J-S01013-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: THE ESTATE OF KATHRYN S. 

MCLEOD, DECEASED JOAN Y. 

SUMMY-LONG, INDIVIDUALLY AND 

AS AGENT FOR JANICE S. FAUST 

Appellant

v.

NANCY MCLEOD O'BRIEN, 

EXECUTRIX OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE 

AND TRUSTEE OF THE KATHRYN 

MCLEOD TRUST U/A DTD 5/24/1999

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 394 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Orders Entered January 30, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2215-0133

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MAY 04, 2021

Joan Y. Summy-Long appeals, pro se,

1

from two orders, entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Orphans’ Court Division, on 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Summy-Long purports to appeal “individually and as agent for Janice Faust,”

her sister. Although Appellants were previously represented by counsel, he 

has since been permitted to withdraw his representation. See infra at 11-

15. Following counsel’s withdrawal, Summy-Long, with the leave of this 

Court, filed a pro se supplemental brief. This Court has previously held that 

an agent’s pro se “legal representation” of a principal under a power of 

attorney is “contrary to the constitution, the laws, and the public policy of this 

Commonwealth” and constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Kohlman 

v. W. Pennsylvania Hosp., 652 A.2d 849, 853 (Pa. Super. 1994). 

Accordingly, to the extent that Summy-Long appears pro se in this matter, we 
J-S01013-21

- 2 -

January 30, 2020. The first order denied Appellants’ motion for 

reconsideration of an order dated May 30, 2019; the second order denied their 

objections to the Second and Final Account of Nancy McLeod O’Brien, 

Executrix of the Will of Kathryn S. McLeod, Deceased, and Trustee of the 

Kathryn McLeod Trust Under Agreement dated May 24, 1999. After our 

review, we quash the appeal from the order denying reconsideration of the 

order dated May 30, 2019. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the order 

denying Appellants’ objections to the Second and Final Account and remand 

for further proceedings.

This matter has a long and tortured history before both the Orphans’ 

Court and this Court. In his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the Honorable John J. 

McNally, III, provided a thorough recitation of the extensive factual and 

procedural history of this case, which includes excerpts from a prior 

memorandum decision of this Court. In the interests of judicial economy, as 

well as for ease of disposition, we reproduce that portion of the Orphans’ 

Court’s opinion in substantial part:

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recited a portion of the early 

procedural background in this matter, as follows:

Kathryn S. McLeod died testate on December 18, 2014. On 

February 9, 2015, the Register of Wills [] of Dauphin County 

[] probated an instrument dated February 19, 2004, as 

decedent’s last will and testament and granted letters 

testamentary to Nancy McLeod O’Brien [(“Executrix”)], 

[decedent’s] stepdaughter. Appellants [] were decedent’s 

____________________________________________

deem her to be acting only on her own behalf. However, for the sake of clarity, 

we refer to “Appellants” in the plural, when appropriate. 
J-S01013-21

- 3 -

nieces. The residuary estate was left to the Kathryn S. 

McLeod Trust dated February 19, 2004 [(“2004 Trust”)].

The [2004 Trust], which constituted a complete restatement 

of a trust agreement dated July 27, 2001, was a living will 

whereby [decedent] appointed herself as trustee and 

retained a life estate. Upon [decedent’s] death, the settlor’s 

two stepdaughters, [Executrix] and Jean McLeod Croft, were 

appointed as successor co-trustees, and, after some specific 

bequests, [decedent] distributed the remaining ninety 

percent of the trust’s assets to the two stepdaughters. 

Appellants each received five percent of the remainder of 

the trust assets. [Jean McLeod Croft, who was also named 

as a co-executrix under the will, declined to serve as either 

co-executrix or co-trustee. As a result, Executrix serves 

alone in both roles.]

After an attorney had entered an appearance on their 

behalf, Appellants filed a pro se document, which was 

directed to the Register of Wills and indicated that it was 

being filed to “meet the required legal deadline of being 

within one year of probation [sic] of the Will and is under 

consultation with attorneys at this time.” There is no 

indication that the document was served on [Executrix]. 

The filing in question did not raise any issues as to the 

validity of the will or trust[,] nor did it suggest that the 

decedent lacked the capacity or was unduly influenced to 

execute those February 19, 2004 documents. 

Instead, Appellants averred that there was tortious 

interference with their inheritance, and they sought 

subpoenas in order to obtain answers to “questions 

regarding the entirety of [decedent’s] assets” as well as the 

disposition of assets held in 1992, 1997, and 1999 trusts 

created by the decedent. On March 9, 2016, the orphans’ 

court dismissed the untitled document.

On March 17, 2016, counsel for Appellants filed a Petition to 

Contest Probated Will and Trust Agreement. That petition 

sought discovery to determine whether all of the decedent’s 

assets had been located and whether decedent had 

executed a will and trust after February 19, 2004. 

Appellants also requested copies of any trusts that the 

decedent executed prior to 2001.
J-S01013-21

- 4 -

The executrix filed preliminary objections to the [petition], 

alleging that it was untimely, did not state a cause of action 

in that it did not contain any challenges to the validity of the 

February 19, 2004 will and trust, and was incapable of being 

answered. As to the latter averment, the executrix noted 

that the [petition] referred to wills and/or trusts that were 

supposedly executed after 2004, but that the document 

failed to apprise her of any facts that would enable her to 

locate testamentary dispositions signed after 2004. The 

executrix also set forth that, even though Appellant SummyLong was the decedent’s [agent under a] power of attorney 

for the twenty-five years preceding her death, Appellants 

did not list any assets that should have been, but were not, 

included in either the trust corpus or the estate.

