## The Attorney General’s Role as Chief Litigator for the United States

[The following mem orandum describes the development and present scope of the Attorney G eneral's role in representing the United States and its agencies in litigation. It discusses the policy reasons for the centralization of litigation authority in the Department of Justice, and analyzes the Attorney G eneral’s relationship with client agencies. It also touches on the Attorney G eneral’s authority to settle and com prom ise cases, and on his authority over litigation in international courts. It concludes that, absent clear legislative directives to the contrary, the Attorney General has plenary authority and responsibility over all litigation to which the United States or one of its agencies is a party, and that his discretion is circumscribed only by the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."]

January 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

You have asked this Office to outline the role and responsibilities of the Attorney General in representing the United States in litigation in which the United States, or a federal agency or department, is a party. In particular, you asked that we consider the Attorney General’s authority and responsibility to make decisions with respect to litigation, even if those decisions may conflict with the views, desires, or legal analyses of other departments or agencies of the United States, including those which may be “clients” in the particular litigation.Litigation involving agencies which have been granted express exclusive authority by Congress to conduct their own litigation is not within the scope of this m emorandum.1 Rather, the focus of this memorandum is litigation involving

1 Circum stances in w hich the Attorney General lacks supervisory authority over litigation on behalf of the U nited States include ( I) Litigation in U nited States courts where the Attorney General has no authority to determ ine w ho shall represent the U nited States, such as the United States Tax Court (26 U S-C. § 7452 specifies that the U nited States shall be represented by the C hief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service or his delegate) and the U nited States Court of M ilitary A ppeals (10 U S C § 870 specifies that the United States shall be represented by the Judge Advocate General o r his delegate); (2) Litigation involving independent regulatory agencies which have been given the express statutory authority to conduct their own litigation using agency attorneys, e g ., the National L abor Relations Board (29 U S C § 154(a)); the Federal Power Com m ission (16 U .S .C . § 825m(c) pow er transferred to Federal Energy Regulatory C om m ission (42 U .S C. § 7172(a)(2)(A) (Supp IV 1980)), the Interstate C om m erce Com m ission (49 U .S .C . § 16(11) (Supp IV 1980)); and (3) Litigation involving Executive Branch agencies w hich have been granted independent litigating authority by C ongress, e g , the Secretary of Labor is authonzed to appoint attorneys to represent the Secretary or the Benefits Review Board in actions under the Longshorem en’s and H arbor W orkers’ C om pensation A ct, except in the Supreme C ourt, under 33 U S.C . § 921a. There are also circum stances in which certain agencies have assum ed, notw ithstanding their lack of express statutory authority, full responsibility for their ow n trial and appellate litigation, so far w ithout objection from the Attorney G eneral. These agencies, such as the Tennessee Valley A uthority and the Federal D eposit Insurance C orporation, have not been required to submit to the Attorney G eneral's supervisory authority, apparently for

C ontinued 47those agencies whose litigating authority is clearly subject to the Attorney

G eneral’s direction, or whose statutory grants of authority are ambiguous or
insufficient to remove them from the A ttorney General's supervision. We conclude that, absent clear legislative directives to the contrary, the Attorney General has full plenary authority over all litigation, civil and criminal, to which the United States, its agencies, or departments, are parties. Such authority is rooted historically in our common law and tradition, see Confiscation C ases, 74 U . S . (7 W all.) 454,458-59 (1868); The G ray Jacket, 72 U . S . (5 Wall.) 370 (1866) and, since 1870, has been given a statutory basis. See 5 U.S.C. § 3106, and 28 U .S.C . §§ 516, 519. See generally United States v. San Jacinto Tin C o ., 125 U.S. 273 (1888). The Attorney General’s plenary authority is circum scribed only by the duty imposed on the President under Article II, § 3 of the Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”



### I. Historical Development of the Role of the Attorney General

Plenary power over the legal affairs of the United States was vested in the Attorney General when the Office of the Attorney General of the United States was first created by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92.2 The Attorney General’s statutory authority to conduct litigation to which the United States, its departments, or agencies, is a party was more fully developed by Congress in 1870, in the same legislation that provided for the creation of the Departm ent of Justice. A c to fJu n e 2 2 ,1870,ch. 1 5 0 ,16Stat. 162. Prior to 1870, however, the Attorney General’s authority in litigation matters involving the United States had been recognized by the Supreme Court. In The G ray Jacket, 72 U .S. (5 Wall.) 370 (1866), the Court held that no counsel would be heard for the United States in opposition to the views of the Attorney General. In the C onfiscation C ases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1868), the Court concluded that:

W hether tested, therefore, by the requirements of the Judiciary Act, or by the usage of the government, or by the decisions of this

historical reasons, som e o f w hich relate to th e ir financial independence as governm ent corporations. See Daniel J M eador, A ssistant A ttorney G eneral, Office fo r Improvements in the Administration of Justice, D raft M em orandum to the A ttorney G eneral and the Assistant A ttorneys G eneral Re: G overnm ent Relitigation Policies (M ay 21, 1979), M em orandum to the Attorney General from W illiam D. Ruckelshaus (M ar 5, 1970) The operative statutes in these tw o ca ses, 16 U S C § 831c(h), 83lx (TV A ) and 12 U S C § 1817(g) (FD1C), merely give the agencies the authority to sue and be sued— not to litigate independently of the D epartm ent of Justice. Presumably, the Attorney G eneral may reassert his supervisory authority at any tim e. 2 S ection 35 of the Judiciary Act provided in pertinent part that [T]here shall . . be appointed a m eet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the U nited States, w ho shall be sworn o r affirm ed to a faithful execution of his office; w hose duty it shall be to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Suprem e Court in which the United Slates shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President o f the U nited States, or w hen requested by the heads of any of the departm ents, touching any m atters that may concern their departm ents. “ D istrict attorneys," now know n as “U nited States A ttorneys," were to be appointed to conduct litigation in the low er courts o f the U nited States but were not placed under the Attorney G eneral’s authority until 1861 Act of A ug. 2, 1861, ch 37, 12 Stat 285. F rom 1820 until 1861, the “district attorneys” w ere supervised by the D epartm ent o f the Treasury. A ct of May 15, 1820, ch 107, 3 Stat 592

48court, it is clear that all such suits, so far as the interests of the

United States are concerned, are subject to the direction, and within the control of, the Attorney-General.

