NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM 

2010:

A MID-TERM ASSESSMENT

Joseph R. Cerami

Robert H. Dorff

Matthew H. Harber

Editors

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Strategic Studies Institute Book

NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM 2010:

A MID-TERM ASSESSMENT

Joseph R. Cerami

Robert H. Dorff

Matthew H. Harber

Editors

August 2011

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ISBN 1-58487-499-6
iii

IN MEMORIAM

Harvey Sicherman

1945-2010

Harvey Sicherman died quite suddenly on December 25, 2010. Not long before, he had completed 

the manuscript that now appears as Chapter 6 in this 

book. He presented the original paper at the April 22, 

2010, Symposium in Washington, DC. Testimonials to 

his life, his accomplishments, and his legacy appeared 

almost immediately following his death, and include 

a special issue of Orbis published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute where he served as President 

(http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5503.html). The authors of 

this edited volume wanted to add to this publication 

an acknowledgement of what Harvey had meant to 

so many of us. We thought it most appropriate to ask 

a colleague from the Strategic Studies Institute who 

had known him for more than 40 years to share his 

thoughts.

I first met Harvey Sicherman in 1967 when he was a 

graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania. 

Harvey stood out then for his sartorial splendor in 

an era of bell bottoms and beards. But it was and remained more than sartorial elegance that drew people 

to him. It soon became clear that he had a penetrating 

intelligence, coruscating wit, great charm, and deep 

passion, a rare combination even then among students 

of international affairs. When I later encountered him 

as Secretary of State Haig’s assistant, I was not surprised by his rise. Neither could I then or now think 

of anyone better qualified for the position. As leader 

of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Harvey then 

gave his utmost to restoring FPRI to its previous glory 

in another sign of his commitment, passion, intelligence, and charm. At the same time he never lost his 
iv

profound religious commitment that prevented these 

gifts from becoming style rather than substance. Harvey may have slaughtered several sacred cows, but he 

never denied the importance of the sacred in human 

affairs. He left us all far too soon. May his memory be 

a blessing.

Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D.

Professor, Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

Carlisle, Pa
v

CONTENTS

Foreword .................................................................vii

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Preface .......................................................................ix

Ryan C. Crocker 

1. Introduction: Strategic Assessments 

 and National Security Reform ...........................1

 Joseph R. Cerami, Jared E. Bennett, and 

Robert H. Dorff

2. Grading the Government: A Mid-Term 

 National Security Assessment.........................13

James Jay Carafano

3. Five Heretical Suggestions: Addressing 

 Civil-Military Tensions .....................................25

Bernard I. Finel

4. Congressional National Security 

 Reform During the Obama 

 Administration.....................................................37

James R. Locher III

5. Congressional National Security Reform: 

 A Mid-Obama Administration 

 Review ................................................................45

Richard Weitz

6. The National Security Council System: 

 It's Not Much, But We Like It...........................79

Harvey Sicherman
vi

7. Assessing the United States in Afghanistan: 

 The Record and the Range of Choice ............111

Joseph J. Collins

8. Stabilization and Reconstruction in 

 Conflict and Post-Conflict Since 9/11............141

James Stephenson

9. Our Strategic Assessment “System” 

 Needs an Overhaul: Summary and 

 Concluding Thoughts .....................................167

Matthew Harber

About the Contributors .................................. .187

The Bush School of Government 

and Public Service .................................................193

The Strategic Studies Institute..............................195
vii

FOREWORD

On April 22, 2010, the Bush School of Government 

and Public Service at Texas A&M University, and the 

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, conducted a colloquium in Washington, DC, on 

“2010: Preparing for a Mid-Term Assessment of Leadership and National Security Reform in the Obama 

Administration.” This conference marked the fifth 

collaboration between the Bush School and SSI. The 

first, “The Future of Transatlantic Security Relations,” 

was held in 2006. In 2007, a workshop was held in College Station, Texas, on “The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare.” The third conference, “Reform 

and the Next President’s Agenda,” was held in March 

2008, also in College Station, Texas. That conference 

was also co-sponsored by the nonpartisan Project on 

National Security Reform (PNSR), which includes retired Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft as a member 

of its Guiding Coalition. The PNSR guiding coalition 

also originally included several key members of the 

Obama administration. The fourth conference, “Leadership and Government Reform,” took place in June 

2009. Two major topics were discussed: leader development in professional schools and leadership and 

“whole of government” reforms.

The theme of the 2010 colloquium continued the 

discussion of “whole of government” reforms, but 

added three new areas of emphasis. The first identified the critical need for congressional leadership in 

carrying out transformational national security reforms. The second addressed improving methods of 

strategic planning and assessment to meet the current 

U.S. fiscal constraints. The third discussed the transi-
tion from military to civilian leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Strategic Studies Institute joins the co-editors 

of this volume in thanking the Bush School staff members for their extraordinary efforts in coordinating the 

conference and in the preparation of this book. We 

especially thank the Bush School events coordinator, 

Beth Stanley. Bush School graduate assistant Ethan 

Bennett contributed to making the colloquium a success and in laying the groundwork for this volume. 

The Bush School and SSI also thank Robert Fiedler of 

the Reserve Officers Association for his outstanding 

support in hosting the colloquium in the ROA Minuteman Memorial Building in Washington, DC.

The Bush School of Government and Public Service 

at Texas A&M University is dedicated to academic 

integrity, leadership development, professional experience, and unique relationships between professors 

and students academically and in research. The Bush 

School program also offers students opportunities 

through national and international internships and 

emphasizes the development of written and oral communication skills. The Bush School, along with SSI, 

are proud to put forward this book, as both institutes 

believe the individual research, analysis, and opinions 

expressed within are valuable and important to the 

ongoing debates over national security reform.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

viii
ix

PREFACE

Assessing U.S. leadership in ongoing national security reform was the focus of a research colloquium 

hosted by the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University; and the Strategic 

Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, on 

April 22, 2010, in Washington DC. The colloquium 

was entitled “2010: Preparing for a Mid-Term Assessment of Leadership and National Security Reform in 

the Obama Administration.” The colloquium’s three 

panels addressed: (1) Assessing National Security 

Reform; (2) Legislative Imperatives; and (3) The Way 

Forward. 

This colloquium and report continue our ongoing 

partnership with the Strategic Studies Institute and 

other foreign and defense policy educational and research institutes. There is an important need to think 

more deeply about leadership and government reform 

in their broadest sense. This volume includes papers 

that reassess our theories, concepts, and practices for 

understanding America’s leadership role in national 

security and international affairs. The following chapters offer a variety of ideas, approaches, and suggestions. While these represent a wide and contrasting 

range of views, there is a consensus that reforms are 

needed across and within the many government agencies engaged in diplomacy, defense, and development 

policy. 

Present as panelists and participants were more 

than two dozen analysts, scholars, and former officials from the executive and legislative branches of 

government. The majority of the concerns, questions, 

and ideas discussed during the symposium are articu-
x

lated and expanded upon in the following chapters. 

The colloquium co-sponsors included the Reserve Officers Association (ROA), the Foreign Policy Research 

Institute (FPRI), the Hudson Institute, the Council 

on Foreign Relations (CFR), the American Security 

Project (ASP), Creative Associates International, Inc. 

(CAII), and the Project on National Security Reform 

(PNSR). The colloquium participants, including experts from both the policy community and academia, 

all contributed their ideas to address the pressing issues captured in the body of this book. We thank these 

prestigious research institutions for their participation 

in this project.

We especially thank the Director of the Strategic 

Studies Institute, Professor Douglas Lovelace, for cosponsoring the colloquium, and also SSI’s Dr. Robert 

H. (Robin) Dorff for his efforts in conference planning 

and execution, as well as for chairing a panel and coediting this volume. We greatly appreciate the editorial skills of Dr. James Pierce and Ms. Rita Rummel 

of the Strategic Studies Institute, for their professional 

and selfless efforts in publishing this monograph. 

Robert Fiedler of the ROA provided essential support 

in hosting the colloquium at the ROA Minuteman Memorial Building in Washington, DC.

In addition, our Bush School staff performed numerous tasks in planning and executing the conference. Special thanks to our events coordinator, Beth 

Stanley, for her professionalism in arranging all our 

support efforts. Our Bush School Graduate Assistants 

for Research, Ethan Bennett and Matthew Harber, 

provided administrative and research assistance as 

well as their ideas and writing talents in planning for 

the conference as well as in preparing the papers presented in this volume. 
xi

Our mid-term assessment is designed to contribute in a positive manner to the ongoing initiatives for 

institutional and organizational national security reforms. At the same time, we fully realize that much 

work remains to be done to improve U.S. and coalition efforts to sustain the essential leadership role of 

the United States in national security and international affairs. The Bush School is proud to join with SSI 

to publish this book as a tribute to the ideals of two 

institutions that strongly believe that the individual 

research and ideas expressed in the pursuit of public 

service and the national interest are always valuable 

and important.

RYAN C. CROCKER

Dean and Executive Professor

Holder of the Edward & Howard 

Kruse Endowed Chair

George Bush School of Government 

& Public Service

Texas A&M University

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS

AND NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM

Joseph R. Cerami

Jared E. Bennett

Robert H. Dorff

One of the fundamental skills of critical thinking is 

the ability to assess one’s own reasoning. To be good 

at assessment requires that we consistently take apart 

our thinking and examine the parts (or elements) for 

quality.1

BACKGROUND

On April 22, 2010, the Reserve Officers Association 

(ROA), the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), 

the Hudson Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations 

(CFR), the American Security Project (ASP), Creative 

Associates International, Inc. (CAII), and the Project 

on National Security Reform (PNSR) participated with 

the Bush School of Government and Public Service, 

and the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, in co-sponsoring a colloquium in Washington, DC, on a mid-term assessment of leadership and 

national security reform in the Obama administration. 

Three panels discussed “Assessing National Security 

Reform,” “Legislative Imperatives,” and “Assessing 

National Security Reform—The Way Forward.” The 

colloquium theme focused on the need for advancing the research and study of key national security 

issues, engaging the invited participants in sharing 

their expertise, and informing interested community 
2

members of ways to develop a deeper awareness and 

understanding of security reform issues facing the 

U.S. Government by examining the topics of leadership and national security reform. 

PANEL 1: ASSESSING NATIONAL SECURITY 

REFORM

The first panel clarified conceptual questions by 

outlining the current themes inherent in the national 

security reform debate. In introducing the panel, Joseph Cerami of the Bush School commented that the 

panel’s first objective was to outline and assess changing national security efforts as they have evolved and 

adapted during the first 2 years of the Obama administration. The second panel’s objective was to detail specific political and organizational challenges in which 

progress was made during the first 2 years, as well 

as those obstacles that continue to impede significant 

and efficient reforms. 

The panelists introduced the current terminology 

and trends, and set the conditions for the colloquium 

discussions. Integral to this panel was an analysis 

of how security paradigms and the continuing need 

for reform might affect the organization, operations, 

policies, and strategies of the U.S. military in the short 

term. 

Joseph Collins of the National Defense University 

spoke on Afghanistan. In his examination, Collins 

made five major points: Two presidents have declared 

that the War in Afghanistan is of vital importance 

to the nation; the costs of the war have been high in 

blood and treasure; the Taliban is weakening, thanks 

to President Barack Obama’s surge; the Karzai government is weak, corrupt, and ineffective; and the 
3

Afghan people are tired of war, coalition forces, and 

their own government. Collins further questioned the 

future of the war’s success, given the current stress on 

the Department of Defense (DoD) budget (currently 

projected to be more than $700 billion/year).

Scott Feil of the Institute for Defense Analyses addressed how assessments are generated within the 

DoD. Feil examined two categories of assessments, 

Strategic Assessments and Operational Resource Assessments, subsequently detailing how such assessments contribute to national security solutions. Using 

as examples the DoD response to the improvised explosive device (IED) and the resurgence of the Army 

post-Vietnam, Feil concluded that the obstacle encountered in problem solving in government is that 

it does not focus on the “problem as a whole.” Rather, 

each segment of government proposes solution sets 

that optimize its own capabilities and interests. He 

concluded that the government should confront national security as a whole with a focus on optimizing 

the overall function, which necessarily suboptimizes 

the individual subordinate processes and organizations.

Thomas Mahnken of Johns Hopkins University 

and the Naval War College examined U.S. Defense 

policy and its implications for national security reform. Focusing on the proper division of labor in the 

government, Mahnken suggested that entities within 

government abide by their clearly defined roles, recommending that the DoD be used to fight and win 

wars, and the State Department (DoS) and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) be 

empowered to support a “whole of government” approach to national security issues. 
4

Harvey Sicherman of FPRI reviewed the best and 

worst cases of past Presidents’ actions in making national security policy, distinguishing between the 

Harry Truman (White House-State Department partnership) and Richard Nixon (White House dominant) 

models. He praised the Bush-Baker-Scowcroft (Presidential-led, integrated, interagency process) variant. 

Sicherman concluded that the current administration 

has tried a version of the Bush-Baker-Scowcroft model, but too much is being done in the White House. 

Instead, Sicherman recommended giving greater responsibility to the State Department, allowing the National Security Council (NSC) to focus on its primary 

mission of coordinating policy for the President while 

considering policy alternatives.

PANEL 2: THE LEGISLATIVE IMPERATIVE

The second panel, discussing the Legislative Imperative, examined the congressional role in the national security process from 2008 to 2010. Panel Chair 

James Locher III of the Project on National Security 

Reform opened the panel by stating that 95 percent 

of the American people say that national security reform will never be done. Locher went on to refute this 

point, claiming that the objects impeding reform were: 

a lack of routine oversight, a lack of confidence, a slow 

confirmation process for presidential appointees, a 

failure to pass legislation that has become endemic, 

and frequent confrontation between the branches of 

the government. Locher exclaimed that many believe 

Congress lacks the political will to take on national 

security reform, but was quick to point out that, quite 

to the contrary, Goldwater-Nichols achieved just this 

feat. To elucidate the issue’s complexity, Locher identi-
5

fied clear differences between the past and today, with 

today’s challenges being: a security environment that 

is much more complex, the unprecedented size of the 

defense budget, and concerns over domestic security. 

According to Locher, the major challenges confronting 

national security reform are those of politics, scope, 

ownership, and bandwidth. Politically, individuals 

favor the status quo. With regard to scope, Locher emphasized that the size of national security reform is 

daunting and inhibits congressional commitment. In 

reference to ownership, Locher stated that the simple 

fact is that there is no mandate for national security 

reform. Finally, he stated that bandwidth, or time, is a 

major challenge, as it took Goldwater-Nichols over 4 

years to complete. The focus needed for national security reform would certainly require politicians to surrender other legislative initiatives.

The post-September 11, 2001, system and campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed additional pressure on the U.S. Government’s civilian and 

military departments and their levels of interagency 

cooperation. At the heart of this discussion was an 

assessment of the contributions of the Project on National Security Reform, an initiative on Capitol Hill to 

build political support for congressional reform of interagency dynamics much in the same way the Goldwater/Nichols Act transformed the armed services.

Nina Serafino of the Congressional Research Service focused on the possibility of legislative action on 

reform, including reorganizing Congress for proper 

oversight. Recognizing prospects for comprehensive 

reform is a daunting task; however, Serafino stated 

that some members are discussing selected reforms. 

One example is a national security professional development program to foster interagency cooperation 
6

through a civilian interagency education and training 

program, including rotations between agencies. She 

noted expert opinion that recommends that Congress 

reorganize itself cyclically, with small changes made 

in response to events, and large, substantive changes 

following periods of rising frustration or party turnover. She reflected that the Obama administration 

might trigger changes in Congress by submitting a 

unified security budget combining all security assistance accounts. 

Larry Sampler of CAII spoke on the topic of legislative imperatives for national security reform. Sampler 

said that one of the major impediments to national security reform is the prerogative of an official to seek 

reelection, thus making things inefficient. The U.S. 

Government’s system of checks and balances creates 

an environment of stasis, leading to operational paralysis in the government. Sampler also addressed the 

issue of the terminology being used between military 

and civilian entities, and the need to understand this 

terminology to produce effectiveness. Sampler cited 

the need for good leadership behind national security 

reform. Finally, Sampler expressed his belief that the 

3-Ds (defense, diplomacy, and development) model is 

not a model based in reality, and should be done away 

with. 

Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute and PNSR 

discussed the importance of resource allocation and 

national security reform. He recommended that the 

NSC play a greater role in designing an integrated 

national security process, including new approaches 

for matching resources to strategies. Weitz also suggested the need for a national operational framework, 

whereby national security reform would be viewed as 

more of a national responsibility.
7

James Lindsay of CFR examined the practicality 

of national security reform. Specifically, Lindsay tried 

to answer the questions of why Americans wish to 

produce reform, and why the government has failed 

to achieve it. Lindsay suggested that reform is undertaken to elicit greater policy effectiveness. The U.S. 

Government has failed to achieve reform because of 

bad policy choices and a streamlined executive. Lindsay also focused on the role of development and its 

organization within the government, emphasizing the 

political battles that impede reform. He concluded 

that reform would be achieved only if the government 

focused on pivotal reform measures, admitting that 

the overall political climate would be the eventual 

catalyst for change.

PANEL 3: ASSESSING NATIONAL SECURITY 

REFORM—THE WAY FORWARD

This panel focused on examining steps to implement significant national security reform over the next 

2 years (2010-12). Panel Chair Robert “Robin” Dorff of 

the Strategic Studies Institute asked the panelists to 

assess the Obama administration’s first years with an 

eye toward offering ideas for continuing or accelerating the pace of national security reform. The researchers were also asked to assess the successes and weaknesses of the first years and address the institutional 

and organizational challenges that continue to face the 

administration. Finally, the panelists were asked to 

suggest promising areas for national security reform 

initiatives in the near term.

Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American 

Security stated that one issue confronting the Obama 

administration is that it has recognized its limits of 
8

engagement, especially given the complexity of issues like Iran and North Korea. Cronin criticized the 

nearsightedness of America by calling for a national 

security strategy that focused on the future, “thinking 

about the America of 2030, and not just 2010.” Cronin 

recommended that the United States should focus on 

civilian capacities and a stronger State Department by 

developing a better system of educating diplomats, 

and by recruiting the best and brightest. Cronin also 

recommended that the United States should become 

serious about investing in development, focusing on 

those countries in the bottom realm of the development process, the poorest performers. 

Bernard Finel of ASP suggested strengthening the 

role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

removing any politics associated with the position. He 

suggested that this could be achieved by assigning a 

timeline to the position, such as 5 years without the 

possibility of removal. In that same vein, he recommended taking the media out of the military, allowing 

the DoD voice to be expressed through a single office, 

the Secretary of Defense. Fiscal responsibility was another topic of interest, as Finel stated that declaring 

wars (those planned for 10, 15, or more years) should 

be something that is placed on a normal budgeting 

process. Finel also discussed the legality of behavior 

in combat by suggesting that there should be an increase in personal liability for criminal conduct. 

James Stephenson of CAII examined the areas of 

counterinsurgency, reconstruction, and stabilization. 

A focus of the talk was the shrinking role of USAID. 

Stephenson said it was a great concern that USAID 

was being taken over by the DoS, further hindering 

USAID’s ability to control its own policy, planning, 

and budget. The majority of Stephenson’s time was 
9

spent discussing the role of stabilization and reconstruction. Stephenson said that the individuals who 

work effectively in stabilization know their territory 

and can enable the local populace. Stephenson questioned the fiscal sustainability of the current DoS-led 

civilian efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which 

use large numbers of U.S. temporary hires who are 

expensive and lack the training, the experience, or the 

mobility to be effective. 

Beth Tritter of The Glover Park Group explored the 

debate over development, questioning where it fits in 

the approach to national security. Tritter agreed that 

the 3-D’s approach is an incorrect model and further 

addressed the question of whether or not development was truly essential to U.S. foreign policy. Tritter 

suggested that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was 

making development an issue because it takes work 

off of the hands of the DoD. Tritter also commented on 

deficits and current spending levels, saying that this 

will be the catalyst for reform.

KEYNOTE SPEAKER: JAMES CARAFANO, 

HERITAGE FOUNDATION

The Keynote Speaker, James Carafano, tackled national security reform with regard to defense spending and congressional oversight effectiveness. First, 

Carafano addressed the overarching sentiment of pessimism in America today, the belief in the idea that we 

cannot afford defense measures. Carafano defended 

the position that defense is the fundamental responsibility of the government. He further stated that the 

proposition for cutting defense spending often becomes an excuse for inaction. Carafano also spoke on 

the topic of Congress, suggesting that it is incapable 
10

of doing functional assessments of national security. 

He said this is because of the fact that the majority of 

power is being held by the Senate and House leadership, not in the committees. This produces committee 

hearings that are almost irrelevant, allowing little time 

to be given to pertinent, substantial issues. He also directly addressed whole-of-government reform, coupling it with the recommendation that there is a need 

to define this concept more clearly. Carafano concluded by stating that the government should build an effective construct for the whole of government, and the 

nation’s leadership needs to build a conceptual doctrine in strategic, operational, and tactical terms. According to Carafano, this will allow the government to 

focus more directly on national security issues that are 

nonlinear and highly complex. 

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

While there was no consensus among the panelists, 

three major themes did emerge from the presentations 

and discussions. First, the initiatives for the extensive 

national security reform that are required to meet current threats will have to come from outside of the executive branch bureaucracy. This is true, even though 

former senior members of the Project on National Security Reform hold key executive branch positions.

A second major point was that the 3-Ds model has 

been a harmful way to portray the capacities, requirements, and relationships for policy and operational 

effectiveness, especially in ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. In the view of several 

stability and reconstruction expert field hands with 

extensive on-the-ground experience, the current 3-Ds 
11

model is incorrect, since these functions are not properly represented by circles, are not the same size in 

terms of capacity and resources and, in many significant ways, do not overlap in several respects in the 

key areas necessary for effective integration, alignment, and coordination.

Third, the Obama administration still has much 

work to do in organizing development efforts to focus 

on the need for stronger political, economic, and social 

development structures, resources, and leadership. 

Given the ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

there is an urgent need for better definition of the roles 

and responsibilities of the DoS, the DoD, and USAID. 

The following papers and authors’ insights in assessing early strategy and reform efforts reflect on the 

need for improving strategies, as well as the need for 

more effective assessments. Regarding the need for 

improving congressional oversight, James Carafano 

argues for improving our assessment of the whole-ofgovernment construct and the interagency process, as 

well as for designing fiscally responsible methods for 

linking policy, operations, and practice. Bernard Finel 

critically assesses the current state of U.S. civil-military 

relations and the deficiencies in strategic, cost-benefit 

analyses. James Locher, the guiding force in the national security reform movement, assesses congressional roles and responsibilities. In assessing national 

security reform efforts, Richard Weitz sees a need for 

more comprehensive national security reviews that 

address capabilities, needs, and resources, as well as 

for improving our strategic knowledge management. 

FPRI’s Harvey Sicherman provides historical and current insights on the presidency and Cabinet versus 

NSC tensions and the need for attention in terms of 

both policymaking structures and functions.
12

Reforming U.S. national security policymaking, 

especially policy implementation, remains a work in 

progress among and within government, nongovernment, and private organizations. The purpose of this 

book is to reflect on the idea that the national security 

community should place renewed attention on, and 

more-critical thinking about, improving strategic assessment processes as well.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Richard Paul and Linda Elder, Critical Thinking: Learn the 

Tools the Best Thinkers Use, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2006, p. 43.
13

CHAPTER 2

GRADING THE GOVERNMENT:

A MID-TERM NATIONAL SECURITY 

ASSESSMENT

James Jay Carafano

INTRODUCTION

The way America manages and maintains the key 

instruments of national security has slipped into neutral. Frankly, there are few signs that the trend is likely 

to change any time soon. Two of the biggest obstacles 

to making progress are: (1) an increasingly Washington-wide belief that that the United States cannot afford to defend itself; and (2) an equally dour belief 

that mastering interagency and whole-of-government 

operations are just too difficult, or that mastering them 

requires the impossible task of completely reconfiguring how Washington works. Both these beliefs are 

wrong-headed, and if they don’t change, America will 

slip from neutral into reverse. 

The issue of defense spending is both highly controversial and political. There is an overreaching pessimism that the United States cannot afford defense 

measures. One of the best examples of this is the debate 

on the ballistic missile defense program. Spending on 

this important project does not even account for 1 percent of the defense budget in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, 

and is $1 billion less than the Bush administration’s 

budget request for missile defense in FY 2009.1

 Such 

cuts are trumpeted as cost-saving measures and proof 

that Washington is capable of making hard choices; in 

fact, the exact opposite is true. The mantra of cutting 
14

defense as a strategic priority in order to address the 

nation’s fiscal ills has become a convenient excuse to 

justify politically expedient decisions.

Whole-of-government reform has become an 

equally convoluted Gordian knot.2

 Everyone acknowledges that the most pressing national security 

challenges require the effective integration of multiple 

federal agencies. Likewise, there is a consensus that 

the U.S. Government often fails to muster effective 

joint action in times of crisis or great need. Most, however, also believe that fixing this shortfall is just too 

hard or requires restructuring the federal bureaucracy 

from top to bottom. Painting the problem as a difficulty akin to the labors of Hercules encourages most 

in Washington to adopt the politically convenient answer: do nothing.

WASHINGTON’S PHONY WAR—THE GUNS 

AND BUTTER BATTLE

The U.S. defense budget has suffered from a dangerous, post-Cold War trend: It has been slowly eroding, interspersed with event-driven massive increases 

to pay for current operations. This yin and yang of 

spending has undermined the development of a 

stable, coherent defense program.3

 Today, national 

defense ranks a distant fourth in the overall budget, 

trailing financial support for the elderly (through Social Security and Medicare), education funding, and 

means-tested welfare payments. In terms of national 

spending, defense is actually at near historic lows. All 

defense spending (military operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq included) is equal to about half of what the 

United States spent on average each year (as a percentage of gross domestic product [GDP]) throughout 

the Cold War.4
15

Defense spending is less than one-fifth of the federal budget. Nevertheless, it was the target of roughly 

half of the administration’s $17 billion in spending cuts in 2010.5

 As many as 50 programs were cut 

or eliminated in the past year alone,6

 nor is there an 

end to the cutting of the defense budget in sight. The 

Obama administration has proposed cutting the C-17 

Transport Plane ($2.5 billion); EP-X Manned Airborne 

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting Aircraft ($12 million), or the Navy’s CGX Cruiser 

Program, known also as Next Generation Cruiser Program ($46 million).7

Entitlement spending and the sum of all other discretionary spending account for most of the federal 

budget. Federal, state, and local governments consume over 40 percent of U.S. GDP.8

 Given that proportion, even large cuts in the defense budget would not 

reign in federal spending or reduce the federal deficit. In the not-so-distant past, Congress has eagerly 

showered checks for hundreds of billions of dollars on 

dicey financial gambits like the Troubled Asset Relief 

Program (TARP) or the demonstrably nonstimulating 

“stimulus package.”9

 Legislation such as health care 

and cap and trade (the latter has to be passed in the 

Senate yet) will add multi-trillion-dollar expenses, 

even further straining the budget.

Taking all of the above into account, military 

spending (including the costs of all the battles in the 

global war on terrorism) looks pretty modest. Certainly, defense, despite the heated rhetoric from Washington, is not the source of the nation’s fiscal ills. The way 

America is going, the federal debt will be $4.8 trillion 

in just 5 years. By then, the interest payment on the 

debt alone will exceed the entire defense budget. 
16

Lack of funding will inevitably lead to a lack in 

capabilities. The military has missions that cannot be 

compromised without putting the United States at 

risk. It has to protect the homeland and respond to 

domestic disasters, ensure freedom of the commons 

(air, space, sea, and cyberspace) for commerce; help 

build the capacity of other allies to defend themselves 

and partner with the United States to defend common interests; and have the capability to breach the 

sanctuary of the nation's enemies—conventional and 

nonconventional, state or nonstate—so that they have 

no home base from which they can attack the United 

States with impunity. All these missions are performed 

today, but the military strains to do so with the forces 

available. The notion that long-term national defense 

can be provided for with significantly fewer forces 

and capabilities defies common sense.

The government has put off modernizing many 

major systems (such as ground vehicles) for decades. 

Procurement holidays are unprecedented since the 

Great Depression, and unparalleled for a nation at 

war. To make matters worse, the United States never 

recapitalized its forces after the Cold War. Thus, calls 

for another peace-dividend now are the equivalent of 

taking a peace-dividend on the back of what in many 

ways is still a peacetime force.

It is necessary to maintain current levels of defense 

spending and implement comprehensive reforms to 

prevent a debilitating investment crisis in defense. For 

example, the average age of the Air Force inventory is 

23 years, and there are no plans to replace it.10 According to Air Force estimates, 800 aircraft will be lacking 

by 2024, and Navy officials projected a shortfall of up 

to 200 aircraft by 2018.11
17

The broad range of missions performed today requires steady, robust funding for several years. In addition, the services will need billions of dollars for at 

least 3 years after operations in Iraq conclude to repair 

and replace equipment damaged during combat operations.12 For years the Department of Defense (DoD) 

has not addressed the issue of shortfalls (differences 

between service requirements and money allocated to 

fulfill these requirements in the budget) because of the 

dynamic of wars and budget supplementals.13

Predictable levels of defense spending would allow the military to reset, rebuild, and modernize arsenals and train forces for all types of warfare. However, 

forcing the military to make unnecessary trade-offs, 

accepting too much risk, assuming that the potential 

threats will never materialize, or not reducing global 

military commitments in line with changes in defense 

strategy could ultimately produce a hollow force that 

is unready, unable, or too small to help keep the nation safe, free, and prosperous. 

Soft power, the use of diplomacy, and other tools 

of national security are not necessarily fungible. Soft 

power is not a substitute for hard power. Indeed, soft 

power is at its most effective when it is used in concert with hard power. Gutting defense will not only 

do little to revitalize the U.S. economy; it will unbalance and undermine all the nation’s instruments of 

national power. 

WASHINGTON’S FAINT OF HEART ON 

WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT

In addition to losing its will to fund national defense, Washington has become positively inert on 

addressing the challenges of harnessing all the instru-
18

ments of national power on tough issues. Here, much 

of the fault lies with Congress, as well as with the administration that has not pressed Congress to do the 

right thing. 

The poster child for the lack of integrated effort is 

the challenge of homeland security. There is no question that Congress has a major role to play in establishing an effective homeland security regime. While the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 created a lead federal 

agency for many domestic security activities, this was 

only the first step. Building an effective Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) requires sound strategies, solid programs, personnel reforms, and integrating information technologies; effective congressional 

oversight is a key part of making these initiatives happen.14 Congress, however, has failed to provide competent leadership.

The final report of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) 

Commission reaffirmed the importance of fixing congressional oversight. The commission held that:

Congress should create a single, principal point of 

oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee 

should have jurisdiction over this department [the 

DHS] and its duties. But we believe Congress has the 

obligation to choose one in the House and one in the 

Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan staff.15

One expert witness appearing before the commission testified that the lack of effective congressional 

oversight is perhaps the single greatest obstacle impeding the successful development of the DHS.16

Today, there are at least 100 committees, subcommittees, and other entities claiming jurisdiction over 
19

the DHS. Congressional oversight is both proper and 

necessary, but the high number of hearings decreases 

their relevance and provides little time for pertinent 

substantial issues—in addition to creating burdensome duplications, consuming resources, and devouring the time of the DHS staff. 

Fixing this conundrum of oversight would require 

collapsing jurisdiction into single committees with 

responsibility for homeland security oversight in the 

House and Senate—such a reform ought to be a priority. Yet neither the leadership in the Congress nor the 

White House has shown any serious interest in taking 

such a step. 

BIGGER-THAN-A-BREADBOX PROBLEMS

Beyond homeland security, many federal missions 

require better integration, the foundation of which is 

whole-of-government reform. The manner of U.S. interagency operations has changed little since the end 

of the Cold War. Innovations are needed to create a 

regional framework for interagency planning and action. To understand the performance of the interagency process, it is useful to divide it into three levels: 

policy, operations, and practice. At the policy level, 

agencies in Washington reach broad agreement on 

what each will do to coordinate and support an overall U.S. policy. At the lowest level is the practice of 

cooperation among individuals on the ground.17

It is at the operational level where the U.S. Government undertakes major operations and campaigns 

and where agencies in Washington have to develop 

operational plans such as coordinating recovery operations after a major hurricane. This is where interagency cooperation is the weakest, a legacy of the 
20

Cold War. There was never a requirement for federal 

agencies to do that kind of integrated planning to 

contain the Soviet Union. Agencies generally agreed 

on the broad role each would play. There were few 

requirements under which they had to plan to work 

together in the field to accomplish a goal under unified direction. Washington has never had an enduring 

formal system to do that.