After Appellants filed preliminary objections to the 

executrix’s preliminary objections, the orphans’ court 

entertained oral argument on October 17, 2016. On 

November 3, 2016, it dismissed Appellants’ preliminary 

objections, granted the executrix’s preliminary objections, 

and dismissed with prejudice Appellants’ [petition]. The 

orphans’ court concluded that the appeal from probate was 

untimely under 20 Pa.C.S. § 908(a), . . . and that the 

petition failed to state a claim that actually contested the 

validity of the will or trust.

Estate of McLeod[, 1960 MDA 2016 at 1-4 (Pa. Super. filed July 

31, 2017) (unpublished memorandum decision)].

Following issuance of the order by the Hon[orable] Lori Serratelli, 

dismissing their preliminary objections, [Appellants] filed their 

appeal to the Superior Court. The primary issue presented was 

whether Appellants had adequately asserted a fraud exception 

which would allow them to challenge the validity of the will and/or 

trust beyond the one-year statute of limitations permitted for an 

appeal from the probate of a will [under section 908]. The fraud 

alleged by [Appellants] before the Superior Court “stems from the 

Executrix’s failure to include between $1,000,000[ and 

]$2,000,000 in assets of the Estate. This [is] based upon 

petitioner Summy-Long’s personal knowledge.” The Superior 

Court rejected the fraud claim because the averment “that there 

is certain property owned by the decedent that has not been 

included in the estate and/or trust assets . . . simply does not 

raise any valid challenge to the probate of the will or the integrity 

of the will or trust, much less the existence of fraud perpetrated 
J-S01013-21

- 5 -

on the register of wills during probate.” The Superior Court was 

critical of Appellants’ decision to pursue their meritless appeal and 

improperly litigate collateral issues therein, stating:

In fact, Appellants do not understand that the failure of the 

executrix or the co-trustees to account for assets actually 

owned by the decedent can be raised by objections to their 

accounts. Appellants also have no inkling of how to conduct 

discovery, which is not by means of filing an appeal from 

the probate of a will. Hence, the orphans’ court did not 

abuse its discretion in concluding that [section] 908 applied 

and that Appellants had failed to state a valid cause of action 

in their [petition]. 

Id. [at 7 (emphasis in original)].

On November 13, 2017, following the Superior Court’s decision, 

the Executrix and her attorney completed an accounting of the 

estate and 2004 Trust assets, including proposed distributions 

[(collectively, “Accounts”)]. The [Accounts] were served on all 

interested parties and scheduled for audit on January 3, 2018. 

The petition for adjudication/statement of proposed distribution 

filed with the [Accounts] stated that the issues in the case involved 

distribution of the trust principal and termination thereof, 

discharge of the trustee and resolution of the issues listed in the 

rider, which included a statement by the estate that it intended to 

impose attorneys’ fees [on Appellants], reasoning as follows:

[Rider: Question 14]

At the time of decedent’s death, [Joan Summy-Long] was 

serving under decedent’s power of attorney and also 

produced to the [executrix] of the estate the will of the 

decedent[,] which was duly admitted to probate.

Ms. Long claimed that there was another will of the decedent 

and other assets than those which were probated. Counsel 

for the [executrix] took the necessary steps and no other 

assets nor another will has been found. Nevertheless, Ms. 

Long has caused the estate and trust to incur substantial 

legal fees and costs in raising the same issues before the 

Orphans’ Court Division of Dauphin County and, after being 

unsuccessful there, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania[,] 

where she was also unsuccessful. 

. . .
J-S01013-21

- 6 -

[Ms. Long] has also refused to sign a receipt and release 

agreement[,] which would have saved the expense and time 

of this proceeding. Accordingly, it seems only fair and 

proper that the costs of litigation, being legal fees and court 

costs[,] be charged in whole or in part to the shares now 

available for distribution to Ms. Long, individually and as 

attorney-in-fact.

The estate [stated] that it had incurred counsel fees of $156,002 

and $43,345.50, respectively, or a total of $199,347.68 [sic] for 

the period from December 18, 2014 through October 31, 2017. 

On January 16, 2018, [Appellants] filed objections to the 

Accounts. Also filed that same day was an entry of appearance of 

a new attorney for [Appellants], Ronald Finck[, Esquire]. 

[Appellants’] primary claims centered around Joan Summy-Long’s 

belief that that the decedent might have established another trust 

during her lifetime besides the probated 2004 Trust, the ultimate 

disposition of which was unknown to her and [under which] she 

and her sister might be beneficiaries. [] Summy-Long also 

suggested that assets from other trusts might have been 

improperly co-mingled in the 2004 Trust when they should have 

remained separate for the sole benefit of [Appellants]. She 

asserted that the executrix refused to provide her with complete 

copies of the trust agreements dated 1993, 1997, 1999 and 2001. 

She also sought copies of decedent’s account statement from the 

corporate trustees through which the various trusts were created, 

including the Hershey Trust Company and Edward Jones, which 

[Summy-Long] claimed she needed to determine whether the 

[Appellants] would be receiving that to which they were entitled. 

Appellants raised six specific objections. The first and sixth were 

general objections to the [Accounts], reiterating the incomplete 

document history allegedly rendering the asset picture incomplete 

and suggesting executrix breached her fiduciary duty by failing to 

identify assets of the estate or improperly designated as assets of 

the estate assets of some other trust. These objections were 

raised “under the premise that it is appropriate for [the executrix] 

to proceed with the production of various statement, copies of the 

various trust documents, and other information through discovery 

proceedings, and to then reconcile the various entries on the 

[Accounts].” [Appellants] objected to any proposed distribution 

premised upon missing information that may not reconcile with 

the estate and the trust(s). 
J-S01013-21

- 7 -

[Appellants] raised in the second objection that they believed 

decedent had an investment account with BNY Mellon which, on 

December 31, 2009, was claimed to have a value of $2,565,000 

and that this account had been titled to the 1999 trust. 

