Testimony 

Before the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:30 a.m. EST 

in New York, New York 

Tuesday, April 1, 2003 

TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY 

Post-September 11th 

Initiatives and Long-Term 

Challenges 

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham 

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues 

GAO-03-616T 
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Before September 2001, GAO’s work in transportation security focused 

largely on aviation security, which was then the responsibility of the Federal 

Aviation Administration, within the Department of Transportation. This 

work often demonstrated the existence of significant, long-standing 

vulnerabilities in aviation security. Among these vulnerabilities were airport 

screeners’ inadequate detection of threats when screening passengers and 

their carry-on bags prior to their boarding aircraft; the absence of any 

requirement to screen checked baggage on domestic flights; inadequate 

controls for limiting access to secure areas at airports; and inadequate 

security for air traffic control computer systems and facilities. 

Since September 2001, securing the nation’s transportation systems from 

terrorist attacks has assumed great urgency. The Congress and the 

administration have reorganized the federal agencies responsible for 

transportation security, transferring them to the new Department of 

Homeland Security, and the agencies are attempting to enhance security 

without unduly inhibiting the movement of goods and people. The 

Transportation Security Administration, which was created in November 

2001 and has assumed overall responsibility for transportation security, has 

made considerable progress in addressing aviation security challenges. By 

the end of December 2002, the agency had hired and deployed a workforce 

of over 60,000, including passenger and baggage screeners and federal air 

marshals, and was screening about 90 percent of all checked baggage for 

explosives. In addition, local mass transit agencies have assessed 

vulnerabilities, increased training for emergency preparedness, and 

conducted emergency drills. The Coast Guard has also performed initial risk 

assessments of ports, established new security guidelines, and initiated a 

comprehensive assessment of security conditions at 55 U.S. ports. The 

Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have 

actions under way to strengthen port security. Nevertheless, air cargo 

shipments, general aviation airports, and mass transit systems remain 

vulnerable to attack, and an effective port security environment may be 

many years away. 

The Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security face long-term 

transportation security challenges that include (1) developing a 

comprehensive transportation risk management approach; (2) ensuring that 

transportation security funding needs are identified and prioritized and that 

costs are controlled; (3) establishing effective coordination among the many 

public and private entities responsible for transportation security; (4) 

ensuring adequate workforce competence and staffing levels; and (5) 

implementing security standards for transportation facilities, workers, and 

security equipment. We have issued reports and made recommendations 

that address many of these challenges, and in response some actions are 

under way. 

This testimony responds to the 

request of the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States for 

information on GAO’s work in 

transportation security. It 

addresses (1) transportation 

security before September 2001; (2) 

what the federal government has 

done since September 11th to 

strengthen transportation security, 

particularly aviation, mass transit, 

and port security; and (3) what 

long-term institutional challenges 

face the federal agencies 

responsible for transportation 

security. The testimony is based 

on a body of work that GAO has 

performed over the years. 

This testimony does not contain 

recommendations. However, GAO 

reports and testimonies on 

aviation, transit, and port security 

and on management issues are 

listed at the end of the statement. 

Many of these reports and 

testimonies contain GAO 

recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-616T 

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gerald L. 

Dillingham, Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or 

dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-616T, a testimony 

before the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 

March 31, 2003 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

Post-September 11th Initiatives and 

Long-Term Challenges 
Page 1 GAO-03-616T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission:1

We are here today to discuss our public work on transportation security. 

As you know, the General Accounting Office is the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of the Congress. Our mission is to support the Congress 

in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 

performance and accountability of the federal government for the 

American people. We examine the use of public funds; evaluate federal 

programs and policies; and provide analyses, recommendations, and other 

assistance to help the Congress make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions. Our commitment to good government is reflected in our 

core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. We wish to thank 

the Commission for inviting us today to share our knowledge of 

transportation security issues, and we look forward to continuing to work 

with you. 

Since September 11, 2001, securing our nation’s transportation system 

from terrorist attacks has assumed great urgency. On November 19, 2001, 

the Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which 

created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the 

Department of Transportation (DOT) and defined its primary 

responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. DOT 

then worked to strengthen security through its modal administrations 

while simultaneously organizing the new agency to meet the longer-term 

challenge of implementing security improvements that will not excessively 

inhibit commerce and travel or interfere with other critical agency 

missions. With the passage of the Homeland Security Act on November 25, 

2002, TSA was transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security, 

which assumed overall responsibility for transportation security. 

My testimony today addresses (1) transportation security before 

September 2001; (2) what the federal government has done since 

September 11th to strengthen transportation security, particularly 

aviation, mass transit, and port security; and (3) the long-term institutional 

challenges that face the federal agencies responsible for transportation 

security. 

 1

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States is an independent, 

bipartisan commission created by Public Law 107-306 to investigate the circumstances 

surrounding the events of September 11, 2001, and make recommendations for corrective 

measures that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism. 
Page 2 GAO-03-616T 

In summary: 

Before September 2001, our work in transportation security focused 

largely on aviation security, which was then the responsibility of DOT’s 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Together with other studies, our 

work often demonstrated the existence of significant, long-standing 

vulnerabilities in aviation security. These vulnerabilities included failure to 

detect threats when screening passengers and their carry-on bags prior to 

their boarding aircraft and the absence of any requirement to screen 

checked baggage on domestic flights; inadequate controls for limiting 

access to secure areas at airports; and failure to secure air traffic control 

computer systems and facilities. 

