1 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Un-Governed and Un-Governable Spaces: 

Threats to Democracy and National Security in 

Jamaica

George Benson

Preventing Violent Extremism in the Caribbean 

Francesca Caonero and Pernille Rasmussen

Citizen Insecurity in Trinidad and Tobago and the 

Applicability of the Concept of the Mafia State

Dianne Williams

Warring on Domestic Soil: Military versus Police 

Missions in Jamaica 

Valeen Calder

Systemic Challenges in Law Enforcement: 

Examining the Social Context of Misconduct and 

Criminal Behavior within the Police Service of 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Netty-Ann Gordon

Corruption and its Impact on Good Governance in the 

Caribbean 

Henderson P. Patrick

The United Nations Law of the Sea Conventions 

(UNCLOS) and its Impact on the Traditional Maritime 

Powers Operations in the Caribbean 

Wilbert Kirton

Global Warming and Climate Change in the Caribbean 

Pat Paterson

Venezuela’s “9-Dash-Line” in the Caribbean 

R. Evan Ellis.

ISBN: 978-0-9913377-1-2
2 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

The opinions in this report are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 

those of the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the 

National Defense University, or the U.S. Department of Defense. 

The editors extend their sincere appreciation to the graphic designer 

Vivian Edwards for her help designing and assembling the book, and to the Perry 

Center research assistants Liliana Besosa, Sarah Albanesi, and Caroline Armstrong.

ISBN: 978-0-9913377-1-2

Front Cover:

A U.S. Army National Guard soldier holds the ensign of the United States alongside 

standard bearers of other nations during the Tradewinds 2015 exercise. A number of armies 

from Caribbean nations also participate in the Conference of the American Armies. Photo 

credit: Wimbish, Michael D CIV USSOUTHCOM/SC-CC (L)
1 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Contemporary Security 

and Defense 

Issues in the Caribbean

Editors: Pat Paterson and Walter Earle

August 2016
2 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Table of Contents

Foreword: 

William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Studies

Mark Wilkins, Director ..........................................................................................3

Un-Governed and Un-Governable Spaces: 

Threats to Democracy and National Security in Jamaica

George Benson....................................................................................................... 9

Preventing Violent Extremism in the Caribbean

Francesca Caonero and Pernille Rasmussen........................................................39

Citizen Insecurity in Trinidad and Tobago and the 

Applicability of the Concept of the Mafia State

Dianne Williams....................................................................................................63

Warring on Domestic Soil: Military versus Police Missions in Jamaica 

Valeen Calder.........................................................................................................83

Systemic Challenges in Law Enforcement: 

Examining the Social Context of Misconduct and Criminal Behavior within 

the Police Service of Trinidad and Tobago

Netty-Ann Gordon.................................................................................................99

Corruption and its Impact on Good Governance in the Caribbean 

Henderson P. Patrick...........................................................................................123

The United Nations Law of the Sea Conventions (UNCLOS) 

and its Impact on the Traditional Maritime Powers Operations 

in the Caribbean 

Wilbert Kirton......................................................................................................137

Global Warming and Climate Change in the Caribbean 

Pat Paterson........................................................................................................157

Venezuela’s “9-Dash-Line” in the Caribbean 

R. Evan Ellis........................................................................................................177
3 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Foreword

 

The Caribbean is often overshadowed by other problems in the Western 

Hemisphere. To some degree, this is understandable. Drug-fueled violence from 

organized crime and local gangs have made Central America and Mexico some 

of the most dangerous places in the world. Remnants of communist insurgents 

continue to plague Colombia and Peru. Corruption charges threaten to unseat the 

President of Brazil as they have in Guatemala. Warming temperatures threaten the 

potable water sources for millions in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia. 

But this is not to understate the problems in the Caribbean. Organized crime, 

Haitian and Jamaican gangs, a surge in drug trafficking, all-too-frequent hurricanes and earthquakes, and a steady flow of arms and migrants elevate the level of 

urgency to crisis stages in Caribbean nations. In many ways, conditions in the Caribbean are even more dire than in other parts of the Americas. The security forces 

in most Caribbean nations number in the hundreds, not the tens of thousands as in 

neighboring Latin American nations. The institutional capacity of the governments 

of many Caribbean countries is still developing. In this sense, organized crime activities can potentially overwhelm the forces of Caribbean nations much faster and 

deeper than they can in larger Central or South American countries. 

The Perry Center has assembled a collection of essays regarding the contemporary security and defense challenges that face Caribbean nations. The essays examine a myriad of complex threats: corruption, loss of control of sovereign territory, organized crime activities, gangs, and drug trafficking. The essays also address 

problems that frequently don’t generate as much attention as the violent activities 

of criminal groups: global warming, border disputes, and maritime boundaries. 

These are not new threats. The 2013 CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy addresses all of these problems as either Tier 1 (immediate threat), Tier 2 

(substantial threat), Tier 3 (significant risk), or Tier 4 (future risk). Nor are these 

problems unique to the Caribbean. Organized crime activities are present on every 

continent and in nearly every country in the world regardless of wealth, population, or geographic location. Wherever there is a market opportunity for illegal 
4 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

goods and a lack of state presence, organized crime will fill the vacuum. When 

coupled with poverty, unemployment, lack of social and economic mobility, and 

weak institutions, the problem is even more amplified. 

Our first chapter addresses the ungoverned spaces that affect many countries. Major George Benson, an adjunct professor at the Perry Center, examines 

the political garrisons in cities like Kingston that have fallen under the control of 

political factions or gangs. Other countries or territories have similar problems. 

In some neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, Haiti or San Juan, Puerto Rico, crime 

groups have seized control of entire sections of the cities, rendering them off limits 

to security forces. This represents the loss of control of the territory of sovereign 

states. Organized crime groups manage these areas as sanctuaries and with nearly 

total impunity, a state within a state. In response, security forces often have to 

launch operations to retake these areas, at great risk to themselves. 

In the second chapter, Francesca Caonero and Pernille Rasmussen, both 

United Nations staffers with extensive and diverse experiences, examine what may 

be the second-most urgent problem in Caribbean nations: the potential return of 

violent extremists from the Middle East. As the former Commander of the U.S. 

Southern Command General John Kelly said in Congressional testimony, scores 

of Muslim jihadists who have learned lethal tactics in Syria and Iraq may return to 

their home states intent on carrying out attacks like those experienced in Paris and 

Brussels recently. 

The third essay by Dr. Dianne Williams, a Perry Center graduate and a professor at the University of the West Indies at the St. Augustine Campus in Trinidad 

and Tobago, addresses citizen security in her home state of Trinidad and Tobago. A 

criminologist by training, Dr. Williams examines the levels of crime and homicide 

on the islands, an area that has historically been besieged by violence fueled by 

drug trafficking. With a boom in recent coca cultivation in Colombia, Trinidad and 

Tobago may suffer from the violent consequences of increased cocaine trafficking 

through the country in the next year or two. 

Valeen Calder, author of “Warring on Domestic Soil,” the fourth chapter 

in our collection, is a deputy police superintendent in the Jamaican Constabulary 

Force. Calder, another graduate the Perry Center’s Caribbean Defense and Se-
5 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

curity Course (CDSC), has a direct perspective on security sector reform efforts 

in Jamaica. Like many countries in the hemisphere, the amount of violence in 

Jamaica have reached levels that overwhelm the capacity of the police forces. The 

Jamaican Defense Force (JDF) has been ordered to the streets to support police operations. The Jamaican Defense Forces’ raid on the Tivoli Gardens neighborhood 

in May 2010 is one example of this. Seventy-three civilians and four policemen or 

soldiers were killed in the operation to arrest drug lord Christopher “Dudus” Coke. 

The next article addresses police misconduct in Trinidad and Tobago. Netty 

Ann Gordon, a special investigator with the Trinidad and Tobago police forces, 

addresses a dilemma that plagues a number of security forces in the Caribbean. Police units that are often underpaid, unsupervised, or suffer from a lack of professionalism contribute to the instability in many Caribbean cities or communities. The 

United Nations declared illegal violence by state agents as one of the six principal 

threats in the region.1 Ms. Gordon examines how two government entities in Trinidad and Tobago, the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) and the Police Service 

Commission (PSC) oversee police actions as a transparency effort to build rapport 

and confidence with the public. It is just the kind of institutional reform that would 

benefit every security force in the region. 

The sixth essay in the series concerns corruption. Henderson Patrick of the 

Barbados Fire Service addresses what may be the most intractable problem in the 

Caribbean. When we query Perry Center students what they believe is the most 

dangerous problem facing Caribbean countries, they invariably say organized crime. However, when we ask them what they perceive is the most difficult problem 

to solve, they nearly unanimously say corruption. According to the World Bank 

Institute on Global Governance, corruption may sap 9% of the combined Gross 

Domestic Product in the Western Hemisphere. Globally, it amounts to $1 trillion 

of lost revenue per year. Corruption is a cancer that produces crises in public confidence throughout the region. The presidents of Honduras, Mexico, and Argentina 

are all facing corruption scandals. The president of Brazil is facing impeachment 

charges for her alleged role in billions of dollars of bribes. The president of Guatemala has already been arrested and thrown in jail. In his essay, Mr. Patrick ex1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Human Development Report 2013 -2014, p. 7.
6 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

amines the multiple facets to corruption and how it effects good governance in 

Caribbean nations. 

Professor Wilbert Kirton, a long-time instructor at the Perry Center and a 

former naval officer of the Barbados Defence Force, shares an important analysis 

of the maritime spaces of Caribbean nations in his essay on the United Nations 

Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). Commander Kirton’s thirty years of experience in maritime matters is apparent as he examines important issues such as the 

right of innocent passage, what constitutes territorial seas, and the rights of nations 

over their economic exclusion zones (EEZ). Small Island Developing Nations like 

those of the Caribbean are highly dependent on the ocean as a source of resources, 

commerce, and security. Commander Kirton addresses the complex legal issues 

surrounding maritime rights in the region. 

Professor Pat Paterson, a Professor of Practice at the Perry Center and the 

co-editor of this collection of essays, explores the unique dangers that Caribbean 

nations face from global warming and climate change. The risks from rising sea 

levels, increased ferocity of storms, and debilitating droughts may be the greatest 

long-term threat that Caribbean nations face. Climate change is no longer a threat 

that we face in the future; the problems are occurring now and will continue to 

grow in intensity as mankind pumps toxic gases from fossil fuels into the atmosphere. Ironically, Caribbean nations produce only a tiny percentage of the overall 

greenhouse gases but they may suffer disproportionately from the collective problem. 

Dr. Evan Ellis of the U.S. Army War College and a former faculty member 

at the Perry Center is the author of our ninth and final essay. Dr. Ellis, a prolific 

researcher and writer on security and defense issues in the Western Hemisphere, 

addresses the border dispute between Venezuela and Guyana that threatens to disrupt the long peace between nations on the continent. This dispute pertains to a 

56,000-square-mile area of land in the Orinoco basin referred to as Guyana Esequiba. As in other regional boundary disagreements, the dispute spawned from 

the era of independence when disagreements over the borders between Venezuela 

and the former British Guiana remained unsettled. The problem has potential to 

erupt into the first inter-state conflict in the hemisphere in over 25 years.
7 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

This collection of essays is representative of what the Perry Center does 

best: assemble diverse perspectives from policy leaders in the region, craft them 

into an academic product, and distribute it to interested parties who may use it to 

develop constructive policy that contributes to regional stability and prosperity. 

Most importantly, the nine authors in the book are all products of the Perry Center 

courses and programs. They have sharpened their information, critical thinking 

skills, and knowledge through academic exchanges at the Center. On behalf of all 

the staff and faculty at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, we hope you find the book informative and enjoyable to read. 

Mark Wilkins

National Defense University

Washington DC
8 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016
9 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Un-governed and Un-governable Spaces: 

Threats to the Democracy and the 

National Security of Jamaica

George Benson

Introduction

Situated in the central Caribbean Sea to the south of Cuba and west of Haiti, Jamaica is the largest island of the Commonwealth Caribbean. With a population of 

approximately three million people, it is the third most populous English-speaking 

country in the Americas after the United States and Canada.1 As a sovereign state, 

the island gained its full independence from Britain on August 6, 1962. Since then, 

Jamaica has practiced a British-style Parliamentary Democracy with a two-party 

model dominated by the People’s National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour 

Party (JLP) which currently forms the Government.

In August of 2012, Jamaica marked 50 years of self-government and, having 

survived half a century, its democracy could well be described as being enduring. On its journey of independent self-rule, this Small Island Developing State of 

10,991 square kilometers has managed and executed twelve deliberate changes of 

government. Via democratic processes, it has had nine different Prime Ministers 

(Heads of Government) and has provided the political space for the co-existence 

and operation of approximately 50 political parties some of which are named in 

Table 1 below.2

During the half century of independence, the body politic has been able to 

operate freely without any attempt at a coup d’état, without an assassination or any 

attempts to assassinate, without a civil war, without a dictatorial leader, without 

operating as a one-Party State and without any of the other political ills which have 

plagued many of the emerging democracies within the Western Hemisphere.

However, perhaps the truest testament to Jamaica’s post-independence de1 The World Factbook, Jamaica: Geography, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos 2 “Nearly 50 Political Movements in Jamaica’s History”, The Daily Gleaner, 14th November, 2011. 
10 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

mocracy lies in the fact that the two dominant parties have alternated regularly and 

are always competitive. The successive government administrations and the six 

Prime Ministers to have held office were all elected by the ballot – i.e., Government by the people via power vested in the people and exercised directly by 

the people under a free electoral system. This routine, democratic exchange of 

political power since independence is illustrated in Table 2 next page.
11 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Table 1. Political parties operating in Jamaica 3

SRL PARTY DESIGNATION REMARKS1 Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) Founded in 19432 People’s National Party (PNP) Founded in 19383 National Democratic Movement (NDM) Founded in 19954 New Nation Coalition (NNC) Most recently founded Party (2010)5 People’s Political Party6 Jamaica Alliance Movement7 Agricultural Industrial Party 8 Farmers’ Federation/Farmer’s Party9 Federation of Citizen’s Association10 Jamaica Alliance for National Unity11 Jamaica Democratic Party12 Jamaica Liberal Party13 Jamaica Radical Workers Union14 Jamaica Socialist Party15 Jamaica United Party Formerly United West Indian Party16 New Jamaica Alliance17 People’s Freedom Movement18 Jamaica Alliance for National Unity19 Jamaica Democratic Party20 Progressive Labour Movement Merged with the People’s Political Party21 Republican Party of Jamaica22 National Labour Party23 United Party of Jamaica24 United People’s Party25 Workers Party of Jamaica The list indicates active, dormant and defunct Parties and is not exhaustive.

3Source: The Electoral Office of Jamaica.
12 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Also of profound importance is the fact that, at the end of the election process when the results are known, the leader of the defeated party has, customarily, 

publicly conceded the outcome as the will of the people – applying, as it were, the 

stamp of legitimacy and acceptance. All this speaks well of the island’s democracy 

which, on further examination, is more than just enduring – it is a healthy, robust 

democracy which shows more signs of maturity with each succeeding period of 

national elections and electioneering.

Notwithstanding the above, the strength of Jamaica’s democracy is by no 

means an unqualified success as it has not been a perfect democracy. It is arguable 

whether the notion of a “perfect democracy” even exists at all when even the most 

prosperous of developed countries cannot profess to have achieved it.

Table 2. Jamaica: post- independence election results4

SRL ELECTION 

DATES

VICTOR SEATS ASCENDING PM REMARKS

1 10 April 1962 JLP 26 of 45 A. Bustamante

2 12 February 1967 JLP 33 of 53 D.B. Sangster Death; H.L. Shearer elevated

3 29 February 1972 PNP 37 of 53 M. N. Manley

4 15 December 1976 PNP 47 of 60 M. N. Manley Held under State 

of Emergency

5 30 October 1980 JLP 51 of 60 E.G. Seaga

6 15 December 1983 JLP 60 of 60 E.G. Seaga The PNP boycotted these Elections

7 09 February 1989 PNP 45 of 60 M. N. Manley Retirement; P.J. Patterson elevated

8 30 March 1993 PNP 52 of 60 P.J. Patterson

9 17 December 1997 PNP 50 of 60 P.J. Patterson

10 16 October 2002 PNP 34 of 60 P.J. Patterson Retirement; P.L. Simpson Miller elevated

11 03 September 2007 JLP 32 of 60 O.B. Golding Retirement; A. M. 

Holness elevated

4Source: The Electoral Office of Jamaica.
13 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Within the context of democratic imperfections, perhaps one of the greatest 

weaknesses of Jamaica’s democracy is the phenomena called “garrisons” – i.e., 

communities which operate as zones of political exclusion with certain negative 

stigma associated with them. The examination of these phenomena will be at the 

core of the study.

The aim of this paper is to highlight and examine the Jamaican garrison 

phenomena as a threat to the island’s democracy, its governance and national security. References will also be made to the island’s maritime domain, in particular 

its open, extensive coastline, insofar as this is deemed to have its own negative 

effects on governance and the potential for further negative influences on garrison 

life which will further threaten the national security of the State.

The paper will seek to determine the extent to which the illicit use of ungoverned and un-governable spaces impact the national security of Small Island 

Developing States (SIDS) with the focus being on Jamaica. Notwithstanding this 

focus, brief references will be made to the wider CARICOM region where relevant.

The hypothesis is that for a variety of reasons attributable to governance 

deficiencies and political malaise, there is either none, little or ineffective control 

measures in place to prevent the creation of un-governed and un-governable spaces and their exploitation by illegal operators to the detriment of the State. Concurrent with this are two widely held views. The first is the importance of the degree 

of exclusion of garrison communities from mainstream governance. The second is 

the view regarding the vulnerability of Jamaica’s coastal borders occasioned by its 

open, extensive maritime domain which serve as “gateways” for the introduction 

of illicit goods and activities into the country.

By asking the following research questions, the paper will seek to clarify 

the issues surrounding garrisons and those coastal areas which, like garrisons, fit 

the characterization of un-governed and un-governable spaces:

• What is the nature and extent of garrisons within the political and 

physical landscape of Jamaica?

• Do garrisons pose a threat to democracy, governance and the well-being 

of the State?
14 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

• Is the perception of Jamaica’s coastline as being “inherently porous”

truth or fallacy?

• Does an inherently porous coastline have any effect on life in the garrisons and any effect on Jamaica, generally?

In seeking to answer these questions, the paper will attempt to explain how 

the social deficiencies of un-governed and un-governable spaces can generate 

challenges to governance, law and order and other wider, socio-economic issues 

which can further impact the security and the well-being of the State.

Objectives of the Study

This research is of vital importance to Jamaica’s development, particularly in 

the areas of urban renewal, security sector reform, and the impact of these reformations on national security. Against the background of the hypothesis and the 

research questions, a study of the illicit use of un-governed and un-governable 

spaces will be of importance to improved governance and the ongoing quest for 

development on the one hand and to security-sector reforms and the “war” against 

crime on the other.

The paper will seek to bring a renewed focus on the subject which will, 

hopefully, influence a greater level of governmental support and governance actions towards correcting any ills that are highlighted. The hope is, that by providing a critical examination of the status quo, the findings of the study will help to 

bridge the gap between the realities on the ground and the policy prescriptions to 

be applied from the halls of power.

Finally, it is hoped that the paper will create an awareness of the inevitable 

peril of inaction or protracted tardiness in addressing two issues which are regarded by many as burgeoning threats.

Methodology

The material highlighted and discussed in this study was compiled from a number 

of sources. Much reliance was placed on previous literature (government-commissioned studies, reports and independent academic papers) which provided the 
15 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

fundamentals for a better understanding of the issues. The study also relied on 

information gathered from “field research” done through a number of qualitative interviews with practitioners within the local law enforcement agencies 

and government ministries. These interviews tapped into a wealth of experience 

and knowledge accumulated by members of the security forces and related agencies who, from their years of experience working in the field, are authorities on the 

subject.

The field research also involved informal interviews with locals from garrisons who were consulted on garrison lifestyle. This provided the views of the common man with first-hand experience from within these communities. By their own 

admissions, the community respondents were constrained by garrison discipline 

and only spoke on condition of anonymity. Admittedly, because of the sensitivities 

involved and the real dangers to the safety of researcher and respondent, information gleaned from such persons was limited.

In addition to the interviews conducted, direct observations and evaluations 

were made of the security management, the tactics, methods and resources employed by state agencies in monitoring and policing the island’s coastal borders 

and its wider maritime domain. This was augmented by the personal experience of 

the writer, which spans decades as a senior member of defense, law enforcement, 

emergency operations, industrial security and port security operations in Jamaica. 

This offered the benefits of first-hand experiences gained from years of personal 

interactions during the course of inter-agency collaborations with the military, 

police, coast guard, customs, fire services, health, Port/Shipping Authorities and 

other government officials. 

Definitions

The definitions of some key terms and concepts are set out below to reduce the 

likelihood of misunderstandings and to provide an accurate interpretation of the 

subject matter and the analyses flowing throughout the pages of the study.

Garrison (Traditional). Historically, a garrison is a fortified place (a castle, 

a citadel, a fort), a permanently established military post and the collective body 

of troops stationed there. Over time, a garrison has also come to mean a place 
16 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

where troops are stationed as a home base.5 In British military traditions, a “garrison town” is one with a major military base in or near to it. Aldershot, Bulford, 

Catterick, Colchester and Tidworth are well known examples of British garrison 

towns. However, such billeting arrangements are not confined to the United Kingdom. Member states of the British Commonwealth are also known to have local garrison towns. For instance, news reports in May 2011 introduced the world 

to “Abbottabad”,6 a garrison town 72 miles north of Islamabad, Pakistan, where 

Osama Bin Laden was killed by US troops.”7 

The city of Kingston, Jamaica, is also a garrison town where, in 1784, the 

156-acre garrison of Up Park Camp became a base for Her Majesty’s Forces in the 

island and later became the garrison of the British West India Regiments. Up Park 

Camp continues, to this day, to billet troops of the Jamaica Defence Force who still 

occupy well-preserved relics of the colonial past kept alive in the “Garrison Chapel”, the “Garrison Sergeant’s Mess” and other remnants of the British Garrison 

which are still in existence and daily use.8

Garrison (Jamaican-brand). Borrowing from the military imagery of a fortified place, political scientist Carl Stone is credited as the first person to have introduced the term into Jamaican parlance when he defined a garrison as a “...stronghold based on political traditions, cultural values, beliefs, myths and socialization.”9

Later research work further cemented the term in Jamaica as “...a political stronghold, a veritable fortress, completely controlled by one of the dominant political 

parties..., a totalitarian social space in which the lives of those who live within 

its boundaries are effectively controlled.10As part of the garrison construct, party 

politics is closely tied to garrison operation and allegiance can only be pledged 

to one political party. Accordingly, the political stronghold operates against all 

persons from the opposing side who are not welcome and who enter the area on 

pain of punishment or harsh, adverse reactions from the residents. Other local, po5 The Free Dictionary, Farlex Inc., www.thefreedictionary.com 6 Abbottabad is home to two of Pakistan’s Infantry Regiments and its elite Military Academy. 7 “Osama bin Laden Killed In US Raid; Buried At Sea”, Washington Post: 2nd May, 2011. 8 Jamaica Defence Force Website, http://www.jdfmil.org/campsAndBases/campAndBasesHome.php 9 Carl Stone, “Class, State and Democracy In Jamaica”, Praeger: New York (1986). 10 Mark Figueroa, “Garrison Communities in Jamaica 1962-1993: Their Growth and Impact on Political Culture.” Paper presented to symposium on Democracy and Democratization in Jamaica, UWI, December, 1994.
17 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

litical scientists and researchers have also come to classify a garrison community 

as an area where at least 75% of the eligible electoral votes are consistently cast 

for one of the dominant parties – the JLP or the PNP. In practice, the percentage 

of the electoral vote in garrisons is sometimes as high as 90% or even higher. It is 

worthy of note here that the term “garrison” is the abbreviated form of the phrase 

“political garrison.” The latter is the original, full-length term from which the more 

commonly used, abbreviated form grew. Today, they are used inter-changeably.

Don. Also referred to as don man, top-ranking, area leader and strongman; 

the don is usually a wealthy, politically-connected individual – usually a male 

figure. He has leadership over the garrison and acts as an enforcer exercising firm 

control over the community by the use of heavy-handed, internal, disciplinary 

measures. The don is a prime example of “rogue leadership” in the civil sphere.11

Governance. Defined as the process of decision-making and the process 

by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented), it reflects the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised for the common good and is 

equally applicable in several spheres: national, local, corporate, global and even 

in criminal enterprise. Good governance is usually recognized for its eight major 

characteristics: it is participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and it follows the rule of 

law. It assures that corruption is minimized, that the views of minorities are taken 

into account, that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decisionmaking and that there is responsiveness to the present and future needs of society.12

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). Refers to planned, orchestrated 

crime that is coordinated and executed across national borders. That is, violations 

of law which involve more than one country in their planning, execution and impact. The “organized” aspect of the crime speaks to the effort, sophistication and 

networking that goes into the planning, execution and engagement in illicit business by a structured group, or groups, operating as networks. Common examples 

of TOC include illicit trafficking in guns, drugs and contraband merchandise, trafficking in persons, racketeering, counterfeiting, money laundering, cybercrimes 

11 Hume Johnson and Joseph Soeters, “Jamaican Dons, Italian Godfathers and the Chances of a ‘Reversible Destiny.” Political Studies, 2008, Volume 56: 166–191. 12 United Nations ESCAP, “What Is Good Governance?”, http://www.unescap.org/huset/gg/governance.htm
18 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

and financial crimes – activities which present a growing threat to national and 

global security.13

Maritime Domain. Typically linked or referenced to a coastal state, the term 

refers to all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to or bordering on 

a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, 

infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels, and other marine conveyances.14

Illegal Operators. This term will appear frequently throughout the study. It is 

used to describe any person or persons, acting singly or in groups, operating on the 

wrong side of the law in ways detrimental to society. Put another way, any person 

or persons operating in any way which violates societal law and in so doing does 

harm to the security, the order and well-being of society are referred to as “illegal 

operators.”

References

National policy documents which directly address garrisons and governance:

The National Security Policy for Jamaica (NSPJ). The outcome of broad stakeholder consultations, the NSPJ was promulgated in 2007 and was described by 

the then Minister of National Security as “...an overall master plan for accomplishing national security goals...”15 Now under review for renewal, on the matter 

of garrisons the NSPJ acknowledges that “enclaves of dominant one-party loyalty remain...leading to fragmented communities with informal power centers that 

are in frequent conflict and are not accountable to traditional authority.” It notes 

further that “social progress has been retarded in many poor urban communities 

that are characterized by squalor, high levels of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, 

corner crews, dominant gangs, easily accessible firearms and ammunition...and 

the inconsistent delivery of public services.”16 The NSPJ highlights a Ministerial 

13 Gerhard Mueller, “Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts,” Transnational Organized Crime, Vol. 

4, 1998. 14 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Maritime Security: National Plan 

to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf 15 “The National Security Policy for Jamaica: Towards a Secure And Prosperous Nation”, Kingston: JIS, 2007. 16 Ibid, Pg. 5, Section 1.12
19 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

study17 of Jamaican gangs which posited that “the threat presented by gangs could 

be minimized if the country significantly reduced the political and social tolerance of criminal dons, the facilitation of garrison politics and the coercive control 

of communities with a power base rooted in large, ill-gotten financial resources. 

A most poignant point raised by the study is that political and social tolerance of 

dons, gangs and garrison communities could eventually lead to Jamaica becoming 

a failed state.18

Vision 2030 Jamaica National Development Plan. Published by the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) in 2009 and described as a roadmap to Jamaica’s 

prosperity, the Vision 2030 Plan is the country’s first long-term, national development plan which aims at enabling Jamaica to achieve “developed country” status 

by 2030. The Plan is based on a comprehensive vision for making “Jamaica, the 

place of choice to live, work, raise families and do business”19 by the year 2030.

Operating within the limitations of resource constraints, the plan is designed 

for phased implementation. In keeping with this, the Medium Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework (MTF) is a companion document which sets out the 

prioritized action plan for the first three years by aligning programs and activities 

to the constraints of the national budget. In this regard, the MTF focused on six 

national outcomes inclusive of safety, security and effective governance. Notably, 

in the area of security and safety, the projections established by the MTF address 

the reduction of garrisons through processes for the empowerment of these communities to become independent of criminal gangs and to participate fully in mainstream society. Additionally, it projects the modernization and reformation of the 

island’s law enforcement systems by (among other things) increasing the quantity 

and quality of the equipment available to law enforcement agencies and improvements to border security.20

17 “Gang Study: The Jamaican Crime Scene” Ministry of National Security (1998). 18 NSPJ, Pg. 12, Section 2.24 19 Vision 2030 Jamaica - National Development Plan, http://www.vision2030.gov.jm/ 20 Ibid. 
20 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Dissecting the Garrison

A close examination of the garrison phenomena revealed a number of critical 

factors, trends and contingent issues. For example, the 1997 Kerr Report21 attributes the creation of garrisons to the following:

a) The construction of large-scale housing schemes by the State 

(meaning the political party in power) and the awarding of these houses to 

supporters of the party.

b) The political homogenization of an area by activists from the dominant 

party chasing out all political opposition at gunpoint and guarding against 

invasion from outside.

c) Expelled persons setting up safe-haven squatter communities and employing their own strong-arm tactics to keep “outsiders” out.

At various points in Jamaica’s history, the tribal, political culture at work 

has also resorted to the deliberate movement of large numbers of persons of strong 

party affiliation into areas of known marginal support. Communities such as Boon 

Hall in St. Andrew and “Lesser Portmore” in St. Catherine are known to have been 

initiated by political aspirants or their field operatives in an effort to transfer loyalists from strong political constituencies to upset the balance of support in marginal 

constituencies. These then exist as communities that are established more for political expediency than for the economic good or the true, sustainable well-being of 

the residents living in them. Also on record are acts of deliberate property invasion 

and seizure of property as legitimate home owners are burnt out or driven out and 

their property used to create or augment garrisons.22

As mentioned earlier, the garrison phenomena is bipartisan and is practiced 

21 “The Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism” (July 1997). Chaired by Political 

Ombudsman James Kerr. 22 Professor Barry Chevannes, “The Formation Of Garrison Communities”, paper delivered at symposium 

on Grassroots Development And The State Of The Nation, Department of Sociology and Social Work, UWI, 

Mona Campus, 1992.
21 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

by the two major political parties. From Professor Carl Stone’s 1986 characterization of it, the concept and construct has grown to the extent that, today, there are 

eighteen recognized political garrisons throughout Jamaica as indicated in Table 3

below. A distinction must be made between “garrison constituencies” and “garrison 

communities,” the former being those electoral constituencies where almost all 

of the territory is garrisoned as different from those constituencies with only the 

presence of garrison communities within them. 

Table 3. Jamaica’s Political Garrisons, 2011

PNP Garrisons JLP Garrisons

1. Kingston East And Port Royal 1. Kingston West

2. Kingston Central 2. St. Andrew West Central

3. St. Andrew South West 3. St. Andrew North Eastern*

4. St. Andrew East Central 4. St. Andrew North Central*

5. St. Andrew West 5. St. Catherine Central

6. St. Andrew South 6. Clarendon Central

7. St. Catherine South Central 7. St. James North Western*

8. St. Catherine East Central * Constituencies with garrison communities.

9. St. Mary Central

10. St. Ann South East

11. Westmoreland Central

Impacts on society

From the research findings, there are many drawbacks and negative impacts to the 

State from the existence of these garrisons:

Political homogeneity/entrenched politicians. One very serious drawback to 

the garrison construct is the mockery it makes of the democratic process. The end 

result of the actions taken to create garrisons is that party supporters are geographically concentrated by deliberate, political design to ensure victory for a political candidate. As Professor Figueroa asserted, “...the creation, development and 

maintenance of garrisons are neither accidents of history nor geography, but part 

of a process deliberately fostered for political ends.”23 In other words, by concen23 Mark Figueroa, “Garrison Communities in Jamaica 1962-1993: Their Growth and Impact on Political 

Culture”, UWI, 1994 (Revised 1996)
22 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

trating loyal, coerced, political support in defined spaces – be they whole electoral 

constituencies or strategic, “spoiler” communities – political hegemony is created 

in these spaces. Electoral vote count and parliamentary seat count is therefore, to 

an extent, known even before an election is called, virtually guaranteeing several 

parliamentary seats to the major political parties by virtue of the garrisons they 

control. A closer look at the election vote count in three urban, garrison constituencies (Kingston West, St. Andrew South West and St. Andrew South) reveals that 

political representatives from one or the other of the dominant parties have been 

consistently elected with 76% (or more) of the votes cast in general elections for 

well over 40 years since Jamaica’s independence.24 These constituencies truly 

exhibit all the features of garrisons with contrived, political stability being one of 

these features. By virtue of this, the same political party has represented each of 

these garrison constituencies for well over a generation with the same politicians 

being the elected Members of Parliament for the period. 

Entrenched criminality. Once these zones of political exclusion are established, politically- affiliated dons and their violent, criminal gangs are used to 

enforce the political homogeneity of the garrison in exchange for a measure of 

exemption from law and order. That is to say, “...political protection insulates them 

from the reach of the security forces.”25 Thus, drug peddling, gun running, extortion rackets and other forms of organized crime are able to flourish behind the 

walls of secrecy of these “closed communities.” The result is that garrisons have 

virtually become criminal free-spaces, i.e., spaces in which criminals are relatively 

free to carry out their activities shielded and protected by the residents who are 

protecting a system which provides more for their everyday life than the government apparatus. Migratory criminals are sometimes given shelter in these communities where they are able to hide from law enforcement while continuing to 

ply their criminal trade. The residents of garrisons remain loyal to the “process” 

in exchange for scarce benefits essential to their survival: rent-free and utility free 

housing, groceries, medical bills, back-to-school expenses paid and the swift dispensation of community “justice” by the don, among other things. Handouts from 

24 Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ) election results and statistics. www.eoj.com.jm 25 Barry Chevannes, “The Formation Of Garrison Communities”, Department of Sociology and Social Work, 

UWI (1992)
23 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

the spoils of criminal enterprise and criminal exploits are oftentimes shared with 

the community to secure their continued support, their secrecy, and blind loyalty. 

