U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

33–866 WASHINGTON : 2019

THE OPIOID CRISIS: STOPPING THE FLOW OF 

SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 

MAIL SYSTEM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 25, 2018 

Serial No. 115–TR04 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means 

( 

ii 

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

KEVIN BRADY, Texas, Chairman 

SAM JOHNSON, Texas 

DEVIN NUNES, California 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

PETER J. ROSKAM, Illinois 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

LYNN JENKINS, Kansas 

ERIK PAULSEN, Minnesota 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

DIANE BLACK, Tennessee 

TOM REED, New York 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

JIM RENACCI, Ohio 

KRISTI NOEM, South Dakota 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

JASON SMITH, Missouri 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

CARLOS CURBELO, Florida 

MIKE BISHOP, Michigan 

DARIN LAHOOD, Illinois 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts 

SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan 

JOHN LEWIS, Georgia 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

MIKE THOMPSON, California 

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

RON KIND, Wisconsin 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

DANNY DAVIS, Illinois 

LINDA SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

TERRI SEWELL, Alabama 

SUZAN DELBENE, Washington 

JUDY CHU, California 

GARY ANDRES, Staff Director 

BRANDON CASEY, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington, Chairman 

DEVIN NUNES, California 

ERIK PAULSEN, Minnesota 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TOM REED, New York 

KRISTI NOEM, South Dakota 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

JASON SMITH, Missouri 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

RON KIND, Wisconsin 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan 

DANNY DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

iii 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Advisory of April 25, 2018, announcing the hearing ............................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection .................................................................. 6 

Robert Cintron, Vice President, Network Operations, United States Postal 

Service ................................................................................................................... 17 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Questions from Trade Subcommittee Chairman David G. Reichert (R–WA) 

to Robert Cintron, Vice President, Network Operations, United States Postal Service .............................................................................................................. 46 

Question from Representative Devin Nunes (R–CA) to Robert Cintron, Vice 

President, Network Operations, United States Postal Service ........................ 47 

Questions from Representative Erik Paulsen (R–MN) to Robert Cintron, Vice 

President, Network Operations, United States Postal Service ........................ 48 

Questions from Trade Subcommittee Chairman David G. Reichert (R–WA) 

to Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection ..................................................... 51 

Question from Representative Devin Nunes (R–CA) to Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection ................................................................................................. 55 

Questions from Representative Erik Paulsen (R–MN) to Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection .......................................................................................... 57 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Alliance for Safe Online Pharmacies (ASOP Global) ............................................ 59 

Gregory D. Thome, Director, Office of Specialized and Technical Agencies, 

Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State ............... 62 

(1) 

THE OPIOID CRISIS: STOPPING THE FLOW OF 

SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 

MAIL SYSTEM 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2018 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m., in Room 

1100, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. David G. Reichert 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

[The advisory announcing the hearing follows:] 

2 

ADVISORY 

FROM THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: (202) 225–3625 

Wednesday, April 25, 2018 

TR–04 

Chairman Reichert Announces Hearing on 

The Opioid Crisis: Stopping the Flow of 

Synthetic Opioids in the International 

Mail System 

House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee Chairman David G. Reichert (R– 

WA), announced today that the Subcommittee will hold a hearing entitled ‘‘The 

Opioid Crisis: Stopping the Flow of Synthetic Opioids in the International Mail System.’’ The hearing will focus on efforts to improve the detection of synthetic opioids 

in the international mail system and prevent them from entering the United States. 

The hearing will also examine bipartisan legislative solutions to address 

vulnerabilities in the international mail system that have allowed synthetic opioids 

to go undetected. The hearing will take place on Wednesday, April 25, 2018, 

in room 1100 of the Longworth House Office Building, beginning at 2:00 

p.m. 

In view of the limited time to hear witnesses, oral testimony at this hearing will 

be from invited witnesses only. However, any individual or organization may submit 

a written statement for consideration by the Committee and for inclusion in the 

printed record of the hearing. 

DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: 

Please Note: Any person(s) and/or organization(s) wishing to submit written comments for the hearing record must follow the appropriate link on the hearing page 

of the Committee website and complete the informational forms. From the Committee homepage, http://waysandmeans.house.gov, select ‘‘Hearings.’’ Select the hearing for which you would like to make a submission, and click on the link entitled, 

‘‘Click here to provide a submission for the record.’’ Once you have followed the online instructions, submit all requested information. ATTACH your submission as a 

Word document, in compliance with the formatting requirements listed below, by 

the close of business on Wednesday, May 9, 2018. For questions, or if you encounter technical problems, please call (202) 225–3625. 

FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS: 

The Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing record. As always, submissions will be included in the record according to the discretion of the Committee. 

The Committee will not alter the content of your submission, but we reserve the right to format 

it according to our guidelines. Any submission provided to the Committee by a witness, any materials submitted for the printed record, and any written comments in response to a request for 

written comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any submission not in compliance with these guidelines will not be printed, but will be maintained in the Committee files 

for review and use by the Committee. 

1. All submissions and supplementary materials must be submitted in a single document via 

email, provided in Word format and must not exceed a total of 10 pages. Witnesses and submitters are advised that the Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official 

hearing record. 

3 

2. All submissions must include a list of all clients, persons and/or organizations on whose 

behalf the witness appears. The name, company, address, telephone, and fax numbers of each 

witness must be included in the body of the email. Please exclude any personal identifiable information in the attached submission. 

3. Failure to follow the formatting requirements may result in the exclusion of a submission. 

All submissions for the record are final. 

The Committee seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. 

If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202–225–1721 or 202–226– 

3411 TDD/TTY in advance of the event (four business days’ notice is requested). 

Questions with regard to special accommodation needs in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats) may be directed to the Committee as noted above. 

Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available at 

http://www.waysandmeans.house.gov

f 

/ 

Chairman REICHERT. Good afternoon, the Subcommittee will 

come to order. 

Welcome to the Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee. 

We are having a hearing today on how to stop the flow of synthetic opioids in the international mail system. 

In 2016, nearly 64,000 Americans died from drug overdoses, 

nearly doubled from 10 years ago. Of those deaths, approximately 

66 percent involved opioids. In my home State of Washington, 

there has been a 134 percent increase in opioid-related cases between 2004 and 2016. That is an increase of 33 percent. 

To put this in stark and shocking terms, the increase in opioidrelated deaths in Washington State exceeds the growth in the 

State’s population. There has been a sharp rise in the number of 

deaths involving fentanyl, a cheap, synthetic opioid that is up to 50 

times stronger than heroin and up to 100 times stronger than morphine. The number of Americans who died from an overdose on 

synthetic opioid more than doubled from 2015 to 2016. Because 

fentanyl is so potent, it takes only a very small amount to cause 

severe or deadly reactions. 

Fentanyl enters the United States with alarming ease. It is frequently sold online, and then shipped to the United States typically 

from China through express delivery carriers, or through the international mail. 

Because it is shipped in such small quantities, it is very difficult 

to detect. For the last 15 years Customs and Border Protection, by 

law, has required private carriers to transmit advance electronic 

data on shipments entering the United States. The data typically 

includes the shipper and recipient name and address, as well as 

the package contents, all of which helps CBP identify high-risk 

shipments. 

CBP has exercised its discretion not to impose this data requirement on the Postal Service because the Postal Service operates in 

a different environment than private carriers do. As a result, international mail shipments arrive in the United States with little information. This lack of data creates a significant vulnerability that 

can be easily exploited by drug traffickers. 

To the credit of CBP and the Postal Service, they have established a pilot program to test the effectiveness of acquiring advance 

electronic data on a small subset of mail shipments. The pilot itself 

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is an important step, and I commend the agencies for taking that 

step. But as the pilot has expanded, there are significant concerns 

about the quality of the data supplied by foreign postal operators 

and the ability of the Postal Service to physically retrieve the packages that CBP targets. 

I am eager to hear from our witnesses today about what steps 

the agencies are taking to improve the pilot program, and whether 

they believe it has been effective. 

I also look forward to hearing about the unique challenges surrounding the Postal Service’s ability to collect and transmit advance electronic data. 

Finally, I would like to thank CBP and the Postal Service for 

working closely and cooperatively with our bipartisan Committee 

staff to craft a legislative solution that will require the transmittal 

of advance electronic data on all international mail shipments in 

a way that is effective and achievable and ensures the agencies are 

held accountable to Congress. 

I would also like to thank Representative Mike Bishop, who is 

leading the Committee’s effort on this important issue, together 

with Representative Vern Buchanan, and Carlos Curbelo, as well 

as Representative French Hill for his work to improve the detection 

of fentanyl by the Postal Service and Representative John Faso, 

who is here with us today to show his commitment to help solve 

this problem. 

The opioid crisis must be addressed from every angle, and that 

includes stopping synthetic opioids from entering our country. We 

must do more to protect our families and our communities from 

this deadly substance in requiring advance electronic data on international mail shipments that would help us do that. 

