UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DONNA J. ZORNES; SHIRLEY D'AMICO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. No. 97-2337

SPECIALTY INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge.

(CA-96-244-S)

Argued: May 7, 1998

Decided: December 21, 1998

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and

TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Williams wrote the majority

opinion, in which Chief Judge Wilkinson concurred. Judge Traxler

wrote a dissenting opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Joseph Anthony Schwartz, III, SCHWARTZ, BOYD &

METZ, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Douglas William

Desmarais, SMITH & DOWNEY, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Richard L. Hackman, SMITH & DOWNEY,

P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

Donna J. Zornes and Shirley D'Amico (Appellants) appeal from

the district court's dismissal of their consolidated cases with prejudice

under Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for discovery abuse. We affirm.

I.

On January 25, 1996, Appellants filed separate complaints in the

United States District Court for the district of Maryland under the

Equal Pay Act of 1963, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d) (West 1978), and

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)

(West 1994), alleging that their employer, Specialty Industries, Inc.

(Appellee), engaged in a pervasive policy of sex discrimination.1

Appellee answered and discovery began. In reviewing the propriety

of the district court's dismissal with prejudice of Appellants' claims,

we must recite the unfortunately lengthy timetable of events leading

to the imposition of sanctions.

On March 7, 1996, the district court entered a Scheduling Order

requiring discovery to be completed by October 9, 1996. Pursuant to

Appellants' unopposed motion, the cases were referred to a magistrate

judge to oversee the discovery process.

On April 26, 1996, Appellants served Interrogatories and Requests

for Production of Documents on Appellee. Appellee timely responded

on May 29. Sixty-five days later, on August 5, 1996, Appellants filed

a Motion to Compel more complete answers to the April 26 discovery

requests. Appellee moved to strike the motion as untimely under the

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1 On August 28, 1996, the district court issued an order allowing the filing of amended complaints and consolidating the cases.

 2
District of Maryland's local rules. In an order dated August 22, 1996,

the magistrate judge granted Appellee's motion. He ruled that Appellants' motions failed to comply with Local Rule 104.8 in two respects.2

First, the motion was filed outside the twenty-day window afforded

by the rule, and second, Appellants improperly filed the motion with

the district court prior to serving it upon opposing counsel, also in

violation of the local rule. At the conclusion of the order, the magistrate judge admonished Appellants that "[n]o party should be allowed

to thwart the purposes of the rule or to ignore the time requirements

imposed by the Rule." (J.A. at 66.)

The problems continued, however. Before the magistrate judge

issued that order, on August 9, 1996, Appellee had hand-delivered

Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents and Things

to Appellants' counsel. In accordance with Rules 33 and 24 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellants were required to

respond by September 9, 1996. On September 13, however, Appellants had neither responded nor filed a request for an extension of

time, despite Appellee notifying Appellants on September 9 that the

responses were due and then warning Appellants on September 10

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2 Local Rule 104.8 provides, in pertinent part:

a. Service of motions papers. If a party who has propounded

interrogatories or requests for production is dissatisfied with the

response to them, that party shall serve a motion to compel

within twenty days of the party's receipt of the response. The

memorandum in support of the motion shall set forth, as to each

response to which the motion is directed, the discovery request,

the response thereto and the asserted basis for the insufficiency

of the response. The opposing party shall serve a memorandum

in opposition to the motion within fourteen days thereafter. The

moving party shall serve any reply memorandum within eleven

days thereafter. The parties shall file with the Court notices of

service of the motion and memoranda but not the motion and

memoranda themselves . . . .

b. Conference of counsel. Counsel are encouraged to confer

with one another before or immediately after a motion to compel

is filed. If they are unable to resolve their disputes, counsel must

hold the conference required by LR 104.7 after serving upon one

another all of the papers relating to the motion to compel.

 3
that a motion to compel would be filed on September 12 if no

responses were immediately forthcoming. As warned, on September

13, Appellee moved to compel answers to discovery and to impose

sanctions against Appellants for their failure to respond to discovery

requests.

When Appellants failed to respond to the Motion to Compel, the

magistrate judge issued a Show Cause Order on September 18 directing Appellants to demonstrate by September 25 why an order should

not be issued (1) dismissing the case with prejudice for noncompliance with discovery requests; (2) ordering the payment of Appellee's

attorneys' fees incurred in filing the September 13 motion; and (3)

awarding Appellee any other necessary relief. In his written Show

Cause Order, the magistrate judge noted that this was the second time

that Appellants' counsel had ignored the mandates of the local rules

and warned Appellants and their counsel that the court would not tolerate further delays in the prosecution of the case. The magistrate

judge also advised Appellants that their failure to timely respond to

Appellee's discovery requests constituted a waiver of any objections

that they may have had to any of the requests3 and specifically warned

Appellants that the failure to timely comply with the show cause

order and Appellee's discovery requests could result in the dismissal

with prejudice of their cases.

Five days later, on September 23, Appellants filed a response to the

Show Cause Order to which they finally attached their answers to

Appellee's Interrogatories and Requests for Production. Incredibly,

these answers contained several objections, despite the magistrate

judge's earlier finding that all objections had been deemed waived.

Also, Appellants explained in their response that the good faith cause

for their delay was that they were "hard-working people with very little education" and that compliance with Appellee's discovery requests

proved to be "an overwhelming and daunting task." Specifically,

Appellants' counsel noted that "[Appellants] were laboriously trying

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3 The Show Cause Order contained a footnote alerting Appellants that

"[f]ailure to timely respond to discovery requests is considered a waiver

of any objections that the answering party may have to any of the

requests." (J.A. at 76.)

 4
to answer the `Instructions' section of the Interrogatories." (J.A. at

77.)

In response to Appellants' objections, Appellee advised Appellants' counsel by letter dated September 23, 1996, that the magistrate

judge's September 18 Show Cause Order provided that Appellants

had waived all objections due to their tardiness. Appellants refused to

withdraw their objections, however, and on November 14, 1996,

Appellee ultimately moved to compel compliance with the August 9

discovery request and the court's September 18 Show Cause Order.

Meanwhile, during an October 1, 1996, deposition, Appellant

D'Amico contradicted counsel's assertion that the discovery was

tardy because she and Appellant Zornes were having difficulty understanding the "Instructions" of the Interrogatories.4

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4 The following exchange occurred during Appellant D'Amico's October 1 deposition.

Q: Which part of answering the Interrogatories was overwhelming to you?

A: Just some of the questions were.

Q: Now, it says here, that [Appellants] were "laboriously" trying to answer the "Instructions" of the Interrogatories, that's

not true, is it?

A: For me it wasn't.

* * *

Q: Did [Appellant Zornes] ever express any concern to you

about anything in the instructions portion of the interrogatories?

A: No.

Q: So, based on your personal knowledge, this statement is

untrue; is that correct?

* * *

A: For me.

Q: For you, that's not true, is it?

A: Right.

(J.A. at 235-36.)

 5
On September 14, Appellants served Appellee with additional

Interrogatories and a Request for Production of Documents. Appellants also served an amended request that they be permitted to enter

the Appellee's premises and to inspect and photograph machinery

pursuant to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By letters dated October 1 and 3, Appellee offered to allow Appellants,

accompanied by counsel, to inspect the premises at the close of their

shift and to allow photography at the conclusion of the main day shift.

Appellants' counsel refused this offer, however, insisting that her clients be present during the inspection during their shift and that the

machinery be photographed while in operation. On October 7, Appellee responded by moving for a Protective Order to prevent the

requested inspection from taking place during work hours. Later, on

October 15, Appellee moved for yet another Protective Order from

the September 14 Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, asserting that they had been served less than thirty days

before the parties' stipulated October 9 discovery deadline in violation of Local Rule 104.2.

Meanwhile, on September 23, Appellants served upon Appellee a

"Notice to Take Deposition" pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 4, 1996, Appellee moved for

issuance of a Protective Order and attorneys' fees due to the "absurdity of the scope" of the Appellants' Rule 30(b)(6) deposition

notice/document request, arguing that Appellants' document production requests were overbroad and exceeded the number allowed by

Local Rule 104.1. In response to Appellee's October 4 and 7 protective order motions, Appellants, on October 8, moved to compel compliance with their September 14 and September 23 discovery requests.

On November 18, the magistrate judge convened a hearing to discuss the numerous pending discovery motions. Specifically, he

addressed (1) Appellants' Rule 30(b)(6) requests, (2) Appellants'

Amended Request for Permission to Enter Premises and To Inspect

and Photograph Machinery, (3) the timeliness of Appellants' September 14 Interrogatories and Requests for Production, and (4) Appellants' response to the magistrate judge's September 18 Show Cause

Order.

As to Appellants' Rule 30(b)(6) requests, the magistrate judge

found that they exceeded the number allowed by the local rules and

 6
ordered the parties to agree upon document production at the deposition. As to the September 14 Interrogatories and Requests for Production, the magistrate judge granted the Appellee's motion for a

protective order as to certain overbroad document requests. The magistrate judge allowed Appellants to present the remaining September

14 Requests, however, despite recognition that the Requests were

untimely under the local rules. The magistrate judge also denied

Appellants' October 8 Motion to Compel the inspection of the premises and adopted the parameters for the inspection previously proposed by Appellee. Finally, the magistrate judge admonished

Appellants yet again for their continued failure to respond to Appellee's discovery responses which were due originally on September 9

and again ordered Appellants to submit completely their responses

without objections, with the exception of objections based upon attorney work-product or attorney-client privilege. The magistrate judge

further ordered the parties to establish a new discovery exchange

schedule.

In response to the magistrate judge's orders, on November 26,

Appellants' counsel proposed a revised discovery schedule. Appellee's counsel agreed, and the parties stipulated to December 12, 1996,

as the deadline for written discovery responses, December 31 as the

deadline for Rule 30(b)(6) and Rule 34 examinations, and January 31,

1997, as the deadline for summary judgment motions. 5 On December

12, however, Appellants' counsel notified Appellee via facsimile that

due to "unforeseen difficulties, we will need an additional period of

time in which to provide you with requested discovery." (J.A. at 162.)

Appellants' counsel subsequently indicated that the exchange date

would be December 13. Neither a response to the discovery request

_________________________________________________________________

5 Appellants characterize December 12 as a "target date" rather than a

deadline for the parties to supplement their discovery. The proposed date

resulted, however, from an order by the magistrate judge to agree upon

a revised discovery timetable. Moreover, in their November 26, 1996,

letter proposing the revised discovery schedule, Appellants gave no indication that their suggested dates were flexible"target dates" rather than

deadlines. (J.A. at 161.) In light of the magistrate judge's order to establish a discovery schedule and the problems then existing, we have a difficult time accepting Appellants' current depiction of the discovery due

dates.

 7
nor a motion for extension of time followed, however; Appellee ultimately moved for dismissal with prejudice of Appellants' lawsuit on

December 16.

On December 20, Appellants finally served their complete discovery responses, originally due on September 9, upon Appellee. These

supplemental responses included a one-hundred-page journal which

Appellant D'Amico had denied existed during her earlier deposition.

