Interim Decision * 3052 

MATTER OF CHURCH SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

A-26781336 

Decided by Commissioner March 15, 1988 

(1) A person seeking a Schedule A, Group IV, labor certification must meet all eligibility requirements for "L-1" classification as a manager or executive, including 

those relating to a qualifying relationship between the entities for which the 

person has been and would be employed. 

(2) In view of congressional intent that the "L-1" provisions be used for personnel 

transferred by international businesses, any religious personnel who are able to 

meet all the same "L-1" requirements which apply to business or other personnel 

may be granted "L-1" visas or Schedule A, Group IV, labor certifications. 

(3) Ownership and control are the factors for establishing a qualifying relationship 

between entities for purposes of "Lf-1" classification. 

(4) Ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of 

an entity with full power and authority to control. 

(5) Control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. 

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Jerald B. Serviss 

Barat & Mulleins]. 

One Wilshire Building 

624 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2620 

Los Angeles, California 90017 

Mark A. Mancini 

Wasserman, Mancini & Chang 

1724 H Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

The director, Western Regional Service Center, denied the sixthpreference immigrant visa petition and certified his decision to the 

Commissioner for review. The Commissioner affirmed the director's 

decision. 

Counsel now moves the matter be reconsidered_ The matter will 

be reconsidered. The decisions of the director and the Commissioner will be affirmed. 

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Interim Decision #3052 

The petitioner is the Mother Church of the Church of Scientology. It seeks the beneficiary's services as an establishment executive. 

The petitioner claims the beneficiary is eligible for a Schedule A, 

Group N, labor certification under 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(1) (1988). 

That regulation relates to an alien in the United States who was 

admitted to the United States to work in, and is currently working 

in, a managerial or executive position with the same international 

corporation or organization with which he or she was continuously 

working as a manager or executive for 1 year immediately prior to 

admission. For 1 year prior to her admission to the United States, 

the beneficiary worked as a deputy commanding officer for tours 

for the Church of Scientology, Inc. in Sydney, Australia. 

The director and the Commissioner both determined the beneficiary does not qualify for a Schedule A, Group N, labor certification. 

This is based on their findings that the United States and foreign 

entities are not part of the same international corporation or organization for purposes of such a labor certification. 

Counsel seeks reconsideration on the following four grounds: 

(1) The petitioner (the Mother Church of a hierarchical religion) and the foreign 

entity (another church of the same religion) satisfy the requirements of a qualifying of liato rolationehip bocause of the nature of ecclesiastical control in A hierarchical. religion. 

(2) The test and standards of proof applied to the petitioner are arbitrary and capricious. 

(3) Denial of the petition constitutes religious discrimination in violation of the 

due process and equal protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments 

to the United States Constitution. 

(4) Denial of the petition violates the first amendment to the Constitution. 

Although the beneficiary was found ineligible for a Schedule A, 

Group IV, labor certification on the ground that the United States 

and foreign entities are not part of the same international corporation or organization, there is another issue in this proceeding 

which was not previously explored. This issue is whether or not the 

beneficiary is eligible for such a labor certification as a manager or 

executive. Each issue will be addressed separately. 

QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED 

STATES AND FOREIGN ENTITIES 

Applicability of "L-1" standards to Schedule A, Group IV 

A person seeking a Schedule A, Group N, labor certification 

must meet all eligibility requirements for "L-1" nonimmigrant 

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intra-company transferee classification as a manager or executive 

pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(L) (1982), including those relating to a 

qualifying relationship between the entities for which the person 

has been and would be employed. Title 20 C.F.R. § 656.22(f)(1) (1988) 

states: 

Aliens seeking labor certifications under Group IV of Schedule A shall meet, at 

the tune of filing the applinotion, the eligibility requirements of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act for an L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification as a manager or 

an executive. 

Similarly, the Department of Labor's Technical Assistance Guide, 

No. 656, Labor Certifications (1981) ("TAG"), provides on pages 14 

and 15: 

The only aliens who qualify for Group IV of Schedule A are those in executive or 

managerial positions who can qualify to enter the United States under an "Mr 

visa. 