By these and other means, dons and their criminal gangs maintain a firm control 

over the constituencies and a stranglehold on the residents living there.

Links between politics and crime. Also of grave concern is the tacit association that exists between mainstream politics and garrison life. As enforcer, the don 

reports to the political leadership and is the one tasked with ensuring strict party 

loyalty in the garrisons. The politicians depend on him to deliver the electoral 

votes and in return, the don depends on the party politicians for patronage such as 

jobs, contracts via public works programs and public housing. This unholy alliance between the State’s body politic and the criminal underworld is not expected 

of leaders – especially at the national level – and it is fraught with compromises 

and potentially explosive embarrassments for the state and its political leadership. 

There has even been the suggestion that politicians are “...prisoners, hostages 

of garrison politics”26 an association which damages the country’s reputation on 

the international stage. This is evidenced, for instance, in the Failed States Index (FSI)27 where, under the indicator “Legitimacy of the State,” Jamaica is rated 

poorly, below the norm, with a score of 6.5 which is attributable to the power of 

dons and the perceived links between politics and crime.28

Jungle Justice. Within the garrison, the norm is that the residents, the citizens 

of Jamaica, turn to the don and not to the State for justice when they feel that they 

have been wronged. In turn, the don and his lieutenants mete out garrison-style 

justice on the “guilty.” In this context, justice ranges from community service, 

solitary confinement, flogging, maiming and even death, whatever punishment is 

considered by the don as befitting the reported infraction.

Disruption of social norms. Dr. Henry-Lee, Senior Research Fellow at the UWI’s 

Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies (SALISES), contends 

26 “Politicians Are Prisoners Of Dons”, Daily Gleaner, May 14, 2001. 27 Governance Indicator published annually by the Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace. 28 The Failed State Index measures twelve indicators to determine the stability of a country. Categories are 

graded from 1 (the best) to 10 (the worst). The Fund For Peace, “The Failed States Index, 2011,” http://fsi.

fundforpeace.org/
24 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

that “the psychological dimension of life in the inner cities may never be fully understood by researchers. Living in these communities is a nightmare during volatile 

periods [with] the fear that people have of the disruption to their lives from sudden 

outbreaks of violence.” She also points to aspects of social exclusion experienced 

by the residents of the garrison constituencies such as restrictions on their movement especially when there is gang warfare and shootings, as whole communities 

are ‘shut down’ for days as a result. All this has a negative impact on employment, 

education, business, sports, entertainment and family life. Young children are constantly being excluded from the educational system because “when gunfights begin their schooling is disrupted and they either have to stay home or, if they are at 

school, they must leave school early.”29

Restrictions on social relationships. There is a stigma attached to people who 

live in garrisons which impacts their interactions with the wider society. People 

outside of the garrisons are reluctant to associate freely with the residents from 

within. This makes it difficult for the residents of garrisons to find jobs as employers refuse to consider applicants, even those who satisfy the job requirements, if 

their address is from a known garrison. Some employers do not hesitate to say why 

they reject these applicants: “They hail from a ‘bad area’ where only robbers, gunmen and their families live.” The life of the garrison resident is further complicated 

by the fact that job security is often jeopardized by physical insecurity and restrictions on movement during periods of violence.30

Usurping State authority. Arguably, the most ominous challenge of political 

garrisons to the democracy and national security of the island is presented when 

the development of the enclave moves it to the point where it becomes a virtual 

“state” within the State. Manifestations of this are seen in many garrisoned communities where the State has failed, or is unable, to protect the residents and provide for their social needs. Under these circumstances, the dons, the “rogue powers”, intervene and the real power and authority of the State is threatened and may 

even succumb to the intervening rogue power. There is much evidence of this in 

29 Dr. Aldrie Henry-Lee, “The Nature Of Poverty In Garrison Constituencies In Jamaica”, SALISES, UWI, 

Mona, 2005. 30 Horace Levy, (1996) “They Cry ‘Respect!”: Urban Violence and Poverty in Jamaica.” Kingston: CPCSC, 

UWI.
25 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Jamaica where, according to one writer, “... one can see the emergence of private, 

don-controlled enclaves that coexist in delicate relationships with the... government and its security forces.”31 Another writer sees the garrisons as having the 

potential to become “whole urban communities living beyond the State and law...

safe havens where externally directed criminality is accepted [by the residents].”32

Core garrison constituencies such as Tivoli Gardens (Kingston West) and 

Arnett Gardens (St. Andrew South) exhibit elements of autonomy from the state. 

These communities are so tightly closed, so tribal and so dangerous to the uninvited that not even the legitimate authorities of the State (i.e., the military and the 

police) are keen on entering them, except in the form of well-organized security 

operations. It is community stigmas like these which led to Tivoli Gardens being 

characterized as “the mother of all garrisons.”33 The Tivoli Gardens community 

was to demonstrate its strength and autonomy as a garrison enclave when, in the 

latter part of May into June, 2010 global news reports were abuzz with its violent 

up-rising against the State in protection of the garrison don, Christopher “Dudus” 

Coke.34 In this study, neither time nor space will allow for an in-depth description 

or analysis of that uprising; suffice it to say that it played out as the outright show 

of armed rebellion by the residents of a section of the island’s capital city, requiring a full-scale incursion by the security forces to put down the “insurrection” 

and re-take the territory. This development provided proof of the real threat to 

democracy and national security posed by entrenched garrison communities. Arising out of this experience, all other garrisons should, at the very least, come under 

greater State scrutiny and action to prevent a repeat scenario of the un-governed 

and un-governable graduating to become anarchists rising up in armed insurrection 

against the State.

31 Dr. Max Manwaring, “A Contemporary Challenge To State Sovereignty”, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.

army.mil/pubs/ 32 Anthony Harriott, (Editor), Understanding Crime In Jamaica – Pg. 65, Kingston: UWI Press (2000) 33 “Army Chief says...Tivoli, Mother Of All Garrisons”, The Observer Newspaper: 8th October, 2005. 34 “Is West Kingston ‘The Mother Of All Garrisons’?”, Sunday Gleaner: 4th September, 2005.
26 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Christopher “Dudus” Coke, the don of Tivoli Gardens neighborhood in Kingston, Jamaica 

after his extradition to the U.S. in June 2010 on drug trafficking charges. 

Tenacity rooted in poverty, political inaction and patronage

With its genesis in the early post-independent years, the island’s garrison phenomena is almost as old as independent Jamaica itself. Why then does it persist in 

spite of its many negative attributes? This study concurs with the view posited by 

Dr. Henry-Lee who said: In spite of a reduction in poverty at the macro level in 

these garrison constituencies, the quality of life for the residents has not improved 

significantly and any sustained improvement will be extremely difficult given the 

quality of their political and social capital. More importantly, there has been no 

sustained political will to dismantle garrison constituencies and everyday life is 

deeply entrenched in crime, violence and political patronage. Unless and until 

there are deliberate, well-targeted policies to dismantle these constituencies and 

break the political and criminal stranglehold over the residents, then they will 

never experience any sustained improvements in their quality of life.”35 

The sad reality is that the same political motivations which initiated the creation of 

garrisons years ago are still today helping to maintain them.

35 Dr. Aldrie Henry-Lee, “The Nature Of Poverty In Garrison Constituencies In Jamaica”, SALISES, UWI, 

Mona, 2005.
27 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Garrisons, Social Theory, Socio-Economic Issues and Governance

From the discussions so far, deviant behavior is clearly in evidence within the garrison phenomena. Sociological theories are of relevance here as they provide some 

explanations for the motivations which drive, coerce and shape individuals to deviant behavior harmful to fellow citizens, the community and the State.

The Rational Choice Theory is grounded in the premise that decisions are 

made by individuals as a rational exercise of free will. Therefore, individuals will 

choose to obey or to violate the law do so by a rational calculation of the risk of 

punishment versus the potential gain to be derived from the act. Thus, in contemplating a deviant act (like shielding criminals or committing acts of violence at 

the behest of the don), individuals will take into account the likelihood of being 

caught, the likelihood of being convicted and the level of penalty attached to the 

crime. Whether the legal penalty threatens more punishment than the likely gain 

from the deviant act will determine the course of action taken.36 Therefore, the 

dons, their gun-toting followers and the very residents of garrisons are to be seen 

as rational individuals who choose to commit crimes based on their own costbenefit considerations.

The Social Learning Theory emphasizes the reciprocal interaction between 

cognitive, behavioral and environment determinants and is based on the assumption that deviant behavior is learned through a process of interaction with other 

persons within intimate groups. The learning includes techniques and motivations 

which are acquired from exposure to violations. Consequently, persons become 

delinquent due to severe, negative exposure.37 Thus, the theory holds that the criminal activities and associations seen within garrisons is a learned behavior similar 

to any other form of learning.

Sociological causation theories can only provide partial answers for the understanding of societal problems. Accordingly, despite the relevance of causation the36 Larry J. Siegel, “Criminology, 9th Edition”, New York: Thompson and Wadsworth, 2006. 37 Ibid.
28 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

ories, the analysis of the problem must go beyond them because, invariably, there 

are other factors, trends and contingent issues with strong causal influence. Furthermore, deliberate action by the State towards remedying deviant behavior must 

be informed by an understanding of all the factors that impact the problem. This 

grasp of all the facts and all the attendant issues is a necessary first step to proper 

policy design and the implementation of appropriate strategies and remedies. 

Indigenous socio-economic issues

Sociologists, criminologists and academics agree that criminal activity can be seen 

as reflections of social problems within a society and that economic opportunity (or 

the lack of it) can be a major factor which influences criminal behavior. Accordingly, socio-economic issues such as widespread poverty and a lack of legitimate employment opportunities are identified as factors contributing to the perpetuation of 

garrison lifestyles. To the individual who is unemployed, marginalized and caught 

up in a vicious cycle of poverty, the garrison lifestyle offers a workable alternative.

A paper on the attitudes and outlook of Jamaican youth delivered at a 2008 

regional conference asserted that, “Coupled with the lack of civic education, the 

reality that [Jamaican] youths see and live every day has contributed to an overwhelming sense of hopelessness [with] little or no faith that the ‘system’ works 

or [that it] works for them.”38 This hopelessness is fueled by the realities of high 

youth unemployment, escalating levels of crime, high levels of inequity and stigma associated with class, poverty and the very geographic areas where persons 

live. These realities have led many a person to follow a life of crime as the illegal 

operators are only too eager to enlist their services for rewards that are denied them 

through legitimate avenues of employment.

The Role of Governance

38 Sasha Parke, Jamaica’s Youth: Building Healthy Attitudes Towards Democracy and Development Their 

Role In The Political Process, Diaspora Conference on Gang Violence Prevention in Jamaica, Miami, 

Florida, August, 2008.
29 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

As highlighted earlier, government actions feature prominently in the milieu under examination. Elected by the people to govern in their best interest, and quite 

apart from those issues that are complex and macro, the government has a duty 

to provide basic, social services to better improve the quality of life of all its citizens. The provision of basic health care, transportation infrastructure, fire service, 

garbage collection, the upholding of citizens’ rights and the maintenance of law 

and order constitute some of the most basic responsibilities of a government to 

its citizens. To the extent that government and governance fails to be responsive, 

effective and inclusive in fulfilling these responsibilities and, to the degree that 

government and governance fails to reach and affect the lives of all sectors of the 

populace, un-governed and un-governable spaces will begin to exist.

From the examination of the political garrisons, it is clear to see how citizens 

who are marginalized and untouched by the State drift from the formal into the 

informal, from the real world into the underworld to later subjugate themselves to 

gun-toting, coercive, but responsive benefactors who fill the void left by the State. 

Under these circumstances, it is indeed a thin line between being un-governed by 

the State to becoming intolerant of the State apparatus and to reach the point of being independent of the traditional State authority. These are the manifestations of 

the workings of the garrison community. The threats they pose to democracy and 

the national security of the State are clear.

Porous coastal borders, un-governed and un-governable

As an archipelagic State, Jamaica has jurisdiction over a maritime domain of some 

240,000 square kilometers - approximately 25 times the size of its main landmass 

– and additional land space of approximately 433 square kilometers accounted for 

by its archipelagic extensions. All this was made possible by the State laying claim 

to archipelagic status as allowed under Articles 46 and 47 of UNCLOS39 and ratified by the United Nations in August, 1996. 

Therefore, as the main island within the archipelago, Jamaica has sovereign 

ownership of approximately sixty islets, cays and rocks within its maritime juris39 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/

convention_overview_convention.htm
30 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

diction with most of these lying off the south coast. Some of the larger and better 

known ones include the Pedro Cays, the Morant Cays, Lime Cay, Navy Island, 

Pigeon Island, Little and Great Goat Islands. Additionally, Jamaica has laid claim 

to its territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, a contiguous zone of a further 12 nautical 

miles and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles. These areas 

protect Jamaica’s sovereign rights and preserve its interests in any natural resources found lying offshore in the future. 

These extended boundaries constitute the island’s maritime domain and 

make up the sum total of Jamaica’s sovereign jurisdiction. When viewed as an 

archipelago with the extensive maritime areas included, this presents a completely different scenario with the requirements for increased coastal monitoring and 

coastal management. The wisdom of the decision to have acquired such an extensive maritime jurisdiction is questionable. While the decision may be seen as the 

bestowal of an insurance policy on long-term, future possibilities, for the nonce 

these huge maritime claims offer little but require much. One obvious concern is 

the resource implications for exercising control and offering protection to such 

sweeping, maritime areas. This situation is true for many other Caribbean States. 

For instance, the land area of Antigua and Barbuda is approximately 440 square 

kilometers and the area of its EEZ is 110,103 square kilometers. The land area 

of Barbados is approximately 430 square kilometers and the area of its EEZ is 

167,384 square kilometers. 

For Small Island Developing States, these skewed ratios of land to maritime 

domain give rise to massive resource requirements which the states oftentimes do 

not have. The reality is that these disparities create stark weaknesses and immense 

challenges to the efforts to have control over the coastlines and the maritime domains of many island-states scattered throughout the region. These are the realities 

which exacerbate the challenges to law enforcement agencies and national security.

Without considering its archipelagic attachments, mainland Jamaica has a 

coastline of 1,022 kilometers to protect. This is a coastline made up of miles and 
31 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

miles of beaches (and beach-like areas) that are simultaneously open, remote and 

secluded as they are heavily indented with coves, inlets and bays which are also 

sheltered, secluded and, in many instances, hidden by lush, tropical mangroves. 

Much of these coastal areas are rugged areas that are difficult to reach and to monitor. Consequently, they provide cover to clandestine activities of all sorts. It is this 

state of affairs which has led to the characterization of the island’s coastline as 

being “inherently porous” as it contains open, free-for-all spaces with little or no 

semblance of security and are an attraction to illegal operators and their activities.

These “inherently porous” coastal areas are also deemed to be un-governed 

and un-governable but for very different reasons to the ones within the sphere of 

the garrisons. Jamaica’s porous, coastal borders and its open, maritime domain 

facilitates illegal activities. Proof of this is evident in crime statistics collated from 

the Jamaica Defence Force Coast Guard, the Marine Division of the Jamaica Constabulary Force and Customs Department personnel. On the matter of the island’s 

coastlines and its wider maritime domain, the NSPJ acknowledges the potential 

threats to Jamaica due to it being a coastal state. It identifies illegal trafficking in 

narcotics, the illicit flow of arms and ammunition, the illegal landing of refugees 

and human trafficking (among others) as threats to the country via its maritime 

domain. Also relevant are the documented cases of illegal fishing by locals and 

foreigners and the illegal disposal of wastes and pollutants in Jamaican waters.

Of grave significance are the indications of transnational and organized 

criminal activity taking place in the maritime domain. Based on the accounts of 

apprehended perpetrators, confiscated records, seizure statistics and intelligence 

assessments done by law enforcement agencies, clear indications of TOC are routinely seen in the origins and intentions of the illegal operators. These indications 

are demonstrated by seized satellite phones, vessels of foreign registry intercepted 

in local waters with no bona fides business, seized go-fast boats fitted with extended fuel tanks or with extra fuel on board, bundles of seized foreign currency 

in used notes, the increasing arrest of foreign nationals in Jamaican waters and the 

seizure of maps, charts and other long-range navigational aids. These occurrences 

and the frequency with which they take place is a measure of how un-governed and 

un-governable these coastal areas and the wider maritime domain are.
32 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

In its analysis of Jamaica’s maritime border problem, the NSPJ asks, “How 

does the State prevent transnational criminal syndicates and terrorists from using 

its land, air and sea space to facilitate their activities?” and “How should the State 

organize, equip and utilize its security apparatus for greater effectiveness?” It concludes with the need for Jamaica to “control entry and exit through the ports of 

entry and coastline, to monitor, regulate and control the use of Jamaica’s...coastal 

waters and to adopt and implement the best border management practices to minimize the risk of transnational threats.”40 

With regards to the requisite state responses, the study found that the primary response agencies (the JDF Coast Guard, the Marine Police and the JDF Air 

Wing) are seriously handicapped by the sheer expanse of the maritime areas to be 

covered, the limited resources at their disposal, the scope and complexity of situations that present themselves daily, the multiplicity of the tasks to which they are 

required to attend, the craftiness and the superior resources of the illegal operators. 

As a consequence, the challenges posed by the illegal use of the island’s coastlines 

and its archipelagic waters were found to be beyond the capability of the primary, 

maritime law enforcement agencies to execute with efficiency and success. Despite their gallant efforts, and as well-intentioned as they are, the current maritime 

deployments of the State are too little, too infrequent and are not sufficiently concentrated to dominate the maritime areas and effectively stop illegal movement 

and illegal activities.

Conclusion

The garrisons in Jamaica and the “inherently porous” coastlines and maritime domain present a real dilemma which demands action. Which should be tackled first? 

On the one hand, without meaningful, remedial actions, the uncontrolled maritime 

spaces will continue to provide unmonitored “gateways” through which TOC and 

other ills will have easy access into the island. On the other hand, political garrisons will continue to provide fertile ground in which TOC in all its forms can take 

root and develop to further challenge the national security of the country. It is a 

40 NSPJ, Pg. 58 Section 3.19
33 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

dilemma that is not only for law enforcement agencies but is more so for government and national governance. 

In the meantime, there are two important truths which must not be forgotten. The first is that problems left un-checked and un-attended usually fester and 

produce far greater consequences than if attended to quickly. The second is that 

in today’s globalized world, the problems of a country are never its own, alone. 

Problems that are internal to a country do not conveniently stop at the territorial 

borders of the State. They tend to be contagious and are capable of spreading into 

the wider, borderless, global commons. 

Though grim, the situations highlighted by the study are not beyond redemption. The very fact that some of the security imperatives documented in the NSPJ 

are targeted for action under the Vision 2030 Plan is confirmation of the need for 

urgent, remedial action. What is now required is the aggressive and deliberate application of improved national governance to begin to affect, reduce or eliminate 

the un-governed and un-governable spaces. 

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34 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

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35 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

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36 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

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Parke, Sasha. “Jamaica’s Youth: Building Healthy Attitudes Towards Democracy 

and Developing Their Role in the Political Process”, a Paper presented at Di-
37 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

aspora Conference on Gang Violence Prevention in Jamaica, Miami, Florida, 

8th August, 2008.

Siegel, Larry J. Criminology – 9th Edition (New York: Thompson and Wadsworth, 2006).

Stone, Carl. Class, State and Democracy in Jamaica. (New York: Praeger, 1986).

Virtue, Erica. “Army Chief says....Tivoli mother of all garrisons,” The Observer, 

October 8, 2005. www.jamaicaobserver.com

Wilson, Scott, et al, “Osama bin Laden killed in U.S. raid, buried at sea,” Washington Post, May 2, 2011. www.washingtonpost.com/national

World Factbook. “Jamaica Geography.” 

www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos
38 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016
39 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Preventing Violent Extremism in the Caribbean

Francesca Caonero and Pernille Rasmussen

Introduction

On 12 March 2015, General John F. Kelly, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, testified before the Senate of the United States Congress and separately 

addressed the Pentagon on SOUTHCOM operational efforts and challenges. His 

statements warned about the increasing threat posed by the potential infiltration of 

the U.S. by radicalized individuals through the southern border. Individuals intent 

on engaging in terrorist acts enter the U.S. along both legal and illegal routes. 

While elaborating on the threat posed by these individuals, General Kelly highlighted the inability of Caribbean countries to identify and deal with nationals who 

are vulnerable to religious-motivated radicalization.1 Reportedly, a number of radicalized individuals from the Caribbean have received training in the use of weapons and explosives in and outside of the region and have joined the Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Daech.2

This paper examines two questions. First, whether radicalized individuals 

pose a direct threat to the security of Caribbean nations in view of the strategic 

role that Caribbean states play vis-à-vis the United States and European states 

and second, how violent extremism prevention (PVE) strategies can help reduce 

the threat. These questions will be addressed firstly by discussing the discourse 

on countering violent extremism (CVE) within current international discussions 

on violent extremism and the counter-terrorism debate. Secondly, the paper will 

provide a brief threat assessment of Caribbean extremism, including outlining the 

phenomenon of Caribbean Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF). Finally, CVE options 

for Caribbean policy-makers will be analyzed.

1 “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Gen. Kelly in the Pentagon Briefing Room”, US Department of 

Defense, accessed November 10, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/

Article/607023/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-gen-kelly-in-the-pentagon-briefing-room. 2 “2015 Posture Statement to Congress”, United States Southern Command, General John F. Kelly, accessed 

November 10, 2015, http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/2015-Posture-Statement-to-Congress-.aspx.
40 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

The Discourse on Violent Extremism 

Violent extremism, radicalization and terrorism have received increased attention 

from the international community in foreign policy since 9/11. Despite the heavily 

debated subject, there is, as of yet, no clear agreed upon definition of the terms, 

as they are used almost interchangeably. Moreover, the fact that several different stakeholders are attempting to define these concepts can also complicate the 

process. Terrorism and violent extremism are discussed in the context of politics, 

religion, foreign affairs and defense. Although urged to find a clear definition, the 

international community is yet to come to a consensus. 

Terrorism and violent extremism are for many reasons concepts that are hard 

to define. As many will argue, they are to some extent subjective, depending on the 

person judging the act. From the standpoint of the victim, the act may be regarded 

as terrorism. However, if the same belief or ideology as the perpetrator is shared by 

others, the act is not regarded as terrorism.3 The United Nations’ (UN) definition 

of terrorism is “any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing 

conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to 

civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 

organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.4

The international discourse surrounding how violent extremism and terrorism differ, argues that violent extremism is often a “lone wolf attack” rather than 

something organized by a larger terrorist network.5 Some argue that violent extremism aims to build support for its objectives by radicalizing moderates for the 

long run. Like terrorism, violent extremism lacks a universally accepted definition 

despite the existence of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 condemning violent 

extremism. Moreover, perpetrators who act alone may be unpredictable and per3 M. Nasser-Eddine, Bridget Garnham, Katarina Agostino and Gilbert Caluya, Countering Violent 

Extremism (CVE): Literature Review by Australian Government Department of Defence (Counter terrorism 

and Security Centre, 2011), 6. 

4 “Terrorism”, United Nations, accessed November 10, 2015, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/

sg%20high-level%20panel%20report-terrorism.htm.

5 J. Mroz, J., “Lone Wolf Attack and the Difference Between Violent Extremism and Terrorism”
41 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

haps close to impossible to keep under surveillance.6

Violent extremism, like terrorism, can have different motivational drives. 

Some individuals are motivated by ideology, religion, politics or social marginalization. For the purpose of this paper, and as argued in a study on CVE by the 

Australian Department of Defense, terrorism and radicalization are considered part 

of the wider phenomenon of violent extremism.7 The focus of this paper is solely 

on CVE and religiously motivated violence in terms of the threat posed to the 

Caribbean through Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF). This is not to say that other 

motivators for violent extremism are disregarded or other threats to the security of 

the Caribbean are excluded. 

Consideration for Creating Violent Extremism Prevention Strategies

Since 9/11 and the beginning of the “war on terror,” significant attention has been 

given to the threat posed by terrorist networks across the globe. It has become 

apparent that the traditional division between domestic and foreign policy is challenged by the transnational nature of terrorism. An approach where both aspects 

are involved is necessary as coordination between domestic and foreign policy is 

necessary in order to alleviate violent extremism. At the same time, domestic and 

foreign policy must focus on building international and regional coordination.8

Analysis of existing literature and relevant programming in this area suggests that the main components of CVE strategies aim at either preventing the 

act of violent extremism or rehabilitating violent extremist offenders (VEO). Preventing violent extremism and rehabilitating VEOs requires a careful analysis and 

understanding of the reasons behind the act, be they social, political or ideological. 

CVE strategies should have a multi-disciplinary approach involving the partnerships of national and non-national actors.9

 The importance of CVE lies in building 

a strong and resilient community to resist violent extremism and terrorism. The 

6 http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21678511-how-europe-has-become-more-vulnerable-terroristattacks-what-parisu2019s-night-horror?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/whatparis

7 Nasser-Eddine et al, 1. 8 R. Crelistine, Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the art, gaps and future direction, (Counterterrorism 

as Global Governance: A research Inventory. In M. Rastorp (Ed.) 2007), 216. 

9 Nasser-Eddine et. al., 17.
42 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

international community has come together in several forums in order to combine 

efforts and come up with good practices on how to tackle violent extremism. 

This paper draws on the good practices as set out in the Rome and Rabat 

Memorandums developed under the Global Counterterrorism Forum.10 The Rome 

Memorandum outlines a set of good practices to guide states as they develop programs to rehabilitate and disengage incarcerated violent extremists, to reduce recidivism and to address other issues regarding radicalization in prisons.11 The Rabat Memorandum resulted from a meeting that took place in Rabat on the 7-8 of 

February 2012 and which was aimed at compiling good criminal justice and counterterrorism practices. The primary objective of a CVE strategy is to prevent the 

act of terrorism before it happens. States must have the legal authority to deal with 

this matter in accordance with human rights.12 The Rabat Memorandum sets out 

good practices for the criminal justice system to prevent and counter terrorism.13

Violent Extremism in the Caribbean: a Threat Assessment

According to the former Commander of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), General Kelly, about one hundred individuals have traveled from Latin 

America and the Caribbean to Syria to join the ISIS.14 While the majority of the 

press quoted his words stressing the potential threat posed by religiously motivated 

extremism to the national security of the United States,15 others directed their attention to the phenomenon of the radicalization of Caribbean nationals.16 Even 

10 “Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist 

Offenders”, Global Counterterrorism Forum, accessed November 11, 2015, https://www.thegctf.org/web/

guest/countering-violent-extremism. 11 Ibidem.

12 Ibidem.

13 Ibidem.

14 “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Gen. Kelly in the Pentagon Briefing Room”, US Department 

of Defense, accessed November 10, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/

Article/607023/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-gen-kelly-in-the-pentagon-briefing-room. 15 Dan Lamother,“Islamic State could infiltrate U.S. through Caribbean and South America, general says”, 

Washington Post, March 12, 2014 accessed November 10, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/

checkpoint/wp/2015/03/12/islamic-state-could-infiltrate-united-states-through-caribbean-general-says/; 

“U.S. general: Caribbean recruits joining extremists in Syria”, CBS News, March 12, 2014, accessed 

November 10, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/islamic-extremists-recruiting-militants-from-caribbeanto-fight-in-syria/. 16 Martine Powers, “Caribbean nationals join forces with ISIS”, Miami Herald, October 15, 2014, accessed 

November 10, 2015, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article2838599.html.
43 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

fewer addressed the reported lack of capacity of Caribbean countries to track down 

and deal with violent extremists operating in the Caribbean basin or FTF returning 

home. The following sections will address extremism in the Caribbean and discuss 

how much of a threat it is to the national security of Caribbean states.

Religious Motivated Extremism and Caribbean Foreign Terrorist Fighters

As a result of the convergence of different migratory flows, the Caribbean is characterized by religious pluralism. Islam, practiced by the Indian and Afro-Caribbean communities, is rooted across the basin and particularly thrives in Trinidad and 

Tobago, Guyana, Suriname, and Jamaica.17 With twelve percent of its population 

adhering to Islam, Guyana accounts for the largest Muslim community in the Caribbean. 18 In Trinidad and Tobago it is estimated that five to eight percent of the 

population is of Islamic faith.19

Yasin Abu Bakr (center, in white), leader of the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, leaves court after 

his August 2012 trial on sedition ended in a hung jury. Photo credit: The Trinidad Express. 

17 “Islam in the sun”, The Economist, July 7, 2007, accessed November 10, 2015, http://www.economist.com/

node/9308125. 

“Muslims in the Caribbean”, Islamweb.net, November 20, 2015, accessed November 10, 2015, http://fatwa.

islamweb.net/en/article/136012/muslims-in-the-caribbean. 18 Raymond Chickrie, Muslims in Guyana: History, Traditions, Conflict and Change, Journal of Muslim 

Minority Affairs, 19.2 (Oct 1999): 181-195. 19 “Trinidad and Tobago, Islam in”, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, November 11, 2015, http://www.

oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2400?_hi=0&_pos=14.
44 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Among the Trinidad and Tobago Muslim population is a former president, 

Mr. Noor Mohamed Hassanali, but also a group of extremists – Jamaat Al Muslimeen - that in 1990 attempted a coup to seize government power.20 The attempted 

coup is probably the most clamorous extremist incident that happened in the Caribbean in the past decades. Other violent extremist acts have been attempted or 

committed by Caribbean nationals outside the region. The 2007 conspiracy to attack the John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York was planned by one 

Trinidadian and three Guyanese Muslims.21 Other examples of Caribbean-borne 

religious radicalism include: the flow of Caribbean nationals fighting alongside 

ISIS and the 2014 arrest in Venezuela of nineteen Trinidadian Muslims. They were 

detained on counts of suspicious terrorist activities in connection with training that 

reproduced jihadist techniques, including the use of high caliber weapons and explosives22. More recently, in November 2015, a video released by the Islamic State 

showed ISIS affiliates from Trinidad and Tobago calling on fellow countrymen to 

“rise up”. 23

Trinidad and Tobago appears to be fertile ground for religiously motivated 

extremism. Out of the one hundred fighters who joined ISIS from the region in 

2014-2015 between thirty and fifty are reportedly from the twin island state.24 Jamaica, Suriname and Guyana face similar challenges as allegedly fighters have 

also left these territories to take part in the Syrian conflict.25 The phenomenon of 

FTF in connection with religious radicalism has heightened the threat associated 

with the commission of violent extremist acts in the country of origin of these 

fighters. 

20 Sawicki, John Andrew, “The 1990 Islamist coup in Trinidad and regional security among Caribbean 

microstates, (New York: Sowicki, 2003), 86. 

21 A. G. Sulzberger, “2 Men Convicted in Kennedy Airport Plot”, The New York Times, August 2, 2015, 

accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/nyregion/03kennedy.html. 22 Robert Spencer, “Trinidad Muslims travel to Venezuela for jihadist training”, Jihad Watch, May 15, 2015, 

accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.jihadwatch.org/2014/05/trinidad-muslims-travel-to-venezuela-forjihadist-training. 23 Tom Batchelor, “ISIS in the Caribbean: Islamic State in alarming call to arms to jihadis on paradise isle”, 

Express, November 10, 2015, accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/618059/

Islamic-State-ISIS-militants-expand-terror-network-Trinidd-Tobago. 24 Martine Powers, “Caribbean nationals join forces with ISIS”, Miami Herald, October 15, 2014, accessed 

November 10, 2015, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article2838599.html. 25 “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Gen. Kelly in the Pentagon Briefing Room”, US Department 

of Defense, accessed November 10, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/

Article/607023/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-gen-kelly-in-the-pentagon-briefing-room.
45 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

In November 2015, a video released by the Islamic State showed 

ISIS affiliates from Trinidad and Tobago calling on fellow 

countrymen to “rise up”. 

Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) – co-sponsored by Jamaica and 

Trinidad and Tobago - defines FTF as “individuals who travel to a State other than 

their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.”26 To date, 

thirty thousand foreign individuals have joined the conflict in Syria from more 

than one hundred countries.27 Extremists-to-be and their recruiters take advantage 

of loopholes in domestic legal systems and the lack of capacity at operational and 

intelligence levels. The international community has voiced concern over these individuals and their ability to operate across borders, including receiving and giving 

training, financing, inciting, traveling to conflict zones and taking part in terrorist 

acts. Developed and developing countries alike face the challenge of preventing 

radicalized individuals from engaging in these activities. Clearly, some states are 

better equipped than others and can offer assistance to less equipped ones in monitoring and tracking down these radicalized individuals as they engage in suspicious 

activities. This is the case with respect to the United States and the United Kingdom, which are supporting Caribbean countries in their intelligence and extremism 

prevention efforts.28 International cooperation in investigation, intelligence, and 

capacity building are pivotal to stemming religious radicalization and deterring 

terror acts. The surge of religiously motivated activities across the globe highlights 

26 “Jamaica will not stay out of terrorism debate — Nicholson”, Jamaica Observer, October 12, 2014, 

accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Jamaica-will-not-stay-out-of-terrorismdebate---Nicholson_17735461; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), United Nations, S/

RES/2178 (2014), accessed November 12, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_

EN.pdf, 2. 27 Martine Powers, “Caribbean nationals join forces with ISIS”, Miami Herald, October 15, 2014, accessed 

November 10, 2015, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article2838599.html. 

