## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellat e District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 0 2

- 19

- 00132

- C V

___________________________

O n Appeal f

ro m the 89th District Court Wichita County, Texas Trial Court No. 187,526

- B
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack 

### T HOMAS 

### W

AYNE 

### E VANS 

### , Appellant

V


### . S ANDRA 

### L

YNN 

### E VANS 

### , Appellee2 MEMORANDUM OPINIO N
I. I NTRODUCTION Appellant T homas Wayne Evans (Thomas) appeals t h e trial c ourt ’ s final decree
of divorce

. In three issues, Thomas argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) ordering that he pay spousa l maintenance to appellee Sandra L ynn Evans (Sandra) , (2) ordering that he pay spousal maint enance in exc e ss of the stat utory limit, and ( 3 ) not ordering that he was entitled to reimbursement for improvements made to
Sandra ’ s separate property. Bec ause we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering spousal maint en ance but that the t rial cour t order ed the spousal
maintenance in excess of the statutory limit and because we conclude t hat Thomas
failed to provide sufficient ev idence that he was entitled to reim bursement , w e reverse and remand in part and affirm in part

. II. B ACKGROUN D After mo re than eig hteen years of marriage, Thomas file d his petition for
divo rce pleading that the marriage had become “ insupportable because of discord or
conflict of personalities

. ” Sandra filed a general den ial and a counterpetition requesting , among o ther relief, that the trial court order that Thomas pay post

- divorce

s pousal maintenance. Trial was to the court

. A. Sandra ’ s Testimony
San dra testified at t rial

. Sandra said that she owned a house that was he r sepa rate proper ty on Rose Street in Burkburne tt. According to Sandra, she acquired3

the house in a previous divorce on August 9, 1999. She further stated that Thomas
had moved into t he house in April 1999 but that he did not begin he lping with house payments until July 1999

— Thoma s and Sandra married on August 21, 1999. Sandra said that after their marriage, she and Thomas began to pay the Rose Street house
paymen t s from c ommunity fun ds. By Sandra’s accou nt, tw o yea rs aft er the couple married, and bec ause it was required under her previous divorce decree, she and Thomas refinanced the house in both of their names, but the deed remained in her

name. Regarding her plans for housing , S andra averred tha t a t ax app raisal had

recen tly valued the Rose Street house at $114,000, t hat she had currently listed the house for sale at $145,000, and that there remained $49,000 in debt on the house. She said that she would expect to have roughly $9 6,000 in pro ceed s when she sold the
Rose Street house ; that she expected those proceeds would go toward the purchase of
a new home ; and that, given realtor fees and closing costs, she was “going to ba re ly have enough to pay for [the new] house.”
Accord i n g to Sandra, Thomas had made “[m]inor improvements” on the h ouse since the couple married, including having new carpet laid, installing a new stove and a new dishwasher, and putting a ne w steel roof on the house, which she testified cost between $8,000 a n d $10,000. Sandra stated that these improvements were paid for
from the couple ’ s joint checking account that contained community funds, including
monies fr om an income tax ret urn and from both of their jobs. Bu t Sandra a dmi tted4

that some of the money tha t went into t he joint checking account came from an
inherita nce that Thomas received after the couple married. Sandra said, h owever, that
she did not know how much money Thomas had inherited and place d into the ir joint bank account because he had “kept e v erything hush, hush, and [she] was never told

exa ctly how much money he was given.” She also stated that she had never seen a will or even a check demonstrating that any of the monies in t heir share d a ccount

w ere Thomas’s separate property.
Sandra said that other improvements ha d been made on the house since
Thomas received his inheritance. Specifically, Sandra averred that Thomas had painted the ceiling and helped p ut down li no leum in the kitchen and that, together,

t hey had built and decorated a work shop

. By Sandra’s account, Thomas and her brothers provided the labor to build the worksho p, which has running w ater and
electric it y . S he admitted that some of the money to build the work sho p came from
Thomas’s inheritance. The c ouple had opened a fine and performing arts studio in the workshop ; Thomas ta ught on one side of the workshop , and Sa ndra taught on the
other. Sandra referred to the stud io as the coup le ’ s jo int business

