. I’ve met with Secretary Wilkie. He’s 

brought us his top people in and told them to work with our people, 

which I’ve said we will provide them as much help as we can to 

do that. 

But it’s prevented them from dealing with some very serious underlying management challenges of accountability, oversight, updated policies and procedures, good training programs. They don’t 

have good resource allocation issues in a lot of cases. So it’s been 

a significant problem. 

Nikki, do you want to—— 

Ms. CLOWERS. I would just add to what you were saying, Representative Kelly, the vacancies still remain a problem. There’s 

about 12 senior leadership positions that remain vacant as of February. 

And when you have those vacancies and not clear policies or 

clearly defined roles and responsibilities for those in acting positions, it can cause confusion or for activities not to move forward. 

And we’ve seen that in some of our work, such as suicide prevention outreach, where, when there were vacancies in those leadership positions, efforts stalled. 

Ms. KELLY. So there’s been a confirmed Secretary for the last few 

months, but you’re still citing leadership problems. What do you 

think that’s about? It’s just not enough time to get things in order, 

or—— 

Mr. DODARO. Well, I would say, first of all, VA has some of the 

most serious management challenges in the Federal Government. 

You know, we look across the entire Federal Government. And so 

the Secretary, no matter who it is, how well-intentioned that person will be, it’s going to take time to address these issues. So I 

think you have to give the current Secretary some time. 

I’ve met with him. Our people are working with him. I’m hopeful. 

I’m hopeful, in this case, we’ll see progress. But it’ll be some time 

before they can right the ship there. 

Ms. KELLY. One thing I’m particularly concerned about is IT, because I was the ranking member, with Chairman Hurd, last year 

on the IT Subcommittee. And your report says the Department has 

had four different CIOs in the last two years. According to the report, the frequent turnover in this position raises concern about 

VA’s ability to address the Department’s IT challenges. 

What should the VA to do to fix this persistent leadership problem? 
16 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. Well, they have a—I believe they have a confirmed CIO now in place, recently. So that’s a good step. But they 

need to fix a lot of their fundamental IT problems over there. 

They’ve got a huge contract in place now to produce electronic 

healthcare records that can be comparable with DOD. You know, 

we’ve been tracking this whole electronic healthcare record situation for 20 years over there. And VA and DOD still don’t have either good systems themselves or the ability to share records between the two agencies. So if somebody leaves Active Duty service, 

their record doesn’t go immediately to VA; you have to sort of start 

over. And this is a huge problem. 

This is expected to take many years, to get these systems in 

place. So they’re going to need stable leadership over there, better 

disciplined management practices and IT best practices. That’s why 

I’ve offered to have our experts explain to them what kind of best 

practices that we’ve seen that they should put in place over there. 

So I’m hopeful they’ll be able to do it. 

But they have one of the largest IT budgets in the government. 

They’ve got about a $4 billion budget, as you know, in information 

technology. So they need to have the right kind of work force over 

there and the right kind of systems and processes in place. 

Ms. KELLY. I was going to ask you, are you looking—— 

Ms. HILL.[Presiding.] The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

Ms. KELLY [continuing]. at the issue, and you apparently are. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Ms. KELLY. So thank you. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. We’d be happy to give you more details. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. 

Ms. HILL. I’d like to recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. 

Comer. 

Mr. COMER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Dodaro, I want to focus my questions on oversight of food 

safety. 

As more and more food is imported from abroad, do you anticipate more strain on Customs and Border Protection as it enforces 

regulations on goods flowing into the country? 

Because, you know, when we talk about national security, obviously, there are many of us in Congress, apparently not a majority, 

that are serious about border security. But one of the aspects of 

border security and national security that we fail to hear a lot 

about is our food supply. There’s no greater issue to our national 

security than the need to have a safe, abundant supply of food. 

So I guess, what do you see in the future with respect to strain 

on border security? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. Well, food safety’s been on our list for a long 

time. 

Mr. COMER. Uh-huh. 

Mr. DODARO. Our system that we have now is very fragmented. 

There are about 30 different laws, 15 different Federal departments and agencies that have responsibility for food safety, FDA 

and USDA being the 2 most important areas over time. And there 

is no comprehensive governmentwide plan. Imports have grown 

dramatically over time, particularly in seafood areas, but about 60 
17 

percent of fruits and vegetables right now are imported as well. 

And that’s only on a trend to continue in the future. 

And I think, you know, the impact as it relates to the Customs 

and Border Patrol is they’re a part of the system, but, actually, I 

think, from their standpoint, the other big issue that’s on our High 

Risk List is medical products and food safety. You know, 80 percent 

of the ingredients for prescription drugs come from foreign sources, 

40 percent of finished drugs. And that’s where we’re having a lot 

of problem with the fentanyl and other areas. 

So both food safety, as you’re appropriately pointing out, but also 

other safeties of prescription drugs, medical devices, and others. 

So, you know, we’re in a global marketplace now, and our systems were set up for domestic production, domestic oversight. So 

we’ve been working with the Congress for a number of years to 

now get the agencies more focused on other country systems as a 

means of trying to make sure that there’s at least first line of defense there, and then we can also, you know, do our part to handle 

these areas. 

I’m, you know, very disappointed in the progress that we’ve made 

in the food safety area. You continue to see, you know, thousands 

of people who have foodborne illnesses every year. 

Mr. COMER. Right. 

Mr. DODARO. Many people die in the year. 

And, recently, there was the big recall of blood pressure medicine 

because of problems in production in China and India. You know, 

most of our prescription drugs come from those two countries. 

Mr. COMER. I believe President Trump has proposed consolidating all the food-safety efforts under one agency. Would that correct the problem with waste of duplicate programs? Or would 

that—how would that affect—— 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. Well, we’ve called for such comprehensive reform in the past. And, actually, you know, based on my discussions 

with OMB, they were informed by our work in this area. 

Now, obviously, a lot depends on exactly how that’s done, how it’s 

implemented, and a number of areas. But there needs to be, at a 

minimum, a governmentwide comprehensive plan—— 

Mr. COMER. Right. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. you know? And, right now, the FDA 

and Agriculture and these other agencies share a little bit of information, but it’s on a situation-specific issue. 

Mr. COMER. You’re exactly right. That’s been my experience. The 

FDA and the USDA, they communicate a little bit but not a lot. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. And they have very different approaches—— 

Mr. COMER. Absolutely. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. that they take to food safety. 

And so, you know, our goal—we’ve been pushing for a reorganization for a while, but, at a minimum, we need a governmentwide plan. There used to be a food safety council, but that hasn’t 

met for a number of years as well. So that’s a problem. 

And Mr. Gaffigan here, Mark Gaffigan, is our expert in this area. 

Let me just ask if he wants to add anything. 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. I would just say it’s going to get more complicated. I was just at the ag forum last week, and they talked 

about our population getting close to 9 billion people by 2050 and 
18 

the need to come up with a food—FDA and USDA are the two 

main agencies. They talked about having, currently, 17 different 

MOUs just to try to coordinate on. 

And one of the reasons it’s going to become more and more complicated is the use of technologies. We’re going to start seeing genetically engineered beef, talking about those things. And there’s 

a lot of regulatory uncertainty about that. 

And it’s a global market. Other countries are doing different 

things. And we sort of need to get our act together, try and make 

sure there’s some regulatory certainty so we can meet that need for 

safe, reliable food. 

Mr. COMER. Thank you. 

Thank you. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. 

I’d like to recognize Mr. Raskin from Maryland. 

Mr. RASKIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Dodaro, welcome. 

You run the supreme audit agency for the U.S. Government, 

which is a $4 trillion enterprise, one of the most complex institutional entities on Earth. 

Your high risk designation program identifies government programs that have unique vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and 

mismanagement. And in 2018 you added the personnel security 

clearance process to your High Risk List. 

The GAO’s report states, and I quote, ‘‘A high-quality personnel 

security clearance process minimizes the risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information and helps ensure that information 

about individuals with criminal histories or other questionable behavior is identified and assessed.’’ 

Now, I just want to you ask a few obvious questions first. Do you 

think that a high-quality security clearance process should identify 

concerns about a candidate’s suitability before they receive classified information? 

Mr. DODARO. Absolutely. 

Mr. RASKIN. Do you think a high-quality security clearance process should assess whether an applicant is susceptible to inappropriate influence or blackmail from a foreign government or another 

third party? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Mr. RASKIN. Why is it important that investigators and adjudicators assess these concerns before a security clearance is granted to 

an applicant? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, it’s very important because, once a security 

clearance is granted, it’s not updated until several years later. So 

you’re entrusting that person to protect the information at the appropriate level, whether it’s Secret, Top Secret. There can be compartmentalized secret information—— 

Mr. RASKIN. And kind of things could happen if a security clearance is granted to someone who really shouldn’t have it? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, you’ve seen episodes of that with, you know, 

Edward Snowden and other people. I mean, a lot of the secrets can 

be, you know, unveiled to the public. 

There’s also possibilities of putting people at risk at the intelligence communities and law enforcement agencies. I mean, there’s 
19 

a lot of potential problems that could occur. That’s why we put it 

on the list, because there’s such a backlog. 

You know, it used to be—I mean, after September 11, 2001, more 

things became classified. And, most recently, more things are becoming more classified. So the government really didn’t adapt to 

having a better infrastructure to do security clearances. 

I might note also, I’ve been joined by Cathleen Berrick, who’s our 

expert in this area, so she’ll help me answer some questions. 

Mr. RASKIN. Okay. You can choose who answers—— 

Mr. DODARO. Okay. 

Mr. RASKIN [continuing]. as you wish. 

But last week, on February 28th, The New York Times reported 

that President Trump ordered John Kelly to grant Jared Kushner 

a security clearance. But based on the FBI’s background investigation, career officials at the White House reportedly recommended 

against granting Mr. Kushner a security clearance. And the CIA 

reportedly expressed concerns about granting Mr. Kushner access 

to the Nation’s most sensitive information. 

Do you know whether these reports are accurate? 

Mr. DODARO. No. No. We’ve not looked—we typically do not look 

at individuals and the clearance decisions. We look at how the 

process works. 

Mr. RASKIN. Okay. And we cannot gauge the veracity of these 

claims either, because President Trump and the White House are 

withholding this information from our committee. 

When the GAO investigates whether a process or program is 

functioning properly, is it important for agencies and officials in 

the executive branch to cooperate with your investigation? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Mr. RASKIN. Do you agree it’s important for Congress to review 

how the White House conducts its security clearance process today 

in order to ensure that the system is functioning properly? 

Mr. DODARO. I think it’s definitely within the Congress’s oversight purview to do so. 

Mr. RASKIN. Okay. Well, I am with you, because I’m very concerned that your finding that our governmentwide security clearance process poses a high risk is one that is going completely ignored by the executive branch of government. In fact, they’re 

compounding the risk by overriding the procedures that are supposed to be in place. 

I’m very troubled that the White House and other parts of the 

administration have failed to provide us information about the 

process, as required by a statute that was signed into law by President Trump himself. The committee must continue to pursue information about the clearance process at the White House and elsewhere in this administration. 

I think James Madison said it best long ago, which is that knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be 

their own Governors must arm themselves with the power that 

knowledge gives. We need that knowledge in order to do the people’s business. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Ms. HILL.[Presiding.] Perfect timing. I recognize the gentleman 

from South Carolina, Mr. Norman. 
20 

Mr. NORMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Dodaro, in the past decade, Congress has imposed many 

complex regulations on financial institutions with little regard as 

to whether this is sensible, particularly for the smaller community 

banks and the credit unions. In February 2018 GAO reported that 

new financial regulations imposed costly compliance burdens on 

smaller, community banks and credit unions. What steps should 

the financial regulators need to take in order to sufficiently address 

these challenges, particularly with the cost of the regulations that 

ultimately the customers and consumers are going to pay for? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. Yes, we’ve done work looking at the compliance burden, particularly for community and small banks. I’ve been 

joined by Mr. Lawrence Evans, who heads our financial markets 

and community investment work. He can give you details. 

Mr. EVANS. Yes, thank you for that question. One of the most important things regulators can do is rigorous cost-benefit analysis, 

including retrospective reviews, and we’ve leveled a number of recommendations militated toward ensuring that we’re quantifying 

where possible and we’re doing everything in our power to ensure 

that we can right-size regulations, where appropriate, without losing effectiveness. 

Mr. NORMAN. Give me some examples, like—pick Dodd-Frank, 

some of the regulations that they had back when the TARP fiasco 

was going on. 

Mr. EVANS. That’s right. So, you know, some of these regulations 

are subject to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires a costbenefit analysis before they promulgate the rules. Also, there are— 

there’s the agripper process which requires a retrospective review. 

So this will allow you to right-size regulations appropriately if it’s 

done well. 

Mr. NORMAN. And how were these presented to the banks? In 

other words, what form did that take to say that they could save 

X dollars if they did this? 

Mr. EVANS. So I think that’s a more complicated question. Typically, when this analysis is done, there is a notice of proposed rulemaking or some type of vehicle for banks to discuss issues that 

they have, and then that is considered as they attempt to finalize 

the rules. 

Mr. DODARO. One of the things, Congressman, we were required 

to look at all the rulemaking under Dodd-Frank. And so one of the 

things that we identified was that a lot of the financial regulators 

are not required to follow OMB guidance on cost-benefit analysis, 

No. 1, and so we suggested they have a more rigorous cost-analysis 

benefit that would follow the best practices in that area. 

Second, they were—there wasn’t as much coordination among the 

financial regulators as there needed to be, in order to address this 

issue. So those were two things up front before the original regulations will be put in place. 

Now, what we find is, after the regulations are put in place, they 

were slow to look at it, how is it actually working. Because you can 

do a cost-benefit analysis up front, but you make assumptions and 

you have certain things. But it’s different from what might play out 

in reality once the regulation is in place. 

Mr. NORMAN. Yes. 
21 

Mr. DODARO. So both things are important. 

Mr. NORMAN. CRA is a good example. A lot of banks—Community Reinvestment Act—where the banks wanted to invest, wanted 

to help the communities, but they had no guidance. 

Mr. DODARO. Right. 

Mr. NORMAN. And they didn’t want the hammer that was 

brought down. The other thing was the cost of compliance where— 

where banks, they couldn’t afford to buy another bank in a smaller 

community because it was going to mean a whole new team of regulators to interpret the regulations that were put on them. So I 

would just ask you, as you move forward, to work toward that end, 

giving the banks definite things to work—work toward concrete 

measures so that it’s not out in the—in the hinder land, so they 

don’t know how to enforce it. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. No, it’s a point well taken, Congressman. 

Mr. NORMAN. Thank y’all for coming. I yield back. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. I would like to recognize Ms. Wasserman 

Schultz from Florida. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. 

Dodaro, good to see you. Glad to be able to have an opportunity to 

have some dialog with you. It was a privilege to do that when I 

oversaw your budget as the ledge branch chair. 

I want to continue with Congressman Raskin’s line of questioning, because in your report, you indicated a governmentwide security clearance backlog of 565,000 investigations. And your report 

also identifies lack of quality measures as a risk facing the governmentwide personnel security clearance process. What quality assessment standards currently exist for background investigations? 

Mr. DODARO. Ms. Berrick will answer that question. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you. 

Ms. BERRICK. Yes, thank you for the question. We’ve been reporting for the last 20 years on the need to improve the quality of background investigations supporting security clearances. And most recently in 2010, we recommended that the executive branch develop 

measures to assess the quality of how agencies are doing in terms 

of performing investigations and documenting them. 

In the years since, the executive branch has taken two important 

steps to get there, but they haven’t yet reached that goal. They developed, as you mentioned, these quality standards for assessments. These are really kind of guideposts that tell agencies, here’s 

the sorts of things you should be looking at when determining 

whether or not an investigation is complete. 

And then they also developed a reporting tool for agencies to report that information to the—through the Performance Accountability Council. 

What’s missing, though, are those metrics to really assess how 

well our agency’s doing in terms of meeting goals and developing 

high quality investigations. And we continue to urge the executive 

branch to develop those. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, I think the issue, we pointed out, is, you have 

good standards, but you don’t know whether they’re being followed 

or not. And so unless you measure how well they’re being followed, 

you really don’t know. 
22 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Okay. And that sort of begs the continued question that has arisen. If there are standards that have 

been established and strengthened on your recommendations—the 

recent media reports that indicated that members of the Trump administration, including Jared Kushner, and Ivanka Trump, were 

able to obtain security clearances against the recommendations of 

White House staff, presumably using those standards, that’s troubling because obviously the White House is supposed to set an example for the rest of government to follow. And your report outlines ways in which the administration is already failing to ensure 

that there is background-clearance quality. 

Mr. Dodaro, could you—could you share with us how granting a 

security clearance to an official where there were credible concerns 

about their ties to foreign nationals—you indicated that that would 

be a concern in answering Mr. Raskin’s question—how would that 

impact our national security potentially? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, I think, I mean the whole point of the background investigations is to ensure that the wrong information 

doesn’t fall in the wrong hands. And so it’s very important. It can 

compromise national security in a lot of different ways by, you 

know, making sure that people, you know, people can understand 

the government’s, you know, processes and controls and informations that would—that would enable them to get, you know, a potential advantage of dealing with our—you know, whether it’s an 

adversary of the United States or even an ally of the United States. 

So this is very important that only the right people in the government have access to the highest, sensitive—most sensitive information. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. So, in your opinion, could the President’s overruling White House security clearance personnel’s recommendations, impact the quality and integrity of a national security background check? 

Mr. DODARO. I don’t have enough facts about that situation. We 

haven’t looked at it to—to opine on that issue. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Okay. The fact that bypassing—let me 

just ask you another question. 

So would it be appropriate for an individual to bypass the recommendation against a security clearance, from security clearance 

personnel? 

Mr. DODARO. It depends on the facts and circumstances associated with the decision. There’s a—there’s a—part of the process is 

called the adjudication process. And it’s up to the person who’s responsible for the adjudication to take the results of the background 

investigation and make a decision whether to grant the clearance 

or not. In some cases, they may or may not agree with the investigation that’s in place. So it’s a very facts and circumstances decision. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. And that’s why this committee, under 

Chairman Cummings, is trying to get information from the White 

House, which they have not yet sent, because we do need to get to 

the bottom of how those security clearances were granted, because 

as you said, there is a potential risk to our national security. Isn’t 

that right? 
23 

Mr. DODARO. I think it’s well within Congress’ right to ask questions and get the facts associated with the situation. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. Mr. Gibbs from Ohio? 

Mr. GIBBS. Thank you. 

Mr. Dodaro, just to followup on the security clearance, ultimately, the President of the United States, doesn’t he have final 

authority to grant or deny a security clearance for a White House 

employee? 

Mr. DODARO. I’m not sure we—and we haven’t looked at the legal 

authority of the President in this regard. 

Mr. GIBBS. Because—because my understanding, former President Clinton created a process issuing security clearances for White 

House employees by executive order. So maybe there’s been a sort 

of precedent set there, I don’t know. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, we’ve never looked at the security clearance 

process in the White House, either under past administrations or 

the current one. 

Mr. GIBBS. Okay. I did have quite a few questions about food 

safety but my colleague from Kentucky did an excellent job. And 

I was really impressed with your knowledge on answering those 

questions. 

Looking through your report here, about the U.S. Postal Service, 

you talk about their 3 to $5 billion loss every year, and we all know 

that first-class postage is dropping because stuff’s done by e-mail 

and everything. But the third class or the bulk stuff has been growing because of all the shipments from the internet. But then also 

we are about the benefits to retirees. What do you see as their biggest challenge or their biggest adding to their deficit? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. Their biggest problem is, the business model 

is really broken. And the first-class mail has always been their 

most profitable line of business, and that has declined. It went 

down further during the Great Recession that we had in 2009, or 

whatever, and really hasn’t come back yet or not. And they haven’t 

been able to control their costs. 

So they have a structural problem with their labor costs and 

other costs and not enough revenue to cover it, and as a result, 

they haven’t been able to make payments into the retirement 

healthcare program. 

Now, for the first time, they’re starting to draw down on the fund 

that they paid, so eventually when that money gets drawed down 

for retirees’ healthcare benefits and the benefits—healthcare benefits of their current work force, there’s going to be a real issue at 

that point. 

But right now, you don’t have a sustainable business model with 

appropriate revenues and expenditures. I mean, they were intended to be a government corporation, to be run like a private 

business, but that model is—is not what’s happened. 

Mr. GIBBS. Yes. Okay. I just wanted to get the clarification on 

that, because I hear from some of my constituents in that—in that 

area, that they’re blaming it more on the healthcare retirement 

benefits is really their problem. 

Mr. DODARO. That’s—that’s a symptom of the problem, and their 

liabilities are almost twice their revenues, their unfunded liabil-
24 

ities. That’s included or whatever, but that’s not—you know, that’s 

part of the solution. 

Mr. GIBBS. Okay. 

Mr. DODARO. And we’ve suggested you could smooth out those 

payments over time a little bit better, but that alone is not going 

to fix their issues. 

Mr. GIBBS. Okay. In previous years, the GAO has reported that 

the PBGC has not properly managed its investments. Has the 

agency corrected its policies and fully benefited from the growth in 

the stock market in the recent years? 

Mr. DODARO. Mr. Charlie, come on. I’m going to bring up our expert on PBGC. I’m very concerned about the multi-employer pension—— 

Mr. GIBBS. So am I. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. as I mentioned in my opening statement, I mean, that’s projected to be insolvent by 2025, and if that 

happens, they—PBGC estimates they will only be able to pay benefits to—there’s about 11 million people covered by that benefit of 

$2,000 a year. I mean, that’s not adequate pension by any stretch 

of the imagination. Charlie can talk about their investment policies, Congressman. 

Microphone. 

Mr. JESZECK. Congressman, there are two big programs in 

PBGC, that’s the single-employer program and the multiemployer 

program. They have different structures. The single-employer program actually collects assets when a company goes bankrupt, and 

the pension goes to PBGC, so they have those assets. The singleemployer program is actually doing much better. It’s actually, I believe, in surplus as of 2018. So they have been able to take advantage of the stock market as well as other things to get to that situation. 

The real problem, as the Controller General mentioned, is the 

multiemployer plan program. And now the multiemployer program 

is a different structure. They don’t collect assets from—from pension plans. The triggering event that the multiemployer program 

pays—becomes operative on, is when the plan becomes insolvent. 

So there aren’t any assets there to—at least for PBGC to gain market return—— 

Mr. GIBBS. Just quickly, do you have any recommendations to 

GAO about how to maybe resolve some of this issue or—— 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. We—yes, we have a number of results. There 

needs to be a new premium structure that’s risk-based over there. 

The PBGC Board should be expanded because right now it’s just 

the heads of three or four different departments and agencies, and 

it should be some outside people involved, experts in that area as 

well over time, and the Congress really needs to address the multiemployer pension program. I’ve sent special letters up. Congress 

took action in 2014, but it didn’t completely solve the problem. 

Ms. HILL. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. DODARO. And I can submit for the record all our detailed recommendations. 

Mr. GIBBS. My time has expired. Okay, thank you. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you, Mr. Dodaro. 

I recognize the gentle lady from New York, Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. 
25 

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. Thank you. 

I want to ask about one of the most important issues addressed 

in GAO’s high risk report, and that is climate change. Over the last 

two years, the Trump administration released the fourth National 

Climate Assessment, which is the Federal Government’s definitive 

statement on climate science, and Volume 1 of the assessment confirmed that climate change is real, it is happening now, and that 

humans are the cause. 

Volume 2 of the assessment looked at serious—looked at the serious impacts of climate change and projected that rising temperatures, flooding, and extreme weather caused by climate change, will 

result in economic losses of, quote, hundreds of billions of dollars 

by the end of the century. 

In fact, according to The New York Times these prospects include 

major hits to GDP, up to 10 percent, drought and reduced crop 

yields and other issues, destruction of infrastructure due to rising 

sea levels, rebuilding power grids wiped out by storms. We’ve seen 

this even on a small level in Puerto Rico. [TheNew York Times article is available on: docs.house.gov or https://www.nytimes.com/ 

2017/10/12/nyregion/bronx-heroin-fentanyl-opioid-overdoses.html] 

As some of these costs, especially with reducing farm meals represent permanent losses to the economy, to the United States economy. Mr. Dodaro, do you agree that climate change is occurring? 

Mr. DODARO. Our work relies on the global, climate-change assessments that are done as well as numerous studies by the National Academy of Sciences, which have concluded climate change 

is producing economic and environmental risks to the government 

and increasing the Federal Government’s fiscal exposure. 

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. So you believe climate change is real? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, that’s one of the reasons we added it to the 

High Risk List in 2013. Now, our focus on the High Risk List is 

on limiting the Federal Government’s fiscal exposure and—— 

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. Got it. Do you agree that the United States 

could face huge costs as a result if we fail to act right now? 

Mr. DODARO. Definitely. 

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. Okay. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, the—— 

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. Sorry, because I have limited time. 

Mr. DODARO. All right. Go ahead. 

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. President Trump’s own Director of National 

Intelligence, Dan Coats, provided a National Threat Assessment to 

Congress in January that identified climate change as a threat to 

our national security as well. Global, environmental, and ecological 

degradation, as well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for resources, economic distress and social discontent through 

2019, this year, and beyond. 

How is climate change currently impacting our national security? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, there—there are direct impacts on the Defense Department right now. You saw last year with the storms in 

North Carolina and in Florida, Tyndall Air Force Base, Camp 

Lejeune, both had damages over $3 billion and need to be repaired. 

There’s other infrastructure, particularly along coastal areas where 

sea-level rise is changing. And the impacts on the Defense Depart-
26 

ment also extend to their international installations around the 

world, so it’s both domestically and internationally. 

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. So we’re seeing already, as you mentioned, 

already existing costs in the billions of dollars due to the Department of Defense, because of climate change and the impacts of climate change. But rather than trying to slow down climate or mitigating its impact, it seems as though the administration right now 

is ignoring its own scientists, national security professionals, and 

economists who warn that the continued increased flooding, extreme weather, and temperature increases will be extremely costly 

for the Federal Government. 

Mr. Dodaro, what steps would the GAO recommend that the 

White House take to show leadership in addressing these issues 

and saving our next generation? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, our recommendations extend in several different areas. One is, they have a comprehensive national strategy. 

The Federal Government needs to provide leadership in this area. 

Many of the vulnerabilities are decisions that are made at the state 

and local level—building codes and other issues. 

We’ve also recommended that the Federal Government find out 

ways to provide better climate science information to state and 

local officials, so they can be on an actionable basis. The Federal 

agencies need to prepare—Federal Government’s one of the largest 

property holders in the United States. The flood insurance program 

is not on a fiscally sound basis. It’s not actuarially sound. It’s also 

on our High Risk List. Crop insurance. So we made a number of 

recommendations in that area and give you a complete list for the 

record. 

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. And I would just like to submit that it truly 

does not seem as though the track record is showing up that there’s 

any desire in the executive branch to address climate change, and 

we have to reiterate that Congress—and we have to use our—our 

powers here so that Congress and this committee, particularly with 

oversight, take action to address this clear and present danger to 

the United States. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. And along those lines, we do give credit to the 

Congress for passing the National Disaster Recovery—Reform 

Act—excuse me—Reform Act in 2018, which allows funding now to 

be set aside for resilience building and mitigation, and to give state 

and local governments funding for Building Code reforms. So that 

was a good step Congress has taken. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you so much. 

Mr. DODARO. More needs to be done, though. 

Ms. HILL. We agree. Thank you. 

I recognize Mr. Grothman from Wisconsin. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. I have a little bit of the statement on 

the—on the concerns about climate change and that sort of thing. 

I realize you don’t have a choice, apparently, to bring things in or 

investigate things or make statement on things when individual 

Congressmen ask you to do things, but without going into a depth, 

if you Google it, the science or the opinions on climate change vary 

a great deal. 

You know, sometimes you talk about saving money, which is 

good. You know, we don’t want waste in Medicaid or Medicare or 
27 

anywhere else. But as far as doing wide-reaching things, because 

of climate change, which may or may not be true, depending upon 

what you Google, I think has the potential to kind of discredit your 

agency in the eyes of some. You know what I’m saying? 

I mean, I always kind of think at GAO fighting waste or fraud 

or something that we’re all on the side of the recommendations, 

and when you begin to make recommendations based on what some 

people think about climate change, and other people don’t think 

about climate change, I think it kind of hurts your agency a little. 

Although you might not have a choice in it. 

Now I’ll go on. I want to talk about the tax laws a little bit. You 

have made recommendations, I guess 103 recommendations, to the 

IRS since February 2017. And most of those recommendations remain open. Could you give me some summary of the recommendations you have or major recommendations that you believe nothing 

has been adapted on? 