The United States needs to improve its ability to 

coordinate major interagency challenges outside of 

Washington, away from the offices of Cabinet secretaries and staffs, whether it is coordinating disaster relief 

over a three-state area after a hurricane, or conducting the occupation of a foreign country. In short, the 

challenge here lies not in the formulation of national 

policy, but in planning and executing operations in a 

way that lets the people on the ground work well together and get the job done. Especially at the federal 

level, centralization and dissolution of responsibilities 

of federal agencies complicates the process of governing, obfuscates effective congressional oversight, blurs 

lines of authority and responsibility, and increasingly 

bogs the White House down in the day-to-day affairs 

of managing homeland security.18

There are many reasons interagency cooperation is 

weakest at the operational level. Flaws come from: the 

traditional divide between civil and military spheres; 

distinct institutional cultures and operational organization; lack of common knowledge, practices, and 

experiences that would facilitate trust and confidence 

among participants at the interagency process; and 

lack of capabilities to conduct operational activities. 

In addition, federal inspector general corps responsible for oversight, efficiency, and credibility align with 

individual agencies instead of providing common 

ground for interagency operations. Ultimately, the 
21

question is: What can be done to make the interagency 

process more responsive in the operational environment? 

One major shortfall in the interagency process is 

the lack of adequate capacity to conduct operations 

outside of Washington. Where the lead agency has the 

preponderance of responsibility and resources, other 

departments usually act like bystanders, primarily 

interested in doing as little as possible. There is little 

cooperation or planning with outside organizations or 

departments.

Congress is ill-suited to promote cooperation between federal agencies. It appropriates funds for operations of individual departments and the jurisdiction 

of committees that oversee the government dovetail 

with the departments they oversee. Also, many politicians are rightly uncomfortable with the notion of 

big government. They are concerned that creating a 

more effective interagency process would empower 

government to the point that it might lead to abuse, 

encouraging Washington to take on missions that are 

not appropriate.

While Congress has done much to promote interagency inertia, the administration has done little to 

break the log jam. Nothing will change unless Washington starts doing something different.

How can we break out of this morass and start 

making real progress toward preparing effectively for 

the worst? The Constitution suggests an answer. The 

framers were most interested in articulating the roles, 

responsibilities, and checks and balances between the 

branches of government. They left it to responsible 

men and women within each branch to largely determine how to run their part of the government. Thus, 

the answer is: We need each part of government to do 

its job, and we need responsible people.
22

Real reform has to start with Congress. It must set 

a legislative framework that ensures the Executive 

branch can stock federal agencies with responsible 

people who are skilled in interagency operations. 

Each chamber should establish a new committee with 

very narrow jurisdiction to address only those matters that are essential to building a federal work force 

skilled at whole-of-government operations. The committees should have oversight for the policies establishing the education, assignment, and accreditation 

of interagency leaders in the federal enterprise. Such 

committees could provide the needed, but currently 

still lacking, leadership. 

GETTING BACK ON TRACK

Unless Washington takes two critical steps—adequately funding national defense and fixing congressional oversight of interagency operations—the instruments of national security are likely to get rustier 

in the years ahead. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Baker Spring, “The Obama Administration’s Ballistic Missile Defense Program: Treading Water in Shark-Infested Seas,” 

Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2396, April 8, 2010, available from http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/TheObama-Administrations-Ballistic-Missile-Defense-Program-TreadingWater-in-Shark-Infested-Seas.

2. Whole-of-government reform is an approach encompassing interagency operations; coordinating the joint effort of multiple government agencies, often with support from the ministries 

from different nations and nongovernmental and international 

organizations; as well as private sector service providers (entities 

that often have different operational styles and practices, con-
23

trasting organizational cultures, disparate resources, and conflicting goals and missions). 

3. Kevin N. Lewis, “The Discipline Gap and Other Reasons 

for Humility and Realism in Defense Planning,” in Paul K. Davis, 

ed., New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is 

Enough, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994, p. 104.

4. Jim Talent, “A Constitutional Basis for Defense,” Heritage 

Foundation America at Risk Memo No. AR 10-006, June 1, 2010, 

available from www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/A-Constitutional-Basis-for-Defense.

5. Baker Spring, “The 2011 Defense Budget: Inadequate and 

Full of Inconsistencies,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 

2375, February 22, 2010, available from thf_media.s3.amazonaws.

com/2010/pdf/bg2375.pdf.

6. John T. Bennett, “DoD Examining F/A-18 Multiyear Plans; 

Gates Endorses KC-X Requirements,” Defense News, March 24, 

2010, available from www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4553123. 

7. Ed O’Keefe, “2011 Budget: Spending Cuts and Reductions,” 

The Washington Post, February 1, 2010, available from voices.washingtonpost.com/federal-eye/2010/02/2011_budget_spending_cuts_and.

html.

8. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Outlook 86 Database, available from www.oecd.org/

dataoecd/5/51/2483816.xls.

9. James Carafano, “War Spending Is Not Frivolous Spending,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 1, 2009, available from www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/12/WarSpending-is-Not-Frivolous-Spending.

10. Talent. 

11. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy-Marine Corps Strike-Fighter 

Shortfall: Background and Options for Congress,” Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 12, 

2008, p. 4, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22875.pdf.
24

12. Mackenzie Eaglen, “U.S. Defense Spending: The Mismatch Between Plans and Resources,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2418, p. 3, available from www.heritage.org/research/

reports/2010/06/us-defense-spending-the-mismatch-between-plansand-resources#_ftnl.

13. David Berteau, “Fixing the Shortfalls: Defense Budget 

Trends and Long Term Impact,” Defense Industrial Initiatives 

Group Current Issues, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, No. 19, December 14, 2009, p. 1, available from csis.org/files/publication/DIIG%20Current%20Issue%20

Number%2019%20Fixing%20the%20Shortfalls%20Defense%20Budget%20Trends%20and%20Long%20Term%20Impact%20_0.pdf. 

14. James Carafano, “Homeland Security Needs Responsible 

Congressional Oversight,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 

528, July 7, 2004, available from www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/07/Homeland-Security-Needs-Responsible-CongressionalOversight.

15. The 9/11 Commission Report: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 421, available from www.

gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf.

16. James Jay Carafano and David Heyman, “DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. SR-02, December 13, 2004, available from 

www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/12/DHS-20-Rethinking-theDepartment-of-Homeland-Security. 

17. James Jay Carafano, “Herding Cats: Understanding Why 

Government Agencies Don’t Cooperate and How to Fix the Problem,” Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 955, July 26, 2006, available 

from www.heritage.org/research/lecture/herding-cats-understandingwhy-government-agencies-dont-cooperate-and-how-to-fix-the-problem. 

18. Jena Baker McNeill and James Carafano, “President 

Should Merge Homeland Security Council with NSC,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo #2390, April 9, 2009, available from 

www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/04/President-Should-MergeHomeland-Security-Council-with-NSC.
25

CHAPTER 3

FIVE HERETICAL SUGGESTIONS:

ADDRESSING CIVIL-MILITARY TENSIONS

Bernard I. Finel

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, Washington, DC, has 

been consumed with another in a periodic round of 

hand-wringing over the structure of the national security process. The main thrust of these efforts has been 

an attempt to deal with supposed gaps in America’s 

capacity to coordinate whole-of-government responses, particularly in counterinsurgency situations as in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. The recommendations have 

usually focused on better integration of the various 

instruments of statecraft, as well as better training and 

education for civilians to produce a unified cohort of 

national security professionals. This entire line of argumentation is both flawed and misguided.

At a fundamental level, much of the debate over 

national security reform has been distorted by the unexamined assumption that it is in America’s interest 

to maintain a quasi-colonial presence abroad. Efforts 

to implement reforms in support of that objective run 

into the problem that this approach simply does not 

support American national security, and the tensions 

between any objective assessment of the challenges 

facing the United States and the supposed demands 

of this imperial mission create an endless series of unsolvable problems. On the other hand, over the past 

decade, there have been three sets of crises in the national security process. Identifying the problems with 
26

greater clarity allows for a more consistent and sustainable path forward.

First, there is indeed a problem surrounding the occupation/counterinsurgency/counterterrorism (CT)/

hybrid war nexus, but the problem is not the lack of 

a capacity to wage such conflicts using a whole-ofgovernment approach. The problem is in the failure to 

impose a disciplined cost-benefit analysis framework 

to the issue, and the associated failure to develop an 

explicit risk-management framework for these sorts of 

conflicts. These conflicts involve actual costs and opportunity costs, few of which have been explicitly assessed against likely benefits from the endeavors. 

Second, there is an ongoing crisis in civil-military 

relations. The consequence of unhealthy civil-military 

relations has resulted in a paradoxical rise of military 

entrepreneurs freelancing on policy issues, combined 

with a failure to systematically integrate professional 

military advice into policy decisions. Though these 

two problems seem contradictory at first glance, they 

actually represent two sides of the same coin. They 

both result from a breakdown in a disciplined and 

principled scheme for civil-military relations. We need 

a system in which responsible military advise can be 

delivered to senior decisionmakers, while at the same 

time discouraging what has become a back-channelpolicy development process whereby military leaders 

curry opinion leaders in think tanks and the press directly.1

Third, the United States national security community has, over the past decade, been implicated in 

an egregious series of unlawful activities. These have 

included battlefield war crimes and their cover-up, 

unlawful domestic surveillance, torture and other 

inhumane treatment of prisoners, and a wide vari-
27

ety of criminal acts committed by individuals on U.S. 

Government contracts.2 These acts are a tremendous 

embarrassment and pose a threat both to American 

foreign policy and domestic liberty. The national security community needs to operate within the confines 

of domestic and international law. It is doing neither 

in too many cases.

In order to address the three sets of challenges, 

I propose five heretical recommendations. None of 

these have been discussed in the national security 

reform debates in any depth, but they have the advantage of: (a) dealing with some pressing crises in 

the national security community, and (b) that they can 

be accomplished without spending billions or re-engineering vast segments of the U.S. government.

THE ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT 

CHIEFS

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 

ought to be better insulated from political pressures. 

The CJCS needs to be able to provide candid advice 

to the President and Congress about military issues. 

If that is to be the case, he needs to be above political 

pressures. He is not in the chain of command in any 

case, so there is no issue of civilian control involved 

in insulating him. However, there are real negative 

consequences to the Chief being muzzled by directives that “the Department of Defense [DoD] speaks 

with one voice,” or the pressure associated with the 

implicit threat of being removed for being at odds 

with administration policy, or not being reappointed 

to a customary second term as happened with General 

Peter Pace.
28

Like the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the 

CJCS should be appointed for a 5-7 year term, Senate 

confirmable, but removable only for causes like the 

abuse of office for personal gain. The CJCS should be 

charged by statute with providing the President not 

just with his best advice, but with serving as a conduit 

for formal dissents from within the military—creating something akin to the State Department’s dissent 

channel.3

There would be many benefits to this approach. 

First, the President would have more reliable access 

to independent, professional military advice. Second, 

various CJCS products, including the Chairman’s Risk 

Assessment, would be more candid and honest. Third, 

this approach would create a channel for military dissent and hopefully reduce the amount of back-channel 

lobbying and diminish the opportunities for military 

policy entrepreneurs.

Consider recent cases. A strong, independent chairman would have been able to give additional weight 

to the concerns of Generals Tommy Franks and Eric 

Shinseki about inadequate forces being budgeted for 

the initial invasion of Iraq. He could have given voice 

and standing to the concerns of the Judge Advocate 

General Corps (JAGC) regarding violations of international law in our treatment of detainees. He could, 

in 2006 and 2010, been more candid about identifying 

the flaws and limits in the Quadrennial Defense Reviews

of those years. In 2009, he could have been more effective in advising President Barack Obama’s Afghanistan review that recommended a counterinsurgency 

approach in Afghanistan without any sense of the resource implications of that decision.4
29

PUBLIC VISIBILITY OF OTHER GENERAL 

OFFICERS

In contrast to the greater role for the CJCS, it is 

imperative that other general officers see their profile 

diminished. In 2009, the United States was treated to 

the public spectacle of a theater commander publicly 

debating the Vice-President of the United States on a 

critical policy issue. This is a shocking level of insubordination, similar to General Douglas MacArthur’s 

breach of protocol during the Korean War. In 2010, 

General Stanley McChrystal was ultimately fired for 

the lack of judgment demonstrated in various quotes 

given by him and his aides to a Rolling Stone reporter.5

But General McChrystal was not the first to transgress norms of civil-military relations. Indeed, a large 

number of political generals over the past several 

years have routinely been crossing the line into policy 

advocacy. For instance, General Michael Hayden, as 

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, was 

a key architect of an unlawful domestic surveillance 

program and proceeded to provide many of the public 

rationales. General David Petraeus, of course, was the 

face of the Iraq surge in 2007, but he also issued pronouncements on the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in August 2010 launched a media blitz to weaken President 

Obama’s announced timeline in Afghanistan.6

 He later issued a press release directly calling out American 

citizens for exercising, albeit in a misguided fashion, 

their First Amendment rights to free speech.7 Engaging publicly in these policy debates goes beyond the 

traditional role of military officers in lobbying for 

service-specific programs. Decisions about war and 

peace, about the balance between civil liberties and security, and politically complex issues like Middle East 
30

peace must remain in the civilian sphere if the concept 

of civilian primacy is to mean anything.

A fundamental challenge is that in the United States 

we have come to so venerate military service that the 

moment a military leader weighs in on an issue supporting him or her, it becomes a test of patriotism. The 

question ceases to be the strategic issue under consideration and instead becomes about supporting the 

military. This also serves to politicize the military in 

ways that are not conducive to sound civil-military relations. When the liberal activist group Move On took 

out ads challenging “General Betray Us,” they cross 

a line of respectful dialogue, and yet it was a natural 

consequence of Petraeus willingly taking on the role 

of administration spokesman for an unpopular war.8

As a consequence and for the benefit of both civilian 

supremacy and military professionalism, this sort of 

involvement in policy debates needs to be restrained.

Serving General officers, other than the CJCS, 

should be banned from any public statements. They 

should not give speeches to think tanks or universities, 

nor give interviews to TV or newspapers. They should 

communicate only through the chain of command and 

when responding to direct questions in congressional 

hearings. 

LIMIT GENERALS AS POLITICAL APPOINTEES

Another major cause of the politicization of the 

military is the now-routine tapping of recently retired 

officers to serve as political appointees. The ability to 

reward military officers for following unlawful or other politically sensitive orders with high-prestige appointments risks politicizing the military and erodes 

professionalism in the officer corps.
31

As a consequence, no retired general officer should 

be eligible for any political appointment for a period 

of no less than 5 years after retirement from the service. Nor should any serving general be eligible to 

run any government agency (including Department 

of Defense agencies). This would make a dramatic 

change in the culture of several DoD agencies, but as a 

practical matter, an agency head ought to be a civilian 

because of the position’s inherent policymaking role.

The example of Michael Hayden is too serious to 

ignore. Hayden developed and implemented an unlawful domestic surveillance program; indeed, as initially implemented, it was denied recertification even 

by the Bush administration. He was then rewarded 

with a promotion to head the CIA immediately upon 

his retirement from active duty. 

NATIONAL SECURITY EXPENDITURES 

SHOULD FOLLOW PAYGO UNLESS WAR IS 

DECLARED

PAYGO is a congressional rule whereby all new 

expenditures must be offset with either revenue increases or spending cuts making them budget neutral. 

PAYGO was used to great effect in the 1990s, leading 

to dramatically reduced budget deficits and actual surpluses from 1998 to 2001. Placing war supplementals 

off-budget and refusing to even consider spending or 

revenue off-sets makes waging drawn-out conflicts 

with few national security benefits too easy politically. 

The United States should be able to use force in defense of the national interest, but using force should 

only be done in circumstances where the threat is 

significant enough to justify additional revenues or 

spending cuts as part of the price of doing business. 
32

Regardless of whether the United States national 

security actually benefits from the extended occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is doubtful that these 

conflicts could be termed cost-effective. Consider the 

importance of the CT mission in justifying the escalation of the conflict in Afghanistan. Certainly, there are 

some CT benefits to a greater presence in Afghanistan 

and a continued suppression of the insurgency, but is 

the United States really getting $100 billion worth of 

CT annually from the effort? By placing these conflicts 

largely outside normal budgeting channels, American 

leaders have largely ignored the tradeoffs associated 

with waging long, drawn-out, nation-building campaigns.

CLARIFY PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR 

CRIMINAL ACTS

In the name of the War on Terror, the United States 

has essentially accepted what was once a punchline 

as a national policy, “If the president does it, it isn’t 

illegal.” And just as bad, the United States has decided 

that the Nuremberg Defense, “I was just following orders,” is legitimate.9

 It would have been hard enough 

to overturn the Bush administration’s precedents; it 

will be essentially impossible to overturn bipartisan 

precedent from both Presidents George Bush and 

Obama.

As painful as the American experience with independent counsels, particularly Ken Starr’s lurid investigation into President Bill Clinton, has been, the experience of the Obama administration has demonstrated 

the fundamental problem with leaving these sorts of 

investigations in the hands of future administrations. 

It is difficult to imagine a president investigating the 
33

national security choices of his predecessor. By the 

same token, however, the current precedent provides 

no deterrence against unlawful acts committed in the 

name of national security. This is a fundamental threat 

to our constitutional order.

While it would be ideal if we could rely on professionalism to restrain unlawful conduct, the reality is 

that, absent some possibility of criminal liability, the 

pressure to simply go along is likely to be difficult to 

refuse. There needs, in short, to be some independent 

authority capable of investigating and initiating criminal proceedings for actions such as war crimes and 

unlawful intelligence activities.

CONCLUSIONS

The United States currently faces a number of significant foreign policy challenges, but we will not be 

able to meet those challenges until and unless we address some of the major problems that have emerged 

over the past decade. Most notably, the United States 

has expended billions of dollars in unnecessary and 

often incompetently waged conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrating that effective military advice is not being well integrated into policymaking 

decisions. 

Worse, the consequence of this decade of war has 

been a dramatic erosion in civil-military norms to the 

point that egregious violations of these norms is so 

commonplace as to pass largely without notice. The 

great risk is not of a military coup, of course, but rather of a continued politicization of the U.S. military in 

a way that makes the effective integration of military 

power into American national security strategy even 

more difficult.
34

There is a strong temptation to address problems 

that will help us win the wars we are in. This drives 

the admirable desire to develop better whole-of-government approaches to issues like counterinsurgency, 

but prioritizing this approach assumes that such wars 

are either inevitable or beneficial. As a practical matter, neither one of those claims is at all self-evident. 

Addressing some of the major challenges in the provision of military advice, the politicization of the military, and the erosion of civil-military norms of professionalism would serve a dual purpose: It would 

both ensure that civilian supremacy, a key value in a 

democracy, is protected, and it would likely provide 

benefits in the form of more effective security strategy 

decisionmaking. 

Many U.S. problems in Iraq and Afghanistan 

stemmed from a failure to integrate military advice 

into key decisions. By doing so better, the United 

States may not only have a better chance to win the 

wars we are in, but also to avoid those kind of lingering conflicts whose costs easily outweigh any conceivable strategic benefit.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. This paragraph was written prior to General Stanley 

McChrystal’s problems following the publication of a profile in 

Rolling Stone magazine. That development merely strengthens the 

assessment of this essay.

2. Jane Mayer, The Dark Side, New York: Anchor, 2009 ; Jack 

Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, New York: W.W. Norton, 2009.

3. Foreign Affairs Manual Vol. 2, General, Policy 2 FAM 070, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, available from www.

state.gov/documents/organization/84374.pdf.
35

4. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Civilian, Military Officials at Odds 

Over Resources Needed for Afghan Counterinsurgency,” Washington Post, October 8, 2009, available from www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/07/AR2009100704088.html.

5. Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General,” Rolling Stone, 

June 22, 2010, available from www.rollingstone.com/politics/

news/17390/119236.

6. Associated Press, “Hayden insists warrantless surveillance is legal,” MSNBC, available from www.msnbc.msn.com/

id/12847084/; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Gen. David Petraeus says 

Afghanistan war strategy ‘fundamentally sound’,” Washington 

Post, August 16, 2010, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/15/AR2010081501514.html.

7. Julian E. Barnes and Matthew Rosenberg, “Petraeus Condemns U.S. Church’s Plan to Burn Qurans,” Wall Street Journal, 

September 6, 2010.

8. Wikipedia provides a comprehensive review of the controversy that is available from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MoveOn.org_ad_

controversy.

9. Daphne Eviatar, “In Torture Cases, Obama Toes Bush 

Line,” Washington Independent, “March 16, 2009, available from 

washingtonindependent.com/33985/in-torture-cases-obama-toes-bushline.

37

CHAPTER 4

CONGRESSIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY 

REFORM

DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

James R. Locher III

INTRODUCTION

As an equal branch of government, Congress plays 

a crucial role in national security affairs, and Capitol 

Hill’s participation in the reform of the national security system is essential to the ultimate success of this 

endeavor. With the legislative power to authorize 

and appropriate resources, Congress can spearhead 

and direct reform through its oversight of the application, administration, and execution of the laws it 

passes. While national security reform is a sizeable 

undertaking, Congress successfully completed the 

difficult transformation of the Department of Defense 

(DoD) with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Admittedly, today’s national security environment has 

changed considerably from that of the 1980s. Several 

challenges must be overcome in Congress to ensure 

success, including issues of institutional knowledge, 

politics, and capacity. Overcoming these challenges 

will require reform in the legislative branch itself. 

Comprehensive restructuring is critically needed 

to revamp our out-of-date national security system, 

which was devised to address the Cold War threats 

of a bipolar, state-centric world. In the post-World 

War II environment, stove-piped agencies and departments were responsible for applying the elements of 

national power with only a marginal need for inter-
38

agency coordination. The President benefited from the 

National Security Council, established by the National 

Security Act of 1947. Its members were drawn from 

the agencies and departments with purviews relevant 

to national security. This arrangement, however, has 

proved ill suited for the current threat environment, 

which is characterized by tensions among a complex 

array of state, substate, and transnational entities, 

and is further complicated by the dynamics of technological advancements and globalization. The new 

national security threats require a careful calibration 

of the instruments of national power enabled by robust coordination across the interagency community. 

Capitol Hill’s organization mirrors that of the executive branch. Individual committees are charged 

with overseeing specific agencies and departments. 

However, since Congress does not have a National Security Act of its own to encourage a holistic approach 

to national security affairs, it remains focused on its 

parts. Its inability to look at the national security system comprehensively has rendered Congress unable 

to address whole-of-government integration, which 

is now the central challenge of the national security 

system. 

Two key deficiencies result from the legislature’s 

stove-piped approach to national security. First, 

through its excessive focus on the parts, Congress 

has a tendency to reinforce divisions in the executive 

branch, magnifying interagency gaps and cleavages. 

Second, Congress is becoming increasingly irrelevant 

to the larger issues of national security, as it lacks an 

institutional mechanism to address issues that cut 

across agency lines. 

One reason for this is the current committee system, which causes two notable dynamics. By depriv-
39

ing any congressional body of the explicit jurisdiction 

to authorize, fund, or oversee interagency solutions, 

congressional committees examine issues from the 

narrow confines of particular agency perspectives. 

Furthermore, stove-piped programming is reinforced 

by an appropriations process driven by committee 

jurisdictions rather than a mission-based budgetary 

practice that would be more akin to a whole-of-government approach. 

The Project on National Security Reform’s (PNSR) 

report, Forging a New Shield, identified six major problems in congressional performance in national security affairs. They are as follows:

1. Congress undertakes no routine oversight of interagency issues, operations, or requirements;

2. Congress lacks interest and confidence in the executive branch’s management of foreign affairs;

3. The allocation of resources by Congress tends 

towards inflexibility;

4. Slow confirmation processes for presidential appointees by the Senate lead to inaction and bureaucratic drift on many issues;

5. The failure to pass legislation on time has become endemic;

6. The legislative and executive branches are too 

confrontational.1

Given these problems, there is considerable need 

for Congress to reform itself in order to further comprehensive national security transformation. Unfortunately, there has been no meaningful action on this 

front to date.

Even so, Capitol Hill has been acutely interested 

in reforming the executive branch apparatus in an effort to keep it responsive to changing national secu-
40

rity imperatives. Through its oversight role, Congress 

seeks to promote efficiency, economy, effectiveness, 

responsiveness, and accountability among the executive agencies and departments. Nevertheless, recent 

operations have highlighted serious shortcomings in 

these 5 areas. Although existing executive branch authority will enable many solutions, other challenges 

will require changes to the law necessitating that Congress act as it did with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 

1986, which mandated a sweeping reorganization of 

the DoD. Currently, however, Congress lacks the relevant institutional mechanisms and perhaps the political will for doing so. Skeptics may be concerned 

that Capitol Hill will never undertake comprehensive 

national security reform, but in asserting this, they ignore the case of Goldwater-Nichols, which was passed 

over bitter opposition by the DoD. 

The example of Goldwater-Nichols provides hope 

for congressional action on national security reform, 

but admittedly, there are important differences between it and today’s reorganization needs. First, the 

contemporary security threat environment is much 

more complex and rapidly changing than that of the 

1980s. Modern challenges require approaches that are 

not purely diplomatic, developmental, or defensive in 

nature, often demanding tools that cross agency lines. 

This reality presents challenges of jurisdiction, authorization, and appropriations that will require a more 

intricate organizational practice than that instituted in 

the Goldwater-Nichols era. 

Second, the scope of national security reform necessary is unprecedented in its size and complexity and 

may be 15-20 times bigger than Goldwater-Nichols. 

Those who have studied PNSR’s work have noted that 

there has never been a transformation effort as large 
41

as that currently being attempted. While GoldwaterNichols addressed only the DoD, the current reform 

must include the entire national security system, both 

in the executive and legislative branches. Furthermore, 

today’s reform will have to consider international and 

domestic security apparatuses, encompassing organizations not considered under Goldwater-Nichols to 

include state, local, tribal, and territorial governments 

as well as nongovernmental and private organizations. 

Third, in addition to broad changes to existing 

institutions, national security reform necessitates the 

creation of entirely new entities and capacities, a challenge not tackled in Goldwater-Nichols, which only 

provided the proper authorities to already-existing 

organizations.2

 The creation of these new entities will 

demand a concentrated effort by both the executive 

and legislative branches. 

Finally, the scope of national security reform demands careful stewardship through and by Congress. 

However, whereas Goldwater-Nichols benefited from 

ownership by the Senate and House Armed Services 

Committees, no one committee sees itself as having 

the mandate to push for current reform initiatives. 

The absence of a congressional champion has stymied 

the progress of national security reform on Capitol 

Hill. Furthermore, today’s Congress is constrained by 

partisan political considerations, which has prevented a truly bipartisan approach. Bipartisanship was 

crucial to the ultimate success of Goldwater-Nichols. 

Republican Senator Barry Goldwater and Democratic 

Senator Sam Nunn demonstrated tremendous skill in 

forging this legislation and ushering it through a Republican Senate and a Democratic House.
42

Indeed, the challenges of national security reform 

on Capitol Hill are formidable and multifaceted, encompassing intellectual, political, scope, ownership, 

and bandwidth challenges. Intellectually, because 

the legislature lacks jurisdiction and the institutional 

mechanisms to systematically look at interagency 

issues, it does not have the requisite storehouse of 

knowledge. As it did with Goldwater-Nichols, when 

Capitol Hill knew little about defense institutions, 

Congress will have to devote time and resources to 

understanding interagency organizational practice. 

In addition to this intellectual challenge, politically 

entrenched congressional interests favor the status 

quo and discourage comprehensive reform. Furthermore, with multiple stakeholders involved and the 

complexity of reform required, the scope of reorganization is simply daunting, inhibiting congressional 

engagement and commitment. The compounding of 

these challenges, and the amount of time reform will 

demand, create a bandwidth challenge; GoldwaterNichols took 4 years and 241 days to enact, and in 

order to achieve success, the Act was the top priority 

of the Senate Armed Services Committee for 2 years. 

Nearly 2-and-a-half decades on, as the inefficiencies 

of the congressional process have grown, finding the 

capacity on Capitol Hill to undertake institutional reform on the scale of today’s requirements has become 

more challenging. 

Certainly, the task of national security reform is 

significant, demanding a focused, bipartisan effort in 

both the executive and legislative branches. While today’s transformation will prove a more demanding effort than the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the experience of 

the 1980s proved that seemingly insurmountable challenges can be overcome with skillfulness and commit-
43

ment. Modern national security reform is not a novel 

preoccupation; it is essential to the national interest of 

the United States, and Congress must act to make it a 

reality.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), Turning Ideas 

into Action, Arlington, VA: PNSR, 2008, pp. 404-434, available 

from www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_turning_ideas_into_action.pdf.

2. “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, available from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/

title_10.htm.

45

CHAPTER 5

CONGRESSIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY 

REFORM:

A MID-OBAMA ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

Richard Weitz

The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) 

is comprised of former senior national security executives and military leaders, as well as foreign affairs, international development, and human capital experts. 

Since 2007, this bipartisan group has engaged in an 

intensive analysis of the U.S. national security system, 

with particular attention to the interagency aspects of 

national security. It is the perhaps the premier organization on issues relating to national security reform, 

the topic that is PNSR’s exclusive focus.

The PNSR offered a vision for the national security 

system of the 21st century in its November 2008 report, 

Forging a New Shield.

1

 This report offers the most comprehensive study of the U.S. national security system 

in American history. Its vision stresses the need for 

holistic reform, as contrasted to the piecemeal reform 

that has been pursued since 1947. This new improved 

national security system would:

• employ whole-of-government approaches;

• operate effectively across the interagency;

• reflect the insights and innovations that come 

from collaboration by many varied perspectives, both inside and outside government;

• empower leaders to make timely, informed decisions and take decisive action;

• be sufficiently cohesive and agile both to seize 

opportunities and overcome threats;
46

• ensure that the national security system integrates all elements of national power and puts 

mission outcomes first;

• coordinate effectively between the federal government and state, local, tribal, and territorial 

governments and other mission partners.

To realize this vision of a collaborative, agile, and 

innovative national security system that horizontally and vertically integrates all elements of national 

power, the PNSR develops several key concepts for 

processes that would improve U.S. national security 

decisionmaking: strategic management, effective resource allocation, empowered interagency teams, 

a dedicated national security workforce, and a collaborative culture of information sharing. In Toward 

Integrating Complex International Missions, the PNSR 

sought to document the lessons it learned from supporting the National Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning.2

In the fall of 2009, the PNSR published another 

report, Turning Ideas into Action. This document reiterates and refines the recommendations in Forging 

a New Shield. It also outlines specific next steps that 

must be undertaken by the American government to 

implement systemic transformation. The report found 

that reform is underway and that progress is being 

made toward a national security system able to respond more effectively to 21st-century challenges and 

opportunities.3

 President Barack Obama is a consistent 

advocate of U.S. national security reform. He and others in the administration have spoken of the complex 

challenges facing the United States and the need for 

change. Nonetheless, major problems with the U.S. 

national security system remain. Policy formation and 
47

execution is still stovepiped by department and agency lanes rather than a result of a genuinely integrated, 

horizontal interagency collaboration. The system continues to lack unity of purpose and strategic direction, 

partly because strategy and resources are not aligned. 

Furthermore, policymakers do not routinely consider 

all elements of national power in decisions and strategies. Finally, Congress still lacks the proper structure 

to exercise oversight of interagency activities.