Then, at 5:00 p.m. on December 31, the agreed-upon date for the

conclusion of all discovery, Appellants requested permission to

inspect the premises and review documents during the week of January 21-27. This request squarely conflicted with the parties' stipulation that all discovery would be completed by December 31.

Moreover, Appellee had notified Appellants that the documents were

available for review on December 12. Due to the untimeliness of the

request, on January 8, 1997, Appellee moved for a Protective Order

to deny the discovery.

Undeterred, Appellants moved on January 22 for entry of default

judgment against Appellee for failure to comply with the magistrate

judge's November 18 order which they asserted granted their Motion

to Compel and ordered Appellee to produce certain documents, to

fully answer various interrogatories, and to permit inspection of premises. Not surprisingly, on January 27, the magistrate judge issued an

order barring any additional discovery motions.

On July 3, 1997, the magistrate judge issued an order granting

Appellee's January 8 protective order and denying Appellants' January 22 default judgment motion. Further, finding Appellants' default

motion to be utterly lacking in merit, the magistrate judge imposed

sanctions against Appellants' counsel, ordering her to pay Appellee's

attorneys' fees incurred as a result of Appellants' motion for default

judgment, and a $500 fine. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The magistrate

judge based his rulings upon the following conclusions:

[Appellants'] Motion is fraught with false allegations

regarding Orders of the Court, misrepresentations of

requests for extensions, meritless excuses and unsubstantiated allegations as to [Appellee's] failure to supply discovery which was neither ordered by this Court nor properly

 8
requested by [Appellants]. The frivolousness of [Appellants'] Motion is evidenced by [Appellants'] counsel's complete failure to proffer dates to conduct the outstanding

discovery or to file the appropriate motion to compel. Additionally, a bad faith, retaliatory purpose seems evident in

light of [Appellants'] counsel's failure to attempt to conduct

or compel discovery in a timely manner. Thus, this Court

finds that [Appellants'] counsel's history of continued disregard for the letter and spirit of the Federal Rules, Local

Rules, and Orders of this Court merits sanctions.

(J.A. at 203.) The magistrate judge simultaneously issued a Report

and Recommendation to the district court to dismiss Appellants' suit

with prejudice for abuse of discovery under Rule 37(d). The magistrate judge found that counsel's "history of untimeliness and eleventh

hour extension[s]" evidenced "bad faith." (J.A. at 210.) The magistrate judge sharply rebuked counsel for providing a"questionable

response to a Show Cause Order," and for "directly violat[ing] Fed.

R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4), and this Court's explicit Order." (J.A. at 211.)

After a de novo review, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the district court

fully adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granted

Appellee's motion to dismiss by order dated August 26, 1997. The

district court also imposed sanctions against Appellants' counsel pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellants

appeal the dismissal of their cases.6

II.

Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives the district court wide discretion to impose sanctions for a party's failure to

comply with its discovery orders. Thus, it is only for an abuse of discretion that a reviewing court may reverse the decision of the district

court. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,

Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976); United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co.,

11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 1993). In fact, the Supreme Court has cautioned us not to allow the "natural tendency on the part of reviewing

_________________________________________________________________

6 Appellants do not appeal the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against

their attorney.

 9
courts, properly employing the benefit of hindsight, to be heavily

influenced by the severity of outright dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order." National Hockey League, 427

U.S. at 642. "The question, of course, is not whether [we] would as

an original matter have dismissed the action; it is whether the District

Court abused its discretion in so doing." Id. 

In an effort to balance the competing interests of the due process

rights of the litigants and the integrity of the judicial process, the

Supreme Court has held that a court must consider four factors before

imposing sanctions under Rule 37(d): (1) whether the noncomplying

party acted in bad faith; (2) the amount of prejudice the party's noncompliance caused the opposing party, which necessarily includes an

inquiry into the materiality of the evidence that the noncomplying

party failed to produce; (3) the need for deterrence of the particular

sort of noncompliance; and (4) the effectiveness of less drastic sanctions. See Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Richards & Assocs., 872

F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989). The Fourth Circuit has stated further that

before dismissing a case with prejudice, the district court must give

a party a "clear and explicit" warning of the consequences of failing

to satisfy the court's conditions and orders. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc.

v. Goodwin & Boone, 11 F.3d 469, 472 (4th Cir. 1993); see also

Hathcock v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 40-41 (4th Cir.

1995) (noting that "this court has emphasized the significance of

warning a defendant about the possibility of default[under Rule 37]

before entering such a harsh sanction"); Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray,

Inc., 816 F.2d 951, 954 n.2 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that warning to

parties was a "salient fact" that distinguished cases in which default

judgment was appropriate sanction for discovery abuse under Rule

37).

In this case, the magistrate judge expressly warned Appellants

early in the parties' litigation that further discovery abuse would

result in the dismissal of their actions. In his August 22 order, the

magistrate judge wrote that "[n]o party should be allowed to thwart

the purposes of the rule or to ignore the time requirements imposed

by the Rule." (J.A. at 66.) Again, in his September 18 Show Cause

Order, the magistrate judge specifically warned that failure to comply

with the requirements of the discovery rules could result in dismissal

with prejudice of Appellants' claims. Finally, the magistrate judge

 10
verbally chastised Appellants during the November 18 hearing and

ordered their compliance with Appellee's discovery requests.7 In spite

of these clear warnings, Appellants nevertheless continued to violate

the magistrate judge's orders, ignore the Rules of Civil Procedure,

and unreasonably reject Appellee's attempts to maintain an orderly

discovery process. As a result, we cannot say that the district court

abused its discretion when it ultimately resorted to the severest sanction of dismissing Appellants' complaints with prejudice pursuant to

Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A.

In considering the first element of the four-part test, we have held

that the district courts should restrict their imposition of the ultimate

sanction of dismissal with prejudice to "only the most flagrant case,

where the party's noncompliance represents bad faith and callous disregard for the authority of the district court and the Rules." Mutual

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 872 F.2d at 92. We are convinced that,

unfortunately, this high standard was met in this case. The district

court found that Appellants' bad faith was demonstrated by, among

other things, Appellants' numerous "eleventh hour extensions" and

consistent disregard of discovery deadlines, despite Appellee's good

faith prodding and the magistrate judge's warning in the Show Cause

Order that such delays would not be tolerated. The district court specifically found that Appellants' tardy October 8 submission of objections to Appellee's Interrogatories was in direct violation of the

_________________________________________________________________

7 The dissent chastises the majority's reliance upon the statements

made in the November 18 hearing, noting that "[w]ith no hearing transcript or written order to inform us, there is no way to ascertain exactly

what was conveyed to the parties." Dissent op. at 30. While we acknowledge that no transcript or order memorializes the statements made, the

dissent fails to acknowledge that the magistrate judge characterized his

November 18 warnings in his Report and Recommendation as "verbal

admonitions [that] put Plaintiffs on notice that further discovery abuse

would not be tolerated." (J.A. at 211.) Absent evidence (or even argument) from Appellants to the contrary, unlike the dissent, the majority

relies upon the magistrate judge's own history of the hearing -- that he

delivered a clear message that further discovery abuse would lead to dismissal.

 11
September 18 Show Cause Order.8 The district court also pointed to

_________________________________________________________________

8 Appellants argue for the first time in their Reply Brief that they did

not wilfully or intentionally violate the Show Cause Order because their

only objections were either "attorney-client and work-product privileges"

or "`form objections' produced from a word processor's memory."

Appellants' Reply Br. at 10-11. In support of this proposition, Appellants

have filed an accompanying motion to supplement their Reply Brief with

the entirety of their answers to Appellee's Interrogatories and Request

for Production of Documents. Appellee has moved to strike the portions

of Appellants' Reply Brief concerning this argument and opposes Appellants' Motion to Supplement the Reply Brief on the grounds that these

factual issues were never presented to the district court and were omitted

from Appellants' Opening Brief. We grant Appellee's motion to strike

this portion of Appellants' Reply Brief and deny Appellants' motion to

supplement their Reply Brief with their responses to Appellee's discovery requests.

The magistrate judge recommended that Appellants' cases be dismissed with prejudice, in part, because they submitted objections to

Appellee's August 9 discovery requests in violation of the Show Cause

order, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the local rules. In their

objections to the Proposed Findings and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Appellants asserted that the magistrate judge's finding that

Appellants submitted objections in bad faith was erroneous because (1)

the order "did not explicitly state that Appellants had waived their right

to objections" and (2) they "believed that they showed good cause[, i.e.,

Appellants' difficulties understanding the questions posed,] and, for that

reason, did not believe that they had waived their objections." Objections

By Plaintiffs To Proposed Findings And Recommendations Of Magistrate Judge, C.A. No. S-96-244 (July 18, 1997). This argument (that

Appellants believed that they had not waived any objections because

they had "good cause" for their delay) is an entirely separate and distinct

argument from that posed in their Reply Brief. Accordingly, we decline

to consider it. See Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 134 F.3d 1222,

1227 (4th Cir. 1998) (declining to review issues not raised in the district

court).

Further, even if the issue was raised below, Appellants' failure to present it in their Opening Brief forecloses our review of it. See Cavallo v.

Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1152, n.2 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that arguments not raised on appeal by appellants until their reply brief were not

properly before the appellate court regardless of whether question was

raised in district court), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 684 (1998). The only

mention of the "objection issue" in Appellants' Opening Brief is in an

 12
Appellants' failure to comply with the December 12 deadline for providing supplemental answers to interrogatories. Noncompliance with

this due date was especially egregious because Appellants themselves

proposed the due date, and these same answers were the subject of

two prior Motions to Compel. Moreover, Appellants utterly failed to

articulate any good cause for the delay. This "blatant disregard" for

the court's order and the rules, (J.A. at 254), the court concluded, evidenced bad faith warranting dismissal. See Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass'n, 872 F.2d at 92 (holding that dismissal with prejudice is proper

when a "party's noncompliance represents bad faith and callous disregard for the authority of the district court and the Rules").

Moreover, in addition to Appellants' lack of compliance with the

court's order and rules, the magistrate judge made findings, adopted

by the district court, that Appellants made affirmative misrepresentations to the magistrate judge. As discussed, supra, Appellants' counsel filed a response to the magistrate judge's September 18 Show

Cause Order in which she posited that the good faith cause for Appellants' delay in complying with Appellee's discovery requests was that

"Plaintiffs were laboriously trying to answer the`Instructions' section

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argument to refute the district court's assertion that Appellee suffered

prejudice when it incurred additional expenses as a result of filing successive motions to compel. Appellants argue that the magistrate judge's

later acknowledgment that Appellants had not waived their right to

object on the grounds of work-product or privilege was a ruling against

Appellee; therefore, Appellants argue, they should not be penalized for

expenses Appellee incurred filing a motion which it subsequently lost.

Again, this argument which solely addresses the prejudice factor, is completely different from the one in the Reply Brief which addresses Appellants' alleged bad faith.

