IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
ARTHUR WEST, Appellant,

v. DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, Respondent. No. 71643-3-1 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PUBLISH

Respondent, State ofWashington Department of Licensing, has moved for 

### publication ofthe opinion filed in this case on June 9, 2014. The panel hearing the case has considered the motion and Appellant's answer and has determined that the motion should be granted. The court hereby ORDERS that the motion to publish the opinion is granted. Dated this 1st day ofAugust, 2014.

For the Panel: 

# Cqx.^T

Judge *——* —«i("~*•* -r- 3>5i CZ ' o 

### 2? ^

ro o
— COARTHUR WEST, Appellant,

v. DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, Respondent. c:\

CJl", • IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

No. 71643-3-1 DIVISION ONE

PUBLISHED FILED: June 9. 2014
Cox, J. - ArthurWest appeals the summary dismissal of his suit brought 

### under the Public Records Act against the Department ofLicensing. He contends thatthe Department violated the Public Records Act by failing to reasonably 

### search for, identify, and produce records related to motor vehicle fuel tax 

### payments to Indian Tribes. West also appeals the order denying his motion for reconsideration ofthe summaryjudgment order. The Department properly redacted and withheld information pursuantto a statutory exemption. Its search 

### forrecords was adequate and timely. The court properlyexercised its discretion 

### in denyingWest's motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we affirm. On January 12, 2012, West submitted a PublicRecords Actrequestto the Department of Licensing. He sought: (1) "All records showing the total amounts 

### ofgas tax money givenmonthly to each Indian Tribe, 2008 to present"; (2)"All audit reports concerning the expenditure of such funds"; and (3) "All communications concerning the disclosure or witholding [sic] ofsuch records, orNo. 71643-3-1/2 the propriety ofdisclosing or withholding such records, [J]anuary of2011 [t]o present." The Department ofLicensing timely acknowledged receipt ofWest's request and sought clarification. AfterWest clarified his request, the Department informed him that the estimated date of response was March 9, 2012. West e-mailed the Department on February 11, 2012 stating thatthe estimated time period was "unreasonable." Additionally, he made a second requestfor disclosure, seeking "any indexes of public records maintained by the 

### department that encompass the gas tax refund amounts, and any applicable retention and destruction schedules." The Department acknowledged receipt of his second request on February 17, 2012. Itinformed Westthat itexpected a response could be made on or before February 24, 2012. On February 24, the Department contacted Westto provide a status 

### update on his second public records request. It informedWestthat itexpected to respond on or before March 2, 2012. Three days later, West responded and informed the Departmentthat he considered it to be in violation of the Public Records Act by failing to reasonably disclose the records. 

### The Department made its firstdisclosure forWest's first request on March 7, 2012. Itstated that responsive records to items #1 and #2 were exemptfrom disclosure, and itattached an exemption/redaction log. Italso told Westthat it
was reviewing other records to determine whetherthey were exempt. 

### Additionally, the Department stated that it continued to "search for and review records responsive to item #3" and that itexpected to provide such records toNo. 71643-3-1/3
West "no later than March 23, 2012 and in installments as they become available." The next day, West sued the Department alleging that itviolated the 

### Public Records Act by "failing to reasonably search for, identify, and produce records." 

### The Department continued to respond to West's requests throughoutthe spring and summer. The details ofthe Department's response are described later in this opinion. 

### In November 2012, the Department moved for summaryjudgment. It 

### argued thatWest's suit was unnecessary, that its search for records was reasonable, that it timely responded to West's requests, that it properly identified each exempt record, and that it properly redacted or withheld records pursuantto
a statutory exemption. 

### West cross-moved for summaryjudgment and requested a continuance 

### pursuantto CR56(f). In his motion, he argued that he was forced tofile suit and conduct discovery inorderto compel the disclosure ofrecords and that the Department's exemptions were improper. 