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 458-59. The' 1870 Act established the Department of Justice and designated the Attorney General as its chief legal officer. The Act provided that certain specified “solicitors” performing legal functions within the various agencies “shall be transferred from the Departments with which they are now associated to theDepartment of Justice, . . . and shall exercise their functions under the supervision and control of the head of the Department of Justice.” ( § 3 ,1 6 Stat. 162.)3 The Act also authorized the Attorney General to designate any officer of the Department of Justice, including himself, to conduct and argue any case in which the government is interested, in any court of the United States, whenever he deems it necessary for the interest of the United States. (§ 5, 16 Stat. 162.) In addition, the Act gave the Attorney General supervisory authority over the conduct and proceedings of the various attorneys for the United States in the respective judicial districts, “and also of all other attorneys and c o u n se llo rs employed in any cases or business in which the United States may be concerned.” (§ 16, 16 Stat. 164.) And finally, the Act forbade the Secretaries of the ExecutiveDepartments to employ other attorneys or outside counsel at government expense, but “shall call upon the Department of Justice . . ., and no counsel or attorney fees shall hereafter be allowed to any person . . ., besides the respective district attorneys . . ., for services in such capacity to the United States, . . . unless hereafter authorized by law, and then only on the certificate of theAttorney-General that such services . . . could not be performed by the AttorneyGeneral, . . . or the officers of the Department of Justice.” (§ 17, 16 Stat. 164.)
16 Stat. 162. The initial motivation for this legislation was the desire to centralize the conduct and supervision of all litigation in which the government was involved,as well as to eliminate the need for highly paid outside counsel when governmenttrained attorneys could perform the same function. Other objectives of the legislation that were advanced in the congressional debates were to ensure the presentation of uniform positions with respect to the laws of the United States (“a unity of decision, a unity of jurisprudence . . . in the executive law of the United States”),4 and to provide the Attorney General with authority over lower court proceedings involving the United States, so that litigation would be better handled on appeal, and before the Supreme Court. See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. IV, 3035-39, 3065—66 (1870). See generally Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Governm ent’s C hief Lawyer and C hief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1049 (1978); Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 Va. L. Rev. 165 (1938).

3 Prior to the A ct, Congress had provided for the existence of “solicitors” in the various departm ents and agencies, w ho were responsible for the legal affairs of their respective departm ents See generally Key, The Legal Work o f the Federal Government, 25 Va L Rev 165 (1938). 4 Cong G lobe, 41st Cong . 2d Sess , Pt IV, 3035, 3036 (1870)

49The Supreme Court considered this legislation in United States v. San Jacinto

Tin C o., 125 U.S. 273 (1888) and concluded that the Attorney General was “undoubtedly the officer who has charge of the institution and conduct of the pleas of the United States, and of the litigation which is necessary to establish the rights of the government.” Id. at 279. Emphasizing the centralizing function of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General, the Court reasoned that the power to control government litigation must lie somewhere— that there must exist some officer with authority to decide when the United States should sue, and to oversee the execution of such a decision— and that the Attorney General was designated such appropriate officer, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, by reference to the historical practice in England.5125 U.S. at 278-80. In 1921, the Court added that the Attorney General’s authority to conduct such litigation could be affected only by clear legislative direction to the contrary. Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U .S. 147, 155 (1921). See also 21 Op. A tt’y Gen. 195 (1895). (The Secretary of the Navy was not warranted in employing counsel in a foreign country to institute suit in behalf of the United States, but should have referred the matter to the Department of Justice, “which is charged with the duty of determining when the United States shall sue, for what it shall sue, and that such suits shall be brought in appropriate cases,” id. at 198.)Lower courts reached similar conclusions with respect to subsequent recodifications of the 1870 legislation. The Court of Claims summarized the legislation in the following manner:

These provisions are too comprehensive and too specific toleave any doubt that Congress intended to gather into the Department of Justice, under the supervision and control of the AttorneyGeneral, all the litigation and all the law business in which the United States are interested, and which previously had been scattered am ong different public officers, departm ents, and branches of the Government, and to break up the practice of frequently employing unofficial attorneys in the public service.

Perry v. U nited States, 28 Ct. Cl. 483, 491 (1893). Speaking for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Learned Hand emphasized the centralizing function of the Attorney General’s role as chief litigator for the United States and the necessity that that role be committed exclusively to the Attorney General:

The government has provided legal officers, presumably competent, charged with the duty of protecting its rights in its

5 This reference is to the origin of the office of Attorney G eneral, which was first created in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and derived its function from the ro le of the A ttorney G eneral in England. The Court stated. T he judiciary act o f 1789 . w hich first created the office of Attorney G eneral, without any very accurate definition o f his powers, in using the words that “there shall also be appointed a meet person, learned in th e law, to act as Attorney G eneral for the United States," 1 Stat. 93, c. 21, § 35, m ust have had reference to the sim ilar office w ith the sam e designation existing under the English law. A nd though it has been said th at there is no com m on law of the United States, it is still quite true that w hen acts o f Congress use words which are fam iliar in the law o f England, they are supposed to be used w ith reference to their m eaning in that law.