[Appellants] had been unable to determine its disposition.

[Appellants’] third objection was that the executrix failed to 

distribute two pieces of heirloom jewelry bequeathed to Joan 

Summy-Long under the 2004 will []. Both pieces were missing 

from decedent’s belongings and the estate had submitted 

insurance claims for the loss. 

In [their] fourth objection, [Appellants] sought reimbursement of 

$2,887.47 for expenses incurred clearing out items [for them] 

from decedent’s last residence.

In the fifth objection, [Appellants] disputed the executrix’s 

proposal to charge attorneys’ fees totaling $199,347.68 against 

their distribution. They also objected to the reasonableness of the 

fees. [Summy-Long] disputed the executrix’s characterization 

that [Appellants’] prior litigation contesting probate was baseless 

and unnecessarily costly. [Appellants] also disputed that they 

caused unnecessary counsel fees by failing to agree to a release. 

[The] court thereafter issued a number of case management 

orders[,] including a discovery deadline of June 30, 2018. During 

this time, while the objections were pending, executrix’s attorney 

conferred with the Hershey Trust Company regarding decedent’s 

assets[,] even though he believed that the documents sought by 

[Appellants] were irrelevant. On April 25, 2018, he provided 

[Attorney Finck] with a letter from the Hershey Trust Company 

confirming there were no trusts . . . that were not previously 

known or disclosed. Thereafter, executrix’s attorney obtained 

from the archives of the Hershey Trust Company complete copies 

of the 1999 will and trust, and the 1997 trust, which were sent to 

Attorney Finck. 

On October 26, 2018, Attorney Finck filed a petition to withdraw 

from representation of [Appellants] because he and Joan SummyLong had “reached an irreconcilable impasse regarding case 

strategy.” On November 19, 2018, Summy-Long filed a lengthy 

response objecting to the petition to withdraw. In it, she 

characterized her attorney as refusing to investigate fraud in the 

[Account]. She claimed that the impasse arose because Attorney 

Finck, without explanation, refused to depose a Hershey Trust 

Company officer whom she believed had detailed knowledge of 
J-S01013-21

- 8 -

the wills and trusts executed by decedent under the trust officer’s 

co-direction with decedent’s attorney. She believed a deposition 

would reveal that decedent’s attorney had concealed documents 

necessary to validate the veracity of the [Accounts]. 

On November 26, 2018, [the] court granted Attorney Finck 

permission to withdraw and stayed all proceedings for sixty days 

to allow Joan Summy-Long to procure new counsel. She chose 

not to do so, however, and entered her appearance as a selfrepresented litigant on January 28, 2019. [The] court thereafter 

scheduled a hearing on the objections to the [Accounts] for May 

16, 2019. 

On April 26, 2019, executrix filed a motion in limine seeking to 

exclude from the hearing, on irrelevancy grounds, any and all 

estate planning documents predating the 2004 will and 2004 

[T]rust. The motion noted that the recent discovery revealed 

there were no trusts discovered not previously known or disclosed 

and that executrix’s attorney had provided this additional proof to 

Attorney Finck. Executrix additionally noted that [Appellants] had 

failed to produce any documents relating to allegedly missing or 

improperly assigned assets.

Executrix specifically argued that earlier wills and trusts were not 

relevant to the disposition of assets through the 2004 trust 

agreement because that trust was, on its face, the governing 

document, based upon the following record: (a) that the 2004 

trust lineage established that it was an amendment and 

continuation of the line of trust referenced by the [Appellants] 

from 1993 to 2004[;] (b) that the Superior Court specifically held 

that the 2004 will and the 2004 [T]rust govern the disposition of 

decedent’s assets[;] and (c) that the 2004 [T]rust specifically 

identifies the trust property as annexed in Schedule A, which 

identifies an Edward Jones account ending in 4118, the account 

listed in the executrix’s [Accounts] for probate.

. . .

[] Executrix argued that the 2004 [T]rust defined the scope of its 

assets. Any prior trust documents, which were specifically 

amended and restated and rendered nullities by the 2004 trust 

agreement, would not tend to prove or disprove whether any 

assets are missing from the 2004 [T]rust, or whether any assets 
J-S01013-21

- 9 -

in the 2004 [T]rust belong to any person or entity other than the 

estate or the 2004 [T]rust. 

In [their] response to the motion in limine, [Appellants] disputed 

that the executrix had accounted for all assets but[,] instead[,] 

had actively concealed estate documents including the 2001 trust, 

preventing them access to important evidence that could 

contradict or challenge the proposed [Accounts,] including 

exposing possible fraud. 

[Following argument, the court granted executrix’s motion in 

limine, holding it would only consider the 2004 will and trust in 

determining the estate distribution. A hearing on Appellants’ 

objections followed, at which Appellants presented no witnesses 

or documentary evidence,] but argued the same issues [] raised 

in [the] pleadings. 

. . .

On May 30, 2019, [the] court entered an order approving the 

account, denying the objections . . ., and granting the 

accountant’s petition for adjudication. With regard to 

[Appellants’] primary complaint, set forth in [the] first and sixth 

objections, in which [they] claimed the executrix breached her 

fiduciary duty by failing to identify assets or improperly designated 

as assets of the estate assets of some other trust, [the] court 

found “that the estate has made trust documents, statements[,] 

and other information sought by [Appellants] available to [them]. 

The court finds that distribution of principal and income that have 

been made have been for the direct benefit of the decedent’s 

estate.” The court also found, as to the second objection, that the 

estate made a complete and proper accounting of the BNY Mellon 

account. 