In an advisory opinion dated January 10, 1986, contained in the 

record of proceeding, the Department of Labor reasserts its view 

that this is the correct standard for Schedule A, Group IV. 

Criteria for a qualifying relationship between entities 

Case law has confirmed that ownership and control are the factors for establishing a qualifying relationship between United 

States and foreign entities for purposes of "L-1" classification. 

Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (Comm. 

1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982); see also 

Matter of Tassel, Inc., 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Acting Assoc. Comm. 1981). 

Accordingly, to establish the existence of such a relationship, a petitioner must demonstrate ownership and control. 

Ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control. Control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority 

to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an 

entity. See the definitions of the terms "ownership" and "control" 

in the Immigration and Naturalization Service Operations Instructions 214.2(1)(4). See also Matter of Hughes, supra. While an entity 

is usually in the form of a corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship and is either a profit or nonprofit organization, the nature 

and form of the entity are not relevant. Johnson-Laird, Inc. v. INS, 

537 F. Supp. 52 (D. Or. 1981). 

The ownership and control of both entities must be the same for 

a finding of a same employer, parent/subsidiary, or affiliate relationship, as required by the statute. In each case, the Service must 

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determine whether the same individual(s) or organization owns 

enough of the assets of both entities to enable the individual(s) or 

organization to control the management and operations of both entities. 

Qualifying relationship between religious organizations 

The "L-1" classification was originally created for business, not 

religious, personnel. House of Representatives Report No. 91-851 

(which accompanied Public Law 91-225 (1970) when the "L-1" provisions were first enacted into law) states the purpose of the "L-1" 

provisions is to facilitate the admission of "key personnel" and 

"managerial personnel" of international businesses. H.R. Rep. No. 

851, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. 

News 2750. According to the report: 

This amendment would help eliminate problems now faced by American companies having offices abroad in transferring key personnel freely within the organization This proposal would meet the objectives of American industry which has 

been seriously hampered in transferring personnel. 

Id. at 2754. 

The report, however, makes no mention of religious organizations. The Service does not believe that Congress intended "L-1" 

visas to be used by employees of religious organizations. There are 

other statutory and regulatory provisions to facilitate the entry of 

persons engaged in religious activities. 

Nonetheless, the lack of a provision for employees of religious organizations to obtain "L-1" visas does not preclude their obtaining 

these visas if they are otherwise qualified. The following interpretation of the Department of State specifically indicates they are allowed to do so: 

An organized religious, charitable, service, or other nonprofit organization is considered to be 1. . . a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or 

subsidiary, thereof . . .' for purposes of section 101(aX15XL) of the Act. 

Vol. 9, Foreign Affairs Manual, Part II, 22 C.F.R. § 41.67 note 2.9 

("FAM"). 

The main thrust of counsel's argument is that a hierarchical religion such as that of the Church of Scientology, in which the 

Mother Church exercises control over the theology and doctrines of 

other Scientology churches, has the necessary qualifying relationship between its entities to meet the requirements for "L-1" classification. Counsel argues further that, since members of a religious 

organization, unlike stockholders in a business enterprise, do not 

own any property, ecclesiastical and doctrinal control, not owner596 
Interim Decision #3052 

ship, should be the standard for determining whether or not there 

is a qualifying relationship between religious entities. 

Additionally, counsel submits a copy of an unpublished Service 

decision (NYC-N-109090) where a qualifying structural link between two separate Catholic religious orders was found for purposes of "L-1" classification based on the fact that the transfer of 

the beneficiary (a Roman Catholic nun) required and received the 

administrative approval of the Vatican bureaucracy. Counsel also 

notes the standards for determining qualifying relationships between entities have, in the past, varied from case to case. 

The Service, in the absence of any legislative history, regulations, or precedent decisions on the applicability to religious personnel of the "L-1" and Schedule A, Group IV, provisions, has been 

attempting to set standards and may have inadvertently rendered 

some inconsistent decisions. In spite of this, this Service is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not 

been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals which may 

have been erroneous. Matter of Khan, 14 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 1973), 

by extension; Matter of M-, 4 I&N Dec. 532 (BIA 1951; BIA, A.G. 