125 U .S . at 280

50courts. . . . Congress, having so provided for the prosecution of

civil suits, can scarcely be supposed to have contemplated a possible duplication in legal personnel. The cost of this is oneconsideration, but far more important is the centering of responsibility for the conduct of public litigation. The Attorney Generalhas powers of “general superintendence and direction” over district attorneys (title 5, U.S. Code, § 317 [5 USCA § 317]), and may directly intervene to “conduct and argue any case in any court of the United States” (title 5, U.S. Code, § 309 [5 USCA § 309]). . . . Thus he may displace district attorneys in their own suits, dismiss or compromise them, institute those which they decline to press. N o such system is capable o f operation unless his pow ers are exclusive, or if the Departments may institute suits which he cannot control. His powers must be coextensive with his

duties.

Sutherland v. International Insurance C o., 43 F.2d 969,970 (2d Cir. 1930), cert, denied, 282 U .S. 890 (1930) (emphasis added). In 1933, as part of a crusade to consolidate as much of the government’s business as necessary to increase operating efficiency, President Roosevelt issued an executive order to supplement the existing legislative mandate of centralized litigation authority. Executive Order No. 6166 (June 10, 1933), which requires all claims by or against the United States to be litigated by, and under the supervision of, the Department of Justice, is still in effect. The order provides in pertinent part:

Claims by or against the United States.

The functions of prosecuting in the courts of the United States claims and demands by, and offenses against, the Government of the United States and of defending claims and demands against the Government, and of supervising the work of United States attorneys, marshals, and clerks in connection therewith, nowexercised by any agency or officer, are transferred to the D epartment of Justice.As to any case referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense in the courts, the function of decision whether and in what manner to prosecute, or to defend, or to compromise, or to appeal, or to abandon prosecution or defense, now exercised by any agency or officer, is transferred to the Department of
Justice.

Reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 901 note (1976).



### II. Present Statutory Bases of the Attorney General’s Authority

These attempts to centralize the litigating function and authority of the federal government in the Department of Justice, with the Attorney General at its helm,

51are now codified in 5 U.S.C. § 3106and 28 U .S.C . §§ 515-516. Section 3106 of

Title 5 forbids the employment of outside counsel by executive agencies for litigation involving the United States unless Congress has provided otherwise, requiring instead that the m atter be referred to the Department of Justice.6 Although we have found no case law interpreting this provision, the language of § 3106 appears to limit the prohibition of payment to outside counsel for litigation, and litigation-related matters. However, in view of the centralization and uniformity purposes underlying the 1870 Act and its progeny, we believe that, absent statutory authority to the contrary, the prohibition should be broadly interpreted to preclude payments to non-agency or non-Justice Department attorneys for (legal) advisory functions as well. See Scalia, Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Office of Legal Counsel, Letter to Hoffman, General Counsel, Department of Defense (Mar. 2 6 ,1975).7 See also B oyle v. U nitedStates, 309F.2d399, 402 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (quoting from a 1957 letter by the Comptroller General: “[I]n the absence of urgent and compelling reasons, a Government agency may not procure from an independent contractor services normally susceptible of being performed by Government em ployees.”). Nevertheless, the Attorney General may employ outside counsel to perform legal duties under his direction. Sections 515 and 543 of Title 288 authorize the Attorney General to commission “special attorneys” to assist United States Attorneys, or to “conduct any kind of legal proceeding, civil or criminal, . . . which United States attorneys are authorized by law to conduct

. . .

6 5 U S C § 3106 provides in pertinent p art that. [ejxcept as otherw ise authorized b y law, the head o f an Executive departm ent o r military departm ent may not em ploy an attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation in w hich the United S tates, an agency, o r employee th ereo f is a party, or is interested, or for the securing o f evidence therefor, but shall refer the matter to the D epartm ent o f Justice. 7 A lthough the Scalia letter w as written in response to an inquiry regarding the use o f outside counsel by an agency in connection w ith the investigation o r prosecution of adm inistrative claim s, the principles expressed therein are broadly applicable

In prohibiting the use o f outside co u n sel by the several departm ents, Congress concentrated all the G overnm ent’s law business in the D epartm ent of Justice— not only litigation, but also advisory functions. This was thought to be necessary in order to provide for uniform legal interpretations throughout the Executive branch . . . Congress later departed from the principle that all legal activities o f the Governm ent were to be carried out by the D epartm ent of Justice; subsequent legislation, authorizing and funding agency legal staffs, perm itted legal matters not involving litigation to be handled in the various agencies. Those changes were taken into account when C ongress, in 1966, codified the various provisions o f the law going back to the Departm ent of Justice A ct o f 1870. S ee, e.g , H isloricaland Revision Notes to 5 U .S .C 3 1 0 6 an d 2 8 U S C 516. T here is, however, no indicauon o f a C ongressional intent to relax the prohibition against engagem ent o f outstde counsel by agencies other than the D epartm ent of Justice. This principle rem ains in effect w ith respect to both litigation reserved to the D epartm ent o f Justice and nonlitigative m atters handled w ithin the several agencies. Letter at 4-5 (footnotes and citations om itted) (em phasis added). 8 28 U .S .C . § 515(a), provides tn pertinent part that. [t]he A ttorney G eneral o r any other officer of the D epartm ent of Justice, or any attorney specially appointed by the A ttorney General u n d er law, may, w hen specifically directed by the Attorney G eneral, conduct any kind of legal proceeding, civil o r c rim in a l. . which U nited States attorneys are authorized by law to conduct, w hether or not he is a resident o f the district in which the proceeding is brought 28 U .S .C . § 543 provides:

(a) T he Attorney G eneral may ap p o in t attorneys to assist United States attorneys when the public interest so requires (b) Each attorney appointed under this section is subject to removal by the Attorney G eneral.

52Sections 515-519 of Title 28 codify the law growing out of the 1 870 Act which

consolidated the power to conduct litigation involving the United States in the Department of Justice, and granted the Attorney General supervisory authority over such litigation. The principal provisions granting such authority are §§ 516 and 519. Section 516 provides that

[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.