Mr. DODARO. We have recommendations in the IRS, both for the 

IRS itself, as well as for the Congress, in those areas. But I would 

say, with regard to your statement, Congressman, we’re focused on 

limiting the Federal Government’s fiscal exposure. Since 2005, the 

Federal Government has spent nearly half a trillion dollars to respond to major disasters. We’re not suggesting that there be steps 

made in dealing with, you know, greenhouse gas emissions and all 

those things. Our focus is on fiscal exposure to Federal Government, which we think is our responsibility at GAO, and we’ve got 

a good basis for doing that. 

So I’ll let Chris talk about the IRS. 

Mr. MIHM. Yes, sir. Congressman, as the Controller General mentioned in his earlier testimony, is that when you have a $400 

billion annual tax gap, we’ve been focusing, as well as IRS, on how 

do you reduce that tax gap. How do you make sure that we can— 

because all you would need is—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Define the tax gap. 

Mr. MIHM. All right. Tax gap is the difference between what IRS 

actually collects and what is legally owed. And so this is—Congress 

has already established through law what should be paid, and this 

is actually what comes in. And this is a net, this $400 billion. So 

this is after enforcement actions may have taken place. So this is— 

this is a big deal. Not only is it foregone revenue, but it also, if 

you’re a business and you’re fairly and accurately paying your 

taxes, it puts you at a competitive disadvantage if your competitor 

is not paying, you know, his or her taxes. 

So we’ve been focusing on the opportunities to reduce the tax 

gap. The point here is that you would only need 5, 10, 15 percent 

reductions and you’re, in effect, funding another Cabinet department. So you could really make a big difference there. 

The strategy that IRS needs to put in place is three-fold. One is 

that they need better enforcement and that is, it needs to be better 

targeted. They need to know return on investment of their various 

strategies that they have in place. We’ve had recommendations in 

place that they need to do a better job on that. 

Second is that they need to have much better customer service, 

is that most people want to pay their taxes and they want to pay 

it accurately. A lot of times when they don’t, it’s because they have 
28 

made an honest mistake, and that they—if the IRS makes sure 

that they have good customer service, they can help on that on 

that. Their telephone service has improved markedly in recent 

years because Congress gave them more—more financial resources 

to do that, and because IRS is putting in a better service strategy 

as we’ve been recommending. 

And then the third thing that needs to be dealt with is obviously 

the complexity of the Tax Code. It can be very difficult for people 

to understand what they need to do. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Do you think part of the problem is when we put 

dollar-for-dollar credits in there, it encourages people to do wrong 

things? I mean, you put a—you put a wrong number on your tax 

return, if a marginal rate is 27 percent, you know, maybe it affects 

you, you know, 27 cents on the dollar. But when you have credits 

in there, I think it encourages people to intentionally do things 

wrong. Do you think that’s accurate? 

Mr. MIHM. Well, we haven’t actually looked at it from that angle, 

sir, and it’s an intriguing way to kind of think about the issue. But 

there are two aspects of what you’re raising I think that are important. One is that for many of the errors that may be made by people, the actual dollar amount may be relatively small for those individual areas. Obviously, cumulatively, it can be huge, which—but 

the individual errors if they’re small—yes, sir? 

Mr. GROTHMAN. I just want to get one more question here on 

Medicaid before—before things end. I was recently down at the border, and the customs people were concerned, of all the Medicaid 

cards they saw people coming back across the border down south 

to Mexico had. In other words, people who are here illegally with 

Medicaid cards. Is that something you’ve addressed, the degree to 

which we are giving Medicaid benefits to people who are not citizens? 

Ms. HILL. Mr. Dodaro, the time is expired, but you may answer 

the question. 

Mr. DODARO. We have not focused, per se, on that issue. One of 

the things, though, that we’ve suggested, that CMS has not—the 

Center for Medicare and Medicaid Studies, has not looked at beneficiary eligibility determination since 2014, when the Affordable 

Care Act went in place. They’re going to start now in 2019, but for 

these several years, nobody’s been looking at the eligibility determinations for individual beneficiaries. And that needs to be looked 

at. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Good. Customs thinks it’s a problem, so thanks. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. I just have to say that as a Californian 

coming off of the most deadly fire season in our state’s history, that 

science is science, and I think that that’s something that we should 

continue to respect in this chamber. 

With that, I’d like to recognize Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for holding 

this hearing. 

Mr. Dodaro, welcome back. You’re a frequent flyer to this committee, and I just want to say, I hold you and your staff in the 

highest regard in terms of the work that you do on our behalf. I 

do—I want to followup on Ms. Wasserman Schultz’ questions and 

other Members’ questions about security clearance. 
29 

So we’ve been worried about this for some time, as you know. It’s 

been a frequent topic of discussion at this committee. I know going 

back to the Navy Yard shootings where we had an individual who 

should not have had a security clearance was able to perpetrate 

those crimes. I do want to drill down a bit on Mr. Kushner, though. 

And, you know, I know you look at the system and not individuals, 

but we have an individual here who, he had dozens and dozens of 

contacts with foreign governments and foreign officials, and yet, 

when he had to fill out his—his disclosure to get his clearance, he 

forgot, and he forgot about meetings that he had just had weeks 

and months before he applied for his clearance. 

So he had dozens of—dozens of meetings with foreign officials, 

Russians in particular. He—you know, he—I think he—frankly, 

you don’t have dozens and dozens of meetings and then just forget 

about it. I think he actually misled people in getting his security 

clearance. 

And then on top of that, his own refusal to disclose, the White 

House also engaged in reinforcing or abetting him in his cover-up. 

The White House transition team, basically Hope Hicks at the 

time, said, no, it never happened, there was no communications between Mr. Kushner or any campaign and a foreign entity during 

the campaign. That was on November 11th. 

Again on January 13, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer, 

he gave a timeline of meetings between General Flynn at the time, 

who was the National Security Advisor, and Ambassador Kislyak 

from Russia, but he never mentioned that Mr. Kushner was in the 

meeting. So they gave—gave a very selective disclosure there. 

Again, on January 23d, 2017, again, Mr. Spicer disclosed phone 

calls with Mr. Flynn and the Russians but left out Mr. Kushner 

and did not disclose that Mr. Kushner was at the meeting at the 

Trump Tower. 

So—and it goes on and on and on. There’s February 14th, February 16th, February 20th, where the White House says there was 

no contact at all. And yet later on there was pressure put on Chief 

of Staff John Kelly to basically give him—give him the security 

clearance. 

Here’s where it gets really interesting. Now we have multiple 

whistleblowers who have come forward to the committee and indicated to us that Mr. Kushner is leading an effort to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. And the details of this—I’ll just 

give it to you really quickly. 

Brookfield Business Partners buys Westinghouse Electric for $4.6 

billion. And they’re trying to get the contracts in Saudi Arabia to 

build these nuclear plants, you know, if they get the approval from 

the—from the government. 

What they’re trying to do as well, they just bought a share—a 

partnership share in 666 Fifth Avenue, which is owned by Mr. 

Kushner’s family, and it’s in dire financial shape. So the same company that’s looking for the technology transfer, for the Saudis, is 

invested in Mr. Kushner’s family’s building at of 666 Fifth Avenue. 

So if you’re ever looking for a smoking gun on something—and 

your people are really, really smart. I mean all of them. But it 

doesn’t take Sherlock Holmes to figure this out, that there’s a problem. 
30 

And it just goes back to the decision that was made to give this 

individual a security clearance, and the total disregard for national 

security, and for the interest of this country, being exercised by 

this individual and this White House. So I hope you look into it. 

We’re going to look into it, that’s for sure. 

It is a disgrace that this is happening and that we are allowing 

an individual with these obvious conflicts to continue to—to be involved as a special envoy when his own personal interests are obviously overriding the—— 

Ms. HILL. The gentleman’s time—— 

Mr. LYNCH [continuing]. the national security interests of this 

country. 

Thank you for your indulgence, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. 

Mr. Higgins? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Dodaro, thank you for your service to your country, sir. You 

have struck me as such a candid and intelligent man, and your 

staff must be brilliant. One of the most difficult jobs that perhaps 

exists in this Federal Government is to try and keep this thing 

under control, regarding spending. So thank you for your very sincere effort. 

I have important questions regarding significant services to 

many, many millions of Americans—Medicaid and Medicare—but 

before I get there, let me ask you, you refer to process and studying 

the process in the interest of fiscal stability and efficiencies for the 

Federal Government. That’s your job. The process and differences 

between White House clearance processes and Federal agencies 

clearance—security clearance process, there’s a difference, is there 

not? 

Mr. DODARO. Quite frankly, Congressman, I don’t know. Because 

I—we never looked at the White House security clearance process. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Are you—are you familiar with the fact that the 

White House conducts a suitability review, and then they can receive a favorable or unfavorable adjudication through another series, if it’s different for a Federal agency? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, I just don’t have that information. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Let me just share that according to my understanding, the President has the ultimate authority to grant or deny 

security clearance. Are you aware that Members of Congress have 

access to highly confidential data and security clearances? 

Mr. DODARO. I would assume so, but I never looked at that part. 

Mr. HIGGINS. We do. Don’t quote me on this, but according to my 

memory, somewhere—somewhere north of 40 Congressmen, either 

prior to office or while in office, have been convicted of felonies. So 

let us move on, please, to the people’s business. 

It—according to your—to your knowledge—sir, I’m moving if you 

need the appropriate staff member to—— 

Mr. DODARO. Right. 

Mr. HIGGINS [continuing]. to Medicaid here. I’m very concerned 

about it. Last year the Federal portion of Medicaid spending totaled nearly $400 billion. Additionally, 9.8 percent of Federal program spending and the $36.2 billion was attributed to improper 

payments. 
31 

Now, one of our major missions here is to control waste, fraud, 

and abuse, mismanagement of moneys, and you and your staff are 

brilliant and dedicated to this effort. As the Medicaid program continues to expand and grow, I’m increasingly concerned about the 

program’s integrity. In fact, auditors in my home state of Louisiana 

have recently identified as much as $85 million in improper payments. What’s the status of CMS’s initiative to reduce improper 

payments based on your recommendations? 

Mr. DODARO. They’re starting to take some action. They have a 

strategy that they put in place, but quite frankly, a lot more needs 

to be done. The $36.7 billion that you mentioned in improper payments is only one component of the components of improper payments at Medicaid. 

The other component, Congressman, is the managed-care portion, 

which is about half of the Medicaid spending. Nobody’s auditing 

that area as well, and we’ve recommended they do that. 

I’ve talked to Daryl Purpera, your state auditor in Louisiana, and 

work with the State Auditors Association to try to get state auditors more involved, and the Federal Government should support 

them. 

The other component, the third component, is beneficiary eligibility determinations. That has not been done by CMS and the administration since 2014 when the Affordable Care Act put in place. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Federal legislation fix that? 

Mr. DODARO. Pardon me? 

Mr. HIGGINS. In your opinion, could Federal legislation—— 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. I think there ought to be Federal legislation 

to give the state auditors a role. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you. I have limited time. I’d like to move on 

to Medicare. Both of these programs, it’s crucial for so many millions of Americans that these programs have long-term sustainability, and this is my concern. Medicare is a critical lifeline for almost 58 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries and makes up to 

17 percent of total Federal spending. It’s been a high risk program 

since 1990. In my remaining 41 seconds please advise America 

what can we do, as Members of Congress, to comply with your recommendation, sir, and save these vital and important programs? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, first of all, Medicare is on an unsustainable, 

long-term fiscal path. By 2026, the trust fund for the hospital insurance portion will only have 91 cents to pay on the dollar. We 

have a number of recommendations where payments could be 

equalized between outpatient and the doctor’s office service, and 

outpatient at a integrated, consolidated facility at a hospital. Right 

now they’re paid on different rates, even though you get the same 

service. There are certain cancer hospitals that have been grandfathered in to get higher payments. In other areas, we have a long 

list of recommendations we think could help, but this needs congressional attention. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, sir, for your answer. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, I yield. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you so much. 

Ms. Pressley? 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you, 

Mr. Dodaro, I appreciate the GAO’s comprehensive data collection 
32 

and your insights today on the various high risk areas within the 

Federal Government. In April 2020, the census will move to a digital platform to provide online access for more than 100 million 

housing units across the country. 

Although an online system will undoubtedly improve the efficiency and accuracy with which the Federal Government can collect 

much needed personal information, it also presents substantial 

challenges for many congressional districts like the one that I represent, the Massachusetts Seventh. It is one of the most unequal 

in the country, and I maintain that is because it is underresourced, 

and that is under because of undercounting, and the digital divide 

is still very real. 

Based on the latest census estimates 63 percent of Mass 7 residents live in hard-to-count neighborhoods, a figure that is nearly 

on par with the 71 percent of people in hard-to-reach communities 

nationwide. 

Mr. Dodaro, would you agree that the intended goal of the census 

is to maintain a fair and accurate count of every person living in 

the U.S.? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Ms. PRESSLEY. What factors, aside from limited to no internet access, might make communities susceptible to undercounting, given 

the methodological changes in the upcoming census? 

Mr. DODARO. The response rate to the mail survey continues to 

be a problematic area. The response rate has gone from 78 percent 

in the 1970 census, to 63 percent in the 2010 census, and census 

is currently estimating that the response rate will drop even further to 60 percent. So one of the things that’s very important is the 

get-out efforts by the partnership efforts in the local communities 

to get people to fill out the form. They will have options to do it 

in a digital way, but they will have paper options as well. 

And so the main thing that can be done is a grassroots effort 

that census is trying to work with, with state and local officials, to 

get people to fill out the form. And that’s a big—that’s a big effort. 

Chris Mihm is our expert in this area. I’ll ask if he has other 

suggestions. 

Ms. PRESSLEY. And could you also just give your opinion as to 

whether or not this undercounting also contributes—not only does 

it contribute to the underresourcing and the allocation of Federal 

funds, but does it affect redistricting and representation as well? 

Mr. DODARO. It could, yes. 

Chris? 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Okay. And what steps can we take to mitigate 

undercounting? I’m sorry. 

Mr. DODARO. Go ahead. 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Let me let you go. Go on, Chris. 

We have two minutes and 26 seconds, let’s get it, let’s go. I’m trying to be effective and efficient here. I’m sorry, Okay, let’s go. 

Mr. MIHM. Ma’am, I’m not here to interrupt a Member. 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Okay. I’m a fourth Italian, we do that, come on. 

Mr. MIHM. The key thing that Census Bureau needs to do on the 

precise issues that you’re talking about, is work with local communities, work with community organizations in those communities to 

build confidence in the integrity and the accuracy of the census. 
33 

They hire partnership specialists that come from the communities, 

that are sensitive to the types of issues that could result in an 

undercount. Even when they’re doing the homeless count, they 

would look to get advocates for the homeless population—— 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Okay. 

Mr. MIHM [continuing]. that would know where—— 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Last question. Giving growing anti-immigrant 

sentiment and xenophobia, Wilbur Ross proposed that we add an 

immigration-status question. This will be the first time in 60 years 

that that question has been on the census, and how do you see that 

having—contributing to undercounting given the fear that so many 

immigrants are living under? 

Mr. MIHM. We have haven’t looked precisely at that question, 

ma’am, and that is the question of the citizenship question. What 

I can say is that what we have seen in past censuses, and what 

concerns us about this, is, any late changes to census design always induce uncertainty and, therefore, risk. 

The census has to have hundreds of different operations come together perfectly at a precise point in time once every decade. Any 

uncertainty on that is not a good place to be. 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Great segue. So do you feel that you’re well positioned and prepared to administer the census from an operations 

standpoint and from a staffing standpoint? 

Mr. DODARO. I’ll let Chris elaborate, but there is risk at this 

point. The next six months is critical. There are hundreds of security weaknesses, and there are IT systems that haven’t been fully 

tested. The census has had to scale back on its test and only really 

done one test in Providence County, Rhode Island, when they had 

multiple sites. 

So there hasn’t been enough testing, they’re trying new procedures, and the combination of all these things leads to a risk, 

which is why we put it on the High Risk List. So there needs to 

be a lot more—— 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Thank you. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. done. 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Thank you. And I have 10 seconds left, and I’m 

just—just curious. Again, my district is one of the most unequal in 

the country. It certainly has been impacted by mass incarceration. 

One in four in our households has an incarcerated loved one. Do 

you support incarcerated individuals being included according to 

their home address, not where they’re incarcerated? 

Mr. MIHM. That’s not something—I know what that issue is. We 

haven’t actually looked at that from a policy standpoint because it 

is a policy call. But we know it is an issue of some controversy 

within the Census Bureau, but we haven’t looked at that directly, 

ma’am. 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Thank you. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you both. 

Mrs. Miller? 

Ms. PRESSLEY. I yield. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you, Mr. Dodaro, for being here today and sharing 

your report with us. You know better than most the importance of 
34 

ensuring our government is running efficiently and that we need 

to be good stewards of our taxpayer dollars. 

One of my goals in Congress is to make sure that government 

is accountable to the people it serves, and your report helps us 

show where we can improve. 

In your report, under ‘‘retained areas,’’ you highlighted the cost 

of funding our Nation’s infrastructure. As you are aware, our Nation’s infrastructure is in need of repair and improvement. Worn 

down, broken roads and bridges pose a safety risk for travelers 

across the United States. My own district experienced this in 1967 

when the Silver Bridge across the Ohio River collapsed, killing 46 

people. 

Improving our infrastructure ensures that we can connect our 

rural and urban areas and continue to get our goods and services 

across the United States. It also means economic development for 

the communities in our country. 

However, to ensure we repair and maintain our Nation’s infrastructure requires a significant investment. Given the cost of repairs and improvements to our infrastructure, can you elaborate 

more on your findings? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. The Highway Trust Fund, for example, on surface transportation, has not been able to pay the annual amounts 

necessary to maintain Federal investment and highway repairs, for 

example, since 2008, there’s not enough money being generated 

through the tax on gas, to be able to do that. So Congress has had 

to appropriate additional money. 

There’s enough money been appropriated to provide funding to 

2020, 2021. After that, there’s a big gap. If you want to maintain 

spending right now, it’s about 45, $50 billion a year, you’d have to 

have $158 billion to cover the 2022 to 2029 period. So the whole 

concept, initially, of our transportation system, particularly the 

highway portion, was, it was supposed to be funded by users, and 

be self-sufficient over time. That’s no longer the case. And so the 

Congress needs to deal with the financing aspect of it. 

Ms. Susan Fleming has joined me. 

There’s also a standpoint of making sure that the investments by 

state and local levels produce better results with the number of discretionary grants and other money that’s there, and she can talk 

to you about reforms that are under way there. 

Mrs. MILLER. Okay. We need to fund our vital infrastructure, but 

according to the DOT, only 15 percent of the roads in California are 

in good condition, and they have the second highest gas tax in the 

country. 

Furthermore, about 20 percent, or $8 billion of all Federal, gastax revenue doesn’t even go to the roads. Before we even go to the 

taxpayers and ask them to give their government more hardearned tax dollars, we have to be sure every dollar is being used 

efficiently and effectively as possible. Are there other efficiencies 

and revenues that you think that we could use to fund infrastructure other than gas taxes? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, there’s other—if recommendations that we 

have to make more efficient use of the money that’s there, particularly the discretionary programs given the state and local levels, 

Susan can elaborate. 
35 

Ms. FLEMING. You know, I think it is a policy call for Congress 

about whether or not you want to increase revenues through additional gas tax or other sources. What we recommended is to spend 

the money wisely and efficiently, and we’ve applauded the fact that 

the last two surface reauthorization bills have required that the 

Department of Transportation move toward a performance-based 

framework. So basically ensuring that we are getting the best 

value for the dollars that are being spent. We’re in the early stages 

of that framework. DOT has put out rulemaking, and now the 

states are in the process to establish targets and to evaluate performance. So we’re optimistic that we’re heading in the right direction. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

Also, I’d like to shift our focus to the Veterans Health Administration. As you are aware, in 2014, a scandal broke at the Phoenix 

VA where it was found out veterans were dying while they were 

waiting for care. We also found the VA was covering up its extended wait times. This is unacceptable, and has since shed light 

on other problems that are facing the Veteran Health Administration. 

I’m very lucky, in my district, we have a great veterans hospital, 

the Hershel ‘‘Woody’’ Williams VA Medical Center. However, I 

want to make sure all veterans across the United States receive 

good access to the care they have earned and deserved. What immediate changes need to be made at the Veterans Health Administration? 

Mr. DODARO. Ms. Nikki Clowers is our expert in that area. I’ll 

have her respond. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you. 

Ms. CLOWERS. Representative, one of the things that we’ve recommended for them to do is to look at their access standards that 

they have for the veterans and make sure that the access standards they have in place represents the full lifecycle from when the 

veteran approaches the medical center for appointment, to when 

they’re actually seen, to determine how long that is taking, and 

then make adjustments based on that, to ensure that they’re getting timely access to the care that they need. 

Mrs. MILLER. Okay, thank you very much. 

Ms. HILL. I want to thank the gentlelady for her remarks on this 

issue. It’s so important, and I couldn’t agree more. 

Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Ranking Member. 

Mr. Dodaro, thank you for being here today, and every single 

member of the GAO that’s here today, we owe you a big round of 

applause. Thank you for your hard work. Digging into this kind of 

stuff, it’s tough to do. It’s hard work. Steady pencil, some might say 

‘‘bean counting,’’ but some people would get offended by that, so I 

won’t say ‘‘bean counting.’’ But you’re in there digging out the details, and we have to have it. 

You know, the Army just recently went through its first audit— 

its first. I think it’s older than the Nation, actually, the United 

States Army, and it’s just gone through its first audit. We need 

you, we’re glad for you, we appreciate you. 
36 

I served as the CEO of a healthcare company. We had about a 

thousand employees when I left the company. And digging in, doing 

the Six Sigma the lean analysis to find where we could make operations better was, you know, bread and butter of our company. And 

so I’m especially interested in asking today about the VA. 

I’m also a VA patient and a veteran. And as a physician and 

CEO of a healthcare company, watching just the tragedy of the 

things that are happening at the VA, breaks my heart. And so my 

first question is really just, as I understand it, you guys have made 

over the years, the two years that they have been on this list, 30 

different recommendations for the VA to make changes. And I just 

wondered, what’s their responsiveness to you in those—on those 30 

recommendations? 

Mr. DODARO. They’re working on the individual areas. Ms. Nikki 

Clowers can give you the details. But the responsiveness has been 

slow, and I’m concerned about it. As I mentioned earlier, I have 

met with three VA Secretaries—Secretary McDonald, Secretary 

Shulkin, Secretary Wilkie. I’m encouraged by Secretary Wilkie’s 

commitment to work with us in order to address, not only our recommendations, but the underlying root causes of why they’re on 

the High Risk List, and to develop a comprehensive plan for improvement. 

You know, so—and we keep finding the same problems over and 

over. You know, the VA’s on our High Risk List for three components—healthcare, disability-claims processing, and now acquisitions and procurement of medical supplies and products that could 

be more efficient as well. 

They have a huge budget. It’s not been for a lack of resources 

that they haven’t addressed these problems, in my opinion. But 

Nikki can tell you. We meet with them monthly to go over the recommendations, but they need a better plan. They need stable leadership. They have some of the most entrenched management problems that I’ve seen across government, and I’ve been around for a 

long time. 

Mr. GREEN. That’s sad to hear, because they have been here 

since, I think, 1930. You’d think they’d get some of those business 

processes worked out. 

Are they allowed to do cooperative purchasing agreements, like 

other hospitals in the country are, to band together with other hospital organizations and purchase in bulk? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Mr. GREEN. They are allowed to do that? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. And they’re just not, or—— 

Mr. DODARO. Come on, Michele. She is our expert in acquisitions 

at the VA. 

Mr. GREEN. Awesome. 

Mr. DODARO. This is Michele Mackin. 

Mr. GREEN. This is in my strength zone, so—— 

Mr. DODARO. Okay. 

Mr. GREEN [continuing]. I’ll go in the weeds for a second. 

Ms. MACKIN. Strategic sourcing, I think, is what you’re talking 

about—— 

Mr. GREEN. Exactly. 
37 

Ms. MACKIN [continuing]. and we’ve actually recommended that 

the individual medical centers do that in order to leverage their 

enormous buying power. I think part of it is a very decentralized 

organization, and each local medical center wants to buy what they 

want to buy for the clinicians at that medical center. So they have 

been a little slower to implement that for medical supplies, but for 

other types of supplies, like some IT goods and services, VA has 

done strategic sourcing and saved quite a bit of money. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Well, what drives that decisionmaking in the 

hospital world outside the VA is the hiring of physicians, right? So 

if you’re going to purchase a specific spine screw in order to get 

that surgeon to come work at your hospital, that shouldn’t be a 

problem with the VA, I wouldn’t think, but—— 

Mr. DODARO. Well, what we find, Congressman, when they try to 

launch a purchasing program for medical supplies, surgical supplies, they didn’t involve the clinicians as much as they should 

have, in deciding what to—what to purchase. And as a result, you 

know, 20 percent of their purchasing items are still done on an 

emergency basis because they don’t have the competitive process in 

place to buy in bulk, leverage their purchasing power. So they’re 

revamping this again, and we’ll see if they come up with a better 

approach. 

Mr. GREEN. Unfortunately, I think I’m out of time. I’ve got about 

57 other questions, but—— 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. 

Mr. GREEN [continuing]. I yield. Thank you for being here. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you, Mr. Green. 

Mr. DODARO. We’re happy to followup with you later, to talk 

about these things. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. And you might have noticed that was not 

actually a mistake. It was really because I wanted to make Mr. 

Gomez, my colleague from California, wait. But you may now 

speak. 

Mr. GOMEZ. Thank you. Madam Chair, I always appreciate the 

extra five minutes I’ll get at the end of this presentation. But before I go on, you know, one of my colleagues was questioning your 

credibility if you bring up climate change, or you consider climate 

change in developing the risk assessment. I just did a quick Google 

search, and I looked up the Department of Defense 2014 Climate 

Change Adaptation Road Map, and it says, quote, ‘‘among the future trends that will impact our national security is climate 

change.’’ So, if the Department of Defense is looking at climate 

change, I think you’re in good company, and I think your credibility 

is well intact. 

But I want to turn to the census. It’s an important issue that’s 

coming up, and you mentioned previously that the Department 

only conducted a full, operational test in just one city—Providence, 

Rhode Island—as you mentioned. And you also mentioned some 

concerns about the—about IT It says, the report states, I quote, not 

fully testing innovations in IT systems as designed increases the 

risk that innovations in IT systems will not function as intended 

during the 2020 census. What are the risks the census could face 

from a lack of adequate testing? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. There are many. 
38 

Go ahead, Chris. 

Mr. MIHM. Sir, just to clarify your question, are you interested 

in IT testing or testing overall? 

Mr. GOMEZ. Testing overall. 

Mr. MIHM. Okay, testing—testing overall is me. 

What the—the big risk there is, as we were discussing with the 

Congresswoman, is that this is a once-a-decade operation, and 

there are innumerable number of procedures that have to come together, and if you mess it up, you don’t have an opportunity to step 

back and say, Okay, we’ll do it again in another six months or so. 

So the testing needs to be done to make sure, not just an individual 

programs work, but they also all work together under census-like 

conditions. 

That’s the importance of doing it in different locations around the 

country, with different populations, with different census-taking 

strategies, to make sure that it will work when you actually go live, 

because there is not a do-over. 

Mr. DODARO. But it could affect the quality and increase the cost. 

Mr. MIHM. Absolutely. 

Mr. GOMEZ. What are the risks of not having tested in the rural 

areas, remote communities, and other types? Same thing, you 

might not have it just function correctly? 

Mr. DODARO. That’s correct. And it’s difficult to count in rural 

areas to begin with. 

Mr. MIHM. It’s a separate set of challenges. There, sir, is that, 

you know, the key to the census is counting not just each individual but counting them at their usual residence. And so you need 

to make sure that you actually locate them where they are living, 

and in some of the most rural parts of the country, the different 

address conventions, you know, P.O. Boxes as opposed to actually 

street numbers. 

The second thing there is that they’re going to be—for—the census takers will be using hand-held computers and that if you have 

internet connectivity problems in some of the more rural areas, 

that can compromise both the quality and the cost of the census, 

as the Controller General mentioned. 

Mr. GOMEZ. And just also, you had just mentioned that cutting 

the test to save money would actually end up costing the U.S. Government more in the long run. Is that correct? 

Mr. DODARO. It potentially can. Because, I mean, we’re very diverse country—— 

Mr. GOMEZ. Yes. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. as you know, and just testing in one 

location doesn’t really give you a full range of tests. Chris mentioned the internet connectivity. It’s—it’s variable across the country, particularly in certain areas, and so that’s going to be a problem. So we’re very concerned that the testing hasn’t been as robust 

as you would want to have, particularly when you’re introducing 

new concepts into the census. 

