TC 7-100.4

Hybrid Threat 

Force

Structure

Organization Guide

June 2015

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This publication supersedes FM 7-100.4, 3 May 2007. 

HEADQUARTERS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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TC 7-100.4 

Technical Circular

No. 7-100.4

Headquarters

Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 4 June 2015

Threat Force Structure Organization Guide

Contents

Page 

PREFACE...............................................................................................................v

INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................vi

Chapter 1 HYBRID THREAT ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN TRAINING .................. 1-1

Hybrid Threat for the Complex Operational Environment .................................. 1-1

Role in Training .................................................................................................. 1-2

Tie-In with Other Manuals in the 7-100 Series ................................................... 1-3

Chapter 2 HYBRID THREAT FORCE STRUCTURE ......................................................... 2-1

Section I – Threat Forces: Strategic Level..................................................... 2-1

National-Level Command Structure ................................................................... 2-1

Service Components .......................................................................................... 2-2

Theater Headquarters ........................................................................................ 2-6

Section II – Threat Forces: Operational Level ............................................... 2-7

Section III – Threat Forces: Tactical Level..................................................... 2-8

Divisions ............................................................................................................. 2-8

Maneuver Brigades ............................................................................................ 2-8

Battalions ............................................................................................................ 2-8

Companies ......................................................................................................... 2-8

Platoons.............................................................................................................. 2-9

Aviation Units...................................................................................................... 2-9

Nondivisional Units ............................................................................................. 2-9

Section IV – Irregular Forces........................................................................... 2-9

Irregular Organizations ..................................................................................... 2-10

Insurgent Organizations ................................................................................... 2-10

Criminal Organizations ..................................................................................... 2-14

Other Combatants ............................................................................................ 2-14

Noncombatants ................................................................................................ 2-15

Section V – Organizational Directories ........................................................ 2-17

Files for OPFOR Units...................................................................................... 2-18

Folders for Threat Force Structure ................................................................... 2-22

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

4 June 2015 i 
Contents 

Chapter 3 TASK-ORGANIZING ..........................................................................................3-1

Section I − Fundamental Considerations .......................................................3-1

U.S. Training Requirements................................................................................3-1

Hybrid Threat Doctrine........................................................................................3-2

Section II – Threat Forces: Strategic Level ....................................................3-4

Supreme High Command ...................................................................................3-4

Strategic Framework ...........................................................................................3-4

Section III – Threat Forces: Operational Level...............................................3-5

Field Group .........................................................................................................3-6

Operational-Strategic Command ........................................................................3-7

Section IV – Threat Forces: Tactical Level...................................................3-13

Tactical Groups ................................................................................................. 3-13

Detachments .....................................................................................................3-15

Integrated Fires Command ...............................................................................3-16

Integrated Support Command...........................................................................3-17

Internal Task-Organizing...................................................................................3-17

Special-Purpose Forces....................................................................................3-18

Internal Security Forces ....................................................................................3-18

Section V − Non-State Actors ........................................................................3-18

Insurgent and Guerrilla Forces .........................................................................3-18

Other Paramilitary Forces .................................................................................3-19

Noncombatants ................................................................................................. 3-20

Section VI – Exploitation of Noncombatants and Civilian Assets .............3-21

Military Forces...................................................................................................3-21

Paramilitary Forces ...........................................................................................3-21

Section VII − Unit Symbols for OPFOR Task Organizations.......................3-22

Section VIII − Building an OPFOR Order of Battle.......................................3-23

Step 1. Determine the Type and Size of U.S. Units..........................................3-24

Step 2. Set the Conditions ................................................................................3-24

Step 3. Select Army Tactical Tasks ..................................................................3-24

Step 4. Select OPFOR Countertasks................................................................3-24

Step 5. Determine the Type and Size of Hybrid Threat Units...........................3-24

Step 6. Review the HTFS Organizational Directories.......................................3-25

Step 7. Compile the Initial Listing of Hybrid Threat Units for the Task 

Organization......................................................................................................3-25

Step 8. Identify the Base Unit ...........................................................................3-25

Step 9. Construct the Task Organization..........................................................3-25

Step 10. Repeat Steps 4 through 9 as Necessary............................................3-26

Chapter 4 EQUIPMENT OPTIONS .....................................................................................4-1

Baseline Equipment ............................................................................................4-1

Worldwide Equipment Guide ..............................................................................4-4

Appendix A THREAT FORCE STRUCTURE ORGANIZATIONAL DIRECTORIES 

LISTING............................................................................................................. A-1

Appendix B BUILDING A HYBRID THREAT TASK ORGANIZATION................................ B-1

ii TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Contents

Appendix C LOCAL INSURGENT ORGANIZATION FROM THE HTFS 

ORGANIZATIONAL DIRECTORIES ................................................................. C-1

Appendix D MOTORIZED INFANTRY COMPANY FROM THE HTFS 

ORGANIZATIONAL DIRECTORIES ................................................................. D-1

Appendix E GUERRILLA HUNTER/KILLER COMPANY FROM THE HTFS 

ORGANIZATIONAL DIRECTORIES ................................................................. E-1

GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................Glossary-1

REFERENCES..................................................................................References-1

INDEX..........................................................................................................Index-1

Figures

Figure 2-1. National-Level Command Structure and Service Components ...........................2-2

Figure 2-2. Internal Security Forces in the Ministry of the Interior .........................................2-4

Figure 2-3. Peacetime Threat force Structure ........................................................................2-7

Figure 2-4. Infantry Squad Personnel and Equipment (Example)........................................2-20

Figure 2-5. Basic Listing of Folders in TFS Organizational Directories ...............................2-23

Figure 3-1. Wartime Fighting Force Structure........................................................................3-6

Figure 3-2. Allocation of Forces to an OSC (Example)..........................................................3-7

Figure 3-3. Possible OSC Organization (Example)................................................................3-8

Figure 3-4. Possible IFC Components in an OSC..................................................................3-9

Figure 3-5. Possible RISTA Command in an OSC...............................................................3-11

Figure 3-6. OSC Task Organization, with ISC Example ......................................................3-12

Figure 3-7. Possible DTG Organization (Example)..............................................................3-14

Figure 3-8. Possible BTG Organization (Example) ..............................................................3-15

Figure 3-9. Battalion-Size Detachment (BDET) Example ....................................................3-16

Figure 3-10. Company-Size Detachment (CDET) Example.................................................3-16

Figure 3-11. Possible IFC Components in a DTG................................................................3-17

Figure 3-12. OSC Symbol ....................................................................................................3-22

Figure 3-13. Motorized Infantry-Based DTG Symbol ...........................................................3-22

Figure 3-14. Mechanized Infantry-Based DTG Symbol .......................................................3-22

Figure 3-15. Tank-Based BTG Symbol ................................................................................3-23

Figure 3-16. Heliborne Infantry-Based BDET Symbol..........................................................3-23

Figure 3-17. Attack Helicopter-Based BDET Symbol...........................................................3-23

Figure 3-18. Mechanized Infantry-Based CDET Symbol .....................................................3-23

Figure 4-1. Motorized Infantry Company Principal Items of Equipment List ..........................4-2

Figure 4-2. Motorized Infantry Company Personnel and Equipment Chart ...........................4-3

Figure B-1. Basic Task-Organized Hybrid Threat (Example).................................................B-3

Figure B-2. Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade from TFS to Use as a Baseline Unit.........B-5

Figure B-3. Local Insurgent Organization from HTFS to Use as a Baseline Unit ..................B-7

Figure B-4. Folders for Task Organization .............................................................................B-9

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 iii
Contents

Figure B-5. Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light)......................................B-12

Figure B-6. Rows 1 and 2 ....................................................................................................B-13

Figure B-7. BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) Personnel and Equipment List, Page 1..................B-19

Figure B-8. BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) Personnel and Equipment List Continued, 

Page 2 ..............................................................................................................B-20

Figure B-9. BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) Personnel and Equipment List Continued, 

Page 3 ..............................................................................................................B-21

Figure B-10. BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) Personnel and Equipment List Continued, 

Page 4 ..............................................................................................................B-22

Figure B-11. BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) Personnel and Equipment List Continued, 

Page 5 ..............................................................................................................B-23

Figure B-12. Folders and Files for Task Organization .........................................................B-25

Figure B-13. Local Insurgent Organization (Affiliated).........................................................B-28

Figure B-14. Local Insurgent Organization Equipment (Affiliated) ......................................B-29

Tables

Table 3-1. Command and Support Relationships.................................................................. 3-2

Table 4-1. Equipment Tier Table (Example).......................................................................... 4-8

Table 4-2. Systems Substitution Matrix (Example).............................................................. 4-10

Table B-1. Initial Listing of Hybrid Threat Units Required for Task Organization ..................B-4

Table B-2. Specific Units Required for BTG Task Organization............................................B-5

iv TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Preface 

This training circular (TC) is one of a series that describes the Hybrid Threat Force Structure (HTFS) for 

training U.S. Army commanders, staffs, and units. See the References section for a list of other publications in 

this series. (Other publications in the former Field Manual [FM] 7-100 series will be converted to TCs as well.) 

Together, these TCs outline a Hybrid Threat than can cover the entire spectrum of military and irregular

capabilities against which the Army must train to ensure success in any future conflict.

Applications for this series of TCs include field training, training simulations, and classroom instruction 

throughout the Army. All Army training venues should use a HTFS based on these TCs, except when mission 

rehearsal or contingency training requires maximum fidelity to a specific country-based threat or enemy. Even 

in the latter case, trainers should use appropriate parts of the Hybrid Threat TCs to fill information gaps in a 

manner consistent with what they do know about a specific threat or enemy. 

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG) /Army National Guard of the 

United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the proponent for this publication. 

The preparing agency is the TRADOC G-2, ACE-Threats . Send comments and suggested improvements on 

DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to ACE-Threats at the 

following address: Director, Threats , TRADOC G-2, ACE, ATTN: ATIN-T (Bldg 467), TRADOC Intelligence 

Support Activity 801 Harrison Drive, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2308. 

This publication is available at Army Publishing Directorate (APD) at http://www.apd.army.mil and on the 

Army Training Network (ATN) at http://www.atn.army.mil. Readers should monitor those sites and also the 

TRADOC G2, ACE, Threats (ACE-Threats) Websites listed below for the status of this TC and information 

regarding updates. The TC is also available (after AKO login) in AKO files under Organizations/DoD 

Organizations/Army/Army Command/TRADOC/HQ Staff/DCS, G-2 (Intelligence)/TRISA/TRISACTID/Hybrid Threat Doctrine at or https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/11318389 (for ACE Threats folder) or 

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/30837459 (for Hybrid Threat Doctrine folder). Periodic updates, subject to 

the normal approval process, will occur as a result of the normal production cycle. The date on the cover and 

title page of the electronic version will reflect the latest update.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 v 
Introduction

This manual is part of the 7-100 series, which describes the Hybrid Threat that exists for the purpose of 

training U.S. forces for potential combat operations. The Hybrid Threat reflects the characteristics of 

military and irregular forces that may be present in the operational environment (OE). Like those realworld threats, the Threat will continue to present new and different challenges for U.S. forces. The OE is 

constantly changing, and it is important for U.S. Army training environments to keep pace with real-world 

developments. This manual differs from others in the 7-100 series in that it includes both Threat doctrine 

regarding organization (Threat force structure and task-organized fighting force structure) and trainingrelated issues from a U.S. viewpoint.

This organization guide also differs from other publications in the fact that it is linked to online 

organizational directories. TRADOC G2, ACE, Threats (ACE-Threats) maintains these directories and 

continuously updates them, as necessary, to represent contemporary and emerging capabilities. In order to 

provide a comprehensive menu of the numerous types of Threat organizations in the detail required for the 

Army’s live, virtual, and constructive training environments, these directories exceed the scope and size 

that can be accommodated within a traditional printed format. The directories contain over 10,000 pages 

detailing Threat organizations. From this menu, users can select and download just those parts needed to 

build the appropriate HTFS for a particular exercise. Task-organizing an exercise order of battle also 

requires that users have the ability to use downloaded organizations in an interactive manner. For these 

reasons, it is necessary for this TC to be linked to organizational diagrams and associated equipment 

inventories made available in electronic form that users can download and manipulate as necessary in order 

to create task organizations capable of fighting in adaptive ways that typify the OE.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In planning a training scenario and its road to war, trainers need to take into consideration the entire 

operational environment (OE) and its impact on the Threat’s order of battle (OB). The DOD officially 

defines an operational environment as “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that 

affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander” (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0). 

The operational environment (OE) is the synergistic combination of all the critical variables and actors that 

create the conditions, circumstances, and influences that can affect military operations today and in the 

near- and mid-term. 

The OE has a direct impact on the architecture and capabilities of Threat organizations. Proper taskorganizing can either mitigate or exploit the environment by the proper selection of organization and/or 

equipment. This enables the appropriate HTFS to perform countertasks that challenge the ability of U.S. 

units to perform the tasks in their mission essential task list (METL) in training environments. 

The OE is the holistic view of the environment in the near- and mid-term that comprises the conditions, 

circumstances, and influences that affect the training and employment of military forces. Analysis of the 

OE focuses on eight interrelated variables:

 Political.

 Military.

 Economic.

 Social.

 Information.

 Infrastructure.

 Physical environment.

 Time.

An assessment of these critical variables and their relationships helps to understand any OE and its impact 

on the Army.

The OE is particularly valuable in training. In order to develop adaptive leaders capable of operating in any 

OE, the Army requires challenging training scenarios, a Threat model, and Threat doctrine. This provides 

vi TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Introduction

an adaptive, asymmetric Hybrid Threat in order to train, develop, and prepare Soldiers and leaders to 

overcome threats in a complex and adaptive OE. It also provides a benchmark to measure training 

effectiveness and combat development activities. See ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations for further 

discussion of the OE and its application to training.

REAL WORLD

In the real world, the OE is the entire set of conditions, circumstances, and influences that U.S. Armed 

Forces can expect to face when conducting military operations to further the interests of the United States, 

its friends, and allies. The OE is “contemporary” in the sense that it does not represent conditions that 

existed only in the past or that might exist only in the remote future, but rather those conditions that exist 

today and in the clearly foreseeable near- and mid-term future. This OE consists not only of the military 

and/or paramilitary capabilities of potential real-world adversaries, but also of the manifestations of the 

seven other variables that help define any OE.

TRAINING

In training environments, the OE is the environment created to approximate the demands of the real-world 

and to set the conditions for desired training outcomes. This involves the appropriate combination of a 

Hybrid Threat (with regular and, irregular capabilities representing a composite of a number of potential 

adversaries) and other OE variables in a realistic, feasible, and plausible manner. The purpose of the OE in 

training simulations is to produce the necessary training outcomes.

Note. The same type of OE conditions can be created to support some combat development 

activities that do not require simulation of a specific real-world potential adversary. However, 

some combat development activities may require portrayal of an environment that extends 

further into the future than is typical for the OE; in that case, they are dealing with the future 

operational environment (FOE).

THREAT FORCE

As a training tool, the Threat must be a challenging, uncooperative sparring partner capable of stressing any 

or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. force. Training for the OE requires a 

Hybrid Threat that is “a plausible, flexible regular and/or irregular force representing a composite of 

varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and 

developing U.S. forces” (AR 350-2). This manual introduces the baseline organizational structures of a 

flexible, thinking, adaptive Hybrid Threat.

As the real-world conditions and capabilities change over time, threat doctrine, organizations, and equipment 

capabilities will evolve along with them, to continue to provide the Army a threat appropriate for the OE. Thus, 

the threat will remain capable of presenting realistic and relevant challenges that are appropriate to meet 

evolving training requirements. at any given point in time given current conditions in the OE.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 vii
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Chapter 1

Hybrid Threat Roles and Relationships in Training 

A Hybrid Threat Force Structure is a training tool that should allow the U.S. Army to 

train against a challenging and plausible sparring partner that represents the range of 

possible opponents the Army could face in actual conflict. It enables training of all 

arms of the Army and prepares the Army for potential combat operations.

HYBRID THREAT FOR THE COMPLEX OPERATIONAL 

ENVIRONMENT 

1-1. A Hybrid Threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and / or 

criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Hybrid Threats are innovative, 

adaptive, globally connected, networked, and embedded in the clutter of local populations. They can 

possess a wide range of old, adapted and advanced technologies―including the possibility of weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD). They can operate conventionally and unconventionally, employing adaptive and 

asymmetric combinations of traditional, irregular, and criminal tactics and using traditional military 

capabilities in old and new ways.

1-2. Hybrid threats seek to saturate the entire operational environment (OE) with effects that support their 

course of action and force their opponents to react along multiple lines of operation. A simple military 

attack may not present enough complexity to stretch resources, degrade intellectual capacity, and restrict 

freedom of maneuver. Instead, Hybrid Threats can simultaneously create economic instability, foster lack 

of trust in existing governance, attack information networks, provide a captivating message consistent with 

their goals, cause man-made humanitarian crises, and physically endanger opponents. Synchronized and 

synergistic hybrid threat actions can take place in the information, social, political, infrastructure, economic 

and military domains.

1-3. Opponents of Hybrid Threats will have difficulty isolating specific challenges. They will be forced to 

conduct economy of force measures on one or more of several lines of operation. Meanwhile, Hybrid 

Threats will continue to shift effort and emphasis to make all choices seem poor ones. Hybrid threats are 

networks of people, capabilities, and devices that merge, split, and coalesce in action across all of the 

operational variables of the OE. Each separate actor and action of a hybrid threat can be defeated if isolated 

and the proper countermeasure is applied. By creating severe impacts across the total OE, a hybrid threat 

prevents its opponents from segregating the conflict into easily assailable parts. Often military action will 

be the least important of a hybrid threat’s activities, only coming after exploitation of all the other aspects 

of the OE has paralyzed its opponent.

1-4. Hybrid threats can include criminals and criminal groups used in conjunction with both regular and 

irregular forces. A picture of this future was provided by the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, in which 

Russia employed the many criminal elements operating in South Ossetia to conduct the cleansing of ethnic 

Georgians from that region. Additionally, criminal organizations have the potential to provide much needed 

funding to operations and facilitate the purchase of equipment. Adversaries will be enabled by WMD and 

technologies that allow them to be disruptive on a regional and area basis.

1-5. Swift tactical success is not essential to victory. The dimension of time favors those fighting the 

United States. An enemy need not win any engagement or battles; the enemy simply must not lose the war. 

Wearing down the popular support for U.S. operations by simply causing a political and military stalemate 

can be all that is required to claim victory or to change U.S. behavior or policy.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 1-1 
Chapter 1

1-6. The most challenging attribute of our adversaries will be their ability to adapt and transition. Their 

speed, agility, versatility, and changeability are the keys to success in a fight against a larger, more 

powerful opponent.

1-7. Training U.S. forces for the operational environment (OE) requires a different kind of threat from 

that of the past. The Hybrid Threat must be less predictable and not based on the armed forces of a 

particular country or non-state actor. In today’s world, the U.S. Army must be prepared to go into any 

operational environment (OE) and perform its full range of missions. It must be ready to do so in the face 

of a wide variety of possible threats and at the same time be prepared to deal with third-party actors that 

may have other interests. Not all threats are purely military in nature. Therefore, the U.S. Army now 

defines an OPFOR as “a plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of 

varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and 

developing U.S. forces” (AR 350-2).

1-8. In some training environments, a regular force or an irregular force alone may be the Threat. In other 

cases, regular forces may have irregular forces acting in loose affiliation with them, or acting separately 

from them within the same training environment. These relationships depend on the scenario, which is 

driven by training requirements.

1-9. Various agencies and experts have different lists of real-world threats the United States might have to 

face. If the U.S. Army were to pick any one of these threats as the Threat against which to train, that threat 

would almost certainly not be the one that all Army forces would actually fight. What is needed is a 

composite that is representative of the full range and variety of possible threats and OEs. It must have a bit 

of everythingit could be virtually anybody, anywhere. Therefore, this manual is linked to directories of 

organizations that provide a representative composite of real-world military and paramilitary organizations. 

With this composite as a baseline, trainers have the flexibility to task-organize and adjust the capabilities of 

an OPFOR to fit the most demanding U.S. Army training requirements and provide a framework for 

training that creates the leaders, soldiers, and unit skills necessary for success on the next 

battlefieldwherever that might be.

ROLE IN TRAINING 

1-10. As a training tool, the Threat must be a challenging, uncooperative sparring partner, capable of 

stressing any or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. force. However, it must 

also be tailored to meet specific training requirements.

Note. Although the HTFS is primarily a training tool, it may be used for other purposes. For 

example, some combat development activities that do not require simulation of a specific realworld potential adversary may use a HTFS to portray the “threat” or “enemy.”

1-11. As a baseline for developing a HTFS for a specific training environment, this manual describes a 

threat that is representative of the forces of contemporary state and non-state actors. This composite of the 

characteristics of real-world regular and irregular forces provides a framework for the realistic and relevant 

portrayal of capabilities that U.S. forces might face in the OE. This manual is applicable to the entire U.S. 

Army training community, including the Hybrid Threat at all of the combat training centers, the TRADOC 

schools, and units in the field.

1-12. The 7-100 series, as a whole, covers not only the military and paramilitary forces of a Threat, but 

also other, non-state paramilitary organizations and nonmilitary actors that might be present in a region of 

the world. The Unites States, as an extraregional power becoming involved in such a region, might have to 

deal with any or all of these types of military, paramilitary, and nonmilitary elements. It might encounter 

these elements individually or, more likely, in combination with other such elements. Whether these 

elements operate in concert or independently, they are an important part of the OE.

1-13. Trainers need to consider the total OEnot just the military or threat dimensionin designing 

training environments. All the other critical variables can affect the overall OE and the military, 

paramilitary, and nonmilitary entities that are part of it.

1-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Hybrid Threat Roles and Relationships in Training

1-14. The baseline HTFS organizations linked to this manual do not constitute an order of battle (OB). 

Rather, they provide a framework from which trainers can develop a specific OB appropriate for their 

particular training requirements. Within this framework, scenario writers and exercise designers have 

considerable flexibility in determining what the Threat actually has at a given point in time or a given place 

on the battlefieldin a particular scenario. In some cases, an organization taken straight from the threat

force structure may meet the requirements for a particular U.S. Army training environment. In most cases, 

however, it will be necessary to task-organize the HTFS in order to portray the right mix of units and 

equipment for stressing the mission essential task list (METL) of U.S. units in particular training 

environments.

1-15. Thus, the baseline organizations presented in the organizational directories linked to this manual are 

intended to be tailored and task-organized in a manner that is appropriate for the training objectives. 

Depending on the training requirement, the Hybrid Threat may be a large, medium, or small force. Its 

technology may be state-of-the-art, relatively modern, obsolescent, obsolete, or an uneven combination of 

these categories. Its ability to sustain operations may be limited or robust.

1-16. During the road to war leading up to events in a training scenario, the Threat may play the role of a 

potential enemy or “belligerent” that is on the verge of becoming a combatant. However, the actual training 

event usually deals with a state of hostilities. Thus, once hostilities begin in the training event, the Threat 

acts as the “enemy” of the U.S. force in the training environment.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER MANUALS IN THE 7-100 SERIES 

1-17. This organization guide is meant to be used in conjunction with other products in the 7-100 series. 

Together, these products outline a Threat that can cover the entire spectrum of regular and irregular 

capabilities against which the Army must train to ensure success in the types of OEs it can expect to 

encounter in the clearly foreseeable future.

OPFOR STRATEGY, OPERATIONS, AND TACTICS

1-18. This organization guide ties in with the national-level organizations described in detail in TC 7-100, 

Hybrid Threat. Organizations from the threat force structure (found in the online directories linked to this 

manual) should be task-organized in accordance with Hybrid Threat doctrine in FM 7-100.1, Opposing 

Force Operations, and TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics.

IRREGULAR ORGANIZATIONS AND NONMILITARY ACTORS

1-19. This organization guide ties in with TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces. See that document for 

more detail on the nature and activities of such actors.

WORLDWIDE EQUIPMENT GUIDE

1-20. The WEG contains equipment data, tier tables, and substitution matrices for the various categories of 

equipment found in threat organizations. Training planners can employ the tier tables and substitution 

matrices in the WEG to find appropriate substitutes for baseline equipment shown in the organizational 

directories. Within each functional category of equipment, there are four tiers representing different levels 

of capability, with Tier 1 representing the highest level of capability and modernity. The WEG also contain 

technical data on the capabilities of systems identified as “Principal Items of Equipment” in the 

organizational directories and/or listed in the tier tables.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 1-3
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Chapter 2

Hybrid Threat Force Structure

This chapter and the organizational directories to which it is linked provide the 

Hybrid Threat Force Structure (HTFS) to be used as the basis for a threat

organization in all Army training, except real-world-oriented mission rehearsal 

exercises. This includes the forces of Threat actors as well as key non-state actors. In 

most cases, the organizations found in the HTFS will require task-organizing (see 

chapter 3) in order to construct a threat order of battle appropriate for a training 

event.

SECTION I – THREAT FORCES: STRATEGIC LEVEL

2-1. When the Hybrid Threat consists of or includes the regular and/or irregular forces of a Threat, the 

national-level structure of that state, including the overall military and paramilitary structure, should follow 

the patterns described in TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat. Those patterns are summarized here. (See TC 7-100 for 

more detail.)

2-2. The 7-100 series refers to the country in question as “the State.” In specific U.S. Army training 

environments, however, the generic name of the State may give way to other fictitious country names used 

in the specific training scenarios for example the countries listed in the Decisive Action Training 

Environment (DATE). (See AR 350-2 for additional guidance concerning the use of country names in a 

scenario.) The State possesses various military and paramilitary forces as well as irregular forces with 

which to pursue its national interests. This section of chapter 2 describes the national-level command 

structure and the various services that control these forces. For more information on the Decisive Action 

Training Environment go to the ATN Website at: https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=311 and 

click on the Decisive Action Training Environment.

2-3. The State’s Armed Forces have a threat force structure (TFS) that manages military forces in 

peacetime. This TFS is the aggregate of various military headquarters, organizations, facilities, and 

installations designed to man, train, and equip the forces. Within the TFS, tactical-level commands have 

standard organizational structures (as depicted in the organizational directories). However, these TFS 

organizations normally differ from the Threat’s wartime fighting force structure. (See chapter 3 on TaskOrganizing.)

2-4. The TFS includes all components of the Armed Forcesnot only regular, standing forces (active 

component), but also reserve and militia forces (reserve component). Certain elements of the Threat Force 

Structure will also coordinate an affiliation with irregular forces if the scenario requires this relationship. 

For more information see table 3-1 Command and Support Relationships. For administrative purposes, both 

regular and reserve forces come under the headquarters of their respective service component. Each of the 

six service components is responsible for manning, equipping, and training of its forces and for organizing 

them within the TFS. 

NATIONAL-LEVEL COMMAND STRUCTURE 

2-5. The State employs its military forces, along with its other instruments of power, to pursue its tactical, 

operational, and strategic goals and, thus, support its national security strategy. The national-level 

command structure includes the National Command Authority, the Ministry of Defense, and the General 

Staff. (See figure 2-1 on page 2-2.)

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-1 
Chapter 2

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

2-6. The National Command Authority (NCA) exercises overall control of the application of all instruments 

of national power in planning and carrying out the national security strategy. The NCA allocates forces and 

establishes general plans for the conduct of national strategic campaigns. The NCA exercises control over 

the makeup and actions of the Armed Forces through the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

2-7. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Armed Forces 

and for the readiness and overall development of the six service components of the Armed Forces. 

However, the General Staff has direct control over the six services. In wartime, the MOD merges with the 

General Staff to form the Supreme High Command (SHC). The countries in the Decisive Action Training 

Environment use the SHC to show this structure.

GENERAL STAFF

2-8. The General Staff is a major link in the centralization of military command at the national level, since 

it provides staff support and acts as the executive agency for the NCA. Together with the MOD, the 

General Staff forms the SHC in wartime. The General Staff has direct control over the six services, and all 

military forces report through it to the NCA. The Chief of the General Staff commands the SHC.

Figure 2-1. National-Level Command Structure and Service Components

SERVICE COMPONENTS 

2-9. The Armed Forces generally consist of six services. These include the Army, Navy, Air Force (which 

includes the national-level Air Defense Forces), Strategic Forces (with long-range rockets and missiles), 

Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Command, and Internal Security Forces. The Internal Security Forces are 

subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior in peacetime, but become subordinate to the SHC in time of war. 

ARMY

AIR 

DEFENSE

FORCES

INTERNAL 

SECURITY 

FORCES*

NAVY SPF

COMMAND

STRATEGIC

FORCES

NATIONAL 

COMMAND 

AUTHORITY

SUPREME

HIGH COMMAND

MINISTRY OF 

DEFENSE

GENERAL 

STAFF

 

*In peacetime, the Internal Security Forces are subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior.

In wartime, some or all these forces may be resubordinated to the SHC.

AIR FORCE

2-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Hybrid Threat Force Structure

The Armed Forces field some reserve component forces in all services, but most reserve forces are Army 

forces. Militia forces belong exclusively to the ground component.