Section 519 provides that

[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney Generalshall supervise all litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and special attorneys appointed under section 543 of this title in the discharge of their respective duties.

However, as with the previous legislative and executive efforts designed to centralize the litigating functions of the United States, these provisions have beenundercut by exceptions authorized by Congress which grant agencies or departments litigating authority independent of the Department of Justice. See Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's C hief Lawyer and C hief Litigator, or One Among M any?, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1049 (1978); Memorandum to the Attorney General, from William D. Ruckelshaus (Mar. 5, 1970); Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 Va. L. Rev. 165 (1938).9 As of 1978, some 31 Executive Branch and independent agencies were authorized to conduct at least some of their own litigation. Bell, supra, at 1057. Although this memorandum does not address those cases in which agencies have been grantedindependent litigating authority, the lines between the Attorney General’s authority and that which has been delegated to the agencies have at times been drawn ambiguously, and in those cases, the Attorney General frequently asserts his historic authority over the litigation proceedings.

9 Congress has thus far m aintained virtually unim paired the Attorney G eneral's control over the initiation of criminal proceedings See, e.g , 15 U S C. § 77t(b) (SEC), 16 U S C § 825m (a) (FPC). The preservation o f suchauthority in the Attorney G eneral is, we believe, sound constitutional policy, in view of the Executive s constitutional mandate to take care that the laws be executed faithfully. Such a responsibility carries with it the vindication of public rights through the institution of criminal proceedings against those who violate the laws w hich the Executive adm inisters As the Executive s chief legal officer, the A ttorney G eneral is singularly suited to carry out this responsibility Similarly, the A ttorney G eneral’s authority to conduct cases in the Suprem e Court has rem ained undiluted Section 518 o f Title 28, which reserves the conduct and argum ent in the Suprem e Court of suits and appeals “in which the United States is interested" to the Attorney General and Solicitor G eneral. does not contem plate existing o r future statutory authorizations to the agencies, as do §§ 516 and 519 However. 518 does perm it the Attorney G eneral to “direct otherw ise,” in particular cases

53

### III. Supervisory Authority in the Context of Jointly Conducted Litigation

A . Policy Considerations

The policy considerations which support the centralization of federal litigating authority in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Attorney General, are many. In addition to the “unity of decision, unity of jurisprudence” goals that were articulated in the 1870 congressional debates, the centralization of authority and supervision over federal litigation in the Department of Justice meets several other objectives: (1) the coordination of lower court proceedings, which enhances the ability of government lawyers to select test cases presenting the governm ent’s positions in the best possible light; (2) the facilitation of presidential supervision, through the Attorney General, over Executive Branch policies that are implicated in litigation; (3) the allowance for greater objectivity in the filing and handling of cases by attorneys who are not themselves the affected litigants; and (4) the increased effectiveness in the handling of appeals and Supreme Court litigation which results from centralized control over lower court proceedings. See generally Memorandum to the Attorney General from W illiam D. Ruckelshaus, Re: Encroachments upon the Authority of the Attorney General to Supervise and Control the Government’s Litigation (Mar. 5, 1970).
See also Harm on, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for the Associate Attorney General (Dec. 11, 1980). Centralization of federal litigating authority in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Attorney General, is vitally necessary to ensure the Attorney G eneral’s proper discharge of his duty to oversee the legal affairs of the United States with which Congress has entrusted him. Centralization ensures that the Attorney General is properly informed of the legal involvements of each of the agencies for which he is responsible; supervisory authority permits him to act on that knowledge. In this way, the Attorney General is better able to coordinate the legal involvements of each “client” agency with those of other “client” agencies, as well as with the broader legal interests of the United States overall. Yet, while the “client” agencies may be involved, to varying degrees, in carrying out the litigation responsibilities necessary to assist the Attorney General in representing the agency’s particular interests, it is essential that the Attorney General not relinquish his supervisory authority over the agency’s litigation functions, for the Attorney General alone is obligated to represent the broader interests of the Executive. It is this responsibility to ensure that the interests of the United States as a whole, as articulated by the Executive, are given a paramount position over potentially conflicting interests between subordinate segments of the government of the United States which uniquely justifies the role of the Attorney General as the chief litigator for the United States. Only the Attorney General has the overall perspective to perform this function. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that in exercising supervisory authority over the conduct of agency litigation, the Attorney General will generally defer to the

54policy judgments of the client agency. This deference reflects a recognition of the

agency’s considerable expertise in the substantive area with which it is primarilyconcerned. Strictly speaking, “policy” judgments are confined to those substantive areas in which the agency has developed a special expertise and in which the agency is vested by law with the flexibility and discretion to make policyjudgments. However, it is increasingly the case that policy concerns are implicated in decisions dealing with litigation strategy, and in such cases, the Attorney General will accommodate the agency’s policy judgments to the greatest extent p o ssib le w ith o u t co m p ro m isin g the law, o r b ro a d e r natio n al p o licy
considerations. It is in the context of these dual representation functions— in which there exists inherent potential for conflict between “clients”— that questions of representation arise. Circumstances frequently develop in which the Attorney General and client agencies disagree as to the proper course of the litigation— including strategy, legal judgm ents, settlement negotiations, and policy judgments which impact on the litigation. Such circumstances frequently present the question whether the Attorney General should continue to represent the client. The simple answer is yes. The Attorney General has not only the statutory authority to represent the agencies over whose litigation he exercises supervisory authority, but, indeed, the duty to do so, “[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law.” 28 U .S.C. §§ 516, 519. The Attorney General’s authority and duty torepresent these agencies are described more particularly by the specific legislation which sets forth his and the agencies’ respective litigation responsibilities, and occasionally, in “Memoranda of Understanding” entered into by the Attorney General and specific agencies apportioning such responsibilities. Nevertheless, unlike the private attorney, the Attorney General does not have the option of withdrawing altogether from the representation of client agencies, as long as interests of the United States for which he is held responsible are at stake. However, recognition of the very real difficulties which are posed in the context of litigation jointly conducted by the Attorney General and “client” agencies— particularly in view of the agencies’ greater staffing resources, more intimate familiarity with the subject matter of the litigation, greater visibility to the public as a litigant, and more involvement in the day-to-day administration of field offices— tends to suggest that a more practical understanding of the AttorneyGeneral’s authority and duty to represent client agencies may be needed. Distinguishing policy judgments from legal judgments in litigation matters— the former being primarily the province of the agencies and the latter being reserved to the Attorney General— helps to provide not only a more reasonable and efficient use of government resources, but a workable framework for resolving most disputes that may result in representation crises. Nevertheless, because of his unique responsibilities in representing government-wide interests as well as those of particular “client” agencies, the final judgment concerning the best interests of the United States must be reserved to the Attorney General.

