[Cite as Falah v. Falah , 2021-Ohio-4348.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )

JAMILA FALAH Appellee

v. GHAZI FALAH Appellant C.A. No. 20CA0039-M

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO CASE No. 14 DR 0051

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: December 13, 2021

TEODOSIO, Judge. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Ghazi Falah (“Husband”), appeals from the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pl eas, Domestic Relations Divisio n. This Court affirms.

I. {¶2} This Court previously set forth the underlying facts and proced ural history of this

case as follows: Husband and * * * Jamila Falah (“Wife”) married in Israel in Au gust 1981 and had four children during the c ourse of their marriage, three of whom are now adults and one of whom is deceased. Husband is a tenured unive rsity professor who taught in multiple countries over the years while Wife rema ined alongside him and raised their four children. The family ultimately sett led in Wadsworth in 2001, but both Husband and Wife con tinued to travel internation ally to visit family and friends. In August 2013, one or both of the p arties decided to divorce, and they both prepared their Wadsworth home fo r sale. Both parties remained at the marital residence until October 2013, when Wife went on a trip to Israe l. Husband then followed Wife to Israel and, in December 2013, filed for a divo rce in the Sharia Court. Wife initially refused service, but ultimately secured an attorney in Israel, participated in the proceedings, and received a deferred dowry. While the Israeli2

proceedings were still pending, however, Wife also returned to the United States and filed a complaint for divorce in Medina. Following her ret urn, Wife continued to reside in the marital residence until it sold in J uly 2014. Husband responded to Wife’s comp laint in Medina by filing a mot ion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. He ar gued both that Wife had abandon ed her Ohio domicile when she left for Israel and the court had to cede jur isdiction to Israel, where he had filed for divorce. Before the court could hold a hearing on Husband’s motion, the Sharia Cour t issued a decision, approving a divorce for the parties under Israeli law. Husba nd then filed a supplement to his motion to dismiss, notifying the court of the divorce in Israel. In Augu st 2014, while this matter was still pending, Husba nd remarried in Israel. A magistrate held a hearing on a Husband’s motion to dismiss in December 2014 and later denied it. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision, and scheduled the matter for a final divorce hearing. The final he aring took place before the trial judge in March 2015. In its final judgment en try, the court purportedly gave comity to the parties’ Israeli divorce decisio n, but it also granted a decree of divorce and set forth orders for the division of th eir assets and the allocation of their debt. Add itionally, it ordered Husband to pay Wife permanent spousal support in the amount of $2,750 per month.

Falah v. Falah , 9th Dist. Medina No. 15CA0039-M, 2017-Ohio-1087, ¶ 2-5. Husb and appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and this Court affirmed i n part, but also reversed in part

because the trial court “acted unreasonably in failing to addre ss the temporary support that Husband had already paid.” Id. at ¶ 28. We remanded the matter “for the court to address the temporary support Husband paid in light of its decision to vaca te the order for temporary support.” Id. at ¶ 28, 44. Upon remand, the trial court issued a nunc pro t unc final judgment entry of divorce in June 2017, which modified its April 2015 en try to now award Husband an additional credit of $15,200 for temporary spousal support that had been withheld and paid from December 2014 through March 2015. {¶3} Meanwhile, during the pendency of that appeal, Husband filed mo tions to terminate spousal support and for orders regarding personal pro perty, and Wife filed motions to modify spousal support, to show cause for failure to pay spousa l support, and for spousal support3

