NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0198n.06

Case No. 23-1881

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JEFFREY HAROLD STEFANSKI,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

ADAM DOUGLAS, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

OPINION

Before: GIBBONS, MCKEAGUE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey Harold Stefanski was convicted in a 

Michigan state court of three counts of criminal sexual conduct. He appealed his conviction in 

state court, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on (1) his counsel’s failure to 

introduce evidence that would have supported Stefanski’s theory that the victim made up the 

sexual assaults to curry favor in a separate court proceeding, and (2) his counsel’s failure to 

successfully object to the admission of hearsay testimony by the victim’s mother. After the 

Michigan courts affirmed on direct review, Stefanski filed a habeas petition in federal court. The 

district court denied Stefanski habeas relief after determining that, even if Stefanski’s counsel was 

deficient, Stefanski could not establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged errors. For 

the following reasons, we affirm. 
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I. 

Stefanski’s convictions stem from his sexual assault of Phil Lounds.1 Stefanski—forty-six 

years old at the time of trial—owned a home and cabin in Northern Michigan, where he allegedly 

hosted sexually-charged parties in which he allowed teenage boys to drink alcohol. People 

v. Stefanski, No. 334510, 2018 WL 5276411, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2018). Lounds—then 

eighteen years old—attended some of these parties with friends. Lounds alleged that Stefanski 

twice inserted his penis into Lounds’s mouth when Lounds was too intoxicated to stop him. Id. 

On another occasion, Stefanski attempted to initiate anal sex with Lounds while Lounds was 

“nearly unconscious.” Id. This time, Lounds was able to roll over and prevent penetration. Id.

Lounds first reported these sexual assaults to a lawyer, Jennifer France, who represented 

him in a pending probation violation proceeding. Id. at *2. Stefanski was then charged with two 

counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and one count of criminal sexual conduct in 

the second degree. Stefanski’s first trial resulted in a mistrial, but he was convicted in the second. 

At trial, Lounds testified that he reported Stefanski’s misconduct while awaiting sentencing for his 

parole violation after seeing on the news that Stefanski was charged with a different crime 

involving sexual misconduct. While Lounds asserted that he did not expect to get anything out of 

reporting Stefanski’s crimes, Stefanski’s theory of defense was that Lounds falsified the sexual 

assaults to get a more lenient sentence at his probation violation sentencing. To this end, 

Stefanski’s trial counsel underscored the timing and inconsistencies of Lounds’s first reports of the 

sexual assaults—noting that Lounds first told his lawyer as he faced a pending violation 

proceeding, that Lounds spent significant time at Stefanski’s home after the assaults allegedly

1 We recite the facts largely as portrayed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. This recitation is 

presumed to be correct. See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1)). Stefanski does not dispute the Michigan court’s discussion of the facts on appeal. 
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occurred, and introducing testimony conflicting with Lounds’s accounts of Stefanski’s 

sexually-charged parties. Stefanski also took the stand and refuted Lounds’s and others’ accounts 

that he regularly served teenagers excessive alcohol and engaged in sexual behavior at gatherings 

he hosted; he further adamantly denied Lounds’s allegations of sexual assault.

The jury convicted Stefanski on all three counts. Ultimately, the court sentenced Stefanski 

to 11 to 40 years’ imprisonment on counts 1 and 2 to run concurrently, and 2 to 15 years on count 

3—also concurrent. On direct appeal and collateral review, Stefanski has maintained that his 

counsel performed deficiently in two instances during trial, which amounted to ineffective 

assistance of counsel and resulted in convictions in violation of Stefanski’s constitutional rights. 