B. Legislative Exceptions to the Attorney G eneral’s Authority

Although Congress has over the years responded, in varying degrees, to themultitude of pressures exerted by agencies seeking independent litigating au55thority, the courts have continued to give greater weight to the strong policy

objectives which recommend centralization. As a result, the “otherwise authorized by law” language creating the exception to the Attorney General’s authority in 28 U .S.C . §§ 516 and 519 has been narrowly construed to permit litigation by agencies only when statutes explicitly provide for such authority. See M arshall v. G ibson ’s Products. Inc., 584 F.2d 668,676 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1978); ICC v. Southern Railway, 543 F.2d 534, 535-38 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 54 (2d Cir. 1975); FTC v. Guignon, 390 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1968); U nited S tates v. Tonry, 433 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. La. 1977). Although the legislative history of Sections 516 and 519 is relatively sparse— in fact, the “history” is contained almost entirely in the “Historical and RevisionNotes” prepared by the revisers o f Title 5 in 1966— the courts’ strict interpretation of these provisions is supported not only by the historical antecedents of these statutes and the policy considerations discussed above, but also by the Reviser’s Notes to the 1966 am endm ents.10 The revisers state, with respect to both Sections 516 and 519, that the sections were revised to express the effect of existing law, which does permit agency heads, “ with the approval of Congress, [to employ] attorneys to advise them in the conduct of their official duties. . . .” 28 U .S.C . § 516 note (emphasis added). The revisers further state that “[t]he words ‘Except as otherwise authorized by law,’ are added to provide for existing and future exceptions (e.g., section 1037 of title 10).” § 516 note; 28 U.S.C. § 519 note. Thus the revisers have indicated that existing and future grants of litigating authority that are at least as express as the language contained in 10 U .S.C . § 1037 are to be excepted from the Attorney General’s broad grant of authority under §§ 516 and 519 o f Title 28. Section 1037 of Title 10 permits the Secretaries of the various military departments to “employ [private] counsel” for the “representation” of persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice “before the judicial tribunals and administrative agencies” of foreign nations. W hile nothing in the legislative history of § 1037 indicates a congressional intent to create an exception to the predecessors of §§ 516 and 519, Congress made clear in 1966 that the operative language, “the Secretary concerned may employ counsel . . . incident to the representation before . . . judicial tribunals” was sufficient to trigger the exception." See H.R. Rep. No. 1863, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); S. Rep. No. 2544 , 84th C ong., 2d Sess. (1956). See generally Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum to Peter R. Taft (Aug. 27, 1976). In order to come within the “as otherwise authorized by law” exception to the Attorney G eneral’s authority articulated in 28 U .S.C . §§ 516 and 519, it is necessary that Congress use language authorizing agencies to employ outside

10 28 U S C §§ 5 1 5 -5 2 6 (1976), Pub L. N o . 89-554, § 4(c), 80 Stat 613 is the most recent codification of the provisions contained in the 1870 Act creating the D epartm ent of Justice Prior to 1966, these provisions were
codified in Title 5 11 I 0 U S C § 1037 was. adopted in 1956, p rio rto the 1966adoption of 28 U S C §§ 516 and 519, and provides in pertinent part:

(a) U nder regulations to be prescribed by him, the Secretary concerned may em ploy counsel, and pay counsel fees, court costs, bail, an d other expenses incident to the representation, before the judicial tribunals and adm inistrative agencies o f any foreign nation, o f persons subject to the U niform C ode o f M ilitary Justice.

56counsel (or to use their own attorneys) to represent them in court. See, e .g ., 49

U.S.C. § 16(11) (Interstate Commerce Commission); 16 U.S.C. § 825m(c) (Federal Power Commission); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board); 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (National Labor Relations Board);12 5 U .S.C. § 7105(h) (Supp. IV 1980) (Federal Labor Relations Authority).13 However, even agencies to which Congress has granted independent litigating authority may be prohibited from conducting their own litigation in the Supreme Court. See, e.g ., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(b)(2) (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); 5 U.S.C. § 7105(h) (Supp. IV 1980) (Federal Labor Relations Authority).14 More ambiguous language, which, for example, authorizes an agency to “sue and be sued,”15 “bring a civil action,” or “invoke the aid of a court,” has been considered by some courts to be insufficient to confer independent litigating authority. See. e.g ., ICC v. Southern Railway, 543 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1976); FTC v. Guignon,