to be paid through the Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA” ). Husband also filed a reply to Wife’s motion for spousal support to be paid through C SEA. A magistrate held a final hearing on these competing motions in May 2018 and issued her d ecision in October 2018. The magistrate dismissed Wife’s m otion to modify spousal support, g ranted Wife’s motion for spousal support to be paid through CSEA, denied Husband’s motio n to terminate spousal support, and denied Husband’s moti on for orders regarding perso nal property. As for Wife’s motion to show cause for failure to pay spousal support, the ma gistrate found Husband to be in contempt of court for failure to pay spousal support. The tria l court issued a judgment entry on the same day as the magistrate’s decision, see Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i), adopting the magistrate’s findings and entering jud gment on the matter. {¶4} Husband filed timely objections to the magistrate’s decision in October 2018 and later supplemented his objecti ons in January 2019. The trial c ourt heard oral arguments on the objections in April 2019 and issued a judgment entry overruling Husband’s objections in June 2020. In its entry, the court confirmed its prior judgment and stated: “Since the [c]ourt has already independently entered j udgment on the [m]agistrate’s [d ]ecision, the [j]udgment [e]ntry that was journalized October 18, 2018 shall remain in full forc e and effect.” {¶5} Husband now appeals from the trial court’s judgment and raises four assignments of error for this Court’s review. We have rearranged the order of Husband’s assignments of

error to facilitate our review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING APPELLEE’S EXHIBIT 6 PURPORTING TO BE PROOF OF A FOREIGN MARRIAGE AND FINDING THAT MR. ALMOUHAMAD WAS MARRIED ON SEPTEMBER 22, 201[6,] WHEN HE MARRIED APPELLEE IN OHIO.4

{¶6} In his second assignment of error, Husband argues that the tria l court erred in admitting into evidence a picture of a purported foreign marria ge contract (“Exhibit 6”) between Abd Alrahman Almouhamad (“Mr. Abdul”) and Ebtisam Elmousleh (“M s. Elmousleh”). Because this issue was not properly preserved below, we conclud e that Husband has forfeited his argument on appeal. {¶7} The decision to admit or to exclude evidence is within the soun d discretion of the

trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that di scretion. Homler v. Homler , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 05CA008752, 2006-Ohio-2556, ¶ 14. An abuse of discretion implies the court’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When applyi ng this standard, a reviewin g court is precluded from simply substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. , 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993). {¶8} The trial court’s nunc pro tunc f inal judgment entry of divorce provides that “[s]pousal support * * * shall c ontinue until the death of eith er party, the remarriage of the Wife[,] or the cohabitation of t he Wife with an unrelated adult male.” At the final hearing on the motions, the parties stipulated that Wife entered into a purpor ted marriage contract with Mr. Abdul in Ohio on September 22, 2016. Nevertheless, Wife testif ied that she never consummated the marriage with Mr. Abdul, he did not financially support her , and they never cohabited, as her religious and cultural beliefs f irst required a formal announce ment of the marriage to family and friends. According to Wife, she was aware Mr. Abdul was divorc ed from Ms. Elmousleh, but she later learned from a phone ca ll with her son—in which she c ould hear Husband talking in the background—that Mr. Abdul had remarried Ms. Elmousleh prior to Wife’s 2016 marriage to Mr. Abdul. Under Ohio law, only persons “not having a husband or w ife living” may be joined in5

marriage. R.C. 3101.01(A). 1 Bigamous marriages are therefore void ab initio and of no leg al

purpose. Darling v. Darling , 44 Ohio App.2d 5, 7 (8th Dist.1975). {¶9} Wife testified that Husband had Ms. Elmousleh send a picture of a foreign marriage certificate (“Exhibit 6”) to their son who, in turn, t exted it to Wife. According to Wife,

Mr. Abdul soon left the United States in November 2016 at her b ehest. At the time of the final hearing, Wife had filed for divorce from Mr. Abdul and the case was still pending. When

confronted with Exhibit 6 at the hearing, Husband testified tha t he did not recognize it and

claimed that he never sent it to the couple’s son. He testifie d that Exhibit 6 was a “false piece of paper.” Exhibit 6 is written in Arabic and was later admitted into evidence at the close of the hearing over Husband’s objection. It is accompanied by a certi fied Arabic-to-English translation