“Secretary-General’s remarks to Security Council meeting on Threats to International Peace and Security 

Caused by Terrorist Acts (Foreign Terrorist Fighters)”, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, May 29, 2015, 

accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8689.

28 Martine Powers, “Caribbean nationals join forces with ISIS”, Miami Herald, October 15, 2014, accessed 

November 10, 2015, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article2838599.html.
46 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

the dimensions of a problem that transcends borders and that requires a coordinated global response. Regional approaches to the threat should also be favored, 

especially in those regions where simplified mechanisms for movement of people 

are in place, such as in the CARICOM area.29

Heavily-armed Jamaican soldiers patrol the streets. Photo credit: Source: BBC, May 24, 

2010. 

In this regard and with a view to stemming the flow of FTF, UNSCR 2178 

calls on States to require that commercial operators share passenger’s information 

with national authorities in order to detect the departure, transit, arrival or re-entry 

of individuals listed by the Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee.30 From a regional perspective it is interesting to note that CARICOM member states do benefit from a 

regional Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS). Through the system, 

information on travelers coming in and out of the ten participating States is shared 

with national authorities by commercial maritime and aviation operators.31 An assessment of the effectiveness of the information sharing mechanism is beyond the 

scope of this paper. Yet, the system qualifies as one of the most appropriate and 

advanced tools to identify and track down fighters that may return to the Caribbean 

from Syria. Proper screening and analysis of the data provided by the system can 

29 “Free Movement in the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)”, Caribbean Community 

Secretariat, accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/skill.jsp?menu=csme. 30 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), United Nations, S/RES/2178 (2014), accessed 

November 12, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf, 2. 31 “CARICOM Advanced Passenger Information Guidelines”, Implementation Agency for Crime and 

Security (IMPACS), accessed November 12, 2015, http://www.impacsjrcc.org/APIGuidelines/tabid/63/

Default.aspx. 
47 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

support the development of regional intelligence control lists.32

To address the problem of FTF, CARICOM member States can find additional guidance in “The Hague-Marrakesh Memorandum on Good Practices for a 

More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon” elaborated by the FTF working 

group set up under the Global Counterterrorism Forum.33 Interestingly, analysis 

of the Memorandum reveals that CVE and FTF strategies are inter-related. The 

phenomenon of FTF is indeed one of the most profound consequences of violent 

extremism. Prevention, detection, intervention and rehabilitation are the four pillars around which FTF strategies should be developed at national, regional and 

international level to deter radicalization, recruitment, facilitation, travel, fighting, 

and return of FTF.34 While CVE strategies will be discussed later, the four pillars 

are clearly valid also in preventing violent extremism. 

The Caribbean as the U.S. and the EU third border: options for terror 

The extent of radicalization efforts and the phenomenon of FTF reveal that the 

Caribbean is highly vulnerable to religious extremism. The question is whether 

radicalized citizens pose a serious threat to the national and regional security of 

countries in the basin. A threat derives from intent and capability. Vulnerability 

to radicalization does not necessarily mean intent. Indeed, with the exception of 

Trinidad and Tobago, there is little evidence to show that Caribbean extremists 

would commit religiously motivated violent acts in their country of origin because 

of political or religious postures adopted at national level. Yet, it can be argued that 

Caribbean countries could be targeted as an intermediate objective to hit the strategic economic interests that the U.S. and European countries have in the region, 

thus substantiating the intent element. As for the capability element, the recent at32 Letter dated 26 May 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 

resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council, 

United Nations, S/2015/377 (2015), accessed November 12, 2015, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/

cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3 CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_377.pdf, 11 33 “The Hague-Marrakesh Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF 

Phenomenon”, Global Counter Terrorism Forum, accessed November 12, 2015, https://www.thegctf.org/web/

guest/foreign-terrorist-fighters. 34 Humera Khan, “Why Countering Extremism Fails”, Foreign Affairs, February 18, 2015, accessed 

November 12, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-02-18/why-counteringextremism-fails.
48 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

tacks perpetrated in Paris demonstrate that extremists definitely have the capacity 

to hit any country, even well-equipped ones. Assuming that both the intent and the 

capability element are satisfied, this section identifies potential targets and ways 

for terrorists-to-be to achieve their objectives.

 The Caribbean is often referred to as the U.S. third border in view of the intertwined relationship that exists between Caribbean and U.S. strategic interests.35

Military infrastructure and support is also provided to the U.S. out of Antigua and 

Barbuda and the Bahamas.36

Fragile economies that are mainly rooted in tourism could be highly affected 

by violent extremist acts. The recent terror attacks of beach resorts in Tunisia are 

a clear example of this. In terms of strategic economic interests, Jamaica produces 

26 percent of U.S. imports of bauxite and Trinidad and Tobago supplies 78 percent of the liquefied natural gas consumed in the country.37 Violent religiously 

motivated acts committed either by a lone wolf or a returned FTF in the attempt to 

damage U.S. interests pose a serious threat to the national security of the targeted 

country and the stability of the region. An attack that targets the plants and factories engaged in the gas trade could seriously jeopardize the prosperous economy of 

Trinidad and Tobago. Measures to increase the resilience of critical infrastructure 

should not be overlooked by Caribbean authorities.

Economic citizenship programs along with simplified visa requirements 

among Caribbean countries open the door to radicalism and the commission of 

violent extremist acts. USSOUTHCOM’s General John Kelly expressed concern 

in this regard during his testimony to the Senate.38 Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis 

and Antigua and Barbuda offer the possibility of acquiring investor visas granting 

access to their territory for a price that is well within the reach of extremist organizations.39 Upon reaching any of the countries that open their borders to foreigners 

35 Hilton A. McDavid, “The Caribbean: The Third U.S. border”, FOCAL, 2011, accessed November 13, 2015,

http://www.focal.ca/publications/focalpoint/394-february-2011-hilton-a-mcdavid. 

36 Ibidem. 37 Hilton A. McDavid, Security Challenges and Threats in the Caribbean, “Rewiring National Security in a 

Fragmented World,” United Nations Institute of Peace Press, July 2011.

38 “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Gen. Kelly in the Pentagon Briefing Room”, U.S. Department 

of Defense, accessed November 10, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/

Article/607023/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-gen-kelly-in-the-pentagon-briefing-room. 39 Kim Gittleson, “Where is the cheapest place to buy citizenship?”, BBC, June 4, 2014, accessed November 

13, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27674135. 
49 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

under economic arrangements, moving within the basin may not be so difficult 

for extremists-to-be. In this regard, thorough background checks and the sharing 

of information with partner countries are essential in ensuring that countries can 

protect themselves from unwanted individuals. Similarly, the movement of Caribbean nationals across the region under free market arrangements should be closely 

scrutinized. Without limiting the freedom of movement of skilled individuals and 

hampering socio-economic development, mechanisms to properly screen and conduct background checks should be put in place.

Thorough background checks and the sharing of information with 

partner countries are essential in ensuring that countries can protect themselves from unwanted individuals.

European territories in the Caribbean basin can also be an easy prey of violent extremists as a direct target or as an entry door to Europe’s mainland. Dutch, 

French and British territories are borders of the countries under whose jurisdiction 

they fall. More recently, the European Union has waived visa requirements for a 

number of Caribbean countries, including Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica and St 

Lucia.40 Exploiting the travel and visa acquisition mechanisms mentioned above, 

radicalized individuals could find easy access to Europe’s mainland.

CVE Strategies: Options for Policy Makers 

The international community has been grappling with the question on how to address violent extremism for the past few years. Initial policies and programs aimed 

at preventing radicalization moved from the premise that extremism was purely 

motivated by religious sentiments. Arguments have also been made that the lack of 

economic development and opportunities are the primary causes of extremism.41

Policies and programming based on these premises failed in their approach to pre40 “EU signs visa waiver agreements with 7 ACP countries”, European Council, Council of the European 

Union, accessed November 14, 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/28-jhaeu-visa-waiver-agreements/. 41 Lydia Wilson, “What I Discovered From Interviewing Imprisoned ISIS Fighters”, The Nation, October 21, 

2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/what-i-discovered-from-interviewing-isis-prisoners/
50 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

vent radicalism and de-radicalize youth, men and women alike.42 In fact, recent 

research has highlighted that a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of radicalization should be promoted and in particular: (1) root causes of radicalization 

have to be assessed in light of the specific circumstances of each group and country 

affected by violent extremism, (2) unemployment and lack of skills or opportunities in most cases act as drivers of the problem rather than as root causes, and (3) 

programming adopting one approach in isolation will not be able to address the 

root causes of extremism.43

The following sections will elaborate on the three points raised above in the 

context of public policies at community level and penitentiary reform that policy 

makers in Caribbean might draw upon to deter extremism or rehabilitate radicalized individuals.

Deterring Violent Extremism through the Promotion of Social Integration 

and Economic Development 

The “Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach 

to Countering Violent Extremism” is based on the premise that extremism is a 

multi-faceted problem that requires a research-based, comprehensive, and interinstitutional approach.44 Extremism is rooted in and driven by different factors, 

the combination of which makes individuals of religious, ethnic and social groups 

vulnerable to radicalization. Injustice, discrimination, lack of economic opportunities and skills, and a sense of non-belonging all contribute to extremism, but will 

not affect in the same way individuals or groups of individuals that are vulnerable 

to extremism. 

42 “Youth & Consequences: Unemployment, Injustice and Violence”, MercyCorps, accessed November 14, 

2015 http://www.mercycorps.org.uk/research-resources/youth-consequences-unemployment-injustice-andviolence

43 Ibidem.

44 “Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent 

Extremism”, Global Counter Terrorism Forum, accessed November 12, 2015, https://www.thegctf.org/

documents/10162/72352/13Sep19_Ankara+Memorandum.pdf. 
51 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Photo caption: Armed gangs in Jamaica. Photo credit: National Geographic. 

Policies and programs that are not based on a sound assessment of all contributing elements and that do not strive to distinguish root causes from drivers 

will inevitably fail and may fuel radicalization even further. Assuming that only 

religious beliefs are at the foundation of radicalization could lead to singling out 

and isolating even further vulnerable groups and aggravating the feeling of nonbelonging that has often been indicated as being at the root of extremism.45

Root causes and drivers that affect individuals or a group of individuals 

need to be correctly identified to implement effective policies and programs. Also, 

within one group, individuals may be vulnerable to different extents. CVE policies 

and programs need to be tailored to the degree of vulnerability or radicalization to 

which individuals are exposed. The phenomenon of FTF associated with violent 

extremism (VE) shows that individuals from all social classes, backgrounds and 

skills are susceptible to radicalization. Therefore, providing education or professional skills through vocational training to all affected individuals alike may not 

deter or rehabilitate the targeted individuals.

Prevention, detection, intervention and rehabilitation are the four 

pillars upon which policies and programs should be developed.

45 Lydia Wilson, “What I Discovered From Interviewing Imprisoned ISIS Fighters”, The Nation, October 21, 

2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/what-i-discovered-from-interviewing-isis-prisoners/. 
52 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

National authorities should develop a multi-disciplinary and multi-sector approach that builds on the engagement of both public and private actors and that is 

endorsed at community level. As mentioned previously, prevention, detection, intervention and rehabilitation are the four pillars upon which policies and programs 

should be developed. These four pillars call for the involvement of a wide range 

of actors and institutions, including law enforcement, social workers, corrections, 

civil society, and community personnel. Mechanisms ensuring dialogue and coordination should be devised to ensure that an agreed approach and a roadmap are 

developed and implemented. In doing this, the community to which the vulnerable or radicalized individuals belong plays an essential role. Indeed, prevention 

and rehabilitation can only happen if the community to which vulnerable and affected individuals belong is engaged at all levels. Prevention of extremism and 

rehabilitation are successful if all members of the exposed group understand and 

work together towards addressing root causes and drivers of extremism. Often it is 

not only the community or group to which the radicalized individual belongs that 

needs to be engaged, but also the society at large. Moderate preaching of Islam 

at group and community level, for instance, is essential in order for vulnerable 

individuals not to fall in the hands of recruiters and become radicalized. However, 

it requires the whole society in a country across faiths and social classes to accept 

Islam and its followers, thus avoiding segregation.

Prevention and Rehabilitation of Violent Extremism in Detention

The importance of the role of prisons in responding to CVE has become even 

clearer in the light of recent discussion in various international fora. The underlying assumption is that promotion of CVE strategies in detention revolve around 

two aspects: (1) the prisons can act as an incubator for violent extremist ideology, 

and (2) the prisons can equally act as an institution of reform and rehabilitation 

programs with the aim to reintegrate VEOs into society and reduce the risk of 

recidivism.46

46 “The Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal 

Justice Sector”, Global Counterterrorism Forum, accessed November 11, 2015. 
53 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

The two aspects play an important part in preventing and rehabilitating 

VEOs in prison. However, the most important thing to bear in mind is that there is 

no one-size-fits-all. Therefore, a careful analysis of the environment and situation 

at the given incarceration facility is necessary. 

As mentioned above, this paper draws on good practices from two memorandums from the Global Counterterrorism Forum. The Rome Memorandum47 includes five parts to consider in its approach to preventing radicalization in prison. 

According to the memorandum, states should:

1. Define the goals and objectives of the program,

2. Encourage good practices in the prison context, including the facilities 

and treatment of prisoners,

3. Strengthen the roles of different actors in the prison, such as prison officers and other interlocutors,

4. Encourage constructive reintegration components of the prisoners into 

society after their release,

5. Look at other relevant fields for lessons learnt. 

One of the reasons why CVE responses have failed in the past is the isolated 

implementation of CVE initiatives. When looking at prevention and rehabilitation 

in prisons, it is difficult to achieve long term success if state policies and legislation surrounding arrest, prosecution, incarceration and post-release/reintegration 

in connection with violent motivated acts are not included in the overall CVE 

strategy. The Rabat Memorandum, as mentioned, focuses on effective good practice in the criminal justice sector in order to counter terrorism. The memorandum 

includes two aspects to consider in the justice sector: (1) criminal procedure tools, 

and (2) criminal offenses.

For CVE responses to be effective in the prisons, it is important to include 

good practices from both of the above memorandums. A solidly developed response to violent extremism in a prison still demands the criminal justice sector 

have effective good practices in place in order for the VEOs to be fairly convicted 

47 Ibidem.
54 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

and brought to prison. Several countries have long term prisoners on remand due 

to the time it takes the courts to handle terror cases.

Once the above guidelines for good practices are considered, it is vital that 

CVE initiatives are not implemented in isolation. To enhance the success of CVE 

responses in prison, initiatives for rehabilitation in the prison should be validated 

by the society. The rehabilitation program within the prison must be supported in 

the civil society and the community upon the release of the prisoner to further reduce the risk of recidivism and further the success of reintegration. 

It is important to bear in mind that the development of Strategies for Preventing Violent Extremism is a relatively new phenomenon in the overall countering terrorism discourse and programming. Programs need to be developed and 

implemented to suit the context and risk they are intended to address.48 There is 

evidence of some programs being more successful than others, but a model which 

proved unsuccessful in one context, may still work when implemented elsewhere.49

There is, however, evidence that a program must include a balance of education, 

vocational training and religious re-education. Equally important are interlocutors, such as religious clerics and prison officers who can relate to the prisoner and 

help them transition into society and social networks away from extremism.50 And, 

when a strategy, as such, is in place for the prison, the surrounding community, 

legislative framework and international coordination should not be left out, but 

fully included.

48 Global Center on Cooperative Security, “Addressing the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Phenomenon from a 

European Union Perspective,” 2014, 6 49 The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, “Prisons and Terrorism: 

Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 countries,” 2010, 47. 50 The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, “Prisons and Terrorism: 

Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 countries,” 2010, 55.
55 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Conclusions 

Prompted by USSOUTHCOM General Kelly’s statements on the inability of Caribbean countries to identify and deal with nationals who are vulnerable to religious-motivated radicalization, this paper provided a brief threat assessment of 

Caribbean extremism and the FTF phenomenon. The paper examined the questions whether radicalized individuals pose a direct threat to the security of Caribbean nations and how counter violent extremism (CVE) strategies implemented at 

community and prison levels can minimize the threat. In addressing these questions, the paper framed the discourse on CVE within current international discussions on violent extremism and the counter-terrorism debate.

The paper concluded that in light of the extent of radicalization efforts and 

the phenomenon of FTF, the Caribbean is vulnerable to violent extremism. Radicalization if not deterred could result in individuals, or groups committing religiously motivated acts in countries in the Caribbean. These acts could be prompted 

in view of the strategic interests that the United States and European countries 

have in the basin, hence making the Caribbean an intermediate target. In this regard, infrastructure that is critical to the Caribbean’s economy and tourism should 

be made more resilient to violent acts. Policies and programs to prevent extremism 

should be developed both at community level and in the context of penitentiary 

reform to ensure that vulnerable individuals are identified and mechanisms that 

address the root causes and drivers of radicalization are devised to prevent such 

individuals from embracing violent extremism or ensure their rehabilitation if they 

have been radicalized.
56 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

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62 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016
63 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Citizen Insecurity in Trinidad and Tobago and the 

Applicability of the Concept of the Mafia State

Dianne Williams

Introduction

Citizen security in Trinidad and Tobago has become increasingly important as a 

result of serious threats posed by growing crime, violence, and lawlessness. The 

country’s proximity to major drug producing countries in Latin America, porous 

borders, and the poor work ethic of those charged with protecting and serving 

make it a prime transit point. This paper will address the extent and characteristics 

of crime and violence in Trinidad and Tobago, evaluate the impact of the phenomenon on levels of citizen security and end with a discussion of whether or not 

Trinidad and Tobago is becoming a “mafia state.” 

Establishing linkages between rising citizen insecurity and crime and violence is critical to avoiding the ambiguity that is often inherent in any discussion of 

these issues. The first section will therefore present a brief overview of citizen security – a definition, related concepts, context as well as the institutional, social and 

government prerequisites necessary for its existence. Since discourse on preventative efforts and government responses to crime and violence must occur against 

the backdrop of organized crime, drug trafficking, corruption, criminal gangs and 

illegal firearms, subsequent sections will examine several critical security issues 

that have shaped the contemporary face of crime in Trinidad and Tobago. State and 

regional responses to these specific threats will also be discussed. The paper will 

close with an exploration of the emerging concept of the Mafia State as a newer 

and even bigger security threat. 
64 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Citizen Security: An Overview of the Key Dimensions

The concept of “citizen security” can be best understood in two contexts. On the 

one hand, citizen security can be considered as a subunit within the wider framework of human security1

 with the human security approach narrowing the scope of 

security analysis and policy from territorial security to the security of people. On 

the other hand, human security can be seen as a people-oriented approach where 

the Government plays a key role in protecting its citizens.2 Thus, citizen security 

can be regarded as the social condition which best facilitates human security. 

Threats to Citizen Security in Trinidad and Tobago

Serious Crimes, Homicides, Violent Crimes and Detection Rates

Source: Crime and Problem Analysis Branch, TTPS.

1 Oscar Gómez and Des Gasper. A Thematic Guidance Note for Regional and National Human Development 

Report Teams, New York: United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report Office, 

2013. 

2 United Nations Development Programme. Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human 

Development and Shift to Better Citizen Security. New York: United Nations Development Programme, 

2012.,rryuly J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Washington DC, mal activists. the ery 

sincere. nd seemed genuinely sym
65 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Despite, growing concern about the escalation of crime in Trinidad and Tobago, over the last six years there has been a downward trend in the number of 

reported serious crimes (SRCs).3 Figure 1 shows the total number of serious crimes 

reported between 2009 and 2015. A temporal analysis shows that there was a consistent decline in SRCs over the six-year period, except in 2012 where there was a 

minor increase over 2011. The number of serious crimes decreased by 45% from 

2009 to 2014. The largest increase in SRCs over a comparative yearly period was 

between 2011 and 2012 of 12.4%. Despite the downward trend, detection rates (the 

rates at which recorded and detected crimes are solved by the police) for SRCs 

remained relatively low between 2010 and 2013. In 2010, the detection rate was 

16%, 19% in 2011, 17% in 2012 and 18% in 2013. Only in 2014 did the detection 

rate surpass previous years with 23%. 

Homicides are the strongest, single indicator of security and perception of 

safety in any country. Figure 2 illustrates the number of homicides in Trinidad and 

Tobago from 2009 to 2014. 

Source: Crime and Problem Analysis Branch, TTPS.

3 A serious crime is an offence for which the minimum sentence is 5 years. Serious crimes include murders, 

shootings/woundings, sexual offences, kidnapping, burglaries, robberies, fraud, general larceny, larceny 

motor vehicle, larceny dwelling house, narcotic offences and other serious crimes.
66 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

While in 2009 there were 506 homicides, by 2014 this was reduced by almost 20% to 406. There was a marked drop in homicides between 2009 and 2011, 

which also coincided with the decline in the number of SRCs. Nonetheless, subsequent years have seen a slow but steady increase, the largest being between 2011 

and 2012 of 8%. This does not correspond to the overall fall in SRCs, signifying 

that homicides accounted for a greater proportion of SRCs in the latter years. Indeed, homicides contributed 3.1% and 3.4% of the total number of SRCs for 2013 

and 2014 respectively, compared to between 2.2% and 2.4% from 2009 to 2011. 

Unlike SRCs, the detection rate for homicides fluctuated substantially between 

2010 and 2014. 

While an estimated 23% of homicides were solved in in 2010, only 18% 

were solved in 2012. A further decline occurred in 2013 where only 15% or 62 homicides were solved, rising to 20% in 2014. It should be noted that the actual number of homicides solved has not gone beyond 100 since 2010. Thus, low rates of 

detection that coincide with a steadily increasing number of homicides represents 

a serious threat to citizen security, leading to perceived sense of rising insecurity 

among the citizenry. Detection rates are determined by the statistical relationship 

between the number of homicides detected by or reported to the police and the 

number of homicides for which an arrest is made, a charge laid and an offender 

successfully prosecuted. 
67 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Source: Crime and Problem Analysis Branch, TTPS.

Similar to SRCs, violent crimes4 have also experienced a downward trend 

from 2009 to 2014 (see Figure 3). However, the detection rate for homicides continue to fall even as the number of homicides continue to rise. Not only does this 

give way to fear of crime, safety concerns and curtailment of certain freedoms but 

it also points to major deficiencies in the state’s ability to protect its citizens and to 

an unravelling of the social cohesion, integration, and collective efficacy that are 

critical elements of citizen security. 

Criminal Gangs

Street gangs have become synonymous with crime and violence.5 The violence and 

crimes committed by gangs tend to develop in the context of collective dynamics 

that range from temporary and unstructured groups to highly hierarchical criminal gangs6

 presenting a particularly serious problem for the safety of the region. 

4 Violent Crimes is the collective term used to describe a group of serious crimes which include the following 

6 offences: (a) murder, (b) wounding & shooting, (c) sexual offences, (d) kidnapping, (e) kidnapping for 

ransom and (f) robbery.

5 See United National definition of youth at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/

youth-definition.pdf

6 José Miguel Cruz. “State and criminal violence in Latin America: Reflections on the coup in Honduras,”

Nueva Sociedad, 2010, 226. http://132.248.9.1:8991/hevila/Nuevasociedad/2010/no226/6.pdf
68 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Table 1 shows the number of criminal gangs in each police division in Trinidad 

and Tobago. 

Table 1: NUMBER OF GANGS PER DIVISION

No. Division 2009 2012 % change

1 Port of Spain 16 44 175

2 Western 12 16 33

3 Northeastern 05 12 140

4 Northern 12 13 8

5 Central 02 03 50

6 Southern 03 04 33

7 Southwestern 01 02 100

8 Eastern 06 03 -50

9 Tobago 03 05 67

Total 60 102 70

Source: Criminal Gang & Intelligence Unit and Crime and Problem Analysis Unit 

In the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Citizen Security Survey 2010 conducted across the Caribbean, 38% of respondents in Trinidad and 

Tobago indicated that criminal gangs are a big problem in their neighborhood. 

This was slightly higher than the average for the regional response (32.4%). This 

perception is mainly fueled by the criminal activity and networks with which these 

groups are associated. 

In Trinidad and Tobago, crime and violence are perhaps the most visible 

consequences of street gangs. Gang-related murders accounted for 16% (75) of 

all homicides in 2010. However, by 2012, this climbed to 38% (144) and peaked 

at 48% (197) in 2013 and dropped to 35% in 2014. Data also indicate that gang 

members are disproportionately engaged in criminal activities.7 Seepersad (2013) 

states that approximately 51% of the gang members were previously arrested with 

each member having an average of 2.09 arrests, compared to a non-gang sample 

(n=878), where only 20.2% were previously arrested, with the mean number of arrests being 0.68. As expected, arrest data illustrate that gang members perpetrate a 

greater number of offences than their non-gang counterparts. Gang members also 

7 The Besson Street Gang Intelligence Criminal History Project offers rare insight into the nature and 

composition of gangs in Trinidad and Tobago. In this project 368 gang members were interviewed with data 

collected in 2005.
69 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

commit violent offences at approximately three times the rate of persons who are 

non-gang members (31.5% as compared to 10.4%). With respect to firearm related 

offences, nearly 26% of gang members were arrested in contrast to 8.7% of nongang persons. Similarly, 3.2% of non-gang members were apprehended for drug 

trafficking compared to 15.2% of gang members. A similar over-representation in 

criminal offences for gang members obtains for property offences, sexual offences, 

and drug use/possession.8

In Trinidad and Tobago, a large part of this rivalry among criminal gangs is 

over turf: the control over specific areas within communities to sell drugs. There is 

a spill-over effect as rivalries extend beyond protecting drug blocks to more personalized conflicts among criminal gangs, exacerbating the violence at the community-level. In addition, due to its illicit nature, the production and trafficking 

of drugs worsens levels of impunity and corruption, distorts the economy through 

money-laundering, and adversely affects human development in a variety of ways.9

The activities in which criminal gangs engage transcend the traditional, 

street-level crimes like robbery and larceny. Gang members are often part of larger 

criminal networks which involve organized crime, drug trafficking and illicit firearms. It is difficult to assess the full extent to which criminal gangs are integrated 

into these criminal networks, given the inherent difficulties entailed in measuring 

such phenomena. Although assessment difficulties may lead to an underestimation 

of the true nature of the street gang problem in Trinidad and Tobago, ultimately, the 

proportion of gang-related crimes as well as their purported links to more powerful 

criminal networks impact the sense of security among citizens. 

8 Randy Seepersad. “Street Gangs and Violence in Trinidad and Tobago.” Journal of Gang Research 21 (1), 

2013: 17-42.

9 Global Commission on Drug Policy, “War on Drugs – Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy,” 

2011; “Ending the War on Drugs,” Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2012. 
70 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Photo caption: Newly recruited members of the Port Authority of Trinidad and Tobago. 

Police were trained at the Police Training Academy in St James. Photo credit: Sureash 

Cholai. 

Organized Crime 

Organized crime includes all criminal activity organized and extended over time, 

whose capacity to deny or provide goods and services depends on the use of corruption, coercion, and in some cases, violence.10 Official crime data or empirical 

research on organized crime is sparse for the majority of Caribbean nations, including Trinidad and Tobago, therefore, evidence is largely anecdotal. In the case 

of Trinidad and Tobago, such evidence suggests that organized crime is mainly 

related to drug-trafficking. Local officials note that “the people who are involved 

in moving drugs are often the same people who will use the same operation for 

many other illegal activities” such as money laundering and terrorism.11 

Additionally, the proliferation of firearms is a direct result of drug-trafficking. Firearms serve a dual purpose in this context; they are traded for drugs and 

used for protection of turf and other illegal property. The escalation of firearmrelated violent offences in recent years in Trinidad and Tobago also adds to the 

10 United Nations Development Programme. “Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals 

for Latin America,” (Regional Human Development Report 2013-2014). New York: United Nations 

Development Programme, 2013.

11 David A. Granger. “The Failure of Guyana’s National Drug Strategy Master Plan: Guyana’s National Drug 

Strategy Master Plan 2005–2009 Has Expired; Was It a Success or Failure?” Guyana Review, Stabroek News, 

Georgetown, Guyana, 31 May 2010.
71 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

problem.12 According to the UNODC (2008), organized crime constitutes a serious threat not only because of the attendant intimidation and fear, but also because 

of the perception of a weakened democracy and increased levels of corruption. 

Perhaps the most significant consequence of organized crime in the Trinidad and Tobago context is the number of murders, shootings and woundings, and 

other violent crimes. The presence of organized criminal structures fuels violence 

and crime either because of turf disputes or in reaction to attacks by state security 

forces.13 Organized crime can also have an impact on the rule of law through the 

corruption of the judicial process.14 The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 suggested that the perception of judicial corruption is high in Trinidad and Tobago 

where almost 70% of the residents believe the judicial system is corrupt and that 

politically connected criminals circumvent the judicial process.15 Approximately 

62% of respondents believe powerful criminals go free and 59% believe judges are 

corrupt in comparison to 47.3% and 37.2% for the region.16

Drug Trafficking and Illegal Firearms

The “weaponization” of civil society in the Caribbean is connected to the market 

for illicit drugs.17 For Trinidad and Tobago, this relationship must begin with an examination of the known transhipment routes for narcotics and firearms (see Figure 

4). Trinidad and Tobago is the first island on the transhipment route out of South 

America, from which drugs can be shipped to Europe or along the chain of islands 

to North America.

12 Ibid.

13 United Nations Development Report, 2012 

14 UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) and World Bank. “Crime, Violence, and 

Development: Trends, Costs and Policy Options in the Caribbean.” Report 37820. Washington, DC: World 

Bank, 2007.

15 William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Washington DC, mal activists. the ery sincere. 

nd seemed genuinely sym United Nations Development Report, 2013

16 Ibid.

17 Agozino, B., Bowling, B., Ward, E., and Bernard, G. S. T. “Guns, crime and social order in the West 

Indies.” Criminology and Criminal Justice, 9(3), 2009, 287 - 305.
72 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Figure 4: Major cocaine and gun trafficking routes in the Caribbean region18

Additionally, it is a destination point for illegal firearms from South America.19 This convergence of both drugs and guns is seen in only two other Caribbean 

states; Jamaica and Puerto Rico, strongly suggesting that Trinidad and Tobago 

is a transhipment point for both particularly given its geographical proximity to 

Venezuela. Even more disconcerting is the country’s movement towards becoming a consumer state where these illicit goods are not just smuggled through but 

are distributed and used by citizens locally. Consequently, the level of gun-related 

violence in Trinidad and Tobago is fast approaching that of drug and gun producing nations. In 2013, 78% of all homicides in Trinidad and Tobago were committed 

with firearms.20 This greatly surpasses the world average of 43%.21 The extensive 

use of firearms also reflects on their availability. But the clandestine nature of the 

arms market makes it difficult to quantitatively evaluate the extent of the problem.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Crime and Problems Analysis unit of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.
73 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Corruption and Impunity 

Corruption is defined as the misappropriation of public assets, and is a serious 

and widespread threat to citizen security.22 The World Bank estimates that corruption absorbs around 9% of regional GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean.23 It 

undermines the political, economic and judicial systems and erodes public confidence in the state and is particularly difficult to measure. As such, the perception 

of corruption is measured locally and regionally through public surveys. Figure 5 

highlights the perception of corruption among 7 selected Caribbean States (Caribbean-7). 

Figure 5: Perception of Corruption in the Caribbean 

Source: Caribbean Human Development Report, 2012

22 United Nations Development Report, 2012 and 2013. 23 Ibid. 

Country Judges are corrupt Justice system 

is corrupt

Powerful 

criminals go free

Politically 

connected 

criminals go free

Antigua & 

Barbuda 32.3 44.3 37.8 44.8

Barbados 24.5 33.8 40.1 41.9

Guyana 39.0 47.7 46.9 51.8

Jamaica 36.3 57.3 52.7 57.8

Saint Lucia 33.7 48.1 47.7 51.3

Suriname 35.6 45.8 38.9 47.0

Trinidad & 

Tobago 58.7 69.8 61.6 70.2

Caribbean 7 37.2 49.6 47.0 52.5
74 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Almost 70% of respondents in Trinidad and Tobago believe that the Criminal Justice system is corrupt versus an average of 50% for the Caribbean-7. Similarly, 58.7% perceive judges to be corrupt, which is almost twice the Caribbean-7 

average (37.2%). Many of the respondents also believe that politically connected 

and powerful criminals go free (70.2% and 61.6% respectively). These figures 

substantially surpass both averages for the Caribbean-7 as well as for individual 

countries. These indicators strongly suggest that corruption in the Criminal Justice 

system in Trinidad and Tobago is widespread, and perhaps even the highest in the 

Caribbean. This perception is further validated by the results of the Corruption 

Perceptions Index in 2014. Trinidad and Tobago scored 38 and ranked 85th out of 

175 countries, having scored 38 and 39 in 2013 and 2012, respectively.24 In fact, 

the country has the lowest scores in the Caribbean region and is comparable to 

countries like Mexico (score of 34 in 2014) and Colombia (score of 37 in 2014), 

both of which have a long history of corruption, political instability and violence. 

At the same time, untrained, unmotivated and unethical security forces and 

the failure to complete efforts at institutional reform have generally left police, 

prisons, and the judicial systems weak and susceptible to corruption.25 Police legitimacy, the moral right of the police to exercise authority on behalf of the state,26

has emerged as a challenge to the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) as 

many citizens do not view the TTPS as an effective, impartial and citizen-oriented 

mechanism for maintaining law and order.27 Even without the presence of criminal gangs, confidence in police to control crime in general among respondents is 

3.7% compared to the Caribbean average of 10.2%. Confidence in the TTPS is low 

across other areas compared to the Caribbean average as well; murder (9.5% vs. 