Finally, Fourth Circuit Rule 28(b) requires that a party wishing to

attach supplemental material to a brief must present the proposed material under separate cover "accompanied by a motion for leave to file that

specifically identifies the proposed material, indicates whether it is a

matter of record, and sets forth good cause for deviating from the general

prohibition of attachments to briefs." Fourth Cir. R.28(b). We deny

Appellants' motion to supplement the Reply Brief with the proposed

material because they have failed even to attempt to articulate good

cause for granting the motion.

 13
of the Interrogatories." (J.A. at 77). However, as noted, supra at n.4,

Appellant D'Amico denied in a later deposition that she was having

difficulty understanding the interrogatory instructions. She further

stated that Appellant Zornes had not expressed any concern to her

about understanding the instruction section of the interrogatories.

Appellants' filing of what the magistrate judge appropriately characterized as a "questionable response" to its Show Cause Order further

supports the district court's conclusion that Appellants' constant

delays and noncompliance were motivated by bad faith. (J.A. at 211.)

These findings more than adequately support the district court's finding of bad faith.9

B.

As to the prejudice to Appellee, the district court determined that

Appellants' "delays in providing answers in a timely fashion ha[d] . . .

materially prejudiced the Defendant." (J.A. at 255.) In particular, the

district court cited Appellants' failure to produce a one-hundred-page

diary chronicling alleged acts of harassment perpetrated by Appellants' co-workers until after the discovery due date. This failure, the

court found, was exaggerated by the fact that Appellant D'Amico

flatly denied the existence of such a journal during her October 1,

_________________________________________________________________

9 The dissent contends that our statement that the magistrate judge

found that Appellants "made affirmative misrepresentations" to the court

"is an overstatement of what the magistrate judge found." Dissent op. at

33. The dissent then continues on to explain "[w]hat actually happened."

Id. In response to the dissent's first assertion, we cite footnote 2 of the

magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation in which he notes the

court's "concern about deposition testimony by Plaintiff Shirley

D'Amico which directly controverted assertion of counsel in her

Response to the Show Cause Order." (emphasis added) (J.A. at 211.)

Further, while we find the dissent's explanation of the deposition testimony of Plaintiff D'Amico interesting, it is an argument and explanation

that Appellants have never offered to this Court. On appeal, Appellants

have not taken issue with the magistrate judge's finding that the deposition testimony "directly controverted" the assertions of counsel. Accordingly, while the dissent's view of the deposition testimony may be

supportable, it is not one espoused by Appellants. Although it is often

tempting to step into the advocate's shoes, we believe that judicial

restraint mandates that we leave advocacy to parties' able counsel.

 14
1996, deposition.10 In addition to withholding the diary from Appellee, Appellants also failed to respond to Appellee's Interrogatories

_________________________________________________________________

10 In their Reply Brief, Appellants argue for the first time that any prejudice suffered by the Appellee due to Appellant D'Amico's perjury was

minimized when D'Amico admitted that such a diary existed during her

deposition the very next day. Appellants contend that as a result of

Appellant D'Amico's deposition, Appellee knew of the diary's existence

on October 2, 1996, and any prejudice Appellee suffered is the result of

Appellee's own failure to pursue a known line of inquiry. In support of

this factual allegation, Appellants move that they be allowed to supplement their Reply Brief with excerpts from Appellant D'Amico's October

2 deposition in which she allegedly admitted to the diary's existence.

Appellee moves to strike the portions of Appellants' Reply Brief concerning the alleged recantation and oppose Appellants' Motion to Supplement the Reply Brief because, like the argument referred to in n.8,

Appellants failed to raise the alleged recantation below or in their Opening Brief. We agree and grant Appellee's Motion to Strike and deny

Appellants' Motion to Supplement their brief.

Despite Appellants' assertions to the contrary, this claim was not presented to the district court for its consideration. As such, Appellants'

claim is foreclosed from appellate review. See Karpel v. Inova Health

Sys. Servs., 134 F.3d 1222, 1227 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that issues

raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances). Appellants admit that they failed to address

D'Amico's perjury in any of their motions to the magistrate judge or the

district court. Nevertheless, they incredibly assert that the issue was

properly placed before the district court because (1) Appellee attached

pertinent portions of the October 2 deposition transcript to a wholly unrelated November 14, 1996, document filed with the district court, and (2)

Appellee raised the issue of D'Amico's perjury to the district court in its

Reply to Appellants' Response to Appellee's Motion to Dismiss. This

argument is completely without merit. District courts are not required "to

anticipate all arguments that clever counsel may present in some appellate future. To do so would not only strain judicial resources by requiring

those courts to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a . . . plaintiff,

but would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory

role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party." Beaudett v. City of

Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Because the district court

was not presented with Appellants' argument, it obviously did not abuse

its discretion in failing to consider it.

Second, despite the district court's express reliance upon Appellant

D'Amico's failure to disclose the diary as a basis for dismissing the com-

 15
and Requests for Production of Documents by the original September

9, 1996, deadline. Further, when Appellants finally answered the

_________________________________________________________________

plaints, Appellants inexplicably did not address the issue in their Opening Brief to this court. Rather, they waited until their Reply Brief to

attempt to refute the district court's finding. Consequently, even if the

issue were raised in the district court, we decline to consider it. See

Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1152, n.2 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding

that arguments not raised on appeal by appellants until their reply brief

were not properly before the appellate court regardless of whether question was raised in district court), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 684 (1998). As

a result of the foregoing reasoning, we deny Appellants' motion to supplement the record on appeal with excerpts from Appellant D'Amico's

October 2 deposition.

The dissent, incredibly, asserts that Appellants' failure initially to brief

the issue of whether Appellant D'Amico committed perjury should be

excused because Appellee did not use the word "perjury" below. See Dissent op. at 43-44 n.20. If Appellants read either"Defendant's Reply to

Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" or "Defendant's

Reply to Plaintiff's Objections to the Findings of the Court Regarding

Sanctions," they were fully apprised of Appellee's allegations regarding

Appellant D'Amico's nondisclosure under oath of the diary. That Appellees failed to invoke the term "perjury" until on appeal to this Court is

of no moment. Appellee's argument was clear.

As noted in n.9, supra, we decline to make Appellants' case as the dissent has done. While the result in this case may appear to be harsh, we

cannot condone the dissent's willingness to excuse Appellants' failure to

challenge the district court's conclusion that Appellant D'Amico comitted perjury regarding the diary in their initial brief (a finding, we emphasize, that was strenuously sought by Appellees in two separate motions).

The dissent seems to dismiss the district court's conclusion because the

ruling totaled only "7 words in a 27-page order." Dissent op. at 43-44

n.20. The length of the district court's ruling is not relevant to our

inquiry. The district court clearly concluded that Appellant D'Amico was

not truthful, and Appellants did not appeal that ruling.

Moreover, even if we considered Appellants' argument, it would not

change the outcome of this appeal. To the contrary, that Appellants possessed the diary and knew that it was the subject of a proper discovery

request, and yet deliberately failed to produce it until two months after

the October 2 deposition and four months after the initial August 9 dis-

 16
overdue interrogatories, they improperly answered with objections in

violation of Rule 33(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure11

and the magistrate judge's Show Cause Order. The district court

noted that all of these improprieties by Appellants required Appellee

to file numerous Motions to Compel and Protective Orders, resulting

in the expenditure of significant attorneys' fees.

The record supports the district court's finding of substantial prejudice. Appellants protest that any prejudice Appellee may have suffered as a result of their delay was minimized by their ultimate

compliance with all discovery requests by December 20, 1996, only

eight days after the parties' stipulated due date. We disagree. Appellants' decision to withhold certain materials from Appellee, notably

the diary, until ten days before the discovery deadline effectively prevented Appellee from pursuing any further discovery.

In addition, although Appellants' counsel was assessed attorneys'

fees related to Appellee's defense of Appellants' frivolous Motion for

Default Judgment, the district court noted that Appellee was forced

unnecessarily to expend monies defending against other meritless

motions and pursuing overdue discovery in this case. The district

court cited at least three such instances, including (1) defense of

Appellants' August 6 Motion to Compel, (2) Appellee's September

_________________________________________________________________

covery request, is unexcusable. Appellants' attempt to shift the burden

back to the Appellee to pursue discovery of the diary that it had already

requested to no avail further demonstrates Appellants' conscious disregard of Appellee's discovery requests. As to the dissent's assertion that

Appellants' counsel objected to production of the journal on privilege or

work-product grounds, we find no basis in the record on appeal or in

Appellants' briefs for this proposition.

11 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

All grounds for an objection to an interrogatory shall be stated

with specificity. Any ground not stated in a timely objection is

waived unless the party's failure to object is excused by the court

for good cause shown.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). As noted, supra, Appellants filed numerous

objections to Appellee's interrogatories without offering any good cause

in direct violation of both the court's order and the Rules.

 17
13 Motion to Compel, and (3) Appellee's November 14 Motion to

Compel. We agree with the district court that Appellee was substantially prejudiced by having to incur significant additional legal fees as

a result of Appellants' continued discovery abuses. See Zaczek v.

Fauquier County, Va., 764 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1991) (dismissing with prejudice action, in part, because plaintiff's misconduct

caused defendants "unnecessary expenses for costs and attorneys

fees"), aff'd, 16 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 1993); Aerodyne Sys. Eng'g v.

Heritage Int'l Bank, 115 F.R.D. 281, 290-91 (D. Md. 1987) (dismissing with prejudice action under Rule 37, in part, because party was

"prejudiced by the fact that it has been put to substantial expense in

seeking discovery and has faced substantial delay in proceeding with

. . . litigation"). The district court's conclusion that the cumulative

effect of Appellants' misconduct substantially prejudiced Appellee

was not an abuse of discretion.

C.

As to the third factor for consideration -- the need to deter noncompliance with the rules of discovery and the directives of the court

-- the Supreme Court has held that "the most severe in the spectrum

of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose

conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those

who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent." National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643. In the instant case,

Appellants chose to ignore the Local Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and the magistrate judge's orders, despite numerous written and verbal warnings that such violations would not be countenanced. In light of the dramatic increase in federal court litigation, we

will not circumscribe the district courts' ability to maintain efficiently

their dockets and to guard jealously the court's integrity. See

Lolatchy, 816 F.2d at 957 (noting that trial judge's supervision of pretrial discovery is entitled to deference because of the "superiority of

the trial judge's position to supervise the litigants and assess their

good faith" (internal quotation marks omitted)) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). For it is the court's duty to protect the interests not only of

the parties directly prejudiced by discovery abuse, but also those litigants indirectly prejudiced when the court's resources are squandered

due to an abusing party's misconduct. Cf. National Hockey League,

 18
427 U.S. at 643 (affirming district court's dismissal with prejudice of

appellant's case under Rule 37, in part, because"it might well be that

[petitioner] would faithfully comply with all future discovery orders

entered by the District Court in this case. But other parties to other

lawsuits would feel freer than we think Rule 37 contemplates they

should feel to flout other discovery orders of other district courts.");

8A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure Civil § 2284, at 640 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that district

courts are "tak[ing] a tougher view of sanctions for discovery violations, and that sanctions are, as the Supreme Court invited in National

Hockey League, now being looked to for their deterrent effect in other

cases rather than merely as a remedy for the wrong done in the case

at hand"). As a result, we cannot say that the district court abused its

discretion when it concluded that Appellants' continued discovery

abuse in the face of an explicit warning "warrant[ed] dismissal as a

way to deter future egregious behavior." (J.A. at 259.)