1952); see also Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281(1906); Lazarescu v. 

United States, 199 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1952); United States ex rel. 

Vajta v. Watkins, 179 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1950); Mannerfricl v. Brownell, 145 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 288 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 

In view of the congressional intent that the "L-1" provisions be 

used for personnel transferred by international businesses, the only 

appropriate standards for determining "L-1" eligibility are those 

applied to businesses. Accordingly, this Service withdraws from the 

decision in NYC-N-109090 involving a Roman Catholic nun (mentioned above) and any other prior "L-1" or Schedule A, Group IV, 

decisions which apply other standards. Since personnel of religious 

organizations are not precluded from obtaining "L-1" visas or 

Schedule A, Group IV, labor certifications, any religious personnel 

who are able to meet the same "L-1" requirements which apply to 

business or other personnel may be granted these benefits. 

With reference to NYC-N-109090, it should be noted that evidence of the Vatican's administrative approval of the beneficiary's 

transfer, in and of itself, does not establish the existence of a qualifying relationship between the two religious orders. Based upon a 

review of the narrative decision only and without reference to the 

record of proceeding in that case, it is not possible to determine 

whether or not the petition met the standards articulated here for 

a qualifying relationship between the relevant entities. 

Applying the same standards to all business, religious, and other 

personnel is the only fair way to adjudicate "L-1" and Schedule A, 

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Group IV, cases. These standards apply equally to personnel of all 

religions (whether newly established or older) seeking the benefits 

in question. 

Type of qualifying relationship claimed in this proceeding 

The Immigration and Nationality Act does not define the terms 

"subsidiary" and "affiliate," but new "L-1" regulations defining 

these terms went into effect March 30, 1987, after this petition was 

filed. The new regulations do not reflect a change in Service policy. 

They merely codify definitions already set forth in administrative 

case law. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., supra; 

Matter of Hughes, supra. 

Title 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1X1)(ii)(K) (1988), effective March 30, 1987, 

states: 

`Subsidiary' means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent 

owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; 

or owns, directly or indirectly, 50% of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control 

and -veto power, or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in 

fact controls the entity. 

Title 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(L) (1988) states: 

`Affiliate' means one of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled 

by the same parent or individual or one of two legal entities owned and controlled 

by the same group of individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each entity. 

The record in this proceeding attempts to establish the existence 

of an affiliate relationship between the petitioning Mother Church 

and the foreign entity. Since it is asserted that the Mother Church 

controls the subordinate foreign entity in Australia, the actual 

question in this case is whether a parent/subsidiary relationship 

exists. 

Counsel's citations from the TAG and PAM 

In a brief dated August 16, 1985, counsel argues the United 

States and foreign entities constitute a qualifying association 

within the meaning of the following discussion of Schedule A, 

Group IV, on page 13 of the TAG: 

For Group IV purposes, corporations and organizations shall also include associations, firms, partnerships, joint ventures, joint stock companies, affiliates, and 

subsidiaries, but shall not include relationships which are only licensor-licensee or 

franchisor-franchisee. 

This citation from the TAG explains the types of entities which 

may have qualifying relationships. It does not mean that all such 

entities qualify for purposes of Schedule A, Group IV. Further598 
Interim Decision 4t3052 

more, the Commissioner's decision found no evidence establishing 

the existence of a qualifying association. 

In the brief dated August 16, 1985, and in the motion to reconsider, counsel advances the argument that the United States and 

foreign entities in question, as "an organized religious . . . organization," are part of the same international organization within the 

meaning of the State Department interpretation from the FAM 

cited previously. In the motion, counsel takes issue with the Commissioner's conclusion that components of international churches 

have qualifying relationships no more automatically than do components of international commercial enterprises. Counsel argues 

the FAM merely requires the religious, charitable, or service organization to be organized. According to counsel, if the organization 

is organized, no further examination is necessary to determine affiliation. 