THE CONGRESSIONAL IMPERATIVE

Congress has a major role in reforming the national 

security organizations and processes in the executive 

branch. Since its establishment, the PNSR has devoted 

substantial attention to Congress in recognition of the 

crucial importance of the legislative branch in shaping U.S. national security strategy. The Project first 

sought to determine the current role of Congress and 

its various committees in supporting and overseeing 

the national security system. PNSR analysts therefore 

undertook a comprehensive review of recent studies 

of these issues, including those by the Government 

Accountability Office and internal department and 

agency inspectors general. The PNSR then recommended congressional and other oversight changes 

consistent with the organizational strategy, structure, 

processes, and personnel recommendations made by 

its other working groups. The specific methodology 

was to: 

• Examine the history and underlying assumptions of the current congressional oversight 

mechanisms and procedures to determine how 

they took their current form;
48

• Identify recurring problems, their causes, and 

their consequences;

• Explain how core problems differ from peripheral ones;

• Isolate critical impediments to success;

• Develop the full range of alternative solutions;

• Evaluate alternative solutions;

• Make appropriate recommendations; and,

• Identify practical means to ensure successful 

implementation of the recommended reforms.

The PNSR made two core assumptions when examining Congress. First, that the congressional leadership would support adjustments to the body’s committee structure and other oversight mechanisms in 

order to improve overall national security. Second, 

that the Congress would support legal and procedural 

reforms to improve executive branch national security 

performance in the context of an overarching reform 

effort. 

Forging a New Shield identified six problems that 

impede the contribution of Congress to U.S. national 

security policy:4

1. There is no routine oversight of interagency issues, operations, or requirements.

2. Congress lacks interest and confidence in the executive branch’s management of foreign affairs.

3. The overall allocation of resources between all 

elements of national power, including defense, diplomacy, and development, tends toward inflexibility.

4. A slow confirmation process for presidential appointees leads to inaction and bureaucratic drift on 

many issues.

5. Failure to pass timely legislation has become endemic. 
49

6. Legislative and executive branches have lost the 

ability to work together productively.

The PNSR then offered a series of recommendations to address these problems.

STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING 

GUIDANCE 

In both reports and in other documents, the PNSR 

calls for developing a national security strategy and 

accompanying planning and resource guidance for the 

interagency system. Turning Ideas Into Action concluded that establishing a permanent strategy directorate 

in the National Security Staff could strengthen strategy development. The directorate would set direction 

and advance objectives to ensure the government is 

prepared to address near-, medium-, and long-term 

challenges as well as capitalize on new opportunities. To fulfill these objectives, the strategy directorate 

should produce three documents for presidential approval:

1. A National Security Review (NSR) to assess strategic challenges and capabilities;

2. A National Security Strategy (NSS) to focus the 

executive branch; and, 

3. A National Security Planning and Resource Guidance (NSPRG) to implement and fund the strategy.

The NSR would establish the administration’s 

strategy baseline for decisionmaking. It would guide 

senior strategists and policy planners from across the 

national security interagency system as well as other 

government stakeholders and experts. The NSR’s specific objectives would be: 
50

• To describe the strategic landscape;

• To assess existing capabilities and resources 

against needs;

• To make recommendations regarding missions, 

activities, and budgets;

• To review the scope and assumptions of national security, including possible changes in roles 

and responsibilities within the interagency and 

among external stakeholders; and,

• To occur on a quadrennial cycle, preceding and 

informing departmental reviews, with annual 

updates.

The NSR would be used to craft the administration’s NSS, which would comprise a political document 

in narrative form that would establish the President’s 

national security objectives by region and transnational issue. The NSS’s specific objectives would be to 

identify significant challenges in the international and 

domestic security environment and their implications 

for homeland security policy. The NSS would be published once during each presidential term in order to 

establish the administration’s prioritized national security objectives as well as its criteria to manage risks 

and opportunities, given available resources.5

The NSPRG would translate the President’s NSS 

into policy, planning, and resource guidance to departments and agencies. Specifically, the NSPRG 

would provide annually updated 6-year resource profiles covering the capabilities of each department and 

agency for meeting future national security needs as 

defined in the NSS. As part of this process, the National Security Staff and the Office of Management of Budget (OMB) would jointly issue this resource guidance 

at the beginning of the annual program and budgeting 
51

cycle. A copy of the annual resource guidance would 

be provided to Congress to help inform the authorization and appropriation processes. 

The strategy reviews under the Obama administration have indeed been very inclusive. These reviews include the drafting of a new Quadrennial Defense Review

(QDR), Nuclear Posture Review, Ballistic Missile Defense 

Review, and the most recently released NSS. They all 

employed a whole-of-government approach in which 

the National Security Council (NSC) solicited advice 

and input from across the national security community. The reviews themselves stressed the need to improve interagency cooperation as well as develop and 

use all elements of American national power, not just 

the military. For example, the 2010 QDR stresses the 

need to institutionalize greater “partnership capacity” 

across all Department of Defense (DoD) areas.6

 This 

effort lends itself to greater interagency coordination 

between the military component of national power 

and the remaining components, such as diplomacy, 

intelligence, and economy (development). 

Congressional legislation contributed to this process. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2009 

mandated a State Department review of diplomacy 

and development. In addition to identifying key objectives and missions for U.S. foreign policy and assistance, it calls for an interagency approach to strategy:

Each Quadrennial Review of Diplomacy and Development shall take into account the views of the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States 

Agency for International Development, the Secretary 

of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the United 

States Trade Representative, and the head of any other 

relevant agency.7
52

The House Foreign Affairs Committee also introduced the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (H.R. 2410) mandating a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.

8

 Various 

members of Congress, including U.S. Representative 

Jim Langevin (D-RI), have introduced bills requiring 

a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) with 

the objective of establishing overarching goals to create unity of purpose among departments and agencies 

pursuing national security objectives. For example, 

H.R. 4974 states that:

The President shall, in consultation with the Director 

of the Office of Management and Budget, Congress, 

and the heads of other appropriate departments and 

agencies responsible for national security, conduct a 

quadrennial national security review . . . to set forth 

the security goals, including long-term and short-term 

security goals, of the United States.9

This year has seen an unprecedented number of 

narrower reviews, including the Quadrennial Defense 

Review, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review, and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. This bill would 

integrate these efforts and institutionalize a whole-ofgovernment approach to setting U.S. national security 

priorities. Producing an interagency National Security 

Review every 4 years will be a significant step along 

the path of national security reform by providing the 

whole government, including Congress, a common 

strategy to guide planning and resource allocation 

across departments and agencies.
53

INTERAGENCY TEAMS AND TASK FORCES

The PNSR has sought to delegate and unify management of national security issues and missions 

through empowered interagency teams and crisis task 

forces. Although U.S. national security missions are 

shifting, broadening, and becoming increasingly interdisciplinary, the current national security system, 

encumbered by inflexible stovepipes, needs further 

reform to meet today’s multidimensional national security challenges. The recommendations made in Forging a New Shield stressed the importance of employing 

an interagency team approach to issue and mission 

management. The goal was to rectify the problems 

posed by overly centralized decision making, insufficient guidance for and coordination of policy implementation, and insufficient linkage of authorities to 

mission demands. These recommendations encompass system-wide changes, as well as their enabling 

mechanisms.

With congressional support, the Obama administration has developed several interagency teams with 

wide executive branch representation for important 

geographic areas, including Afghanistan-Pakistan and 

the Sudan. The PNSR had the privilege of being able 

to provide direct support to the latter team, which is 

led by the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan (USSES). The 

PNSR helped establish the USSES as an empowered 

interagency team that employed a whole-of-government approach in order to develop a holistic and integrated U.S. approach to the situation in Sudan. Unfortunately, although the PNSR believes in the potential 

for the USSES to act as a model for applying a PNSRdesigned interagency team approach to other priority 

national security issues currently being managed by 
54

czars and special envoys, the interagency team model 

has yet to be extended across the U.S. Government 

through either executive or congressional branch action. 

ALIGNED STRATEGY AND RESOURCES

Linking resources to goals through national security mission-based analysis and resourcing is essential 

for making progress on congressional reform. National security executives must be able to link resources 

to strategic goals, because aligning national security 

strategy with resources is essential. For a plan to be 

genuinely strategic, it must account for both the capabilities and the costs of implementation. National 

security reforms must empower policymakers to set 

strategic objectives and obtain the means to achieve 

them. Resource allocation reform is critical for addressing complex security threats, major emergencies, 

and opportunities. Linking national security priorities and budgets would allow policymakers to make 

improved decisions across the entire national security 

system and provide a capability to respond better to 

the security challenges and opportunities that arise. 

These reforms would greatly enhance U.S. national 

security, help eliminate waste, and more efficiently allocate resources.

Past PNSR research has identified three core problems regarding resource management. First, strategy 

and policy priorities do not drive resource allocation 

and tradeoffs. Second, the national security system is 

unable to resource the full range of required capabilities for national priority missions. Third, it is difficult 

to provide resources for crises requiring an urgent interagency response.10
55

In the current system, national security funding is 

distributed program by program, department by department, agency by agency. The resource allocation 

process focuses on means rather than ends and relies 

on policy entrepreneurs within the interagency to work 

around bureaucratic impediments to achieve successful mission outcomes. Other problems contribute to 

these larger flaws. First is the absence of an agreement 

on which parts of an agency budget should be included in an integrated national security budget. Another is that national security departments and agencies differ considerably in terms of program/budget 

calendars, resource displays/formats, and planning 

horizons (e.g., DoD, the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] and the Intelligence Community use 5-6 

years, but other agencies typically consider only 1-2 

years). As a result of these problems, departments and 

agencies typically shortchange interagency missions 

and nontraditional capabilities. In addition, the requirements for national mission success are often not 

met. In particular, the resource allocation processes do 

not provide the full range of required capabilities, do 

not permit the system to surge in response to priority 

needs, and do not provide resource allocation flexibility in response to changing circumstances.11

The existing national security strategy development and resource allocation system is largely a relic 

of the Cold War. It is clearly inadequate for meeting 

today’s complex and fast-breaking security challenges. The U.S. federal budgeting model follows a process 

that predates the American colonies. The legislature 

appropriates funds, while the executive expends them 

according to congressional specifications. During the 

past 2 centuries, however, the role of the President 

and his staff has grown substantially. The process has 
56

also become more complex. At any time, the federal 

budgets for 3 fiscal years are simultaneously under 

consideration. Historically, departments and agencies 

prepare their own budget requests each summer with 

guidance from the OMB. The President and OMB review the requests, make final decisions, and submit 

a consolidated budget request to Congress. Congress 

reviews the requests and appropriates funds, sometimes with accompanying authorizing legislation. 

The executive branch then executes the functions for 

which monies are appropriated. 

From the late 1940s through the end of the Cold 

War, the resource allocation system for national security consisted largely of forming and reviewing the 

defense and intelligence budgets. At the time, this process may have been appropriate, since most national 

security funding, including intelligence funding, resided in the DoD budget. Starting in the early 1990s, 

and especially since 2001, the growing complexity of 

potential threats and the importance of interagency 

cooperation for accomplishing national security missions have exposed systemic weaknesses in the traditional resource allocation system. In particular, 

serious problems exist regarding national strategy development as well as aligning resources with strategy, 

which requires cross-agency resource allocation:

• Departments and agencies formulate budget 

requests to support their own programs.

• National strategy and contingency funding are 

not primary considerations.

• This orientation makes it difficult to assess 

whether budgets will support strategy.

• It also can mislead officials into thinking that 

they can carry out policies when insufficient 

funds have been provided.
57

• Not all decisions need initial budgetary inputs, 

but they eventually must be considered to prevent policy failure.

• Furthermore, the current process of mediating 

agency budget requests after formulation does 

not effectively address contingencies that require integrated interagency action.

• Existing processes for moving funds between 

agencies with national security responsibilities 

are generally cumbersome and inefficient; even 

redirecting unspent funds to other agencies to 

address urgent contingencies is difficult.

• As a result, crosscutting programs that address 

complex or urgent threats often do not receive 

adequate or timely funding.

Resolving these problems requires directing each 

national security department and agency to prepare 

a 6-year budget projection derived from the proposed 

NSPRG. The President should direct the National 

Security Staff’s strategy directorate, in partnership 

with the OMB Office of National Security Programs, 

to produce and disseminate annual policy planning 

and resource guidance to departments and agencies, 

including guidance concerning necessary capabilities to be developed for current and future needs. The 

resource guidance should provide annually updated 

6-year resource profiles covering each department/

agency’s capabilities for meeting future national security needs, as suggested by the NSR and as defined in 

the NSS. The NSPRG direction would provide annual 

policy planning and resource guidance. These documents would be disseminated to departments and 

agencies with national security roles and missions, 
58

but also to the appropriate congressional committees. 

This reform would help ensure more realistic annual 

budget requests from departments and agencies, thus 

enhancing mission preparedness, reducing waste, and 

enabling more effective contingency response. 

Congress also needs to develop the capability to 

produce an integrated national security budget. One 

metric would be a unified budget focused around 

national security missions that would shift resources 

to a whole-of-government approach. An integrated 

national security budget presentation to Congress 

would improve funding of national security mission 

priorities and reconcile resource imbalances among 

agencies. Moreover, it would provide a clear vision of how to resource missions requiring the participation of multiple agencies. It should be derived 

from the NSR process and the NSS, and, through the 

President’s budget submission to Congress, provide 

a single integrated national security budget display 

along with integrated budget justification material 

that reflects how each department’s and each agency’s 

budget aligns with underlying security assessments, 

strategy, and resource guidance. 

The PNSR would like Congress to contribute to this 

resource reform effort by establishing select committees on national security in the House and Senate that 

would have jurisdiction over interagency operations 

and activities. Congressional committees organized 

along departmental equities reinforce departmental and agency tendencies to protect turf and power 

rather than reconcile imbalances. One effect is that 

well-funded departments, like the DoD, inevitably are 

called to assume the responsibilities of other, underfunded, nonmilitary agencies like the Department of 

State. Pending the creation of select national security 
59

committees, executive-legislative consultations could 

encourage the House and Senate Budget Committees 

to consider an integrated national security budget in 

addition to the customary component-specific authorizations. 

Congress also needs to reform the existing inadequate portfolio of contingency funding mechanisms to 

address emerging threats and situations that demand 

urgent interagency responses. The current resource 

allocation system is unable to address the full range 

of capabilities required for key national missions. Instead, it actively discourages departments and agencies from budgeting for external or contingent purposes, even for national security. Rightfully concerned 

about maintaining its power of the purse, Congress 

has historically resisted allocating contingency funds. 

Various congressional limits on reprogramming and 

transfer authority complicate or limit sufficient response when contingencies actually emerge. Congress 

should develop new accounts and procedures to meet 

unanticipated requirements that necessitate an integrated interagency approach. For example, Congress 

should consider establishing a mechanism for expedited fund transfers between agencies for contingencies 

that require interagency integration. An integrated 

national security budget presentation and executivelegislative consultations on the subject could advance 

this effort. 

HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION 

INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION

The PNSR urges the creation of a homeland security and emergency management system that integrates federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal interests. The currently fragmented national security and 
60

homeland security structures leave us vulnerable to 

both natural and manmade disasters. For most of the 

nation’s history, national security threats against the 

homeland have originated outside U.S. borders and 

involved only the federal level of government. Today, 

national security threats transcend this division, requiring that state and local entities possess the ability 

to integrate and communicate up to the national level 

to address all potential hazards, from natural disasters 

to terrorist attacks to catastrophic accidents such as in 

the Gulf of Mexico [the 2010 Gulf oil rig disaster]. The 

transforming security landscape also requires that the 

federal security apparatus provide the organizational 

conduits, processes, resources, and planning guidance 

to allow that linkage when appropriate, both constitutionally and as homeland emergency operations dictate. 

The DHS has made some progress in this direction 

by conducting the first Quadrennial Homeland Security 

Review. The next step would be to develop a National 

Operational Framework (NOF) to better address homeland security challenges. The NOF would provide a 

primary means for reconciling homeland security’s 

integrated policy and planning efforts within an operational structure. It would encompass the entire 

homeland security mission continuum, easing confusion throughout the interagency and intergovernmental systems while enabling a closer working relationship among all stakeholder—both public and private. 

The PNSR also recommends complementary systemic reform at the regional level to strengthen the National Preparedness System (NPS), which was defined 

by the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform 

Act (PKEMRA) of 2006. The PNSR white paper, “Recalibrating the System: Toward Efficient and Effective 
61

Resourcing of National Preparedness,” cites fundamental and interrelated structural and process problems plaguing the current system.12 It recommends direct funding from the federal government—instead of 

resourcing through grants—for national catastrophic 

planning and assessments. Resourcing primarily via 

grants, with their oversight and reporting requirements, fosters intergovernmental relationships that 

can be more adversarial than collaborative and thus 

not optimal for unity of purpose. The study recommends that the DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) finance an intergovernmental, interagency Regional Catastrophic Preparedness 

Staff (RCPS) in each region. These standing regional 

staffs would be where federal, state, tribal, territorial, 

local, private sector, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) representatives would come together 

daily, from the beginning, as equal partners to build a 

bottom-up, collaborative culture of preparedness—or 

even resilience—and the collaborative regional programs to go with it. This initiative would not impose 

a financial burden on the states or localities. The state 

and local authorities would assign representatives to 

an RCPS for temporary duty and receive federal reimbursements under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) Mobility program. Since it is only at the 

regional level where we can arrive at a consensus for 

that region, standing RCPSs would work with existing 

planning, training, and exercise units in the states and 

at the local level to conduct catastrophic risk assessments; catastrophic operational planning and exercise 

validation; catastrophic capability inventories via negotiated processes through which states could identify gaps for targeting grants and other resources; and 

regional evaluations and self-assessments informed 

by regionally determined performance metrics.
62

HUMAN CAPITAL

The PNSR calls for developing a national security 

strategic human capital plan to align human capital 

programs with strategic goals, objectives, and outcomes. Forging a New Shield found that, “The [current] 

national security system cannot generate or allocate 

the personnel necessary to perform effectively and 

efficiently agency core tasks or the growing number 

of important interagency tasks.”13 A well-designed 

and executed human capital system for the national 

security mission will help attract, retain, promote, 

reward, and educate a capable workforce to advance 

and defend the United States. The current system 

and its associated human capital policies, programs, 

procedures, and incentives are unable to generate the 

required human capital with the requisite competencies to ensure a continuing supply of well-qualified 

national security personnel. It also cannot assign the 

right people, with the right competencies, at the right 

time, to execute interagency tasks successfully. Furthermore, the current national security system cannot 

overcome the historic dominance of several strong department and agency cultures. It also does not ensure 

that political and career officials pay sufficient attention to building the human resource capacity needed 

to achieve interagency missions and priorities, especially when those might conflict with the missions and 

priorities of individual departments and agencies. 

Continuous learning is essential for a well-qualified 

national security workforce; it requires increasing opportunities for education, training, and professional 

development. Providing a system for interagency assignments is also essential for ensuring that national 

security professionals have practical experience in interagency work. 
63

Yet, developing a successful interagency assignment process will prove particularly complex, since it 

requires identifying core competencies for national security work; determining assignments that will build 

those competencies; establishing an administrative 

system to match people with assignments; identifying 

or creating an organization to provide policy, management, and oversight for the process; and providing 

the positions, funds, and coordinating mechanisms required for an interagency assignment system to operate effectively.

 The government’s newly created National Security Professional Development Integration Office (the 

NSPD-IO) represents an important first step toward 

the creation of national security executives. It was established by Executive Order 13434 on May 17, 2007, 

and has already developed and promulgated the National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals; provided OPM guidance for developing promotion 

regulations and additional authorizations; created the 

National Security Professional Development Integration Office; and established a National Security Education and Training Board of Directors. Furthermore, 

the NSPD-IO has identified approximately 1,500 Senior Executive Service (SES) positions with national 

security responsibilities; created an education council 

that has agreed on certain general standards; encouraged existing departments and agencies to establish 

education and training programs for national security professionals; and designed and made available 

system-wide courses. The NSPD-IO's Defense Senior 

Leader Development Program (DSLDP), the management program for DoD’s SESs, has improved with 

National Security Professional Development initiatives as well as the OPM’s Executive Core Qualifica-
64

tions (ECQ). These reforms have helped promote an 

“enterprise-wide perspective” that features strategic, 

top-level understanding of individual and organizational responsibilities and strategic priorities.14

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

(ODNI) has also implemented an award-winning Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty program 

that fosters interagency collaboration and communication. The ODNI Intelligence Community Civilian 

Joint Duty Program was adopted on June 25, 2007, 

with phased implementation to be complete by October 2010. In September 2008, the IC (Intelligence Community) Joint Duty Program received the “Innovations 

in American Government” award by the Ash Institute 

of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. The ODNI has issued policies and procedures 

for performance assessment and promotion that support interagency assignments within the IC, the appropriate sharing of information between and among 

intelligence agencies, and assurance that interagency 

assignments would be viewed positively when considering IC employees for promotion.15

 The NSPD-IO and ODNI initiatives are encouraging, since they indicate that it is possible to establish 

certain system-wide performance requirements. The 

experience of the DoD joint assignment process, recent NSPD-IO and ODNI initiatives, and emerging 

insights from several PNSR initiatives suggest that 

properly designed and executed pilot programs are 

particularly effective in confirming what works and 

identifying unintended consequences of new policies 

and procedures. Furthermore, it is evident that interagency assignments are beginning to be seen as contributing to an employee’s growth and development. 

Yet, these activities remain largely managed within 

the cultural stovepipes of the individual departments 
65

and agencies. The essential next step is to create an 

interagency culture within the larger national security 

community. In this regard, while the DoD’s Goldwater-Nichols experience provides useful insights into 

broad reform frameworks, substantial differences exist between the military human capital system (e.g., 

up-or-out promotion system, established expectation 

of multiple assignments, the Uniform Code of Military Justice to compel acceptance of assignments, etc.) 

and current civilian human capital systems.

The PNSR has also recommended that the Congress should strengthen education and training 

programs for interagency personnel by creating a 

comprehensive, professional education and training 

program with an interdisciplinary curriculum. The 

Congress must provide additional revenue to enlarge 

the civilian workforce to create a “float” that will enable interagency training, education, and experiential opportunities. A mandatory orientation program 

would be required for each individual assigned to 

a national security position. The Congress should 

give high priority to preparing civilian personnel for 

leadership positions in the national security system. 

It should also require individuals appointed to serve 

in high-level national security positions to complete 

a structured orientation on the policy and operations 

of the national security interagency system. The Congress should authorize and fund an executive office 

to support development and execution of the above 

reforms and provide continuing policy determinations and oversight for interagency national security 

human capital programs.

In any case, successful implementation of any reform will depend, in part, on codifying existing human capital systems. To achieve coherence and optimal performance in a reformed interagency human 
66

capital system, moreover, an enhanced management 

function is required. Further consultations with stakeholders and subject matter experts will clarify the 

extent of legislation required to ensure continuity in 

interagency management. Nonetheless, the following 

questions should be answered before proceeding to 

implement any specific reform:

• What defines the aggregate national security 

interagency system, its workforce, and its key 

component parts, such as the National Security 

Professional Corps?

• What costs arise from establishing the interagency human capital system? What are the 

estimated number of positions? What is the 

definition of the national security professional 

corps? How many people would that comprise?

• What are the potential benefits and costs? How 

will both be measured?

• What specific goals or purposes will interagency rotational assignments achieve? How 

will the costs and benefits of such a program be 

measured?

• What types of positions and organizations constitute or contribute to the national security interagency system?

• How will interagency assignments be identified? How will national security professionals 

be identified and assigned to these positions?

• How do we avoid the present need to provide 

so much detail that laws or executive orders 

prove inadequate to address needs that could 

easily evolve within the next 5-to-10 years?

Regardless of which specific reforms the ODNI, 

White House, and the Congress support, the executive 

and legislative branches should partner to require the 
67

periodic review of the National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan. They should also approve a human 

capital advisory board of public and private experts to 

advise the appropriate officials of the national security 

staff; and establish new interagency personnel designations and programs to better recruit, prepare, and 

reward national security professionals for interagency 

assignments.

KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL

A well-functioning U.S. national security system 

requires a great improvement in the flow of knowledge and information among national security decisionmakers. Today the national security system “does 

not know what it knows.” Both within individual government agencies and across the broader interagency 

environment, the tools and willingness to share are 

sorely lacking. Technology to share data is not readily available; policies and procedures promote an attitude that information is something that is “owned” 

rather than something to be shared; and government 

employees fear that exchanging “too much” information can hurt someone’s career. As a result, data 

producers do not make their holdings known or discoverable, while data consumers have no idea what 

might exist to help them. Requirements for security 

clearances and information classification policies vary 

widely from agency to agency. In addition, time-sensitive information is often conveyed by fax machine, 

and agencies’ computer systems are often incompatible with those in other agencies. 

The PNSR supports the set of recommendations offered in the Markle Foundation’s Nation at Risk: Policy 

Makers Need Better Information to Protect the Country. 
68

They cover the full range of technological, procedural, 

structural, and cultural challenges that must be addressed before the U.S. national security system can 

make knowledge- and information-sharing a reality. 

The core Markle recommendations are: reaffirm information sharing as a top priority; make government 

information discoverable and accessible to authorized 

users; enhance security and privacy protections to 

match the increased power of shared information; 

transform the information-sharing culture with metrics and incentives; and empower users to drive information sharing by forming communities of interest.16

Adopting these recommendations should help 

ensure that what an organization knows can be captured, leveraged, and exchanged for the benefit of 

all authorized and authenticated members of the national security community. The ultimate objective is to 

make decisions that are better, faster, and more likely 

to achieve decisive action. Intelligent informationsharing must become the norm, as national security 

decisionmakers shift from “need to know” to “need 

to share.” 

It is important to recognize that technology alone 

will not solve the problem of inadequate knowledgeand information-sharing within the U.S. national security system. It must be complemented by an information-sharing culture that extends throughout the 

greater national security community. The national 

security system must capture, leverage, and exchange 

data, information, and knowledge more effectively. 

People can then make better decisions more rapidly—

leading to more decisive policy development and execution. Furthermore, the mindset of national security 

members must change from a culture that is too risk 

averse. National security policymakers must manage 

risks rather than avoid every possible hazard. 
69

IMPROVING CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 

None of these reforms can be comprehensively 

implemented or achieve a sustained improvement 

in national security decisionmaking without an improvement in how Congress oversees the system. In 

its oversight role, Congress has a responsibility to 

promote efficiency, economy, effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability. When performed well, 

congressional oversight ensures compliance with the 

laws passed by Congress and the orders issued under 

the authority of the President. It can also assess the 

effectiveness and efficiency of government programs 

and provide senior officials with alternate sources of 

information about the performance of subordinate 

personnel and organizations. Congressional oversight 

can expose problems, provide incentives for solutions, 

stimulate good performance, and deter misconduct. 

Furthermore, congressional oversight can help ensure 

accountability and consistency with America’s goals, 

values, and laws.

Forging a New Shield identified six major problems 

in congressional performance in national security affairs. First, Congress does not provide routine oversight of interagency issues, operations, or requirements. Second, Congress lacks interest and confidence 

in the executive branch’s management of foreign affairs. Third, Congress needs to offer more flexibility 

in how it allocates national security resources. Fourth, 

Congress must accelerate the process of confirming 

presidential appointees to reduce the extent of inaction and bureaucratic drift among national security 

decisionmakers. Fifth, Congress’s failure to enact legislation in a timely manner has become endemic. Fi-
70

nally, relations between the legislative and executive 

branches are too often excessively confrontational despite the importance of achieving cooperation regarding national security issues.

The PNSR is not unique in citing these problems 

with congressional oversight. Earlier blue-ribbon 

commissions and other analysts point to structural 

inadequacies in the committee system, they complain 

about the neglect of important issues, and they lament both qualitative and quantitative shortfalls in 

congressional oversight. For example, the Hart-Rudman Commission criticized the executive branch for 

“often treat[ing] Congress as an obstacle rather than 

as a partner,” and blamed Congress for “sustain[ing] 

a structure that undermines rather than strengthens 

its ability to fulfill its constitutional obligations in the 

foreign policy arena.”17 The 9/11 (September 11, 2001) 

Commission declared that “Congressional oversight 

for intelligence—and counterterrorism – is now dysfunctional.”18 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project 

report said that after consulting numerous current 

and former officials in both branches of government, 

“Practically all agree that there has been a significant 

and disturbing degree of erosion in the quality and 

structure of congressional oversight of the [Defense] 

Department in recent years.”19 These criticisms are 

consistent with the broader studies of congressional 

oversight that usually conclude that either little or no 

oversight is done, or “when done that it is uncoordinated, unsystematic, sporadic, and usually informal, 

with members of Congress (or groups of members on 

narrowly based committee units) seeking particularistic influence or publicity for purposes of reelection.”20
71

Members of Congress presently struggle to see 

the big-picture interrelationship among all elements 

of national power. Congressional leadership tolerates 

a Congress that cannot authorize, finance, or oversee 

the interagency approaches envisioned by executive 

branch leaders and the preceding recommendations 

in this report. Instead of structuring itself to catalyze 

the interagency approaches envisioned and required 

by the executive branch, the Congress in fact reinforces outdated, department-centric practices. The existing committees in Congress examine the activities of 

individual departments and agencies, but no one congressional committee has a whole-of-government perspective on national security. Perhaps for this reason, 

the Congress is not keeping up with the rapid changes 

in the executive branch. To take but one example, the 

Obama administration’s National Security Council 

combines homeland security, economic security, and 

transnational security issues, such as climate change, 

within the NSC portfolio, but the Congress lacks a 

means to address these issues in a similarly integrated 

manner.

Eight congressional committees, one each in the 

House and Senate, have significant oversight jurisdiction for national security matters: the foreign policy, 

defense, intelligence, and appropriations committees. 

In addition, however, many other committees handle 

issues that have national security aspects. For example, the tax committees (House Ways & Means, Senate 

Finance) have jurisdiction over trade legislation and 

agreements, while export controls and import controls 

are handled by different committees in each body. No 

single committee is responsible for overseeing the interagency process for national security or the broad 

policy issues and legal authorities for the Executive 
72

Office of the President or the National Security Council. Reorganization proposals are the responsibility of 

the Government Affairs/Government Reform committees but thereafter the various departmentally-focused committees have jurisdiction. The foreign policy committees have broad jurisdiction over relations 

with other countries and “intervention abroad and 

declarations of war” (House Rule X and Senate Rule 

XXV have identical language on this point), while the 

defense committees are vaguely limited to the DoD 

and “common defense” issues. Since 1977, the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee has had a special mandate to “study and review, on a comprehensive basis, 

matters relating to the national security policy, foreign 

policy, and international economic policy as it relates 

to the foreign policy of the United States.”21 Its House 

counterpart has no similar mandate.

The defense committees have reported annual authorization bills since the 1960s. These measures now 

cover all areas included in the regular defense appropriations bill. The foreign policy committees try to 

pass authorizations for the State Department, but no 

foreign aid authorization bill has been enacted since 

1986. As a consequence, international affairs programs 

and legislation are now largely influenced by the appropriations subcommittees and included in their bills. 

Intelligence activities are overseen by the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence, which develop an 

annual authorization bill covering most, but not all, 

programs. The remaining so-called tactical intelligence 

activities for the armed forces are handled by the defense authorizing committees. The DHS faces a very 

complicated situation, with 86 congressional subcommittees having jurisdiction over some DHS programs. 

In addition to the two standing committees having 
73

departmental oversight, numerous other panels have 

legacy oversight of programs—like customs and the 

Coast Guard—that have responsibilities in addition to 

homeland security. Foreign economic policy matters, 

which often have major national security aspects or 

consequences, are fragmented among a wide array of 

congressional committees. Trade committees oversee 

trade and tariff questions. The foreign policy committees oversee foreign aid, the international financial institutions, and the foreign policy aspects of economic 

relations. Export controls are handled by the Banking 

Committee in the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House. Agricultural imports and exports 

are under the agriculture committees. Import quotas 

can be voted by the Commerce, Interior, and environmental committees. Appropriations are handled by 12 

subcommittees, each reporting a separate bill. Defense 

spending is largely covered by the defense appropriations bill and subcommittees, except for military construction funds that are included with veterans programs. Foreign operations funding, including foreign 

aid, is now part of a money bill for the State Department and international organizations. Department of 

State funds until 2006 competed with the Commerce 

and Justice Departments in a multiagency bill and 

subcommittee. Funds for the President and the NSC 

are appropriated through the Financial Services and 

General Government funding bill. Reorganization issues are the purview of the Senate Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs Committee and the House 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 

A separate House standing committee oversees the 

DHS. The House committee has a subcommittee on 

National Security and Foreign Affairs, but the Senate 

panel includes the subject under its subcommittee on 
74

Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security. As a 

result, formal jurisdiction over interagency operations 

is limited to issues relating to government reorganization rather than oversight of ongoing activities.