26.7%), gang violence (11.4% vs 25.4%) and drug trafficking (10.6% vs 23.0%).28

A major contributor to this lack of confidence is the perception of corruption 

among police officers. Acceptance of bribes, engaging and/or supporting illegal 

24 Ibid.

25 Seelke, C., Wyler, L., Beittel, J and Sullivn, M. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking 

and the U.S. Counterdrug Programs,” Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2012.

26 Anthony Bottoms, and Justice Tankebe. “Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy 

in Criminal Justice, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 119 (2013), 102 27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.
75 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

activities, and deliberately subverting the course of justice for economic gain are 

cited as the main examples of corruption among police officers in Trinidad and 

Tobago.29 Apart from data on police officers arrested or currently before the courts, 

it is difficult to measure this problem, although anecdotal evidence suggests it is 

quite prevalent. 

Moreover, corruption in the Caribbean is not limited to the lower administrative governmental ranks. There are cases of large-scale corruption involving 

the state or its major players. Given the economic incentives and the weakness of 

controls, the range of opportunities for corruption is widespread: in the procurement of public contracts, in the illegal financing of electoral campaigns, even in 

the passing of legislation favorable to particular economic interests or sectors.30

Under these circumstances, protecting the rights of citizens by rule of law is not 

fulfilled. Instead, it favors the interests of particular influential groups or individuals. In Trinidad and Tobago, there have been several cases that can be classified as 

high level corruption, involving public officials and prominent persons. Seldom do 

such individuals face the sanctions meted out to other individuals who have been 

convicted for less serious offenses. It is this imbalance in the scales of justice that 

damages public trust and confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole. 

This point is an important precursor to a discussion of impunity. When a high 

percentage of violent and criminal acts against the citizenry are not investigated, 

processed, and punished, it creates a perception of vulnerability. While no country solves all of its crimes or punishes all of its offenders, a minimal threshold is 

required to avoid generalized distrust, fear, and even contempt for the law among 

citizens.31 Punishment is also expected to be proportional to the seriousness of the 

crime. Less than 20% of murders committed in Trinidad and Tobago are detected, 

which gives perpetrators the freedom to act with relative impunity. In a number of 

cases, individuals involved in drug trafficking and/or criminal gangs have failed 

to be apprehended and continue to perpetuate crime, violence and insecurity. Furthermore, high levels of impunity are associated with powerful individuals, who 

often receive sanctions disproportionate to the crimes committed. This reduces 

29 Ibid.

30 United Nations Development Report, 2012 and 2013

31 Ibid
76 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

the perceived effectiveness and legitimacy of the state institutions charged with 

protecting citizens. 

Citizen Insecurity and the Mafia State 

The perception of insecurity encompasses several factors that can be categorized 

as macro-factors and institutional factors. Macro-factors are factors that tend to 

have a larger, overall impact on crime, violence and perception of security, for example gangs, drugs and firearms. Institutional factors are those which result from 

deficiencies in the state’s capacity to provide citizen security, for example against 

corruption and impunity.32

But, there is another hidden and far greater threat to citizen security which 

has, thus far, remained largely undetected in the Caribbean context: the emergence 

of a mafia state - the coalescence between state institutions and criminal networks. 

According to Naim (2012), mafia states are reflective of the development of an 

intimate relationship between high ranking government officials and leaders of 

criminal enterprises. Crime and violence are manifested in extreme forms, as the 

state’s capacity to protect its citizens is compromised not by institutional deficiencies but by its collusion with criminal networks for profit and power. Along the 

continuum of security, the mafia state would represent the greatest level of citizen 

insecurity any country can experience. 

The Applicability of the concept of the Mafia State to the Trinidad and Tobago 

context.

While the collusion between governments and criminal networks is not a new phenomenon, the difference with mafia states is that high-ranking government officials 

become integral players in, if not leaders of, criminal enterprises, and the defense 

and promotion of the business concerns of those enterprises become official priorities.33 Essentially, the state and its actors neglect their central roles in the protec32 Estévez, E. “Public and Citizen Security in South America: Trends, Controversies and Proposals”, 

Georgetown University: Political Database of the Americas, 2008.

33 Moises Naím, “Mafia States: Organized Crime takes Office” Foreign Affairs, May/ June 2012.
77 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

tion of the rights and freedoms of its citizens. Instead, they become subsumed by 

economic and political power on a scale that goes beyond the country’s borders. 

In turn, rule of law, social cohesion, state legitimacy, public confidence and trust 

as well as social crime prevention measures are overshadowed or even discarded. 

One of the most distinguishing features of the mafia state is that it is transnational 

in nature. International criminal networks are dynamic and innovative, function in 

open, legitimate markets and are complex, political structures, all of which makes 

its descent upon Caribbean nations especially threatening. 

However, it can be argued that becoming a mafia state occurs along a continuum rather than being a dichotomous phenomenon. In other words, a country 

does not go from a normal, democratic state to a mafia state overnight. In order 

to evaluate where on this continuum Trinidad and Tobago lies, if at all, the main 

principles of the mafia state need to be identified. 

Miklaucic and Naím (2013) identify indicators and typologies of state criminalization that collectively provide what might be thought of as a comprehensive 

state criminalization profile. However, that definition assumes that all mafia states 

adhere strictly to those indicators. In fact, the degree to which a state can be defined as a mafia state is mitigated by each country’s context. Nonetheless, for the 

purpose of standardization, we accept the following typologies of the criminal 

state: (1) criminal penetration, (2) criminal infiltration, (3) criminal capture and (4) 

criminal sovereignty.34 Several of these typologies seem applicable to the Trinidad and Tobago context, the most relevant being criminal penetration. This occurs 

when the governing apparatus of the state itself is co-opted or even transformed 

by criminal enterprises thus granting access to public resources and other assets 

to non- or even antigovernment interests. For example, a customs officer on the 

payroll of contraband traffickers may compromise an inspection or a tax official 

may be paid to overlook money-laundering activity. Such penetration pits the assets and resources of the state against the public interest, a central characteristic of 

a criminal state.35 

34 Ibid.

35 Michael Miklaucic and Moises Naím, “The Criminal State” in Convergence: Illicit Networks and National 

Security in the Age of Globalization, edited by Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer. Washington: 

National Defense University Press, 2013
78 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

In Trinidad and Tobago the perception of corruption among state institutions and its actors – police, judiciary, correctional agencies and the legislative 

and executive – is high,36 and the country’s position on the Corruption Perceptions 

Index appears to validate the perception of citizens. Moreover, although no state 

official, high-ranking or otherwise, has been prosecuted for their active role in a 

criminal network or organization, it is strongly believed that corrupt state officials 

are profiting from criminal networks and their activities, in which case, criminal 

penetration may have already begun. 

Notwithstanding the fact that very little is known about organized crime, 

criminal networks and their relationship with state actors, the combination of vulnerable state institutions and agencies, proliferation of illegal firearms, high murder rates and rising citizen insecurity point to the threat of Trinidad and Tobago 

becoming a mafia state. More importantly, corruption is the biggest facilitator of 

criminal penetration and Trinidad and Tobago, appears to already be comparable to 

some of the most corrupt nations in the world, another indication that the country 

may indeed be approaching the extreme part of the continuum and is fast becoming 

a mafia state. 

36 Ibid.
79 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

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Georgetown, Guyana.

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Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer. Washington: National Defense 

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Naím, M. 2012. “Mafia States: Organized Crime takes Office” Foreign Affairs, 

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Seelke, C., Wyler, L., Beittel, J and Sullivn, M. 2012. “Latin America and the 

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Seepersad, Randy. 2013. “Street Gangs and Violence in Trinidad and Tobago.” 

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82 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016
83 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Warring on Domestic Soil: Military 

versus Police Missions in Jamaica

Valeen Calder

Introduction

Policing in any democratic society is a sensitive subject, not least of all because it 

is a function of the state, which also has a responsibility to protect the civil liberties 

of its citizens. Achieving the delicate balance between these two responsibilities is 

often a challenge for most states, as advancing one objective appears to inevitably 

intrude on the other. Given the distinct difference in operational nature between the 

police and the army, including their respective emphasis and intensity of the use of 

force, the involvement of military forces in civil law enforcement gives rise to potentially a greater assault on democracy than the crime and violence that originally 

influenced the decision in favor of it. In Jamaica, the use of the Jamaican Defense 

Forces (JDF) in domestic security operations in the face of rising organized crime 

and violent homicides presents significant risks of intruding on citizens’ constitutional civil liberties.

Context of Military Deployments

The history and context of the Commonwealth Caribbean is as complex as it is 

unique in every facet of its being. Security challenges are among the most complicated and unique features of the region. As colonies, the security concerns involved protecting the economic and political interest of the British Empire from 

invasion and conquest by other world powers, and internally from rebels seeking 

to overthrow its rule. In the context of that era, the use of military force was an appropriate answer to both repel invasions and to suppress internal revolts from slave 

populations. This was exacerbated by the fact that the population had few guarantees of civil liberties and no constitutional protection against state overreach. 
84 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

The involvement of military forces in civil law enforcement gives 

rise to potentially a greater assault on democracy than the crime 

and violence that originally influenced the decision in favor of it.

Today, the status and threats to the islands have changed significantly. Former colonies are almost all sovereign democratic states responsible for protecting 

statehood and nationhood for the sake of citizens, rather than protecting the state 

from them. However, in their evolution from a past concerned with the suppression and control of colonies for the sake of the motherlands’ profits to independent 

democracies, states have struggled to change both the philosophy and practice of 

‘policing’ those who are now citizens. 

Understanding the ethos and method a state employs in policing is critical 

because the use of coercive power by a state must be tempered by the need to protect and respect constitutional democratic guarantees. A democracy calls for state 

sensitivity to civil liberties, and policing of citizens by consent. Fundamental to the 

protection of these liberties are the institution of checks and balances that prevent 

abuse and excesses by the state actors. This necessary curtailment is made possible 

through legislation and regulated institutions and offices. A state acts illegitimately 

when it ignores these checks and balances, in breach of its own democratic policies. This paper will examine the legitimacy of the actions of the Jamaican state in 

deploying the military to enforce domestic law and in effect police citizens.

Internationally, the deployment of military forces for domestic security 

against internal threats, i.e. by its own citizens, has long been associated with the 

displacement of democracy and the rule of tyranny by military controlled governments. This is because there is an accepted division of responsibility that associates military forces with countering and neutralizing external aggression aimed 

at weakening or destroying a nation, while internal security concerns of law and 

order are the mission of civilian police forces.1

An exception exists for military intervention on domestic soil or in civil 

1Hilton McDavid, Anthony Clayton, and N. Cowell. “The Difference between the Constabulary Force and 

the Military.” Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies 36 (2011).
85 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

affairs under constitutional emergency powers meant to be activated for the preservation of democracy. Therefore, a national army on home streets is traditionally 

indicative that almost all that can go wrong has gone wrong. Any prolonged or 

normalized use of the military under emergency powers or otherwise consequently 

becomes anomalous to maintaining a democracy. In fact, to divert from this rule 

of exception can be interpreted as an indicator of repressiveness and a lack of democracy. In recognition of the fact that the operation of an army on home streets 

could be a threat to national security, some states, including the United States under Posse Comitatus, and Germany under its Constitution, have outlawed the use 

of their military forces in domestic law enforcement operations, except in extreme 

circumstances. 

Photo caption: Unrest in Jamaica in 2010. Photo credit: BBC. 

Legitimate cases of extreme circumstances have included terrorism and insurgencies, for two main reasons. These reasons are that both terrorists and insurgents often employ tactics and firepower well beyond the capability of the average 

civilian police force, and moreover, that both represent unconstitutional challenges 

to the political framework. As such, recent attacks by religious fundamentalists that 

are intent on establishing Islamic caliphates and eradicating non-believers have necessitated domestic military defense deployments in Africa, and in some European 

states. States including Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia have been forced to resort to 
86 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

domestic military deployments for routine patrols and offensive attacks against the 

Boko Haram and Al Shabaab groups. France has also resorted to domestic deployments of some 100,000 soldiers in the wake of the 2015 Paris attacks.2

Latin America has also had its share of challenges to domestic security from 

anti-government groups, without the religious fervor attached. In Colombia for 

instance, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC in Spanish) is categorized as an insurgent force with the objective of overthrowing the Colombian 

government. As an irregular armed force or insurgency using unconventional methods of warfare, such as sabotage, ambushes, and other conspicuous acts of extreme 

violence to secure political leverage, they qualify as combatants against whom a 

State can justifiably use the military under article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.3

Whereas generally in the Western Hemisphere the deployment of 

the army on the street signals an escalation of threats to national 

security to an extreme level, the marker of abnormality in Jamaica 

has become the absence, rather than the presence of the military 

on the street.

In contrast, Jamaica, like many other Commonwealth Caribbean counterparts, cannot claim the existence of terrorists or insurgencies to justify the resurgence of the use of military force to suppress domestic crime and disorder, reminiscent of pre-democratic times. There is no martial law, nor is there civil unrest. 

While the country struggles with the challenge of organized crime, these criminals 

are not interested in usurping political power, or running a state.4 Yet, the use of the 

military has in effect become a de facto component of the national policing plan. 

Whereas generally in the Western Hemisphere the deployment of the army 

on the street signals an escalation of threats to national security to an extreme 

level, the marker of abnormality in Jamaica has become the absence, rather than 

2 Dietmar Neuerer and Siobhán Dowling. “Germany Mulls Deploying Soldiers On Domestic Soil.” 

Handelsblatt. No. 97 January 20, 2015. 

3 Harry Kawilarang. Quotations on Terrorism. Victoria, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2006; Philip P. 

Purpura, Security and Loss Prevention: An Introduction. Burlington MD: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 

2007.

4 McDavid, et al, 2011.
87 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

the presence of the military on the street. Statistical data from the Jamaica Constabulary Force for the last eight years reveals consistent deployment of the army 

to ‘police’ across all nineteen police divisions serving the island of Jamaica. The 

most intensive concentration of troops have been in the divisions of St. James and 

Manchester in the west; Clarendon and St. Catherine North in the south central; 

and St. Andrew South and Kingston Western in the southeast. Between January 

2008 and July 2015, the military conducted a total of 72,410 mobile and foot patrols throughout the parishes of Jamaica. In 2012 in the division of St. Catherine 

North, where gang on gang crimes have been of concern, the army conducted a 

total of 5,212 of these patrols. In the seven months between January 2015 and July 

2015, the military conducted 1396 of these patrols in St. James where the majority of crimes are attributed to competition among lottery advance fee scammers. 

While these operations would have been classified as joint police military operations, the standard deployment ratio of men for patrols has been one police officer 

to four army personnel. 

This sustained reliance on use of the army speaks to a normalization of domestic military deployments, or what Campbell identifies as role “evolution” to a 

constabularization of the military, in response to criminal activity of non-combatants.5

 Given the distinct difference in operational nature between the police and 

the army, including their respective emphasis and intensity of the use of force, this 

strategy of institutionalization of military policing is inappropriate and ineffective 

in a democratic state.

It is of course incontestable that the state faces a challenge with violent 

criminal activity. Major threats to national security include rising homicide rates, 

influenced by organized crime involving thriving illegal narcotics transshipment 

and trade, and human and arms trafficking.6 The challenge of illegal narcotics in 

particular is inexorable for Jamaica and other states in the Caribbean, given their 

unique geo-strategic location along the supply routes between demand markets in 

Europe and North America and supply markets such as Colombia.7 This challenge 

5 Donald J. Campbell, and Kathleen M. Campbell, “Soldiers as Police Officers/ Police Officers as Soldiers: 

Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States.” Armed Forces & Society 36 (2010): 327-350. 6 McDavid, et al, 2011.

7 Pat Paterson, “Criminal Threats in the Caribbean,” (presentation, Caribbean Defense and Security Course, 

William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Washington DC, 14 July 2015.
88 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

of narcotrafficking is further aggravated by the parallel trade in illegal firearms 

used to commit violent crimes in furtherance of organized criminal activities. 

While it has been argued that organized crime benefits from political protection through the corruption of the officials and compromise of the political process, 

a more immediate and visible concern with organized crime has been high levels of 

violence. 8 Using 2009 homicide rates, Clayton and Blake argued that the homicide 

rate of Jamaica has been about 10 times higher on a per capita basis than that of 

Northern Ireland, a state with a history of civil conflict and low-level insurgency.9

This is attributable to the use of violence by organized criminals to inspire 

paralyzing fear in order to prevent people from cooperating with law enforcement 

efforts to prosecute these criminals. Methods of intimidation have included the vicious murder of witnesses and members of the security services who pose a threat 

to their operations. This threat further allows criminal elements to operate with 

impunity. 

In a recent call for an end to the ‘anti- informer culture’ Colonel Desmond 

T. Edwards, director general of the Major Organized and Anti-Corruption Agency 

(MOCA) in Jamaica, explained that the culture created a safe operation haven for 

criminals, as any receipt of valuable information on corruption and major organized crimes was nullified by the reluctance of witnesses to give court testimonies 

out of fear.10

While all these challenges are acknowledged, it is argued that the assessment 

of and response to this national security threat is a distortion of reality. Manwaring 

made the bold argument that the disruptive nature of gang activities was comparable to the coups and revolutionary wars of insurgents that depose governments.11

His suggestion that both groups have the same putative objective to neutralize, 

control, or depose governments to ensure self-determined (nondemocratic) ends 

8 Anthony Harriott. Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica: Breaking the Nexus. Kingston, Jamaica: 

Canoe Press, 2008.

9 Anthony Clayton and Kevin Blake. “Intelligence-Led Policing: The Model for Jamaica.” National 

Intelligence Bureau - Jamaica Constabulary Force, 2010. 

10 Jeff Penrose, “MOCA Director General Calls for End to ‘Informer Culture’.” Jamaica Observer, August 7, 

2015.

11 Max G. Manwaring, “A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit 

Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil.” 

Washington: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011.
89 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

so as to make a distinction irrelevant is unfounded.

To categorize for-profit gang crime as being the same as terrorism in places 

like Colombia where the FARC operate or Afghanistan where the Taliban operate 

is to oversimplify the challenges of terrorism, as well as exaggerate and misdefine 

the challenge of organized crime. The FARC participates in the organized crime of 

narcotrafficking as a means in furtherance of its political end, while narcotrafficking is the business end for Jamaican gangs. Moreover, the acceptance of this exaggeration as reality has had the ill effect of prompting the state to a misinformed 

escalated response in the form of adopting the war metaphor in domestic security 

policy statements, and deploying military personnel to routinely police the streets. 

There are several concerns surrounding this response of deploying the military for domestic ‘policing’ purposes. These are chiefly related to the fact that long 

term military policing will have substantial practical, political, and legal ramifications that are likely to be injurious to the democratic ideal policy makers would 

argue it is meant to protect.12

Operational Ethos 

First, as discussed above, there is a clear distinction between civilians and combatants who must meet the requirements of public international law to be treated 

accordingly. In light of the difference in ethos and modus operandi between civilian police and the army, it is an appreciation of this distinction between a civilian 

population and armed combatants that should inform the response of the State. 

Summarized by Greener-Barcham, the differences in the primary objectives 

of the two organizations is that for the police, the primary objectives are law enforcement, public order, or the support of civic institutions.13 On the other hand, 

the military is concerned with defense, destroying the enemy’s ability to fight, or 

the provision of security via the suppression of violence. Therefore, there are clear 

disparities in the operating principles and command and organizational structures 

of both groups. Police officers are there to provide safety and security to the people 

12Campbell and Campbell, 2010.

13 B. K. Greener-Barcham, “Crossing the Green or Blue Line? Exploring the Military-Police Divide.” Small 

Wars and Insurgencies, 18, 2007: 90-112.
90 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

who often request these services, as Walker & Katz point out.14 They exercise 

powers of arrest and the discretion to take away the liberty of another person in the 

prevention of crime and maintenance of order. By contrast, the military ethos cultivates an “us versus them” attitude in order to reinforce group cohesion and maintain mission focus. Among the primary differences to note between the two groups 

is the placement of use of deadly force in the continuum of appropriate responses. 

A police officer’s task is to de-escalate incidents and preserve life, while soldiers 

are mission trained to neutralize the enemy. Campbell argues that an army’s ability 

to win wars rests on its ability to use maximum coercion, including lethal violence, 

as diametrically opposed to the commitment of constabularies to a client service 

attitude and the use of minimum force.15

In answer to this disparity, some military strategists have put forth the suggestion that new soldiers can be developed with significantly enhanced capacities 

for adaptability, versatility and mental flexibility achieved through training that explicitly sensitizes them to the dangers posed to a democracy from having soldiers 

as police on home soil.16 However, this argument that identifies soldiers in peace 

building missions as the prototype must be considered flawed given recent reports 

of serious human rights abuse by such deployments beginning in Mozambique in 

1996,17 followed by the 2005 Zeid report on abuses in the Democratic Republic of 

Congo,18 and recent reports out of the Central African Republic.19

14 Samuel Walker and Charles Katz. The Police in America - An Introduction. New York: McGraw Hill, 2011. 15 Campbell and Campbell, 2010.

16 Ibid. 

17 Grac’a Machel, “Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of armed conflict on 

children.” Report to United Nations Secretary General. United Nations, 1996.

18 United Nations Secretary-General Report. A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual 

Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations [Zeid Report]. New York: United 

Nations, 2005.

19 BBC, “UN’s CAR envoy Gaye sacked over peacekeeper abuse claims,” August 12, 2015; Amy Bracken, 

“Haitian Moms Demand UN Help for the Babies Their Peacekeepers Left Behind.” Public Radio 

International, August 28, 2014; Don Melvin, “U.N. report: Sex exploitation by peacekeepers persists 

unacceptably.” CNN, June 17, 2015.
91 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Legislative Imbalance

A second issue of concern with domestic military deployment to perform a domestic policing role is the threat it poses to basic civil liberties.20 There is currently 

insufficient regulation and legal protection for citizens from excesses and abuse 

by members of the military. In contrast to the multiple layers of statutory checks 

and balances under which the civilian police force operates, the legislative provisions for military operations on domestic soil are quite limited. While section 5 

of the Defense Force Act charges the Jamaica Defense Force with the defense of 

and maintenance of order in Jamaica, and section 9(3), inserted in 1994, provides 

for privileges and immunities for acts done in furtherance of section 5, it contains 

no further guidance on civilian interactions. The limited reference in the Defense 

Force Act to the powers and authority of a soldier in respect to citizens is understandable in light of the rules of engagement that are provided for under international rather than domestic law. 

Photo caption: A police officer in Kingston, Jamaica stands guard a few blocks away from 

the Tivoli Gardens in 2010. Photo credit: BBC. 

20 Campbell and Campbell, 2010.
92 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Furthermore, there is a fundamental difference between the police force and 

the military with respect to the treatment of legitimate orders and the question of 

lawful orders. While sworn members of the police force are invested under the 

authority of the law, military culture supports a tradition of executing assignments 

from individual commanders regardless of personal inclinations.21 Police officers 

answer to the law and their own conscience as an agent of the courts, while the 

soldier’s responsibility in a command and control system is to his superiors and the 

rules of engagement as an agent of the government. This is incongruous with the 

needs of citizens of a democracy where policing calls for discretionary judgments 

about warnings or arrest, as well as determinations regarding the appropriate and 

justifiable levels of force, rather than saturation patrols, aggressive intimidation, 

and heavy weaponry.22

Some states in consideration of this competency and operational difference 

between the two groups have restricted the deployment of the military for internal 

security to cases in which they serve as reinforcement to the police. In Northern 

Ireland’s experience of civil unrest, for example, the military would patrol well 

outside of the geographical range of the police units, for the purpose of securing 

the perimeter, allowing for normal policing to take place inside the ‘bubble.’ In 

contrast, the practice in Jamaica to deploy a mix of soldiers and police officers, 

with an average ratio of four soldiers to one officer, blurs the important distinction 

between their respective roles. 

Acts of Futility

A third concern is that military deployment for policing is ineffective and unsustainable for the long term. The annals of West Indian history are replete with 

repetitive accounts of military deployments to quell and contain disgruntled and 

‘threatening’ colonial populations. Accounts captured from official documents referenced by Finlason disclose the high frequency with which such activities took 

place, indicative of ineffectiveness of military might then and now in constructing 

21 Campbell and Campbell, 2010.

22 Ibid. 
93 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

and cultivating sustained civil order.23 An illustration of this is captured in official 

documented accounts showing for example that despite Governor Sir P. Grant calling in military force in 1874 to ‘enforce obedience’ in the community of Hartland 

outside the old country capital, his successor had to again respond to disaffection 

in the same area in a matter of mere months. 

Today, the increased use of military personnel to conduct routine saturation 

patrols in crime “hotspots” may produce encouraging statistics, but they are only 

effective for as long as they are sustained. This is explained by the fact that militaries are created to suppress and neutralize threats as they exist against the state and 

not to consider or address the socio-political or economic factors that would have 

given rise to the threats in the first place.

Reconciling the differences

Jamaica may have better use of its security forces and achieve better results by 

considering alternative options. Currently the most serious security problems facing Jamaica are internal, with only a residual though genuine possibility of external aggression concerning marine borders. This suggests that resources could 

be reallocated from the defense budget to fund governance improvement, control 

corruption, and strengthen policing.

Additionally, given that a large proportion of military are skilled personnel, military manpower can also be redeployed to address structural development 

needs that impact social and ultimately criminal behavior. While over-militarization of constabularies is another legitimate cause for concern, a suitable alternative 

to domestic military deployment in answer to the surge in violent crime is the use 

of specialist units with paramilitary roles and functions.

23 William Francis Finlason. The History of the Jamaica Case: Being an Account, Founded Upon Official 

Documents, of the Rebellion of the Negroes in Jamaica, the Causes which Led to It, and the Measures Taken 

for Its Suppression. London: Chapman and Hall, 1869.
94 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Finally, there must also be sustained focus and emphasis on full implementation of community policing that is consultative and inclusive of citizens as a sustainable long term resolution to crime and violence and the development of good 

governance. 

The involvement of military forces in civil law enforcement gives 

rise to potentially a greater assault on democracy than the crime 

and violence that would have originally influenced the decision in 

favor of it.

Implications

At present the involvement of military forces in civil law enforcement gives rise to 

potentially a greater assault on democracy than the crime and violence that would 

have originally influenced the decision in favor of it. The blurring of the distinction 

between the jurisdiction of the military and that of the civilian police provides for 

an ambiguous commitment to the rule of law and democratic security and governance. There is an absence of the requisite legislative framework to safeguard the 

civil liberties of citizens who cannot be classified as combatants. Further to this, 

use of the military to lead or support domestic security operations is inappropriate 

for reasons that it is ineffective, addressing only the symptoms and not the root 

causes of crime and violence. Training is also an unlikely solution to supplant 

or restrain their traditional war fighter orientation where military personnel are 

unsuited to provide the client-based service of policing that calls for problem solving, communication, persuasion and quick judgment skills. Therefore, a deliberate 

and clear separation of the two security forces is imperative to the maintenance of 

democratic law and good governance.
95 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

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98 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016
99 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Systemic Challenges in Law Enforcement: 

Examining the Social Context of 

Misconduct and Criminal Behavior within 

the Police Service of Trinidad and Tobago

Netty-Ann Gordon

Introduction 

Law enforcement is one of the main components of the criminal justice system 

which is made up of the police, courts, probation, prosecution and corrections. 

The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS), is the largest law enforcement 

organization in Trinidad and Tobago. Over the years, members of the TTPS have 

been accused of misconduct, corruption and abuse of authority. Police officers 

have also been charged for serious criminal offenses. Pino and Johnson assert that 

police deviance permeates at all levels of the TTPS.1 Police misconduct is a paradoxical phenomenon where persons entrusted to uphold and enforce the law violate it. This paper presents a critical analysis of law enforcement and highlights 

the social challenges facing the criminal justice system. It provides details on the 

impact of police deviance on communities in relation to the ongoing fight against 

crime and advocates the need for judicial and administrative reforms. 

Purpose Statement

Rule of law and order are highly critical for any civilized society. The main objectives of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) are the maintenance of law 

and order, the prevention and detection of crime, and the prosecution of offenders. 

The history of the TTPS can be traced back to 1592 with an initial workforce of 

1 Nathan W. Pino and Lee Michael Johnson, “Police Deviance and Community Relations in Trinidad and 

Tobago.” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management 34 (3), 2011: 454. 
100 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

six police officers. Today, the service employs over 65002 police officers who are 

deployed in nine divisions and eighteen specialized units with a mandate to protect 

and serve the population with P.R.I.D.E. (Professionalism, Respect, Integrity, Dignity and Excellence in Service). 

Trinidad and Tobago utilizes the traditional policing model which was inherited from British colonial rulers. This method of policing is a reactionary approach 

with little community consultation and involvement. This dated policing model 

with poor community relations can hinder the work of the police who are agents 

of social control. Community relations are a vital part of policing - the police cannot do their jobs effectively without the invaluable assistance of members of the 

community. According to Sir Robert Peel (considered by many to be the founding 

theorist on police behavior), “the police at all times should maintain a relationship 

with the public.” To show the importance of community involvement in crime prevention and public safety, Peel referred to the “police as the public and the public 

as the police.”3

Policing refers to the authorized use of force to maintain order on behalf of 

the entire community. Policing has evolved over the years since it was formalized 

in the mid-1800s. 

The police are a social group that interacts with other groups and individuals in society often in support of the existing social order.4

 Police officers have a 

highly unique job that requires trust and confidence from the public. They have a 

duty of law: their jobs involve crime prevention, crime fighting, and the protection 

of lives and property. As law enforcement personnel, police officers are expected 

to provide optimum service. Peel maintains that the real “test of police efficiency 

is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in 

dealing with them.”5

2 Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS), www. http://ttps.gov.tt/About-TTPS. 

3 John S. Dempsey and Linda S. Forst. An Introduction to Policing. Massachusetts: Cengage Learning, 2014: 

7.

4 Michael J. Palmiotto and Prabha Unnithan. Policing and Society: A Global Approach. New York: Delmar, 

2011: 13.

5 Dempsey and Forst 2014, 7.
101 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Photo caption: Guard and Emergency Branch officers simulate a riot drill display at the 

grounds of The Police Academy published by Trinidad and Tobago Guardian Online.May 

19, 2015. Photo credit: Shirley Bahadur.

Policing in a multicultural democratic society such as Trinidad and Tobago 

is a difficult task, especially when there is little public trust and confidence in the 

police. In a survey conducted by the Youth at Risk Report Committee, the persons 

interviewed felt that 30 to 40 percent of the members of the police service were 

corrupt.6 In another survey of heads of household in Trinidad and Tobago7, only 14 

percent of the responders felt there is a high level of trust between the police and 

the community.8

Public confidence in the police is closely related to the attitude and behavior 

of members of the service and their respect for human dignity, rights and freedom.9

 The police represent one of the most visible manifestations of government 

authority.10 In the performance of their duties, police officers need to respect the 

fundamental rights and liberties of individuals. To accomplish this, there must be a 

6 Selwyn Ryan, Indira Rampersad, Lennox Bernard, Patricia Mohammed and Marjorie Thorpe. No Time to 

Quit: Engaging Youth at Risk, Executive Report of the Committee on Young Males and Crime in Trinidad 

and Tobago, 2013, 42. 

7 The study analyzed data from 322 questionnaires completed by head of households between April and 

November 2010 in several police district in Trinidad and Tobago. 

8 Wendell C. Wallace. “Findings from a Concurrent Study on the Level of Community Involvement in the 

Policing Process in Trinidad and Tobago.” The Police Journal 85, 2012, 71. 9 Jim Murdoch and Ralph Roche, The European Convention on Human Rights and Policing: A Handbook for 

Police Officers and Other Law Enforcement Officials. Council of Europe Publishing, 2013, 8. 10 Ibid, 24.
102 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

concerted effort towards striking a balance between police powers and individual 

liberty. 

Abuse of trust and authority undermine the relationship between the police 

and community. It erodes public confidence in the police as trust is vital for social 

relationships. According to the European Convention on Human Rights and Policing, striking this balance of trust and public confidence requires the police to subject themselves to accountability before the law.11 This is imperative for Trinidad 

and Tobago because the police act as guardians of its democracy to maintain the 

rule of law and public tranquility. 

Police forces of all countries embody the negotiated balance between governmental power and individual citizens, their liberties, and their privacy.12 Police 

officers operate today in a fluid environment that requires a strong independent, 

impartial, and effective police administration and governance, to reduce the fear of 

crime and to support crime prevention and crime reduction. 

In Trinidad and Tobago, the Police Service Commission (PSC) is a statutory 

civilian oversight organization which is responsible for monitoring and evaluating 

the police service. It is the organization charged with the recruitment and performance management of the Commissioner of Police (COP), Deputy Commissioner of Police, and other police executives. The PSC acts as an appeal board for 

decisions made by the commissioner of police and has the power to remove him 

from office. It also has disciplinary control over the entire police service. The PSC 

together with the Ministry of National Security (the ministry for the TTPS), are 

responsible for transforming the police service into a modern, effective, high performance organization that harnesses greater trust and confidence from the public.

Notwithstanding the role of the PSC, the functional leadership and direction 

for members of the police service rests on the shoulders of the police commissioner. According to Section 123A (1) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, 

the COP has “complete powers to manage the Police Service and is required to 

ensure that the human, financial and material resources are available to the Service 

and are used in an efficient and effective manner.”13 In other words, the COP has 

11 European Convention on Human Rights and Policing (2013).

12 Palmiotto and Unnithan 2011, 13.

13 Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, http://rgd.legalaffairs.gov.tt/laws2/Constitution_12Aug2015.pdf 
103 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

autonomous authority over the daily operations of the police service. This is a 

herculean task without strong external institutional structures and public support, 

especially in light of repeated cases of abuse of police powers and misconduct 

which tarnishes the image of the TTPS.