Note. Regular, reserve, and militia forces of the State can maintain various relationships with 

insurgent, guerrilla, and possibly criminal organizations.

ARMY

2-10. The Army includes tank, mechanized infantry, motorized infantry, and a small number of airborne 

and special-purpose forces (Army SPF). The Army fields both rocket and tube artillery to support ground 

operations. The Army also has some long-range rockets and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). Fire 

support capability includes attack helicopters of Army aviation. The Army is assigned large numbers of 

shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and will also have mobile air defense units in support.

NAVY

2-11. The State maintains a regional force-projection navy with a significant access-control capability built 

on small surface combatants, submarines, surface- and ground-based antiship missile units, and antiship 

mines. The Navy has a limited amphibious capability and possesses naval infantry capable of conducting 

forcible entry against regional opponents. The Navy also fields organic Special-Purpose Forces (Naval 

SPF).

Note. If the State in a particular scenario is a landlocked country, it may not have a navy.

AIR FORCE

2-12. The Air Force, like the Navy, is fundamentally a supporting arm. Its aircraft include fighters, 

bombers, tactical transport, tankers, airborne early warning aircraft, electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, 

reconnaissance aircraft, and auxiliaries. The State’s national-level Air Defense Forces are subordinate to 

the Air Force. Similar to other services, the Air Force has its own organic Air Force SPF.

STRATEGIC FORCES

2-13. The Strategic Forces consist of long-range rocket and missile units. The missiles of the Strategic 

Forces are capable of delivering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) munitions, and the 

NCA is the ultimate CBRN release authority. The State considers the Strategic Forces capability, even 

when delivering conventional munitions, the responsibility of the NCA. Therefore, the NCA is likely to 

retain major elements of the Strategic Forces under its direct control or under the SHC or a theater 

headquarters in wartime. In some cases, the SHC or theater commander may allocate some Strategic Forces 

assets down to operational-level commands. Conventionally-armed rocket, INFOWAR, and missile units 

may be assigned directly in support of air, naval, and ground forces.

SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES COMMAND

2-14. The SPF Command includes both SPF units and elite commando units. The General Staff or SHC 

normally reserves some of these units under its own control for strategic-level missions. It may allocate

some SPF units to subordinate operational or theater commands, but can still task the allocated units to 

support strategic missions, if required.

2-15. Four of the five other service components also have their own SPF. In contrast to the units of the SPF 

Command, the Army, Navy, and Air Force SPF are designed for use at the operational level. The Internal 

Security Forces also have their own SPF units. These service SPF normally remain under the control of 

their respective services or a joint operational or theater command. However, SPF from any of these service 

components could become part of joint SPF operations in support of national-level requirements. The SPF 

Command has the means to control joint SPF operations as required.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-3 
Chapter 2

2-16. Any SPF units (from the SPF Command or from other service components’ SPF) that have 

reconnaissance or direct action missions supporting strategic-level objectives or intelligence requirements 

would normally be under the direct control of the SHC or under the control of the SPF Command, which 

reports directly to the SHC. Also, any service SPF units assigned to joint SPF operations would temporarily 

come under the control of the SPF Command or perhaps the SHC.

2-17. Most of the service SPF units are intended for use at the operational level. Thus, they can be 

subordinate to operational-level commands even in the TFS. In peacetime and in garrisons within the State, 

SPF of both the SPF Command and other services are organized administratively into SPF companies, 

battalions and brigades.

Note. SPF can organize, train, and support local irregular forces (insurgents or guerrillas and 

possibly even criminal organizations) and conduct operations in conjunction with them. SPF 

missions can also include the use of terror tactics.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

2-18. Internal security forces are designed to deal with various internal threats to the regime. In peacetime, 

the Chief of Internal Security heads the forces within the Ministry of the Interior that fall under the general 

label of “internal security forces.” (See figure 2-2.) Most of the internal security forces are uniformed, 

using military ranks and insignia similar to those of the other services of the State’s Armed Forces.

Figure 2-2. Internal Security Forces in the Ministry of the Interior

2-19. During wartime, some or all of the internal security forces from the Ministry of the Interior become 

subordinate to the SHC. Thus, they become the sixth service component of the Armed Forces. At that time, 

the formal name “Internal Security Forces” applies to all forces resubordinated from the Ministry of the 

Interior to the SHC, and the General Staff controls and supervises their activities. The forces resubordinated 

to the SHC are most likely to come from the Security Directorate, the General Police Directorate, or the 

Civil Defense Directorate.

Security Directorate

2-20. The Security Directorate has elements deployed throughout the state. Many of these elements are 

paramilitary units equipped for combat. They include Border Guard Forces, National Security Forces, and 

Special-Purpose Forces. Together with the regular Armed Forces, these paramilitary forces help maintain 

the state's control over its population in peace and war.

POLITICAL 

DIRECTORATE

GENERAL 

POLICE 

DIRECTORATE

CIVIL 

DEFENSE 

DIRECTORATE

MINISTRY OF 

THE 

INTERIOR

BORDER 

GUARD

FORCES

NATIONAL 

SECURITY 

FORCES

SPECIALPURPOSE 

FORCES

STATE 

SECURITY 

DIRECTORATE

INTELLIGENCE 

DIRECTORATE

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

CHIEF OF 

INTERNAL 

SECURITY

2-4 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Hybrid Threat Force Structure

2-21. The Border Guard Forces consist of a professional cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs) supplemented by conscripts and civilian auxiliaries. During war, they may be assigned to a military 

unit to guard a newly gained territory or to conduct actions against the enemy. The Border Guard Forces 

may also have one or more independent special border battalions. These constitute an elite paramilitary 

force of airborne-qualified personnel trained in counterterrorism and commando tactics. When the SHC 

assumes control of Border Guard Forces in wartime, the General Staff provides overarching administrative 

and logistics support in the same manner as with a regular military force.

2-22. The National Security Forces are organized along military lines and equipped with light weapons and 

sometimes heavy weapons and armored vehicles. This organization conducts liaison with other internal 

security forces and with other services of the State’s Armed Forces and may combine with them to conduct 

certain actions. An operational-level command of the State’s Armed Forces may include one or more 

security brigades to augment its military capability. This type of brigade not only increases the military 

combat power, but also offers a very effective and experienced force for controlling the local population. 

Security battalions, companies, and platoons are similar to equivalent infantry units in the regular Armed 

Forces and can thus be used to augment such forces.

2-23. Within the Security Directorate, the Ministry of the Interior has its own Special-Purpose Forces 

(SPF). These are the most highly-trained and best-equipped of the internal security forces. The State 

Security Directorate maintains its SPF units as a strategic reserve for emergency use in any part of the State 

or even outside State borders. The commando-type SPF forces can conduct covert missions in support of 

other internal security forces or regular military forces. SPF activities may include the formation and 

training of an insurgent force in a neighboring country. In wartime, the SHC may use them to secure 

occupied territory or to operate as combat troops in conjunction with other services of the Armed Forces.

General Police Directorate

2-24. The General Police Directorate has responsibility for national, district, and local police. In some 

circumstances, police forces at all three levels operate as paramilitary forces. They can use military-type 

tactics, weapons, and equipment. National Police forces include paramilitary tactical units that are equipped 

for combat, if necessary. These uniformed forces may represent the equivalent of an infantry organization 

in the regular Armed Forces. Within the various national- and district-level police organizations, the special 

police are the forces that most resemble regular armed forces in their organization, equipment, training, and 

missions. Because some special police units are equipped with heavy weapons and armored vehicles, they 

can provide combat potential to conduct defensive operations if required. Thus, special police units could 

be expected to supplement the Armed Forces in a crisis situation.

Civil Defense Directorate

2-25. The Civil Defense Directorate comprises a variety of paramilitary and nonmilitary units. While the 

majority of Civil Defense personnel are civilians, members of paramilitary units and some staff elements at 

the national and district levels hold military ranks. Civil Defense paramilitary units are responsible for the 

protection and defense of the area or installation where they are located. Even the nonmilitary, civil 

engineering units can supplement the combat engineers of the Armed Forces by conducting engineer 

reconnaissance, conducting explosive ordnance disposal, and providing force-protection construction 

support and logistics enhancements required to sustain military operations.

RESERVES AND MILITIA

2-26. Although all six services can field some reserve forces, most of the reserve forces are Army forces. 

All militia forces belong to the Army component. Overall planning for mobilization of reserves and militia 

is the responsibility of the Organization and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff. Each service 

component headquarters would have a similar directorate responsible for mobilization of forces within that 

service. Major geographical commands (and other administrative commands at the operational level and 

higher) serve as a framework for mobilization of reserve and militia forces.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-5 
Chapter 2

Note. The Army is normally the dominant partner among the services, but relies on the 

mobilization of reserve and militia forces to conduct sustained operations. These additional 

forces are not as well-trained and -equipped as the standing Army. Militia forces are composed 

primarily of infantry and can act in concert with regular forces.

2-27. During mobilization, some reserve personnel serve as individual replacements for combat losses in 

active units, and some fill positions (including professional and technical specialists) that were left vacant 

in peacetime in deference to requirements of the civilian sector. However, reservists also man reserve units 

that are mobilized as units to replace other units that have become combat-ineffective or to provide 

additional units necessary for large, sustained operations.

2-28. Like active force units, most mobilized reserve and militia units do not necessarily go to war under 

the same administrative headquarters that controlled them in peacetime. Rather, they typically become part 

of a task-organized operational- or tactical-level fighting command tailored for a particular mission. In 

most cases, the mobilized reserve units would be integrated with regular military units in such a fighting 

command. In rare cases, however, a reserve command at division level or higher might become a fighting 

command or serve as the basis for forming a fighting command based partially or entirely on reserve 

forces.

THEATER HEADQUARTERS

2-29. For the Threat, a theater is a clearly defined geographic area in which the Threat’s Armed Forces 

plan to conduct or are conducting military operations. Within its region, the Threat may plan or conduct a 

strategic campaign in a single theater or in multiple theaters, depending on the situation. The General Staff 

may create one or more separate theater headquarters even in peacetime, for planning purposes. However, 

no forces would be subordinated to such a headquarters until the activation of a particular strategic 

campaign plan.

Note. The term theater may have a different meaning for the State than for a major extraregional 

power, such as the United States. For an extraregional power with global force-projection 

capability, a theater is any one of several geographic areas of the world where its forces may 

become involved. For the State, however, the only theater (or theaters) in question would be 

within the region of the world in which the State is located and is capable of exerting its 

regionally-centered power. The extraregional power may not define the limits of this specific 

region in exactly the same way that the State defines it, in terms of its own perceptions and 

interests. Within its region, the State may plan or conduct a strategic campaign in a single theater 

or in multiple theaters, depending on the situation.

2-30. A theater headquarters provides flexible and responsive control of all theater forces. When there is 

only one theater, as is typical, the theater headquarters may also be the field headquarters of the SHC, and 

the Chief of the General Staff may also be the theater commander. Even in this case, however, the Chief of 

the General Staff may choose to focus his attention on national strategic matters and to create a separate 

theater headquarters, commanded by another general officer, to control operations within the theater.

2-31. When parts of the strategic campaign take place in separated geographical areas and there is more 

than one major line of operations, the State may employ more than one theater headquarters, each of which 

could have its own theater campaign plan. In this case, albeit rare, the SHC field headquarters would be a 

separate entity exercising control over the multiple theater headquarters.

2-32. The existence of one or more separate theater headquarters could enable the SHC to focus on the 

strategic campaign and sustaining the forces in the field. A theater headquarters acts to effectively 

centralize and integrate General Staff control over theater-wide operations. The chief responsibility of this 

headquarters is to exercise command over all forces assigned to a theater in accordance with mission and 

aim assigned by the SHC. A theater headquarters links the operational efforts of the OPFOR to the strategic 

efforts and reports directly to the SHC.

2-6 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Hybrid Threat Force Structure

2-33. If the General Staff or SHC elects to create more than one theater headquarters, it may allocate parts 

of the TFS to each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. One example would be to divide Air 

Force assets into theater air armies. Another would be to assign units from the SPF Command to each 

theater, according to theater requirements. During peacetime, however, a separate theater headquarters 

typically would exist for planning purposes only and would not have any forces actually subordinated to it.

SECTION II – THREAT FORCES: OPERATIONAL LEVEL

2-34. The organizational directories do not show organization charts or equipment lists for operationallevel commands. That is because there are no standard organizations above division level in the TFS. 

However, the directories do provide the organizational building blocks for constructing operational-level 

commands appropriate to a given training scenario.

2-35. In peacetime, each service commonly maintains its forces grouped under single-service operationallevel commands (such as corps, armies, or army groups) for administrative purposes. In some cases, forces 

may be grouped administratively under operational-level geographical commands designated as military 

regions or military districts (see note). There are no standard “table of organization and equipment (TOE)” 

organizations for these echelons above division. For example, an army group can consist of several armies, 

corps, or separate divisions and brigades. In peacetime, the internal security forces are under the 

administrative control of the Ministry of the Interior. (See figure 2-3.) Normally, these administrative 

groupings differ from the Armed Forces’ go-to-war (fighting) force structure (see chapter 3). 

Note. A military district may or may not coincide with a political district within the State 

government.

Figure 2-3. Peacetime Threat force Structure

2-36. In wartime, most major administrative commands continue to exist under their respective service 

headquarters. However, their normal role is to serve as force providers during the creation of operationallevel fighting commands. Operational-level commands of the TFS generally remain in garrison and 

continue to exercise command and control (C2) and administrative supervision of any of their original 

THEATER HQs SERVICE HQs

SINGLESERVICE 

OPERATIONALLEVEL 

COMMANDS

NATIONAL 

COMMAND 

AUTHORITY

MINISTRY OF 

DEFENSE

GENERAL 

STAFF

MINISTRY OF 

THE INTERIOR

CHIEF OF 

INTERNAL 

SECURITY

INTERNAL 

SECURITY 

FORCES HQ

SINGLESERVICE 

DIVISIONS/

BRIGADES/

BATTALIONS

SINGLESERVICE

NATIONAL/

DISTRICTLEVEL 

COMMANDS

OSC HQs

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-7 
Chapter 2

subordinates (or portions thereof) that do not become part of the fighting force structure. See chapter 3 for 

more information on the formation of wartime fighting commands.

SECTION III – THREAT FORCES: TACTICAL LEVEL

2-37. In the HTFS, the largest tactical-level organizations are divisions and brigades. In peacetime, they are 

often subordinate to a larger, operational-level administrative command. However, a service of the Armed 

Forces might also maintain some separate single-service tactical-level commands (divisions, brigades, or 

battalions) directly under the control of their service headquarters. (See figure 2-3 on page 2-7.) For

example, major tactical-level commands of the Air Force, Navy, Strategic Forces, and the SPF Command 

often remain under the direct control of their respective service component headquarters. The Army 

component headquarters may retain centralized control of certain elite elements of the ground forces, 

including airborne units and Army SPF. This permits flexibility in the employment of these relatively 

scarce assets in response to national-level requirements.

2-38. For these tactical-level organizations (division and below), the HTFS organizational directories 

contain standard “TOE” structures. However, these administrative groupings normally differ from the 

Threat’s go-to-war (fighting) force structure. (See chapter 3 on Task-Organizing.)

DIVISIONS

2-39. In the Threat’s HTFS, the largest tactical formation is the division. Divisions are designed to be able 

to serve as the basis for forming a division tactical group (DTG), if necessary. (See chapter 3.) However, a 

division, with or without becoming a DTG, could fight as part of an operational-strategic command (OSC)

or an organization in the HTFS (such as army or military region) or as a separate unit in a field group (FG).

MANEUVER BRIGADES

2-40. The OPFOR’s basic combined arms unit is the maneuver brigade. In the HTFS, some maneuver 

brigades are constituent to divisions, in which case the OPFOR refers to them as divisional brigades. 

However, some are organized as separate brigades, designed to have greater ability to accomplish 

independent missions without further allocation of forces from a higher tactical-level headquarters. 

Separate brigades have some subordinate units that are the same as in a divisional brigade of the same type 

(for example, the headquarters), some that are especially tailored to the needs of a separate brigade [marked 

“(Sep”) in the organizational directories], and some that are the same as units of this type found at division 

level [marked “(Div)”].

2-41. Maneuver brigades are designed to be able to serve as the basis for forming a brigade tactical group 

(BTG), if necessary. However, a brigade, with or without becoming a BTG, can fight as part of a division 

or DTG, or as a separate unit in an OSC, an organization of the HTFS (such as army, corps, or military 

district), or an FG.

BATTALIONS

2-42. In the HTFS, the basic unit of action is the battalion. Battalions are designed to be able to execute 

basic combat missions as part of a larger tactical force. A battalion most frequently would fight as part of a

brigade, BTG, or DTG. A battalion can also serve as the basis for forming a battalion-size detachment 

(BDET), if necessary. (See chapter 3.)

COMPANIES

2-43. Threat companies most frequently fight as part of a battalion or BTG. However, companies are 

designed to be able to serve as the basis for forming a company-size detachment (CDET), if necessary. (See 

chapter 3.)

2-8 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Hybrid Threat Force Structure

PLATOONS

2-44. In the threat force structure, the smallest unit typically expected to conduct independent fire and 

maneuver tactical tasks is the platoon. Platoons are designed to be able to serve as the basis for forming a 

reconnaissance or fighting patrol. A platoon typically fights as part of a company, battalion, or detachment.

AVIATION UNITS

2-45. The threat has a variety of attack, transport, multipurpose, and special-purpose helicopters that 

belong to the ground forces (Army) rather than the Air Force. Hence the term army aviation. Army aviation 

units follow the organizational pattern of other ground forces units, and are thus organized into brigades, 

battalions, and companies.

2-46. Air Force organizations are grouped on a functional, mission-related basis into divisions, regiments, 

squadrons, and flights. For example, a bomber division is composed primarily of bomber regiments, and a 

fighter regiment is composed mainly of fighter squadrons. The Air Force also has some mixed aviation 

units with a combination of fixed- and rotary-wing assets; these follow the normal Air Force organizational 

pattern, with mixed aviation regiments and squadrons. However, rotary-wing subordinates of these mixed 

aviation units would be battalions and companies (rather than squadrons and flights), following the pattern 

of similar units in army aviation. Various fixed- and/or rotary-wing Air Force assets may be task-organized 

as part of a joint, operational-level command in wartime.

NONDIVISIONAL UNITS

2-47. Units listed as “nondivisional” [marked “(Nondiv”)] in the HTFS organizational directories might be 

found in any of the operational-level commands discussed above, or in a theater command, or directly 

subordinate to the appropriate service headquarters. The HTFS contains brigade- and battalion-size units of 

single arms such as SAM, artillery, SSM, antitank, combat helicopter, signal, and INFOWAR. In wartime, 

these nondivisional units can become part of a task-organized operational- or tactical-level command. 

These units almost always operate in support of a larger formation and only rarely as tactical groups or 

detachments, or on independent missions.

SECTION IV – IRREGULAR FORCES

2-48. Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, 

police, or other internal security forces (JP 3-24). The OPFOR recognizes how its adversaries and enemies 

categorize irregular forces. The distinction of being armed as an individual or group can include a wide 

range of people who can be categorized correctly or incorrectly as irregular forces. Excluding members of 

regular armed forces, police, or internal security forces from being considered irregular forces may appear 

to add some clarity. However, such exclusion is inappropriate when a soldier of a regular armed force, 

policeman, or internal security force member is concurrently operating in support of insurgent, guerrilla, or 

criminal activities. (See TC 7-100.3 for a detailed discussion of irregular opposing forces.)

2-49. Irregular forces can be insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal organizations or any combination that might 

also include armed and unarmed combatants. Any of these OPFOR individuals, groups, organizations, 

units, or forces can be affiliated with mercenaries, corrupt governing authority officials, compromised 

commercial and public entities, active or covert supporters, and willing or coerced members of a populace. 

Independent OPFOR actors can also act on agendas separate from those of irregular forces but be 

categorized as an irregular element. An additional complication is determining who is or may be an armed 

combatant and/or unarmed combatant, and what is or may be a legitimate or an illicit commercial or private 

organization.

2-50. Terrorism is a tactic often associated with irregular forces. Acts of terrorism demonstrate an intention 

to cause significant psychological and/or physical effects on a relevant population through the use or threat 

of violence. Terrorism strategies are typically a long-term commitment to degrade the resilience of an 

enemy in order to obtain concessions from an enemy with whom terrorists are in conflict. International 

conventions and/or law of war protocols on armed conflict are often not a constraint on terrorists. Whether 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-9
Chapter 2

acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently random, and/or purposely haphazard, the physical, symbolic, 

and/or psychological effects can diminish the confidence of a relevant population for its key leaders and 

governing institutions. The OPFOR uses terrorism when these tactics achieve actions or reactions of an 

enemy and/or relevant population that benefit the OPFOR operational or strategic objectives. 

IRREGULAR ORGANIZATIONS 

2-51. Irregular organizations are distinct from the regular armed forces of a sovereign nation state, but can 

resemble them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. Therefore, the HTFS organizational 

directories include baseline organizations for insurgent and guerrilla forces (see examples in appendixes C 

and E), as well as criminal organizations and private security organizations. This TC presents OPFOR 

organizational considerations for training, professional education, and leader development venues as 

follows:

 Insurgent organization

 Guerrilla unit

 Criminal organizations

 Noncombatants—when this category of individual is complicit in activities as coerced or willing 

members of irregular forces. Notwithstanding, many noncombatants conduct legitimate private 

or commercial activities that complicate identifying noncombatant supporters of irregular forces. 

2-52. Irregular forces may operate in other than military or military-like (paramilitary) capacities and 

present diverse threats in an OE. “A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the 

capability and intent to harm U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland. Threats may include 

individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nationstates, or national alliances. When threats execute their capability to do harm to the United States, they 

become enemies” (ADRP 3-0). Irregular forces can also be part of a hybrid threat, that is, “the diverse and 

dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to 

achieve mutually benefitting effects” (ADRP 3-0). A hybrid threat can consist of any combination of two or 

more of these components. ADRP 3-0 defines an enemy as “a party identified as hostile against which the 

use of force is authorized.” The OPFOR apply these definitions in its organization and irregular force 

operations. 

INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

2-53. Insurgent organizations have no regular, fixed table of organization and equipment structure. The 

mission, environment, geographic factors, and other OE variables determine the configuration and 

composition of each insurgent organization and its subordinate cells. Their composition varies from 

organization to organization, mission to mission, and environment to environment. Insurgent organizations 

are typically composed of from three to over 30 cells. All of the direct action cells could be multifunction 

(or multipurpose), or some may have a more specialized focus. The single focus may be a multifunction 

direct action mission, assassination, sniper, ambush, kidnapping, extortion, hijacking and hostage taking, or 

mortar and rocket attacks. Each of these may be the focus of one or more cells. More often, the direct 

action cells are composed of a mix of these capabilities and several multifunction cells. There are also a 

number of types of supporting cells with various functions that provide support to the direct action cells or 

to the insurgent organization as a whole. Thus, a particular insurgent organization could be composed of 

varying numbers of multifunction or specialty direct action cells, supporting cells, or any mix of cells. (See 

TC 7-100.3.) 

2-54. Insurgents are armed and/or unarmed individuals or groups who promote an agenda of subversion 

and violence that seek to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. They can transition between 

subversion and violence dependent on specific conditions to organize use of subversion and violence to 

seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. The intention is to gradually undermine the 

confidence of a relevant population in a governing authority’s ability to provide and justly administer civil 

law, order, and stability.

2-55. Several factors differentiate the structure and capabilities of an insurgent organization (direct action 

cells and support cells) from the structure and capabilities of a guerrilla unit. An insurgent organization can 

2-10 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Hybrid Threat Force Structure

be primarily a covert organization with a cellular structure to minimize possible compromise of the overall 

organization. Much of the organizational structure may be disguised within a relevant population. By 

comparison, a guerrilla unit displays military-like unit structure, systems, member appearance, and 

leadership titles. Insurgent organizations typically do not have many of the heavier weapon systems and 

more sophisticated equipment that guerrilla units can possess. The weapons of the insurgents are generally 

limited to small arms, antitank grenade launchers, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and may 

possess limited crew-served weapons (82-mm mortar, 107-mm single-tube rocket launcher). In the event 

the insurgents require heavier weapons or capabilities, they might obtain them from guerrillas or the 

guerrilla unit might provide its services depending on a mutually supporting relationship between the two 

organizations. 

2-56. Insurgent organizations normally conduct irregular conflict within or near the sovereign territory of a 

state in order to overthrow or force change in that state’s governing authority. Some insurgent activities—

such as influencing public opinion and acquiring resources—can occur outside of the geographic area that 

is the focus of the insurgency.

2-57. An insurgent organization may originate and remain at the local level. A local insurgent organization

may exist at small city, town, village, parish, community, or neighborhood level. It may expand and/or 

combine with other local organizations. Cities with a large population or covering a large area may be 

considered regions and may include several local insurgent organizations. A higher insurgent organization

may exist at regional, provincial, district, national, or transnational level.. The OE and the specific goals 

determine the size and composition of each insurgent organization and the scope of its activities.

HIGHER INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

2-58. The higher insurgent organization includes any insurgent organization at regional, provincial, 

district, or national level, or at the transnational level. Cities with a large population or covering a large 

geographic area are considered regions. Higher insurgent organizations can have transnational affiliations 

or other overt and/or covert support. (See Tc 7-100.3.)

2-59. Higher insurgent organizations usually contain a mix of local insurgent organizations and 

guerrillaunits. Each of these organizations provides differing capabilities. The main capabilities of a higher 

insurgent organization that are not usually present in a local insurgent organization are as follows:

 Subordinate local insurgent organizations in their network. (Local insurgent organizations

usually do not have echeloned subordinate local insurgent organizations.)

 Guerrilla units within their network and operating in the same geographic area. (Local insurgent

organizations may have temporary affiliations with guerrilla units or may occasionally command

and control them.)

 Personal protection and security cell(s) for the organization’s senior leaders and designated

advisors or special members. (A local insurgent organization does not normally have a personal

protection and security cell.)

 Associations and/or affiliations with criminal organizations directly and without coordination

with subordinate local insurgent organizations. (The long-term vision in a higher insurgent

organization may include cooperation with regional or transnational criminal organizations for

specific capabilities or materiel available through criminal networks.)

LOCAL INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

2-60. The term local insurgent organization applies to any insurgent organization below regional, 

provincial, or district level. This includes small cities, towns, villages, parishes, communities, 

neighborhoods, and/or rural environments. Large cities are equivalent to regions and may contain several 

local insurgent organizations. Activities remain focused on a local relevant population.(See TC 7-100.3.)

2-61. Local insurgent organizations may or may not be associated with or subordinate to a higher insurgent 

organization at the regional, national, or transnational level. The local insurgents may operate 

independently, without central guidance or direction from the overall movement, and may not be associated 

with a larger, higher insurgent movement in any manner. The local insurgent organization can be 

subordinate to, loosely affiliated with, or completely autonomous and independent of higher insurgent 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-11
Chapter 2

organizations. These relationships are generally fluctuating and may be mission dependent, agendaoriented motivations.

2-62. Differences between a local insurgent organization and a higher insurgent organization are as 

follows:

 Direct actions cells are present within a local insurgent organization. Their multifunctional 

and/or specific functional capabilities may be enhanced or limited based on availability of 

resources and technical expertise in or transiting the local OE. These direct actions are planned 

for immediate and/or near-term effects related to the local insurgent organization’s area of 

influence.

 Guerrilla units might not be subordinate to the local insurgent organization. However, 

temporary affiliations between local insurgents and guerrillas are possible for specified missions 

coordinated by a higher insurgent organization. Direct action personnel may use, fight alongside 

of, or assist affiliated forces, and guerrillas to achieve their common goals or for any other 

agenda. Guerrilla units may operate in a local insurgent organization’s area of influence and 

have no connection to the local insurgent organization or a higher insurgent organization.

 Criminals can affiliate with a local insurgent organization or a higher insurgent organization as a 

matter of convenience and remain cooperative only as long as criminal organization aims are 

being achieved. The local insurgent organization retains a long-term vision of its political 

agenda, whereas cooperation by a criminal organization is usually related to local commercial 

profit and/or organizational influence in a local environment. This usually equates to criminals 

controlling or facilitating materiel and commodity exchanges. The criminal is not motivated by a 

political agenda.

2-63. Appendix C provides an example of a typical local insurgent organization, taken from volume III of 

the HTFS organizational directories. For illustrative purposes, this example includes a reasonable number 

of multifunction direct action cells (four) and at least one cell of each of the 18 other more specialized 

types. The dashed boxes in the organizational graphic indicate the possibilities for varying numbers of each 

type of cell, depending on the functions required for the insurgent organization to accomplish its mission.