. Sa ndra testif

ied that she drove a 2014 GMC Acadia that was worth $18,000 but that the payoff fo r the vehicle was $23,000 and that the note on the vehicle was in
both her and Thomas’s name s . Thus, Sandra as ked the trial c ourt to order that Thomas be req uired to help pay her “almost $500 car payment ” e ach mon th

. Sandr a said th at Thomas drove a 2006 Chevrolet Colorado that was titled in his name a lone ,5

and she ask ed the court to awa rd the Color ado and any debt a ss ociated with it to
Thoma s. By Sandra’s account, the couple al so owned a 2006 Chrysler PT Cruiser

. She wanted the co urt to order it sold and to order that the proceeds be divi ded
between herself and Thomas. Sandra f urther ask ed th e court to order that Thomas
assume any debt on his Wichita Falls Teachers Credit Union credit ca rd, which she said had a balance of about $6 ,000. Regarding her monthly expens es, Sandra testified that she spen t $150 a month on gas and $200 a m o nth on groceries. She aver red that she did not know what her monthly utilities w ould cost until she moved into a new home, but that she was asking
the court to order $240 f or monthly utility bills, which she said was half of the

amount s h e and Tho mas spent on monthly utilities on the Rose Street house. Sandra
stated that she incurred more than $350 monthly related to medical co

- pays, counseling, physic al thera py, and over

- the

- counter medications and that she was asking th e c ou rt to consider these amounts in her request for spousal maintenance

. Sandra said that she did not expect to need more than $10 a month for clothing purchases, but she would need r oughly $30 a month for haircuts. She also said t hat she would need $200 a month to pay dow n the credit cards that she would be assuming. According to Sandra, she receive d $586 monthly from her ex

- husband’s
retirement , an d she believed that after subtract ing that from her total mon thly

ex pen ses, she would need roughly $1 ,122 a month to pay for her living expenses.6

Sandra testified that she had undergone twenty

- one surgeries in the six years leading up to tri al, including having had multiple herniated dis cs removed and repl ac ed with artificial discs, as well as h aving a spinal stimulator implant , two abdominal surg eries, and two shoulder surgeries. She also explained that she had
permane nt nerve damage on her left side and that she suffers from se vere ne u ro pathy. According t o S andra, the Social Security Administration deemed her di sabled in August 2015, but some of these surgeries occurred since receiving that designation.
She also stated that she had not paid into Social S ecurity be cause she had previou sly
been either self

- empl oyed or a teacher

. Therefore , the only benef it she received from the disability designation was Medicare

. S ince applying for Medicaid, she r eceived $100 monthly in food stamps , and she believed in the near fu tu re that Me dicaid wo uld pay h er Medicare premiums. Sandra said that the only w ay that she had been able to afford her monthly expenses during the pendency of this case was thro ugh assistance from family
members and charities

. She a l so said t hat even though the tr ial court had rece ntly
entered orders for Thomas to pay temporary spousal maintenance , he had not fully complied with the orders and still owed her between $ 800 and $1,300. Sandra av erred
that Thomas earn ed $4,18 5

. 68 a mont h and that she was a sking the court that 2 0% of
that amount be aw arded to her as permanent monthly spousal support given her
disabilities.7

Sandra testified that T homas had become abusive towards her after she
“ca ught him w ith hi s co
- worker at school” in 2013

. Specifically, Sa ndra said that
Thom as was mentally and physically abusive toward her, that he had “put hands on” her four times, and that the abuse made the marriage unbearable.
B. Tho mas ’ s Test imony
T ho m as testified that he inherited $50,000 w hen his father passe d away, that he had only received $47,000 of that inheritance, and that $40,000 was deposited into a joint bank account the cou ple had opened and used for the sole purpose of b uilding
the works ho p . Thomas claimed that the $7,000 that came later was actually a loan
from his mothe r for putting a new roof on the house and installing a carport, but in
other testimony, Thomas said that the $7,000 “was part of [his] i nherita nc e to start with.” And Thomas claimed that his mother paid the Rose Street house payments “[e]very month” dur

in g the four years before trial because he and Sandra had a hard

t ime making ends meet. Thomas ask ed t he court to order th at Sandra be entitled to all proceeds from the sale of the house in lieu of spousal support and any entitlement
to his retirement acc ou nt. Thomas agreed that he grossed $4,185