Mr. GOMEZ. Do you have a rough estimate of how much it would 

cost if things are delayed or we don’t hit our—— 

Mr. DODARO. Well, the current estimate is $15.6 billion, and 

there’s some contingencies in there. I’m not sure, you know, there 

will be another estimate coming out from the Bureau soon. We’ve 
39 

looked at the estimate, the original estimate, that was made several years ago, we found, was not comprehensive or reliable 

enough. The current one is pretty good. 

Mr. GOMEZ. And so, given the reductions in testing, is there a 

risk that the census will not be ready to run an accurate and secure 2020 census? 

Mr. DODARO. There’s risk at this point. The next six months are 

critical. I can’t give you a final determination, but there’s certainly 

enough risk to be concerned. 

Mr. GOMEZ. Are we further behind today from the 2020—in preparation compared to the 2010 census? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, I’d like to tell you that the censuses in the 

past have run like clock work, but they haven’t. There’s been problems with almost every one. 

Mr. GOMEZ. But there—— 

Mr. DODARO. I’ve been involved since the 1990 census. 

Mr. GOMEZ. And I noticed that you put it on the 2009 High 

Risk—— 

Mr. DODARO. The only reason it comes off is because it actually 

gets conducted. And, you know, so—you know, I can’t tell you. But 

I do think, given the new innovations that they want to put in 

place, that I do think they’re behind where I’d like to see them be 

in terms of testing. 

Mr. GOMEZ. So for my next five minutes—I’m kidding, Madam 

Chair. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. 

Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam chairman. 

And, Mr. Dodaro, welcome back. I think this is one of the most 

important hearings our committee has every year, and hopefully 

we can try to double down on working with you to implement the 

recommendations contained in your annual report. 

Ms. Ocasio-Cortez was talking a little bit earlier about climate 

change, and good for you in making it one of your high risk categories. I think the science is quite clear. I heard a colleague earlier indicate that it was questionable. Maybe for him but not for 

the rest of the world. There is a very strong consensus in the scientific community that it is real. 

And as you point out, if you want to argue about the theology 

of climate science, go ahead, but real communities in real America 

and, for that matter, around the world are looking at real costs and 

trying to figure out resilience and retrofit to protect themselves 

from the clear consequences of rising sea levels, changing temperatures, crop changes, and even what constitutes temperate zones for 

growing food. 

And so I absolutely salute GAO for doing that. It is not a new 

item for you, but it is imperative that you be immune from any political pressure in calling it like you see it. 

Another subject that you and I have talked about, this committee 

has worked with you very closely on, is, of course, IT, information 

technology and the vulnerability of the Federal Government and, 

you know, legacy systems, encryption, how we procure and manage 

our IT assets. 
40 

And I was looking at your report this year, Mr. Dodaro, and just 

looking at the cyber part of the IT subject, you have 700 GAO recommendations to agencies addressing cybersecurity risks that have 

not yet been implemented. Is that accurate? 

Mr. DODARO. That is accurate. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And of those, 35 are priority recommendations 

that you say should receive particular attention from heads of key 

departments. And of those 35, 26 have not been implemented. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. DODARO. That is correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So why haven’t they been implemented, from 

your point of view? What is going on that we are not making the 

kind of progress we should be? 

Mr. DODARO. I am concerned that it is not a priority for the 

heads of the departments and the agencies, that there is not a full 

understanding of the extent of the vulnerabilities there, and that 

they are not held properly accountable for those areas. 

Even where Congress has expressed concerns, in the OPM situation, for example, they still haven’t responded to all of our recommendations in the area. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Even after the breach—— 

Mr. DODARO. Even after the breach, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. that compromised 24 million Americans’ data. Yes. 

Mr. DODARO. Right. Right. 

And so I think Congress should provide more rigorous oversight 

and talk to the top leadership of the agencies in order to deal with 

this issue. Because year after year, we keep finding the same problems, as well as the inspector generals. Now, some of it is part of 

the not replacing the legacy systems. But, again, there needs to be 

some urgency there as well. 

So, I mean, Nick Marinos, our expert, might have other reasons, 

but, from my standpoint, if you don’t have the leadership and the 

top direction, you are not going to solve this problem, because there 

are many other competing problems. 

Mr. MARINOS. Yes, two quick things, Congressman, that I think 

you are very familiar with. 

One, leadership gets very interested in cybersecurity after the incident, unfortunately—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Although, not in the case of OPM. 

Mr. MARINOS. Well, and then what I would also say, too, is that 

we also see the average tenure of CIOs generally be around the 

two-year point too. So I think that is another challenge too. You 

may have committed leadership for a certain period of time, but 

generally they don’t stick around too long. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So, as you know, we work with GAO on the quarterly scorecard for compliance with FITARA, which is sort of the 

framework legislation governing a lot of this. Let’s make sure that 

we are—we need your help and input in making sure that we are 

adequately addressing the cyber part of it. And we will be glad to 

talk to you further about how we do that. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, we would be happy to do that. You meant the 

Connolly Issa bill, didn’t you? 
41 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Dodaro. You are always welcome 

in this committee. 

Thank you, Madam chair. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. 

Mr. Cloud? 

Mr. CLOUD. Thanks for being here. I really appreciate it, really 

appreciate this topic. This seems to me like this is exactly what 

this committee should be about. And so I appreciate you and your 

team being here. 

And I appreciate you preparing a report on waste, fraud, abuse, 

and mismanagement in government. It is essential, with us having 

a $22 trillion debt and continuing deficit spending, that we begin 

to figure out where the problems are. And you seem to outline a 

lot of them for us. 

I appreciate seeing that some items have come off the list and 

others have improved. I think that is the goal. It is kind of like the 

endangered species list; the goal is to rehabilitate and get them off 

the list eventually. And, in a sense, that is what has happened in 

some areas. 

But there are some areas that have been there since the 1990’s 

when we first started doing this: the DOD weapons systems acquisitions, NASA acquisition management, DOE’s contract management for national nuclear security administration, and Office of 

Environmental Management—there is a mouthful for you—enforcement of tax laws. 

Can you explain some of the challenges and why we are not seeing any movement on these? 

Mr. DODARO. For a number of years, you know, we have looked 

at—let’s take the DOD weapons systems. First thing was to get 

better management practices in place. You know, we looked at how 

the private sector develops technologies. And what we found was 

that DOD, in many cases, was not identifying the requirements up 

front and stabilizing the requirements, not maturing the technologies before they go into production. 

So, right now, DOD has, based on our recommendations and congressional actions, particularly the Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, 

imposed in their requirements best practices. But they are not 

being followed in all cases. 

Now, when they are being followed, and based on our recommendations, in the weapons systems area, DOD saved $36 billion. But, in most cases, they are not following the best practices 

and implementing them properly, as well, over time. And, as a result, you get a fact where there are cost overruns, there are schedule delays, and, ultimately, less functionality gets delivered to the 

warfighters in the end. So there is an ultimate price to be paid in 

this area. 

So part of it is not going through a disciplined process on a consistent basis. 

Mr. CLOUD. Right. 

Mr. DODARO. The same thing’s true in the Department of Energy. For example, 90 percent of the Department of Energy’s budget goes to contractors. In a lot of cases, I think the contractors have 

had the upper hand on DOE, and there hasn’t been enough independent cost estimates that have been done over time. When these 
42 

projects change at DOE, they can change by a decade in terms of 

schedule delays and the costs can increase by multiple billions of 

dollars. 

And so we have gotten them to implement now better cost accounting practices, and, actually, we showed an improvement in 

the DOE contracting area. 

NASA had been making better progress, but they have regressed. 

We downgraded them in their leadership commitment. I have met 

with the NASA Administrator. The new human space flight programs, Congress isn’t getting the full cost information. It is not 

transparent over time, what needs to be done. Their portfolio of 

programs is having more cost overruns and schedule delays. The 

James Webb Telescope, for example—— 

Mr. CLOUD. Right. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. is years behind, multibillion dollars 

over budget. And so they have put together a new action plan now, 

but it needs to be implemented over time. 

Medicare continues to be problematic, with $48 billion in improper payments last year. They are getting better attention to this 

area. They have increased their staff, focused on it. But it continues to be very problematic. We have made recommendations 

that they seek legislative authority to do more prepayment audits. 

Because unless you can stop these improper payments up front, it 

is too hard to recover the money afterwards. 

And so we have made a lot of recommendations, but these are 

big problems. And we have seen incremental improvements, but 

more needs to be done. 

Mr. CLOUD. Yes. If I may, I only have 30 seconds left, which is 

kind of indicative of today’s discussion, that we have 34 major programs that you have identified as high risk and just a couple hours 

to cover them all. 

Do you think it would be helpful—if I could ask a couple questions to get them in, do you think it would be helpful for this committee to take each one up in a committee hearing? 

Mr. DODARO. Absolutely. 

Mr. CLOUD [continuing]. oversight to it, that would be essential? 

Mr. DODARO. Absolutely. And where we have seen progress, congressional hand has been at play. 

Mr. CLOUD. Right. 

Mr. DODARO. So it is instrumental to making these—I am happy 

to come back, and our team, talk about each of these areas individually. 

Mr. CLOUD. And then one of the criteria that is on this list is 

that it has to be in danger of losing a billion dollars, because I 

guess anything less than that just doesn’t count as government 

waste anymore. But is that a helpful metric? Or what metric 

should we be looking at? 

Mr. DODARO. Well—— 

Ms. HILL. The gentleman’s time has expired, but you can answer 

the question. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. that is the one quantifiable measure 

we use, but we have many qualitative measures: the impact on the 

economy, on public safety and health, the impact on national security and other factors. And so many of the areas are on there not 
43 

solely because of the dollar exposures but because of their importance to the American people. 

Mr. CLOUD. Thank you. I wish we had more time, but I appreciate you being here, you and your team. 

Thanks. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you both. 

I recognize myself for five minutes. 

My questions are a followup around the VA issues. It is a huge 

issue in my district; it is personal for me. 

I am concerned that the VA is failing to make progress on longoverdue reforms that are necessary to provide the best possible 

healthcare to more than 9 million veterans. The administration has 

said that veterans health is a priority, but this report suggests that 

actions haven’t exactly matched up with that. 

The report finds that many of the VA problems stem from a lack 

of clearly established goals. Your report says, quote, ‘‘Though the 

Department took steps to establish offices, work groups, and initiatives to address its high risk designation, many of these efforts are 

either in the initial stages of development or resources have not 

been allocated.’’ 

And this is a yes-or-no question. Mr. Dodaro, is the VA moving 

fast enough to address its high risk designation? 

Mr. DODARO. I don’t believe so. 

Ms. HILL. Okay. Why do you believe that resources are not being 

allocated more quickly? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, they basically have difficulties with their resource allocation process, which was one of the reasons we put 

them on the High Risk List. 

Ms. Clowers, who is our expert in this area, can elaborate. 

Ms. HILL. Just briefly. 

Ms. CLOWERS. Certainly. 

As the Comptroller said, they, in terms of capacity—this is the 

area that you mentioned—there are a number of activities that are 

ongoing, but they really just started in the last six months, and we 

need to watch them mature to make sure they have the right resources, both people and attention, on these issues. 

Ms. HILL. Okay. Great. 

And is this something that you believe our committee needs to 

be involved in, in addition to—— 

Mr. DODARO. Absolutely. 

Ms. HILL. Okay. 

So, given the lack of an adequate action plan, in your report, it 

states that the VA’s action plan did not include all goals and substantive actions taken. 

What are the risks of a subpar action plan? 

Mr. DODARO. The risks are the problems will continue, which is 

what we have seen. Our reports and the report of the inspector 

general from VA continue to find the same type of problems regardless of what we look at. 

Ms. HILL. Great. 

The GAO also reported that the VA’s Veterans Health administration lacked sufficient data to monitor whether veterans are getting timely access to the Veterans Choice Program. Today’s report 

states that the veterans who are referred to the Veterans Choice 
44 

Program, quote, ‘‘could potentially wait for care up to 70 calendar 

days if the maximum amount of time allowed by VA processes is 

used.’’ 

Mr. Dodaro, is it true that wait times this long exceed the maximum limits under the law? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. The maximum limits under the law are 30 

days. 

Ms. HILL. And what do you believe needs to be done around this? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, we have made some recommendations. They 

need to clarify their wait-time rules; they need to train their people 

properly; and they need to followup and monitor effectively to make 

sure that is being adhered to. 

They also need to change their processes. One of the things they 

did with the Choice Act is they involved an intermediary between 

VA and the eventual providers, which just built in an additional 

layer of bureaucracy and delay. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. 

The VA estimates that every day 20 veterans die by suicide. 

Some veterans have committed suicide at the very VA hospitals 

where they have come to receive care. 

Each of these deaths is a tragedy, and last year the VA declared 

that suicide prevention is its highest clinical priority. Just yesterday, President Trump announced a new task force to provide recommendations for this ongoing tragedy. 

But the high risk report makes it clear that this is an additional 

problem. Do you agree? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. We issued a report; Nikki can talk about it. 

But, you know, they are trying to right the ship now in that area 

and make it a priority, but there was funds that were unspent for 

a period of time back, and—but it needs continued attention. 

Ms. HILL. That is what I want to highlight, is that the social 

media and the media outreach campaign around veteran suicide 

prevention had a massive decline, including the VHA’s contractor 

for social media content around this issue dropped from 339 pieces 

in 2016 to just 47 pieces in 2018, a decline of more than 85 percent. 

And as many of my colleagues know, 339 pieces of social media is 

not a lot, in general. 

And, additionally, the GAO found that the VA expected to spend 

just $1.5 million out of $6.2 million obligated for suicide prevention 

in Fiscal Year 2018. As of September 2018, GAO found that the VA 

had only spent $57,000 of the obligated $1.5 million in outreach, 

making it unlikely that they spent much more. 

So today’s report concludes that the VA’s failure to do more aggressive outreach is, quote, ‘‘inconsistent with VHA’s efforts to reduce veteran suicides,’’ which is the VA’s highest clinical priority. 

Is that correct? 

Ms. CLOWERS. It is. 

Ms. HILL. And what additional steps should the VA take to improve outreach to veterans and do a better job of preventing suicides? 

Ms. CLOWERS. One of our recommendations was for them to 

clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the leadership office 

there. One of the contributing factors that we saw in the decline 

of the effort was a gap in leadership. So the position for that office 
45 

remained open for a number of months, and then they had an acting person in charge. And what VA told us was they didn’t feel like 

they had the authority to move forward until you saw these efforts 

decline. 

The other recommendation that we made is for them to establish 

performance targets for their efforts. They do collect a number of 

metrics on their outreach efforts, but they lack the targets to know 

whether it is good or bad. So the contractor will tell them there are 

20,000 hits on a website, but you don’t know if that is what they 

wanted to achieve. 

Ms. HILL. I know I am over. Is there a timeline for these improvements? Because veterans are dying at a rate of 20 veterans 

per day from suicide. 

Ms. CLOWERS. VA told us they agreed with the recommendations 

and would implement them in 2019. 

Ms. HILL. Thank you so much. 

Recognizing Mr. Armstrong. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you. So I am looking at the report, and I want to talk about the $23 

million that could be economically captured from flared gas. And 

this isn’t about environmental—there are lots of reasons we don’t 

want to flare natural gas. 

Mr. DODARO. Right. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But I think we can assume that this is gas associated with oil wells, because nobody’s drilling a gas well to flare 

the gas. 

So one of my questions—and this is one of the things either—I 

have had this conversation; we have dealt with it a lot in North 

Dakota. 

So, today, oil is trading at $56 a barrel. Gas is at $2.88, but just for simplicity, we are going to use $3 in MCF. And so a typical well 

in the Bakken is 500/500—500 barrels of oil, 500 MCF. And typical 

Federal lease is 20-percent royalty. Is that about right? 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. It depends, but, yes, that is in the neighborhood. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So, in order to capture that—if a well produces 

500 barrels a day, 500 MCF a day, the royalty on the oil would be 

$5,600 a day, the royalty on the gas would be $300 a day. So, in 

a month, it’d be $168,000 in oil royalties, $9,000 in gas. In a year, 

it would be just around $2 million in oil royalties versus $109,000 

in royalties on gas. 

And the reason the gas is flared is because the Federal Government doesn’t build the infrastructure to get the gas, so natural 

companies don’t go to get it. But if you are losing 20 percent, 

whoever’s drilling the oil well is losing 80 percent. And so they are 

making an economic decision to do that. 

So if you shut down that oil well for a day because you have to, 

because the only way to capture the gas is to get a pipe in the 

ground, get a processing plant midstream or upstream, so you lose 

that 500 barrels of oil a day, and you turn the well back on the 

next day, you don’t get the oil back then. You only get 500—if you 

shut the well down on Monday, you lose 500 barrels. But when you 

turn it back on on Tuesday, you only get 500 barrels of oil again 

on Tuesday, right? I mean, you don’t produce twice as much on 

Tuesday. 
46 

And the reason I ask that is, just purely from a revenue collection standpoint, you don’t get the money back on the royalty for oil 

and gas until end of life of the oil well. So if you have to shut that 

oil well down for a month to capture the gas royalties, you lose all 

of the oil royalties at the same time. 

I mean, am I correct? 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. So I think you are as good a bean counter as we 

are, in following all that. 

But the point we are making in our report is the methane rule, 

the methane emissions rule, which BLM worked on for a number 

of years. And the point of that was to look where it economically 

made sense and you could bring in the technology to reduce the 

amount of emissions that were vented. So, for example, if you had 

leaks in the system, you would use the infrared technology to try 

to identify that. 

So I think that is what the methane rule was about and we talk 

about in our high risk report. And that rule was developed and finalized in November, I believe, and then later revoked by an Executive order. And we felt that was a step back, because it didn’t— 

and was replaced by another rule which didn’t allow for that calculation. In other words, it just assumed that it was too costly to 

do it, whereas the rule prior had folks take a look at whether it 

was costly and made sense to do it. That was the issue around the 

methane rule. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But you are not putting the technology in. I 

mean, the premise is still the same. Every dollar you lose in gas 

at $3 in MCF on an associated oil well, there is a $56-a-barrel—— 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Oh, absolutely. And we know in the Bakken that 

oil is the name of the game. The infrastructure is not there. In 

North Dakota, you know, there was a lot of initial boon from the 

fracking there in the shale, in that play. And the concern, even in 

North Dakota, was to, you know, figure out what they could do 

with the gas. 

And, again, this is a rule that applies across the country. And 

where applicable, the idea was: See if it makes economic sense and 

we have the technology to try to reduce the amount of emissions. 

So it wasn’t just in North Dakota; it was across the Nation. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, I mean, I understand that. But I think we 

are still talking about associated—I mean, regardless of whether it 

is here or the Eagle Ford or—— 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Sure. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG [continuing]. the Powder River, it doesn’t matter 

where, I mean, when you are talking about gas in this context, you 

are talking about associated gas. 

And when you say ‘‘we’’ have the technology, who do you mean 

has the technology? I mean, it is not the Federal Government. 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. No. It is the producer of the oil. It is the producer 

of the oil and natural gas. Sure. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And the same—just one more, and then—— 

Mr. DESAULNIER.[Presiding.] Please, go ahead. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The same premise would, I mean, apply to that 

as well. I mean, if you are losing 20 percent, they are losing 80 percent. 
47 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Yes. And I don’t think—again, I don’t think the 

rule necessarily referred to the actual production. If there is no 

market for the natural gas, you are allowed to flare it, right? The 

associated gas. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. There are a lot of reasons not to flare gas, 

and—— 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Right. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG [continuing]. and there are a lot of reasons not 

to flare gas. 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Right. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I mean, when you are dealing with associated 

gas in an oil well, I don’t think the economics is one of them. 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Yes. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Mr. Armstrong, I can tell your passion for this 

issue. It is understandable. But your time is up. We are going to 

recognize Ms. Norton. 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Well, we would be happy to meet with you further 

to discuss it. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. I am sure he’ll take you up on that. 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. All right. I will bring my calculator. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Ms. Norton? 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dodaro, it looks as though the census is off to a very tough 

start. Major litigation involving citizenship status, that could affect 

the census, I believe going to the Supreme Court. And all at a time 

when, for the first time, we will be taking the census online. That 

really would seem to me to essentially take you to redesigning how 

you do the census, but let me see if that is the case. 

Any idea of what percentage, what proportion of Americans will 

be going online to fill out their census form? 

Mr. MIHM. Ma’am, I will have to get you that information. We 

will get it to you right after the—— 

Ms. NORTON. I wish you would. Because when you consider that 

most people are used to the paper census and you are having to 

prepare for online, I am beginning to wonder about this census in 

many ways. 

Mr. MIHM. Yes, Ms. Norton, if people don’t respond on the census, then they will get a paper form after that. And so they will 

have the two options. But we will get you the answer to the question you are asking. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, but I am worried about those who do respond. 

And I am worried about your testing and the delays, the compressed time there was for testing. Why was the time compressed 

for testing? 

Mr. MIHM. Initially, they argued that they had some budget 

issues. Now, the budget issues have largely been resolved for 2018 

and 2019. In fact, they have gotten even more than what they were 

looking for. But there were some budget constraints in the early 

years. 

Ms. NORTON. Do you have enough funds to do the census right, 

Mr. Dodaro? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. The Bureau believes that the funding that 

they have for this year is adequate. 
48 

Ms. NORTON. I am interested in whether the delays we have experienced will turn up or lead to problems in the census going forward. The end-to-end test, as it is called, in 2018, did it meet its 

key milestones? 

Mr. MIHM. It met the key milestones, but it was reduced, ma’am, 

as you mentioned in, you know, the premise to your question. 

The biggest challenge that they face going forward is that they 

have all these various operations that have to come together at precisely the right moment for a once-a-decade operation. And so, just 

like you are talking about with the internet option, any time you 

are introducing new ideas and new ways, even when they make 

sense, you know, such as like an internet option, it does entail a 

degree of risk. 

And so that is why, throughout the decade, you want to have a 

very robust testing process to make sure that you are testing the 

census under different conditions, different places around the country, different population groups, because you want to make sure 

that your testing captures the diversity of the Nation. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, did you test it online? Did you test it with 

respect to paper ballots? Because it looks like there are going to be 

two censuses. 

Mr. MIHM. Well, the way it will work, ma’am, is that, at least 

under the current design, there will be the—similar to the last census, there will be a postcard that will go out ahead of time reminding—in that case, it was just alerting people, in the 2010 census, 

alerting you, be on the lookout for your form. This time, it will tell 

you you have the option to answer online. 

For those that do not answer online after a period of time, I 

mean, just a matter of a couple of weeks or so, then they will be 

getting the paper. And then after that is when the census-takers 

will come if you have not done either online or the paper. 

The big challenge there is just because of all the concerns about 

even a reduced response rate overall, that it is going to require 

more hiring, more followup of the census-takers, a population that 

may not be, just because of survey fatigue and other reasons, may 

not be as willing to or able to respond to the census. So that is—— 

Ms. NORTON. Oh, surely. 

Mr. MIHM [continuing]. going to put an extra burden on what 

they call their nonresponse followup operation. 

Ms. NORTON. Surely. It is hard enough getting people to respond 

once. When they may have to respond twice, I must say I am concerned. 

Mr. MIHM. Well, the challenge there, ma’am, is exactly what you 

are saying, is that the Census Bureau is going to have in place— 

and they have been working very hard on this—what they call the 

de-duplication. In the risk that one of us would respond on the 

internet and then try and respond on the paper, the Census Bureau has to have in place procedures and automated processes to 

make sure that they can de-duplicate. And they have been working 

very hard on that. 

Mr. DODARO. Right. 

My team also tells me, Representative Norton, that the Census 

Bureau estimates 45 percent of the households will respond online. 

Ms. NORTON. That is huge. 
49 

Mr. DODARO. If that happens, that is one way to reduce the cost, 

because you won’t have to send people door-to-door to do that. So 

we will have to see what the actual experience is, but that is the 

current estimate. 

Ms. NORTON. Your report says, and here I am quoting, that the 

2020 census lacks a risk assessment and certain best scheduling 

practices. 

Now, given how you have testified about what I will call the dual 

census, is there time to get to best practices to be assured that this 

dual way of doing the census will, in fact, work? 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Ms. Norton, your time has expired. 

But the gentleman, please, go ahead and answer. 

Mr. DODARO. The next six months are critical, Representative 

Norton, and that will tell you whether they are going to have adequate testing in time or not. We are concerned, but the next six 

months will tell the tale. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, if I could say, I do think, if the next 

six months is when we are going to learn something, that we need 

perhaps in the next three months another hearing. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. I agree. 

I am going to recognize myself for five minutes and agree with 

my friend from Virginia. Mr. Dodaro, this is one of my favorite 

hearings. To your staff, I know you don’t get acknowledged, in my 

view, nearly enough for the work you do. But I just want to go on 

the record and acknowledge that, in spite of your shameless comment to Mr. Connolly. 

So the Center for Disease Control has done a study on so-called 

diseases of despair. They are a very large problem in this country. 

And in relation to that—and we are going to have a hearing tomorrow that you will not be at, but Ms. McNeil will be here—why— 

in reading why you put our efforts in to prevent drug abuse, why 

did you put that in the emerging category? 

And I would like to say, too, in our discussions with you and the 

Governors Association, opioids, in the bills that we got passed in 

a bipartisan level, I was able to put three or four amendments in 

there with Republican colleagues about metrics and performance 

standards. We are spending $30 billion a year on this. It costs— 

just the opioid crisis costs us $500 billion. 

The fact that this is emerging at the same time that we are in 

a bipartisan effort trying to assert ourselves in this raises large 

concerns for me. Could you respond to that, please? 

Mr. DODARO. Sure. Well, you know, one of the factors that we 

consider is public safety. And this is an area that is very concerning. It was mentioned earlier that there are 70,000 deaths from 

drug overdoses every year. That is 119 people a day. And the situation is getting worse, rather than better, despite all the efforts. 

For the last two years, for 2017 and 2018, there was no national 

strategy. There was no official in charge of the Office of Drug Control Policy. So I became very concerned. And I have held forums on 

this issue where we brought a lot of experts together from the provider community, from the treatment community, from law enforcement, and we talked about the challenges associated with this. 

So I think the challenges are huge. We are doing more work in 

this area. So we put it sort of in a category of, you know, we are 
50 

considering putting this on the High Risk List and that we are 

watching it very closely. 

And if we think that the—like, the national strategy, for example, our preliminary observations are it doesn’t cover all the things 

you would want to have in a national strategy, you know. And our 

witness will talk about that tomorrow at your hearing. But we 

have already found some deficiencies in that national strategy that 

we think need attention. 

So this is a very worrisome area to people. You know, as a parent 

and now a grandparent, I have worried about this with my own 

children going forward. And so I think it is deserving of special attention if it warrants it. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Well, we will go into this more tomorrow. But 

in relation to previous administrations, going back through multiple presidencies, Republican and Democrats, we have put a lot of 

effort nationally, at the state level, at the local level into this. 

The report that we will talk about tomorrow is 23 pages, I think. 

There is only a page that refers to metrics and performance standards. I thought it was fairly appalling, having been involved in this 

field for some time. 

So it seems to be more than emerging. This is a real—it was a 

crisis before. We have recognized this as a crisis since President 

Reagan was Governor—was President. Sorry. Californian. Freudian 

slip. 

What can we do in more than a hearing tomorrow? We have 

plenty of performance metrics now. The public health system does, 

CDC does, but they are daunting, to make sure that we are on top 

of this. 

And, again, in context of a bipartisan effort, particularly on the 

opioid side, to intervene and support public health officials, it 

strikes me that two years and a lack of specificity on performance 

standards and metrics in reference to those that have been built 

on by previous administrations is rather appalling and would make 

me think it should be high risk. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. Well, again, we made this determination, you 

know, a couple months ago, before we saw the national strategy 

and had a chance to evaluate it. 

So the one thing I will tell you is that we don’t normally have 

to wait a full two years for the next update to put something on 

the High Risk List. I put on a number of issues out of cycle to the 

High Risk List in this area. 

We have 30 open recommendations that need to be addressed in 

this area. And once we have some work underway not only in the 

national strategy but a number of other areas, as soon as we finish 

this body of work this year, I will make a determination of whether 

to officially add it or not. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Well, I look forward to having further conversations outside the committee on this. Some of those performance standards asked you and the National Academy of Sciences to 

help with best practices in this regard, to make sure that the efforts we have made actually show real results as soon as possible. 

Because the urgency of almost 200 people a day losing their lives 

speaks for itself. 

Mr. DODARO. I couldn’t agree with you more, Congressman. 
51 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you. Thanks again. 