from the International Institu te of Akron. The translation ind icates that Exhibit 6 purports to be a foreign marriage contract between Mr. Abdul and Ms. Elmousleh, who were married in the city of Tripoli in September 2014. {¶10} Husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in admittin g Exhibit 6 into evidence because it is a copy of a writing in Arabic, which is not certified or verified and is not accompanied by a certificate of genuineness, as required by Evi d.R. 902(3). Husband further contends that the accompanying Ar abic-to-English translation on ly certifies that the translation itself is accurate; it does not certify the authenticity of the foreign marriage certificate. He argues that Exhibit 6 was also improperly admitted because it i s incomplete and constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Finally, he argues that the court improp erly found Wife’s testimony to be credible when Wife’s opinion was based solely on her reliance u pon Exhibit 6.

1 Although not relevant to this app eal, we note that this statut e has been declared unconstitutional on other grounds related to same-sex marriage. See, generally, Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. 644 (2015).6

{¶11} We conclude that Husband has not properly preserved his argumen ts for appeal. Pursuant to Evid.R. 103(A)(1), “ [e]rror may not be predicated u pon a ruling which admits * * * evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected[] and * * * a timely objection or motion to strike appears of rec ord, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the contex t * * *.” During the hearing, Exhibit 6 was marked for identification, and Husband was questioned by Wife’s attorney a bout it without objection. Wife was likewise questioned about E xhibit 6, and she identified it and explained where it came from without objection. Husband’s atto rney then questioned Wife fur ther as to Exhibit 6 on re-cross examination. Although Husband u ltimately objected to the admis sion of Exhibit 6 into evidence at the close of the hearing on the bases that it is “in Arabic” and “we don’t know if it’s accurate as well[,]” he never objected to either the exhibit or to any o f the testimony regarding the exhibit during the hearing. {¶12} When a party fails to contemporaneously object to the testimony and identification of an introduced exhibit, and only later objects , after the close of evidence when the exhibit is being admitted into evidence, he forfeits the ma tter for review on appeal. See State v. Henry , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27758, 2016-Ohio-680, ¶ 10, citing State v. Sykes , 9th Dist. Summit No. 25263, 2011-Ohio-293, ¶ 8. See also State v. Hughes , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27061, 2014-Ohio-4039, ¶ 8; State v. Payne , 9th Dist. Summit No. 26655, 2013-Ohio-5230, ¶ 10; State

v. Rice , 9th Dist. Summit No. 26116, 2012-Ohio-2174, ¶ 21; State v. Cross , 9th Dist. Summit No. 25487, 2011-Ohio-3250, ¶ 49; Fleischer v. George , 9th Dist. Medina No. 09CA0057-M, 2010-Ohio-3941, ¶ 14-15; State v. Gray , 9th Dist. Wayne No. 08CA0057, 2009-Ohio-3165, ¶ 7. “Indeed, ‘[t]he contemporaneous objection rule is fundamental t o our jurisprudence.’” Condon

v. Rockich , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28479, 2018-Ohio-71, ¶ 17, quoting In re M.B. , 9th Dist.7

Lorain Nos. 11CA010060 and 11CA010062, 2012-Ohio-5428, ¶ 11, qu oting Steward v. Norris Bros. Co., Inc. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 53540, 1988 WL 32117, *1 (Mar. 17, 198 8). “‘The rule serves the interest of justice because it allows for the correc tion of many defects while they are readily curable, as well as it encourages the elimination of de lay and the unnecessary use of the appellate process.’” Id. , quoting In re M.B. at ¶ 11. Moreover, although Husband argued in his supplemental objections to the ma gistrate’s decision that the c ourt erred in admitting Exhibit 6 into evidence, “[t]his Court has stated that ‘[t]he filing of a written objection to the decision of a magistrate is not a substitute f or the obligation to object to a purported error at the time of its