Insurgent organizations may a relationship with guerrilla organizations, criminal organizations, and/or other 

actors based on similar or shared goals and/or interests. The nature of the shared goal/interest determines 

the tenure and type of relationship and the degree of affiliation or association. Guerrilla Units

2-64. A guerrilla force is a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along 

military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory (JP 

3-05). Thus, guerrilla units are an irregular force, but structured similar to regular military forces. They 

resemble military forces in their command and control (C2) and can use military-like tactics and 

techniques. Guerrillas normally operate in areas occupied by an enemy or where a hostile actor threatens 

their intended purpose and objectives. Therefore, guerrilla units adapt to circumstances and available 

resources in order to sustain or improve their combat power. Guerrillas do not necessarily comply with 

international law or conventions on the conduct of armed conflict between and among declared 

belligerents. 

2-65. Compared to insurgent organizations as a whole, guerrilla units have a more military-like structure. 

Within this structure, guerrillas can have some of the same types of weapons as a regular military force. 

The guerrilla unit contains weapons up to and including 120-mm mortars, antitank guided missiles 

(ATGMs), and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and can conduct limited mine warfare and 

sapper attacks. Other examples of equipment and capability the guerrillas can have in their units that the 

insurgents generally do not have are 12.7-mm heavy machineguns; .50-cal anti-materiel rifles; 73-, 82-, and 

84-mm recoilless guns; 100- and 120-mm mortars; 107-mm multiple rocket launchers; 122-mm rocket 

launchers; GPS jammers; and signals intelligence capabilities.

2-66. The area of operations (AOR) for guerrilla units may be quite large in relation to the size of the force. 

A large number of small guerrilla units can be widely dispersed. Guerrilla operations may also occur as 

independent squad or team actions. In other cases, operations could involve a guerrilla brigade and/or 

independent units at battalion, company, and platoon levels. A guerrilla unit can be an independent 

paramilitary organization and/or a military-like component of an insurgency. Guerrilla actions focus on the 

tactical level of conflict and its operational impacts. Guerrilla units can operate at various levels of local, 

2-12 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Hybrid Threat Force Structure

regional, or international reach. In some cases, transnational affiliations can provide significant support to 

guerrilla operations.

2-67. Guerrilla units may be as large as several brigades or as small as a platoon and/or independent 

hunter/killer (H/K) teams. The structure of the organization depends on several factors including the 

physical environment, sociological demographics and relationships, economics, and support available from 

external organizations and/or countries. Some guerrilla units may constitute a paramilitary arm of an 

insurgent movement, while other units may pursue guerrilla warfare independently from or loosely 

affiliated with an insurgent organization.

2-68. Some guerrilla units may have honorific titles that do not reflect their true nature or size. For 

example, a guerrilla force that is actually of no more than battalion size may call itself a “brigade,” a 

“corps,” or an “army.” A guerrilla unit may also refer to itself as a “militia.” This is a loose usage of the 

term militia, which generally refers to citizens trained as soldiers (as opposed to professional soldiers), but 

applies more specifically to a state-sponsored militia that is part of the state’s armed forces but subject to 

call only in emergency. To avoid confusion, the TC 7-100 series uses militia only in the latter sense.

GUERRILLA BRIGADES

2-69. The composition of the guerrilla brigadeis flexible. A basically rural, mountainous, or forested area 

with no major population centers might have a guerrilla brigade with only one or two battalions (or five or 

six companies) with little or no additional combat support or combat service support. A guerrilla brigade 

operating astride a major avenue of approach, or one that contains several major population (urban) or 

industrial centers, might be a full guerrilla brigade with additional combat support or combat service 

support elements. (See TC 7-100.3.)

2-70. Unit structure isclosely aligned to a military-like organization and its subordinate echelons. Typical 

composition of a fully organized guerrilla brigade may be as follows:

 Brigade headquarters.

 Three or more guerrilla battalions.

 Weapons battalion.

 Reconnaissance company.

 Sapper company.

 Transport company.

 Signal platoon.

 Medical platoon.

GUERRILLA BATTALIONS

2-71. A brigade-sized guerrilla force may not be feasible; however,a guerrilla battalion or a taskorganized battalion may be an available level of capability. A guerrilla battalion may be any combination of 

guerrilla companies or guerrilla H/K companies. When a battalion consists predominantly of guerrilla H/K 

companies, it may be considered a guerrilla hunter-killer (H/K) battalion. A typical task-organizedbattalion might have four or five guerrilla H/K companies, organic battalion units, and a weapons battery 

from brigade (with mortar, antitank, and rocket launcher platoons) and possibly intelligence and electronic 

warfare (IEW) support.

2-72. Battalion structure is flexible. However, composition of a typical guerrilla battalion is as follows:

 Battalion headquarters.

 Guerrilla companies or guerrilla HK companies.

 Weapons company.

 Reconnaissance platoon.

 Sapper platoon.

 Transport platoon.

 Signal section.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-13
Chapter 2

 Medical section.

GUERRILLA COMPANIES

2-73. The guerrilla company fights with platoons, squads, and fire teams. When organized for combat as a 

guerrilla H/K company, it fights with H/K groups, sections, and teams. The guerrilla H/K company is 

simply a restructured guerrilla company.They both contain the same number of personnel and similar 

equipment. Complete battalions and brigades or selected subordinate units can be organized for combat as 

H/K units.

2-74. The typical guerrilla H/K company is organized into three H/K groups. Each group has four sections 

of three H/K teams each. This company structure contains a total of 36 H/K teams. There can be 39 H/K 

teams if the two sniper teams and the company scouts in the company’s headquarters and command section 

are configured as H/K teams.

2-75. The guerrilla H/K company is especially effective in restrictive terrain and close environments (such 

as urban, forest, or swamp). The task-organized H/K team structure is ideal for dispersed combat 

operations. H/K teams can easily disperse within an area of operations and conduct coordinated or semiindependent actions.

2-76. Company structure is flexible. A typical guerrilla company consists of—

 Headquarters and service section.

 Three guerrilla platoons

 Weapons platoon.

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

2-77. Criminal organizations are normally independent of threat control and large-scale organizations often 

extend beyond national boundaries to operate regionally or worldwide. Individual criminals or small-scale 

criminal organizations (gangs) do not typically have the capability to adversely affect legitimate political, 

military, and judicial organizations. Large-scale organizations can demonstrate significant capabilities 

adverse to legitimate governance in an area, region, nation, and/or transnational influence. The weapons 

and equipment mix varies, based on type and scale of criminal activity. Criminal organizations can take on 

the characteristics of a paramilitary organization. (See TC 7-100.3.)

2-78. By mutual agreement and when their interests coincide, criminal organizations may become affiliated 

with other non-state paramilitary actors such as insurgent organization or guerrilla unit. Insurgents or 

guerrillas controlling or operating in the same area can provide security and protection to the criminal 

organization’s activities in exchange for financial assistance or arms. Guerrilla or insurgent organizations 

can create diversionary actions, conduct reconnaissance and early warning, money laundering, smuggling, 

transportation, and civic actions on behalf of the criminal organization. Their mutual interests can include 

preventing state forces from interfering in their respective spheres.

2-79. Criminal organizations might also be affiliated with threat military and/or paramilitary actors. A 

state, in a period of war or during clandestine operations, can encourage and materially support criminal 

organizations to commit actions that contribute to the breakdown of civil control in a neighboring country. 

OTHER COMBATANTS 

ARMED COMBATANTS

2-80. In any OE, there will be nonmilitary personnel who are armed but not part of an organized 

paramilitary organization or military unit. Some of these nonaffiliated personnel may possess small arms 

legally to protect their families, homes, and/or businesses. Some might only be opportunists who decide to 

attack a convoy, a vehicle, or a soldier in order to make a profit. Motives might be economic, religious, 

racial, cultural differences, or revenge, hatred, and greed. 

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Hybrid Threat Force Structure

2-81. Armed combatants may represent a large segment of undecided elements in a relevant population. 

An event prompting support to the OPFOR might be the injury or death of a family member, loss of 

property, or the perceived disrespect of their culture, religion, or social group. Armed combatants might 

change sides several times depending on the circumstances directly affecting their lives.

2-82. Some armed noncombatant entities can be completely legitimate enterprises. However, some 

activities can be criminal under the guise of legitimate business. The irregular OPFOR can embed 

operatives in legitimate commercial enterprises or criminal activities to obtain information and/or 

capabilities not otherwise available to it. Actions of such operatives can include sabotage of selected 

commodities and/or services. They may also co-opt capabilities of a governing authority infrastructure and 

civil enterprises to support irregular OPFOR operations

UNARMED COMBATANTS

2-83. The local populace contains various types of unarmed nonmilitary personnel who, given the right 

conditions, may decide to purposely and materially support the OPFOR in hostilities against an enemy. 

This active support or participation may take many forms, not all of which involve possessing or using 

weapons. For example, in an insurgent organization unarmed personnel might conduct recruiting, 

financing, intelligence-gathering, supply-brokering, transportation, courier, or information warfare 

functions (including videographers and camera operators). Technicians and workers who fabricate IEDs 

might not be armed. The same can be true of people who knowingly provide sanctuary for combatants. 

Individuals who perform money-laundering or operate front companies for large criminal organizations 

might not be armed. Individual criminals or small gangs might be affiliated with a paramilitary 

organization and perform support functions that do not involve weapons. 

2-84. Examples can include unarmed religious, political, tribal, or cultural leaders who participate in or 

actively support the OPFOR. Unarmed media or medical personnel may become affiliated with a military 

or paramilitary organization. Unarmed individuals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile 

actions and those who do so unwittingly can, in some cases, be categorized as combatants. From the 

viewpoint of some governing authorities attempting to counter an OPFOR, any armed or unarmed person 

who engages in hostilities, and/or purposely and materially supports hostilities against the governing 

authority or its partners might be considered a combatant. 

NONCOMBATANTS

2-85. Noncombatants are persons not actively participating in combat or actively supporting of any of the 

forces involved in combat. They can be either armed or unarmed. Many noncombatants are completely 

innocent of any involvement with the OPFOR. However, the OPFOR will seek the advantage of operating 

within a relevant population of noncombatants whose allegiance and/or support it can sway in its favor. 

This can include clandestine yet willing active support (as combatants), as well as coerced support, support 

through passive or sympathetic measures, and/or unknowing or unwitting support by noncombatants. (See 

TC 7-100.3)

2-86. The TC 7-100.4 online directories also include nonmilitary actors that are not part of the HTFS but 

might be present in the OE. As noncombatants, they are currently either friendly or neutral. They can be 

either armed or unarmed, and have the potential to become combatants in certain conditions. They might 

provide support to combatants—either as willing or unwilling participants.

2-87. The irregular OPFOR recognizes that noncombatants living and/or working in an area of conflict can 

be a significant source of— 

 Intelligence collection.

 Reconnaissance and surveillance.

 Technical skills.

 General logistics support.

2-88. The irregular OPFOR actively attempts to use noncombatants within a relevant population to support 

its goals and objectives. It sees them as a potential multiplier of irregular OPFOR effectiveness. It will also 

attempt to use the presence of noncombatants to limit the effectiveness of its enemies. The irregular 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-15
Chapter 2

OPFOR can marshal and conceal its combatant capabilities while hiding among armed and unarmed 

noncombatants in a geographic or cyber location.

ARMED NONCOMBATANTS

2-89. In any OE, there will be nonmilitary individuals and groups who are armed but are not part of an 

organized paramilitary or military structure. Some may be in possession of small arms legally to protect 

their families, property, and/or businesses. Some may use weapons as part of their occupation (for example, 

hunters, security guards, or local police). Some may be minor criminals who use their weapons for 

activities such as extortion and theft; they might even steal from U.S. forces, to make a profit. They may be 

completely neutral or have leanings for either side, or several sides. However, they are not members of or 

directly affiliated with a hostile faction. Their numbers vary from one individual to several hundred. Given 

the fact that they are already armed, it would be easy for such noncombatants to become combatants, if 

their motivation and commitment changes. 

2-90. Some armed noncombatant entities can be completely legitimate enterprises. However, some 

activities can be criminal under the guise of legitimate business. The OPFOR can embed operatives in 

legitimate commercial enterprises or criminal activities to obtain information and/or capabilities not 

otherwise available to it. Actions of such operatives can include sabotage of selected commodities and/or 

services. They may also co-opt capabilities of a governing authority infrastructure and civil enterprises to 

support irregular OPFOR operations

2-91. Examples of armed noncombatants commonly operating in an OE are—

 Private security contractor (PSC) organizations.

 Local business owners and employees.

 Private citizens and private groups authorized to carry and use weapons.

 Criminals and/or organizations with labels such as cartels, gangs.

 Ad hoc local “militia” or “neighborhood watch” programs.

2-92. As one example, private security contractors (PSCs) are commercial business enterprises that provide 

security and related services on a contractual basis. PSCs are employed to prevent, detect, and counter 

intrusions or theft; protect property and people; enforce rules and regulations; and conduct investigations. 

They may also be used to neutralize any real or perceived threat. PSCs can act as an adjunct to other 

security measures and provide advisors, instructors, and support and services personnel for a state’s 

military, paramilitary, and police forces. They may also be employed by private individuals and businesses 

(including transnational corporations). PSCs are diverse in regard to organizational structure and level of 

capability. The weapons and equipment mix is based on team specialization/role and varies. Other example 

equipment includes listening and monitoring equipment, cellular phones, cameras, facsimiles, computers, 

motorcycles, helicopters, all-terrain vehicles, antitank disposable launchers, submachine guns, and silenced 

weapons.

UNARMED NONCOMBATANTS

2-93. Other actors in the OE include unarmed noncombatants. These nonmilitary actors may be neutral or 

potential side-changers in a conflict involving the irregular OPFOR. Their choice to take sides depends on 

their perception of who is causing a grievance for them. It also depends on whether they think their 

interests are best served by supporting a governing authority. Given the right conditions, they may decide

to purposely support hostilities against a governing authority that is the enemy of the OPFOR. Even if they 

do not take up arms, such active support or participation moves them into the category of unarmed 

combatants. (See TC 7-100.3.)

2-94. Some of the more prominent types of unarmed noncombatants are—

 Media personnel.

 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

 Transnational corporations and their employees.

 Private citizens and groups.

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Hybrid Threat Force Structure

2-95. However, unarmed noncombatants may also include internally displaced persons, refugees, and 

transients. They can also include foreign government and diplomatic personnel present in the area of 

conflict. Examples of common types of unarmed noncombatants can also be found in the organizational 

directories. These include medical teams, media, humanitarian relief organizations, transnational 

corporations, displaced persons, transients, foreign government and diplomatic personnel, and local 

populace. These nonmilitary actors may be neutral or potential side-changers depending on OE conditions 

as they change.

SECTION V – ORGANIZATIONAL DIRECTORIES

2-96. This organization guide is linked to online organizational directories, which TRADOC G2, ACE, 

Threats (ACE-Threats) maintains and continuously updates, as necessary, to represent contemporary and 

emerging capabilities. These directories provide a comprehensive menu of the numerous types of Threat 

organizations in the detail required for the Army’s live, virtual, and constructive training environments. To 

meet these various requirements, the directories contain over 10,000 pages of organizational information, 

breaking out most Threat units down to squad-size components. However, some training simulations either 

cannot or do not need to portray Threat units down to that level of resolution. From this extensive menu, 

therefore, trainers and training planners can select and extract only the units they need, in the appropriate 

level of detail for their specific training requirements.

Note. The organizations in these directories do not constitute a threat order of battle (OB).

However, trainers and training planners can use these organizational building blocks to construct 

a threat OB that is appropriate for their training requirements. To do so, it will often be 

necessary to create task organizations from the available building blocks. It may also be 

necessary to substitute different pieces of equipment for those listed for units in the 

organizational directories.

2-97. The organizational information contained in the directories exceeds the scope and size that can be 

accommodated within a traditional FM format. The magnitude of task-organizing an exercise order of 

battle also requires that users have the ability to use downloaded organizations in an interactive manner. 

For these reasons, it is necessary for this FM to be linked to organizational diagrams and associated 

equipment inventories made available in electronic form that users can download and manipulate as 

necessary in order to create task organizations capable of fighting in adaptive ways that typify the OE.

Note. For illustrative purposes, this FM contains several examples from the online HTFS 

organizational directories. Readers are reminded that even the baseline HTFS organizations 

are subject to change over time. Therefore, readers should always consult the online 

directories for the latest, most up-to-date versions of organizational data.

2-98. Online directories of organizations in the HTFS are accessible by means of the following link to the 

Army Training Network portal: https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=311; then click on the 

particular organization needed for that portion of the threat force structure. If the user is already logged into 

AKO (by user name and password or by Common Access Card login), no further login may be necessary.

2-99. The directories consist of four volumes: Divisions and Divisional Units; Nondivisional Units; 

Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Actors; and Other. These directories are maintained and continuously 

updated, as necessary, by the TRADOC G2, ACE, Threats (ACE-Threats), in order to represent 

contemporary and emerging capabilities. The TRADOC G-2, ACE Threats is designated as “the 

responsible official for the development, management, administration, integration, and approval functions 

of the OPFOR Program across the Army” (AR 350-2).

2-100. The role of these directories is to provide a menu of Threat units to use in task-organizing to stress 

U.S. Army training. These directories do not constitute an order of battle (OB) but rather a menu of 

capabilities. Chapter 3 provides guidance on how to task-organize the Hybrid Threat from the pieces 

contained in the online directories. In some cases, task-organizing may not be required (particularly at 

lower tactical levels), and fighting organizations may be lifted directly from the HTFS. However, it is often 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-17
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necessary to tailor these standard organizations into task organizations better suited for training 

requirements.

2-101. There is no such thing as a standard structure for major operational-level commands in the HTFS: 

corps, armies, army groups, military districts, or military regions. Therefore, the online directories provide 

only the organizational structures for the types of units likely to be found in one of these echelons-abovedivision commands in the peacetime HTFS. In an OPFOR OB, some of these units will have become part 

of a task organization at operational or tactical level.

FILES FOR OPFOR UNITS

2-102. The architectural build of the HTFS units located on the ATN website is simple and 

straightforward. The organizations were built from the bottom up, solely for trainers and planners to use to 

select and build Threat organizations to execute Hybrid Threat countertasks. The build for the 

organizational directories started at the lowest level, breaking out the organization, personnel, and 

equipment down to squad-size components, since some training simulations may require that level of 

resolution. If some trainers or training planners do not require that level of detail, they can extract from the 

organizational directories the entries starting at the lowest level that is required for their particular exercise 

OB.

2-103. All of the Threat organizations listed in the HTFS organizational directories on ATN are 

constructed using known software so the trainer could tailor and/or task-organize them individually or 

collectively to meet specific training and/or simulation requirements. Most trainers and simulators have 

software available and a basic knowledge of its use. See appendix B for detailed instructions that should 

enable a trainer with only a basic knowledge of to build a task-organized structure using available software.

2-104. The basic entry for each organization is built in an document. This Document provides details for 

the Threat organization and contains four basic sets of information: unit name, organizational graphics,

personnel information, and principal items of equipment (unless personnel and equipment are listed in a 

separate spreadsheet). For examples, see appendix D, which contains the complete entries for the motorized 

infantry company and the personnel and equipment spreadsheets for the motorized infantry battalion as 

they appear in the HTFS organizational directories on ATN.

UNIT NAME

2-105. The name of the unit appears in a heading at the top of each page in the organizational directory. 

Each or file name includes the name of the highest unit described in that file.

2-106. The names of some units (usually battalions or companies) in the HTFS organizational directories 

are followed by the label “(Div)” or “(Sep).” Here, “(Div)” indicates that the battalion or company in 

question is the version of its type organization normally found at division level in the HTFS. Separate 

brigades in the HTFS have some subordinates that are the same as at division level and are therefore 

labeled “(Div).” Other subordinates that are especially tailored to the needs of a separate brigade are 

labeled “(Sep).” Any subordinates of a separate brigade that are the same as their counterparts in a 

divisional brigade do not have either of these labels. Units with “(Sep)” following their names are not 

separate battalions or separate companies. To avoid confusion, any unit that is actually “separate” would 

have the modifier “Separate” (or abbreviated “Sep”) preceding its name rather than following it.

2-107. Some units (usually brigades and battalions) could have the label “(Nondiv)” following their 

names in order to identify them as “nondivisional” assets (not subordinate to a division). Other units with 

the same basic name may have the label “(Div)” to distinguish them as being “divisional” (subordinate to a 

division). For example, the Materiel Support Brigade (Nondiv) has a different structure from the Material 

Support Brigade (Div).

ORGANIZATIONAL GRAPHICS

2-108. The organizational graphics are built in known software and then inserted into a document. The 

organizational charts for specific organizations in the online directories depict all possible subordinate units

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Hybrid Threat Force Structure

in the HTFS. Aside from the basic organization, the organizational directory entry for a particular unit may 

contain notes that indicate possible variations and alternatives.

Note. Some of the graphics in this TC are based on graphics in the online organizational 

directories. In the process prescribed for FM publication, however, they may have been 

converted to another format and thus can no longer be opened or manipulated as objects. If users 

of this TC need these graphics, they will have to go to the organizational directories on the Army 

Training Network (ATN) Website at https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=311 . 

2-109. Organization charts in the online directories display units in a standard line-and-block chart 

format. These charts show unit names as text in a rectangular box (rather than using “enemy” unit symbols 

in diamonds, as is often the custom in Threat OBs for training exercises). There are a number of reasons for 

this, mostly in the interest of clarity: The Threat has some units whose nature and names (appropriate to 

their nature) do not correspond directly to unit symbols in ADRP 1-02, which are designed primarily for 

depicting the nature of U.S. units. Therefore, the use of text allows organizational charts to be more 

descriptive of the true nature of Hybrid Threat units. The space inside a rectangular box is better suited than 

a diamond for showing the unit names as text, thus allowing organization charts to display a larger number 

of subordinate units in a smaller space.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LISTS

2-110. For each unit, the organizational directories provide a very detailed listing of personnel and 

equipment. For some training requirements, the Threat OB might not need to include personnel numbers. A 

particular OB might not require a listing of all equipment, but only major end items. In such cases, trainers 

and training planners can extract the appropriate pages from the organizational directories and then 

simplify them by eliminating the detail they do not need. However, the directories make the more detailed 

version available for those who might need it.

2-111. At the lowest-level organizations (for example, infantry squad), where the organizational chart 

does not show a unit breaking down into further subordinate units, the organizational directories list 

individual personnel with their individual weapons. (Figure 2-4 shows the example of an infantry squad, 

taken from page 15 of the Document for the motorized infantry battalion in the HTFS organizational 

directories. See appendix D for additional details on the motorized infantry platoon, company, and 

battalion.) At this level, each individual’s duty title/position/function is identified for all Threat personnel 

organic to the organization described. The duty title is followed by the individual’s rank category:

 (O) = Officers (commissioned and warrant).

 (N) = Noncommissioned officers.

 ( ) = Enlisted personnel. This is usually blank and reflected only in the personnel totals.

Note. Charts for insurgent organizations are the exception, since they do not show personnel 

broken down into the three rank categories. Insurgents are not part of a formalized military 

structure and are therefore not broken down by rank. See appendix C for an example of 

insurgent organization. For additional information on insurgents, see TC 7-100.3.

2-112. Directly following the individual’s title and rank category is the number of personnel occupying

that position, such as (x1) or (x2). This is followed by the nomenclature of the individual’s assigned 

personal weapon, such as AK-74M or SVD. In some cases, an individual may have two assigned weapons; 

for example, an individual assigned a 7.62-mm GP MG, PKM may also be assigned a 9-mm Pistol, PM. 

This reads as PKM/PM in the listing. In some instances, the individual also serves as the gunner/operator of 

a weapon—this is also identified. In figure 2-4, for instance, the Grenadier (x1) is the gunner/operator of 

the ATGL, Panzerfaust 3-T600. His personal weapon is the 5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U. The Riflemen 

(x2) are assigned the 5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M with the 40-mm Under-Barrel Grenade Launcher, 

GP-30 (similar to the U.S. M16/M203).

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-19
Chapter 2

Figure 2-4. Infantry Squad Personnel and Equipment (Example)

2-113. Personnel totals for a unit are listed below the detailed listing of individual personnel and their 

equipment (or directly below the organizational chart for larger units). The first number reflects the total 

personnel in that organization. The second set of numbers breaks down the total number of personnel by 

rank category. In this case, “E” is used for enlisted personnel. In figure 2-4 on page 2-17, for example, the 

personnel for the infantry squad indicate that there are no officers, two noncommissioned officers, and 

seven enlisted personnel—for a total of nine personnel.

Infantry Squad, Inf Plt____________________________________________________

INFANTRY

SQUAD

Squad Leader (N) (x1) ..............................AK-74M

Asst Sqd Ldr (N) (x1) ................................AK-74M

Machinegunner (x1).................................PKM/PM

Asst Machinegunner (x1) ..........................AK-74M

Sniper/Marksman (x1).....................................SVD

Grenadier (x1)............................ PZF3-T/AKS-74U

Asst Grenadier (x1)...................................AK-74M

Rifleman (x2) .................................AK-74M/GP-30

Total Personnel....................9 O-0/N-2/E-7

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM ..............................................................1

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M.....................................6

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U............................................1

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * ................................................1

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD * ..........................................1

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30....................................2

ATGL, Panzerfaust 3-T600 *...........................................1

ATDL, Armbrust..............................................................1

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series **............................... 2

Mines (AP&AT) **/*** .................................Assorted

Binocular Laser Rangefinder * ...................................2

GPS Receiver, Handheld ............................................ 2

Night-Vision Goggles................................................. 2

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30) ........................ 2

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power............................... 2

NOTES:

1. The infantry squad consists of at least two maneuver fire teams. The squad leader may choose to command one fire 

team while the assistant squad leader commands the second. The infantry squad may be augmented by elements from the 

weapons squad–in which case the infantry squad may operate with three maneuver fire teams (or anti-armor hunter-killer 

teams). 

2. The squad leader and assistant squad leader both have NVGs, a handheld radio, LRF, and GPS. The riflemen also 

support other weapons including the machinegunner, the ATGL grenadier, the sniper/marksman, or attachments from the 

weapons squad.

3. Some squads may have a second machinegunner in lieu of the rifleman (mission dependent). In this case the second 

rifleman becomes the assistant machinegunner. You gain a PKM and PM for the machinegunner and an AK-47M for the 

assistant machinegunner but lose the two AK-74M/GP-30s the riflemen carried previous to the substitution. 

__________________________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon–BOI may vary.

*** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mine mix is mission dependent and varies.

15

2-20 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Hybrid Threat Force Structure

2-114. For organizations from the lowest levels up through battalion level (in some cases up to brigade 

level), the basic entry in the HTFS organizational directories includes a listing of “Principal Items of 

Equipment.” This list gives the full nomenclature for each item of equipment and the total number of each 

item in the unit. Figure 2-4 on page 2-17 shows an example of this for the infantry squad.

2-115. Some weapons are issued as a munition rather than an individual’s assigned weapon. An example 

of this is the Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series (see figure 2-4 on page 2-17). Generally, a footnote 

accompanies these weapons, stating that they are issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—therefore the 

basis of issue (BOI) may vary. Anyone in the unit might fire these weapons, and the numbers of these 

weapons in an organization vary. Often they are carried in a vehicle, or kept on hand, until needed.

2-116. Sometimes a weapon is not assigned a gunner. In this case, a note generally describes the 

relationship. Some organizations, especially Special-Purpose Forces, have a wide selection of weapons and 

equipment available due to their multipurpose mission capability. The final selection of weapons and 

equipment is determined by the specific mission required at the time. These weapon and equipment 

numbers are easily adjusted using and/or.

Note. Some of the graphics in this TC are based on spreadsheets in the online organizational 

directories. In the process prescribed for FM publication, however, they may have been 

converted to another format and thus can no longer be opened or manipulated as objects. If users 

of this TC need these spreadsheets in form, they will have to go to the organizational directories 

on the Army Training Network (ATN) Website at 

https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=311 .

2-117. For larger organizations, personnel and equipment numbers are listed in spreadsheets. There is a 

vertical column for each subordinate unit and a horizontal row for each item of equipment, with an 

automatically summed total at the right end of each row for the total number of each item of equipment in 

the overall organization. When the overall organization contains multiples of a particular subordinate unit, 

the unit designation at the top of the column indicates the number of like units (for example, “Hunter/Killer 

Groups (x3)” for the three hunter/killer groups in a hunter/killer company of a guerrilla battalion). In the 

interest of space, however, the spreadsheet format is not used for smaller units. Instead, they list “Total 

Personnel” and “Principal Items of Equipment” as part of the document. Brigades and some battalions list 

personnel and equipment in both formats.

FOOTNOTES

2-118. Footnotes apply to lists of personnel and equipment, in either or format. Each footnote has a 

number of asterisks that link it to footnote reference with the same number of asterisk in the equipment list. 

Some footnotes explain—

 Characteristics of a piece of equipment (for example, “* With thermal sight”).

 Why the total for a particular item of equipment is flexible (for example, ** Issued as 

ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI varies”).

 The types of weapons or equipment that might be included under “Assorted.”

 Possible equipment substitutions and their effect on personnel numbers.