D.

Finally, we must consider whether a less drastic sanction would

have been effective to stop Appellants' misconduct. Appellants contend that the more appropriate sanction in this case would have been

the levying of attorneys' fees against Appellants' counsel under Rule

37 with a warning that future abuse would lead to dismissal. We disagree. First, Appellants received such a warning from the magistrate

judge and chose to ignore it. Second, while this sanction was available to the district court, it was not the only one. The purpose of Rule

37 is to allow the district courts to punish deliberate noncompliance

with the federal rules of discovery and to deter such conduct in the

future. To that end, Rule 37 is flexible. It gives the district court a

wide range of possible sanctions from which the court is given the

discretion to choose the most appropriate considering the unique circumstances of each case. See 8A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice

& Procedure, § 2284, at 614-15 (1994) ("The sanctions enumerated

in the rule are not exclusive and arbitrary but flexible, selective, and

plural. The district court may, within reason, use as many and as varied sanctions as are necessary to hold the scales of justice even.").

As stated previously, Appellants and their counsel were warned

repeatedly by the magistrate judge in his written orders that discovery

 19
abuses would not be tolerated and continued noncompliance could

lead to dismissal with prejudice of Appellants' cases. Subsequent to

the issuance of these warnings, Appellants were chastised again by

the magistrate judge during the November 18, 1996, hearing for their

continued abuses. Nevertheless, Appellants continued to flout the

rules by missing the December 12 discovery due date and requesting

discovery past the December 31 deadline. In view of Appellants' history of continued discovery abuse in wilful defiance of the magistrate

judge's warnings, we cannot say that dismissal was not an appropriate

sanction.

III.

"[W]hen a party deceives a court or abuses the process at a level

that is utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice

or undermines the integrity of the process, the court has the inherent

power to dismiss the action." Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d at 462; see

also Zaczek, 764 F. Supp. at 1076 (noting that"federal judges possess

the inherent authority to dismiss a complaint to sanction litigants or

attorneys who violate court orders, abuse the litigation process, or

otherwise conduct the litigation in bad faith" (citing Roadway

Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-66 (1980))). The discovery

disputes in this case began with Appellants' filing an untimely Motion

to Compel in violation of the local rules and ended with Appellants'

filing of a frivolous Motion for Default Judgment against Appellee.

In the interim, Appellants demonstrated an incredible disregard for

the local rules, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the magistrate

judge's Show Cause order in which he specifically warned Appellants

and their counsel that the court would not tolerate delays in the prosecution of their case and that a failure to respond to discovery requests

could result in the dismissal with prejudice of their actions. (J.A. at

76.) Based upon the foregoing and the facts enumerated above, the

district court did not abuse its discretion when it levied the ultimate

sanction against Appellants.12 Accordingly, the district court's order

_________________________________________________________________

12 Having ruled in favor of Appellee, we conclude that its Motion to

Strike portions of Appellants' Opening Brief is moot. Further, as this

appeal was not frivolous, we deny Appellee's motion for costs.

 20
dismissing with prejudice Appellants' actions is

AFFIRMED.

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

With respect, I dissent. In my opinion, the district court abused its

discretion by dismissing these cases with prejudice under Rule 37(d)

as a first sanction for plaintiffs' 3 month delay in completing their

response to defendant's last minute discovery requests.

Donna Zornes and Shirley D'Amico ("plaintiffs") filed these lawsuits against Specialty Industries, Inc. ("defendant") in January 1996.

Discovery disputes ensued, and at times became acrimonious. However, the discovery delay leading to the dismissal under Rule 37(d)1

-- plaintiffs' tardy responses to defendant's discovery -- lasted less

than four months, during which time the magistrate judge (to whom

all discovery oversight had been assigned) issued a single 2-page Rule

to Show Cause that received no further action and held a single hearing which resulted in no written order and for which we have no transcript. The magistrate judge never issued an order compelling

plaintiffs to produce discovery by a specific deadline or face dismissal

and, despite defense counsel's requests, never imposed a sanction

upon plaintiffs' counsel -- opting instead to recommend, as the first

sanction, outright dismissal of plaintiffs' complaints. The district

judge, also without conducting a hearing or issuing a prior order,

accepted the recommendation and dismissed the actions.2

_________________________________________________________________

1 Under Rule 37(d), the district court may impose sanctions "[i]f a party

... fails ... to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted

under Rule 33 ... or [ ] to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34." Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d). Although the majority has also referenced the inherent authority of a judge to impose the

sanction of dismissal, see, e.g., United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11

F.3d 450, 462-63 (4th Cir. 1993), the district judge relied solely upon

Rule 37(d).

2 In relating the background of this case, I have noted when hearings

were not held by the magistrate judge or district judge. I fully recognize

that Local Rule 105 of the District of Maryland permits courts to rule

upon motions without a hearing and I know that this is a common prac-

 21
In recommending dismissal, the magistrate judge erroneously concluded that defendant had been prejudiced by a 10-month delay in

receiving responses to its discovery requests. The district judge recognized the error, as defendant's requests were not served until August

1996 and were "answered properly" in plaintiffs' second supplemental responses served on December 20, 1996. J.A. 255. Yet the district

judge, eight months after these complete responses were served, nevertheless dismissed both complaints pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d),

having concluded that defendant had been prejudiced because the

December 20 production had "included a one hundred page journal

entry which [p]laintiff D'Amico had previously denied existed." J.A.

255. Unfortunately, this finding was erroneous -- the product of several misrepresentations made to the district judge concerning the discovery at issue.

Thus, I dissent, not because I condone the delay by plaintiffs'

counsel, but because the events below do not rise, as a matter of law,

to the level necessary to justify, as a first sanction, the drastic consequence of dismissal with prejudice. In my opinion, its imposition was

unduly hasty, unfair to plaintiffs, and inconsistent with prior decisions

of this court.3

_________________________________________________________________

tice in the various districts, including my own. The decision to conduct

or forgo a hearing under these circumstances is indeed a matter of discretion on the part of district courts, but the exercise of this discretion is

appropriately considered by this court in reviewing an imposition of the

most harsh sanction available. As will be pointed out later, there were

misconceptions on the part of the magistrate judge and the district judge

regarding important facts in this case which might have been eliminated

with courtroom hearings. Accordingly, I would temper the deference

normally given the trial court's decision in these matters because this

deference is predicated to a certain extent on the contact the district court

has with the attorneys and litigants and here this contact was very limited.

3 Alarmed by inconsistencies between the incomplete joint appendix

before us and troublesome assertions made by defense counsel, I

requested and reviewed the full record below. Having found therein substantially relevant information, I have relied upon it in this dissent.

 22
Facts

As reflected in the majority opinion, the procedural history of this

case is convoluted. Although plaintiffs filed these lawsuits in January

1996, virtually no discovery was conducted by either side during the

ensuing months. When plaintiffs' counsel served interrogatories and

requests for production on April 26 however, conflicts began to arise.

Defense counsel served answers and objections to plaintiffs' discovery, which plaintiffs' counsel felt were incomplete. She wrote defense

counsel a letter on June 12, within 20 days after receipt of the

responses, in an attempt to informally resolve the problem. In my

opinion, such a practice is commendable and should be encouraged.4

Defense counsel ignored the first letter, so plaintiffs' counsel made a

second attempt at an informal resolution. This second try at a resolution short of court intervention was met by a flat refusal from defense

counsel, who then called her on the 20-day rule. Continuing her

efforts to secure complete responses to her discovery requests, plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion to compel on August 5. 5

Five days later, on August 9, defense counsel served his first set

of written discovery requests -- five months after the first scheduling

order was issued and at the latest possible time to afford a response

under the discovery deadline, which had already been extended by

consent to September 9. Thus, it is hardly surprising that defense

counsel joined with plaintiffs' counsel on September 6 (three days

before plaintiffs' responses were due) in obtaining an additional 30-

day extension of discovery to October 9. Defense counsel, however,

refused to allow plaintiffs any additional time to respond to defendant's outstanding discovery requests, and on September 16 filed a

motion to compel, a motion to shorten plaintiffs' time to respond to

_________________________________________________________________

4 As noted by the majority, Local Rule 104.8(a) of the District of Maryland requires a party dissatisfied with discovery responses to serve a

motion to compel within 20-days of the party's receipt of the responses.

Local Rule 104.8(b) also encourages counsel to confer with one another

and attempt to resolve disputes before or immediately after a motion to

compel is filed.

5 On August 22, the magistrate judge summarily denied this motion, as

he had the right to do, because technically it was made beyond the 20-

day time limit.

 23
the motion to compel, and a motion for sanctions. Defense counsel

contends these motions were necessitated by the October 9 deadline

-- an interesting theory given his own contribution to the discovery

delays -- yet there is no indication the court was putting time pressures upon the litigants.

Immediately upon receipt of the defendant's motions, the magistrate judge on September 19 issued a Rule to the plaintiffs to show

cause why an order should not be issued dismissing their cases with

prejudice or imposing other sanctions. The magistrate judge simultaneously denied the defendant's motion to shorten the plaintiffs' time

to respond, specifically noting that any prejudice the defendant might

suffer as a result of the impending October 9 deadline was "of its own

making by waiting so long to propound discovery requests." J.A. 75.6

Plaintiffs' counsel filed a response to the Rule on September 23,

within the court's deadline, and attached her discovery responses,

which resulted in her missing the original 30-day time limit for

response by 14 days.

This Rule is significant for several reasons. First, and most importantly, no hearing was held, no order predicated upon the Rule was

issued, and no sanctions were imposed. Second, this Rule would turn

out to be the only written document issued by the court prior to the

decision to sanction plaintiffs by dismissing their cases. Third, this

Rule, which as stated above was never acted upon by the court, contained a footnote in which the magistrate judge stated, that "[f]ailure

to timely respond to discovery requests is considered a waiver of any

objections that the answering party may have to any of the requests."

J.A. 76. Although the Rule was never acted upon, the district judge

and the majority would later attach great significance to this footnote.

On October 1 and 2, defense counsel deposed plaintiff D'Amico.

During this deposition, D'Amico advised defense counsel that she and

_________________________________________________________________

6 The majority states that the Rule to Show Cause was issued when

plaintiffs failed to respond to the motion to compel. However, the motion

to compel was not served until September 16 and the Rule to Show

Cause was filed September 19. Thus, I would not conclude that the Rule

was issued because plaintiffs "failed to respond" to defendant's motion

to compel.