Nevertheless, as in the case of the above citation from the TAG, 

the excerpt from the FAM simply explains that religious, charitable, and service organizations may have qualifying relationships for 

purposes of "L-1" nonimmigrant intra-company transferee classification. It does not mean that all organizations of this type qualify 

for purposes of "L-1" and Schedule A, Group IV, benefits. 

The Church of Scientology and the Roman Catholic Church 

Counsel asserts the hierarchical structure of the Church of Scientology is similar to, if not identical to, that of other longer established hierarchical religions, where the Service has recognized 

qualifying relationships between entities for purposes of "L-1" classification. Specifically, counsel asserts "the parallels between the 

Roman Catholic Church and the Church of Scientology are particularly strong!' While the Mother Church of Scientology controls the 

doctrine and theology of local Scientology churches, review of the 

evidence in the record does not support counsel's proposition. 

The Church of Scientology does exhibit some of the same characteristics as the Roman Catholic Church. Both religions have similar 

structures in that both have separately incorporated individual 

units. Both also have hierarchies consisting of nonprofit entities. 

Consequently, neither has stock ownership or accrual of profits. In 

spite of these similarities, the two hierarchies must be compared 

with profit-making organizations in many other respects in order 

to determine ownership of assets and control of the entities. 

The petitioner has submitted, as a sample of a typical incorporation in the Roman Catholic Church, a copy of an amendment of the 

articles of incorporation of a Roman Catholic bishop (designated as 

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a corporation sole) changing its jurisdiction and changing its name 

to that of an archbishop. Comparison of this document with a copy 

of the constitution and general rules of a typical Scientology 

church reflects markedly different control of the subordinate entities. 

The sample document indicates that a Roman Catholic bishop or 

archbishop incorporates a diocese or archdiocese on authority and 

under order or proclamation of the Pope. The Pope has sole authority to appoint or remove the bishop or archbishop. It is the Pope 

who entrusts the bishop or archbishop with the corporate powers to 

manage and operate the diocese or archdiocese under rules, regulations, and disciplines of the Roman Catholic Church, just as the 

parent corporation of a business enterprise appoints a board of directors to manage and operate its subsidiaries according to its 

rules, regulations, and philosophy. In addition, the Pope has authority to change jurisdictions and names of dioceses and archdioceses and to create new ones. 

Thue, not only does the Pope have control over theological doctrines, but he also has control over the assets, management, and 

operations of each diocese or archdiocese, as well as control over 

bishops and archbishops. A bishop or archbishop, as shown in the 

sample document, is designated as a corporation sole. Therefore, 

the Pope also indirectly owns the assets of the diocese or archdiocese. 

Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) states: 

A corporation sole is one consisting of one person only, and his successors in some 

particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal 

capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural 

persons they could not have had. 

The sample document reflects that a bishop or archbishop (the 

corporation sole) is "authorized to hold, own and administer properties." Since the Pope may appoint, promote, or remove the 

person who is designated as the corporation sole or change his jurisdiction, the Pope indirectly owns the corporation sole's property. 

On the other hand, the foreign entity (local church) in Australia 

in this case is subject only to the theological and doctrinal control 

of the petitioning Mother Church. Although a trustee must be a 

duly ordained minister of Scientology in good standing with the 

Mother Church, whose tenure may be terminated for failure to continue in this status, the members of the Board of Trustees of the 

foreign entity are elected by local church members or other trustees. They manage the foreign entity's own affairs and elect other 

church officers. 

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While the foreign entity must follow the doctrines of the Mother 

Church and contract with it for trademarks, products, literature, 

and services used in the practice of Scientology, there is a major 

distinction between its theological and corporate relationship with 

the Mother Church. Unlike the Roman Catholic hierarchy, where 

the Pope alone has the authority to create and change jurisdictions 

of dioceses and archdioceses, the foreign entity can be dissolved by 

a majority of four-fifths of the votes at a general meeting. 

Notwithstanding counsel's assertion that all religious organizations are based on voluntary participation, the Church of Scientology in Sydney, Australia, according to its constitution and general 

rules, is bound by the hierarchical structure of the international 

organisation only through a voluntary and self-determined agreement which is not present in the Roman Catholic Church. Such an 

agreement does not establish control of one entity by the other. 