In addition to oversight activities by congressional 

committees, there are several other venues for oversight. The most active is the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which regularly reviews and 

investigates government programs, partly on its own 

initiative and partly in response to congressional requests. Other agents of the legislative branch are the 

Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which analyzes 

programs in terms of their costs and alternatives, and 

the Congressional Research Service (CSR), which prepares reports on topics of current interest to lawmakers. Congress has also created Inspector General (IG) 

offices within major departments and with some degree of independence from political appointee control. 

In addition, Congress has mandated periodic review 

of some national security policies through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and has, on occasion, 

created outside panels—like the National Defense 

Panel and Hart-Rudman Commission—for independent assessments. Presidents also use permanent or 

temporary groups to review and report on agency 

activities. Examples include the President’s Foreign 

Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and panels like 

the Iraq Study Group. 

MEETING THE CONGRESSIONAL IMPERATIVE

The PNSR wants—indeed, insists on—an important congressional role in making and overseeing national security policy. To this end, the PNSR earlier 
75

recommended establishing select committees on national security in the Senate and House of Representatives. These new committees would authorize and 

oversee programs and activities that are conducted by 

multiple departments and agencies in support of national security and foreign relations missions. These 

committees would draw their membership from the 

standing defense, foreign relations, and reformed 

homeland security committees, as well as other committees with jurisdiction over national security and 

foreign relations. Their creation would help achieve a 

number of other goals sought by the PNSR and various Members of Congress:

• Formulate and enact annual foreign relations 

authorization bills;

• Provide greater flexibility on reprogramming 

(intradepartmental) and transfer (interdepartmental) of funds for multiagency activities;

• Consolidate oversight of the DHS to one authorizing committee and one appropriations subcommittee per chamber;

• Create a common set of financial and other 

forms required of nominees for use by the 

White House and Senate;

• End the practice of honoring a hold by one or 

more Senators on a nominee for a position in a 

national security department or agency;

• Require that each nomination for one of the 10 

most senior positions in a national security department or agency would be placed on the executive calendar of the Senate with or without 

a committee recommendation after 30 days of 

legislative session; and,

• Establish the expectation that each presidential 

appointee—unless disabled, experiencing a 

hardship, requested to resign by the President, 
76

or appointed to another government position—

would serve until the President has appointed 

his or her successor.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), Forging a New 

Shield, Arlington, VA: PNSR, November 2008.

2. Project on National Security Reform, Toward Integrating 

Complex International Missions: Lessons from the National Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, Arlington, VA: PNSR, February 2010, available from www.pnsr.org/

data/files/pnsr_nctc_dsop_report.pdf.

3. Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas into Action, Arlington, VA: PNSR, 2008, available from www.pnsr.org/

data/files/pnsr_turning_ideas_into_action.pdf.

4. Forging a New Shield, p. 352.

5. See 50 USC § 404a. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 

mandated an annual transmission by the executive branch of a 

national security strategy report to Congress within 150 days after 

an administration takes office. This mandate is not always met, 

and the National Security Strategy (NSS) document is a public, 

usually rhetorical, document, rather than one that provides a 

practical context for the national security system to make strategic 

decisions. An amendment to make the National Security Strategy 

a quadrennial requirement due 365 days after an administration 

takes office with updates as needed would allow more time for 

thoughtful policy input and make the NSS's production align 

more with actual practice. 

6. “2010 QDR Terms of Reference Fact Sheet,” Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, April 17, 2009, available from www.

defenselink.mil/news/d20090429qdr.pdf. 

7. United States. Cong. House. H.R. 2410, Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, introduced in the 

U.S. House; May 14, 2009, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington: U.S. 

Government Printing Office (GPO), 2009, available from http://

www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-2410. 
77

8. Ibid.

9. United States. Cong. House. H.R. 4974, Quadrennial National 

Security Review Act, introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives; March 25, 2010, 111th Cong., 2nd Sess., available from http://

www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-4974.

10. Forging a New Shield, pp. 340-351.

11. Ibid., p. 130. See also Michael Leonard, “Matching Policy 

and Strategy with Resources,” PNSR Issue Brief, August 10, 2009, 

available from www.pnsr.org/data/files/matching%20policy%20

and%20strategy%20with%20resources-%20web%20brief.pdf.

12. Recalibrating the System: Toward Efficient and Effective Resourcing of National Preparedness, Arlington, VA: PNSR, December 

2009, available from www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_national_preparedness_system.pdf.

13. Forging a New Shield, p. 260.

14. Civilian Personnel Management Service, “Defense Senior Leader Development Program, (DSLDP): Informational 

Briefing,” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2009, 

September 2, 2009, available from www.cpms.osd.mil/ASSETS/

BD3F17FE13824136B1FDF34CBEA1B751/DSLDP%20Program%20

Brief%20v%20%20June%20w%2009%206-8-09%20chgs.pdf.

15. For example, see the human capital management-related 

Intelligence Community Directives (ICD) 601, 610, 650, 651, 652, 

653, 654, 655, 656, September 20, 2009, available from www.dni.

gov/electronic_reading_room.htm. 

16. The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security 

in the Information Age, Nation at Risk: Policy Makers Need Better 

Information to Protect the Country, New York: The Markle Foundation, March 1, 2009.

17. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (The Hart-Rudman Commission) Phase III Report, “Road Map 

for National Security: Imperative for Change,” March 15, 2001, 

p. 111.
78

18. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, New York: Norton, 2004, p. 

420.

19. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase I Report, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004, p. 68.

20. Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of 

Congressional Oversight, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990, p. 187 .

21. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate 

(Excerpted from Rules of the Committee), “Membership and Jurisdiction of Subcommittees of The Committee on Foreign Relations,” September 2009, available from webcache.googleusercontent.

com/search?q=cache:pybFu8sLxtoJ:foreign.senate.gov/about/jurisdictio

n/+study+and+review+on+a+comprehensive+basis,+matters+relating

+to+the+national+security+policy,+foreign+policy,+and+internationa

l+economic+policy+as+it+relates+to+the+foreign+policy+of+the+Un

ited+States&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com.
79

CHAPTER 6

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM:

IT’S NOT MUCH, BUT WE LIKE IT

Harvey Sicherman

INTRODUCTION

Memoirs of the American national security system 

often read as if they were a new installment of the Pinocchio story, so often do noses grow and fingers point, 

especially during interagency meetings. Policymaking through this system sometimes appears to be an 

unnatural act, unnatural being defined by where one 

sits in a convoluted process established in 1947 and 

periodically updated, though not necessarily for the 

better. These pathologies are well known, and always 

reflect a want of executive leadership. Presidents who 

demean the system should not expect much of it, and 

a White House bereft of broad policy ideas will always be a victim of parochial departmental pursuits. 

That said, both enduring themes of national security 

reform and President Barack Obama’s changes to 

the National Security Council (NSC) system are best 

understood in historic context. That perspective suggests two major points.

First, patterns do exist; namely, a pair of very different approaches emerging from the 1947 National 

Security Act, each with virtues and vices. These may 

be called the Truman-Acheson model (1948-52) on the 

one side, and the early Nixon-Kissinger model (1969-

70) as its opposite. I shall also discuss each model’s 

dysfunctional version, Reagan-Haig (1981-82) and the 

later Nixon-Kissinger (1971-72, before the latter became Secretary of State). This chapter will also cover 
80

the most recent and effective of these models—the 

Bush-Scowcroft-Baker system (1989-92).

Second, the Obama administration appears to be 

a hybrid in this context, one intended to be like that 

of President George H. W. Bush but overly centered 

in the White House. For several reasons it will not 

wear well. Still, in the final analysis, those who would 

try to transform the system should understand that it 

endures because presidents who understand it, like it.

“PRESENT AT THE CREATION”: 

THE TRUMAN-ACHESON MODEL

Timing suggests that the NSC system, dating as it 

does from 1947, was conceived as a device with which 

to fight the Cold War. But the evidence argues for a 

less flattering origin, reflecting the tendency of governments to back firmly into the future. Those who invented it had World War II and Franklin Roosevelt in 

mind, not Harry Truman or the incipient U.S.-Soviet 

rivalry.

By 1946, the United States had emerged as the 

mightiest democracy. Its resources, its influence, and 

the consequences of its policies were now of global 

strategic significance. The aftermath of World War II 

meant that America’s traditional policies, including 

diplomatic isolation and a very small standing army 

among others, were no longer up to the task of securing the United States. How then, the question is, to 

create an executive branch up to the challenge?

Those who promoted a new national security system were all men steeped in the immediate experience of mobilizing a nation for a two-front war. They 

had been mightily impressed by Winston Churchill’s 

handling machine, the Imperial General Staff, and cut 

their teeth on the Allied Joint Staff. These seemed to 
81

work: The President was well served by an organization that gave him critical information, competing 

views, and efficient execution. But military policy 

was not the whole of national security.

The overall picture was decidedly different. President Franklin Roosevelt (FDR), who once described 

himself as a “juggler,” dealt with a floating cast of 

characters, overlapping missions, and secretive assignments.1

 He evinced little respect for Cabinet departments or his own appointees. FDR’s crucial first 

visit with Winston Churchill off Newfoundland in 

1941, for example, was concealed from his Secretary 

of State and his Secretary of War, neither of whom attended.

The new system embodied in the 1947 National 

Security Act therefore was intended to give the President a permanent organization to coordinate action 

while simultaneously establishing order in the relations between the Cabinet and the President. Its birth, 

however, was assisted by numerous midwives, some 

of whom had different expectations of the infant. Its 

upbringing and education predictably became controversial. The new U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, believed that a civilian version of the Joint Staff 

would rely on Department of Defense (DoD) personnel rather than on White House appointees. He was 

wrong. The U.S. Secretary of State, General George 

Marshall, feared for the State Department’s primacy 

in a council that might be dominated by other departments. He was right.2

Truman himself seemed to have grasped the inherent difficulties in the twin objectives of more presidential control, yet greater presidential accountability. 

He fully supported the need for an orderly system, 

which, to use James Locher’s felicitous phrase, “oc-
82

cupies that space between the departments and the 

president.”3 The man from Missouri had himself been 

a victim of FDR’s methods, entering the presidency 

upon Roosevelt’s sudden death completely unaware 

of his predecessor’s international arrangements. That 

said, he was also acutely aware of the challenges to 

his authority from both the political opposition and 

FDR loyalists who deemed him unworthy. These circumstances made him more, rather than less, eager to 

show that the buck stopped on his desk. So, as he took 

pains to point out in his memoirs, “I used the National 

Security Council only as a place for recommendations 

to be worked out.”4

 Like the Cabinet, the Council does 

not make decisions. The policy itself has to come 

down from the President, as all final decisions have to 

be made by him.5

 President Truman was accountable 

to Congress and the American people, and bound by 

the Constitution. He was not accountable to the NSC.

That being so, at least one premise of the new 

system was questionable. It might very well suit the 

style of someone like Truman, who, although he was 

a strong partisan of his own prerogative, also favored 

Cabinet responsibility. His appointees were his staff, 

and the NSC eventually became for him a good forum 

to exercise orderly government. But what of a President who wanted to run part or all of national security 

policy from the White House? Or a latter-day juggler, 

like FDR? Or simply a chief executive who wanted 

decisions made in another forum? This might render 

the NSC system useless, or confusing at best. As we 

shall see, that is precisely what happened.

The Truman administration’s NSC functioned 

without an advisor, and the President’s assistant 

simply acted as an administrator. In its early years, 

Truman did not view NSC meetings as compelling, 
83

attending only 12 of 57 before the Korean War. The 

Act was amended in 1949 to make the NSC more useful. Still, it would be wrong to describe the set-up as 

weak; its test was whether it helped the President to 

decide and execute. Truman, although keen on his 

prerogatives, believed in Cabinet government, not total control from the White House. The entire system 

benefited from the surprising relationship between a 

very odd couple, Truman and his Secretary of State, 

Dean Acheson. This accidental President—Midwestern, lower middle class, and largely self-educated in 

history—got along famously with the imperious, superbly cultivated, and worldly establishment lawyer. 

Their mutual confidence was reflected in a telling bureaucratic detail; Acheson chaired NSC meetings in 

Truman’s absence, a sure sign of State’s preeminence.

Years later, Acheson succinctly summarized the 

Truman era’s achievement, “to create half a world, a 

free half, out of the same material without blowing the 

whole to pieces in the process.”6 How much did the 

NSC contribute? It is important here to distinguish 

between process and result. One can have an orderly 

process, yet one that will not guarantee the correct decision. The record amply illustrates the point.

Truman’s team produced two of the great strategic documents of American history. George Kennan’s 

long telegram (1946) and subsequent X article in Foreign Affairs stood the test of long-term analysis, laying the basis for the so-called ”containment strategy.” 

Kennan’s work, of course, preceded the NSC’s formation. But the strategy that embodied his insights was 

the product of the NSC. Its staff, ably led by Acheson’s 

Policy Planning chief, Paul Nitze, undertook the production of what became NSC-68 as part of the decision 

to build the H-Bomb. Here was the new system doing 
84

what it was designed to do: bringing together disparate dimensions of the problem and relating means to 

ends. Acheson saw the study as a way to fill the widening gap between U.S. conventional capabilities and 

its new international commitments.

By all accounts, too, the NSC performed its crisis 

management task during the Korean War. Truman’s 

personal attendance at 64 of the 71 meetings between 

June 1950 and the end of his term testified to its utility as a wartime tool. Thus, despite its early sketchy 

performance, by the end of the Truman administration, the NSC tool in the context of a strong PresidentCabinet team had proven its utility as both long-range 

planner and crisis manager.7

Still, as noted earlier, an effective process does not 

necessarily guarantee results. NSC-68, however fruitful its long-term yield, came too late to save Truman 

and the United States from the consequences of that 

military gap when North Korea invaded the South in 

June 1950, only 4 weeks after the completion of the 

document and before its cost could be fully calculated. 

Nor did it spare the President from authorizing General Douglas MacArthur’s offensive that brought China into the war, possibly the product of what the late 

Peter Rodman called “too much collegiality around 

the National Security Council table.”8

 Even Acheson, 

experienced and combative as he was, noted ruefully 

that no one had quite crystallized the potential worst 

case, thereby letting Truman down. The Secretary of 

State thus acknowledged that the ever-present pressure to agree with a President once he indicates his 

preferences was still at play, the NSC structure notwithstanding.
85

REAGAN-HAIG: “THE GHOST SHIP”

The dangers of trying to fix on a president a national security system at odds with his personal predilections is well-illustrated by the Reagan-Haig experience (1981-82). On the surface it began as a duplicate 

of Truman-Acheson, but Reagan was not Truman, and 

therefore Haig could not be Acheson.

Unlike Truman, Ronald Reagan became President 

on the strength of a huge electoral victory. An older 

man schooled in the ways of the Midwest and Hollywood of an earlier era, Reagan had a gift for expressing 

American values. His purpose, as much domestic as 

foreign, was to restore American self-confidence and 

the winning ways of democracy and free enterprise.

Reagan had little foreign policy experience, but he 

harbored a few immutable convictions. He believed 

that the Soviet Union and communism were destined 

to fail of their own internal absurdities; that the United States and its allies had to firmly oppose Soviet 

attempts to enlarge their influence, especially through 

force; and that the proper mobilization of American 

moral and military power could achieve these ends 

without war, especially nuclear war. Putting these 

convictions into policy, however, required experts. 

General (Ret.) Alexander M. Haig, Jr. was to be Reagan’s expert on foreign policy.

Haig had already served in the national security 

system at all levels, from a soldier in Korea to Supreme Commander of the Northern Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), from an assistant to Cyrus 

Vance in Lyndon Johnson’s DoD under Robert McNamara, to Henry Kissinger’s aide at the NSC. He 

functioned successfully as White House Chief of Staff 

during the Watergate crisis. Thus, Haig was the most 
86

experienced of his generation in what worked and did 

not work in the NSC system.

At first, Haig believed he had found in Reagan a 

strong believer in Cabinet government, similar to Truman. He secured from the President-elect authority to 

take the lead in foreign policy (be the “vicar”). Encouraged by Reagan’s desire not to suffer rows between the 

NSC advisor, a downgraded post, and the Cabinet, he 

set about designing a system around State’s primacy 

certainly in the spirit of Truman-Acheson.

Reagan’s idea of Cabinet government, however, 

soon proved incompatible with Haig’s. More than 

most presidents, he wanted consensus from his Cabinet, especially on issues where he lacked knowledge 

or convictions. He depended entirely on an inner 

circle of three assistants to achieve consensus, or, failing that, to spare him a decision that would appear to 

favor one Cabinet secretary over another.

Haig discovered this abruptly when he noticed the 

three aides sitting at the Cabinet table rather than on 

the side, their place in previous administrations.9

 His 

NSC memo setting up various committees was never 

signed, while, quite contrary to staff capabilities, the 

Vice-President, George H. W. Bush, whose advisors 

suspected Haig’s presidential ambitions, became 

chairman of the crisis group. Sniping among State, 

Defense, and the White House provided happy hunting grounds for the media.

This dysfunctional system claimed Haig 18 months 

later amid the storms of the Falklands War and Israel’s 

invasion of Lebanon. It threw off a shower of misleading signals, policies at cross purposes, and costly errors.10 Haig’s sheer persistence, however, saved both 

the U.S.-China relationship and the Egyptian-Israeli 

peace treaty, and where Reagan actually had a strong 
87

personal view, such as in U.S.-Soviet relations, Haig 

found the going much easier.

The “ghost ship” as Haig called it, where no one 

could be sure of the captain’s preferences, suited Reagan’s decisionmaking style, but it left the NSC system 

rudderless, uncertain of the White House’s direction. 

Haig’s replacement in July 1982 by George Shultz 

soon proved that the problem was not one of personalities. For the remainder of Reagan’s presidency, 

Shultz often found his way blocked by U.S. Secretary 

of Defense Caspar Weinberger, with no one to resolve 

the resulting paralysis. The NSC advisors paid the 

personal price: Reagan had six in 8 years. Finally, in 

the wake of the NSC-centered Iran-Contra crisis, the 

Tower Commission Report identified the system itself 

as a contributing cause.11

The Reagan years were therefore an object lesson 

that presidents get the systems they want and the 

systems they deserve. On paper, Reagan-Haig and 

Reagan-Shultz looked like Truman-Acheson, but, in 

fact, Reagan’s desire for consensus and his reliance on 

his immediate staff drained the formal process of its 

functions. In doing so, U.S. foreign policy, generally 

rated successful in fulfilling Reagan’s objectives with 

respect to the Soviet Union, also suffered serious reverses in Central America and the Middle East that 

could be attributed, at least in part, to a malfunctioning system.

CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE 

NIXON-KISSINGER MODEL

The Nixon-Kissinger model offers another conception of how the national security system should work 

as an instrument of presidential power. As we have 

seen already in the Truman-Acheson and Reagan-
88

Haig experiences, conceptions, personalities, and political circumstances shape operations regardless of 

formal structures.

Richard Nixon’s election to the presidency in 

1968 capped a long and controversial political career 

marked by dramatic ascents and descents. President 

Eisenhower’s Vice-President, Nixon, barely lost to 

John Kennedy in 1960; his political career appeared 

over when he lost the California gubernatorial race 

years later. A man of the West Coast, he then moved 

to New York, but never lost his dislike of the Eastern 

establishment. After enormous efforts, 6 years later 

he barely won the presidency over Hubert Humphrey.

Nixon’s America was convulsed by the Vietnam 

War, accompanied by social and economic upheaval. 

The new President was not a unifying figure. Widely 

reviled as ”Tricky Dick” and an unregenerate Cold 

Warrior, he was by nature a shy man given to awkward gestures and deep suspicions. Yet there existed 

another Nixon, carefully self-tutored in foreign policy 

and passionately interested in history. You needed a 

President for foreign affairs, he would say, because a 

competent Cabinet could run the country.

Nixon was intimately familiar with Eisenhower’s 

staff concept for the NSC and understood how the former general had used it to develop alternatives that allowed him nonetheless to move in his preferred direction. Nixon did not want the hidden-hand presidency 

though. He believed that to succeed, a President had 

to choose priorities and then pursue them relentlessly.

Nixon’s Secretary of State, William Rogers, was an 

old friend from the Eisenhower and law practice days. 

To him would be subcontracted the foreign policy issues other than Nixon’s top list: Vietnam, U.S.-Soviet 

relations, and China. Taking his political rival Nelson 
89

Rockefeller’s foreign policy advisor, Harvard Professor Henry Kissinger, as his NSC Advisor, Nixon 

would use the NSC not only to coordinate national 

security policy but to actually carry it out.

Much ink has been spilled on the psychology of 

the Nixon-Kissinger duo. Suffice to say, Nixon regarded the foreign policy establishment with the same 

suspicion he reserved for the elite in general; they 

would thwart him if they could. Kissinger, the refugee turned academic superstar, did not need tutoring 

in the politics of envious rivalry.

Thus, the new model was founded in part on presidential mistrust of the departments. Unlike Cabinet 

government with the NSC as coordinator, the President would use it partly in place of the Cabinet on 

several key issues. Kissinger and select members of 

his staff, including his able military assistant, Colonel 

Alexander M. Haig Jr., became the key executors of 

the policy itself. This operation notched several significant if very controversial achievements in a very 

short time: the strategy of Vietnamization; U.S.-Soviet 

détente; and above all, the opening to China.12

By the end of Nixon’s first term, however, the 

model had begun to morph into something else. The 

bureaucracy, deeply affronted at its exclusion from 

key issues, fulfilled Nixon’s expectations of resistance 

and sabotage. Worse, the State Department, in the 

President’s eyes, mishandled parts of its subcontract, 

notably the Middle East, thereby threatening U.S.-Soviet relations in the process. Soon there were mixed 

signals about who was in charge of what. The Kissinger-Rogers rivalry set a sensational example (nearly 

duplicated by the Brzezinski-Vance combat in the 

Carter administration) upon which the media feasted.
90

Peter Rodman, who, as Kissinger’s assistant, lived 

to tell the tale, described the extent to which the administration was a house divided against itself, keeping 

two or three sets of books on China, for example, (one 

for State, one for the DoD, and the real one); absurdly, 

a naval ensign turned out to be literally a spy for the 

DoD.13 This was a system, or lack thereof, headed for 

a great fall until the lack of coordination was resolved 

by a single stroke: Henry Kissinger became Secretary 

of State in 1973.

Kissinger would serve as both National Security 

Advisor and Secretary of State for 1 1/2 years, coordinating the government’s national security policy 

while restoring State’s leadership in his own person. 

To State’s surprise, he proved respectful of the Foreign Service, its skill and prerogatives. Writing about 

it years later, he would declare that the first negotiation facing a Secretary of State was that between the 

secretary and the Foreign Service. Upon its success 

depended all others.14

In sum, the Nixon-Kissinger model gave the President more direct and secretive operational control of 

key issues at the expense of the Cabinet departments. 

It could function well as long as boundaries were respected and subcontracts executed well. Under the 

pressure of events, however, it degenerated into expanding White House execution of policy and internecine warfare. Ironically, the Nixon-Kissinger model 

would be rescued in 1973 by a revival of the Truman 

model when Kissinger became U.S. Secretary of State.
91

BUSH-BAKER-SCOWCROFT: SYSTEMIC 

INTEGRITY

Having reviewed the contrasting models (Truman-Acheson; early Nixon-Kissinger) and examples 

of how each could become imbalanced (Reagan-Haig; 

late Nixon-Kissinger), one further example should be 

discussed. This was the very effective system run by 

President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of State James 

Baker III, and General Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s National Security Advisor. It proved crucial in managing two unforeseen crises, namely, the end of the Cold 

War and Saddam Hussein’s seizure of Kuwait.

Bush won the 1988 election decisively, but the new 

President did not regard his term as a mere extension 

of Reagan's. Part New England patrician and part 

Texas oil wild-catter, he was a veteran Washington 

insider with a special interest in foreign policy. Bush 

had served as Ambassador to the United Nations 

(UN) from 1971-73, de facto ambassador to China, and 

director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Not 

much for what he called derisively “the vision thing,” 

he was an awkward public speaker and more a pragmatic administrator.

General Scowcroft, for his part, was also a consummate insider. He had worked on the civilian side of the 

government for some time. Scowcroft played a part at 

the NSC as early as 1955; he served as NSC deputy 

when Kissinger was both Secretary of State and NSC 

Advisor. He was then the Advisor from 1975 to 1976.

Finally, Bush selected as his Secretary of State his 

long-time confidante, James A. Baker III. An authentic Texan given to salty speech and agricultural metaphors, Baker was a sophisticated lawyer and political 

operative. He had been one of Reagan’s three vital 
92

staff aides, escaping the crash of that arrangement by 

becoming Secretary of the Treasury in Reagan’s second term. Unlike Bush or Scowcroft, he knew little of 

foreign policy, but had acquired considerable international experience through the negotiations over currency and trade agreements.

Bush, Scowcroft, and Baker had all been appalled 

in the Reagan years by what they saw as a dangerously defective NSC. Scowcroft himself had been coauthor of the Tower Commission Report, which laid 

out the system’s malfunctions. While the new President’s own fascination with the subject and pragmatic 

bent meant that he would be hands on, this did not 

mean White House execution of foreign policy. As 

both Bush and Scowcroft recalled, they wanted a real 

workhorse at State who could conceive and execute 

policy at the President’s direction.15 There should be 

departmental or Cabinet responsibility, not a cabal of 

aides. Above all, there should be an orderly process 

that gave the national security establishment a role 

and a stake. Baker, supremely confident in his relationship with Bush, accepted these arrangements. He 

would make up for his lack of knowledge by employing the best people he could find and concentrating 

them on State’s Policy Planning staff.

The three pragmatists did bring a few ideas with 

them. On the procedural level, Scowcroft wanted to 

revive the professional element in making policy; so 

one of the new administration’s first acts was to call 

for an interagency review and assessment of policy. 

He also gave the NSC committees their 3-level form: 

principals, deputies, and policy coordinating committees.16 As for policy itself, they wanted to substantiate 

much of the late Reagan-Gorbachev frothy rhetoric 

with real agreements to decrease tensions. The Cold 
93

War was not nearly as much over as many believed; 

a dose of serious management would either ratchet it 

down or expose Mikhail Gorbachev as merely a clever 

propagandist. In any event, little change was expected in the basic European security architecture, locked 

in its NATO-Warsaw Pact dimensions.

Finally, while expectations on U.S.-Soviet relations 

were rather muted, the new administration had high 

hopes for dramatic change in Asia. Much of this derived from Bush’s own analysis of China and Baker’s 

international economic experience with the leading 

powers of the region, including a Japan then regarded 

as America’s most serious commercial competitor.

All of these approaches were rapidly overcome 

by events. The interagency review cost the new administration time, resources, and initiative without 

producing any notable policy insights. Baker, a quick 

learner, later wrote, “In the end, what we received 

was mush.”17 By early spring, Bush had to work hard 

to counteract Gorbachev’s “common European home” 

idea, settling on the State Department’s phrase, “a 

Europe whole and free.”18 Then, in early June, the 

Tiananmen Square massacre ended hopes for much 

advance in U.S.-China relations. Last, and above all, 

Europe was transformed as the Berlin Wall fell and 

Germany was reunited.

Bush, Scowcroft, and Baker had expected to manage rather than innovate. Now they were faced with 

transformative events. The NSC system had to develop new strategic geopolitical concepts on the spot, 

but, as Scowcroft would later say, “That was one of 

the most frustrating things to me. Nobody else is in a 

position to do the broad, long-range thinking that the 

NSC is, but I don’t know how you do it.”19 Thus, in a 

way remarkably similar to the Truman-Acheson pe-
94

riod, policy planning at the State Department would 

develop the administration’s overall strategy, filling 

the NSC vacuum.

This is not the place to relate every detail in a complex policy, the outcome of which was the peaceful 

reunification of Germany in NATO, a signal triumph 

for the United States.20 For our purposes, one critical 

event will suffice: the process whereby the two-plusfour negotiating framework became American policy. 

This framework, agreed to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Britain, and France in early 

1990, convened the four occupying powers of 1945 for 

a singular purpose--to facilitate the merger of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) 

with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or West 

Germany).

The opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 

1989, had been the most sensational of the tumultuous political events that replaced the Stalinist East 

German regime with what Gorbachev believed to be 

a stabilizing reformist government, but the situation 

did not settle down. East Germany’s economy was 

rapidly deteriorating as workers went on strike, management and skilled people emigrated, and demonstrations continued. Gorbachev had a large army in 

East Germany, complete with dependents. Would he 

allow the GDR to slip into chaos, or would he attempt 

to save the state through military action? Both prospects carried the danger of violent and unpredictable 

consequences for the peace of Europe.

Beginning in mid-December, the author had raised 

with Dennis Ross, head of the Policy Planning staff, 

the four-power forum as the way out for Gorbachev 

between the choice of chaos or military action. To ease 

West German fears, the point of a four-power confer-
95

ence would be strictly defined, namely, to facilitate 

reunification of the Germanys. By definition then, the 

Soviets (plus the British and French) would already 

have conceded that the GDR would cease to exist, a 

huge advance in and of itself for Chancellor Helmut 

Kohl, who badly wanted a unified Germany firmly 

tied to NATO and the West. This was also President 

Bush’s fundamental requirement.

The NSC staff, which included some notable Soviet and European experts, strongly opposed a revival 

of the four occupation powers as a vehicle to steady 

the situation. In their view, this would fatally damage 

U.S.-West German relations; the Kohl government, 

like its predecessors, regarded the idea that the 1945 

victors would determine Germany’s fate to be an intolerable affront to the sovereignty of the successful 

democracy that the Bonn republic had become. This 

view was strongly shared by the European Bureau at 

State. The alternative was to hope for a de facto reunification on the ground, which subsequent diplomacy 

might then ratify.21

By late January, however, Gorbachev had also 

come to realize that the GDR was slipping away, and 

he feared the existing alternatives. The message from 

Moscow was a call for assistance before matters got 

out of control. Paris, and especially London meanwhile, dreaded German unification.

Baker was persuaded by Policy Planning’s proposal and secured Bush’s approval to sound out German 

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on what 

came to be called the two-plus-four framework. Genscher, a Free Democrat, was notably more eager to deal 

with Moscow than his Christian Democrat chief, Kohl. 

Bush, at Scowcroft’s urging, had to check with Kohl at 

critical points in the diplomacy, a tricky maneuver for 
96

both leaders. Kohl proved very much in favor of his 

foreign minister’s policy and the two-plus-four. For 

Bush, the matter was decided.

At this point, a badly run NSC operation would 

have opened a flood of leaks to the media intended 

by the opponents of the policy to drown it, especially 

when that opposition could draw on not only NSC 

staff professionals but also the European Bureau at 

State. It did not happen. General Scowcroft rallied 

his staff behind the policy and, indeed, imposed discipline on the rest of the national security bureaucracy. 

It worked. There were no mixed signals from Washington, and on February 12, 1990, the two-plus-four 

framework was agreed to at the Ottawa summit.

Curiously, the crucial transaction occurred on July 

15-16, 1990, when Kohl and Gorbachev worked out 

essential military and financial details between them. 

The deal respected the basic two-plus-four parameters 

though a unified Germany in NATO, formally agreed 

to on September 12 in Moscow. Former Secretary of 

State George P. Shultz once lamented that presidential 

decisions were too often just a signal to begin a new 

stage of the same argument. In the case of German 

unification, however, Bush’s decision on two-plusfour ended the argument, and Scowcroft enforced it—

all the more impressive because his own experts and 

he himself disagreed with the policy. The peace and 

freedom of Europe were the beneficiaries.

Bush’s NSC process was not always so skillful. 

The run-up to war in Kuwait, the other great surprise, 

found the administration struggling with its rationale 

for war. It was also plagued by DoD leaks about the 

dangers of military action. On other issues, such as the 

Balkans, the administration had already lost some of 

its grip as the 1992 election approached. State’s ideas 
97

on Europe’s future were put aside. Bush’s, Scowcroft’s, and Baker’s last great achievement proved to 

be the Arab-Israeli peace conference, held in Madrid 

(October 1991) following Saddam’s defeat.