Determinatively, [Appellants] failed to file an appeal within thirty 

days from the issuance of the May 30, 2019 order, which [they 

were] required to do to avoid waiver of the issues litigated. The 

next docket activity in this matter occurred [on] November 11, 

2019, when Executrix filed her Second and Final Accountings with 

Petition for Adjudication and Statement of Proposed Distribution. 

The Second [Accounts] covered the period from November 1, 

2017 through August 28, 2019, and addressed new items 

including the proposed distribution of additional bonds that had 

since been discovered. It also reflected the imposition of 
J-S01013-21

- 10 -

attorneys’ fees against [Appellants,] as had been approved by the 

court in its May 30, 2019 order. Under the proposed distribution, 

the 5% shares due [Appellants], of $115,934.43 each, were 

applied to attorneys’ fees. The Second [Accounts] showed that 

the estate had incurred $181,236.11 in counsel fees for the 

second accounting period, which was in addition to the estate’s 

counsel fees for the first accounting period, of $199,347.68. 

On December 27, 2019, [Appellants] filed a “Motion for 

Reconsideration of Objections to First and Final Trust and Account 

Order,” specifically requesting that the court reconsider the May 

30, 2019 order approving the account and denying the 

[Appellants’] objections. On December 31, 2019, [Appellants] 

filed objections to the Second [Accounts]. Joan Summy-Long, 

who filed the motion and objections, was still self-represented.

In the motion for reconsideration, [Appellants] raised three 

issues[.] First, they sought that the court revisit the issue of 

whether the estate was forthright when it claimed it was not in 

possession of one of the rings bequeathed to Joan Summy-Long. 

They suggested new evidence had been discovered showing the 

estate was falsely claiming it lacked possession. Second, they 

also again accused Executrix of breach of fiduciary duty in [her] 

administration of the 2004 Trust and that additional assets were 

due to [Appellants] inasmuch as the 1999 trust, created in their 

favor, had been “co-opted” into the 2004 Trust. They took 

particular issue with the fact that the estate had not provided a 

copy of the 2001 trust and that a 1999 revision to a will had been 

concealed. Third, [Appellants] argued that the estate failed to 

adequately search for unclaimed property owned by Decedent[,] 

which was allegedly known to the estate to exist in 2015[,] 

including a life insurance policy and two other items. SummyLong asserted that recent searches she undertook (in late 2019) 

revealed the existence of this property and that the executrix 

breached her fiduciary duty by failing to include them in the estate 

assets. 

In the objections to the Second [Accounts], [Appellants] 

continued to raise issues with the trusts[,] including that the 2004 

Trust was deficient because it was unfunded according to Edward 

Jones account documents and that the 2004 Trust improperly coopted the 1999 trust. [Appellants] again accused Executrix of 

concealing documents and allowing [Appellants’] inheritance to be 

taken away from them. [Appellants] also objected to the 

imposition of attorneys’ fees. Finally, [Appellants] argued that 
J-S01013-21

- 11 -

Joan Summy-Long should have received the appraised value of 

the missing jewelry (rings) she was bequeathed instead of the 

insurance claim value. Notably, the objections raised no new 

arguments directed solely at the Second [Accounts], to which the 

objections purported to object. 

On January 22, 2020, the Executrix filed preliminary objections to 

both of [Appellants’] filings[,] arguing that all issues raised were 

a rehashing of issues previously raised in the first set of objections 

and which were finally resolved by this court in its May 30, 2019 

order. Inasmuch as no new issues have been raised, and because 

any attack on the old issues had to be raised within thirty days 

from the issuance of the May 30 order, all issues were waived and 

this court lacked jurisdiction to [consider] them. 

On January 30, 2020, this court issued two orders from which 

[Appellants] currently appeal. The first denied reconsideration[,] 

stating that “[Appellants have] failed to present facts which the 

court did not gather during the hearing on objections or law that 

the court did not consider in rendering its decision.” 

In the second order, this court denied the objections to the Second 

[Accounts], stating that “[Appellants] simply rehashed objections 

to the First [Account,] which this court has rejected and further 

objects to counsel fees charged to the estate, the cost of which 

are, in part, attributable to [Appellants’] own filings.” On February 

25, 2020, [Appellants] filed a timely appeal from both orders 

issued January 30, 2020. Following [Appellants’] filing of their 

notice of appeal, a third attorney entered his appearance on their 

behalf and filed a [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise] statement of errors 

complained of on appeal.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/15/20, at 1-11 (footnotes, citations to record, and 

unnecessary capitalization omitted).

On March 20, 2020, Norman Perlberger, Esquire, entered his 

appearance in this Court on Appellants’ behalf. On June 10, 2020, Attorney 

Perlberger filed a motion to withdraw from his representation of Appellants, 

stating that he had “reached a professional impasse with [Summy-Long], and 

. . . that all attempts to resolve or remove said impediment have failed.” 
J-S01013-21

- 12 -

Motion to Withdraw, 6/10/20, at ¶ 8. On June 10, 2020, Summy-Long filed a 

pro se document styled “Answer to the Motion for Leave to Withdraw and for 

Extension of Time with Request for Documents and Counsel Compromise,” in 

which she disputed numerous averments made in counsel’s motion and 

asserted that “withdrawal of [c]ounsel at this stage makes it virtually 

impossible to find another attorney to represent the Appellate [sic] that is 

essential to complete the [c]ase.” Answer to Motion to Withdraw, 6/10/20, at 

¶ 6. On June 22, 2020, Attorney Perlberger filed a “Sur-Reply to Appellant’s 

Answer to Motion for Leave to Withdraw and for Extension of Time,” in which 

he disputed certain claims made by Summy-Long in her answer and “rest[ed]

on the [m]otion pending before the Court.” Counsel’s Sur-Reply, 6/22/20, at 

[2]. On June 29, 2020, Summy-Long filed an answer to counsel’s sur-reply. 

