[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Revision , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4486.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2021-O HIO -4486
T HE S TATE EX REL
. A MES , A PPELLANT , v . P ORTAGE C OUNTY B OARD OF
R EVISION , A PPELLEE . [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Ames v. Po rtage Cty. Bd. of Revision , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4486.] Mandamus—Standing—Relator lacks standing to bring mandamus action against a board of revision when he fails to a llege that his property was the subject of an improper hearing by the board or that he has been personally harmed by the board’s practices—Court of appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed. (No. 2021-0647—Submitted October 5, 2021—Decided December 23, 2 021.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals fo r Portage Count y, No. 2021-P-0027,
2021-Ohio-1698.

__________________S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Appellant, Brian M. Ames, appeal s the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismis sing his complaint for a writ o f mandamus against appellee, Portage C ounty Board of Revisi on, for lack of standin g. We affirm. I. Background {¶ 2} Each Ohio county has a board of revision that is authorized to hear and decide complaints regarding the valuation of real property for taxation purposes. R.C. 5715.01(B). The board consists of the county treasurer, t he county auditor, and one member of the county board of commissioners who is selected by the
commissioners. R.C. 5715.02. The board is also authorized to create hearing boards, when necessary, to hear valuation complaints expeditiously. Id . Each board member “may appoint one qualified employee from the official’s office to serve in the official’s place and stead on each such board.” Id

. {¶ 3} On January 11, 2021, the Portage County Board of Revision held its mandatory organizational meeting. The treasurer, the auditor, and the commissioner assigned to the board were in attendance. They “discuss[ed] th e selection of alternate delegates to serve on the board during scheduled appeal hearing s.” Proposed
alternates for each of the board members were identified. Howe ver, the board did not create any hearing boards. {¶ 4} Ames resides in Portage County where he owns parcel No. 28-100-
00-00-011-000. On March 17, 2021, Ames filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals. He alleged that the Revised Code requires the creation of hearing boards for which alternates may then be identified but that the board members may not lawfully appoint alternates to the board itself. He asked the court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the board to creat e hearing boards and to record the name of the board member or board member’s appoin tee assigned to each board and to “[r]evoke any and all designations of alterna tes” made by the
board.January Term, 2021

3 {¶ 5} The board filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure t o state a claim upon which relief may be granted and on the ground that A mes lacks standing. Ames responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment. {¶ 6} On May 17, 2021, the court of appeals granted the motion to dis miss and denied the motion for summary judgment. 2021-Ohio-1698, ¶ 14. The court of appeals held that Ames lacks standing, id . at ¶ 8, and that the “public right” exception to standing does not apply, id. at ¶ 13. {¶ 7} Ames appealed to this court as of right. II. Legal analysis {¶ 8} We review a dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo. State ex rel. McKinney v. Schmenk , 152 Ohio St.3d 70, 2017-Ohio-9183, 92 N.E.3d 871, ¶ 8. Whether a party has standing to b ring an action is a question o f law that we also
review de novo. State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 132 Ohio St.3d 47, 2012-Ohio-1861, 969 N.E.2d 224, ¶ 10. {¶ 9} Standing determines “whether a litigant is entitled to have a c ourt determine the merits of the issues presented.” Ohio Contrs. Assn. v. Bicking , 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088 (1994). A party must esta blish standing to sue before a court will consider the merits of the party’s clai m. Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce , 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27. {¶ 10} A party lacks standing unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, “some real interest in the subject mat ter of the action.” State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 298 N.E.2d 515 (1973), syllabus. T o have standing in a mandamu s case, a relator must be “ ‘beneficially interested’ ” in the case. State ex rel. Hills & Dales v. Plain Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 158 Ohio St.3d 303, 2019-Ohio-5160, 141 N.E.3d 189, ¶ 9, quoting State ex rel. Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning Comm. , 80 Ohio St.3d 297, 299, 685 N.E.2d 1251 (1997); R.C. 2731.02. “[T]he a pplicable test isS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 whether [a] relator[] would be directly benefited or injured by a judgment in the
case.” State ex rel. Sinay v. Sodders , 80 Ohio St.3d 224, 226, 685 N.E.2d 754 (1997). A mandamus action brought by a party that lacks standi ng will be
dismissed. See generally Hills & Dales