Right now, I will yield to Mr. Pascrell, the Ranking Member, for 

his opening statement. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Chairman Reichert, for holding the 

hearing today, and I want to thank Mr. Owen and Mr. Citron. Mr. 

Owen is the Executive Assistant Commissioner, correct me if I am 

wrong, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Thank you for being here today; and Robert Citron is Vice 

President of Network Operations in the U.S. Postal Service. 

So you are at the heart of what we are talking about today, so 

thank you both. 

Every day in the United States, 115 Americans lose their lives 

to opiates. We are trying to attack the problem from every direction 

possible. 

In 2016, my home State of New Jersey alone experienced 2,056 

lives lost to this epidemic. The New Jersey Attorney General’s Office predicts that the number this year could surpass 3,000. 

One of the ways that synthetic opioids make their way into the 

United States is through the mail. Fentanyl, an illicit synthetic opiate, that is extremely deadly, primarily comes from China. 

Fentanyl is frequently sold online, shipped to the United States in 

very small quantities, making it hard to detect. 

These sellers are incredibly easy to find online, and there is evidence of multiple fatalities in which the victim received fentanyl 

through the mail from China. 

5 

Ports of entry are a critical juncture in the flow of synthetic opiates. Just across the river from my district in New York City, the 

Postal Service receives international mail at one of its five international service centers. The Postal Service receives an astronomical volume of mail, handling an estimated 275 million international packages in 1 year. 

Given this high volume of international shipments, more data is 

needed for international shipments to catch synthetic opiates at the 

ports of entry before they enter our country and devastate so many 

of our communities. 

To address the vulnerability, I was proud to sponsor the Synthetics Trafficking and Overdose Prevention, or the STOP Act, with 

my friend, Congressman Pat Tiberi—and we miss him—and Ranking Member Neal of the full Committee. 

This bill would require the Postal Service to transmit advance 

electronic data to Customs and Border Patrol on international shipments into the United States. This information typically includes 

the name and the address of the shipper, the recipient, as well as 

the contents of the package. 

When CBP identifies shipments that may pose a risk, they can 

place a hold on the shipment and notify carriers that a package 

must be presented for examination. This data will help CBP identify and stop the shipments of synthetic opiates coming from China 

and other countries around the world. 

I understand that CBP and the U.S. Post Office have some concerns with the STOP Act as it currently stands, but I am confident 

that we can work on a bipartisan basis to address these concerns 

and maintain a robust mechanism that ensures that the CBP and 

USPS are held accountable for collecting data on international 

shipments. 

The Postal Service and Customs have already put in place a pilot 

program that has made great progress in the transmission of this 

electronic data. The program began in 2014, I believe, at JFK 

International Service Center in New York, and the Postal Service 

was able to secure data from foreign posts on certain international 

packages. 

CBP then targeted a small amount of mail each day for the Postal Service to locate and provide to CBP for this inspection. I understand that in 2017, the CBP and Postal Service expanded the pilot 

program and entered bilateral agreements with several foreign 

posts, including China, which accounts for nearly two-thirds of 

international mail in the United States. 

In 2017, Customs and Border Patrol seized more than 1,100 

pounds of fentanyl. This rate doubled over the year before. However, an Office of Inspector General report found in 2016, that 

under the pilot program, the Postal Service had only presented 

around 80 percent of the packages targeted by CBP for inspection, 

and the majority, more than 60 percent, of international packages 

received by the Postal Service, had no advance electronic data associated with them. Much of the data it did receive from foreign posts 

was low quality. 

We also know that foreign carriers like UPS and FedEx are already required to provide advance electronic data, but have sepaVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:13 Apr 18, 2019 Jkt 033866 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\33866.XXX 33866
6 

rate requirements and receive only around one-fourth the volume 

of packages as the U.S. Postal Service. 

It is my hope that with the continued progress of the pilot program and subsequently with the STOP Act passage, we can address the remaining vulnerabilities within the system itself. 

Again, I thank you both for being here today, and I turn it back 

to our Chairman. 

Chairman REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. 

Today we are joined by two witnesses. The first witness is Mr. 

Todd Owen, the Executive Assistant Commissioner for CBP’s Office 

of Field Operations. 

Our second witness is Mr. Robert Cintron, Vice President of the 

Postal Service’s Network Operations. 

Before recognizing our first witness, let me note that our time is 

limited as almost always we say. So you should limit your testimony to 5 minutes please, and Members should keep their questioning to 5 minutes. 

Mr. Owen, your written statement will be made a part of this 

record. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF TODD C. OWEN, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS 

AND BORDER PROTECTION 

Mr. OWEN. Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the role of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in combating the flow of dangerous, illicit drugs into 

the United States. 

As America’s unified border security agency, CBP plays a critical 

role in our Nation’s efforts to keep dangerous drugs from entering 

our communities. CBP interdicts drugs and other dangerous items 

at our ports of entry, including multiple mail and express courier 

facilities by leveraging advance electronic data, automated targeting systems and intelligence-driven strategies, and by using various types of detection technology as part of our multilayered, riskbased approach to enhance the security of our borders. 

Since the STOP Act was first introduced, CBP, working collaboratively with the Postal Service and our law enforcement partners, 

has made strong progress in enhancing our enforcement capabilities and the effectiveness in the international mail and express 

courier environments, but more must be done. 

Recent bilateral agreements regarding advance electronic data 

between the U.S. Postal Service and foreign postal operators, have 

increased CBP’s ability to target high-risk shipments. 

At the start of 2016, CBP was receiving advance electronic data, 

or AED, on a limited basis from only eight countries. Today we are 

receiving advance electronic data from 28 countries accounting for 

over 40 percent of all international mail shipments with goods. 

CBP works internationally to increase the volume and the accuracy of the AED provided to the Postal Service. 

CBP has now initiated pilot programs at the top five international mail facilities in JFK, Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, and 

San Francisco, which allows CBP officers to target high-risk shipments using AED. Through these pilots, CBP has enhanced our 

7 

automated targeting capabilities and has been working with the 

Postal Service to develop protocols to ensure that every shipment 

selected for CBP by examination is, in fact, presented for inspection. 

Last summer, CBP and the Postal Service signed a memorandum 

of understanding aimed at increasing the level of advance electronic data while aligning inspection processes. 

In the past year, CBP has increased our staffing at the six main 

international mail facilities by 20 percent, and all CBP narcotics 

detection canines assigned to the mail facilities express courier operations at international airports, have now been trained to detect 

fentanyl, adding important detection capability at our ports of 

entry. Once detected, these substances must be positively identified. 

In the past 18 months, CBP has deployed identification testing 

equipment so that officers can quickly determine what the unknown substances are. The average fentanyl seizure in the international mail environment is only 700 grams and arrives as an unknown powder. CBP officers must have the technology enabling 

them to quickly and safely identify these unknown substances. 

CBP has increased the availability of such testing equipment, 

and we are appreciative to Congress for the recently-passed funding which will allow us to add even additional testing equipment. 

In the mail and express courier environments, the fentanyl detected arise primarily from China and is over 90 percent pure. CBP 

has deployed the necessary personal protective equipment to safely 

inspect and process these narcotics. 

We have also deployed naloxone or Narcan to our ports of entry, 

so if our officers or our canines are accidentally exposed to these 

deadly substances, we can quickly administer these treatments to 

save their lives. 

Lastly, substantive and timely information sharing is critical to 

targeting and interdicting shipments containing illicit drugs. CBP’s 

national targeting center collaborates with critical partners on a 

daily basis, including HSI, the DEA, FBI, members of the intelligence community, and the Postal Service inspection service. These 

investigative relations are critical to delivering consequences to 

those who try to smuggle narcotics across our border. 

In closing, we are seeing an increase in interdictions as a result 

of the efforts I have outlined. In 2015, CBP seized 50 pounds of 

fentanyl in the international mail and express courier environments. In 2016 that increased to 81 pounds of fentanyl; and in 

2017, 335 pounds of fentanyl were seized again in the mail and express courier environments. 

Already this fiscal year, we have seized 211 pounds of fentanyl 

and expect to exceed our numbers by early this summer. 

So despite this success, much more must still be done. We must 

continue to increase the level and accuracy of advance electronic 

data provided. We must further refine our targeting capabilities, 

we must find a technological solution that can quickly examine parcels for the presence of contraband without having to open the 

package, and we must work with our law enforcement partners to 

identify and dismantle those criminal networks bringing these ilVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:13 Apr 18, 2019 Jkt 033866 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\33866.XXX 33866
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licit narcotics into our communities, and ensure criminal prosecutions. 

We must deliver consequences. 

Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Owen follows:] 

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Chairman REICHERT. Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. Cintron, your written statement will be made part of the 

record, and you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT CINTRON, VICE PRESIDENT, 

NETWORK OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 

Mr. CINTRON. Good afternoon. 

Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, and Members of 

the Subcommittee, thank you. Thank you, Chairman Reichert, for 

calling this hearing. 

My name is Robert Cintron. I am the Vice President of Network 

Operations for the United States Postal Service. I oversee the Postal Service’s national distribution network, including its operations 

at the international service centers, known as ISCs. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee 

on our efforts to combat opioids in the mail. This includes improvements in the collection and receipt of advance electronic data, or 

AED. 

Together with our Federal agency partners, we are committed to 

work with foreign postal operators to increase AED for packages 

coming into the United States. In order to improve the targeting 

of illicit drugs and other contraband, we collect AED from more 

than 90 percent of outbound international mail. In the past 3 

years, we have increased the receipt of AED on inbound shipments 

from virtually none to over 40 percent as of March 2018. A substantial portion of these originate in China. 

The amount of AED from China is expected to grow significantly 

by the end of this year. 

Since January 2017, the number of countries sending AED to the 

Postal Service has grown from 8 to 27, and includes China and 

other countries of interest. We have prioritized obtaining AED from 

the largest volume foreign postal operators, which collectively account for over 90 percent of all inbound volume. 

We now require AED on packages where rates are established 

under bilaterally negotiated agreements, and currently have such 

agreements in place with postal operators in Australia, Canada, 

China, Hong Kong, and Korea. Moreover, 60 foreign posts have entered into voluntary data sharing agreements to facilitate the exchange of AED. In September 2017, the Postal Service and CBP 

completed a memorandum of understanding to solidify our interagency partnership. 

Additionally, a program initiated at the New York ISC to use inbound AED to facilitate more advanced targeting by CBP has been 

expanded to all five ISCs across the country. 

Over the last year, the Postal Service has provided hundreds of 

thousands of records per data CBP, and expanded the number of 

countries and types of packages available for targeting. We have 

also implemented an automated process to identify targeted pieces 

requested by CBP. Additionally, we provided training to ISC employees to reinforce proper processes for handling and presenting 

mail in accordance with CBP requirements. 

To further improve the Federal Government’s coordination of 

oversight over inbound international items, the Postal Service, 

CBP, and the FDA formed an interagency work group. The group 

18 

is working on efforts to build capacity to exchange AED, develop 

detection technology, continue information sharing, provide technical assistance for legislation, and improve physical and IT infrastructure. 

We also continue to work in close collaboration with our law enforcement branch at the inspection service, which has seen significant improvements in its ability to seize opioids. 

From fiscal year 2016 through fiscal year 2017, the inspection 

service achieved a 375 percent increase in international parcel seizures, and an 880 percent increase in domestic parcel seizures related to opioids. 

The Postal Service agrees with the goal of the STOP Act to increase AED. However, unlike private companies, the Postal Service 

must accept and deliver mail from nearly every country in the 

world. As we do not control the induction of foreign mail destined 

for the United States, we cannot control the collection of AED 

abroad. 

As detailed in my written testimony, we have worked with DHS, 

CBP, the FDA, and State Department, to provide technical assistance for proposed legislation that recognizes the practical realities 

and sets achievable targets. 

Additionally, our recommendations align with the Administration’s opioid initiative. 

In conclusion, we share the concerns about illegal drugs and contraband entering the country through the mail and commercial carriers. The Postal Service is committed to taking all practicable 

measures to ensure our Nation’s mail security and provide the best, 

most efficient service possible. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cintron follows:] 

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Chairman REICHERT. I thank you both for your testimony. 

I will start out with the questioning. 

It seems to me that in the national conversation about opioids, 

there is not enough emphasis placed upon the dangers that synthetic opioids pose to first responders, law enforcement officials, 

postal workers, and I think that, Mr. Owen, you mentioned canine 

units who may come into direct contact with these substances in 

the normal course of their duties. 

Has the rise in shipments of synthetic opioids posed a greater 

risk to CBP officers and Postal Service workers? 

What measures are your agencies taking to protect the workforce? 

And would having advance electronic data on international mail 

shipments improve your ability to protect your employees? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, sir, speaking on behalf of U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, yes, the risk of accidental exposure has always 

been there, whether it is fentanyl, which has much more deadly 

consequences now, or throughout our history when we dealt with 

narcotic interdiction. With the increase in the fentanyl and the 

other synthetic opioids, we have now deployed naloxone, more commonly known as Narcan, throughout our ports of entry, so it is 

readily available for all of our officers, as well as for members of 

the traveling public should they be coming in through an airport 

or a seaport and have an incident with any narcotics. 

So we have deployed that. We have special equipment at our 

mail facilities, our express courier facilities, to allow us to safely inspect the packages. So I think as an agency, we have put a lot of 

emphasis on personal protective equipment and safe protocols to 

handle the fentanyl. 

Mr. CINTRON. As it relates to Postal Service employees, over 

600,000 employees in the organization, as it relates to keeping 

them safe, we do suspicious package training. So our focus really 

is not just on fentanyl but any suspicious package that they could 

come into contact with that would be at any one of our processing 

facilities, the ISCs, or delivery units. We have specific protocols for 

how they would handle those suspicious packages. 

As it relates very specifically at the ISCs, we have handling procedures. Again, the pilot program has very specific ways for us to 

isolate through automation that volume and keep, so we can isolate 

and then present to CBP upon request. We do a lot of standard 

work instruction. We do a lot of visual aids that are utilized by the 

employees so it is very visible in terms of what suspicious packages 

and the protocols are. 

The last thing that we do, we have deployed Narcan to the inspection service, and in the next several months we will be deploying that to the largest postal facilities, the largest post offices 

around the country, and that will be happening in the next few 

months. 

Chairman REICHERT. The last part of that question had to do 

with electronic data, having more access to that, having accurate 

data. I am sure you get some intel on some packages coming 

through and you are able to be proactive. So how would advance 

electronic data help keep the employees and your canine units 

safer? 

26 

Mr. OWEN. Absolutely. When you look at the volume that we 

are receiving today, every day, 1.7 million parcels come into the 

country through the mail and through the express courier facilities, 

1.7 million a day. 

When I last testified before Congress on this subject in January, 

it was at 1.4 million. So in the course of 31⁄2 months, we have increased by roughly 35 percent of the overall volume. The manual 

inspection of volumes like that is not efficient and not effective. We 

need advance electronic information so we can use our targeting 

system to identify those shipments that pose a greater risk, and 

then initiate the proper inspection protocols, whether it is to safely 

isolate that package, open it in these specialized boxes that we 

have with special ventilation systems and things of that nature. 

So without advance electronic data, we will simply not be effective in identifying the high-risk shipments when we are dealing 

with such growing volumes through e-commerce. 

Chairman REICHERT. So the quality of your data would increase if you had some of the technology that you just mentioned. 

The Senate Subcommittee on Homeland Security, as you know, did 

a study, and the Subcommittee found that the quality of the advance electronic data that the Postal Service receives from foreign 

postal operators is very low. The report found that at times basic 

information like the sender names and addresses were not provided, or the data was a long line of illogical letters and characters. 

Can either of you speak to the quality of the data? 

Mr. OWEN. When we started the pilot with China post, the quality of the data in some circumstances was not what we expected 

it to be. It was not very effective for targeting. But now that we 

have been active for about 18 months, we have seen the quality improve as well as the timeliness of the data improve. So as with any 

process, as it matures, we are getting stronger, the data quality is 

getting better, it is presented more timely to CBP, we are able to 

effectively target the shipment before it arrives and place it on hold 

giving the Postal Service the opportunity to stop it and present it 

to us for inspection. So the process is improving. 

Chairman REICHERT. Mr. Cintron. 

Mr. CINTRON. I think the quality, I look at it from two perspectives, one of them is around being able to get the data. So one 

thing that we do every day we are monitoring every day that the 

data we expect to get we are actually receiving. We work very 

closely with the foreign postal operators on that exchange. 

The second piece is we use our internal advanced analytics group 

at Postal Service, who have been taking the data sets and have 

been looking at them. There are certain fields that we expect, A, 

are they getting filled out? Are the fields actually populated? That 

is number one. 

Two, what we are starting to spend some time on is the quality 

of what is in the field itself, and I think collaboratively, that is the 

kind of stuff that we can do across the agencies to really improve. 

The last part I might add to that is we use this AED not only 

from the pilots at the ISC itself, but we have expanded this to 

downflow facilities away from the ISCs, so using that electronic information, if we capture a piece downstream, we are able to actually capture it and present it back to CBP. And in the summer of 

27 

this year, we will also have the ability to capture that at a delivery 

unit. So if, for some reason, it gets further downstream, we will 

have that ability very soon to be able to capture it and then bring 

it back to CBP. 

Chairman REICHERT. I appreciate your answers and some of 

the specifics there. I would ask that maybe you could supply some 

additional specifics in a written answer to this question as far as 

specific steps that your agencies are taking to ensure that you are 

receiving good and actionable data from foreign postal operators. 

So if you can provide that in writing. 