On July 6, 2020, this Court issued a per curiam Order, denying counsel’s 

motion without prejudice to his ability to seek relief in the trial court and 

granting Summy-Long an extension of time, until July 29, 2020, to file a brief 

and reproduced record. See Order, 7/6/20. 

On July 6, 2020, Attorney Perlberger filed an “Ex Parte Motion for 

Reconsideration/Clarification of July 6, 2020 Ruling Re: Motion for Leave to 

Withdraw and for Extension of Time.”2 In that motion, Attorney Perlberger 

____________________________________________

2 Counsel averred that he filed his motion for reconsideration ex parte so as 

not to prejudice his client by “serving opposing counsel with [the m]otion, or 

. . . providing Appellee with any damaging allegations” regarding Appellant. 

Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration, 7/6/20, at ¶ 4. However, counsel stated 

that opposing counsel did not oppose his withdrawal. See id. 
J-S01013-21

- 13 -

noted that he had been retained solely for purposes of representing Appellants 

on appeal and had not been involved in the Orphans’ Court proceedings. Thus, 

he requested “clarification of why a motion in the court below would have any 

bearing on [his] duties . . . to this Court as [c]ounsel on appeal.” Ex Parte

Motion for Reconsideration, 7/6/20, at ¶ 3.B. Attorney Perlberger further 

averred that:

Communications with [Summy-Long] to limit the grounds of 

appeal to a single issue which [counsel] believed had been 

preserved failed, and [Summy-Long’s] insistence that [counsel] 

proceed with the filing of the [b]rief and [r]eproduced [r]ecord on 

all issues, created an irreconcilable conflict, which [counsel] 

determined under the Rules of Professional Conduct precluded 

further representation before this Court.

Id. at ¶ 3.D (emphasis in original). Summy-Long filed a pro se response to 

counsel’s motion for reconsideration on July 15, 2020. On July 20, 2020, 

counsel filed a motion requesting an extension of time to file the Appellants’ 

brief, as his motion for reconsideration had not been ruled upon, and his 

motion to withdraw—filed in the trial court pursuant to the July 6, 2020 order 

of this Court—remained pending. See Motion for Continuance, 7/20/20, at ¶ 

3. 

Subsequently, on July 27, 2020, counsel filed a motion to withdraw his 

motion for reconsideration/clarification, stating that he “is now prepared and 

intending to file [a b]rief and [d]esignated [r]eproduced [r]ecord by the 

deadline of this Court, i.e., July 29, 2020.” Application to Withdraw Filing, 

7/27/20, at ¶ 2. That same day, counsel also filed an “Application to Amend 
J-S01013-21

- 14 -

Motion for Continuance,” in which he advised this Court that Summy-Long had 

responded to his motion to withdraw filed in the trial court, and that the trial 

court would be scheduling a hearing on the motion “in due course.” 

Application to Withdraw Filing, 7/27/20, at ¶ 3. Accordingly, counsel 

requested that this Court amend its briefing schedule to allow Summy-Long a 

period of 45 to 60 days from the entry of an order in the trial court to file her 

appellate brief. See id. at ¶ 4. By per curiam Order dated July 28, 2020, this 

Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw his motion for 

reconsideration/clarification and gave Summy-Long until September 28, 2020 

to file her brief and reproduced record. 

Attorney Perlberger filed a brief and reproduced record for Appellants 

on July 28, 2020. In the brief, counsel raised a single issue related to the 

Orphans’ Court assessment of counsel fees against the Appellants’ 

inheritance. Counsel stated as follows:

Although the [Rule 1925(b)] statement raised five issues, after 

reviewing the complete record, including the transcript of the May 

16, 2019 hearing, the motion in limine (& responsive papers) and 

order of May 16, 2019 (none of which had been provided to 

undersigned counsel when he undertook representation), the 

Rules of Professional Conduct [(]i.e., Rules 1.16(a)(1) & (a)(4), 

and Rule 3.3) dictate that only a single issue addressed in this 

brief had not been waived and precluded by the failure of 

Appellants to appeal from the May 2019 orders. With respect to 

Rule 1.16, undersigned counsel was denied a motion to withdraw; 

and thus, the submission of this brief on the single issue presented 

comports with undersigned counsel’s professional responsibilities 

of candor toward the tribunal. Furthermore, the failure to file a 

timely appeal or receive leave of court to extend said period, does 

not permit the prosecution of issues by way of a concise statement 
J-S01013-21

- 15 -

of issues complained of on appeal, not preserved thereby. 

Pa.R.A.P. 342.

Brief of Appellants, at 3 n.1 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

On August 13, 2020, the Orphans’ Court granted Attorney Perlberger’s 

motion to withdraw, finding that counsel had “set forth more than sufficient 

evidence to support his claim that he and [Summy-Long] have reached a 

professional impasse, and such is an impediment to his continued 

representation.” Orphans’ Court Order, 8/13/20, at 1. In light of the Orphans’ 

Court’s ruling, on August 14, 2020, Attorney Perlberger filed an application in 

this Court, renewing his request to withdraw from his representation of 

Appellants. 