The importance of this topic cannot be overstated because of the role police officers play in national security, the threat and far reaching consequences of 

crime and the need for improved citizen-police relations. Crime has the potential 

to destabilize a country; it is the object of concern for citizens and the government 

of Trinidad and Tobago which appears to be losing the fight against it. Crime is 

a pervasive dilemma; its manifestation in Trinidad and Tobago poses a threat to 

other neighboring islands. Crime is at the center of regional security discussions 

in the Caribbean.

The aim of this essay is not to peer simply into the transgressions of law 

enforcement officers but to highlight the many challenges they pose to society and 

the difficulties the police administration face to curtail problems of misconduct. 

This publication traces the systematic transformation in the TTPS of the behaviors 

of its members. It examines the government’s intervening efforts to improve the 

police service through the establishment of oversight institutions and the creation 

of internal specialized units. 

Although this study highlights the fundamental abuse and misuse of police 

authority and force, it is not merely an evaluation of police practices and policies. 

Rather, it provides an anecdotal account of accusations of misconduct and criminal 

charges within the TTPS with implications for criminal justice reform. Additionally, this study outlines specific issues that lead to police misconduct, deviance and 

crime, which are presented within a theoretical framework. The essay concludes 

with recommendations for the systematic transformation of the TTPS.

Problem Analysis

When law enforcement officers find themselves on the wrong side of the law, it 

affects the individual, the police service, and the country. Police officers not only 
104 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

have the responsibility for crime control, they are defenders of the democracy 

and engage in services that promote sustainable security and eliminate threats to 

national security.

On Friday April 17, 2015 a newspaper article captioned “22 cops before 

the courts this year”14 was published by the Trinidad Guardian Newspapers. In 

it, reporter Geisha Kowlessar highlighted allegations of criminal conduct within 

the TTPS where 12 police officers were charged for mistreatment of persons in 

custody. Trinidad and Tobago, like the rest of the world, has incidences of law 

enforcement officers abusing their roles. The frequency with which police officers 

engage in law breaking activities seems to be on the rise. These occasions are not 

only reflected in charges by the TTPS Professional Standards Bureau (PSB), they 

are mirrored in the number of complaints lodged at the Police Complaint Authority 

and the growing discord between police and citizens.

The Police Complaints Authority (PCA) was established in 2010 in response 

to the growing accusations of police misconduct and criminal deviance. It was also 

intended to address the perception of the lack of transparency and the slow pace 

in police investigations. The PCA is an independent organization led by trained 

impartial personnel that exists to investigate matters involving police officers who 

are allegedly engaged in police corruption, serious police misconduct and criminal 

offences. 

The PCA is an advisory board to the COP and National Security Council on 

a number of issues. It also makes recommendations to reduce the amount of police 

deviance. It has the powers to make recommendations for criminal or disciplinary proceedings after investigations have been conducted. To date, the PCA was 

instrumental and successful in lobbying for the establishment of a special unit (the 

PSB) to investigate fatal police killings.

During the period 2013-2014, a total of 1556 complaints were lodged at 

the PCA. From that total, 223 cases are before the courts (the subject of judicial 

proceedings), whilst 958 are still under investigation.15 In the last period of report14 Data collected up to mid-April 2015 from the TTPS Professional Standards Bureau.

15 Police Complaints Authority (PCA). 2014. The Police Complaints Authority’s Fourth Annual Report 

2013/2014: Finding Truth-Ensuring Justice. Port of Spain: PCA, 2014, 49. 
105 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

ing, October 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014, the PCA received a total of 49116

complaints. Within that total, 92 complaints are before the courts while 354 are 

currently being investigated. During the same period (2013-2014), the PCA was 

able to place offences in two categorizes – criminal offences with a total of 378 

and disciplinary offences recording 665. The following tables provide a statistical 

breakdown of complaints handled by the PCA at that time:

Table No. 1 Total number of complaints categorized as disciplinary offenses for the 

period October 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014.17

Disciplinary Offences Totals

Discreditable Conduct 304

Unlawful/Unnecessary Exercise of Authority 169

Neglect of Duty 127

Corrupt Practice 51

Falsehood/Prevarication 7

Using Property Without Consent 2

Accessory to a Disciplinary Offence 2

Failure to account for Government Property 1

Breach of Confidence 1

Oppressive Conduct 1

665

16 This figure represents a four percent increase over the 2012-2013 period and a 93 percent increase from the 

inception of the PCA in 2010. 

17 Police Complaints Authority Annual Report 2013/2014, p. 46.
106 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Table No. 2 Total number of complaints categorized as criminal offenses for the period 

October 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014.18

Criminal Offences Total Criminal Offences Total

Assault 119 Unlawful Arrest and Detention 2

Larceny and Related Offences 42 Causing Death by Dangerous Driving 2

Harassment 34 Killing or Wounding Animals 2

Common Assault 29 Murder 2

Fatal Shooting 29 Sexual Harassment 1

Misbehavior in Public Office 23 Cruelty to Children 1

Malicious Damage 19 Rape 1

Non-fatal Shooting 17 Trespass and Unlawful Entry 1

Assault with actual bodily harm 16 Kidnapping 1

Threat 10 Illegal Quarrying 1

Perverting Course of Justice 9 Dangerous Driving 1

Indecent Assault 3 Impersonation of Police 1

Sex with a Female 14-16 3 Failure to account for Gov’t Property 1

Death in Police Custody 3 Grievous Sexual Assault 1

Malicious Prosecution 3 Discharge Firearm 40m of road 1

378

In examining the data presented in the tables, one cannot overlook the high 

number of cases of neglect of duty, discreditable conduct, unlawful/unnecessary 

exercise of authority, and corrupt practices among police officers. Of greater concern is the number of law enforcement officers faced with criminal offences of 

fatal shootings, assaults, harassment, larceny, and misbehavior in public office. 

Although these figures were generated from complaints within one year, they reflect a society in conflict, chaos, and disorder.

18 Police Complaints Authority Annual Report 2013/2014, p. 45.
107 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Review of Literature

Lead criminologist Selwyn Ryan contends that “there is much wrong about the 

police service and that lawlessness is not only limited to gangsters.”19 Kappeler, 

Sluder and Alpert in their seminal writing on “Forces of Deviance: Understanding 

the Dark Side of Policing” remarked “since the creation of the first law enforcement agencies, police have engaged in misconduct...to study the history of police 

is to study police deviance, corruption and misconduct.”20

It is such historical conditions which shaped the modern concept of ethical 

policing beginning with the establishment of Roberts Peel’s (1829) principles of 

policing for the London Metropolitan Police. Since that time, there is a wide body 

of literature on police misconduct, corruption and criminal deviance. However, 

there is insufficient research and empirical data on police misconduct and criminal 

deviance within the Caribbean. One of the problems in collecting data on police 

officers who engage in misconduct is their unwillingness to divulge information 

that would hurt their careers. Another exceeding difficulty in collecting data is the 

possibility that officers may lie, mask or embellish pertinent information. Along 

the same lines, some researchers argue that information collected on police performance is “typically superficial and sanitized”21 and therefore does not provide 

enough detail for researchers to make meaningful conclusions.

19 Ryan et al, 2012.

20 Kappeler, Sluder and Alpert, 1998, 28.

21 Jeffery Ian Ross, Policing Issues: Challenges and Controversies. Massachusetts: Jones and Bartlett 

Learning, 2012, xi. 
108 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Photo Caption: Police officers on patrol in Port of Spain, Trinidad. Photo credit: Trinidad 

and Tobago Guardian Online March 25, 2013.

Notwithstanding these notions, there is wide agreement in the literature on 

the globalization of crime and the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of the police 

services to deal with it. This globalization, according to Bowling, makes nation 

states less relevant and has profound implications for policing since “it implies a 

diminution in the role of the nation state in authorizing and providing security to its 

citizens.”22 The erosion of state powers is not only a consequence of globalization, 

it is a result of violent crime that establishes alternative power structures where 

state powers can be undermined by corruption. McDavid et al, describes the threat 

of corruption as having political consequences where the perceived legitimacy of 

the state is questioned when it acts on behalf of friends and clients rather than the 

people.23 It is up to the people, the police administration, and the justice system to 

correct the misconduct of these officers.

Research has indicated that only a small percentage of police officers account for a disproportionate amount of misconduct measured through complaints 

filed by citizens. There has been agreement by some researchers that officers from 

22 Ben Bowling, Policing in the Caribbean: Transnational Security Cooperation in Practice. Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 2010, 35. 

23 Hilton A. McDavid, Anthony Clayton, and Noel M. Cowell. “The Difference between the Constabulary 

Force and the Military: An analysis of the Differing Roles and Functions in the Context of the Current 

Security Environment in the Caribbean (The Case of Jamaica).” Journal of Easter Caribbean Studies 36(3), 

2011: 46. 
109 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

the lower ranks have the most difficulty upholding the integrity of the service. This 

is debatable, since most researchers focus on problematic officers at one point of 

their careers rather than examining their problematic behaviors over the course of 

their careers.24

Theoretical Framework 

There has been limited success in criminal predictions after decades of research.25

Consequently, theories on police misconduct are diverse and complex. There are 

many proposed behavioral models and causal factors for misconduct including the 

failure of individuals in terms of ethics, the failing of institutions in terms of social 

control and failing of a society in terms of its moral values and weak organizations 

with soft rules and policies that fail to provide focus, direction, and motivation to 

employees. 

Criminologists agree that there is no one explanation for crime. Similarly 

there is no simple prediction or solution for police misconduct. Although police 

officers who commit devious acts come from the same society where criminals exist and face some of the same social challenges, they are considered professionals 

who received extensive training in crime prevention and law enforcement, which 

puts them at a higher level of accountability. Many times, the problems that law 

enforcement officers get into are not recognized as ethical issues until is too late 

to correct. 

The social control theory is one of the most plausible explanations of deviance which results in a violation of norms. Social control is a set of mechanisms 

that create normative compliance in individuals. The mechanisms include attachment to people and institutions, opportunity for achievement, involvement in positive activities, and belief which stems out of values and morality. Social control is 

a method of checking people according to the ethical principle of utilitarianism, 

that is, what makes an action good or bad based on the value of returns and conse24 Christopher J. Harris, Pathways of Police Misconduct: Problem Behavior Patterns and Trajectories from 

Two Cohorts. North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2010, 6. 25 David P. Farrington, Lloyd E. Ohlin, and James Q. Wilson. 1986. Understanding and Controlling Crime: 

Towards a New Research Strategy. New York: Springer, 1986: 211. 
110 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

quences. The social control theory was developed by Albert Reiss26 and refined by 

Thomas Hirschi. Social control provides formal sanctions imposed by laws, rules, 

regulations, and informal sanctions such as culture and behavior expectations. It 

traces deviance back to childhood in terms of improper socialization of children to 

law abiding values and examines the breakdown of these values. 

Social control theorists focus on both the controlling forces behind criminal 

acts (such as group dynamics) and people who do not commit crime (which assumes there is some tendency that prevents these law abiders from engaging in 

criminal acts). The social control theory is subjected to many criticisms. For one, 

conformity to rules and norms requires communicating expectations clearly. Social control relies upon what is understood to be the ‘social norm’ within a given 

society. This leaves room for conflicting messages and distortions regarding behavior expectations because society provides the rules for social order and at the 

same time sets examples of unacceptable behavior. 

The social control theory provides a basis for police officers to obey rules 

and laws and a basis for them to deviate. Police officers who are highly stressed, 

overworked, and demotivated can form attachments to miscreants who provide 

opportunities for them to engage in illicit activities and anti-social actions that can 

transcend into a norm. Police actions can also be guided by ethical egotism – the 

view that human conduct should be based exclusively on self-interest. Additionally, police actions can be a result of lack of moral development: the notion that 

persons are not born with the ability to understand moral standards. They later 

learn and develop morals as the consequence of past misdeeds. Finally, police actions can result from personal moral failure – no precondition, behavioral training, 

or conviction to cause deterrence. 

26 A.J. Reiss, “Delinquency as the failure of personal and social controls.” American Sociological Review, 

Volume 16, 1951 pp. 196-207. 
111 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Culture

Culture is perhaps the most influential driver of organizational change and challenges. Culture is defined as a set of identities, values, attitudes, beliefs, traditions, 

unwritten rules and habits. Culture is important for the management of human 

resources for three reasons: (1) culture can have effects on laws because laws are 

based on the culture’s definition of right and wrong, (2) culture influences what 

people value so it affects economic systems, and (3) culture determines the effectiveness of organizational practices.27

The Police Service like any other organization has cultures of its own. Literature on policing suggests that most new recruits enter the police service with 

strong public service values. However, due to socialization efforts on the part of 

seasoned officers, new recruits quickly adjust and adhere to the norms and values 

(whether negative or positive) associated with the police service. Police culture has 

been widely criticized as a source of resistance to change and reform. 

There are many subcultures within police services. The dominant one is 

camaraderie – a willingness to stick together. When there are problems within 

the service, police officers protect each other even in the face of unconstitutional 

conduct. Another culture is codes of silence – police officers are often hesitant to 

communicate complaints with their superiors through official channels. Neither 

do they divulge information to sources outside their own circles. Paradoxically, of 

the many cultures and practices that exist within the police service, obstructing the 

course of justice and condoning misconduct can become pervasive enough to be 

accepted as the norm. 

27 Raymond A. Noe, John R. Hollenbeck, Barry Gerhart and Patrick M. Wright. Fundamentals of Human 

Resource Management. 5th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin 2014, 477.
112 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Photo caption: Relatives protest the police killing of Chaquille McCoy at Morvant in June 

- police killings spiked in 2014, published by Trinidad and Tobago Guardian Online, December 31, 2014. Photo credit: Michael Bruce.

Changing the culture of a police organization can be a difficult task as cultures exist within systems themselves, with many variations according to the individual dynamics of the police unit. However, this should not impede attempts to 

change the mindset of police officers in Trinidad and Tobago. Batts et al, present 

strategies for achieving cultural change by adjusting the value systems by teaching 

ethics-based decision-making at the police academy and by “incorporating valuebased review boards that examine violations through the lens of department values, in contrast with breaches of specific rules or policies.”28

To combat the perceptions of negative cultures, there should be reinforcement of strong ethical principles and reputable codes of conduct with accompanying measures for non-compliance. For example, regardless of the jurisdiction or locality of police, Mastrofski (1999) proposed six principles of good policing which 

can be incorporated into regulations and rules of practice: attentiveness, reliability, 

responsiveness, competence, manners, and fairness. 

28 Anthony W. Batts, Sean Michael Smoot and Ellen Scrivner. “Police Leadership Challenges in a Changing 

World.” Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2012, 14. 
113 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Corruption

Corruption is defined by the World Bank as the misuse or abuse of public office for 

private gain.29 Under the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 11:11, Section 3), 

corruption in Trinidad and Tobago is an offense that is punishable by law. The law 

clearly outlines corrupt practice and a corrupt person as:

“every person who, by himself or in conjunction with any other 

person, corruptly solicits or receives, or agrees to receive, for himself 

or for any other person, any gift, loan, fee, reward or advantage whatsoever, as an inducement to, or reward for, or otherwise on account of, 

an agent doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter 

or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed, in which the State or a 

pubic body is concerned, is guilty of an offense.”

Trinidad and Tobago is no stranger to accusations of corruption and lack of 

ethics by public officials. Charges include allegations against a Prime Minister and 

her cabinet throughout the period 2010-2015 (some of which includes a former 

Acting Prime Minister and Minister of National Security who has charges levied 

against him for widespread global corruption), to the dismantling of the Integrity 

Commission on more than one occasion because of public discontent with its leadership and affairs. Presently, Trinidad and Tobago ranks 85th on the 2014 Corruption Perception Index30 which could deter potential business investors.

Members of the TTPS are not immune to corruption. Within recent times, 

there have been allegations of a police cover up at the Prime Minister’s residence 

involving the findings of a plant like substance resembling marijuana. Newspaper reports indicated that Police Commissioner Stephen Williams ordered a probe 

when head of the Special Branch of the TTPS Senior Superintendent Gary Gould 

allegedly confirmed the discovery of the substance.31

29 World Development Report 1997 : the state in a changing world. World Development Report. 

Washington, DC : World Bank Group. Accessed August 10, 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/

en/1997/06/17396260/world-development-report-1997-state-changing-world.

30 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/

results 

31 Joel Julien, “PCA Probes Cops: Steps in Alleged Ganga Cover-up at PM’s House” Trinidad Express 

Newspapers. June 17, 2015. Accessed August 10, 2015. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/20150617/news/pcaprobes-cops. 
114 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Corruption in police agencies is a global problem. Gomes contends that “police forces across the region are characterized by high levels of corruption and severe weaknesses, or the complete lack of accountability mechanism.”32 She claims 

this is a result of unreformed police structures. Prenzler identifies miscarriage of 

justice as the worst form of police corruption which can result in wrongful convictions and punishment of innocent persons and the acquittal of guilty parties.33

When police officers stand in the way of procedural justice, they send a message to 

the population that no one can be trusted. This has the potential to promote further 

crime and disorder when people resort to their own types of vigilante justice, refusing to cooperate with law enforcement officials. 

Police Deviance

Deviance is defined as any act, role, career, attribute or appearance that departs 

significantly from social situational expectations.34 Deviant behavior is characterized by acts that break social rules. Police work contains a range of stresses and 

pressures that can present opportunities for misconduct. Although persons recruited into the TTPS undergo rigorous testing and checks into their character and 

background, some police officers are dishonorably discharged from the service for 

misconduct or unethical behavior. 

The present problems within the TTPS are an indication that not enough is 

being done to maintain high standards of ethics which most recruits seem to have 

when they entered the service. Part 1 Section 3 (a, d) and Sections 4 (a, b) of the 

Police Service Regulations (2007) states that each new applicant shall provide a 

police certificate of good character. This involves background checks and finger 

printing to determine their suitability and the accuracy of their information. 

Additionally, the names of police applicants are published in the public domain for public vetting and verification of character. Successful applicants who 

32 Carolyn Gomes, “Police Accountability in the Caribbean: Where are the People?” Paper presented at the 

Workshop on Police Accountability at Civicus World Assembly, Glasgow, Scotland. 23-27 May 2007, 2. 

33 Tim Prenzler, Police Corruption: Preventing Misconduct and Maintaining Integrity. Florida: CRC Press 

2009, 18.

34 Clifton D. Bryant, Deviant Behavior: Readings in the Sociology of Norm Violations. New York: Routledge 

2014: 83. 
115 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

possess the required qualifications and characteristics must undergo polygraph 

testing, psychological testing, and tests for drug abuse. Despite the TTPS’ many 

efforts to select the best law enforcement candidates to preserve order, promote 

liberties, and protect lives and property, there are still members of the police service who engage in misconduct and fall on the wrong side of the law. This persistent problem raises the question of a systemic failure of the criminal justice system 

and reflects on the inherent culture within the police service and the reality of the 

manifestations of the diminishing moral values of citizens of Trinidad and Tobago.

Police deviance not only shapes public perception of law enforcement officers, but, as Pino and Johnson found, it makes citizens less likely to report crimes 

and generates citizen dislike of law enforcement officers.35 The social cost of police deviance permeates far beyond the institutional confinements of the TTPS, 

PSC and PCA; it erodes public confidence in the police and stymies law enforcement efforts. Without public cooperation and partnerships, law enforcement officers cannot effectively police society and ensure public safety.

Use of Force

The police are given discretionary powers to perform their duties. These coercive 

powers involve the use of reasonable force when police are lawfully executing 

their duties. Use of force has become a contentious issue which received much 

public attention due to injuries and deaths of suspects in police care. The problems 

with use of force in Trinidad and Tobago arise as “a showing of rank” and the use 

of excessive force in high crime areas. Because use of force gives police officers 

the capacity to intrude on people’s lives, it is often utilized as an end and not a 

means.

Given the nature of the job, police officers cannot act on impulse. The justice 

system procedures require that police officers make decisions based on predictions 

but this has yielded little success. Policing is highly prone to technical and procedural errors that can result in serious injury and loss of life.36 Since civilians can re35 Pino and Johnson, 2011, 455-465.

36 Prenzler, 2009, 13.
116 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

ceive injuries or death when police officers use excessive force in conducting their 

duties, use of force policies must have checks and balances. According to former 

Director of the PCA Gillian Lucky, those who are given powers to exercise control 

over the life, limb and liberty of citizens must be subject to maximum scrutiny.37

Trinidad and Tobago Defence Forces make a raid on a simulated enemy as part of a Joint 

Combined Exchange Training (JCET) with U.S. Special Forces. Photo credit: U.S. Army 

photo by Spec. Michael A. Byars Jr., published on U.S. Special Operations Command 

South News.

The TTPS Use of Force Policy (Departmental Order No. 92) provides a 

balanced checklist of actions under reasonable and appropriate terms. Some of 

the problems with use of force are the unpredictability of situations, the estimated 

degree of threat, and the time officers have to make decisions. A level of discretion 

is usually employed because no use of force framework document can fully prepare an officer for a particular situation. Still, the actions of police officers should 

be calculated and informed. When officers of the law act on impulse, they are no 

different than the general public. 

37 Police Complaints Authority (PCA) Annual Report 2013/2014, p. 59.
117 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Accountability, Reform Initiatives and Civilian Oversight Bodies

The environment in Trinidad and Tobago is highly politically charged. This has 

frustrated reform efforts as they mainly deal with bureaucracy. Gomes insists that 

reform initiatives to improve police accountability within the Caribbean should 

begin with reengineering the design and power structures of the Public Services 

Commissions to reflect a universal design in which they could be more accountable to the people and not just the political leadership.38 The power structures within the Caribbean as evidenced by their colonial past can be linked to the sociology 

of behaviors in island states today. According to Pino and Johnson, “the grossly 

uneven distribution of power in countries containing weak civil society and a small 

number of powerful elites results in the unequal treatment of its citizens.”39

Bureaucracy cannot be overlooked. The PSC describes its challenges in 

terms of being an organization that is inflexible and whose archaic bureaucratic 

system inhibits productivity and its overall mission.40 The PSC links its administrative challenges to having policy responsibility and transformational leadership 

placed with the Government through the Ministry of National Security. Changes 

to the PSC can be effected through legislative amendment to the Constitution and 

the availability of resources to carry out its mission. 

Civilian oversight bodies are only one aspect of dealing with police accountability. Lucky argues that civilian oversight bodies cannot transform the police 

service because they are merely a review function.41 She believes that despite the 

limitations of the PCA in Trinidad and Tobago and the backlog of cases for investigation and growing number of new cases, the PCA must do what it can to put 

pressure on law enforcement officials to act according to their oaths of office.42

38 Gomes, 2007, 12.

39 Pino and Johnson, 2011, 468.

40 Police Service Commission (PSC). 2011. Strategic Master Plan 2011-2014: Charting the Way Forward. Port 

of Spain, 2011, p. 3. 

41 Police Complaints Authority (PCA) Annual Report 2013/2014, p. 60.

42 Ibid., 60. 
118 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Conclusion

Trinidad and Tobago has resorted to many policing initiatives (tactical and management-oriented) over the years which yielded little results. Organizational and 

cultural changes cannot rest solely on the shoulders of the commissioner of police. 

In order to become effective, the police service as an organization must evolve 

and adapt to the changing dynamics of society, and society must play its part in 

policing itself. Given the elevation of crime and the evolution of citizen behaviors, 

emphasis must be place on the need for empirical research on criminal deviance 

especially when law enforcement officers are involved.

Dealing with police misconduct requires not only reengineering organizational structures, institutional strengthening, and capacity building. It requires 

an understanding of the sociology of behaviors of law enforcement officers in a 

changing global environment and a microcosmic analysis of the moral compass 

of society. Consequently all of these efforts require a relevant body of research to 

guide decisions and make administrative and legislative changes.
119 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

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Bowling, Ben. Policing in the Caribbean: Transnational Security Cooperation in 

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123 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Corruption and its Impact on 

Good Governance in the Caribbean

Henderson P. Patrick

Introduction

This paper examines the controversial topic of corruption and evaluates the threat 

it poses to good governance in the Caribbean. From a myopic perspective, the Caribbean may be viewed as two dimensional, characterized by commerce and crime. 

The region’s political directorate is confronted by the need to ensure economic 

and social stability, growth and development,1 while at the same time seeking to 

prevent the negative influence of national and trans-national crime.2 The constant 

pursuit of social and economic equilibrium is a mammoth undertaking and appears 

futile at best because of its contention with myriad external and internal forces. 

From the outset, governments want to do well; they want to fulfill their manifesto 

and show the citizens that they can deliver on campaign promises to effect change, 

improve their standard of living, guarantee their security, and show the world that 

their nation has the political capacity to govern itself. 

This idealism permeates the entire Caribbean, the archipelago which occupies the geographical space stretching from the southern tip of Florida in North 

America to Venezuela in South America. The region is diverse in relation to its 

people, culture, and resources. These differences give unique character to Caribbean societies and citizens’ demands, but also inform their peculiar linguistic, political, and resource vulnerabilities.3

 By virtue of their size and limited resources, 

Caribbean economies are mostly driven by external global forces leaving them 

susceptible to systemic shock and collapse. Parallel to this reality is the perpetual 

1 Paul Sutton, Caribbean Development: An Overview, 12 December 2005. http://swisscaribbean.org/?i=10 

(accessed August 20, 2015)

2 Anthony Harriott, Crime Trends In The Caribbean and Responses. University of West Indies, Mona 

Campus Jamaica Report, November 12, 2012.

3 Ralph R. Premdas, “Ethnicity and Identity in the Caribbean: Decentering a Myth,” Helen Kellogg Institute 

for International Studies, Working Paper #234 - December 1996, https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/

workingpapers/WPS/234.pdf (accessed August 20,2015)
124 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

fight against trans-national organized crime (TOC) which threatens the national 

and citizen security of these mostly lesser developed countries (LDC), a fight most 

territories are incapable of winning with traditional approaches.4 The pressure to 

deliver and satisfy both citizen and self, thus creates along the continuum, this 

margin for calculated error which is called corruption.

The Current Environment

Operating within a harsh global economic environment with limited natural resources and the inability to generate and maintain productive capacity exacerbates 

the challenges Caribbean leaders face to keep their economies on a sustainable 

path. The pace of delivery or non-delivery of social goods and services has the 

potential to quickly shift the balance of power back to the electorate and render 

political operatives useless and shamed. Political operatives rarely see this as an 

option, especially when they consider that the non-state actors from the criminal 

element never appear to have such constraints. 

It has been argued that were it not for the illegitimate character of their actions, transnational criminals could be lauded as pioneers and visionaries in the 

age of globalization. It is noted that they have adopted facilitative and exacting 

measures to remain a competitive, fashioned and enviable organizational culture 

of efficiency and accountability, and maximized the opportunities provided by globalization. They have been able to innovate, expand and flourish in a furiously 

changing international scenario and to do it while being relatively cloaked so that 

there is an aura of mystery and ambiguity about their operations.5

Conditions Conducive to Corruption

These challenges and realizations act as triggers and open up the door for corruption and corrupt practices to become endemic in government. The region’s leaders 

are fully aware that the Caribbean benefits from as well as faces challenges that 

arise from the geostrategic realities of the region. The Caribbean Sea is both a 

4 Moises Naim, Five Wars of Globalization, Foreign Affairs, 2003, 29-34. 5 Ben Bowling, Policing the Caribbean: Transnational Security Cooperation in Practice. London: Oxford 

Press, 2010, 29.
125 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

barrier and a bridge; it separates nations, but it also facilitates the flow of illegal 

commerce and other illicit activities. The Caribbean, because of its geographical 

position caught between the world’s largest producers of coca and the world’s largest consumers, is considered a prime transshipment location for drugs destined to 

points in Europe and North America. Criminal gangs take advantage of the porous 

borders to traffic not only narcotics but also arms, ammunition and, to some extent, 

people.6

While much admiration may be showered on the organized crime brand, it 

must be said that their ability to strive and succeed is anchored in their ability to 

exercise a corrupting influence on politicians and other state and non-state actors 

who are easily swayed into facilitating some aspect of the organized crime process. 

This reality therefore serves as the point of departure for this conversation on corruption and the threat it poses to good governance, but with an objective of offering solutions which may prevent or diminish the societal imbalances which can be 

caused by corruption.

While much admiration may be showered on the organized crime 

brand, it must be said that their ability to strive and succeed is anchored in their ability to exercise a corrupting influence on politicians and other state and non-state actors who are easily swayed 

into facilitating some aspect of the organized crime process.

Corruption can be endemic, episodic, fiduciary, focalized, generalized, international, local or national.7

 Whichever form it takes, it is manifested in the general 

abuse of power and trust and can be classified as grand, petty and political. While 

we ought to be concerned about all aspects of corruption, grand corruption and 

political corruption will engage our attention more fervently because of the link 

with government and governance and the deliberate manipulation of policies, institutions, and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing. It is 

6 McDavid, Hilton A. “Security Challenges and Threats in the Caribbean,” in Rewiring National Security 

in a Fragmented World, Edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, United Nations 

Institute of Peace Press (July, 2011), 463. 

7 MOOC Chile, Transparency and Corruption, https://www.udemy.com/transparency-and-anti-corruption 
126 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

manifested through bribery, fraud, extortion, influence peddling, kickbacks, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, embezzlement, vote buying, and election rigging, and in 

some sense is deemed by some public officials as an expectation, and thus viewed 

as a social norm.8 Political decision makers often abuse their position to sustain 

their power, status and wealth. In some instances, public officials believe that the 

purpose of obtaining office is to provide one’s family and friends with money, 

goods, favors, or appointments; these unsanctioned social networks can perpetuate 

the norm of corruption.9

The effects of these socio-political and psychological models of corruption 

present themselves in two categories of economic distress which can have either 

minor or major consequences. Both of them in one way or the other will have 

serious impact on the individual community and country. Corruption leads to the 

depletion of national wealth. It is often responsible for increased costs of goods 

and services, the funneling of scarce public resources to uneconomic high profile 

projects at the expense of much-needed projects such as schools, hospitals and 

roads, or the supply of potable water. It also leads to diversion and misallocation 

of resources, conversion of public wealth to private and personal property, inflation, imbalanced economic development, weak work ethics and professionalism, 

hindrance of the development of fair market structures and unhealthy competition 

thereby deterring fair competition. Large scale corruption hurts the economy and 

impoverishes the entire population.10 

In some instances, public officials believe that the purpose of obtaining office is to provide one’s family and friends with money, 

goods, favors, or appointments; these unsanctioned social networks 

can perpetuate the norm of corruption.

8 Transparency International, “What is Corruption? (2015).

9 World Bank Report (2015), 60.

10 Brima Karl Samura, “The Effects Of Corruption.” Global Network for Peace & Anti-Corruption Initiative, 

Link: http://gnpai.org/researchlibrary/corruption/THE%20EFFECTS%20OF%20CORRUPTION.pdf, 

(accessed August 23, 2015).
127 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Concomitantly it is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects 

on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of 

human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized 

crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish. This evil phenomenon is found in all countries—big and small, rich and poor—but it is in the 

developing world that its effects are most destructive. Corruption hurts the poor 

disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a 

government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice and 

discouraging foreign aid and investment.11

Corruption as outlined is a key element in economic underperformance 

and a major obstacle to poverty alleviation and development. In most cases, these 

conditions, along with a weak judiciary, create a supporting environment for the 

proliferation of trans-national criminal organizations and nefarious activities. The 

conduit is through government infiltration or penetration where criminal operatives are absorbed into government to basically facilitate the interest of the criminal element by exploiting the vulnerabilities which are created. 

Governments can also be corrupt. Rather than intensifying efforts to stamp 

out corruption or the advancement and influence of powerful gangs, some governments have instead taken over the illegal operations of the criminal elements. In 

what is referred to as mafia states, government officials enrich themselves and their 

families and friends while exploiting the money, muscle, political influence, and 

global connections of criminal syndicates to cement and expand their own power. 

Indeed, top positions in some of the world’s most profitable illicit enterprises are 

no longer filled only by professional criminals; they now include senior government officials, legislators, spy chiefs, heads of police departments, military officers, and, in some extreme cases, even heads of state or their family members.12

11 United Nations, “UN Convention against corruption,” Link: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/

CAC/

12 Moises Naim, “Mafia State,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012.
128 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

What can Countries do about Corruption?

Huberts asked the question why would or should a country bother about its governance reputation and in particular its corruption reputation? Aren’t corruption 

and favoritism “facts of life,” almost impossible to eradicate because they are part 

of the existing culture and expectations?13 Systems of favoritism and corruption 

have enormously damaging consequences for politics, administration, economy, 

and society. There are examples of states with promising successes in improving 

good governance. However, it is indisputable that there is a relationship between 

corruption and lack of governance and poverty. 

Governance is viewed as the process of decision-making and the process by 

which decisions are implemented or not implemented. Government is only one 

of the actors in governance which also includes other actors such as influential 

land lords, associations of peasant farmers, cooperatives, non-government organizations (NGO), research institutes, religious leaders, finance institutions, political parties, the military, the media, lobbyists, international donors, multi-national 

corporations, and organized crime syndicates. All of these state and non-state actors play a role in decision-making or in influencing the decision-making process. 