2-119. In a spreadsheet, footnotes with reference asterisks in the top row of a column can provide 

information about the subordinate unit in that column. Most often, this type of footnote explains that the 

equipment numbers in that column have already been multiplied to account for multiple subordinates of the 

same type. For example, the reference “Motorized Infantry Company (x3)*” is linked to a footnote that 

explains: “* The values in this column are the total number for three companies.” Other footnotes serve the 

same purposes as in a document.

NOTES

2-120. Notes in a Document generally apply to the organization as a whole or its relationship with other 

organizations. Occasionally, they provide additional information on a particular part of the organization. In 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-21
Chapter 2

either case, notes are numbered (unless there is only one), but the number is not linked to a particular part 

of the organization. Various types of notes can explain—

 The nature of the organization and possible variations in its structure.

 Possible augmentation with additional equipment.

 Personnel options. For example: “Some squads may have a second machinegunner in lieu of a 

rifleman (mission dependent).”

 Unit capabilities or limitations. For example: “The infantry platoon has sufficient assets to 

transport the platoon headquarters and weapons squad. It is dependent upon augmentation from 

higher (battalion transport platoon) to transport the three infantry squads over distance.”

 Which personnel man a particular weapon or piece of equipment.

 How units or personnel are transported.

 How a unit or subordinate is employed and the types of tactics used.

 How assets of one subordinate can be allocated to other subordinates.

2-121. Especially for paramilitary and nonmilitary entities, notes describe various possible mixtures of 

personnel, equipment, and subordinates that might occur. Notes may reference another manual in the 7-100 

series for more information regarding the organization described.

FOLDERS FOR THREAT FORCE STRUCTURE

2-122. The organizational directories of the HTFS are contained in four volumes. Each volume is divided 

into folders that contain the unit files. These folders and files serve as the menu for threat baseline units. 

Many of the baseline Hybrid Threat Force Structure (HTFS) is located on the Army Training Network 

(ATN) for ease of access and use. The HTFS organizational directories are continually updated on the 

ATN; therefore, the listing below is dynamic. Over time, additional units will be added and existing units 

will be modified and updated, as necessary, to represent contemporary and emerging capabilities. Although 

the list of threat units may change, the basic architecture of the organizational directories will remain

essentially the same. Figure 2-5 on page 2-22 shows the basic listing of folders in the organizational

directories. For a more detailed listing of folders and files for threat units in the TFS organizational 

directories, see appendix A.

2-123. A particular training venue might not require the level of detail found in the spreadsheets and 

equipment lists in the organizational directories. However, the use of these tools is a good way to avoid the 

sometimes significant errors that can result from more expedient methods of performing the threat OB 

function. (See appendix B.)

2-22 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Hybrid Threat Force Structure

Volume I – Divisions and Divisional Units

01 Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV) 

01 Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV)

02 Division Headquarters and Staff

03 Integrated Fires Command and Integrated Support Command

04 Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV) (X3)

05 Tank Brigade (Div) 

06 Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade

07 Air Defense Brigade (Short-Range)

08 Materiel Support Brigade (Div) 

09 Antitank Battalion

10 Reconnaissance Battalion

11 Sniper Company

12 Engineer Battalion

13 Signal Battalion

14 Chemical Defense Battalion

15 Medical Battalion

02 Mechanized Infantry Division (APC) (see appendix A)

03 Tank Division (see appendix A)

04 Motorized Infantry Division (see appendix A)

Volume II – Nondivisional Units

01 Separate Combat Brigades

01 Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV)

02 Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (APC)

03 Separate Tank Brigade

04 Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade

02 Combat Brigades (Nondivisional)

01 Special-Purpose Forces Brigade

02 Multiple Rocket Launcher Brigade (Nondiv)

03 Combat Support Units (Nondivisional)

01 Smoke Battalion (Nondiv)

04 Combat Service Support Units (Nondivisional)

01 Materiel Support Brigade (Nondiv)

Volume III – Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Actors

01 Combatants

01 Armed Combatants

01 Insurgent Organizations

01 Local Insurgent Organization

02 Higher Insurgent Org (Regional, National, Transnational)

02 Guerrilla Brigade

02 Unarmed Combatants

02 Noncombatants 

01 Armed Noncombatants

02 Unarmed Noncombatants

Volume IV – Other

01 Glossary

02 Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light), Example

Threat Task Organization

03 Other Nondivisional Units

Figure 2-5. Basic Listing of Folders in TFS Organizational Directories

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 2-23
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Chapter 3

Task-Organizing 

The concept of task-organizing for combat is not unique to the Threat. It is 

universally, performed at all levels, and has been around as long as combat. The U.S. 

Army defines a task organization as “A temporary grouping of forces designed to 

accomplish a particular mission” and defines task-organizing as “The process of 

allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their 

command and support relationships” (ADRP 1-02). Task-organizing of the Hybrid 

Threat must follow Hybrid Threat doctrine (see TC 7-100, FM 7-100.1, and TC 7-

100.2) and reflect requirements for stressing U.S. units’ mission essential task list 

(METL) in training.

SECTION I − FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-1. The purpose behind task-organizing the Threat is to build an order of battle (OB) that is appropriate 

for U.S. training requirements. The Hybrid Threat Force structure (HTFS) organizational directories are not

the Threat OB. The OB is the Threat’s go-to-war, fighting force structure.

U.S. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 

3-2. The HTFS’s reason for existence is to serve as an appropriately challenging sparring partner in U.S. 

training. The Threat doctrinal view, task-organizing is a top-down process, the process of building the 

Threat Force Structure for a training event is best approached in a bottom-up mannerfor practical 

purposes. That is because the task organizations at one level of command are the building blocks for 

determining the overall organization and total equipment holdings of the next-higher command. From the 

perspective of U.S. Army training, OPFOR task organization is also based on the missions and tasks the 

Hybrid Threat needs to perform in order to stress U.S. units’ METL.

3-3. At some point, the holdings of the higher levels of command become irrelevant to a particular 

training event. Generally, this occurs when those assets no longer have an effect on Hybrid Threat

capabilities within the particular area of responsibility (AOR) where the training event occurs. If trainers 

build the Threat Force Structure from the bottom up, they will know when to stopor at least when all 

they need is a general organizational outline, rather than a detailed OB.

Note. It is possible to have a training scenario that begins when the Hybrid Threat is still entirely 

in its peacetime HTFS—or that peacetime organization is all the U.S. force knows about the 

Threat’s organization. Then an implied task for the U.S. unit(s) would be to conduct further OB 

analysis to determine what parts of the threat currently have been task-organized and how. In 

most cases, however, the training scenario begins at a point when the Hybrid Threat has already 

task-organized its forces for combat. In those cases, the HTFS as a whole is merely a part of the 

road to war, which outlines how this fight came to take place and how the U.S. unit(s) become 

challenged by certain threat unit(s). Aside from specific organizations designed to perform 

specific countertasks to challenge U.S. METL tasks, everything else could be a mere backdrop—

to explain the larger context in which this particular fight occurs and perhaps where some of the 

assets came from to form this particular Threat Force Structure.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-1 
Chapter 3

HYBRID THREAT DOCTRINE 

3-4. U.S. training requirements normally dictate the size and type of Hybrid Threat needed. Nevertheless, 

the Threat Force Structure needs to make sense within the Hybrid Threat doctrinal framework, including 

the task-organizing process. From the Hybrid Threat doctrinal view, task-organizing is a top-down process. 

That is because the higher commander is always the one who decides the missions of his subordinates and 

allocates additional resources for some of those missions. The allocated units can have several types of 

command and support relationship with the receiving command.

ALLOCATION AND SUBALLOCATION OF ASSETS

3-5. OPFOR commanders must consider where the assets required for a particular task organization are 

located within the threat force structure (TFS) and how to get them allocated to the task organization that 

needs them. Particularly at the tactical level, the base organization around which a tactical group or 

detachment is formed may not have the organizational or equipment assets necessary to carry out the 

mission. Its next higher headquarters might have such assets at its disposal to allocate downward, or those 

assets might first have to be allocated from outside that parent organization in order for the parent 

organization to further suballocate them to the task organization. The latter could be the case, for instance, 

when a brigade tactical group (BTG) within a division or division tactical group (DTG) needs attack 

helicopters to augment its fire support or transport helicopters to enable a heliborne landing. If the BTG 

needs these assets in a subordinate (constituent or dedicated) command relationship rather than just a 

supporting relationship, a higher headquarters would have to allocate the helicopter units to the division or 

DTG, which would in turn suballocate them to this BTG.

3-6. When tactical-level commands become part of the fighting force structure, they often receive 

additional assets that better enable them to perform a mission for which they are task-organized. If some of 

their original subordinates are inappropriate or otherwise not required for the assigned mission, the tacticallevel organizations typically leave these behind, under the command and control (C2) of their next-higher 

headquarters that remains in the TFS framework. The higher headquarters could provide these units to 

another task organization or hold them in reserve for possible future requirements.

Note. The Hybrid Threat must understand its own strengths and weaknesses, and those of its 

enemy. An OPFOR commander must consider how to counter or mitigate what the other side 

has and/or how to exploit what he has on his own side. The mitigation or exploitation may be by 

means of equipment, tactics, or organization—or more likely all of these. However, the process 

generally starts with the proper task organization of forces with the proper equipment to 

facilitate appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

HYBRID THREAT COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

3-7. Hybrid Threat units are organized using four command and support relationships, summarized in 

table 3-1 and described in the following paragraphs. Command relationships define command 

responsibility and authority; they establish the degree of control and responsibility commanders have on 

forces operating under their control. Support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired 

when one capability supports another. These relationships may shift during the course of an operation in 

order to best align the force with the tasks required. The general category of subordinate units includes 

both constituent and dedicated relationships; it can also include interagency and multinational (allied) 

subordinates.

Table 3-1. Command and Support Relationships

Relationship Commanded by Logistics from Positioned by Priorities from

Constituent Gaining Gaining Gaining Gaining

Dedicated Gaining Parent Gaining Gaining

Supporting Parent Parent Supported Supported

Affiliated Self Self or “Parent” Self Mutual Agreement

3-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Task-Organizing

Constituent

3-8. Constituent units are those forces assigned directly to a unit and forming an integral part of it. They 

may be organic to the table of organization and equipment of the administrative structure forming the basis 

of a given unit, assigned at the time the unit was created, or attached to it after its formation. From the view 

of an OPFOR commander, a unit has the same relationship to him regardless of whether it was originally 

organic or was later assigned or attached.

Dedicated

3-9. Dedicated is a command relationship identical to constituent with the exception that a dedicated unit 

still receives logistics support from a parent organization of similar type. An example of a dedicated unit 

would be the case where one or two surface-to-surface missile (SSM) battalions from an SSM brigade 

could be dedicated to an operational-strategic command (OSC). Since the OSC does not otherwise possess 

the technical experts or transloading equipment for missiles, the dedicated relationship permits the SSM 

battalion(s) to fire exclusively for the OSC while still receiving its logistics support from the parent SSM 

brigade. Another example of a dedicated unit would be the case where a specialized unit, such as an attack 

helicopter company, is allocated to a brigade tactical group (BTG). Since the base brigade does not 

otherwise possess the technical experts or repair facilities for the aviation unit’s equipment, the dedicated 

relationship permits the helicopter company to execute missions exclusively for the BTG while still 

receiving its logistics support from its parent organization. In Hybrid Threat plans and orders, the dedicated 

command relationship is indicated by “(DED)” next to a unit title or symbol.

Note. The dedicated relationship is similar to the U.S. concept of operational control (OPCON), 

but also describes a specific logistics arrangement. This is something for exercise designers to 

consider when developing the Threat Force Structure. They should not “chop” part of an SSM 

unit to an OSC, DTG or BTG without its support structure. If the gaining unit does not have the 

ability to support the SSM unit logistically, it might be better to keep it in a dedicated 

relationship. If the gaining unit also does not have the capability to exercise command over the 

SSM unit, it might be better to keep it in a supporting relationship. 

Supporting

3-10. Supporting units continue to be commanded by and receive their logistics from their parent 

headquarters, but are positioned and given mission priorities by their supported headquarters. This 

relationship permits supported units the freedom to establish priorities and position supporting units while 

allowing higher headquarters to rapidly shift support in dynamic situations. The supporting unit does not 

necessarily have to be within the supported unit’s AOR. An example of a supporting unit would be a 

fighter-bomber regiment supporting an OSC for a particular phase of the strategic campaign plan (SCP) but 

ready to rapidly transition to a different support relationship when this OSC becomes the theater reserve in 

a later phase. Another example of a supporting unit would be a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) battalion 

supporting a BTG for a particular phase of an operation but ready to rapidly transition to a different support 

relationship when the BTG becomes the DTG reserve in a later phase. In Hybrid Threat plans and orders, 

the supporting relationship is indicated by “(SPT)” next to a unit title or symbol.

Note. The supporting relationship is the rough equivalent of the U.S. concept of direct support 

(DS). Note that there is no general support (GS) equivalent. That is because what would be GS 

in the U.S. Army is merely something that is constituent to the parent command in the OPFOR.

In U.S. doctrine the format for task-organizing says: “List subordinate units under the C2 

headquarters to which they are assigned, attached, or in support. Place DS units below the units 

they support.” In the threat force structure, therefore, units in the supporting status (like U.S. DS) 

could be considered part of the task organization of the “supported” unit. For units that are 

supporting, but not subordinate, it may be better to keep them and their equipment listed under 

their parent unit’s assets, unless that parent unit is not included in the OB. In any case, trainers 

will need to know what part of the parent unit will actually affect the situation.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-3 
Chapter 3

Affiliated

3-11. Affiliated organizations are those operating in a unit’s AOR that the unit may be able to sufficiently 

influence to act in concert with it for a limited time. No “command relationship” exists between an 

affiliated organization and the unit in whose AOR it operates. Affiliated organizations are typically 

nonmilitary or paramilitary groups such as criminal organizations, terrorists, or insurgents. In some cases, 

affiliated forces may receive support from the OSC, DTG, or BTG as part of the agreement under which 

they cooperate. Although there would typically be no formal indication of this relationship in Hybrid 

Threat plans and orders, in rare cases “(AFL)” is used next to unit titles or symbols.

Note. Although there is no “command” relationship between the two organizations, the military 

command may have the ability to influence an affiliated paramilitary organization to act in 

concert with it for a limited time. For example, it might say: “If you are going to set off a car 

bomb in the town square, we would appreciate it if you could do it at 3 o’clock tomorrow 

afternoon.” In organizational charts for threat force structure, affiliated forces are shown with a 

dashed line (rather than a solid one) connecting them to the rest of the task organization. The 

dashed line indicates only a loose affiliation, but no direct command relationship with the 

military unit with which they are affiliated. For units that are affiliated, but not subordinate, it 

may be better to list their personnel and equipment separately or under their parent unit’s assets, 

if there is a parent organization. However, trainers will need to know what part of the parent unit 

will actually affect the situation. If affiliated forces are not included in organization charts or 

equipment totals for the task organization, they have to be accounted for elsewhere in the OB.

SECTION II – THREAT FORCES: STRATEGIC LEVEL

3-12. In the wartime fighting force structure, the national-level command structure still includes the 

National Command Authority (NCA), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the General Staff. The only 

difference is that the MOD and General Staff merge to form the Supreme High Command. How the Armed 

Forces are organized and task-organized depends on the type of operations they are conducting under the 

State’s strategic framework.

SUPREME HIGH COMMAND

3-13. In wartime, the State’s NCA exercises C2 via the Supreme High Command (SHC), which includes 

the MOD and a General Staff drawn from all the service components. In peacetime, the MOD and General 

Staff operate closely but separately. During wartime, the MOD and General Staff merge to form the SHC, 

which functions as a unified headquarters. (See figure 3-1 on page 3-6.)

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

3-14. For most training scenarios, strategic-level organizations serve only as part of the road to war 

background. Within the Hybrid Threat strategic framework, it makes a difference whether the exercise 

portion of the scenario takes place during regional, transition or adaptive operations. (See TC 7-100 for 

more detail on these strategic-level courses of action.)

3-15. For regional operations against a weaker neighboring country, the Hybrid Threat might not have 

needed to use all the forces in its HTFS in forming its fighting force structure—only “all means necessary” 

for the missions at hand. As U.S. and/or coalition forces begin to intervene, the Hybrid Threat begins 

transition operations and shifts more HTFS units into the wartime fighting structure—possible mobilizing 

reserves and militia to supplement regular forces. For adaptive operations against U.S. and coalition forces, 

the Hybrid Threat would use “all means available.” Even those forces that were previously part of the 

fighting force structure might need to be task-organized differently in order to deal with extraregional 

intervention.

3-16. If the Hybrid Threat is originally task-organized to fight a regional neighbor, it would (if it has time) 

modify that task organization in preparation for fighting an intervening U.S. or coalition force. Threat units 

may have suffered combat losses during the original fight against a neighboring country or in the early 

3-4 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Task-Organizing

stages of the fight against U.S. or coalition forces. In such cases, the threat force structure might have to 

change in order to sustain operations. Lost or combat-ineffective units might be replaced by units from the 

reserves, paramilitary units from the Internal Security Forces, or regular military units from other 

commands, which are still combat effective—or by additional units from the HTFS. If not already the case, 

Hybrid Threat military forces may incorporate irregular forces (insurgent, guerrilla, or even criminal), at 

least in an affiliated relationship.

SECTION III – THREAT FORCES: OPERATIONAL LEVEL

3-17. In the peacetime HTFS, each service of the Armed Forces commonly maintains its forces grouped 

under single-service operational-level commands (such as corps, armies, or army groups) for administrative 

purposes. In some cases, forces may be grouped administratively under operational-level geographical 

commands designated as military regions or military districts. (See chapter 2 for more detail on these 

administrative groupings.) However, these administrative groupings normally differ from the Armed 

Forces’ go-to-war (fighting) force structure. (See figure 3-1 on page 3-6.)

3-18. In wartime, most major administrative commands continue to exist under their respective service 

headquarters. However, their normal role is to serve as force providers during the creation of operationallevel fighting commands, such as field groups (FGs) or operational-strategic commands (OSCs). OSC 

headquarters may exist in peacetime, for planning purposes, but would not yet have any forces actually 

subordinate to them. The same would be true of any theater headquarters planned to manage multiple 

OSCs. FGs, on the other hand, are not normally standing headquarters, but may be organized during full 

mobilization for war.

3-19. The original operational-level administrative headquarters normally remain “in garrison” during 

conflict. After transferring control of its major fighting forces to one or more task-organized fighting 

commands, an administrative headquarters, facility, or installation continues to provide depot- and area 

support-level administrative, supply, and maintenance functions. A geographically-based administrative 

command also provides a framework for the continuing mobilization of reserves to complement or 

supplement regular forces. 

3-20. In rare cases, an administrative command could function as a fighting command. This could occur, 

for instance, when a particular administrative command happens to have just the right combination of 

forces for executing a particular strategic campaign plan. (This is not likely to be the case at division level 

and higher.) Another case would be in times of total mobilization, when an administrative command has 

already given up part of its forces to a fighting command and then is called upon to form a fighting 

command with whatever forces remain under the original administrative headquarters.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-5 
Chapter 3

Figure 3-1. Wartime Fighting Force Structure

3-21. The operational level of command is that which executes military tasks assigned directly by a 

strategic campaign plan (SCP). The most common Hybrid Threat operational-level commands are FGs and 

OSCs. There is also the possibility that a division or DTG could be directly subordinate to the SHC in the 

fighting force structure and thus perform tasks assigned directly by an SCP. In such cases, the Hybrid 

Threat would consider the divisions or DTGs to be operational-level commands. More typically, however, 

they perform tactical missions as subordinates of an FG or OSC.

FIELD GROUP

3-22. A field group is the largest operational-level organization, since it has one or smaller operationallevel commands subordinate to it. An FG is a grouping of subordinate organizations with a common 

headquarters, a common AOR, and a common operation plan. FGs are always joint and interagency 

organizations and are often multinational. However, this level of command may or may not be necessary in 

a particular SCP. An FG may be organized when the number of forces and/or the number of major military 

efforts in a theater exceeds the theater commander’s desired or achievable span of control. This can 

facilitate the theater commander’s remaining focused on the theater-strategic level of war and enable him to 

coordinate effectively the joint forces allocated for his use.

3-23. The General Staff does not normally form standing FG headquarters, but may organize one or more 

during full mobilization, if necessary. An FG can be assigned responsibilities in controlling forces in the 

field during adaptive operations in the homeland, or forward-focused functionally (an FG may be assigned 

an access-control mission). However, FGs may exist merely to accommodate the number of forces in the 

theater.

SERVICE

HQs

FGs/OSCs

SEPARATE 

DIVs/DTGs/

BDEs/BTGs/BNs

NATIONAL 

COMMAND 

AUTHORITY

SUPREME

HIGH COMMAND

MINISTRY OF 

DEFENSE

GENERAL 

STAFF

 

THEATER HQs

SINGLE-SERVICE 

OPERATIONALLEVEL COMMANDS

SEPARATE SINGLESERVICE 

DIVs/DTGs/

BDEs/BTGs/BNs

3-6 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Task-Organizing

3-24. FGs are typically formed for one or more of the following reasons:

 An SCP may require a large number of OSCs and/or operational-level commands from the

HTFS. When the number of major military efforts in a theater exceeds the theater commander’s

desired or achievable span of control, he may form one or more FGs.

 In rare cases when multiple operational-level commands from the HTFS become fighting

commands, they could come under the control of an FG headquarters.

 Due to modifications to the SCP, a standing operational-level headquarters that was originally

designated as an OSC headquarters may receive one or more additional operational-level

commands from the HTFS as fighting commands. Then the OSC headquarters would transition

into an FG headquarters.

OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC COMMAND

3-25. The Hybrid Threat’s primary operational organization is the OSC. Once the General Staff writes a 

particular SCP, it forms one or more standing OSC headquarters. Each OSC headquarters is capable of 

controlling whatever combined arms, joint, interagency, or multinational operations are necessary to 

execute that OSC’s part of the SCP. However, the OSC headquarters does not have any forces permanently 

assigned to it.

3-26. Figure 3-2 shows an example of allocation of forces to an OSC. A basic difference between an OSC 

and tactical-level task organizations is that the latter are built around an existing organization. In the case of 

an OSC, however, all that exists before task-organizing is the OSC headquarters. Everything else is this 

example is color coded to show where it came from. Figure 3-2 shows under the OSC all the major units 

from the TFS that are allocated to the OSC headquarters in this example, but does not reflect how those 

units might be task organized within the OSC.

Figure 3-2. Allocation of Forces to an OSC (Example)

3-27. The units allocated from the TFS to form the OSC typically come from an army group, army, or 

corps (or perhaps a military district or military region) or from forces directly subordinate to a service 

Army group assets 

resubordinated to 

the OSC

Army assets 

resubordinated to 

the OSC

LEGEND

Theater assets 

resubordinated to 

the OSC

AIRBORNE

BRIGADE

OSC

HQ

MECHANIZED

INFANTRY

DIVISION

TANK

DIVISION

SPF

BRIGADE

SAM

BRIGADE

SSM

BRIGADE

OSC

UAV

SQUADRON

FIGHTER-BOMBER

AVIATION

REGIMENT

ANTITANK

BRIGADE

COMBAT

HELICOPTER

BRIGADE

FIGHTER-BOMBER

AVIATION

REGIMENT

THEATER

THEATER

AIR ARMY

OTHER

AIR FORCE

ASSETS

FIGHTER-BOMBER

AVIATION

DIVISION

ARMY

TANK

DIVISION

SAM

BRIGADE

ANTITANK

BRIGADE

COMBAT

HELICOPTER

BRIGADE

MECHANIZED

INFANTRY

DIVISION

OTHER

DIVISIONS

OTHER

ARMY

ASSETS

SSM

BRIGADE

UAV

SQUADRON

ARTILLERY

BRIGADE

ARMY

GROUP

AIRBORNE

BRIGADE

OTHER

ARMIES

OTHER

ARMY GROUP

ASSETS

OTHER

ARMY

GROUPS

OTHER

THEATER

ASSETS

ARTILLERY

BRIGADE

SPF

BRIGADE

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-7 
Chapter 3

headquarters. There can also be cases where forces from the services have initially been allocated to a 

theater headquarters and are subsequently re-allocated down to the OSC. The organizations shown under 

the OSC, like those shown under the theater headquarters in this example, indicate a pool of assets made 

available to that command. The commander receiving these assets may choose to retain them at his own 

level of command, or he may choose to sub-allocate them down to one or more of his subordinates for their 

use in their own task organization.

3-28. When the NCA decides to execute a particular SCP, each OSC participating in that plan receives 

appropriate units from the TFS, as well as interagency and/or multinational forces. Forces subordinated to 

an OSC may continue to depend on the TFS for support.

3-29. If a particular OSC has contingency plans for participating in more than one SCP, it could receive a 

different set of forces under each plan. In each case, the forces would be task-organized according to the 

mission requirements in the given plan. Thus, each OSC consists of those division-, brigade-, and battalionsize organizations allocated to it by the SCP currently in effect. These forces also may be allocated to the 

OSC for the purpose of training for a particular SCP. When an OSC is neither executing tasks as part of an 

SCP nor conducting exercises with its identified subordinate forces, it exists as a planning headquarters.

Figure 3-3. Possible OSC Organization (Example)

3-30. Figure 3-3 shows an example of the types of organizations that could make up a particular OSC 

organization. The numbers of each type of subordinate and whether they actually occur in a particular OSC 

can vary. As shown in this example, the composition of an OSC is typically joint, with Air Force and 

possibly maritime (naval or naval infantry) units, and it can also be interagency. If some of the allocated 

forces come from another, allied country, the OSC could be multinational. The simplified example of an 

OSC shown here does not show all the combat support and combat service support units that would be 

present in such an organization. Many of these support units are found in the integrated fires command and 

the integrated support command (outlined below). Other support units could be allocated initially from the 

TFS to the OSC, which further allocates them to its tactical subordinates.

3-31. Once allocated to an OSC, a division or brigade often receives augmentation that transforms it into a 

DTG or BTG, respectively. However, an OSC does not have to task-organize subordinate divisions and 

brigades into tactical groups. Most divisions would become DTGs, but some maneuver brigades in the TFS

may be sufficiently robust to accomplish their mission without additional task-organizing.

3-32. The Hybrid Threat has great flexibility regarding possible OSC organizations for different missions. 

There is virtually no limit to the possible permutations that could exist. The allocation of organizations to 

 

DTGs DIVISIONS

INTEGRATED

SUPPORT

COMMAND

INTEGRATED

FIRES

COMMAND

BTGs BRIGADES AIR FORCE

UNITS

OSC

MARITIME

UNITS

INTERAGENCY

UNITS

RISTA

COMMAND

3-8 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Task-Organizing

an OSC depends on what is available in the State’s TFS, the mission requirements of that OSC, and the 

requirements of other operational-level commands. In a U.S. Army training exercise, the OSC should get 

whatever it needs to give the U.S. unit a good fight and challenge its METL tasks.

INTEGRATED FIRES COMMAND

3-33. The integrated fires command (IFC) is a combination of a standing C2 structure and task 

organization of constituent and dedicated fire support units. (See figure 3-4.) All division-level and above 

Hybrid Threat organizations possess an IFC C2 structure. The IFC exercises command of all constituent 

and dedicated fire support assets retained by its level of command. This includes aviation, artillery, and 

missile units. It also exercises command over all reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target 

acquisition (RISTA) assets allocated to it. Any units that an OSC (or any headquarters at echelons above 

division) suballocates down to its subordinates are no longer part of its IFC. (See FM 7-100.1 for more 

detail on the IFC at OSC level.)

Note. Based on mission requirements, the commander may also allocate maneuver forces to the 

IFC. This is most often done when he chooses to use the IFC command post to provide C2 for a 

strike, but can also be done for the execution of other missions.

Figure 3-4. Possible IFC Components in an OSC

3-34. The number and type of fire support and RISTA units allocated to an IFC is mission-dependent. The 

IFC is not organized according to a table of organization and equipment, but is task-organized to 

accomplish the missions assigned.

IFC Headquarters

3-35. The OSC IFC headquarters, like the overall OSC headquarters, exists in peacetime in order to be 

ready to accommodate and exercise C2 over all forces made subordinate to it in wartime. The IFC 

headquarters is composed of the IFC commander and his command group, a RISTA and information 

warfare (INFOWAR) section, an operations section, and a resources section. Located within the operations 

section is the fire support coordination center (FSCC). To ensure the necessary coordination of fire support 

IFC

OSC

 

IFC

HEADQUARTERS

ARTILLERY

COMPONENT

SPF

COMPONENT

MISSILE

COMPONENT 

INTEGRATED

SUPPORT

GROUP

INFOWAR

COMPONENT

RISTA

COMPONENT

AVIATION

COMPONENT

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-9
Chapter 3

and associated RISTA, the operations section of the IFC headquarters also includes liaison teams from 

subordinate units.

