State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: June 2, 2016 521817 

521668

________________________________

In the Matter of EVA FISCHER,

RespondentPetitioner,

v

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NYACK HOSPITAL,

AppellantRespondent,

et al.,

Respondent.

________________________________

Calendar Date: April 18, 2016

Before: Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Garry, Rose and Aarons, JJ.

__________

Nixon Peabody LLP, Albany (Jena R. Rotheim of counsel), for

appellant-respondent.

O'Connell & Aronowitz, Albany (Caitlin Monjeau of counsel),

for respondent-petitioner.

__________

Lahtinen, J.P.

(1) Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Mott, J.),

entered December 3, 2014 in Albany County, which denied a motion

by respondent Nyack Hospital to, among other things, convert the

CPLR article 78 proceeding into a plenary action, and (2)

proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court

by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to

review a determination of respondent Nyack Hospital denying

petitioner medical privileges at that institution.
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Petitioner, a surgeon, had medical privileges at respondent

Nyack Hospital that were set to expire in mid-2012. While her

application to renew was pending, Nyack summarily suspended her

in May 2012 after learning that her privileges had recently been

suspended at another hospital. She met with Nyack's medical

executive committee, which recommended that the suspension be

upheld and her privileges not be renewed. After this

recommendation was adopted by Nyack, she requested a hearing,

which ensued before a four-member panel of physicians. The panel

issued a detailed written decision finding, among other things,

that petitioner had a pattern of inaccessibility to staff when on

call, she repeatedly did not respond promptly to the emergency

department when on call, she failed to obtain coverage when

unavailable because of illness, she left the operating room and

could not be located while her patients were in surgery and she

failed to properly disclose her suspension at the other hospital

as required by Nyack's bylaws. Based on these and other

findings, the panel recommended that her application be denied. 

Nyack's board of trustees accepted the panel's recommendation.

Pursuant to Public Health Law § 2801-b, petitioner filed a

complaint with respondent Public Health and Health Planning

Council (hereinafter PHHPC) challenging Nyack's refusal to renew

her privileges. PHHPC did not credit her complaint and informed

her that Nyack's reasons for terminating her privileges were

"focused on patient care and welfare and were consistent with

Public Health Law [§] 2801-b." Petitioner commenced this CPLR

article 78 proceeding seeking to annul Nyack's determination and

reinstate her privileges.1 Nyack answered, moved to convert the

proceeding into a plenary action and, once converted, for summary

judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court denied Nyack's

motion and transferred the proceeding to this Court pursuant to

CPLR 7804 (g). Nyack appealed from the denial of its motion.2

1 Although PHHPC was also named a respondent, petitioner

consented to a dismissal as to PHHPC.

2 Nyack's appeal from the nonfinal order denying its motion

must be dismissed as no appeal as of right lies from a nonfinal
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Nyack's motion to convert the proceeding into an action for

injunctive relief should have been granted. Although at common

law a private hospital had unfettered discretion in denying

privileges to a physician, Public Health Law article 28 was

enacted to temper the harsh effect of the common law (see e.g.

Matter of Cohoes Mem. Hosp. v Department of Health of State of

N.Y., 48 NY2d 583, 588 [1979]; Guibor v Manhattan Eye, Ear &

Throat Hosp., 46 NY2d 736, 737 [1978]). Under the statute, it is

an improper practice for a hospital to deny privileges unless it

gives reasons therefor, and those reasons relate to "standards of

patient care, patient welfare, the objectives of the institution

or the character or competency of the applicant" (Public Health

Law § 2801-b [1]). An aggrieved physician generally must seek

review from PHHPC of a denial of privileges (see Public Health

Law § 2801-b [2]; Gelbard v Genesee Hosp., 87 NY2d 691, 696

[1996]; see also Indemini v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 4 NY3d 63, 67

[2005]; cf. Yin v N. Shore LIJ Health Sys., 20 F Supp 3d 359, 367

[ED NY 2014] [noting two narrow exceptions recognized in federal

courts]). Where the physician thereafter seeks reinstatement of

privileges based upon allegations of improper practices by the

hospital, the remedy is an action for injunctive relief (see

Public Health Law § 2801-c; Bhard-Waj. v United Health Servs.,

Hosps., 303 AD2d 824, 825 [2003]; Moallem v Jamaica Hosp., 264

AD2d 621, 622 [1999]; Matter of Chong-Hwan Wee v City of Rome,

233 AD2d 876, 877 [1996]; Matter of Nawaz v University Hosp. of

State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 166 AD2d 593, 593 [1990], lv

denied 77 NY2d 805 [1991]; Matter of Moss v Albany Med. Ctr.

Hosp., 61 AD2d 545, 548 [1978]; see generally Mason v Cent.

Suffolk Hosp., 3 NY3d 343, 348 [2004]). 

order in a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see CPLR 5701 [b] [1]). 

However, the issues raised with respect to said order are

reviewable within the context of the transferred proceeding (see

Matter of Board of Educ. of Union-Endicott Cent. School Dist. v

New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 250 AD2d 996, 996

[1998]; Matter of Schultz v Roberts, 138 AD2d 980, 980 [1988];

Matter of Desmone v Blum, 99 AD2d 170, 177 [1984]).
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Petitioner asserted improper practices and bylaw procedural

violations by Nyack. As to each cause of action, she relied in

part on alleged violations of Public Health Law § 2801-b. The

primary relief that petitioner seeks is annulment of Nyack's

decision and an order directing reinstatement of her privileges

at the hospital. Under such circumstances, Nyack's motion to

convert the proceeding into an action should not have been

denied, and we now grant such relief (CPLR 103 [c]; Matter of

Moss v Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 61 AD2d at 548; see also Falk v

Anesthesia Assoc. of Jamaica, 228 AD2d 326, 329-330 [1996], lv

dismissed 89 NY2d 916 [1996]; Gelbard v Genesee Hosp., 211 AD2d

159, 164 [1995], affd 87 NY2d 691 [1996]). 

Judicial review of an alleged violation of Public Health

Law § 2801-b (1) is "limited to 'whether the purported grounds

were reasonably related to the institutional concerns set forth

in the statute, whether they were based on the apparent facts as

reasonably perceived by the administrators, and whether they were

assigned in good faith'" (Bhard-Waj v United Health Servs.,

Hosps., 303 AD2d at 825, quoting Fried v Straussman, 41 NY2d 376,

383 [1977]; see Matter of Tabrizi v Faxton-St. Luke's Health

Care, 66 AD3d 1421, 1421 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 717 [2010]). 

Here, the record reflects that petitioner received a fair hearing

at which she was represented by counsel, who cross-examined

Nyack's witnesses and presented proof in support of her position. 

The grounds found by Nyack were reasonably related to

institutional concerns and amply supported by proof, including,

among other things, testimony of hospital personnel and

physicians as well as hospital records. Although petitioner

alleges bad faith by Nyack, this conclusory allegation is

unsupported by any evidence. The fact that she was not subject

to discipline by the Office of Professional Medical Conduct is

not evidence of bad faith by Nyack. Since petitioner failed to

raise material issues of fact, Nyack's motion for summary

judgment dismissing the now converted action is granted (see

Matter of Tabrizi v Faxton-St. Luke's Health Care, 66 AD3d at

1421-1422; Bhard-Waj v United Health Servs., Hosp., 303 AD2d at

825). 
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McCarthy, Garry, Rose and Aarons, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed,

without costs.

ADJUDGED that respondent Nyack Hospital's motion to convert

the CPLR article 78 proceeding into a plenary action and then for

summary judgment dismissing said action is granted, without

costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court