First, Stefanski challenges his counsel’s failure to introduce Lounds’s probation records to 

conclusively demonstrate that Lounds faced a pending probation violation proceeding when he 

first disclosed Stefanski’s sexual assault to France. This, Stefanski argues, was key to establishing 

Lounds’s motive to fabricate the assaults. Although Lounds readily admitted in his testimony that 

he faced sentencing for a probation violation when he first reported the sexual assault, France 

equivocated. France agreed that Lounds was on probation when he disclosed the assaults and that 

she later used his reporting in a sentencing memorandum, but she denied that Lounds faced charges 

of new crimes when he first reported. Further, she testified that “nothing was pending” at the time 

of his initial report. DE 5-15, Trial Tr. Vol. II, Page ID 944. Lounds’s probation records, which 

were not introduced at trial, confirm that Lounds was facing a pending parole violation when he 

first disclosed Stefanski’s assaults to France. Stefanski, 2018 WL 5276411, at *2 n.2. Lounds had 

also garnered a second parole violation a few days after his disclosure. France testified that 

Lounds’s upcoming parole hearing, and her later use of his disclosure in a sentencing 

memorandum, referred to this later violation that occurred after his disclosure, and not any prior 
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violation. This underscored her (incorrect) testimony that Lounds was not facing a pending 

violation proceeding when he first reported Stefanski’s crimes. Because Stefanski’s theory of 

defense—that Lounds had a motive to falsify the allegations—depended on Lounds facing jail 

time at the time of his initial disclosure, Stefanski argues that his counsel’s failure to impeach 

France with Lounds’s probation records to reaffirm that he was in fact facing a probation violation

greatly undermined his defense. He points to the government’s use of France’s testimony in

closing arguments to say that Lounds “was not in trouble” when he first reported the assault as 

indicative of the harm done. DE 5-16, Trial Tr. Vol. III, Page ID 1118, 1151.

Second, Stefanski charges his counsel as ineffective for failing to successfully object to 

hearsay testimony from Lounds’s mother. Lounds’s mother briefly testified to the contents of a 

phone conversation she had with Lounds while he was in jail, presumably for the probation 

violation. She recalled Lounds crying and telling her that Stefanski had done something sexual to 

him. Stefanski’s counsel lodged a hearsay objection, but the court ultimately overruled the 

objection and agreed with the prosecution that the testimony could come in as a prior consistent 

statement under the Michigan Rules of Evidence. Stefanski argues that his counsel erred in failing 

to inform the judge that the testimony was not in fact a prior consistent statement because Lounds 

made the statement after he had developed the motive to fabricate the assault. 

After the trial court denied Stefanski’s motion for a new trial on these grounds, Stefanski 

unsuccessfully raised both issues on direct appeal in state court. Stefanski, 2018 WL 5276411, at 

*2–5. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Stefanski’s first assignment of error after finding 

Stefanski’s counsel not deficient in his failure to introduce Lounds’s probation records. 

Specifically, the court noted that Lounds “himself readily admitted that he was facing a probation 

violation when he disclosed the sexual assault. Therefore, the probation documents would have 
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demonstrated that the victim testified truthfully, bolstering his credibility.” Id. at *2. Further, the 

court highlighted that France’s testimony about the pending proceeding was ambiguous, 

thus reducing the need to impeach her, as she also testified that she did attempt to obtain a reduced 

sentence for Lounds based on his cooperation in the sexual assault case against Stefanski. 

Id. Even if counsel did unreasonably err, the court found that Stefanski failed to establish 

prejudice, as Lounds’s credibility was supported by more than his own testimony; other witnesses 

corroborated aspects of Lounds’s account, such as the sexual nature of the parties and Stefanski’s 

inappropriate behavior toward Lounds and others. Id. at *3. Likewise, the court rejected 

Stefanski’s second allegation of error: the missed hearsay objection. The court did agree with 

Stefanski that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Id. at *5. But even assuming counsel 

performed deficiently by failing to raise the correct hearsay objection, the court concluded that 

Stefanski again failed to show prejudice. The court found Lounds’s mother’s testimony vague and 

unlikely to carry much weight in light of the other testimony from witnesses detailing more specific 

aspects of Stefanski’s parties where the assaults took place. Id. Furthermore, since the statement 

was made after Lounds was imprisoned for the probation violation, it “actually bolstered”

Stefanski’s motive-to-falsify theory. Id. 

Stefanski then reasserted these claims in state and federal court. First, he applied for leave 

to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. People v. Stefanski, 924 N.W.2d 

552 (Mich. 2019) (mem). Then, Stefanski filed a habeas petition in district court. After finding 

the Michigan Court of Appeals’s decision properly within 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)’s realm, the district 

court rejected Stefanski’s petition but granted a certificate of appealability. Stefanski appealed. 
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II. 