. {¶ 11} Ames does not allege that his property was the subject of an improper hearing by the board. N or does he claim that the boar d’s practices have harmed him in any way. Instea d, he presents the following prop ositions of law.
A. The first proposition of law {¶ 12} The complaint alleged that “[a]s the owner of parcel 28-100-00- 00- 011-000, Mr. Ames enjoys standing to bring this action.” In hi s first proposition of law, Ames contends that the cour t of appeals was required to ac cept this assertion
as true and therefore could not di smiss his complaint under Civ .R. 12(B)(6). {¶ 13} When standing is challenged in a motion to dismiss, the court m ust presume that all the factual allegations in the complaint are true. Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. , 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 768 N.E.2d 1136, ¶ 41. But “legal conclusions, even when cast as factual assertions, a re not presumed true for purposes of a motion to dismiss.” State ex rel. Martre v. Reed , 161 Ohio St.3d 281, 2020-Ohio-4777, 162 N.E.3d 773, ¶ 12 (holding that the cou rt was not required to accept as true the relator’s assertion that he lacked an ade quate remedy in the ordinary course of the law). Applying these rules to the prese nt case, the court of appeals was required to accept as true the allegation that Ames owns the parcel that he identified in his complaint, but it was not required to acce pt the legal conclusion that this property ownership c onfers standing on Ames to bring the mandamus action. We reject Ames’s first proposition of law.
B. The second proposition of law {¶ 14} In addition to the averment of standing quoted abo ve, the compl aint also alleged that “Mr. Ames is prejudiced by the illegal organi zation of the board as the [sic] fair hearing of com plaints against valuation or as sessment.” In hisJanuary Term, 2021

5 second proposition of law, Ames asse rts: “The taxable value of all real property in the same taxing district and class is a critical factor in the determination of the effective tax rate for parcel 2 8-100-00-00-011-000 owned by Mr. Ames. R.C. 319.301(B)(3). Therefore, Mr. Ames has a beneficial interest i n the lawful operation of the [board] and in t he decisions of the [board] re ndered on complaints
filed under R.C. 5715.19.” {¶ 15} Ames’s theory is that a misevalua tion of one property affects t he tax assessment of his own property, and therefore he has standing. But even assuming that to be true, Ames alleged onl y that he has an interest in t he outcome of tax-rate assessment appeals. Whether he has standing to challenge the p rocedures by which the board conducts those hearings is a different question. In other words, Ames has not alleged that he is personally harmed by the board’s practic e of appointing
alternates without first crea ting separate hearing boards. {¶ 16} Ames also asserts that R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) confers standing on h im to bring this action. That section authorizes the filing of co mplaints with the county auditor to challenge any of the determinations that the board i s statutorily authorized to make and does not limit the persons who may file such complaints. But R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) is inapplicable, because this is not a c omplaint challenging a valuation determination, rec oupment charge, or any other subs tantive decision by the board, and it was not filed with the county auditor. This is a mandamus action seeking to compel the board to change how it conducts business in all cases. Therefore, R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) does not confer standing on Ames to bring this
action. {¶ 17} Finally, Ames argues that the cou rt of appeals “erred in findin g * * * the potential harm in this case to be not severe enough to meri t the issuance of the requested writ.” Ames maintains that the court of appeals shou ld have found standing based on the theory that he had asserted a “public rig ht.” The court of appeals did not need to make any d etermination with respect to an alternative theoryS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 of standing, however, because Ames did not assert the issue in the court of appeals. And because he failed to raise the issue, he waived it. See ProgressOhio.org at ¶ 16 (holding that the appellant waive d a claim of taxpayer standing by failing to raise it in the court of appeals). {¶ 18} Ames’s second proposition of law has no merit.
C. The third and fourth propositions of law {¶ 19} The remaining propositions of law do not present substantive challenges to the court of app eals’ decision on standing. In h is third proposition of law, Ames argues that the board’s practice of designating alter nates prior to the creation of hearing boards violates the law because it allows t he alternates to perform all duties of the board and not just hear complaints as to the valuation of real property. And in his fourth proposition of law he contend s that, because the board is violating the law and th e facts are not in dispute, th e court of appeals should have granted his motion for summary judgment. Because we hold that Ames lacks standing to bring this mandamus action, it is unnecessary for t his court to address these arguments.
III. Conclusion {¶ 20} For these reasons, we hold that the court of appeals properly dismissed Ames’s compla int for lack of standing. Judgment affirmed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F ISCHER , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , S TEWART , and B RUNNER , JJ., concur.

_________________ Brian M. Ames, pro se. Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage C ounty Prosecuting Attorney, and C hristopher J. Meduri, Assistant Prosecu ting Attorney, for appellee.

_________________