Now I recognize Mr. Pascrell for his questions. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you, 

Todd and Robert, for being with us here today. Your testimony is 

invaluable. 

The focus on efforts to improve the detection of synthetic opioids 

in our international mail system and prevent them from entering 

the United States is a big task. I understand that. My first question goes right to the country that accounts for a very high percentage of all packages entering the United States, and China is the 

primary source of fentanyl to our folks. 

So this is a question for both of you. 

What is the status of efforts on coordinating our efforts with 

China? Number one. 

And what stands in the way of that? 

And the second question is how close are we to collecting advance 

electronic data on all shipments from China? All shipments? 

Those are two questions. Who wants to go first? 

Mr. CINTRON. I think in terms of our ability to collect the advance electronic data from China, we get a substantial amount of 

it today. One stream of product that comes in out of China is what 

we consider this untracked volume. There is a lot of effort underway right now to get AED on that. The first step is getting barcode 

information on those packages, and we are seeing a significant 

amount of that today. 

The focus for us is by the time we hit December of this year, we 

will have a significant portion of the mail from China that will 

have advance electronic data. We are projecting that the overall 

number for the organization is going to bring the United States up 

to about 70 percent total of AED collected. And a big portion of this 

will come from that one large effort, not to mention—— 

Mr. PASCRELL. How is it shipped? Is it by cover? Is it actually 

right out in the open? The majority of the material that is shipped 

into this country that winds up in American homes. How is it 

shipped? 

Mr. OWEN. The parcels themselves or the fentanyl? 

Mr. PASCRELL. The parcel itself. 

Mr. OWEN. Just a package. 

Mr. CINTRON. It is generally packages that are coming in. So 

cargo planes are bringing product in from China into the ports here 

in the United States. 

Mr. PASCRELL. How are they marked? 

Mr. CINTRON. They are enclosed in sacks. So the way that 

these come in, we have large sacks of mail that contain a significant number of pieces in them. 

28 

For our, the way that we leverage the AED data, we are actually 

scanning that sack. And in that sack there is information nested 

about what is sitting in that sack. The taxer tells us that there is 

a piece in there that potentially we are looking for, and we extract 

that sack out of the mail itself or out of the flow of the mail, and 

then we extract the pieces. But there are, again, several hundred 

pieces nested inside of a sack. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Drugs from all countries come into the United 

States of America. Most of the drugs that come into this country, 

prescription drugs, are legal, and they are marked as such. Is that 

correct? Or am I incorrect? 

Mr. OWEN. Most of the prescription drugs coming in from overseas, they need to be cautious as to what they are purchasing from 

overseas suppliers. 

Mr. PASCRELL. We have to have enough resources and manpower to go through this mail and be able to take out what is being 

shipped into this country to go on the streets basically, most of it? 

Mr. OWEN. No, sir. The volumes are just too overwhelming. In 

the case of fentanyl, again, the average seizure is 700 grams. It is 

just a small baggie that you can hide inside a book, inside anything 

at all. It is very, very difficult. We will send those packages 

through x-ray systems to try to identify the anomalies. We have 

the canines that run them. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So your point, then, is that basically this is hidden, most of it that comes into this country that is illicit is hidden. 

Mr. OWEN. Inside some other commodities. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So how do you find it if it is hidden? 

Mr. OWEN. Again, it is very difficult. We use the x-ray systems, 

the canines, and intuition of the officers. But really, it comes, 

again, back to the advance electronic data, knowing the parties 

that are sending it, the parties that are receiving it, different rules 

sets that we have in our targeting that will help us to go through 

those mass quantities of mail to say this is a shipment that poses 

a greater likelihood of being problematic, and it is something that 

we need to pull aside and look at. 

The manual process of dumping all of these huge sacks onto conveyor belts, pushing them through x-rays and perhaps having the 

canines run them, opening what you can, the volumes are just too 

overwhelming to be effective. 

Chairman REICHERT. Mr. Rice. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here to testify today. 

Mr. Owen, you mentioned that we are up to 20 countries that are 

providing advance electronic data? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir, 28. 

Mr. RICE. Twenty-eight. What is advance electronic data? What 

is that? 

Mr. OWEN. Advance electronic data is a data set, if you will, of 

certain data elements that the foreign post will capture, will transmit to the U.S. Postal Service, who will then forward it to us. 

Mr. RICE. So in other words they are looking for suspicious characters that are mailing packages? 

Mr. OWEN. The individuals who are sending it, receiving it, the 

descriptions, the weights, the quantities. 

29 

Mr. RICE. So there is some kind of a database of that that we 

are sharing back and forth? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, that advance information is run through our 

law enforcement, our trade databases to identify those shipments 

that are outside of what is normal. Of course, the targeting efforts 

are focused on previous violators, things of concern that we won’t 

get into here, but it is a very rich targeting environment in the 

mail, and we are pretty good at picking out things that are problematic. 

Mr. RICE. You are saying there are so many parcels and it is so 

small, it is so easy to hide, that, really, it is almost—you could add 

as many people as you wanted to and as many x-ray machines as 

you wanted to, and it will still come through. Is that what you are 

saying? 

Mr. OWEN. I am saying that is why we need the advance electronic data to be very effective, because opening 1.7 million packages a day is just not possible. So we need to identify that smaller 

subset that is a higher risk, because the targeting systems have 

said, for whatever reason, this one needs to be pulled aside, that 

is the only way we can be effective in this space. 

Mr. RICE. So we are hearing that 90 percent of the fentanyl is 

coming from China. Is that correct? Isn’t that what you said? 

Mr. OWEN. The fentanyl that is coming from China is 90 percent pure. 

Mr. RICE. I am sorry. Excuse me. Do you know what percentage 

of the fentanyl that is killing people in the United States is coming 

from China? Do we know that? 

Mr. OWEN. I do not know that. 

Mr. RICE. So is fentanyl the only drug that is coming in through 

the mail, the only opioid? 

Mr. OWEN. No. There is various analogues, different types of 

synthetic opioids that are coming through the mail, cocaine, heroin, 

meth, all the traditional narcotics. 

Mr. RICE. Is most of it coming from China? Do we know that? 

Mr. OWEN. Most of the fentanyl? 

Mr. RICE. Most of the opioids coming through the mail. 

Mr. OWEN. A good deal coming through, the opioids coming 

through, I believe, I would say are coming from China, yes. 

Mr. RICE. What about Mexico? 

Mr. OWEN. From Mexico, you are primarily seeing your meth 

and your cocaine. 

Mr. RICE. And do we have the same level of scrutiny for packages coming in from Mexico and Central America and South America? 

Mr. OWEN. We do. The narcotics that are coming in from the 

Mexican border are primarily coming across the land border in passenger vehicles through our ports of entry. 

Mr. RICE. Not necessarily through the Postal Service? 

Mr. OWEN. Not necessarily through the mail, yes. 

Mr. RICE. Gotcha. Looking at the, when you consider diseases 

and maladies of humans, and you look at the graphs of how they 

affect people and our life expectancy, most every malady that we 

incur, they are either starting to trend level or down. We are getVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:13 Apr 18, 2019 Jkt 033866 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\33866.XXX 33866
30 

ting a handle on a lot of these things, and certainly we have a long 

way to go with a lot of things, but we are getting better. 

But with opioids, the trend is startling. It is not that it is getting 

better, it is actually getting much, much worse. It has passed traffic deaths in South Carolina. Over 100 people in my home county, 

Horry County, were killed last year. We have to do a much better 

job of dealing with that. 

Do you have any idea about what percentages come through the 

Postal Service versus other methods, across our southern border? 

Mr. OWEN. Speaking for the fentanyl, we actually have more 

seizures in mail, but smaller quantities than what we have in the 

express courier environments. So in the express courier environments, fewer seizures, but more quantities, so larger shipments. 

You compare that to what is coming across the Mexican border, 

much larger quantities of fentanyl, but it is mixed in with other 

hard narcotics, and the fentanyl coming in through Mexico because 

it is mixed with other things is less than 10 percent pure. So, really, the greater concern is the small packet coming directly from 

China that is 90 percent pure. 

Mr. RICE. Do you think that we would make a bigger dent by 

focusing more on the small packages coming through the Post Office, or through the large couriers coming across the southern border? 

Mr. OWEN. I think we need to focus both on the Postal Service 

and the express courier companies that are bringing through their 

hubs into the United States, too. I think if we focus too many resources on one, the shift—the drug traffickers will just shift into 

that other avenue into the country. So I think our strategy has to 

focus on the international mail. It also has to continue to focus on 

the express courier environments, as well as interdiction along the 

southwest border for the hard narcotics that are coming in through 

the ports of entry. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman REICHERT. Mr. Levin. 

Mr. LEVIN. Hello. Thank you so much for coming and for holding this hearing. 

It is hard to know, but just based on what you find, do you have 

any estimate as to how much fentanyl is being sent into this country through the Postal Service? Do you have any guess? 