When reviewing the denial of habeas corpus relief, we review the district court’s legal 

conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Rayner v. Mills, 685 F.3d 631, 636 

(6th Cir. 2012). Our review of the state court’s determinations, however, is governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Fleming 

v. Metrish, 556 F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Ivory v. Jackson, 509 F.3d 284, 291 (6th Cir. 

2007)). AEDPA provides that: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 

the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court 

applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides 

a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Lang v. Bobby, 889 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). 

Alternatively, a state court’s decision denying habeas relief is an “unreasonable application” of 

clearly established federal law if the court identifies the correct governing legal principle but 

applies it in an “objectively unreasonable” way to the facts at hand. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 

510, 520–21 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 413 (2000)). The state court’s 
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determination of a claim is insulated if “fairminded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of 

its decision. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 

541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In applying these standards, we look to the last reasoned state court 

decision. Lang, 889 F.3d at 813. Here, that is the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals. 

III. 

A claimant establishes ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth 

Amendment right by showing that his counsel’s conduct fell below “an objective standard of 

reasonableness” and that a “reasonable probability” exists that “but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 688, 694 (1984). In determining whether counsel’s conduct was objectively unreasonable, 

courts “must apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide 

range’ of reasonable professional assistance.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 104 (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689). And a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome “is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

Because Stefanski seeks habeas corpus relief, AEDPA adds another layer to Strickland’s 

two-part test. Id. at 105. As the Supreme Court recognized, “[t]he standards created by Strickland

and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ 

so.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether 

counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. Stefanski argues that the Michigan 

Court of Appeals assessed Stefanski’s ineffective assistance claims in a manner that was both 

(1) contrary to clearly established law, and (2) an unreasonable application of federal law. We 

discuss both arguments in turn. 
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1.

The Michigan Court of Appeals and the district court found that counsel’s failure to 

introduce Lounds’s probation records did not support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

We affirm. First, Stefanski cannot surpass AEDPA’s restriction of our consideration of the state 

court’s assessment of his attorney’s performance. And even if his attorney was deficient, the state 

court’s assessment of prejudice is also entitled to AEDPA deference. 

A. Performance

Stefanski first argues that the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied 

Strickland’s performance prong in finding his counsel’s failure to introduce Lounds’s probation 

records not deficient, thus making AEDPA’s prohibition on relief inappropriate. According to 

Stefanski, “no reasonable, fairminded jurist could subscribe” to the Michigan court’s analysis. 

CA6 R. 5, Petitioner Br., at 34–35 (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 101). Counsel’s mistake was 

unreasonable, in Stefanski’s eyes, because using Lounds’s probation records to contextualize

France’s testimony would have helped Stefanski’s motive-to-falsify theory more than it would 

have bolstered Lounds’s credibility. In light of this cost-benefit analysis, and lacking any reason 

not to introduce the records, no fairminded jurist could find defense counsel’s failure to do so 

within the realm of reasonable representation. 

True, Stefanski’s lawyers conceded that they possessed documentation showing that 

Lounds had a pending probation violation proceeding when he reported the assaults to France. 

And the government later capitalized on the timing ambiguity in closing arguments, invoking 

France’s testimony to say that Lounds was not in any trouble and thus lacked a reason to fabricate 

the assaults when he first reported them. The better course may well have been introducing 

Lounds’s records to settle any remaining confusion on the matter. But the state court addressed 
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these arguments and found Stefanski’s counsel’s conduct within the wide realm of reasonable 

representation. See Stefanski, 2018 WL 5276411, at *2. In doing so, the state court identified 

“reasonable argument[s] that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 

562 U.S. at 105. Even if the state court’s reasoning was “incorrect or erroneous,” Wiggins, 

539 U.S. at 520, a petitioner alleging an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law “must show far more than that the state court’s decision was ‘merely wrong’ or ‘even clear 

error.’” Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting Virginia v. LeBlanc, 

582 U.S. 91, 94 (2017) (per curiam)). Stefanski has not done so, and AEDPA accordingly 

prohibits relief.