 24
Zornes had been keeping journals of incidents which occurred in the

workplace. Plaintiffs served supplemental responses to defendant's

written discovery requests on October 8, in accordance with

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e), but did not produce the journals, apparently

asserting that the journals were protected by the attorney-client and

work-product privileges. Defendant, however, raised no claim of a

deficiency in the October 8 responses with the court until November

14, when it filed a motion to compel plaintiffs to withdraw their

objections and supplement their responses -- four days in advance of

a hearing which had been scheduled for November 18 to address several unrelated discovery motions filed in the interim. It apparently

escaped notice that, in doing so, defendant violated, with impunity,

the same 20-day deadline for filing a motion to compel imposed by

Local Rule 104.8 that defendant had earlier enforced against plaintiff.

Defense counsel argued in part that he was entitled to the journal

because D'Amico had waived the attorney-client and work-product

privileges by discussing the journal during her deposition, and

attached in support the portions of D'Amico's deposition transcript in

which she disclosed the journal's existence.

The November 18 hearing was the only hearing ever held in this

case. Yet there is no written order from it to review, and the parties

have not given us the benefit of a hearing transcript. According to the

magistrate judge, however, counsel reached an agreement during the

hearing as to what supplemental discovery would be produced by

each side. In addition, the magistrate judge determined, despite the

footnote in the Rule to Show Cause, that plaintiffs had not, in fact,

waived objections based upon the attorney-client and work-product

privileges. We also know, from the docket sheet, that the September

16 motion to compel which led to the Rule was deemed to be

"[m]oot[ ]" at the conclusion of the hearing. J.A. 6. Significantly, the

magistrate judge imposed no deadline for the exchange of materials,

the completion of discovery, the filing of dispositive motions, or the

trial, leaving me doubtful that the discovery issue was as severe as

defense counsel would now have us believe. Instead, the magistrate

judge asked both counsel to agree upon the remaining discovery

deadlines and advise him of an agreed deadline for dispositive

motions only. According to the report and recommendation, "the parties were put on notice that further character attacks by or upon counsel for either party would not be tolerated, and the parties were

 25
ordered to agree upon a revised discovery time table and proceed with

the conclusion of discovery." J.A. 209. There is no indication plaintiffs' counsel was singled out for a specific warning and no sanctions

were imposed during the hearing.

Counsel thereafter agreed to a written discovery exchange date of

December 12 and a discovery deadline of December 31. On December 12, plaintiffs' counsel notified defense counsel that her supplemental responses were not ready and that some additional time was

necessary. Since this was not, in my opinion, a court-mandated

exchange date, the parties were free to alter their agreed-upon schedule. Defense counsel declined to do so, however, and filed the motion

to dismiss four days later. The discovery requests were "answered

properly" in plaintiffs' supplemental responses served on December

20, which included production of the journal discussed during

D'Amico's deposition. J.A. 255. Although the journal was produced

one week beyond the agreed-upon December 12 exchange date, the

discovery deadline had not yet passed, dispositive motions were not

due until January 31, 1997, and there was no trial date set. Indeed, the

pre-trial conference was not scheduled to be held until late March

1997.

Nevertheless, seven months after the motion to dismiss was filed,

the magistrate judge recommended dismissal with prejudice for what

he mistakenly believed had been a 10-month delay by plaintiffs in

fully responding to defendant's requests. The district judge correctly

noted that there had been only a 3 month delay, but believed (at the

suggestion of defense counsel) that D'Amico had unequivocally

denied the existence of the journal during her deposition and that

defendant first learned of this document in December 1996, when in

fact D'Amico had unquestionably disclosed the existence of her journal during the very same deposition. Assuming that defendant had

been prejudiced by plaintiffs' production of the journal on December

20, the district judge dismissed plaintiffs' complaints.7

_________________________________________________________________

7 The majority has also described the events which transpired after

December 20, primarily plaintiffs' counsel's attempt to conduct discovery after December 31 and the motion for default filed in January 1997.

In response to these events, the magistrate judge suspended the disposi-

 26
Discussion

It is well established that dismissal under Rule 37(d) should be limited to "the most flagrant case, where the party's noncompliance represents bad faith and callous disregard for the authority of the district

court and the [r]ules." Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Richards &

Assocs. Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989). This is because dismissal "infringe[s] upon a party's right to trial by jury under the seventh amendment and runs counter to sound public policy of deciding

cases on their merits, and against depriving a party of his fair day in

court." Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 503-04 (4th

Cir. 1977) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).

A district court's decision to grant sanctions under Rule 37(d) is

reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. See Wilson, 561 F.2d at

505. "This does not mean, though, that an appellate court should automatically affirm such exercise of discretion," and "an appellate court

would be remiss in [its] duties if [it] chose only to rubber stamp such

orders of lower courts." Id. at 505-06 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Rather, this court"is obligated to consider

the full record as well as the reasons assigned by the [district court]

for its judgment, and to reverse the judgment below, if after such

review, the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the

court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it

reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Id. at 505 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The specific factors are (1) whether plaintiffs acted in bad faith; (2) whether defendant has been prejudiced in

the defense of the lawsuit, which includes an inquiry into the materi-

_________________________________________________________________

tive motions deadline and stayed further discovery pending resolution of

the existing motions. I do not quarrel with the court's frustration with

plaintiffs' counsel after receiving defendant's motion to dismiss, but the

district judge specifically noted that no sanctions would be imposed upon

Zornes and D'Amico for these acts. They were instead the subject of the

court's imposition of a personal sanction against plaintiffs' counsel

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, consisting of a fine and attorneys' fees incurred

by defendant in responding to the motion for default. Because they are

not a subject of the district court's decision to dismiss the claims of the

plaintiffs, I do not rely upon them.

 27
ality of the evidence which was not produced; (3) the need to deter

the type of noncompliance at issue in the future; and (4) the effectiveness of less drastic sanctions as a preliminary deterrent. See Mutual,

872 F.2d at 92; see also Hathcock v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 53

F.3d 36, 40-41 (4th Cir. 1995). In addition, the court must consider

whether plaintiffs were clearly warned of the threat of dismissal and

given an opportunity to avoid the sanction. See Hathcock, 53 F.3d at

40. Applying these factors, I am convinced that the district court

abused its discretion in this case by dismissing these cases.

An Insufficient Warning, And Never

A Less Drastic Sanction

In this case the majority equates, wrongly I believe, the required

consideration of warnings with that of the effectiveness of less drastic

sanctions. Specifically, the majority concludes that the magistrate

judge's failure to impose any sanction prior to recommending outright

dismissal of plaintiffs' complaints was justified by plaintiffs' counsel's disregard of his prior warnings. In my view, the "warnings"

issued by the magistrate judge, and relied upon by the majority, fall

far short of the clarity and specificity required to justify imposition of

dismissal with prejudice. And, they certainly do not rise to a level sufficient to justify a complete disregard of the "lesser sanctions"

strongly encouraged, except in the most unusual cases, as a predecessor to dismissal or default.

I begin with the lack of sufficient "warnings" of dismissal, the significance of which has been often emphasized by this court. See

Hathcock, 53 F.3d at 40; Anderson v. Foundation for Advancement,

Educ. & Employment of Am. Indians, 155 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir.

1998). It is well settled that "fairness to the plaintiff[s] and [ ] the

sound public policy of deciding cases on their merits" require that district courts "make the threat of th[e] sanction [of dismissal] explicit

and clear so that there can be no question . . . as to whether a plaintiff

who did not satisfy the conditions understood that, by not satisfying

them, he faced prejudicial dismissal." Choice Hotels Int'l v. Goodwin

& Boone, 11 F.3d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (emphasis added); see also Hathcock, 53 F.3d at 40 (explaining that the litigant "`is entitled to be made aware of th[e] drastic consequence[s] of failing to meet the court's conditions at the time the

 28
conditions are imposed, when he still has the opportunity to satisfy

the conditions and avoid' the sanction.") (quoting Choice Hotels, 11

F.3d at 473). Simply stated, the law requires that prior to any dismissal the offending party be sufficiently warned of the possibility of

dismissal and be given a reasonable opportunity to avoid the sanction.

In concluding that "clear" warnings were given, the majority relies

upon three events. In my opinion, however, these incidents fall woefully short of supporting the conclusion that the district court's dismissal was preceded by explicit and clear warnings that dismissal

would be entered if plaintiffs failed to file supplemental responses to

defendant's discovery by a specific date or otherwise failed to comply

with some specific condition of the court.

The majority first relies upon the magistrate judge's August 22

order denying plaintiffs' motion to compel, characterizing it as an

"express[ ] warn[ing] [to plaintiffs] early in the parties' litigation that

further discovery abuse would result in the dismissal of their actions."

Majority op. at 10. This August 22 order provides no warning of possible dismissal -- it does not even mention the word. Rather, in this

3-page order (issued without benefit of a hearing), the magistrate

judge stated that:

The purpose of Local Rule 104.8 is to have counsel mutually attempt to resolve their differences before requiring the

Court's intercession. The Rule works to save considerable

judicial time. No party should be allowed to thwart the purposes of the rule or to ignore the time requirements imposed

by the Rule.

J.A. 47. Hardly a clear warning that dismissal was a possibility, the

order at best notified plaintiffs' counsel that the 20-day rule for filing

motions to compel would be strictly enforced. There is no indication

plaintiffs' counsel made the mistake a second time, although in my

view defendant's November 14 motion to compel ran afoul of it. Perhaps most importantly, neither the magistrate nor the district judge

relied upon this as a warning of impending dismissal.

The majority next relies upon the magistrate judge's two-page Rule

to Show Cause, also issued without benefit of a hearing, which reads

 29
as follows: "Plaintiff is instructed that her failure to timely comply

with this Show Cause Order and show good cause why she failed to

reasonably respond to discovery requests may result in her action

being dismissed with prejudice." J.A. 76.8 Plaintiffs' counsel timely

responded to the Rule, and the magistrate judge issued no order predicated upon it, ultimately ruling at a November 18 hearing that the

motion to compel prompting the Rule was moot. Obviously the court

felt, at least at the time, that no further action was justified. Thus, I

do not understand how this Rule can be an explicit and clear warning

that failure to satisfy a specific condition of the court would lead to

prejudicial dismissal. See Choice Hotels, 11 F.3d at 473. It was a

warning, but hardly issued in a way that would alert plaintiffs that dismissal might be issued as the first sanction whenever, in the future,

the magistrate judge decided to recommend it.

Finally, the majority relies upon statements purportedly made during the November 18 hearing before the magistrate judge. However,

the record does not indicate that plaintiffs' counsel was warned that

dismissal was imminent at that time. With no hearing transcript or

written order to inform us, there is no way to ascertain exactly what

was conveyed to the parties. According to the report of the magistrate

judge, however, "the parties were put on notice that further character

attacks by or upon counsel for either party would not be tolerated."

J.A. 209. Thus, he does not state that plaintiffs' counsel was warned

that dismissal of the lawsuits loomed on the horizon. Significantly,

the district judge relied upon no statements made during the hearing

as a basis upon which to find that plaintiffs' counsel had been clearly

and explicitly warned that dismissal was imminent. 9

_________________________________________________________________

8 Although the magistrate judge referenced plaintiffs' violation of

Local Rule 104.8 in a footnote to his Rule to Show Cause, the Rule is

the first and only place that dismissal is mentioned.