I now want to recognize Ms. Tlaib. 

Ms. TLAIB. Thank you, chairman. 

Thank you. Eighteen years. That is amazing. I have only been 

here two months, and I just want to commend you for sticking 

around for 18 years to run the GAO. I really commend you. 

Mr. DODARO. Well, actually, this is my 46th year at GAO. 

Ms. TLAIB. Oh, it is—they put 18 years. 

Mr. DODARO. No, I know I look younger, but I—— 

Ms. TLAIB. That is amazing. Forty-six. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Ms. TLAIB. Congratulations. And I have only heard incredible 

things about you, your integrity. And I appreciate that service. 

So I am really concerned about the Environmental Protection 

Agency, the EPA, that it is not meeting its obligation. 

I think, for me, you know, I come from Michigan. And from the 

lack of response with the Flint tragedy that continues impacting so 

many children and families to this day, to the fact that I have some 

of the most polluted ZIP Codes in the state of Michigan from, you 

know, bringing in, piping in the tar sands from Canada, and they 

produce the petroleum coke, and the coke/carbon company dumped 

it on the riverfront, and, as a former state legislator, trying to contact the EPA for some sort of response. 

And so, when I read part of your report, you identified and used 

the word, I think—you identified the EPA’s process for assessing 

and controlling toxic chemicals as a high risk area and that you— 

I think in there is quoted saying ‘‘regressed,’’ that the EPA’s efforts 

have regressed over the past two years. 

And you should know, this morning, we just had a hearing on 

PFAS and the fact that, even then, everybody recognized it is dangerous, it is an impact on public health, we need to do something 

about it, but, again, there seems to be a lack of action on the EPA. 

So I am wondering, you know, what is the IRIS program? What 

are some of the things that you are mentioning here? And if you 

can provide some sort of feedback to me, as a legislator, what I 

need to be doing from my end to hold the administration accountable. 

Mr. DODARO. Sure. I will start, and Mr. Gaffigan is our expert 

in this area. He can add. 

First, the IRIS program is the program the EPA uses to assess 

the hazard assessment of the chemicals and actually produces a 

toxicity estimate, a number. And that is then used not only by EPA 

programs in regional offices to then assess whether or not to regulate it and how to regulate it, if they do, it is used by state and 

local officials and others. So it is really intended to be the starting 

process for assessing a chemical’s capabilities. 

Now, one of the changes that we had recommended in the past 

that Congress has finally improved, in the Toxic Substances Control Act, to now require EPA, under the new requirements, has to 

approve a chemical in advance. Previous to that, they had to prove 

it was problematic. And so the burden has shifted. So the EPA 

needs to implement the TSCA requirements too, the new amendments to the law. 
52 

But the IRIS program also is a starting point for that area, and 

we have a number of recommendations underway. They have improved the process, but right now they haven’t been transparent in 

how many assessments they are going to do and what has happened to assessments that were already through many parts of the 

process. In some cases, they have been assessing the process since 

the 1990’s. 

Ms. TLAIB. Yes. 

Mr. DODARO. And so it is not transparent enough, and it is not 

clear how they are going to apply the resources necessary to do 

this. 

You know, we labeled them as regressed for two reasons. One, 

the leadership of EPA hasn’t been as outspoken about this as a priority than the previous administration was. And, second, they proposed budget cuts for the IRIS program. Now, Congress didn’t go 

along with the budget cuts and kept the resources at the 2017 levels. But it is not clear how those resources are going to be used and 

how the assessments will be prioritized going forward. 

Ms. TLAIB. So, you know, is this about the lack of capacity? Or 

is it, you know—when you say ‘‘since the 1990’s,’’ I have heard 

even other horror things of not being able to get something that is 

toxic on the toxic list for the EPA. Is it—you know, because I think 

it goes beyond the capacity. It is also the will or some political 

courage. Can you talk a little bit about that? 

Mr. DODARO. Sure. 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Sure. I think as the Comptroller General said, we 

felt they regressed in the leadership part of things. And so we felt 

all along that there needed to be some congressional action to help 

improve the authorities that EPA had to do this, and so the 2016 

act did provide them that. 

And so we have been doing a series of work following how they 

are doing in the implementation. And we just released a report on 

Monday that really sort of highlights the importance of staying on 

top of the leadership and ensuring transparency throughout the 

process. 

Very simply, to take the IRIS program, in May 2018, they had 

20 chemicals on a list ready to go. They had talked. They checked 

in with the program offices. They all said they had their—this is 

what they still wanted. They had the resources to do it. 

They were told in June to hold up, by leadership. They were told 

not to work on any of the assessments. 

In August, they sent out a survey to the offices again asking, 

these 20, do you still want them? Survey results said, yes, we do. 

The then-leadership later asked, well, prioritize within these and 

limit, you know, to three or four. But they provided no criteria for 

the program offices to decide, well, how do we prioritize? 

The next thing they know, there is a list published in December, 

has 11 chemicals on it. Four chemicals which were on that list of 

20, which were ready for peer review at stage four, disappeared. 

There was no explanation as to what happened. 

And so that speaks to the lack of transparency. And that really 

comes from leadership. I think they have an opportunity to make 

decisions, but they need to be transparent about it. Otherwise, it 

raises the questions of, why did this happen? 
53 

Ms. TLAIB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you. 

That is our last member who would like to speak. I want to 

thank you again for your fine work and all your staff’s work. We 

really appreciate it. And we appreciate you for the testimony today. 

Without objection, all members will have five legislative days 

within which to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the chair, which will be forwarded to the witnesses for 

their responses. 

I ask our witnesses to please respond as promptly as you are 

able. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:19 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(55) 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
56 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:30 p.m. ET 

Wednesday, March 6, 2019 

GA0-19-392T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Oversight 

and Reform, House of Representatives 

HIGH-RISK SERIES 

Substantial Efforts 

Needed to Achieve 

Greater Progress on HighRisk Areas 

Statement of Gene L. Dodaro 

Comptroller General of the United States 
57 

HIGH-RISK SERIES 

Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater 

Progress on High-Risk Areas 

What GAO Found 

The ratings for more than half of the 35 areas on the 2019 High-Risk List remain 

largely unchanged. Since GAO's last update in 2017, seven areas improved, 

three regressed, and two showed mixed progress by improving in some criteria 

but declining in others. Where there has been improvement in high-risk areas, 

congressional actions have been critical in spurring progress in addition to 

actions by executive agencies. 

GAO is removing two of the seven areas with improved ratings from the HighRisk List because they met all of GAO's five criteria for removal. The first area, 

Department of Defense (DOD) Supply Chain Management, made progress on 

seven actions and outcomes related to monitoring and demonstrated progress 

that GAO recommended for improving supply chain management. For example, 

DOD improved the visibility of physical inventories, receipt processing, cargo 

tracking, and unit moves. Improvements in asset visibility have saved millions of 

dollars and allow DOD to better meet mission needs by providing assets where 

and when needed. 

The second area, Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data, made significant 

progress in establishing and implementing plans to mitigate potential gaps. For 

example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration successfully 

launched a satellite, now called NOAA-20, in November 2017. NOAA-20 is 

operational and provides advanced weather data and forecasts. DOD developed 

plans and has taken actions to address gaps in weather data through its plans to 

launch the Weather System Follow-on-Microwave satellite in 2022. 

There are two new areas on the High-Risk List since 2017. Added in 2018 

outside of GAO's biennial high-risk update cycle, the Government-Wide 

Personnel Security Clearance Process faces significant challenges related to 

processing clearances in a timely fashion, measuring investigation quality, and 

ensuring infonmation technology security. The second area, added in 2019, is 

Department of Veterans Affairs 0/A) Acquisition Management. VA has one of the 

most significant acquisition functions in the federal government, both in 

obligations and number of contract actions. GAO identified seven contracting 

challenges for VA, such as outdated acquisition regulations and policies, lack of 

an effective medical supplies procurement strategy, and inadequate acquisition 

training. 

Overall, 24 high-risk areas have either met or partially met all five criteria for 

removal from the list; 20 of these areas fully met at least one criterion. Ten highrisk areas have neither met nor partially met one or more criteria. 

While progress is needed across all high-risk areas. GAO has identified nine that 

need especially focused executive and congressional attention, including 

Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation, Resolving the Federal Role in Housing 

Finance, addressing Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Insurance Programs, 

Managing Risks and Improving VA Health Care, and ensuring an effective 2020 

Decennial Census. Beyond these specific areas, focused attention is needed to 

address mission-critical skills gaps in 16 high-risk areas, confront three high-risk 

areas concerning health care and tax law enforcement that include billions of 

dollars in improper payments each year, and focus on a yawning tax gap. 

-------------United States Government Accountability Office 
58 

GAO's 2019 High-Risk list 

Strengthening the Foundation for Efficiency and Effectiveness 

Strategic Human Capita! Management 

Managing Federal Rea! Property 

Funding the Nation's Surface Transportation System"' 

Modernizing the U.S. Financial Regulatory System"' 

Resolving the Federal Role in Housing Finance"' 

USPS Financial Viability"' 

Management of Federal Oil and Gas Resources 

Limiting the Federal Government's Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks a 

lmprovmg the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations 

Improving Federal Management of Programs That Serve Tribes and Their Members"' 

2020 Decennial Census"' 

U.S. Government Environmental Liabilitya 

Transforming DOD Program Management 

DOD Weapon Systems Acquisition 

DOD Financial Management 

DOD Business Systems Modernization 

DOD Support Infrastructure Management3 

Government-wide Personnel Security Clearance Process (new)"' 

Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation3 

Strengthening Department of Homeland Security Management Functions 

Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies Critical to U.S. National Security Interests a 

Improving Federal Oversight of Food Safety"' 

Protecting Public Health through Enhanced Oversight of Medical Products 

Toxic Chemicals3 

VA Acquisition Management (new) 

DOE's Contract Management for the National Nuclear Security Administration and Office of Environmental Management3 

NASA Acquisition Management'" 

DOD Contract Management 

Assessing the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Tax Law Administration 

Enforcement ofT ax Lawsa 

Modernizing and Safeguarding Insurance and Benefit Programs 

Medicare Program & Improper Payments" 

Strengthening Medicaid Program !ntegritya 

Improving and Modernizing Federal Disability Programs 

Pens1on Benefit Guaranty Corporation Insurance Programs'" 

National Flood Insurance Programa 

Managing Risks and Improving VA Health Carea 

Source GAO I GA0·19·157SP 

aLegislation is likely to be necessary in order to effectively address this area 
59 

Chairman Cummings, Ranking Member Jordan, and Members of the 

Committee: 

Since the early 1990s, our high-risk program has focused attention on 

government operations with greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, 

and mismanagement, or that are in need of transformation to address 

economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. This effort, supported 

by this committee and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, has brought much needed attention to problems 

impeding effective government and costing billions of dollars each year. 

We have made hundreds of recommendations to reduce the 

government's high-risk challenges. Executive agencies either have 

addressed or are addressing many of them and, as a result, progress is 

being made in a number of areas. Congress also continues to take 

important actions. For example, Congress has enacted a number of laws 

since our last report in February 2017 that are helping to make progress 

on high-risk issues. Financial benefits to the federal government due to 

progress in addressing high-risk areas over the past 13 years (fiscal year 

2006 through fiscal year 2018) totaled nearly $350 billion or an average of 

about $27 billion per year. In fiscal year 2018, financial benefits were the 

highest we ever reported at nearly $47 billion. 1 

Our2019 High-Risk Report, which is being released today, describes (1) 

progress made addressing high-risk areas and the reasons for that 

progress, and (2) actions that are still needed. 2 It also identifies two new 

high-risk areas-Government-wide Personnel Security Clearance 

Process and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Acquisition 

Management, and two high-risk areas we removed from the list because 

they demonstrated sufficient progress in managing risk-Department of 

Defense (DOD) Supply Chain Management and Mitigating Gaps in 

Weather Satellite Data. 3 

Substantial efforts are needed on the remaining high-risk areas to 

achieve greater progress and to address regress in some areas since the 

1Fmanctal benefits are based on actions taken in response to our work, such as reducing 

government expenditures, increasing revenues, or rea !locating funds to other areas 

2

GAO, High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforls Needed to Achieve Greater Progress on HighRisk Areas, GA0-19-157SP (Washington, D.C .. Mar. 6, 2019). 

3

Government-wide Personnel Security Clearance Process was added to the High-Risk 

List in January 2018 

Page 1 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
60 

How We Rate HighRisk Areas 

last high-risk update in 2017. Continued congressional attention and 

executive branch leadership attention remain key to success. 

Our experience has shown that the key elements needed to make 

progress in high-risk areas are top-level attention by the administration 

and agency leaders grounded in the five criteria for removal from the 

High-Risk List, as well as any needed congressional action. 4 The five 

criteria for removal that we issued in November 2000 are as follows: 

Leadership commitment. Demonstrated strong commitment and 

top leadership support. 

Capacity. Agency has the capacity (i.e., people and resources) to 

resolve the risk(s). 

Action plan. A corrective action plan exists that defines the root 

cause, solutions, and provides for substantially completing 

corrective measures, including steps necessary to implement 

solutions we recommended. 

Monitoring. A program has been instituted to monitor and 

independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of 

corrective measures. 

Demonstrated progress. Ability to demonstrate progress in 

implementing corrective measures and in resolving the high-risk 

area. 

Starting in our 2015 update, we added clarity and specificity to our 

assessments by rating each high-risk area's progress on the five criteria 

and used the following definitions: 

Met. Actions have been taken that meet the criterion. There are 

no significant actions that need to be taken to further address this 

criterion. 

Partially met. Some, but not all, actions necessary to meet the 

criterion have been taken. 

Not met. Few, if any, actions towards meeting the criterion have 

been taken. 

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks, 

(Washington, D.C .. November 2000) 

Page2 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
61 

Changes to the 2019 

High-Risk List 

DOD Supply Chain 

Management Removed 

From the High-Risk List 

Source GAO~naly;,s GA0·19-151SP 

We are removing two areas-DOD Supply Chain Management and 

Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data-from the list due to the 

progress that was made in addressing the high-risk issues. As we have 

with areas previously removed from the High-Risk List, we will continue to 

monitor these areas to ensure that the improvements we have noted are 

sustained. If significant problems again arise, we will consider reapplying 

the high-risk designation. We added two areas to the High-Risk List since 

our 2017 update-Government-Wide Personnel Security Clearance 

Process and VA Acquisition Management. 

We are removing the area of DOD Supply Chain Management from the 

High-Risk List because, since 2017, DOD has addressed the remaining 

two criteria (monitoring and demonstrated progress) for the asset visibility 

and materiel distribution segments. Congressional attention, DOD 

leadership commitment, and our collaboration contributed to the 

successful outcome for this high-risk area, which had been on GAO's 

High-Risk List since 1990. 

DOD's actions for the asset visibility segment of this high-risk area 

included (1) providing guidance for the military components to consider 

key attributes of successful performance measures during metric 

development for their improvement initiatives; (2) incorporating into afteraction reports, information relating to performance measures; and (3) 

demonstrating sustained progress by, for example, increasing its visibility 

of assets through radio-frequency identification (RFID), an automated 

data-capture technology that can be used to electronically identify, track, 

and store information contained on a tag. According to DOD, the use of 

RFID tags to provide visibility of sustainment cargo at the tactical leg (i.e., 

the last segment of the distribution system) resulted in $1.4 million annual 

cost savings. 

DOD's actions for the materiel distribution segment of this high-risk area 

included (1) making progress in developing its suite of distribution 

performance metrics; (2) incorporating distribution metrics, as 

appropriate, on the performance of all legs of the distribution system, 

including the tactical leg; (3) making progress in refining its Materiel 

Distribution Improvement Plan and incorporating additional actions based 

on interim progress and results; and (4) improving its capability to 

comprehensively measure distribution performance, identifying 

distribution problems and root cause, and implementing solutions. 

Page3 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
62 

Mitigating Gaps in 

Weather Satellite Data 

Removed From the HighRisk List 

According to DOD, initiatives focused on distribution process and 

operational improvements have resulted in at least $1.56 billion in 

distribution cost avoidances to date. 

As we have with areas previously removed from the High-Risk List, we 

will continue to monitor this area to ensure that the improvements we 

have noted are sustained-' Appendix I provides additional information on 

this high-risk area. 

We are removing the area of Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data 

from the High-Risk List because-with strong congressional support and 

oversight-the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

and DOD have made significant progress since 2017 in establishing and 

implementing plans to mitigate potential gaps in weather satellite data. 

The United States relies on polar-orbiting satellites to provide a global 

perspective on weather every morning and afternoon. NOAA is 

responsible for the polar satellite program that crosses the equator in the 

afternoon while DOD is responsible for the polar satellite program that 

crosses the equator in the early morning orbit. NOAA's actions for polarorbiting weather satellites that addressed the remaining criteria of action 

plan and demonstrated progress included ( 1) issuing three updates to its 

gap mitigation plan between January 2016 and February 2017 to address 

shortfalls we had identified previously; and (2) successfully launching the 

NOAA-20 satellite in November 2017, which is currently operational and 

is being used to provide advanced weather data and forecasts. Moreover, 

NOAA is also working to build and launch the next satellites in the polar 

satellite program. 

DOD's actions for polar-orbiting weather satellites, pursuant to statutes 

and accompanying congressional direction, included DOD leadership (1) 

developing and implementing plans to acquire satellites as part of a family 

of systems to replace its aging legacy weather satellites, including 

awarding a contract for its Weather System Follow-on-Microwave 

program, planned for launch in 2022; (2) establishing plans to meet its 

highest-priority weather monitoring data collection needs that will not be 

covered by the Weather System Follow-on-Microwave program, including 

by acquiring and launching the Electro-Optical/Infrared Weather Systems 

satellite in 2024; and (3) monitoring the Weather System Follow-on5For additional details on the reasons for removing this high-risk area, see p. 57 of this 

statement 

Page4 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
63 

Microwave satellite program's progress toward addressing critical needs 

and assessing its operations and sustainment costs. 

As we have with areas previously removed from the High-Risk List, we 

will continue to monitor this area to ensure that the improvements we 

have noted are sustained' Appendix I provides additional information on 

this high-risk area. 

6For additional details on the reasons for removing this high~risk area, see p. 64 of 

this statement 

PageS GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
64 

Government-wide 

Personnel Security 

Clearance Process Added 

to the High-Risk List 

Government-wide Personnel 

Security Clearance Process 

'", MONITORING ',, ACTION PLAN 

So~cce GAOarmlys•s. I GA0·19-157SP 

Executive branch agencies are not meeting investigation timeliness 

objectives, and these processing delays have contributed to a significant 

backlog that the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB)-the 

agency responsible for personnel security clearance investigationsreported to be approximately 565,000 investigations as of February 2019, 

In addition, the executive branch has not finalized performance measures 

to ensure the quality of background investigations and some longstanding key reform initiatives remain incomplete, Further, information 

technology (IT) security concerns may delay planned milestones for the 

development of a new background investigation IT system, 

We included the DOD program on our High-Risk List in 2005 and 

removed it in 2011 because of improvements in the timeliness of 

investigations and adjudications, and steps toward measuring the quality 

of the process, We put the government-wide personnel security clearance 

process on our High-Risk List in January 2018 because of significant 

challenges related to the timely processing of security clearances and 

completing the development of quality measures, In addition, the 

government's effort to reform the personnel security clearance process, 

starting with the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004, has had mixed progress, and key reform efforts 

have not been implemented government-wide, 7 Since adding this area to 

the High-Risk List, the Security Clearance, Suitability, and Credentialing 

Performance Accountability Council (PAC), including its four principal 

members-the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB), the Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI); the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and the Director of 

the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)-have not fully met the five 

criteria for high-risk removaL 

Several issues contribute to the risks facing the government-wide 

personnel security clearance process: 

Clearance processing delays, Executive branch agencies are not 

meeting most investigation timeliness objectives, The percentage of 

executive branch agencies meeting established timeliness objectives 

for initial secret clearances, initial top secret clearances, and periodic 

reinvestigations decreased each year from fiscal years 2012 through 

2018, For example, 97 percent of the executive branch agencies we 

7Pub, L No, 108-458, 118 Stat 3638 (2004), 

Page6 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
65 

reviewed did not meet the timeliness objectives for initial secret 

clearance investigations in fiscal year 2018. 

Lack of quality measures. While the executive branch has taken 

steps to establish government-wide performance measures for the 

quality of background investigations-including establishing quality 

assessment standards and a quality assessment reporting tool-it is 

unclear when this effort will be completed. 

Security clearance reform delays. The executive branch has 

reformed many parts of the personnel security clearance processsuch as updating adjudicative guidelines to establish common 

adjudicative criteria for security clearances; however, some longstanding key initiatives remain incomplete-such as completing plans 

to fully implement and monitor continuous evaluation. 

IT security. DOD is responsible for developing a new system to 

support background investigation processes, and DOD officials 

expressed concerns about the security of connecting to OPM's 

legacy systems since a 2015 data breach compromised OPM's 

background investigation systems and files for 21.5 million 

individuals. As of December 2018, OPM has not fully taken action on 

our priority recommendations to update its security plans, evaluate its 

security control assessments, and implement additional training 

opportunities. 

However, since we added this area to our High-Risk List, the PAC has 

demonstrated progress in some areas. For example, NBIB reported that 

the backlog of background investigations decreased from almost 715,000 

cases in January 2018 to approximately 565,000 cases in February 2019. 

NBIB officials credit an Executive Memorandum-issued jointly in June 

2018 by the DNI and the Director of OPM and containing measures to 

reduce the investigation backlog-as a driver in backlog reduction. 

Further, in response to a requirement in the Securely Expediting 

Clearances Through Reporting Transparency (SECRET) Act of 2018, in 

September 2018, NBIB reported to Congress, for each clearance level, 

(1) the size of the investigation backlog, (2) the average length of time to 

conduct an initial investigation and a periodic reinvestigation, and (3) a 

discussion of the factors contributing to investigation timeliness. 8 The 

PAC is also reporting publicly on the progress of key reforms through 

www.performance.gov, and for fiscal year 2018, the website contains 

quarterly action plans and progress updates, which present figures on the 

'Pub. L. No.115-173,§3,132Stat 1291, 1291-1292(2018). 

Page7 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
66 

average timeliness of initial investigations and periodic reinvestigations 

for the executive branch as a whole, investigation workload and backlog, 

and investigator headcounts. 

We have made numerous recommendations to PAC members to address 

risks associated with the personnel security clearance process between 

2011-when we removed DOD's personnel security clearance program 

from the High-Risk List, and 2018-when we placed the government-wide 

personnel security clearance process on the High-Risk List. We consider 

27 of these recommendations key to addressing the high-risk designation. 

Eight recommendations key to the high-risk designation have been 

implemented, including three since January 2018. 

Nineteen of these key recommendations remain open-including 

recommendations that the principal members of the PAC (1) conduct an 

evidence-based review of investigation and adjudication timeliness 

objectives, (2) develop and report to Congress on investigation quality 

measures, (3) prioritize the timely completion of efforts to modernize and 

secure IT systems that affect clearance holders government-wide, and (4) 

develop and implement a comprehensive workforce plan that identifies 

the workforce needed to meet current and future demand for background 

investigations services and to reduce the investigations backlog. 

See page 170 of the report for additional detail on this high-risk area, 

including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

PageS GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
67 

VA Acquisition 

Management Added to the 

'"'""'-"'«"" List 

Source GAO anarys<s. I GA0-1\}.-1S7SP 

VA spends tens of billions of dollars to procure a wide range of goods and 

services-including medical supplies, IT, and construction of hospitals, 

clinics, and other facilities-to meet its mission of providing health care 

and other benefits to millions of veterans. VA has one of the most 

significant acquisition functions in the federal government, both in 

obligations and number of contract actions. The Veterans Health 

Administration (VHA) provides medical care to veterans and is by far the 

largest administration in the VA Since we began focusing on VA's 

acquisition management activities in 2015, we have reported numerous 

challenges in this area. Since 2015, we have made 31 recommendations, 

21 of which remain open, that cover a range of areas to address 

challenges in VA's acquisition management 

In fiscal year 2019, VA received the largest discretionary budget in its 

history-$86.5 billion, about $20 billion higher than in 2015. About a third 

of VA's discretionary budget in fiscal year 2017, or $26 billion, has been 

used to contract for goods and services. VA's acquisition management 

continues to face challenges including (1) outdated acquisition regulations 

and policies; (2) lack of an effective medical supplies procurement 

strategy; (3) inadequate acquisition training; (4) contracting officer 

workload challenges; (5) lack of reliable data systems; (6) limited contract 

oversight and incomplete contract file documentation; and (7) leadership 

instability. 

In light of these challenges and given the significant taxpayer investment, 

it is imperative that VA show sustained leadership commitment to take 

steps to improve the performance of its procurement function so that it 

can use its funding in the most efficient manner possible to meet the 

needs of those who served our country. 

This area has been added to the High-Risk List for the following reasons 

in particular: 

Outdated acquisition regulations and policies. VA's procurement 

policies have historically been outdated, disjointed, and difficult for 

contracting officers to use. In September 2016, we reported that the 

acquisition regulations contracting officers currently follow have not 

been fully updated since 2008 and that VA had been working on 

completing a comprehensive revision of its acquisition regulations 

since 2011. VA's delay in updating this fundamental source of policy 

has impeded the ability of contracting officers to effectively carry out 

their duties. We recommended in September 2016 that VA identify 

Page9 GA0·19-392T High~Risk Series 
68 

measures to expedite the revision of its acquisition regulations and 

clarify what policies are currently in effect. VA concurred with this 

recommendation but has not yet fully implemented it. 

Lack of an effective medical supplies procurement strategy. VA"s 

Medical Surgical Prime Vendor-Next Generation (MSPV-NG) 

program for purchasing medical supplies to meet the needs of about 

9 million veterans at 172 medical centers has not been effectively 

executed. nor is it in line with practices at leading hospitals that have 

launched similar programs. We reported in November 2017 that VA's 

approach to developing its catalog of supplies was rushed and lacked 

key stakeholder involvement and buy-in. As a result, VA was not able 

to accomplish some of the key efficiencies the program was intended 

to achieve, such as streamlining the purchase of medical supplies 

and saving money. We recommended in November 2017 that VA 

develop, document, and communicate to stakeholders an overarching 

strategy for the program. VA concurred with this recommendation and 

reported that it would develop a new strategy by March 2019. 

Contracting officer workload challenges. The majority of our 

reviews since 2015 have highlighted workload as a contributing factor 

to the challenges that contracting officers face. Most recently, in 

September 2018, we reported that about 54 percent of surveyed VA 

contracting officers said their workload was not reasonable. In 

addition, in September 2016, we reported that VHA contracting 

officers processed a large number of emergency procurements of 

routine medical supplies, which accounted for approximately 20 

percent of VHA's overall contract actions in fiscal year 2016, with 

obligations totaling about $1.9 billion. 

Contracting officers told us that these frequent and urgent small-dollar 

transactions reduce contracting officers' efficiency and ability to take a 

strategic view of procurement needs. We recommended in November 

2017 that VHA network contracting offices work with medical centers to 

identify opportunities to more strategically purchase goods and services 

frequently purchased on an emergency basis. VA concurred with this 

recommendation and reported in December 2018 that it is utilizing a 

supply chain dashboard to track items purchased on an emergency basis 

and determine which of those items to include on the catalog. VA noted 

that it added 13,300 items to the catalog from June 2018 to December 

2018, including items often purchased on an emergency basis. We 

requested documentation showing which items added to the catalog were 

previously purchased on an emergency basis, but as of January 2019, VA 

had not yet provided it. 

Page 10 GA0~19..J92T High~Risk Series 
69 

Emerging Issue Requiring 

Close Attention: Federal 

Efforts to Prevent Drug 

Misuse 

Among other things, VA should implement our 21 open recommendations 

and specifically needs to take the following steps to demonstrate greater 

leadership commitment and strategic planning to ensure efficient use of 

its acquisition funding and staffing resources: 

Prioritize completing the revision of its acquisition regulations, which 

has been in process since 2011. 

Develop, document, and communicate to stakeholders a strategy for 

the Medical Surgical Prime Vendor program to achieve overall 

program goals. 

Identify opportunities to strategically purchase goods and services 

that are frequently purchased on an emergency basis. 

See page 210 of the report for additional detail on this high-risk area, 

including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

In addition to specific areas that we have designated as high risk, other 

important challenges facing our nation merit continuing close attention. 