Artillery Component

3-36. The artillery component is a task organization tailored for the conduct of artillery support during 

combat operations. In an OSC’s IFC, it is typically organized around one or more artillery brigades, or 

parts of these that are not allocated in a constituent or dedicated relationship to tactical-level subordinates. 

The artillery component includes appropriate target acquisition, C2, and logistics support assets.

3-37. The number of artillery battalions assigned to an IFC varies according such factors as mission of 

friendly units, the enemy (U.S.) situation, and terrain. However, the number of artillery units also can vary 

based on the capabilities of the supporting artillery fire control system.

Aviation Component

3-38. The aviation component is a task organization tailored for the conduct of aviation operations. The 

aviation component is task-organized to provide a flexible and balanced air combat organization capable of 

providing air support to the OSC commander. It may be organized around an Air Force aviation regiment 

or an air army, or parts of these, as required by the mission. It may also include rotary-wing assets from 

Army aviation. It includes ground attack aviation capability as well as requisite ground and air service 

support assets.

Missile Component

3-39. The missile component is a task organization consisting of long-range missiles or rockets capable of 

delivering conventional or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) munitions. It is 

organized around an SSM or rocket battalion or brigade and includes the appropriate logistics support 

assets. Missile and rocket units may come from the Strategic Forces or from other parts of the TFS (where 

they may be part of a corps, army, or army group).

Special-Purpose Forces Component

3-40. The SPF component normally consists of assets from an SPF brigade. Units may come from the 

national-level SPF Command or from Army, Air Force, and Navy SPF. If an OSC has received SPF units, 

it may further allocate some of these units to supplement the long-range reconnaissance assets a division or 

DTG has in its own IFC. However, the scarce SPF assets normally would remain at OSC level.

RISTA Component

3-41. The RISTA component normally consists of assets from the RISTA Command. All reconnaissance, 

intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) assets allocated to the RISTA command are used 

to create of windows of opportunity that permit OPFOR units to move out of sanctuary and attack. Threat 

RISTA can do this by locating and tracking key elements of the enemy’s C2, RISTA, air defense, and longrange fires systems for attack. 

RECONNAISSANCE INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE TARGET ACQUISITION COMMAND

3-42. The reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition command (RISTA) is a combination 

of a standing C2 structure and task organization of constituent and dedicated reconnaissance units. (See 

figure 3-5.) All Army level Hybrid Threat organizations possess a RISTA C2 structure. The RISTA 

command exercises command over all reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition 

(RISTA) assets allocated to it. Any units that an OSC (or any headquarters at echelons above division) 

suballocates down to its subordinates are no longer part of its RISTA.

3-43. The IFC exercises command over all reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition 

(RISTA) assets allocated to it. The number and type of fire support and RISTA units allocated to an IFC is 

mission-dependent. 

3-10 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Task-Organizing

3-44. Targets of Hybrid Threat RISTA assets during regional operations include the enemy’s

 Precision weapons delivery means.

 Long-range fire systems.

 WMD.

 RISTA assets.

Figure 3-5. Possible RISTA Command in an OSC

Integrated Support Group

3-45. The integrated support group (ISG) is a compilation of units performing logistics tasks that support 

the IFC in a constituent or dedicated command relationship. For organizational efficiency, various units 

performing other combat support and combat service support tasks might be grouped into the ISG, even 

though they may support only one of the major units or components of the IFC. The ISG can perform the 

same functions as the OSC’s integrated support command (see below), but on a different scale and tailored 

to the support requirements of the IFC

3-46. There is no standard ISG organizational structure. The number, type, and mix of subordinate units 

vary based on the operational support situation. In essence, the ISG is tailored to the mission and the task 

organization of the IFC. An ISG can have many of the same types of units as shown in figure 3-6 for one 

example of ISC subordinates, but tailored in size and functions to support the IFC.

INTEGRATED SUPPORT COMMAND

3-47. The integrated support command (ISC) is the aggregate of combat service support units (and perhaps 

some combat support units) allocated from the TFS to an OSC or a division in a constituent or dedicated 

command relationship and not suballocated in a constituent or dedicated command relationship to a 

subordinate headquarters within the OSC. Normally, the OSC further allocates part of its combat service 

support units to its tactical-level subordinates and some, as an ISG, to support its IFC. The rest remain in 

the ISC at OSC level to provide overall support of the OSC. For organizational efficiency, other combat 

service support units may be grouped in this ISC, although they may support only one of the major units of 

the OSC. Sometimes, an ISC might also include units performing combat support tasks (such as chemical 

defense, INFOWAR, or law enforcement) that support the OSC. Any units that an OSC suballocates down 

to its subordinates are no longer part of its ISC. (See FM 7-100.1 for more detail on the ISC at OSC level.)

ISC Headquarters

3-48. The ISC headquarters is composed of the ISC commander and his command group, an operations 

section, and a resources section. The operations section provides the control, coordination, 

communications, and INFOWAR support for the ISC headquarters. Located within the operations section is 

COMMAND

HQ

SIGNAL

BATTALION

UAV

BATTALION

INFOWAR

BATTALION

RISTA

SIGNAL

RECON

BRIGADE

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-11
Chapter 3

the support operations coordination center (SOCC). The SOCC is the staff element responsible for the 

planning and coordination of support for the OSC. In addition to the SOCC, the operations section has 

subsections for future operations and airspace operations. The resources section consists of logistics and 

administrative subsections which, respectively, execute staff supervision over the ISC’s logistics and 

personnel support procedures. The ISC headquarters includes liaison teams from subordinate units of the 

ISC and from other OSC subordinates to which the ISC provides support. These liaison teams work 

together with the SOCC to ensure the necessary coordination of support for combat operations.

Figure 3-6. OSC Task Organization, with ISC Example

ISC Task-Organizing

3-49. The units allocated to an OSC and its ISC vary according to the mission of that OSC and the support 

requirements of other operational-level commands. The OSC resources officer (in consultation with his 

chiefs of logistics and administration and the ISC commander) determines the proper task organization of 

logistics and administrative support assets allocated to the OSC. He suballocates some assets to the IFC and 

to other OSC subordinates based on support mission requirements. The remainder he places under the ISC 

commander. Figure 3-6 above shows a typical OSC organization, with an example of the types of combat 

service support and combat support units that might appear in an OSC ISC.

3-50. The number and type of units in the ISC and ISG will vary according to the number and size of 

supported units in the OSC and its IFC, respectively. For example, an ISC supporting an OSC composed 

mainly of tank and mechanized infantry units will differ from an ISC supporting an OSC composed mainly 

of infantry or motorized infantry units. When the logistics units are no longer required for ISC or ISG 

functions, they will revert to control of their original parent units in the TFS or otherwise will be assigned 

to other operational-level commands, as appropriate.

ISC

MATERIEL

SUPPORT

BRIGADE

MAINTENANCE

BATTALION

TRAFFIC

CONTROL

BRIGADE

CHEMICAL

DEFENSE

BATTALION

OSC

ISC 

HEADQUARTERS

PERSONNEL

SUPPORT

BATTALION

MEDICAL

BATTALION

HEAVY 

EQUIPMENT 

TRANSPORT

BRIGADE 

SMOKE

BATTALION

 

IFC TACTICAL-LEVEL 

SUBORDINATES

ISG

3-12 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Task-Organizing

SECTION IV – THREAT FORCES: TACTICAL LEVEL

3-51. In the TFS, the largest tactical-level organizations are divisions and brigades. In wartime, they are 

often subordinate to a larger, operational-level command. Even in wartime, however, some separate singleservice tactical commands (divisions, brigades, or battalions) may remain under their respective service 

headquarters or come under the direct control of the SHC or a separate theater headquarters. (See figure 3-1 

on page 3-6.) In any of these wartime roles, a division or brigade may receive additional assets that 

transform it into a tactical group.

TACTICAL GROUPS

3-52. A tactical group is a task-organized division or brigade that has received an allocation of additional 

land forces in order to accomplish its mission. Thus, a tactical group differs from higher-level task 

organizations in that it is built around the structure of an already existing organization. Tactical groups 

formed from divisions are division tactical groups (DTGs), and those formed from brigades are brigade 

tactical groups (BTGs). In either of those cases, the original division or brigade headquarters becomes the 

DTG or BTG headquarters, respectively. 

3-53. The additional forces that transform a division or brigade into a tactical group may come from within 

the MOD, from the Ministry of the Interior, or from affiliated forces. Typically, these assets initially are 

allocated to an OSC or FG, which further allocates them to its tactical subordinates. If the tactical group 

operates as a separate command, it may receive additional assets directly from the theater headquarters or 

the SHC that are necessary for it to carry out an operational-level mission. If a DTG has a mission directly 

assigned by an SCP or theater campaign plan, it acts as an operational-level command. If a DTG has a 

mission assigned by an intermediate operational-level command (such as an FG or an OSC), then it acts as 

a tactical-level command.

3-54. A DTG or BTG may receive augmentation from other services of the State’s Armed Forces. 

However, it does not become joint. That is because it can accept such augmentation only in the form of 

land forces, such as special-purpose forces from the SPF Command or naval infantry from the Navy. 

Augmentation may also come from other agencies of the State government, such as border guards or 

national police that have not been resubordinated to the SHC in wartime.

3-55. Any division or brigade receiving additional assets from a higher command becomes a DTG or BTG. 

In addition to augmentation received from a higher command, a DTG or BTG normally retains the assets 

that were originally subordinate to the division or brigade that served as the basis for the tactical group. 

However, it is also possible that the same higher command that augments a division or brigade to transform 

it into a tactical group could use units from one division or brigade as part of a tactical group that is based 

on another division or brigade. The purpose of a tactical group is to ensure unity of command for all land 

forces in a given AOR.

3-56. A DTG may fight as part of an OSC or as a separate unit in an FG or directly under a theater 

headquarters or the SHC. A BTG may fight as part of a division or DTG or as a separate unit in an OSC or 

FG.

DIVISIONS AND DTGS

3-57. Divisions in the TFS are designed to be able to serve as the basis for forming a division tactical 

group (DTG), if necessary. Thus, they are able to

 Accept constituent flame weapons, artillery (cannon and rocket), engineer, air defense, chemical

defense, antitank, medical, logistics, signal, and INFOWAR units.

 Accept dedicated and supporting surface-to-surface missile (SSM), Special-Purpose Forces

(SPF), aviation (combat helicopter, transport helicopter), and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

units. A division may accept these type units as constituent if it is also allocated their essential 

logistics support.

 Integrate interagency forces up to brigade size.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-13
Chapter 3

3-58. Figure 3-7 gives an example of possible DTG organization. Some of the units belonging to the DTG 

are part of the division on which it is based. Note that some brigades are task-organized into BTGs, while 

others may not be and have structures that come straight out of the organizational directories for the TFS. 

Likewise, some battalions and companies may become detachments. Besides what came from the original 

division structure, the rest of the organizations shown come from a pool of assets the parent operationallevel command has received from the TFS and has decided to pass down to the DTG. All fire support units 

that were organic to the division or allocated to the DTG (and are not suballocated down to a BTG) go into 

the integrated fires command (IFC). Likewise, combat service support units go into the integrated support 

command (ISC). As shown here, DTGs can also have affiliated forces from paramilitary organizations.

Figure 3-7. Possible DTG Organization (Example)

3-59. The division that serves as the basis for a DTG may have some of its brigades task-organized as 

BTGs. However, just the fact that a division becomes a DTG does not necessarily mean that it forms BTGs. 

A DTG could augment all of its brigades, or one or two brigades, or none of them as BTGs. A division 

could augment one or more brigades into BTGs, using the division’s own constituent assets, without 

becoming a DTG. If a division receives additional assets and uses them all to create one or more BTGs, it is 

still designated as a DTG.

MANEUVER BRIGADES AND BTGS

3-60. In the TFS, divisional or separate maneuver brigades are robust enough to accomplish some missions 

without further allocation of forces. However, maneuver brigades are designed to be able to serve as the 

basis for forming a brigade tactical group (BTG), if necessary. Thus, they are able to

 Accept constituent flame weapons, artillery (cannon and rocket), engineer, air defense, antitank, 

logistics, and signal units.

 Accept dedicated and supporting chemical defense, medical, EW, SSM, SPF, aviation (combat 

helicopter, transport helicopter), and UAV units. A brigade may accept these type units as 

constituent if it is also allocated their essential logistics support.

 Integrate interagency forces up to battalion size.

DTG

BTGs BRIGADES DETACHMENTS BATTALIONS

COMPANIES ISC INTERAGENCY

UNITS IFC

AFFILIATED

FORCES

3-14 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Task-Organizing

3-61. Figure 3-8 give an example of possible BTG organization. This example shows that some battalions 

and companies of a BTG may be task-organized as detachments, while others are not. Although not shown 

here, BTGs (and higher commands) can also have affiliated forces from paramilitary organizations.

Figure 3-8. Possible BTG Organization (Example)

3-62. Unlike higher-level commands, Hybrid Threat brigades and BTGs do not have an IFC or an ISC. 

Brigade and BTG headquarters have a fire support coordination center (FSCC) in their operations section, 

but are not expected to integrate fires from all systems and services without augmentation.

DETACHMENTS

3-63. A detachment is a battalion or company designated to perform a specific mission and allocated the 

forces necessary to do so. Detachments are the Hybrid Threat’s smallest combined arms formations and 

are, by definition, task-organized. To further differentiate, detachments built from battalions can be termed 

BDETs and those from companies CDETs. The forces allocated to a detachment suit the mission expected 

of it. They may include

 Artillery or mortar units.

 Air defense units.

 Engineer units (with obstacle, survivability, or mobility assets).

 Heavy weapons units (including heavy machineguns, automatic grenade launchers, and antitank

guided missiles).

 Units with specialty equipment such as flame weapons, specialized reconnaissance assets, or

helicopters.

 Chemical defense, antitank, medical, logistics, signal, and INFOWAR units.

 Interagency forces up to company for BDETs or platoon for CDETs.

BDETs can accept dedicated and supporting SPF, aviation (combat helicopter, transport helicopter) and 

UAV units. Figures 3-9 and 3-10 provide examples of a BDET and a CDET, respectively.

BTG

DETACHMENTS BATTALIONS COMPANIES PLATOONS

INTERAGENCY

UNITS

AFFILIATED

FORCES

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-15
Chapter 3

Figure 3-9. Battalion-Size Detachment (BDET) Example

Figure 3-10. Company-Size Detachment (CDET) Example

3-64. The basic type of OPFOR detachment—whether formed from a battalion or a company—is the 

independent mission detachment. Independent mission detachments are formed to execute missions that are 

separated in space and/or time from those being conducted by the remainder of the forming unit. Other 

common types of detachment include

 Counterreconnaissance detachment.

 Movement support detachment.

 Obstacle detachment.

 Reconnaissance detachment.

 Security detachment.

 Urban detachment.

INTEGRATED FIRES COMMAND

3-65. A division or DTG would have an IFC similar to that found in an operational-level command (see 

figure 3-7 on page 3-14). The primary difference is that its aviation component would include only Army 

aviation assets. Also, rather than an “SPF component” as at the operational level, the division or DTG IFC 

would have a “long-range reconnaissance component” that most often would not include scarce SPF assets. 

Even when allocated to a DTG, probably in a supporting status, the SPF would pursue tactical goals in 

support of operational objectives. Any units that a division or DTG suballocates down to its subordinates 

are no longer part of its IFC. An IFC C2 structure Figure 3-11 and task organization is not found below 

division or DTG level. (See TC 7-100.2 for more detail on the IFC at division or DTG level.)

BDET

ADDITIONAL

COMPANIES

BATTALION

(BASE)

ADDITIONAL

PLATOONS

INTERAGENCY

UNITS

CDET

ADDITIONAL

PLATOONS

COMPANY

(BASE)

ADDITIONAL

SQDS/SECTIONS

INTERAGENCY

UNITS

3-16 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Task-Organizing

Figure 3-11. Possible IFC Components in a DTG

Note. In rare cases, such as when a division or DTG would have the mission of conducting a 

strike, the commander might also allocate maneuver forces to the IFC.

INTEGRATED SUPPORT COMMAND 

3-66. A division or DTG would have an ISC similar to that found in an OSC (see figure 3-7 on page 3-14). 

An ISC C2 structure and task organization is not found below division or DTG level. Any units that a 

division or DTG suballocates down to its subordinates are no longer part of its ISC. (See TC 7-100.2 for 

more detail on the ISC at division or DTG level.)

INTERNAL TASK-ORGANIZING

3-67. Given the pool of organizational assets available to him, a commander at any level has several 

options regarding the task-organizing of his subordinates. An OSC is always a task organization. An OSC 

allocated divisions and/or separate brigades would almost always provide those immediate tactical-level 

subordinates additional assets that would transform them into DTGs and BTGs tailored for specific 

missions. However, it is not necessary that all divisions or divisional brigades (or even separate brigades) 

become tactical groups. That is the higher commander’s option.

3-68. At any level of command, a headquarters can direct one or more of its subordinates to give up some 

of their assets to another subordinate headquarters for the creation of a task organization. Thus, a division 

could augment one or more brigades into BTGs, using the division’s own constituent assets, without 

becoming a DTG. A brigade, using its own constituent assets, could augment one or more battalions into 

BDETs (or direct a battalion to form one or more CDETs) without becoming a BTG. A battalion could use 

its own constituent assets to create one or more CDETs without becoming a BDET.

3-69. If a division receives additional assets and uses them all to create one or more BTGs, it is still 

designated as a DTG. If a brigade receiving additional assets does not retain any of them at its own level of 

command but uses them all to transform one or more of its battalions into BDETs, it is still a BTG.

IFC

DTG

 

IFC

HEADQUARTERS

MISSILE

COMPONENT 

ARMY AVIATION

COMPONENT

ARTILLERY

COMPONENT

LONG-RANGE

RECON

COMPONENT

INTEGRATED

SUPPORT

GROUP

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-17
Chapter 3

SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES 

3-70. In wartime, some SPF units from the SPF Command or from the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Internal 

Security Forces SPF may remain under the command and control of their respective service headquarters. 

However, some SPF units also might be suballocated to operational- or even tactical-level commands 

during the task-organizing process.

3-71. When the Hybrid Threat establishes more than one theater headquarters, the General Staff may 

allocate some SPF units to each theater. From those SPF assets allocated to him in a constituent or 

dedicated relationship, the theater commander can suballocate some or all of them to a subordinate OSC.

3-72. The General Staff (or a theater commander with constituent or dedicated SPF) can allocate SPF units 

to an OSC in a constituent or dedicated relationship or place them in support of an OSC. These command 

and support relationships ensure that SPF objectives support the overall mission of the OSC to which the 

SPF units are allocated. Even in a supporting relationship, the commander of the OSC receiving the SPF 

unit(s) establishes those units’ objectives, priorities, and time of deployment. The OSC commander may 

employ the SPF assets allocated to him as constituent or dedicated as part of his integrated fires command 

(IFC), or he may suballocate some or all of them to his tactical-level subordinates. Even SPF units allocated 

to an OSC may conduct strategic missions, if required.

3-73. The SPF units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Internal Security Forces may remain under the 

control of their respective services (or be allocated to a joint theater command). However, they are more 

likely to appear in the task organization of an OSC. In that case, the OSC commander may choose to 

suballocate them to tactical-level subordinates. If necessary, SPF from any of these service components 

could become part of joint SPF operations in support of national-level requirements. In that case, they 

could temporarily come under the control of the SPF Command or the General Staff.

3-74. Regardless of the parent organization in the HTFS, SPF normally infiltrate and operate as small 

teams. When deployed, these teams may operate individually, or they may be task-organized into 

detachments. The terms team and detachment indicate the temporary nature of the groupings. In the course 

of an operation, teams can leave a detachment and join it again. Each team may in turn break up into 

smaller teams (of as few as two men) or, conversely, come together with other teams to form a larger team, 

depending on the mission. At a designated time, teams can join up and form a detachment (for example, to 

conduct a raid), which can at any moment split up again. This whole process can be planned before the 

operation begins, or it can evolve during the course of an operation.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES 

3-75. During wartime, some or all of the internal security forces from the Ministry of the Interior become 

subordinate to the SHC. Thus, they become the sixth service component of the Armed Forces, with the 

formal name “Internal Security Forces.” The SHC might allocate units of the Internal Security Forces to a 

theater command or to a task-organized operational- or tactical-level military command that is capable of 

controlling joint and/or interagency operations. In such command relationships, or when they share a 

common area of responsibility (AOR) with a military organization, units of the Internal Security Forces 

send liaison teams to represent them in the military organization’s staff. (See chapter 2 of this manual and 

TC 7-100.3 for more detail on the various types of internal security forces and their possible roles in the 

OPFOR’s wartime fighting force structure.)

SECTION V − NON-STATE ACTORS

3-76. Various types on non-state actors might be part of the Hybrid Threat, affiliated with it, or support it 

in some manner. Even those who do not belong to the Hybrid Threat or support it directly or willingly 

could be exploited or manipulated by the Hybrid Threat to support its objectives.

INSURGENT AND GUERRILLA FORCES

3-77. Insurgent organizations are irregular forces, meaning that there is no “regular” table of organization 

and equipment. Thus, the baseline insurgent organizations in the organizational directories represent the 

3-18 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Task-Organizing

“default” setting for a “typical” insurgent organization. If a Hybrid Threat has more than one local 

insurgent organization, no two insurgent organizations should look exactly alike. Trainers and training 

planners should vary the types and numbers of cells to reflect the irregular nature of such organizations.

3-78. The baseline organization charts and equipment lists for individual cells include many notes on 

possible variations in organization or in numbers of people or equipment within a given organization. 

When developing an OB for a specific insurgent organization for use in training, users may exercise some 

latitude in the construction of cells. Some cells might need to be larger or smaller than the “default” setting 

found in the organizational directories. Some entire cells might not be required, and some functional cells 

might be combined into a single cell performing both functions. However, trainers and training planners 

would need to take several things into consideration in modifying the “default” cell structures: 

 What functions the insurgents need to be able to perform.

 What equipment is needed to perform those functions.

 How many people are required to employ the required equipment.

 The number of vehicles in relation to the people needed to drive them or the people and

equipment that must be transported.

 Equipment associated with other equipment (for example, an aiming circle/goniometer used with

a mortar or a day/night observation scope used with a sniper rifle).

3-79. Any relationship of independent local insurgent organizations to regional or national insurgent 

structures may be one of affiliation or dependent upon a single shared or similar goal. These relationships 

are generally fluctuating and may be fleeting, mission dependent, or event- or agenda-oriented. Such 

relationships can arise and cease due to a variety of reasons or motivations.

3-80. When task-organizing insurgent organizations, guerrilla units might be subordinate to a larger 

insurgent organization, or they might be loosely affiliated with an insurgent organization of which they are 

not a part. A guerrilla unit or other insurgent organization might be affiliated with a regular military 

organization. A guerrilla unit might also become a subordinate part of an OPFOR task organization based 

on a regular military unit.

3-81. Even in the HTFS organizational directories, some guerrilla units were already reconfigured as 

hunter/killer units. In the fighting force structure represented in a Threat Force Structure, some additional 

guerrilla units may become task-organized in that manner.

OTHER PARAMILITARY FORCES 

3-82. Insurgent and guerrilla forces are not the only paramilitary forces that can perform countertasks that 

challenge a U.S. unit’s METL. Other possibilities are criminal organizations and private security 

organizations. Sometimes the various types of paramilitary organizations operate in conjunction with each 

other when it is to their common benefit.

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

3-83. Criminal organizations may employ criminal actions, terror tactics, and militarily unconventional 

methods to achieve their goals. They may have the best technology, equipment, and weapons available, 

simply because they have the money to buy them. Criminal organizations may not change their structure in 

wartime, unless wartime conditions favor or dictate different types of criminal action or support activities.

3-84. The primary motivation of drug and other criminal organizations is financial profit. Thus, the 

enemies of these organizations are any political, military, legal, or judicial institutions that impede their 

actions and interfere with their ability to make a profit. However, there are other groups that conduct drugtrafficking or other illegal actions as a means to purchase weapons and finance other paramilitary activities.

3-85. When mutual interests exist, criminal organizations may combine efforts with insurgent and/or 

guerrilla organizations controlling and operating in the same area. Such allies can provide security and 

protection or other support to the criminal organization’s activities in exchange for financial assistance, 

arms, and protection against government forces or other common enemies. The amount of mutual 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-19
Chapter 3

protection depends on the size and sophistication of each organization and the respective level of influence 

with the government or the local population.

3-86. Criminal organizations may conduct civic actions to gain and maintain support of the populace. A 

grateful public can provide valuable security and support functions. The local citizenry may willingly 

provide ample intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and security support. Intelligence and security 

can also be the result of bribery, extortion, or coercion.

PRIVATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

3-87. Private security organizations (PSOs) are business enterprises or local ad hoc groups that provide 

security and/or intelligence services, on a contractual or self-interest basis, to protect and preserve a person, 

facility, or operation. Some PSOs might be transnational corporations. Others might be domestic firms that 

supply contract guard forces, or they might be local citizen organizations that perform these actions on a 

volunteer basis. Their clients can include private individuals and businesses (including transnational 

corporations) or even insurgent or criminal organizations.

3-88. The level of sophistication and competence of a commercial PSO is often directly related to a client's 

ability to pay. For example, a drug organization can afford to pay more than many small countries. The 

leader of an insurgent or criminal organization might employ a PSO to provide bodyguards or conduct 

surveillance or a search at a site prior to his arrival. Another group, such as a drug organization or a 

transnational corporation, may contract a PSO to guard its facilities. During the conduct of their duties, 

members of a PSO may take offensive actions. For example, a patrol may conduct a small-scale ambush to 

counter an intrusion. The allegiance of PSOs can vary from fanatical devotion to just doing a job for purely 

financial reasons. Each organization is tailored to serve its customer’s needs.

NONCOMBATANTS 

3-89. Noncombatants might be friendly, neutral, or hostile toward U.S. forces. Even if they are not hostile, 

they could get in the way or otherwise affect the ability of U.S. units to accomplish their METL tasks. 

Some might become hostile, if U.S. forces do not treat them properly. Noncombatants may be either armed 

or unarmed.

3-90. A military or paramilitary force can manipulate an individual or group of noncombatants by 

exploiting their weaknesses or supplying their needs. For example, an insurgent, guerrilla, drug, or criminal 

organization might use bribery or extortion to induce noncombatants to act as couriers or otherwise support 

its activities. It might also coerce a businessperson into running a front company on its behalf. A 

paramilitary organization might orchestrate a civil disturbance by encouraging the local populace to meet at 

a public area at a certain time. Members of the paramilitary group could then infiltrate the crowd and incite 

it to riot or protest. Sometimes, they might pay members of the local populace to conduct a demonstration 

or march.

UNARMED NONCOMBATANTS

3-91. Common types of unarmed noncombatants found in the organizational directories include medical 

teams, media, humanitarian relief organizations, transnational corporations, local populace, displaced 

persons, transients, and foreign government and diplomatic personnel. The directories allow for adjusting 

the number of unarmed noncombatants by employing multiples of the basic organization shown. Thus, 

numbers can vary from one individual to as many as several hundred. While such noncombatants are 

normally unarmed, there is always the potential for them to take up arms in reaction to developments in the 

OE and their perception of U.S. actions. Therefore, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between 

combatants and noncombatants.

3-92. Unarmed noncombatants are likely to be present in any OE. For training in METL tasks other than 

those dealing with armed conflict, these noncombatants are present as key players. However, armed 

conflict will draw in more of some groups, such as displaced persons, humanitarian relief organizations, 

and media. Even in the midst of armed conflict, U.S. units will still need to deal with the local populace and 

3-20 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Task-Organizing

all the other kinds of unarmed noncombatants. Insurgents can melt into the general populace—or perhaps

were always part of it.

ARMED NONCOMBATANTS

3-93. There are also likely to be armed noncombatants who are not part of any military or paramilitary 

organization. Some may be in possession of small arms legally to protect their families or as part of their 

profession (for example, hunters, security guards, or local police). They may be completely neutral or have 

leanings for either, or several sides. Some may be affiliated with the one faction or the other, but are not 

members. Opportunists may decide to hijack a convoy or a vehicle by force of arms. Some are just angry at 

the United States. Some may be motivated by religious, ethnic, and cultural differences, or by revenge, 

anger, and greed. The reasons are immaterial—armed noncombatants are ubiquitous. The organizational 

directories allow for adjusting the number of armed noncombatants by employing multiples of the basic 

organization shown. Thus, numbers can vary from one individual to as many as several hundred. The 

armed noncombatants may have vehicles or may not be associated with any vehicle.

SECTION VI – EXPLOITATION OF NONCOMBATANTS AND CIVILIAN 

ASSETS

3-94. Some noncombatant personnel and civilian assets may be available as additional resources for 

Hybrid Threat military and/or paramilitary forces. Because these assets are not part of the peacetime, threat 

force structure of military or paramilitary organizations, they do not appear under those organizations in the 

online HTFS organizational directories. In wartime, however, they may be incorporated or co-opted into a 

military or paramilitary force. Willingly or unwillingly (sometimes unwittingly), such personnel and 

equipment can supplement the capabilities of a military or paramilitary organization. Therefore, trainers 

and training planners should also take these assets into account when building a Threat Force Structure.