occurrence.’” Id. , quoting In re M.B. at ¶ 11. In this case, any purported errors with Exhibit 6 could have been easily corrected had an objection been timely m ade. See id. While an appellant who has forfeited such an argument may still argue plain error on appeal, see Evid.R. 103(D), this Court will not sua sponte unde rtake a plain-error analysis if the appellant fails to do so. See Sykes at ¶ 8, citing Akron v. Lewis , 179 Ohio App.3d 649, 2008-Ohio-6256, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.). Husband has not argued plai n error in this matter. {¶13} Husband’s second assignm ent of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ACCEPT AND CONSIDER THE CERTIFIED COPY OF APPELLEE’S OHIO DIVORCE DECREE AND ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT DID NOT PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE ON THAT ISSUE AT TRIAL. {¶14} In his third assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court, during oral arguments on Husband’s objections to the magistrate’s decision, erred in not accepting a decree of divorce which he contends reflects the validity of the 2016 marriage between Wife and Mr.

Abdul.8

{¶15} Husband contends that “a dissolution of a marriage in a divorce proceeding connotes that the marriage is va lid with it being terminated un der one of the grounds provided for in [R.C.] 3105.01” and “[a] party to a void marriage can on ly file for divorce to declare it a nullity.” Husband directs us to no legal authority, however, i n support of his arguments under this assignment of error. See App.R. 16(A)(7) (requiring “cita tions to the authorities, stat utes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.”); accord Loc.R. 7(B)(7). “It is an appellant’s duty to demonstrate his assigned error through an argument that is supported by citations to legal authority and facts in the record * * *.” McDonald’s USA, LLC v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011279, 2019-Ohio-4217, ¶ 34. It is n ot the function of this Court to

construct a foundation for Husba nd’s alleged error, or to searc h for authority to support his argument. In re Estate of Irvine , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28901, 2019-Ohio-772, ¶ 11. Because

Husband has failed to cite to a ny legal authority upon which he relies under this assignment of error, we decline to address it. See Wrinch v. Miller , 183 Ohio App.3d 445, 2009-Ohio-3862, ¶ 45 (9th Dist.). {¶16} Even assuming we were to address the merits of this assignment of error, we note that the purported 2016 decree o f divorce between Wife and Mr. Abdul is not contained in the record before us. This Court’s review on appeal is restricted to the record provided by the appellant. See Harding v. Harding , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27464, 2016-Ohio-7028, ¶ 9; App.R. 12(A)(1)(b). See also Emergency Physicians Ins. C o. RRG v. Emergency Physicians Ins. Exchange , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28747, 2018-Ohio-566, ¶ 8, citing Volodkevich v. Volodkevich , 48 Ohio App.3d 313, 314 (9th Dist.1989) (noting appellant’s res ponsibility to provide a record of facts, testimony, and evidentiary matters necessary to support an assignment of error). As

Husband would not be able to dem onstrate error by referencing a document not contained in the9

record, we would presume regularity in the proceedings and over rule this assignment of error. See Harding at ¶ 9

. {¶17} Husband’s third assignmen t of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO TERMINATE SPOUSAL SUPPORT DUE TO APPELLEE’S RELIGIOUS MARRIAGE IN 2015 AND HER OHIO MARRIAGE ON SEPTEMBER 22, 2016[,] BASED UPON THE LANGUAGE IN THE NUNC PRO TUNC FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY OF DIVORCE WHICH PROVIDES FOR TERMINATION OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT UPON WIFE’S REMARRIAGE. {¶18} In his first assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to terminate spousal support because Wife and Mr. Abdul entered into a religious marriage outside of the United States in April 2015 a nd then entered into a secular marriage in Ohio in September 2016. {¶19} Generally, “the decision to adopt , reject, or modify a magistra te’s decision lies

within the discretion of the t rial court and should not be reve rsed on appeal absent an abuse of

discretion.” Barlow v. Barlow , 9th Dist. Wayne No. 08CA0055, 2009-Ohio-3788, ¶ 5. However, “[i]n so doing, we consid er the trial court’s action w ith reference to the nature of the underlying matter.” Tabatabai v. Tabatabai , 9th Dist. Medina No. 08CA0049-M, 2009-Ohio3139, ¶ 18. An abuse of discretion means more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unco nscionable. Blakemore v.

Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When applying the abuse of dis cretion standard, a reviewing court is precluded from simply substituting its own j udgment for that of the trial court.

Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. , 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993). {¶20} “The Supreme Court of Ohio has c oncluded that ‘the difference b etween a modification and a termination of alimony was a distinction wit hout a difference. Modification10

and termination of an alimony awar d are simply different points or degrees on the same

continuum.’” Kelly v. Kelly , 9th Dist. Wayne No. 18AP0048, 2019-Ohio-4723, ¶ 10, quoting

Kimble v. Kimble , 97 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-6667, ¶ 7. “This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to modify spousal support under an abuse of discretion standard.” Michaels v.

Michaels , 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0029-M, 2013-Ohio-984, ¶ 7. {¶21} We first note that the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify or terminate spousal support is not disputed here, as the nunc pro tunc final judgme nt entry of divorce contains a provision that the court “retains jurisdiction over all aspects of spousal support.” See Kimble at ¶ 10 (“[P]ursuant to R.C. 3105.18(E), a trial court has the autho rity to modify or terminate an order for alimony or spousal support only if the divorce decree conta ins an express reservation of jurisdiction.”). See also R.C. 3105.18(E)(1). {¶22} Husband argues that Wife stipulated to the fact that she remarr ied Mr. Abdul on September 22, 2016, which should have terminated his spousal su pport obligation. Despite Wife’s opposition to the termination of spousal support and her claim that Mr. Abdul was already married at the time of his 2016 marriage to Wife, Husba nd argues that Wife’s testimony

and Exhibit 6 did not constitute sufficient evidence to demonst rate that Mr. Abdul was already married, and the trial court therefore erred in finding that Wi fe’s 2016 marriage to Mr. Abdul

was void. {¶23} The trial court’s nunc pro tunc f inal judgment entry of divorce provides that “[s]pousal support * * * shall c ontinue until the death of eith er party, the remarriage of the Wife[,] or the cohabitation of the Wife with an unrelated adult male.” The parties stipulated that Wife attempted to marry Mr. Abdul in Ohio in 2016. Wife testif ied, however, that Mr. Abdul left for Michigan immediately after they were married in 2016. According to Wife, due to her11

religious and cultural beliefs, the 2016 secular marriage was n ever consummated, she received no financial support from Mr. Abdul , and the couple never cohab ited. Wife further testified that, while planning a formal ceremony afterward to announce the marr iage to friends and family, she was notified by her son that Mr. Abdul was already married. He r son then sent her a picture of

Mr. Abdul and Ms. Elmousleh’s 2014 foreign certificate of marri age. Once again, bigamous marriages are void ab initio and of no legal purpose. Darling , 44 Ohio App.2d at 7. See also R.C. 3101.01(A). Wife testified th at she subsequently asked Mr . Abdul to leave the United

States and then filed for divor ce. Although bigamous marriages are void, a party to a bigamous marriage may nonetheless obtain a divorce. See R.C. 3105.01(A) (“The court of common pleas may grant divorces [if] [e]ither party had a husband or wife li ving at the time of the marriage from which the divorce is sought * * *.”). {¶24} The trial court found Wife’s tes timony as it related to Mr. Abd ul’s 2014 marriage to Ms. Elmousleh to be credible. The court found that, despite Husband’s denials, he was the one who informed Wife in 2016, through the couple’s son, that M r. Abdul was already married. The court further found that Husband admitted speaking to Mr. A bdul, while pretending to be Wife’s son, and telling him he needed to “admit to [Wife] that he was married.” The court also found that the evidence demonstrated that Mr. Abdul did not sup port Wife and that the couple never cohabited prior to the a ttempted 2016 marriage. It there fore concluded that Wife’s attempted 2016 marriage to Mr. A bdul should be treated “as thou gh it never existed.” {¶25} Regarding the alleged religious m arriage in 2015, Husband claim s that his own testimony and the pictur es of Wife’s “open and intimate relatio nship” with Mr. Abdul constituted sufficient evidence of a religious marriage. Husband testified that Wife is a devout Muslim and, according to her religious beliefs, she should not eat from the same plate as Mr. Abdul, touch12

him, or show him affection in publ ic unless they are married to each other. Husband introduced into evidence pictures of Wife and Mr. Abdul together while out side of the United States in 2015. He also attempted to introduce text messages from others in the Middle East, but the messages were deemed inadmissibl e hearsay. Contrary to Husband ’s claims, Wife testified at the hearing that she never enter ed into any religious marriage with Mr. Abdul in 2015. She testified that she is an artist and explained that the pictures were all taken in public amongst many of her artist friends, incl uding Mr. Abdul, while they all traveled to various art shows throughout different countries. S he also testified that it is “no problem” in her religion to be

affectionate with a nother person in public. {¶26} The trial court found that Husba nd did not present sufficient e vidence to prove that a religious marriage occurr ed between Wife and Mr. Abdul i n 2015, such as any documentation establishing that sa id marriage occurred. The co urt declined to infer the existence of a religious marriage based on Husband’s pictures of Wife and Mr. Abdul at art shows along with inadmissible hearsay. {¶27} Upon review, there is competent , credible evidence in the rec ord supporting the

trial court’s conclu sions that Mr. Abdul was already married wh en he attempted to marry Wife in 2016 and that Husband failed to present sufficient evidence of a 2015 religious marriage between Wife and Mr. Abdul. As such, Husb and has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to terminat e his spousal support obligati ons. {¶28} Accordingly, Husband’s first a ssignment of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FOUR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING APPELLANT IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.13

{¶29} In his fourth assignment of error, Husband argues that the tria l court abused its discretion in finding him in cont empt of court for failure to p ay spousal support. We disagree. {¶30} Contempt of court may be genera lly defined as disobedience of a court order or conduct that brings the administr ation of justice into disrespe ct or impedes a court’s ability to perform its functions. Freeman v. Freeman , 9th Dist. Wayne No. 07CA0036, 2007-Ohio-6400, ¶ 45. See also R.C. 2705.02. Civil contempt requires proof by clear and conv incing evidence.

Zemla v. Zemla , 9th Dist. Wayne No. 11CA0010, 2012-Ohio-2829, ¶ 11. “Clear a nd convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more certa in than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the exten t of such certainty as is re quired ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. “To est ablish contempt, the moving part y must ‘establish a valid court order, knowledge of the order by the defendant, and a violation of the order.’” Henry v. Henry , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27696, 2015-Ohio-4350, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Komadina , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 03CA008325, 2004-Ohio-4962, ¶ 11. “‘A prima facie case of contempt is established where the divorce decree is before the court along with proof of the contemnor’s failure to comply

therewith.’” Nelson v. Nelson , 9th Dist. Medina No. 10CA0115-M, 2011-Ohio-6200, ¶ 30, quoting Riley v. Riley , 9th Dist. Summit No. 22777, 2006-Ohio-656, ¶ 25, quoting Robinson v.

Robinson , 6th Dist. Wood No. 93WD053, 1994 WL 110846, *3 (Mar. 31, 1994 ). The alleged contemnor must then present evidence of his inability to comply with the order or any other

available defense. Henry at ¶ 12; Zemla at ¶ 11. {¶31} We review a trial court’s contem pt finding for an abuse of disc retion. Morrow v.