One of these is the use of illicit drugs and the misuse of prescription 

drugs and the ways they affect individuals, their families, and the 

communities in which they live. Over 70,000 people died from drug 

overdoses in 2017-about 191 people every day-according to the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, with the largest portion of 

these deaths attributed to opioids. Further, drug overdoses are the 

leading cause of death due to injuries in the United States. They are 

currently at their highest ever recorded level and, since 2011, have 

outnumbered deaths by firearms, motor vehicle crashes, suicide, and 

homicide, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration. The Council 

of Economic Advisors estimates that in 2015, the economic cost of the 

opioid crisis alone was more than $500 billion when considering the value 

of lives lost due to opioid-related overdose. 

Federal drug control efforts spanning prevention, treatment, interdiction, 

international operations, and law enforcement represent a considerable 

federal investment. According to the President's fiscal year 2019 budget, 

federal drug control funding for fiscal year 2017 was $28.8 billion. Multiple 

federal agencies have ongoing efforts to respond to this crisis, including 

efforts to reduce the supply and demand for illicit drugs, to prevent 

misuse of prescription drugs, and to treat substance use disorders. 

Page 11 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
70 

High-Risk Areas That 

Made Progress 

However, we previously found that many efforts lacked measures to 

gauge the success of the federal response. Further, we have long 

advocated an approach to decision-making based on risk management. 

Such an approach would (1) link agencies' plans and budgets to 

achieving their strategic goals, (2) assess values and risks of various 

courses of actions to help set priorities and allocate resources, and (3) 

provide for the use of performance measures to assess progress. 

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is responsible for 

overseeing and coordinating the implementation of U.S. drug policy, 

including developing the National Drug Control Strategy (Strategy). 

ONDCP released the 2019 Strategy on January 31, 2019. The Strategy 

focuses on approaches related to prevention, treatment and recovery, 

and steps to reduce the availability of illicit drugs in the United States. We 

will continue to monitor the extent to which ONDCP and other federal 

agencies are employing a risk management and coordinated approach to 

their efforts to limit drug misuse. 

In particular, we have ongoing and planned work to assess ONDCP's 

operations, including its (1) leadership and coordination of efforts across 

the federal government; (2) the effects of the drug crisis on labor force 

participation and productivity and on people with disabilities and other 

vulnerable populations; (3) key federal efforts to reduce the availability of 

illicit drugs; and (4) agency efforts around drug education and prevention. 

We will determine whether this issue should be added to the High-Risk 

List once we have completed this ongoing and planned work. 

Agencies can show progress by addressing our five criteria for removal 

from the list: leadership commitment, capacity, action plan, monitoring, 

and demonstrated progress. 9 As shown in table 1, 24 high-risk areas, or 

about two-thirds of all the areas, have met or partially met all five criteria 

for removal from our High-Risk List; 20 of these areas fully met at least 

one criterion. Compared with our last assessment, 7 high-risk areas 

showed progress in one or more of the five criteria without regressing in 

any of the criteria. Ten high-risk areas have neither met nor partially met 

one or more criteria. Two areas showed mixed progress by increasing in 

at least one criterion and also declining in at least one criterion. Three 

9

Additional detail on our high-risk criteria and ratings is in appendix I on page 69 of the 

report 

Page 12 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
71 

areas declined since 2017. These changes are indicated by the up and 

down arrows in table 1. 

Table 1:2017 High-Risk Areas Rated Against Five Criteria for Removal from GAO's High-Risk List 

High-risk area 

Department of Defense (DOD) Supply Chain Management 

Mitigating Gaps 1n Weather Satellite Data 

DOD Support Infrastructure Management 

Medicare Program & Improper Payments a 

DOD Financ1a! Management 

DOE's Contract Management for the Nat1onal Nuclear Security Administration and 

Office of Environmental Management 

DOD Business Systems Modernization 

DOD Approach to Business Transformation 

USPS Financial Viability 

NASA Acqu1s1tion Management 

Transformmg the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Processes for 

Assessing and Controlling Toxic Chemicals 

Limiting the Federal Government's Fiscal Exposure by Better Managmg Climate 

Change Risks 

Strengthening Department of Homeland Security Management Functions 

DOD Contract Management 

DOD Weapon Systems Acquisition 

Moderntzmg the U.S. Financial Regulatory System 

National Flood Insurance Program 

Strengthening Medicaid Program Integrity 

Resolving the Federal Role in Housing Finance 

Page 13 

Change 

since2017 

Number of criteria 

Partially 

Met met Not met 

GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
72 

High-risk area 

Improving Federal Oversight of Food Safety 

Change 

since 2017 

Manag1ng Risks and !mprovmg VA Health Care 

2020 Decennial Census 

Government-wide Personnel Secunty Clearance Process 

Improving Federal Management of Programs that Serve Tribes and Their Members 

U.S. Government's Environmental Liabllity 4 

Funding the Nation's Surface Transportation Systemc 

Pens1on Benefit Guaranty Corporation Insurance Programsc 

(1' indicates one or more areas progressed; -l< indicates one or more areas declined since 2017; 1' .L indicates mixed progress; • indicates no change) 

GAO I GA0-19-157SP 

aMedicare Program & Improper Payments was only rated on the Improper Payments program; we did 

not rate other elements of the Medicare program because the area is subject to frequent legislative 

updates and !he program is in a state of transition 

°Four areas are receiving ratings for the first time because they were newly added in 2017 and 2018 

cTwo high-risk areas were not rated because addressing them primarily involves congressional action 

(Funding the Nation's Surface Transportation System and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 

Insurance Programs) 

Figure 1 shows that since our 2017 update, the most progress was made 

on the action plan criterion-four high-risk areas received higher ratings. 

We rated two areas lower on leadership commitment and two areas lower 

on monitoring. 

Page 14 GA0-19-'392T High-Risk Series 
73 

Figure 1: High~Risk Areas' Progress and Regress on High~Risk Criteria Since 2011 

LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT 

+ DOD Financial Management 

DEMONSTRATED PROGRESS - Transforming EPA's Process for Assessing A DOD Support Infrastructure Management 

- NASA Acquisition Management 

+ DOD Supply Chain Management and Controlling Toxic Chemicals 

+ Mitigating Gaps in 

Weather Satellite Data ___ _ __ CAPACITY 

+ DOE's Contract Management ~igh Risk List Crit7ria for the National Nuclear Secunty • + Medrcare Improper Payments 

Admrnrstratron and Office of + Progress - DOD Approach to Busrness 

Envrronmental Management - Regress Transformatron 

- USPS Fr::::::::I:G f&;s~tnce 2017 

+ DOD Frnancral Management + Mrtrgatrng Gaps rn Weather Satellite Data 

+ DOD Supply Cham Management + DOD Approach to Busrness Transformatron 

+ USPS Frnancral Vrabrllty + DOD Support Infrastructure Management 

ACTION PLAN 

- NASA Acquisition Management + DOD Business Systems Modernization 

- Limiting the Federal Government's 

Fiscal Exposure by Betler Managing Climate Change Risks 

Source' GAO analysiS of cntena for removal from the Hll)h·Risk List status ! GAO-19-157SP 

Table 2 shows that 17 of the 34 high-risk areas we rated have met the 

leadership commitment criterion while two high-risk area ratings 

regressed on leadership commitment from met to partially met since our 

last report_ 

Leadership commitment is the critical element for initiating and sustaining 

progress, and leaders provide needed support and accountability for 

managing risks_ Leadership commitment is needed to make progress on 

the other four high-risk criteria_ Table 2 shows that only three high-risk 

areas met the criterion for capacity, six met the criterion for action plan, 

and two met the criterion for demonstrated progress_ One high-risk 

area-U.S. Government's Environmental Liability-has partially met only 

Page 15 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
74 

one criterion since we added the area to our list in 2017 and the rest are 

not met. 

Table 2: 2019 High~Risk Area Ratings on Five Criteria for Removal from GAO's High~Risk List 

Criteria 

Leadership Action Demonstrated 

High~risk area commitment Capacity plan Monitoring progress 

Department Of Defense (DOD) Supply Chain Management * * * * * Mit1gat1ng Gaps in Weather SateH1te Data * * * * * Strengthenmg Department of Homeland Security * * * * * Management Functions 

Medicare Program & Improper Payments a * * * * * DOD Support Infrastructure Management * * * * * 2020 Decennial Census * * * * * DOD Contract Management * * * * * DOD Weapon Systems Acquisition * * * * * Enforcement of Tax Laws * * * * * Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation * * * * * Improving the Management of Information Technology * * * * * Acquisitions and Operations 

Managing Federal Real Property * * * * * Protecting Public Health through Enhanced Oversight of * * * * * Medical Products 

DOD Approach to Bus10ess Transformation * * * * * NASA Acquisition Management * * * * * . 

DOD Financial Management * * * * * Strategic Human Capital Management * * * * * Government-Wide Personnel Secunty Clearance Process * * * * * DOE's Contract Management for the National Nuclear 

* * * * * Security Administration and Office of Environmental 

Management 

Page 16 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
75 

USPS Fmanc1al V!ab!llty 

DOD Business Systems Modernization 

Ensunng the Effect1ve Protection of Technologies Crit1cal to 

U.S. National Security Interests 

Improving and Modernizing Federal Disability Programs 

lmprovmg Federal Management of Programs that Serve 

Tribes and Their Members 

Strengthening Medicaid Program Integrity 

Transforming the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 

Processes for Assessing and Controlling Toxic Chemicals 

Resolving the Federal Role m Housmg Fmance 

Limiting the Federal Government's Fiscal Exposure by 

Better Managing Cl1mate Change Risks 

Improving Federal Oversight of Food Safety 

Managing Risks and Improving VA Health Care 

U.S Government's Environmental Liability 

Legend: *Met *Partially Met ;~:Not Met 

Source GAO I GA0-19-157SP 

Monitoring progress 

Notes: Two high-risk areas-Funding the Nation's Surface Transportation System and Pension 

Benefit Guaranty Corporation Insurance Programs-did not receive ratings against the five high-risk 

criteria because progress would pnmarily involve congressional action 

Progress in High-Risk 

Areas 

aMedicare Program & Improper Payments was only rated on the Improper Payments, and we did not 

rate other elements of the Medicare program 

As noted, seven areas showed improvement in one or more criterion 

without regressing in any criteria. Two areas showed sufficient progress 

to be removed from the High-Risk List. The other five high-risk areas 

remaining on the 2019 list demonstrated improvement and are described 

below. Three of these five improving high-risk areas are the responsibility 

Page 17 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
76 

0Progressedsince2017 

Sourr,e·C>AOanalyms I GA0·19-157SP 

of the Department of Defense (DOD)-DOD Support Infrastructure 

Management, DOD Financial Management, and DOD Business Systems 

Modernization. The two other improving areas are Department of 

Energy's (DOE's) Contract Management for the National Nuclear Security 

Administration and Office of Environmental Management, and Medicare 

Program & Improper Payments. 

DOD Support Infrastructure Management: DOD manages a portfolio of 

real property assets that, as of fiscal year 2017, reportedly included about 

586,000 facilities-including barracks, maintenance depots, 

commissaries, and office buildings. The combined replacement value of 

this portfolio is almost $1.2 trillion and includes about 27 million acres of 

land at nearty 4,800 sites worldwide. This infrastructure is critical to 

maintaining military readiness, and the cost to build and maintain it 

represents a significant financial commitment Since our 2017 High-Risk 

Report, DOD's rating for two criteria-leadership commitment and action 

plan-improved from partially met to met 

DOD has demonstrated leadership commitment by stating its commitment 

to addressing key recommendations we have made by, for example, (1) 

better forecasting the initial Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) costs 

for military construction, IT, and relocating military personnel and 

equipment; (2) better aligning infrastructure to DOD force structure needs 

by, for example, improving the accuracy and sufficiency of its excess 

capacity estimates; and (3) pursuing an effort to consolidate and 

standardize leases, which includes analyzing whether it is feasible to 

relocate functions from commercial leased space to existing space on an 

installation, thereby reducing leases and better utilizing excess space. 

DOD has developed action plans to better identify excess infrastructure 

and thus be positioned to dispose of it For example, in the 2017 HighRisk Report, we stated that DOD's Real Property Efficiency Plan includes 

DOD's goals for reducing the footprint of its real property inventory and 

metrics to gauge progress, to be implemented by the end of 2020. We 

also found in 2018 that DOD was achieving cost savings and cost 

avoidances as it had begun using intergovernmental support agreements 

between military installations and local governments to obtain installation 

services, such as waste removal, grounds maintenance, and stray animal 

control. As a result of these and other actions, DOD now meets the action 

plan criterion for this high-risk area. 

As of December 2018, 23 recommendations related to this high-risk area 

remain open. DOD continues to partially meet the criteria for capacity, 

monitoring, and demonstrated progress. 

Page 18 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
77 

MONITORING"", /ACTION PLAN 

O~>rogressedsirce2017 Ooeclinedsince2017 

Source GI\Ounni%•S i GJI.019-157SP 

See page 158 of the report for additional detail on this high-risk area, 

including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

DOD Financial Management: Since our 2017 High-Risk Report, ratings 

for the DOD Financial Management high-risk area improved for the 

criteria of leadership commitment and monitoring. For the leadership 

commitment criterion, the high-risk area rating improved from partially met 

to met in 2019 due to several DOD leadership actions. For example, in 

2018, DOD leadership met the goal of undergoing an agency-wide 

financial statement audit and established a process to remediate any 

audit findings-ultimately to improve the quality of financial information 

that is most valuable in managing the department's day-to-day 

operations. In addition, according to a DOD official, audit remediation 

efforts have produced benefits in certain inventory processes that have 

led to operational improvements. 

DOD leadership demonstrated its commitment to making needed 

improvements by developing a database that tracks hundreds of findings 

and recommendations that came out of the audits. In addition, senior 

leadership has been meeting bimonthly with military services' leadership 

for updates on the status of corrective action plans to address audit 

findings and recommendations, and the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) has been meeting frequently with the Secretary of Defense 

to review the plans. 

These same DOD actions also led to the high-risk area's rating for the 

criterion of monitoring to improve from not met to partially met. For 

example, the database mentioned above is intended to capture, prioritize, 

and assign responsibility for auditor findings and related corrective action 

plans, which are meant to be used to measure progress towards 

achieving a clean audit opinion. 

Further, DOD leadership has held frequent meetings to discuss the status 

of corrective action plans. In addition, DOD also established councils in 

certain areas (e.g., financial reporting) to review the status of audit 

remediation activities and challenges. All of these actions demonstrate an 

improvement in DOD's monitoring activities for its financial management 

function. 

However, DOD's efforts to improve its financial management continue to 

be impaired by long-standing issues-including its decentralized 

environment; cultural resistance to change; lack of skilled financial 

management staff; ineffective processes, systems, and controls; 

incomplete corrective action plans; and the need for more effective 

monitoring and reporting. DOD remains one of the few federal entities 

Page 19 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
78 

000 Busmess Systems Modernization 

0Prcgressedsmce2017 

that cannot accurately account for and report on its spending or assets. 

As of December 2018, 53 recommendations for this high-risk area are 

open. The DOD Financial Management high-risk area continues to 

partially meet the capacity and action plan criteria and not meet the 

demonstrated progress criterion. 

See page 147 of the report for additional detail on this high-risk area, 

including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

DOD Business Systems Modernization: DOD spends billions of dollars 

each year to acquire modernized systems, including systems that 

address key areas such as personnel, financial management, health care, 

and logistics. This high-risk area includes three critical challenges facing 

DOD: ( 1) improving business system acquisition management, (2) 

improving business system investment management, and (3) leveraging 

DOD's federated business enterprise architecture. 

DOD's capacity for modernizing its business systems has improved over 

time and, since our 2017 High-Risk Report, DOD's overall rating for the 

criterion of action plan improved from not met to partially met in 2019. 

DOD established a plan for improving its federated business enterprise 

architecture (i.e., description of DOD's current and future business 

environment and a plan for transitioning to the future environment). 

Specifically, the rating improved for DOD's federated business enterprise 

architecture segment of the high-risk area because DOD's assistant 

deputy chief management officer approved a business architecture 

improvement plan in January 2017. 

Since 2017, we have made 10 recommendations related to this high-risk 

issue. As of December 2018, 27 recommendations are open. The 

leadership, capacity, monitoring, and demonstrated progress criteria 

remain partially met as in 2017. 

See page 152 of the report for additional detail on this high-risk area, 

including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

Page 20 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
79 

DOE's Contract Management for the National Nuclear Security 

Administration and Office of Environmental Management: DOE 

oversees a broad range of programs related to nuclear security, science, 

energy, and waste cleanup, among other areas. As the largest civilian 

contracting agency in the federal government, DOE relies primarily on 

contractors to carry out its programs. For instance, DOE spends about 90 

percent of its annual budget on contracts and acquiring capital assets. In 

fiscal year 2018, DOE's budget was $34.5 billion. 

The high-risk area focuses on contracts, as well as major projects-those 

with an estimated cost of $750 million or greater-managed by DOE's 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Office of 

Environmental Management (EM). 

Since our 2017 High-Risk Report, DOE has made progress by improving 

from a not met to a partially met rating for the demonstrated progress 

criterion. Specifically, through its Office of Cost Estimating and Program 

Evaluation, NNSA has enhanced its capability to estimate costs and 

schedules, and to assess alternatives for programs and projects, among 

other things. NNSA also made progress by adopting best practices in 

several areas, such as those for estimating costs and schedules in 

nuclear weapons refurbishment activities and capital asset acquisitions. 

For example, we determined that DOE's revised cost estimate of $17.2 

billion to construct a Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to dispose of 

surplus, weapons-grade plutonium substantially met best practicesproviding assurance that the estimated costs could be considered 

reliable. This finding contributed to DOE's reevaluation of the project and 

ultimate termination, in October 2018, in favor of a potentially less costly 

disposal approach. 

Fifty-one of our recommendations were open as of December 2018; 15 

recommendations were made since the last high-risk update in February 

2017. DOE continues to meet the criterion of leadership commitment, 

partially meet the criteria for action plan and monitoring, and not meet the 

criterion for capacity. 

See page 217 of the report for additional detail on this high-risk area, 

including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

Page 21 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
80 

Medicare Improper Payments 

0 Progressed since 2017 0 Declined since 2017 

Source· GAO analysts I GA0-19-157SP 

Congressional Action 

Aided Progress on HighRisk Issues 

Medicare Program & Improper Payments: In calendar year 2017, 

Medicare, which is overseen by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 

Services (CMS), financed $702 billion worth of health services for 

approximately 58 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries. Medicare 

faces a significant risk with improper payments-payments that either 

were made in an incorrect amount or should not have been made at allwhich reached an estimated $48 billion in fiscal year 2018. 

Since our 2017 High-Risk Report, estimated improper payment rates 

declined more than one percent across the Medicare program. In 

addition, CMS' rating for the capacity criterion of the improper payments 

segment improved from partially met to met in 2019 due to several 

actions. First, the Center for Program Integrity's (CPI) budget and 

resources have increased over time and the agency has established work 

groups and interagency collaborations to extend its capacity. For 

example, CMS allocated more staff to CPI after Congress provided 

additional funding. CPI's full-time equivalent positions increased from 177 

in 2011 to 419 in 2017. 

Additionally, in August 2017, we reported that CMS's Fraud Prevention 

System, which analyzes claims to identify health care providers with 

suspect billing patterns, helped speed up certain fraud investigation 

processes. Further, the Healthcare Fraud Prevention Partnership helped 

improve information sharing among payers inside and outside of the 

government. 

Since 1990, when we added Medicare to our High-Risk List, we have 

made many recommendations related to the Medicare program, 28 of 

which were made since the last high-risk update in February 2017. As of 

December 2018, more than 80 recommendations remain open. CMS 

continues to meet the criterion of leadership commitment and to partially 

meet the remaining three criteria of action plan, monitoring, and 

demonstrated progress. 

See page 241 of the report for additional detail on this high-risk area, 

including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

Congress enacted several laws since our last report in February 2017 to 

help make progress on high-risk issues. Table 3 lists selected examples 

of congressional actions taken on high-risk areas. 

Page 22 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
81 

Table 3: Examples of Congressional Actions Taken on High~Risk Areas 

High~risk 

area 

Department of Defense 

(DOD) Approach to 

Business 

Transformation 

Government~wide 

Personnel Security 

Clearance Process 

Congressional 

actions taken 

Section 901(c) of the National 

Defense Authorization Act (NOAA) for 

Fiscal Year 2017 created the position 

of Chief Management Officer (CMO) 

within DOD, effective February 1, 

2018 ° 

Fiscal a 

Technology Modernization Fund and 

Board, and allowed agencies to 

establish agency information 

technology system modernization and 

workmg capital funds,b 

Section 925(k) of the NOAA for Fiscal 

Year 2018 requires the Director of 

National Intelligence, in coordination 

with the Chair and other principals of 

the Suitability, Security, and 

Credentialing Performance 

Accountability Council, to provide an 

annual assessment of any 

impediments to the timely processing 

of personnel security clearances.c 

Page 23 

How GAO work contributed 

to congressional actions 

The 2016 passage of the NOAA 

is consistent with our February 

2005 report, in which we 

Identified the need for DOD to 

have a full~time CMO position 

created through legislation, with 

responsibility, authority, and 

accountability for DOD's overall 

busmess transformation efforts 

manage the billions of dollars 

the federal government spends 

Impact on 

high-risk area 

Based on congressional 

direction, DOD established and 

is beginning to restructure its 

CMO office to fulfill its 

responsibilities given by 

Congress. Continued leadership 

commitment at the highest 

levels will help sustain focus on 

this business transformation 

The longer this critical position 

is filled by someone in an acting 

capacity, the greater the risk 

that DOD's transformation 

efforts could be 

annually on legacy IT when we transitioning away from legacy 

added this area to the High-Risk IT systems and (2) created a 

List in 2015. We further technology modernization fund 

examined the government's to help agencies retire and 

heavy reliance on legacy IT replace legacy systems, as well 

systems in our 2016 report as acquire or develop new 

systems. (Capacity) 

The 2017 passage of the NOAA 

is consistent with our December 

2017 report, in which we asked 

Congress to consider both 

reinstating and adding to the 

requirement in the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 for the 

executive branch to report to 

appropriate congressional 

committees annually on Its 

background investigation 

process. 

Annual assessments will help 

Congress monitor the timeliness 

of the executive branch's 

background investigations to 

monitor 1ts own timeliness. The 

act requires the executive 

branch to report the length of 

time for initiating and conducting 

investigations and finalizing 

adJudications, and case load 

composition and costs, among 

other matters deemed relevant 

by Congress. (Monitoring) 

GAO-t 9-392T High-Risk Series 
82 

High-risk 

area 

Mitigating Gaps in 

Weather Satellite Data 

Limiting the Federal 

Government's Fiscal 

Exposure by Better 

Managing Climate 

Change Risks 

Ensuring the 

Cybersecurity of the 

Nation 

Congressional How GAO work contributed 

actions taken to congressional actions 

Provisions of the NOAA for F!scal We found that DOD was slow to 

Year 20151imited the availability of establish plans for its Weather 

certam funds until the Secretary of System Follow-on-Microwave 

Defense submitted to congressional program in our 2017 High-Risk 

defense committees a plan related to Report. We also found it had 

weather satellites. d Similarly, the made little progress in 

NOAA for F1scal Year 2016 limited the determming how it would meet 

availability of certain funds until (1) weather satellite requirements 

the Secretary of Defense briefed the for cloud descriptions and areacongressional defense committees on specific weather imagery 

a plan for cloud characterization and 

theater weather imagery, and (2) the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

certified to the committees that the 

plan would meet DOD requirements 

without negatively affecting 

commanders of combatant 

commands."' 

Section 1234(a)(5) of the Disaster 

Recovery Reform Act of 2018 allows 

the President to set aside, with 

respect to each major disaster, a 

percentage of certain grants to use 

for pre-disaster hazard mitigation 

Section 1206(a)(3) makes federal 

assistance available to state and local 

governments for building code 

administration and enforcement.1 

An explanatory statement 

accompanying the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2018 directed the 

National Protection and Programs 

Directorate to brief the appropriations 

committees on its specif!c plans to 

address GAO recommendations 

including the National Cybersecurity 

and Communications Integration 

Center's (NCCIC) implementation of 

the recommendations for ensuring 

that it fulfills its statutory functions, 

such as information about 

Page 24 

We found that federal 

investments in resilience could 

be more effective if postdisaster hazard mitigatton 

efforts were balanced with 

resources for pre-disaster 

hazard mitigation, as part of a 

comprehensive resilience 

mvestment strategy. We also 

found that enhancing state and 

local disaster resilience could 

help reduce federal fiscal 

exposure 

We reported that NCCIC had 

taken steps to perform each of 

the Department of Homeland 

Security's (DHS) statutorily 

required cybersecurity 

functions. However, the extent 

to which NCCIC performed the 

actions was unclear, m part, 

because the center had not yet 

established metrics and 

methods by which to evaluate 

its performance. 

Impact on 

high-risk area 

These proVISions (1) 

encouraged DOD to develop 

and implement plans to address 

its weather satellite 

requirements and (2) helped 

Congress monitor DOD plans 

and actions to address these 

requirements. (Action plan) 

These provisions could improve 

state and local resilience to 

disasters by increasing the 

amount of funding available for 

pre-disaster hazard mitigation 

and increasing state and local 

adoption and enforcement of 

the latest building codes 

(Capacity) 

As of January 2019, DHS had 

fully addressed two of the nine 

recommendations we made to 

enhance the effectiveness and 

efficiency of NCCIC, and had 

taken initial actions toward 

addressing several others 

(Demonstrated progress) 

GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
83 

High-risk 

area 

Managing Risks and 

Improving VA Health 

Care 

Improving Federal 

Management of 

Programs that Serve 

Tribes and Their 

Members 

Source GAOanal-,s•s I GA0·19-157SP 

Congressional 

actions taken 

The No Veterans Cns1s Lme Cal! 

Should Go Unanswered Act directs 

the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(VA) to develop a quality assurance 

document for carrying out the toll-free 

Veterans Crisis Line, and requires VA 

to develop a plan to ensure that each 

telephone call, text message, and 

other communication received is 

answered in a timely manner. h 

An explanatory statement 

accompanying the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2018 directed the 

Indian Health Service (!HS) to report 

to the appropriations committees on 

the status of its efforts on improving 

wait times for patients seeking 

primary and urgent care, including an 

explanation of how these efforts will 

address GAO recommendations.1 

. How GAO work contributed 

to congressional actions 

About 6 months pnor to the 

passage of this legislation, our 

May 2016 report identified the 

need for VA to take several 

steps to better test, track, and 

assess the performance of the 

Veterans Crisis Line in order to 

improve the timeliness and 

quality of its responses to 

veterans and others 

We found that IHS had not 

conducted any systematic, 

agency-wide oversight of the 

timeliness of primary care in its 

federally operated facilities and 

recommended that IHS 

communicate specific agencywide standards for patient wait 

times; monitor patient wait 

times; and ensure corrective 

actions are taken when 

standards are not met 

aPub. L. No. 114-328, § 901(c), 130 Stat. 2000, 2341 (2016) 

Impact on 

high-risk area 

In July 2017, VA updated a 

quality assurance plan with 

measurable targets and time 

frames for key performance 

indicators needed to assess 

Veterans Crisis Line 

performance. VA also 

established an Executive 

Leadership Council in March 

2017 to monitor data on the key 

performance indicators. These 

two act1ons wi!! assist wtth the 

oversight and accountability of 

the Veterans Crisis Lme, and 

the services provided to 

veterans. (Leadership 

commitment, Action plan, and 

Monitoring) 

IHS developed spec1fic 

standards for patient wait times 

and developed a plan and 

timeline for implementing an 

agency-wide standard for 

patient wait times. It is also in 

the process of updating its 

patient wait time policy to 

include emergency department 

wait times and developing 

automated data collection for 

wait times. (Leadership 

commitment, Action plan, 

Monitoring) 

0

Pub. L. No. 115-91, §§ 1076-1078, 131 Stat. 1283, 1586-1594 (2017) 

'Pub L. No 115-91, § 925(k)(1)(F), (3)(1), 131 Stat 1283,1530, 1532 (2017) 

ctcar! Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, 

Pub. L No. 113-291, § 1612, 128 Stat 3292,3628 (2014) 

eNational Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1615, 129 Stat. 726, 

1105(2015) 

rFAA Reauthorization Act of2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. D, §§ 1206(a)(3), 1234{a)(5) 132 Stat. 

3186,3440,3462 (2018). 

9

Chairman Rodney P. Frelinghuysen of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 

Representatives filed an explanatory statement relating to the House amendment of HR. 1625 in the 

Congressional Record on March 22, 2016. 164 Gong. Rec. H2045, H2557. Section 4 of the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, stales that this explanatory statement shall have the same 

effect with respect to the a !location of funds and implementation of divisions A through l of the act as 

if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference. Pub. L. No, 115-141, § 4, 132 

Stat 348, 350 (2018) 

hPub L No.114-247, 130Stat 996(2016). 

