This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 CARMEN V. ORTIZ, 2 Petitioner-Appellee, 3

v. NO. A-1-CA-36878 4 ANDREW M. ORTIZ, 5 Respondent-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANDOVAL COUNTY 7 Cheryl Hein Johnston, District Judge 8 Wolf & Fox, P.C. 9 Bryan T. Fox 10 Albuquerque, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Fuentes Law Office 13 Robert R. Fuentes 14 Rio Rancho, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 VANZI, Chief Judge. 182 {1} Respondent Andrew M. Ortiz appeals fro m a district court order denying his 1 motion to set aside his divorce decree and marital settlement agreement. We issued 2 a calendar notice proposing to affirm . Respondent has filed a memorandum in 3 opposition. Not persuaded, we affirm the district court. 4
{2} Respondent continues to argue that the district court erred in denying his 5 motion to set aside his divorce decree and marital settlement agreement. The divorce 6 decree and the marital settlement agreement (MSA) were entered in February 2011. 7 [RP 383] Respondent filed a motion to set aside the decree and MSA in January 2016, 8 arguing that these pleadings were the product of fraud perp etrated by Petitioner 9 Carmen V. Ortiz. [RP 263; 384] 10 Rule 1-060(B) NMRA states: 11 On motion and on such terms as are ju st, the court may relieve a party or 12 the party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 13 proceeding for the following reasons: 14 (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 15 (2) newly discovered evidence whic h by due diligence could not have 16 been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 1-059 17 NMRA; 18 (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 19 misrepresentation, or other mi sconduct of an adverse party; 20 (4) the judgment is void; 213 (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 1 judgment on which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, 2 or it is no longer equitable that th e judgment should have prospective 3 application; or 4 (6) any other reason justifying re lief from the operation of the 5 judgment[.] . . . The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and 6 for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one (1) year after the 7 judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 8
{3} Respondent’s January 4, 2016 motion to di smiss did not challenge the parties’ 9 dissolution of marriage. [RP 263] Instead, it sought to set aside the MSA and final 10 decree on the basis of fraud. Respondent’s motion was filed well beyond the one-year 11 time limit allowed for raising fraud as a ba sis for setting aside a judgment under Rule 12 1-060(B)(3). Respondent does not dispute this. Instead, he argues that the MSA is 13 void because his signature was forged at some point during the proceedings. 14 Respondent argues that this forgery constitutes a “fraud upon the court” that allows 15 him to rely on Rule 1-060(B)(4), which is not limited to one-year. It is unclear 16 whether fraud upon the court would generally render a judgment void. Cf. Phoenix 17 Funding, LLC v. Au rora Loan Servs. , LLC, 2017-NMSC-010, ¶ 43, 390 P.3d 174 18 (observing the long-held principle “that a court will not set aside a judgment because 19 it was founded on a fraudulent instrument” (alteration, omission, internal quotation 20 marks, and citation omitted)). However, in this case, the district court addressed the 21 issue on the merits. It noted that there was no dispute as to the authenticity of 224 Respondent’s signature on the MSA, the parenting plan, and the final decree. [RP 386, 1 ¶ 29] As such, the district court rejected Respondent’s claim that the judgment was 2 void. [RP 386, ¶ 31] We defer to this ruling under our standard of review, which is 3 abuse of discretion. See Martinez v. Friede , 2004-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 135 N.M. 171, 4 86 P.3d 596, superseded by ruleon other grounds as stated in State v. Moreland, 5 2008-NMSC-031, 144 N.M. 192, 185 P.3d 363. Finally, we also believe the district 6 court had discretion to refu se to hold an evidentiary hearing, because it was 7 undisputed that the aforementioned controlling documents had valid signatures. 8
{4} For the reasons set forth above, we affirm. 9
{5} IT IS SO ORDERED. 10

______________________________ 11 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 12

WE CONCUR: 13

_______________________________ 14 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 15

_______________________________ 16 JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge 17