The state court found that defense counsel’s failure to impeach France with the records 

should be viewed in light of the other evidence introduced, namely, Lounds’s admission that he 

faced a probation violation when he first disclosed the assault. Stefanski, 2018 WL 5276411, at 

*2. Strickland supports this. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (considering the reasonableness of 

counsel’s conduct “in light of all the circumstances”). Stefanski himself painted this case as a 

credibility contest between Lounds and himself. The state court found that impeaching France 

further could have incidentally bolstered Lounds’s credibility by confirming that portion of his 

testimony. Stefanski, 2018 WL 5276411, at *2. The court also highlighted the inconsistencies 

inherent in France’s testimony, as she admitted to using Lounds’s sexual assault report in a 

sentencing memorandum—making impeachment of her testimony less essential. Id.

The state court’s weighing of the risk of crediting Lounds’s testimony may have been 

incorrect, but its determination that Stefanski’s counsel fell within Strickland’s broad realm of 

reasonableness is not “objectively unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. As the district court 

recognized, France’s testimony was unclear at times as to whether she was referring to Lounds not 
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having an outstanding criminal charge (which was true) or not having a probation violation (which 

was not true). It only became clear at closing argument that the government used France’s 

testimony to establish that there was no pending probation violation at all. Although the preferable 

way to clear up the confusion would have been to introduce Lounds’s probation records during 

France’s testimony, Stefanski’s attorney instead raised France’s prior testimony detailing 

Lounds’s pending probation violation, although that proved unsuccessful.

The circumstances of this case thus differ from those presented in Peoples v. Lafler, 

734 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2013), in which this court found that an ineffective assistance claim based 

on counsel’s failure to present impeachment evidence warranted habeas relief. Id. at 512. In 

Lafler, defense counsel failed to impeach known false testimony from the only two witnesses who 

tied the defendant to the crime. See id. at 512–13. The court found that the defense counsel thus 

failed to elicit key testimony, which was the only way for the defendant to prove his theory of the 

case. Id. at 513. Here, in contrast, the information Stefanski desired was already in the record 

through Lounds, who testified the day before France and repeatedly affirmed that he faced an 

upcoming sentencing for a probation violation when he first disclosed the sexual assaults to France. 

And Stefanski’s counsel did attempt to draw out France’s use of Lounds’s reporting to obtain a 

more lenient sentence in a proceeding, comporting with Stefanski’s general theory that Lounds 

fabricated the story to benefit himself in legal proceedings. Although the probation record could 

have easily been introduced, weighing in favor of deficient performance, see Lafler, 734 F.3d at 

514, the misstep does not rise to the magnitude warranting habeas relief. At bottom, although 

Stefanski’s counsel’s conduct was certainly not the best course of action, we are not faced “with a 

record that cannot, under any reasonable interpretation of the controlling legal standard, support” 
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the state court’s finding that Stefanski’s counsel was not deficient. Panetti v. Quarterman, 

551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007); see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 126–27 (2009). 

B. Prejudice

If Stefanski’s counsel was deficient, such deficiency gives rise to a constitutional violation 

only upon a showing of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the outcome of 

the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Stefanski attacks the state 

court’s conclusion that he failed to show prejudice both as contrary to clearly established federal 

law and as an unreasonable application of federal law. Taking each in turn, we disagree. 

Contrary to Clearly Established Federal Law. Where a state court applies a legal rule 

contrary to governing Supreme Court law, a federal court on review is “unconstrained by 

§ 2254(d)(1)” and can review the petitioner’s claim de novo. Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 

799 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). A paradigmatic example would be a state 

court stating that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires the petitioner to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence—rather than Strickland’s reasonable probability standard—that the

result of his proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s errors. Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405–06. That said, we must avoid a “readiness to attribute error” to state court decisions and 

instead view them “with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law.” Woodford 

v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam). 