. 68 and netted $3,667 monthly from his teachin g job.
Thomas denied that he had ever physically abused Sandra. Instead, Thomas said that Sandra had once hit him with her car, but he chose not to press charges. He
also s aid that she once attacked him with a t ree bra nch, but he evaded h er . Thomas also disputed that he had ever committed infidelity during the marriage. When8

confronted with a letter that he had written Sandra in which he apologized for having
an “ in a ppropriate rel atio nship a t work,” Thomas said th at Sandra ’ s definition of inappropriate relationship included talking to another woman and that he was attempting to utilize her language in an effort to prevent “hours and hours of
banterin g” about him ha vi ng talked to a fema le co

- worker.
T ho mas a dmitted that he did not have a copy of his father’s will showing that he had inherited the money deposited into the account used for building the workshop , nor did he have any paperwo rk to demonstrate when the m on ey w as deposi ted, how much may have be en dep osited, and where the money was deposited

. Instead, Thomas said that his testimony was the only evidence he had that the money used to pay for building the workshop w as his separate p roperty. C. The Trial C ou rt ’ s Judgment
In the fi nal divo rce decree, th e trial court granted the divorce, dissolving the marriage on the grounds of insupportability. The court ordered that Sandra was awarded the GMC Acadia (an d its related deb t) and that she was entitl ed to 50% of
Thomas’s r et

irement b enefits accrue d during the marriage. The trial court also ordered that Thomas was not entitled to reimbursement for improvements made to
the Rose Street house and th at Thomas was to pay spousal ma intenance i n the amount of $900 mon th ly for an in definite p eriod or until the death of one of the parties, the remarriage of Sandra , the abeyance of Sandra ’ s disability , or the entry of a

new court order.9

In one o f its findings o f fact, the cou rt found th at Thomas’s monthly gros s income “ [w as] greater than $4,500. ” The court also found that the Rose Street house was Sandra’s separate property as she acquired it prior to the marriage an d that there

was insufficient e vidence to show Thom as was enti tled to any reimburse me nt for the improveme nt s on the house. This appeal followed.
III. D ISCUSSION A. Spousal Maintenance
In his first issue, Thomas argues that the trial court abused its d iscretion by ordering that he pay spous al ma in tenance
. Specifica lly, Thomas argues that Sandra
was award ed sufficient property to meet her minimum reasonable needs.
A spouse in a divorce proceeding is eligible to seek sp ousal mainte nance if that
spouse lac ks sufficient property to meet m inimum reasonable needs and cannot support herself due to an incapacit at ing physical or mental disability. See T ex . F am . C ode A nn . § 8.051(2)(

A ) ; In re Green , 221 S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex. 20 07); In re M arriage of
Elabd , 58 9 S.W.3d 280, 283 (Tex. App.

— Waco 20 19, no pet.). The term “minimum reasonable needs” is not defined in t he Family Code, nor are there cases defining the

term. Slicker v. Slicker

, 464 S.W.3d 850, 860 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2015 , no pet.). Rather, the minimum reasonable needs for a particular i ndividual is a fact

- specific determination that should be made by the tr ial court on a case

- by

- case basis. Id

. Section 8.054(a)(1) of the Texas Family Code generally limits a tri al court ’ s award of spousal maintenance based on the length of the marriage

. See T ex. Fam.10

Code. Ann. § 8.054(a)(1); Green , 221 S.W.3d at 647; Ela bd , 589 S.W.3d at 283

. But
under section 8.05 4(b), if the spouse seeking maintenance is unable to supp ort he rself
thr ough approp riate employment because of an incapacitating physical or mental disability, the trial court may order spousal maintenance for an inde finite period of time as long as the di sability continues. T ex. F am . C o de A nn . § 8.054(b); Green , 221 S.W.3d a t 647; Elab d , 589 S.W.3d at 283

. Additionally, S ection 8.056 prov id es that the obligation to pay future maintenanc e terminates on the dea th of either part y, the remarriage of the obligee, or if, after a hear ing, the trial court determines that th e obligee “ cohabits with another person with whom the obligee has a dating or romantic relationship in a permanent place of abo de on a continuing b as is .” T ex . F am . C o de A nn . § 8.056; Green , 221 S.W.3d at 647; Elabd , 589 S.W.3d at 283