The Bush-Baker-Scowcroft example reminds us 

that fundamental to a successful national security system is what may be called the integrity of the process. 

It consists of four vital and interlinked components:

1. The process matters: The interagency discussions contribute to final decisions without there being 

any end runs or secret channels. This encourages the 

participants to do their best.

2. The process is fair: Alternatives are heard, and 

the relevant departments contribute. There is no need 

to leak.

3. Talent is concentrated: The President can call 

upon a concentration of conceptual or strategic thinkers (at the NSC or, as was the case, in State’s Policy 

Planning), not only tacticians.

4. Decisions are executed: Once decisions are 

made, the relevant departments carry them out.

ASSESSING OBAMA: A HYBRID SYSTEM

The two Presidents who followed George H. W. 

Bush did not give the NSC system its finest hours. 

Bill Clinton’s verbose meetings rarely yielded conclusions; his presidency, by all accounts, was not orderly, 

and the NSC operation reflected as much. Moreover, 

in some respects, the staff became operational rather 

than primarily analytical, especially in the counterterrorism area.22

By contrast, George W. Bush’s NSC was intended 

as a reversion to the Scowcroft model. Directed by 

Condoleezza Rice, a veteran of the 1989-90 experience, 
98

the NSC staff became primarily analytical.23 After 

September 11, 2001 (9/11), however, all of these intentions were subsumed into crisis management. The 

DoD and the White House, notably the Vice President, 

overshadowed State. In the eyes of the critics, the NSC 

system did not supply either an orderly process, a full 

venting of different views, or a forum for decisionmaking. Only in Bush’s second term, when Rice became Secretary of State and her deputy, Stephen Hadley, succeeded her at the NSC, did the Council regain 

its balance. Bush’s decision in early 2007 to reverse 

Iraq strategy in favor of a surge under the command 

of General David Petraeus, DoD’s arch counterinsurgency advocate, was the most significant outcome of 

the new operation.

Under the impetus of these events, both the 9/11 

Commission and what became a full-blown national 

security reform movement advocated large-scale 

changes.24 The intent was to improve the NSC system’s 

coordinating and analytical functions, especially in 

the face of a rapidly changing post-Cold War picture 

in which economics played an increasingly important 

role. Thus, when Barack Obama became President after a campaign promising change, the stage seemed 

set for a different approach.

The new President was a political dramatist of the 

first order. Unknown but a few years before, Barack 

Obama parlayed a modest resume and unique biography into a campaign that defeated decisively the 

well-known and widely admired war hero, Senator 

John McCain. This was all the more impressive, given 

the continuing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and a 

sense of national alarm brought on by the severe economic crisis of September 2008.
99

Obama promised new ideas on foreign policy that 

would contrast with those of his predecessor. They 

proved sometimes to be different, but they were not 

new. Under the mantra of engagement, for example, 

the President emphasized the virtues of collective 

rather than unilateral or even allied action, a theme 

reminiscent of Jimmy Carter or Woodrow Wilson. As 

for the detailed policies, these were drawn largely 

from a consensus, often of a bipartisan nature. Thus, 

much of the new administration’s Middle East activity 

could be found in the recommendations of the 2006 

Baker-Hamilton Commission.25 Obama’s emphasis on 

a nuclear free world, to cite another example, drew 

on a bipartisan group headed by former Secretary of 

State Shultz.26

As for the national security system, Obama clearly 

had the Scowcroft precedent in mind. His NSC Advisor, Marine General James Jones, spoke of his role as 

coordinator and facilitator of the debates the President 

needed to hear. The three-level organization originated by Scrowcroft was retained.27 Obama’s choice of 

his Democratic Party rival, Hillary Clinton, to serve 

as Secretary of State also suggested a strong Cabinet 

model.

In actuality however, Obama-Clinton-Jones would 

not be like Bush-Baker-Scowcroft, or Truman-Acheson. While both Obama and Clinton delivered major 

foreign policy speeches in the spring and summer of 

2009, and Obama adopted State’s slogan about engagement, the White House circumscribed State’s role.28

This was done not simply through rhetoric but by the 

appointment of special representatives on critical issues, notably, former Senator George Mitchell in the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Ambassador Richard 

Holbrooke for Afghanistan-Pakistan. Vice President 
100

Joe Biden, an acknowledged foreign policy enthusiast 

throughout a long senatorial career, soon surfaced as 

a key figure in dealing with European, NATO, and 

Russian affairs when he was not busy with Iraq and 

Afghanistan. The signal sent abroad suggested that 

the special representatives, the Vice President, or the 

White House, were the primary addresses, not State. 

State was not the only Cabinet department to be diminished; Homeland Security was another. On May 

26, 2009, Obama combined the Homeland Security 

Council staff with the NSC under General Jones, but 

the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 

and Counterterrorism, John Brennan, a CIA veteran, 

soon became the major administration spokesman.29

This combined analytical/operational post resembled 

Richard Clarke’s role in the last years of the Clinton 

administration, which was undone by Condoleezza 

Rice before 9/11.

The model, then, was very much a hybrid: an NSC 

advisor and the staff were to function like Scowcroft’s 

with Cabinet personalities (including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, a Bush holdover who, as deputy 

to Scowcroft and then CIA chief under George H. W. 

Bush, was intimately familiar with the Bush-Baker 

system); but, at least in the case of State and Homeland Security, functional control of several key issues 

was held by the White House itself—early Nixon.

How well is the hybrid working? Jones managed 

to do some streamlining in the name of coordination 

by incorporating the Homeland Security staff into the 

NSC. By his own account, he has tried to broaden the 

Council’s analytical capability. Thus far, however, he 

has not touched the high-powered, and separate, national/economics council, nor is it clear whether these 

topics are a subject for NSC review.
101

The homeland security portion of these changes did 

not work very well. On December 25, 2009, a wouldbe suicide bomber bungled his mission on board an 

airplane bound for Detroit; he was subdued by passengers. After landing, he proved to be a Nigerian 

whose father had warned the State Department about 

his son’s ways. This and other important elements 

did not sound an alarm for the National Counterterrorism Center. Worse yet, as U.S. Admiral Dennis C. 

Blair, then Director of National Intelligence, revealed, 

neither he (nor the NSC) had been consulted when 

the Justice Department decided to read the suspect 

his Miranda rights.30 The coordination function had 

clearly failed in this case. 

The system was also given a severe test on the Afghanistan issue. Here the analytical and coordinating 

role came under enormous pressure when the presidential preference for consensus required a reassessment. Obama had made Afghanistan his war. The 

President emphasized both the justness and significance of the effort to defeat al Qaeda, the main enemy 

of the redefined war on terrorism, or “violent extremism,” to use the words of John Brennan, Obama’s de 

facto czar on the subject.31 In March 2010, Obama endorsed a strategy of counterterrorism in Afghanistan, 

approved troop reinforcement already underway, 

and also appointed a new commander, General Stanley McChrystal, to run the war.

Obama’s course, however, had not been uncontested. Biden and others rejected the idea that what 

had worked in Iraq would work in Afghanistan. They 

favored a much more limited exercise that basically 

targeted al Qaeda. Their opposition surfaced when 

McChrystal, after assessing his strategic needs, reported through DoD that he needed another 40,000 troops.
102

Then Karzai was re-elected President in a corrupt 

August poll, throwing into question whether counterinsurgency could work with such a partner. Thereafter, the administration’s low opinion and frequent 

upbraiding of the Afghan leader surfaced often, sometimes officially and sometimes through leaks.

On September 21, 2010, General McChrystal’s 

dire estimate of the Afghan situation appeared in the 

newspapers. The leak prompted President Obama 

to remind the Joint Chiefs that he was commander in 

chief. Secretary of Defense Gates talked of the virtues 

of advice through the chain of command.32

His original consensus undone, President Obama 

called for a reassessment of the strategy. This was 

conducted through a vast number of meetings and reports under the coordination of the NSC.33 Touted as 

a model exercise of its own, the reassessment went on 

for over 3 months. It, too, was disrupted by a serious 

leak, this time a cable from the U.S. Ambassador in 

Kabul, General Karl Eikenberrry, himself a one-time 

commander in Afghanistan under the earlier, discredited strategy. He argued vehemently against anything that counted on Karzai.34 This leak effectively 

sundered relations with McChrystal, who had not 

been forewarned of Eikenberry’s opinion; it also fatally damaged the ambassador’s relations with Karzai. 

Nor was Special Representative Holbrooke on good 

terms with the Afghan leader. That left McChrystal as 

the only American official with a good working connection.

Finally, in late December, Obama announced his 

decision. He had cobbled together a fresh consensus. 

He would give McChrystal 30,000 more troops to pursue counterinsurgency. The strategy would be subject 

to major review a year later. July 2011 would mark the 
103

beginning of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, 

and responsibility would be shifted to the newly organized Afghan army and police units.

The latest compromise, like the earlier ones, put a 

greater premium on consensus at home than effectiveness in the field. It presumed a straight-line success 

almost on the Iraqi schedule and an Afghan government a whole lot more capable in a short time than 

anyone could imagine. All of this was undermined 

by the withdrawal date, itself clearly intended to hold 

the support of the Vice President and the many Democrats opposed to the strategy. Attempts by Petraeus, 

Clinton, and Gates to play down the significance of 

July 2011 were quickly countered by Biden, among 

others. These confusing signals could only have the 

most dire effect, as McChrystal struggled to persuade 

the Afghans that the surge was more than just a last 

effort to make things look better while actually simply 

being a cover for the end of the mission.

McChrystal himself became the victim of the December consensus, and by his own hand. The spring 

fighting, even with an abrupt and belated embrace 

of Karzai by Obama, did not go as well as planned. 

Once more the administration began to divide, and 

the leaks multiplied. Then, in the third week of June 

2010, McChrystal and his staff were exposed by an 

about-to-be-published account of their disdain for the 

Obama team’s management of the war.35 On June 23, 

2010, McChrystal resigned, to be replaced by the architect of the Iraqi surge and the Afghanistan strategy, 

General David Petraeus.

As the President pointed out, it was not a difference over strategy, but rather the way the general had 

complained through the media that compelled his 

departure. At the heart of McChrystal’s complaints, 
104

though, was the disarray on the civilian side. Were 

Eikenberry and Biden, for example, really behind the 

strategy? Or had the December review and July 2011 

date simply held them off? The President, the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

and General Petraeus all hastened to explain that these 

mileposts were not cast in cement. Obama also chastised his team the day of McChrystal’s resignation for 

petty quarrels that hurt the war effort. These repairs 

notwithstanding, Obama’s method and his reliance on 

consensus had revealed that the resulting policy was 

either incoherent (the withdrawal date issue) or ineffective (mixed signals from too many officials). And 

the leaking suggested flaws in the NSC system’s integrity, or, at the least, its discipline.

To sum up: Obama had combined something of 

the Bush-Baker model and something of the NixonKissinger model but without the balances that would 

make the hybrid work. Unlike Bush-Baker, Clinton’s 

State Department had a secondary role, and unlike 

Nixon-Kissinger, consensus politics robbed the White 

House's primacy of disciplined coherence. This is unlikely to last. The pressure of untoward events will 

push the system more toward one model or the other.

The way will thus be open once more to reform. Before we get too excited about such prospects, though, 

this article’s historical perspective may be useful. 

Three points may be extracted from the record:

1. Presidents must choose their paradigm: Either 

Truman-Acheson; its lineal successor, Bush-Baker; or 

early Nixon-Kissinger will do, so long as its chief executive understands the consequences.

2. Integrity is all: The process cannot work well 

unless it is to be seen as important, inclusive, thoughtful, and decisive.
105

3. Strategy counts: The tendency of crisis management to cancel out strategy can only be counteracted 

by the creation of an effective “strategy cell” of people 

tasked to do it either at State’s Policy Planning or in 

the NSC staff.

Last but not least, perhaps the final judgment on 

the NSC system as we have known it since 1947 may 

be found in a dialogue from the 1968 Clint Eastwood 

film, Coogan’s Bluff. Eastwood plays a Western marshal sent to recover a fugitive under custody of the 

New York Police. After suitable smashing of the china, he is confronted dramatically by a surly New York 

detective played by Lee J. Cobb. Cobb tells Eastwood, 

“Now, we have a system here. It’s not much, but we 

like it!”

Presidents have not always understood the national security system they inherit. Nor have they always 

used it to great effect, but like Harry Truman, Richard 

Nixon, or George H. W. Bush, once they did grasp its 

utility for the power of the presidency, they liked it. 

All would-be reformers should heed this experience; 

for, while the integrity of the system, as illustrated by 

the Bush-Baker-Scowcroft experience, is necessary for 

success, it is not sufficient. For that, reform must appeal, above all, to the President himself. Nothing less 

is likely to work.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. See Alfred D. Sander, “Truman and the National Security 

Council: 1945-1947,” Journal of American History, Vol. 59, September 1972. This juggler reference comes from Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Morgenthau, Jr.’s, diary, May 15, 1942. Referenced 

in Peter Rodman, Presidential Command, New York: Knopf, 2010, 

p. 296.
106

2. A short good recent account is found in Rodman, pp. 15-24.

3. James R. Locher III, “Leadership and the National Security 

Reform Agenda,” Colloquium Report, Joseph R. Cerami, Robin 

Dorff, and Lisa M. Moorman, eds., Leadership and National Security 

Reform: The Next President’s Agenda, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2008, p. 25, available 

from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB888.pdf.

4. Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Garden City, NY: 

Doubleday, 1956, p. 59.

5. Ibid.

6. Dean Acheson, “Apologia Pro Libre Hoc” in Present at the 

Creation: My Years in the State Department, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969, p. xvii.

7. Although some scholars use Eisenhower’s NSC as the 

“foundational model,” from my perspective, Eisenhower simply 

filled in the planning and staff logic of the system he inherited, 

just as he provided the resources to flush out NSC 68’s strategy; 

the real foundation for the NSC’s function was laid under Truman. See, for example, John P. Burke, “The National Security Advisor and Staff: Transition Challenges,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2, June 2009.

8. Rodman, Presidential Command; Robert L. Beisner, Dean 

Acheson: A Life in the Cold War, New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2006.

9. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign

Policy, New York: MacMillan, 1984, p. 80.

10. See my memorial essay, “Patriot: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,” 

Orbis, Vol. 54, No. 3, Summer 2010, pp. 344-345, 351-352.

11. John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft, The 

Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President’s Special Review Board, New York: Random House, 1987, pp. 62-63.

12. Rodman, p. 69.
107

13. Ibid., pp. 66-67, especially p. 54.

14. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, Boston, MA: Little, 

Brown, 1982, p. 446.

15. George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998, p. 31.

16. Burke, “The National Security Advisor and Staff: Transition Challenges,”pp. 23-24. See also David Rothkopf, Running the 

World, New York: Public Affairs, 2005, pp. 266-67.

17. James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, 

War, and Peace. 1989-1992, New York: G P Putnam’s Sons, 1995, 

p. 68.

18. Philip D. Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 31. 

19. John P. Burke, Honest Broker?: The National Security Advisor 

and Presidential Decision Making, College Station, TX: Texas A&M 

University Press, 2009, pp. 173-174.

20. For a recent treatment, see Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The 

Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 2009.

21. Zelikow and Rice, p. 167.

22. Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War 

on Terror, New York: The Free Press, 2004. See also Colin Powell 

and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, New York: Random 

House, 2003, pp. 547-550, 572-573, for an account of President 

Clinton’s meetings.

23. Powell and Persico, My American Journey; Clarke, Against 

All Enemies.

24. 9-11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
108

States--Authorized Edition, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 

July 22, 2004, paperback Ed., “PNSR Recommendations: Forging a New Shield,” Project on National Security Reform, November 

2008, available from pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20

new%20shield.pdf; “Turning Ideas into Action,” Project on National 

Security Reform, September 2009, available from www.pnsr.org/

data/files/pnsr_turning_ideas_into_action.pdf. A good review of the 

reform debate may be found in Catherine Dale, Nina M. Serafino, 

and Pat Towell, “CRS Report: Organizing the U.S. Government 

for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 2008.

25. The Iraq Study Group Report, James A. Baker, III, and Lee 

H. Hamilton, co-chairs; Lawrence S. Eagleburger et al., New York: 

Vintage Books, 2006, available from www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_

group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf.

26. For more information, see the Nuclear Security Project, 

available from nuclearsecurityproject.org; 

27. “Presidential Policy Directive–1: Organization of the National Security Council System,” Washington, DC: The White 

House, February 13, 2009.

28. See my article, “Obama’s Foreign Policy at Ten Months: 

the Limits of Consensus,” FPRI E-Notes, November 2009.

29.“A New Approach to Safeguarding Americans,” Remarks 

by John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, prepared for delivery at the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, August 6, 2009, Washington, DC, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/

Remarks-by-John-Brennan-at-the-Center-for-Strategic-andInternational-Studies/.

30. “REPORT 2010 111–199: Unclassified Executive Summary 

of the Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on 

Northwest Airlines Flight 253,” Report of the Select Committee on 

Intelligence United States Senate, May 24, 2010.
109

31. Brennan, “A New Approach to Safeguarding Americans.” 

32. “Remarks Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. 

Gates,” Washington, DC: Association of the United States Army, 

October 5, 2009, available from www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.

aspx?speechid=1383

33. “Briefing by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs,” 

Washington, DC: The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, 

October 30, 2009, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/briefing-white-house-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-103009.

34. Greg Jaffe, Scott Wilson, and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Envoy Resists Increase in Troops, Concerns Voiced About Karzai, 

Cables Sent as Obama Weighs Deployment Options,” The Washington Post, November 12, 2009.

35. Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General,” Rolling Stone 

Magazine, July 22, 2010.

111

CHAPTER 7

ASSESSING THE UNITED STATES IN 

AFGHANISTAN:

THE RECORD AND THE RANGE OF CHOICE

Joseph J. Collins

INTRODUCTION

U.S. efforts and prospects in Afghanistan stand at 

the intersection of five major vectors. These vectors 

are likely to foster change before and after July 2011 

(7/11), the date when the President has said that “our 

troops will begin to come home.”1

 Some conservatives 

in the West might prefer to fight on, shift later to a 

security assistance strategy, and deal with reconciliation and reintegration as a third priority. This may not 

be possible. Change in Afghanistan may not follow a 

linear pattern. While the United States should seek to 

shape events, it needs to be ready to react to changes 

that originate from events, contextual factors, or the 

actions of third parties. To understand why this is 

true, one must first understand the vectors that constitute the context for our future strategy, and then how 

those vectors developed over time.

U.S. objectives remain our guide and provide the 

first vector. Two successive U.S. Presidents have declared that the war in Afghanistan is a vital interest. 

Long after September 11, 2001 (9/11), the administration is still rightfully focused on the defeat or degradation of al Qaeda and its associated movements, one of 

which is the Afghan Taliban. Confounding those who 

doubted his will, President Barack Obama in the first 

14 months of his administration has twice reinforced 
112

the U.S. contingent of now nearly 100,000 service 

members in Afghanistan; 45,000 Allied soldiers and 

235,000 Afghan soldiers and police officers are also in 

the fight. In his first 14 months in office, according to 

the New America Foundation, President Obama has 

more than doubled the 2008 drone strikes (from 39 to 

92 strikes) against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan.2

 In a May visit to Washington, DC, Afghan 

President Karzai also received a promise from the 

Obama administration for a deeper, long-term strategic relationship that will cement the U.S.-Afghan partnership beyond the sound of the guns.3

 As the Iraq 

war fades, the “other war” in Afghanistan has become 

the main effort in the U.S. war on terrorism. It is impossible for any President to abandon or turn his or 

her back on such commitments.

Second, the costs of this war in time, blood, and 

treasure have been high. For the United States, the 

war has gone on for nearly 9 years, longer than U.S. 

combat troops were in Vietnam. For Afghanistan, the 

spring of 2010 marks 32 years of uninterrupted war. A 

thousand U.S. war dead, 750 fallen allies, and tens of 

thousands of Afghan dead bear silent witness to the 

high cost of this protracted conflict. June 2010, with 

more than 100 allied deaths, has been the worst month 

since the war started.4 In a recent visit, General Kayani, the Pakistani Army Chief, reminded his U.S. audiences that in 2009 alone, the Pakistani Army suffered 

10,000 casualties in its battles against the Pakistani 

Taliban.5

 Politically, most of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) nations, including the United 

States, are wavering. In Europe, delicate coalition 

governments are dealing with serious fiscal problems 

and low public support for fighting in Afghanistan. 

American pleas for a larger European contribution 
113

have fallen on deaf ears, and most European combat 

contingents are likely to be withdrawn within a year. 

War weariness among all combatants will be a significant change agent in the next few years.

U.S. war expenditures in FY 2010 will likely exceed 

80 billion dollars.6

 This enormous cost—on behalf of a 

country whose legal gross domestic product (GDP) is 

less than a third of that total—comes at a time of high 

unemployment and rampant deficit spending in the 

United States. As one wag told me: “We aren’t yet at 

the bottom of our purse, but we can see it from here.”7

In the mid-term, budgetary constraints in the United 

States and Europe will begin to influence how the coalition pursues its objectives in Afghanistan.

Third, the enemy, generally successful from 2005 

to 2009, is beginning to feel the heat of the Obama 

surge. Pakistan is slowly awakening to the danger of 

harboring violent extremist groups on its territory. Its 

soldiers have fought a war in the Northwest Frontier 

Province (renamed Khyber Paktoonkhwa) and South 

Waziristan to make that point. In Afghanistan, major 

allied offensives in the Pashtun-dominated south and 

east of Afghanistan highlight the Coalition’s determination. In 2010 alone, U.S. Special Operations forces 

have killed or captured over 500 Taliban, over 100 of 

whom are senior Taliban officials.8

 U.S. Treasury experts on al Qaeda funding are turning their sharp eyes 

on the Taliban’s financiers. One of the three major elements of the Afghan Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s 

Hezb-i-Islami faction, has entered into direct talks 

with the Karzai government. Another part of the Taliban, the Haqqani network, with close InterServices 

Intelligence (ISI) and al Qaeda connections, has begun 

exploratory talks, using Pakistan as an intermediary. 

The Taliban is neither down nor out; it is still resilient 
114

and motivated, but for the first time it is feeling serious 

pressure from both its enemies and its benefactors.

Fourth, President Karzai’s government remains 

weak, corrupt, ineffective, and by far, the Taliban’s 

best talking point. The government that must win this 

war—if it is to be won—seems little more capable than 

it was in 2002. The Afghan government’s police are a 

hindrance, its bureaucrats inefficient and corrupt, and 

its ministries ineffective. The narcotics industry may 

be a third the size of the entire legal economy. The effect of narcotics trafficking on both Taliban finances 

and Afghan governmental corruption is profound. 

The level of governmental corruption was evident 

in the recent presidential election. Only the withdrawal of Karzai’s most serious competitor, former foreign 

minister Abdullah Abdullah, enabled the current 

president to be legitimately called the winner. U.S. 

Ambassador Karl Eikenberry famously told U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama in 

November 2009 that Karzai “is not an adequate strategic partner.”9

 More recent bickering had U.S. officials 

embarrassing Karzai by their public statements, while 

he bitterly denounced the United States and NATO 

for acting as occupiers, once even threatening to join 

the Taliban. 

The May 2010 Karzai visit to Washington poured 

oil on these troubled waters, but it is not clear how 

long the calm seas will prevail. Friction within the U.S. 

team—the embassy, Holbrooke’s team, and the military command—is evident. It is a key factor hobbling 

the U.S. ability to shape the situation in Afghanistan. 

Friction among decisionmakers was also a key factor 

underpinning General Stanley McChrystal and his 

staff’s inappropriate and ill-timed remarks in Rolling 

Stone, which brought about his relief from command.10
115

In all, according to the United Nations (UN), despite much economic aid, Afghanistan, economically 

and socially, remains one of the bottom five countries 

in the world. There are, however, a few economic 

bright spots: Spurred by foreign aid, legal GDP growth 

has been robust; millions of Afghans use cell phones; 

indigenous radio and TV programs abound; and the 

Karzai government has increased revenue collection 

by 58 percent in the past year. Transportation, education, and health care have made marked improvements. The country has also begun to aggressively 

license the development of what may amount to 3 trillion dollars worth of mineral wealth.11

A final vector: After 32 years, the Afghan people 

are sick of war and tired of the intrusive presence of 

coalition forces. While International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-involved civilian deaths and collateral damage are way down in the past year, growing 

Coalition forces are hard to live with. Fortunately, for 

the most part, the Afghan people despise the Taliban 

more than they dislike the government and its coalition partners. In national polls, the Taliban rarely rank 

higher than 10 percent. Most Afghans remember how 

repressive and ineffective the Taliban was at ruling 

their country from 1996 to 2001. With 40 nations helping the Karzai government today, the Afghan population also remembers that the Taliban regime was officially recognized by only three other countries. The 

vast majority of Pashtuns who live in the most violent 

areas, however, fear Taliban terror, and must sit on 

the fence for their own security. 

The five vectors constitute the context for future 

strategic decisions in Afghanistan. The interaction of 

these variables has created a fluid environment where 

non-linear change is highly possible. The remainder 
116

of this chapter will cover what happened both on the 

battlefield and in stability operations that created the 

situation today, the decision to surge, and the way 

ahead.

WHAT HAPPENED, 2002-08? 

There have been two phases in the war conducted 

under the banner of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Despite the hoopla about the transformation of 

warfare and Green Berets on horseback calling in precision-guided bombs “danger close,” the initial phase 

of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was actually a 

conventional, albeit network-centric, military operation.12 It featured Northern Alliance and anti-Taliban 

Pashtun ground forces (infantry and, in some places, 

cavalry) fighting a war of maneuver against the forces 

of the Taliban government and their legion of foreign 

supporters, many of whom were trained in al Qaeda 

camps in Afghanistan. The U.S. contribution came in 

the form of advice from U.S. Special Operations forces 

and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary 

personnel. The latter had provided yeoman service 

before 9/11 by maintaining close relations with Massoud and his Northern Alliance. These teams—approximately 600 people, in all—also connected friendly ground power to the awesome effects of American 

aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Former 

U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld heralded 

the U.S. contribution and claimed that this operation 

was an example of defense transformation, but perhaps not the transformation that he intended:

On the appointed day, one of their teams slipped 

in and hid well behind the lines, ready to call in airstrikes, and the bomb blasts would be the signal for 
117

others to charge. When the moment came, they signaled their targets to the coalition aircraft and looked 

at their watches. Two minutes and 15 seconds, 10 seconds . . . and then, out of nowhere, precision-guided 

bombs began to land on Taliban and al-Qaeda positions. The explosions were deafening, and the timing 

so precise that, as the soldiers described it, hundreds 

of Afghan horsemen literally came riding out of the 

smoke, coming down on the enemy in clouds of dust 

and flying shrapnel. A few carried RPGs. Some had as 

little as 10 rounds for their weapons. And they rode 

boldly . . . Americans, Afghans, towards the Taliban 

and al Qaeda fighters. It was the first [horse] cavalry 

attack of the 21st century . . . Now, what won the battle 

for Mazar[-e-Sharif] and set in motion the Taliban’s 

fall from power was a combination of ingenuity of the 

Special Forces, the most advanced precision-guided 

munitions in the U.S. arsenal delivered by U.S. Navy, 

Air Force and Marine crews, and the courage of the 

Afghan fighters. . . . That day on the plains of Afghanistan, the 19th century met the 21st century, and they 

defeated a dangerous and determined adversary, a 

remarkable achievement.13

The initial campaign lasted from mid-October to 

March 2002. The last operation, fraught with tactical 

difficulties, broke up a hardcore Taliban and al Qaeda strongpoint in the Shahi Kot valley, northwest of 

the Khost area. Overall, post-9/11 U.S. conventional 

operations were impressive, and successful, but they 

were not decisive. The United States neither destroyed 

the enemy nor its will or ability to resist. The Taliban 

field forces were defeated, and the regime ousted, but 

much of the leadership of al Qaeda and the Taliban 

escaped to safe havens in Pakistan and other nearby 

countries. 

The United States and its allies did not invite the 

Taliban to participate in the Bonn Process to establish 

a new government. In retrospect, this may have been 
118

a mistake, but it was an understandable one. With 

help from the international community, Afghan leaders formed an interim government, without Taliban 

participation, with Hamid Karzai, a Durrani Pashtun 

of the Popalzai tribe, the traditional source of leaders 

in Afghanistan. The international community pledged 

over $5 billion in aid, and began the tough work of 

rebuilding a nation. After more than 2 decades of 

war, many believed that peace had come to the Hindu 

Kush. 

The Taliban and al Qaeda, however, had other 

plans. They planned to hatch an insurgency to regain 

power in Kabul. Their hope was that the international community would tire of nation building under fire and would ultimately depart, leaving Karzai 

to the same horrible fate that befell Najibullah, the 

last communist ruler killed by the Taliban in the UN 

compound when they seized Kabul in 1996. The Taliban had sanctuaries in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Area (FATA) and Baluchistan in Pakistan, and 

other countries. They also quietly but obviously had 

strongpoints in a number of Afghan provinces, such 

as Helmand. Given the U.S. record, the insurgents felt 

that time was on their side. One familiar saying encapsulated their approach: The Americans have all the 

watches, but we have all the time.

Inside Afghanistan, Allied commanders and diplomats were astounded at the devastation that had been 

brought about by 23 years of war. The economy and 

society—rated by the UN in 1966 in the bottom five 

of all nation states —suffered mightily from 5 years 

of Taliban mismanagement and authoritarian rule, 

further complicated by a few years of drought. The 

country was only 30 percent literate, and 80 percent 

of its schools, neglected under the Taliban, had been 
119

destroyed in various wars. Of the Afghan children, 

25 percent died before the age of 5. Only 9 percent of 

the population had access to health care. The professional and blue-collar work forces had virtually disappeared.14

Starting from the rock bottom in nearly every category, the government of Afghanistan and its coalition partners had a relatively easy time of it from 2002 

to 2004. Progress was made in security, stabilization 

activities, and economic reconstruction. From 2003-

05, the U.S. team, led by Ambassador Khalilzad and 

Lieutenant General Dave Barno, focused on teamwork 

and organization for Counterinsurgency (COIN) and 

stability operations. During this period of time, the 

relationship between Ambassador Khalilzad and 

President Karzai was very close and productive.15 The 

government of Afghanistan, with much help from the 

international community, conducted nationwide jirgas (gatherings of community elders), passed a modern constitution, and held fair presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005, respectively. 

These development efforts attracted a fair amount of 

international aid, but far less than the Balkan nations 

did after their conflicts in the 1990s.16 U.S. security and 

economic assistance in these 3 years was a modest $4.4 

billion, but nearly two-thirds of this went to economic 

assistance, with only slightly more that one-third to 

security assistance.17 Using U.S. embassy statistics, the 

total foreign and security assistance (2002-08) per Afghan was approximately $270 per year.18

In the early years, under the guidance of Finance 

Minister Ashraf Ghani, the Afghan government 

swapped out the several viral currencies in use across 

the country, established a single stable currency, let 

international contracts for a nationwide cellular phone 
120

service, and began economic reconstruction. With the 

help of the international community, there was rapid 

reconstruction in health care and education. The ring 

road was rebuilt, furthering travel and commerce. Access to medical care was extended from less than 15 

percent of the population under the Taliban to over 85 

percent of Afghans.19 Rapid economic growth began 

and has continued. 

With the help of coalition forces and diplomats, the 

government’s reach was tentatively extended to the 

provinces. Various countries, following the U.S. lead, 

set up Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)—small 

interagency elements to improve security and reconstruction—initially in a third of the provinces but now 

nearly nationwide. These 24 teams today play a key 

role in reconstruction and development.

The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) was 

brought into being, and an international peacekeeping 

force secured Kabul. More than 10,000 U.S. and allied 

forces conducted counterterrorism operations across 

the country. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 

was wary at the start about talking about our efforts 

there as COIN. Some in the Bush administration were 

concerned specifically about limiting expectations for 

nation building, which was not a presidential priority in the first Bush administration. Progress was slow 

but steady, and the Taliban appeared to be relatively 

dormant. Kabul in particular, was calm as thousands 

of ISAF troops, mainly European, controlled security 

in the 225-mile area surrounding the capital.