Similarly, notwithstanding counsel's assertion to the contrary, 

approval by the Mother Church of transfers of personnel from one 

church entity to another, in and of itself, does not establish the existence of a qualifying relationship between entities. As noted 

above, this is equally true in the case of the Roman Catholic nun 

(NYC-N-109090), discussed previously. 

In addition, the agreement for services between the Mother 

Church and the foreign entity clearly provides for binding arbitration, under the auspices of the Los Angeles office of the American 

Arbitration Association, of disputes between the two entities. The 

license agreement between them also provides for arbitration. In 

the Roman Catholic Church, however, the Pope is the supreme 

pastor, supreme legislator, and supreme judge_ 

Other distinctions between the Church of Scientology and the 

Roman Catholic Church are that, unlike the Roman Catholic 

Church, the Mother Church of Scientology does not own, either directly or indirectly, or control any of the assets of the foreign 

entity. Moreover, the Mother Church does not ordain local church 

ministers. Rather, the assets are owned locally and ordinations are 

performed, and may be revoked, by the local church. Accordingly, 

the petitioning Mother Church clearly does not own or have the ultimate legal right to control the local church. 

The relationship between the Mother Church and the foreign 

entity is, in business terms, that of a franchisor/franchisee, not a 

parent/subsidiary relationship. According to Black's Law Dictionary: 

In its simplest terms, a franchise is a license from [the] owner of a trademark or 

trade name permitting another to sell a product or service under that name or 

mark More broadly stated, a 'franchise has evolved into an elaborate agreement 

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Interim Decision #3052 

under which the franchisee undertakes to conduct a business or sell a product or 

service in accordance with methods and procedures prescribed by the franchisor, 

and the franchisor undertakes to assist the franchisee through advertising, promotion, and other advisory services. 

In this case, the petitioning Mother Church provides continuous 

religious guidance to the local church, gives training to its ministers, and ensures the standardization of its doctrines and practices, 

much as a franchisor in the business world would guide, give training to and regulate a franchisee. The local church, which is locally 

owned and solely responsible for acquiring trustees and church officers and managing its affairs, may likewise be compared with the 

independently owned business of a franchisee. 

The Mother Church and the foreign entity are joined by a license 

agreement and an agreement for services. The Mother Church and 

the religious Technology Center (another Scientology organization) 

own and control, by trademarks and service marks, the products, 

literature, and services used in the practice of Scientology. The 

Mother Church and the Religious Technology Center permit the 

foreign entity to use (diem under the terms of a license. A contractual relationship of this type is not considered to be a qualifying 

relationship for purposes of "L-1" classification. See Matter of 

Schick, 18 I&N Dec 647 (RC. 19'70) 

The above discussion cannot be construed to mean that there is a 

qualifying relationship between all organizations associated with 

the Roman Catholic Church, or that there is not a qualifying relationship between the Church of Scientology and its other associated 

organizations. Such a determination is made on a case-by-case basis 

after considering the petitioner's evidence of ownership and control. 

Test and standards of proof applied to the petitioner 

Counsel argues the test and standards of proof applied to the petitioner are arbitrary and capricious. In considering the nature of 

relationships between religious entities for purposes of "L-1" classification, the Service, while applying law and regulation equally, 

must examine organizational structure and relevant factors. As 

with nonreligious entities, this must be accomplished by reviewing 

the documentary evidence of record. 

In each case, all evidence must be evaluated, and there is no presumption of eligibility. The fact that some religious entities may be 

able to establish qualifying relationships while others are not able 

to do so may lead to the erroneous conclusion asserted by counsel 

that the findings are subjective opinions relating to individual peti602 
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tioners. This is not the case. Varying opinions should be expected 

where diverse structures are found. 

The tests and standards of proof utilized in this proceeding have 

been clearly established through regulation and administrative 

case law, as discussed at length above. The record demonstrates 

that all due consideration has been accorded the petitioner in accordance with current Service policy. 