### The Department moved forin camerareview of the withheld and redacted
documents. The trial court denied West's motion for a continuance, denied the 

### Department's motion forin camera review, and granted the Department's motion for summaryjudgment. West moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied his motion.No. 71643-3-1/4
West appeals. SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE DEPARTMENT West claims that the trial court erred when it (1) concluded that the Department properly redacted or withheld records pursuant to a statutory exemption, (2) concluded that the Department responded to his requests in a timely manner, and (3) concluded that West's lawsuit was unnecessary to compel production. His arguments are addressed in turn. Judicial review under the Public Records Act is de novo.1 Public Records 

### Actcases may be decided on summaryjudgment.2 "Under summary judgment analysis, the appellate court engages inthe same inquiry as the trial court: '[l]t views the pleadings and affidavits inthe file, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, inthe lightmost favorable to the nonmoving party, and itgrants 

### judgmentwhen no material issue of fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 

### judgment as a matter oflaw.'"3 Statutory Exemptions 

### West argues thatthe Department improperly withheld and redacted records pursuant to a statutory exemption. Specifically, he contends that these

RCW 42.56.550(3). 2 Spokane Research & Def. Fund v. City ofSpokane, 155 Wn.2d 89, 106, 117P.3d 1117(2005). 

### 3Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 98 Wn. App. 612, 614, 989 P.2d 1257 (1999) 

### (alteration in original) (quoting Muellerv. Miller, 82Wn. App. 236, 246-47, 917 P.2d 604 (1996)).No. 71643-3-1/5


### statutes do not exemptdisclosure ofamounts ofmoney refunded bythe state to the tribes. We disagree. The Public Records Act requires each agency to make available all public records unless the record falls within a Public Records Act exemption or other 

### statutory exemption.4 "Tothe extent necessary to prevent an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy interests protected by the [Public Records Act], the 

### agency shall redact identifyingdetails and produce the remainder ofthe record."5 "The burden of proofshall be on the agency to establish that refusal to permit public inspection and copying is in accordance with a statute that exempts or 

### prohibits disclosure in whole or in part of specific information or records."6 The Public Records Act is a "'strongly worded mandate for broad 

### disclosure of public records.'"7 The Act is to be "'liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed to promote this public policy and to assure that 

### the public interestwill be fully protected.'"8 

### When interpreting a statute, we conduct a de novo review.9 We interpret a statute so as to ascertain and give effect to the legislativeintent.10 "Ifthe

4 Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puvallup, 172 Wn.2d 398, 407, 259 P.3d 190 (2011); RCW42.56.070(1). 5 Bainbridge, 172 Wn.2d at 407. 6RCW 42.56.550(1). 7Bainbridge, 172 Wn.2d at 408 (quoting Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246 (1978)). 8\± (quoting Hearst, 90 Wn.2d at 127). 9Limstrom, 98 Wn. App. at 615.No. 71643-3-1/6 

### statute's meaning is plain, [the court] give[s] effectto that plain meaning as the expression ofthe legislature's intent."11 "'Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered 

### meaningless or superfluous.'"12 Under RCW 82.36.450, the State may enter into an agreementwith any federally recognized Indian tribe regarding the taxation of motor vehicle fuel on 

### reservation property.13 One provision of this statute provides: (4) Information from the tribe ortribal retailers received by the state or open to state review under the terms of an agreement shallbe deemedto bepersonalinformation under[RCW 42.56.230(4)(b)]andexemptfrompublic inspection and 

### copying^ RCW 42.56.230(4)(b) provides: The following personal information is exemptfrom public inspection and copying underthis chapter:


### (4) Information required ofany taxpayer in connection with the assessment or collection of any tax ifthe disclosure ofthe information to other persons would: . . . (b) violate the taxpayer's 

### right to privacy or result in unfaircompetitive disadvantage to the taxpayer.
10 \± 11 Bostain v. Food Express, Inc.. 159 Wn.2d 700, 708, 153 P.3d 846 (2007).12 State v.J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (internal 

### quotation marks omitted) (quoting Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wn.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999)). 13 RCW 82.36.450. 14 (Emphasis added.)No. 71643-3-1/7
Here, the Department properly withheld and redacted information related to the amounts ofgas tax money refunded to a tribe pursuant to these statutory 

### exemptions. The plain language of RCW 82.36.450(4) shows the legislature's intentto protect "information from the tribe," which itexpressly deems "personal 

### information." The plain language of RCW42.56.230(4)(b) shows the legislature's intent to protect "[i]information required of [the tribe],"ifthat information would violate the tribe's right to privacy. Under these statutes, this personal information is plainlyexemptfrom public inspection and copying. West focuses on the words "from the tribe" in RCW 82.36.450 or 

### "required of any taxpayer" in RCW42.56.230(4)(b) to argue that the dollar 

### amounts of gas tax moneygiven orrefundedto the tribes isfundamentally different information from information receivedfrom or required ofthe tribe, such 

### as numbers of gallons of gasoline, that is used to calculate the refund. He 

### argues thatonlythe latteris exemptunderthe statutes. This argument isnot persuasive. 

### West's reading ofthe statutes is too restrictive. 

### The amount ofgas tax money given or refunded to the tribe contains 

### "information required of[thetribe]." Likewise, it contains"informationfrom the tribe." Whether the State discloses this private information to West in itsoriginal 

### form, i.e., the number of gallons ofgasoline, orrather, whetherit provides the information inthe form of a mathematical calculation, i.e., the number ofgallons 

### ofgasoline is equal to therefund amountdivided bythe taxrate, theprivate information is the same. Itwould simply be disclosed in a differentform.No. 71643-3-1/8 Disclosure ofsuch personal information would be contrary to the plain words of the statute. West's arguments that this information is qualitatively different are not convincing. West contends that Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puvallup is 

### "on point."15 We disagree. He relies on that case for the assertion that "[e]ven though a public record 

### requestor could work backwards and figure out some information provided bythe 

### tribes, that does not make the amountthe State paid out exempt."16 In Bainbridge, a police officer accused ofsexual misconduct sought an injunction to 

### prevent the disclosure ofinvestigation reports.17 The supreme court considered whetherthe reports must be disclosed under the PublicRecords Act, orwhether 

### theyfell under the personal information exemption or the investigative records exemption.18 The lead opinion concluded that while the officer'sidentity was 

### exemptfrom production, the remainder ofthe reports were not exempt, because 

### thenature oftheinvestigations is a matteroflegitimate public concern.19 Bainbridge is distinguishablefrom this case. In order for either exemption 

### to apply in Bainbridge, itwas necessary to determine that disclosure of the

15 AppellantArthurWest's Opening Briefat 22 (citing Bainbridge, 172 Wn.2d at 417-18). 16 lU at 23. 17 Bainbridge, 172 Wn.2d at 405. 18 JU at 408-09. 19 JU at 417-18.
8No. 71643-3-1/9 

### information would violate the individual's right to privacy.20 Aperson's right to privacy is violated only ifdisclosure of information about the person: (1) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to 

### the public.21 Because only the officer's name was not of legitimate public concern, the remainder ofthe reports did not qualify under the exemption. Here, in contrast, RCW 82.36.450 does not turn on whetherthe 

### individual's right to privacy would be violated by disclosure.22 Accordingly, it is not necessary for this court to conductthis balancing inquiry and consider whetherthe matter is one oflegitimate public concern. So long as the information is "information from the tribe," it is statutorily defined as personal information and is exempt. 

### West relies on the following language from Bainbridge to support his 

### argument: "We recognize that appellants' request under these circumstances 

### may resultin others figuring out [theofficer's] identity. However, it is unlikelythat these are the onlycircumstances in which the previously existing knowledge of a 

### third party, pairedwith the information in a public records request, reveals more than either source would reveal alone."23

20 lg\ at 408-09, 419. 21 Id, at 415. 22 See RCW 82.36.450(4). 23 Bainbridge, 172 Wn.2d at 418.