,2 These statutes provide as follows I C C — 49 U .S C § 16(11)
The C om m ission may employ such attorneys as it finds necessary for proper legal aid and service of the Com m ission or for proper representation of the public interest*, in investigations made by it . o r to appear fo r or represent the Commission in any case in court. F P C — 16 U S C 8 825m(c)— language substantially sim ilar to that provided for I C C Federal Home Loan Bank Board— 12 U .S C. 1464(d)(1) The Board shall have pow er to cnforce this section and rules and regulations made hereunder In the enforcem ent of any provision of this section o r rules and regulations made hereunder . the Board is authorized to act in its own nam e and through its own attorneys . . National Labor Relations Board— 29 U S .C . § 154(a) Attorneys appointed under this section may. at the direction of the Board, appearfor and represent the Board in any case in court. (Em phases added ) O f course, these authorizations must be read within the context of the whole statutory schem e of which they are a part— in som e instances these agencies are represented by the D epartm ent o f Justice. 13 Language sim ilar to that contained in the statutes cited in n. 12, supra was recently held by the District C ourt for the District of C olum bia to confer independent litigating authority on the Federal Labor Relations A uthority (FLR A), including the litigation o f proceedings under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U S C . § 552 See AFGE

v Gordon, C A No. 81-1737 (D D C O ct. 23. 1981) The statute construed by the court as granting the FLRAindependent litigating authority. 5 U S C § 7105(h) (Supp IV 1980), providesExcept as provided in section 518 o f title 28. relating to litigation before the Suprem e Court. attorneys designated by the Authority may appear fo r the Authority and represent the Authority in any civil action brought in connection w ith any function carried out by the A uthority pursuant to this title or as otherwise authorized by law The Appellate Section of the Civil Division has recom mended that the Departm ent of Justice not appeal this decision N evertheless, the D epartm ent has m aintained vigorously in the past, and will continue to m aintain, that broad grants o f independent litigating authority, sim ilar to those discussed above, do not encom pass cases arising under adm inistrative statutes that apply govem m ent-wide This view is supported by the strong policy im peratives of “unity in the executive law o f the United States." infra at 5, as well as some legislative history See H R C onf Rep No 539, 95th Cong . 1st Sess. 72 (1977). reporting on the Departm ent of Energy O rganization Act. Pub L No 95-91. 91 Stat 565. which established the Federal Energy Regulatory Com m ission 14 42 U S.C § 2000e-4(b)(2) provides Attorneys appointed under this section may, at the direction of the C om m ission, appear for and represent the Com m ission in any case in court, provided that the Attorney General shall conduct all litigation to which the Commission is a parly in the Supreme Court pursuant to this subchapter. 5 U S C § 7105(h) (Supp IV 1980) provides:

Except as provided m section 518 c f title 28. relating to litigation before the Supreme Court, attorneys designated by the A uthority may appear for the A uthonty and represent the A uthority in any civil action brought in connection with any function carried out by the Authority pursuant to this title o r as otherwise authorized by law (Em phases added ) 15 The Office o f Legal Counsel views “sue and be sued” language as merely designating the agency as a “jural entity” which may sue or be sued in its own nam e, and not as rem oving the agency’s representation from the dom ain of the Department

of Justice pursuant to 28 U S C § § 5 1 6 and 519 See Meador, Draft M em orandum Re Government Relitigation Policies, supra, at 19, n 51. cuing an interview w ith H Miles Foy III, D epartm ent of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel

57390 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1968). S ee generally Harmon, Office of Legal Counsel,

M emorandum for the Associate Attorney General (Dec. 11, 1980); Meador, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, Draft Memorandum (May 21,1979); Office of Legal C ounsel, Relationship of Proposed Amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act . . . to the Department of Justice Policy of Opposition to Litigation Power Outside of the Department (Apr. 29, 1974); M emorandum to the Attorney General from William D. Ruckelshaus, supra; but
see SEC v. R obert C ollier & C o ., 76 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1935). Other language which does grant agency attorneys authority to litigate, but provides that such authority shall be exercised under the direction and control ofthe Attorney General, provides the framework for “Memoranda of Understanding” (MOUs) between the agencies and the Department of Justice, whichapportion the litigation responsibilities between the Department and the agencies. See, e .g ., 29U .S .C . § 204(b) (Fair Labor Standards Act); the Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602.16 These memoranda usually specify both the categories of cases in which agency counsel may appear and the nature of the Attorney General’s continuing control andsupervision over such cases. We believe that the sharing of litigation responsibilities under MOUs is proper, as long as the Attorney General retains ultimateauthority over the litigation. Moveover, the rationale underlying these arrangements is an eminently sensible one. The efficiency and expertise objectives in government litigation are thereby maximized, without sacrificing the Attorney G eneral’s statutory role as chief government litigator, and the responsibilities and prerogatives which attach thereto. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, MOUs do compromise the AttorneyG eneral’s control, if not authority, over the conduct of agency litigation. Agencies eager to control their own litigation may proceed to negotiate settlement agreements, send out “no action” letters, depose witnesses, and otherwise represent the agency’s position to the public without consultation or assistance from the Attorney General, leaving the Attorney General with a fait accom pli and a potential equitable barrier to his subsequent assertion of control over the litigation.17 Such occurrences effectively undermine the Attorney General’s

16 29 U .S .C . § 204(b) perm its Departm ent o f Labor attorneys to “appear for and represent” the Administrators of the FLSA and ADEA “ in any litigation," but subjects all such litigation “to the direction and control of the Attorney G eneral ” The S ecretary o f L abor and the A ttorney G eneral have entered into a series of understandings which provide that D epartm ent o f L abor attorneys w ill ordinarily handle all appellate litigation pursuant to the Acts, but perm it the Attorney G eneral to take part in the conduct o f such cases as he deem s to be in the best interest o f the
U nited States 17 We do not m ean to suggest that agencies acting beyond the scope of their litigating authority in settling claim s legally bind the U nited States, rather, we refer only to the confusion, ill will, and lack of confidence that would accrue to the agency in its public relations should the Attorney G eneral reverse the agency's actions, as well as the practical difficulties inherent in such a reversal See Dresser Indus., Inc v United States. 596 F.2d 1231, 1236 (5th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444 U S 1044 (1980):