The Taliban, however, was biding its time. From 

2002 to 2005, the Taliban was rebuilding its cadres 

with drug money, so-called charity from donors in the 

Gulf states, and help from al Qaeda. Their sanctuaries 

in Baluchistan and the FATA enabled them to rearm, 
121

refit, and retrain. By 2005, the Quetta Shura Taliban, 

led by Mullah Omar; the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin 

(HIG), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; and the Haqqani Network, led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, 

Sirajuddin, or Siraj, were all working together to subvert the Karzai regime, hoping to wear down the coalition. The Afghan government’s lack of capacity and 

the allies’ “light footprint” allowed many districts and 

a few provinces to remain under the quiet control of 

the Taliban.

In 2005, the Taliban began a nationwide offensive 

to spread its influence. From 2004 to 2009, there was a 

nine-fold increase in security incidents and a 40-fold 

increase in suicide bombing.20 Conflict has spread to 

most of the 34 provinces, but 71 percent of the security 

incidents in 2010 have taken place in only 10 percent 

of the nearly 400 districts nationwide.21 The war in Afghanistan today is still primarily a war over control of 

Pashtun areas in the eastern and southern portions of 

the country, but Taliban subversion and terrorism are 

important factors in many provinces across the country.

With lessons learned through al Qaeda in Iraq, the 

use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became the 

tactic of choice of the Taliban. IED strikes went from 

300 in 2004 to more than 4,000 in 2009. Suicide bombers, 

almost unknown before 2004, became commonplace. 

By 2009 there were Taliban shadow governments in 

nearly all provinces. Even in areas dominated by the 

government or government-friendly tribes, Taliban 

subversion or terror tactics have become potent facts 

of life in many provinces.

Beginning in 2005, the Taliban added more sophisticated information operations and local subversion to 

their standard terrorist tactics. Sadly, those terror tac-
122

tics remained Standard Operating Procedures for the 

Taliban. In October 2008, for example, “the Taliban 

stopped a bus in the town of Maiwand, forcibly removed 50 passengers, and beheaded 30 of them.”22 A 

UN study in 2010, comparing 2009 to 2008, recorded a 

14 percent increase in deaths totaling 2,412 personnel. 

Reflecting ISAF restraint, the report showed that the 

Taliban were responsible for the death of 70 percent of 

these Afghan civilians.23

How did the war in Afghanistan go from being a 

bright spot in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 

to an issue in doubt? First, there was little progress in 

building Afghan governing capacity. To begin with, 

there was so little Afghan government and administrative capacity, that much economic and security assistance bypassed the Afghan government. Nations 

and international organizations found it more convenient to work through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and contractors. Over the years, the government in turn lost key ministers, like Ashraf Ghani, 

Abdullah Abdullah, and Ali Jalali, an early Minister of 

the Interior. There was much government corruption, 

often tied to police operations or the drug trade. Karzai was left alone by the Coalition to deal with the socalled warlords. Many of them ended up in the government. Others continued their viral existence in the 

provinces, often using their local power and business 

skills to rake off money from reconstruction projects 

or even from U.S. security contracts. 

Second, Coalition arms, aid, trainers, and advisors 

ended up being too little, too slow, and too inefficient. 

U.S. and allied combat troops fared well, but the Coalition was unsuccessful in building up the capacity 

of the Afghan security forces, especially the police. 

Responsibility for police training was bounced from 
123

Germany to the State Department to the DoD. Parts of 

that effort are still in transition. Army and police trainers and advisers are still in short supply. Being a weak 

link in the security chain, the Taliban has made attacking the police a priority. From 2007 to 2009, Afghan 

security forces killed in action (2,943) outnumber U.S. 

and allied dead (774) by a factor of nearly 4 to 1. More 

than two out of every three Afghan service members 

killed were policemen.24

In all, from 2004 to 2009, there were insufficient 

Coalition forces or Afghan national security forces to 

“clear, hold, and build.” The Taliban had great latitude in picking their targets. Coalition military efforts 

often resembled the game of whack-a-mole, in which 

a sweep would go after the Taliban, who would go 

into hiding until the Coalition forces left. Taliban penetration of many areas deepened over time. Subversion, terrorism, and night letters from the local Taliban ruled many apparently safe districts by night.

It is not true that initial U.S. operations in Iraq 

stripped Afghanistan of what it needed to fight the 

Taliban. While some intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissaince (ISR) assets and Special Forces were 

removed from Afghanistan, most of the assets needed 

to continue the operation there were wisely fenced by 

Pentagon and Central Command (CENTCOM) planners.25 It is fair to say, however, that post-2005, as the 

situation in Afghanistan began to decline, the much 

greater scope and intensity of problems in Iraq prevented reinforcements from being sent to Afghanistan. Perhaps more important, the near-desperate 

straits in Iraq up to mid-2007 kept U.S. leaders from 

focusing on fixing our efforts in Afghanistan. It was 

not until the obvious success of the surge in Iraq that 

U.S. decisionmakers were able to turn their attention 
124

to the increasingly dire situation in Afghanistan. With 

the advent of the Obama administration and improvements in Iraq, Afghanistan became the top priority in 

the War on Terrorism.

By the start of the Obama administration, security in Afghanistan was down, as was Afghan optimism about the future. Karzai’s popularity declined, 

and confidence in the United States and its allies was 

halved. Many Afghans believed that the Taliban had 

grown stronger every year since 2005, and incentives 

for fence-sitting increased along with fear and disgust 

at government corruption. A new strategy was clearly 

needed.26

THE DECISION TO SURGE

The United States decided to surge in Afghanistan 

when it became feasible, but it took nearly a year to 

bring it to fruition. The foundation of the surge was 

laid by President George W. Bush in 2008, but the construction was completed under President Obama in 

2009 and 2010. Studies on the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan began in the last year of the Bush administration. 

The most critical study of all was reportedly the one 

conducted under the auspices of the Bush National 

Security Council (NSC) staff.27

There was a preliminary decision to recommend to 

President Bush an increase in forces, but this was delayed to give the new team a chance to study the situation and make its own recommendations. Early on, 

President Obama, and his team conducted their own 

studies, which incorporated the work of the previous 

administration. Bruce Reidel of RAND supervised the 

efforts, which were facilitated by the continued presence on the NSC staff of U.S. Army Lieutenant Gen-
125

eral Doug Lute, who managed the war for the previous administration’s NSC and has been an essential 

element in the continuity of our Afghanistan policy 

between the administrations. 

In March, President Obama decided to alter the 

strategy. His 6-page March 27, 2009, White Paper contained the guts of a broad counterinsurgency program 

aimed at thwarting al Qaeda, “reversing the Taliban’s momentum in Afghanistan,” increasing aid to 

both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and forging a more 

united strategic approach to both countries.28 In a parallel action, the President replaced the U.S. and ISAF 

commander, General David McKiernan, with General Stanley McChrystal, the then-Director of the Joint 

Staff and a highly experienced commander of Special Operations forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

McChrystal was directed by the Secretary of Defense 

to conduct an assessment of our current efforts and 

report back to the White House. His August assessment was leaked to the press, and it was followed by 

a detailed in-house assessment and decisionmaking 

effort by President Obama over some 5 months.

President Obama’s national security team examined various options. General McChrystal recommended a beefed-up, population-centric counterinsurgency strategy.29 He identified two key threats: the 

insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the Karzai 

regime and the coalition. Key among his recommendations were greater partnering, increasing the size of 

the Afghan national security forces, improving governance, and gaining the initiative from the Taliban. 

He also recommended focusing resources on threatened populations, improving counternarcotics efforts, 

changing the culture of ISAF and adapting to restrictive rules of engagement to better protect the popula-
126

tion. His initial assessment did not include a request 

for a troop increase, but he later requested a significant increase.

Other administration players had other ideas and 

they were debated for months with the active participation of the President. Some saw a need to focus more 

directly on al Qaeda; others wanted more emphasis 

on Pakistan. Yet, others wanted a delay because our 

Afghan allies had us balancing on a two-legged stool, 

while still others saw shifting priority to building the 

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF, police and 

military) as the key to victory. Vice President Biden 

advocated a strategy focused on counterterrorism, 

without the expensive COIN and nation-building. As 

previously noted, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, now 

on his third full tour in Afghanistan, was concerned 

with the inefficiency and corruption of the Karzai regime. He did not initially concur with U.S. reinforcements and recommended a shift of our top priority to 

preparing the ANSF to take over security and to work 

more closely with Pakistan. 

President Obama outlined objectives in his West 

Point speech: 

We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse 

the Taliban momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the 

capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.30

To accomplish this, the President directed a surge 

of 30,000 U.S. troops, with the NATO allies adding 

nearly 10,000 to that total. To accompany this troop 

surge, the President ordered a surge of civilian officials, a great increase in foreign assistance, a decisive 
127

boost in funding for ANSF, increased aid to Pakistan, 

and support for Afghan reintegration and reconciliation efforts. The President also made it clear that the 

United States would not tolerate an open-ended commitment, an “endless war.” The President directed that 

in July 2011 “our troops will begin to come home.” He 

pointed out that the United States must balance all of 

its commitment. He rejected the notion that Afghanistan was another Vietnam. His message attempted to 

portray a firm national commitment, but not an indeterminate military commitment: 

There are those who acknowledge that we can’t leave 

Afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that we 

go forward with the troops that we already have. But 

this would simply maintain a status quo in which we 

muddle through, and permit a slow deterioration of 

conditions there. It would ultimately prove more 

costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because 

we would never be able to generate the conditions 

needed to train Afghan security forces and give them 

the space to take over. 

Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a time 

frame for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended 

escalation of our war effort . . . one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I 

reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond 

what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what 

we need to achieve to secure our interests. Furthermore, the absence of a time frame for transition would 

deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will 

have to take responsibility for their security, and that 

America has no interest in fighting an endless war in 

Afghanistan.
128

As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our 

responsibility, our means, or our interests. And I must 

weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don’t 

have the luxury of committing to just one. Indeed, I’m 

mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who 

—-in discussing our national security —-said, ’Each 

proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader 

consideration: the need to maintain balance in and 

among national programs’.31

CONTENDING OPTIONS

In December 2010, the United States plans to take 

stock of its progress. It will assess the situation and 

begin to identify options for the post-July 2011 period. There will likely be three types of options that 

will dominate the minds of the Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, and the 

new military commander, General David Petraeus.

First, there will no doubt be some key players 

who favor continuing with the current U.S. plan that 

is still unfolding. Given the protracted nature of such 

conflicts, and barring unforeseen surprises, the battlefield situation in December 2010 is not likely to be 

radically different than it is now. Many, though certainly not all, conservatives will prefer to keep up the 

full-blown COIN operation for a few more years, and 

move slowly on the transition to Afghan responsibility for security and only then onto reconciliation with 

the enemy.

This would give the best breathing space needed 

for building Afghan capacity, but it is expensive and 

plays into enemy propaganda about the coalition as an 

occupying force. Moreover, this plan will entail very 

high expenditures, with no guarantee of results. If its 

proponents succeed, it will last only for a short time, 
129

perhaps as much as another year, up to the summer of 

2012. Whatever the selected option, one aspect of the 

current plan that should be maintained is the progress that ISAF has made in protecting the population 

and showing respect to Afghans on the roads and in 

their homes. Allied restraint toward the civilian population has shown positive results, but there are some 

indications that restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) 

may also be affecting troop morale. General Petraeus 

indicated in his confirmation hearing that he would 

reexamine this problem and the existing ROE.

A second option would be to reduce over a year 

(July 2011-July 2012) most of the 30,000 Soldiers and 

Marines in the surge combat forces and make security 

assistance and capacity building—not the provision of 

combat forces—ISAF’s top priority. Remaining ISAF 

combat units could further integrate with fielded ANA 

units. Maximum emphasis would be placed on quality 

training for soldiers and policemen. To build Afghan 

military capacity, ISAF commanders would also emphasize the development of Afghan combat enablers, 

such as logistics, transportation, and aviation. In this 

option, the focal point of allied strategy would be on 

the NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan, and not 

on allied combat forces. This training mission is still 

short permanent cadres and is being kept on track by 

hundreds of U.S. temporary-duty military personnel.

This option would not be cheap, but it could gradually bring down costs and troop levels. Trading U.S. 

combat units for ANA or integrated formations, however, would result in some short-term security degradation, a real problem if negotiations are ongoing. On 

the other hand, the integration of ISAF combat units 

with ANA units could also pay great training dividends in a few years. 
130

There are other challenges that may arise with this 

option: The Afghan government may resist integration and improvements in unity of command. U.S. and 

allied trainer/advisor shortages will have to be filled 

rapidly. This will be difficult. In a similar vein, the 

training and education of Afghan civil servants will 

need much more attention, and additional trainer/advisors. In order to bring this about, the coalition needs 

also to reinforce support to the national government, 

its ministries, and its local appointees. 

The biggest obstacle to success here is and will remain the Afghan police, who will be vital to success 

in defeating the insurgency. Efforts to improve their 

training must be increased. Rule-of-law programs—

courts, jails, legal services—must also be improved if 

this government will ever rival Taliban dispute resolution mechanisms. The Ministry of Interior may well 

have to be broken up to defeat its endemic corrupt 

practices, which go all the way to the top levels of the 

ministry, according to in-country observers. The appointment of General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, 

formerly chief of the General Staff, as the Minister of 

the Interior may provide an impetus for change.

For its part, the government of Afghanistan—

which ultimately must win its own war—must work 

harder against corruption and redouble its efforts to 

develop its own capacity in every field of endeavor. 

Links between the center and the provinces must be 

strengthened. Coalition civilian advisors must become the norm in every ministry and throughout their 

subdivisions. The civilian part of the U.S. surge must 

clearly be maintained for a few more years.

A third option—compatible with the options noted 

above, either sequentially or concurrently—is for the 

Afghan government, with coalition and UN support, 
131

to move out smartly on reintegration of individuals 

and reconciliation with parts of or even the entire Afghan Taliban. To do this, President Karzai first will 

have to win over the nearly 60 percent of the Afghan 

population who are not Pashtuns. These groups—

Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazarras, and others—were treated 

poorly by the Taliban and today often live in areas 

outside Taliban influence. They will want peace, but 

not at a price that threatens their regions or allows the 

new Taliban much latitude. 

There should be limits to coalition flexibility. Reconciliation and reintegration are not for war criminals. 

The Afghan constitution cannot be bargained away, 

and participants of all stripes must renounce violence, 

disavow al Qaeda, and come home to Afghanistan 

without arms. One downside here is the potential for 

simultaneous talking and fighting to take place. This is 

hard for Westerners to tolerate; authoritarian entities, 

like the Taliban, often can manipulate talk-fight periods to their advantage. The best way to ensure Taliban 

sincerity is to keep up constant military pressure on its 

formations and their command cadres. The more the 

Taliban feel the heat from the coalition and Pakistan, 

the more likely it will be to embrace reconciliation.

In sterile decisionmaking exercises, teams might 

well decide that the clear way ahead is to go through 

these options in order, starting with another dose of 

full-service COIN, with coincident reintegration of 

individual belligerents. This would be followed by 

Afghanization, with reconciliation beginning only after option two is well underway. Life, however, often 

defeats linear thinking. This is a time of rapid change 

on many fronts. The Coalition is in the same boat today as British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was 

during the Cold War. When asked what his greatest 
132

challenges would be, Macmillan replied: “Events, my 

dear boy, events.”32

Reconciliation, spurred by political maneuvering 

and war weariness may end up leading and not following developments on the battlefield. Counterinsurgency successes in Pakistan can change the battlefield 

dynamics in Afghanistan, and vice versa. Agreements 

among regional powers can effect military operations. 

The exploitation of mineral wealth may provide great 

incentives for some insurgents to come home and improve their economic lot. 

There is an understandable reluctance to move 

into negotiations while the war continues. Few wars, 

however, end with the unconditional surrender of 

your enemy on the deck of a battleship, or with an 

evacuation of your diplomats as enemy tanks seize an 

ally’s capital city. Most irregular and civil wars end in 

some form of negotiation. The United States should 

not stand in the way of reconciliation with the Taliban. 

Rather, it should work for the best possible outcome, 

guided both by its objectives and the available means.

The degree of help the coalition gets from Pakistan will be a key variable in any scenario. Indeed, 

increased Pakistani pressure on the Afghan Taliban 

could drastically speed up reconciliation. The United 

States must continue to insist that Pakistan take action 

against U.S. and Afghan enemies resident on its soil. 

To obtain the assistance of the regional powers, all of 

those powers must believe that a future Afghanistan 

will not work against their interests. To that end, an 

understanding between India and Pakistan on the future of Afghanistan will be critical to long-term stability in Afghanistan. Separate negotiations among 

regional powers may be as important as any of the 

above noted options. To facilitate these negotiations, 
133

Special Representative Richard Holbrooke and his 

team should be given expanded authority to facilitate 

regional negotiations with all interested parties, to include India.

INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS

It is not possible now to chart an exact course for 

the future. It may well be, that despite our best hopes, 

the war continues unabated. Security assistance may 

move to the forefront of the allied agenda. Reintegration of individuals and reconciliation with parts or all 

of the Taliban may occur much faster than the Western 

powers prefer. Regional actors, like Pakistan or Iran, 

may play more constructive roles in reaching settlements or otherwise fashioning a better peace.

While major outcomes are all wrapped in a fog of 

uncertainty, there are any number of key issues that 

the U.S. leadership team needs to tackle right away. 

First, on the military side of the house, it will be necessary to keep up the pressure on the Taliban. Protecting 

the population should remain the first priority, but one 

of the best ways to do that is to eliminate the Taliban, 

i.e., the forces which would oppress the population we 

seek to protect. If reconciliation advances, there will be 

many, including some in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

who will want to cut back on offensive operations and 

counterterrorist activities against the Taliban. In truth, 

reconciliation in the long run depends on destroying 

Taliban formations and convincing them that reconciliation is a better path. 

In a similar vein, there is the issue of rules of engagement. ISAF must balance protecting the population with the need to provide air and artillery support 

to its forces on the ground. It may well be that there 
134

is less here than meets the eye. It may also be that the 

ROE are fine, but are being misinterpreted in some 

units. 

Secondly, it is clear that there needs to be better 

teamwork among our leadership in-country. If the 

change in military commanders does not help this 

situation, the President will have to take a more active 

role or appoint one of the three as primus inter pares,

which is easier written than carried out. Iraq and Afghanistan are proof positive that personal chemistry 

can remove obstacles to cooperation, but that chemistry is not always there. It is not clear if you can legislate or even order such chemistry, but it may help 

to clarify intra-command relationships. On a brighter 

note, inside the operational elements in Afghanistan, 

civil-military cooperation has improved tremendously. The civilian surge is working, even if slower 

than some had hoped. Regional Command-East, for 

example, by the end of 2010, will have close to 300 civilian professionals to work with its military forces in 

their areas of responsibility, which constitute roughly 

a fourth of the country. There is now integration of 

politico-military efforts at the brigade, regional, and 

national levels.33 Indeed, this is one area where the 

subordinates may be able to teach their superiors important lessons.

Finally, it is imperative that we focus on building 

Afghan capacity, not just in the short term in the national security ministries, but across the board in the 

long term in the civil government and private sectors. 

Training and advising are important in the short term, 

but in the long term we must think in decades about 

how to help Afghanistan help itself to overcome the 

horrendous effects of 32 years of war. Governance, 

rule of law, and basic enterprise management must all 
135

be reinforced. Improving Afghan colleges and graduate schools must be a high-priority activity for the long 

term. While a highly centralized government is not a 

good idea, and working more closely with local governments is important, it is also true that there will be 

no end to the problems of Afghanistan unless there is 

a functioning government in Kabul that is well linked 

into the provinces and districts and able to perform 

the basic security and welfare functions of a state. 

The United States has preached for a decade in 

its advisory and development activities that teaching 

people to fish is better than providing them with fish. 

The truth of the matter is, however, that we are superb 

at providing fish and have not done well at teaching 

how to fish, which in this case means building capacity and mentoring Afghans. As we work on building 

national security and local defense forces, we need to 

redouble our efforts at building up Afghan human 

capital and the institutions of governance that one 

day will enable the state of Afghanistan to stand on 

its own two feet. If this does not come to pass, we will 

ultimately fail in Afghanistan.34

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” West Point, NY, December 1, 2009, available from www.

whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-wayforward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 

2. Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 

2004-10, Washington, DC: New America Foundation, April 2010, 

available from counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones. Obama administration data in this study was current to the end of March 

2010.
136

3. The long-term relationship was discussed by both Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton and President Hamid Karzai at an 

open meeting at the United States Institute of Peace, May 13, 2010. 

A transcript of this meeting is available from www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/05/141825.htm .

4. The best source on OEF casualties is available from 

www.icasualties.org/oef/ .

5. General Kayani spoke at a by-invitation meeting at the 

New America Foundation, March 25, 2010.

6. Author’s estimate, based on past spending patterns. Some 

unofficial estimates go as high as 100 billion dollars to be expended in Fiscal Year 2010.

7. Author conversation with a serving defense official, Spring 

2010.

8. David Ignatius, “What Would Reconciliation Look Like 

for the U.S.,” Washington Post, June 29, 2010, available from 

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/28/

AR2010062802758.html?hpid%3Dopinionsbox1&sub=AR. See also, 

unpublished testimony, General David Petraeus, to Senate Armed 

Services Committee, June 29, 2010.

9. Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Envoy’s Cables Show Worries on Afghan Plans,” New York Times, January 25, 2010, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/world/asia/26strategy.html .

10. Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General,” Rolling 

Stone, June 22, 2010, available from www.rollingstone.com/politics/

news/17390/119236. 

11. Karzai et al., USIP, May 13, 2010.

12. One of the better articles on the initial phases of OEF is by 

Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,” MarchApril 2003, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58811/

stephen-biddle/afghanistan-and-the-future-of-warfare .
137

13. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “21st Century Defense Transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces,” Speech at the 

National Defense University, January 31st, 2002, available from 

www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=183. 

14. Various USAID web site articles, especially, afghanistan.

usaid.gov//en/Page.CountryOverview.aspx . UN Human Development Reports and their Index are available from hdr.undp.org/en/

statistics/.

15. For a précis of Khalilzad’s masterful performance in 

Afghanistan, see Kathleen Parker, “The U.S. can’t ignore Karzai’s Tantrum,” Washington Post, April 11, 2010, available from 

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/09/

AR2010040904013.html.

16. James Dobbins, et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: 

From Germany to Iraq, Santa Monica, CA: 2003, pp. xviii, 157-159.

17. Unpublished U.S. Embassy derived statistics for the years 

2002 to 2008. Those proportions in 2008 were reversed, with security assistance-related activities having two-thirds of the available 

dollars. The author thanks Ambassador William Wood for sharing this material.

18. This material represents the author’s calculation, using 

U.S. Embassy statistics, 2002-08, and assuming a population of 29 

million Afghans. These statistics do not include U.S. or international expenditures for their own military forces.

19. USAID statistics, available from afghanistan.usaid.gov//en/

Page.CountryOverview.aspx .

20. Unpublished Central Command statistics briefed at National Defense University in 2009.

21. ISAF statistics and visuals used in CSIS’s Anthony Cordesman and Jason Lemieux, Afghan Campaign: An Overview, available 

from csis.org/publication/afghan-war-campaign-overview-0 .

22. Testimony of former Under Secretary of State James K. 

Glassman before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 

10, 2010, available from mountainrunner.us/files/congress/testimony/

SFRC_20100310-GlassmanTestimony100310p.pdf .
138

23. Then-unpublished UN report cited in Agence France Presse dispatch, January 12, 2010, available from www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g4utYst-DaAXPCnjeGyl2AMualJw.

24. Unpublished ISAF J1 statistics briefed at the National War 

College, Spring 2010.

25. Conversations with various General Officers and CENTCOM and Joint Staff planners, 2003-04.

26. This conclusion was strongly influenced by the yearby-year ABC News-BBC and Asia Foundation polling. Somewhat mysteriously, the trends noted above showed a sharp 

positive increase in the 2009 ABC-BBC polls, before the U.S. 

surge and coincident with the first round of Presidential elections. The 2009 polls are available from abcnews.go.com/images/

PollingUnit/1099a1Afghanistan-WhereThingsStand.pdf and www.

asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2009.pdf . 

27. Conversations between the author and two senior NSC 

officials, as well as a scholar who later participated in the review, 

Spring 2010.

28. White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. 

Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 27, 2009, available 

from www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_

White_Paper.pdf. The short quote is on page 6.

29. General Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, COMISAF’s Initial 

Assessment (Redacted), August 30, 2009, available from media.

washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. 

30. President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in 

Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan,” West Point, NY, December 1, 2009, available from www.

whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-wayforward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 

31. Ibid.
139

32. Quoted in “Harold MacMillan,” Wikipedia, available 

from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harold_Macmillan.

33. See interview with Major General Mike Scaparrotti, USA, 

the commander of Regional Command-East, June 3, 2010, available 

from www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4628 . 

Scaparrotti and his civilian deputy, Dawn Liberi, noted that there 

would be nearly 300 civilian experts in the command by the end 

of 2010. A recently returned commander of an airborne brigade 

in that region spoke in the Spring of 2010 to a National Defense 

Univeristy (NDU) audience regarding the unity of effort on stability operations and reconstruction that takes place at every level of 

command.

34. This paragraph is an edited version of part of a letter to 

the editor on Afghanistan issues in Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 58, 

3d Quarter, July 2010.

141

CHAPTER 8

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN

CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT SINCE 9/11

James Stephenson

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 2001, approximately 100 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives and 300 Special Operations forces drove the Taliban and al Qaeda from 

Afghanistan in a little over 2 months. In 8 years, almost 1,000 American lives and $200 billion later, we 

will soon have a U.S. military force of 98,000 and a $38-

billion foreign-assistance program arrayed against a 

resurgent Taliban that effectively controls large swaths 

of Afghanistan.1

 Our ally and exit strategy, the Karzai 

government, is corrupt, largely viewed by Afghans as 

illegitimate and by virtually all as massively ineffective at delivering essential services and governance to 

its constituents. To the east, our fickle ally, Pakistan, is 

also corrupt and impoverished; is a sanctuary to the 

Taliban, al Qaeda, and a stew of other Afghan insurgents; is unstable; and is perched atop a stockpile of 

nuclear weapons. Having gained little from billions of 

dollars of military and foreign assistance over the last 

8 years, the United States just promised Pakistan an 

additional $7.5 billion in foreign aid, in addition to a 

continuation of high levels of military assistance. One 

could argue that our position is precarious. How we 

got there is a cautionary tale worth telling in the hope 

that we can right our course and avoid the missteps of 

the past.
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THE PERVERSE IMPACT OF IRAQ 

RECONSTRUCTION

U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld clearly 

did not want the armed forces to engage in nation 

building in Afghanistan, but when the Department 

of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) arrived in the wake of the Taliban 

defeat, the Pentagon was appalled at their paucity of 

personnel and financial resources. The response of 

the Pentagon was not to militarize foreign assistance 

to the then-peaceful Afghanistan, but angst over the 

State and USAID approach did lead Secretary Rumsfeld to demand that the Department of Defense (DoD) 

be responsible not only for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 

but also for any post-war reconstruction. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24 gave Rumsfeld the authority he sought. Although USAID was 

brought into the late-stage planning at the DoD, the 

State Department was closed out and largely ignored. 

To manage post-war Iraq reconstruction, the DoD created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 

Assistance (ORHA), which was made up of a handful of retired officers, DoD civilians, USAID officers, 

and, reluctantly, several officers seconded from State. 

ORHA was a modest effort, whose leadership was 

convinced that the major post-war risk was humanitarian suffering, and that its mission would conclude 

in a matter of a few months. USAID was, however, 

allowed to plan for a longer-term stabilization and 

reconstruction program, drawing on its experience 

in other post-conflict countries, most recently the Balkans and the former East Bloc. As it was, ORHA had 

barely reached Baghdad, Iraq, when it was unceremoniously informed of its demise and the succession of 
143

the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, reporting to the Secretary 

of Defense. There was nothing modest about the CPA. 

Although it initially had only a few billion dollars of 

appropriated funding for reconstruction inherited 

from ORHA, the CPA, fueled by DoD hiring, quickly 

grew to some 4,000 souls—at the time, nearly four 

times larger than USAID’s entire Foreign Service.2

 The 

Pentagon was in charge, and its approach to reconstruction was to go big. It was going to rebuild Iraq, 

and then hand it back to the Iraqis and leave. Seated in 

Baghdad, the CPA quickly opened regional offices to 

reach into every province of Iraq. Senior Advisors and 

staff were assigned to every government ministry as 

surrogates. Ambassador Bremer was the legal and de 

facto leader of Iraq and issued general orders to effect 

his authority.

Although the CPA had a statement of broad goals 

for rebuilding Iraq, it never had a coherent strategy 

with carefully phased activities to achieve objectives. 

Instead, it tried to do everything at once. CPA personnel, often hired for their political loyalty, served for 

as little as 3 months, and typically had no prior experience in stabilization and reconstruction. USAID 

was reduced to an executing agency, with little input 

in program decisionmaking. Much of the plan it had 

developed under ORHA was either abandoned or 

gutted of funding to bolster other CPA priorities. By 

July 2003, it was clear that the CPA was going to need 

more money, a lot more money, and Bremer ordered 

his staff to prepare a reconstruction plan and budget 

to be sent to Congress. Developed in the span of a few 

weeks, the $18.4 billion plan that went to Congress 

was heavily focused on rebuilding physical infrastructure—electricity, water, sewerage, oil, transpor-
144

tation, communications, rail, hospitals, schools, and 

security. To foreign assistance professionals, it was 

a staggeringly extravagant program that ignored the 

hard-learned lessons from 50 years of foreign aid, but 

$18.4 billion was pocket change to the DoD.

Stabilization and reconstruction is an enabling 

process that follows a critical path dictated by political, economic, social, and physical forces often outside 

the control of the practitioners. It is rarely about simply rebuilding a country’s physical infrastructure. The 

CPA’s tenure in Iraq was doomed by Iraqi desire and 

demand for self-determination. Before the ink was 

dry on the $18.4 billion supplemental appropriation, 

the Bush administration was forced to agree that the 

CPA would end on June 30, 2004, and hand sovereignty back to a transitional Iraqi government. The CPA 

would be replaced by an embassy. Unfortunately, the 

painful transition from DoD/CPA control to State control, mandated by NSPD 36, was heavily influenced 

by the extant, unprecedented structures of the CPA 

and the inherited $18.4 billion plan. The transition negotiations between State and the DoD resulted in an 

American Embassy, albeit smaller than the CPA, but 

still the largest in the world. The CPA reconstruction 

program was realigned to provide more funding for 

democracy, governance, agriculture, civil society, and 

economic growth, but remained heavily tilted toward 

physical infrastructure. Although more effort was 

made to enable Iraqis to rebuild their own country, 

the original design of the CPA program determined a 

course that had the U.S. Government still attempting 

to rebuild it for them. At the time, no one knew the 

adjustment to an inherited, ill-conceived program for 

Iraq would reverberate for so long or so profoundly. 

Afghanistan, which was then a backwater, was destined for a makeover.
145

STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND 

EXPEDITIONARY CIVILIANS

Stabilization is the process of establishing enough 

governance, security, and economic activity to enable 

the process of reconstruction, which is the longer-term 

rebuilding of institutions of civil society, governance, 

security, and the economy. In Iraq, reconstruction was 

begun before stabilization was achieved. Stabilization 

has to be highly visible, and this militates towards 

many small community projects, including ones that 

promote entrepreneurship and enable the creation of 

small and micro enterprises that marginally improve 

people’s lives. Stabilization buys time for reconstruction, which takes longer and may be largely invisible 

to the average citizen. By concentrating on large infrastructure, which is capital intensive and takes years 

to complete, the CPA squandered the opportunity to 

convince the average Iraqi that his life was going to 

be better. Iraqi disappointment and frustration fed the 

insurgency. Even the U.S forces—who joked that CPA 

stood for “Can’t Provide Anything”—quickly learned 

of the need for visible stabilization efforts. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) became the vehicle for maneuver units to engage in thousands of projects at the community level. It was not 

perfect, and the quality of implementation varied with 

the expertise of the officer dispensing it, but CERP addressed a void that anyone on the ground could see. 