. We review a trial cou rt ’ s awar d of spousa l maintenance for an abuse of
discretion

. Elabd

, 589 S .W .3d at 283

. Under the abuse of discretion standar d, legal
and factual s ufficie ncy of the evidence are not independent grounds for asserting error, but they are relevant factors i n assessi ng whether the trial court abused its
discretion. Id

.; Dunn v . Du nn , 177 S.W.3d 393, 396 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.]
2005 , pet. denied

)

. Here, Thomas does not challe nge that Sandra is disabled or unable to work. 1 Rather, Thomas argues that S andra rece ived a suf ficient amount of the ma rital estate,

1 At trial, Thomas agr eed multiple times that Sandra i s “ physically disabled

. ”11

including the Rose S treet house and 50 % of his retirement, to meet her needs. The gist of T homas ’s argument is that because she left the marriage with nearly $100,000 worth of assets, she can affor d to pay f or her rou ghly $1100 mont hly d eficie ncy and
th us spousal maintenan ce is improper. Thomas does not cite any authority to suppor t his posit io n. We conclude that the trial c ourt had sufficient evidence to order spousal
maint ena nce. After deta iling her monthly living expenses, S andr a testified that even
afte r receiving $586 mont hly from her previous h usband ’s retireme nt, she w ould still
need r oughly $1,122 a month to cover her necessary living expenses. Further, Sandra

test ified that this defi cient amount did not inclu de a month ly rent or mortg age pa yment and that the proceeds from the sale of the Rose Stree t house would go directly into the p urchase of a new home so that she did not have a house payment.
Sandra said that a fter the s ale of the Rose Street house , given realtor fees and closing

costs , she was “going to barely have enough to pay for [the new] h ouse.” Thus, the
trial court h ear d evidence that Sandra had not included the costs of stable housing in
he r request for spousal ma intenance because she inte nded to cover those costs with
the pr oce eds from the sale of the house and that she would c ontinue to incur her

m onthly deficit despi te the fact that she was selling the Rose Street house

. We also reject Th omas ’s argument that b ec ause S andra was awarded h alf of his retirement, she has suffici ent resources to cover her monthly needs. Indeed, Thomas
testified that his retirement annuity wo uld not begin to pay out for anot her twelve to12

fif teen years. Thus, the benefits t hat Sandra will receive i n the future will not support her during th e time between the divorce and when Thomas begins to draw from his
retir ement. And the trial court exp re s sly stated in the decr ee that when Sandra be gins to receive benefits from Thomas ’ s retirement , “ that circum stance shall be a consideration in any p eti tion to modify spousal suppor t filed by Thomas

. ” Thus, the
tri al court considered the financial impact o f both Sandra and Thomas receiving his
retirement in the futur e. See De l tuva v. Deltuva , 113 S.W. 3d 882, 888 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2003, no p et. ) ( “ While Barbara received the majority of the marital estate, the

court could have reasonably concluded that her f unds would be exhausted before her earnings matched her reasonable minim u m monthl y expenses. ”). W e overrule
Thomas ’s first issue.
B. Sp ous al Mainten ance Amount
In his second issue, Thomas argues that the trial court erred by finding th at he
made in exc es s of $4,5 00 a month and thus the ordered $900 in monthly spousal
mainte n ance exceeds the statutory l imit. We agree.
The amount of spou sal maintenance is confined by statutory limits. T ex . F am . C ode A nn . § 8.055(a)

. Under Section 8.055(a) , t he amount o f mainten ance awarded by the trial court can not be more than the lesser of $5,000 or twenty percent of the paying spouse ’ s average monthl y g ross income. Id

. The trial court in this case found that Thomas ’ s average m onthly gross income

“ is greater than $ 4,500 ” a nd ordered that Thomas pay $900 (which would be twenty13

percen t o f $4,500) monthly to Sandr a a s spousal maintenance. But the evid enc e does not support that Thomas ’ s monthly gross income “ is greater than $4,500

. ” Even though T h omas testified that i n the p ast he ha d held part

- time employment in addition to his employ men t a s a schoolteacher , he s aid that he curre ntly was making
onl y h is salary at the school and that the income was fi xed at $4,185.68 per mo nth