Also on August 14, 2020, Summy-Long filed a pro se application for 

relief, requesting that this Court order Attorney Perlberger to file an amended 

brief including all five claims originally raised in Appellants’ Rule 1925(b) 

statement. Attorney Perlberger responded that same day, requesting that the 

motion be denied on the basis that the raising of unpreserved issues would be 

a violation of his ethical responsibilities. On August 21, 2020, this Court issued 

a per curiam order granting counsel’s motion to withdraw, directing SummyLong to notify this Court of her intention to retain new counsel or represent 

herself on appeal, and giving Summy-Long until September 28, 2020 to file a 

supplemental brief either pro se or through newly-acquired counsel. 

On August 24, 2020, Summy-Long filed a pro se response to Attorney 

Perlberger’s response to her August 14, 2020 application requesting that 

counsel be ordered to brief all issues raised in Appellants’ Rule 1925(b) 
J-S01013-21

- 16 -

statement, as well as an answer to counsel’s renewed motion to withdraw. 

On August 27, 2020, Summy-Long filed a pro se “Notification” in response to 

this Court’s order of August 21, 2020, stating that:

Appellant intends to continue searching for counsel to replace Mr. 

Norman Perlberger, Esq. If another counsel cannot be found, 

Appellant will serve as [p]ro [s]e, although not her desire or first 

intention. It is understood specialized legal counsel is necessary 

for meeting the rigors and required knowledge for an appeal to 

the Superior Court. 

Notification, 8/27/20. 

Also on August 27, 2020, Summy-Long filed a pro se “Motion for 

Reconsideration and for Extension of Time,” requesting that this Court 

reconsider its August 21, 2020 order granting Attorney Perlberger leave to 

withdraw as counsel and further requesting an additional extension, until 

December 31, 2020, to file a supplemental brief. On September 15, 2020, 

this Court issued a per curiam order denying Summy-Long’s application for 

reconsideration of this Court’s August 21, 2020 order and granting her an 

extension of time to file a supplemental brief, either pro se or through newlyacquired counsel, until October 28, 2020.

On September 15, 2020, Summy-Long filed yet another pro se

application for relief, styled as an “Update on Motion for Reconsideration and 

for Extension of Time.” In that application, Summy-Long cited her sister’s 

health problems and difficulties in retaining new counsel and requested that 

her briefing deadline be “further extended for preparation of the Supplemental 

Brief without legal representation which appears most likely.” Application for 
J-S01013-21

- 17 -

Relief, 9/15/20, at ¶ 5. By per curiam order filed October 9, 2020, this Court 

denied that request, and Summy-Long filed her supplemental brief that same 

day. 

We begin by noting that: 

Our standard of review of an orphans’ court’s decision is 

deferential. When reviewing an orphans’ court decree, this Court 

must determine whether the record is free from legal error and 

whether the orphans’ court’s findings are supported by the record. 

Because the orphans’ court sits as the finder of fact, it determines 

the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, this Court will not 

reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of 

discretion. However, this Court is not bound to give the same 

deference to the orphans’ court’s conclusions of law. Where the 

rules of law on which the orphans’ court relied are palpably wrong 

or clearly inapplicable, we will reverse the court’s decree. 

Moreover, we point out that an abuse of discretion is not merely 

an error of judgment. However, if in reaching a conclusion, the 

court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised 

is shown by the record to be manifestly unreasonable or the 

product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, discretion has been 

abused.

In re Estate of Zeevering, 78 A.3d 1106, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted). 

In the brief filed on Appellants’ behalf by Attorney Perlberger, counsel 

raises one issue for our review: 

Did not the [Orphans’ Court] err in awarding counsel fees and 

taxing [Appellants] with same, thereby virtually stripping them of 

their inheritances, without any itemization of professional services 

or affording [Appellants] a hearing to determine the correctness 

and appropriateness of said fees?

Brief of Appellants, at 3. 
J-S01013-21

- 18 -

Appellants’ claim stems from the Orphans’ Court’s order dismissing their 

objections to the Executrix’s Second and Final Account, which Appellants 

timely appealed.

3

 Among numerous other objections, Appellants challenged

the second assessment of attorneys’ fees against their distributive shares of 

the trust. The Orphans’ Court summarily dismissed Appellants’ objections, in 

their entirety, without holding a hearing. On appeal, counsel concedes that

Appellants have waived their right to challenge the fees assessed in the First 

Account because they did not appeal the court’s May 30, 2019 order 

confirming that account. However, counsel takes issue with the “burdensome 

and debilitating award of a second round of counsel fees” charged to the 

Appellants in the Second Account. Counsel argues that there were no legal 

fees attributable to actions of the Appellants during the second accounting 

period and that the Orphans’ Court erred in “us[ing] the prior actions or 

inactions of the [Appellants], that had been the underlying basis justifying the 

first award of counsel fees, to extend as an automatic justification for 

approving the second award.” Brief of Appellants, at 12. Counsel argues that 

“[t]he enormity of the fees awarded on May 30, 2019 should have, at the very 

least, required of the estate that it provide adequate and credible evidence of 

____________________________________________

3 The Orphans’ Court order dismissing Appellants’ objections “left no 

outstanding claims or parties remaining in the [] action” and is, accordingly, 

appealable as a final order. In re Nadzam, 203 A.3d 215, 219 (Pa. Super. 

2019). See also Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (“A final order is any order that . . . 

disposes of all claims and of all parties[.]”); Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(8) (“An appeal 

may be taken as of right from the following orders of the Orphans’ Court 

Division: . . . An order otherwise appealable as provided by Chapter 3 of these 

rules.”).
J-S01013-21

- 19 -

the incurring of nearly $200,000 [in] additional fees” and charging them to 

Appellants. 