USAID also implemented community development 

projects, but its program was initially constrained by 

funding decisions of the CPA. The realignment enabled USAID to dedicate $400 million to economic 

policy, market reform, and private-sector develop-
146

ment, as well as greater efforts at the community level 

to enable an environment for Iraqi’s to improve their 

quality of life and for entrepreneurs to either start or 

expand small enterprises.

 In Afghanistan, State and USAID embarked on an 

effort to build a strong central government from the 

top down, where none had ever effectively governed. 

Stabilization was never achieved. The U.S. program 

was Kabul-centric, with most Afghans oblivious to 

any efforts to improve their lives. No community development efforts were undertaken, in spite of the success of the World Bank National Solidarity Program, 

which enabled thousands of projects in rural villages. 

Recognizing the problem, the Coalition began in 2003 

to form Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 

military units with civilian advisors from State, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture, tasked with 

working with local governments to implement relatively small projects. While the PRTs met with some 

success, performance and methods were decidedly 

mixed. USAID initially staffed most PRTs with a single personal services contractor, while State tended 

to use junior Foreign Service officers. PRTs were also 

severely limited in their effect in southern and eastern 

Afghanistan by the security challenges of movement 

in a hostile environment. In spite of the limitations, 

State decided in 2005 to build PRTs in Iraq, where they 

also were hampered by deteriorating security and, 

again, had modest impact. PRTs are deeply resented 

by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating 

in the same space, who argue that military personnel 

delivering the same assistance creates identity confusion and makes targets of the NGOs, which have 

traditionally been viewed as neutral and accorded 

humanitarian space. The more salient point is that 
147

NGOs, unlike PRTs, generally use local nationals to 

continually engage communities and local governments. PRTs typically engage a community by arriving in an armed military convoy. Often they are unable to leave their bases for weeks at a time, due to 

security threats. Essentially military units with a few 

civilian advisors, the PRTs in Afghanistan generally 

have 80-100 personnel. Given that the cost of deploying a soldier to Afghanistan is $1 million a year, PRTs 

are an enormous investment for very little return.3

By 2004, senior members of Congress and the Bush 

administration, alarmed at the poor mobilization and 

implementation of the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, sought a mechanism within the 

U.S. Government to better plan for and implement stabilization and reconstruction, utilizing the full range 

of the government’s civilian assets, when necessary in 

coordination with U.S. military forces. While legislation did not pass until 2009, the State Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004 as the operational 

component of the State Department’s reconstruction 

and stabilization (R&S) activities. S/CRS is charged 

by Congress and the Secretary of State with building 

and maintaining an expeditionary, innovative, and 

interagency civilian capability to plan, manage, and 

conduct U.S. stabilization operations on behalf of the 

Secretary of State and Chiefs of Mission overseas.4 It 

is tasked with cooperating closely with the DoD, but 

its limited funding and staff are dwarfed by the military’s capabilities. S/CRS has had only a marginal role 

in Afghanistan and Iraq.

S/CRS seeks to monitor countries at risk of failure 

and maintain a small Standby Component of interagency professionals prepared to deploy in Advance 
148

Civilian Teams anywhere in the world within days. It 

is building a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) of interagency professionals to deploy within 30-60 days to 

support the advance teams. The planned CRC of up to 

5,000 private citizens with critical skills has not been 

funded by Congress. While persons in the Standby 

Component and Civilian Response Corps have deployed as individuals to address specific needs, and 

assessment teams have performed discrete missions 

in support of country teams, to date, S/CRS has deployed no Advance Civilian Teams to manage stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Indeed, State has 

used S/CRS and the CRC to staff the needs of ad hoc 

efforts, e.g., the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.5

Even as S/CRS sought to establish itself as the coordinator of U.S. Government stabilization efforts, it 

has endured constant criticism and attack from various quarters. The Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) recently proposed creating the 

U.S. Office of Contingency Operations, which would 

absorb S/CRS and parts of USAID and other agencies 

and report to the National Security Advisor. The staff 

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is circulating draft legislation that would terminate S/CRS and 

create a joint State-USAID office, reporting directly to 

the Secretary of State. These efforts are indicative of 

the lack of confidence within the government that S/

CRS will ever be capable of performing its expeditionary mission.

Skepticism of S/CRS appears to be strongest at the 

DoD, which embraced stabilization and reconstruction—what the military calls Stability Operations—in 

2005 with the Defense Directive 3000.05, which raised 

stability operations to the same level of importance 
149

as combat operations. It states that, “stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign 

or U.S. civilian professionals,” but, “nonetheless, U.S. 

military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks 

necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.” It also directs the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop, 

“methods to recruit, select and assign current and former DoD personnel with relevant skills for service in 

stability operations assignments.”6

 In 2008, the Army 

issued its first Field Manual for Stability Operations (FM 

3-07), and is becoming increasingly sophisticated at 

stabilization and reconstruction. In 2007, exercises in 

stability operations were incorporated into Mission 

Readiness Exercises for all brigades deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq. In theater, U.S. forces are experimenting with methodologies that use development 

experts and indigenous personnel to engage with 

communities and traditional governance structures. 

While U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been 

an outspoken advocate for funding the S/CRS Civilian 

Reserve Corps, he has nevertheless ordered the DoD 

to build its own Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, 

and that effort is underway. Finally, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, which seeks to envisage how 

the joint forces will operate in the future and in what 

environments, recognizes relief and reconstruction as 

a key component of how joint forces will operate. It 

was signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

in January 2009.7

THE SHRINKING OF USAID

USAID’s slow slide toward the abyss accelerated 

during the Clinton administration as Congress cut 

USAID’s operating budget, compelling it to reduce 
150

its force of Foreign Service Officers. To compensate 

and continue to perform its mission, USAID increasingly utilized personal services contractors, many of 

whom were retired or involuntarily separated former Foreign Service Officers. These positions could 

be salaried with program funds, which, contrary to 

the operating budget, continued to grow. The second 

blow was the administration’s innovation of inviting 

other departments and agencies of the government to 

encroach on the foreign-assistance program. It was 

the nascence of what would later be heralded as “a 

whole-of-government approach.” The Departments 

of Treasury and Justice not only carved out swaths 

of foreign assistance, but asserted their ownership of 

what they had taken. The Departments of Commerce 

and Agriculture strengthened their own foreign-assistance services and participation in foreign-assistance 

programs. The Department of State reserved more 

Economic Support Funds for its own use. At the same 

time, Congress began to mandate State Department 

Coordinators for special-assistance programs in the 

Balkans and former Soviet states. Increasingly, these 

coordinators not only made policy, but dictated the 

method of implementation and dispersed funding. 

USAID’s share of funding and influence diminished, 

in Washington and overseas. Faced with shrinking 

power, influence, and operating budgets, USAID shed 

many of its specialized officers in health, education, 

engineering, and science, and relied more and more 

on obtaining those skills by contract from the private 

sector. In some countries, missions were closed because USAID simply did not have sufficient operating 

funds to keep them open. The end of the 1990s seemed 

like the nadir for USAID. The next decade was worse.
151

The George W. Bush administration’s disastrous 

venture with the ad hoc Coalition Provisional Authority did not sway it from other ventures. Instead, it continued to diminish USAID by creating new institutions 

to implement large elements of foreign assistance that 

had traditionally been the province of USAID. In 2003, 

President Bush created the President’s Emergency 

Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a 5-year, $15-billion 

initiative managed by a Global AIDS Coordinator 

reporting to the Secretary of State.8

 USAID was but 

one of a half-dozen agencies tasked with its implementation. In 2008, PEPFAR was renewed until 2013, 

increased to a commitment of $48 billion and expanded to cover other infectious diseases, further eroding 

USAID’s health portfolio. In 2004, the President created the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 

to form partnerships with some of the world’s poorest countries and provide large-scale grants to fund 

country-led solutions for reducing poverty through 

sustainable economic growth.9 To date, the MCC has 

signed compacts with 20 countries for $7 billion. As of 

July 2008, it has disbursed only $235 million of the $7.5 

billion provided by Congress.10 The MCC tends to be 

popular with conservative think-tanks as an innovative approach to foreign assistance, but has been criticized by development professionals and Congress for 

slow implementation and questionable achievements. 

However, the MCC has been embraced by the Obama 

administration, and Congress continues to provide it 

with funding, though at levels significantly below the 

administration’s requests. 

The Bush administration’s worst blow to USAID 

occurred in 2006, when it appointed Randall L. Tobias 

as the first U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance, to serve 

concurrently as the Administrator of USAID. Tobias 
152

was responsible for overseeing all foreign-assistance 

activities of the U.S. Government. In addition to his 

direct responsibilities for USAID, Tobias was charged 

with directing the transformation of the U.S. Government’s approach to foreign-assistance. Responsible 

for providing strategic direction and guidance to all 

other foreign-assistance programs delivered through 

the various agencies and entities of the U.S. Government, including MCC and the Global AIDS Coordinator, he reported directly to the Secretary of State and 

held the rank of Deputy Secretary of State. USAID 

was stripped of its policy, program, and coordination 

functions, which were moved to the Department of 

State.11 The “F process,” launched by U.S. Secretary of 

State Condoleezza Rice in January 2006, was designed 

to place USAID under more direct control of the State 

Department.12 The new F Bureau, staffed by State and 

USAID personnel, was tasked with integrating foreign-assistance planning and resource management 

across State and USAID. This radically altered the 

relationship between USAID, the State Department, 

and Congress. USAID no longer submitted its annual 

budget request directly to the Office of Management 

and Budget. Instead, The F process integrated USAID 

programs into the foreign operations budget request 

of the Department of State. USAID had lost it voice in 

policy, and no longer controlled either its budget or 

the programming of it. 

These events spawned alarm in the development 

community, Congress, and think tanks. Numerous 

studies were published, most arguing for the rebuilding of USAID capabilities and its autonomy. Some 

went so far as to argue that USAID’s authorities 

and independence be restored and it be elevated to 

a Cabinet-level department. Others argued for abol-
153

ishing USAID and rewriting the Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961. Still others argued for absorbing USAID 

into the Department of State. No consensus had been 

reached by the inauguration of the Obama administration, though the weight of opinion in the development community seemed to favor a return of USAID’s 

authorities and autonomy, at least to the status quo 

ante, and a significant increase in personnel. The confirmation of Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State was 

warmly greeted by the development community, given her foreign affairs credentials and her long history 

of support for foreign aid and USAID. Clinton spoke 

of “smart power” and the “three D’s of Diplomacy, 

Defense and Development.”13 Many thought that the 

pursuit of these concepts heralded the elevation of USAID. They were soon disabused. For 11 months, while 

no nomination was forthcoming, USAID was led by a 

career officer, supervised by the Deputy Secretary of 

State for Management and Resources. No authorities 

were returned to USAID. Secretary Clinton did support and win funding for significant increases in USAID and State personnel. She spoke often of her desire 

to strengthen USAID, but also spoke of the need for 

diplomacy and development to serve policy and be 

closely coordinated. It appeared to many that the USAID the Secretary supported was one she envisioned 

either within the Department of State or closely supervised by it. The Secretary remained ambiguous, if not 

opaque, about her intentions.

In July 2009, Secretary Clinton announced the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), a 

“process to guide us to agile, responsive, and effective 

institutions of diplomacy and development, including 

how to transition from approaches no longer commensurate with current challenges,” and, “offer guid-
154

ance on how we develop policies; how we allocate 

our resources; how we deploy our staff; and how we 

exercise our authorities.”14 In August 2009, President 

Obama signed a Presidential Study Directive (PSD7), ordering an interagency review of all U.S. global 

development policy, led by the National Security 

Council and National Economic Council. This seemed 

unprecedented, coming only months after the QDDR 

was announced, and was widely viewed as a slap at 

the more parochial QDDR. It came after Senators John 

Kerry and Dick Lugar introduced the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act (S.1524) 

to rebuild the USAID and strengthen evaluation of 

foreign-aid programs. Finally, under increased scrutiny for his failure to nominate a new USAID administrator, President Obama announced the nomination 

of Rajiv Shah to lead the Agency. At his confirmation 

hearing on December 1, 2009, Shah testified, “Not 

since the founding of USAID in 1961 and the passage 

of the Foreign Assistance Act have we had such an 

opportunity to fundamentally re-imagine our nation’s 

development strategy and strengthen the organization 

that leads it.”15 Just weeks later, Shah was tapped by 

President Obama to lead U.S. efforts to respond to the 

devastating earthquake in Haiti, and Shah received 

high marks for his performance; however, Secretary 

Clinton put her Chief of Staff, Cheryl Mills, in charge 

of all funding decisions, raising questions about who 

was really in charge.

Perhaps no one but President Obama knows what 

the convergence of the QDDR, PSD-7, and congressional efforts will produce with regard to the future of 

USAID and U.S. foreign assistance. The publication of 

the results of the QDDR has been delayed, and the National Security Council (NSC) has reportedly agreed 
155

to hold the publication of the PSD review until after 

the release of the QDDR, though a draft summary of 

the PSD-7 recommendations was leaked in April 2010. 

It is reasonable to assume, though not certain, that 

Congress will hold off on bringing S.1524 to the floor 

until both the QDDR and PSD results are officially released. In the meantime, there are signs that the State 

Department continues to extend its influence over 

USAID and foreign assistance, both in Washington 

and the field. For example, the State Department’s International Cooperative Administrative Support Services initiative to consolidate administrative services 

at U.S. embassies worldwide, according to a March 

2010 survey by the American Foreign Service Association, rather than being used to increase efficiency 

and reduce costs, is being used instead to force USAID to utilize incompatible, less efficient, more costly 

systems of the State Department. The authors of the 

survey concluded that “USAID’s ability to support its 

staff and carry out its development goals overseas is 

in serious jeopardy.”16 Nowhere is USAID’s subordination to the State Department more evident than in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan (AFPAK).

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

On January 22, 2009, just 2 days into the Obama 

administration, Secretary Clinton announced the appointment of Richard Holbrooke as the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Stating that 

nowhere was “the need for a vigorous diplomatic 

approach more apparent than in the two regions that 

epitomize the nuance and complexity of our interconnected world,” she acknowledged that many “Foreign 

Service and Civil Service and Foreign National col-
156

leagues have been engaged on behalf of issues related 

to the Middle East and to Afghanistan and Pakistan 

for years, sometimes, as we know, at great peril and 

personal sacrifice,” and promised their work would 

“continue to be the underpinning of everything our 

government does to achieve peace and stability in 

these regions.” She went on to state that Mr. Holbrooke’s task would be to “coordinate across the 

entire government an effort to achieve [the] United 

States’ strategic goals in the region. This effort will be 

closely coordinated, not only within the State Department and, of course, with USAID, but also with the 

Defense Department and under the coordination of 

the National Security Council.”17

In the ensuing months, it became clear that Mr. 

Holbrooke was far more than a coordinator of strategic goals. Within a few months, the country team in 

Afghanistan was reorganized and included, in addition to the Ambassador, a Deputy Ambassador and 

a Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs, to whom the USAID Mission Director 

reported. (USAID Mission Directors normally report 

to the Ambassador). In Pakistan, the USAID Mission 

Director was replaced with a USAID officer known 

to Mr. Holbrooke from the Balkans. In August, former ambassador Robin Raphel was appointed to the 

Embassy in Islamabad as the State Department’s nonmilitary aid coordinator for Pakistan. Mr. Holbrooke 

announced that his team would develop an assistance 

strategy for both Afghanistan and Pakistan that, in 

a departure from USAID’s normal operating modality, would utilize fewer U.S. contractors and NGOs; 

disburse funds directly to government entities, local contractors and NGOs; and significantly increase 

the number of U.S. Government employees in both 
157

countries, to directly implement the strategy. By the 

year’s end, the U.S. Government civilian presence in 

Afghanistan tripled to almost 1,000, most ostensibly to 

be placed outside of Kabul in PRTs, District Support 

Teams, and with military maneuver units. In Pakistan, 

USAID was completely reorganized to implement the 

new strategy, though significant USAID staff increases were slower to be realized.

It is too soon to know whether the new strategies 

for Afghanistan and Pakistan will be successful, but 

there are a number of factors inherent to both countries and the AFPAK approach that raise concerns. 

The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Afghanistan as the world’s second 

most corrupt country, at 179. Pakistan fairs slightly 

better with a score of 139, but still with a score of only 

2.4 out of a possible 10.18 Given endemic corruption in 

both government and the private sector, the plan to 

disburse funds directly to both governments and to 

local contractors and NGOs would seem fraught with 

the risk of both failure and the theft of funding. The 

use of U.S. contractors and NGOs, who hire local personnel and utilize local contractors and NGOs, provides the U.S. Government with a form of insurance. 

When U.S. contractors or NGOs fail to meet the terms 

of their agreements or lose funds due to fraud, waste, 

or abuse, they usually settle without legal action, but 

may be easily pursued in U.S. Federal Court. They are 

responsible and liable for the actions of their subcontractors and grantees. When they are removed and the 

U.S. Government enters into contractual relationships 

directly with foreign governments, contractors and 

NGOs, recourse is through local courts and processes 

with little chance of recovering funds lost, embezzled, 

or simply wasted. 
158

Stabilization and reconstruction, particularly in 

dangerous environments, is an art traditionally practiced by a small cadre of experienced officers from 

State, USAID, a handful of other agencies, and a handful of contractors and NGOs. The business model being pursued by AFPAK, particularly in Afghanistan, 

requires larger numbers of experienced personnel 

than are available in either USAID or the State Department. Both have resorted to temporary hires, but 

many of these are reported to have not only no stabilization and reconstruction experience, but also no 

overseas development experience. Only a few State 

Department Foreign Service officers are trained and 

experienced to do stabilization and reconstruction. To 

expect temporary hires—essentially personal services 

contractors—to successfully engage in an effort so 

complex after a few months of training is unrealistic, if 

not dangerous. That would be the case in a permissive 

environment, which Afghanistan and Pakistan decidedly do not provide. Even before the civilian surge to 

Afghanistan, the security environment prevented PRT 

personnel and embassy personnel from providing adequate oversight to field activities. In dangerous environments, the State Department’s security protocols, 

which cover USAID, place crippling restrictions on 

mobility, usually for valid reasons. USAID contractors 

and NGOs do not fall under those restrictions. While 

they must take extraordinary care to protect their personnel, they are generally adept at successfully performing their tasks, which involve operating outside 

the wire. This reality is borne out by the increased use 

of U.S. NGOs and contractors in Afghanistan in the 

past year, in spite of State Department claims to the 

contrary.
159

 Since the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, security considerations—including 

Inman-compliant buildings, armored vehicles, bodyguards, static guard forces, and secure communications—have greatly increased the costs of fielding Embassy staff. While there is no argument that both the 

State Department and USAID, particularly the latter, 

need significant increases in Foreign Service staff to 

meet global challenges, there is also no argument that 

it is costly. Embassy facilities will have to be expanded 

or new ones built. If the cost of fielding a single soldier 

for 1 year in Afghanistan is $1 million, what is the cost 

of fielding a single Foreign Service officer there? It is 

certainly no less, and a lot more than the cost of fielding 

an individual working for a contractor or NGO. Personnel numbers at USAID and the State Department 

declined over the past decades because Congress was 

not disposed to provide the funding to maintain them. 

Absent the national security threat that conditions in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan pose, what is the likelihood 

that Congress will continue to provide funding for expanded personnel numbers, much less the capacity to 

surge large numbers of personnel to the next threat? Is 

the AFPAK business model even sustainable?

A LEANER, SUSTAINABLE MODEL 

The United States actually has in its recent history a successful model of how to fight a counterinsurgency: El Salvador. When that conflict flared 

in the late 1970s, the searing experience of Vietnam 

was fresh, and Congress was deeply skeptical of U.S. 

involvement in another guerilla war. President Reagan—determined to check communist expansion in 

Central America, but faced with stiff opposition in 
160

Congress—agreed to limit military intervention to a 

Milgroup of 55 advisors who would train and equip 

the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF).19 The Milgroup 

advisors, many of whom were Special Forces highly 

trained in counterinsurgency, were not allowed to accompany into combat the forces they trained. ESAF 

officers were also trained in the United States, and for 

a brief period Salvadoran soldiers were trained at a 

base in neighboring Honduras. Congressional opposition also contributed to keeping in check the number 

of State, USAID, and other personnel assigned to the 

Embassy in San Salvador. (At the peak, USAID had 

only 36 Foreign Service officers in-country, and approximately an equal number of personal services 

contractors working alongside.) Although Milgroup 

bridled at the inefficiencies of the limitations, they 

turned out to be a blessing.20 Unable to go big, so to 

speak, Milgroup was forced to invest time, intelligence, equipment, and training to enable the ESAF to 

defeat the insurgency, not to do it for them. It took 

12 years. While the ESAF was slowly becoming proficient, State and USAID worked with the government and civil society to enable reform of the social, 

economic and political system that had fueled the 

insurgency. Most significantly, USAID worked with 

the Salvadoran private sector to create organizations 

that supported entrepreneurs in the creation or expansion of micro, small, medium, and large enterprises 

in agriculture, services, industry, and export. Technical assistance and credit enabled the process. With 

USAID assistance, economist Dr. Arnold Harberger 

of the University of Chicago, and his team of Chicago 

Boys were brought in by The Salvadoran Foundation 

for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES) 

to design and help implement a comprehensive neo-
161

liberal economic reform program. This program, with 

the bottom-up enabling efforts, became the engine 

of economic recovery and sustained growth in gross 

domestic product (GDP). Community development 

programs empowered villagers and undermined the 

influence of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation 

Front (FMLN, the Marxist insurgency). Again, this 

was not a linear process, but one of steady progress 

with frequent setbacks. Undoubtedly, the breakup of 

the Soviet Union, which removed significant materiel 

support for the insurgents, helped, but by the beginning of peace negotiations in 1990, El Salvador was a 

different country than it had been in 1980. When the 

war ended by negotiation in 1992, the former FMLN 

insurgents, through peaceful elections the next year, 

became the loyal opposition in the legislature. In 2009, 

an FMLN candidate won the presidential elections, 

and there was a peaceful transition of power. El Salvador remains a peaceful democracy with a free market 

economy. The cost of victory to the United States was 

approximately $4 billion and a score of civilian and 

military casualties.

The model the United States employed in the 

countries of the former East-Bloc and the Balkans also 

utilized small numbers of highly qualified personnel 

with significant monetary resources at their disposal. 

Originally, the State Department wanted only a single 

USAID affairs officer in each embassy, but later recognized it needed USAID Missions. None of these were 

particularly robust. (For example, the USAID Mission 

in Serbia and Montenegro had only seven Foreign 

Service officers and nine personal service contractors 

to manage a fully integrated development program 

that averaged $200 million per year.) As in the case of 

El Salvador, the modalities used by State and USAID 
162

were at least partly driven by decades of declining 

operating budgets and consequent reductions in personnel. This was particularly acute at USAID, whose 

corps of Foreign Service officers by the late-1990s had 

been reduced to just over 1,000. USAID had always 

utilized contractors and NGOs to implement foreignassistance programs, but the declines in personnel 

meant that the ratio of program managers to contracts 

and grants widened significantly. Still, the model of 

enabling countries to reform and rebuild themselves, 

rather than doing it for them, was served well by 

relatively modest numbers of capable, experienced 

Foreign Service officers leveraged by contractors and 

NGOs that also used small numbers of expatriate personnel and larger numbers of local nationals. During 

the author’s tenure in Iraq from 2004-05, the USAID 

Mission had 102 expatriates and 103 Iraqi nationals to 

manage a program of $5 billion with 9,000 projects. 

USAID’s 50 contractors and NGOs employed daily 

as many as 70,000 Iraqis, though over half were day 

workers. The program during that period is generally 

conceded to have functioned well, and the Agency 

never wanted or asked for additional personnel. Success at post-conflict transition or counterinsurgency 

is predicated on the right enabling strategy, implemented by experienced practitioners with time and 

patience. Throwing more money and personnel at a 

bad strategy is a waste of both, as are misguided efforts to try to force a timeline that cannot be forced.

RATIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM

The Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act (S.1524), as written, would restore 

USAID’s policy and planning and strengthen its hu-
163

man resource capacity, but is ambiguous with regard 

to its authority over its own budget. If USAID’s budget 

remains under the control of the Department of State, 

its influence and capability will continue to decline. In 

that event, the recommendation of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction for the creation of 

the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations may be the 

most viable option for reforming U.S. capacity to conduct stabilization and reconstruction abroad. However, if the absorption of USAID by the Department 

of State is reversed, by legislation or executive action, 

USAID should also be designated as the coordinator 

of U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction 

operations. Should that occur, a number of concurrent 

actions should be initiated. 

USAID’s Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance should be expanded by folding 

its Office of Military Affairs, Office of Transition Initiatives, and Office of Civilian Response into a new 

Bureau of Stabilization and Reconstruction (BSR). S/

CRS should be abolished and its responsibilities and 

functions transferred to the BSR, which would have 

interagency staffing from State, the DoD, and other 

agencies, including Senior Foreign Service and General Officer supervisory positions. BSR staffing in 

Washington should be only as large as necessary to 

monitor failed and failing states, plan for contingency 

operations, and maintain the capacity to field two Advance Civilian Teams simultaneously, anywhere in 

the world. The Standby Component in Washington 

should be supplemented by offering modest pay incentives to 500 qualified State and USAID Foreign Service officers, wherever serving, willing to deploy on 

24 hours notice for up to a year. Members of a reduced 

300-member Civilian Response Corps, drawn from 
164

other federal agencies, should receive the same incentive payments. The Civilian Reserve Corps should be 

abandoned. Continuous training should be provided 

to all BSR officers and reserves, including training 

with the military to develop stabilization and reconstruction skills. BSR and the military should develop 

flexible models for civilian-military cooperation in the 

field, but not be wedded to any single model, including the use of U.S. contractors and NGOs and their 

local employees.

Finally, stabilization and reconstruction operations 

are different than USAID’s other development assistance operations and the Department of State’s normal 

diplomatic postings. Officers attracted to stabilization 

and reconstruction are a different breed than those attracted to more normal postings. The fact is that stabilization and reconstruction are most often practiced 

in dangerous environments, under primitive living 

and working conditions. It is not for everyone. Both 

USAID and the Department of State should develop 

a cadre of officers with the inclination and skills for 

stabilization and reconstruction and cease the practice 

of requiring all officers to bid (volunteer) for assignments to countries where the United States is engaged 

in stabilization and reconstruction. The civilians who 

do stability and reconstruction are as different from 

the rest as Special Operations forces are from the rest 

of the military. In fact, they are very much like special 

operations forces and operate in the same environments—they just do it unarmed.
165

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. “Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, July 14, 2009, available from fas.

org/sgp/crs/row/R40699.pdf.

2. Personnel reporting by the DoD on the numbers deployed 

to the CPA was so poor that no exact number is attainable. 

3. Christopher Drew, “High Costs Weigh on Troop Debate for 

Afghan War,” New York Times, November 14, 2009, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/us/politics/15cost.html.

4. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, available from www.state.gov/s/crs/index.htm.

5.Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, available from www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.

display&shortcut=JDKH.

6. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Washington, DC, 

available from www.usaid.gov/policy/cdie/sss06/sss_1_080106_dod.

pdf.

7. U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), available from 

www.jfcom.mil/new. 

8. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, available from 

www.pepfar.gov/about/index.htmslink/storyarchive/2009/pa012309a.

html.

9. Millennium Challenge Corporation, available from www.

mcc.gov/mcc/about/index.shtml.

10. Noam Unger and Margaret L. Taylor, “Capacity for 

Change, Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile 

Countries,” Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution and the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 2010, 

p. 12. 

11. Ibid., p. 10.
12. Ryan Weddle, “What’s Next for the ’F’ Process,” March 

30, 2009, available from www.devex.com/articles/what-s-next-for-thef-process.

13. Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Washington, DC: Department of State, July 10, 2009, available from www.

state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125956.htm.

14. Ibid.

15. Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 1, 2009, available from www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2009/pr091201.html.

16. “The Vanguard,” available from www.afsa.org/

usaid/0410vanguard.pdf.

17. U.S. Department of State, available from www.state.gov/

secretary/rm/2009a/01/115297.htm.

18. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 

2009, available from www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_

indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.

19. Major Paul P. Cale, “The United States Military Advisory 

Group In El Salvador, 1979-1992,” p. 13, available from smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cale.pdf.

20. Ibid., p. 14.

166
167

CHAPTER 9

OUR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT “SYSTEM”

NEEDS AN OVERHAUL:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Matthew Harber

Throughout this book, all the authors in one form 

or another have provided insight into a midterm assessment of the Obama administration. The strength 

of all the contributed articles is the scope of subjects 

that were covered. These subjects included how the 

U.S. national security system needs reform and the 

best possible ways to go about this, highlighting the 

need for Congress to take most of the initiative. Additional topics included the U.S. handling of the Iraq 

and Afghanistan invasions and the future of U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts. In this chapter, 

each preceeding chapter will be reviewed, engaging in 

a discussion of what should be expected of President 

Obama and U.S. foreign policy in the last 2 years of his 

first term regarding national security reform.

In Chapter 2, James Carafano includes a dual argument: (1) that through proposed defense spending 

cuts the United States is putting itself at risk from 

international security threats; and (2) that whole-ofgovernment approaches are quite possible but difficult within our governmental structure. Carafano 

postulates that these problems are causing the key 

instruments of the American national security system 

to fall into neutral. Furthermore, if these issues are not 

addressed, then one could actually see the American 

national security system regress and put the country 

at large at risk.
168

Carafano vehemently argues against defense 

spending cuts as a method for politicians to make 

simple pronouncements. He counters one of the traditional claims—that if only Washington could cut 

down on military spending, America’s fiscal issues 

would be solved. He points out that defense spending ranks fourth in the overall federal budget; it trails 

financial support for the elderly, education funding, 

and means-tested welfare programs. Furthermore, 

even if Washington were to cut defense spending, this 

would not have any significant impact on solving the 

country’s budgetary problems. The problem arises 

when proposals link reductions in defense spending 

to solving U.S. fiscal issues, while forgetting the international ramifications.

According to Carafano, the American military simply has some missions that if abandoned or compromised, would put the United States at risk. In other 

words, what the American people expect of the military on an international level simply cannot be done 

with fewer forces, capabilities, and funding. To put 

it succinctly, this expectation defies common sense. 

Rather, for the U.S. military to accomplish the goals 

expected of it requires predictable levels of spending. Stability in defense spending allows the military 

to maintain and modernize its arsenals. More importantly, predictable levels of spending would allow the 

military to train its forces for all types of warfare. This 

is extremely important, since the threats facing the 

United States are complex and take on many forms. 

Therefore, the military must be able and ready to confront any of these potential threats when asked to. Unfortunately, Carafano argues, the U.S. military is not 

able to be properly prepared, as described above, because policymakers are making the incorrect assump-
169

tion that potential threats will never emerge. There 

is the potential that the military will be turned into 

a “hollow force” that will lack the capabilities necessary to keep the nation free, safe, and prosperous.

The other half of Carafano’s argument for strengthening America’s national security system is that a 

whole-of-government approach must be adopted. Carafano argues that this can be accomplished through 

better congressional oversight and a deeper understanding of the interagency process. The current congressional oversight process, filled with overlapping 

committees, simply leads to inefficiency and detracts 

from overall effectiveness. Carafano proposes that the 

solution to this oversight conundrum is to collapse 

the multiple committees within the House and Senate into single entities for each legislative chamber. In 

fact, he argues that such an action should be a top priority. Unfortunately though, neither Congress nor the 

White House has shown any initiative in instituting 

such internal reforms.

Additionally, Carafano believes that some policymakers simply do not understand the entire interagency process. This lack of understanding deters from creating a whole-of-government national 

security system paradigm. Carafano argues that the 

interagency process can be broken down into three 

levels: policy, operations, and practice. The level that 

requires significant attention, scrutiny, and reform is 

operations. The driving factors behind the operational 

weakness originate from flaws in the divide between 

military and civilian circles, including distinct institutional cultures, lack of trust between actors within 

the interagency process, and lack of interagency operational experience. Until those issues are addressed, 

the operational level will remain weak. In Carafano’s 
170

view Congress and the White House, the two agents 

most capable of stimulating effective and efficient interagency operations, have not shown enough interest 

or committed enough resources to overcoming these 

obstacles. Therefore, real national security reform 

must start with Congress; Congress can create a legislative framework in which federal agencies can be 

staffed with responsible people who are skilled in the 

interagency process.