9 Defense counsel asserts that the magistrate judge "advised [p]laintiffs

that the Court's Show Cause Order `meant what it said' with respect to

objections, and [that] [p]laintiffs were ordered to submit discovery

responses to [d]efendant without objections, with the exception of objections based on attorney work product or attorney-client privilege." Brief

of Appellee at 6. In support of this quote it attributes to the magistrate

judge, defense counsel refers us to a docket entry which merely tells us

that a marginal order was entered "granting in part [and] denying in part

 30
Thus, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that these warnings

were of sufficient clarity to warrant dismissal with prejudice.

Nowhere did the magistrate judge make the threat of dismissal so

explicit and clear as to leave "no question" that plaintiffs' counsel,

much less the plaintiffs themselves, understood that the plaintiffs

"faced prejudicial dismissal" for failing to satisfy a specific condition

of the court.

I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that these purported

warnings justify the presumption by the lower court, endorsed by the

majority, that a lesser sanction would have been futile. This court has

"encouraged trial courts initially to consider imposing sanctions less

severe" than dismissal or default. Hathcock , 53 F.3d at 41. Compare

Mutual Federal, 872 F.2d at 93-94 (upholding default judgment

where less severe sanctions had little, if any, impact on defendant's

conduct, and defendant failed to comply with orders compelling discovery after being specifically threatened with contempt and warned

that continued noncompliance could result in default), with Hathcock,

53 F.3d at 40-41 (vacating default judgment where plaintiff had some

knowledge of unproduced material and the district court had issued

no prior sanctions or warnings of default).

In this case the district court did not oversee discovery, yet its first

discovery order granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs'

complaints for alleged discovery abuse. Without ever conducting a

single hearing, the district court did so based upon unclear and nonspecific admonitions by the magistrate judge and relied upon those

same admonitions to, in effect, disregard the required consideration

of lesser sanctions. In my view, this was an abuse of discretion.

_________________________________________________________________

[the] motion of defendant to Compel plaintiffs Zornes and D'Amico to

fully respond to discovery requests." J.A. 7. It provides us with no support for the purported "warning" by the magistrate judge.

Defense counsel's assertion is unusual, given his concurrent attacks

upon plaintiffs' counsel for her attempt to supplement the joint appendix

before us. Under defense counsel's view of the rules, plaintiffs' counsel

should be barred from arguing anything not contained in the joint appendix, even if it is in the district court record, while he is allowed to make

representations not backed up in either place.

 31
Whose Bad Faith?

I next address the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs acted

in bad faith because they failed to meet two discovery deadlines and

asserted objections to defendant's discovery requests in their initial

responses. First, I believe the objections are unfairly characterized as

a direct violation of the Rule to Show Cause. As an initial premise,

the Rule was not an order granting the motion to compel responses

by a specific date, nor an order imposing sanctions. Rather, the Rule

directed counsel to advise the court why discovery responses had not

been served and to demonstrate "why an [o]rder should not be passed"

imposing sanctions. J.A. 75 (emphasis added).10 Thus, I am extremely

reluctant to view this footnote in the Rule as being an "order" that

plaintiffs had waived all objections to defendant's discovery requests.11

Furthermore, plaintiffs' counsel's response to the Rule obviously satisfied the magistrate judge because he issued no follow-up order and

later ruled that all objections had not been waived by the plaintiff. I

am also troubled because there is no reference in the record to any

violation of the Rule until the magistrate judge issued his recommendation for dismissal over nine months later.12 In summary, I am

_________________________________________________________________

10 By definition, a Show Cause Order directs "a person or corporation,

on motion of opposing party, to appear in court and explain why the

court should not take a proposed action. If the person or corporation fails

to appear or to give sufficient reasons why the court should take no

action, the court will take the action." Black's Law Dictionary 1379-80

(6th ed. 1990).

11 Although not referenced in the Rule to Show Cause, the majority

relies upon Rule 33(b)(4), which states that "[a]ny ground not stated in

a timely objection is waived unless the party's failure to object is

excused by the court for good cause shown." Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(4). In

my view, Rule 33(b)(4) is consistent with my belief that the footnote

could have been interpreted as notice that objections would be deemed

waived if good cause was not shown. Any other reading, I believe,

requires a presumption that the magistrate judge had already found an

absence of good cause -- which would seem inappropriate since plaintiffs' response to the motion to compel was not yet due.

12 The majority has refused to accept the September 23 responses from

the plaintiffs as supplemental material on appeal, or even to consider

plaintiffs' argument that they had not waived objections. Because they

are the subject of the Rule 37(d) dismissal, I would accept them.

 32
unable to discern a clear meaning from the footnote and cannot vote

to deprive the plaintiffs of a decision on the merits because their

counsel ran afoul of the magistrate judge's later clarification -- particularly given the high standard for imposing dismissal as a sanction.

I am also unprepared to accept the district court's finding of bad

faith because "[p]laintiffs have requested multiple eleventh hour

extensions and have continually disregarded discovery deadlines." J.

A. 253. The contribution of defense counsel to the discovery problem

below cements my opinion. From January to August of 1996, these

cases were the subject of mutual neglect on the part of counsel for

both parties. The requests at issue were not served by defense counsel

until August 9, and without the mutual consent to a 30-day extension

of discovery, defense counsel would have had no time to conduct any

additional discovery. Initial responses were served on September 16,

objections ruled upon on November 18, and the requests were fully

responded to on December 20. In terms of specific deadlines, plaintiffs' counsel missed the original September 9 deadline by 14 days,

and the agreed-upon December 12 deadline by 8 days. 13 Thus, I am

loath to conclude that plaintiffs' counsel requested (as found by the

district court) or was afforded (as the majority seems to indicate)

"multiple eleventh hour extensions" as that term has been understood

in previous cases. On the contrary, plaintiffs' counsel has been consistently held to and punished for missing deadlines, not extensions of

deadlines.

In support of the district judge's dismissal, the majority also states

that "the magistrate judge made findings, adopted by the district

court, that [plaintiffs] made affirmative misrepresentations to the

magistrate judge" in their response to the Rule to Show Cause. Majority op. at 13. In my view, this is an overstatement of what the magistrate judge found. I begin with the actual response offered by

plaintiffs' counsel to the Rule to Show Cause, filed two weeks after

the initial responses were due and concurrently with those responses:

_________________________________________________________________

13 It should not escape notice that defendant also served a supplemental

response to plaintiffs' discovery requests nineteen days beyond the proposed December 12 exchange date.

 33
The Plaintiffs are hard-working people with very little education. Their desire to answer the discovery in as complete

a manner as possible was an overwhelming and daunting

task. For example, Plaintiffs' counsel learned that the Plaintiffs were laboriously trying to answer the "Instructions"

section of the Interrogatories.

J.A. 77. In support of his motion to dismiss, filed months after this

response was offered, defense counsel argued that he had since had

the opportunity to ask both plaintiffs about this assertion and that

D'Amico "categorically denied that anything of the sort occurred, and

further testified that Ms. Zornes did not appear to have a problem

understanding the discovery requests at issue." (Defendant's Motion

to Dismiss at 2).

In my opinion, this entire issue arose as a result of defense counsel's mis-characterization of the testimony below. What actually happened is as follows. D'Amico testified that the discovery requests

were confusing and that some of the questions were overwhelming for

her. When asked specifically about the "example" given in the Show

Cause response, D'Amico denied an attempt on her part to "answer"

the instructions, but would not presume to speak on Zornes' behalf.14

_________________________________________________________________

14 When questioned about the second sentence of the response,

D'Amico testified as follows:

Q. Did you at any point, try to answer the instruction in the

document?

A. No, I -- to tell you the truth, lot of this, it's a lot -- it's very

confusing, because -- it's just very confusing.

. . .

Q. As you were answering the interrogatories did any of the

questions seem difficult to answer or unclear to you?

A. Yeah.

. . .

Q. Which part of answering the Interrogatories was overwhelming to you?

A. Just some of the questions were.

 34
In support of his motion to dismiss, defense counsel transformed this

testimony into a representation that D'Amico had"categorically

denied" the earlier response on behalf of herself and Zornes. And

while he represented to the court that he had asked both plaintiffs

about the response, he offered no citation to Zornes' testimony on the

issue.15 In his report and recommendation, issued more than nine

_________________________________________________________________

Q. Now, it says here, that Plaintiffs were "laboriously" trying

to answer the "Instructions" of the Interrogatories, that's not

true, is it?

A. For me it wasn't.

Q. Then based on your observations of Ms. Zornes, that's not

true either?

A. I can't make an observation for Donna.

. . .

Q. Did she ever express any concern to you about anything in

the instructions portion of the interrogatories?

A. No.

. . .

Q. So based on your personal knowledge, this statement is

untrue; is that correct?

. . .

A. For me.

Q. For you, that's not true, is it?

A. Right.

J.A. at 229-236.

15 There are no excerpts from Zornes' deposition in the record. In an

earlier attempt to refute the magistrate judge's finding (in the Rule) that

any prejudice to defendant was a result of its own neglect in pursuing

discovery, defense counsel represented that Zornes was deposed in April

(prior to the Rule or plaintiffs' response to the Rule). He now argues that

he questioned both plaintiffs about the Show Cause response, which was

not filed until late September, and learned that the response was untrue.

Once again, the issue is, in my opinion, too unclear to serve as any reliable basis for the entry of dismissal as a sanction, particularly as against

Zornes.

 35
months after plaintiffs' counsel filed the actual response to the Rule,

the magistrate judge stated that the response was"questionable," J.A.

211, but did not go to far as to characterize it as an "affirmative misrepresentation" by both plaintiffs. The district judge did not mention

the issue -- perhaps because it only involved D'Amico's testimony

or perhaps because the entire issue was too "questionable" a basis

upon which to throw both plaintiffs out of court.

In summary, I believe the record fails to support the majority's

conclusion that the magistrate judge made a "finding" that plaintiffs'

counsel's response to the Rule to Show Cause amounted to an "affirmative misrepresentation" by D'Amico and Zornes. Even if I were

inclined to place any emphasis upon the response, deemed "questionable" by the magistrate judge, I cannot attribute it to plaintiffs, only

to plaintiffs' counsel, and Zornes has been punished despite the fact

that she had nothing to do with either the Show Cause response or the

testimony of D'Amico.

Perhaps what is most troubling to me is that any errors of plaintiffs'

counsel have never resulted in the imposition of sanctions when committed. Rather, the first sanction ever imposed was the dismissal of

her clients' lawsuits. Although a litigant generally chooses counsel at

its peril, see Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962), "`justice demands that a blameless party not be disadvantaged by the

errors or neglect of his attorney which cause a final, involuntary termination of proceedings.'" Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d

951, 953 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d

725, 728 (4th Cir. 1982)); see also United States v. Shaffer Equip.

Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 1993) (recognizing, in a similar context, the "strong policy that cases be decided on the merits" and that

imposition of a dismissal sanction should include consideration of

"the extent of the client's blameworthiness if the wrongful conduct is

committed by its attorney" because "we seldom dismiss claims

against blameless clients").

In Lolatchy, the court reversed the sanction of default imposed

upon the defendants because:

the defendants [were] blameless. There ha[d] been no prejudice to the plaintiff [because the discovery had been fully

 36
answered before the hearing on the default motion]. Any dilatory action was on the part of the attorney, not the defendants, it was not drawn out, and continued at the most for

a time span of only a few months. No sanctions short of

default were attempted by the district court. The only sanction it ever imposed was default as to liability.

Id. at 953. Although recognizing that opposing counsel's frustration

in preparing for trial "may be a sufficient reason for sanctions short

of default judgment," the court held that it"should not suffice as a

reason for depriving the [litigants] of their day in court." Id. at 954.

Rather, a more appropriate sanction would have been to charge the

attorney "with all costs and expenses attendant to the delay, including

attorneys' fees, or even . . . contempt of court." Id. at 953.

Similarly, no sanction short of dismissal was ever attempted in this

case. The entire discovery dispute over the completeness of plaintiffs'

responses lasted less than four months, and it is undisputed that complete responses were in fact served within days of defendant's motion

to dismiss and months in advance of the dismissal order. These facts,

coupled with my adherence to the strong policy of deciding cases on

the merits, lead me to conclude that dismissal was too harsh a sanction given the insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of Zornes

or D'Amico.

What Prejudice to Defendant?

It is well settled that the sanction of dismissal should also be

reserved for cases "in which it is demonstrated that the failure to produce materially affect[s] the substantial rights of the adverse party

and is prejudicial to the presentation of his case ." Wilson, 561 F.2d

at 504 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in

original) (emphasis added). And, even where the"failure to produce

results in the discovering party's case being jeopardized or prejudiced, it is the normal rule that the proper sanction must be no more

severe . . . than is necessary to prevent prejudice to the movant." Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). The district

court "must consider how the absence of such evidence [not produced] would impair [the other party's] ability to establish their case

and whether the non-complying party's conduct [in not producing

 37
documents] would deprive [the other party] of a fair trial." Id. at 505

(internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). Furthermore, "when granting such sanction, [the district court] should clearly

state its reasons so that meaningful review may be had on appeal." Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

In my opinion, the district court abused its discretion in finding that

defendant was significantly prejudiced by plaintiffs' delay in producing the journal which "Plaintiff D'Amico had previously denied

existed" during her deposition. J.A. 255. Defense counsel is more critical -- representing to this court that D'Amico committed perjury by

flatly denying the journal's existence. And, the majority has rejected

plaintiffs' attempt to supplement the transcript of record with additional excerpts from D'Amico's deposition, which reveal that she in

fact disclosed the existence of the journal over two months before

defense counsel filed his motion to dismiss. Unlike the majority, I am

unprepared to place the brand of "perjury" upon D'Amico, or to rely

upon it to dismiss Zornes' complaint. Moreover, I fail to find sufficient support for the conclusion that defendant was materially prejudiced by plaintiffs' production of the journal on December 20.

First, too much has been made in this appeal of D'Amico's alleged

"perjury" at her deposition. This is what happened. D'Amico's deposition began on October 1, at which time she denied keeping a journal

of workplace concerns.16 However, the deposition was continued the

_________________________________________________________________

16 During her first day of testimony, D'Amico testified as follows:

Q. Did you review the notebook you've been keeping in this

litigation?

A. What notebook.

Q. Let's start another way, have you been keeping any kind of

notebook to record any of your concerns, about the workplace?

A. No.

Q. Did you bring a note pad at all to work to write down any

of your concerns?

A. No.

 38
following day, and D'Amico volunteered that she was keeping an "incident journal" at her home.17 It is as simple as that, and I am unwill-

_________________________________________________________________

Q. Does Ms. Zornes do that?

A. No.

. . .

Q. To your knowledge, does Ms. Zornes keep a notebook?

A. I don't know.

Q. Have you ever seen her keep a notebook?

A. No, I haven't.

Q. Have you ever seen her write anything down during the

work-day?

A. No.

. . .

Q. Outside of the work-place, have you maintained any kind of

notebook or journal?

A. No.

Q. Outside of the work-place, do you know if Ms. Zornes

keeps any kind of notebook?

A. No, I don't know.

J.A. 147-49.

17 On her second day of testimony, D'Amico testified as follows:

Q. You and I discussed yesterday, some occasions when you

spoke with management to discuss your concerns?

A. Yes.

Q. I'm just trying to learn whether there are other occasions

that you might have done so, that were not described yesterday?

A. I think we touched base with everything.

Q. We did, you're confident of that?

A. So far as I know, yes.

 39
ing to find either perjury or prejudice to the defendant from a situation

such as this.

After D'Amico's deposition, plaintiffs' counsel resisted production

of the journal on the basis that it was protected by the attorney-client

and work-product privileges. On November 14, defense counsel filed

a motion to compel plaintiffs to withdraw their objections to produc-

_________________________________________________________________

Q. Are there any documents that would refresh your recollection to make sure that we did in fact discuss everything?

A. Yeah, I do have an incident journal that I do keep of things

that does happen.

Q. You do keep a journal?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Yesterday you told me you didn't; is that correct.

A. Right.

Q. What has happened in the past 24 hours to enabled you to

recall something that you specifically told under oath yesterday that you did not have?

A. It's not that I don't have it, it's just than I -- you kept asking me if I kept it at work. If I wrote in it at work and it's

not really a whole lot of paper. All it is just certain dates

where something went down and I wrote notes.

. . .

Q. Did you have something to hide yesterday?

A. No, I don't have nothing to hide. You kept asking about a

"journal" and this and that, and to me it's not a "journal" all

it is is an incident report, where some things set things in

my mind because this is drawing on so long.

. . .

Q. Does Ms. Zornes keep a journal of incidents like you do?

A. Yes.

Continued Deposition of Shirley D'Amico taken October 2, 1996 at 225-

30. It is this testimony that the majority has refused to accept as supplemental material to the record on appeal.

 40
ing the journal, arguing in part that the Rule to Show Cause barred

all objections and, in part, that D'Amico had waived work-product

and attorney-client privileges by discussing the journal during the second day of her deposition, October 2.18 Thus, the magistrate judge,

who was overseeing discovery and had been made aware of

D'Amico's testimony disclosing the journal's existence, makes no

mention in his report and recommendation of a previous denial by

D'Amico. He knew the truth about what had happened during

D'Amico's deposition, but mistakenly believed that plaintiffs had

withheld complete responses to discovery for ten months.

Plaintiffs thereafter filed their objections to the report and recommendation, but had no reason to address D'Amico's deposition testimony because the magistrate judge had not relied upon it in any way

in his reasoning. Defense counsel, in response to plaintiffs' objections, attached copies of only the October 1 deposition testimony of

D'Amico and represented to the district court that she had "previously

deni[ed]" its existence. The district judge, who had not been involved

in the details of the earlier discovery dispute and who held no hearing

on the motion to dismiss, ruled as follows:

The Plaintiffs in the instant case correctly point out that [the

magistrate judge] incorrectly stated that the Plaintiffs prevented the Defendant from preparing an adequate defense to

Plaintiffs' case for ten months by Plaintiffs' tardiness in

answering interrogatories properly. These interrogatories

were not served until August 9, 1996, and were finally

answered properly on December 20, 1996, one week after

the final deadline for the second supplemental answers. This

delay, through clearly not ten months, did prejudice the

Defendant, as the overdue discovery included a one hundred

page journal entry which Plaintiff D'Amico had previously

denied existed. Untimely receipt of such a document just ten

days before the December 31, 1996, discovery deadline

prejudiced the Defendant substantially.

_________________________________________________________________

18 Thus, the October 2 deposition excerpts which plaintiffs have

attempted to submit to this court, contrary to the majority's belief, were

not attached to a "wholly unrelated November 14, 1996 document filed

with the district court." Majority op. at 15.

 41
J.A. 255 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). I note first

that the district court's entire reference to D'Amico's testimony concerning the journal is contained within his finding that defendant was

prejudiced by a 3-1/2 month delay in the production of the journal

"which D'Amico had previously denied existed." J.A. 255. It is obvious that the district court incorrectly believed that defense counsel

had no prior knowledge of the journal and that plaintiff simply withheld the document until ten days before the existing discovery deadline -- a belief which had been artfully perpetrated by defense

counsel despite the lack of any such finding by the magistrate judge

who, of course, knew better. The district judge also ruled that the

journal's contents prejudiced the defendant, but there is no indication

that the journal was placed before the magistrate judge or district

judge for their evaluation19 and the district judge provided no explanation as to why a lesser sanction would not suffice to "prevent prejudice to the movant." Wilson, 561 F.2d at 504.

Perhaps D'Amico did improperly deny the existence of a journal

on the first day of her deposition, although I can equally speculate

that she was confused by the questions or misunderstood them. She

may have believed the journal was privileged -- defense counsel did,

after all, argue that the plaintiffs' claims of privilege in the journal

were waived by D'Amico's discussing the journal on the second day

of her deposition. The crucial fact, of course, is that she disclosed the

existence of her written record the next day during the same

deposition. And even if the testimony was sufficient to support a finding of "perjury" on the part of D'Amico, Zornes has once again been

punished for testimony that she had nothing to do with and over

which she had no control.

Equally troubling to me is the fact that defense counsel knew a

_________________________________________________________________

19 In fact, the exact nature of the journal is entirely unclear to me. The

magistrate judge did not mention it, the district court calls it a "journal

entry," J.A. 255, the majority terms it a "diary," majority op. at 14, and

the defendant makes reference to "journals," Brief of Appellee at 29. I

find it extremely difficult to conclude that the prejudicial effect of this

document (or documents) was carefully considered below, as all indications are that it was not reviewed by the magistrate judge or district

judge.

 42
journal existed on October 2, yet led the district court to believe that

D'Amico had only denied the existence of the journal and that defendant first became aware of it on December 20. He also made the following representation to this court:

[T]he production of a document as vital as Plaintiffs' journals eight days after the final deadline . . . is extraordinarily

prejudicial to Defendant's defense of Plaintiffs' lawsuit,

especially in light of Plaintiff D'Amico's prior testimony

under oath that neither she nor Plaintiff Zornes maintained

a journal. Obviously, had D'Amico not perjured herself at

her deposition, Defendant could have explored the contents

of Plaintiffs' journals with her at that time. Additionally,

Defendant could have formulated an appropriate discovery

strategy in response to the contents of those voluminous

journals. Indeed, had the journals been produced on September 9, 1996 as required, Defendant would have had almost

four months to conduct the discovery it deemed appropriate

in response to those journals.