Mr. OWEN. No, sir. 

Mr. LEVIN. What percentage—this was asked more or less. Is 

most of it coming from China? 

Mr. OWEN. In terms of the purity and the most dangerous, it 

is the fentanyl coming directly from China, and the fentanyl coming in from Mexico is much less pure, mixed in with other hard 

narcotics. 

Mr. LEVIN. Do you know where—from where in China it is coming? 

Mr. OWEN. It is coming from throughout the country, yes. 

Mr. LEVIN. You can’t tell anything about where it is produced? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, with the electronic information, we are able to 

identify who the shippers were. Of those seizures working Customs 

to Customs, between U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the 

general administration of China Customs, we are able to exchange 

31 

information as to those types of seizures, and then the bigger investigations, the State Department and DEA are involved with 

those types of things. 

Mr. LEVIN. So you know the shippers, at least in some cases. 

And then what kind of communication or action comes from the 

United States as to those shippers? Do you know? 

Mr. OWEN. That is what filters into our automated targeting 

systems. So when we have a seizure, and we identify the parties 

that were involved with those seizures, we will set up the rules to 

target additional shipments that may be going between those parties to those addresses, all of those types of selector information. 

Mr. LEVIN. Is any action attempted with the Chinese against 

the sources of fentanyl? 

Mr. OWEN. That would be a question that we would have to 

speak with the State Department about. It is not something that 

CBP is engaged with. We are, again, engaged with that Customs 

to Customs relationship but not as to the bigger getting to the supply, the source of the fentanyl. 

Mr. LEVIN. Do you know, sir? 

Mr. CINTRON. I would not know. 

Mr. LEVIN. Do the shipments go—they are small amounts—to 

individuals, do you think? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. They are definitely going to individuals. Individuals will go on the dark web or even the regular web, and will 

purchase the fentanyl. The fentanyl will be shipped. It will either 

be mis-described as some other type of medicine, or it will, again, 

be smuggled in everything you could think of, inside books, inside 

pens, inside figurines, whatever the case may be. And again, the 

average size seizure we are seeing is 700 grams. It is very easy to 

hide 700 grams in anything. 

So when we do identify a shipment and identify it as fentanyl, 

we will work with our criminal investigators, with Homeland Security investigation, as well as the State and local task forces to do 

what we call a controlled delivery to allow the merchandise to 

move to the recipient so that additional arrests can be made. 

Mr. LEVIN. So you think, in many cases, action is taken against 

the recipients? 

Mr. OWEN. I think there needs to be consequences against the 

recipient. I think part of the challenge that we have had is to be 

able to timely identify what those white, unknown powders are. 

The equipment that we have purchased with the assistance of Congress in the last 2 years allows us to quickly identify what that 

merchandise is, and what that commodity is. 

If you have ordered your illegal narcotics and you are waiting 

and it has now been several months that it hasn’t shown up, and 

then it shows up, you are not going to take receipt of those goods. 

So the investigative component needs to occur timely after an 

interdiction. That is where the testing equipment allows us to get 

that presumptive determination as to what that unknown substance is so that the criminal investigators can then move forward 

and try to initiate arrests on that commodity. 

Mr. LEVIN. So we are now taking actions to try to determine the 

source? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. 

32 

Mr. LEVIN. And to try to determine the amount and to be able 

to take action against people who ordered? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, working, again, with the investigative partners 

to various task forces that have been set up all across the country. 

When we will interdict at the mail facility, it is our goal to work 

with them to conduct, again, a delivery and make an arrest on the 

individuals that have ordered those products. There must be consequences behind bringing this in, because if we just interdicted 

today, they can go back online tomorrow and try again. 

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman REICHERT. Thank you. 

Mr. Marchant. 

Mr. MARCHANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks for being here today, Mr. Owen. Are you familiar with 

the Senate Subcommittee of Investigations report on drug trafficking that was released in January? 

Mr. OWEN. I am not sure which one that was, sir. 

Mr. MARCHANT. It came out January of this year. 

Mr. OWEN. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations? 

Mr. MARCHANT. The Senate Subcommittee of Investigations. 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. The one that talked about a lot of the online 

purchases? Yes. 

Mr. MARCHANT. That is the one that we have been studying. 

Their study found that 318 million packages, international packages, and most of them from China, entered the United States with 

no advance data on the shipper, recipient, or the contents of the 

package which were used by your agency to target packages that 

contained fentanyl. 

Mr. Cintron, the Postal Regulatory Commission’s annual compliance determination report disclosed that of those 318 million packages, there was basically a $170 million loss by the Post Office last 

year alone. 

So we have written a letter to Mr. Mnuchin asking him to look 

into this matter, and to ask him why we continue to cooperate with 

the postal agreement that basically binds us to these lower cost 

packages. So the way we have begun to look at it, is if many of 

these packages contain illicit drugs, if most of these packages contain something we really don’t want shipped into the United 

States, why in the world are the United States citizens, people that 

buy stamps, people that use the Post Office, why in the world 

would we be subsidizing the very sending of those packages to the 

United States? 

Mr. CINTRON. Yes, I will try to answer that. I am not a subject 

matter expert on all of the rates, how they apply. I am familiar 

with the report. I would say it identifies one stream of mail coming 

into the country. We would be looking at international with all of 

the pieces that are involved with it. There have been changes that 

I am aware of that change some of that cost coverage for the pieces 

coming in in that mail stream. 

Going forward, I can tell you that, getting back to the AED, why 

it is so important, as you mentioned some of this without the AED, 

I will say that with China, we are seeing a substantial amount of 

additional AED coming in, and that has really been our focus. As 

we have said, we have been focused on top countries, getting the 

33 

AED from them. We have signed five bilateral agreements. One of 

those is with China, express mail is an example. It is mandatory 

for them to have AED, and these bilateral mandate that as well. 

Mr. MARCHANT. All of that is really good work. But at the base 

of all this is an almost competitive advantage given to China, almost an inducement for them to ship these by a smaller package, 

a package that is very specifically subsidized through this international agreement that we are really not even a party to anymore. 

We observe it, and we respect the rates. But in many cases, it is 

more expensive to send something inside the United States to Dallas than it is to send it from China to Dallas. 

I just have to say, I don’t think—I think that, first of all, the 

Postal Service, the postal inspection service, could use the extra 

revenue generated just to screen these packages, and it would certainly reduce the number of packages if they were paying a significantly higher price to ship them in here. It just doesn’t seem—so 

I have introduced H.R. 5524 that basically is called the Post Act. 

It basically terminates the subsidy. I believe that if the Postal 

Service wanted to use that extra money to bring about the services, 

employ the people to interdict this stuff, that would be a decision 

of Congress. But certainly, it would be something that the United 

States citizens would feel a whole lot better about than if they 

knew that these millions of packages were coming in from China, 

and I would say a great deal of them have these drugs in them, 

and they are contributing to the opioid problem, not trying to solve 

it. Thank you very much. 

Chairman REICHERT. Mr. Kind. 

Mr. KIND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this very important meeting. I want to thank the witnesses for 

your testimony here today. 

I represent a very large, rural western Wisconsin district. The 

opioid epidemic is sweeping through my district as it is in my State 

and most parts of the country right now. Most of us truly believe 

it is an all-hands-on-deck moment. Now more than ever, we are 

going to need incredibly strong partnerships at the Federal, State, 

and local level to try to get out ahead of that. I have been holding 

a lot of opioid meetings and forums in my district, too, getting feedback with people on the ground, from law enforcement to 

healthcare providers to addiction clinics. They all conclude that unless we address the demand aspect, the addictive qualities, and try 

to get out ahead of that, there is not enough we can do as far as 

the enforcement or the interdiction part. But it doesn’t mean we 

shouldn’t try. 

As a former prosecutor, I had to live in the drug world for a 

while, and I know how nefarious it can be. But the challenge at the 

borders is certainly gigantic. If we can help you with more tools 

and how to better intercept and how to identify, you need to let us 

know. 

AED is something that we required back in ’02 with the private 

careers, when it went into effect, but Mr. Cintron, at that time, 

USPS was exempted. I think one of the reasons was some of the 

international obligations that existed. 

34 

Do any of those still exist today that might make universal AED 

difficult to achieve, or might get us in trouble with some other 

countries? 

Mr. CINTRON. I think that is probably the big difference, right? 

Through the UPU for the United States, we are the postal designated provider to deliver the mail for over 192 countries. So we 

don’t get to choose, unlike the private industry, where they can. 

Private carriers can choose where they are going to do business, we 

are pretty much under the treaty obligations required to deliver for 

the 192 countries. 

Mr. KIND. And it has to be uniform with all of them? Is that the 

problem? The requirements, the standards have to be uniform for 

all 191 countries? 

