IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gilbert M. Martinez, :

: Appellant :

:

v. : No. 960 C.D. 2022

: Submitted : June 5, 2023 City of Reading Police : Pennsylvania Department : of Transportation :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM FILED: June 26, 2023

Gilbert M. Martinez ( Martinez ) appeals

, pro se , the order of the Berks

County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) dismissing his Action for Declaratory

Judgment (Action)

, an d Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Motion)

, filed against

the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (DOT) and the City of Reading

Police Department (Reading Police) pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil

Procedure (Pa.R.Civ.P.) 240(j)(1). 1 We affir m.

1 Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1) states, in pertinent part: “ If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or proceeding

. . . , a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

, the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action [or] proceeding .

. . if it is satisfied

that the action [or] proceeding .

. . is frivolous .” As this Court has observed: “ A frivolous action

has been defined as one that ‘ lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. ’ Note to Pa. R.C[iv].P. []

2 40(j) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319 (1989)). Stated differently, a frivolous action

fails to state a valid cause of action on its face. McGriff v. Vidovich , 699 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). ” Laramy v. Garman (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 928 C.D. 2018 , filed February 12, 2020), slip op. at 4.2 O n July 18, 2022, Martinez filed the unverified Action, pursuant to

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1 60 1 and 1602 , and the unverified M otion, 2 pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P.

1531, in which he sought declaratory and injunctive relief against DOT and the

Reading Police

. 3 Along with the Action and Motion , Martinez also filed a n

unverified application to pro ceed in the matter i n f orma p auperis (Application)

.

2 Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024(a) states, in relevant part: “ Every pleading containing an averment of fact not appearing of record in the action

. . . shall state that the averment

. . . is true upon the signer ’ s personal knowledge or information and belief and sh all be verified .” As the Pennsylvania Superior Court has observed:

As noted in Goodrich Amram, “ [ t ] he requirement of a verification is not waivable because without it a pleading is mere narration, and amounts to nothing.” 2 Goodrich Amram 2d §1024(a) : [2 ( 2023 ) (footnotes omitted) ]

. While our cases acknowledge that amendment should be liberally allowed to cure technical defects in a verification, see, e.g. , George H. Althof, Inc. v. Spartan Inns of America, Inc.

, [ 441 A.2d 1236 ( Pa. Super. 1982) ] ; Monroe Contract Corp. v. Harrison Square, Inc.

, [ 405 A.2d 954 ( Pa. Super. 1979) ] , there is no doubt but that the verification attached to the complaint in the instant case falls so far short of the statutory mandate that the verification is wholly defectiv e and inadequate to support entry of a [] judgment against [the] appellants

.

Atlantic Credit and Finance, Inc. v. Giuliana , 829 A.2d 340, 344 (Pa. Super. 2003). Likewise

, in

the instant matter , the complete lack of a verification is wholly defective and inadequate to support the entry of the requested relief against DOT and the Reading Police.

3 In particular, in the Action, Martinez sought the following declaratory relief: (1) “ [a] declaration decreeing that [he] has a common law right to travel freely for pleasure and to conduct his business in his automobile unimpeded by police and that [he] is not required in accordance with his common law right to possess a driver’s license to use his property on the highway, streets, or roads, and that no registere d license plate, liability insurance, or state inspection shall be required”; (2) “[a] declaration decreeing that [DOT and the Reading Police] willfully violated [his] 4th, 5th, and 14th [A]mendment right[s under] the U.S. [C]onstitution, [U.S. Const. amen d. IV, V, and XIV,] as well as the [D]ue Process and [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause[s] by unlawfully entering my automobile, unlawful [ly] us [ing] tracking devices, and vandalizing my property for no legitimate reason or lawful purpose”; (3) “[a]n award of r easonable cost[s] to repair the computers (Footnote continued on next page...)3 On August 10 , 2022, the trial court issued an order denying Martinez’s

in forma pauperis A pplication because: (1) th e A pplication was not properly

verified; (2) the declaratory and injunctive relief requested in the Action and Motion

is in violation of the laws of this Commonwealth; and (3) the allegations in the

Action and Motion do not allege causes of action because they are “vague and

without the necessary detail.” Trial Court 8/10/22 Order. Martinez t hen filed the

instant timely appeal of the trial court’s order.

On appeal, 4 Martinez claims that the trial court erred in dismissing the

A pplication because: (1) Pa.R.Civ.P . 240(b) specifically provides that a party who

is without the financial resources to pay the costs of litigation is entitled to proceed

in forma pauperis ; and ( 2 ) the trial court’s summary dismissal of the Action and

and door lock[s] in my automobiles”; (4) “[a]n [a]ward of reasonable attorney fees and costs”; and (5) “[i]njuncti[ve] relief ordering [relief requested in] number (1) as demanded here until the outset

of this case , and whatever relief the court deems just and proper in the interest[s] of justice.”