Since September 2001, securing our nation’s transportation system from 

terrorist attacks has assumed great urgency. The Congress and the 

administration have reorganized the federal agencies responsible for 

transportation security, transferring them to the new Department of 

Homeland Security, and the agencies are attempting to enhance security 

without unduly inhibiting the movement of goods and people. TSA has 

made considerable progress in addressing aviation security challenges. By 

the end of December 2002, the agency had hired and deployed a workforce 

of over 60,000, including passenger and baggage screeners and federal air 

marshals, and was screening about 90 percent of all checked baggage for 

explosives. In addition, local mass transit agencies have assessed 

vulnerabilities, increased training for emergency preparedness, and 

conducted emergency drills. The Coast Guard has also performed initial 

risk assessments of ports, established new security guidelines, and 

initiated a comprehensive assessment of security conditions at 55 U.S. 

ports, and the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service have actions under way to strengthen port security. Nevertheless, 

air cargo shipments, general aviation airports, and mass transit systems 

remain vulnerable to attack, and an effective port security environment 

may be many years away. 

DOT and the Department of Homeland Security face long-term 

transportation security challenges that include (1) developing a 

comprehensive risk-management approach; (2) ensuring that 

transportation security funding needs are identified and prioritized and 

that costs are controlled; (3) establishing effective coordination among the 

many public and private entities responsible for transportation security; 

(4) ensuring adequate workforce competence and staffing levels; and (5) 

implementing security standards for transportation facilities, workers, and 
Page 3 GAO-03-616T 

security equipment. We have issued reports and made recommendations 

that address many of these challenges, and some actions are under way. 

Our work on transportation security prior to September 2001 primarily 

addressed vulnerabilities in aviation security. These included ineffective 

screening of passengers and baggage for threat objects and explosives, 

inadequate controls for limiting access to secure areas at airports, and 

inadequate security for air traffic control computer systems and facilities. 

Mass transit agencies were taking actions to enhance security, and 

concerns about port security were raised. 

Before September 2001, screeners, who were then hired by the airlines, 

often failed to detect threat objects located on passengers or in their carryon luggage. As we reported in June 2000, tests of screeners conducted in 

1987 revealed that screeners missed 20 percent of the potentially 

dangerous objects that FAA used in its tests, and test data from 1991 

through 1999 showed a declining trend in the rate of detection.2

 At that 

time, FAA characterized this level of performance as unsatisfactory. The 

more recent results showed that as testing got more realistic—that is, as 

tests more closely approximated how a terrorist might attempt to 

penetrate a checkpoint—screeners’ performance declined significantly. A 

principal cause of screeners’ performance problems was rapid turnover 

and insufficient training. Turnover exceeded over 100 percent a year at 

most large airports, leaving few skilled and experienced screeners, 

primarily because of low wages, limited benefits, and repetitive, 

monotonous work. 

Before September 2001, controls for limiting access to secure areas of 

airports, including aircraft, did not always work as intended. As we 

reported in May 2000, our special agents used fictitious law enforcement 

badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas, bypass security 

checkpoints at two airports, and walk unescorted to aircraft departure 

gates.3

 The agents, who had been issued tickets and boarding passes, could 

have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto 

aircraft. DOT’s Inspector General also documented numerous problems 

 2

U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair 

Airport Screeners’ Performance, GAO/RCED-00-74 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000). 

3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports, 

GAO/OSI-0010 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000). 

Some Vulnerabilities 

in Transportation 

Security Were Known 

before September 

2001 
Page 4 GAO-03-616T 

with airport access controls, and in one series of tests, nearly 7 out of 

every 10 attempts by the Inspector General’s staff to gain access to secure 

areas were successful. 

Before September 2001, our reviews of FAA’s oversight of air traffic 

control computer systems showed that FAA had not ensured the security 

of these systems or of the facilities that house them.4

 Our reviews also 

found that FAA had not ensured that the contractors who had access to 

the air traffic control computer systems had undergone background 

checks. The air traffic control computer systems provide information to 

air traffic controllers and aircraft flight crews to help ensure the safe and 

expeditious movement of aircraft. Failure to protect these systems and 

their facilities could cause a nationwide disruption of air traffic or even a 

loss of life because of collisions. Because of the vulnerabilities we 

identified, the air traffic control system was susceptible to intrusion and 

malicious attacks. 

Over the years, we made numerous recommendations to FAA to improve 

screeners’ performance, strengthen airport access controls, and better 

protect air traffic control computer systems and facilities. As of September 

2001, FAA had implemented some of these recommendations and was 

addressing others, but its progress was often slow. In addition, many 

initiatives were not linked to specific deadlines, making it difficult to 

monitor and oversee their implementation. 

Before September 2001, many transit agencies were implementing 

measures to enhance transit safety and security, such as revising 

emergency plans and training employees in emergency preparedness. 

According to transit agency officials, the 1995 sarin gas attack on the 

Tokyo subway system and experiences during natural disasters had served 

as catalysts for the agencies to focus on safety and security. The officials 

said that the terrorist attacks on September 11th elevated the importance 

of security. 

 4

Aviation Security: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight Safety, 

GAO/AIMD-98-155 (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1998); Computer Security: FAA Needs to 

Improve Controls over Use of Foreign Nationals to Remediate and Review Software, 

GAO/AIMD-00-55 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 23, 1999); Computer Security: FAA Is 

Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, but Further Action Is Required, GAO/AIMD-00-169

(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2000); FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to 

Personnel and Other Continuing Weaknesses, GAO/AIMD-00-252 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 

16, 2000); and FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing 

Weaknesses, GAO-01-171 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2000). 
Page 5 GAO-03-616T 

Concerns about the security of the nation’s ports were recognized even 

before the September 11th attacks. Ports are inherently vulnerable to 

terrorist attacks and make desirable targets because of their size, 

accessibility by water and land, location in metropolitan areas, volume of 

material transported, and ready transportation links to interior locations. 

Moreover, a terrorist act at one of these seaports could result in extensive 

loss of lives, property, and business, and could impact the nation’s 

economy if the free flow of trade is disrupted. In August 2000, the 

Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports estimated 

that the costs to upgrade the security infrastructure at the nation’s 361 

ports ranged from $10 million to $50 million per port. 

Since September 2001, federal and local agencies have been trying to 

assess and address the monumental challenges they face in attempting to 

strengthen the security of the nation’s transportation systems. As we 

testified on September 20, 2001, the enormous size of the U.S. airspace 

alone defies easy protection, and no form of travel can ever be made 

totally secure. Providing aviation security means protecting hundreds of 

airports, thousands of planes, and tens of thousands of daily flights. 

Providing transit and port security also poses daunting challenges. For 

example, about 6,000 agencies provide transit services through buses, 

subways, ferries, and light rail service to about 14 million Americans each 

weekday, and millions of containers are imported into the United States 

through more than 300 public and private U.S. seaports, with more than 

3,700 cargo and passenger terminals. 

The federal government’s role in transportation security has been evolving 

since September 2001. TSA was created in November 2001 by the Aviation 

and Transportation Security Act and has assumed overall responsibility for 

transportation security. Although the agency has thus far focused 

primarily on aviation, it is responsible under the act for the security of all 

modes of transportation, which also include mass transit, maritime, rail, 

highway, and pipelines. TSA is in the early stages of working with the 

other transportation modes. We highlight some of the progress that has 

been made in aviation, mass transit, and port security. 

Following the September 11th attacks, DOT faced several urgent aviation 

security challenges, such as meeting newly established screening 

deadlines and addressing security gaps that we and others, including 

DOT’s Inspector General, had identified. In November 2001, TSA assumed 

responsibility under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act for 

Since September 

2001, Federal 

Agencies Have Put 

People, Policies, and 

Procedures in Place 

to Strengthen 

Transportation 

Security 

Aviation Security 
Page 6 GAO-03-616T 

screening passengers and property. (See fig. 1.) The act required it to hire 

and deploy federal passenger screeners by November 19, 2002, and to 

screen all checked baggage using explosives detection systems by 

December 31, 2002.5 In addition, FAA established a requirement for 

installing reinforced cockpit doors in aircraft. 

 5

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 amends this requirement. According to the legislation, 

if, in his discretion or at the request of an airport, the Under Secretary of Transportation for 

Security determines that TSA is not able to deploy the explosives detection systems 

required in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act by December 31, 2002, then for 

each airport for which the Under Secretary makes this determination, the Under Secretary 

shall submit to specific congressional committees a detailed plan for the deployment of the 

number of explosives detection systems at that airport necessary to meet the requirements 

as soon as practicable at that airport but no later than December 31, 2003; the Under 

Secretary shall take all necessary action to ensure that alternative means of screening all 

checked baggage are implemented until the requirements have been met. 
Page 7 GAO-03-616T 

Figure 1: Passengers Being Screened at a Security Checkpoint 

TSA has made considerable progress in addressing aviation security 

challenges. For example, according to TSA, it 

• met the November 2002 deadline by hiring and deploying over 40,000 

passenger screeners to screen passengers at 429 commercial airports; 

• hired and deployed more than 20,000 of an estimated 22,000 baggage 

screeners as of mid-December 2002 to screen all checked baggage; 

• has been using explosives detection systems or explosives trace detection 

equipment to screen about 90 percent of all checked baggage as of 

December 31, 2002;6

 6

Explosives detection machines are used to screen baggage for explosives and work by 

using CAT scan X-ray to take fundamental measurements of materials in bags to recognize 

characteristic signatures of threat explosives. Explosives trace detection systems (trace 

detection machines) are used to screen baggage for explosives, and work by detecting 

vapors and residues of explosives. 
Page 8 GAO-03-616T 

• has been using alternative means such as canine teams, hand searches, 

and passenger-bag matching to screen the remaining checked baggage; 

and 

• has made substantial progress in expanding the Federal Air Marshal 

Service. 

Furthermore, according to an FAA official, as of March 21, 2003, FAA had 

approved designs for reinforcing the cockpit doors of over 98 percent of 

the commercial fleet’s 5,750 aircraft, 80 percent of the doors had been 

installed, and kits had been ordered for the remaining doors. As of midDecember 2002, however, TSA still had to complete the installation of 

most of the explosives detection equipment needed to screen baggage to 

meet the act’s baggage-screening requirements. At that time, according to 

TSA, it had installed 239 of the 1,100 explosives detection machines and 

1,951 of the 6,000 trace detection machines that it had estimated were 

needed. 

Although TSA has focused much effort and funding on ensuring that 

bombs and other threat items are not carried onto planes by passengers or 

in their luggage, vulnerabilities exist in securing the cargo carried aboard 

commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act requires that all cargo carried aboard 

commercial passenger aircraft be screened and that TSA have a system in 

place as soon as practicable to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the 

security of cargo on all-cargo aircraft. The “known shipper” program—

which allows shippers that have established business histories with air 

carriers or freight forwarders7

 to ship cargo on planes—is TSA’s primary 

approach to ensuring air cargo security and safety and to complying with 

the cargo-screening requirement of the act. However, we and DOT’s 

Inspector General have identified weaknesses in the known shipper 

program and in TSA’s procedures for approving freight forwarders.8

Since September 2001, TSA has taken a number of actions to enhance 

cargo security, such as implementing a database of known shippers in 

October 2002. The database is the first phase in developing a cargoprofiling system similar to the computer-assisted passenger prescreening 

 7

Freight forwarders consolidate shipments and deliver them to air carriers and cargo 

facilities of passenger and all-cargo air carriers. 

8

U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential 

Improvements for the Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002). 
Page 9 GAO-03-616T 

system. However, in December 2002, we reported that additional 

operational and technological measures, such as checking the identity of 

individuals making cargo deliveries, have the potential to improve air 

cargo security in the near term.9 We further reported that TSA lacks a 

comprehensive plan with long-term goals and performance targets for 

cargo security, time frames for completing security improvements, and 

risk-based criteria for prioritizing actions to achieve those goals.10

Accordingly, we recommended that TSA develop a comprehensive plan for 

air cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach, includes 

a list of security priorities, and sets deadlines for completing actions. TSA 

agreed with this recommendation. 

Since September 2001, TSA has taken only a few actions related to general 

aviation security, leaving it far more open and potentially vulnerable than 

commercial aviation. General aviation includes more than 200,000 

privately owned airplanes, which are located in every state at more than 

19,000 airports. Over 550 of these airports also provide commercial 

service. General aviation’s vulnerability was revealed in January 2002, 

when a Florida teenager (and flight student) crashed a single-engine 

Cessna airplane into a Tampa skyscraper. FAA has since issued a notice 

with voluntary guidance for flight schools that suggests such measures as 

using different keys to gain access to an aircraft and start the ignition, not 

giving students access to aircraft keys, ensuring positive identification of 

flight students, and reporting suspicious activities. However, because the 

guidance is voluntary, it is unknown how many flight schools have 

implemented these measures. 

Since September 2001, FAA has continued to strengthen the security of the 

nation’s air traffic control computer systems and facilities in response to 

39 recommendations we made between May 1998 and December 2000. 

However, more must be done to ensure that critical information systems 

are not at risk of intrusion and attack. Among its accomplishments, FAA 

has established an information systems security management structure 

under its Chief Information Officer, whose office has developed an 

information systems security strategy, security architecture (that is, 

overall blueprint), security policies and directives, and a security 

awareness training campaign. This office has also managed FAA’s incident 

response center and implemented a certification and accreditation process 

 9

GAO-03-344. 

10GAO-03-344. 
Page 10 GAO-03-616T 

to ensure that vulnerabilities in current and future air traffic control 

systems are identified and weaknesses addressed. Nevertheless, the office 

faces continued challenges in increasing its intrusion detection 

capabilities, obtaining accreditation for systems that are already 

operational, and managing information systems security throughout the 

agency. In addition, according to senior security officials, FAA has 

completed assessments of the physical security of its staffed facilities, but 

it has not yet accredited all of these air traffic control facilities as secure in 

compliance with agency policy. Finally, FAA has worked aggressively over 

the past 2 years to complete background investigations on numerous 

contractor employees. However, ensuring that all new contractors are 

assessed to determine which employees require background checks, and 

that those checks are completed in a timely manner, will be a continuing 

challenge for the agency. 

Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems 

secure, in part because certain characteristics that make them vulnerable 

also make them difficult to secure. For example, the high ridership of 

some transit agencies makes them attractive targets for terrorists but also 

makes the use of certain security measures, like metal detectors, 

impractical. Despite such challenges, transit agencies have taken a number 

of steps to improve the security of their systems. In December 2002, after 

visiting 10 transit agencies and surveying 200, we reported that these 

agencies had implemented new security initiatives or increased the 

frequency of existing activities since September 2001.11 For example, many 

transit agencies had assessed vulnerabilities, provided additional training 

on emergency preparedness, revised emergency plans, and conducted 

multiple emergency drills. (See fig. 2.) Several agencies we visited had also 

implemented innovative practices to enhance safety and security, such as 

training police officers to drive buses and implementing an employee 

suggestion program to solicit ideas for improving security. 

 11U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit 

Agencies Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-263 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2002). 

Mass Transit 
Page 11 GAO-03-616T 

Figure 2: Emergency Transit Drill in Progress 

After September 2001, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), which 

has limited authority to oversee and regulate transit security, launched a 

multipart security initiative. Although most of the transit agencies we 

visited said this initiative was useful, they wanted the federal government 

to provide more assistance to support transit security, such as more 

information, help in obtaining security clearances, increased funding, and 

more security-related research and development. To give transit agencies 

greater flexibility in paying for transit security improvements, we 

recommended that the Secretary of Transportation consider seeking a 

legislative change to allow all transit agencies, regardless of the size of the 
Page 12 GAO-03-616T 

urbanized area they serve, to use urbanized area formula funds12 for 

security-related operating expenses. We also recommended that the 

Secretary of Transportation develop risk-based criteria for distributing 

federal funds to transit agencies for high-priority security improvements. 

The department agreed to carefully consider our recommendations as it 

continues working to improve transit security around the country.13

Since September 2001, federal agencies, state and local authorities, and 

private-sector stakeholders have done much to address vulnerabilities in 

the security of the nation’s ports.14 The Coast Guard, in particular, has 

acted as a focal point for assessing and addressing security concerns. After 

September 11th, the Coast Guard responded by refocusing its efforts and 

repositioning vessels, aircraft, and personnel not only to provide security, 

but also to increase visibility in key maritime locations. Some of its actions 

included (1) conducting initial risk assessments of ports, which identified 

high-risk infrastructure and facilities and helped determine how the Coast 

Guard’s small boats would be used for harbor security patrols; (2) 

initiating new guidelines for developing security plans and implementing 

security measures for passenger vessels and passenger terminals; and (3) 

beginning a process to comprehensively assess the security conditions of 

55 U.S. ports over a 3-year period. 

In addition, shortly after September 11th, the Coast Guard began requiring 

ships to provide earlier notification of their scheduled arrival at a U.S. 

port. All vessels over 300 gross tons are now required to contact the Coast 

Guard 96 hours—up from 24 hours—before they are scheduled to arrive at 

a U.S. port. Each vessel must provide information on its destination, its 

scheduled arrival, the cargo it is carrying, and a roster of its crew 

members. The information, which is processed and reviewed by the Coast 

Guard’s National Vessel Movement Center, is used in conjunction with 

data from various intelligence agencies to identify “high-interest” vessels. 

Decisions on appropriate actions to be taken with respect to such vessels, 

 12The federal urbanized area formula program provides federal funds to urbanized areas 

(jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more) for transit capital investments, operating 

expenses, and transportation-related planning. 

13We are currently examining TSA’s role in the security of transit and all other modes of 

transportation. We expect to report on this work later this spring. 

14U.S. General Accounting Office, Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in 

Making New Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2002). 

Port Security 
Page 13 GAO-03-616T 

such as whether to board, escort, or deny entry to them, are based on 

established criteria and procedures.15 (See fig. 3.) 

Figure 3: Inspecting Millions of Containers That Arrive at U.S. Ports Remains a 

Challenge 

Two other key federal agencies—the Customs Service and the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service—also have actions under way to 

begin to address such issues as container security and the screening of 

persons seeking entry into the United States. With more than 6 million 

containers a year entering U.S. ports, examining them all has not been 

possible. Using a targeted approach, Customs physically inspects about 2 

percent of the containers that enter the country. New initiatives by the 

 15U.S. General Accounting Office, Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear 

Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges, GAO-03-297T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 

2002). 
Page 14 GAO-03-616T 

Customs Service would widen inspection coverage. For example, the 

Customs Service’s Container Security Initiative focuses on placing U.S. 

Customs inspectors at the ports of embarkation to target containers for 

inspection; the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism focuses on 

efforts by importers and others to enhance security procedures along their 

supply chain; and Operation Safe Commerce focuses on using new 

technology, such as container seals, to help shippers ensure the integrity 

of the cargo included in containers being sent to the United States. 

Efforts to strengthen transportation security face several long-term 

institutional challenges that include (1) developing a comprehensive risk 

management approach; (2) ensuring that funding needs are identified and 

prioritized and that costs are controlled; (3) establishing effective 

coordination among the many responsible public and private entities; (4) 

ensuring adequate workforce competence and staffing levels; and (5) 

implementing security standards for transportation facilities, workers, and 

security equipment. 

To achieve transportation security as well as homeland security, it will be 

important to effectively manage the risks posed by terrorist threats and to 

direct national resources to the areas of highest priority. We have 

advocated the use of a risk management approach to guide federal 

programs and responses to better prepare for and withstand terrorist 

threats.16 A risk management approach is a systematic process to analyze 

threats, vulnerabilities, and the criticality (or relative importance) of 

assets, to better support key decisions linking resources with prioritized 

efforts for results. Figure 4 describes this approach. 

 16U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can 

Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001). 

Transportation 

Security Poses LongTerm Institutional 

Challenges 

Risk Management 
Page 15 GAO-03-616T 

Figure 4: Elements of a Risk Management Approach 

Our work has shown that TSA and some of DOT’s modal administrations 

have partially developed risk management approaches. For example, in 

the fall of 2001, FAA completed an assessment of the threats to and 

vulnerabilities of air cargo. The assessment examined a single scenario—a 

terrorist attempting to place a bomb on a commercial passenger aircraft—

but did not address the shipment’s vulnerability to tampering along the 

route from the shipper to the aircraft. In December 2002, we also reported 

that FTA obtains threat information from a variety of sources, including 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and had started to identify the most 

critical transit infrastructure. Moreover, according to agency officials and 

our survey results, many transit agencies are conducting vulnerability or 

security assessments. Finally, as noted, the Coast Guard has already 

conducted initial risk assessments of the nation’s ports, has established 

new security guidelines, and is planning for comprehensive assessments of 

security conditions at 55 U.S. ports. We have recommended that TSA 

conduct a comprehensive plan for air cargo security that incorporates a 

risk management approach, and we have recommended that FTA use a 

risk-based approach in prioritizing funding decisions for security projects. 

Both TSA and FTA agreed with our recommendations. Comprehensive 

risk-based assessments are important for all the modes, and they support 

effective planning and resource allocation. 
Page 16 GAO-03-616T 

Two key funding and accountability challenges will be (1) paying for 

increased transportation security and (2) ensuring that these costs are 

controlled. The costs associated with acquiring equipment and personnel 

for improving aviation security alone are huge. Although TSA estimates 

that it will need about $4.8 billion for aviation security in fiscal year 2003, 

it estimates that revenues from the new passenger security fee will pay for 

only around one-third ($1.7 billion) of that amount. As a result, TSA will 

need a major cash infusion at a time when federal budget deficits are 

growing. Similarly, many of the planned security improvements for surface 

transportation facilities, such as seaports and mass transit, require costly 

outlays for infrastructure, technology, and personnel at a time when 

weakening local economies have reduced local transportation agencies’ 

abilities to fund security improvements. 

Estimates of the funding needed to pay for port security far outstrip the 

amounts made available to date.17 As we reported in August 2002, the 

Congress appropriated $93 million to fund security improvements at the 

nation’s 361 ports in fiscal year 2002, but TSA received applications for as 

much as $697 million for these improvements. Efforts by the Coast Guard 

to develop security standards for ports, which we reported in August 2002, 

should help to identify and prioritize needs so that limited funds can be 

targeted to the highest risks at each port. Additional funding will be 

needed to comply with provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security 

Act, enacted in November 2002, which require, among other things, that 

regulations be developed for the preparation and submission of vessel and 

facility security plans, and that vulnerability assessments be conducted for 

vessels and U.S. port facilities. 

In July 2002, we reported that long-term attention to cost and 

accountability controls for acquisition and related business processes will 

be critical both to ensuring TSA’s success and to maintaining its integrity 

and accountability.18 According to DOT’s Inspector General, although TSA 

has made progress in addressing certain cost-related issues, it has not 

established an infrastructure that provides effective controls to monitor 

contractors’ costs and performance. To ensure control over TSA contracts, 

DOT’s Inspector General has recommended that the Congress set aside a 

 17GAO-02-993T. 

18U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Transportation Security 

Administration Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges, GAO-02-971T (Washington, 

D.C.: July 25, 2002). 

Funding 
Page 17 GAO-03-616T 

specific amount of TSA’s contracting budget for overseeing contractors’ 

performance with respect to cost, schedule, and quality.19

In considering the federal government’s role in meeting long-term funding 

challenges, several issues will need to be addressed beyond determining 

who should pay for the security enhancements and to what extent the 

agency functions should be funded. An important consideration is, which 

criteria are most appropriate for distributing federal funds? The chief 

criteria considered have been ridership level, population, identified 

vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets. Another important consideration, 

as we reported in September 2002, is, which federal policy instruments—

grants, loan guarantees, tax incentives, or partnerships—are most 

appropriate to motivate or mandate other levels of government or the 

private sector to help address security concerns?20 Finally, it will be 

important to consider how to allocate funds between competing needs and 

to measure whether we are achieving the increased security benefits 

envisioned. 

Since September 2001, federal, state, and local surface transportation 

agencies and the private sector have begun rethinking roles and 

responsibilities for transportation security. One challenge to achieving 

national preparedness hinges on the federal government’s ability to form 

effective partnerships among entities that implement security measures at 

the local level. Effective, well-coordinated partnerships require identifying 

roles and responsibilities; developing effective, collaborative relationships 

with local and regional transportation, emergency management, and law 

enforcement agencies; agreeing on performance-based standards that 

describe desired outcomes; testing procedures that implement roles and 

responsibilities; and sharing intelligence information. 

Although TSA has focused primarily on aviation security challenges since 

its creation in 2001, it is working toward defining the roles and 

responsibilities for other modes. TSA has developed a memorandum of 

agreement with FAA that laid out general principles of cooperation and 

 19U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Key Challenges Facing 

the Transportation Security Administration, CC-2002-180 (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 

2002). 

20U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, 

GAO-02-1075T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2002). 

Coordination 
Page 18 GAO-03-616T 

consultation between the two agencies. DOT and TSA expect that 

agreement to also serve as a guide to relations between TSA and DOT’s 

other modal administrations. 

Coordination challenges will continue now that TSA has been transferred 

to the new Department of Homeland Security. TSA will act as a national 

transportation system security manager and expects to work closely with 

DOT to establish security standards for all modes of transportation (air, 

mass transit, maritime, rail, highway, and pipelines). Both TSA and DOT 

will have to ensure the development of sound security policies and 

procedures and the effective implementation of those procedures by the 

many public and private transportation systems’ stakeholders. 

TSA will also have to ensure that the terrorist and threat information 

gathered and maintained by law enforcement and other agencies—

including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the 

Department of State—is quickly and efficiently communicated among 

federal agencies and to state and local authorities, as needed. In aviation 

security, timely information-sharing among agencies has been hampered 

by organizational cultures reluctant to share sensitive information and by 

outdated, incompatible computer systems. In surface transportation, 

timely information-sharing has been hampered by the lack of standard 

protocols to exchange information among federal, state, and local 

government agencies and private entities. Finally, as we reported in 

September 2002, intelligence-sharing can be hampered if personnel in 

surface transportation agencies have difficulty in acquiring the security 

clearances needed to obtain critical intelligence information.21

As it organizes itself to protect the nation’s transportation system, TSA 

faces the challenge of strategically managing its workforce of more than 

60,000 people, most of whom are deployed at airports or on aircraft to 

detect weapons and explosives and to prevent them from being taken 

aboard and used on aircraft. To assist agencies in managing their human 

capital more strategically, we have developed a model that identifies 

cornerstones and related critical success factors that agencies should 

apply and steps they can take.22 Our model is designed to help agency 

 21GAO-02-1075T. 

22U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, 

GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2002). 

Human Capital 
Page 19 GAO-03-616T 

leaders effectively lead and manage their people and integrate human 

capital considerations into daily decisionmaking and the program results 

they seek to achieve. In January 2003, we reported that TSA is addressing 

some critical human capital success factors by hiring personnel, using a 

wide range of tools available for hiring, and beginning to link individual 

performance to organizational goals.23 However, concerns remain about 

TSA’s approach to compensation and progress in setting up a performance 

management system. For example, DOT’s Inspector General expressed 

concern about TSA’s approach to compensation. TSA is basing its 

compensation system on FAA’s pay banding approach, which allows the 

agency to hire employees anywhere within broad pay bands for their 

positions. Last summer, the Inspector General reported that TSA’s salary 

levels for law enforcement and general and administrative positions were 

higher than for comparable positions in other agencies. 24 TSA was also 

behind schedule in establishing a performance management system linked 

to organizational goals. Such a system will be critical in order for TSA to 

motivate and manage staff, ensure the quality of screeners’ performance, 

and, ultimately, restore public confidence in air travel. 

Security standards for transportation facilities, workers, and security 

equipment define the level of security that is needed and the safeguards 

that should be in place to meet identified security needs. Adequate 

standards, consistently applied, are important to ensure that operators 

improve their security practices in modes where lax security could make 

surface transportation facilities attractive targets for terrorists. New 

security standards are being developed in some modes and are being 

considered in other modes. For example, new security standards are being 

developed for ports, to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access 

to sensitive areas, to detect and intercept intrusions, to check the 

backgrounds of those whose jobs require access to port facilities, and to 

screen travelers and other visitors to port facilities. The Maritime 

Transportation Security Act of 2002, enacted November 25, 2002, requires 

the development of (1) port security regulations for access controls, 

background checks, and vessel and facility security plans and (2) 

 23U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and 

Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2003). 

24U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Progress in 

Implementing Provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, CC-2002-203 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 7, 2002). 

Security Standards for 

Surface Transportation 
Page 20 GAO-03-616T 

performance standards for seals and locks on shipping containers. In 

addition, legislation proposed in the last session of Congress would 

require DOT to prescribe standards for pipeline security programs and to 

approve or disapprove each pipeline operator’s program on the basis of 

the operator’s adherence to these standards.25 However, industry 

representatives have told us that they would prefer a nonregulatory 

approach, citing concerns about the need for flexibility in designing 

security programs suitable for each pipeline facility. 

While progress has been made in developing security standards, 

challenges remain in implementing them. There is little precedent for how 

to enforce standards, because the size, complexity, and diversity of 

surface transportation facilities do not lend themselves to an enforcement 

approach similar to the one adopted for airports after September 11th. 

Implementing standards is also difficult because it requires consensus and 

compromises on the part of stakeholders. To the degree that some 

stakeholders believe that security actions are unnecessary or conflict with 

other goals and interests, achieving consensus about what to do will be 

difficult. 

Where do we stand today? How much more secure are we now than we 

were before September 11th? After spending billions of dollars on people, 

policies, and procedures to improve security, we are much more secure 

now than we were then, but we can never be completely secure. Today, 

we have better intelligence, coordination, and communication; we have 

plans to alert the public to threats; and we are all more alert to the 

possibility of threats. Yet major vulnerabilities remain, particularly in air 

cargo, general aviation, mass transit, and port security. Addressing these 

vulnerabilities will continue to require risk assessments and plans that 

balance security concerns against mobility needs, and that consider how 

much the nation can afford to spend for security improvements in light of 

other, competing demands for limited funds. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the Commission may have. 

 25Pipeline Infrastructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act, H.R. 3609, 107th 

Congress (2001). 

Concluding 

Observations 
Page 21 GAO-03-616T 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Gerald L. 

Dillingham at (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony include Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Maren McAvoy, John W. 

Shumann, and Teresa Spisak. 

Contact information 
Page 22 GAO-03-616T 

Aviation Security: FAA Needs to Update Curriculum and Certification 

Requirements for Aviation Mechanics. GAO-03-317. Washington, D.C.: 

March 6, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot 

Certification Process. GAO-03-248NI. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003. 

(NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and 

DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10, 

2003. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo System. GAO-03-286NI. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

(NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by 

Terrorists Using Dangerous Goods. GAO-03-30C. Washington, D.C.: 

December 3, 2002. 

Aviation Safety: Better Guidance and Training Needed on Providing 

Files on Pilots’ Background Information. GAO-02-722. August 30, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 

Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 25, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial 

Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection 

Equipment. GAO-02-713C. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002. (CLASSIFIED) 

Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation’s Air 

Transportation System. GAO-01-1164T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 

2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Information on the Nation’s Air Transportation 

System Vulnerabilities. GAO-01-1174T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 

2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Related GAO Products 

Aviation Security 
Page 23 GAO-03-616T 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 

Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 

Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 

Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 

Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access 

Security Improvements. GAO-01-1069R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 

2001. 

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access 

Security Improvements. GAO-01-1068R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 

2001. (RESTRICTED) 

FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing 

Weaknesses. GAO-01-171. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in 

Carriage of Weapons Regulations. GAO/RCED-00-181. Washington, D.C.: 

September 29, 2000. 

FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses 

That Jeopardize Aviation Operations. GAO/T-AIMD-00-330. Washington, 

D.C.: September 27, 2000. 

FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other 

Continuing Weaknesses. GAO/AIMD-00-252. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 

2000. 

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ 

Performance. GAO/RCED-00-75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000. 
Page 24 GAO-03-616T 

Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems 

Detecting Dangerous Objects. GAO/RCED-00-159. Washington, D.C.: June 

22, 2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, but 

Further Action Is Required. GAO/AIMD-00-169. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 

2000. 

Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports. GAO/OSI-00-10. 

Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Screener Performance in Detecting Dangerous 

Objects during FAA Testing Is Not Adequate. GAO/T-RCED-00-143. 

Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to 

Combat Terrorism. GAO/NSIAD-00-85. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security 

System. GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-142. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000. 

U.S. Customs Service: Better Targeting of Airline Passengers for 

Personal Searches Could Produce Better Results. GAO/GGD-00-38. 

Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Screeners Not Adequately Detecting Threat Objects 

during FAA Testing. GAO/T-RCED-00-124. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 

2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener 

Performance Problems. GAO/T-RCED-00-125. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 

2000. 

Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign 

Nationals to Remediate and Review Software. GAO/AIMD-00-55. 

Washington, D.C.: December 23, 1999. 

Aviation Security: FAA’s Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding 

for Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies. GAO/RCED99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 1999. 

Aviation Security: FAA’s Deployments of Equipment to Detect Traces of 

Explosives. GAO/RCED-99-32R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998. 
Page 25 GAO-03-616T 

Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight 

Safety. GAO/AIMD-98-155. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1998. 

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-Term Attention Is 

Needed. GAO/T-RCED-98-190. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 1998. 

Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight 

Safety. GAO/AIMD-98-60. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 1998. (LIMITED 

OFFICIAL USE –DO NOT DISSEMINATE) 

Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, 

but Completion Will Take Several Years. GAO/RCED-98-102. Washington, 

D.C.: April 24, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-

164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998. 

Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA 

in Identifying and Responding to Risks. GAO/RCED-98-6. Washington, 

D.C.: February 27, 1998. 

Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices. 

GAO/RCED-97-111R. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997. 

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives 

Detection Devices. GAO/RCED-97-ll9R. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 1997. 

Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the 

Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety 

and Security. GAO/T-RCED-97-90. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 1997. 

Aviation Security: Technology’s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities. 

GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 1996. 

Aviation Security: Oversight of Initiatives Will Be Needed. C-GAO/TRCED/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 1996. (CLASSIFIED) 

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed. GAO/TRCED/NSIAD-96-251. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 1996. 

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security. 

GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 1996. 
Page 26 GAO-03-616T 

Aviation Security: FAA Can Help Ensure That Airports’ Access Control 

Systems Are Cost Effective. GAO/RCED-95-25. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 

1995. 

Aviation Security: Development of New Security Technology Has Not Met 

Expectations. GAO/RCED-94-142. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 1994. 

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and 

International Challenges. GAO/RCED-94-38. Washington, D.C.: January 

27, 1994. 

Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address 

Security Challenges. GAO-03-263. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002. 

Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems. GAO-02-1075T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002. 

Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor 

Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions. GAO-03-544T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It 

Transitions to the New Department. GAO-03-467T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 12, 2003. 

Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New 

Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November 

18, 2002. 

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New 

Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to 

Terrorism. GAO-03-519T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003. 

Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a 

Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 

2003. 

Transit Security 

Maritime Security 

Other 
Page 27 GAO-03-616T 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Homeland Security. GAO-03-102. Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003. 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Transportation. GAO-03-108. Washington, D.C.: January 2003. 

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private 

Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland 

Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership 

Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002. 

A Model of Human Capital Management. GAO-02-373SP. Washington, 

D.C.: March 2002. 

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