Mr. CINTRON. Yeah. Look, our focus has really been, as I said 

earlier, we are trying to focus on the top 20 countries that represent 90 percent of the volume, so there is different capacity levels 

for each one of these countries. While it is a deterrent and you 

can’t keep them all the same, there is a lot of work with every one 

of these countries to try to figure out how to get the AED. 

The focus primarily, again, let’s focus on where we have the big 

pile of the volume. Like I said, 20 countries represent 90 percent 

of that volume. 

Mr. KIND. So is it an issue of capacity building for some of these 

other nations? 

Mr. CINTRON. Yes. If you read some of the reports, look, in 

some cases, we have countries and places inside of countries who 

don’t have power, don’t have internet, don’t have technical capability. There are privacy issues that could be an issue in some 

countries. So it is a big issue all the way around. 

Mr. KIND. Let me ask you both, GAO went in and did a 2017 

assessment as far as the pilot AED program and how it is going, 

and it came forward with some recommendations. One is some 

measurable performance standards. Where are we in all of that? 

Mr. OWEN. We concurred with all of those. We clearly agree 

that we should measure the effectiveness of AED, but the manual 

way to screen the mail is just not going to be effective. So far at 

JFK Airport, we made 189 fentanyl seizures, 125 of those have 

been based on targeting through the AED. So while we are working 

on those performance measures, we are seeing the effects and positive results every single day of why we need that advance electronic data. 

Mr. KIND. Mr. Cintron, anything to add as far as GAO recommendations? 

Mr. CINTRON. I would say, we have been working very closely 

together between both agencies. The focus for us is twofold. Get 

AED, work with the foreign post to get the data. The second real 

big piece is for us to present to CBP everything they are asking for. 

So, we are well over 80 percent today on the presentation. We have 

seen some pretty large numbers since we have started this project. 

All five ISCs are up. 

As I mentioned earlier, one of the key focuses for us is to make 

sure that nothing gets beyond the ISCs. As you mentioned, a lot 

of volume comes in, a very small percentage could leave the ISC, 

which is why we have expanded our capabilities through automaVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:13 Apr 18, 2019 Jkt 033866 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\33866.XXX 33866
35 

tion to be able to capture a piece downstream. And as I mentioned 

in the summer of this year, we will also be able to now capture an 

added delivery unit. So before it even gets to the stream we will 

have that capability. 

Mr. KIND. Mr. Cintron, with what little time I have remaining, 

obviously there are a lot of delegations, a lot of trade missions, a 

lot of trade discussions going on between the United States and 

China right now. Do you feel as if this issue, in particular, is being 

elevated high enough in those discussions with Chinese officials? 

Do they need to be doing more to crack down? 

Mr. CINTRON. I believe so, but I am not the expert on those negotiations. I know from the Customs to Customs relationship, we 

have had these discussions. Those higher level treaty discussions, 

sir, I can’t speak to that. 

Mr. KIND. Thank you both for being here. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman REICHERT. Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for 

being here. Some of the information we had beforehand, I was looking at it, and I think there was an article in The Wall Street Journal, and just you being here really helps us, because I don’t think 

a lot of people understand just how difficult it is to do what we are 

asking you to do, especially with the manpower you have and the 

volume and the capacity that you are trying to handle. 

My question comes back, and I think Mr. Kind was talking about 

it, but the UPU, the Universal Postal Union, I am reading this 

from this article, was founded in 1874, and it is now a United Nations agency. It sets intercountry rates for mail delivery. It would 

just seem to me that something that was founded in 1874, if we 

are still working under the parameters of that, there are probably 

some other considerations we should be looking at. 

There is not one person sitting up here either on this panel, or 

out in the room, that doesn’t have a great concern with this opioid 

crisis and fentanyl and we are saying we know where it comes 

from. Listen, the Chinese use our mail system because it is a cheap 

way to deliver, and they also get a big break on that because of 

the UPU. That is my understanding. 

So you being on the front line, you are the ones that are the people we go to and say, what would you do different? We know what 

the problem is. We know why we have a problem. 

Then the question is, so how do we fix it? 

I am just amazed that we have an agreement in 1874, and we 

are still running with that as the parameters of the way we should 

run this whole outline? 

I think Mr. Pascrell hit on this, too. What can we do to help you 

help us? 

This is kind of a Jerry Maguire moment. Help me to help you. 

So what would we do? From a congressional standpoint, what will 

we do? 

I hear people keep talking about look, we have this fentanyl 

problem, we have this drug problem, we have this overdose problem. I hear all that. Then we are talking about we know where the 

source of it is. And the idea of the AED, it is kind of an honor system. We are kind of believing what we see on the label, and then 

36 

for some reason, other ways of shipping don’t have to follow the 

same regulations. They go from original entry to destination, so 

they have more control. 

But what would you suggest to us today? If you can’t do it right 

now, put it in writing. What could we do from a congressional 

standpoint to help you? 

Mr. OWEN. Thank you for the funding that we received in the 

fiscal year 18 budget. The money that was allocated to CBP to enhance our technology capabilities at our ports of entry, including 

the mail facilities, was definitely a positive. The additional 328 officers that were accounted for in the budget will definitely help staff 

up some of the mail securities at the express courier facilities, as 

well as our seaports and some of our airports as well. So the funding that Congress has provided has been very appreciated. Thank 

you. 

Mr. KELLY. What else can we do, because I heard we can use 

different methods of technology, we have dogs that can smell this 

stuff out. 

Apparently, just the volume alone creates a situation where we 

can’t look at enough of these packages. If we know where it is coming from and we know who the biggest user of this postal system 

is, my question is, there is an old saying, you shoot yourself in the 

foot and then wonder why you are limping. If we know this, why 

do we keep following the same path and saying you know what? 

We know they are doing it. We just don’t know how to handle it. 

I just am trying to understand, you are their front line. I understand about the money. I get the thing about the money, because 

we throw money at every problem we can, and if we don’t get the 

right result, then we just throw more money at it. 

What are we not doing with the money that we are already allocating? How can we get better use out of what the taxpayers put 

into this? 

Mr. OWEN. The growth of e-commerce has just been overwhelming. When you look at what is coming out of China, the volumes are significant. We have been working with the technology 

folks at the Department of Homeland Security. 

When we can get to a piece of equipment that can tell us what 

is inside that package without us having to open the package, that 

really is a game changer for us. 

So the technology folks that are working toward this I think are 

close to having a solution with the different types of algorithms 

and the way the different systems can work because that can really 

be a game changer in this space. 

Mr. KELLY. One of the things I was reading, one example, one 

Pennsylvania address was used to send more than 120 packages 

tied to payment to an online seller during a 2-month period in 

early 2017 alone. So when you are looking at these numbers, and 

you are doing the analytics on them, there has to be something 

that red flags or pops that up, there is something that just doesn’t 

make sense here. 

Mr. OWEN. Right. With the post seizure analyses that we do and 

with the information that is provided back to us from the local law 

enforcement, the task forces that we sit on, we take that information and we put it into our targeting system. So shipments that are 

37 

destined for those areas of interest will be flagged and inspected 

the next time they come in. 

Mr. KELLY. So with innovation and technology, we will be able 

to have a better feel for this. But I do say, if we already know who 

the bigger users of this way of getting cheap mail delivered to us 

are, that should send out a real warning signal. I appreciate what 

you are doing. Just let us know, and if there is something you are 

seeing that we are not seeing, let us know how it is we can help 

you, because this affects every single American at every single 

level. So thank you so much for what you do. 

Chairman REICHERT. Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I certainly agree 

that every single American and every tight community or neighborhood is affected. I happen to represent a large, low-income population group in a big urban area, and, of course, we are simply 

frightened to death. 

I am wondering, since we know that China, whether intentionally, unintentionally, or however it happens, is a major concern 

in terms of the quantity that comes in, how cooperative would we 

say that China has been relative to trying to not only get a better 

handle on the situation, but also to reduce and stop the transmission? 

Mr. CINTRON. I will try to answer from the perspective of AED. 

As we have been talking about today, the importance of the AED 

is, for us, to be able to do the type of analysis to really be able to 

identify particular addresses or places where we know we may 

have an issue. I would say as it relates to AED, because I can 

speak to that part, they have been very cooperative. 

As I said, one of the key structures we are going after right now 

is that untracked volume of mail that is coming through the country that has no tracking at all. We are very, very much along the 

way with them of getting—the initial steps of getting them 

barcoded, and we expect by the end of the year, a substantial 

amount of their mail, that untracked volume will absolutely have 

AED, and that will help us with the analysis that we are doing. 

Mr. DAVIS. So when you just mentioned, or talked about the 

technology, and we know that technological advances are occurring 

significantly in our country, I was thinking that I just opened at 

the University of Illinois about 3 weeks ago, their robotics competition, where hundreds of high school kids were coming in to practice. 