Page 25 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
84 

'Chairman Rodney P. Frelinghuysen of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 

Representatives filed an explanatory statement relating to the House amendment of H. R. 1625 in the 

Congressional Record on March 22, 2016. 164 Cong. Rec. H2045, H2628. Section 4 of the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, states that this explanatory statement shall have the same 

effect with respect to the allocation of funds and implementation of divisions A through l of the act as 

if it were aj01nt explanatory statement of a committee of conference. Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 4, 132 

Stat 348, 350 (2018). 

Congressional oversight also plays a vital role in addressing high-risk 

issues. For example, at a May 2018 hearing, we testified that the Census 

Bureau's (Bureau) cost estimate was not reliable, and that the actual cost 

could be higher than planned. 1

° Further, the Secretary of Commerce 

created a dedicated team to provide oversight and guidance to the 

Bureau on cost estimation. 

In addition to its instrumental role in supporting progress in individual 

high-risk areas, Congress also enacted the following statutes that, if 

implemented effectively, will help foster progress on high-risk issues 

government-wide: 

Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 (FRDAA): 11 

FRDAA is intended to strengthen federal antifraud controls. 

OMFRDAA requires OMB to use our Fraud Risk Framework12 to 

create guidelines for federal agencies to identify and assess fraud 

risks, and then design and implement control activities to prevent, 

detect, and respond to fraud. Agencies, as part of their annual 

financial reports beginning in fiscal year 2017, are further required 

to report on their fraud risks and their implementation of fraud 

reduction strategies, which should help Congress monitor 

agencies' progress in addressing and reducing fraud risks. 

To aid federal agencies in better analyzing fraud risks, FRDAA 

requires OMB to establish a working group tasked with developing 

a plan for creating an interagency library of data analytics and 

data sets to facilitate the detection of fraud and the recovery of 

improper payments. This working group and the library should 

help agencies coordinate their fraud detection efforts and improve 

their ability to use data analytics to monitor databases for potential 

improper payments. The billions of dollars in improper payments, 

and Secure Enumeration, 

Key Risks Jeopardizing a Cost-Effective 

2018) 

11Pub. L. No. 114-186,130 Stat 546 (2016). 

12GAO, A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs, GA0-15-593SP 

(Washington, D.C .. July 2015). 

Page 26 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
85 

some of which may be a result of fraud, are a central part of the 

Medicare Program, Medicaid Program, and Enforcement of Tax 

Laws (Earned Income Tax Credit) high-risk areas. 

We reported in 2018 that, among other things, OMB did not 

involve all agencies subject to the act as required by FRDAA or 

hold the required minimum number of working-group meetings in 

2017. 13 As shown in figure 2, a majority of the 72 agencies 

surveyed indicated a lack of involvement with and information 

from the working group as challenges in implementing FRDAA 

We made three recommendations, including that OMB ensure the 

working group meets FRDAA's requirements to involve all 

agencies that are subject to the act and ensure that mechanisms 

to share controls, best practices, and data-analytics techniques 

are in place. OMB did not concur with our recommendations. We 

continue to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed 

in the 2018 report. 

Figure 2: Percentage of Agencies That Identified Their Involvement with the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 

Working Group as a Great or Moderate Challenge 

Sufficiency of informatlon from the working group 

Sufficiency of your agency's involvement 

with the working group 

UAI!agencies 

- CFO Act agenc1es 

IIIIJ Non-CFO Act agencies 

SO\lrce: GAO analysis of suruey data. I GA0.1S.157SP 

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 

13GAO, Fraud Risk Management: OMB Should Improve Guidelines and Working-Group 

Efforts to Support Agencies' Implementation of the Fraud Reduction and Data Anafytics 

Act, GA0-19-34 (Washington, D.C .. December4, 2018). 

Page 27 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
86 

IT Acquisition Reform, statutory provisions known as the 

Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act 

(FITARA): 14 FITARA, enacted in December 2014, was intended to 

improve how agencies acquire IT and better enable Congress to 

monitor agencies' progress in reducing duplication and achieving 

cost savings. Since the enactment of these provisions, OMB and 

federal agencies have paid greater attention to IT acquisition and 

operation, resulting in improvements to the government-wide 

management of this significant annual investment These efforts 

have been motivated in part by sustained congressional support 

for improving implementation of this law, as highlighted in 

agencies' FITARA implementation scores issued biannually by the 

House Committee on Oversight and Reform. 

This continuing oversight has produced positive results. For 

example, in the committee's December 2018 FITARA 

implementation scorecard, 18 of the 24 major federal agencies 

received the highest possible rating for their efforts to improve the 

management of software licenses, of which we have found there 

are thousands annually across the government Seven months 

earlier, in the prior scorecard, only eight agencies had achieved 

this rating. Moreover, federal agencies have taken actions to 

address 106 of the 136 related recommendations that we have 

made in this area since 2014. 

FITARA includes specific requirements related to seven areas: the 

federal data center consolidation initiative, enhanced transparency 

and improved risk management, agency Chief Information Officer 

authority enhancements, portfolio review, expansion of training 

and use of IT acquisition cadres, government-wide software 

purchasing, and maximizing the benefit of the federal strategic 

sourcing initiative. 

In November 2017, Congress extended or removed the sunset 

dates of several of these statutory requirements that were 

originally to end in 2018 and 2019. 15 While all of the 24 federal 

agencies covered by this law have developed FITARA 

implementation plans, the agencies need to effectively execute 

these plans. Successfully addressing FITARA requirements is 

central to making progress in Improving the Management of IT 

14F!TARAwas enacted into law as part of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291 (2014), div. 

A, title VIII, subtitle 0, §§ 831-837, 128 Stat 3292, 3438-3450 

05FITARA Enhancement Act of2017, Pub. L. No. 115-88, 131 Stat 1278 (2017). 

Page 28 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
87 

Acquisitions and Operations, which has been on our High-Risk 

List since 2015. 

Program Management Improvement Accountability Act 

(PMIAA): 16 Enacted in December 2016, the act is intended to 

improve program and project management in certain larger federal 

agencies. Among other things, the act requires the Deputy 

Director for Management of OMS to adopt and oversee 

implementation of government-wide standards, policies, and 

guidelines for program and project management in executive 

agencies. The act also requires the Deputy Director to conduct 

portfolio reviews to address programs we identify as high-risk. It 

further creates a Program Management Policy Council to act as 

the principal interagency forum for improving practices related to 

program and project management The council is to review 

programs identified as high-risk and make recommendations to 

the Deputy Director or designee. 

OMS has produced a general strategy for implementing the law 

through 2022 and met some initial milestones required by PMIAA 

For example, in June 2018, OMS issued OMS Memorandum M18-19, which includes: (1) agency guidance for implementing 

PMIAA, (2) a five-year strategic outline for improving program and 

project management, and (3) initial program management 

standards and principles. 17 Further, agencies have designated 

Program Management Improvement Officers to guide their 

implementation of PMIAA 

According to OMS, it began implementing PMIAA's requirement to 

conduct portfolio reviews on high-risk areas by requiring relevant 

agencies to provide several items for discussion during the 2018 

Strategic Review meetings. These annual meetings are to consist 

primarily of a discussion of agency progress towards each of the 

strategic objectives outlined in their strategic plans, but also cover 

other management topics such as enterprise risk management 

and high-risk area progress. According to OMS documents, in 

advance of these meetings, OMS required agencies to provide a 

high-level summary of (1) any disagreements with our 

recommendations, (2) progress barriers, and (3) actions needed 

16Pub L. No. 114-264, 130 Stat 1371 (2016). 

170ffice of Management and Budget, Improving the Management of Federal Programs 

and Projects through Implementing tile Program Management Improvement Accountability 

Act (PMIAA), OMB Memorandum M-18-19 (Washington, D.C .. June 25, 2018) 

Page 29 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
88 

Executive Branch Action 

on Our Recommendations 

Aided Progress on HighRisk Issues 

by OMB, other agencies, or Congress to help the agency achieve 

progress towards removal from our High-Risk List 

OMB officials told us their 2018 Strategic Review meetings did not 

address each high-risk area but did address government-wide 

high-risk areas, such as cybersecurity, information technology, 

and strategic human capital as they related to the President's 

Management Agenda. 

In the past, senior management officials from OMB, applicable 

agencies, and our agency have met to address areas where 

additional management attention could be beneficial to high-risk 

issues. These trilateral meetings, beginning in 2007 and predating PMIAA's 2016 enactment, have continued across 

administrations. 

However, OMB has organized only one of these high-risk 

meetings since the last high-risk update in 2017, on the 

Government-wide Personnel Security Clearance Process. In 

November 2018, OMB told us of plans to hold additional meetings 

on priority high-risk areas, including the 2020 Decennial Census, 

Strategic Human Capital Management, Ensuring the 

Cybersecurity of the Nation, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) Acquisition Management, and Managing 

Federal Real Property. 

Effective implementation of PMIAA provides an important 

opportunity to enhance progress on high-risk areas by focusing 

leadership attention through the portfolio reviews and trilateral 

meetings. Further, a number of high-risk areas have longstanding 

or significant program and project management concerns, 

including the acquisition-related high-risk areas for DOD, DOE, 

NASA, and VA. These and other programs can benefit from 

improving program and project management In December 2019, 

we will report on OMB's progress in implementing PMIAA, 

including what further steps it has taken to use the portfolio review 

process required in PMIAA to address issues on our High-Risk 

List. 

Agency leaders took actions to implement our recommendations. These 

resulted in numerous improvements to programs and operation and 

improved service. Further, these actions to implement our 

recommendations resulted in significant financial benefits. Table 4 shows 

some examples of the financial benefits achieved since our last High-Risk 

Report. 

Page 30 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
89 

Table 4: Examples of GAO High~Risk Area Recommendations Leading to Financial Benefits 

High~risk 

area 

Strengthening Medicaid 

Program Integrity 

Improving the Management of 

Information Technology (IT} 

Acquisitions and Operations 

Medicare Program & Improper 

Payments 

Enforcement of Tax Laws 

National Flood Insurance 

Program 

GAO analysiS I GA0.19-157SP 

GAO recommendations leading 

to financial benefits 

In multiple reports, we found that demonstration 

spending limits approved by the Department of Health 

and Human Services (HHS) often were not budget 

neutral, as required by HHS policy. This increased the 

federal government's fiscal liability by billions of 

dollars. We recommended that HHS better ensure that 

valid methods are used to determine spending limits 

In multiple reports, we made recommendations for 

improving the management of IT portfolios, which 

resulted in reduced agency commodity IT spending 

and fewer duplicative investments 

In December 2015, we recommended that Congress 

consider directing the Secretary of HHS to equalize 

payment rates between physician offices and hospital 

outpatient departments for evaluation and 

management services and to return the associated 

savings to the Medicare program 

In June 2015, we expressed concerns to Internal 

Revenue Service (IRS) officials about fraudsters 

potentially using taxpayer account information stolen 

in the 2014 and 2015 "Get Transcript" online service 

data breach to file multiple fraudulent returns and 

receive refunds. In response, IRS changed 1ts 

authentication and monttoring procedures for accounts 

affected by the breach 

Staff from the Federal Emergency Management 

Administration (FEMA) Identified a number of actions 

that the agency has taken or has underway to address 

issues we raised related to its rate~setting methods in 

June 2011 In response to a congressional matter we 

made, congressional staff notified us that Congress 

passed the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform 

Act of 2012 which eliminated or phased out subsidized 

premium rates for several types of properties 

Page 31 

Financial benefits 

achieved 

HHS responded by limiting the amount of 

unspent funds states may accrue and 

reducing the federal government's fiscal 

liability. As a result, the Centers for 

Medicare & Medicaid Services was able to 

identify a total of $23.5 billion in financial 

benefits for fiscal year (FY) 2017 

Agencies have achieved about $2.5 billion 

m savings from fiscal years 2012 to 2017 

through the Office of Management and 

Budget's PortfolioStat that was intended to 

consolidate and elimmate duplicative 

systems. Agencies have the potential to 

achieve about $3.5 billion in additional 

This change 1n reimbursement resulted In 

estimated cost savings to the program of 

$1 6 billion 1n FYs 2017 and 2018, and will 

result in additional savings going forward. 

As a result of our suggestion and the new 

authentication procedures, in August 2017 

we found that IRS prevented paymg a total 

of $480.2 mi!hon in fraudulent refunds in 

FYs 2015 and 2016. In 2018, we found 

that IRS prevented an additiOnal $110 

million in FY 2017 

As a result of changes FEMA has made in 

rates for certain subsidized properties, we 

estimate that policyholders with these 

subsidized premiums paid $338 4 million 

(net present value) more in premiums as 

of the end of FY 2017 than they would 

have paid prior to the enactment of the 

Biggert~Waters Act 

GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
90 

High-Risk Areas 

Needing Significant 

Attention 

Three High-Risk Areas 

That Regressed 

NASA Acquisition 

Management 

0Progressedsince2017 Ooec!inedsince20i7: 

In the 2 years since our last High-Risk Report, three areas-NASA 

Acquisition Management, Transforming EPA's Process for Assessing and 

Controlling Toxic Chemicals, and Limiting the Federal Government's 

Fiscal Exposure By Better Managing Climate Change Risks-have 

regressed in their ratings against our criteria for removal from the HighRisk List. In addition, while progress is needed across all high-risk areas, 

we have identified nine additional areas that require significant attention 

to address imminent, longstanding, or particularly broad issues affecting 

the nation. 

NASA plans to invest billions of dollars in the coming years to explore 

space, improve its understanding of the Earth's environment, and conduct 

aeronautics research, among other things. We designated NASA's 

acquisition management as high risk in 1990 in view of NASA's history of 

persistent cost growth and schedule delays in the majority of its major 

projects. 

Following several years of continuing a generally positive trend of limiting 

cost growth and schedule delays for its portfolio of major projects, we 

found that NASA's average launch delay increased from 7 to 12 months 

between May 2017 and May 2018. Further, the overall development cost 

growth increased from 15.6 percent to at least 18.8 percent over the 

same time period. NASA's largest science project, the James Webb 

Space Telescope, has experienced schedule delays of 81 months and 

cost growth of 95 percent since the project's cost and schedule baseline 

was first established in 2009. 

NASA is at risk for continued cost growth and schedule delays in its 

portfolio of major projects. Since our 2017 high-risk update, we have 

lowered NASA acquisition management from meeting the rating to 

partially meeting the rating in two criteria-leadership commitment and 

monitoring. The other three criteria ratings remained the same as in 2017. 

Ratings for capacity and demonstrated progress remain partially met and 

the rating for action plan remains met. 

Over the nex1 several years, NASA plans to add new, large, and complex 

projects to the portfolio, including a lunar Gateway-currently being 

discussed as a platform in a lunar orbit to mature deep space exploration 

Page 32 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
91 

capabilities. In addition, many of NASA's current major projects, including 

some of the most expensive ones, are in the phase of their life cycles 

when cost growth and schedule delays are most likely. 

NASA acquisition management requires significant attention for the 

following reasons: 

NASA leadership has approved risky programmatic decisions for 

complex major projects, which compounded technical challenges. 

For example, leadership has approved some programs to proceed 

( 1) with low cost and schedule reserves, (2) with overly aggressive 

schedules, and (3) without following best practices for establishing 

reliable cost and schedule baselines. 

NASA leadership has also not been transparent about cost and 

schedule estimates for some of its most expensive projects. 

Without transparency into these estimates, both NASA and 

Congress have limited data to inform decision making. 

NASA has not yet instituted a program for monitoring and 

independently validating the effectiveness and sustainability of the 

corrective action measures in its new action plan, which NASA 

finalized in December 2018. 

In addition, while NASA has taken some steps to build capacity to help 

reduce acquisition risk, including updating tools aimed at improving cost 

and schedule estimates, other areas still require attention. For example, 

we reported in May 2018 that several major NASA projects experienced 

workforce challenges, including not having enough staff or staff with the 

right skills. NASA has also identified capability gaps in areas such as 

scheduling, earned value management, and cost estimating, and has 

efforts underway to try to improve capacity in these areas. 

Since 2017, we have made 9 recommendations on this high-risk area, 

and as of December 2018, 15 recommendations remain open. These 

recommendations include that NASA needs to improve transparency of 

major project cost and schedule estimates, especially for its human 

spaceflight programs, as well as continue to build capacity to reduce 

acquisition risk. NASA will also need to implement its new action plan and 

track progress against it See page 222 of the report for additional detail 

on this high-risk area, including more details on actions that need to be 

taken. 

Page 33 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
92 

Transforming EPA's Process 

for Assessing and Controlling 

Toxic Chemicals 

\,'-

MONITORING"',, _____ " 

// 

, ACTION PLAN 

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) ability to effectively 

implement its mission of protecting public health and the environment is 

dependent on it assessing the risks posed by chemicals in a credible and 

timely manner. Such assessments are the cornerstone of scientifically 

sound environmental decisions, policies, and regulations under a variety 

of statutes. 

Based on our work since our 2017 High-Risk Report, the overall rating for 

leadership commitment decreased from met to partially met due to limited 

information for completing chemical assessments and proposed budget 

cuts in the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) Program. The 

ratings for the remaining four criteria remain unchanged and are partially 

met. 

The EPA Acting Administrator indicated his commitment to fulfill the 

agency's obligations under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) as 

amended by the 2016 Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21 

Century Act (Lautenberg Act) and ensure chemicals in the marketplace 

are safe for human health and the environment. Nonetheless, EPA needs 

to give more attention to several areas to fully realize the benefits of the 

new law, and to demonstrate additional progress in the IRIS Program, 

such as: 

While EPA released a document in late December 2018 called 

the IRIS Program Outlook, the Outlook fails to list the projected 

date for most of the assessments and includes no information 

regarding assessment prioritization-including how these 

assessments will meet program and regional office needs. 

The Lautenberg Act increases both EPA's responsibility for 

regulating chemicals and its workload. EPA recently issued a rule 

under the act to collect fees from certain companies to defray a 

portion of the implementation costs, but it is unclear whether the 

fees collected will be sufficient to support relevant parts of the 

program. 

EPA issued a First Year Implementation Plan in June 2016 noting 

that this document is intended to be a roadmap of major activities 

EPA will focus on during the initial year of implementation. As of 

mid-February 2019 the plan has not been updated, according to 

publically available information, although EPA had indicated that it 

is a living document that will be further developed over time. 

EPA needs to ensure that the people and resources dedicated to the 

IRIS Program and TSCA implementation are sufficient. Our March 2019 

Page 34 GA0~19...J92T High-Risk Series 
93 

Limiting the Federal 

Government's Fiscal Exposure 

by Better Managing Climate 

Risks 

'"ACTION PLAN 

0 Declined smce2017 

report on chemical assessments provides information on what remains to 

be done to address challenges in the IRIS program and implement the 

Lautenberg Act. 18 

Since we added this area to our High-Risk List in 2009, we have made 12 

recommendations to EPA related to IRIS and TSCA. As of February 

2019, seven recommendations remain open. See page 204 of the report 

for additional detail on this high-risk area, including more details on 

actions that need to be taken. 

Numerous studies have concluded that climate change poses risks to 

many environmental and economic systems and creates a significant 

fiscal risk to the federal government. The rising number of natural 

disasters and increasing reliance on the federal government for 

assistance is a key source of federal fiscal exposure. As of December 

2018, total federal funding for disaster assistance since 2005 is 

approaching half a trillion dollars (about $430 billion), most recently for 

catastrophic hurricanes, flooding, wildfires, and other losses in 2017 and 

2018. The costliness of disasters is projected to increase as extreme 

weather events become more frequent and intense due to climate 

change. There are five areas where government-wide action is needed to 

reduce federal fiscal exposure, including, but not limited to, the federal 

government's role as (1) the insurer of property and crops; (2) the 

provider of disaster aid; (3) the owner or operator of infrastructure; (4) the 

leader of a strategic plan that coordinates federal efforts and informs 

state, local, and private-sector action; and (5) the provider of data and 

technical assistance to decision makers. 

sourc-:o GAo~na'ysis.l GAo1s1s7sP Neither global efforts to mitigate climate change causes nor regional 

adaptation efforts currently approach the scales needed to avoid 

substantial damages to the U.S. economy, environment, and human 

health over the coming decades, according to the November 2018 Fourth 

National Climate Assessment. Government-wide action is needed to 

improve the nation's resilience to natural hazards and reduce federal 

fiscal exposure to climate change impacts. 

Congress continues to show its commitment to progress on this high-risk 

issue by enacting legislation. For example, in October 2018, the Disaster 

Recovery Reform Act was enacted, which, among other things, allows the 

President to set aside, with respect to each major disaster, a percentage 

18GAO, Chemical Assessments: Status of EPA's Efforts to Produce Assessments and 

Implement the Toxic Substances Control Act. GA0-19-270. Washington, D.C .. March 4, 

2019. 

Page 35 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
94 

of certain grants to use for pre-disaster hazard mitigation. In addition, the 

National Defense Authorization Act of 2018, required, among other 

things, DOD to report on climate impacts to its installations. However, the 

federal government has not made measurable progress since 2017 to 

reduce its fiscal exposure to climate change, and in some cases, has 

revoked prior policies designed to do so. Specifically, since 2017, the 

ratings for four criteria remain unchanged-three at partially met and one 

at not met. The rating for one criterion-monitoring-regressed to not 

met. 

Limiting the federal government's fiscal exposure to climate change 

requires significant attention because the federal government has 

revoked prior policies that had partially addressed this high-risk area and 

has not implemented several of our recommendations that could help 

reduce federal fiscal exposure. For example, since our 2017 high-risk 

update, the federal government: 

revoked Executive Order 13690, which had established a 

government-wide federal flood risk management standard to 

improve the resilience of communities and federal assets against 

the impacts of flooding. This action could increase federal fiscal 

exposure, as taxpayer-funded projects may not last as long as 

intended because they are not required to account for future 

changes in climate-related risk. 

rescinded its guidance directing agencies to consider climate 

change in their National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 reviews 

for certain types of federal projects. 

has not implemented our July 2015 recommendation to establish 

a comprehensive investment strategy identifying, prioritizing, and 

implementing federal disaster resilience investments that could 

reduce federal fiscal exposure to climate change. 

has not implemented our November 2015 recommendations to 

create a national climate information system providing 

authoritative, accessible information useful for state, local, and 

private-sector decision making. 

We have made 62 recommendations related to this high-risk area, 12 of 

which were made since our February 2017 high-risk update. As of 

December 2018, 25 remain open. The federal government needs a 

cohesive strategic approach with strong leadership and the authority to 

manage climate change risks across the entire range of federal activities. 

Page 36 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
95 

Additional High-Risk Areas 

That Need Significant 

Attention 

Ensuring the Cybersecurity of 

the Nation 

Ensuring the Cybersecurity 

of the Nation 

\~"' MONITORING ~ 

Sowce.GAOanal)osis I OA0-19·t57SP 

/ ;,/ 

ACTION PLAN 

See page 110 of the report for additional detail on this high-risk area, 

including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

Federal agencies and the nation's critical infrastructures-such as 

energy, transportation systems, communications, and financial servicesare dependent on information technology systems to carry out operations. 

The security of these systems and the data they use is vital to public 

confidence and national security, prosperity, and well-being. The risks to 

systems underpinning the nation's critical infrastructure are increasing as 

security threats evolve and become more sophisticated. 

We first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk 

area in 1997. This was expanded to include protecting cyber critical 

infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable 

information in 2015. In 2018, we updated this high-risk area to reflect the 

lack of a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy for the federal 

government. 

Since 2010, we have made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies 

aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings, including protecting 

cyber critical infrastructure, managing the cybersecurity workforce, and 

responding to cybersecurity incidents. Of those 3,000 recommendations, 

448 were made since our last high-risk update in February 2017. 

Although many recommendations have been addressed, about 700 have 

not yet been implemented. 

Despite the number of unimplemented recommendations, since our 2017 

High-Risk Report, the administration has made progress in this high-risk 

area as it continues to meet the leadership commitment criterion through 

various actions. These include the President issuing (1) an executive 

order in May 2017 requiring federal agencies to take a variety of actions, 

including better managing their cybersecurity risks and coordinating to 

meet reporting requirements related to cybersecurity of federal networks 

and critical infrastructure 19 and (2) a National Security Strategy in 

19Executive Order 13,800, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,391 (May 16, 2017). 

Page 37 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
96 

December 2017 citing cybersecurity as a national priority and identifying 

needed actions. Further, the administration issued a government-wide 

reform plan and reorganization recommendations in June 2018 with, 

among other things, proposals for solving the federal cybersecurity 

workforce shortage. Additionally, the administration released a National 

Cyber Strategy in September 2018 outlining activities such as securing 

critical infrastructure, federal networks, and associated information. 

However, additional actions are needed. We have identified four major 

cybersecurity challenges facing the nation: (1) establishing a 

comprehensive cybersecurity strategy and performing effective oversight, 

(2) securing federal systems and information, (3) protecting cyber critical 

infrastructure, and (4) protecting privacy and sensitive data. To address 

the four major cybersecurity challenges, we identified 10 critical actions 

the federal government and other entities need to take. These critical 

actions include, for example, developing and executing a more 

comprehensive federal strategy for national cybersecurity and global 

cyberspace; addressing cybersecurity workforce management 

challenges; and strengthening the federal role in protecting the 

cybersecurity of critical infrastructure (see figure 3). 

Page 38 GA0-19-392T High~Risk Series 
97 

Figure 3: Ten Critical Actions Needed to Address Four Major Cybersecurity 

Challenges 

Major challenges Critical actions needed 

Source: GAO analysis. I GAO.Hl-157SP 

Page 39 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
98 

Resolving the Federal Role in 

Housing Finance 

I 

Resolving the Federal Role 

in Housing Finance 

; / ~ 

IIDEMONSTRA .• 

1

TE!l/ PROGRESS 

I

I \, 

MONITORING '· -. 

Until these shortcomings are addressed, federal agencies' information 

and systems will be increasingly susceptible to the multitude of cyberrelated threats that exist. See page 178 of the report for additional detail 

on this high-risk area, including more details on actions that need to be 

taken. 

The expanded federal role in housing finance that began during the 

2007-2009 financial crisis has substantially increased the government's 

exposure to potential mortgage losses. Federally supported mortgages 

include those backed by the Federal National Mortgage Association 

(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 

Mac)-collectively, the enterprises-which the Federal Housing Finance 

Agency (FHFA) placed into government conservatorships in 2008. 

Federal support also occurs through Federal Housing Administration 

(FHA) mortgage insurance and Government National Mortgage 

Association (Ginnie Mae) guarantees on mortgage-backed securities. The 1 substantial financial assistance the enterprises required during and after 

, the crisis, coupled with the large fiscal exposure they and other federal 

mortgage entities represent today, underscore the need to reform the 

federal role in housing finance. 

Delay in resolving the federal role in housing finance poses considerable 

risks. Through the enterprises, FHA, and Ginnie Mae, the federal 

government is exposed to potential losses on several trillion dollars in 

mortgage debt. A severe economic downturn could trigger significant 

taxpayer assistance to one or more of these entities. 

Congress and federal agencies have taken some steps to facilitate the 

transition to a revised federal role, such as holding hearings, introducing 

legislation, issuing regulations, and developing market monitoring tools. 

For example, in 2013 and 2014, housing and regulatory agencies 

finalized rules designed to prevent a recurrence of risky practices in 

originating and securing mortgages that contributed to the financial crisis. 

Additionally, FHFA and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau have 

developed a representative database of mortgage information that could 

be useful for examining the effect of mortgage market reforms. However, 

overall progress on resolving the federal role will be difficult to achieve 

until Congress provides further direction by enacting changes to the 

housing finance system. 

Several issues contribute to the risks facing federal housing finance, 

including the following: 

Page 40 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
99 

More than 10 years after entering federal conservatorships, the 

enterprises' futures remain uncertain and billions of taxpayer dollars 

remain at risk. Under agreements with the Department of the 

Treasury (Treasury), the enterprises have received $191.4 billion in 

capital support as of the end of fiscal year 2018 and have paid 

dividends to the department exceeding that amount. If they were to 

incur major additional losses, they would draw required amounts from 

their remaining $254.1 billion in Treasury commitments. In addition, 

prolonged conservatorships could hinder development of the broader 

mortgage securities market by creating uncertainty and crowding out 

private investment. 

Nonbanks (lenders and loan servicers that are not depository 

institutions) have played an increasingly large role in the mortgage 

market in recent years. While nonbanks have helped provide access 

to mortgage credit, they also may pose additional risks, in part 

because they are not federally regulated for safety and soundness. 