It is well established that (he federal governm ent w ill not be bound by a contract or agreement entered into by one of its agents unless such agent is acting w ithin the limits o f his actual authority. . . As the Suprem e C ourt staled in [Federal Crop Ins Corp v Merrill. 332 U .S. 380 (1947)] W hatever the form in w hich the G overnm ent functions, anyone entering into an arrangem ent with the G overnm ent takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the G overnm ent stays w ithin the bounds o f his authority. T he scope of this authority may be exphctlydefined by C ongress or be limited by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rulem aking pow er A nd this is so even though . the agent him self may have been unaware of the lim itations upon his authority 332 U S at 384

58ability to perform the dual litigating functions with which he is charged. Recognizing that the efficiency and expertise objectives in government litigation necessitate the sharing of litigation responsibilities in most cases, care should be taken to make explicit in these arrangements the Attorney General’s overriding authority in directing the litigation. While the Attorney General may delegate some litigating authority under the MOUs, he may not delegate the ultimate responsibility which is by law vested exclusively in the Attorney General. See Harmon, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for the Associate Attorney General (Dec. 11, 1980). Thus, the Attorney General should make clear to the client agency his willingness to support the Assistant Attorney General and line attorneys in the enforcement of his prerogatives under the M OU.18



### IV. Settlement and Compromise Authority

Included within this broad grant of plenary power over government litigation is the power to compromise and settle litigation over which the Attorney General exercises supervisory authority. This power “to compromise any case over which he has jurisdiction upon such terms as he may deem fit” is “in part inherent in [the Attorney General’s] office and in part derived from statutes and decisions.” 38 Op. A tt’y Gen. 124 (1934). This authority was the subject of President Roosevelt’s Executive Order No. 6166, (June 10, 1933), reprinted in 5 U .S.C . § 901 note (1976), which provided that “. . . the function of decision whether . . . to compromise . . . appeal . . . [or] abandon prosecution or defense, now exercised by any agency or officer [of the United States], is transferred to the Department of Justice.” See infra at 7-8. With respect to the power to com promise, Attorney General Cummings observed that

it is a power, whether attaching to the office or conferred by statute or Executive order, to be exercised with wise discretion and resorted to only to promote the Government’s best interest or to prevent flagrant injustice, but that it is broad and plenary may beasserted with equal assurance, and it attaches, of course, immediately upon the receipt of a case in the Department of Justice, carrying with it both civil and criminal features, if both exist, and any other matter germane to the case which the Attorney General may find it necessary or proper to consider before he invokes the aid of the courts; nor does it end with the entry of judgm ent, but
embraces execution (United States v. M orris , 10 Wheat. 246).

18 Additional litigating authority, independent of the Attorney G eneral, was granted to certain agencies by the Hobbs Act. 28 U S C §§ 2342, 2348 (1976 & Supp IV 1980). The Hobbs Act grants specified agencies authority to intervene in appellate proceedings “of their own motion and as of rig h t/' even though the Attorney G eneral “is responsible for and has control o f the interests o f the Government** in the proceedings N otw ithstanding the Attorney G eneral’s overall authority, he “may not dispose of or discontinue the proceeding” over the objection o f the intervening agency, and the agency “may prosecute, defend, or continue the proceeding unaffected by the action o r inaction of the A ttorney G eneral ”

5938 Op. A tt’y Gen. 98, 102 (1934).19 In these opinions, Attorney General

Cummings concluded that the Attorney General’s authority to settle cases extended even beyond that which would have been available to the agency charged with administering the underlying law.20 Executive Order No. 6166, together with Sections 516 and 519 of Title 28 ofthe U.S. Code (and their predecessor provisions), have been interpreted consistently by the courts to vest the Attorney General with virtually absolute discretion to determine whether to compromise or abandon claims made in litigation on
behalf of the United States. See N ew York v. N ew Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 308 (1921); U nited States v. N ewport N ew s Shipbuilding & D ry D ock C o., 571 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967); H albach v. Markham, 106 F. Supp. 475, 479-81 (D.N.J. 1952), aff'd, 207 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1953). In deciding to settle or abandon a claim, or not to prosecute at all, the Attorney General is not restricted to considerations only of litigative probabilities, but rather may make a decision, in his discretion, on the basis of national policies espoused by the Executive. Smith v. United States, supra. The only limitations placed on the Attorney General’s settlement authority are those which pertain to his litigating authority generally— i.e., explicit statements by Congress circumscribing his settlement authority,21 see, e .g ., 8 U .S.C. § 1329 (1976) (prohibiting settlement of suits and proceedings brought under Title II of the Immigration Act without consent of the court in which the suit or proceeding is pending), and the duty imposed on the President by Article II, § 3 of the Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. ...” See generally Office of Legal Counsel, M emorandum for Sanford Sagalkin (Sept. 4, 1980); Office of Legal Counsel, M emorandum to James W. Moorman (Oct. 30, 1979). To guide the Attorney General in the exercise o f his settlement discretion, the 1934 opinions ofAttorney General Cummings proposed a “promote the Government’s best interest, or . . . prevent flagrant injustice” standard. See 38 Op. A tt’y Gen. at 102.