Executrix argues that Appellants’ counseled brief “cites no legal 

authority which would support reversing the Orphans’ Court’s decision to 

approve [the] attorneys’ fees assessment against Appellants[.]” Brief of 

Appellee, at 18. In addition, Executrix asserts that Appellants have waived 

any challenge to the assessment of counsel fees because it was included in 

the May 30, 2019 order confirming the First Account and, moreover, “although 

[Appellants] challenged the fee assessment generally (and lost on that issue 

following the hearing), they never challenged the reasonableness of the fees 

themselves[.]” Id. at 29. Executrix claims that Appellants “identify no place 

in the record where they challenged the rates or the total amount of the fees 

such that [Executrix] should have produced the [supporting] invoices[.]” Id.

Finally, even if the claim is not waived, Executrix argues that the assessed 

fees were 

amounts the [e]state and [t]rust had previously paid to their 

counsel in the hopes of resolving the issues with [Summy-Long]. 

The [c]ourt found that such an assessment was reasonable under 

the circumstances and thus exercised its discretion to accept 

[Executrix’s] evidence regarding [Appellants’] meritless litigation 

and fruitless demands for information, all of which drained 

hundreds of thousands of dollars of estate resources.

Id. at 36.

It is well-settled that a court “may require a party to pay another 

participant’s counsel fees if the party’s conduct during the pendency of the 

matter was ‘dilatory, obdurate, or vexatious [.]’” Brenckle v. Arblaster, 466 
J-S01013-21

- 20 -

A.2d 1075, 1078 (Pa. Super. 1983). It is equally well-established that, 

whenever there is an unsuccessful attempt by a beneficiary to surcharge a 

fiduciary, the latter is entitled to an allowance out of the estate to pay for 

counsel fees and necessary expenditures in defending himself against the 

attack. In re Francis Edward McGillick Found., 642 A.2d 467, 472 (Pa. 

1994). 

However, an attorney seeking compensation for services and costs has 

the burden of presenting facts to support that claim. Estate of Sonovick, 

541 A.2d 374, 376 (Pa. Super. 1988). The fees must be reasonable and 

based on actual services provided and not some arbitrary formula. Estate of 

Preston, 560 A.2d 160, 164 (Pa. Super. 1989). The primary responsibility 

for determining the reasonableness of attorney fees rests with the auditing 

judge. Estate of Burch, 586 A.2d 986, 987 (Pa. Super. 1991). In 

determining the reasonableness of attorney fees, Pennsylvania courts 

consider the following facts and factors:

the amount of work performed; the character of the services 

rendered; the difficulty of the problems involved; the importance 

of the litigation; the degree of responsibility incurred; whether the 

fund involved was ‘created’ by the attorney; the professional skill 

and standing of the attorney in his profession; the results he was 

able to obtain; the ability of the client to pay a reasonable fee for 

the services rendered; and, very importantly, the amount of 

money or the value of the property in question. 

LaRocca Estate, 246 A.2d 337, 339 (Pa. 1968).

Here, the Executrix is correct that Appellants have waived their right to 

challenge the fees that were assessed in the First Account and were
J-S01013-21

- 21 -

attributable to their frivolous and unreasonable conduct regarding the lineage 

of the trusts, allegedly unaccounted-for assets, and other unfounded 

accusations directed to the Executrix. The Orphans’ Court made that 

determination in its May 30, 2019 order confirming Executrix’s First Account, 

from which the Appellants did not appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 342(a) (order 

confirming account, or authorizing or directing distribution from estate or trust 

appealable as of right); see also Pa.R.A.P. 342(c) (failure to challenge 

immediately appealable order constitutes waiver of all objections to that 

order; such objections may not be raised in subsequent appeal). 

However, to the extent that Appellants challenge the amount of fees 

assessed against their distributive shares in the Second Account, we find that 

Appellants properly preserved that claim by raising it in their objections to the

account and in their Rule 1925(b) statement. Specifically, in their pro se

objections, Appellants specifically raised the issue of excessiveness as follows: 

(1) by “object[ing] to having their inheritance taken from them without charge 

to the McLeod family to pay for huge attorneys’ fees totaling $231,868.86;” 

(2) by asserting that they had been “charged $115,934.43 each for excessive 

attorneys[’] fees;” and (3) by asserting that “the $231,868.86 [in attorneys’ 

fees] being charged by the [e]state is huge compared with approximately 

$80,000 paid by [p]ro [s]e [litigants] for legal representation.” Objections to 

Second Account, 12/31/19, at 4, 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Read 

together, we find these assertions raise a colorable claim that Appellants were 
J-S01013-21

- 22 -

charged excessive fees, some of which may not have been attributable to their 

conduct.4 

While we understand and even sympathize with the Orphans’ Court’s 

frustration with the conduct of the Appellants in this matter, where a claim is 

properly and timely raised by a litigant, due process requires a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard in a proceeding before a tribunal having jurisdiction 

of the cause. Com. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. 

Clayton, 684 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. 1996). Here, Appellants timely challenged 

as excessive the fees assessed against their distributive shares and it was 

incumbent upon the court to require the Executrix to provide evidence 

substantiating those fees. Estate of Sonovick, supra. Accordingly, we are 

constrained to vacate the order dismissing Appellants’ objections to the extent 

those objections asserted the excessiveness of the counsel fees assessed

against Appellants’ distributive shares, and we direct the Orphans’ Court to 

____________________________________________

4 Appellants also preserved the claim as follows in their Rule 1925(b) 

statement:

The [Orphans’ Court] erred in charging [Appellants] (and not the 

McLeods) with grossly excessive counsel fees for both estate

administration and litigation, thereby stripping them of even the 

small fractional shares of the estate that were bequeathed in the 

unsupported instruments accepted by the court. Compounding 

this erroneous charge, only the McLeod sisters were reimbursed 

for so-called unused attorney[s’] fees.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 3/18/20, at ¶ 4 (unnecessary capitalization 

omitted).
J-S01013-21

- 23 -

hold a hearing to determine whether the fees were reasonable and properly 

attributable to Appellants’ conduct. 