Action at 11.

In addition, in the Motion, Martinez sought the following injunctive relief:

[Martinez] respectfully demands an injunction ORDER decreeing that [he has ] a common law right to travel freely for pleasure and to conduct his business in his automobile unimpeded by the [Reading Police] and that he is not required in accordance with his common law right to possess a driver’s license to use his property on the highway, streets, or roads, and that no registered license plate, liability insurance and[/]or state inspection shall be required. [Martinez] further requests an order directing the [Reading Police] to provide [him] with [its] policy manual.

Motion at 8.

4 In reviewing a trial court’s order dismiss ing Martinez’s Application pursuant to
Pa. R .Civ.P. 240(j)(1), this Court is limited to determining whether his constitutional rights were violated, and whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Jones v.

Doe , 126 A.3d 406, 408 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015 ).4

Motion without disposing of his A pplic ation demonstrates an ill will toward him

thereby violating his “right to the fair, orderly, and expeditious administration of

justice.” Brief for Appellant at 10. However, Martinez misapprehends the manner
in which the trial court was required to procee d on his A pplication under Pa.R.Civ.P.

240.

A s the Pennsylvania Superior Court has not ed:

The purpose of granting in forma pauperis status to indigent litigants is to enable them to access the court system without having to pay the costs normally associ ated with court proceedings. As society grows more litigious and economic resources become more scarce, it is increasingly important that both litigants and courts act responsibly. An individual seeking to proceed in forma pauperis , thus requesting to ha ve court costs paid for from funds provided to this Commonwealth by its taxpayers, has a responsibility to present a valid cause of action. To hold otherwise would violate [Pa.R.Civ.P.] 240(j) and would display a blatant disregard for the notion of judici al

economy. Courts should not allow a litigant seeking in forma pauperis status to use the court ’ s time and the taxpayer ’ s money to support a frivolous claim

. Conover v. Mikosky , 609 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa. Super. 1992). “In other words, an action

is frivolous, and therefore subject to dismissal before the court considers the petition

to proceed in forma pauperis , if, on its face, the action does not set forth a valid

cause of action.” 25A Standard Pa. Practice 2d §127: 101 at 107 (2006) (footnotes

omitted).

In the opinion filed in support of its order in this case, the trial court

explained its rationale for dismissing the Action, Motion, and A pplication as

follows:

This court denied the in forma pauperis

[Application ] because the pleading was not properly5 verified, the relief requested in the [Action and Motion are] in violation of the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the allegations are so vague that they did not allege any causes of action. Due to thes e defects and [Martinez’s] failure to state a cause of action for which relief can be granted, this court denied [his] in forma pauperis [Application] . [Martinez] has been the defendant in approximately fourteen different actions filed by various municipa lities because he refuses to believe that laws and regulations apply equally to him as a citizen of the United States. He does not pay, inter alia , water bills and taxes, so municipal[] claims are filed against him. In the case sub judice , he is attempti ng to sue governmental units because they enforce laws that every citizen must obey to protect other members of our society. [Martinez] declares himself “a[n] unfranchised Common law free man” (sic) which does not have to be obligated by laws or

contracts to pay for a driver’s license to travel in his automobile, to be forced to register his license plate, to be forced to buy automobile insurance, and to be forced to have his vehicles undergo state inspections. He is therefore suing [DOT and the Reading P olice] to obtain injunctions against them to stop them from enforcing motor vehicle laws. Since this relief is not permitted under the law, this court did not grant [him] in forma pauperis relief. This court determined that it could not aid [him] in

purs uing a case that had no basis for relief and sought illegal remedies.

Trial Court 8/25/22 Opinion. The foregoing demonstrates that the trial court

properly considered the merits of the claims presented in Martinez’s Action and

Motion before ruling on his A pplication to proceed in forma pauperis in accordance

with the requirements of Pa.R.Civ.P. 240

.

Moreover, w ith respect to the merit of the claims raised in Martinez’s

Action and Motion

, a rticle II, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution declares

that “[t]he legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General

Assembly .

. . .” Pa. Const. art. II, §1. In this regard, the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court expli cat ed long ago:6 The plenary power of the Legislature over the highways of the [C] ommonwealth is of ancient standing, and seldom, if ever, has been questioned. It was said

. . . in an early case: ‘In England, a highway is the property of the King as parens patriae . * * * In Pennsylvania, it is the property of the people, not of a particular district, but of the whole state. * * * Highways, therefore, being universally the property of the state, are subject to its absolute direction and control.’