MILITARY FORCES

3-95. In wartime, the State and its armed forces might nationalize, mobilize, confiscate, or commandeer 

civilian transportation assets that are suitable for supporting military operations. These assets can include 

trucks, boats, or aircraft. The Hybrid Threat would organize these assets into units that resemble their 

military counterparts as much as possible. For example, civilian trucks and their operators could be formed 

into a cargo transport company or a whole materiel support battalion. One difference might be that the 

operators are not armed. This is either because weapons are not available or because the Hybrid Threat 

does not trust the operators—who may have been coerced into entering this military-like force, along with 

their vehicles or craft. Civilian construction workers and their equipment (such as dump trucks, back hoes, 

dozers, and cement mixers) could be formed into an engineer support company or a road and bridge 

construction company. Medical professionals, engineers, mechanics, and other persons with key skills 

might also be pressed into military service in wartime, even though they had no connection with the 

military forces in their peacetime, threat force structure.

PARAMILITARY FORCES

3-96. Non-state paramilitary forces also could mobilize additional support assets in the same ways—except 

for nationalization. Again, they could organize these assets into units or cells that are similar to their 

counterparts in the particular paramilitary organization. In this case, transport vehicles could include 

civilian cargo trucks, vans, pickup trucks, automobiles, all-terrain vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles, or carts. 

For the purposes of a paramilitary organization, transportation assets can extend beyond vehicles and craft 

to draft animals and noncombatant personnel used as bearers or porters. Individuals might receive pay for 

their services or the use of their vehicles, or they might be coerced into providing this assistance. A front 

organization could employ such assets without individuals or vehicle owners being aware of the connection 

with the paramilitary organization. In other cases, individuals or groups might volunteer their services 

because they are sympathetic to the cause. When such individuals or their vehicles are no longer required, 

they melt back into the general populace.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-21
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SECTION VII − UNIT SYMBOLS FOR OPFOR TASK ORGANIZATIONS

3-97. Unit symbols for all OPFOR units employ the diamond-shaped frame specified for “hostile” units in 

ADRP 1-02. When there is a color capability, the diamond should have red fill color. All Hybrid Threat 

task organizations should use the “task force” symbol placed over the “echelon” (unit size) modifier above 

the diamond.

3-98. An OSC is the rough equivalent of a U.S. joint task force (JTF). Therefore, the map symbol for an 

OSC is derived from the JTF symbol in ADRP 1-02 (see figure 3-12.)

Figure 3-12. OSC Symbol

3-99. At the tactical level, the area inside the diamond contains the symbol for the branch or function of the 

unit. For Hybrid Threat task organizations, this part of the symbol reflects the type of unit (for example, 

tank, mechanized infantry, or motorized infantry) in the HTFS, which served as the “base” around which 

the task organization was formed and whose headquarters serves as the headquarters for the task 

organization. In many cases, the task organization might also retain the alphanumeric unit designation of 

that base unit as well. Figures 3-13 through 3-18 (on pages 3-22 through 3-23) provide examples for 

various types of Hybrid Threat task organizations at the tactical level.

Figure 3-13. Motorized Infantry-Based DTG Symbol

Figure 3-14. Mechanized Infantry-Based DTG Symbol

OSC

XXX

OSC

XXX

OR

XX XX

OR

XX XX

OR

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Task-Organizing

Figure 3-15. Tank-Based BTG Symbol

Figure 3-16. Heliborne Infantry-Based BDET Symbol

Figure 3-17. Attack Helicopter-Based BDET Symbol

Figure 3-18. Mechanized Infantry-Based CDET Symbol

SECTION VIII − BUILDING AN OPFOR ORDER OF BATTLE

3-100. For effective training, a Hybrid Threat must be task-organized to stress those tasks identified in the 

U.S. unit’s mission essential task list (METL). The U.S. unit commander identifies those areas (or training 

objectives) requiring a realistic sparring partner. The U.S. unit’s organization and mission drives the taskorganizing of the Hybrid Threat. Hybrid Threat task-organizing is accomplished to either stress issues 

X X

OR

I I I I

OR

OR

I I

A

I I

A

I I

OR

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-23
Chapter 3

identified in the U.S. unit’s METL or it is accomplished in order to exploit the Hybrid Threat strength and 

U.S. weakness. Steps 1 through 3 of the process outlined below define the scope and purpose of the training 

exercise. This sets the stage for Steps 4 through 9, which determine the kind of threat needed to produce the 

desired training. The entire process results in building the appropriate Threat Force Structure.

STEP 1. DETERMINE THE TYPE AND SIZE OF U.S. UNITS 

3-101. The U.S. commander who acts as the senior trainer (commander of the parent organization of the 

unit being trained) determines the type and size of unit he wants trained for a specific mission or task. The 

first step in exercise design is for the senior trainer to determine the exact troop list for the training unit. 

The senior trainer should identify the task organization of the unit to be trained.

STEP 2. SET THE CONDITIONS 

3-102. The senior trainer ensures the unit’s training objectives support it’s approved METL. Each training 

objective has three parts: task, condition, and standard. The OE—including the OPFOR—is the condition. 

The exercise planner has the task of actual creating the framework for the exercise and its conditions. For 

the training scenario, the exercise planner develops reasonable courses of action (COAs) for the U.S. unit 

and reasonable COAs for the Hybrid Threat consistent with the OE and the 7-100-series. The exercise 

planner determines the size and type of Threat organizations. The conditions under which U.S. units 

perform tasks to achieve training objectives include the time of day or night, weather conditions, the type of 

Threat, the type of terrain, the CBRN environment, the maturity of the theater, and the OE variables in 

play. During scenario development, all the conditions for the exercise OE are set.

STEP 3. SELECT ARMY TACTICAL TASKS 

3-103. The U.S. commander reviews the Army Universal Task List (AUTL) in FM 7-15. As a catalogue, 

the AUTL can assist a commander in his METL development process by providing all the collective tasks 

possible for a tactical unit of company-size and above and staff sections. From the AUTL, the U.S. 

commander selects specific Army tactical tasks (ARTs) on which he wants to train.

Note. Commanders use the AUTL to extract METL tasks only when there is no current mission 

training plan (MTP) for that echeloned organization, there is an unrevised MTP to delineate 

tasks, or the current MTP is incomplete.) The AUTL does not include tasks Army forces 

perform as part of joint or multinational forces at the operational and strategic levels. Those 

tasks are included in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) (CJCSM 3500.04C).

STEP 4. SELECT OPFOR COUNTERTASKS 

3-104. Trainers and planners select OPFOR countertasks to counter or stress each selected ART for the 

U.S. unit. Appendix A of TC 7-100.2 provides an “OPFOR Universal Task List.” This is a listing of 

OPFOR tactical countertasks for various ARTs found in the AUTL. If, for example, the U.S. unit’s METL 

includes ART 5.1.1 (Overcome Barriers/Obstacles/Mines), the OPFOR countertask would involve creating 

barriers or obstacles or emplacing mines. If the U.S. unit’s METL includes tasks under ART 4.0 (Air 

Defense), the OPFOR needs to have aviation units. If the U.S. unit’s METL includes ART 5.3.2 (Conduct 

NBC [CBRN] Defense), the OPFOR needs to have a CBRN capability. If the U.S. unit’s METL includes 

counterinsurgency operations, the OPFOR should include insurgents.

STEP 5. DETERMINE THE TYPE AND SIZE OF HYBRID THREAT 

UNITS 

3-105. Trainers and planners select the appropriate type and size of Threat unit or units capable of 

performing the OPFOR countertasks. The type of Threat unit is determined by the type of capability 

required for each OPFOR countertask. The size of the Threat organization is determined by the required 

capability and the size of the U.S. unit(s) being trained.

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Task-Organizing

STEP 6. REVIEW THE HTFS ORGANIZATIONAL DIRECTORIES 

3-106. Once the U.S. units and tactical tasks have been matched with OPFOR countertasks and Threat 

units capable of providing counters to each ART, trainers and planners review the list of units in Threat 

Force Structure on the Army Training Network (ATN). They review this menu of Threat units to find out 

what kinds and sizes of Threat units are available in the HTFS, and the options given.

STEP 7. COMPILE THE INITIAL LISTING OF HYBRID THREAT 

UNITS FOR THE TASK ORGANIZATION 

3-107. Trainers and planners compile an initial listing of Hybrid Threat units for the task organization. 

This initial listing could use one of the two task organization formats provided in ADRP 5-0: outline and 

matrix.

STEP 8. IDENTIFY THE BASE UNIT 

3-108. Trainers and planners again review the Hybrid Threat organizational directories to determine 

which standard OPFOR unit most closely matches the OPFOR units in the initial task organization list. 

This Threat unit will become the “base” unit to which modifications are made, converting it into a task 

organization. (At the tactical level, all Threat task organizations are formed around a “base” unit, using that 

unit’s headquarters and all or some of its original subordinates as a core to which other Hybrid Threat units 

are added in order to supply capabilities missing in the original “base” organization.) While the base unit 

for a task organization is most commonly a ground maneuver unit of a regular military force that does not 

necessarily have to be the case. (For example, an aviation unit might serve as the base for a task 

organization that includes infantry units to provide security at its base on the ground.) It is even possible 

that the base unit for the required task organization might be other than a regular military unit. (For 

example, an insurgent or guerrilla organization might have a small military unit affiliated with it, as 

“advisors.”)

3-109. Before extracting the “base” unit from the organizational directories, trainers and training planners 

should determine how much of the organizational detail in the directories they actually need for their 

particular training exercise or simulation. The directories typically break out subordinate units down to 

squad-size components. However, some simulations either cannot or do not need to provide that level of 

resolution. Therefore, trainers and training planners should identify the lowest level of organization that 

will actually be portrayed. If the only task-organizing involved will be internal to that level of base unit, 

any internal task-organizing is transparent to the users. However, if any subordinate of that base unit 

receives assets from outside its immediate higher organization, it might be necessary to first modify the 

subordinate into a task organization and then roll up the resulting personnel and equipment totals into the 

totals for the parent organization in the OPFOR OB for the exercise.

STEP 9. CONSTRUCT THE TASK ORGANIZATION 

3-110. Trainers and planners modify the standard Threat baseline unit to become the new task 

organization. This can involve changes in subordinate units, equipment, and personnel. If training 

objectives do not require the use of all subordinates shown in a particular organization as it appears in the 

HTFS, users can omit the subordinate units they do not need. Likewise, users can add other units to the 

baseline organization in order to create a task organization that is appropriate to training requirements. 

Users must ensure that the size and composition of the Hybrid Threat is sufficient to meet training 

objectives and requirements. However, total assets organic to an organization or allocated to it from higher 

levels should not exceed that which is realistic and appropriate for the training scenario. Skewing the force 

ratio in either direction negates the value of training. Therefore, specific OBs derived from the 

organizational directories are subject to approval by the trainers’ Hybrid Threat-validating authority.

3-111. The steps for converting a HTFS baseline unit to a task-organized Hybrid Threat are 

straightforward and simple. Once the units comprising the task-organization have been identified and the 

HTFS baseline unit has been selected, the following sub-steps are then followed:

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 3-25
Chapter 3

 Step 9a. Create folders in to accommodate the files copied and/or modified from those in the 

HTFS directories using in the process explained below.

 Step 9b. Modify the organizational graphics in the document using graphics. Remove the units 

not needed in the task organization and add the new ones that are required.

 Step 9c. Modify personnel and equipment charts. Even for those lower-level units that have only 

a document in the HTFS organizational directories, it is recommended to use a spreadsheet as a 

tool for rolling up personnel and equipment totals for the modified unit. Update the subordinate 

units at the tops of the columns on the spreadsheets. Adjust all of the equipment numbers in 

appropriate rows, by unit columns. Once the new personnel and equipment numbers are updated, 

transfer the appropriate numbers back to the basic organizational document.

 Step 9d. Adjust equipment tiers, if necessary, to reflect different levels of modernity and 

capability (see chapter 4).

 Step 9e. Update folders and file paths to reflect the conversion from a HTFS organization to a 

task-organized unit.

The task-organized detachment, BTG, DTG, or OSC is finished. For detailed instructions on performing 

Step 9 and its sub-steps, see appendix B.

STEP 10. REPEAT STEPS 4 THROUGH 9 AS NECESSARY 

3-112. Repeat Step 9 for as many task organizations as are required to perform the OPFOR countertasks. 

In each case, select a baseline HTFS unit and modify it as necessary. 

3-113. Training may reveal the need for the U.S. unit to train against other ARTs. If so, trainers and 

planners must repeat Steps 4 through 9.

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Chapter 4

Equipment Options

The Hybrid Threat Force Structure (HTFS) organizational directories provide 

example equipment types and the numbers of each type typically found in specific 

organizations. The purpose is to give trainers and training planners a good idea of 

what a Threat Force Structure should look like. However, training requirements may 

dictate some modifications to this baseline. Therefore, training planners have several 

options by which they can modify equipment holdings to meet particular training 

requirements.

BASELINE EQUIPMENT

4-1. For each organization in the HTFS, the online organizational directories list “Principal Items of 

Equipment” in a document and/or list “Personnel and Items of Equipment” in a spreadsheet chart. (Figures 

4-1 and 4-2 on pages 4-2 and 4-3 show the equipment list for a motorized infantry company in both 

formats.) In most cases, this equipment corresponds to Tier 2 in the tier tables of the Worldwide Equipment 

Guide (WEG) online. However, some elite units, such as Special-Purpose Forces, may have Tier 1 

equipment. On the other hand, insurgent and guerrilla organizations typically have older, less capable 

equipment. (For more information on equipment tiers, see Equipment Tier Tables in the section on the 

WEG later in this chapter.)

Note. For illustrative purposes, this TC contains several examples from the online HTFS 

organizational directories and the online WEG. Readers are reminded that even the baseline 

OPFOR organizations are subject to change over time. The equipment found in those 

organizations can also change. Therefore, readers should always consult the online directories 

for the latest, most up-to-date versions of organizational and equipment data. (See page 4-4 for a 

link to the online WEG.)

4-2. For larger units, equipment lists in the HTFS directories take the form of a spreadsheet that provides 

a quick overview of the holdings for subordinate units and equipment totals for the unit as a whole. When 

the organization chart indicates multiple, identical units subordinate to a particular organization (using 

stacked blocks), the spreadsheet column for those particular subordinates indicates equipment totals already 

multiplied by the number of such units present. The heading with the subordinate unit name at the top of 

such a column indicates that multiplication by adding an annotation, for example “(x2)” or “x3),” after the 

name of the subordinate unit type.

Note. In a unit with multiple subordinates of the same type, one or more of these like 

subordinates may be augmented or decremented in different ways in the process of taskorganizing. In such cases, users will need to replace this column in the spreadsheet with multiple 

columns reflecting the differences created.

4-3. Footnotes linked to the equipment nomenclature in the “Equipment” or “Personnel and Items of 

Equipment” column in equipment lists may serve one of two purposes. Sometimes, such a footnote 

indicates additional information about that piece of equipment or a possible substitute for it. In other cases, 

it may indicate possible variations in the quantity of that particular item of equipment.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 4-1 
Chapter 4

Figure 4-1. Motorized Infantry Company Principal Items of Equipment List

Infantry Company, Mtzd Inf Bn___________________________________________

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM........................................18

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M ............131

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U.....................21

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM *..........................12

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD *....................11

.50-cal Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 *...........2

12.7-mm HMG, NSV *................................8

35-mm AGL-Light, W-87 *.........................9

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30.............30

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 *.................3

ATGM Launcher, Milan 3 ** ......................3

ATGM Lchr, Manportable-SR, Eryx *........3

ATGL-Long Range, RPG-29 *....................6

ATGL, Panzerfaust 3-T600 * ......................9

ATDL, Armbrust ***...................................9

ATDL, RPG-27 ***.....................................4

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series ..................23

Minefield Breaching SystemExplosive Charge, ZRP-2   .............3

Mine-Scattering System, 

Manportable, PKM ................................3

Mines (AP&AT) ** */***** ........... Assorted

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469 ..............7

Truck, Light .................................................3

Truck, Medium ............................................2

Trailer, Cargo, 1-Axle..................................2

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle..................................2

Trailer, Utility ..............................................7

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter).........................1

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades............................. Assorted

Aiming Circle/Goniometer ..........................1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder * ..................42

GPS Receiver, Handheld ...........................53

Laser Target Designator **..........................3

Observation Scope, Day/Night * or ** .........2

Radar, GSR, Manportable, Fara-1 ...............3

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie...........14

Night-Vision Goggles................................61

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver)..................12

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30) .......30

Night-Vision Sight (Aiming Circle) ............1

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power................48

Manpack, Low-Power............................6

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power ..........12

Warning Receiver ..................................1

________________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** With thermal sight.

 *** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon– the BOI may vary.

   No dedicated operator/BOI. It is carried until needed

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines.

4-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Equipment Options

Figure 4-2. Motorized Infantry Company Personnel and Equipment Chart

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 Hq & Service Section Motorized Infantry Platoon X3 * Weapons Platoon  TOTAL

 Officers 2 3 1 6

 NCO 2 27 14 43

 Enlisted 8 99 25 132

Total Personnel 12 129 40 181

9-mm Pistol, PM 15 3 18

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M 12 87 32 131

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U 18 3 21

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM 3 9 12

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD 9 2 11

.50-cal Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 2 2

12.7-mm HMG, NSV 2 3 3 8

35-mm AGL-Light, W-87 6 3 9

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30 3 24 3 30

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 3 3

ATGM Launcher, Milan 3 3 3

ATGM Lchr, Manportable-SR, Eryx 3 3

ATGL-Long Range, RPG-29 6 6

ATGL, Panzerfaust 3-T600 9 9

ATDL, Armbrust 9 9

ATDL, RPG-27 3 1 4

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series 2 21 23

Minefield Breach System-Explosive ZRP-2 3 3

Mine-Scattering System, Manport, PKM 3 3

Mines (AP&AT) Assort Assort Assort Assort

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469 2 3 2 7

Truck, Light 1 2 3

Truck, Medium 2 2

Trailer, Cargo, 1-Axle 2 2

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle 2 2

Trailer, Utility 2 3 2 7

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter) 1 1

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels & Grenades Assort Assort

Aiming Circle/Goniometer 1 1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder 2 27 13 42

GPS Receiver, Handheld 5 30 18 53

Laser Target Designator 1 2 3

Observation Scope, Day/Night 2 2

Radar, GSR, Manportable, Fara-1 3 3

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie 1 6 7 14

Night-Vision Goggles 1 30 30 61

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) 5 3 4 12

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30) 3 24 3 30

Night-Vision Sight (Aiming Circle) 1 1

 Handheld, Very-Low-Power 3 30 15 48

 Manpack, Low-Power 1 3 2 6

 Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power 5 3 4 12

 Warning Receiver 1 1

Motorized Infantry Company

 Page 1

Radios:

Personnel

Equipment

NOTES:

 * The values in this column are the total number for three platoons.

 ** This company may be augmented by high-mobility/all-terrain vehicles.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 4-3
Chapter 4

4-4. The OPFOR order of battle (OB) must meet the training requirements, based on the menu of possible 

organizational parts provided in the directories. If a particular piece of equipment is not appropriate for a 

specific scenario, trainers may substitute another system according to the guidelines in the WEG. However, 

such substitutions are subject to approval by the trainers’ OPFOR-validating authority. Training planners 

should exercise caution in modifying equipment holdings, since this impacts on an OPFOR unit’s 

organizational integrity and combat capabilities.

WORLDWIDE EQUIPMENT GUIDE

4-5. The Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) is accessible online by means of the following link to the 

Army Training Network: https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=311 ; then click on “Worldwide 

Equipment Guide.”

4-6. The WEG directories consist of three volumes: Volume 1, Ground Systems; Volume 2, Airspace and 

Air Defense; and Volume 3, Naval and Littoral Systems. These directories are maintained and continuously 

updated, as necessary, by the Complex Operational Environment Threat Integration Directorate, U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC C-TID). The TRADOC C-TID is designated as “the 

responsible official for the development, management, administration, integration, and approval functions 

of the OPFOR Program across the Army” (AR 350-2).

EQUIPMENT DATA

4-7. The WEG contains technical data on the capabilities of systems identified as “Principal Items of 

Equipment” in the HTFS organizational directories and/or in the equipment tier tables or substitution 

matrices of the WEG. On the following three pages are examples of the kind of information the WEG 

provides. The three systems chosen as examples are highly capable in today’s operational environments. 

They are widely proliferated and are likely to be encountered by U.S. forces in real-world areas of conflict. 

Therefore, they are good candidates for inclusion in HTFS used in training that is realistic and relevant for 

the OE.

4-4 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Equipment Options 

United States M82A1A .50-cal Antimateriel Rifle ____________________________

Ammunition

Types

.50-cal cartridge

Raufoss Grade A

Ball (M2/M33)

AP (M2)

AP-I (M8)

API-T (M20)

Tracer (M10/21)

SLAP (M903)

MP (MK211 Mod 0)

Typical

Combat Load

30 

SYSTEM

Alternative Designations: None

Date of Introduction: Early 1980s 

Proliferation: Widespread (27+) 

Description:

Weight (kg):

Empty (w/o magazine): 14.75 

Length (mm): 

Overall: 1,448 

Barrel: 736 

Rate of Fire (rd/min): 20

Operation: Recoil

Feed: 10-rd detachable box magazine 

Fire Mode: Semi-automatic only 

SIGHTS

Name: Unertl 

Type: Optical (matches trajectory of .50-cal Raufoss Grade A) 

Magnification: 10x 

Name: Swarovski 

Type: Optical (with ranging reticle)

Magnification: 10x42 

Night Sights Available: yes

AMMUNITION

Name: Raufoss Grade A (match)(DODIC A606) (USMC) 

Caliber/length: .50-cal BMG/12.7-mm x 99-mm (NATO)

Type: Standard operating round 

Range (m) (equipment-size targets):

Maximum (w/scope): 1,800 

Muzzle Velocity (m/s): 854 

Name: MP NM140 (Nammo) MK211 Mod 0 

Caliber/length: .50-cal BMG/12.7-mm x 99-mm (NATO) 

Type: Multipurpose 

Range (m) (equipment-size targets):

Maximum (w/scope): 1,800

Armor Penetration: 11 mm @45° @1,000 m 

Fragmentation: 20 fragments after hitting 2 mm steel 

Incendiary Effect: Ignition of JP4 and JP8

Accuracy: <15 cm @ 550 m

Muzzle Velocity (m/s): 915 

Name: AP-S NM173 (Nammo) 

Caliber/length: .50-cal BMG/12.7-mm x 99-mm (NATO) 

Type: Armor piercing 

Range (m) (equipment-size targets):

Maximum (w/scope): 1,800

Armor Penetration: 11 mm @30° @1,500 m 

Accuracy: <15 cm @ 550 m

Muzzle Velocity (m/s): 915 

Name: M903 (Olin) 

Caliber/length: .50-cal BMG/12.7-mm x 99-mm (NATO)

Type: Saboted Light Armor Penetrator (SLAP) (actual bullet is 

 tungsten .30 inch penetrator wrapped in a .50-cal plastic sabot) 

Range (m) (equipment-size targets):

Maximum (w/scope): 1,500 

Armor Penetration: 19 mm (.75 in) @1,500 m 

Accuracy: INA

Muzzle Velocity (m/s): 1,014 

Name: M8 

Caliber/length: .50-cal BMG/12.7-mm x 99-mm (NATO) 

Type: Armor piercing incendiary 

Range (m) (equipment-size targets):

Maximum (w/scope): 1,800

Armor Penetration: 20 mm @ 100 m 

Accuracy: <25 cm @ 550 m

Muzzle Velocity (m/s): 881 

Name: M20 

Caliber/length: .50-cal BMG/12.7-mm x 99-mm (NATO) 

Type: Armor piercing incendiary-Tracer 

Trace (m): 91 to 1,463

Armor Penetration: 20 mm @ 100 m 

Accuracy: <25 cm @ 550 m

Muzzle Velocity (m/s): 887 

VARIANTS

Model 95: Bullpup bolt action, 5-round magazine

NOTES

The M82A1A provides maneuver commanders with the tactical option of employing snipers with an antimateriel weapon to augment present 

7.62-mm antipersonnel sniper rifles. Recoil equals 7.62x51-mm levels. The USMC uses Raufoss Grade A ammunition, but the rifle is capable 

of firing any standard 12.7x99-mm Browning machinegun ammunition. 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 4-5
Chapter 4 

Russian 105-mm Antitank Grenade Launcher RPG-29________________________

Ammunition

Types

105-mm grenade

HEAT (tandem)

HE thermobaric

Typical

Combat Load

3

As needed

SYSTEM

Alternative Designations: Vampir 

Date of Introduction: Late 1980s 

Proliferation: Former Soviet Union

Description:

Crew: 2 

Caliber (tube) (mm): 105 

Weight (w/o sight) (kg): 11.5

Length (transport) (mm): 1,000 

Length (firing) (mm): 1,850

Life of Tube/barrel: 300 

Rate of Fire (rd/min): INA

Fire From Inside Building: INA

Maximum Target Speed (km/h): INA 

Emplacement/displacement time (min): <0.25

SIGHTS

Daysight:

Name: 1P-38

Type: Iron, optical, and LRF-based FCS 

Magnification: INA

Location: Left side 

Sighting Range (m): 500 

Weight (kg): .6 

Name: Simrad IS2000 or similar sight for RPG-29 Mounted

Type: LRF-based FCS with ballistic computer

Magnification: INA

Location: Left side 

Sighting Range (m): 800 m for this mount 

Weight (kg): INA 

Night Sight: 

Name: 1PN51, 1PN52 standard RPG-29 or RPG-29N

Type: II sight

Weight (kg): 2.1 

Name: KN250F or similar sight for RPG-29 Mounted

Type: 3 gen II clip-on sight designed to work with daysight

Magnification: 1 X

Location: Left side 

Sighting Range (m): 600-800 for vehicle targets, 300+ man

Weight (kg): INA 

AMMUNITION

Name: PG-29V 

Caliber (warhead): 105 

Type: Tandem HEAT (shaped charge) 

Range (m):

Effective: 500m, 800 for RPG-29 mounted (used by OPFOR)

Penetration (m): 

Armor: 750 + (650 behind ERA) 

Concrete and brick: 1.5 +

Brick: 2 +

Earth: 3.7 +

Length (mm): INA

Complete Round Weight (kg): 6.7

Muzzle Velocity (m/s): 280 

Other Ammunition: A multipurpose HE thermobaric grenade is 

also used. Blast effects are the same as the TBG-7V. 

VARIANTS

RPG-29N: Night sight only variant

RPG-29 Mounted: For use as a mounted crew-served system. This 

variant can fit on a vehicle with a pintle mount, or be dismounted to a 

tripod ground mount. The RPG-29 Mounted variant has a fire control 

system with an optical sight, laser rangefinder and ballistic data 

computer for increased range and precision. This increases the 

effective range of the mounted system to 800 m against a stationary 

target with a hit probability of 80%. The system can fire at all 

(including moving) to its maximum range, even with a reduced Ph. 

This variant would be expected to include HE in its mix of grenades . 

For Tier 1 and Tier 2 COE OPFOR, RPG-9 Mounted is the crew 

weapon in Weapons Squads and other supporting tactical units. In 

later time frame, this system or equivalent could become the standard 

squad ATGL for maneuver forces. 

RPG-32/Hashim: New Russian/Jordanian ATGL to launch RPG29V and HE thermobaric grenades. The launcher base is a short tube 

extension with optics and trigger assembly, which attach to the the 

grenade canister, resulting in a shoulder-launcher with up to 700 m 

range. Grenades come two per carry case. This is another example of 

an expanding AT trend of fitting large lethal warheads onto ATGLs. 

Another example fitting canister on launcher base is PF-98 (pg 1-34). 

NOTES

The RPG-29 replaces SPG-9 as an all-purpose small unit artillery against the gamut of targets, including vehicles, personnel, buildings, and any 

other direct-fire targets within range - including helicopters. 

The RPG-29 can be broken down into two parts for one soldier carry. It can be made ready to fire within a few seconds. A folding bipod is 

provided to assist aiming during prone firing. RPG-27, PG-7VR for RPG-7V, and RPG-32/Hashim use the same (PG-29V) warhead.

4-6 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Equipment Options

EQUIPMENT TIER TABLES

4-8. The WEG contains Tier Tables for the various categories of equipment found in Hybrid Threat 

organizations. Training planners can employ these tables to adjust the level of capabilities of equipment 

from the baseline shown in the HTFS organizational directories. Within each functional category of 

equipment, there are four tiers representing different levels of capability, with Tier 1 representing the 

highest level of capability and modernity.