In line with this presumption, an occasional imprecise or incorrect articulation of federal 

law does not run afoul of AEDPA if the state court otherwise properly discussed the governing 

law. See id. at 23–24 (imprecise recitation of prejudice prong does not automatically render state 

court decision contrary to clearly established law); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 654–55 

(2004) (per curiam) (finding articulation of Strickland not contrary to clearly established law even 
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though state court could be read to implement a preponderance of the evidence standard for 

prejudice prong but such reading would “needlessly create internal inconsistency in the opinion,” 

and the state court otherwise correctly articulated Strickland’s test); Johnson v. Genovese, 

924 F.3d 929, 937–38 (6th Cir. 2019) (not contrary to federal law where state court articulated 

Strickland standard correctly multiple times and only articulated an incorrect standard once); 

see also Daniel v. Curtin, 499 F. App’x 400, 411 n.5 (6th Cir. 2012) (not contrary to federal 

law where court correctly articulated Strickland standard but then twice referenced 

outcome-determinativeness and the parties did not raise the issue). But see Vasquez v. Bradshaw, 

345 F. App’x 104, 111–12 (6th Cir. 2009) (contrary to clearly established law when the state court 

repeatedly articulated and applied a but-for test instead of Strickland’s reasonable probability test); 

Spaulding v. Larson, 704 F. App’x 475, 480 (6th Cir. 2017) (contrary to clearly established law 

where “the Michigan Court of Appeals never stated the Strickland standard correctly, and thrice 

stated it incorrectly”); Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (contrary to clearly 

established law where the state court clearly articulated and applied a stricter prejudice standard). 

Stefanski argues that AEDPA deference is unwarranted here because the state court 

improperly jettisoned Strickland and required Stefanski to show that his counsel’s error was 

“outcome determinative.” Stefanski, 2018 WL 5276411, at *3.2 Stefanski is correct that the state 

court’s reference to outcome determinativeness could be read as holding Stefanski to a higher 

burden than Strickland requires. But in line with the Supreme Court’s command that we view 

2

In its discussion of whether the failure to introduce Lounds’s probation records prejudiced 

Stefanski, the Michigan Court of Appeals first cited Strickland’s reasonable probability standard. 

Stefanski, 2018 WL 5276411, at *3 (citing analogous standard under Michigan law). After 

discussing the other evidence that supported Stefanski’s conviction, the court ended the paragraph 

with its finding that “[t]hus, the jury considered other evidence that corroborated the victim’s 

testimony, and the contradiction about the timing of the victim’s probation violation proceedings 

was not outcome determinative.” Id. Stefanski takes issue with this last sentence. 
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state court opinions with a presumption that they consistently and correctly apply the law, 

see Holland, 542 U.S. at 654–55, the state court’s opinion is more properly read as following 

Strickland, with the last sentence inartfully crafted. At the outset, the state court thrice articulated 

Strickland’s prejudice prong—with its reasonable probability requirement—correctly, including

once in the very same paragraph in which the state court wrote the offending sentence. 

See Stefanski, 2018 WL 5276411, at *1, 3, 4. And the court’s reference to outcome 

determinativeness appears in the context of responding to Stefanski’s claim that the counsel’s 

failure was “fatal to his defense,” suggesting that the court’s phrasing may have been a response 

to his argument rather than the application of a stricter prejudice test. Id. at *3. In light of the 

court’s repeated correct articulation of the law, we decline to “needlessly create internal 

inconsistency” by charging the court with applying the incorrect test based on this stray reference. 

Holland, 542 U.S. at 654; see also Genovese, 924 F.3d at 937–38, 937 n.2 (finding case with 

similar error more like Holland than Vasquez). 

Unreasonable Application. Stefanski next contends that even if the state court’s prejudice 

determination was not contrary to clearly established federal law, AEDPA is inapplicable because 

it nonetheless constitutes an unreasonable application of federal law. We disagree. 

Stefanski bases this argument on the proposition that the state court credited the 

government’s witnesses over Stefanski’s, thus improperly weighing the evidence and usurping the 

role of the jury. But Stefanski misinterprets the state court’s opinion and AEDPA’s restrictions 

on our review. Determining whether a reasonable probability of a different outcome exists requires 

reviewing courts to take stock of the strengths and weaknesses of the surrounding case. 