Are we hearing anything from our technical people relative to 

needs they may have that may not be being met sufficiently to do 

the kind of work and the experimentation that they are doing and 

attempting to do? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, I know the science and technology director 

within DHS is looking at this challenge that we have and how we 

can design technology that can help us to see what is inside the 

containers—or, I am sorry, what is within the parcels. We are also 

working with TSA on some of the equipment that they currently 

have that helps to identify explosives within suitcases and things, 

and how can that be further developed to look for the synthetic 

substances and such that are inside of parcels. 

38 

So there is a great deal of work that is being done in this area 

between science and technology directorate, and with some of the 

existing technology that is geared toward explosives that could be 

modified to focus on the opioids. 

Mr. DAVIS. And, finally, what I asked, Mr. Cintron, do you think 

that some of the other countries, even though we are not getting 

as much action from them, that they may be doing a better job 

than the areas where we are getting the most, China, and the 

other two or three countries? 

Mr. CINTRON. Yeah. Well, like I said, our focus has been on the 

top 20, not that we don’t focus on the rest, but the top 20 generate 

90 percent of the volume coming into the country, so a lot of work 

is being done with that group. As I said, five bilaterals were just 

signed over the past year that mandate AED, and that group probably represents close to 80 percent of the volume. 

So there is a lot of work. It is based really on capacity of the 

country in terms of our ability to get it, but there is cooperation 

with many different countries. So I think it varies from country to 

country and their abilities. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you both. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 

holding this hearing, and I yield back. 

Chairman REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Mr. Reed. 

Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our 

panelists today for the work that you are doing and for coming and 

having a conversation with us about how maybe we can assist you 

to address this critical issue that is impacting so many lives across 

the country, and in particular, in western New York and our district of the 23rd. 

One of the things that I am a big advocate for is making sure 

as we deal with data, as we get into the data question, that one 

of the things I learned when I first got here in 2010 is often the 

bureaucracies of Washington, D.C. have an inability to make sure 

that all of the data is standardized, so that there is seamless transition between the different agencies, be it the IRS into other agencies, et cetera. 

So the premise of my question is, how are you getting the data? 

And is the data that you are receiving standardized across your organization so that there is no loss of information from that data exchange that is occurring either between your two organizations or, 

I would assume, in your efforts in coordination with law enforcement, such as the FBI, and other resources that are out there? 

Mr. CINTRON. I will start and then I will turn it over to Todd. 

Yeah, I mean, it is standardized in terms of how the electronic data 

comes into the country, so we do have standard formats. We do, 

when we onboard anyone, you heard us talk about the 60 data 

sharing agreements that we have had, that is kind of like the starting pieces of getting people to start exchanging the data. We then 

get into testing where they are actually—— 

Mr. REED. So, Mr. Cintron, when you get that data, when you 

enter that data, is that data accessible by the FBI? Is that data accessible by Customs? Do they have the capability in their departments to read your data, pick up your data, and coordinate with 

you on coordinated efforts to address this issue? 

39 

Mr. CINTRON. So, 96 times a day I pass the data on to Customs 

Border Protection. 

Mr. REED. And there is no technical barriers to your receiving 

that data and interpreting that data? 

Mr. OWEN. No. 

Mr. REED. Okay. That is good to hear. Now, going outside the 

government and our interactions with the express carriers, and this 

may have been covered, so bear with me. But when you are interacting with carriers like FedEx, UPS, DHL, those carriers, is there 

a data problem between your organizations and their organizations 

as to making sure that information is—— 

Mr. OWEN. They provide the data directly to U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection and there are no issues. 

Mr. REED. So you can read their data and they can read your 

data? 

Mr. OWEN. Yeah, since the Trade Act of 2002, they have been 

providing the data to us. In the beginning, there were issues similar to what we are seeing now with the postal service in terms of 

being able to have all the data that we are looking for, the timely 

submission of the data, the accuracy of the data, the completeness. 

That has improved, and now the express couriers really are the 

model of where we need to go with the postal service. 

So I think with time, as this process matures, I think with the 

right focus, the right level of attention, the right funding stream, 

that this can be a model, much like the express couriers are. 

Mr. REED. Excellent. So what is the difference between the express carriers’ data and your data, or the postal carrier data, if 

there is a difference, that we are trying to aspire to what the express carriers are doing? 

Mr. OWEN. The data elements are the same. 

Mr. REED. What are they doing that you are not doing? 

Mr. OWEN. They control their supply chain from start to finish. 

So as they receive the goods at the source of origin, they immediately bring that data in through their process and transmit it to 

us. On the postal side, the foreign postal carrier collects that data 

and then transmits it to the U.S. Postal Service, who transmits it 

to us. 

Mr. REED. Okay. So that is what we have to try to streamline 

and improve upon, is what you are indicating? Okay. What do you 

do with the data when you get it? Are you deploying analytics? Are 

you deploying data mining on it? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. 

Mr. REED. Do you have cutting edge technology in order to—— 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, we have our advanced targeting system, we 

have our national targeting center out in Northern Virginia. We 

have everything you talked about down to a counter network division that will identify the networks that are behind different shipments and things of that nature. So we have a very robust targeting system that will use not only our past enforcement results, 

but inputs from the intelligence community, all sorts of different 

intelligence items, and further streamline those targeting capabilities so that when we have those 1.7 million parcels coming in a 

day, we can identify those that need to be held and inspected beVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:13 Apr 18, 2019 Jkt 033866 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\33866.XXX 33866
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cause they have a higher risk for whatever trigger our targeting 

systems said is the concern here. 

Mr. REED. Well, that is good to hear. Is the analytics and the 

technology the private sector is using in FedEx, UPS, the express 

carriers, is that at a similar capability or is that better or worse? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, they collect the data and transmit it to us and 

we run the targeting—— 

Mr. REED. Oh, they are not running analytics? 

Mr. OWEN. No. Not in terms of border security and our enforcement mission, that is all done by CBP. So it is their data that they 

transmit to us, and we run it through the same system as the data 

that the postal service is providing to us. 

Mr. REED. That is interesting. So are the express carriers running any analytical triggers that they are sharing with you up 

front, or are they just giving you the data and relying on you to 

run the analytic? 

Mr. OWEN. We have very strong working relationships with express carriers. I think I will just leave it at that. 

Mr. REED. Okay. I appreciate it. We don’t want to let the bad 

guys know what we are up to. Keep up the good work and anything 

you need from us—we want to be of assistance. So with that, I 

yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman REICHERT. Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, fentanyl is 

50 times more potent than heroin, and it is often used to enhance 

the potency of heroin. According to the Centers for Disease Control, 

116 people a day die from opioids. This is obviously a national epidemic. 

And what you are saying is huge volumes of fentanyl is moved 

into the United States and Canada in the aggregate, yet, that volume defies detection as it is moved in very small increments because of its potency? 

Mr. OWEN. The overall volume of trade coming in from China 

is overwhelming. Hidden within that overall volume are small shipments of fentanyl. 

Mr. HIGGINS. And that is what defies detection? 

Mr. OWEN. It is very difficult. 

Mr. HIGGINS. And what are your tools of detection now; let’s 

say, at the airport? You had made reference to it in previous discussions, but I am just curious what you have now and what is 

being developed to enhance those efforts? 

Mr. OWEN. The targeting, of course, begins with the advanced 

electronic data. So having that data as to who is shipping it to 

whom, and other data elements that help our targeting system to 

identify those shipments that are of concern. We also have the 

standard x-ray systems that have a role in this. We are looking to 

advance the technology, as we have talked about. All of our narcotics detection K–9s at the mail facilities, the express facilities at 

the airports have been trained to detect fentanyl, so that is an addition. We have also increased our officers at the mail facilities by 

20 percent. 

So combined, I think we are having a much greater impact on 

the seizure rates, but again, the volume is very significant that is 

coming in. 

41 

Mr. HIGGINS. So you are confident that that technology is evolving, the detection technology to the point where even the smallest 

trace of fentanyl in a suitcase, which is further disguised in a book 

or something, will be detectable within—— 

Mr. OWEN. That is where we hope the technology manufacturers 

can get us to, yes. 

Mr. HIGGINS. When do those manufacturers estimate that that 

technology will be—— 

Mr. OWEN. That I don’t have. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Interesting. Let me ask you this: I represent Buffalo, the Peace Bridge connects Buffalo to southern Ontario. Southern Ontario is a third of the entire population of Canada. Would 

we have a situation whereby—would it be easier for China to mail 

order fentanyl into Canada and then have it driven into the United 

States through places like Buffalo? 

Mr. OWEN. I don’t think it would be easier. I know that Canada 

Border Services Agency, CBSA, also has the same challenges in 

their mail facilities. They are also seizing fentanyl directly from 

China. So it is going directly into Canada, it is going directly into 

the United States. I don’t think there is a reason it would have to 

go into Canada to be moved across—— 

Mr. HIGGINS. Customs and Border Protection coordinates well 

with their Canadian counterpart? 