Note. Niche systems and niche technology upgrades provide capabilities that exceed the general 

capability level of the overall force. For example, a Tier 3 force might have a few systems from 

Tier 1 or 2. Applying a niche technology upgrade to one or more subsystems of a Tier 2 legacy 

system could raise its level of capability to the equivalent of a Tier 1 system. (See the sections 

on Equipment Upgrades and Emerging Technology Trends later in this chapter.)

4-9. Tier 1 reflects systems across the different functional areas that a major military force with state-ofthe-art technology would generally have. At Tier 1, new or upgraded systems are limited to those robust 

systems fielded in military forces or currently developed and marketed for sale, with capabilities and 

vulnerabilities that can be portrayed for training.

4-10. Tier 2 reflects modern competitive systems fielded in significant numbers for the last 10 to 20 years, 

with limitations or vulnerabilities being diminished by available upgrades. Although forces are equipped 

for operations in all terrains and can fight day and night, their capability in range and speed for several key 

systems may be somewhat inferior to U.S. capability.

4-11. Tier 3 systems date back generally 30 to 40 years. They have limitations in all three subsystems 

categories: mobility, survivability, and lethality. Systems and force integration are inferior. However, guns, 

missiles, and munitions can still challenge vulnerabilities of U.S. forces. Niche upgrades can provide 

synergistic and adaptive increases in force effectiveness.

4-12. Tier 4 systems reflect 40- to 50-year-old systems, some of which have been upgraded numerous 

times. These represent equipment typically found in forces of Third World or smaller developed countries. 

Use of effective strategy, adaptive tactics, niche technologies, and terrain limitations could enable a Tier 4 

OPFOR to challenge the effectiveness of a U.S. force in achieving its goals. This tier includes militia, 

guerrillas, special police, and other forces.

4-13. To achieve specific training objectives, trainers and training planners can substitute other equipment 

for those items listed in the baseline. Equipment tier tables and substitution matrices list alternative systems 

with varying levels of capability and modernity. The baseline systems, as well as those listed in tier tables 

and substitution matrices, are built in large numbers and proliferated throughout the world. (That is part of 

the criteria for their inclusion in the WEG.) Thus, the country of origin or an actual country possessing such 

systems does not necessarily pose a threat to the United States. However, these widely used systems 

provide an OPFOR with capabilities that could present a challenge in U.S. Army training.

4-14. Table 4-1 provides a sample of systems listed in the Tier Tables (from volume 1 of the WEG). This 

example is based on the assessment of tiers in 2006.

4-15. Hybrid Threat organizations and equipment must support the entire spectrum of OE training 

scenarios for the U.S. Army. The Hybrid Threat, as described in the 7-100 series, represents rational and 

adaptive adversaries, and offers flexibility for use in training applications and scenarios for U.S. training. 

The main part of the WEG deals with systems that are widely proliferated in the current timeframe. Lists of 

equipment on the Tier Tables offer convenient baseline examples arranged in capability tiers for use in 

composing OPFOR equipment arrays for training scenarios. Each volume of the WEG also has a chapter on 

Emerging Technology Trends. Tables in those chapters offer an extended capabilities tier for the near and 

mid-term.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 4-7 
Chapter 4

Table 4-1. Equipment Tier Table (Example)

Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4

Main Battle Tank

Amphibious Tank

Tracked HACV

Wheeled HACV

T-90S

Type 63AModernized

2S25 

AMX-10RC Desert Storm

T-72B (Improved)

Type 63AM

AMX-10 PAC 90 

AMX-10RC

Chieftain

M1985

AMX-13

EE-9

T-55AM

PT-76B

M41A3

EE-9

Towed Light Howitzer

Towed Medium How/Gun

Self-Propelled Howitzer

Multiple Rkt Launcher

Heavy MRL

1-Round Rkt Launcher

Amphibious SP How

D-30

G5

G6, AU-F1T 

Prima

9A52-2

9P132

2S1

D-30

2A65

G6, 2S19

Prima

9A52-2

9P132

2S1

D-30

2A36

2S3M

BM-21

9P140

9P132

2S1

D-30

D-20

2S1

Type 63

Fadjr-3

9P132

2S1

4-16. The Tier Tables were developed in order to portray systems for adversaries with differing budgetary 

levels and force capabilities. Systems in a tier reflect more or less comparable levels of modernity, for use 

with a force at that level of capability. Each tier provides an equivalent level of modernization for systems 

across different functional areas. The tier tables are also another tool for Exercise Designers to use to alter 

systems in simulations to reflect different levels of modernity. One can find an item of equipment at Tier 2

in the baseline equipment list for a given Threat organization, note its counterpart at a higher or lower tier, 

and then substitute to build the same unit (for example, division, brigade, battalion) for a different tier. The 

key to using the tables is to know the tier capability of the initial organizations.

4-17. A Threat Force Structure should contain a mix of systems that realistically vary in fielded age and 

generation. Given the modern reality of budget constraints on military spending, the WEG authors have 

tempered depiction of new, expensive systems to a fraction of any force. The more common modernization 

approach within the higher tiers is to upgrade existing systems.

4-18. The Tier Tables are less concerned with systems’ age than realistically reflecting a capability to be 

addressed in training. Not all systems and functional areas have to be modernized equally or 

simultaneously. The Hybrid Threat may have one system 10 to 20 years older than others in a functional 

area. In a given time frame, military forces often will emphasize upgrades in one functional area while 

modernizing or maintaining lower tier levels in other functional areas.

4-19. Some systems are used in common in lower and higher tiers. For instance, because of the need for 

improved anti-armor, air defense, and precision artillery munitions, these capabilities are shared across 

several tier levels. Older 4x4 tactical utility vehicles that are 30 to 40 years old still offer effective support 

capability, and may extend across three tier levels. Common use of some Hybrid Threat systems also 

reduces the database maintenance requirement.

4-20. No force in the world has all of its systems at the most modern tier. Even the best force in the world 

has a mix of state-of-the-art (Tier 1) systems, as well as mature (Tier 2), and somewhat dated (Tier 3) 

legacy systems. Much of the latter systems have been upgraded to some degree, but may exhibit the 

limitations of their original state of technology. Even modern systems recently purchased may be 

considerably less than state-of-the-art, due to limited military budgets and limited user training and 

maintenance capabilities. Thus, even new systems may not exhibit Tier 1 or Tier 2 capability. As forces 

later field systems with emerging technologies, legacy systems may be more suitable for employment in 

certain conditions, or they may be upgraded and continue to be competitive. Adversaries with lower-tier 

systems can use adaptive technologies and tactics, or obtain niche technology systems to challenge the

advantages of a modern force.

4-21. A major emphasis in the OE is flexibility in use of forces and in doctrine. This also means that the 

Hybrid Threat, given rational and justifiable force development methodology, has the flexibility to adapt 

the systems mix to support doctrine and plans. The tiers provide the baseline list for determining the force 

mix, based on scenario criteria. The Hybrid Threat compensates for capability limitations by using 

innovative and adaptive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Some of these limitations may be 

caused by the lack of sophisticated equipment or integration capability, or by insufficient numbers. Forces 

4-8 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Equipment Options

can be tailored, in accordance with Hybrid Threat doctrine, to form tactical groups and other task 

organizations. 

SYSTEMS SUBSTITUTION MATRICES

4-22. In each volume of the WEG, a Systems Substitution Matrix table provides comparative data for users 

who would like to substitute other systems for Threat systems listed in the baseline organizational 

directories. For each system, the table shows the system name, its tier level, and the WEG page on which 

data for that system begins. Within each functional area, systems are displayed in groups (with spaces 

separating the groups) of systems of like type that could be substituted for one another. Within each group, 

the system shown in italics is the one listed in TC 7-100.4 as the baseline system (normally Tier 2) in some 

Threat organization. Within each grouping by type, most systems are listed in tier order, and can be 

substituted to fit scenario requirements. Some systems span the boundary between two tiers (for example, 

“3-4”). Other systems can be used at more than one tier (for example, “3 and 4”). Table 4-2 provides a 

sample from the Systems Substitution Matrix in volume 1 of the WEG. Tiers shown in this example are 

based on the assessment of tiers in 2006.

4-23. Trainers also should keep in mind that substitutions of major weapon systems may also affect the 

types and numbers of supporting and related systems. For example— 

 A towed artillery system needs an appropriate prime mover vehicle.

 Some air defense systems need radars that are not on the weapon platform.

 An under-barrel grenade launcher needs to be compatible with the assault rifle on which it is

mounted.

 A mortar system may need an aiming circle/goniometer.

4-24. Within each functional category of equipment, there are four tiers representing different levels of 

capability, with Tier 1 representing the highest level of capability and modernity. Not all tiers of a given 

system category may be represented in the WEG.

EQUIPMENT UPGRADES

4-25. An exercise designer has the option to make selective adjustments such as use of niche technology 

upgrades (for example, in tanks, cruise missiles, or rotary-wing aircraft) to offset U.S. advantages. (See the 

Equipment Upgrades chapter in each volume of the WEG). Forces may include niche systems that exceed 

the general capability level of the overall force. For example, a Tier 3 force might have a few systems from 

Tier 1 or 2. As the “current” timeframe shifts each year, more systems from higher tiers could be expected 

to be added to the force. The WEG authors will always be ready to assist a developer in selecting niche 

systems and upgrades for use in Hybrid Threat portrayal. The scenario developer should be cognizant of the 

need to justify changes and systems selected. With savvy use of TTP and systems available, all tiers can 

offer challenging threat capabilities for training.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 4-9 
Chapter 4

Table 4-2. Systems Substitution Matrix (Example)

4-26. Upgrades enable military forces to employ technological niches to tailor their force against a specific 

adversary, or to integrate niche upgrades in a comprehensive and well-planned modernization program. 

Because of the competitive export market and varying requirements from country to country, a system may 

be in production simultaneously in many different configurations, as well as variants fulfilling other roles. 

In light of this trend, Threat equipment selected for portrayal in training simulations should not be limited 

to the original production model of a system. Rather, training planners should select a version of the system 

that reflects the Hybrid Threat’s overall strategy and modernization plans and likely constraints that would 

apply.

4-27. An adaptive Hybrid Threat will introduce new combat systems and employ upgrades on existing 

systems to attain a force structure that supports its plans and doctrine. Because the legacy force mix was 

selected in accordance with earlier plans and options, the use of upgrades will always be an attractive 

option, compared to costly new acquisitions. Equipment Upgrade chapters in the WEG consider only 

upgrades currently available (or marketed with production and fielding expected in the near term) for 

systems in Tiers 1 through 4. However, the WEG’s Emerging Technology Trends chapters anticipate a

wider variety of upgrades that could be applied to currently fielded systems.

Tier Page

Armored Personnel Carriers

BTR-80A ....................................................2 2-15

BTR-90 ..................................................... 1-2 2-16

BTR-T Heavy APC................................... 1-2 2-19

BTR-80 ......................................................3 2-14

Pandur........................................................3 2-23

WZ 551A ...................................................3 2-25

VTT-323 .................................................. 3-4 2-24

BTR-60PB ................................................ 3-4 2-13

BTR-D Airborne APC .............................. 3-4 2-18

M113A1.................................................... 3-4 2-21

YW 531H/Type 85 ................................... 3-4 2-27

BOV-M......................................................4 2-10

BTR-152 ....................................................4 2-17

BTR-60PA.................................................4 2-11

MT-LB ......................................................4 2-22

YW 531A/531C/Type 63-II.......................4 2-26

Infantry Fighting Vehicles

BMP-2M Modernized ...............................2 2-39

BMP-3M IFV................................ Near Term 2-43

BMP-3 UAE IFV.......................................1 2-41

Kliver IFV Turret.......................................1 2-49

BMD-3 Airborne ......................................2 2-31

Marder 1IFV............................................. 2-3 2-45

Warrior IFV .............................................. 2-3 2-47

AMX-10P IFV...........................................3 2-28

BMP-2 IFV................................................3 2-37

BMP-1P IFV............................................. 3-4 2-35

BMD-1/BMD-1P Airborne .......................4 2-29

BMP-1 IFV................................................4 2-33

Tier Page

Main Battle Tanks

T-72B/T-72B (Improved)........................... 2 4-23

Challenger 2 .............................................. 1 4-5

T-90M ...................................................... 1 4-33

T-90S.........................................................1 4-31 

T-80U ........................................................1-2 4-29

Chieftain Mk 5 ..........................................2-3 4-7

Leopard 2...................................................2-3 4-11

T-64B ........................................................2-3 4-21

T-80B ........................................................2-3 4-27

Type 96......................................................2-3 4-39

T-72M1 .................................................... 3 4-25

AMX-30 ....................................................3-4 4-3

Leopard 1A1..............................................3-4 4-9

M60A1/M60A3.........................................3-4 4-13

T-55AMV..................................................3-4 4-17

T-62M ......................................................3-4 4-19

Type 59-II.................................................. 4 4-37

T-34........................................................... 4 4-15

Heavy Armored Combat Vehicles

2S25 Self-Propelled AT Gun .....................1-2 5-9

Type 63A Mod Amphibious Tank ..............1-2 5-21

AMX-10RC Armored Recon Veh ...............2-3 5-12

AMX-10 PAC90 Fire Support Veh........... 3 5-11

EE-9 Armored Recon Veh......................... 3 5-14

M1985/PT-85 Light Tank ......................... 3 5-17

AMX-13 Light Tank .................................3-4 5-13

Scorpion Trkd Combat Recon Veh ..........3-4 5-20

M41A3 Walker Light Tank....................... 4 5-16

M36 SP AT Gun........................................ 4 5-15

PT-76B Amphibious Tank ........................ 4 5-19

4-10 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Equipment Options

EMERGING TECHNOLOGY TRENDS

4-28. The equipment data and Tier Tables in the WEG reflect legacy systems that are fielded and available 

to various forces worldwide at the time the latest version of the WEG directories is posted on ATN. As 

time passes, new systems and whole new technologies will be fielded and available to the Hybrid Threat. 

(See the Emerging Technology Trends chapter in each volume of the WEG.)

4-29. The most notable difference between the Hybrid Threat force mix and that of U.S. forces is that the 

Hybrid Threat would typically have a broader mix of older systems and a lower proportion of state-of-theart systems. Rather, the Hybrid Threat typically relies more on adaptive applications, niche technologies, 

and selected proven upgrades. The Hybrid Threat will retain expensive legacy systems, but with affordable 

upgrades and technology niches. A judicious mix of equipment, strategic advantages, and sound Hybrid 

Threat principles can enable even lesser (lower-tier) forces to challenge the capabilities of U.S. forces.

4-30. Threat systems must represent reasonable responses to U.S. force developments and developments in 

other countries. A rational, thinking Hybrid Threat would study force developments of its adversaries, as 

well as approaches of the best forces worldwide, then attempt to exploit and counter them. For instance, 

U.S. Future Combat System technologies would trigger the Hybrid Threat to modify equipment and tactics 

to counter them. Given economic constraints, the Hybrid Threat has the option of incrementally adding 

higher-tier systems to lower-tier units, as selective upgrades. However, it might also upgrade legacy 

systems with subsystem technology upgrades in order to keep pace with state-of-the-art systems fielded by 

U.S. forces or possibly by its regional neighbors.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 4-11
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Appendix A

Threat Force Structure Organizational Directories Listing 

A-1. The organizational directories of the Hybrid Threat Force Structure (HTFS) are contained on the 

Army Training Network (ATN) at https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=311 . The folders and unit 

files in these directories serve as the menu for Threat baseline units. The Threat Force Structure are 

continually updated on the ATN. Therefore, the listing below is dynamic. Although the list of Hybrid 

Threat units in the directories might change over time, the basic architecture of the menu remains. The 

basic organizational directory listing is as follows:

Note. The organizations in these directories do not constitute a Hybrid Threat order of 

battle (OB). However, trainers and training planners can use these organizational building 

blocks to construct a Hybrid Threat OB that is appropriate for their training requirements. To do 

so, it will often be necessary to create task organizations from the available building blocks. It 

may also be necessary to substitute different pieces of equipment for those listed for units in the 

organizational directories.

Note. For illustrative purposes, this TC contains several examples from the online HTFS

organizational directories. Readers are reminded that even the baseline Threat organizations 

are subject to change over time. Additional units will be added and existing units will be 

modified and updated, as necessary, to represent contemporary and emerging capabilities. 

Therefore, readers should always consult the online directories for the latest, most up-to-date 

versions of organizational data.

VOLUME I – DIVISIONS AND DIVISIONAL UNITS

01 Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV) (the architecture for all divisions is similar)

01 Mechanized Infantry Division 

01 Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV).doc

02 Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV) Equipment.xls

02 Division Headquarters and Staff

01 Division Headquarters and Staff.doc

03 Integrated Fires Command (IFC)/Integrated Support Command (ISC)

01 Integrated Fires Command Headquarters.doc

02 Integrated Fires Command Structure.ppt

03 Integrated Support Command Headquarters.doc

04 Integrated Support Command Structure.ppt

04 Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV) (X3)

01 Mechanized Infantry Brigade.doc

01A Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV).doc

01B Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV) Equipment.xls

02 Brigade Headquarters and Staff.doc

03 Mechanized Infantry Battalion (IFV).doc

03A Mechanized Infantry Battalion (IFV).xls

04 Tank Battalion (31-Tank).doc

04A Tank Battalion (31-Tank) Equipment.xls

05 Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion (18-gun).doc

05A Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion 152-mm.xls

06 Air Defense Battalion (Short-Range).doc

06A Air Defense Battalion (Short-Range).xls

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 A-1 
Appendix A

07 Antitank Battalion, Brigade (Div).doc

08 Reconnaissance Company.doc

09 Sniper Platoon.doc

10 Engineer Company.doc

11 Signal Company.doc

12 Materiel Support Company.doc

13 Maintenance Company.doc

14 Chemical Defense Platoon.doc

15 Medical Platoon.doc

05 Tank Brigade (Div)

01 Tank Brigade.doc

01A Tank Brigade Equipment.doc

01B Tank Brigade (Div) Equipment.xls

02 Brigade Headquarters and Staff.doc

03 Mechanized Infantry Battalion (IFV)

04 Tank Battalion (31-Tank).doc

04A Tank Battalion (31-Tank).xls

05 Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion (18-gun) (152-mm).doc

05A Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion (18-gun) (152-mm).xls

06 Air Defense Battalion (Short-Range).doc

06A Air Defense Battalion (Short-Range).xls

07 (not used)

08 Reconnaissance Company.doc

09 (not used)

10 Engineer Company.doc

11 Signal Company.doc

12 Materiel Support Company.doc

13 Maintenance Company.doc

14 Chemical Defense Platoon.doc

15 Medical Platoon.doc

06 Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade 

01 Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade Equip.doc

02 Brigade Headquarters and Staff.doc

02A Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade Equipment.xls

03 Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion (152-mm) (18-gun).doc

03A Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion (152-mm) Equipment.xls

04 Multiple Rocket Launcher Battalion (122-mm) (18-Launcher).doc

04A Multiple Rocket Launcher Battalion (122-mm) (18-Launcher).xls

05 Target Acquisition Battery.doc

06 MANPADS Platoon.doc

07 Materiel Support Battalion.doc

07A Materiel Support Battalion.xls

07B Ammunition Transport Company.xls

07C Cargo Transport Company.xls

08 Maintenance Company.doc

09 Signal Company.doc

10 Chemical Defense Platoon.doc

11 Medical Platoon.doc

07 Air Defense Brigade (Short-Range)

01 Air Defense Brigade (Short-Range).doc

02 Air Defense Brigade (Short-Range) Equipment.xls

A-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Threat Force Structure Organizational Directories Listing

08 Materiel Support Brigade (Div) 

01 Materiel Support Brigade.doc

01A Materiel Support Brigade.xls

02 Brigade Headquarters and Staff.doc

03A Materiel Support Battalion.doc

03B Materiel Support Battalion Equipment.xls

03D Cargo Transport Company.xls

04A Maintenance Battalion.doc

04B Maintenance Battalion.xls

04C Tracked Vehicle Maintenance Company.xls

04E Wheeled Vehicle Maintenance Company.xls

05A Heavy Equipment Transport Battalion.doc

05B Heavy Equipment Transport Battalion Equipment.xls

05C Heavy Equipment Transport Company.xls

06A POL Transport Battalion.doc

06B POL Battalion Equipment.xls

06C POL Company Equipment.xls

07 (not used)

08 Signal Platoon.doc

09 Chemical Defense Platoon.doc

09 Antitank Battalion

01 Antitank Battalion (Sep).doc

02 Antitank Battalion (Sep) Equipment.xls

10 Reconnaissance Battalion

01 Reconnaissance Battalion (Div).doc

02 Reconnaissance Battalion Equipment.xls

11 Sniper Company

01 Sniper Company.doc

02 Sniper Company Equipment.xls

12 Engineer Battalion

01 Engineer Battalion.doc

02 Engineer Battalion Equipment.xls

13 Signal Battalion

01 Signal Battalion.doc

02 Signal Battalion.xls

14 Chemical Defense Battalion

01 Chemical Defense Battalion.doc

02 Chemical Defense Battalion Equipment.xls

03 Decontamination Company Equipment.xls

15 Medical Battalion

01 Medical Battalion.doc

02 Medical Battalion Equipment.xls

03 Medical Company Equipment.xls

03A Collection and Evacuation Company Equipment.xls

02 Mechanized Infantry Division (APC) (see TFS, ATN for complete listing)

03 Tank Division (see TFS, ATN for complete listing)

04 Motorized Infantry Division (see TFS, ATN for complete listing)

Note. The organizational directory architecture for the Mechanized Infantry Division (APC), the 

Tank Division, and the Motorized Infantry Division is similar to that shown above for the 

Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV).

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 A-3 
Appendix A

VOLUME II – NONDIVISIONAL UNITS* 

01 Separate Combat Brigades

01 Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV) (typical breakout)

01 Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV).doc

01A Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV)

02 Brigade Headquarters and Staff.doc

03 Mechanized Infantry Battalion (IFV).doc

03A Mechanized Infantry Battalion (IFV) Equipment.xls

04 Tank (41-Tank) (Sep).doc

04A Tank Battalion (Sep) Equipment.xls

04B Light Tank Battalion (Sep) Equipment.xls

05 Composite Artillery Battalion (Sep).doc

05A Composite Artillery Battalion (Sep) Equipment.xls

06 Antitank Battalion (Sep).doc

06A Antitank Battalion, (Sep) Equipment.xls

07 Reconnaissance Battalion (Sep).doc

07A Reconnaissance Battalion (Sep) Equipment.xls

08 Sniper Platoon.doc

09 Air Defense Battalion (Short-Range) (Sep).doc

09A Air Defense Battalion (Short-Range) (Sep) Equipment.xls

10 Engineer Battalion (Sep).doc

10A Engineer Battalion (Sep) Equipment.xls

11A Materiel Support Battalion.doc

11B Materiel Support Battalion Equipment.xls

11C Ammunition Transport Company Equipment.xls

11D Cargo Transport Company Equipment.xls

12A Maintenance Battalion.doc

12B Maintenance Battalion Equipment.xls

12C Tracked Vehicle Maintenance Company Equipment.xls

12D Wheeled Vehicle Maintenance Company Equipment.xls

12E Ordnance Maintenance Company Equipment.xls

13 Signal Company (Sep).doc

14 Chemical Defense Company (Sep).doc

14A Chemical Defense Company (Sep) Equipment.xls

15 Medical Company (Sep).doc

15A Medical Company (Sep) Equipment.xls

02 Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (APC) (see TFS, ATN for complete listing)

03 Separate Tank Brigade (see TFS, ATN for complete listing)

04 Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade (see TFS, ATN for complete listing)

02 Combat Brigades (Nondivisional)

01 Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Brigade

01A Special-Purpose Forces Brigade.doc

01B Special-Purpose Forces Brigade Equipment.xls

02 Brigade Headquarters Staff.doc

03A Special-Purpose Forces Battalion.doc

03B Special-Purpose Forces Battalion Equipment.xls

03C Special-Purpose Forces Company Equipment.xls

04A Long-Range Signal Company (SPF).doc

04B Long-Range Signal Equipment (SPF).xls

05A Materiel Support (SPF).doc

05B Materiel Support Company (SPF) Equipment.xls

06 Medical Platoon (SPF).doc

02 Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL) Brigade (Nondivisional) 

01 MRL Brigade (Nondiv).doc

A-4 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Threat Force Structure Organizational Directories Listing

01A MRL Brigade (Nondiv) Equipment.xls

02 Brigade Headquarters and Staff.doc

03A MRL Battalion (220-mm) (18-launcher).doc

03B MRL Battalion (220-mm) (18-launcher) Equipment.xls

04A MRL Battalion (300-mm) (12-launcher).doc

04B MRL Battalion (300-mm) (12-launcher) Equipment.xls 

05 Target Acquisition Battery.doc

06 MANPADS Platoon (APC).doc

07A Materiel Support Battalion.doc

07B Materiel Support Battalion Equipment.xls

07C Ammunition Transport Company Equipment.xls

07D Cargo Transport Company Equipment.xls

08 Maintenance Company, Wheeled.doc

09 Signal Company (Sep).doc

10 Chemical Defense Platoon.doc

11 Medical Platoon.doc

03 Combat Support Units (Nondivisional)

01 Smoke Battalion (Nondiv)

01 Smoke Battalion (Nondiv).doc

02 Smoke Battalion Equipment.xls

02A Smoke Company Equipment.xls

04 Combat Service Support Units (Nondivisional) 

01 Materiel Support Brigade (Nondivisional) 

01 Materiel Support Brigade (Nondiv).doc

01A Materiel Support Brigade (Nondiv) Equipment.xls

02 Brigade Headquarters and Staff.doc

03A Materiel Support Battalion.doc

03B Materiel Support Battalion Equipment.xls

03C Ammunition Transport Company Equipment.xls

03D Cargo Transport Company Equipment.xls

04A Maintenance Battalion.doc

04B Maintenance Battalion Equipment.xls

04C Tracked Vehicle Maintenance Company Equipment.xls

04D Wheeled Vehicle Maintenance Company Equipment.xls

04E Ordnance Maintenance Company Equipment.xls

05A HET Battalion.doc

05B HET Battalion Equipment.xls

05C HET Transport Company Equipment.xls

06A POL Transport Battalion.doc

06B POL Transport Battalion Equipment.xls

07A Mobile Security Battalion (Nondiv).doc

07B Mobile Security Battalion (Nondiv) Equp.xls

08 Signal Platoon.doc

09 Chemical Defense Platoon.doc

10 Medical Platoon.doc

*Note. The Other Nondivisional Units in volume IV are temporary low-resolution placeholders

for units not yet described in the format and detail afforded nondivisional units in volume II. 

Over time, those organizations will be fleshed out in higher resolution and added to volume II.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 A-5 
Appendix A

VOLUME III – PARAMILITARY AND NONMILITARY ACTORS

Paramilitary and nonmilitary-chart.ppt

01 Combatants

01 Armed Combatants

01 Armed Combatants.doc

01 Insurgent Organizations

01 Local Insurgent Organization

01A Local Insurgent Organization.doc

01B Local Insurgent Organization Equipment.xls

01C Direct Action Cells-insurgents-Equipment.xls

01D Direct Action Cells-multifunction-Equipment.xls

01E Technical Support Cell Equipment.xls

02 Higher Insurgent Organizations (Regional, National, Transnational)

02A Higher Insurgent Organization.doc

02B Higher Insurgent Organization Equipment.xls

02 Guerrilla Brigade

01 Guerrilla Brigade, Headquarters and Staff

01A Guerrilla Brigade.doc

01B Brigade Headquarters and Staff.doc

01C Guerrilla Brigade Equipment.xls

01D Brigade Headquarters Equipment.xls

01E Command Group and Staff Equipment.xls

01F Command Section Equipment.xls

01G Staff Section Equipment.xls

02 Guerrilla Battalion

01 Guerrilla Battalion.doc

02A Guerrilla Battalion Equipment.xls

03A Hunter/Killer Company Equipment.xls

03B Headquarters Command Sect Equipment.xls

03C Hunter/Killer Group Equipment.xls

03D Hunter/Killer Section 1,2,3 Equipment.xls

03E Hunter/Killer Section 4 Equipment.xls

04A Guerrilla Company Equipment.xls

04B Headquarters Service Section Equipment.xls

04C Guerrilla Platoon Equipment.xls

04D Weapons Platoon Equipment.xls

05 Weapons Company Equipment.xls

03 Weapons Battalion

01 Weapons Battalion.doc

01A Weapons Battalion Equipment.xls

02A Towed Mortar Battery (120-mm).doc

02B Towed Mortar Battery (120-mm) Equipment.xls

03A Rocket Launcher Battery (107-mm and 122-mm).doc

03B Rocket Launcher Battery (107-mm & 122-mm) Equipment.xls

04A Antitank Battery.doc

04B Antitank Battery Equipment.xls

05A Transport Section.doc

04 Reconnaissance Company

01A Reconnaissance Company.doc

01B Reconnaissance Company Equipment.xls

01C Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Platoon Equipment.xls

A-6 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Threat Force Structure Organizational Directories Listing

05 Sapper Company

01A Sapper Company.doc

01B Sapper Company Equipment.xls

06 Transport Company

01 Transport Company.doc

07 Signal Platoon

01 Signal Platoon.doc

08 Medical Platoon

01 Medical Platoon.doc

02 Unarmed Combatants

01 Unarmed Combatants.doc

02 Noncombatants

01 Armed Noncombatants

Personal Security Force.doc

01 Unarmed Noncombatants

Unarmed Noncombatants.doc

VOLUME IV – OTHER

01 Glossary

02 Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light), Example Hybrid Threat TaskOrganization

03 Other Nondivisional Units*

*Note. The Other Nondivisional Units in volume IV are temporary low-resolution placeholders 

for units not yet described in the format and detail afforded other nondivisional units in volume 

II. Over time, these organizations will be fleshed out in higher resolution and added to volume 

II.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 A-7
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Appendix B

Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

Chapter 3 describes the process of task-organizing for combat and its role in 

matching the appropriate OPFOR task organization to the training objectives of the 

unit to be trained. This appendix explains in more detail how trainers and training 

planners modify a Hybrid Threat organization from the Hybrid Threat Force 

Structure (HTFS) listed in the organizational directories on the Army Training 

Network (ATN) into a Hybrid Threat Force Structure for countering the tasks listed in 

FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List (AUTL). For illustrative purposes, the appendix 

describes a particular example based on hypothetical tasks and OPFOR countertasks. 