See Richter, 562 U.S. at 112–13 (discussing the strength of the other evidence of guilt); Kayer, 

592 U.S. at 121–22 (applying similar analysis in the context of mitigation). And here, the state 
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court reasonably concluded that, in light of Lounds’s repeated testimony that he faced a pending 

probation violation at the time of his initial report, as well as testimony by other men corroborating 

aspects of his story, Stefanski failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not 

have been convicted had the probation records been introduced.3 Stefanski, 2018 WL 5276411, at 

*3. The import of the state court’s analysis was not to make a credibility determination favoring 

the government’s witnesses over Stefanski’s testimony and witnesses, but to demonstrate that 

Lounds’s alleged motive to fabricate was not the key to the case, as the case turned on not only 

Lounds’s testimony, but the credibility of other witnesses as well.4 The court could have 

reasonably found that the case did not turn mainly on the motive theory, as the testimony 

concerning the sexual nature of Stefanski’s parties differed so greatly between the government and 

defense’s witnesses—with the government’s witnesses describing Stefanski hosting parties 

featuring heavy intoxication and overt sexual activities while the defense’s witnesses described 

more casual gatherings along the lines of card games and soda pop or light drinking—the jury 

simply had to choose to believe one side over the other. Stefanski’s disagreement with the state 

3 We also note that while Stefanski attributes the change in verdict across the first and second trial 

to France’s different testimony, Stefanski recognizes that two of the government’s witnesses who 

corroborated aspects of Lounds’s accounts of sexually-charged parties had not testified in the first 

trial. The addition of these two witnesses to corroborate Lounds’s account and refute Stefanski’s 

narrative of events undoubtedly strengthened the government’s case. 

4 Further, Ramonez v. Berghuis, 490 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2007), a case cited by Stefanski, speaks 

largely to a different issue than presented here. The court in Ramonez rejected the notion that the 

state court’s credibility determinations were entitled to deference under § 2254(e)(1)—a portion 

of AEDPA not implicated in the case before us. See 490 F.3d at 491 (finding determinations within 

the prejudice prong to be a mixed issue of law and fact and thus not subject to § 2254(e)(1)’s 

presumption). Although it also deemed the state court’s determination that the defendant was not 

prejudiced unreasonable, it did so under circumstances different than here: the defense counsel 

failed to conduct a reasonable investigation to learn that witnesses could have disputed a key 

element of the prosecution’s case on which the jury had indicated it was deadlocked. Id. at 489. 
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court’s conclusion falls far short of establishing that no fairminded jurist could agree that he failed 

to establish prejudice. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. 

As the Supreme Court has noted, a reasonable probability requires more than a 

“‘conceivable[]’ likelihood of a different result.” Kayer, 592 U.S. at 118 (internal citation 

omitted). It is thus not enough for Stefanski to show that the introduction of Lounds’s probation 

records might have generated a “somewhat stronger defense and the jury conceivably might have 

reached a different result.” Spaulding, 704 F. App’x at 483. We have held that where evidence 

that counsel failed to introduce at trial “would have been simply cumulative to the evidence 

actually presented to the jury,” this failure “does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 

Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295, 313 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quoting Broom v. Mitchell, 

441 F.3d 392, 410 (6th Cir. 2006)). This circuit has recognized that in cases of sexual assault, 

which often lack physical evidence, prejudice may be found more readily. See Vasquez, 345 F. 

App’x at 119 (quoting Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368, 386 (6th Cir. 2005)). But a petitioner

alleging prejudice still must point to evidence that “differ[s] in a substantial way—in strength and 

subject matter—from the evidence actually presented” at trial. Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308, 

319 (6th Cir. 2005); see Martin v. Haas, 731 F. App’x 443, 458–59 (6th Cir. 2018) (deeming 

failure to introduce impeachment evidence of rape victim that would have supported her motive 

to fabricate charges not prejudicial because it was only “relatively more compelling” than the 

theory of motive presented at trial); Hartman v. Bagley, 492 F.3d 347, 361 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding 

no prejudice where counsel failed to expand on or corroborate information already in the record). 