Good governance is built up and sustained by acknowledging that the process is 

participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective 

and efficient, equitable, and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that 

corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account, and that 

the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also 

responsive to the present and future needs of society.14

Good governance is not just a colloquial term but a concept which occupies 

the attention of the global community, regulatory agencies, investors and partners. Of note is the United Nation’s Development Program (UNDP), which supports governance programs such as activities that promote free and fair elections, 

freedom of association and participation, an independent judiciary, bureaucratic 

13 Leo Huberts, “Good Governance in the Caribbean Reflections on Good Governance, Integrity and 

Corruption in CARICOM Countries,” Research Group Integrity of Governance, (2012) VU University 

Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

14The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), “What is good governance?” 

http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf (accessed August 25, 2015).
129 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

accountability, freedom of information, effective and efficient public sector management, decentralization of decision-making and resource management, and government interaction with the organizations of civil society. It is also cognizant of 

the fact that its goal of sustainable human development is achievable by means of 

good governance which requires expanding people’s choices and allowing them to 

participate in the decisions affecting their lives. It demands systems of government 

that encourage people’s involvement in decision-making and which stimulate economic growth and ensure that the benefits of that growth reach all segments of 

society.15

The common thinking is that throughout the wider Caribbean, democracy, 

though flawed in various ways, has largely taken hold in the hemisphere and this 

will continue for the foreseeable future. The expectation is that elections should 

continue to be the norm for selecting political leaders throughout the region, given 

that oppositions have been elected and have taken office in every Latin American 

country except Cuba since the transitions to “third wave” democracy in the region 

began in the late 1970s. Democratic continuity has also contributed to improvements in institutional capacity, which has produced more effective governance, 

including poverty alleviation and public health programs, judicial reforms, and 

infrastructure development. While there continue to be cases of “low intensity” 

democracy in the region (i.e., weak government institutions and low capacity for 

governance), the majority have made significant progress in the last 20 years or 

so.16

According to Buddan, however, good governance is more than democracy.17

By insisting on an effective state, the concept recognizes that a state might be 

democratic but not effective. By insisting on people’s participation in national life, 

it recognizes that occasional elections, even if free and fair, do not allow for meaningful and regular participation in the creation and implementation of policies. By 

insisting that the benefits of growth be shared, it recognizes that democracy by 

15Robert Buddan, “Politics in the Caribbean - Good Governance.” University of the West Indies in Jamaica, 

http://gtuwi.tripod.com/governance5.html (accessed August 25, 2015).

16 James Bosworth, Latin America and the Caribbean in 2012 to 2017: A Conversation Among Latin America 

& Caribbean Specialists, Miami: Florida International University Press, 2012, 5. 17Robert Buddan. “Politics in the Caribbean - Good Governance.” University of the West Indies in Jamaica, 

http://gtuwi.tripod.com/governance5.html (accessed August 25, 2015).
130 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

itself does not produce economic and social equality.

Caribbean people have come to the conclusion that democracy as 

practiced in their countries is currently incapable of delivering the 

national stability and personal security that they desire.

The gains achieved by fostering and promoting the democratic process have 

been commendable but they are still not significant enough to inspire conviction 

that waves of corruption have receded enough to permit the virtues of good governance to prevail. The matter of corruption is not linear. When there is not the satisfying of need, there is the satisfying of greed. The quest for more will influence 

every spectrum and ignore all restrictions. In this context, Caribbean people have 

come to the conclusion that democracy as practiced in the Caribbean is currently 

incapable of delivering the national stability and personal security that they desire. 

In the absence of effective elected gatekeepers of good governance, citizens have 

had to become more vigilant of the performance of political leaders and public 

institutions, and vocal in their demand for civic participation in all public policy 

processes. Citizens therefore require that governments renew their commitment to 

national and people-centered development, and create a facilitating environment 

for civil society organizations that are ready and willing, to work towards national 

goals along with other social partners.18

I have the firm conviction that governments within the Caribbean are fully 

aware of the benefits of good governance to the development of their nation state. 

I am equally certain that they are informed about the ability of corruption and corrupt practices to undermine the potential of any country to flourish especially in 

difficult economic times. Waller et.al (2000) points out the view of Transparency 

International that, from an economic perspective, corruption inhibits private investment and growth, distorts public investment, subverts the merit principle, rewards 

those who do not play by the rules, and contributes to undermining sustainable 

livelihoods in an economy, especially for the poor. As a result, costs are shouldered 

18 Gordon Bispham, “Strengthening Partnership for Good Governance”, Presented at the fifth CDB/IDB Civil 

Society dialogue in Guyana, November 18-20, 2008, http://www.caribank.org/uploads/2012/12/PresentationStrengthening-Partnership-for-Good-Governance-G-Bispham.pdf (accessed August 30, 2015).
131 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

by those who can least afford to bear the burden.19 The limited resources within the 

Caribbean assure dependence on regional and international partners for funding, 

foreign direct investment (FDI), good trade relations, and good foreign relations. 

Countries which score high on the corruption perception index risk the chance of 

losing out on FDI opportunities and enhanced technical assistance from more developed countries (MDC’s). They also open themselves to credit downgrades, the 

difficulty of borrowing on the open market, or from other first line lending agencies. As a last resort, they may have to resort to the International Monetary Fund 

(IMF) to assist in resolving internal governance issues.

Of course the attempt at recovery will come at a price. There is usually the 

imposition of stringent austerity measures which generally have a telling effect on 

the citizens of the country. Camdessus (2000) informed that the approach of the 

IMF is to concentrate on those aspects of good governance that are most closely 

related to surveillance over macroeconomic policies—namely, the transparency of 

government accounts, the effectiveness of public resource management, and the 

stability and transparency of the economic and regulatory environment for private 

sector activity.20 The intervention and approach may be deemed necessary, but it is 

generally viewed as invasive and harsh on the population. The public perception of 

any IMF intervention is that of failure on the part of the government and engenders 

a fear of currency devaluation and of losing status in the global community.

It may not appear like it, but the IMF is part of the solution rather than part 

of the problem. Camdessus (2000) continues to make the point that the IMF will 

continue to be a watch dog for corruption in government, whether it is perpetrated 

by individual actions, or is symptomatic of wider government problems which 

may require a change in policy or legislative frame work to correct the problem. 

Corruption has contributed largely to poor governance practices in some Caribbean countries. All is not lost because, out of the 175 countries evaluated annually, 

several Caribbean countries scored above 50 on the corruption perception index 

(CPI). The 2014 CPI suggests that countries at the bottom of the scale need to 

19 Dr. Lloyd Waller et. Al, “A Landscape Assessment Of Political Corruption In Jamaica,” http://www.

Capricaribbean.Org/Sites/Default/Files/Text/Corruption%20report.Pdf (accessed August 30, 2015). 20 Michel Camdessus, IMF Managing Director, Address to the United Nations Economic And Social 

Council, July 2, 1997; International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Good Governance-The IMF’s Role,” https://

www.Imf.Org/External/Pubs/Ft/Exrp/Govern/Govindex.Htm (accessed August 31, 2015).
132 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

adopt radical anti-corruption measures in favor of their people. It warns that countries at the top should not export corrupt practices to underdeveloped countries.21

Huberts (2009) contends that attention must also be paid to principles such 

as ethics, integrity, morality, and values. These he insists will impact behavior, 

policy construction, and decision making. What must be realized is that governance is about people. It is about ensuring that the population is not marginalized 

and deprived of basic human rights and placed in a position where poor economic 

conditions prevent them from access to basic goods and services. This can only be 

achieved when the focus of elected officials is shifted away from making a gain for 

themselves and placing the constituents in the primary position. 

Corruption will take any form or fashion, from a shake down by a police 

officer to the shifting of program funds from one project to another in an effort to 

divert money for self-gain. Beyond this is the manipulation of policies and procedures and legal framework to provide safe harbor for criminals and criminal organizations. It may extent to the point where governments take hold of the criminal 

assets of gangs and other non-state players and administer them for themselves 

creating mafia states and creating communities and societies of slaves and dependents. Such approaches create the platform for poor governance, which ultimately 

leads to the deterioration of the moral and ethical fabric of any country and opens 

it up to non-development, citizen insecurity, bad credit ratings, and a poor reputation among institutional partners. It lowers investor confidence and makes the 

country susceptible to the harsh reality of IMF and World Bank interventions and 

sanctions.

Conclusion

Corruption has a negative and long lasting impact on good governance. In order 

for any country to remain relevant and competitive, its leaders have to be decisive 

and calculated in their treatment of corruption and adoption of the good governance practices. This is the only real solution to sustainable, economic and social 

21 José Ugaz, Chair, Transparency International, CPI 2014 Report, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/

results (accessed August 31, 2015).
133 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

development in the Caribbean.
134 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

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Bispham Gordon, Strengthening Partnership for Good Governance, Presented at 

the fifth CDB/IDB Civil Society dialogue in Guyana, November 18-20, 2008. 

Link: http://www.caribank.org/uploads/2012/12/Presentation-StrengtheningPartnership-for-Good-Governance-G-Bispham.pdf 

Bosworth, James. Latin America and the Caribbean in 2012 to 2017: A Conversation Among Latin America & Caribbean Specialists. Miami: Florida 

International University Press, 2012.

Bowling, Ben. Policing the Caribbean: Transnational Security Cooperation in 

Practice. London: Oxford Press, 2010. 

Buddan, Robert. “Politics in the Caribbean - Good Governance.” University of 

the West Indies in Jamaica, http://gtuwi.tripod.com/governance5.html (accessed August 25, 2015

Camdessus, Michel. IMF Managing Director, Address to the United Nations Economic And Social Council, July 2, 1997; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 

“Good Governance-The IMF’s Role,” https://www.Imf.Org/External/Pubs/Ft/

Exrp/Govern/Govindex.Htm (accessed August 31, 2015).

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “What is 

Good Governance?” http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf

Harriott, Anthony, “Crime Trends In The Caribbean and Responses,” University 

of West Indies, Mona Campus Jamaica Report submitted to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime November 12, 2012.
135 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Huberts, Leo. “Good Governance in the Caribbean Reflections on Good Governance, Integrity and Corruption in CARICOM Countries,” Research Group 

Integrity of Governance, (2012) VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 

http://sidsgg.webs.com/2012/proceedings/Huberts%20Good%20 Governance 

%20in %20the%20Caribbean.pdf 

Meditz, Sandra W. and Dennis M. Hanratty, Islands of the Commonwealth 

Caribbean - A Regional Study. November, 1987. http://www.marines.mil/

Portals/59/Publications/Islands%20of%20the%20 Commonwealth%20Caribbean%20Study_1.pdf 

McDavid, Hilton A. “Security Challenges and Threats in the Caribbean,” in

Rewiring National Security in a Fragmented World, Edited by Chester A. 

Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, United Nations Institute of 

Peace Press (July, 2011). 

Naim, Moises. “Mafia State,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012.

Naim, Moises. “The Five Wars of Globalization,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2003.

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Working Paper #234 - December 1996. Link: https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/234.pdf

Samura, Brima K. “The effects of Corruption.” Link: http://gnpai.org/researchlibrary/corruption/The%20effects%20of%20corruption.pdf

Sutton, Paul. Caribbean Development: An Overview, 2005. Link: http://swisscaribbean.org/?i=10

Transparency International, What is Corruption? http://www.transparency.org/

what-is-corruption/#define
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Transparency International, Corruptions Perception Index, 2014 Report, https://

www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results

United Nations, “UN Convention against Corruption,” Link: https://www.unodc.

org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/

Waller, Lloyd et. al, “A Landscape Assessment Of Political Corruption In Jamaica. Http://www.Capricaribbean.Org/Sites/Default/Files/Text/Corruption%20

report.Pdf

World Bank Report 2015. Link: http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Publications/WDR/WDR%202015/WDR-2015-Full-Report.pdf
137 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

The United Nations Law of the Sea Conventions 

(UNCLOS) and Its Impact on the Traditional 

Maritime Powers Operations in the Caribbean

Wilbert Kirton

Introduction

Throughout most of history, it was generally acknowledged that the high sea was 

open for navigation to all nations. This enabled the maritime powers to traverse the 

oceans of the world in pursuit of their conquest, virtually unhindered by any constraint of law. The traditional use of the sea led to the discovery and colonization 

of large areas of the globe which intensified a global consciousness concerning the 

jurisdiction of the sea. At the inception of the twentieth century, legislation gained 

momentum and today aims to regulate maritime activity through a comprehensive legal regime. This paper outlines the historical origins of the United Nations 

Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and examines “To What Extent the 

Provisions under the Conventions Impact the Traditional Maritime Powers Operations in the Caribbean”. 

Historical Context

The idea of free communication between peoples justified placing the sea at the 

disposal of all, however in historical reality, only the great maritime powers were 

able to make optimum use of it.1 In fact, there was early erosion of this principle, 

since claims to monopolies over parts of the open ocean have been made at different times by several maritime powers. For example, in the 13th century it was 

generally accepted that coastal states had exclusive rights over the seas adjacent 

to their shores but it was not settled how far into the sea a state may lawfully extend its rule and what powers it could exercise in its marginal sea or even farther 

offshore.2

1Rene-Jean Dupuy. The Law of the Sea: Current Problems. (New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1974), 3. 2 Ruth Lapidoth. “Freedom of Navigation - Its Legal History and Its Normative Basis.” Journal of Maritime 

Law and Commerce, No. 6 (1975), 259-272.
138 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Controversy grew in intensity as a consequence of the great discoveries, and 

the well-known Spanish and Portuguese pretensions based upon two Papal Bulls 

promulgated by Pope Alexander VI in 1493, which purported to divide the New 

World between those two powers.3 As could be expected, this extravagant display 

of sovereignty at sea by two nations could not go unchallenged. The strongest objections came from England and Holland. 

The idea of free communication between peoples justified placing 

the sea at the disposal of all, however in historical reality, only the 

great maritime powers were able to make optimum use of it.

The principle of the freedom of the seas had been most brilliantly and convincingly defended by the Dutchman known as Grotius at the beginning of the 

17th century. However, after the case for “mare liberum” had been championed by 

Grotius, the “pendulum of doctrine” swung quickly the other way, with the arguments of the Englishman John Shelden for a “closed sea.”4

In Mare Clausum, first published in 1635, Shelden argued that the seas, just 

like the land, could become exclusive property of nations. It was at this time also, 

that the concept of territorial sea started to take shape. Grotius having addressed 

the large expanses of the oceans, eventually recognized that some enclosed and 

narrow parts of the sea might be subjected to control from adjacent land territory.5

Consequently, the law of the sea doctrine swung according to the contemporary 

constellation of military and political power and to the beliefs about exhaustibility 

of the ocean resources.

Interestingly, the Caribbean was a center of trade and colonization by the traditional maritime powers from the late 15th Century. According to Jorge Dominguez, 

3 Edward G. Bourne. “The Demarcation Line of Alexander V1: An Episode of the Period of Discoveries.” The 

Yale Review (1892-93), vol. 1, 35-55. 4 Ken Booth. Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea. London: Allen and Unwin, 1985: 15. 5 Horace B. Robertson. The “New” Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea. Newport, Rhode 

Island: Naval War College, 1992: 4.
139 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Since the sixteenth century, the powers and the pirates have helped 

shape the international environment of the lands and peoples around the 

contours of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. In doing so, they 

have interacted with each other and with “local” actors in and around the 

American Mediterranean. These local actors have been quite varied as 

well, ranging from states to individuals. 6

At the beginning of the 18th century, the belt of sea along the coast within 

the range of artillery ashore came to be regarded as the territorial sea belonging to 

the contiguous state. This principle, which was developed by the Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek, became known as the “cannon-shot rule”,7

 as the range of 

the cannon then was approximately three nautical miles. Although the range of the 

cannon shot soon exceeded three nautical miles, the principle remained essentially 

intact until the end of World War II. As stated by Jessup, “it remained because the 

nations found it a convenient compromise between conflicting interests.”8 This 

prevailing theory of sovereignty was confirmed by National Practice and Codification Conferences of the 1920s, as well as the preparatory work for the Hague 

Codification Conference of 1930.9

The next significant development in the Law of the Sea was President Harry 

Truman’s Proclamation of September 1945 of United States claim to jurisdiction 

and control over the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental 

shelf of the United States.10 This unilateral claim by the then preeminent maritime 

power and one of the leading exponents of the freedom of the high seas opened the 

door for wider and more comprehensive unilateral claims by other states.11 It was 

this event that triggered an erosion of the relative uniformity and tranquility which 

had existed for about 150 years with respect to the law of the sea.

6 Jorge I. Domínguez, “The Powers, the Pirates, and International Norms and Institutions in the American 

Mediterranean,” in Desch, Domínguez, and Serbin, editors, From Pirates to Drug Lords (New York: SUNY 

Press, 1998): 79. 

7 Robertson, 4.

8 Philip C. Jessup, P.C The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (New York: G.A. Jennings 

Co, Inc., 1927): 261. 

9 League of Nations, Acts of the Conference for the Codification of International Law (1930) v. III: 202 as 

cited in Shabtai Rosenne. League of Nations Conference for the Codification of International Law. (Dobbs 

Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1975): 1404.

10 Presidential Proclamation 2667, “Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the 

Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf,” 28 Sept 1945. US Federal Register, vol.10: 12303. 

11 Robertson, 7.
140 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Emergence of Independent Caribbean Nations 

In the post-WWII period, a number of technological advances led to the discovery 

of new resources and new uses of the sea, which in turn led to the discovery and 

exploration of oil and gas under the continental shelf and development of offshore fisheries. Most noteworthy, during this period, the post-colonial independent 

nation-states in the Caribbean like those elsewhere in the world demanded greater 

controls over adjacent parts of the ocean and an equitable distribution of the resources beyond. 

The geographical definition of the Caribbean area according to Sutton is 

imprecise.12 He posits that the sea itself was not so named until 1773 and the considerable proliferation of names which it held before that time have continued 

thereafter. Similarly, the Caribbean Basin has a total water expanse of approximately 1.35 million square miles with the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea 

are combined, yet a land area of only 92,000 square miles if the archipelago alone 

is counted. Regardless of the geographical definition adopted, Thomas Anderson13

is of the opinion that “no other sector of the ocean has so many different political 

entities adjoining or facing a common water surface.”

Territorial and Sovereignty Imperative - UNCLOS I - 1958

The Truman Proclamation of 1945, in addition to other unilateral aspects of state 

practices, led to assiduous preparatory work by the International Law Commission 

for the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, (UNCLOS I).14

The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in Geneva 

between February and April 1958, and led to the adoption of four Conventions.

12 Sutton, Paul. “The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean” in Size And Survival: The Politics of 

Security in the Caribbean and the Pacific edited by Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne. (New York: Routledge, 

2013): 1. 

13 Sutton, 1. 

14 Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its eighth session, 23 April - 4 July 1956, 

UN Doc. A/3159, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1956 v. II, p. 256, “Law of the Sea,” Article 

1.
141 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

a. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

b. Convention on the High Seas.

c. Convention on the Continental Shelf.

d. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources.

These four Conventions were the only measures in the evolution of maritime 

order to gain appreciable universal acceptance, however only two will be considered as the point of departure to examine those provisions which had the potential 

to directly impact on the traditional maritime powers operations in the Caribbean. 

The fact that UNCLOS I adopted four separate Conventions, rather than one integrated instrument covering all issues, enabled certain Caribbean States, which 

found it impossible to accept the decision on certain issues, to ratify decisions they 

could accept.15

Territorial Waters and Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ), NOAA.

15 Dick S. Gandhi. Shipowners, Mariners and the New Law of the Sea: The effect of technical, legal and 

political constraints upon traditional users of the world’s Oceans (London: Fairplay, 1977): 4.
142 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Innocent Passage 

The 1958 Convention was able for the first time to strike a balance between “sovereignty” and “freedom of navigation.” Therefore, it is worthwhile mentioning 

that sovereignty declared in Article 1 of the Convention is not total, since the right 

of “Innocent Passage” is assured to the vessels of other nations. The right of “Innocent Passage” through the Territorial Sea of another state is therefore one of the 

most important provisions for both merchant ships and warships. 

Freedom of the High Seas

The next convention to emerge from UNCLOS 1 which is relevant to the central issues of this discussion, covered the “High Seas”, or international waters which are 

those part of the world’s seas and oceans which lie beyond the limits of complete 

national jurisdiction. The principal declaration from this Convention is in Article 

2. “The High Seas being open to all nations, no state may validly purport to subject 

any part of them to its sovereignty.” 

UNCLOS II and Further Developments

Although four Conventions were adopted at UNCLOS 1, the Conference was unable to agree on the article establishing the breath of the territorial sea. Von Glahn 

argues that the Conference failed to act effectively on the crucial aspect of defining 

the territorial seas. What eventually emerged from the Conference, according to 

Von Glahn, was a reaffirmation of traditional law and since many states including 

the traditional maritime powers realized their rights were untouched by the various 

conventions, they refrained from adhering to them, although by doing so they did 

not necessarily reject them.16 Consequently, in the next session, the UN General 

Assembly voted almost unanimously to convene a Second Conference (UNCLOS 

II) in 1960 exclusively “for the purpose of considering further the questions of the 

16 Von Glahn, Gerhard and James Larry Taulbee. Law Among Nations:‎ An Introduction to Public 

International Law. New York: Routledge, 2016. 
143 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

breath of the territorial sea and fishery limits.17

Defining A Reasonable Balance UNCLOS III 1973 and Beyond.

In order to integrate the new developments in the Law of the Sea which had far 

reaching consequences, particularly those that arose from the Declaration Principles, the Third United Nations Conference was convened in December 1973. From 

the outset, negotiations were a struggle and clearly a clash of interests between 

those states which have both the capability and the will to use the sea for military 

purposes and small nation states like the Caribbean states which did not possess 

the capability, except to a limited degree, but which did have the will to extend 

their authority over a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).18

After holding eleven long sessions over a period of nine years, the Conference completed its work in December 1982, and opened the United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea 198219 for signature in Jamaica. There is no 

doubt that UNCLOS III is the most ambitious attempt ever made to define a comprehensive legal regime for the seas. The Convention’s goal is to define a balance 

between the rights of coastal states to control and exploit the resources of the sea 

adjacent to them and the rights of traditional maritime states to use the oceans. 

Therefore, by any standard UNCLOS III is one of the most important new pieces 

of international law. Though it is apparent that the high seas area has been reduced 

by the Convention to a mere 60 percent of its early 20th-century existence (as a result of decisions on the EEZ and territorial seas), freedom of navigation operations 

continue to function as before.20

17 United Nation Resolution 1307 (XIII), 10 December 1958. UNCLOS 11. 

18 Ken Booth. “Naval Strategy and the Spread of Psycho-Legal Boundaries at Sea.” International Journal, 

(vol. 38, no. 3, Summer 1983), 374-375. 

19 United Nations Document A/CONF.62/122, opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 December 

1982. Reprinted in The Law of the Sea: Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

with Annexes and Index. (New York: United Nations, 1983).

20 Jon L. Jacobson. “Law of the Sea - What Now?”, Naval War College Review, March/April 1984, 89.
144 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

The Regime of International Straits and Transit Passage.

The importance of straits transit goes far beyond the military needs of any country. The real issue is to protect the navigational right of all nations while meeting 

the legitimate concerns of coastal States.21 The increase in width of the territorial 

sea from three to twelve miles had the effect of enclosing more than one hundred 

straits.22 It is acknowledged that most of these straits are of minor importance but 

at least sixteen in Europe and Asia are international straits of high commercial and 

strategic value, especially to the traditional maritime powers. With respect to the 

Caribbean, the Panama Canal is the main international shipping lane which connects the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and approximately 160 countries and 1,700 

ports around the world.23 Similarly there are also sixteen other passages which 

connect the Caribbean Sea with the Atlantic Ocean. The most significant are the 

Mona and Windward passages and the Yucatan Channel, which are of strategic 

and economic importance since they provide deep water passage to international 

shipping and warships and submarines entering and exiting the Caribbean basin. 

Considering the lobbying practices which exist in the “real world” of ocean 

politics, it would be unrealistic to believe that the traditional maritime powers 

would have accepted a law of the sea treaty that did not fully protect their freedom 

of navigation through straits.24 In accordance with the terms established in Part III 

of the UNCLOS III, “transit passage” is more similar to the “freedom of navigation” exercised by all vessels and aircraft on the high seas, than it is to “innocent 

passage” as codified in Part II of the Convention. 

Transit passage is defined as the exercise of the “freedom of navigation and 

overflight”25 by ships and aircraft in their “normal mode of continuous and expeditious transit.”26 This is interpreted that, while in transit passage, warships may 

21 John Norton Moore. “The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 

Sea.” American Journal of International Law, no. 74 (1980), 85. 22 Declaration of Mr. Khelstov (USSR) to the 56th Session of the Seabed Committee, UN Doc. A/AC.138/

SR.56, p.161. Cited in Dupuy, 84.

23 Elizabeth Nix, “Seven Fascinating Facts About the Panama Canal.” History Channel. http://www.history.

com/news/7-fascinating-facts-about-the-panama-canal

24 Moore, 120.

25 UNCLOS Convention, article 38, para 2.

26 Ibid. article 39. para 1, (c).5.
145 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

operate aircraft and submarines may remain submerged. However, the ships and 

aircraft must proceed through the strait without delay while in transit, refrain from 

the threat or use of force against bordering states and any other acts contrary to the 

UN Charter, and comply with the generally accepted rules for safety at sea and for 

the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from ships.27 

Prospect for Universality of Ocean Management

While historically the sea was the subject of political rivalry and economic considerations, UNCLOS III is an act of distribution done on behalf of all people of 

the world and covering every relevant aspect of the oceans and their uses. In that 

sense, it is a single integrated whole or it is nothing.28. This concept is clearly 

expressed in the preamble of the Convention which states “the problems of ocean 

space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.” This conviction, however, was not adopted by the traditional maritime powers when the 

Convention was opened for signature in 1982. It should be noted that this major 

difficulty stood in the way of the Treaty’s universal acceptance even when the sixty 

ratifications needed for its entry into force were obtained on 16 November 1993. 

As was expected, none of the traditional maritime powers had ratified the Convention when it came into force one year later on 16 November 1994.

While historically the sea was the subject of political rivalry and 

economic considerations, UNCLOS III is an act of distribution 

done on behalf of all people of the world and covering every relevant aspect of the oceans and their uses.

27 Ibid. article 39 para. 1 & 2.4.

28 Philip Allott. “Making the New International Law: Law of the Sea as Law of the Future.” International 

Journal, XL, Summer 1985, 455.
146 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Sovereignty and Presence of Warships in the Caribbean

Despite the signing of the UNCLOS III, the presence of foreign naval vessels in 

the waters of some Caribbean States remain subject to legal debate. This is one of 

those problems of international law which has never received a clear-cut answer, 

neither in treaty nor customary law. Fundamental disagreements have lingered on 

for many years between some states and even took the form of direct, albeit very 

limited, military confrontation.29 Surprisingly, the Convention has said very little 

about the legal regime of internal waters and several disputes have arisen in relation to historic bays. In fact, Lowe argued that neither UNCLOS III nor UNCLOS 

I deals with the question of historic bays: 

Bays claimed by a coastal state not on the basis of the application of 

the Convention rules on the drawing of baselines across bays but on the 

basis of an historic title, establishing an exceptional claim on the basis 

of long and peaceful possession of the waters in question.30

It is well established that UNCLOS III (Article 3) has settled the outstanding issues of the territorial sea by fixing it at a maximum of 12 miles, and thereby 

eliminated one of the main sources of controversy. However, even today Caribbean States like other states across the world are as divided in their opinions of 

the legal consequences of this omission as they were over a half century ago.31

Some Caribbean states have maintained that warships enjoy no right to innocent 

passage, while the traditional maritime powers have rejected this interpretation. 

As a result, there is no general agreement upon the right of innocent passage for 

warships among Caribbean nations, and consequently the rights of passage for 

such ships swings on the pendulum of “conceptual prerogative.” In practice, however, it is common for the warships of traditional maritime states to give low-level 

notification of innocent passage to some Caribbean States of intended passages, 

29 Erik Franckx. “Innocent Passage of Warships: Recent developments in US-Soviet relations.” Marine 

Policy, November 1990, 484. 30See UNCLOS III, Article 10, para. 6. See also Alan V. Lowe. “Some Legal Problems arising from the use of 

the Seas for military purposes.” Marine Policy (July 1986), 172. 31 Lowe, 173-174. 
147 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

informally and without admission of legal obligation. 

Caribbean States like other states across the world are as divided 

in their opinions of the legal consequences of this omission as they 

were over a half century ago.

Though the roles of the traditional maritime powers’ navies have evolved 

with time, one of the principal values of naval forces is their enormous capacity for 

geographical flexibility and of increasing or reducing, in a relatively short time, the 

scale of military presence in distant regions. Naval ships can be brought close to 

foreign coasts while on the high seas, posing a threat of intervention or punishment 

while remaining militarily uncommitted. It is well documented that naval vessels 

have been used to exert force in the Caribbean Sea, which is much stronger than 

diplomacy but less dangerous than other forces. 

The scope of the traditional maritime powers’ naval operations in the Caribbean includes the categories of peacetime operations and the conduct of war. 

UNCLOS III advocates the uses of the seas for “peaceful purposes,” and therefore 

naval operations which are governed by the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea are beyond the scope of this discussion. In examining the peacetime operations of these 

navies in the Caribbean, it is necessary to give consideration also to those periods 

of tension which may arise from creeping jurisdiction and unresolved disputes. 

The traditional maritime powers’ naval peacetime operations in the Caribbean Sea 

may be expanded to include (1) strategic deterrence, (2) naval presence and diplomacy, (3) surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, and (4) training 

and operational exercises.

Strategic Deterrence

In effort to increase the stability of the global strategic balance, the oceans have 

proven to be ideal for dispersing targets and therefore deterring any destabilizing 

temptation towards first strike. Strategic deterrence at sea is provided mainly by 

the ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), whose credibility is dependent on the 
148 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

routine exercise of freedom of navigation.32 For example, it is the ability to transit 

the Caribbean channels and passages submerged that permits these submarines 

to traverse the Caribbean Sea unimpeded and undetected. Given these stabilizing 

tendencies of ocean strategic forces, the provisions of UNCLOS III protect the 

secrecy of the ballistic missile submarines, since they are not required to surface 

in the channels or passages, or provide notification to Caribbean States. Therefore, 

the legal deployment of these submarines is preserved under the Convention.

Naval Diplomacy

It may be argued that traditional “gun boat” diplomacy is something of the past; 

however, naval diplomacy, like all forms of deterrence, compliance, or reassurance, is still essentially a proven psychological phenomenon. Naval diplomacy 

attempts to translate military movement into diplomatic influence by changes in 

the location, force structure, and weapons display of warships, with the hope that 

such changes will affect the perceptions of those it is intended to persuade. In this 

regard, traditional maritime powers have tended to rely on naval forces as important conveyors of state policy for the purpose of deterring aggression or other 

violence.33 UNCLOS III, rather than threatening naval diplomacy, provided warships with an opportunity to increase the impact of their diplomatic signal. The 

unimpeded ability to cross the boundaries of the ocean legally has increased the 

ability for the naval powers to use military potential in order to show displeasure or 

to demonstrate support without using force.34 There are several instances when the 

traditional maritime powers relied on their naval forces for deterring aggression 

and potential violence in the Caribbean region.

32 George Galdorsi. “Who Needs the Law of the Sea?”, Proceedings, July 1993, 72. 33 Roger W. Barnett. “U.S. Strategy, Freedom of the Seas, Sovereignty and Crisis Management”, Strategic 

Review (Winter 1992), 39-40. 34 Booth, 385-389. 
149 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering

Surveillance and intelligence gathering in different areas of the world oceans is 

important for the traditional maritime powers. The ability to survey the seabed and 

obtain oceanographic data particularly within the EEZ of other states is imperative 

for naval operations planning. As pointed out by Alabaster,35 it is no secret that 

the intelligence gathering role of research vessels has always been important to 

naval operations. Consequently, although UNCLOS III declares that all maritime 

scientific research shall be conducted exclusively for “peaceful purposes,” there is 

no doubt that traditional maritime powers have conducted clandestine “research” 

in the Caribbean Sea in disregard of the Convention (Article 240). Undoubtedly, 

these activities are incompatible with the provisions of innocent passage and will, 

if detected, provoke strong protest from Caribbean States who may even invoke 

the right to self-defense. In reality, if past events are any indication for the future, 

it could be argued that the decision to conduct these operations is more likely to be 

determined by power and interest than by the law of the sea considerations.

Training and Operational Exercises

In order to validate the operational capability, a variety of naval exercises which 

include weapon testing are conducted in the Caribbean Sea. With the activation of 

UNCLOS III, naval maneuvers and the deployment of military units are two activities whose legality under the Convention is controversial. Whilst naval maneuvers 

are not restricted on the high seas under the Convention, some Caribbean States 

may attempt to control the security of the EEZ. Lowe argues that while a coastal 

state may require a warship to leave the territorial sea immediately, (Article 30) 

there are no provisions in the Convention requiring warships to leave the EEZ.36 

35 M.B. Alabaster. “How Might the Emergent Law of the Sea Affect the Operations of Traditional Maritime 

Powers.” Naval Review, (January 1991): 11.

36 Lowe, 179.
150 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Future Implications for Operations in the Caribbean

It has been suggested that the waning of superpower rivalry in the Third World acted as an enabler for regional powers to exert themselves. This “warming” of relationships between East and West over the past quarter century has transformed the 

nature of the traditional maritime powers operations in the Caribbean and simultaneously led to significant reductions in their navies. It is therefore worth noting 

that naval capabilities are no longer confined to the traditional maritime powers. 

There is a proliferation of small- to middle-sized fleets capable of naval demonstrations to many regions in the world including the Caribbean. In the future, these 

fleets are likely to grow rather than shrink. Consequently, maritime security issues 

will remain high priorities on the national agendas of Caribbean States. 

Conclusions

The technological developments of the last century which led to the discovery 

of new ocean resources have changed the traditional use of the sea and made the 

maritime domain a coveted area. This led to unilateral claims by states and inevitably ushered in the Law of the Sea Conventions which sought to strike a balance between sovereignty and the freedom of navigation. UNCLOS III is by far the most 

ambitious attempt ever made to define a comprehensive legal regime for the seas. 

Although the Convention has made constructive achievements towards bringing 

stability to the law of the sea, there are still several problems. 