Appellants raise the following additional issues in their pro se

supplemental brief:

1. The [Orphans’ Court] erred in denying the motion for 

reconsideration of the May 29/30, 2019 order, when 

[Executrix] failed to produce (as directed by the court) the July 

27, 2001 trust (2001 Trust). The court erroneously accepted 

a purported letter allegedly from Decedent, without actual 

reference to the 2001 Trust, which addressed the removal of a 

corporate trustee from the May 25, 1999 KSM trust. Said 

motion for reconsideration was denied without hearing, despite 

[Executrix’s] failure to produce a material and indispensable 

instrument, i.e. the 2001 Trust, even though it had been 

executed at [the] time of the July 27, 2001 letter provided by 

[Executrix]. In the absence of instruments that were created 

and maintained, the [Orphans’ Court] failed to validate the 

express references in the 2004 trust agreement which 

obliquely (with no particularity) identified a purported 

amend[ment] and restatement of the July 27, 2001 trust 

agreement that was, without substantiation, stated as a 

“continuation of the trust created by original agreement dated 

July 23, 1993, which has been amended or restated from time 

to time.” 

2. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] err when it failed to recognize the 

estate’s misrepresentation of the July 27, 2001 trust as being 

the May 25, 1999 KSM trust. This misrepresentation resulted 

in the erroneous approval of the first and second accounting, 

and an unsupported distribution of the May 25, 1999 trust 

assets[?]

3. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] err in denying objections/motion 

for reconsideration, and in refusing to consider evidence 

documenting the failure to fund the February 19, 2004 trust 

while co-opting the May 25, 1999 KSM trust assets with 

distribution according to the 2004 will and trust, relying blindly 

on the unauthorized carryover of said assets in the Edward 

Jones account 336-10841-1-8 identified as Schedule A only in 

the 2004 [T]rust?
J-S01013-21

- 24 -

4. Did not the [Orphans’ Court] err in failing in its fiduciary duty 

to enforce that of the [] Executrix to provide [Appellants] 

(which could not be obtained without the McLeod authorization, 

being ignored when demanded) the required information 

necessary to identify and collect their inherited non-probate[] 

assets of the estate, including life insurance and unclaimed 

property of the [Pennsylvania] state treasury department. In 

this way, [Appellants] have been again deprived of their 

rightful inheritance by the [Orphans’ Court] failing to enforce 

the estate[,] act without favor, or discrimination, and do the 

best for all beneficiaries?

Supplemental Brief of Appellants, at 12-14 (emphasis in original; unnecessary 

capitalization and citations to record omitted).

We have reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record in this matter, 

including this Court’s prior memorandum decision dated July 31, 2017, and 

conclude that Appellants’ remaining claims, as set forth in the pro se

supplemental brief, are thoroughly and correctly disposed of in the opinion 

authored by Judge McNally. Specifically, the court properly concluded that 

issues related to the trust lineage and the production of documents related 

thereto—encompassed in issues one through three—are waived as a result of 

Appellants’ failure to timely appeal the court’s May 30, 2019 order confirming 

the First Account. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/15/20, at 15-17. Similarly, 

the fourth and final claim, relating to allegations that the Executrix failed to 

assist Appellants in identifying non-probate assets to which they were 

purportedly entitled—is waived for failure to raise the issue in objections to 

the First Account. See id. at 19. Because all of these issues relate to the May 
J-S01013-21

- 25 -

30, 2019 order, which Appellants failed to timely appeal, we quash the appeal 

of the Orphans’ Court order denying reconsideration of that order.5 

Order denying reconsideration quashed. Order denying objections to 

Second Account affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for 

further proceedings in accordance with the dictates of this Memorandum.6 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

____________________________________________

5 “[A] party may request the court to reconsider any order that is final under 

Pa.R.A.P. 341(b) or 342[.]” Pa.O.C.R. 8.2. See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505

(“[A] court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 

30 days after its entry . . . if no appeal from such an order has been taken or 

allowed.”). “[T]he trial court may consider a motion for reconsideration only 

if the motion for reconsideration is filed within thirty days of the entry of the 

disputed order.” Haines v. Jones, 830 A.2d 579, 584 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration, however, is insufficient to toll 

the appeal period. Sass v. AmTrust Bank, 74 A.3d 1054, 1062 (Pa. Super.

2013). Moreover, an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not a final 

order and, thus, not appealable. Cheathem v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 743 

A.2d 518, 521 (Pa. Super. 1999). 

Here, Appellants filed their motion for reconsideration of the May 30, 2019 

order on December 27, 2019, more than six months after the entry of that 

order. As such, their motion was patently untimely and the Orphans’ Court 

lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Haines, supra. Moreover, as Appellants 

did not timely appeal the order, see Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (notice of appeal must 

be filed within thirty days of entry of order), we lack jurisdiction to consider 

the merits of their appeal. See Commonwealth v. Capaldi, 112 A.3d 1242, 

1244 (Pa. Super. 2015) (Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to consider untimely 

appeals).

6 Because Appellants were represented in this Court by counsel with respect 

to the issue of the attorneys’ fees assessed against them in the Orphans’ 

Court, we may grant relief to both Appellants on that claim. However, we 

reiterate that Summy-Long may only represent herself on a pro se basis. See 

supra at n.1. Should Janice Faust wish to pursue her claim in proceedings on 

remand, she must either represent herself or retain counsel to act on her 

behalf. 
J-S01013-21

- 26 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/04/2021