[Cite as State v. Lewis, 2018-Ohio-1911.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LOGAN COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 CASE NO. 8-17-43 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

 v. 

 

JASMINE D. LEWIS, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. CR17-06-0180 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: May 14, 2018 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Kort Gatterdam for Appellant 

Eric C. Stewart for Appellee 

 
Case No. 8-17-43 

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WILLAMOWKSI, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jasmine D. Lewis (“Lewis”) brings this appeal 

from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Logan County. Lewis alleges 

on appeal that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. For the reasons 

set forth below, the judgment is affirmed. 

{¶2} On November 23, 2016, Lewis and four of her friends made a plan to 

rob Jeffrey Brentlinger (Brentlinger). Lewis and one of her friends distracted 

Brentlinger while two other friends entered Brentlinger’s home with guns. When 

Brentlinger confronted the two armed with the guns, he was shot and killed. 

{¶3} On June 13, 2017, the Logan County Grand Jury indicted Lewis on 

three counts: 1) Complicity to Aggravated Burglary in violation of R.C. 

2911.11(A)(1) and 2923.03, a felony of the first degree; 2) Complicity to 

Aggravated Robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and 2923.03, a felony of 

the first degree; and 3) Complicity to Murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02 and 

2923.03, an unclassified felony. Doc. 2. All three counts carried firearm 

specifications. Id. Lewis entered pleas of not guilty to all of the counts. Doc. 10. 

Lewis later changed her plea to count three to guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. 

Doc. 55. The terms set forth in the written plea agreement advised Lewis that the 

maximum sentence she could receive would be a life term. Id. In exchange for the 

guilty plea to count three, the State agreed to dismiss the other two counts and the 

gun specification. Doc. 55. A hearing was held on the change of plea on August 
Case No. 8-17-43 

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14, 2017. Doc. 56. After speaking with Lewis, the trial court accepted the change 

of plea and found Lewis guilty of complicity to commit murder. Id. The remaining 

charges and the gun specification were dismissed. Id. 

{¶4} A sentencing hearing was held on September 21, 2017. Doc. 58. After 

reviewing the record, the oral statements, victim impact statements and the 

presentence investigation report, the trial court considered the statutory sentencing 

factors. Id. The trial court then imposed a prison term of life in prison with parole 

eligibility after fifteen years. Id. Lewis filed a notice of appeal from this judgment. 

Doc. 69. On appeal, Lewis raises the following assignment of error. 

[Lewis’] trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, in 

violation of her constitutional rights under the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Sections 10 and 16, of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶5} Lewis’ sole assignment of error alleges that she was denied effective 

assistance of counsel. 

In evaluating whether a petitioner has been denied effective 

assistance of counsel, this court has held that the test is “whether 

the accused, under all the circumstances, * * * had a fair trial and 

substantial justice was done.” State v. Hester (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 

71, 74 O.O.2d 156, 341 N.E.2d 304, paragraph four of the syllabus. 

When making that determination, a two-step process is usually 

employed. “First, there must be a determination as to whether 

there has been a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's 

essential duties to his client. Next, and analytically separate from 

the question of whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights 

were violated, there must be a determination as to whether the 

defense was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness.” State v. Lytle

(1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396–397, 2 O.O.3d 495, 498, 358 N.E.2d 
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623, 627, vacated on other grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 

3135, 57 L.Ed.2d 1154. 

On the issue of counsel's ineffectiveness, the petitioner has the 

burden of proof, since in Ohio a properly licensed attorney is 

presumably competent. See Vaughn v. Maxwell (1965), 2 Ohio 

St.2d 299, 31 O.O.2d 567, 209 N.E.2d 164; State v. Jackson, 64 

Ohio St.2d at 110–111, 18 O.O.3d at 351, 413 N.E.2d at 822. 

State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). “The failure to 

prove either 1) a substantial violation or 2) prejudice caused by the violation makes 

it unnecessary for a court to consider the other prong of the test.” State v. Walker, 

3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-42, 2016-Ohio-3499, ¶ 20. 

{¶6} Lewis claims that her counsel was ineffective for not informing her that 

she could not get a sentence lower than life in prison with parole eligibility after 

fifteen years. In support, Lewis cites to an argument made by her attorney at 

sentencing for the possibility of parole before fifteen years. Lewis alleges that 

counsel’s representation that the sentence could be lower was what caused her to 

agree to plead guilty. There is no question that anyone convicted of violating R.C. 

2903.02 “shall be imprisoned for an indefinite term of fifteen years to life.” R.C. 

2929.02(B)(1). Thus, counsel’s alleged statement that Lewis should be eligible for 

parole in fewer than fifteen years would be contrary to statute. However, this does 

not mean that counsel’s alleged error was prejudicial. 
Case No. 8-17-43 

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{¶7} A review of the record regarding the change of plea shows that the trial 

court specifically spoke with Lewis regarding the offense to which she was pleading 

and the sentence that would be imposed. 

The Court: The charge in the indictment is complicity to murder. 

Doesn’t say you’re the principal, but it means you helped, and 

that is under the complicity statute, which is 2923.03. That 

provides that no person, acting with the kind of culpability 

required for the commission of an offense, shall, one, solicit or 

procure another to commit the offense; two, aid or abet another 

in committing the offense; three, conspire with another to the [sic] 

commit the offense, in violation of Section 2923.01; and, four, 

cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. 

And the offense in question is what we call a felony murder, 

meaning that the – while committing a crime, it caused the death 

of another. The felony murder is under Section – is this 

2903.02(B)? 

Mr. Stewart: yes. 

The Court: Okay. That provides that no person shall cause the 

death of another as the proximate result of the offender’s 

committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is 

a felony of the first or second degree and is not a violation of 

Section 2903.03 or 2903.04, and as the indictment alleges, that the 

offense – the felonies of the first degree or second degree that were 

being committed here were the aggravated burglary, and the 

aggravated robbery. Do you understand the nature of this 

offense? 

The Defendant: Yes. 

The Court: The offense carries with it a maximum fine of $15,000. 

It is a life sentence with eligibility for parole after 15 years. Do 

you understand the maximum sentence? 

The Defendant: Yes, sir. 

* * * 
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The Court: As stated before, this is a situation where the Court 

must impose the sentence. 

August 15, 2017, Tr. 8-10. Although counsel may have made an improper request 

at sentencing, Lewis had already been informed by the trial court that the sentence 

was going to be a life term with parole eligibility after fifteen years. Additionally, 

the written change of plea agreement, which was signed by Jasmine in open court, 

stated that no attorney had promised or suggested that she would receive a lighter 

sentence because of the plea. Doc. 55 at 2-3. This all occurred before Lewis entered 

her plea of guilty. Thus, the record does not support a conclusion that a 

misstatement of counsel at sentencing would have affected the outcome of the case. 

Lewis was fully informed by the trial court of what the mandatory sentence was. 

She was also told by the trial court that it would be imposing that sentence. After 

the trial court informed her of the sentence, she agreed to change her plea. No 

prejudice resulted from counsel’s statement. Thus, this court does not find that 

counsel was ineffective. The assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶8} Having found no prejudicial error in the particulars assigned and 

argued, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Logan County is affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

ZIMMERMAN and PRESTON, J.J., concur. 

/hls