In Chapter 3, Dr. Bernard Finel critically challenges the whole-of-government approach that revolves 

around better integration of the various instruments of 

statecraft as well as better training and education for 

a cadre of national security specialists. Finel believes 

that this is such a big subject of debate within national 

security reform, because for some reason policymakers assume that it is in America’s interest to maintain a 

“quasi-colonial” presence overseas. Finel argues that 

this assumption needs to be challenged and examined 

in far more detail. Specifically, policymakers must be 

able to admit that it might not be in America’s interest 

to be so involved internationally. Finel believes that 

there must be national security reform, but it must 

revolve around introducing disciplined cost-benefit 

analyses to involvement in particular conflicts, improving civil-military relations, and imposing checks 

on any sort of unlawful activity.

Dr. Finel does agree that conflicts in today’s world 

are becoming more complex, complicated, interconnected, and confusing to understand. However, it is 

because of these various components that policymakers absolutely must utilize improved cost-benefit analyses. The purpose of these analyses is to determine up 

front whether the United States has the available resources and that the benefits are tangible if the United 
171

States does decide to commit itself to any particular 

conflict. For if the United States fails to do strict costbenefit analysis, it could commit itself to a conflict 

in which it will incur more costs then benefits, thus 

not serving U.S. interests. Logically, the United States 

should make these assessments before committing 

military forces. Finel, therefore, recommends that national security expenditures follow the congressional 

PAYGO rule, which stresses budget neutrality. That is, 

any expenditure must be offset with revenue increases 

or spending cuts. This would start the U.S. national 

security system down a path of cost-effectiveness and 

meaningful strategic and operational assessments.

As for improving civil-military relations, Finel 

proposes three major changes: (1) insulate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) from political pressures, (2) ban general officers (except for the 

CJCS) from any public statements, and (3) impose 

regulations on the tapping of recently retired officers 

as political appointees. 

In general, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

must be able to provide candid advice to the President 

and Congress about military issues. In the current 

system, the Chairman is unable to do that. Therefore, 

the benefits of insulating him from political pressures 

become readily apparent. First and foremost, it will 

allow him to provide the President the best possible 

military advice, allowing the President to make the 

best decision. Also, by being above political pressures, 

the CJCS can act as a conduit for military dissent. By 

having the CJCS fulfill this function, Finel hopes to 

also limit the number of military leaks and back-channel military lobbying.

Dr. Finel also argues that general officers must see 

their profiles diminish. In other words, they must believe they have to take it upon themselves not to break 
172

with the chain of command by publicly disagreeing 

with a policy decision and not to resort to back-channel lobbying. The main negative consequence that 

occurs when such an event happens is that it sends 

mixed signals of a lack of cohesiveness between the 

military and civilian government to the international 

community. This can have significant consequences 

internationally, and particularly in how U.S. policies 

are received abroad. Therefore, according to Finel, all 

general officers except for the Chairman should be 

banned from giving public statements. This includes 

speeches to think tanks, universities, newspapers, and 

television stations.

According to Finel, there has been a steady increase 

in recently retired officers being tapped to serve as 

political appointees. The major risks of this policy are 

that it runs the possibility of politicizing the military 

and eroding professionalism in the officer corps. In 

other words, the tapping of retired officers as political 

appointees may weaken the ability of our officers to 

provide the strictly military advice required of them. 

To avoid such a situation, Finel proposes that there 

should be strict regulation regarding this. Specifically, 

there must be a 5-year period after retirement before a 

retired officer may be tapped as a political appointee. 

Also, no serving general should be eligible to run any 

government agency. 

The third dimension of Finel’s approach to national security reform is to impose checks on any unlawful 

activity. He argues that over the past decade, the U.S. 

national security community has been implicated in 

various unlawful activities such as war crimes (and 

their cover-up), unlawful domestic surveillance, and 

torture. One of the first steps needed to limit such 

activities is to clarify personal liability. Second, there 
173

needs to be some form of independent authority that 

has the jurisdiction to investigate and initiate criminal 

proceedings into allegations of unlawful activities. If 

all three areas are addressed, then the United States 

will have achieved meaningful national security reform in the eyes of Finel.

In Chapter 4, Jim Locher argues that national security reform is the responsibility of Congress. According to Locher, Congress can spearhead reform through 

its oversight of the application, administration, and 

execution of its laws. Locher argues that there is a 

precedent for Congress-driven reform in the national 

security community with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols 

Act. As such, any argument that such reform cannot 

be done is wrong, because large-scale reform has been 

implemented before through legislative initiatives. 

Locher argues that the current national security 

system is not suited to handle the immediate threat 

environment. Rather, the current system is a legacy of 

the post-World War II environment, in which stovepiped agencies and departments were responsible 

for implementing the instruments of national power. 

Some argue that there was only a limited need for extensive interagency cooperation during the Cold War. 

However, in today’s environment, interagency cooperation is the name of the game; because of the stovepipe legacy, Congress is actually reinforcing divisions 

in the executive branch while magnifying interagency 

gaps and cleavages. According to Locher, Congress 

must become more relevant in national security issues 

by legislating and overseeing methods of promoting 

interagency cooperation.

Proponents of Congress should not despair. Locher argues that Congress is taking an active interest 

in national security reform by promoting efficiency, 
174

economy, effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability among federal departments. Unfortunately, 

whatever reform that has been accomplished has not 

been enough to overcome the current interagency 

gap. Locher believes this to be the case because, unlike 

the Cold War-era Goldwater-Nichols Act, the contemporary security threat environment is far more complex. Modern threats define the three D’s paradigm 

(diplomacy, development, and defense) and require 

more interagency cooperation. In addition, the absolute scope of reform needed today is far greater than 

what was needed in 1986. Locher estimates that the 

needed size of today’s reform is about 15 to 20 times 

larger than what was required in 1986. As a direct result of this enormous need, additional agencies will 

have to be included within the reform framework, including those generally not associated with national 

security. Locher also states that entirely new entities 

might need to be created, which was not the case in 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. 

In short, national security reform will require Congress to take the helm. Unfortunately, according to Locher, no single congressional committee sees itself as 

having the mandate for initiating such major reform, 

thus immediately hindering the reform process. In addition, for significant reform to occur, it must happen 

through bipartisan channels. Obviously, today’s Congress is characterized by extremely partisan politics. 

In short, while Congress does have a precedent for national security reform, there are many obstacles facing 

today’s reform framework.

In Chapter 5, Dr. Richard Weitz also argues for 

national security reform that must come through Congress. Weitz’s argument distinguishes itself from those 

of the previous authors by calling for the establish-
175

ment of a National Security Review, a National Security 

Strategy, and a National Security Planning and Resource 

Guidance as a set of documents. All these documents 

will be ordered and approved by the President, thus 

providing a clear and coherent national security system.

The National Security Review would be used to assess strategic challenges and capabilities. This document would describe the strategic landscape and 

assess existing capabilities and resources against 

America’s strategic needs. The National Security Review

(NSR) would also make recommendations regarding 

missions, activities, and budgets. Most importantly, 

the NSR would review the scope and assumptions 

of national security, especially related to the changes 

in roles and responsibilities of those within the interagency process. 

The National Security Review would also be used to 

create the National Security Strategy. The National Security Planning and Resource Guidance document would 

then translate the National Security Strategy into policy, 

planning, and resource guidance to all the relevant 

departments and agencies, that is, the whole-of-government.

One more distinctive element of Weitz’s argument 

is that the national security system must do a better 

job of capturing and leveraging data and knowledge. 

There have been several cases in which important information has been presented to one agency but has 

failed to make it to other agencies that have a stake in 

the consequences of that knowledge.

In Chapter 6, Dr. Harvey Sicherman argues that to 

understand national security reform as well as President Obama’s changes to the National Security Council, one has to place them within an historical context. 
176

Since the 1947 National Security Act, intrinsic patterns have emerged. Sicherman offers three examples 

of functional trends: Truman-Acheson, early NixonKissinger, and Bush-Scowcroft-Baker. Sicherman also 

offers two dysfunctional trends: Reagan-Haig and 

later Nixon-Kissinger.

First, it is important to know that the policymakers who promoted a new national security system in 

the 1940s were men who had experience in preparing 

the United States for a two-front war. The role of the 

national security system was to create an organization 

that provided the President with critical information, 

competing views and efficient execution. In short, this 

new organization was intended to provide the President with the means to coordinate action while creating order between the Cabinet and the President.

In the Truman-Acheson framework, President 

Truman believed that he was accountable to Congress 

and the American people but not to the National Security Council (NSC). In other words, for Truman, the 

NSC was an organization to provide advice and information, not dictate direction. Direction came from the 

President alone, and it was the NSC’s responsibility 

to carry out his policy effectively and efficiently. In 

subscribing to this noncollegial framework, President 

Truman believed strongly in Cabinet responsibility. 

While Sicherman categorizes the Truman-Acheson 

framework as a functional one, he explicitly states 

that functionality does not equate to correct decisionmaking. While the Truman-Acheson framework was 

extremely successful in producing the containment 

paradigm and providing effective crisis management 

during the Korean War, it also experienced failures. 

For example, Truman’s NSC was not prepared for the 

military gap when North Korea invaded South Korea. Also, Truman’s NSC approved General Douglas 
177

McArthur’s post-Inchon offensive, which brought 

China into the war.

The dysfunctional counterpart to the TrumanAcheson framework is that of Reagan-Haig. The dysfunctionality of this framework came from having a 

national security system that was at odds with President Ronald Reagan’s personality. Reagan believed in 

Cabinet consensus, especially on issues that he lacked 

knowledge about, or those that he did not have any 

serious convictions. What resulted from this emphasis 

on consensus was a “ghost ship” national security system. In other words, no one knew what was wanted or 

expected from the President. As a result, this left the 

NSC rudderless and uncertain of what direction the 

White House desired.

Dr. Sicherman claims that the most recent example 

of a functional and effective NSC framework is that 

of Bush-Scowcroft-Baker. According to Sicherman, 

when Bush, Scowcroft, and Baker took office, they 

were appalled by the Reagan national security system, 

mostly because they saw the NSC as extremely defective. The national security framework under President 

Bush was one that was similar to the Truman-Acheson 

framework in that Cabinet responsibility, along with 

the NSC, was an important concept. The Bush-Scowcroft-Baker approach included an orderly process 

within the NSC that ultimately gave everyone a role 

and a stake. Additionally, under the Bush-ScowcroftBaker framework, the NSC was extremely disciplined, 

which helped U.S. diplomacy, since Washington sent 

few mixed signals internationally. 

Dr. Sicherman argues that the Bush-ScowcroftBaker and Truman-Acheson frameworks demonstrate that when it comes to national security, the integrity of the process is an important factor. That is, 
178

the process matters: It is fair, talent is concentrated, 

and decisions are implemented effectively. When the 

policy process is appreciated and properly followed, 

one can have an effective and efficient national security system. Sicherman claims that President Obama’s 

NSC is a hybrid one that tries to revolve around the 

Bush-Scowcroft-Baker framework. The NSC advisor 

and staff are expected to function as advisors and 

facilitators, but there are still many important functions that the White House feels that it is completely 

responsible for carrying out. However, it seems that 

President Obama highly values consensus, similarly 

to Reagan, and this has caused problems, according 

to Sicherman. First, leaks have been a very large problem within the Obama administration. This is undermining the Obama-Biden framework, since the leaks 

weaken the appearance of a unified national security 

system. Also, Sicherman argues that the compromises 

within the Obama-Biden framework are negatively 

affecting the implementation of the national security 

system in the field.

Based on his analytical case studies of various national security approaches, Sicherman identifies three 

major points: First, Presidents must choose their system. Second, integrity is extremely important as it will 

determine how effective one’s framework is. Third, 

strategy counts.

In Chapter 7, Joseph Collins provides a perspective on nonlinear change within Afghanistan. Collins 

argues that change in Afghanistan will be driven by 

the intersection of five vectors. The first vector is that 

U.S. objectives are and will remain the guide for policies and strategies. The second vector is that the costs 

of the Afghan War, in any way that one may look at 

it, are extremely high. For example, Afghanistan has 
179

consistently been at war for over 30 years. Also, the 

amount of causalities is staggering: 1,000 American 

soldiers dead, 10,000 Pakistani soldiers dead, and tens 

of thousands of dead Afghans. The third vector within 

Afghanistan is that the Taliban are now beginning to 

feel the pressure of Obama’s surge. The fourth vector 

is that President Karzai’s government is weak, corrupt, ineffective, and thus, unfortunately, has become 

the Taliban’s ultimate talking point for recruiting. The 

fifth and final vector is that the Afghan people are sick 

of war and are tired of the presence of coalition forces. 

Fortunately for the coalition forces, the Afghan people 

despise the Taliban more than their own government 

and its coalition partners. In short, these vectors have 

created a situation in which nonlinear change is highly possible.

Collins points out that while U.S. forces did not 

completely destroy the enemy or its will and ability 

to resist, there were significant improvements in other 

areas within Afghanistan. First, under Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, a single stable currency was created 

out of several viral currencies. Second, health-care 

access increased from 15 percent to 85 percent of the 

total Afghan population. While these were significant 

improvements, there was limited nation-building expectation, as Afghan good governance was not a priority within the Bush administration. Collins goes on 

to argue that this would have significant implications 

during the latter years of the Afghan war. More specifically, it would cause the war in Afghanistan to go 

from a highlight in the Global War on Terrorism, to a 

highly controversial issue in terms of the U.S. Government’s nation-building role.

One of the direct consequences of a limited focus 

on nation building is that hardly any Afghan govern-
180

ing capacity was created. Due to this lack of capacity 

and government corruption, much of the international 

assistance work in Afghanistan was being conducted 

through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 

foreign contractors. As such, the Afghan government 

had little control over what was going on, but more 

significantly, it was not learning how to be self-sufficient and sustainable. A negative spillover effect of 

this was that the Afghan government lost key ministers who had great potential. In addition, the capacity of the Afghan security forces, especially the police, 

failed to materialize. This happened because coalition 

arms, aid, trainers, and advisors ended up being either too little, too slow, or too inefficient. 

As the security situation continued to deteriorate within Afghanistan, a new military paradigm 

was recommended by General Stanley McChrystal: 

a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. An 

important recommendation within this new strategy 

was the emphasis on greater partnering between U.S. 

and Afghan forces, increasing the size of the Afghan 

national security forces, improving Afghan governance, and gaining the initiative from the Taliban. In 

response, President Obama committed an additional 

30,000 troops to Afghanistan, with the stipulation that 

the United States would not tolerate an open-ended 

commitment and that by July 2011, American troops 

would begin to leave Afghanistan.

In December 2010, the United States will re-evaluate its commitment to Afghanistan. Collins argues that 

three options will be dominant in the minds of key 

policymakers. First, the United States could continue 

its current strategy of a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, with troop levels remaining where 

they are. While this option would facilitate building 
181

Afghan capacity, it would be expensive for the United 

States. Additionally, it would provide the Taliban 

with a recruiting platform of the coalition being an occupying force.

Second, the United States could reduce most of the 

30,000 Soldiers and Marines associated with President 

Obama’s surge over the period of a year. While this 

is going on, the priority of the International Security 

Assistance Forces would be to prioritize and focus 

on security assistance and capacity building. This option would also be expensive, but it would allow for 

American troops to return home. However, as American forces are replaced with Afghan ones, there could 

be temporary short-term security problems. Collins 

argues that this could be particularly problematic for 

negotiations within Afghanistan.

Third, Collins posits that the Afghan government, 

along with United Nations (UN) and coalition support, could work toward reintegration and reconciliation with parts or the entirety of the Afghan Taliban. 

Collins argues that if this approach is adopted, there 

needs to be strict limits on the reintegration and reconciliation process. First, war criminals should not be 

involved this process. Also, the Afghan constitution 

cannot be bargained away, and all participants must 

renounce violence and al Qaeda. The potential drawbacks of this option, according to Collins, are that it 

could provide the Taliban with an opportunity to negotiate and fight simultaneously. Collins, however, it 

is imperative that the United States does not stand in 

the way of reconciliation with the Taliban.

Change will of course be nonlinear in Afghanistan, and there are key issues that the United States 

can tackle to help influence the outcome. First, it is imperative that the United States maintain pressure on 
182

the Taliban. Second, it is crucial that the United States 

focus on building Afghanistan’s governance capacity, 

not just in security areas, but in civil government and 

the private sectors as well. In short, for Collins, change 

in Afghanistan will depend on how all these issues are 

dealt with systematically and how each of the five vectors interact with each other.

Finally, in Chapter 8, James Stephenson provides 

a detailed case study of U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, 

he provides what he believes is the path for more effective stabilization and reconstruction operations. Initially, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did 

not want to focus on post-war reconstruction in Iraq. 

However, after the 2003 invasion, Rumsfeld changed 

his mind and insisted that the Department of Defense 

(DoD) assume responsibility for post-war reconstruction. According to Stephenson, Rumsfeld changed 

his mind, not because of a fundamental change of 

heart, but because the budgets for the Department of 

State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were relatively small compared to the 

DoD budget. To carry out post-war reconstruction 

in Iraq, the DoD created the Office of Reconstruction 

and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA). However, the 

OHRA had barely reached Baghdad, before the DoD 

informed it that the agency had been dissolved. In its 

place, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was 

created, with a mission statement of rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq.

However, according to Stephenson, the CPA never 

had a coherent strategy for rebuilding Iraq. Stephenson’s main argument is that the principle strategy flaw 

of the CPA was that it tried to do everything at once in-
183

stead of choosing to focus on specific sectors. The CPA 

received an $18.4 billion budget, which completely 

focused on large infrastructure projects. Stephenson 

argues that the problem with such a heavy focus on 

infrastructure in a post-conflict country is that it fails 

to produce immediate benefits that allow locals to 

see their lives improving. Additionally, the CPA was 

staffed with temporary hires who generally had little 

to no experience with stabilization and reconstruction 

projects. As a result, the CPA also suffered from a lack 

of ability to implement its strategy. As such, Stephenson believes the CPA in Iraq was doomed from the 

start.

According to Stephenson, what the DoD and the 

CPA failed to realize was the intricate relationship 

between stabilization and reconstruction. Stabilization enables the necessary governance, security, and 

economic activity that allows the process of reconstruction of civil society, governance, security, and 

the economy. In Afghanistan, USAID and State failed 

dramatically, because they focused on a top-down approach. In other words, they tried to create a government in a country that for decades never knew what 

governance even meant. Additionally, the U.S. efforts 

at stabilization and reconstruction failed within Afghanistan because they were Kabul-centric and, as result, a majority of Afghans were completely oblivious 

to any efforts made to improve their lives.

As opposed to the failed or poorly implemented 

stabilization and reconstructions efforts undertaken 

by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, Stephenson proposes a leaner and more sustainable model. 

In proposing this model, he draws on what he calls 

a successful counterinsurgency program in El Salvador. The main takeaway from El Salvador, accord-
184

ing to Stephenson, is that since the United States was 

unable to go big (compared to the CPA), the United 

States was forced to invest time, intelligence, equipment, and training to enable the El Salvadorian armed 

forces to defeat the insurgents instead of doing it for 

them. While this military capacity was being built, 

complimentary investments were being made by USAID in improving the conditions that had initially led 

to the insurgency. What El Salvador can teach those 

interested in stabilization and reconstruction is that 

success at post-conflict transition is predicated on the 

right enabling strategy and on implementation by experienced practitioners with both time and patience. 

On the other hand, a bad strategy is a bad strategy, 

and no amount of extra money will fix it.

Considering the contributions of all the authors, 

there are a some major takeaways: First, national security reform must be driven by Congress. Second, strategic planning and assessment must be done around 

a whole-of-government approach, while being fiscally 

responsible and incorporating a transition of power to 

civilian leadership.

Congress-driven reform must focus on better efficiency, oversight and interagency cooperation. The 

need for efficiency in establishing a new national security framework is that it will allow a baseline budget 

to be established. By providing a clear baseline, it will 

remove the constant state of suspense and uncertainty 

from those who are involved in the national security 

system. That is, they will know what kind of resources they have at their disposal. For example, defense 

spending should be based on a 3- to 6-year schedule, 

since this will provide the defense community with 

the time to adjust to whatever challenges arise.

In pursuing better oversight, Congress can im-
185

prove the interagency process. Proper oversight from 

Congress will allow each federal agency involved 

in national security to know exactly what its proper 

functions and jurisdictions are. In addition, oversight 

will allow for the interagency process to coordinate 

strategy across the three D’s: defense, diplomacy, and 

development. This area of reform should be put to 

the top of the list, as our authors have clearly argued 

that a functional interagency process is critical for the 

national security system. However, this process needs 

to be pursued in a continually incremental way. This 

will allow the national security system to adapt to the 

environment facing it. More importantly, to make this 

work, Congress must leverage the correct personnel. 

With the right people in place, the interagency process can work properly and achieve the goals handed 

down to it by Congress.

Our second major takeaway is that strategic planning and assessments must adopt a whole-of-government approach. This must happen in a fiscally 

responsible way, while ensuring the transition of 

power to civilian leadership in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

A whole-of-government approach will allow the national security community to position itself to be capable of handling the next critical situation. Currently, 

we are operating under the assumption that Iraq and 

Afghanistan are the last wars that will be fought by 

the United States. Such an assumption is not only incorrect, but it places the United States in a vulnerable 

position. With the complexities of threats facing the 

United States, the national security system must be 

prepared to respond to each one on an appropriate, 

efficient, and effective scale.

187

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Jared "Ethan" Bennett graduated cum laude 

from the University of Kentucky in December 2005 

with a B.A. in Spanish, international economics and 

Latin American studies. He earned the distinction of 

honors in the Department of Hispanic Studies and was 

inducted into five honor societies, among them Golden Key International Honour Society, where he was 

elected vice president. Mr. Bennett was also awarded 

the University of Kentucky Arts and Sciences Merit 

Scholarship for his scholastic achievement. He served 

twice in Chile as part of the United Nations sponsored program "English Opens Doors." This program, 

aimed at teaching English to Chilean youth, was operated through the Chilean Ministry of Education in the 

towns of Quilpué and Valparaíso. Mr. Bennett graduated from the Bush School of Government and Public 

Service at Texas A&M University in 2010.

JOSEPH R. CERAMI is a Professor at the Bush 

School of Government and Public Service at Texas 

A&M University, where he teaches courses on Leadership and National Security Policy. He also serves 

as the current Director of the Bush School’s Public 

Service Leadership Program. Dr. Cerami is a distinguished scholar, having co-edited multiple Strategic 

Studies Institute publications.

ROBERT ”ROBIN” DORFF joined the Strategic 

Studies Institute as a Research Professor of National 

Security Affairs in June 2007. Dr. Dorff remains extensively involved in strategic leadership development, 

focusing on national security strategy and policy, and 

on strategy formulation. His research interests include 
188

failing and fragile states, interagency processes and 

U.S. grand strategy.

JAMES CARAFANO currently serves as the Deputy Director at the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies. He is also the 

Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for 

Foreign Policy Studies. Dr. Carafano works with the 

Heritage Foundation, where he focuses on developing 

national security policies required to secure the longterm interests of the United States.

JOSEPH COLLINS is a Professor at the National 

War College, where he teaches national security strategy. Dr. Collins has served as the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. His 

team led the stability operations effort in Afghanistan. 

Dr. Collins was also a Senior Fellow at the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies.

PATRICK CRONIN is a Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at 

the Center for a New American Security. Prior to his 

current position, he was the Director of the Institute 

for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense 

University. Dr. Cronin had 25 years of experience in 

government and academic research centers, in which 

he dealt with such issues as defense affairs, foreign 

policy, and development assistance.

SCOTT R. FEIL is a retired U.S. Army colonel 

who serves as an Adjunct Research Staff Member in 

the Operation Evaluation Division at the Institute for 

Defense Analyses. He has also served as the Executive Director of the Program on the Role of American 
189

Military Power and as co-director on a project on PostConflict Reconstruction.

BERNARD I. FINEL is a Senior Fellow at the American Security Project, where he directs research on “Securing America in an Age of Terror.” Dr. Finel is the 

lead author of the American Security Project’s annual 

report, “Are We Winning? Measuring Progress in the 

Struggle against Violent Jihadism.” He also produces 

in-depth analyses on the developments in the wars in 

Iraq and Afghanistan and on U.S. defense policy.

Matthew Harber graduated cum laude from 

Truman State University (MO) with a B.A. in political 

science and history. In the summer of 2008 he was one 

of eight undergraduates who attended the Research 

Experience for Undergraduates (REU) at Oklahoma 

State University. There he wrote a research paper that 

he later presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) conference in New York. He also presented 

a second research paper at the student conferences at 

both Illinois State University and Truman State University. Mr. Harber is a member of Pi Sigma Alpha 

(national political science honor society) and has lived 

abroad in Zambia, Madagascar, South Africa, Mozambique, Egypt, and Uganda. He is a 2011 graduate of 

the Bush School of Government and Public Service at 

Texas A&M University.

JAMES M. LINDSAY is the Senior Vice President, 

Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair 

at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is considered 

a leading authority on the American foreign policymaking process and the domestic politics of American 

foreign policy. Dr. Lindsay has also served as the di-
190

rector of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International 

Security and Law at the University of Texas at Austin.

JAMES R. LOCHER III is currently the President 

and CEO of the Project on National Security Reform. 

He has more than 25 years of professional experience 

in both the executive and legislative branches of the 

federal government, including service as the chairman of the Defense Reform Commission of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina.

THOMAS G. MAHNKEN has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning 

since November 2006. He is responsible for the major 

strategic planning function within the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense. Dr. Mahnken also served as the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources 

and Plans and the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Policy Planning.

DONALD L. “LARRY” SAMPLER, JR., is the Vice 

President and Director of the Communities in Transition division of Creative Associates, International. His 

division focuses on societies recovering from trauma 

and works alongside civilian and military actors, international partners, and host-nation civil society and 

governments. Mr. Sampler previously served as the 

Deputy Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. 

NINA SERAFINO is a Specialist in International 

Security Affairs at the Congressional Research Service 

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Previously she worked on Latin American issues, including 

the Central American wars and peace processes, and 

U.S. policy toward Colombia.
191

HARVEY SICHERMAN was the President and Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Pennsylvania. He had extensive experiencing working in 

government. Dr. Sicherman served under Secretary 

of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Secretary of State 

James A. Baker III; and acted as a consultant to Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. and Secretary of 

State George Shultz.

JAMES “SPIKE” STEPHENSON is the Senior Advisor for Stabilization and Reconstruction at Creative 

Associates International, Inc. He is a retired Senior 

Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Agency for International Development. His duties included being 

the Mission Director in Iraq and Senior Advisor to the 

State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization.

BETH TRITTER is a Managing Director at the 

Glover Park Group and specializes in government relations and strategic communications. She has focused 

primarily on clients with an interest in U.S. foreign 

policy. Ms. Tritter has advised multinational corporations such as Standard Charted Bank and De Beers 

on leadership strategies. She has worked for nearly a 

decade on Capitol Hill as Legislative Director for Congresswoman Nita Lowey of New York.

RICHARD WEITZ is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the 

Hudson Institute. His research interests include regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia, as well as U.S. foreign, defense, 

homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction 
nonproliferation policies. Dr. Weitz is also a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Project on National Security 

Reform as well as the Center for a New American Security.

192
193

THE BUSH SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

AND PUBLIC SERVICE

The Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University is located in College 

Station, Texas. Established in 1997, the Bush School 

was created to honor the vision of its founder, George 

H. W. Bush, the 41st President of the United States. At 

the groundbreaking of the compound, President Bush 

shared his conviction that working for government, 

whether as an elected official or civil servant, should 

be viewed as dedication to public service:

I want to share with the students my thoughts on public service—that service to a country is a calling and 

that . . . in a far broader sense it means helping others 

and sacrificing and contributing to causes bigger than 

yourself.

The Bush School is dedicated to academic integrity, 

leadership development, professional experience, and 

unique relationships between professors and students 

academically and in research. In the Bush School, there 

are two distinct master degrees: The Master of Public 

Service & Administration (MPSA) and the Master’s 

Program in International Affairs (MPIA). The MPSA 

program focuses on public management and public 

policy analysis and offers five areas of concentration, 

including nonprofit management; state/local policy 

and management; energy, environment, and technology policy and management; security policy and management; health policy and management; and individually created options. The MPIA program focuses 

on international economics and development and on 

national security and diplomacy. It has nine concentrations, including American diplomacy, intelligence 
194

as statecraft, defense policy and military affairs, international politics, homeland security, regional studies (Europe, Middle East, and China), international 

economics, international economic development, and 

multinational enterprises and public policy. The Bush 

School program also offers students opportunities at 

national and international internships, and emphasizes the development of written and oral communication skills. For the past decade, the Bush School has 

prepared leaders who can share the work of public 

service with a diversified set of players—both in and 

out of government. Its graduates have quickly established themselves in exciting careers in government, 

nonprofits, international organizations, think tanks, 

international financial institutions, and businesses; 

the School will continue to graduate students who 

make a difference.

The Bush School, along with the Strategic Studies 

Institute, is proud to put forward this book, both institutes believe the individual opinions expressed within 

are valuable and important.
195

THE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is the U.S. 

Army’s center for geostrategic and national security 

research and analysis. SSI conducts strategic research 

and analysis to support the U.S. Army War College 

(USAWC) curriculum, provides direct analysis for 

Army and Department of Defense (DoD) leadership, 

and serves as a bridge to the wider strategic community.

SSI is composed of civilian research professors, 

uniformed military officers, and a professional support staff. All have extensive credentials and experience. SSI is divided into four components: the Strategic 

Research and Analysis Department focuses on global, 

transregional, and functional issues, particularly 

those dealing with Army transformation; the Regional 

Strategy Department focuses on regional strategic issues; the Academic Engagement Program creates and 

sustains partnerships with the global strategic community; and the Publications Department maintains 

a web of partnerships with strategic analysts around 

the world, including the foremost thinkers in the fields 

of security and military strategy. In most years, about 

half of SSI’s publications are written by these external 

partners.

SSI documents are published by the Institute and 

distributed to key strategic leaders in the Army and 

the DoD, the military educational system, Congress, 

the news media, other think tanks and defense institutes, and major colleges and universities. SSI publications use history and current political, economic, and 

military factors to develop strategic recommendations.
196

SSI has a variety of publications, including:

• Books - SSI publishes about 3-5 books per year 

consisting of authored works or edited compilations.

• Monographs – Policy-oriented reports provide 

recommendations. They are usually 25-90 pages in length.

• Carlisle Papers - The best of the student papers 

submitted in compliance with requirements for 

graduation from the USAWC are highlighted.

• LeTort Papers - Essays, retrospectives, or 

speeches of interest to the defense academic 

community.

• Colloquium Reports - For larger conferences, 

SSI may produce a report on the proceedings.

• Colloquium Briefs - These 2- to 4-page briefs 

are produced after the colloquia that SSI has 

co-sponsored or helped to fund.

At the request of the Army leadership, SSI sometimes provides shorter analytical reports on pressing 

strategic issues. The distribution of these is usually 

limited.

Additionally, every year SSI compiles a Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) based on input from the USAWC 

faculty, the Army Staff, the Joint Staff, the unified and 

specified commands, and other Army organizations. 

This is designed to guide the research of SSI, the USAWC, and other Army-related strategic analysts.

SSI analysts publish widely outside of the Institute’s own products. They have written books for 

Cambridge University Press, Princeton University 

Press, University Press of Kansas, Duke University 

Press, Praeger, Frank Cass, Rowman and Littlefield, 

and Brassey’s. They have contributed chapters to 
197

many other books, including publications from the 

Brookings Institution, Jane’s Defense Group, and the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies. SSI analysts have written articles for more than 50 journals 

and periodicals on history, strategy, national security, 

and a myriad of other relevant topics. 

SSI also co-sponsors academic conferences to examine issues of importance to the Army, collaborating 

with some of the leading universities in the country. 

Recent partners have included Georgetown, Princeton, Harvard, MIT, Columbia, University of Chicago, 

University of Miami, Stanford, Georgia Tech, Johns 

Hopkins, and the Bush School of Government and 

Public Service at Texas A&M University.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Editors

Dr. Joseph R. Cerami

Dr. Robert H. Dorff

Dr. Matthew H. Harber

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil