U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

35–361PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

MARKUP OF: H.J. RES 37, DIRECTING 

THE REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES 

ARMED FORCES FROM HOSTILITIES 

IN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN THAT 

HAVE NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED BY 

CONGRESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 6, 2019 

Serial No. 116–3 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

JASON STEINBAUM, Staff Director 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Republican Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD 

Representative David Cicilline ............................................................................... 40 

Representative Ken Buck ........................................................................................ 42 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 37 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 38 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 39 

ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Report to Congress .................................................................................................. 12 

Statement of Administration Policy ....................................................................... 19 

Department of Defense letter ................................................................................. 20 

New York Times article submitted by Representative Cicilline .......................... 43 

RECORD VOTE 

Record Vote Talley ................................................................................................... 47 

MARKUP SUMMARY 

Markup Summary .................................................................................................... 48 

(1) 

MARKUP OF: H.J. RES. 37, DIRECTING THE 

REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED 

FORCES FROM HOSTILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN THAT HAVE NOT BEEN 

AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:34 p.m., in Room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ENGEL. A quorum which is carried over from before is 

present, and we meet today to consider a single item. Pursuant to 

notice for purposes of markup, I call up House Joint Resolution 37. 

[H.J. Res. 37 follows:] 
2 

11 Gm COXGHESS 

]ST SEi:lSIOX H. J. RES. 37 Dir<~<-tiug thc> n•1noYal of l'nitc>d 8tnte~ Amw<l Pm·<·Ps fro111 ho~tiliti<'~ in 

the Hrpnbli<' of YPllll'll that lww not !wen anthoriZ<'d h~- CougwH~. 

IN 'rHE HOUSJ;~ OF HEPRESENTNriVES 

.JAXL\HY :30, 20Hl 

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of Texas, :\Is. 8.\x< 'IIEZ, l\h·. (L\H.\1\IEXDJ, :\Ir. ( '.\Hll.\.J.\1,, :\Ir. Gm.JAJXA, 

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l\ls. BJ,J'XT HO<'IlESTJm, l\ls. DELBEXE, l\Js. BoX.\:II!Cl, l\1!-. :\lon.ToX, 

H1lll l\lr. ?\E<H'SE) snl>ntit!Pd the following joint resolntioll; whit·h was n·-

ft•Jn'd to thl' ConunittPP 011 Fot·<'igll Affnirs 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Dirceting- the rcmoYal of United States Armed Forees from 

hostilities in tlw Hepnhlie of Yemen that haYe not been 

authorized h~· Cong-ress. 
3 

2 

Resohwl by the Senate and House of Represcntafil'es 

2 r~l the United Stutes of Amerim i11 Co11grcss assembfed, 

3 SECTION 1. FINDINGS. 

4 Congress finds the following: 

5 (1) Congress has the sole power to dcdnre war 

6 under article I, section 8, elanse 11 of th(_' United 

7 States Constitution. 

8 (2) CongTess has not deelan~<l war \Yith respeet 

9 to, or JH'OYide<l n spl'eifie statutm')· authorization for, 

10 the emlf1iet between militar~· foret~s kd hy Sandi 

11 .A.rahia, iuehHling forees from tlw U nite(l Arab Emir12 ates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Eg:-vt, ,Jonlan, 1\Ioroceo, 

13 Senegal, and Sudan (the Sandi-led coalition), 

14 against the Honthis, also known as Ansar Allah, in 

15 the Repnhlie of Y enwn. 

16 (8) Since 1\lareh 2015, members of the United 

17 States J\mwd Ji'orces luwc been introclnct>d into hos18 tilitics between the Samli-led coalition and the 

19 Honthis, including prmi.diug to the SmH1i-led eoali20 tion aerial targeting assistance, intdligenee sharing, 

21 and micl-t1ight aerial refueling. 

22 (4) The United States has established a ,Joint 

23 Combine<l Plmmiug Cell with Saudi .Arabia, in whieh 

24 memlwrs of the Unite<l States Armed Porees assist 

•HJ 37 IH 
4 

3 

in aerial targeting all(l help to coordinate military 

2 alHl intelligene<' acti\'ities. 

3 (5) In Deeemlwr 2017, Seerctm)' of Dd"c>nse 

4 ,Janws "1'\. l\Iattis stated, "\Ye luwe gmw in to be 

5 Ycr~·-to be hdpfnl where \Ye can in ideutiD-ing hmY 

6 yon do target analysis mH1 how .nm make certain 

7 ~·ou hit the right thing.". 

8 ( 6) 'l'lw conf1iet between the Sancli-kd coalition 

9 and the Houthis constitutes, "·ithiu the meaning of 

10 section 4(a) of tlH• \Yar Powers Hesolntion (50 

11 n.s.c. 1543(a) ), either hostilities or a situation 

12 where imminent involwment in hostilities is clearl~' 

13 indicated by the circumstances into \Yhieh United 

14 Stat(~S Arnwd ForN's haw !wen intro<lneed. 

15 (7) Seetiou 5(c) of the \Ynr Powers 1\esolntion 

16 (50 U.S.C. 1544(e)) states that, "at any time that 

17 United States Armed l''orces a1·e engage(! in hos18 tilities outside the tetTitm·~· of tlw United States, its 

19 possessions aud territories without a declaration of 

20 \Yar or SJK•eifie statntOJ)' authorization, sueh forces 

21 shall be remo\'e(l h~' the President if the Congn•ss so 

22 dircets". 

23 (8) Seetion B(e) of the War Powers Hesolution 

24 (50 U.S.C. 1547(e)) defines the introdnetion of 

25 United States Armed Fon~es to iudnde "th0 assign-

•HJ 37 IH 
5 

4 

mcnt of members of such aruwd forces to emmmmd, 

2 coordinate, participate in the moYNncnt of, or ae3 eOJU])(IIl)' the regular m· irregular military forces of 

4 nn~- foreign emmtr~- or g<r\·ermlwnt when snell mili5 tary fore<'S are engage<l, m· tlwre exists an imminent 

6 threat that sneh forces will hceonw engaged, in hos7 tilitics", and aetiYitics that the Unite<l States is eon8 duding in support of th<' Saudi-led eonlition, indwl9 ing aerial rdiwling· and targeting assist<mee, fall 

10 \YitbilJ this definition. 

11 Ul) Seetion 1018 of the Department of State 

12 Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 198f) (50 

13 U.S.C. 154()n) proYi<lcs that Hll)' joint resolution or 

14 bill to rcquin• the renlOYal of United States Armed 

15 Forces eugnged in hostilities "ithont a dcdnrntiou of 

16 war or speeifie statntm·~- authorization shall be eon17 sidered in aeeordanee ·with the expedited proec<lures 

18 of sedion G01 (h) of the Tnternatimwl Seemit~- and 

19 Arms Export Control Aet of 1 97() (Puhlie JJmY 94-

20 329; ~lO Stat. 765). 

21 (10) 1\o speeific statutory authorization for the 

22 use of United States Armed Forees with respect to 

23 the conflict lwtween thC' Saudi-led coalition and the 

24 Honthis iu Yemen has been enaeted, and no JH'OYi25 sion of lmi· explicitlr authorizes the prm·isiou of tar-

•HJ 37 IH 
6 

5 

g-eting assistance or of midair refueling sernecs to 

2 warplanes of San<li Arabia or the United Arab Emir3 ates that are engaged in such eoul1id. 

4 SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES 

5 FROM HOSTILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF 

6 YEMEN THAT HAVE NO'f BEEN AUTHORIZED 

7 BY CONGRESS. 

8 Pnnmant to sed ion 1013 of tlw Department of State 

9 Authorization Aet, Fiscal Ycm·s Hlf\4 awl 1DR5 (50 

10 U.S.C. Hi4()a) awl m aeeonlmwe with tlw prm'isions of 

11 section ()()](h) of tlw Intemational Scenrit~· Assistance 

12 and Arms Export Control Aet of 197() (Public Law ~>4-

13 829; 90 Stat. 765), Congress hereby dircds the PresidPnt 

14 to remon• United States Armed Fon·es from hostilities in 

15 or affpcting tlw 1\ppnhlic of Yt>mcn, (•xecpt Unitt>cl Statl's 

16 _;\rnwd Fon·es engaged in operations direrted at al-qac<la 

17 or associated f(H·ees, by not later than the date that is 

18 30 days aftnr the date of the enartment oft his joint n•so19 lntion (unless the President J'etrnests and Congl'ess anthor20 izes a lat(•r date), and unless and until a dedaratiou of 

21 war or SJweifie anthorization for such use of U nite(l States 

22 Armed Porees has been euaeted. For purposes of this reso23 lution, in this seetion, the term "hostilities" includes in24 flight refncling, non-United States airernft coudnetiug 

25 missions as part of the ongoing eiYil war in Yemen. 

•HJ 37 IH 
7 

() 

SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING CONTINUED 

2 MILITARY OPERATIONS AND COOPERATION 

3 WITH ISRAEL. 

4 ::\'othing in this joint resolution may he (•onstmed to 

5 inf1tH'JW(' or dismpt any militnr~' OJWrations an<l c·ooJH'l'H6 tion "·itl1 Isra('l. 

7 SEC. 4. REPORT ON RISKS POSED BY CEASING SAUDI ARA8 BIA SUPPORT OPERATIONS. 

9 ;\ot ]at(•r than 90 days nfter the datP of tlw (•mwt1 0 BH'nt of this joiut resolut i(m, the President shall submit 

II to Congn•ss a n•port nss!'ssing tlw risks posl•d to United 

12 Nt;Jtes (·itizens alHl the ('lYilian population of Nnndi Arabia 

13 and the risk of reg·ional hmwlnitnri<lll erises if the United 

14 Htates m•n• to eease support opemtions with resJwet to 

15 tlw ronf1iet hPlm'l'll the Nnndi-k<l eonlitim1 alHI tlw 

16 IIonthis in Yl'llWIL 

17 SEC. 5. REPORT ON INCREASED RISK OF TERRORIST AT18 TACKS TO UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES 

19 ABROAD, ALLIES, AND THE CONTINENTAL 

20 UNITED STATES IF SAUDI ARABIA CEASES 

21 YEMEN-RELATED INTELLIGENCE SHARING 

22 WITH THE UNITED STATES. 

23 ::\'ot latl'l' than 90 <ht~'S after the datp of the l'!laet24 nwnt of this joint n•solution, the PresidPnt shall submit 

25 to Cougn•ss a I'<'port nsspssing the iuereasell risk of ter26 rorist attaeks on United Ntntes Arnwd Porc~es abroad, al-

•HJ 37 IH 
8 

7 

lies, and to the eontinental United States if the Govern2 ment of Sandi Arnhin were to eease Y('nwn-related intd3 ligenee sharing with the United States. 

0 

•HJ 37 IH 
9 

Without objection, the resolution is considered read the first and 

second time and open for amendment at any point and committee 

members may have five calendar days to submit statements for the 

record. 

According to House Rule 11 Clause 2, the chair announces that 

he may postpone further proceedings today on the question of approving any measure or matter or adopting an amendment on 

which a recorded vote is ordered. 

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at 

any time. Now I recognize myself for opening remarks. We are 

going to have opening remarks, Mr. McCaul’s opening remarks. 

Then we are going to go to vote and come back immediately after 

votes to mark this up and to have members say anything they 

might want to say. 

So the committee has just heard testimony about the crisis in 

Yemen, about the death, disease, and displacement of millions that 

this destructive conflict has caused, and in my view, it is incumbent on this committee and this body to do everything we can to 

put a stop to it. We need to push all parties toward a political solution. 

And let me explain why I think this measure introduced by Mr. 

Khanna of California will help us do that. 

Now, in last year’s Defense Authorization, Congress required the 

administration to certify that the Saudis and Emiratis were taking 

real steps to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from the military operations in Yemen. 

In the period of time before the certification was due, attacks 

against civilians rose sharply. According to the International Red 

Cross, August was the most violent month in 2018 in Yemen with 

nearly 500 people killed in just 9 days. 

Since 2015, the coalition has undertaken 18,000 air strikes. That 

is one every 99 minutes, if you do the math. Fully one-third of 

those have hit nonmilitary targets—one in three. 

This is not just a statistic. One of those one in three was a school 

bus in northern Yemen with 40 children on it. That is not acceptable. 

So I was stunned, frankly, that in September the administration 

certified that the Saudis and Emiratis were indeed taking these 

steps, these so-called demonstrable actions to reduce civilian 

deaths. 

The administration simply could have waived the requirement. 

The law allowed that. But they did not. They essentially told us not 

to believe our eyes. 

Let me be clear. We have real strategic interests in that part of 

the world. Iran continues to destabilize the region and their support for the Houthis is only part of their strategy to bleed their regional adversaries. 

But I do not support providing assistance that we know is being 

used to kill civilians. And so, if the administration will not demand 

any sort of accountability from the Saudis and Emirates, the work 

then falls to the Congress. 

The Pentagon cutoff refueling as a matter of policy. But that 

could be reversed at any time. This resolution would cutoff refueling as a matter of law. It also sends a clear message to the admin-
10 

istration, to our partners in the Gulf, and to our adversaries that 

Congress will not sit back and shirk our responsibilities when it 

comes to foreign policy. It is time to have the debates about how, 

when, and where the U.S. military is engaged around the world. 

This resolution is sparking that debate. 

So I will support moving this measure to the floor and at this 

time I will yield to the ranking member for any comments he might 

have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a tremendous respect for the chair, but I must say this 

first markup is a a departure from the strongly bipartisan cooperation that we have enjoyed on this committee. 

I believe that this committee does have a solemn responsibility 

to appropriately exercise congressional war powers under Article 1 

of the Constitution. But the mechanism to force withdrawal of U.S. 

forces under the War Powers Act applies only when we are engaged 

in live fire hostilities. 

This is not the case here. This is not what our military is doing 

currently in Yemen. This resolution would set a very dangerous 

precedent. Are we now going to allow any member to use this privileged war powers tool to second guess all U.S. security cooperation 

agreements throughout the world? 

This interpretation could impact our assistance to Israel. It could 

impact our cooperation with African nations in the Sahel. We could 

recklessly undo critical security relationships we have spent decades building. 

This is not what the War Powers Resolution has ever meant and 

it should not be used this way now. A vote in favor is a victory for 

bad policy. 

As we heard at this morning’s hearing, the situation in Yemen 

poses critical, strategic, and humanitarian issues that deserve careful attention. If we want to discuss conditioning assistance to Saudi 

Arabia in this conflict, that is an area we can explore and debate. 

But this resolution is trying to hammer a square peg into a 

round hole. It misuses an extraordinary an extraordinary War 

Powers tool to try to get at the issue of security assistance to a 

third country. 

Even our aerial refueling of Saudi jets, which does not constitute 

hostilities as traditionally understood, ended last November. And I 

spoke with Defense Department representatives yesterday who reaffirmed that U.S. forces are not engaged in hostilities against 

Houthi forces in Yemen. 

They confirmed the continuing accuracy of the detailed letter 

sent to Congress last year by the department’s acting general counsel. 

No one is saying that U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia or 

anyone else is beyond congressional scrutiny. We have many tools 

to use including this committee’s arms sales notifications, targeted 

legislation, and the annual appropriations process, among others. 

But this resolution stretches the definition of hostilities to cover 

non-U.S. military operations by other countries. It reinterprets U.S. 

support to those countries as engagement in hostility. 

This has implications far beyond Saudi Arabia. Under this 

model, if any Member of Congress does not like something that any 
11 

of our security partners does overseas, that member can force quick 

consideration of a resolution directing the removal of U.S. forces 

from hostilities, quote, ‘‘in or affecting,’’ unquote, that situation. It 

no longer matters that U.S. forces are not actually conducting those 

hostilities. 

The bill is vague and irresponsible. It will create doubts for our 

partners and allies around the world. It will trouble the many 

Americans who believe the burden sharing with capable allies is 

vital for U.S. national security. 

And for that reason, I oppose this measure and, Mr. Chairman, 

I ask unanimous consent to place into the record three documents. 

One, the January 2019 Department of Defense report to Congress concerning our similar acquisition and cross-servicing activities with over 117 nations around the world including our NATO 

allies, CT partners in the Sahel, Israel, and others. 

Two, the November 28th, 2018 statement of the administration 

policy opposing S.J. Res. 54 because, quote, ‘‘The United States 

forces are not engaged in hostilities between the Saudi-led coalition 

and Houthi forces in Yemen,’’ unquote. 

And third, the February 27th, 2018 letter from the Department 

of Defense Office of General Council explaining the legal and security concerns posed by the approach used by today’s resolution. 

I ask unanimous consent to place those in the record. 

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, so moved. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
12 

REPORT TO CONGRESS 

CONCERNING 

ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING ACTIVITIES 

FOR FISCAL YEAR2018 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT 

JANUARY2019 

THE ESTIMATED COST OF THIS REPORT OR STUDY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS APPROXIMATELY 

$2,500.00 FOR THE 2019 FISCAL YEAR. THIS INCLUDES $21N EXPENSES AND $2,500.00 IN DOD LABOR. 
13 

Section 1271 of the JohnS. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2019 (Public Law 115-232) amends Section 2342 of title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), to 

require the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report to the appropriate committees of 

Congress on acquisition and cross-servicing activities that sets forth, in detail, the following: 

• (1) A list of agreements in effect pursuant to subsection (a)(l) of section 10 USC 

section 2342 during the preceding fiscal year; 

• (2) The date on which each agreement listed was signed, and, in the case of an 

agreement with a country that is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization, the date on which the Secretary notified Congress pursuant to 

subsection (b)(2} of the designation of such country under subsection (a) of title 

10, U.S.C. section 2342; 

• (3) The total dollar amount and major categories oflogistic support, supplies, and 

services (LSSS) provided during the preceding fiscal year under each such 

agreement; 

• (4} The total dollar amount and major categories of reciprocal provisions of 

logistic support, supplies, and services received under each such agreement; and 

• (5) With respect to the calendar year during which the report is submitted, an 

assessment of: (a) the anticipated LSSS requirements of the United States; and (b) 

the anticipated requirements of other countries for U.S. LSSS. 

Pursuant to title 10, U.S.C. section 2342(g)(1) and (g)(2), TAB 1 provides a list of 

agreements that were in effect during the preceding FY 2018 and the date each agreement listed 

was signed, and, in the case of an agreement with a country that is not a member of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization, the date on which the Department of Defense (DoD) notified 

Congress pursuant to title 10, U.S.C. section 2342 (b )(2) of the designation of such country 

under subsection (a). 

Pursuant to title 10, U.S.C., section 2342(g)(3) and (g)( 4), TAB 2 provides a list of the 

total dollar amount and major categories of LSSS provided by DoD during FY 2018 under each 

such agreement. TAB 2 also provides the total dollar amount and major categories of reciprocal 

provisions of LSSS received by DoD during FY 2018 under each such agreement. 

• The category shown as "Services" includes the following types ofLSSS, as 

defined in title 10, U.S.C., section 2350: food, billeting, transportation (including 

airlift), communications services, medical services, base operations support (and 

construction incident to base operations support), storage services, use of 

facilities, training services, repair and maintenance services, calibration services, 

and port services. 

• The category shown as "Supplies" includes the following types ofLSSS, as 

defined in title 10, U.S.C., section 2350: petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, 

ammunition, spare parts and components, the value of the temporary use of 

general purpose vehicles and other nonlethal items of military equipment which 

are not designated as Significant Military Equipment (SME) on the United States 

Munitions List, and the value of loans ofSME made pursuant to Section 1207 of 
14 

the Carl Levin & Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113-291). 

• The total value of LSSS provided under agreements during FY 2018 was 

$861,023,595. The total value ofLSSS acquired by the United States during FY 

2018 was $596,075,442. 

Pursuant to title 10, U.S.C., Section 2342(g)(4), TAB 3 provides a list showing the DoD 

assessment of the anticipated LSSS requirements of the United States and the anticipated 

requirements of other countries for U.S. LSSS during CY 2019. 

2 
15 

TAB 

1 
16 

TAB 1 Agreements FV18 ACSA Congressional Report 

NOTE: Congressional notification of NATO Member Countries and International Organizations is not required 
17 

TAB 1 Agreements FY18 ACSA Congressional Report 

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7/'i. 997 

~Kinadom l2 2/i 

~6. 

~ 196 

JL-02 3Q1 001 

. "6" 

NOTE: Congressional notification of NATO Member Countries and International Organizations is not required 
18 

TAB 1 Agreements FV18 ACSA Congressional Report 

Country I Aareement Title I Date Signed I NATO Member I Date Conaress Notified I 

• DoD could not locate copies of letters to providing notice that the DoD intended to designate this country as being 

eligible for the negotiation and conclusion of an acquisition and cross servicing agreement with the DoD. The year 

the notification should have occurred is provided instead. Since the period of time when the notification for these 

countries took place, OSD implemented record keeping procedures to eliminate the potential for lost documentation. 

2002 was the last year for which documentation has not been located. 

• Estimated year of notification to Congress 

NOTE: Congressional notification of NATO Member Countries and International Organizations is not required 
19 

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503 

November 28, 2018 

(Senate) 

STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY 

S .. J. Res. 54- To Direct the Removal of United States Armed Forces from Hostilities in the 

Republic of Yemen that Have Not Been Authorized bv tbe Congress 

(Sen. Sanders, 1-VT and 16 cosponsors) 

The Administration strongly opposes passage of S.J. Res. 54, a joint resolution that purports to 

direct the removal of United States Armed Forces that have not been authorized by the Congress 

from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen. The fundamental premise ofS.J. Res. 54 is t1awedUnited States forces are not engaged in hostilities between the Saudi-led coalition and llouthi 

forces in Y cmen. Since 2015. the United States has provided limited support to member countries 

of the Emirati and Saudi-led coalition, including intelligence sharing, logistics, and, until recently, 

aerial refueling. This support is provided in accordance with licenses and approvals under the 

Arms Export Control Act, statutory authorities to provide logistics support, and the President's 

constitutional powers. United States counterterrorism operations and an October 2016 strike on 

radar facilities in Houthi-controlled territory, which was the subject of a prior report consistent 

with the War Powers Resolution of 1973, are separate matters. Other than those engagements, no 

United States forces have been introduced into hostilities, or into situations where hostilities are 

clearly imminent, in connection with ongoing support to the Saudi-led coalition. As a result, this 

United States support does not implicate the War Powers Resolution. 

In addition to its erroneous premise, the joint resolution would harm bilateral relationships in the 

region and negatively impact the ability of the United States to prevent the spread of violent 

extremist organizations such as al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS in Yemen. The 

continued cooperation of the United States allows the Administration to support diplomatic 

negotiations to end the war, ensure humanitarian access, enhance efforts to recover United States 

hostages in Yemen, and defeat terrorists that seek to harm the United States. 

Accordingly, ifS.J. Res. 54 were presented to the President in its current form. his advisors would 

recommend that he veto the joint resolution. 

******* 
20 

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

1 600 DEFENSE PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301·1600 

GENERAL COUNSEL 

The Honorable Mitchell "Mitch" McConnell 

Majority Leader 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Mr. Majority Leader: 

FEB 27 2018 

On February 22, 2018, the Department of Defense (DoD) briefed your staff concerning 

DoD support to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's (KSA) operations in Yemen. Subsequently, you 

requested an unclassified letter reflecting DoD's views on a draft joint resolution that would 

"direct[] the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the 

Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at al 

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or associated forces .... " DoD opposes this Joint Resolution. 

Even if enacted into law, the Joint Resolution would not achieve its apparent purpose of 

restricting U.S. support to the KSA-led coalition, because, as described below, that support does 

not constitute "hostilities." In addition to the potential constitutional concerns raised by such a 

proposal, the draft resolution's restrictions on U.S. military support to our partners could 

undermine our ability to foster long-term relationships, increase interoperability, promote burden 

sharing, and build strong security architectures throughout the world. The KSA is a key U.S. 

partner in the Middle East and we rely on our strong military partnership to promote regional 

security. 

DoD opposes the resolution because the resolution's fundamental premise is flawed. 

Specifically, the draft resolution incorrectly asserts that U.S. forces have been "introduced into 

hostilities between the [KSA-Ied] coalition and the Houthis ..... " The limited military and 

intelligence support that the United States is providing to the KSA-Ied coalition does not involve 

any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution or of 

section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (50 USC 

1546a). 

Since 2015, the United States has provided limited support to KSA-Ied coalition military 

operations against Houthi and Saleh-aligned forces in Yemen. With the exception of a defensive 

strike in October 2016, U.S. forces are not taking direct military action in this Saudi-led effort in 

Yemen. Instead, the United States provides the KSA-Ied coalition defense articles and services, 

including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice 

regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of 

civilian casualties. 
21 

The draft resolution incorrectly describes United States support to the KSA-led coalition 

as an operation that introduces U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent involvement in hostilities 

for purposes of the War Powers Resolution. It has been the longstanding view of the Executive 

Branch that "hostilities" refers to "a situation in which units of U.S. armed forces are actively 

engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces."1 U.S. personnel providing 

support to the KSA-led coalition are not engaged in any such exchanges of fire. Further, the 

limited U.S. support to the KSA-led coalition does not implicate the activities identified in 

section 8(c) of the War Powers Resolution. Section 8(c) defines the term "introduction of United 

States Armed Forces" but does not address the term "hostilities." "[W]hen applying section 8(c), 

the relevant question remains whether U.S. forces-not the foreign forces they are 

accompanying-are introduced into hostilities or situations involving the imminent threat 

thereof."2 With respect to U.S. support to the KSA-led coalition, U.S. forces do not currently 

command, coordinate, accompany, or participate in the movement of coalition forces in counterHouthi operations. Thus, no U.S. forces are accompanying the KSA-led coalition when its 

military forces are engaged, or an imminent threat exists that they will become engaged, in 

hostilities. Accordingly, U.S. forces supporting the KSA-led coalition have not been introduced 

into hostilities or situations where hostilities are imminent. 

Although the resolution's requirement to remove U.S. forces from hostilities would not 

implicate U.S. support to the KSA-led coalition, this requirement could call into question the 

statutory authority for ongoing U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen. Pursuant to the 2001 

Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) (Public Law 107-40), U.S. armed forces are 

currently engaged in hostilities against b~th al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the 

Islamic State oflraq and Syria (ISIS) in Yemen. Hostilities against AQAP and associated forces 

are explicitly exempted from the resolution's termination requirement, but hostilities against ISIS 

are not similarly exempted. 

The resolution also asserts incorrectly that there is no authorization for U.S. participation 

in a Joint Combined Planning Cell with the KSA and mid-air refueling ofKSA-led coalition 

aircraft. President Obama directed such military and intelligence support pursuant to his 

authority under Article II of the Constitution as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and 

his authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations. See Flemingv. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603,615 

(1850) (explaining that the President "is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and 

military forces placed by law at his command"); Training of British Flying Students in the 

United States, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 62 (1941) ("[TJhe President's authority has long been 

recognized as extending to the dispatch of armed forces outside the United States, either on 

missions of goodwill or rescue, or for the purpose of protecting American lives or property or 

American interests.").3 Because, as discussed above, this limited support to the KSA does not 

1 Letter to Rep. Clement J. Zablocki from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, and Martin R. Hoffinan, 

General Counsel, Dept. of Defense (June 3, 1975). 2 Letter to Sen. Carl Levin from Robert Taylor, Acting General Counsel, Dept. of Defense (May 6, 20 13). Mr. 

Taylor's letter described U.S. military non-combat support to French operations in Mali. That support included 

intelligence collection, in-flight refueling, and logistics. See also Memorandum of June 16, 1978, reproduced in the 

report of the hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on 

International Relations, House of Representatives, August I 0, 1978, at pp. 32-33. 3 Because the President has directed U.S. troops to support the KSA operations pursuant to his authority under 

Article II, and because the limited operation does not implicated Congress's constitutional authority to Declare War, 
22 

involve the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent 

involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated, it does not implicate section 4(a)(l) of the War 

Powers Resolution. See 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(l). The Obama Administration published its 

sununary of that limited support to the KSA-led coalition as part of the December 2016 "Report 

of the Legal and Policy Framework Guiding the United States Use of Military Force and Related 

National Security Operations." As discussed further below, DoD and the Department of State 

have implemented the President's direction through statutory authorities available to the 

respective Secretaries. 

Article II of the Constitution likewise supplied the legal authority for the October 2016 

strikes against radar facilities in Houthi-controlled territory in defense of U.S. Navy ships in 

international waters. The President has authority pursuant to Article II to take military action 

that furthers sufficiently important national interests. The limited October 2016 strikes were 

taken to protect U.S. vessels and personnel. Consistent with the War Powers Resolution, 

President Obama notified Congress of these strikes on October 14, 2016. The Obama 

Administration also published a sununary of its legal analysis for the strike in its December 2016 

report. 

In late July 2017, President Trump completed a review oftheObama Administration's 

policy of limited support to the Saudi-led coalition. President Trump decided to continue that 

support, adjusting the priorities in light of the recommendations of Secretary of Defense James 

Mattis and intervening developments in Yemen. President Trump's policy guidance for support 

to the KSA-led coalition's operations in Yemen is to focus on ending the war and avoiding a 

regional conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia's territorial 

integrity and commerce in the Red Sea. Authorized types of support continue to include 

intelligence, logistics, and advisory support to the KSA-led coalition. 

DoD and the Department of State have implemented the President's policy guidance to 

provide limited support to the Saudi-led coalition pursuant to legal authorities available to the 

respective Secretaries. The most prominent forms of support to the KSA and the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE), as well as the corresponding legal authorities, are detailed below. 

Arms and Other Defense Articles: The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) is the 

underlying authority through which the United States provides or licenses defense articles and 

defense services to the KSA, UAE, and other members of the KSA-led coalition; many of these 

defense articles and defense services have been used in the conflict in Yemen. The AECA and 

associated delegations of authority provide the Secretary of State with the authority to approve 

the transfer of arms and other defense articles and defense services, primarily through the 

Foreign Military Sales program (which is overseen by the State Department and implemented 

through DoD) and through the State Department's licensing of Direct Commercial Sales to 

foreign partners. The authority to approve such transfers or licenses is not contingent upon 

whether the foreign recipient is engaged in an ongoing armed conflict, although the existence of 

the draft resolution would raise serious constitutional concerns to the extent it seeks to override the President's 

detennination as Commander in Chief. 
23 

such a conflict clearly increases demand and can be a policy factor in approval decisions. 

Transfers and licenses made pursuant to the AECA are subject to various requirements (such as 

notifications to Congress when transfers are above certain monetary thresholds) as well as 

restrictions on end-use (including no further transfer by the end-user without U.S. consent and 

that proposed uses must be consistent with the law of armed conflict). 

Logistics: Pursuant to licenses issued by the State Department under the AECA, U.S. 

contractors provide defense services in the form of essential maintenance and sustainment for 

KSA and UAE combat aircraft engaged in hostilities in Yemen. The in-flight refueling ofKSA 

and UAE aircraft, including combat aircraft, and certain other support, may also be provided 

pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §§ 2341 et seq., which authorizes DoD to provide logistic support, 

supplies, and services to the military forces of a country with which DoD has an Acquisition and 

Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in force. DoD must first obtain State Department approval 

to conclude an ACSA; DoD has ACSAs with the Ministry of Defense of the KSA (applied 

provisionally pending its formal entry into force) and with the Armed Forces General 

Headquarters of the UAE. 

I trust that this response will be helpful to your understanding of U.S. support to the 

KSA's operations in Yemen, and the reason for the DoD's opposition to this proposed Joint 

Resolution. Thank you for your continued support of the Department of Defense. 

Sincerely 

tlttfiir cc: 

The Honorable Charles E. "Chuck" Schumer 

Minority Leader 

United States Senate 

Acting 
24 

Mr. MCCAUL. And I thank the chairman for that and, again, I 

oppose this measure and I yield back my time. 

Chairman ENGEL. The ranking member yields back. 

Does any other member seek recognition on the resolution? I am 

told Mr. Connolly does. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the juridical distinction made by the ranking member that the United States is not technically involved on the ground 

in hostilities. 

But the United States most certainly has been involved in equipping, re-equipping, training, and other support for the Saudi activity in Yemen that has led to one of the greatest humanitarian crises on the face of the planet. 

And that is what we are trying to address today. We can hide 

behind juridical language that it is not technically a combat involvement of the United States. But it begs the question. 

Since 2015, the United States has provided support to the Saudiled coalition in its war against Houthis rebels in Yemen. In addition to claiming an estimated 60,000 Yemeni lives, this war is fueling the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. 

Humanitarian agencies now estimate that 85,000 children—children—have died from malnutrition. More than half the population 

currently requires emergency food assistance and one in every ten 

Yemeni children has been forcibly displaced from his or her home 

due to this conflict. 

In September 2018, Secretary Pompeo certified to this Congress 

that the Saudi and Emirate government were mitigating harm to 

civilians and civilian infrastructure in Yemen. 

Meanwhile, the Saudi-led coalition has conducted attacks, killing 

dozens of civilians at a time often with U.S.-provided munitions, 

giving—belying the certification made in September 2018. 

Article 1 Section 8 of the United States Constitution States unequivocally Congress shall have the power to declare war and to 

raise and support armies and other armed forces. 

I would argue, just as the executive branch says there are implied in the role of commander in chief, certainly there are implied 

powers about our ability to stop military interventions as we deem 

fit. Article 1 says so, as far as I am concerned. 

Pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93148, the 

president must remove U.S. armed forces engaged in hostilities 

outside U.S. territory without a specific statutory authorization if 

Congress so directs, and I would argue that that’s a broad, broad 

authority for Congress. 

It does not necessarily mean U.S. combat troops on the ground. 

Support for ongoing hostilities by a third power—an ally—certainly 

qualify as far as I am concerned. 

Chairman ENGEL. Will the gentleman yield? We are concerned 

that there’s time running out. There is 37 seconds left. So—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I support the resolution in front of us. I believe 

Congress needs to reclaim its congressional power and I will vote 

for the resolution pending before this committee. 

I thank the chair. 

Chairman ENGEL. I thank the gentleman. 
25 

The committee will now recess until after votes on the floor. The 

committee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman ENGEL. The committee will come back to order. 

For those who were not here, before we broke I gave my opening 

statement and the ranking member gave his opening statement 

and then Mr. Connolly of Virginia gave a statement. 

So we can now call on any other members seeking recognition. 

First we will start from the Republican side. Anybody seeking recognition? 

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that the Foreign Affairs Committee 

has always had a strongly bipartisan cooperation to work on issues 

that are so important to the American people. 

I believe the committee has the solemn responsibility to appropriately exercise the congressional War Powers Act under Article 1 

of the Constitution. 

But the mechanism to force withdrawal of U.S. forces under the 

War Powers Act applies only when we are engaged in live-fire hostilities. This is not what our military is currently doing in its operations and support of operations in Yemen. 

This resolution would set a very dangerous precedent as we are 

now going to allow any member to use this privileged war powers 

tool to second guess all U.S. security cooperation agreements 

throughout the world. 

This interpretation could impact our assistance to Israel. It 

would impact our cooperation with African countries in the Sahel. 

It would recklessly undo critical security relationships we have 

spent decades building. 

This is not what the War Powers Resolution was ever meant and 

it should not be used in this way. A vote in favor is a victory for 

bad politics. 

As we have heard at this morning’s hearing, the situation in 

Yemen poses critical strategic and humanitarian issues that deserve careful attention. If we want to discuss conditioning assistance to Saudi Arabia in this conflict, that is the area that we need 

to explore and debate. 

But this resolution is trying to hammer a square peg into a 

round hole. It misuses the extraordinary War Powers tool to try to 

get to the issue of security assistance to a third country. 

This—even our refueling of Saudi jets, which does not constitute 

hostilities as traditionally understood, ended last November. I 

spoke with the Department of Defense representatives yesterday 

who reaffirmed that U.S. forces are not engaged in hostilities 

against the Houthis forces in Yemen. 

They confirmed the continuing accuracy of the detailed letter 

sent to Congress last year by the department’s acting general counsel. 

No one is saying that U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia or 

anyone else is beyond congressional scrutiny. We have many tools 

to use including the committee’s arms sales notifications, targeted 

legislation, and the annual appropriations process, among others. 
26 

But this resolution stretches the definition of hostilities to cover 

non-U.S. military operations by other countries. It reiterates and 

reinterprets U.S. support to these countries as engagement in hostilities. 

This has implications far beyond Saudi Arabia. Under this 

model, if any Member of Congress does not like something that any 

of our security partners conducts overseas, that member can force 

quick consideration of a resolution directing the removal of U.S. 

forces from hostilities, quote, ‘‘in or on affecting,’’ end of quote, that 

situation. It no longer matters that U.S. forces are not actually conducting the hostilities. 

The bill is vague and irresponsible. It will create doubts for our 

partners and allies around the world. It will trouble the many 

Americans who believe that burden sharing with capable allies is 

vital for U.S. security to protect American families. 

For these reasons, I strongly oppose this measure. I yield back 

my time. 

Chairman ENGEL. Are there any other members seeking recognition? 

Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to you for moving quickly to give 

this committee the opportunity to advance debate on U.S. involvement in the Yemen conflict. It is a debate that is long overdue. 

As we just heard earlier today, U.S. presence in the Arabian Peninsula and our relationships with regional States are vital to stability in the Middle East. These ties are enduring and date to the 

end of the Second World War. 

We should be clear from the outset that we value our alliances 

and we do share common interests. But we should be honest in reassessing where those interests diverge and in identifying actions 

that set back our mutual objectives. 

First and foremost, we have to view our relationship with regional States through the prism of our own interests. Where do our 

priorities align? What types of action undermine our own goals? 

The Saudis and Emirates are preoccupied with their campaign in 

Yemen, which they see as a direct threat to their national security. 

The U.S. is right to support these countries’ right to self-defense 

and shares the concern that Iran is assisting the Houthis to further 

its own regional ambitions. 

But I also remain deeply troubled by the protracted military 

campaign in Yemen. The number of civilian casualties is alarming, 

to say the least. The lack of humanitarian access that has fostered 

famine and other extreme conditions and has put tens of millions 

of people at risk of starvation and disease is creating the worst crisis in decades. 

And I fear that the United States, through our coalition support, 

may be furthering the suffering and helping to perpetuate a conflict that has no military solution. 

The coalition war against the Houthis also redirects attention 

away from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the most dangerous 

branch of al-Qaida, and one that has sought to attack the United 

States directly. 
27 

In fact, public reporting has indicated these very groups the U.S. 

has long targeted in Yemen have at times been empowered by our 

own allies. Numerous reports of the use of child soldiers on both 

sides, illegal detention centers, shadow mercenaries, and continued 

reckless targeting should at least give us pause to reexamine exactly what role we should play in this conflict. 

That is why I am an original co-sponsor of H.J. Res. 37. That is 

why I will vote in support of it today. For too long this Congress 

has abdicated its role in foreign policy. 

Last Congress procedural moves were made to prevent us from 

even having this debate. The Trump administration, our Saudi and 

Emirate partners, the Houthis, and the Iranian backers must know 

that the status quo is unacceptable and must take greater steps to 

reach a diplomatic settlement to end the war. 

The administration has only been willing to stand up for U.S. 

principles when there is sustained pressure by Congress, as we saw 

with the suspension of refueling. It is time for accountability. 

The world must know that the United States does not accept and 

cannot be complicit in the deaths of innocent civilians in Yemen. 

Being an ally does not mean being given free rein and we must ensure that we are supporting our partners and making decisions 

that are in our best interest. 

I look forward to continuing this debate with my colleagues on 

the House floor and I look forward to ensuring that our policies in 

the Middle East are also protecting U.S. security interests. 

And I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, the opportunity to speak on this 

and yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Mr. Chairman, I can pass on my opening statement if there is nobody else. Otherwise, I will speak. 

Chairman ENGEL. I think—Mr. Curtis, I think, wanted to speak. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Yes, go ahead. 

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Curtis. 

Mr. CURTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

McCaul, for giving me a brief moment to speak regarding House 

Joint Resolution 37 directing the removal of U.S. armed forces from 

hostilities in Yemen. 

To be clear, I support the intent of the resolution. I have spoken 

often and including on the House floor regarding my concerns with 

U.S. involvement in Yemen’s civil war. 

This is one of the world’s deadliest wars that has killed tens of 

thousands of civilians. It is horrific—a horrific humanitarian crisis. 

An estimated 85,000 children have been killed or died of malnutrition and disease. 

The time has come for the U.S. to reconsider our support of this 

disastrous war and to consider the moral imperatives that form the 

foundation of our values and strategic interests. 

It is my fear that our continued support of the Saudi-led coalition’s effort in Yemen will only increase resentment of United 

States in the region and could diminish America’s reputation as 

champion of human rights and civil liberties. 

Aside from the gross inhumanity of this war, I have growing concerns about the behavior of Saudi Arabia as it affects our larger 
28 

American strategic interest in the region and our interest in preserving global humanitarian norms. 

With all of that said, I will be voting no on the resolution before 

the committee today. My concerns are with the way the resolution 

is written and I believe it is the wrong vehicle to achieve the objective. 

I believe that the resolution distorts the War Powers tool to address the situation in Yemen. It is my concern that this resolution 

could set a dangerous precedent and would have the unintended 

consequences of complicating U.S. security cooperation with partners around the world. 

And for those reasons, I oppose the resolution. With that, Mr. 

Chairman, I yield my time. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you. 

Mr. Lieu. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Yemen is not and should not be a partisan issue. As all of you 

know, U.S. assistance to the Saudi-led coalition started under the 

Obama Administration in September 2015. 

I wrote a letter to the Pentagon about this then little known war 

in Yemen because we were seeing reports that the Saudi-led coalition was striking innocent civilians. 

In the following months and years more and more Democrats as 

well as Republicans started to get involved, and it is not just the 

humanitarian catastrophe we are concerned about. It is war 

crimes. 

And regardless of what your view is of Saudi Arabia or our relationship, we cannot be assisting a coalition that is engaging in war 

crimes. 

We also know, based on years of looking at their activity, it is 

not as if the Saudi jets are trying to hit a moving Houthi target 

and they miss and they strike a bunch of civilians. 

What they are doing is precisely trying to strike the civilians. 

They have intentionally hit schools, wedding parties, funerals, most 

recently a bus with over 40 school kids. 

And that is why I support this resolution. I do note that some 

of my Republican colleagues do have concerns related to War Powers. 

That is why Representative Malinowski, Yoho, and I also introduced a simple clean bill that just tells us to get out of Yemen and 

the Armed Services Committee will have jurisdiction over that. 

Having said that, I support this resolution and I urge people to 

support it as well. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Does any other member seek recognition? 

If not, we can go to an immediate vote. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did change my mind 

because there was more discussion than I thought. So thank you 

for this opportunity to address this again. 

Mr. Chairman, I respect the intention of everybody to try to get 

to the solution. I respect the fact that everybody has compassion 

for what is going on in Yemen, as we all should. 
29 

I am going to make the point that I made earlier today, which 

I think is very important to make, before I make a few other 

points. 

The vast majority, or at least a significant number of people that 

are on this committee are freshmen. The freshmen on this committee have not had an opportunity to be briefed by the administration on what is going on in Yemen and what we are doing in 

Yemen. 

The reason many people that are supporting this are supporting 

this are supporting this and OK voting for this without being 

briefed in a SCIF about what is going on in Yemen. And I hate to 

say this because I love this committee, but it is political. 

It is because back home the Yemen war is all over Twitter and 

because there is pressure so we want to just pass this thing out of 

here. I mean, I love the hearing we did earlier. That is important. 

But for the very first action of this committee to be to pass a War 

Powers Resolution that has nothing to do with what the War Powers Resolution was intended to do, the fact that there is over a 

hundred agreements between the Department of Defense and other 

countries that this, if passed, would now open up for any Member 

of Congress who disagrees with any one of those cooperation agreements to do the same exact thing. 

Let us say we have a member of this committee that is—or of 

Congress that does not like our engagement with Israel. By the 

way, I notice that in this resolution it says none of this shall be 

construed to hurt our cooperation with Israel. 

Well, that is true. It also is not construed for our cooperation 

with Georgia or the puppy brigade or anybody because this is specifically about Yemen. 

The point about Israel is this opens up that opportunity now for 

any member to come forward and say they disagree with our military cooperation with Israel and do a privileged resolution and 

force a vote on the floor. 

In the country of Georgia, where a third of it is occupied by Russian forces, we have cooperation with that nation. Now anybody 

that is pro-Russian can come forward and say that we need to debate ending cooperation with the Georgian military and everything 

else. 

I am not—look, if you vote for this I do not think you are a bad 

person. Trust me. I do not think you have America’s interests not 

at your heart. But my request of this committee, if we are going 

to take up this resolution is let us all have really good discussions 

about it. 

Let us have information in the SCIF about what we are really 

doing over there. Let us have a detailed discussion about what happens if we pull out all cooperation of Saudi Arabia and what does 

that look like in terms of targeting in Yemen, and go through what 

we need and then as a committee we can have this vote. 

But, Mr. Chairman, respectively, and I have a great deal of respect for you, this is our very first committee action and we are 

getting ready to take an action that is going to have detrimental 

consequences without really thinking it through. 

So I have a great deal of respect here for all of my colleagues. 

But I would beg you—I would beg you to think through what your 
30 

vote would have. I get the political implications of this. I get that 

Saudi Arabia, for instance, is a hot topic right now in the political 

sphere. 

But what we do on this committee is not about politics. There is 

always some of that. We get it. What I have loved about being on 

the Foreign Affairs Committee and the reason I have fought hard 

to get my waivers to be on this committee is because this is a committee that puts partisan politics for the most part in front—behind what is good for this Nation. 

And if you all think this is good for this Nation, that is fine. But 

I think you need to make that decision after having all the information in front of you before just saying in the very first meeting 

of this committee let us have a vote that could have a massive impact, open up over a hundred defense agreements for any other 

member of the House of Representatives that takes a problem with 

that to debate and bring a privileged resolution. 

So with all due respect, I would beg you to vote against this. I 

would beg the majority to pull this resolution. But if they do not 

pull it, I would beg you to vote against it. 

Let us get briefings, let us move on, and then have a really good 

debate and vote after that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Malinowski. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I very much appreciate the sentiment that was just expressed 

and the passion behind it. With respect, I am a freshman who has 

spent many, many hours in SCIFs looking at this situation, having 

helped to oversee some of our assistance to Saudi Arabia in this 

conflict. 

We have a number of freshman members here who have significant national security experience. So I think we should debate the 

substance of this rather than suggest that any of us on this side 

have not thoroughly studied the question. 

For me, I—look, many of us on both sides have concerns about 

our engagement with Saudi Arabia. I share some of my Republican 

colleagues’ concerns about not overusing the War Powers Resolution. 

I think there may be other ways to address these concerns, and 

as Mr. Lieu mentioned, we hope to be able to work together with 

you on that. 

But the question here before us is a very simple one. Are we actually involved in active hostilities with the Saudis in Yemen? 

I can tell you most of my former colleagues in the State Department who are lawyers looking at this question believe that the answer to is was yes and I think it stands to reason. 

Imagine, if you will, if a foreign power were engaged in air 

strikes against Washington, DC. as we spoke and a second foreign 

power was refueling its aircraft over the Chesapeake Bay and then 

servicing those aircraft when they landed to stock up on bombs 

again so that they could resume their operations against us. 

Would we consider the second power to be engaged in active hostilities against us? I think all of us in this room would say yes. We 

are deeply, deeply embedded in the Saudi conflict in Yemen in a 
31 

way that we are not in the various partnership relationships we 

have in Africa, in the Middle East, that my friend fears that this 

will implicate. 

I think the standard we are setting here for defining engagement 

in active hostilities is in fact very, very high, very, very appropriate 

and I will be voting for this resolution as a result. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would my friend yield for a question? 

Mr. Malinowski. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would my friend agree, in addition to the points 

he made, that we are arguing over what constitutes combat and 

hostilities and that the support we have been giving in the Yemen 

conflict with the Saudis would clearly fall within the penumbra of 

hostilities and combat support involving U.S. military if not on the 

ground? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I would say yes and in a way that is distinct 

from most of our partner relationships around the world. The provision of weapons to Saudi Arabia, in my mind, would not rise to 

that level. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And would my friend—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. But refueling operations, targeting where we 

are actually there with them selecting the target and enabling the 

aircraft to reach the target, if any—if this was being done to us 

there is no question in my mind that we would agree that that 

would be hostilities against the United States. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Will the gentleman—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So—I am not finished yet. If my friend would 

further yield. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Of course, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So some—I understand that there are differences 

in approach and that some have a juridical approach, which is that 

strictly speaking, unless there are boots on the ground, we are not 

in combat and this does not apply and we are overreaching. 

I beg to differ as, obviously, does my friend from New Jersey. But 

let me ask one final question. 

Would my friend also agree that just as there are implied powers 

for the role of the commander in chief that over the years have 

really been expanded that there are also implied powers in Article 

1 Section A to the Constitution exclusively granting to the legislative branch the power of war and peace and the assembling of 

armed forces? That is explicit language in the Constitution of the 

United States. 

And that today we are in fact—you could disagree with the action but certainly you cannot argue constitutionally that we are not 

within our right to circumscribe the involvement of U.S. military 

when we have grave doubts about half the people we represent. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I certainly agree with my friend and it is a responsibility that Congress over the years has, arguably, abdicated 

and I think one of the points of this resolution and our broader efforts on Saudi Arabia, however we approach them, is to assert that 

Congress has that role and responsibility. 

Obviously, we need to exercise it responsibly. But I think we are 

doing so here. 
32 

Chairman ENGEL. Time is up. 

Anybody on the Republican side wish to be heard? 

If not, we have one more—Mr. Zeldin? 

Mr. ZELDIN. I yield to Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just I am not going to take all 5 minutes. I do want to make a 

point, though. If the U.S. Government was overthrown by a terrorist organization and somebody was bombing that terrorist organization and there was a country refueling and giving them targeting against the terrorist organization, I certainly would not consider them an enemy. 

I think that is an important point to make. And again, I think 

just—because I do not want to take all 5 minutes—one of the biggest things here is what precedent are we setting in any one of our 

defense cooperation agreements by this? 

I respect, sir, the gentleman from New Jersey, that you do know 

what is going on. I would argue that there are a lot of people that 

just do not. And that is not a cut to them. There is probably situations around the world I do not know anything about because I 

have not been briefed to the level I should have been. 

And I got to tell you—and this is dead honest, and my friends 

on the other side of the aisle know this about me—if my party in 

2015 was bringing this up against President Obama, who began 

this cooperation, I would be saying the exact words I am saying 

today and I would be opposing my own party in this resolution because I think it is so bad. 

With that, I will just yield back, or I will yield back to the gentleman. 

Mr. ZELDIN. I yield back to the chair. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Ms. Spanberger. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

To comment on the positions put forth by my colleague from Illinois, I would like to posit that we in fact are making informed decisions. That is the focus of what we are doing here, and I can think 

of no better first action than one that is focused on Article 1 of the 

Constitution that requires that Members of Congress make informed decisions about hostile engagement that in fact we undergo. 

And my colleague’s reverse hypothetical of my colleague from 

New Jersey’s position was actually not one that was something 

that we can perceive as a comparison because in fact the minute 

we start changing under which circumstances we are willing to abdicate our responsibility related to Article 1 in the case of a government overthrow, does Congress just step back and let the administration or the executive branch do whatever they want in this circumstance or that circumstance. 

We are taking away and we are abdicating our responsibility as 

Members of Congress and the minute we engage in these 

hypotheticals where we are talking about different circumstances 

and allowing for and justifying behaviors in different circumstances, I think that is where we get into challenging territory. 

And so I will be supporting this resolution today because I think 

it is absolutely because we need to make informed decisions that 
33 

Congress should be engaged on where it is that we are in fact engaged in hostile activity or military activity. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ENGEL. All right. Thank you. 

Hearing no further requests for recognition, the question is to report House Joint Resolution 37 to the House with the recommendation that the bill does pass. 

All those in favor, say aye. 

[Chorus of ayes.] 

All opposed, no. 

[Chorus of noes.] 

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a recorded vote. 

Chairman ENGEL. A recorded vote has been requested. The clerk 

will call the role. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman. Mr. Sherman. 

[No response.] 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Meeks. Mr. Meeks. 

[No response.] 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sires votes aye. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. CONNOLLY. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Connolly votes aye. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. DEUTCH. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Deutch votes aye. 

Ms. BASS. 

Ms. BASS. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Ms. Bass votes aye. 

Mr. KEATING. 

Mr. KEATING. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Keating votes aye. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. CICILLINE. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Cicilline votes aye. 

Mr. BERA. Mr. BERA. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Bera votes aye. 

Mr. CASTRO. 

Mr. CASTRO. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Castro votes aye. 

Ms. TITUS. 

Ms. TITUS. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Ms. Titus votes aye. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Mr. Espaillat. 

[No response.] 

Mr. LIEU. Mr. LIEU. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Lieu votes aye. 

Ms. WILD. Ms. WILD. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Ms. Wild votes aye. 
34 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Ms. PHILLIPS. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Phillips votes aye. 

Ms. OMAR. Ms. OMAR. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Ms. Omar votes aye. 

Mr. ALLRED. Mr. ALLRED. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Allred votes aye. 

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. LEVIN. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Levin votes aye. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Ms. Spanberger votes aye. 

Ms. HOULAHAN. 

Ms. HOULAHAN. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Ms. Houlahan votes aye. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Malinowski votes aye. 

Mr. TRONE. Mr. TRONE. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Trone votes aye. 

Mr. COSTA. Mr. COSTA. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Costa votes aye. 

Mr. VARGAS. Mr. VARGAS. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Vargas votes aye. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. GONZALEZ. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Gonzalez votes aye. 

Mr. MCCAUL. 

Mr. MCCAUL. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. McCaul votes no. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. SMITH. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Smith votes no. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chabot. 

[No response.] 

Mr. WILSON. 

Mr. WILSON. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Wilson votes no. 

Mr. PERRY. 

Mr. PERRY. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Perry votes no. 

Mr. YOHO. 

Mr. YOHO. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Yoho votes no. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Mr. KINZINGER. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Kinzinger votes no. 

Mr. ZELDIN. 
35 

Mr. ZELDIN. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Zeldin votes no. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Sensenbrenner. 

[No response.] 

Mrs. WAGNER. Mrs. WAGNER. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mrs. Wagner votes no. 

Mr. MAST. Mr. MAST. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Mast votes no. 

Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Rooney. 

[No response.] 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Fitzpatrick votes no. 

Mr. CURTIS. 

Mr. CURTIS. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Curtis votes no. 

Mr. BUCK. Mr. Buck. 

[No response.] 

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. WRIGHT. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Wright votes no. 

Mr. RESCHENTHALER. Mr. RESCHENTHALER. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Reschenthaler votes no. 

Mr. BURCHETT. Mr. BURCHETT. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Burchett votes no. 

Mr. PENCE. 

Mr. PENCE. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Pence votes no. 

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. WATKINS. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Watkins votes no. 

Mr. GUEST. Mr. GUEST. No. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Guest votes no. 

Chairman ENGEL. May I ask the clerk how—— 

Ms. STILES. Chairman Engel. 

Chairman ENGEL. Votes aye. 

Ms. STILES. Chairman Engel votes aye. 

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Espaillat. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Espaillat votes aye. 

Chairman ENGEL. Have all members been recorded? 

And the clerk will report. 

One more? 

Chairman ENGEL. Is Mr. Sherman recorded? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Aye. 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Sherman votes aye. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. STILES. Mr. Chairman, on that vote, there were 25 ayes and 

17 noes. 
36 

Chairman ENGEL. Twenty-five ayes and 17 noes. The ayes have 

it. 

The measure is ordered favorably reported and the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table. 

Without objection, the staff is authorized to make necessary technical and conforming changes, and this concludes our business 

today. 

I want to thank Mr. McCaul and all our members on both sides 

of the aisle and the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
37 

APPENDIX 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING AND MARKUP NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Eliot L. Engel (D-NY), Chairman 

February 6, 2019 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing and markup of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held in Room 2172 of the Raybum House Office Building (and available live on the Committee 

website at https://foreignaffairs.house.govi): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, Febmary 6, 2019 

10:00 a.m. 

U.S. Policy in the Arabian Peninsula 

Mr. David Harden 

Managing Director 

Georgetown Strategy Group 

Mara Karlin, Ph.D. 

Director of Strategic Studies and Associate Professor 

School of Advanced Intemational Studies 

Johns Hopkins University 

Mr. Jake Sullivan 

Nonresident Senior Fellow 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Mr. Michael Singh 

Senior Fellow and Managing Director 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

*MARKUP WILL BEGJN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWJNG HEARING* 

MARKUP OF: H.J. Res. 37, Directing the removal of United States Armed Forces from 

hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by 

Congress. 

By Direction of the Chairman 

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make ilsfacilities accessible to persons with disabilities. if you' are in need of special accommodations, please cal/2021225-

5021 at least four bt1SII1ess days in advance of the even!, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in generaf (including availability of 

Committee materials in altemativefonnats and assistive /istmlng devices) may be directed to the Commilfee. 
38 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP 

Day Wednesday Date February 6, 2019 Room 2172 

Starting Time 1:34 p.m. Ending Time 2:50p.m. 

Recesses (1;4D_to .2:2fl.) (__to_) (__to_) (__to __ ) (__to_) (__to_) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Eliot L Engel 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open Session [{] 

Executive (closed) Session D 

Televised[{] 

Electronically Recorded (taped)[{] 

Stenographic Record [{] 

BILLS FOR MARKUP: (Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.) 

H.]. Res. 37, Directing tl1e removal of United States Armed Forces from 

hostilities in the Republic of Yemen tlulJ have not been authorized by 

Cougress. 

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See attached. 

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

NIA 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record) 

SFR_Cicilli11e, SFR_Buck, IFR_Cicilli11e, IFR_McCaull, lFR.)I1cCaul II, lFR_McCaullll 

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: (Attach copies of legislation and amendments.) 

NIA 

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): (Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.) 

Subject fiJ!!. Record Vote on H./. Res 37 25 

~ 

17 

Present 

0 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ____ ~ 

or TIME ADJOURNED 2:50p.m. v--..__ ~ 

"''Comm,...Hurl;i'~ 
39 

PRL'\EST 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X c--,--- X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP 

ME,v!BER l'!!if~ 1\fl::i\JIJ!:R 

Eliot L Engel, NY Michael T. McCaul, TX 

Brad Sherman, CA X Christopher K Smith, NJ 

Gregory W. Meeks. NY Steve Chabot, 011 

Albio Sires. NJ X Joe Wilson, SC 

Gerald L Connolly, VA X Scott Perry, PA 

Theodore K Deutch, FL X Ted Yoho, FL 

Karen Bass, CA X Adam Kinzinger, !L 

William Keating, MA X Lee Zeldin. NY 

,,_,,_ 

David Cicilline. Rl James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr., WI 

Ami Bera,CA X I Ann Wagner, MO 

J;aquin Castro, TX X Brian J, Mast, FL 

Dina Titus, NV X Francis Rooney, FL 

Adriano Espaillat, NY X Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA 

Ted Lieu, CA X John Cutiis, UT 

Susan Wild, PA Ken Buck, CO 

Dean Phillips, MN X Ron Wright. TX 

l!han Omar. MN X Guy Rcschcnthaler, PA 

Colin Allred, TX X Tim Burchett, TN 

Andy Levin, Ml X Greg Pence, IN 

Abigail Spanberger. VA X Steve Watkins, KS 

Chrissy Houlahan, PA X Michael Guest, MS -----

Tom MalinO\vskL NJ 

David Tro~~.:.~P 

Jim Costa, CA 

Juan Vargas. CA 

Vicente Gonzalez. TX 
40 

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Statement for the Record from Representative David N. Cicilline 

Markup of H. J. Res. 37 

February 6, 2019 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the Ranking Member for bringing up this bill today. 

By taking up this important War Powers Resolution, this Committee is reasserting our 

constitutional authority over American military actions, and sending an important message 

both to the Saudi-led coalition and to the Trump Administration. 1 applaud the efforts of my 

colleague Mr. Khanna, who has been unwavering in his dedication to seeing accountability 

for American involvement in Yemen. 

Congress ·cannot and will not look the other way while the war in Yemen results in tens of 

thousands of innocent lives lost and a spiraling humanitarian catastrophe. 

The Iranian-backed Houthis have acted with complete disregard for civilian lives, blocking 

humanitarian aid, and mounting attacks into Saudi Arabian cities. There is no question that 

they bear much of the blame for the current humanitarian crisis. 

However, the Saudi and Emirati-backed coalition is using American-made weapons, aided by 

American logistical support, to kill innocent civilians. Just in recent weeks we have seen 

reports of civilians killed and grain silos destroyed by Saudi-backed effotis. 

For too long, the United States has been involved in this war, without proper congressional 

authorization or oversight. 

The consideration of this bill comes amidst the longer discussion of the future of the U.S.-

Saudi relationship, which J strongly believe must be reevaluated. 

I hope that the strong, bipartisan passage of this resolution will signal to Saudi Arabia, the 

AUE, and the many observers around the world that the United States will not continue to 

blindly suppoti partners that commit violations of international law, murder journalists, and 

lock up and totiurc human rights activists. 

Jt has been three months since Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi was lured into 

the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul and hacked to pieces. This atrocious killing of a journalist 

was. sadly, not an isolated incident. 

According to the Committee to Project Journalists, there are currently 16 journalists sitting in 

Saudi prisons 12 of whom have been imprisoned since Crown Prince Mohammad bin 

Salman came to power. 

The Saudi Government has continued to crack down on human rights activists, particularly 

women. 

Mr. Chairman, l would like to submit for the record "She Wanted to Drive, So Saudi 

Arabia's Ruler Imprisoned and Tortured Her" by Nicholas Kristof. Right now, as we speak, 

Loqjain al-Hathloul is sitting in a Saudi prison, with a recent report from the New York 

Times that she has been tortured and waterboarded. 
41 

Congress cannot remain silent. 

I urge the Administration to take immediate steps to punish those who were involved in 

murder of Jamal Khashoggi and the imprisonment and torture of female activists, including 

utilizing Magnitsky sanctions, and other methods at their disposal. 

But accountability rests at the top, and any retaliatory actions that leave out the Crown Prince 

will be inadequate in my view. 

H.J. Res 37 is in impotiant first step of what I hope will be continued oversight by this 

Committee and by this Congress. This bill does not limit or restrict the role the United States 

can play as a constructive diplomatic and defense partner both in the Gulf region and around 

the world- I think this Committee, on both sides, supports America's partnerships and 

alliances. This bill also does not impact our ability to conduct counter-terrorism operations in 

Yemen. This bill does, however, reassert Congress' Constitutional responsibility to authorize 

sending the Armed Forces into conflict. 

The United States has a critical role to play, alongside our partners, in the Arabian Peninsula. 

We should be focused on supporting diplomatic effotis that will bring an end to suffering of 

the Yemeni people, and taking steps to counter extremists in the region. 

The never-ending war in Yemen has been bad for the Y cmeni people, harmed American 

national security interests, and threatened our strategic alliances in the region. It's time to 

find a diplomatic solution. 

Thank you. 
42 

Statement for the Record from Representative Ken Buck 

Markup ofH.J. Res. 37 

February 6, 2019 

Mr. Chainnan, thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important War Powers Act 

resolution. Over the past two decades, Congress has completely ceded its Article I authority to 

declare war to the Executive Branch. This House has not taken a single vote to authorize a 

military conflict or change the scope of an existing Authorization of Military Force (AUMF) 

since I took office. I support the intent of this legislation, to ensure Congress is exercising its 

Article I powers to decide whether to send our sons and daughters to war. 

However, I am concerned about how broadly this legislation is drafted. The language includes 

intelligence sharing activities and aerial targeting assistance among the list of hostile activities 

the United States is engaging in. This potentially opens pandora's box as we maintain 

intelligence sharing agreements with dozens of countries across the globe. Additionally, our 

troops do not have to put boots on the ground to assist with aerial targeting. As such, 1 am 

concerned that this legislation may create unintended consequences that we are not fully 

considering at this moment. 
43 

ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

2/12/2019 Opinion! She Wanted to Drive, So Saudi Arabia's Ruler Imprisoned and Tortured Her· The New York Times 

She Wanted to Drive, So Saudi 

Arabia's Ruler Imprisoned and 

Tortured Her 

he U.S. should pressure Saudis to respect the human rights of outspoken women. 