Brief of Appellee at 29 (emphasis added). This representation, of

course, was made to this court prior to the plaintiffs' request to supplement the record with D'Amico's October 2 testimony. Clearly misleading, in my view, it obviously necessitated the plaintiff's efforts to

get the entire story before this court.20 

_________________________________________________________________

20 The majority denies plaintiffs' motion to supplement the transcript of

record to show the second day of the deposition testimony and thereby

strikes plaintiffs' attempt to refute the "perjury" allegations because

plaintiff did not raise the issue until after defense counsel filed its brief

to this court. There is, in my opinion, an obvious reason for the delay.

As noted above, the magistrate judge made no mention of the issue and

the district court's reference to a "previous denial" amounted to 7 words

in a 27-page order which dismissed both plaintiffs' complaints and

issued Rule 11 sanctions against their attorney. No doubt aware of the

weaknesses in his case, particularly the absence of any fault on the part

of D'Amico or Zornes, defense counsel made an unfortunately successful

attempt to transform this issue into a major one involving perjury by an

individual plaintiff. Representations to the lower court of a "previous

denial," a half-truth at best, culminated in an obvious attempt to mislead

 43
With the benefit of the additional deposition testimony, we know

that D'Amico unquestionably disclosed during her deposition that she

had recorded and kept a journal of workplace incidents. We also

know that defense counsel asserted, at the conclusion of the deposition, a right to continue the deposition if necessary, but never sought

to do so. Defense counsel also made no motion to compel until

November 14. The record does not tell us exactly how production of

the journal came about, but it appears that counsel, with the magistrate judge's assistance, reached an agreement during the November

18 hearing as to what additional documents would be produced to the

other side -- which included the journal. Thus, despite the fact that

the magistrate judge had imposed no deadline for the production of

documents and defense counsel agreed to a December 12 exchange

date, defense counsel asserts irreparable prejudice because the journal

was not produced until December 20.

Rendering these claims of prejudice even more suspect is the fact

that, while defense counsel claims the journal was so critical that it

_________________________________________________________________

this court into believing that D'Amico not only perjured herself in her

deposition on this issue, but also that defense counsel had absolutely no

knowledge that a journal even existed until it was produced on December

20.

Hence, it is clear to me that it was not until receipt of defendant's brief

to this court wherein the defendant branded D'Amico's testimony as

perjury that plaintiffs' counsel realized a most serious misrepresentation

was being made which would require a supplementation to the transcript

of record before this court for us to know what all of the testimony

revealed. Perhaps plaintiffs' counsel should have anticipated the issue

and covered it as an initial matter, but I can likewise reasonably conclude

that she, as most people would, presumed that no effort would be made

to mislead this court.

Thus, while I am sympathetic to the district court, which was apparently provided with less than thorough memoranda and subjected to the

improper assertions of defense counsel, I believe that candor to this court

must not be defined by the contents of the joint appendix, particularly in

cases involving the severe sanction of dismissal or default. The information is so important that I cannot understand how the majority can use

the testimony from the first day to condemn D'Amico and then forbid

consideration of the next day's testimony during which D'Amico plainly

told defense counsel about the notes she had made.

 44
irreparably prejudiced his ability to defend the cases, and the majority

concludes that the late production "effectively prevented [defendant]

from pursuing any further discovery," majority op. at 17, defense

counsel chose to file a motion to dismiss under Rule 37(d) without

any attempt to reopen D'Amico's deposition to explore the contents

of her journal or to depose Zornes on the contents of the journal

D'Amico claimed that Zornes kept, even though the existing discovery deadline would not pass until December 31, 1996 and the pre-trial

conference would not be held until late March 1997. Nor has defendant at any time contended that the journal, when received, contained

any "incidents" which were not already revealed in plaintiffs' initial

discovery responses or depositions.

At a minimum, defense counsel had knowledge of the journal in

October and ample opportunity to compel its production and explore

its contents. See Hathcock, 53 F.3d at 40-41 (reversing entry of

default, in part because plaintiffs "possessed at least some [but not

full] knowledge of the allegedly discoverable materials [defendant]

failed to produce.").21 These facts, coupled with the lack of explanation as to how late production of the journal, or its contents, actually

prejudiced defendant, leaves me unable to conclude that defendant's

"ability to establish [its] case" has been impaired or that the late production of the journal has "deprive[d][defendant] of a fair trial."

Wilson, 561 F.2d at 505. And even if I were to assume that the late

production of the journal was prejudicial, the district court has failed

to explain why no lesser sanction could have sufficed to "prevent

prejudice to the movant." Id. at 504. In my view, a number of more

appropriate options were available.22

_________________________________________________________________

21 I also note that, had plaintiffs' counsel not consented to the second

extension of discovery, defendant would have had no time to conduct

any discovery in response to the journal including, of course, deposing

D'Amico in the first instance. Even with the extension, they had 30 days

to complete discovery -- not the four months asserted -- and by the time

they filed their untimely motion to compel, discovery was over. While

plaintiffs' counsel was equally negligent in pursuing the discovery necessary to prepare her clients' cases, defendant's claims of prejudice are, in

my view, overstated and sharply diminished by its own conduct.

22 For example, the district court could have extended discovery to

allow defendant to explore the incidents, if any, it had not already been

 45
I am also unpersuaded by the premise that the money spent by

defense counsel associated with pursuing the discovery responses

rises to the level of prejudice warranting dismissal of the complaints.

If a monetary sanction had been imposed for plaintiffs' counsel's conduct after she responded to the Rule to Show Cause, I would support

the district court's attempt to correct any improper behavior at that

time. I would similarly have supported the imposition of such sanctions at the November hearing, along with an appropriate warning. As

it stands, however, plaintiffs' discovery obligations were completed

by December 20, the only existing court deadline was the January 31

deadline for dispositive motions, and there is no indication that a trial

date had been set. Accordingly, any prejudice could have been

addressed by imposing costs and fees, and allowing defendant additional time to complete any discovery the journal necessitated.23

_________________________________________________________________

made aware of through the interrogatory responses and depositions

and/or barred plaintiffs from raising or relying upon any incidents contained in the journal which had not already been disclosed. To the extent

additional discovery was necessary, the court could have imposed fees

and costs associated with it upon plaintiffs or their counsel. In December

1996, there was certainly no time obstacle to this extension of discovery

for defendant as the pre-trial conference was not scheduled to be held

until March of the following year.

23 Thus, I am also unpersuaded by the majority's reliance upon Zaczek

v. Fauquier County, Va., 764 F.Supp. 1071, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd,

16 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 1993), and Aerodyne Sys. Eng'g v. Heritage Int'l

Bank, 115 F.R.D. 281, 290-91 (D. Md. 1987). In Zaczek, the court dismissed a § 1983 action filed by an unemployed pro se prisoner with "few

assets," after the prisoner had filed over fifty motions in eight months

despite repeated, and explicit, warnings to stop. In Aerodyne, the district

court assumed oversight of the discovery dispute from the magistrate

judge when plaintiffs were two months late in responding, sent a letter

informing counsel that sanctions would be granted unless responses were

received by a certain date, issued a follow-up order requiring an immediate response and imposing monetary sanctions when not received, and

held a hearing before ruling that the action would be dismissed unless

plaintiff provided full and complete responses by yet another specific

date. I do not quarrel with these cases, but find them to be vastly different from this one.

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Who Has Been Deterred - And From What?

I turn now to the final factor for consideration-- whether the harsh

sanction of dismissal was warranted by the need to deter noncompliance with discovery rules and court directives. As a general rule, I

embrace and appreciate the majority's deference to the "trial judge's

position to supervise the litigants and assess their good faith."

Lolatchy, 816 F.2d at 957 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). I simply do not find the usual degree of deference to be warranted in this case.

Prior to issuing his recommendation for dismissal, the magistrate

judge had issued the 3-page order denying plaintiffs' motion to compel without a hearing, and the 2-page Rule to Show Cause without a

hearing and without follow-up. The magistrate judge had counsel

appear before him on just one occasion -- the November 18 hearing

-- which resulted in no sanctions or court-ordered deadlines. And

while the magistrate judge chastised both counsel for their unprofessional behavior during the November 18 hearing, he later recommended dismissal without conducting a hearing. The district judge

accepted the recommendation, without ever issuing a prior order or

holding a hearing. Thus, while I agree that dismissal must be available as a sanction in appropriate cases, this is not such a case. The

severity of the sanction demands that it follow a clear and specific

warning, the consideration of imposing lesser sanctions in an attempt

to steer the course, and a careful consideration of alternative methods

to resolve any prejudice.

I also believe the laudable goal of deterrence has not been served.

Plaintiffs' counsel has been fined $500 and ordered to pay approximately $3,400 in attorneys' fees to defense counsel for the motion for

default she filed in January 1997. She may or may not find this to be

a deterrent, but is free to continue practicing law nonetheless. Defense

counsel, buoyed by the result in this case, will likely be encouraged

to litigate similarly in the future. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have

been forever foreclosed from a decision on the merits.

Conclusion

Having reviewed the entire record in this case, and the factors

which must be carefully applied to evaluate the severe sanction of dis-

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missal, I am regretfully convinced that the district court abused its

discretion in dismissing plaintiffs' complaints. Dismissal with prejudice was imposed as the first sanction in this case, and without a

"clear and explicit" warning that dismissal would result if plaintiffs

failed to comply with a specific order or condition of the court. I

believe it is unacceptable to allow courts to rely upon a Rule to Show

Cause, issued days after discovery responses were first due and which

was timely responded to by the offending party, as a vehicle to dismiss complaints months later. If a sanction was warranted, it should

have been imposed within a reasonable time after the response to the

Rule was filed and it should have been based on events which

prompted the Rule in the first instance. I fear the majority has today

eviscerated the purpose behind warnings, for district courts may hereafter threaten dismissal for a minor infraction of timing and forever

rely upon that warning to dismiss at will in the future. And, it appears,

courts may dispense altogether with the consideration of lesser sanctions as a first attempt to correct the behavior of the litigant's attorneys -- so long as they have threatened dismissal sometime in the

past.

The majority has also placed great emphasis upon the district

court's findings of bad faith by plaintiffs and undue prejudice to the

defendant. Plaintiffs' counsel is not blameless by any means. She certainly joined defense counsel's lack of diligence in preparing these

cases for trial and, after being placed under attack by her opposing

counsel, reacted by filing an improvident motion for default judgment. However, in my view, the incomplete representations made by

defense counsel to the court below and an insufficient transcript of

record on appeal have resulted in both the district court and majority

being misled, and my conclusion that defense counsel is equally, if

not more, to blame for the discovery difficulties below.

Thus, I dissent. In my view, the record before us woefully lacks the

clarity and certainty required to impose the harsh sanction of prejudicial dismissal and, instead, reveals a pattern of uncivil and unprofessional behavior on the part of both sides to this controversy. Believing

as I do in the strong policy that cases should be decided on the merits,

rather than on the cunning of the litigants' counsel in conducting discovery, and that Zornes and D'Amico have suffered an unjust sanc-

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tion, I would remand to the district court for close supervision of the

remaining discovery and a final determination on the merits.

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