19 A s early as 1831, A ttorney General Taney observed that.

An attorney conducting a suit fo ra party has, in the absence of that party, a n ght to discontinue it w henever, in his ju d g m en t, the interest of his client requires it to be done If he abuses this power, he is liable to the client whom he injures. An attorney o f the U nited States, except in so far as his powers may be restrained by particular acts o f C ongress, has the same authority and control over the suits which he is conducting The public interest and the principles of ju stice require that he should have this power . . [S]ince he cannot consult his client (the United Stales), the sanction o f the court is regarded as sufficient evidence that he exercised the power honestly and discretely 2 Op. A tt'y G en 4 8 2 ,4 8 6 -8 7 Attorney G eneral Cum m ings cited this opinion approvingly. 38 O p A u ’y G en at
99 20 T he opinions found in 38 O p A tt’yGen a t9 4 ,9 8 ,1 2 4 d is c u s s th e Attorney G eneral’s authority to com prom ise
incom e tax cases in the absence of bona fide disputed questions of fact Attorney General Cum m ings concluded that he did possess the authority to settle such cases, even though the Secretary had no statutory authority to com prom ise
incom e tax cases in those circumstances 21 With respect to actions brought under the Federal Tort C laim s A ct, 28 U .S C §§ 2671-2680 (1976), for exam ple, the A ttorney G eneral o r his designee now has the authority to arbitrate, com prom ise, o r settle claim s brought under the Act after January 17, 1967, 28 U .S .C § 2677 (1976); pnO T to the 1966 am endm ents, court approval was required before the Attorney G eneral was perm itted to effect a settlem ent Congress also prescribed a procedure in the 1966 am endm ents which granted agencies authority to settle claim s under $25,000 without prior w ritten approval by the Attorney General of that specific settlem ent arrangem ent, as long as the arrangem ent was m ade in accordance w ith general regulations prescribed by the Attorney G eneral 28 U S C . § 2672 (1976)

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### V. Litigation in International Courts

Similarly, the Attorney General’s authority over litigation involving the Unitec States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is plenary. Although the Attorney General’s supervisory authority has been challenged only once since the 1966 codification of the broad grant of authority contained in 28 U .S.C. § § 5 1 6 and 519, that challenge was resolved by reference to the broad scope of the statutory provisions as well as Department of Justice regulations contained in Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations. In the connection with the litigation between the United States and Iran in 1980, a dispute arose between the Department of State and the Department of Justice concerning the Attorney General’s authority to represent the United States before the ICJ. The Legal Adviser expressed the view that the State Department, by virtue of its premier role in United States foreign policy and international relations, had been historically charged with the responsibility for internationalaffairs involving the United States, including legal matters. In response, Attorney General Civiletti cited the unambiguous language of §§ 516 and 519, and noted the absence of both statutory law and formal opinions which would “otherwise authorize” the Department of State to conduct litigation independent of the Attorney General’s supervision. Attorney General’s letter to the Legal Adviser, Department of State (Apr. 21, 1980).22 In addition, 28 C.F.R. § 0.46 (1980)2-1 makes clear that the Attorney General’s litigation authority is not limited to domestic matters, but rather includes litigation “in foreign courts, special proceedings, and similar civil matters not otherwise assigned.” See generally D. Deener, The United States Attorneys General and International Law (1957).24



### VI. Conclusion

In short, the Attorney General, as the chief litigation officer for the United States, has broad plenary authority over all litigation in which the United States,

22 At President C arter s request. A ttorney General Civiletti personally conducted the Iran litigation before the ICJ, assisted by the Legal Adviser to the State D epartm ent, whom the Attorney G eneral com m issioned as a “Special A ssistant,” pursuant to 28 U S.C . § 515 21 28 C F R § 0 46 (1980) provides*

The A ssistant Attorney G eneral in charge of the Civil Division shall, in addition to litigation com ing within the scope of § 0 .4 5 , direct all other civil litigation including claim s by or against the United States, its agencies o r officers, in dom estic or foreign courts, special proceedings, and sim ilar civil matters not otherw ise assigned, and shall em ploy foreign counsel to represent before foreign crim inal courts, com m issions o r adm inistrative agencies officials o f the D epartm ent of Justice and all other law enforcem ent officers o f the United States who are charged with violations of foreign law as a result o f acts which they perform ed in the course and scope of theirG ovem m ent
service 24 D eener discusses the historical role of the Attorney G eneral in providing legal advice on questions of
international law and concludes*

The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not specifically charge the Attorney G eneral with the duty of giving legal advice on questions of international law On the other hand, the act did not restrict the “questions of law” that could be referred to the Attorney General to those involving domestic matters only Actually, alm ost from the very beginning, the President and the departm ent heads subm itted questions involving the law of nations to the chief law officer, and succeeding Presidents and cabinet officers have continued to subm it such questions as a m atter of established practice C ongress apparently recognized this practical interpretation o f the statutes defining the Attorney G eneral's duties At any rate. Congress has never deemed it necessary to change the statutes in this
respect. Deener, supra, at 1 0 -1 1 (footnotes om itted)

61or its federal agencies or departments, are involved. This authority is wideranging, embracing all aspects of litigation, including subpoena enforcement, settlement authority, and prosecutorial discretion. The reservation of these powers to the Attorney General is grounded in our common law tradition, Acts of Congress(principally, 5 U .S.C . § 3106, and 28 U .S.C . §§ 516 and 519), various executive orders, and a long line of Supreme Court precedent. These powers can be eroded only by other Acts of Congress, and the Executive’s constitutional command to faithfully execute the laws. Implicit in this broad grant o f authority is the recognition that the Attorney General must serve the interests of the “client” agency as well as the broader interests of the United States as a whole in carrying out his professional duties. The Attorney General is obligated to administer and enforce the Constitution of the United States and the will of Congress as expressed in the public laws, as well as the more “private” legal interests of the “client” agency. It is because of this diversity of functions that situations may arise where the Attorney General is faced with conflicting demands, e .g ., where a “client” agency desires to circumvent the law, or dissociate itself from legal or policy judgments to which the Executive subscribes; where a “client” agency attempts to litigate against another agency or departm ent of the federal government; or where a “client” agency desires a legal result that will benefit the narrow area of law administered by the agency, without regard to the broader interests of the United States government as a whole. In such cases, the Attorney G eneral’s obligation to represent and advocate the “client” agency’s position must yield to a higher obligation to take care that the laws be executed faithfully. In every case, the Attorney General must satisfy him self that this constitutional duty, delegated from the Executive, has not been compromised in any way, and that the legal positions advocated by him do not adversely affect the interests of the United States.

T h e o d o r e B . O l s o n Assistant Attorney G eneral Office c f Legal Counsel

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