Mr. OWEN. We have an excellent relationship with CBSA. We 

have their targeters with us in Northern Virginia and we with 

them up in Toronto. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Good. So, you know, the President has indicated 

a strong commitment to help fund, I think on the demand side, this 

national crisis, and he also has indicated that in discussions with 

China, greater efforts will be made to get the Chinese government 

to crack down on these efforts of some hundred thousand pharmaceutical companies in China. 

Do you hold a lot of confidence that we will be able to make 

progress in those efforts? 

Mr. OWEN. I don’t think that is something that I can speak to. 

Speaking to, again, the U.S. Customs with general administration 

at China Customs, the relationship has been strong and cooperative. Outside of that, that is really outside my scope, sir. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Just as a general issue, let me say this. The 

Peace Bridge is the busiest northern border crossing combined for 

commercial vehicles and passenger vehicles. We have been struggling with a new plaza, an American plaza on the American side, 

where the Canadians have successfully done their side. 

The x-ray and gamma-ray detection technology facial recognition, 

I am speaking generally, that seems to be available now, which creates an opportunity for Buffalo, the Peace Bridge, to become the 

most modern state-of-the-art land port of entry between the United 

States and Canada. 

I would just ask you, as a field leader in Customs and Border 

Protection, to please consider making whatever technology that is 

available, make it available at the Peace Bridge, at the very least, 

as a demonstration project, because I think it would go a long way, 

and in terms of testing the efficacy of that detection technology, but 

42 

also generally cutting down on problems between the United States 

and Canada. 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. And we worked very well with the Peace 

Bridge Authority on the innovative approach as the pre-arrival 

readiness evaluation system, Ron Rienas has worked on it with us, 

has really reduced the wait times on the Peace Bridge itself. The 

facial recognition is not ready for land processing yet. We are doing 

very well in the air environment, but we don’t quite have a solution 

yet to have the facial technician—facial technology working in the 

land border environment. But I think we have a very good relationship with the Peace Bridge. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I just want to say your 

Customs and Border Protection agents are real professionals, and 

they do a great job at all of the western border crossings. Thank 

you. 

Chairman REICHERT. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

leadership on this subject. I appreciate your inclusion of some of us 

who are very interested in this. Gentlemen, I thank you for your 

time. We, as Members, represent 700,000 or so individuals, citizens 

who all have concerns about this. Parents, teachers, law enforcement, first responders, educators. This is a real problem. It is a 

real urgent problem. 

And I presume that after our discussion so far today that we are 

on the same page when it comes to this issue of addressing the 

vulnerabilities in the international mail system. Am I correct? Do 

we have a consensus that we needed to address this issue? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CINTRON. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. I know that seems like a—kind of a slam dunk 

question, but in reality, we have to be on the same page here and 

work together to figure this out. We have 318 million international 

packages entering the United States with no advance electronic 

data or shipper or recipient name, address or content. That is a 

huge number. And we simply can’t continue to allow this to happen. It is very obvious to me that China, Southeast Asia, those responsible for sending this into our country, don’t care, and have 

done everything in their power to make sure that these synthetic 

opioids like fentanyl and Carfentanil continue to get into our country. 

Mr. Higgins made a point that fentanyl is 50 times as potent as 

heroin. Just to add to that, Carfentanil is 100 times as potent as 

fentanyl, and 5,000 times as potent as a unit of heroin, 5,000 times. 

In fact, it takes two milligrams of Carfentanil to be lethal. And this 

package of sweetener has 1,000 milligrams. So it is just amazing 

how small the amount can be and how—that illustration is how 

much can be sent into this country and how lethal it can be. 

We have a big job on our hands to get a hold of this. And that 

is why I am working with my associates here and my colleagues 

in the Congress to introduce a bill that would close the loophole 

and make it harder for these drugs to enter illegally. And I am 

glad to pick up where Representative Tiberi left off on the Stop 

Act, and also work with my colleague, Representative Faso, on this 

subject. 

43 

It is designed to stop dangerous synthetic drugs like fentanyl and 

Carfentanil from being shipped through our borders. Specifically, 

the bill would require shipments from foreign countries through 

our postal system to provide electronic advance data, such as who 

and where it is coming from, who it is going to, where it is going, 

and what is in it before the United States will accept it. 

This will enable our respective agencies to better target potentially illegal packages and keep these dangerous drugs from ending 

up in the hands of drug traffickers who want to harm our local 

communities and our children. I am wondering if you can provide 

me some information on this. There is a provision here that is outside of our control, and that is that effectively screening international mail is difficult, especially when their ability to obtain advance electronic manifest information is depending on whether or 

not there is postal agreement with a foreign postal service. 

How do you reconcile that? How do we put a solution in place 

and be able to work with China and other countries to ensure that 

this solution works? 

Mr. CINTRON. I think as it relates to the AED, right? I will go 

back. Our focus has been, again, on this top 20, I will keep saying 

it, that represents 90 percent of the volume. China is certainly in 

that. We have been working on signing these bilateral agreements. 

We have five of them. AED is absolutely mandated that you have 

to have it. We have mandated it now with the express. 

We have the untracked packages out of China specifically, which 

represent a significant volume of that. The packages that we are 

talking about that are coming in without that AED. So the focus 

really is—and they have been, you know, I will say, collaborating 

to get us to that point. We will have a substantial amount of AED, 

most of the China mail by the time we get to the end of this year. 

That is our focus with them. 

I think what we have to do is stay the course around doing that. 

Stay very focused on where we see the volumes and the countries 

that we are focused with, and it will net us what we are looking 

for over time here. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. Big subject. Thank you all for your focus on 

this issue. I appreciate it. I yield back. 

Chairman REICHERT. I thank the gentleman. I am going to 

allow the Ranking Member to say a couple of closing comments, he 

has had some amazing thoughts. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our two witnesses today, first of all. They were excellent. I really mean that. 

I have a major problem in addressing the subject of any illicit drug, 

because we haven’t done a very good job. You have done your job. 

We are trying to figure out how we can do our job, we really are. 

And in saying that, we are never going to get to a point where we 

are able to have a seamless system at the borders, at the ports, and 

stopping illicit drugs coming into this country. 

So I start this way. No market, no sale. We have the problem, 

the population. If we don’t educate people about what these drugs 

do to us, as I said, it is not better living through chemistry. If we 

don’t educate the public, or if we do educate the public, and decide 

to get really into this, then I think we are going to have a better 

shot of curtailing—curtailing the sale of drugs. This is the market. 

44 

We are the market. Ordinary people living in rural America, suburban America, urban America, and the more there is a desire, I 

don’t care what you do. I don’t care how much electronic equipment 

you have at the port, at the border, it is not going to work. But 

I salute you for what you are doing day in and day out. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman REICHERT. Thank you. I want to thank you both for 

your testimony, first of all, but secondly, I want to thank you for 

your service. And I—having been a law enforcement officer for— 

that was my first career before I came here, 33 years, I understand 

that the law enforcement agencies and the postal office, included 

in this, are usually behind the curve when it comes to new resources, technology, and the ability to have the resources to address the issues. I mean, you just have an amazing hurdle to overcome in the thousands, hundreds of thousands of packages that you 

have, millions of packages that you have to look through to try to 

protect the citizens of this country. 

I can only compare it, in a very small way, to my experience in 

working a serial murder case that you might be familiar with from 

the Seattle area called The Green River serial case, and that was 

in the 1980s. We had 40,000 tip sheets and no computer. We did 

it using 3-by-5 note cards. We collected evidence, but there was no 

science other than blood typing in the 1980s, and then all of a sudden—well, all of a sudden for us, anyway, in the late 1990s DNA 

came into being, and we solved that case by technology, by new 

science. 

And sometimes, you know, the crooks get a little bit of a head 

start on us as far as technology, and they find a way around the 

system. I do think that, you know, the things that you have described today as steps that you have taken and you are in the middle of taking, I think those are great steps, but I do think that we 

need to support you in the advancement of technology and your 

ability to identify those packages, gain quality information, and 

have that technology help you further protect us. 

I think Mr. Pascrell does make a great point in that we do have 

a sociological problem here as far as the number of people who are 

willing to experiment with drugs, and therefore become addicted, 

especially to these opioids that we have discussed, and how dangerous they can be in destroying not only one life, but a community, and eventually the entire Nation. 

And your abilities, your efforts, again, are just greatly appreciated. And I would just like to say on behalf of this Committee and 

the Members of Congress, I think we all agree, we thank you again 

for your service and recognizing the tough job that you have to do. 

So I would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony and 

your responses to our questions. We appreciate that. And I think 

you have given us all much to think about as we prepare to move 

forward with legislation that would require the transmission of advanced electronic data on international mail shipments to prevent 

synthetic opioids from entering our country and harming American 

citizens. 

Please be advised that Members will have 2 weeks to submit 

written questions to be answered later in writing. Those questions 

and your answers will be made part of the formal hearing record. 

45 

Our record will remain open until May 9. I urge interested parties 

to submit statements to inform the Committee’s consideration of 

the issues discussed today. 

With that, this Subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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