However, FHFA lacks statutory authority to examine nonbank 

mortgage servicers and other third parties who do business with and 

pose potential risks to the enterprises. 

The statutory 2 percent capital requirement for FHA's $1.26 trillion 

mortgage insurance fund is not based on a specified risk threshold, 

such as the economic conditions the fund would be expected to 

withstand. As a result, it may not provide an adequate financial 

cushion under scenarios in which Congress may anticipate the fund 

would be self-sufficient. During the last housing downturn, the fund's 

capital ratio fell below the required level and remained there for 6 

consecutive years. At the end of fiscal year 2013, the fund required 

supplemental funds-about $1.7 billion-for the first time in its 

history. 

Six of our federal housing recommendations remain open, including those 

we made in June 2015 on assessing the effects of mortgage reforms 

already in place. 

Further, as we previously recommended in November 2016 and January 

2019, Congress should consider housing finance reform legislation that: 

establishes objectives for the future federal role in housing finance, 

including the role and structure of the enterprises within the housing 

finance system; 

provides a transition plan to a reformed system that enables the 

enterprises to exit federal conservatorship; and 

Page 41 GA0~19-392T High~Risk Series 
100 

Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Corporation Insurance 

addresses all relevant federal entities, including FHA and Ginnie 

Mae. 

As we recommended in March 2016 and November 2017, respectively, 

Congress also should consider granting FHFA explicit authority to 

examine nonbank servicers and other third parties that do business with 

the enterprises, and specifying the economic conditions FHA's insurance 

fund would be expected to withstand without a substantial risk of requiring 

supplemental funds. See page 95 of the report for additional detail on this 

high-risk area, including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

Due to the significance and risk associated with Resolving the Federal 

Role in Housing Finance, we are separating it from the high-risk area of 

Modernizing the U.S. Financial Regulatory System. These areas were 

combined in our 2017 High-Risk report. See page 95 of the report for 

additional detail on this high-risk area, including more details on actions 

that need to be taken. 

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is responsible for 

insuring the defined benefit pension plans for nearly 37 million American 

workers and retirees, who participate in about 24,800 private sector 

plans. PBGC faces an uncertain financial future due, in part, to a longterm decline in the number of traditional defined benefit plans and the 

collective financial risk of the many underfunded pension plans that 

PBGC insures. 

PBGC's financial portfolio is one of the largest of all federal government 

corporations. While PBGC's single employer program had a net surplus 

of about $2.4 billion at the end of fiscal year 2018, its multiemployer 

program had a net deficit of about $54 billion-or a combined net 

accumulated financial deficit of over $51 billion. Its deficit has increased 

by nearly 45 percent since fiscal year 2013. PBGC has estimated that, 

without additional funding, its multiemployer insurance program will likely 

be exhausted by 2025 as a result of current and projected pension plan 

insolvencies. The agency's single-employer insurance program is also at 

risk due to the continuing decline of traditional defined benefit pension 

plans, as well as premiums that are not well aligned to the financial risk 

presented by the plans it insures. 

While Congress and PBGC have taken significant and positive steps to 

strengthen the agency in the past 5 years, challenges related to PBGC's 

funding and governance structure remain. Congress established a 

temporary Joint Select Committee on multiemployer pension plans in 

Page 42 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
101 

Managing Risks and Improving 

VA Health Care 

Managing Risks and Improving 

VA Health Care 

C)Pmgressedsince2017 

Sauces GAOanalys•s I GA0·19-157SP 

2018-with the goal of improving the solvency of the multiemployer 

program. However, the committee did not release draft legislation. 

Addressing the significant financial risk and governance challenges that 

PBGC faces will require additional congressional action. 

Over the years since we added PBGC to the High-Risk List, we have 

suggested a number of matters for congressional consideration, 

including: (1) authorizing a redesign of PBGC's single employer program 

premium structure to better align premium rates with sponsor risk; (2) 

adopting additional changes to PBGC's governance structure-in 

particular, expanding the composition of its board of directors; (3) 

strengthening funding requirements for plan sponsors as appropriate 

given national economic conditions; ( 4) working with PBGC to develop a 

strategy for funding PBGC claims over the long term as the defined 

benefit pension system continues to decline; and (5) enacting additional 

structural reforms to reinforce and stabilize the multiemployer system, 

and balance the needs and potential sacrifices of contributing employers, 

participants, and the federal government. 

Absent additional steps to improve PBGC's finances, the long-term 

financial stability of the agency remains uncertain, and the retirement 

benefits of millions of American workers and retirees could be at risk of 

dramatic reductions. See page 267 of the report for additional detail on 

this high-risk area, including more details on actions that need to be 

taken. 

VA operates one of the largest health care delivery systems in the nation 

through its Veterans Health Administration (VHA), with 172 medical 

centers and more than 1,000 outpatient facilities organized into regional 

networks. VA has faced a growing demand by veterans for its health care 

services-due, in part, to the needs of an aging veteran population-and 

that trend is expected to continue. The total number of veterans enrolled 

in VA's health care system rose from 7.9 million to more than 9 million 

from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2017. Over that same period, 

VHA's total budgetary resources have more than doubled, from $37.8 

billion in fiscal year 2006 to $92.3 billion in fiscal year 2017. 

Given the importance of VHA's mission, coupled with its lack of progress 

in addressing its high-risk designation, we continue to be concerned 

about VHA's ability to ensure its resources are being used effectively and 

efficiently to improve veterans' timely access to safe and high-quality 

health care. We have identified five areas of concern: (1) ambiguous 

policies and inconsistent processes; (2) inadequate oversight and 

Page 43 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
102 

accountability; (3) IT challenges; (4) inadequate training for VA staff; and 

(5) unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. VHA has begun to 

address each of these areas but, prior to Secretary Robert Wilkie's July 

2018 confirmation, its efforts were impeded by leadership instability. 

Since taking office, Secretary Wilkie has demonstrated his commitment to 

addressing the department's high-risk designation by, among other 

things, creating an office to direct an integrated, focused high-risk 

approach and communicating to VA leaders the importance of addressing 

our recommendations. 

While VHA completed root cause analyses for each area of concern and 

developed an action plan in response, the plan lacks milestones and 

metrics needed to effectively monitor its implementation and demonstrate 

progress made in addressing the high-risk designation. Additionally, many 

of VHA's capacity-building initiatives are either in the initial stages of 

development or are lacking necessary funding and resources. As such, 

VHA has not made sufficient progress since our 2017 update to improve 

its overall ratings, as two high-risk criteria remain partially met and three 

criteria remain unmet. 

We remain concerned about VHA's ability to oversee its programs, hold 

its workforce accountable, and avoid ambiguous policies and inconsistent 

processes that jeopardize its ability to provide safe, high-quality care to 

veterans: 

In November 2017, we reported that, due in part to misinterpretation 

or lack of awareness of VHA policy, VA medical center officials did 

not always document or conduct timely required reviews of providers 

when allegations were made against them. As a result, we concluded 

that VA medical center officials may have lacked necessary 

information to reasonably ensure that their providers were competent 

to provide safe, high-quality care to veterans and to grant approvals 

about these providers' privileges to perform specific clinical services 

at VA medical centers. We made four recommendations related to 

this and other findings, all of which remain open. 

In June 2018, we reported that VHA could not systematically monitor 

the timeliness of veterans' access to Veterans Choice Program (VCP) 

care because it lacked complete, reliable data to do so. We also 

found that veterans, who were referred to the VCP for routine care 

because health care services were not available in a timely manner, 

could potentially wait for care up to 70 calendar days if the maximum 

amount of time allowed by VA processes is used. This wait time 

exceeds the statutory requirement that veterans receive VCP care 

Page 44 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
103 

within 30 days of the dates their VA health care providers indicated 

they should receive appointments, or if no such date existed, within 

30 days of the veteran's preferred date. We made 10 

recommendations related to this and other findings, all of which 

remain open. 

Similarly, in July 2018, we reported that VA collected data related to 

employee misconduct and disciplinary actions, but data fragmentation 

and reliability issues impeded department-wide analysis of those 

data. Additionally, we found that VA did not consistently ensure that 

allegations of misconduct involving senior officials were reviewed 

according to its investigative standards or ensure these officials were 

held accountable. We made 16 recommendations related to this and 

other findings, all of which remain open. 

In November 2018, we reported that VHA's suicide prevention media 

outreach activities declined in recent years due to leadership turnover 

and reorganization. Additionally, we found that VHA did not assign 

key leadership responsibilities or establish clear lines of reporting for 

its suicide prevention media outreach campaign, which hindered its 

ability to oversee the campaign. Consequently, we concluded that 

VHA may not be maximizing its reach with suicide prevention media 

content to veterans, especially those who are at-risk. This is 

inconsistent with VHA's efforts to reduce veteran suicides, which is 

VA's highest clinical priority. We made two recommendations related 

to this and other findings, both of which remain open. 

VA needs to further develop its capacity-building initiatives and establish 

metrics to monitor and measure its progress addressing the high-risk 

areas of concern. It is also important that our recommendations continue 

to be implemented. The department has implemented 209 of the 353 

recommendations related to VA health care that we made from January 

1, 2010 through December 2018, but more than 125 recommendations 

remain open as of December 2018. This includes 17 that are older than 3 

years. In addition to addressing our recommendations, VA needs to make 

systemic change to department management and oversight in order to 

fully address the high-risk issues and improve the health care provided to 

our nation's veterans. 

See page 275 of the report for additional detail on this high-risk area, 

including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

Page 45 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
104 

Strategic Human Capital 

Management 

Strategic Human Capital 

Management 

Mission-critical skills gaps both within federal agencies and across the 

federal workforce impede the government from cost-effectively serving 

the public and achieving results. For example, the difficulties in recruiting 

and retaining skilled health care providers and human resource staff at 

VHA's medical centers make it difficult to meet the health care needs of 

more than 9 million veterans. As a result, VHA's 168 medical centers 

have large staffing shortages, including physicians, registered nurses, 

physician assistants, psychologists, physical therapists, as well as human 

resource specialists and assistants. 

OPM continues to demonstrate top leadership commitment through its 

numerous efforts to assist agencies' in addressing mission-critical skills 

gaps within their workforces. This includes providing guidance, training 

and on-going support for agencies on the use of comprehensive data 

analytic methods for identifying skills gaps and the development of 

strategies to address these gaps. However, since we first added strategic 

human capital management to our High-Risk List in 2001, we have 

reported on the need for agencies to address their workforce skills gaps. 

As of December 2018, OPM had not fully implemented 29 of our 

recommendations made since 2012 relating to this high-risk area. Staffing 

shortages and the lack of skills among current staff not only affect 

individual agencies but also cut across the entire federal workforce in 

areas such as cybersecurity and acquisition management. Skills gaps 

caused by insufficient number of staff, inadequate workforce planning, 

and a lack of training in critical skills are contributing to our designating 

other areas as high-risk. 

As table 5 shows, of the 34 other high-risk areas covered in this report, 

skills gaps played a significant role in 16 of the areas. 

Table 5: Skills Gaps Related to High-Risk Areas 

High-risk area Examples of skills gaps and causes 

2020 Decennial Census Staffing: Lack of staff to oversee the $886 mrltion contract for integratmg the Information 

Technology (IT) systems needed to conduct the 2020 Census. 

Strengthening DHS Management Workforce Planning: Lack of guidance on how to identify critical cybersecurity and 

Functions acquisition skills needed to support its new IT delivery model 

Training: Insufficient technical skills to support its biometric identification services program. 

Page 46 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
105 

High-risk area 

DOD Business Systems 

Modernization 

DOD Financial Management 

DOD Contract Management 

DOE's Contract Management for 

the National Nuclear Security 

Administration and Office of 

Environmental Management 

U.S. Government's Environmental 

liability 

Improving Federal Management of 

Programs that Serve Tribes and 

Their Members 

Management of Federal Oil and 

Gas Resources 

Examples of skills gaps and causes 

Workforce Planning: Incomplete assessment of the extent to which DOD personnel meet IT 

management knowledge and skill requirements 

Staffing: Slow and inefficient hiring processes have led to challenges in recruiting and 

retaining qualified chief information officers (CIO) and IT personnel. 

Training: Statutorily required guidance and training for cross-functional team members and 

presidential appointees not completed, 

Staffing: Financial management staff remains insufficient in number, qualifications, and 

expertise 

Staffing: Challenges m recruiting talent for acqu1s1t1on management 

Workforce Planning: Unmet cnt1cal staffing needs and ev1dence that the agency 1s 

understaffed across all functions_ 

Staffing: Competing agency priorities and llmited hiring have contributed to critical staff 

shortages to manage and oversee strategic materials programs 

Workforce Planning: Lack of mformation to evaluate overall project and program 

performance, including number of staff and ski !Is needed to meet its environmental 

management cleanup mission. 

Staffing: Lack of expert staff to review proposals for wind and solar projects, or petroleum 

engineers to review oil and gas proposals. Additionally, shortages of health care providers, 

including physicians, nurses, midwives, dentists, and pharmacists 

Training: Limited funding and lack of a safety training plan contributed to incomplete training 

to protect Bureau of Indian Education schools 

Workforce Planning: Lacks plan for Identifying key 011 and gas positions and their respective 

technical competencies. No evaluation of the effectiveness of its recruitment and retention 

incentives as well as its student loan repayment program 

systems engineering, business management, software rle,,elnnment 

projects, as well as gaps in areas such as cost estimating 

capabilities 

Protecting Public Health Through Staffing: At times, sigmficant gaps 1n staffing still remain during the time staff complete 

Enhanced Oversight of Medical necessary processes to be stationed overseas 

Products 

Improving and Modernizing Staffing: SSA's disability appeals plan calls for increased hiring to reduce disability appeals 

Federal Disability Programs backlogs and improve timellness, and VA has not completed hiring and planning efforts to 

ensure it has the capacity to comprehensively update its disabthty eligibility criteria 

VA Acquisition Management Training: Lack of tratnmg for contracttng officers 

Managing Risks and Improving VA Workforce Planning: No annual tracking and reviewing of data related to IT skills needed in 

Health Care the future 

Staffing: Insufficient number of community care staff and medical support assistants. 

Training: No assessment of the training needs or monitoring of completed training for patient 

advocate positions 

Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Staffing and Training: The admtmstration's June 2018 government reform plan mcludes 

Nation recommendations for solving the federal cybersecurity workforce shortage, including 

prioritizing and accelerating efforts to reform how the federal government recruits, evaluates, 

selects, pays, and places cyber talent 

Page 47 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
106 

High-risk area Examples of skills gaps and causes 

Improving the Management of IT Workforce Planning: None of the 24 major federal agencies had IT management policies that 

Acquisitions and Operations fuHy addressed the role of their C!Os. The majority of the agencies minimally addressed or did 

not address their C!O's role in assessing agency IT workforce needs, and developing 

strategies and plans for meeting those needs 

2020 Decennial Census 

2020 Decennial Census 

Over the years since we added this area to our High-Risk List, in addition 

to recommendations to address critical skills gaps in individual high-risk 

areas, we have made numerous recommendations to OPM related to this 

high-risk issue, 29 of which remain open. Agencies also need to take 

action to address mission-critical skills gaps within their own workforces -

a root cause of many high-risk areas. See page 75 of the report for 

additional detail on this high-risk area, including more details on actions 

that need to be taken. 

The 2010 Census was the costliest in history at about $12.3 billion; as of 

October 2017, the 2020 Census is projected to cost about $15.6 billion, a 

27 percent increase. For the 2020 Census, the U.S. Census Bureau 

(Bureau) plans to implement several innovations, including new IT 

systems. Implementing these innovations, along with other challenges, 

puts the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective census at risk. 

The decennial census is mandated by the U.S. Constitution and provides 

vital data for the nation. Census data are used, among other purposes, to 

apportion seats in the Congress and allocate billions of dollars in federal 

assistance to state and local governments. To ensure its success, this 

complicated and costly undertaking requires careful planning, risk 

management, and oversight. Census activities, some of which are new for 

the 2020 cycle, must be carried out on schedule to deliver the state 

apportionment counts to the President by December 31, 2020. 

The Bureau and the Department of Commerce (Commerce) have 

strengthened leadership commitment with executive-level oversight of the 

2020 Census by holding regular meetings on the status of IT systems and 

other risk areas. In addition, in 2017 Commerce designated a team to 

assist senior Bureau management with cost estimation challenges. These 

examples demonstrate both the Bureau's and Commerce's strong 

leadership commitment to implementing the 2020 Census. 

One of the Bureau's major challenges is to control any further cost growth 

and develop cost estimates that are reliable and reflect best practices for 

the 2020 Census. According to the Bureau, the total cost of the 2020 

Census is now estimated to be approximately $15.6 billion, more than $3 

Page 48 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
107 

Medicare, Medicaid, and 

Earned Income Tax Credit 

Improper Payments 

billion higher than previously estimated by the Bureau. The higher 

estimated life-cycle cost is due, in part, to the Bureau's failure to 

previously include all cost associated with the decennial census. 

The Bureau's schedule for developing IT systems has experienced delays 

that have compressed the time available for system testing, integration 

testing, and security assessments. These schedule delays have 

contributed to systems experiencing problems after deployment, as well 

as cybersecurity challenges. For example, as of December 2018, the 

Bureau had identified nearly 1,100 system security weaknesses that 

needed to be addressed. Continued schedule management challenges 

may compress the time available for the remaining system testing and 

security assessments, and increase the risk that deployed systems will 

either not function as intended, have security vulnerabilities, or both. 

As of January 2019, 30 of our recommendations related to this high-risk 

area had not been implemented. To make continued progress, the 

Bureau needs to ensure that its approach to strategic planning, IT 

management, cybersecurity, human capital management, internal 

collaboration, knowledge sharing, as well as risk and change 

management are all aligned toward delivering more cost-effective 

outcomes. Among other things, the Bureau needs to ensure cost growth 

is controlled and that the development and testing of key systems is 

completed and fully integrated with all census operations before the 2020 

Census. In addition, the Bureau needs to address cybersecurity 

weaknesses in a timely manner and ensure that security risks are at an 

acceptable level before systems are deployed. See page 134 of the 

report for additional detail on this high-risk area, including more details on 

actions that need to be taken. 

An improper payment is any payment that should not have been made or 

that was made in an incorrect amount (including overpayments and 

underpayments) under statutory, contractual, administrative, or other 

legally applicable requirements. Reducing improper payments-such as 

payments to ineligible recipients or duplicate payments-is critical to 

safeguarding federal funds. However, the federal government has 

consistently been unable to determine the full extent of improper 

payments and reasonably assure that appropriate actions are taken to 

reduce them. 

Since 2003-when certain agencies were required by statute to begin 

reporting improper payments-cumulative improper payment estimates 

have totaled about $1.5 trillion. As shown in figure 4, for fiscal year 2018, 

Page 49 GA0~19-392T High~Risk Series 
108 

federal entities estimated about $151 billion in improper payments. 

Medicare and Medicaid improper payments and the Earned Income Tax 

Credit (EITC) improper payments-a part of the Enforcement of Tax Laws 

high-risk area-accounted for about 68.5 percent of this totaL 

Federal spending for Medicare programs and Medicaid is expected to 

significantly increase in the coming years, so it is especially critical to take 

appropriate measures to reduce improper payments in these programs. 

Internal Revenue Service estimates also show that the EITC has 

consistently had a high improper payment rate. OMB has designated 

Medicare programs, Medicaid, and EITC as high-priority programs for 

improper payments, indicating they are amongst the highest-risk 

programs where the government can achieve the greatest return on 

investment for the taxpayer by ensuring that improper payments are 

eliminated. 

Figure 4: Improper Payment Estimates Were Concentrated in Three Areas in Fiscal 

Year 2018 

Medicare - $48.5 billion 

Medicare Fee·for-Service (Parts A and B) 

Medicare Advantage (Part C) 

Medicare Prescription Drug (Part D) 

,------ Earned Income Tax Credit- $18.4 billion 

Medicaid - $36.2 billion 

L_ ______ AU other programs- $47.5 billion 

Source GAO analySIS of agenc1es' fiscal year 2018 data 1 GA0-19-157SP 

Our work has identified a number of strategic and specific actions 

agencies can take to reduce improper payments, which could yield 

significant savings, and help ensure that taxpayer funds are adequately 

safeguarded. Continued agency attention is needed to (1) identify 

Page 50 GA0-19.392T High-Risk Series 
109 

Enforcement of Tax Laws 

I 

\ 

MONITORING "'~ ', ACTION PLAN 

Scurce GAO aflalys•s i GA0·19-157SP 

susceptible programs, (2) develop reliable methodologies for estimating 

improper payments, (3) report as required by statute, and (4) implement 

effective corrective actions based on root cause analysis. Absent such 

continued efforts, the federal government cannot be assured that 

taxpayer funds are adequately safeguarded, 

See pages 241, 250, and 235 of the report (respectively) for additional 

detail on the Medicare Program & Improper Payments, Strengthening 

Medicaid Program Integrity, and Enforcement of Tax Laws high-risk 

areas, including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) continues to face two pressing 

challenges in enforcing tax laws: addressing the tax gap-amounting to 

hundreds of billions of dollars each year when some taxpayers fail to pay 

the taxes that they owe-and combatting identity theft (IDT) refund fraud. 

Enforcement of Tax Laws has been on GAO's high risk list since 1990, 

IRS enforcement of tax laws helps fund the US government by collecting 

revenue from noncompliant taxpayers and, perhaps more importantly, 

promoting voluntary compliance by giving taxpayers confidence that 

others are paying their fair share. In 2016, IRS estimated that the average 

annual net tax gap, the difference between taxes owed and taxes paid on 

time, was $406 billion, on average, for tax years 2008-2010. 

While IRS continues to demonstrate top leadership support to address 

the tax gap, IRS's capacity to implement new initiatives and improve 

ongoing enforcement and taxpayer service programs remains a 

challenge, For example, IRS's strategic plan includes a goal to facilitate 

voluntary compliance and deter noncompliance that could address the tax 

gap. However, IRS could do more to identify specific efforts for improving 

compliance in its strategic plan, measure the effects of compliance 

programs-such as those used for large partnerships-and develop 

specific quantitative goals to reduce the tax gap. Such efforts would help 

IRS make more effective use of its resources and gauge the success of 

its strategies. 

The second challenge facing IRS is IDT refund fraud, which occurs when 

an identity thief files a fraudulent tax return using a legitimate taxpayer's 

identifying information and claims a refund, IRS estimates that at least 

$12,2 billion in individual lOT tax refund fraud was attempted in 2016, of 

which it prevented at least $10,5 billion (86 percent). Of the amount 

attempted, IRS estimated that at least $1.6 billion (14 percent) was paid, 

Page 51 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
110 

IRS's ability to combat IDT fraud continues to be challenged as more 

personally identifiable information has become readily available as a 

result of large-scale cyberattacks on various entities. This makes it more 

difficult for IRS to distinguish between fraudsters and legitimate 

taxpayers. 

While IRS has demonstrated some progress by developing tools and 

programs to further detect and prevent IDT refund fraud, it has not 

completed updating its authentication procedures to be in compliance 

with new government standards. As a result, IRS may be missing an 

opportunity to implement the most secure, robust technologies to protect 

taxpayers. 

As of December 2018, 189 GAO recommendations related to this highrisk area had not been implemented. To make continued progress on 

closing the tax gap, IRS needs to re-establish goals for improving 

voluntary compliance and develop and document a strategy that outlines 

how it will use its data to help address this issue. Reducing the tax gap 

will also require targeted legislative actions, including additional thirdparty information reporting, enhanced electronic filing, expanded math 

error authority (also referred to as correctible error authority), and paid 

preparer regulation. To help stay on top of IDT refund fraud, IRS should 

develop a comprehensive process to evaluate alternative options for 

improving taxpayer authentication. Given that I DT refund fraud continues 

to be a challenge, targeted legislative action, such as requiring a 

scannable code on returns prepared electronically but filed on paper 

could help IRS address such fraud. 

See page 235 of the report for additional detail on this high-risk area, 

including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

Page 52 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
111 

Improving the Management of 

IT Acquisitions and Operations 

Improving the Management of 

IT Acquisitions and Operations 

\,, MONITORING'', ACTION PLAN 

SOUICil"GAOana!ysls l GA0-19-1!>7SP 

The federal government currently invests more than $90 billion annually 

in IT, and OMB has implemented several key initiatives intended to help 

better manage this investment Additionally, enactment of FITARA, in 

conjunction with greater attention paid to the acquisition and operation of 

IT, has helped further improve the government-wide management of this 

significant annual investment 20 OMB's current level of top leadership 

support and commitment to ensure that agencies successfully execute its 

guidance on implementing FIT ARA and related IT initiatives has helped 

this high-risk area meet the leadership commitment high-risk criteria, 

Additional positive government-wide actions have enabled this high-risk 

area to partially meet the four remaining high-risk criteria. For example, 

OMB has established an IT Dashboard-a public website that provides 

detailed information on major IT investments at 26 federal agencies-and 

agencies' data center consolidation efforts have resulted in a total savings 

of slightly more than 80 percent of the agencies' planned $5.7 billion in 

savings since 2011. However, major federal agencies have yet to fully 

address the requirements of FIT ARA and realize billions of dollars in 

planned or possible savings and improved government performance 

through more efficient budgeting and management of IT. 

As government-wide spending on IT increases every year, the need for 

appropriate stewardship of that investment increases as well. However, 

OMB and federal agencies have not made significant progress since 

2017 in taking the steps needed to improve how these financial resources 

are budgeted and utilized. While OMB has continued to demonstrate its 

leadership commitment through guidance and sponsorship of key 

initiatives, agencies still have not fully implemented all requirements of 

FIT ARA, such as putting into place authorities the law requires for chief 

information officers (CIO). Additionally, while the President's Management 

Agenda has a goal to improve IT spending transparency, agencies are 

underreporting IT contract obligations by billions of dollars, OMB and the 

agencies also have not yet implemented hundreds of our 

recommendations on improving shortcomings in IT acquisitions and 

operations. 

In an August 2018 review of the 24 federal agencies covered by FITARA, 

none had IT management policies that fully addressed the role of their 

CIOs consistent with federal laws and guidance. Specifically, the majority 

2

°F!TARAwas enacted mto law as part of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, div. A, title 

VIII, subtitleD,§§ 831-837, 128 Stat 3292, 3438-3450 (2014) 

Page 53 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
112 

of the agencies only minimally addressed, or did not address, their CIO's 

role in assessing agency IT workforce needs and developing strategies 

and plans for meeting those needs. Correspondingly, the majority of the 

24 CIOs acknowledged that they were not fully effective at implementing 

IT management responsibilities, such as IT strategic planning and 

investment management. 

Further, in January 2018, we reported that the majority of 22 agencies did 

not identify all of their IT acquisition contracts, totaling about $4.5 billion in 

IT-related contract obligations beyond those reported by agencies. In 

addition, in November 2018 we reported that four selected agencies 

lacked quality assurance processes for ensuring that billions of dollars 

requested in their IT budgets were informed by reliable cost information. 

Until agencies properly identify IT contracts and establish processes for 

ensuring the quality of cost data used to inform their budgets, agency 

CIOs are at risk of not having appropriate oversight of IT acquisitions and 

may lack adequate transparency into IT spending to make informed 

budget decisions. 

As of December 2018, OMB and federal agencies had fully implemented 

only 59 percent of the recommendations we have made since fiscal year 

2010 to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations. OMB 

and agencies should work toward implementing our remaining 456 open 

recommendations related to this high-risk area. These remaining 

recommendations include 12 priority recommendations to agencies to, 

among other things, report all data center consolidation cost savings to 

OMB, plan to modernize or replace obsolete systems as needed, and 

improve their implementation of PortfolioStat-an initiative that is to 

consolidate and eliminate duplicative systems. 

OMB and agencies need to take additional actions to (1) implement at 

least 80 percent of our open recommendations related to the 

management of IT acquisitions and operations, (2) ensure that a 

minimum of 80 percent of the government's major IT acquisitions deliver 

functionality every 12 months, and (3) achieve at least 80 percent of the 

over $6 billion in planned PortfolioStat savings. 

See page 123 of the report for additional detail on this high-risk area, 

including more details on actions that need to be taken. 

Our high-risk program continues to be a top priority at GAO and we will 

maintain our emphasis on identifying high-risk issues across government 

Page 54 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
113 

and on providing recommendations and sustained attention to help 

address them, by working collaboratively with Congress, agency leaders, 

and OMB. As part of this effort, we hope to continue to participate in 

regular meetings with the OMB Deputy Director for Management and with 

top agency leaders to discuss progress in addressing high-risk areas. 

Such efforts have been critical for the progress that has been made. 

This high-risk update is intended to help inform the oversight agenda for 

the 116th Congress and to guide efforts of the administration and 

agencies to improve government performance and reduce waste and 

risks. 