. Not only was this evidence no t contrad ic ted , but Sandra too testified that Thomas ’ s monthly gross i nc ome was $4,185.68

. Thus, the maximum amount o f sp ous al maintenance that the trial court could have imposed wa s $837.14

. Because the amount of maintenance awar ded by the trial court is discreti on ary only within the statutory limits, we will reverse the judgment of the tr ial court relating
to the amount of sp ousal support awarded and remand for a new trial on the amount of spousal maintenance to be awarded to San dra

. See id

. ; see also Deltuva , 1 13 S.W.3d at 889 (declin ing t o modify the trial court ’ s judgment when there was no t undisputed
evidence of the le ngt h of time spousal maintenance should have been ordered to la st); In re Marriage of Franklin , No. 10

- 13

- 00007

- CV, 2013 WL 4799063, at *3 (Tex

. App.

— Waco Aug. 29, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( holding that trial court imposed a spousal

maintenance amount gre ate r than statutory limits under Section 8.055(a) and remanding to trial court to re

- address spousal maint enance amount while affirming
trial c o u rt ’s judgment in all other r espects )

. We sust ain Thomas ’ s second issue.14

C. Reimbursement
In his third is sue, Thomas argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding him reimbursement for the improvements to the Rose Street prope rty. We disagree.
A claim f

or reimbursement m ay include capital improvements to property other than by incurri ng debt. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.402(a)(8). Reimbursement for
fun ds expended by a marital estate for improvements to another marit al estate sh all be measured by the enhanc ement in value to the benefited marital estate. Id . § 3.402(d).
The enhanced valu e i s determined by the difference between the fair market value of the property before and after the improvements. Matter of Marriage of McCoy & El s , 488 S.W.3d 430, 435 (T ex. App.

— Houston [ 14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). The party claiming reimbursement bea rs the burden of establishing the net benefit to the payee estate, proving that expenditures were made, and that the expenditures are
reimburs able. I

d . at 434; Zeptner v. Zeptner , 111 S.W.3d 727, 737 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Evidence o f the c os t of improvements alone is not sufficient to prove enhanced value. McCoy & Els , 488 S.W.3d at 435 ; see also Anderson v. Gilliland , 684 S.W.2d 67 3, 675 (Tex. 1985) (rejecting cost as a mea sure of r eimbursement). We
review a trial court ’ s decision concerni ng a claim for re i mbursement for an abuse of
di scretion. Penick v. Penick , 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 19 8 8 ). Here, the trial court found that Th om as presented “ insufficient evidence to

su pport hi s claim that his separate estate should be reimbursed for fu nds or assets15

exp e n ded by his separate estate f or the benefit of the community. ” Thomas testified that he used funds he believed to be his separ at e property that he had r eceived f rom an inheritance to improve the Rose Street house , which is Sandra’s separ a te property. In fact, Thomas and Sandra both testified to improvements made to the house during the marriage. Thomas also testified that the a mo unt of funds he expended was $47 ,0 00. But Thomas did not present any evidence to show that any enhanced valu e of the Rose Street house res ulted from the improvements. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Thomas presented i ns ufficient evidence that
he was e nt

itled to reimbursement because Thomas only presented evide nce of the

cost o f im provements to the house. See Bell v. Bell , No. 12

- 04

- 00244

- CV, 2005 WL 1538275, at *7 (Tex. App.

— Tyler June 30, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (h ol ding that
husband was no t entitl ed to reimbursement because there was no evidence that repai ring septic syste m to h ouse owned by wife separ ately was a capital improvement to the septic system or the home). We overrule Thomas’s third issue.
IV. C ONCLUSI ON Having sustained Thomas ’s secon d issue that the trial court abused its
discretion in its ca lculation of the a mount of spousal maintenance to be awarded, we reverse the judgment of the trial court only as to the amount of spousal maintenance
and remand t hi s proceeding to the tri a l court for a new trial so lely on the amount of spousal maintenance to be awarded. H aving o verruled Thomas’s first and third issues, we affirm the judgment of the tr ial court in all other respects.16 /s/ Dana Womack
Dana W omack Justice
Delivere d: April 9, 2020