In examining to what extent the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention impacts maritime powers operations in the Caribbean, it is apparent that the 

Convention has no direct major effect on the legal deployment of naval forces in 

the Caribbean waters. Even though the traditional maritime powers had not ratified 

the Convention a decade after it entered force, their participation in the negotiation 

process during the development phase, ensured that their right of naval mobility 

remained unaffected. 

As mentioned previously, the deployment of submarines in their strategic 

deterrence role and in naval exercises can still be conducted in the EEZs of Carib-
151 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

bean States. Therefore some Caribbean States’ attempts to restrict the mobility of 

warships will no doubt be challenged by the traditional maritime powers. On other 

hand, surveillance and intelligence gathering is not covered under the provisions of 

the Conventions and therefore will be challenged by Caribbean States if conducted 

within their territorial waters.

Considering the lack of enforcement mechanisms within the Convention, 

the decision by the traditional maritime powers to conduct these clandestine operations is more likely to be determined by power and national interest than by 

UNCLOS considerations. Finally, the international community is characterized by 

the rule of law rather than the resort to force. Based on this premise, it is evident 

that the United Nations Law of the Sea Conventions has led to a more orderly and 

lawful use of the sea for peaceful purposes in the Caribbean.
152 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

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156 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016
157 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Global Warming and Climate 

Change in the Caribbean

Pat Paterson

“No challenge poses a greater threat to our future and future generations 

than a changing climate.” U.S. President Barack Obama, 03 August 2015.

Introduction

Global warming presents one of the most serious threats to nations in the Western 

Hemisphere. Caribbean countries in particular are the most vulnerable. Sea rise, 

increased storm volatility, droughts, heat waves, coral bleaching, food shortages, 

and increased temperatures present significant risks to Small Island Developing 

Nations (SIDS) in the Western Hemisphere in the 21st Century. 

This article examines global warming, what is causing it, and the associated risks. The article’s main focus addresses the specific problems presented by 

climate change to Caribbean island nations. Worsening conditions from combined 

effects of global warming and climate change may make some of these countries 

nearly uninhabitable in the next 100 to 200 years. Risks from monster storms, rising sea levels, and lengthy droughts that strain limited potable sources on some 

islands may force a mass migration of citizens to safer habitats. 

Global warming may represent one of the most existential threats mankind has ever faced. After years of foot dragging, the international community 

has finally mobilized to try to implement changes to minimize the damage. Many 

countries are now developing alternate energy sources, trying to minimize the introduction of additional greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. But our actions may 

be too little, too late: for the next 100 to 200 years, we can only slow the process of global warming, not stop it. For Caribbean and Latin American nations, 

the danger is here to stay. Despite our best efforts, the problem will get worse 

– much worse – before it gets better.
158 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

What causes global warming and climate change?

The Earth is warming because of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that act as 

a blanket trapping heat that normally escapes or can be absorbed by the planet’s 

oceans and forests. Whereas the Earth’s temperatures fluctuate over time naturally, 

scientists are nearly unanimous in the belief that the planet’s recent temperature 

increases are a result of human action, primarily the use of fossil fuels that emit 

large amounts of carbon dioxide and methane into the air. 

Global warming and climate change are often used interchangeably but the 

distinctions between the two terms are important. Global warming refers to the 

increase in average temperatures across the planet. Climate change refers to the 

subsequent changes of atmospheric and meteorological events as a result of global 

warming. For example, rising sea levels because of melting ice fields, increased 

surface temperatures, and ocean acidification are caused by global warming. More 

intense storms, changes in weather patterns that create drought conditions, and 

heavier rainfall are products of climate change. Some natural disasters – wildfires, 

avalanches, hurricanes, heat waves – may be attributable to both global warming 

and climate change. 

Graph caption: Global annual average temperature has increased by more than 1.5°F (0.8°C) since 

1880 (through 2012). Red bars show temperatures above the long-term average, and blue bars indicate temperatures below the long-term average. The black line shows atmospheric carbon dioxide 

(CO2) concentration in parts per million (ppm). Source: U.S. National Climate Assessment, 2014. 
159 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Fossil fuels currently supply over 80% of the world’s energy and are currently the most convenient and inexpensive way to meeting growing energy demands in many countries. However, fuels like petroleum, coal, and natural gas 

produce large amounts of carbon dioxide, methane, ozone, and nitrous oxide, the 

primary components of greenhouse gases. These gases trap heat in the atmosphere, 

increasing the temperature of the planet. Ninety percent of the heat is absorbed in 

the ocean. As the ocean temperatures rise, polar ice caps are melting at an alarming 

rate. At the same time, surface land temperatures also rise, generating heat waves 

and droughts to a degree mankind has never before experienced. 

For decades, countries were reluctant to take actions to reduce emissions of 

these harmful gases. The science of global warming was too uncertain to justify 

drastic changes. The expenses and technology of switching to alternate sources of 

renewable energy were cost prohibitive and damaging to fragile economies. There 

was minimal political will among leaders of nations to pursue a collective action. 

The cost of inaction outweighs the cost of action to mitigate the 

effects of global warming and climate change.

Scientists have been warning about the ramifications of global warming 

and climate change for decades. But recent scientific research reached two new 

conclusions that have elevated the urgency of the problem. First, scientists confirmed that global warming was a result of man-made pollutants entering the atmosphere and surpassing the planet’s natural ability to absorb it. The amount of 

greenhouse gases has increased 50% since the start of the Industrial Revolution in 

the 18th century.1 Second, the research predicted the amount of warming that may 

occur in the 21st century. Consequently, scientists were able to estimate the potential level of sea rise and polar ice cap melt that will result. Those reasons, coupled 

with clear examples of rising temperatures, reduced polar ice caps, and heightened 

sea levels, have spurred leaders to action. For many leaders, the cost of retooling 

1According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “human activities have caused more 

than half of the observed increase in global mean surface temperatures from 1951 to 2010.” Source: The Fifth 

Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2013: The 

Physical Science Basis. See Frequently Asked Questions, page 43.
160 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

national energy industries away from fossil fuels to renewable energies like solar 

power, hydro power, and wind energy were too costly. However, these same leaders have recently come to the realization that the potential damage from global 

warming now exceeds the costs of preventive measures that a nation may take. In 

other words, the cost of inaction outweighs the cost of action to mitigate the effects 

of global warming and climate change.2

Dangers of Global Warming and Climate Change

News about risks of climate change are foreboding warnings to Latin American 

and Caribbean nations. 2014 was the hottest year on record. 2015 was even hotter.3

Of greater concern is that the temperature increases may be advancing faster than 

before. 2015 was 0.29 degrees higher than 2014, which itself marked significant 

temperature increases over previous years. The increased temperatures had a series of immediate effects which Latin American and Caribbean nations are already 

feeling.4

“Go back in your life to think about the hottest, most traumatic 

event you have ever experienced. That event is going to become the 

norm.” 

Scientists in Hawaii studying the rapid acceleration of global temperatures 

have issued an alarming forecast. In a report published in the prestigious science 

journal Nature, scientists from the University of Hawaii predicted that by the middle of the 21st century average temperatures will be hotter than anything ever experienced since 1860. In other words, “the coldest year in the future will be warmer 

2 For an account of the economic costs of climate change prevention, see Eduardo Porter, “Counting the 

Costs of Fixing the Future,” New York Times, 10 Sept 2013. 3 In January 2016, the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reported that 2015 and 2014 were the warmest years 

on record since 1880. Before 2014, 2005 and then 2010 were the hottest on record. The ten hottest years in 

modern history have all occurred since 1997. See Joby Warrick and Chris Mooney, “Hot in. . . everywhere: 

2014 breaks all records.” Washington Post, 27 Jan 2015; Justin Gillis, “2015 Far Eclipsed 2014 As World’s 

Hottest Year, Climate Scientists Say,” New York Times, 20 Jan 2016. 4 John Schwartz, “Studies Look for Signs of Climate Change in 2014’s Extreme Weather Events,” New York 

Times, 6 Nov 2015. 
161 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

than the hottest years in the past.” The lead scientist of the study put it in more dire 

terms. “Go back in your life to think about the hottest, most traumatic event you 

have ever experienced. That event is going to become the norm,” he said.5

Warmer temperatures also mean bigger and more dangerous hurricanes and 

typhoons. Warmer atmospheric conditions hold more water vapor and produce 

heavier rainfalls.6 Notable differences in weather patterns have already been noticed in the U.S. According to U.S. National Climate Assessment of 2014, heavy 

rainfall events increased by 71% in the northeast of the country, by 37% in the 

Midwest, and by 27% in the south.7

Photo caption: The Qori Kalis glacier, part of the Quelccaya ice cap in Peru, as seen in 

1978 and again in 2008. The part of the glacier that took 1600 years to grow melted in just 

25 years, an indication of how rapidly the planet is warming.8

In South America, one of the biggest worries is the disappearing glaciers that 

sit high in the Andes Mountains, the source of potable water for millions of citizens of the region. Peru, for example, is home to 70 percent of the world’s tropical 

glaciers. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile are also dependent on icefields and glaciers 

as a source of water. Peruvian glaciers have melted by 40% of their original size 

since 1970. In Colombia, just 16% of the snow cover in the country’s mountains 

remains from 1850. Some environmentalists predict that many of the 18 glaciers 

5 Justin Gillis, “By 2047, Coldest Years may be Warmer than Hottest in Past, Scientists Say,” New York 

Times, 10 Oct 2013. 6 Justin Gillis, “2015 Far Eclipsed 2014 As World’s Hottest Year, Climate Scientists Say,” New York Times, 20 

Jan 2016.

7 Justin Gillis, “U.S. Climate has already changed, study finds, citing heat and floods,” New York Times, 07 

May 2014.

8 Justin Gillis, “In Sign of Global Warming, 1600 Years of Ice in Peru’s Andes Melted in 25 Years,” New York 

Times, 04 Apr 2013; Justin Gillis, “Study Links Temperature to a Peruvian Glacier’s Growth and Retreat,” 

New York Times, 25 Feb 2014.
162 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

in the Peruvian Andes will disappear altogether by 2021. The problem may have 

severe impact on potable water, irrigation for crops, and electricity.9

There is another atmospheric problem that is often overshadowed by the 

attention on climate change. Atmospheric pollution in many parts of the Western 

Hemisphere – primarily from fossil fuels used in power generation and transportation - have reached epidemic levels. According to a report presented at the February 2016 annual conference of the American Association for the Advancement of 

Science in Washington DC, more than 5.5 million people die each year from air 

pollution caused by fine particles generated in coal-fired power plants. Worldwide, 

air pollution is now the second leading cause of premature deaths behind smoking. The problems are concentrated in China and India because of those countries’ 

dependence on coal to produce electricity but the contaminants are carried aloft by 

wind patterns that deliver the pollution to many parts of North and South America.10 Latin America has its own problems with smog. In Santiago, Chile, for example, the government declared an environmental emergency in June 2015 when 

smog blanketed the city, nearly blocking out the sun. Santiago and Mexico City are 

considered some of the most polluted cities in the world. 

Photo caption: A heavy blanket of pollution covers Santiago, Chile in June 2015, forcing the government to shut down nearly 1000 factories and order 40% of the cars off the 

streets. Photo credit: Quartz.com. 

9 AFP, “Andes Glaciers, Ailing Giants Hit by Climate Change,” 02 Dec 2014; Heather Somerville, “Glacier 

melt in Peru becomes more than a climate issue,” Washington Post, 16 Jan 2011. 10 Darryl Fears, “More than 5 million people a year will die from polluted air,” The Washington Post, 13 

February 2016, p. A3. 
163 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Computer models predict an increase in the number of Category 

4 and 5 Atlantic hurricanes by the end of the century. Rainfall 

averages in these events are expected to increase by 20 percent.

Security and Defense issues related to Climate Change

In 2014, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) declared climate change an immediate threat to national security. According to the Pentagon, climate change is 

a “threat multiplier.” Global warming can exacerbate problems on terrorism, infectious disease, global poverty, and conflicts over water and food shortages. The 

DOD tasked its subordinate commands to consider climate change risks in all of 

their operations and strategic planning.11 Then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel 

told the Ministers of Defense from Caribbean and Latin American countries at a 

security conference in Lima, Peru that,

The loss of glaciers will strain water supplies in several areas of our 

hemisphere. Destruction and devastation from hurricanes can sow the 

seeds of instability. Droughts and crop failures can leave millions of 

people without any lifeline, and trigger waves of mass migration.”12

Climate change may be especially hard on economically delicate countries 

in vulnerable coastal regions. India, Bangladesh, and the Mekong Delta in Vietnam 

could suffer tremendously as sea levels rise, triggering a wave of new migration 

problems that would overwhelm the absorptive capacity of neighboring countries. 

Pentagon officials call it a “catalyst for conflict.” “In the past, the thinking was 

that climate change multiplied the significance of a situation. Now we’re saying 

it’s going to be a direct cause of the instability,” said retired General Charles Ward, 

11 Department of Defense, “National Security Implications of Climate-Related Risks and a Changing 

Climate,” 23 July 2015. http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/150724-congressional-report-on-nationalimplications-of-climate-change.pdf?source=govdelivery . In January 2016, the DOD issued additional 

instructions to the military services and other offices under its responsibility. See Department of Defense 

Directive 4715.21, “Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience,” January 14, 2016: http://www.defense.gov 

Portals/1/Documents/pubs/471521p.pdf

12 Coral Davenport, “Pentagon Signals Security Risks of Climate Change,” New York Times, 13 Oct 2014. 

Read the Department of Defense 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/

download/CCARprint.pdf.
164 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

who studied the situation for the Pentagon.13 For example, scientists determined 

that a drought in parts of the Eastern Mediterranean from 2006 to 2009 was a factor in the Syrian civil war. Extreme dryness caused crop failures that forced 1.5 

million Syrians to migrate to cities. This contributed to social stresses in urban 

areas that eventually triggered an uprising against President Bashar al-Assad in 

March 2011.14 Since then, the Syrian civil war has raged unabated, taking the lives 

of 250,000 people. 

“Rising global temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, 

climbing sea levels, and more extreme weather events will intensify 

the challenges of global instability, hunger, poverty, and conflict. 

They will likely lead to food and water shortages, pandemic disease, 

disputes over refugees and resources, and destruction by natural 

disasters in regions across the globe,” 

Former U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, 2013.

Conference to the Parties (COP-21) in Paris, December 2015

For many Caribbean citizens, the reports from the December 2015 global Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 

(COP-21) in Paris was welcome news. For the first time since the 1997 Kyoto 

Protocol, countries established limits on greenhouse gas emissions that aimed to 

reduce the impact of greenhouse gases on the planet. The 196 national representatives attending the conference agreed to try to limit global warming to an increase 

of 2.0 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial levels. Delegates also pledged to try to slow global warming even further, by trying to limit 

temperature increases to 1.5 degrees Celsius.15 The event represents what could 

be a transformational global moment in which countries across the planet change 

13 Coral Davenport, “Climate Change Deemed Growing Security Threat by Military Researchers,” New York 

Times, 13 May 2014.) 14 Henry Fountain, “Researchers Link Syrian Conflict to a Drought made worse by Climate Change,” New 

York Times, 02 Mar 2015; Peter Gleick, “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria,” Pacific 

Institute, February 2, 2014.

15 The 12-page summary of the COP-21 accord is at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf
165 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

their energy-producing industries from “dirty” greenhouse-producing fuels like 

coal, oil, and gas to carbon-free energy sources like wind, solar, geothermal, and 

nuclear power. 

Despite the historical achievement in Paris – the first time in over 20 years 

that the international community reached a universal agreement on the problem 

of climate change – a number of participants in the COP-21 Conference have 

expressed doubts about the process. There is no enforcement mechanism to ensure countries follow through on their pledges. The conference agreement was 

non-binding; each country has only made a voluntary commitment to reduce their 

emissions. There are worries that the world’s biggest polluters - China, the U.S., 

India, Brazil, Canada, Russia, Indonesia and Australia – may not have the political will to curb greenhouse gases when faced with growing energy demands and 

fragile economies. “Whether or not this becomes a true turning point for the world, 

though, depends critically on how seriously countries follow through,” one conference delegate admitted.16

The global collective effort may have come a bit too late. So much greenhouse gas has accumulated in the atmosphere because of human activity that it will 

take centuries for it to be slowly absorbed by oceans. The COP-21 participants 

agreed to reduce the global emissions in order to slow global warming. However, 

that effort only delays the doubling of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere from current amounts by ten years from 2065 to 2075.17 “The pledges are a big step forward 

but not sufficient. . . . not even close,” said one scientist about the conference participants’ efforts to reverse climate change.18

Scientists agree that the melting of ice fields in Antarctica and Greenland 

will continue for decades or centuries even if carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 

gases are brought under control. The melting will continue until the atmosphere 

can clean itself of residual contaminants – a process scientists refer to as “deep 

decarbonization” - and adjust to the new conditions. Some worry that we may have 

already passed the point of no return.19

16 Coral Davenport, “Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris,” New York Times, 12 Dec 2015. 17 Steven Koonin, “Tough Realities of the Climate Talks,” New York Times, 04 Nov 2016. 18 Justin Gillis and Somini Sengupta, “Progress Seen in New Goals on Warming,” New York Times, 28 Nov 

2015.

19 Kenneth Chang, “The Big Melt Accelerates,” The New York Times, 20 May 2014, p. D1.
166 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Political Obstacles

The United States is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world. 

For many years, the U.S. refused to join international efforts to reduce emissions. 

Under the Obama Administration, the U.S. has taken a different tack. In June 

2013, the government released its Climate Action Plan and agreed to reduce its 

greenhouse gas emissions by 17 percent below 2005 levels. Just prior to the Paris 

COP-21 Summit in December 2015, President Obama made an even deeper commitment. He pledged that the U.S. would reduce emissions by 28 percent by 2025. 

This came on the tail of a major breakthrough brokered with the world’s largest 

greenhouse gas producer, China.20

However, the U.S. and other countries still face significant obstacles to 

reducing global warming, particularly from skeptics who refute the science that 

shows the planet is warming. These doubters are a very small percentage of policy 

makers who seem intent on blocking any investment in reducing human-caused 

global warming conditions. Even with the modest accomplishments made at COP21 in Paris in December 2015, conservative politicians and fossil fuel industries 

continue to raise uncertainty on the issue that distracts government and industry 

officials from making meaningful progress. Since the 1970s, top executives and 

scientists of fossil fuel corporations have banded together to block or delay legislation. In 1989, a group of automobile, utility, and fossil fuel industries joined forces 

to form the Global Climate Coalition, a group dedicated to blocking U.S. ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 

The Kyoto Protocol was the 1997 United Nations effort to reduce greenhouse emissions based on the assumption that global warming exists and manmade CO2 emissions have caused it. 192 countries ratified the Protocol including 

Russia, China, and India, countries that produce the largest amount of CO2 emissions. The U.S. was the only major developed country in the world that didn’t 

ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S. Senate voted 95-0 to not ratify the Kyoto Protocol if it harmed the U.S. economy claiming that such efforts were futile unless 

20 Coral Davenport, “A Climate Accord Based on Global Peer Pressure,” New York Times, 15 Dec 2014.
167 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

developing countries were also tasked to reduce emissions.21 The Global Climate 

Coalition and, particularly, fossil fuel companies lobbied to oppose any legislation 

intended to reduce human emissions. 

In March 2015, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, a Republican 

from coal-heavy state Kentucky, wrote governors of the fifty U.S. states, urging 

them to “reject Obama’s mandate for clean-power regulations” and urged them 

to refuse to submit climate change compliance plans to the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA). In November 2015, conservative politicians in the U.S. 

Senate passed legislation that would repeal new EPA rules to reduce heat-trapping 

carbon emissions from existing coal-fired power plants.22 The Senate vote, passed 

on the eve of the COP 21 conference in Paris, carried an important symbolic message to the international community: the conservative Republican leaders in the 

U.S. Congress do not support the Obama administration proposed legislation backing climate change efforts by the international community.23

Republican Party presidential candidates are some of the biggest skeptics of 

climate change. Many have vowed to reverse the efforts of the United States at the 

Paris climate talks. “I don’t believe in climate change,” Donald Trump told CNN 

in an interview in September 2015. Marco Rubio, Republican Senator from Florida, said, “I do not believe that human activity is causing these dramatic changes 

to our climate the way these scientists are portraying it.” Ben Carson said, “There 

is no overwhelming science that things that are going on are man-caused and not 

naturally caused.”24 The Obama Administration efforts to assist developing coun21 Robert Bruelle, “America has been duped on climate change,” The Washington Post, 06 Jan 2016. For a 

comprehensive summary of the U.S. legislative efforts on climate control, see “Jane A. Leggett, “A U.S.-

Centric Chronology of the International Climate Change Negotiations,” Congressional Research Service, 08 

Feb 2011).

22 In 2006, President George W. Bush’s senior associate on climate research, Rick Piltz, resigned in protest 

from the Bush Administration. Piltz complained that the Administration was guilty of a “conspiracy of 

silence” for watering down government reports on climate change in order to hide the severity of the problem 

from the American people. In his resignation letter, he accused the Bush White House of “undermining the 

credibility and integrity of the program.” Coral Davenport, “Senate Votes to Block Obama’s Climate Change 

Rules,” New York Times, 17 Nov 2015. 23 According to one recent U.S. poll, nearly 70% of Democrats believe global climate change is a serious 

problem as compared to only 20% of Republicans. Source: Sewell Chan, “Poll Finds Global Consensus on the 

Need to Curb Emissions,” New York Times, 06 Nov 2015). 24 Heather Haddon, “Donald Trump: I Don’t Believe in Climate Change,” Wall Street Journal, 24 September 

2015; Coral Davenport, “Many Conservative Republicans Believe Climate Change is a Real Threat,” New 

York Times, DATE; Coral Davenport, “Why Republicans Keep Telling Everyone They’re Not Scientists,” 

New York Times, 31 Oct 2014; Emmarie Huetteman, “Rubio Denies Humans Have An Effect on Climate 

Change,” New York Times, 11 May 2014; 
168 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

tries (like those in the Caribbean) with $3 billion of aid so that they may adapt their 

economies to new clean energy standards have been blocked by conservatives in 

the U.S. Congress.25

This philosophical sentiment may be soon obsolete. Recent public opinion 

surveys in the U.S. show that climate change is a significant concern of both Republicans and Democrats alike. Seventy-nine percent of Americans now say they 

have witnessed evidence of climate change. Sixty-seven percent support limiting 

greenhouse gas emissions from power plants. Even multinational companies like 

ExxonMobil have acknowledged that humans are causing climate change and are 

seeking to reform their operations to eliminate dangerous greenhouse gases.26

Climate Change and Global Warming Impact on the Caribbean

For a number of reasons, Caribbean nations have a heightened vulnerability to 

climate change and global warming. In particular, two factors portend the greatest risk to Caribbean nations: more destructive storms and increased sea level. 

Warmer Atlantic Ocean water temperatures will produce stronger and more frequent hurricanes. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 

(IPCC) noted an increase in the intensity, frequency, and duration of Atlantic hurricanes since 1980. Higher sea surface temperatures, expected as global warming increases ocean temperatures, produce stronger hurricanes. Computer models 

based on these indicators predict an increase in the number of Category 4 and 5 

hurricanes by the end of the century. Rainfall averages in these events are expected 

to increase by 20 percent.27

25 The Caribbean Planning for Adaptation to Climate Change (CPACC) and the Global Environment Fund 

(GEF) are two examples of financial assistance packages sponsored by wealthy nations to Small Island 

Developing Nations (SIDS) to ease the financial shock of implementing changes to industry and other 

preventive measures. Coral Davenport, “Global Climate Pact Gains Momentum as China, U.S. and Brazil 

Detail Plans,” New York Times, 01 July 2015, p. A12. 26 David Leonhardt, “American’s Concern over Climate Change is again on the Rise,” New York Times, 16 

June 2015. 

27 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fifth Assessment Report, November 2014. Available 

at https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data.shtml
169 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Table 1 – Examples of Risks and Factors of Global Warming on Caribbean Nations28

Increasing frequency of larger, more destructive storms. 

Sea-level rise and flooding of coastal settlements and infrastructure.

Limited civil defense force capacity and response.

Potential damage to coastal and marine environments and resources (e.g., fishing industry).

Economic losses from climate change effects (e.g., reduced crop yield, drought, 

deforestation, decreased rainfall).

Economic risk heightened by dependence on limited natural resources.

Environmental damage impact on tourist industry (e.g., beach erosion, cruise ship terminals, 

coral bleaching).

Risk to potable water sources.

Decreased tourism due to increased frequency and severity of extreme weather.

Caribbean island nations have always been very vulnerable to Atlantic hurricanes. Aside from the death and injuries these storms cause, they can have costly 

consequences for the infrastructure and economies of the countries. In September 1995, Hurricanes Luis and Marilyn were back-to-back storms that devastated 

Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica. Both storms landed on the islands within 

the space of 10 days; Hurricane Luis on September 5 and Hurricane Marilyn on 

September 14. The storms caused extensive damage on the islands, estimated at 

over $400 million. The entire banana crops on both islands were destroyed. Under 

future conditions of heightened storm activity due to global warming and climate 

change, these kinds of “country killer” storms may become more commonplace. 

A second significant risk for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the 

Caribbean is from rising ocean levels. Temperature increases in the past few decades have caused an accelerated melting of the ice caps in Antarctica and Greenland, home to nearly all of the world’s ice. The Antarctic accounts for nearly 90% 

of all the ice on Earth. Greenland accounts for nearly all of the remaining 10 percent. The melt off on these two land masses has accelerated and some scientists 

now predict that the process is nearly irreversible. Greenland has enough ice to 

raise the sea levels by 23 feet if all the ice on the land mass melted. If the Antarctic 

28 Information collated from numerous sources including United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 

“Climate Change in the Caribbean and the Challenge of Adaptation,” 2008; United Nations Framework 

Convention on Climate Change, “Climate Change - Small Island Developing States,” 2005.
170 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

ice disappeared completely, sea levels would rise 215 feet around the globe.29

Since the year 1900, average global temperatures have increased 1.7 degrees 

Fahrenheit. As a result, sea heights around the planet have risen by eight inches. 

Recent international efforts were aimed at limiting the warming of the planet to 2 

degrees Celsius or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit. But the fear is that the conditions will 

grow much worse. By the year 2100, according to the IPCC, the global temperatures are expected to increase by 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit above pre-industrial levels. Global sea heights could reach three to five feet above current levels.30

Some scientific models predict something much more catastrophic: a temperature rise by as much as 12 degrees Fahrenheit. Caribbean nations with low 

geographic profiles, like the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos, and 

the offshore islands of Belize would be consumed by the ocean rise. 

Projected average annual temperature changes over the contiguous United States. Graph 

shows results from numerous studies: CMIP (Coupled Model Intercomparison Project), 

SRES (Special Report on Emissions Scenarios), RCP (Representative Concentration Pathways), and NCDC (National Climatic Data Center). Differences in these projections are 

principally a result of differences in the scenarios. Source: 2014 National Climate Assessment. 

29 In contrast, ice in mountain glaciers like those in the Andes in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia account for less 

than one percent of the planet’s frozen water. Kenneth Chang, “The Big Melt Accelerates,” The New York 

Times, 20 May 2014, p. D1. 30 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established in 1988, won the Nobel Peace Prize 

in 2007 for its efforts to raise the alarm and rally governments to a response on climate change. Justin Gillis, 

“The Flood Next Time,” New York Times, 14 Jan 2014, p. D1. 
171 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Approximately 70 percent of the nearly 40 million inhabitants of Caribbean 

islands live in coastal communities that are vulnerable to sea rise. The vast majority of the tourist industry is concentrated in this area in the form of hotels, resorts, 

marinas, restaurants, cruise ship terminals, and airports. The problem could cause 

a reduction in the number of foreigners visiting Caribbean islands to scuba dive 

and snorkel, one of the main tourist activities in many of the islands in the region. 

This is alarming for the economies of these countries; on average, Caribbean nations generate about 30 percent of their economies from the tourist industry. In 

Barbados, for example, tourism revenue generates 36 percent of its gross domestic 

product.31 In 2004, almost 2.5 million people in the region depended on tourism for 

employment, about 15.5 percent of total employment.32

Global warming may also threaten fresh water sources on many Caribbean 

islands. Most Caribbean islands depend on a single source of freshwater, either 

groundwater, rainwater, rivers, or surface reservoirs in most cases. The Bahamas 

and Barbados, for example, are almost entirely dependent on groundwater supplies 

of fresh water. Scientists predict that rainfall will be less regular as a result of climate change. Rainfall may increase during intense hurricanes and tropical storms 

but, overall, average rainfall amounts will decrease.33

Consequently, many Caribbean island nations are suffering from droughts. 

The 2015 Caribbean drought, one that continues into 2016, has affected Caribbean 

countries from Cuba to Trinidad and Tobago. This is particularly worrisome for 

some islands that already suffer from freshwater supplies that are lower than the 

international limit of 1,000 cubic meters of potable water per person per year. For 

example, Antigua and Barbuda (800 cubic meters per capita), Barbados (301 cubic 

meters per capita), and St. Kitts and Nevis (621 cubic meters per capita) are all 

considered water-scarce countries according to international standards.34

31 Tourism rates retrieved from World Travel and Tourism Council, http://www.wttc.org/datagateway/

32 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), “Climate Change in the Caribbean and the Challenge of 

Adaptation,” 2008, 12. 

33 United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2007a. “Vulnerability and 

adaptation to climate change in small Island Developing State”. Background paper for the UNFCCC Expert 

Meeting on Adaptation for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Part I - Caribbean and Atlantic Ocean 

SIDS, Jamaica, February 2007.

34 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), Caribbean Environment Outlook 2005. Nairobi, Kenya.
172 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

The atmospheric changes could have an impact under the water also. The 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) announced in 2015 

that the world was suffering from only the third global coral bleaching event ever 

recorded. Coral bleaching is caused by an acidification of the waters as excessive CO2

 is absorbed by the oceans. Severe bleaching can kill reefs, reduce food 

sources for marine life that depends on the reef as an ecosystem, and even decrease 

shoreline protection from storms. According to some scientists, coral reefs have 

been reduced by 40 percent worldwide. Caribbean coral reefs may be deteriorating even faster; one study cited by the United Nations indicates that as much as 

80 percent of reefs in the Caribbean region may have been lost in the past two 

decades.35 Mark Eakin, the director of NOAA’s Coral Reef Watch declared, “This 

is absolutely the worst they have ever seen. We’re very likely to see the bleaching 

get worse in 2016.”36

Conclusion

Among scientists, there is little doubt that human activity is responsible for rising temperatures, a byproduct of the pollution pumped into the atmosphere by an 

overcrowded planet and man’s dependence on fossil fuels for energy. The American Association for the Advancement of Science, the world’s largest science society with over 120,000 members, released a report in early 2014 attesting to the 

near-unanimity on human-caused global warming. “Based on well-established evidence, about 97 percent of scientists have concluded that human-caused climate 

change is happening,” the report stated.37

Among Caribbean nations, there are a number of urgent actions that must be 

taken. Civil defense budgets have to be expanded. Regional agreements on disaster 

responses by CARICOM and other organizations have to be modified to reflect the 

35 Gardner, T., Côté, I., Gill, J., Grant, A., and Watkinson, R., 2003. Long-Term Region-Wide Declines in 

Caribbean Corals. Science: 301. No. 5635, 958 - 960. According to the 2006 Caribbean Sea Ecosystem 

Assessment (CARSEA), the continued decline of coral reefs could cost the region between US$350m and 

US$870m per year by 2050. See CARSEA Executive Summary. 2006. The University of West Indies. The 

Cropper Foundation. 

36 John Schwarz, “Pacific Ocean Becomes a Caldron,” New York Times, 03 Nov 2015; Carl Zimmer, “Ocean 

Life Faces Mass Extinction, Broad Study Says,” New York Times, 16 Jan 2015. 37 Justin Gillis, “Scientists Sound Alarm on Climate,” New York Times, 18 Mar 2014.
173 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

new danger. Legislators have to work with private companies in their countries to 

retool their energy industry toward renewable and cleaner sources of fuel. 

Individuals can also take steps as part of a collective effort to minimize the 

carbon footprint of their countries. The problem is so severe that no effort is too 

insignificant. Install proper insulation in houses to prevent excessive energy use. 

Switch to more efficient light bulbs and electrical systems. Invest in renewable 

energy like solar panels. Use public transportation when possible. Press political 

representatives who support these initiatives; vote out those who do not. 

Every country, including Caribbean nations, has to deal with the risks of 

global warming and climate change. Caribbean countries only produce a fraction 

of the greenhouse gases of other developed countries like China, India, and the 

United States. But the region is heavily dependent on “dirty” fuel sources like 

gasoline, diesel oil, and fuel oil for energy production. In fact, 90 percent of atmospheric contaminants produced by Caribbean countries comes from fossil fuels. 

Everyone must do their part to reduce the introduction of additional greenhouse 

gases into the atmosphere. Caribbean nations have to wean themselves off of fossil 

fuel industries and invest and develop renewable clean energy technologies like 

wind, solar, and hydro power. 

Climate change will affect the Caribbean nations and other countries in the 

Western Hemisphere for hundreds of years. Even if the nations of the world can 

reduce their reliance on fossil fuels and develop alternative sources of energy, the 

climate will continue to warm and create atmospheric difficulties. The question is 

not if conditions will worsen for Caribbean nations – they will – but how rapidly 

the problems will intensify. 
174 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Bibliography

Caribbean Environment Programme, 2008. Caribbean Environment Programme 

(CEP). http://www.cep.unep.org 

CARICOM Secretariat, 2008b. Caribbean Planning for Adaptation to Climate 

Change (CPACC) Project. http://www.caricom.org/jsp/projects/macc%20

project/cpacc.jsp 

CARICOM Secretariat, 2008c. Adaptation to Climate Change in the Caribbean 

(ACCC) Project. 

http://www.caricom.org/jsp/projects/macc%20project/accc.jsp 

CARSEA Caribbean Sea Ecosystem Assessment: Executive Summary. 2006. 