By Nicholas Kristof 

,( Opinion Columnist 

an. 26, 2019 

emember this name: Loujain (pronounced Loo-JAYNE) al-Hathloul. She is 29 years old and a 

ourageous advocate for gender equality- so she is in a Saudi Arabian prison, and reportedly 

ur Saudi allies have tortured her, even waterboarded her. 

here has properly been global outrage at Saudi Arabia's murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a 

olumnist for The Washington Post and resident of Virginia. Jamal was a friend of mine, and I find 

t infuriating that President Trump and other officials won't hold Saudi Arabia accountable for 

illing and dismembering him. 

till, we can't bring him back. So let's direct equal attention to those still alive - like Hathloul, 

long with nine other women's rights activists who are also in custody, including some who say 

hey have endured torture. 

rump, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Jared Kushner bet big on the Saudi crown prince, 

ohammed bin Salman, but they were bamboozled. M.B.S. isn't a great reformer, and he isn't 

oming clean about Khashoggi's murder. 

or is he releasing Hathloul, who, along with others, had peacefully and persistently campaigned 

or years to allow women the right to drive. 

n 2014, she was arrested when she tried to drive into Saudi Arabia with a driver's license from 

he United Arab Emirates, nominally valid also in Saudi Arabia. Then in 2015, Hathloul was one of 

he first women to run for a seat on a municipal council. (She lost). 

he moved to the emirates. But in 2017, Saudi security forces effectively kidnapped her and her 

usband and returned them to the kingdom. The couple have divorced, and while accounts differ, 

ome believe this is because of pressure the government placed on the husband. 

https:/fwww.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/opinion/sunday/loujain-al-hathloul-saudi.html 114 
44 

2/12/2019 Opinion ! She Wanted to Drive, So Saudi Arabia's Ruler Imprisoned and Tortured Her - The New York Times 

hortly before women were allowed to drive last June, the government rearrested Hathloul, along 

ith other women's rights activists who had fought for the right the government was about to 

rant. 

"She said she had been held in solitary confinement, beaten, waterboarded, given electric shocks, 

exually harassed and threatened with rape and murder," her sister, Alia al-Hathloul, who lives in 

elgium, wrote in a searing Op-Ed in The Times this month, recounting what Loujain had told 

heir parents when they saw her. "My parents then saw that her thighs were blackened by 

ruises." 

espite being threatened with rape and murder and having her body thrown into the sewage 

ystem, Hathloul would not stay silent and reported the torture to her parents. 

er sister said Loujain was "shaking uncontrollably, unable to hold her grip, to walk or sit 

ormally." 

he other imprisoned women suffered similar treatment, according to Human Rights Watch, 

mnesty International and their families. They were said to have been subjected to electric 

hocks, whippings, forced kissing and hugging, threats of rape and more. Some were tied to a 

eta! bed and flogged. 

"Loujain's abuse exemplifies the methods of Saudi thuggish and lawless leadership, hellbent on 

xacting sadistic vengeance against any citizen who dares to think freely," Sarah Leah Whitson of 

uman Rights Watch told me. "The Saudi people owe a huge debt to Loujain." 

government spokesman did not respond to my inquiries about why Hathloul was imprisoned 

nd tortured. A pro-government newspaper did suggest that Hathloul is a traitor who could even 

eserve to be executed. 

n recent years, Saudi Arabia has stepped up the pace of executions, with about 150 reported last 

ear. Apparently for the first time, prosecutors have sought the death penalty for a woman who is 

nonviolent human rights defender, Israa ai-Ghomgham. 

https://\.wJIN.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/opinlon/sunday/loujain-al-hath!oul-saudi.html 214 
45 

2/12/2019 Opinion 1 She wanted to Drive, So Saud1 Arabia's Ruler Imprisoned and Tortured Her- The New York Times 

Lou,jain a1-Hathloul recorded a video in 2014 showing her driving in the United Arab 

Emirates toward the border with Saudi Arabia. Loujain ai-Hath!oul, via Associated Press 

rump is right that Saudi Arabia is an important ally. That's why it's important that it have a 

ecent, modernizing leader, rather than one who feuds with neighbors, kidnaps Lebanon's prime 

inistet~ invades Yemen, murders a journalist and tortures outspoken women. 

audi politics are murky, but there are whispers that the crown prince will not necessarily be 

levated to king on the death of his father. Yet Trump, Pompeo and Kushner are acting as M.B.S.'s 

rotectors and backers - so the world could be stuck with M.B.S. as a destabilizing and 

ppressive ruler for the next half century. 

EAD MORE ABOUT SAUDI HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 

_pinion 1 Alia AI-Hathloul: MY. Sister Is in a Saudi Prison. Will Mike Pompeo StaY. Silent? 

an. 13, 2019 

pinion I Nicholas Kristof· So, I Asked People in Saudi Arabia About Their Mad, Murderous 

rown Prince Dec. 15, 201s 

pinion I Katherine Zoepf: The Saudi Regime's Other Victims Dec. 13, 201s 

https:f/W\NW.nytimes.com/2019101/26/oplnion/sundaylloujaln-al-hathloul-saudLhtml 314 
46 

2112/2019 Opinion I She Wanted to Drive, So Saudi Arabia's Ruler Imprisoned and Tortured Her- The New York Times 

merica doesn't have much leverage to improve human rights in countries like China, Venezuela 

r Iran. But we have enormous leverage over Saudi Arabia, because it depends on us for its 

ecurity. Yet Trump, Pompeo and Kushner refuse to use that leverage. 

can't find any indication that any official in the Trump administration has even publicly 

entioned Hathloul's name or called for her release. So I hope Congress will step up, oversee the 

elationship and ask tough questions about why we are silent when our close ally waterboards a 

oman seeking equal rights. 

audi Arabia will never live up to its potential as long as it treats women as second-class citizens. 

hat's at stake is not only justice but also stability, economic development and peace in the 

egion. 

hus I urge the Nobel Peace Prize committee to consider selecting Hathloul this year. 

Nicholas Kristof has been a columnist for The Times since 2001. He has won two Pulitzer Prizes, for his 

coverage of China and of the genocide in Darfur. You can sign up for his free, twice-weekly email 

newsletter and follow him on lnstagram. @NickKristof • Facebook 

version of this article appears in print on Jan. 27, 2019, on Page SR11 of the New York edition with the headline: Tortured For Wanting To Drive 

https;//WWN.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/opinion/sunday/loujain-a!-hathlout-saudi.h!m! 4/4 
Date: 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

U.S. House of Representatives 

116th Congress 

Qi.fo~Aor 

Record Vote Description: 

f!jtb 

Clerk's initials 

Member 

Eliot LEngel, D·NY, Chairman 

Brad Sherman, D~CA Gregory W. Meeks, O.NY 

Albio Sires, 0-NJ 

Gerald E. Connolly, O-VA 

Theodore E. Deutch, 0-FL 

Karen Bass, D·CA 

William A. Keating, O.MA 

David N. Clcilline, D·RI 

Ami Sera, D·CA 

Joaquin Castro, D·TX 

Dina Titus, [}.NV 

Adriano Espaillat, D·NY 

Te<llieu,D·CA 

Susan Wild, D-PA 

Dean Phillips, D·MN 

llhan Omar, 0--MN 

Colin Allred, 0-TX 

Andy Levin, D·MI 

Abigail Spanberger, O.VA 

Chrissy Houlahan, D·PA 

Tom Malinowski, D-NJ 

David Trone, 0-MD 

Jim Costa, D-CA 

Juan Vargas, D-CA 

Vicente Gonztdez, D-TX 

SUBTOTAL 1 

Aye No 

/ 

IL 

v 

I/ 

/ 

/: 

/ 

L 

/ 

/ ~ / 

L 

/ 

/ 

1/ 

/ 

IL 

1/ 

/. 

/ 

1/ 

1..1: 

v 

JL - :..s ....__ 

-

Present Member Aye No Pre

MIChael T. McCaul, A-TX /. 

Chris Smith, R·NJ / 

Steve Chabot, A·OH 

Joe Wllson, R·SC / 

Scot1Perry, A·PA [/ 

Ted Yoho, R·FL / 

Adam Kinzinger, R--IL / 

Lee Zeldin, R·NY / 

J!m Sensenbrenner, A-Wl 

Ann Wagner, R-MO / 

Brian Mast, A·FL / 

Francis Rooney, R·FL 

Brian Fitzpatrick, R-PA /. 

John Curtis, A·UT ,/ 

Ken Buck, A·CO 

Ron Wright, R· TX V. 

Guy Reschenthaler, R·PA v 

nm Burchett, R-TN 1/ 

Greg Pence, R-!N I/ 

Steve Watkins, A-KS 1/ 

Michael Guest, R-MS 1/ 

SUBTOTAL2 

- \~ ,.

Aye No Pre

SUBTOTA~ 1 

SUBTOTA~2 

- TOTA~ 1,? f:} ' ..
48 

MARKUP SUMMARY 

92/06/2019 House Foreign Affairs Committee Mark!nLSummary 

The Chair called up the following measure to be considered: 

H. J. Res. 3 7 (Khanna), Directing the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the 

Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress. 

The Chair moved to report the resolution favorably. A recorded vote was requested, and by a roll call 

vote of25 Ayes and 17 Noes, the motion was adopted. 

The Committee adjourned. 
49 

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