UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 30, 2005

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2005-06: FAILURE TO MAINTAIN ALERT AND

NOTIFICATION SYSTEM TONE ALERT RADIO

CAPABILITY

ADDRESSEES

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who have

permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed

from the reactor vessel.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform

addressees of inspection findings concerning a licensee’s capability to alert members of the

public within the emergency planning zone (EPZ) in the event of a radiological emergency. This

information notice is intended to ensure that licensees using tone alert radios (TARs) maintain

positive control over the distribution of the TARs. The NRC expects recipients to review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider taking actions to avoid similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC

requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

• The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approved alert and notification

system (ANS) design report for the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) facility stated that new

residents in the plume exposure EPZ would be identified through electric service

connection reports from utilities serving the EPZ. The residents identified would be

contacted and offered a free TAR. In practice, the connection reports were provided to

the Arkansas Department of Health, Office of Nuclear Planning and Response Programs

(NPRP). NPRP compared these reports with a TAR distribution list to identify addresses

that had not received a TAR. Letters were then sent to the new addresses informing the

resident of the availability of an emergency information booklet (EIB) and their eligibility

to receive a TAR if they were unable to hear a warning siren. When one of the

participating utilities could no longer provide the new connection reports, ANO and

NPRP agreed that receipt of the reports was not required and that letters would no

longer be sent to new residents. Thus, NPRP and ANO relied on new residents learning

of the EIB and the TARs through passive distribution at public locations, annual mass

mailing of the EIB, and periodic public service TV and radio announcements. New

residents were not directly contacted.

ML050680335
IN 2005-06

Page 2 of 5

As a result of these program changes, ANO could no longer demonstrate a “best effort”

to place TARs at affected residences because the State or the licensee were no longer

identifying these residences. The NRC asked FEMA to evaluate whether the current

practice was acceptable. FEMA concluded that the program change was a loss of

administrative control of TARs and that it was questionable whether affected populations

could be notified in a timely manner. During inspection activities, the NRC determined

that the issue did not represent a degradation in the risk-significant planning standard 10

CFR 50.47(b)(5) and assigned a green finding. The NRC based this determination on

FEMA’s conclusion that the automatic route alerting provided for in existing county

emergency procedures would have been capable of accomplishing the ANS function in

the entire EPZ in a timely manner.

• At the Callaway Plant, TARs are used as the primary ANS for residences located outside

of the coverage area of fixed sirens. On a monthly basis, licensee clerical personnel

review new electric service hookups and disconnect information provided by the three

utilities that supply residential electric service within the plume exposure EPZ. The

database of residences assigned TARs is updated and a mailing is prepared for the

newly identified TAR residences. Licensee personnel annually request an updated

customer service list from one of the three utilities to compare with the TAR database

and the database is updated as needed. Following this update, new batteries and

instructions are sent to each residence in the TAR database.

During a scheduled monthly surveillance, licensee personnel noted an abnormally high

number of new service connections. After comparing these new connections to the TAR

database, the licensee identified 65 residences that should have been previously

identified and added to the database. The licensee determined that clerical personnel

had been told the majority of the customers are within siren coverage for newly

connected residences reported by one of the three utilities serving the EPZ. As a result,

new customers for that utility were not identified as candidates to receive TARs. The

spike in new service connections occurred when the utility transferred part of its service

area to one of the other two utilities serving the EPZ. The receiving utility submitted new

connection reports on the transferred customers. Further review of the database

identified an additional 33 affected residences. Ninety-eight residences outside the siren

coverage area were not identified in the TAR database and would not have received an

emergency alerting signal in the event of an emergency at the Callaway plant. The

licensee had identified errors in the TAR database 4 years earlier but the corrective

actions taken failed to update the database and failed to implement programmatic

changes to prevent further errors. The failure of the licensee’s self-assessments, quality

assurance audits, and supervisory oversight to identify this problem earlier is a

significant weakness in the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area. The

NRC determined that the inspection finding represented a degradation in the risksignificant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and assigned a white finding. A

supplemental inspection was conducted.
IN 2005-06

Page 3 of 5

• The FEMA ANS design report for the Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) committed

the licensee to offer TARs to residences located outside of the 70 db siren coverage

area. This was an over-commitment in that the applicable standard was 60 db for areas

where the population density was less than 2000 persons per square mile. 

The licensee delegated the issuance and tracking of TARs to the county emergency

preparedness office. The county emergency preparedness office received information

concerning new residents and offered TARs to them. The annual letter sent to the

populace within the EPZ provided direction that residents not having TARs and living

outside of certain named towns should contact the county emergency preparedness

office to receive a TAR.

As a result of a quality assurance audit, the licensee identified 72 residences located

outside of the 70 db siren coverage area but inside a town that would not have received

an emergency alerting signal in the event of an emergency at WCGS. The licensee

determined that the apparent cause of the weakness was the poor quality of siren

coverage maps that made it difficult for the county emergency preparedness office to

identify the location of residents in comparison to the 70 db siren coverage map. In

addition, the 72 residences needing TARs were within four of the towns that had been

identified in the annual letter as not needing TARs. The NRC asked FEMA to evaluate

whether the licensee was in compliance with the commitments in the ANS design report. 

FEMA concluded that the licensee was not in compliance with the FEMA-approved ANS

design report since TARs were not offered to some residences outside of the 70 db siren

coverage area. The NRC concluded that the licensee’s failure to identify residences

outside siren coverage areas affected the risk-significant planning standard 10 CFR

50.47(b)(5). The NRC determined that the inspection finding did not represent a

degradation in the risk-significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and assigned a

green finding. The NRC based this determination on the fact that, although WCGS ANS

design report called for TARs outside the 70 db siren coverage area, all of the

residences were within the 60 db siren coverage area and would have been alerted in

the event of an actual emergency.

• The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VYNPS) ANS design report included fixed

sirens and TARs. TARs are the primary means of notification for several communities in

Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. A small number of TARs are the

primary means of notification in areas in other communities outside of the coverage area

of fixed sirens. In addition, TARs are available on request to members of the public in

areas where fixed sirens are the primary means of notification. About 5000 TARs are

issued in the VYNPS EPZ. The licensee should have maintained a list of TAR users and

a list of residences who refused TARs. Although the licensee has overall responsibility

for the ANS, local officials in each community distribute the TARs to the appropriate

residences. The ANS design report approval letter states that residences receiving

TARs sign a three-part equipment loan agreement. The licensee should have used its

copy of the forms to maintain a computer list of TAR holders; the list should have

identified the residences that refused the TARs.
IN 2005-06

Page 4 of 5

During an inspection, the NRC determined that the list of TAR holders was not current

and that a list of the residences that refused a TAR did not exist. A comparison of the

TAR list and the 2000 census data suggests that at least 5 percent of the population in

the EPZ may have been without a TAR, may not have had the opportunity to refuse one,

and would not have received an emergency alerting signal in the event of an emergency

at VYNPS plant. Although new residents may have become aware of the TARs via the

annual public information calendar and other means such as welcome letters, town

office displays, and town meetings, the approach is not consistent with a best-effort

attempt to place receivers as expected by FEMA. The NRC determined that the issue

represented a degradation in the risk-significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5)

and assigned a white finding.

BACKGROUND

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Paragraph 50.54(q) requires nuclear power plant

licensees to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans that meet the standards in

10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Planning standard

10 CFR50.47(b)(5) states that procedures have been established for notification, by the

licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency response

personnel by all organizations; the content of initial and followup messages to response

organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and

clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ have been

established.

These requirements are amplified in Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1, “Criteria for

Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in

Support of Nuclear Power Plants” that states: 1) NRC and FEMA recognize that the

responsibility for activating the prompt notification system . . . is properly the responsibility of the

State and local governments. NRC and FEMA also recognize that the responsibility for

demonstrating that such a system is in place rests with the facility licensee. 2) Within the plume

exposure EPZ, the system shall provide an alerting signal and notification by commercial

broadcast (e.g., Emergency Broadcast System) plus special systems such as the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration radio. A system which expects the recipient to turn on

a radio receiver without being alerted . . . is not acceptable. 

The ANS provides for the timely notification of the affected population within the plume

exposure pathway EPZ surrounding nuclear power reactor sites. The ANS alerts the public of

the emergency and provides a means for public officials to distribute emergency instructions

and advisories. The ANS may be a combination of fixed or mobile sirens, TARs, automatic

telephone dialers, commercial broadcast media, and the Emergency Broadcast System. 

Information Notice 2002-25, “Challenges to Licensees’ Ability to Provide Prompt Public

Notification and Information During an Emergency Preparedness Event,” addressed challenges

related to the ANS, including failure to test and maintain personal home alert devices.
IN 2005-06

Page 5 of 5

DISCUSSION

FEMA advises the NRC on the status of offsite emergency planning, including the acceptability

of the ANS. FEMA bases its finding of acceptability on the licensee’s ANS design report and

FEMA-REP-10, “Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power

Plants.” The NRC relies on FEMA’s assessment of the licensee commitments in the facility

ANS design report in finding that planning standard 10 CFR50.47(b)(5) has been met. 

FEMA-REP 10, recognizing that absolute control of TARs is forfeited once they are given to the

public, establishes a minimum distribution and maintenance program to ensure that affected

residences are offered the opportunity to obtain a TAR. The FEMA guidance states: TARs

should be offered to the public in a geographical area (where needed) and a “best-effort”

attempt must be made to place the radios. A record system (register) containing an accurate

list of addresses (names are optional) must be maintained for those geographical areas using

the tone alert radios. The addresses of residents refusing tone alert radios should also be

noted.

Since FEMA’s determination that the ANS is acceptable is based, in part, on commitments

made by the licensee in the facility ANS design report, the NRC expects licensees to ensure

that these ANS program commitments continue to be met. Licensees are reminded that,

pursuant to 44 CFR 350, significant changes to an ANS requires FEMA review and acceptance

prior to implementation.

CONTACTS

This information notice does not require any action or written response. Please direct any

questions about this matter to the technical contact(s) listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Project Manager.

/RA/

Patrick L. Hiland, Chief

Reactor Operations Branch

Division of Inspection Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Stephen F. LaVie, NSIR Robert E. Kahler, NSIR

(301) 415-1081 (301) 415-2992

E-mail: sfl@nrc.gov E-mail: rek@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site,

http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.