It must be treated as el ementary law that public roads are laid out and opened for the use of all persons on equal terms; that is, to all who comply with the reasonable regulations of the duly constituted authorities. The right to use a public highway for travel or in the transp ortation of merchandise is not unrestricted. It is for the [C] ommonwealth, acting through the Legislature, to direct the conditions under which this limited right shall be exercised. It alone has the power to regulate the manner and circumstances under w hich automobiles may be operated upon the highways of the [C] ommonwealth. This power is vested in the Legislature, and is based, not only upon its right to control and regulate the use of the highways, but is buttressed by the inherent police power of the state

.
This power of the state has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Kane v. New Jersey , 242 U.S. 160, 167 [( 1916 )] , the Supreme Court said: ‘The power of a state to regulate the use of motor vehicles on its highways has been r ecently considered by this court and broadly sustained.’ See Hendrick v. Maryland , 235 U.S. 610 [( 1915 )]

. Mr. Justice Butler said, in Hess v. Pawloski , 274 U.S. 352, 356 [( 1927 )] : ‘Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and, even when skil l fully and car efully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the state may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and nonresidents alike, who use its hi ghways.’ See also Hodge Co. v. Cincinnati , 284 U.S. 335 [( 1932 )]

.7 The permission to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of the [C] ommonwealth is not embraced within the term civil rights, nor is a license to do so a contract or a right of property in any legal or constitutional sense. Although the privilege may be a valuable one, it is no more than a permit granted by the state, its enjoyment depending upon compliance with the conditions prescribed by it, and subject always to such regulation and control as the state may see fit to impose.

Commonwealth v. Funk , 186 A. 65, 67

- 68 (Pa. 1936) (citations omitted). Thus,

“[t] he right to operate a mo tor vehicle on the public highway is subject to regulation

under the police power and such regulations have been embodied in the Vehicle

Code [, 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 101

- 9805 ].” Commonwealth v. Irwin , 29 A.2d 68, 69 (Pa.

1942).

Specifically, pursuant to its cl ear constitutional authority, the General

Assembly has enacted the following relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code: (1)

Section 1301(a), 75 Pa. C.S. §1301(a) (“ No person shall drive or move and no owner

. . . shall knowingly permit to be driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle

which is not registered in this Commonwealth

. . . .”); (2) Section 1331(a), 75

Pa. C.S. §1331(a) (“ Registration plates shall be provided by [DOT].”); (3) Section

1332(a), 75 Pa. C.S. §1332(a) (“ Every registration plate shall, at all times, be

securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned or on which its use is

authorized in accordance with regulations promulgated by [DOT].”); (4) Section

1501(a), 75 Pa. C.S. §1501(a) (“ No person

. . . shall drive any motor vehicle up on a
highway or public property in this Commonwealth unless the person has a driver ’ s
license valid under the provisions of this chapter. ”); (5) Section 1511(a), 75 Pa. C.S.

§1511(a) (“ Every licensee shall possess a driver ’ s license issued to the licensee at

all times when driving a motor vehicle and shall exhibit the license upon demand by

a police officer, and when requested by the police officer the licensee shall write the8

licensee ’ s name in the presence of the officer in order to provide identity .”); ( 6)

Section 1786(a), 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(a) (“ Every motor vehicle of the type required to

be registered under this title which is operated or currently registered shall be

covered by financial responsibility .”); (7) Section 1786(b), 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(b)

(“[DO T] shall require that each motor vehicle registrant certify that the registrant is

financially responsible at the time of registration or renewal thereof .”); (8) Section

4701, 75 Pa. C.S. §4701 (“No owner or driver shall refuse to submit a vehicle .

. . to

any inspection and test that is authorized or required by the provisions of this

chapter.”); and (9) Section 4728, 75 Pa. C.S. §4728 (“ The appropriate certificate of

inspection shall be affixed to the vehicle

. . . as specified in regulations adopted by

[ DOT].”).

Martinez has not cited any legal authority undermining the valid ity of

any of the foregoing well

- settled law. As a result, the trial court did not err or abuse

its discretion in dismissing the Action and Motion pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1)

, before ruling on Martinez’s A pplication under Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(b)

, because the

claims raised in the Action and Motion are patently frivolous and Martinez may not

obtain the requested declaratory and injunctive relief

. 5

Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

5 See, e.g.

, Truax v. Corrigan , 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) (“ Our whole system of law is predicated on the general fundamental principle of equality of application of the law

. ‘All men are equal before the law

, ’ ‘This is a government of laws and not of men,’ [and] ‘No man is above the law,’ are all maxims showing the spirit in which l egislatures, executives and courts are expected to make, execute

, and apply laws. ”).IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gilbert M. Martinez, :

: Appellant :

:

v. : No. 960 C.D. 2022

: City of Reading Police : Pennsylvania Department : of Transportation :

PER CURIAM

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26 th day of June , 20 2 3

, the order of the Berks County

Court of Common Pleas dated August 11, 20 2 2, is AFFIRMED.