Stefanski’s case does not resemble those in which we have found prejudice. Cf. Lewis 

v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir. 2002) (granting habeas petition in rape case due a 

Confrontation Clause violation where the state trial court wrongfully excluded statements from 
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victim’s diary indicating that the sexual conduct was consensual, and the victim had other motives 

for pursuing prosecution). In Lewis, the failure to introduce excerpts from the victim’s diary 

strongly suggesting that she fabricated the sexual assault charges was not harmless in part because 

the excerpts went to a “different type of motive than that implied by the other evidence” 

introduced. Id. And in Vasquez, the defense counsel failed to introduce key testimony from 

multiple witnesses strongly calling into question the child-victim’s allegations in a manner not 

otherwise conveyed to the jury. 345 F. App’x at 119–21. Here, in contrast, the introduction of the 

probation records would have merely corroborated the information Stefanski’s counsel had elicited 

from Lounds himself—that he faced probation violation proceedings when he first reported the 

sexual assault. Lounds did not mention the probation proceedings just one time in passing—he 

noted three times his understanding that he faced an upcoming sentencing when he first reported 

the sexual assaults to France. Even if, as Stefanski alleges, the jury may have believed, after 

France’s testimony, that Lounds was mistaken, Lounds’s testimony at least established that he 

believed he faced an upcoming sentencing for such a violation when he first reported the assaults

and thus still supported the motive-to-fabricate theory. 

The government’s use of France’s testimony to suggest that Lounds faced no probation 

violation proceeding is certainly concerning, but it did not render the state court’s determination 

beyond reasonable debate, nor did it establish prejudice. Based on Lounds’s repeated affirmations 

that he faced a pending sentencing, it appears illogical and unlikely that the jury affirmatively 

disbelieved Lounds’s statements that he faced sentencing for a pending violation at the time of his 

initial report, but simultaneously believed Lounds’s allegations—over testimony by Stefanski and 

others to the contrary—that Stefanski sexually assaulted Lounds on three occasions. Because the 

record already contained much of the information the probation record would have confirmed, 
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fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether the failure to introduce the probation records tipped 

the scales. Because “prejudice is at best debatable, . . . we are therefore not empowered on federal 

habeas review to disturb the Michigan Court of Appeals’s rejection” of Stefanski’s ineffective 

assistance claim. Martin, 731 F. App’x at 459; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

2.

Stefanski also charges ineffective assistance for his counsel’s failure to lodge the correct 

objection to hearsay testimony from Lounds’s mother. For the following reasons, we disagree. 

A. Performance

The parties first disagree about the import of the state court’s discussion of performance, 

and thus which standard of review applies to this prong.

5

 Even assuming that de novo review 

applies to this prong because it is unclear whether the state court assessed performance on the 

merits, see Rayner, 685 F.3d at 638, we do not find counsel’s performance deficient. 

Lounds’s mother testified that Lounds called her from jail and disclosed that Stefanski “did 

something [sexual] to him.” DE 5-14, Trial Tr. Vol. I, Page ID 921. Defense counsel lodged a 

timely objection on the basis of hearsay, which the court initially sustained. After the prosecution 

argued that the statement was admissible as a prior consistent statement, the court reversed course 

and admitted the testimony. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that because Lounds made the 

statement after the motive to fabricate arose, the statement was not in fact admissible as a prior 

5

In addition to arguing that AEDPA deference applies, the government also argues that this is a 

matter of state law and thus unreviewable by federal courts. This argument is misguided, as the 

failure to move to suppress evidence admitted pursuant to state evidentiary law is cognizable as an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See, e.g., Hewitt-El v. Burgess, 53 F.4th 969, 980 (6th Cir. 

2022) (finding counsel’s impeachment of his own client with his five previous felony convictions, 

as well as his failure to attempt to exclude such convictions, unreasonable). 
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consistent statement. See Stefanski, 2018 WL 5276411, at *5. Stefanski thus faults his counsel 

for not following up with a more specific objection to rebut the prosecutor’s (incorrect) contention. 

Stefanski highlights the fact that his counsel lacked a strategic reason for failing to make a 

more specific hearsay objection, one the Michigan Court of Appeals found would have been 

successful. But that Stefanski’s counsel admittedly made a mistake in failing to make a meritorious 

argument for exclusion does not automatically satisfy the first prong of an ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim. Strickland’s definition of deficient performance does not cover any mistake 

made by an attorney; rather, it covers “errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Strickland warns 

reviewing courts to avoid applying 20/20 hindsight “to conclude that a particular act or omission 

of counsel was unreasonable.” Id. at 689. Considering counsel’s otherwise correct general hearsay 

objection to the same testimony, “it is difficult to say that the admission of this one hearsay 

statement demonstrates constitutionally deficient performance.” United States v. Robison, 

205 F.3d 1342, 2000 WL 191852, at *8 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2000) (unpublished table decision); cf. 