9No. 71643-3-1/10
He appears to rely on this information to support the argument that nonexemptinformation does not become exempt simply because its disclosure may result in figuring out other exempt information. But that is notthe circumstance in this case. Here, we do not reach our conclusion that the refund amounts given by the state are exempt because disclosure may result infiguring out otherexempt information provided by the tribes. Rather, as previously discussed, the refund amounts here contains the same "information required of 

### [thetribe]."24 Likewise, it contains the same "information from the tribe."25 This private information is merely expressed in a different manner. It is exempt. Further, Bainbridge is distinguishable because the "previously existing 

### knowledge of a third party" inthat case was obtained from newspaper reports 

### outside the publicrecords request.26 Here, in contrast, the public records request alone reveals personal information from the tribe ifit is not redacted or withheld. And, as West acknowledges, an agency should look to the contents of the document, when deciding ifa record should be exempt because of a privacy 

### right. The contents of the documents in this case further support ourconclusion that the legislature intended to protect the refund amounts as personal information. For these reasons, West's reliance on this case is not helpful. 

### Finally, West argues that this court should consider RCW42.56.270(15), whichexempts financialinformation provided to the department of licensing "as 24RCW42.56.230(4)(b). 25 RCW 82.36.450(4). 26 Bainbridge, 172 Wn.2d at 418.

10No. 71643-3-1/11 required by RCW 19.112.110 or 19.112.120, except information disclosed in aggregate form that does not permit the identification of information related to individual fuel licensees." ButWestfails to adequately explain the relationship between these statutes. RCW 42.56.270(15) does not expressly referto the statute at issue in this case, RCW 82.36.450. The only linkbetween the two is that RCW 19.112.120 refers to chapter 82.36 as a whole. West's citation to these statutes does nothing to override the clear statutory exemption ofthe information we previously discussed. We conclude that the legislative intent is clearfrom the words of RCW 82.36.450(4), which plainly support the claimed exemption. Timeliness ofResponse West next argues that the trial court erred when itconcluded thatthe 

### Department responded to his record requests in a timely manner. We disagree. 

### "The [Public Records Act] mandates full disclosure of public records in a 

### timely manner."27 RCW42.56.520 provides that upon receiving a requestfor public records, the Department must respond within five business days byeither "(1) providing the record; (2) providing an internet address and link on the 

### agency's web site . . .; (3) acknowledging thatthe agency . . . received the request and providing a reasonable estimate of the time the agency . . . will require to respond to the request; or (4) denying the public record request." "Additional time required to respond to a request may be based upon the need to

27 Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney's Guild v. Kitsap County, 156 Wn. 

### App. 110, 120, 231 P.3d 219 (2010).

11No. 71643-3-1/12 clarify the intent ofthe request, to locate and assemble the information requested, to notify third persons or agencies affected by the request, orto determine whether any of the information requested is exempt and that a denial 

### should be made as to all or part of the request."28 Here, the Departmenttimely responded to both ofWest's requests. The Department received West's first request on January 23, 2012 and responded on January 30, 2012, within five business days, by acknowledging his request and asking for clarification. After getting clarification, the Department emailed West a week later, on February 10, with an update. The Department estimated that it would respond to his first request on March 9. West did not challenge the reasonableness of this estimate. 

### West's firstrequestwas "complex." Adeclaration from Hannah Fultz, an 

### employee in the Public Records Office for the Department of Licensing, shows that throughout the spring of 2012, the Department searched forresponsive records. Fultz, along withSara Crosby, a Public Disclosure Manager, reviewed records to determine whetherthey were responsive and whetherthey should be 

### produced, disclosed, redacted, orwithheld. The records responsive to West's first requestwere substantial. For example, Crosby stated that onJune 15,the Prorate and Fuel Tax Program provided paper copies of approximately 50,000 

### pages of records in response toWest's first request. As Fultzstated, "Itwas

28 RCW 42.56.520.

12No. 71643-3-1/13 difficult to grasp the scope ofthe responsive records because of how broad the 

### request was."29 Given this broad request, the Department also timely disclosed records to West. The Department provided its first disclosure for this request on March 7, which was within its estimated time frame. This e-mail stated: Records responsive to items #1 and #2 [inWest's first request] are exempt from disclosure. Please see the attached Exemption/Redaction Log for details. Please note that pages #000001 to #000020 aren't listed on the log. The Department is currently working with our attorneys to determine whether or not these pages are exempt, either in whole or in part. Pending their review, and adding in a shorttime to appropriately document this outcome for you, Iexpect to report the outcome to you by March 16, 2012J30] The Department also stated that itcontinued to search for and review records responsive to item #3 of this request and that itexpected to provide records by March 23, 2012. Although not always within its estimated deadlines, the Department 