The University of West Indies. The Cropper Foundation. 

UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2005. Vital Climate Graphics Latin America and the 

Caribbean. Arendal, Norway.

UNFCCC, 2006a. “Adaptation to Climate Change under the UNFCCC –The 

Caribbean perspectiva”. Presentation at the Symposium Climate Change: 

The Caribbean in Danger, Fort-de-France, Martinique, 11-13 December 

2006. http://www.cgste.gf/fichiers/contributions/2006-12_June_BUDHOORAM.pdf 

UNFCCC, 2006b. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: 

Handbook. Climate Change Secretariat, Bonn, Germany.

UNFCCC, 2008a. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 

Change, http:// unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/2627.php 
175 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

UNFCCC (2005), Climate Change, Small Island Developing States. Climate 

Change Secretariat (UNFCCC), Bonn, Germany. 

U.S. Department of Defense, 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, http://

www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/CCARprint.pdf 

U.S. Global Change Research Program, National Climate Assessment, 2014.

http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report 

World Bank Group, 2008a. The World Bank and GEF sign US$2.1 million grant 

to protect coastal areas in the Caribbean, News Release No. /GEF/October 

03, 2006, Washington, D.C. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/OECSEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21079676~page

PK:1497618~piPK:217854~t heSitePK:339287,00.html 
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177 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Venezuela’s “9-Dash-Line” in the Caribbean

 R. Evan Ellis

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has resurrected century-old land claims 

over two-thirds of neighboring Guyana and its corresponding maritime borders. 

Venezuela’s aggressive rhetoric and stated plan to register Guyanese citizens living in the disputed territory as Venezuelans represent direct challenge to the hemisphere’s traditions of rule of law and diplomacy. The U.S. and other neighbors 

need to step up their condemnation of Venezuela’s aggression and urge a diplomatic solution. 

In recent years, the People’s Republic of China has alarmed its neighbors 

by aggressively asserting sovereignty over vast portions of the South China Sea, a 

claim demarcated through what is commonly called the “9-dash-line.” 

While the United States has abstained from taking a position on China’s 

claims, it has expressed strong reservations over the manner in which it has used 

military and administrative mechanisms to impose its position on its neighbors, 

rather than seeking to resolve the matter through negotiation and arbitration.

Much closer to the U.S., the “Bolivarian Socialist” Republic of Venezuela 

is similarly using a historical claim to assert its own “nine-dash-line” in the Caribbean, in a gambit with significant strategic implications for the U.S. and the 

security of the region.

Venezuela is staking a claim to the vast Essequibo region, representing approximately two-thirds of the current territory of its neighbor Guyana, along with 

the waters defined by the continental shelf of the claimed area. This also just happens to be where an international consortium led by Exxon Mobil, operating under 

a license with the Guyanese government, discovered a large oil deposit with an 

estimated market value of $40 billion.

The area in question had been awarded to Guyana, then under British control, in an 1899 arbitration ruling. In 1962, Venezuela formally declared its desire 

to challenge the long-standing ruling, and, in 1983, declared that it would no longer defer settlement of the matter. The dispute was given relatively little attention 
178 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

until October 2013, when Venezuelan military detained the oil exploration vessel 

Teknik Perdana for conducting exploratory operations in the area without a permit 

from Venezuela. Technically, the 2013 incident involved a different Venezuelan 

claim, based on a maritime line drawn from the current, internationally accepted 

land border—but the seizure suddenly heightened tensions between the two countries. The ship’s presence also confirmed there were significant commerciallyrecoverable quantities of oil in the offshore portion of the disputed area and Venezuela’s plan to aggressively press for control over the region. 

[The Essequibo region of Guyana] just happens to be where an 

international consortium led by Exxon Mobil, operating under 

a license with the Guyanese government, discovered a large oil 

deposit with an estimated market value of $40 billion.

On May 25, 2015, Venezuela issued presidential decree 1787, re-affirming 

its claim and linking it to a new “Integrated Defense Maritime Zone” to be defended by the Venezuelan armed forces. The decree eerily paralleled China’s declaration of an “Air Defense Identification Zone” over disputed territories in the South 

China Sea in November 2013. 
179 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

The Guyana-Venezuela border dispute centers around the Essequibo River. The disagreement originates from the era of independence and almost resulted in a confrontation between Venezuelan and Guyanese military forces in 2007. Background map compliments of 

the Library of Congress.

Indeed, the action was so aggressive that Colombia, whose own maritime 

limits with Venezuela in the Caribbean were also threatened, protested the zone.

In the weeks following the assertion of the new military zone, Venezuelan 

President Nicolas Maduro has declared that his country would begin registering 

the people who live in the territory of Essequibo (under Guyanese administration 

even before the 1899 arbitration formally awarded Guyana control), with Venezuelan identity cards. How it would do so, though, remains unclear, raising such 

questions as whether Venezuelan military or government officials would physically enter Guyanese territory to register Venezuela’s new citizens. 
180 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Guyana’s newly elected President David Granger has repeatedly 

affirmed his interest in settling the dispute through diplomatic and 

legal channels, yet has also vowed to defend Guyana’s sovereign 

territory if necessary, and has reportedly convened Guyana’s 

Defense Board on the issue.

The Venezuelan government is also attempting to use economic pressure 

against Guyana in the matter. In July 2015, it announced that it was suspending its 

purchases of Guyanese rice, a significant blow given that Venezuela has traditionally bought 40 percent of the nation’s rice export.

As with China’s small neighbors sharing the South China Sea, Guyana lacks 

the military capabilities to prevail over Venezuela. Guyana’s newly elected President David Granger has repeatedly affirmed his interest in settling the dispute 

through diplomatic and legal channels, yet has also vowed to defend Guyana’s 

sovereign territory if necessary, and has reportedly convened Guyana’s Defense 

Board on the issue.

Should the United States act? 

 

As in the East China Sea, the United States should avoid taking a position on the 

merits of Venezuela’s legal claim. Yet the U.S. arguably has an interest in making a strong stand in support of the integrity of national borders, and in this case 

Guyana’s security against Venezuelan attempts at intimidation. This should also 

include reinforcing the right of Guyana to manage Stabroek (the offshore oil block 

under dispute) and the country’s other offshore oil blocks, as well as its maritime territories and land. Through this effort, the U.S. must also emphasize that 

any change to the internationally-recognized status quo can only be re-negotiated 

through international legal and diplomatic means.

If not strongly condemned by the international community, Venezuela’s aggressive rhetoric and actions will have troublesome implications for the stability 

of the region. Would the states of the region be equally silent if Colombia began 
181 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

to threaten Nicaraguan fishermen operating near San Andres Island, based on its 

discontent with the 2013 International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision? Should 

Chile have a similar right to declare a maritime defense zone in parts of its maritime frontier with Peru, awarded to the latter by the ICJ in 2014, if Chile were to 

decide that the award was unjust?

If not strongly condemned by the international community, 

Venezuela’s aggressive rhetoric and actions will have troublesome 

implications for the stability of the region. 

If there was ever a dispute which the Organization of American States (OAS) 

should play a role in resolving, it is this one. Venezuela has sought mediation from 

virtually every organization except for the OAS in the matter, including the United 

Nations and CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States). Yet 

the OAS is the only one of these organizations that is representative of the region’s 

political and legal traditions, has the bureaucratic structures to resolve disputes 

of this nature, and includes the United States, which was a key party to the 1899 

arbitration decision at the heart of the present dispute (ironically, the U.S. argued 

for Venezuela’s claim, at the time).

Standing by Guyana against Venezuela’s present pre-emptive actions and 

attempts at intimidation also advances the U.S. agenda of democracy and rule of 

law in the region. On May 11, 2015, Guyana held elections that were broadly 

characterized as free and fair by international monitors from at least 10 nations. 

In those elections, the multi-ethnic “A Partnership for National Unity” (APNU)—

“Alliance for Change” (AFC) coalition successfully defeated the indo-Guyanese 

People’s Progressive Party (PPP), which had ruled the country for 23 years. 

To date, President Granger has shown himself to be a statesman and a democrat, responding with dignity and restraint to the accusations and insults of President Maduro. This is welcome in a region undergoing a dramatic transition, including the re-integration of Cuba into its economic and political structures, the 

slowly unfolding collapse of Venezuela, and the expansion of China’s presence 

throughout the region.
182 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

As with China’s heavy-handed attempt to impose its territorial claims, embodied by the “nine dash line,” in the South China Sea, Venezuela’s assertion of 

rights over two-thirds of Guyana’s territory and associated waters must be resolved 

by diplomacy and international legal mechanisms—not by military, diplomatic, 

and economic attempts at intimidation. In standing up for Guyana’s freedom from 

coercion, the United States and other regional neighbors will be defending democracy, rule of law, the international normative order and those who share those 

values.
183 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Authors’ and Editors’ Biographies

George Benson

A graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Major George Benson pursued a military career of 18 years service with the Jamaica Defence Force holding 

Appointments such as Force Training Officer, Assistant Staff Officer with responsibility for Training, Company Commander, Battalion Second-in-Command, Force 

Education Officer – among others. During his service, he lead CARICOM Forces 

on regional deployments including ‘Operation Urgent Fury’ (Grenada) 1984, Operation Carib (Trinidad & Tobago) 1990, UN Peacekeeping Mission (Haiti) 1994, 

and many regional and international training exercises.He is currently the Director Principal of the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Centre 

(REDTRAC) – a position he has held since 2012.

Major Benson is the holder of a Master of Science Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the University of the West Indies. He is a two-time 

graduate of the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National 

Defense University, USA, where he frequently serves as an Adjunct Professor. His 

research interests include maritime security, port security and the effects of globalization on Caribbean security.

Valeen Calder

Ms. Valeen Calder is a Deputy Superintendent of Police serving with the Jamaica 

Constabulary Force. She has ten years of experience as a senior officer with various administrative and operational responsibilities. At present, she serves as Staff 

Officer of the National Police College of Jamaica, which has responsibility for the 

recruitment and professional qualification of police officers throughout the entirety 

of their careers. Her professional contributions have included the co-drafting of 

the Jamaican National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy, various 

organizational policies, and operational procedures for the Jamaica Constabulary 
184 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Force to include the JCF Community Policing Trainer Manual. She formed part 

of a team awarded the Innovation Award, 2012 by the Scientific Research Council 

for development of the GOGSAT community safety and security courseware. Ms. 

Calder has also for the past five years been a course developer, course coordinator 

and online facilitator with the Open Campus of the University of the West Indies 

in the areas of Criminology and Policing. 

She holds a Master of Philosophy in Criminological Research from the 

University of Cambridge, a Master of Business Administration in International 

Business from the Mona School of Business, University of the West Indies, and a 

Bachelor of Arts in History, as well as a Bachelor of Laws from the University of 

the West Indies. Ms. Calder is a Cambridge Commonwealth Scholar, a Chevening 

Fellow and a Jamaica Exhibition Scholar. 

Francesca Caonero 

Francesca Caonero holds a Master Degree in International Law from the University of Bologna (Italy) and an LL.M in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in Armed Conflict from the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (Switzerland). From 2009 until 2013 she has 

been working with United Nations agencies on issues relating to arms control and 

disarmament, as well as private security, maritime security and weapons of mass 

destruction. She currently works in Nairobi, Kenya for the UN on maritime crime, 

counter-piracy and detention, including prevention of violent extremism (PVE) in 

prison settings.

Walter Earle

Walter Earle is a Visiting Professor at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric 

Defense Studies. Previously, Mr. Earle served as Principal Director for Western 

Hemisphere Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense since 2009. In this 

position, Mr. Earle oversaw the operations of the Office that advises the U.S. Secretary of Defense on all matters of defense and security policy related to or af-
185 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

fecting the countries of the Western Hemisphere. He was Acting Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs from January through October 2013. 

He came to the Defense Department from the Department of Commerce where 

he was a Latin America Country Director for international trade. His first government position was at the Congressional Research Service. Mr. Earle received 

his Bachelor’s Degree, magna cum laude, from Harvard and a Master’s Degree 

in Latin American Studies from Princeton University. He also attended the New 

York University Master’s Degree programs in Madrid, Spain and Paris, France, as 

well as the Harvard Kennedy School’s Executive Seminar for Senior Officials in 

National Security.

R. Evan Ellis

Dr. Evan Ellis is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army 

War College Strategic Studies Institute with a focus on the region’s relationships 

with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors. Dr. Ellis has published 

over 130 works, including the 2009 book China in Latin America: The Whats and 

Wherefores, the 2013 book The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with 

Latin America, and the 2014 book, China on the Ground in Latin America. He 

has presented his work in a broad range of business and government forums in 25 

countries. He has given testimony on Chinese activities in Latin America to the US 

Congress on multiple occasions, and has discussed his work regarding China and 

other external actors in the region on a broad range of radio and television fora, 

including CNN International, CNN En Español, The John Bachelor Show, Voice of 

America, and Radio Marti. His work on the subject is cited regularly in the print 

media in the U.S. and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Dr. Ellis holds a PhD in political science with a specialization in comparative politics.
186 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Netty-Ann Gordon

Netty-Ann Gordon is an avid researcher in behavioural science and political science. She is a student of the University of the West Indies pursuing post graduate 

studies in Criminology and Criminal Justice. Her academic achievements include 

a Bachelor Degree in Bible & Theology from the West Indies School of Theology; 

a Bachelor of Science Degree in Management Studies (Hons) from the University 

of the West Indies, and a Master of Science Degree in Public Sector Management 

from the University of the West Indies. She is also an alumna of The University of 

Graz, Austria and the holder of numerous certificates in diverse disciplines from 

accredited institutions across the globe. Her research interest includes Crime and 

Criminal Justice, Economics, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, International Law, 

Human Rights, History, Climate and Religious Studies. 

Wilbert Kirton

Cdr. Wilbert Kirton is a retired Barbados Defence Force officer with over thirty 

(30) years of military service. He is a graduate of several military institutions including Britannia Royal Naval College, Greenwich Naval Staff College, Royal 

Military College of Science and the William Perry Centre for Hemispheric Defence Studies in Washington DC. He holds a MSc in Ports and Shipping Administration from the World Maritime University Malmo, Sweden and a MA in Defence 

Studies from Kings College London University. During his military career, Cdr. 

Kirton held several command appointments including Commanding Officer of the 

Barbados Coast Guard and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Force prior to retiring. 

Since retirement in 2006, he works as a national security consultant and serves as 

adjutant professor at the William Perry Centre for Hemispheric Defence Studies 

in Washington DC
187 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Henderson P. Patrick

Henderson Patrick is a Station Officer in the Barbados Fire Service. He is currently 

the Chief Training Officer, Chief Fire Prevention Officer, Chief Research and Planning Officer and Chief ICT Officer. He is the fire department’s safety officer and 

is also a fire safety inspector. He is a Fire Service instructor, a hazmat technician, 

team leader for the department Hazmat Team, a member of the national CBRN 

planning committee, The Queen Elizabeth Hospital Disaster Committee and the 

National OZONE steering committee as well. 

He graduated from the University of the West Indies Cave Hill Campus Barbados in 2004 with a certificate in Public Administration. In 2008 and 2010 he 

graduated with distinction from the Jefferson Community and Technical College 

in Kentucky USA with an Associate Applied Science in Fire and Rescue Technology and a Fire Chief Diploma. In 2012 he completed a BSc degree in management 

studies at the University of the West Indies and in 2014 he graduated as the best 

overall performer from the RSS Staff and Command Course 1/2014. He is also a 

graduate of the William Perry Center for Hemispheric Studies, CDSC/2015.

Patrick Paterson

Pat Paterson is Professor in Practice of National Security Studies at the Center 

for Hemispheric Defense Studies. A 1989 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy 

in Annapolis, Maryland, he retired from the U.S. Navy as a Commander in 2009. 

His last assignment was as the Political-Military Advisor and Senior Foreign Area 

Officer (FAO) on the Fourth Fleet staff in Mayport, FL. He has a Masters degree 

in National Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 

CA, a Masters equivalent from the Argentina Naval War College in Buenos Aires, 

Argentina, and a Masters degree in Political Science from the American University 

in Washington DC. As part of those studies, he has researched and written on numerous topics about Latin America including civil-military relations, U.S. foreign 

policy, democracy, rule of law, human rights, social movements, political violence, 

and counterinsurgency. He is the author of numerous defense and security related 
188 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

articles in journals such as Military Review, Armed Forces Journal, Proceedings 

Magazine, Joint Force Quarterly, Naval History, The Journal of International Affairs, and Security and Defense Studies Review. His principle areas of expertise 

include civil-military relations, human rights, rule of law, counter-insurgency, and 

U.S. and Latin American history.

Pernille Rasmussen

Pernille Wohl Rasmussen has a Master Degree in International Business and Politics from Copenhagen Business School. She also served as a first lieutenant for 

the Danish armed forces in Afghanistan before joining the UN in East Africa in 

2014. Pernille currently works with prison management and development in East 

Africa and Somalia. Her focus lies in particularly on Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and rehabilitation of prisoners.

Mark Wilkins

Mark Wilkins is the Director of the William J. Perry Center. He joined the Perry 

Center after nearly four years working with Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) Policy’s Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI). He first served as 

the DIRI Latin American Program Manager, coordinating the development of four 

programs in the Western Hemisphere helping partners develop accountable, professional, and transparent defense establishments that can manage, sustain, and employ their forces. He then served as the Guatemala DIRI Country Project Manager, 

coordinating DOD efforts in support of Guatemalan plans to reform and modernize defense sector governance and bring modern business practices to the Ministry 

of Defense. He also worked as a Senior Mentor and Instructor for the Joint Foreign 

Area Officer (FAO) Skills Sustainment Program, an OSD initiative that supports 

the role of senior FAOs at the highest levels of U.S. Government (USG) policy 

formulation and execution, with a goal of raising their competence and situational 

awareness. In 2010, then-Colonel Wilkins retired from the U.S. Army after 30 

years of service, having served as a Foreign Area Officer in a wide variety of senior 
189 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

policy, security assistance, and intelligence positions in the Western Hemisphere. 

His education includes an MA in Latin American Studies from the University of 

Florida, a BA in Political Science from Western Carolina University, Venezuelan 

National Guard Command and Staff School, as well as numerous other U.S. military joint and service schools. He lived most of his youth in Costa Rica, graduating 

in 1976 from the Country Day School in San José. He speaks fluent Spanish. 

Dianne Williams

Dr. Williams is a Criminologist and Consultant. She has earned a Ph.D., and an 

MBA, and has done additional coursework at Harvard University’s Kennedy 

School of Government, the International Institute for Restorative Practices as well 

as the National Defense University William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. She is a Clinically Certified Criminal Justice Specialist, a Certified 

Sentence Mitigation Specialist in the Division of Counseling of the National Association of Forensic Counselors, a Certified Social and Behavioural Research Investigator and a Certified Mediator. She is a Licensed Trainer of Trainers in Restorative Practices and a Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Specialist.

She is a member of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and the American 

Society of Criminology. Dr. Williams has numerous publications the most recent 

of which are Seepersad, R. & D. Williams (in press 2016). Crime and Insecurity 

in Trinidad and Tobago, Ian Randle Publishers and Williams, D. (2016). U.S. Foreign Policy and the Caribbean Region: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago. In The 

Obama Doctrine. (Ed. Jonathan Rosen). Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. 
190 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016 http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/central_america_ref_2013.pdf Map source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection Appendix 1 - Caribbean Map

Tropic of Cancer

Tropic of Cancer

10

20

60 70 80 90

10

20

80 70 60 90

STATES

UNITED

Curacao

(NETH.)

(NETH.)

Aruba

MEXICO

Turks and

Caicos Islands

(U.K.)

VENEZUELA

COLOMBIA

Martinique

(FRANCE)

Virgin Is.

(U.S.)

Navassa

Island

(U.S.)

U.S. Naval Base

Guantanamo Bay British Virgin Is.

(U.K.)

HONDURAS

JAMAICA

THE BAHAMAS

Puerto Rico

(U.S.)

DOMINICA

Anguilla (U.K.)

Saint Barthelemy(FRANCE) Saint-Martin (FRANCE)

Sint Maarten(NETH.)

CUBA

TRINIDAD AND

TOBAGO

LUCIASAINT

SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

DOMINICAN

REPUBLIC HAITI

NICARAGUA

Montserrat (U.K.)

BELIZE

PANAMA

THE GRENADINESSAINT VINCENT AND

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Cayman Islands

(U.K.)

GUATEMALA

GRENADA

BARBADOS

Guadeloupe

(FRANCE)

COSTA

RICA

GUYANA

BRAZIL

EL SALVADOR

(NETH.)

Bonaire

St. Croix Saba and Sint Eustatius(NETH.)

Isla

Mona

Marie-Galante

Isla

La Tortuga

Isla 

Cozumel

Juventud

Isla de la

Andros

Island

New

Providence

Grand

Bahama

Abaco

Great

Eleuthera

Crooked Island

Samana Cay

San Salvador

Rum Cay

Cat Island

Long Island

Acklins

Island

Mayaguana RANGE ISLAND

RAGGED

Cay Sal

Bank

(THE BAHAMAS)

Cay Lobos

(THE BAHAMAS)

Guinchos Cay 

(THE BAHAMAS)

BIMINI

ISLANDS

Great Inagua

Exuma

Great

Isla de

Margarita

Isla de Aves

(VENEZUELA)

SWAN ISLANDS

(HONDURAS)

(COSTA RICA)

Isla del Coco

Isla de Malpelo

(COLOMBIA)

Isla de San Andrés

(COLOMBIA)

Cayos

Miskitos

ISLAS

DEL MAIZ

LA BAHÍA

ISLAS DE

Isla de la

(COLOMBIA)

Providencia

Tobago

Trinidad

CORDILLERA ORIENTAL

A 

N 

D 

S 

E 

SIERRA MADRE CORDILLERA ORIENTAL

C A Y M A N T R E N C H

(deepest point of the

Atlantic Ocean, -8605 m)

Milwaukee Deep

A v e s R i d g e

C a m p e c h e B a n k

A 

N 

D 

S 

E 

G U I A N A H I G H L A N D S

t a e r G

B a h a m a B a n k

PERU - CHILE TRENCH

PUERTO RICO TRENCH

M DI DLE AMER CI A TRENCH

SIERRA MADRE

Mosquito Coast

Gulf of Mexico

Caribbean Sea

OceanPacificNorth

Bahía de

Campeche

Channel

Yucatan

Passage

Mona

Anegada

Passage

Windward

Passage

Golfo de

Venezuela

de Guri

Embalse Panama

Gulf of

Gulf of

Paria

Panama

Canal

Lago de

Maracaibo

Lago de

Nicaragua

North

Atlantic

Ocean

St rai t s o f F l o r i d a

Río Or ni oco

Río Magdalena

Freeport

Belize City

Boa Vista

Armenia

Barranquilla

Bucaramanga

Buenaventura

Cali

Cartagena

Cúcuta

Ibagué

Manizales

Medellín

Montería

Pereira

Santa Marta

Valledupar

Villaviencio

Golfito

Liberia

Limón

Puerto

Puntarenas San

Isidro

Bayamo

Camagüey

Cienfuegos

Guantánamo

Holguín

Las Tunas

Manzanillo

Matanzas Pinar del

Rio Santa Clara

de Cuba

Santiago

Santiago

San

Miguel

Santa

Ana

Sonsonate

Escuintla

Flores

Barrios

Puerto

Quetzaltenango

Linden

Cap Haïtien

Gonaïves

Les Cayes

Choluteca

Comayagua

Danlí

El Progreso

La Cebia

San

Pedro

Sula

Montego Bay

Spanish

Town

Campeche

Cancún

Chetumal

Ciudad del

Carmen

Comitán

Cozumel

Mérida

Carmen

Playa del

Tapachula

Tuxtla

Gutiérrez

Villahermosa

Bluefields

Chinandega

Estelí

Granada Juigalpa

León

Matagalpa

Bilwi

(Puerto

Cabezas)

Balboa

Bocas

del Toro Colón

David La Palma

Santiago

Key West

Miami

Saint Petersburg

Tampa

Punto

Fijo

Barcelona

Barinas

Barquisimeto

Bolívar

Ciudad

Ciudad Guayana

Cumaná

La Guaira

Maracaibo

Maracay

Maturín

Mérida

Puerto

Ayacucho

San Cristóbal

San Fernando

Valencia

The Valley

Saint John's

Oranjestad

Nassau

Bridgetown

Belmopan

Road Town

George Town

Bogotá

José

San

Havana

Roseau

Santo

Domingo

San

Salvador

Saint

George's

Basse-Terre

Guatemala

City

Georgetown

Port-au-Prince

Tegucigalpa

Kingston

France

Fort-de

Plymouth

Willemstad

Managua

Panama City

San Juan

Gustavia

Basseterre

Castries

Marigot Philipsburg

Kingstown

Port of 

Spain

Grand

Turk

Caracas

Charlotte

Amalie

0 100 200 300 Kilometers

0 100 200 300 Miles

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

803613AI (G00800) 8-13

Scale 1: 12,500,000

Lambert Conformal Conic Projection,

standard parallels 7°N and 24° N

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.
191 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Appendix 2 - Caribbean Political and Economic Highlights

Country Population 

(as of 2014)

Area/Size Independence 

date

Main commercial product / Industries

GDP per capital in Current USD (2013)

Religion Government 

Type

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDACapital: Saint John’sOfficial Language: English

91,295 442.6 sq. km 1 November 

1981 (from the UK)

Cotton, fruits, vegetables / Tourism, construction, light manufacturing

$13,342.1Tourism:58%

Protestant 76.4% Roman Catholic 10.4%

Constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of government and a Commonwealth realm

THE BAHAMASCapital: NassauOfficial Language: English

321,834 13,80 sq. km 10 July 1973 

(from the UK)

Citrus, vegetables, poultry / Tourism, banking, oil bunkering

$22,315.6Tourism:44%

Protestant 69.9%, Roman Catholic 12%, other Christian 13%

Constitutional Parliamentary democracy and a Commonwealth realm

BARBADOSCapital:BridgetownOfficial Language:English

289,680 430 sq. km 30 November 

1966 (from the UK)

Sugarcane, vegetables, cotton / Tourism, sugar

$15,153.8Tourism: 36% 

Protestant 66.3% Roman Catholic 3.8%

Parliamentary democracy and a Commonwealth realm

BELIZECapital:BelmopanOfficial Language:English

340,844 22,966 sq. km 21 September

1981(from the UK)

Bananas, cacao,citrus, sugar, fish /Garment production, foodprocessing, tourism

$4,719.1Tourism:39%

RomanCatholic40.1%,Protestant31.5%

Parliamentarydemocracy and aCommonwealthrealm

Political, Economic, Geographic Features of Caribbean NationsInformation collected by WJPC Research Assistants Caroline Armstrong, Sara Hill, Natalia Munoz-Narino, and Stuart Pike (Apr 2016)
192 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016 Spanish Official Language:

HavanaCapital:CUBA 11,047,251

sq. km110,860 

(from Spain)20 May 1902 

Petroleum, nickel, cobaltrice, potatoes, beans, livestock /Sugar, tobacco, citrus, coffee, 

20%Tourism:$6,789.8

assuming power)(prior to Castro Jewish, Santeria Witnesses, Jehovah’s 85% , Protestant, Roman Catholic Communist State

EnglishOfficial Language:RoseauCapital:DOMINICA 73,449 751 sq. km

the UK)1978 (from 3 November 

Soap, coconut oil, tourismBananas, citrus, mangos

26% Tourism:$7,036.5

20.6%61.4% Protestant Roman Catholic 

DemocracyParliamentary 

SpanishOfficial Language:DomingoCapital:REPUBLICDOMINICAN 10,349,741 48,670 sq. km

Haiti)1844 (from 27 February 

ferronickel and gold miningTourism, sugar processing, cocoa, tobacco / Sugarcane, coffee, cotton, 

16%Tourism:$5,968.7

95%, other 5%Roman Catholic 

republicDemocratic 

SaintCapital:GRENADA

George’s

EnglishOfficial Language:

110,152

D.C.)of Washington (Twice the size 344 sq. km 

(from the UK)7 February 1974 

Food and beverages, textilesBananas, cocoa, nutmeg / 

24%Tourism:$7,956.1

Protestant 33.2%13.8% other 53% Anglican Roman Catholic 

realmCommonwealth democracy and a Parliamentary 

EnglishOfficial Language:GeorgetownCapital:GUYANA 735,554

sq. km214,969

(from the UK)26 May 1966

rice milling, textiles, timberbeef, pork, fish / Bauxite, sugar,Sugarcane, rice,

9%Tourism:$3,918.4

Muslim 7.2%Catholic 8.1%,17.7%, RomanChristian28.4%, Other30.5%, HinduProtestant Republic
193 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

HAITICapital:Port-au-PrinceOfficial Languages:French; Creole

9,996,731 27,750 sq. km 1 January 1804 

(From France)

Coffee, mangoes, cocoa, sugarcane / Textiles, sugar refining, flour milling, cement

$810.3Tourism:9% 

Roman Catholic 80% Protestant 16% (** roughly 1⁄2 population practices voodoo)

Republic

JAMAICACapital:KingstonOfficial Language:English

2,930,050 10,991 sq. km 6 August 1962 

(from the UK)

Sugarcane, bananas, coffee / Tourism, bauxite/alumina, agricultural – processing

$5,226.1Tourism:27%

Protestant 64.8% Constitutional 

parliamentary democracy and a Commonwealth realm

SAINT KITTS AND NEVISCapital:BasseterreOfficial Language:English

51,538 61 sq. km 19 September 

1983 (from the UK)

Sugarcane, rice, yams / Tourism, cotton, salt

$14,498.6Tourism:25%

Anglican, other Protestant, Roman Catholic

Parliamentary democracy and a Commonwealth realm

SAINT LUCIACapital:CastriesOfficial Language:English

163,362 616 sq. km 22 February 

1979 (from the UK)

Bananas, coconuts, vegetables / Tourism, clothing

$7,319.5Tourism:40%

Roman Catholic 61.5% Protestant 25.5%

Parliamentary democracy and a Commonwealth realm

SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINESCapital:KingstownOfficial Language:English

102,918 389 sq. km 27 October 1979 

(from the UK)

Bananas, coconuts, sweet potatoes / Tourism, food processing, cement

$6,591.6Tourism:20%

Protestant 75% Roman Catholic 13%

Parliamentary democracy and a commonwealth realm
194 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

CapitalSURINAME

:

DutchOfficial Language:Paramaribo

573,311

sq. km763,820

Netherlands)1975 (from the25 November

production, fishingmining, aluminachicken / Bauxite and goldRice, bananas, coconuts, beef,

3%Tourism:$9,618.4

19.6%22.8%, MuslimCatholic25.5%, RomanProtestantHindu 27.4%,

democracyConstitutional

EnglishOfficial Language:Port of SpainCapital:TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 1,223,916 5,128 sq. km

(from the UK)31 August 1962 

Petroleum and petroleum productvegetables, poultry, sugar / Cocoa, rice, citrus, coffee, 

9%Tourism:$20,217.1

Muslim 5%Hindu 18.2%, Catholic 21.6%, 32.1%, Roman Protestant 

democracyParliamentary 

CIA World Fact Book Country Profiles (Sources:

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/ )

GDP – World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD)Tourism rates: World Travel and Tourism Council, http://www.wttc.org/datagateway/Reportfor 2013. (St. Kitts and Nevis Religion Statistics – U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. International Religious Freedom 

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper )
195 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

Appendix 3 - Important References on Caribbean Security 

(in chronological order)

Caribbean Border Counternarcotics Strategy, January 2015

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-andresearch/

caribbeanstrategy5.pdf 

Advancing Hemispheric Security: A Multidimensional Approach, 05 June 2014

http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/233442.htm#1

United Nations Human Development Report for Latin America, 2013-2014

http://www.latinamerica.undp.org/content/dam/rblac/docs/Research%20

and%20Publications/IDH/Regional_Human_Development_Report_2013-14.

pdf?download

CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy, February 2013.

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210844.pdf

UNODC Regional Programme 2014-2016 in Support of the CARICOM Crime 

and Security Strategy, 2013

http://www.unodc.org/documents/ropan/UNODC_Regional_Programme_Caribbean/UNODC_Regional_Programme_for_the_Caribbean_2014-2016_in_

support_of_the_CARICOM_Crime_and_Security_Strategy_2013.pdf

Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean, 

September 2012

https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_

America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf

The U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, July 2011

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf
196 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, 2010

https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf

Basic Documents pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 30 

June 2010

http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/basic_documents.asp

OAS Consensus of Santo Domingo on Public Security, 05 Nov 2009

http://www.oas.org/dsp/documentos/mispa_2/ConsensoENG.doc

Hemispheric Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime, 25 Oct 2006

http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/89808.htm

Declaration of Security in the Americas, 28 Oct 2003

https://www.oas.org/en/sms/docs/declaration%20security%20americas%20

rev%201%20-%2028%20oct%202003%20ce00339.pdf

Inter-American Convention against terrorism, 02 June 2002

http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/agres1840_02.htm

Inter-American Democratic Charter, 11 Sept 2001

http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm

United Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 Nov 2000

https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20

Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Arms Acquisitions, 

7 June 1999

http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-64.html
197 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016
198 Contemporary Security and Defense Issues in the Caribbean 2016

William J. Perry 

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

National Defense University 

Abraham Lincoln Hall 

260 5th Ave. Bldg. 64 

Washington, DC 20319-5066 

chds.dodlive.mil