Meadows v. Doom, 450 F. App’x 518, 523 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying AEDPA and Strickland and 

finding that, although “trial counsel could undeniably have been more vigilant in objecting” to 

inadmissible statements, the errors were not so serious as to satisfy Strickland’s first prong). But 

see Hurley, 426 F.3d at 376 (finding counsel’s “failure to object to any of the numerous improper 

statements” made by the prosecutor outside the range of reasonableness). 

Under the circumstances of this case, counsel’s single failure to cite the specific applicable 

evidentiary rule—rather than the more general one—does not fall outside the “wide range of 

professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. This conclusion is supported 

by our prior determination in Cathron v. Jones, 77 F. App’x 835 (6th Cir. 2003), where an attorney 
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lodged an objection against the introduction of testimony on one ground but failed to object on a 

stronger evidentiary ground. Id. at 843. Although the attorney should have lodged a more specific 

objection, we did “not find that counsel’s failure to object was so unreasonable that he was not 

functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. That reasoning is persuasive 

here, and Stefanski does not cite case law counseling a different outcome. Accordingly, Stefanski 

fails to establish deficient performance. 

B. Prejudice

Assuming Stefanski could show deficient performance, he nonetheless fails to demonstrate 

prejudice. At the outset, he is incorrect that the state court unreasonably applied federal law in 

concluding he failed to prove prejudice. At the very least, reasonable jurists could disagree as to 

whether the introduction of Lounds’s mother’s testimony prejudiced Stefanski. Richter, 562 U.S. 

at 101. This renders relief inappropriate. 

Stefanski argues that Lounds’s mother’s testimony was crucial to undercutting Stefanski’s 

theory that Lounds fabricated the assaults to get a lenient sentence on his probation violation

because Lounds allegedly disclosed the assaults to his mother after he was already sentenced and 

thus when he no longer had an incentive to report the assaults. In light of this timing, the state 

court’s determination that Lounds’s mother’s testimony actually bolstered the motive-to-falsify 

theory appears incorrect—at the point Lounds spoke to his mother, he no longer had the alleged 

motive to lie. But this incorrect determination is not so unreasonable that it renders AEDPA 

deference inappropriate. See Kayer, 592 U.S. at 118; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520–21. The state court 

was correct that Lounds’s mother’s testimony was vague and did not provide any detail into 

Lounds’s account of the underlying assaults, so it paled in comparison to the detail provided by 

other testimony and renders it unlikely that the mother’s testimony played a prominent role in the 
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jury’s decision. See Spaulding, 704 F. App’x at 481 (distinguishing between key testimony and 

that which, “though helpful, . . . was far from critical to the prosecution’s case”). 

As noted in the previous prejudice analysis, the testimony presented in this case differed 

wildly. The government produced witnesses with accounts vastly different from the accounts 

provided by Stefanski and his witnesses. The jury’s decision thus came down to which group to 

believe; such analysis centered on credibility determinations. Although the timing of Lounds’s 

disclosures certainly played a role in the case, it was not the only dispute, and perhaps not even 

the main dispute. That Lounds’s mother’s statement helped the prosecution’s case does not render 

it prejudicial—at least, not so prejudicial that it supports “a reasonable probability that,” but for 

the erroneous introduction of the testimony, “the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In speculating that a jury may reasonably believe that 

Lounds would not have disclosed the sexual assaults to his mother if they were not true, Stefanski 

offers just that—speculation. See Kayer, 592 U.S. at 118. Stefanski fails to show a “substantial” 

likelihood of a different result to satisfy Strickland and falls far short of establishing that the state 

court’s determination “lies ‘beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement’” to overcome

AEDPA. Id. (internal citations omitted). 

VI. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s rejection of Stefanski’s petition.