### continued to contactWest and provide periodic updates and installments of documents. The Department provided records responsive to part 3 ofthe 

### request on June 28. It provided pages #000001-000020 to West on July 26. 

### Crosby's declaration reveals that the Department sent installments inresponse to this request on the following dates in2012: July 6, 10, 23, 26, and 27; August 6, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 31; September 18; and October4, 11, 18, 19, 23, 24, and

29 Clerk's Papers at 84. 30 Id. at 129.

13No. 71643-3-1/14 

### 29. As ofOctober 31, 2012, the Department had sent a total of 47,363 pages to West, and there remained 7,000 to 10,000 pages to be reviewed. Overall, the Department's response to this requestwas timely. The request was complex and broad, and the record shows that the Department continued to search for records, review the records, contactWest, and provide installments throughout the spring and summer. Additional time was necessary to locate and assemble the information requested, to notify third persons or agencies affected by the request, and to determine whether any ofthe information requested was exempt. The Department's actions are within the scope ofwhat is permitted under RCW 42.56.520. As Fultz stated in her declaration, "The scope, type and volume of records requested in Request #1
were not routine. Responding to West's requested [sic] could not be 

### accomplished at any faster rate than what the Department has accomplished and 

### certainly not byMarch 8, 2012, when Westfiled the present lawsuit."31 The Department also timely responded to West's second request. It 

### received this request on February 13, 2012 and acknowledged it on February 17, 2012. Itprovided an estimated response date ofone week. One week later, on 

### February 24, the Department contacted Westto provide another update and to inform himthat the new expected response date was March 2. On March 9, the 

### Department again contacted Westto inform himthatthere were no responsive records to his search. Itexplained the results ofthe search and asked Westto

31 Id. at 85-86.

14No. 71643-3-1/15
call the Department if ithad misunderstood his request. West did not further clarify this request, and the request was closed. In sum, the trial court properly concluded thatthe Department responded to West's record requests in a timely manner. West concedes that the Department's search was adequate, but he argues that the Department embarked upon an "unnecessary review" of nonresponsive records, acted in bad faith, silently and deliberately withheld records until after the show cause hearing, "acted to obstruct and complicate the disclosure process." Nothing inthis record supports these accusations. Further, asjust discussed, West's request was complex and broad. And
as the Department points out, West drafted the broad language, he did not indicate that the records were not responsive, and he did not further clarify his 

### request. Moreover, West concedes that half ofthese records were responsive to 

### his request. Accordingly, West's "bad faith" arguments are whollyunpersuasive. West also argues generally that the Department "could have easily disclosed" certain records sooner because ithad these records "at its fingertips." He relies on RCW 42.56.100 for the proposition that the Department is required 

### to provide the timeliest possible assistance to requestors. ButWestfails to 

### provide authority that the Department had any obligation to providethese records first, orthat it had an obligation to provide the installments inany particularorder. 

### As discussed previously, the Department provided timelyassistance to West. As Fultz's declaration reveals, the Department continuously worked to process and 

### respond to his request, and given the complexity, scope, type, and volume of the

15No. 71643-3-1/16 

### records, the disclosure likely could not have been accomplished at any faster rate. West's assertions to the contrary are not persuasive. West also argues that the Department's response was untimely because the Department "ignored its own deadlines," and failed to "providejustification" for its "unilateral extension oftime." He relies on Violante v. King County Fire District No. 20 to argue that "[a]bsent suchjustification, this Court should bind the 

### Departmentto its original time estimate."32 But Violante did not expressly considerwhetherfailure to abide by original time estimates constituted a violation 

### underthe Act.33 West cites no other authority to supportthis claim. Rather, he relies on Model Rules for the Public Records Act to argue thatthe Departments 

### "serialextensions" had the effect of denying West access to publicrecords.34 But 

### the Model Rules "are advisory only and do not bind any agency."35 Accordingly, West's argument is not persuasive. Necessity ofLawsuit 

### Finally, West argues that the trial court erred when itconcluded that his lawsuitwas unnecessary to compel the Departmentto produce the records he 

### had requested. Because we conclude that the Departmentcompliedwith the

32 Appellant ArthurWest's Opening Briefat 30 (citing Violante v. King County Fire Dist. No. 20, 114 Wn. App. 565, 570-71, 59 P.3d 109 (2002)). 33 Violante, 114 Wn. App. at 565. 