Thank you, Chairman Cummings, Ranking Member Jordan, and 

Members of the Committee. This concludes my testimony. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact J. Christopher 

Mihm at (202) 512-6806 or MihmJ@gao.gov. Contact points for the 

individual high-risk areas are listed in the report and on our high-risk 

website. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and 

Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. 

Page 55 GA0~19-392T High~Risk Series 
114 

Appendix 1: Areas Removed From the HighRisk List 

The following pages provide overviews of the two areas removed from the 

High-Risk List. Each overview discusses (1) why the area was high risk, 

and (2) why the area is being removed from the list. Each of these highrisk areas is also described on our High-Risk List website, 

http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/overview. 

Page 56 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
115 

DOD Supply Chain Management 

We are removing this high-risk area because the Department of Defense (DOD) has made sufficient progress 

on the remaining seven actions and outcomes we recommended for improving supply chain management. 

Congressional attention, DOD leadership commitment, and our collaboration contributed to this successful 

outcome. 

Why High-Risk Area is Being 

Removed 

From 2014 to 2017, we identified 

18 actions and outcomes DOD 

needed to implement in order for 

its supply chain management to 

be removed from our High-Risk 

List. In our 2017 High-Risk 

Report, we reported that DOD 

had made progress in addressing 

11 actions and met the criteria of 

leadership commitment, capacity, 

and action plan for asset visibility 

and materiel distribution. 

Source GAO analysis I GA0-19-157SP However, DOD needed to take 

additional actions to fully implement the remaining seven actions and 

outcomes related to the monitoring and demonstrated progress criteria 

(see figure 5). 

Figure 5: Segments of GAO's Department of Defense's Supply Chain Management 

High-Risk Area 

Asset visibility is DOD's ability to provide timely and accurate 

information on the location, quantity, condition, movement, and status 

of its inventory. DOD had weaknesses in maintaining visibility of 

supplies, such as problems with inadequate radio-frequency 

identification information to track aU cargo movements. 

Materiel distribution is DOD's ability to operate its global distribution 

pipeline to deliver the right item, to the right place, at the right time, 

and at the right cost DOD faced challenges in delivering supplies and 

equipment, including meeting delivery standards and time!ines for 

cargo shipments as well as maintaining complete delivery data for 

surtace shipments. 

We are removing DOD Supply Chain Management from the High-Risk 

List because, since 2017, DOD has addressed the remaining two criteria 

(monitoring and demonstrated progress) for asset visibility and materiel 

distribution by addressing the seven actions and outcomes identified in 

our 2017 High-Risk Report. 

Page 57 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
116 

Asset Visibility 

DOD Supply Chain Management 

Asset Visibility 

Source GAOan.alys•s I GA0-19-157SP 

Since our 2017 High-Risk Report, DOD has 

continued to meet the criteria of leadership 

commitment, capacity, and action plan for 

asset visibility. Further, DOD has fully 

addressed the three remaining actions and 

outcomes we outlined in 2017 in order to 

mitigate or resolve long-standing 

weaknesses in asset visibility. 

Consequently, DOD has met the monitoring 

and demonstrated progress criteria for 

asset visibility to remove this area from our 

High-Risk List. 

Leadership commitment: met. Senior leaders have continued to 

demonstrate commitment through their involvement in groups such as the 

Supply Chain Executive Steering Committee-senior-level officials 

responsible for overseeing asset visibility improvement efforts-and 

through the Asset Visibility Working Group, which identifies opportunities 

for improvement and monitors the implementation of initiatives by issuing 

its Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility (Strategy) in 2014, 2015, 

and 2017. 

Capacity: met. DOD continues to demonstrate that it has the capacitypersonnel and resources-to improve asset visibility. For example, DOD's 

2015 and 2017 Strategies advise the components to consider items such 

as staffing, materiel, and sustainment costs when documenting cost 

estimates for the initiatives in the Strategy, as we recommended in 

January 2015. 

Action plan: met. A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2014 required DOD to submit to Congress a 

comprehensive strategy and implementation plans for improving asset 

tracking and in-transit visibility. In January 2014, DOD issued the Strategy 

and accompanying implementation plans, which outlined initiatives 

intended to improve asset visibility. DOD updated its 2014 Strategy in 

October 2015 and in August 2017. 

Importantly, since 2017 DOD addressed the three remaining actions and 

outcomes related to the monitoring and demonstrated progress criteria 

through updates to and implementation of the Strategies (see table 6). 

Page 58 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
117 

DOD Supply Chain Management 

Table 6: Status of Asset Visibility Remaining Action Items Required to Remove 

Supply Chain Management from GAO's High-Risk list 

Action items 

Incorporate the attributes of successful performance 

measures (e.g., clear, quantifiable, objective, and 

reliable), as appropriate, in subsequent updates to the 

Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibillty 

Take steps to incorporate mto after-action reports 

information relating to performance measures for the 

asset visibility initiatives 

3. Demonstrate sustained progress in implementing 

imtiatives that result in measurable outcomes and 

progress towards realizing the goals and objectives in 

the Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility 

Source GAO analysis and pnorGAO report I GA0.19-157SP 

Action 

item High-risk 

status category 

Met Monitoring 

Met Monitonng 

Met Demonstrated 

progress 

Monitoring: met. DOD provided guidance in its 2017 update to the 

Strategy for the military components to consider key attributes of 

successful performance measures during metric development for their 

improvement initiatives. As appropriate, the military components have 

followed the guidance and provided high-level summary metrics updates 

to the Asset Visibility Working Group. In addition, DOD has taken steps to 

monitor asset visibility by incorporating into after-action reports, as 

appropriate, information relating to performance measures. These afteraction reports serve as closure documents and permanent records of 

each initiative's accomplishments. 

Demonstrated progress: met. DOD has demonstrated sustained 

progress by completing 34 of the 39 initiatives to improve asset visibility 

and continues to monitor the remaining 5 initiatives. These initiatives have 

supported DOD's goals and objectives, which include: (1) improving 

visibility efficiencies of physical inventories, receipt processing, cargo 

tracking, and unit moves; (2) ensuring asset visibility data are 

discoverable, accessible, and understandable to support informed 

decision-making across the enterprise; and (3) increasing efficiencies for 

delivery accuracy and cycle times. Also, the Asset Visibility Working 

Group meets regularly to identify opportunities to further improve asset 

visibility within DOD. 

DOD has taken the following actions to demonstrate sustained progress: 

(1) created an integrated single portal system providing 7,500 users 

access to near-real-time, in-transit visibility of eight million lines of items 

of supply and transportation data; and (2) increased its visibility of assets 

through radio-frequency identification (RFID), an automated data-capture 

technology that can be used to electronically identify, track, and store 

information contained on a tag. There are two main types of RFID tags, 

Page 59 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
118 

Materiel Distribution 

DOD Supply Chain Management 

passive and active, which show whether assets are in-storage, in-transit, 

in-process, or in-use. Passive tags, such as mass transit passes, do not 

contain their own power source and cannot initiate communication with a 

reader; while active tags, such as an "E-Z pass," contain a power source 

and a transmitter, and send a continuous signal over longer distances. 

DOD closed nine initiatives from its Strategies by implementing RFID 

technology. For example, the Marine Corps implemented long-range 

passive RFID for visibility and accountability of items, resulting in 

improvements that include an increased range for "reading" an itemfrom 30 feet to 240 feet-and reduced inventory cycle times from 12 days 

to 10 hours. Also, the Navy reported that the use of passive RFID 

technology to support the overhaul of its nuclear-powered attack 

submarines enabled the Navy to better track parts, resulting in 98 percent 

fewer missing components and an average cost avoidance of $1.3 million 

per boat. 

Additionally, according to DOD, the use of RFID tags to provide visibility 

of sustainment cargo at the tactical leg resulted in $1.4 million annual cost 

savings. Further, DOD reported that the migration of the active RFID 

enterprise from a proprietary communication standard to a competitive 

multivendor environment reduced the cost of active RFID tags by half, 

resulting in an estimated $5.7 million annual reduction in costs. 

Since our 2017 High-Risk Report, DOD has 

continued to meet the criteria of leadership 

commitment, capacity, and action plan for 

materiel distribution. Further, DOD has fully 

addressed the four remaining actions and 

outcomes we outlined in 2017 in order to 

mitigate or resolve long-standing 

weaknesses in materiel distribution. 

Consequently, DOD has met the monitoring 

and demonstrated progress criteria for 

materiel distribution to remove this area 

from our High-Risk List. 

Leadership commitment: met. Senior leaders continue to demonstrate 

commitment through their involvement in groups such as the Supply 

Chain Executive Steering Committee-senior-level officials responsible 

for overseeing materiel distribution corrective actions-and through the 

Distribution Working Group, which helped develop the Materiel 

Distribution Improvement Plan (Improvement Plan) in 2016. 

Capacity: met. DOD has continued to demonstrate that it has the 

personnel and resources, such as key organizations and the associated 

Page 60 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
119 

DOD Supply Chain Management 

governance structure, to improve materiel distribution. The Improvement 

Plan recognizes that additional resources will be required to accomplish 

its corrective actions and close any identified performance gaps within the 

time frame specified. 

Action plan: met. In 2016, DOD developed its corrective action plan to 

address the department's materiel distribution challenges. The 

Improvement Plan details specific goals and actions to better measure 

the end-to-end distribution process, ensure the accuracy of undertying 

data, and strengthen and integrate distribution policies and the 

governance structure. 

Importantly, since 2017, DOD has fully addressed the four remaining 

actions and outcomes related to monitoring and demonstrated progress 

to mitigate or resolve long-standing weaknesses in materiel distribution 

(see table 7). 

Table 7: Status of Materiel Distribution Remaining Action Items Required to 

Remove Supply Chain Management from GAO's High-Risk List 

Action items 

1. Make progress in developing Department of Defense's 

(DOD's) suite of distribution performance metrics, 

improving the quality of data underlying those metrics, 

and sharing metrics information among stakeholders 

Integrate dtstnbution metrics data, including cost data, 

from the combatant commands and other DOD 

components, as appropriate, on the performance of all 

legs of the distribution system, including the tactical leg.'" 

Refine ex1st1ng actions 1n the Materiel D1stnbut1on 

Improvement Plan or incorporate additional actions 

based on interim progress and results, and update the 

Materiel Distribution Improvement Plan accordingly 

4. Demonstrate that the actions implemented under its 

Materiel Distributton Improvement Plan improve its 

capability to comprehensively measure distribution 

performance, identify distribution problems and root 

causes, and identify and implement solutions 

Source GAOanalys•sandprlorGAOreport I GA0.19·157SP 

Action 

item High-risk 

status category 

Met Monitoring 

Met Momtoring 

Met Monitonng 

Met Demonstrated 

progress 

aThe tactical leg is the last segment of the distribution system between the supply points in a military 

theater of operations and the forward operating bases and units 

Monitoring: met. DOD has monitored materiel distribution by making 

progress in developing its suite of distribution performance metrics, 

improving the quality of their underlying data, and sharing metrics 

information with stakeholders. For example, in January 2017, DOD 

developed a suite of performance metrics that provides a comprehensive 

picture of the distribution process, including whether supplies are 

Page 61 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
120 

DOD Supply Chain Management 

delivered on time and at sufficient quantity and quality. Also, DOD 

implemented checklists to assess the quality of data underlying each 

performance metric based on relevance, accuracy, comparability, and 

interpretability. 

The checklists and their standards assist in identifying root causes and 

addressing areas where performance data quality may be lacking. DOD 

has also incorporated internal control requirements in its supply chain 

management guidance to increase confidence in the performance data. 

Additionally, DOD has revised its policy documents to require 

stakeholders to routinely capture and share distribution performance 

metrics, including cost data, and the department maintains websites to 

provide current performance information to distribution stakeholders. 

DOD has also incorporated distribution metrics, as appropriate, on the 

performance of all legs of the distribution system, including the tactical leg 

(i.e., the last segment of the distribution system). We previously reported 

on DOD's deficiencies to accurately assess its distribution performance at 

the tactical leg, such as missing delivery dates for shipments in 

Afghanistan. Since that time, the geographic combatant commands have 

been tracking metrics at the tactical leg, including required delivery dates, 

to determine the movement and causes of delays for shipments, and 

have been sharing distribution performance information with the U.S. 

Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) through their deployment and 

distribution operations centers. DOD is implementing a cost framework to 

incorporate transportation costs for all legs of the distribution system, 

which will provide an additional metric for distribution stakeholders to 

assess the efficiency of the system. The first phase of the cost framework 

began operating in August 2018 and is expected to be fully implemented 

in 2019. 

DOD is making progress in refining its Improvement Plan and is 

incorporating additional actions based on interim progress and results. 

Since DOD issued the Improvement Plan in September 2016, the agency 

has (1) documented the results and monitored the status of each 

corrective action, (2) revised completion dates as needed, and (3) 

periodically provided decision makers with summary action charts, plans, 

and milestones. DOD is also updating its instruction on management and 

oversight of the distribution enterprise to clarify the roles and 

responsibilities of all distribution stakeholders. DOD officials have not 

determined a date for when this instruction will be issued. 

Demonstrated progress: met. DOD has demonstrated sustained 

progress in improving its capability to comprehensively measure 

distribution performance, identify distribution problems and root causes, 

and implement solutions. DOD has implemented 10 of 18 corrective 

actions in its Improvement Plan and is on track to implement the 

Page 62 GA0·19-392T High~Risk Series 
121 

Monitoring After Removal 

Related GAO 

Products 

DOD Supply Chain Management 

remaining 8 by September 2019. Because of this progress, DOD's 

monthly shipment reports have assessed performance against enhanced 

metrics across the distribution system. For example, in December 2017, 

TRANSCOM investigated performance standards for truck deliveries from 

its Defense Logistics Agency warehouses in Bahrain to customers in 

Kuwait due to frequent delays in shipments. TRANSCOM determined that 

inadequate time for clearing customs in Kuwait resulted in an unrealistic 

delivery standard. 

TRANSCOM, in coordination with distribution stakeholders, adjusted the 

delivery standard to adequately account for the in-theater customs 

process. In addition, TRANSCOM, in partnership with the Defense 

Logistics Agency and the General Services Administration, developed 

and implemented initiatives focused on distribution process and 

operational improvements to reduce costs and improve distribution 

services to the warfighter. According to DOD, these efforts have resulted 

in at least $1.56 billion in distribution cost avoidances to date. 

DOD has demonstrated commendable, sustained progress improving its 

supply chain management. This does not mean DOD has addressed all 

risk within this area. It remains imperative that senior leaders continue 

their efforts to implement initiatives and corrective actions to maintain 

visibility of supplies, track cargo movements, meet delivery standards, 

and maintain delivery data for shipments. Continued oversight and 

attention are also warranted given the recent reorganization of the Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and 

the resulting change in the oversight structure of Supply Chain 

Management. We will therefore continue to conduct oversight of supply 

chain management at DOD. 

Defense Logistics: Improved Performance Measures and Information 

Needed for Assessing Asset Visibility Initiatives. GA0-17-183. 

Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2017. 

Defense Logistics: DOD Has Addressed Most Reporting Requirements 

and Continues to Refine its Asset Visibility Strategy GA0-16-88. 

Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2015. 

Defense Logistics: Improvements Needed to Accurately Assess the 

Performance of DOD's Materiel Distribution Pipeline. GA0-15-228. 

Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2015. 

Page 63 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
122 

Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data 

We are removing this high-risk area because-with strong congressional support and oversight-the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have made 

significant progress in establishing and implementing plans to mitigate potential gaps in weather satellite data. 

Mitigating Gaps in Weather 

Satellite Data 

Why High-Risk Area Is Being 

Removed 

In our 2017 High-Risk Report, we 

reported that NOAA had fully 

implemented criteria associated 

with demonstrating leadership 

commitment, having the needed 

capacity to address risks, and 

monitoring progress. 

We also reported that NOAA had 

partially implemented the criteria 

for establishing an action plan and 

demonstrating progress. In 

addition, our 2017 report noted 

DOD's slow progress in 

establishing plans for its follow-on weather satellite program and for 

determining how it would fulfill other weather requirements in the early 

morning orbit 

Since that time, (1) NOAA has fully implemented actions in response to 

the remaining two criteria that had previously been partially implemented 

and (2) DOD, pursuant to statutes and accompanying congressional 

direction, established and began implementing plans both for its follow-on 

weather satellite program and for addressing the key requirements that 

were not included in that satellite program. Consequently, we are 

removing the need to mitigate gaps in weather satellite data from our 

High-Risk List 

Page 64 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
123 

NOAA's PolarOrbiting Weather 

Satellites 

Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data 

Since our last high-risk update in 2017, 

NOAA continues to meet the criteria of 

leadership commitment, capacity, and 

monitoring and now also meets the criteria 

of action plan and demonstrated progress. 

Leadership commitment: met. NOAA 

program officials met the leadership 

commitment criteria in 2015 and have 

continued to sustain their strong leadership 

commitment to mitigating potential satellite 

Source·GAOanalys•s l GA0-19-157SP data gaps since that time. For example, 

NOAA issued and frequently updated its polar satellite gap mitigation 

plan, which identifies the specific technical, programmatic, and 

management steps the agency is taking to ensure that satellite mitigation 

options are viable. In addition, NOAA executives continue to oversee the 

acquisition of polar-orbiting satellites through monthly briefings on the 

cost, schedule, and risks affecting the satellites' development. 

Capacity: met. NOAA continues to meet the criterion of improving its 

capacity to address the risk of a satellite data gap. In December 2014, we 

recommended that NOAA investigate ways to prioritize the gap mitigation 

projects with the greatest potential benefit to weather forecasting, such as 

by improving its high-performance computing capacity. NOAA agreed 

with this recommendation and implemented it. For example, NOAA 

upgraded its high-performance computers, which allowed the agency to 

move forward on multiple other mitigation activities, including 

experimenting with other data sources and assimilating these data into its 

weather models. 

Action plan: met. NOAA now meets the criterion for having a plan to 

address the risk of a polar satellite data gap, which is an increase over its 

rating in 2017. In June 2012, we reported that, while NOAA officials 

communicated publicly and often about the risk of a polar satellite data 

gap, the agency had not established plans to mitigate the gap. We 

recommended that NOAA establish a gap mitigation plan, and the agency 

did so in February 2014. However, in December 2014, we recommended 

that NOAA revise its plan to address shortfalls, including (1) adding 

recovery time objectives for key products, (2) identifying opportunities for 

accelerating the calibration and validation of satellite data products, (3) 

providing an assessment of available alternatives based on their costs 

and impacts, and (4) establishing a schedule with meaningful timelines 

and linkages among mitigation activities. 

The agency agreed with the recommendation and subsequently 

addressed it. Specifically, NOAA issued three updates to its gap 

Page 65 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
124 

DOD's Polar-Orbiting 

Weather Satellites 

Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data 

mitigation plan between January 2016 and February 2017. With the last 

of the updates, the agency addressed the shortfalls we had identified. 

Monitoring: met. NOAA met this criterion in 2017, and continues to meet 

it now, by implementing our recommendations to more consistently and 

comprehensively monitor its progress on gap mitigation activities. For 

example, all three NOAA organizations responsible for gap mitigation 

projects regularly brief senior management on their progress. 

Demonstrated progress: met. NOAA now meets the criterion for 

demonstrated progress, which is an increase over its prior rating. In our 

2017 High-Risk Report, we noted that NOAA had identified 35 different 

gap mitigation projects and was making progress in implementing them. 

These projects fell into three general categories: (1) understanding the 

likelihood and impact of a gap, (2) reducing the likelihood of a gap, and 

(3) reducing the impact of a gap. Nevertheless, one of the most important 

steps in reducing the likelihood of a gap-keeping the launch of the next 

polar satellite on schedule-had encountered problems. Specifically, 

agency officials decided to delay the launch due to challenges in 

developing the ground system and a critical instrument on the spacecraft. 

This delay exacerbated the probability of a satellite data gap. 

More recently, however, NOAA was able to demonstrate progress by 

successfully launching the satellite in November 2017. That satellite, now 

called NOAA-20, is currently operational and is being used to provide 

advanced weather data and forecasts. Moreover, the agency is also 

working to build and launch the next satellites in the polar satellite 

program. 

Somce GAOanalys•s j GA0-19<)92T 

Since our last high-risk update in 2017, 

DOD now meets all five high-risk criteria. 

Leadership commitment: met. With 

strong congressional oversight, DOD now 

meets this criterion. Pursuant to enactment 

of the Carl Levin and Howard P. 'Buck' 

McKeon National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2015 (NOAA for FY 2015), 

the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2016 (NOAA for FY 2016), and 

the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, 

DOD leadership committed to developing and implementing plans to 

address its weather satellite requirements. For example, in late 2017, the 

department awarded a contract for its Weather System Follow-onMicrowave satellite to fulfill core weather requirements. 

Page 66 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
125 

Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data 

Capacity: met. With strong congressional oversight. DOD now meets the 

capacity criterion. Specifically, the NOAA for FY 2015 restricted the 

availability of 50 percent of the FY 2015 funds authorized for the Weather 

Satellite Follow-on System (now called the Weather System Follow-onMicrowave satellite program) until DOD submitted to the congressional 

defense committees a plan to meet weather monitoring data collection 

requirements. In addition. the explanatory statement that accompanied 

the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, recommended that the Air 

Force focus on ensuring that the next generation of weather satellites 

meet the full spectrum of requirements and work with civil stakeholders to 

leverage appropriate civil or international weather assets. 

As called for in the law and the explanatory statement, DOD established 

plans to meet weather monitoring data collection needs, including by 

acquiring satellites as part of a family of systems to replace its aging 

legacy weather satellites. Additionally, DOD formally coordinated with 

NOAA on weather monitoring data collection efforts. In January 2017, the 

Air Force and NOAA signed a memorandum of agreement, and in 

November 2017, signed an annex to that agreement, to allow for the 

exchange of information and collaboration on a plan for collecting weather 

monitoring data. The Air Force and NOAA are now developing plans to 

relocate a residual NOAA satellite over the Indian Ocean, an area of 

concern for cloud characterization and area-specific weather imagery 

coverage. 

Action plan: met. In our 2017 High-Risk Report, we reported that DOD 

was slow to establish plans for its Weather System Follow-on-Microwave 

program and had made little progress in determining how it would meet 

weather satellite requirements for cloud characterization and area-specific 

weather imagery. Pursuant to the NOAA for FY 2015, the NOAA for FY 

2016, and the explanatory statement that accompanied the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2016, the department developed and began 

implementing plans to address its weather satellite requirements. As 

mentioned above, in late 2017, the department awarded a contract for its 

Weather System Follow-on-Microwave satellite to fulfill core weather 

requirements. Under this program, the department may launch a 

demonstration satellite in 2021 and plans to launch an operational 

satellite in 2022. 

DOD also developed plans for providing its two highest-priority 

capabilities-cloud characterization and area-specific weather imagery 

data collection-that will not be covered by the Weather System Followon-Microwave satellite program. The department is planning a longerterm solution, called the Electro-Optical/Infrared Weather Systems 

program, to meet these needs, with a planned satellite launch in 2024. 

Meanwhile, DOD is in the process of acquiring a small prototype satellite, 

called the Operationally Responsive Space-S satellite, to provide interim 

Page 67 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
126 

Monitoring After Removal 

Related GAO 

Products 

Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data 

capabilities. DOD plans to launch Operationally Responsive Space-S as 

early as 2022. 

Monitoring: met. DOD now meets the monitoring criterion as evidenced 

by its actions to initiate a major acquisition program, the Weather System 

Follow-on-Microwave, and award a contract for the first satellite. In 

addition, program officials stated that they plan to monitor the program's 

progress toward addressing critical needs and assess its operations and 

sustainment costs. 

Demonstrated progress: met. DOD now meets the demonstrated 

progress criterion because it has developed plans and taken actions to 

address gaps in weather data through its plans to launch the Weather 

System Follow-on-Microwave satellite in 2022. The department also 

plans to launch the Electro-Optical/Infrared Weather Systems satellite in 

2024 and provide interim capabilities beginning as early as 2022. By 

developing these plans, DOD has reduced the risk of a gap in weather 

satellite data and addressed the concerns about a lack of planning that 

we identified in our 2017 High-Risk Report DOD's effective 

implementation of its plans will be key to further reducing the risks of gaps 

in weather satellite data in the future. 

Moving forward, we will continue to monitor both NOAA and DOD efforts 

to develop and launch the next satellites in their respective weather 

satellite programs. NOAA plans to launch its next geostationary weather 

satellite in 2021 and to launch its next polar weather satellite in 2022. 

DOD plans satellite launches in 2021 (potentially), 2022, and 2024. In 

addition, we will continue to monitor DOD's efforts to develop long-term 

plans to meet its weather satellite requirements. 

Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Knowledge Gaps Pose Risks to 

Sustaining Recent Positive Trends. GA0-18-360SP. Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 25, 2018. 

Satellite Acquisitions: Agencies May Recover a Limited Portion of 

Contract Value When Satellites Fail. GA0-17-490. Washington, D.C.: 

June 9, 2017. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GA0-17-333SP. Washington, D.C.: Mar 30, 2017. 

Defense Weather Satellites: DOD Faces Acquisition Challenges for 

Addressing Capability Needs. GA0-16-769T. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 

2016. 

Page 68 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
127 

Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data 

Polar Satellites: NOAA Faces Challenges and Uncertainties that Could 

Affect the Availability of Critical Weather Data. GA0-16-773T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2016. 

Polar Weather Satellites: NOAA Is Working to Ensure Continuity but 

Needs to Quickly Address Information Security Weaknesses and Future 

Program Uncertainties. GA0-16-359. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2016. 

Defense Weather Satellites: Analysis of Alternatives Is Useful for Certain 

Capabilities, but Ineffective Coordination Limited Assessment of Two 

Capabilities. GA0-16-252R. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2016. 

Page 69 GA0-19-392T High-Risk Series 
128 

This 1s a work of the U.S. government and is not subJect to copynght protection m the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distnbuted in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 
129 

GAO's Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Phone 

Connect with GAO 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

Strategic Planning and 

External Liaison 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative 

arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 

responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the 

federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public 

funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through GAO's website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO 

posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, go to http://www.gao.gov 

and select "E-mail Updates." 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of production and 

distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether 

the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and 

information is posted on GAO's website, oovlorderio•1 htm 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TOO (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard, 

Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information. 

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Linked In, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov and read The Watchblog. 

Contact FraudNet: 

Website: https://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htrn 

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7700 

Orice Williams Brown, Managing Director, WilliamsO@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125, 

Washington, DC 20548 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548 

James-Christian Blackwood, Managing Director, spel@gao.gov, (202) 512-4707 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814, 

Washington, DC 20548 

Please Print on Recycled Paper. 
130 

GAO u.s. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

441 GSt. N.W. 

Washington, DC 20548 

May 9, 2018 

The Honorable Donald F. McGahn, II 

Assistant to the President and 

White House Counsel 

The White House 

Dear Mr. McGahn: 

I write to express concern about the policy of certain White House offices regarding 

communication with the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Specifically, I 

understand that attorneys from your office and the National Security Council (NSC) will 

not respond to inquiries or otherwise engage with GAO staff during the course of our 

reviews. This approach represents a clear departure from past practice. 

Generally, GAO's need to interact with these White House offices is fairly limited, arising 

most frequently in the context of matters involving White House or NSC coordination 

among executive branch agencies on interagency initiatives. On these occasions, GAO 

has a history of working with attorneys from your office and the NSC to obtain 

information needed for our reports. GAO staff contact these attorneys with targeted 

requests for critical information after completing work at the agencies or entities 

primarily responsible for the programs or activities under review. Under these 

circumstances, we seek the information or perspective that only these staff can provide. 

Notably, our interaction also provides White House Counsel and the NSC with visibility 

into the ongoing work of GAO. 

Over the past year, GAO has requested information and meetings when preparing 

reports on topics clearly involving White House interests and expertise. These reports 

concern such diverse topics as the role of the NSC in the coordination of conflict 

prevention, mitigation, and stabilization efforts abroad; Inspector General vacancies; 

and the cost of presidential travel and related security measures. In response to our 

requests, White House Counsel and NSC staff have either refused to have any 

discussion with GAO staff or not responded at all, illustrating the recent change in 

policy. 
131 

Æ 

I am concerned about the implications of this new policy regarding communication with 

GAO, particularly in our performance of a core function, namely, contributing to 

Congress's constitutional oversight. Given the importance of this matter, I would ask 

that you correct any misunderstanding that we may have or reconsider this approach to 

engaging with GAO. I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience 

and would appreciate a response no later than May 25, 2018. 

Sincerely yours, 

!!:::!!.~ General Counsel 

Page2