Becker , 9th Dist. Medina No. 11CA0066-M, 2012-Ohio-3875, ¶ 47. An ab use of discretion is14

present when a trial court’s decision “‘is contrary to law, unr easonable, not supported by evidence, or grossly unsound.’” Menke v. Menke , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27330, 2015-Ohio-2507, ¶ 8, quoting Tretola v. Tretola , 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14- 24, 2015-Ohio-1999, ¶ 25. {¶32} Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion and e rred in finding him in contempt of court for failure to pay spousal support because (1) he made substantial overpayments toward spousal support and (2) the issue of Wife’s remarriage has not yet been resolved. According to Husband, if he ultimately succeeds in t his matter he will have made a “gross overpayment with no reasona ble expectation of recouping that overpayment.” {¶33} Husband has failed to direct us to any legal authority in suppo rt of these arguments, see App.R. 16(A)(7), and we likewis e find no merit in them. There is no dispute that the nunc pro tunc final judgment entry of divorce was a valid c ourt order and that Husband was aware of it. The divorce decree awarded spousal support to be paid from Husband to Wife in the amount of $2,750 per month “effective August 5, 2014 and [conti nuing] until the death of either party, the remarriage of the Wife or the cohabitation of the Wi fe with an unrelated adult male.”

Husband was awarded credit to ward his spousal support obligatio ns based on a $37,250 deferred dowry payment and $15,200 in temporary spousal support payments . Ultimately, after consideration of these payments , the court reduced Husband’s mo nthly spousal support payments to $2,250 per month, beginning April 5, 2015, and lasting for a period of 61 months, at which time his spousal support payments a utomatically reverted back t o $2,750 per month. {¶34} Husband never appealed the nunc pro tunc final judgment entry o f divorce. At the May 2018 final hearing on the motions, Wife testified that Husband paid her $4,000 in either April or May of 2015, $2,000 of which she applied to a loan owe d to her by Husband from December 2014. Husband testified that he actually paid her $4, 500, purportedly satisfying two15

months of spousal support paymen ts, but neither party submitted any documentation regarding the $4,000 or $4,500 payment. No evidence of any additional pa yments beyond that was introduced, and the trial court consequently found Husband to b e in contempt of court for failure to make spousal support payments. The court ordered Husband to serve four days in jail, but permitted him to purge the contempt by making spousal support p ayments of $2,250 per month (plus a 2% processing fee) for a period of four months, beginni ng November 1, 2018. {¶35} Thus, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence was introd uced showing

the existence of a valid court order along with Husband’s knowl edge of, and failure to comply with, that order. See Henry at ¶ 12. Husband introduced no evidence to either rebut this initial showing of contempt or to establis h any affirmative defense reg arding his nonpayment of spousal support. See Henry at ¶ 12, quoting Zemla at ¶ 11 (“‘Once the movant proves [her] prima facie case, the contemnor must present evidence of [his] inability to comply with the order or any other available defense.’”). See also Watral v. Watral , 9th Dist. Medina No. 05CA0017- M, 2005-Ohio-6917, ¶ 13, quoting Herold v. Herold , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-206, 2004- Ohio-6727, ¶ 28, citing Pugh v. Pugh , 15 Ohio St.3d 136, 140 (1984) (“ It is well-established that once a defendant’s failure to pay court-ordered [payments] has been sufficiently proven, the defendant may raise inability to comply as an affirmative defen se to contempt.”). Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial cour t abused its discretion in fin ding Husband to be in contempt of court for his failure to pay spousal support. {¶36} Husband’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

III. {¶37} Husband’s assignments of error are all overruled. The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Dom estic Relations Division, is a ffirmed.16

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State o f Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the pa rties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket , pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant.

THOMAS A. TE ODOSIO FOR THE COURT

CALLAHAN, J. CONCURS. CARR, P. J. CONCURRING IN PART, AND DISSENTING IN PART. {¶38} As to Husband’s fourth assignment of error, I respectfully diss ent as I would conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Husband in contempt because no

willful violation of the trial court’s order was demonstrated. This is particularly so given the17

facts and circumstances before us; it is undisputed that wife a t the very least attempted to get remarried, and Husband did file a motion to terminate spousal s upport.

APPEARANCES: JAMES R. RANFTL, Attorney a t Law, for Appellant. CANDACE KIM KNOX, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.