### 34Appellant ArthurWest's Reply Briefat 15-16 (citing WAC 44-14- 04003(6)). 35 WAC 44-14-00003.

16No. 71643-3-1/17
relevant provisions ofthe Public Records Act, we need not address this argument. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION West argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion for reconsideration. We disagree. As an initial matter, West argues that the proper standard of review is de
novo because the trial court was engaged in deciding questions of law, notfact. West is incorrect. This court reviews the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse ofdiscretion.36 A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable


### orbased on untenable grounds or reasons.37 Acourt's decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and 

### the applicable legal standard; it is based on untenable grounds ifthe factual findings are unsupported by the record; and it is based on untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of 

### the correct standard.38 Additionally, we may affirm on any basis supported bythe record.39 

### West moved for reconsideration pursuantto CR 59(a)(4) and CR 59(a)(7). 

### CR 59(a)(4) allows the court to grant reconsideration based on "[n]ewly 36 Lilly v. Lynch, 88 Wn. App. 306, 320-21, 945 P.2d 727 (1997). 37 In re Marriage ofLittlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). 38 JU at 47. 39 LaMon v. Butler, 112Wn.2d 193, 200-01, 770 P.2d 1027(1989).

17No. 71643-3-1/18 

### discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial." 

### CR 59(a)(7) allows the court to grant reconsideration ifthe decision is "contrary
to law." West argues that he "put before the Trial Court a great mass of lateproduced responsive records, which could have and should have been produced to [him] long ago" and that these were "material records that would have and should have changed the result ofthe show cause hearing." But he fails to identify these specific records on appeal, argue how these were material to the issues before the trial court, or explain how they would have changed the result 

### at the hearing. Rather, he generally asserts that ifthe trial court had considered these records, itwould have concluded that the Department could have produced 

### them earlier. Again, Westfails to supportthese speculative arguments. Further, given the scope, complexity, and the Department's response, Westfails to show thatthis evidence would have changed the result ofthe show cause hearing. In sum, Westfails to show that the newly discovered evidence was 

### material to any of the issues before the court, orthatthe court's decision was contrary to law. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

### West argues that the trial court applied the wrong legalstandard and thus, based its decision on untenable grounds. It is true thatthe trial court identified an

18No. 71643-3-1/19 

### outdated version of Local Civil Rule 59.40 Buteven ifthe trial court erred by looking to an outdated rule, we may affirm on any basis supported by the 

### record.41 For the reasonsjust discussed, we conclude that the record shows that trial court did not abuse its discretion. ATTORNEY FEES 

### West argues that he is entitled to fees pursuantto RCW42.56.550(4). 

### RCW42.56.550 provides that any person who prevails against an agency shall be awarded all costs. A Public Records Act claimant "prevails" against an 

### agency"only when that agency[wrongfully] withheld documents."42 Because the Department did notwrongfully withhold the documents, West has notprevailed. Accordingly, we deny his requestforfees on appeal. We affirm the orders and deny West's requestforfees on appeal. 

# ^3

WE CONCUR: 

# yW/yw^v, CJ>

40 See Clerk'sPapers at 1836 ("Local Civil Rule 59 specifies as follows: 'Motions for Reconsideration are disfavored. The court will ordinarilydeny such motions inthe absence of showing ofmanifest error inthe prior ruling or a 

### showing ofnewfacts orlegal authoritywhich could not have beenbroughttoits attention earlierwith reasonable diligence.'"). 41 LaMon, 112 Wn.2d at 200-01. 

### 42 Germeau v. Mason County, 166 Wn. App. 789, 811, 271 P.3d 932, review denied, 174 Wn.2d 1010 (2012).
19