Constitutional issues 

Counsel also claims that denial of the petition raises constitutional issues. Counsel does not, however, claim that the statute is 

unconstitutional. Of course, the Service cannot pass upon the constitutionality of the statute it administers. Nevertheless, we can address questions relating to the constitutionality of its application. 

Since all petitioners who seek "L-1" or Schedule A, Group IV, benefits must qualify on the same basis regardless of their religion, no 

violation of the equal protection or due process clauses can be 

found. 

Counsel argues that the Service has denied the petitioner a 

mechanism for bringing its personnel to the United States, thereby 

violating the free exercise clause. The fact is the Service treats all 

religions the same. Whether or not religious employees qualify for 

"L-1" classification on merits not relating to religious preference 

or practice is a different matter. 

Counsel asserts that the Service's review of the petitioning religion's internal organization is a violation of the establishment 

clause. Matter of Brantigan, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966), holds 

that, in visa petition proceedings, the burden of proof to establish 

eligibility for the benefit sought rests with the petitioner. In carrying out its obligation to ensure compliance with the congressional 

intent of the immigration laws, the Service must examine the organizational structure of an entity seeking "L-1" or Schedule A, 

Group IV, benefits in order to determine whether or not it has met 

its burden of proof. This does not violate the establishment clause_ 

MANAGERIAL OR EXECUTIVE CAPACITY 

As in the case of the definitions of the terms "subsidiary" and 

"affiliate," the new "L-1" regulations, effective March 30, 1987, 

define qualifying managerial and executive capacities. The definitions of "managerial capacity" and "executive capacity" also do not 

reflect a policy change. As noted on February 26, 1987, when the 

new regulations were published, "The standards included the pro603 
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posed regulations were intended to clarify the Service's interpretation of the statute and current regulations, not to make a change 

in policy." 52 Fed. Reg. 5739 (1987). 

Generally speaking, under either the old or new regulations, two 

factors identify a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, as 

defined in 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(1)(1)(i1)(A) and (B) (1987), now cited at 8 

C.F.R. §§ 214-2(1)(1Xii)(B) and (C) (1988), and both must be present. 

First, the position must involve significant authority over generalized policy of an organization or a major subdivision of an organization. Second, the employee's duties must be primarily at the managerial or executive level. An employee who primarily performs the 

tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 

considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 

Moreover, a managerial or executive employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in 

a first-line supervisor. 

Having discretionary authority and a managerial or executive 

title (such as establishment executive and deputy commanding officer for tours) does not, in and of itself, mean a person is employed 

in a managerial or executive capacity. Here, the beneficiary's positions for both. the United States and foreign entities have managerial or executive titles and discretionary authority. 

While working for the foreign entity, the beneficiary was responsible for a staff of 20, including 2 division heads, but she also 

"wrote programs which she implemented" to ensure that Church 

policy was followed regarding "dissemination tours for Church expansion." This appears to be the function of a staff officer or specialist not usually performed by a manager or executive. In her 

current position with the petitioning United States entity, the beneficiary is responsible for running an entire division, but she supervises only five other employees. 

The record does not contain sufficiently detailed descriptions of 

the beneficiary's job duties, the job duties of her subordinates, and 

the organizational structures at her job sites to determine whether 

her employment is in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. This issue was not raised in prior decisions. As the petition is 

otherwise not approvable, it does not need to be addressed further. 

It is simply noted for the record.. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

For the reasons discussed above, the decisions of the director and 

the Commissioner will be affirmed. This action is without prejudice 

to consideration of a new sixth-preference visa petition accompa604 
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nied by a labor certification based upon a specific job offer pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.21 (1988). 

This action also does not preclude a finding of a qualifying relationship between the petitioner and a foreign entity which it owns 

and controls. The Church of Scientology, as with all other religious 

or nonreligious organizations, may secure "L-1" or Schedule A, 

Group IV, benefits for its employees when all requirements of the 

statute and related regulations are met. 

ORDER: The decision of May 29, 1986, dismissing the appeal 

is affirmed. 

605