Then, it provides detailed guidance on how to task-organize Threat units from the 

bottom up.

Note. All of the Hybrid Threat organizations listed in the HTFS organizational directories on 

ATN are constructed using commonly available tools. These should allow trainers and planners 

to tailor and/or task-organize units individually or collectively to meet specific training and/or 

simulation requirements. Most trainers and simulations personnel have software available and a 

basic knowledge of its use. The following instructions enable a trainer with only a basic 

knowledge of to build a task-organized structure using available software.

Note. For illustrative purposes, this TC contains several examples from the online HTFS

organizational directories. Readers are reminded that even the baseline Threat organizations are

subject to change over time. Therefore, readers should always consult the online directories for 

the latest, most up-to-date versions of organizational data.

TASK ORGANIZATION EXAMPLE

B-1. The last part of chapter 3 outlines nine steps in the process of creating the properly task-organized 

OPFOR for an exercise. The first part of this appendix provides more detailed guidance, based on an 

example. This example covers all nine steps. However, it concentrates on Step 9—how to modify a 

standard Threat baseline unit (selected from the HTFS) to become a new, task-organized Hybrid Threat 

Force Structure.

STEPS 1 THROUGH 3. SELECT TRAINING UNITS AND TASKS

B-2. For this example, it is assumed that the senior commander (commander of the U.S. unit to be trained) 

identified the units he wants trained in selected tasks. In this example, the training units consist of a lightly 

armored force of two brigade-size units. The commander’s primary training objective is to conduct an 

assault and sustained combat to destroy a Hybrid Threat brigade defending in complex terrain. His 

secondary training objective is to restore and maintain civil order.

B-3. The U.S. commander (senior trainer) also has reviewed FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List (AUTL) 

and has determined the specific tactical collective tasks on which he wants to train his unit. The specific 

Army Tactical Tasks (ARTs) selected from the AUTL are—

 ART 5.1.1 Overcome Barriers/Obstacles/Mines

 ART 8.1.2 Conduct an Attack

 ART 8.1.3 Exploitation

 ART 8.3.1.2 Conduct Peace Enforcement Operations

 ART 8.3.2.3 Conduct Combat Operations in Support of Foreign Internal Defense (Counter 

Insurgents and Terrorists)

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-1
Appendix B

 ART 8.3.7 Combat Terrorism

B-4. Thus, the U.S. commander (senior trainer) has completed the Steps 1 through 3 of the process 

outlined at the end of chapter 3, which define the scope and purpose of the training exercise. Now the 

training planners know that the enemy of the Hybrid Threat (the training unit) is lightly armored, mobile, 

and lethal, and consists of at least two or more brigade-level units. The training commander has determined 

the level and types of units he wants trained and the specific tasks on which he wants them trained. This 

sets the stage for Steps 4 through 9, which determine the kind of Hybrid Threat needed to produce the 

desired training. The entire process results in building the appropriate Hybrid Threat Force Structure 

(HTFS), which must provide appropriate organizations capable of countering (stressing) those tasks 

selected from the AUTL.

STEP 4. SELECT OPFOR COUNTERTASKS

B-5. The mission of the Hybrid Threat is to counter the training unit, with capabilities that challenge the 

training unit’s ability to accomplish its tasks. In this case, the training unit’s mission is to attack and destroy 

the Hybrid Threat. Therefore, the Hybrid Threat’s mission is to prevent the training unit (enemy) from 

destroying the Hybrid Threat and, if possible, destroy attacking enemy. The Hybrid Threat could 

accomplish this by defending with light, mobile forces in complex terrain and perhaps employing guerrilla 

warfare tactics. The training commander has also selected a task to restore civil order. One way of 

countering this task is for the Hybrid Threat to possess an organization capable of providing or instigating 

civil disorder to stress the training. The commander also wants to train against ART 8.3.7 (Combat 

Terrorism). One way to counter this task is for the Hybrid Threat to include insurgents using terror tactics.

STEP 5. DETERMINE THE TYPE AND SIZE OF OPFOR UNITS

B-6. Next, trainers and planners determine the appropriate type and size Threat units capable of 

performing the OPFOR countertasks and conducting persistent fights on several levels. For the maneuver 

fight, defending against two brigade-size U.S. units, the Hybrid Threat needs a brigade-size organization. 

The optimal Hybrid Threat Force Structure (HTFS) for conducting such a defense in complex terrain would 

include relatively light, motorized infantry, perhaps some even lighter guerrilla forces, and preferably some 

mechanized infantry, combined with an antiarmor capability against lightly armored U.S. forces. Such a 

mix of forces would entail the use of a brigade tactical group (BTG) task organization. In addition, a local 

insurgent force can provide the training unit with an opportunity to combat terrorism.

Motorized Infantry Forces

B-7. The Hybrid Threat organizations determined to best counter (stress) the ARTs consist of a BTG 

based on a motorized infantry brigade, with an antiarmor capability against lightly armored forces to 

counter the maneuver fight, and an affiliated local insurgent organization to counter ART 8.3.7, Combat 

Terrorism. The BTG also can have guerrilla and special-purposes forces subordinate to it.

Guerrilla Forces

B-8. The BTG could include a guerrilla battalion to provide a wider training spectrum and a realistic 

training experience that reflects the OE. Guerrilla warfare is one of many threats that exist in the OE, but it 

does not necessarily occur in isolation from other threats. While guerrilla organizations can be completely 

independent of a parent insurgent organization, they are often either a part of the overall insurgency or 

affiliated with the insurgent groups. Guerrilla units can also be subordinate to a larger, more conventional 

force. For purposes of illustration and simplicity, in this example case, the guerrilla battalion is 

subordinated to the larger conventional maneuver force, the BTG. The guerrillas are a Tier 3 and 4 

organization. (Equipment tiering is discussed in chapter 4.) The inclusion of guerrillas provides 

countertasks to the following ARTs—

B-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

 ART 8.3.1.2 Conduct Peace Enforcement Operations

 ART 8.3.2.3 Conduct Combat Operations in Support of Foreign Internal Defense (Counter

Insurgents and Terrorists)

For details on the guerrilla hunter/killer company and the personnel and equipment list for the guerrilla 

battalion, see appendix E.

Special-Purpose Forces

B-9. Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) can bring another dimension to the training environment. Therefore, 

the BTG could integrate an SPF company and an SPF deep attack/reconnaissance platoon integrated into its 

task organization. The SPF units are a Tier 1 (modern) force multiplier providing a completely different 

level and style of OPFOR countertasks to the fight. While SPF units can also be independent of maneuver 

forces on the battlefield, and generally are, they can also be subordinate to a maneuver organization. For 

simplicity, this example has the SPF units subordinate to a parent maneuver organization—the BTG. The 

inclusion of the SPF provides countertasks to the following ARTs— 

 ART 8.3.1.2 Conduct Peace Enforcement Operations

 ART 8.3.2.3 Conduct Combat Operations in support of Foreign Internal Defense (Counter

Insurgents and Terrorists)

Insurgent Forces

B-10. Insurgent forces can provide a Hybrid Threat countertask capability to ART 8.3.7 (Combat 

Terrorism). A typical insurgent organization also provides the Hybrid Threat with an information warfare 

(INFOWAR) capability to stress ART 7.10.3 (Maintain Community Relations), which is an implied task 

inherent to several selected ARTs. Even a local insurgent organization provides a wide spectrum of 

insurgent capabilities. It is complete with direct action cells, INFOWAR cells, improvised explosive 

devices (IEDs), IED factories, suicide bombers, and even weapons of mass destruction. The relationship 

between the BTG and the local insurgent organization, in this example, is one of loose affiliation, rather 

than subordination.

Overall Hybrid Threat Organization 

B-11. In this example case, the appropriate Hybrid Threat required to meet the commander’s training 

requirements consists of two parts: the Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light) and an 

affiliated Local Insurgent Organization. See figure B-1.

Figure B-1. Basic Task-Organized Hybrid Threat (Example)

STEP 6. REVIEW THE HTFS ORGANIZATIONAL DIRECTORIES

B-12. The trainers and planners review the list of units in the Threat Force Structure organizational 

directories on ATN to determine what kinds and sizes of units are available in the HTFS. At this point, the 

purpose is only to review the menu of options available.

LOCAL

INSURGENT

ORGANIZATION

Affiliated

BRIGADE

TACTICAL GROUP

(Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt)

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-3 
Appendix B

STEP 7. COMPILING THE INITIAL LISTING OF HYBRID THREAT UNITS FOR THE TASK 

ORGANIZATION

B-13. From the HTFS menu, trainers and planners compile an initial listing of Hybrid Threat units for the 

task organization (see table B-1). At this point, the purpose is only to identify the units available, without 

concern for any higher-level command to which they are subordinate in the HTFS.

Table B-1. Initial Listing of Hybrid Threat Units Required for Task Organization

BTG Headquarters

Motorized Infantry Battalion (x2)

Mechanized Infantry Battalion (APC)

Guerrilla Battalion (Hunter/Killer)

Antitank Battalion

Artillery Battalion

Reconnaissance Battalion (Motorized)

SPF Company

Sniper Company

SPF Deep Attack/Recon Platoon

Air Defense Battalion (Motorized)

Engineer Battalion

Materiel Support Battalion

Maintenance Battalion (APC/Motorized)

Signal Company

Chemical Defense Company

Medical Company

STEP 8. IDENTIFY THE BASE UNIT

B-14. Trainers and planners again review the Hybrid Threat Force Structure to determine which standard 

OPFOR unit most closely matches the OPFOR units in the initial task organization list. This Hybrid Threat

unit will become the “base” unit to which modifications are made, converting it into a task organization.

Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade

B-15. For the main maneuver force, the leading candidate seems to be a motorized infantry brigade, of 

which the organizational directories show two types: divisional and separate. Of the two, the separate 

motorized infantry brigade has a much more robust antiarmor capability, with an antitank battalion of the 

type normally found in a division. As a base unit, this brigade can easily accommodate guerrillas and SPF 

into its task organization to meet training requirements. See figure B-2.

B-16. Once training planners have determined the Hybrid Threat units they need to be part of the task 

organization, they review the HTFS organizational directories and select that Threat unit most closely 

representing the combination of units identified in the initial list for the task organization. In this example 

case, the Threat separate motorized infantry brigade in the HTFS organizational directories most closely 

matches the task-organized requirement. To prepare for the task-organizing process, the separate motorized 

infantry brigade was extracted, exactly as it is posted, from the HTFS organizational directories (see figure 

B-2). This HTFS brigade will serve as the base (core) that will be modified and built upon to create the 

task-organized Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light) seen in figure B-5 on page B-12. 

Some units originally subordinate to the separate motorized brigade will be transferred out of the base 

structure, since they are not needed. Meanwhile, other units that were not part of the base unit will be added 

in order to provide additional capabilities that are required. From the Hybrid Threat perspective, higher 

headquarters determines where these units are allocated to or from. If the next higher headquarters does not 

have a subordinate unit that it can allocate for the task organization, it passes the requirement to (or 

through) its next higher headquarters until the appropriate unit can be allocated.

B-4 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

SEPARATE

MOTORIZED

INF BDE

BRIGADE

HQ

MOTORIZED

INFANTRY

BATTALION

ANTITANK

BATTALION

(Div)

LIGHT TANK

BATTALION

(41-Tank)

SNIPER

PLATOON

RECON

BATTALION

(Mtzd)(Sep)

COMPOSITE

ARTILLERY

BN (Sep)

TANK

BATTALION

(41-Tank)

ENGINEER

BATTALION

(Sep)

MATERIEL

SUPPORT

BATTALION

MAINT

BATTALION

(APC/Mtzd)

AIR DEFENSE

BATTALION

(Mtzd) (Sep)

SIGNAL

COMPANY

(Sep)

CHEMICAL

DEFENSE

CO (Sep)

MEDICAL

COMPANY

(Sep)

Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade ______________________

Figure B-2. Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade from TFS to Use as a Baseline Unit

B-17. The separate motorized infantry brigade already contains many of the units required for the BTG 

(Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) task organization. The task-organizing process has determined that the BTG consists 

of the specific units listed in table B-2.

Table B-2. Specific Units Required for BTG Task Organization

BTG Headquarters (based on Bde HQ)

Motorized Infantry Battalion (x2)

Mechanized Infantry Battalion (APC)

Guerrilla Battalion (Hunter/Killer)

Antitank Battalion (Div)

Composite Artillery Battalion (Sep)

Reconnaissance Battalion (Motorized) (Sep)

SPF Company

Sniper Company

SPF Deep Attack/Recon Platoon

Air Defense Battalion (Motorized)

Engineer Battalion (Sep)

Materiel Support Battalion

Maintenance Battalion (APC/Motorized)

Signal Company (Sep)

Chemical Defense Company (Sep)

Medical Company (Sep)

Note. For simplicity, all of the units forming the BTG task organization in this example are 

constituent to the BTG. The local insurgent group is affiliated with the BTG, but it is not part of 

the BTG. For additional information on command relationships see chapter 3. Also see chapter 2 

for an explanation of the “(Div)” and “(Sep)” designations following the names of some units 

(usually battalions or companies) in the TFS. 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-5 
Appendix B

Note. In this example, again for the sake of simplicity, none of the battalions or companies in the 

BTG have been task-organized into detachments. In reality, such task-organizing of subordinate 

units could very well be required in order to produce the right challenge to the training unit’s 

METL. In that case, training planners creating the Hybrid Threat Force Structure (HTFS) would 

have to start from the bottom up—first creating the necessary task organizations at the lowest 

levels of organization and then rolling them up into the personnel and equipment totals for the 

overall task organization. For example, rather than exchanging its original sniper platoon for a 

sniper company, the brigade becoming a BTG could have received a standard sniper company 

and then added its own sniper platoon to that company to create an augmented company-size

detachment (CDET). See the Building from the Bottom Up section later in this appendix.

Local Insurgent Organization

B-18. The HTFS organizational directories include a “typical” local insurgent organization. (See figure B3.) This baseline organization shows the various types of cells often found in insurgent organizations. 

However, the dashed boxes in the organizational chart indicate possible variations in the numbers of cells 

of each type that might be present in a particular insurgent organization. These cell types represent the 

various functions that can contribute to the OPFOR countertasks in this example.

Noncombatants

B-19. This task organization does not include all the players in the OE or even on the battlefield. At a 

minimum, other players include armed and unarmed noncombatants. They are an integral part of the 

operational environment and cannot be excluded. Examples of common types of noncombatants can also be 

found in the organizational directories. The types, behaviors, and impact of such noncombatants are 

discussed in detail in TC 7-100.3.

B-6 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

Figure B-3. Local Insurgent Organization from HTFS to Use as a Baseline Unit

STEP 9. CONSTRUCT THE TASK-ORGANIZED BTG

B-20. There are several differences between the final task-organized BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) and the 

HTFS separate motorized infantry brigade. Not all units originally subordinate to a standard separate 

motorized infantry brigade will be needed to complete the task organization, while additional units will be 

added to provide countertasks to the selected ARTs. Higher headquarters will allocate or re-allocate units 

depending on their need in the task-organized unit. In this task-organizing process, the HTFS separate 

motorized infantry brigade—

 Loses the two tank battalions. Transferred back to higher headquarters and possibly allocated to 

another task organization.

 Loses one motorized infantry battalion. Transferred back to higher and possibly allocated to 

another task organization.

TECHNICAL

SUPPORT

CELL

TRANSPORT

CELL

FINANCE

CELL

TRAINING

CELL

RECRUITING

CELL

MEDICAL

CELL

INFORMATION

WARFARE

CELL

DA CELL

(Information

Warfare)

DA CELL

(Kidnapping

& Extortion)

DA CELL

(MultiFunction)

PLANNING

CELL

CI & INTERNAL

SECURITY

CELL

DA CELL

(Mortar

& Rocket)

DA CELL 

(Assassin/

Sniper)

INTELLIGENCE

CELL

LOGISTICS

CELL

COMMS &

TRADECRAFT

CELL

SHELTER

CELL

(Safe Houses)

CIVIL

AFFAIRS

CELL

LOCAL

INSURGENT

ORGANIZATION

Local Insurgent Organization (Typical) _________________________

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-7
Appendix B

B-21. The task-organized BTG—

 Gains a mechanized infantry battalion (APC) in lieu of the one motorized infantry battalion. This 

battalion was allocated from a mechanized infantry brigade subordinate to the same higher 

headquarters.

 Gains a guerrilla battalion (hunter/killer). This battalion was probably subordinate to an 

insurgent organization operating in the area but, by mutual agreement between the higher 

headquarters of the guerrilla battalion and that of the BTG, has been made subordinate to the 

BTG only for the duration of the mission for which this task organization was created.

 Gains an SPF company. This company, originally part of a larger SPF organization, was 

allocated through higher headquarters.

 Upgrades from a sniper platoon to a sniper company. The upgrade was allocated by higher 

headquarters from a division that is also subordinate to the same higher headquarters. In turn, 

that division might receive the sniper platoon that was originally part of the separate motorized 

infantry brigade.

 Gains an SPF deep attack/reconnaissance platoon. This platoon was originally part of a larger 

SPF organization and was allocated through higher headquarters.

Summarized Sub-Steps of Step 9

B-22. The steps for converting a HTFS baseline unit to a task-organized Hybrid Threat are straightforward 

and simple. Once the units comprising the task-organization have been identified and the HTFS baseline 

unit has been selected, the following sub-steps are then followed:

 Step 9a. Create folders to accommodate the files copied and/or modified from those in the HTFS

directories using in the process explained below.

 Step 9b. Modify the organizational graphics in the document using the inserted graphic. Remove 

the units not needed in the task organization and add the new ones that are required. Re-insert 

the graphic into the document.

 Step 9c. Modify personnel and equipment charts. Even for those lower-level units that have only 

a document in the HTFS organizational directories, it is recommended to use a chart as a tool for 

rolling up personnel and equipment totals for the modified unit. Update the subordinate units at 

the tops of the columns on the spreadsheet page. Adjust all of the equipment numbers in 

appropriate rows, by unit columns. Once the new personnel and equipment numbers are updated 

in the spreadsheet, transfer the appropriate numbers back to the basic organizational document.

 Step 9d. Adjust equipment tiers, if necessary, to reflect different levels of modernity and 

capability (see chapter 4).

 Step 9e. Update folders and file paths to reflect the conversion from a HTFS organization to a 

task-organized unit.

The task-organized detachment, BTG, DTG, or OSC is finished. If there are any questions on the steps 

outlined above, see the detailed instructions directly below in this appendix.

Step 9a. Create Folders

B-23. A preliminary step before beginning to actually build the Hybrid Threat Force Structure is for 

trainers to create folders to accommodate the files they will copy and/or modify from those in the HTFS

directories using in the process explained below. The use of a sequential numbering of folders and files (see 

the arrangement in the HTFS organizational directories) ensures the units are presented in the proper 

sequence when accessed in the ATN site. This method has proven by far to be the simplest when dealing 

with a large number of documents, many with similar titles. Figure B-4 shows the folders that will be 

required for creating the BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Light) and the Local Insurgent Organization.

01 BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) (or fictitious title/number assigned for training)

01 BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt)

02 BTG Hqs and Staff

03 Motorized Infantry Bn (x2)

B-8 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

04 Mechanized Infantry Bn (APC)

05 Guerrilla Battalion (Hunter-Killer)

06 Antitank Battalion (Sep Bde)

07 Composite Artillery Bn (Sep Bde)

08 Recon Battalion (APC-Mtzd) (Sep)

09 SPF Company (not a separate unit in HTFS, must be broken out)

10 Sniper Company (Div)

11 SPF Deep Attack-Recon Plt (not a separate unit, must be broken out)

12 Air Defense Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)

13 Engineer Battalion (Sep Bde)

14 Materiel Support Battalion (Sep Bde)

15 Maintenance Battalion (APC-Mtzd)

16 Signal Company (Sep Bde)

17 Chemical Defense Co (Sep Bde)

18 Medical Company (Sep Bde)

02 Local Insurgent Organization (or fictitious title assigned for training)

Note. In order to keep path lengths within practical limits, folder names had to be shortened

by using abbreviations in unit titles, some of which are not used within the documents and 

spreadsheets themselves.

Figure B-4. Folders for Task Organization

Step 9b. Modify Organizational Graphics into a Task-Organized OPFOR Unit

B-24. The organizational graphics in the HTFS are built using known software. Therefore, the 

modifications should be made using similar software. The graphics are built and then inserted into the 

document. Figure B-2 on page B-5 shows the organization used as the baseline for modification in this 

example. Figure B-5 on page B-12 shows the finished task-organized unit. The following paragraphs walk 

through the process of making the changes in the graphic and then re-inserting the finished organizational 

graphic back into the document. 

B-25. There are several steps to modifying an existing graphic and reinserting it into the document. None 

of these steps is difficult, but most are sequential.

Step 9b(1). Save as New Document

B-26. Save the document titled “Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade” as the “Brigade Tactical Group 

(Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light).” In the Save As process, save the new document into the “01 BTG (Mtzd) 

(Antiarmor-Lt)” folder created in Step 9a.

Step 9b(2). Change Title Line

B-27. In the newly saved document “Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light),” change the 

title line above the graphic from “Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade” to read “Brigade Tactical Group 

(Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light).”

Step 9b(3). Open the Graphic

B-28. To open the graphic— 

 Click once on the center of the graphic (the slide inserted into the document).

 The outline of the box containing the graphic should appear highlighted, showing small squares

on the four corners and a small square in the center of each side.

 Right click once on the box (outline).

 A drop-down menu appears.

 Select Presentation Object and Open.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-9 
Appendix B

 This opens the slide to allow making changes to it.

Step 9b(4). Make Changes in the Graphic

B-29. Make the following changes in the graphic:

B-30. Step 9b(4)(a). Change title box at the top of the line-and-block chart from “SEPARATE 

MOTORIZED INFANTRY BRIGADE” to “BRIGADE TACTICAL GROUP (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt).” 

Stretch the box left-to-right to allow for word spacing.

B-31. Step 9b(4)(b). Change “BRIGADE HQ” to read “BTG HQ”.

B-32. Step 9b(4)(c). Delete one of the three “MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION” boxes.

B-33. Step 9b(4)(d). Change the “TANK BATTALION (41-Tank)” to read “MECHANIZED INFANTRY 

BN (APC).” Stretch the box left-to-right to allow for word spacing.

B-34. Step 9b(4)(e). Change the “LIGHT TANK BATTALION (41-Tank) to read “GUERRILLA

BATTALION (Hunter/Killer).”

B-35. Step 9b(4)(f). Add an additional (entire) row of four organizational boxes with all lines. Since there 

are now more units than the separate brigade template, the additional units require additional boxes.

 Highlight all of the lines and blocks in the graphic. This can be done by holding down the Shift

key while selecting them individually. However, an easier method is to move the mouse to the 

upper left hand corner, left click on that corner, and then hold down the left mouse button while 

moving the cursor diagonally downward to the bottom right corner before releasing it.

 Leave all of the graphics highlighted and tap the UP arrow key (↑) until all organizations have 

moved towards the top of the slide enough to make room for the additional row. Remember 

always save after each step.

 Highlight the bottom box (three units) similar to the process in the first bullet under Step 

9b(4)(f). Move them down toward the bottom of the slide enough to leave room to insert the 

fourth row. Tap the DOWN arrow key (↓) if necessary to bring the bottom row down.

 Highlight the entire next-to-last-row (starts with Air Defense Battalion). Include all units on that 

row and all lines. Copy that row (either using the Copy function from the Edit menu at the top 

left of the slide, or hit Control + C while it is highlighted). Paste the copied row (next to last 

from the bottom) using the Paste function from the Edit menu (or Control + V) above the 

bottom row into the space created when you moved the bottom row down. 

 Move the copied row (with text still in the box) to become the fourth row.

 Properly align/adjust the spacing of the rows.

B-36. Step 9b(4)(g). Change “SNIPER PLATOON” at the right end of the third row to read “SPF 

COMPANY.”

B-37. Step 9b(4)(h). Change the four units in the fourth row as follows:

 Change “AIR DEFENSE BATTALION (Mtzd) (Sep)” to read “SNIPER COMPANY.”

 Change “ENGINEER BATTALION (Sep)” to read “SPF DEEP ATK/RECON PLT.”

 Change “MATERIEL SUPPORT BATTALION” to read “AIR DEFENSE BATTALION 

(Mtzd) (Sep).”

 Change “MAINT BATTALION (APC/Mtzd)” to read “ENGINEER BATTALION (Sep.)”

B-38. Step 9b(4)(i). Change the four units on the next to last (fifth) row to read—

 MATERIEL SUPPORT BATTALION

 MAINT BATTALION (APC/Mtzd)

 SIGNAL COMPANY (Sep)

 CHEMICAL DEFENSE CO (Sep)

B-39. Step 9b(4)(j). Keep only the middle box on the bottom (sixth) row:

 Delete the box on either side of the middle one.

B-10 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

 Add “MEDICAL COMPANY (Sep) in the last (middle) box in the bottom (sixth) row.

B-40. Step 9b(4)(k). Extend the line running from the “BRIGADE TACTICAL GROUP (Motorized) 

(Antiarmor-Light)” box at the top of the diagram to the “MEDICAL COMPANY (Sep)” box at the bottom.

B-41. Step 9b(4)(l). In , highlight all of the unit boxes. Then click on Draw at the bottom left. Click on 

Order, then Bring to Front. This puts the lines behind the boxes and puts multiple boxes in their proper 

sequence. In order for this to work all of the boxes must have white Fill.

Note. If trainers use often for this purpose, they might wish to go to Tools at the top of the 

screen, select Customize, Drawing, and Bring to Front. Drag the Bring to Front icon to their 

tool bar. Then all that is necessary is to highlight all of the unit boxes and click on the Bring to 

Front icon.

B-42. Step 9b(4)(m). Add fictitious unit designators, if desired for training purposes. The last step to 

building the task-organization graphic might be the addition of fictitious alphanumeric unit designators or 

fictitious honorific tiles to the task organization and/or its subordinates. Some example fictitious 

designators or titles might be the 66th BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt), the Ali-Babba Battalion instead of 

Guerrilla Battalion, or the Glorious Path Organization instead of Local Insurgent Organization.

Note. If such fictitious unit designators are used in the graphic, they should also appear in the 

corresponding folder and file names for these units and in the unit names as they appear in 

documents and spreadsheets.

B-43. Step 9b(4)(n). In the graphic go to File at the top left of the screen. Select Update and click on it. (If 

trainers would like to save this file separate from the document, they can also click on Save As under File.) 

Under File again, select Close and Return. This updates the graphic in the document. Use the Crop

function to eliminate extra spacing in the document. Be careful not grab the document by the top or sides 

without clicking on the Crop function. If the Crop function is not used the document will be either 

stretched or compressed out of relational aspect.

B-44. Step 9b(4)(o). The completed BTG graphic in the document should look exactly like that shown in 

figure B-5 on page B-12.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-11
Appendix B

Figure B-5. Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light)

B-45. In this example, for the sake of simplicity, none of the battalions or companies subordinate to the 

BTG has been task-organized into a detachment. If they were, trainers would also need to modify the 

organizational graphics of those subordinates to reflect how they are task-organized. In this simplified 

example, however, all that is required is to copy the files for these battalions and companies “as-is” from 

the HTFS organizational directories into the proper folder created in Step 9a.

Step 9c. Modify Personnel and Equipment Charts

B-46. For the BTG in this example, the personnel and equipment numbers are contained in a spreadsheet. 

Although it is possible to build a new chart from scratch, it is not recommended. The simplest method of 

creating the spreadsheet is similar to that used for modifying organizational graphics, as described above. 

Training planners should find an existing spreadsheet for a similar unit in the HTFS organizational 

directories and modify it into a personnel and equipment chart reflecting the newly created task-organized 

OPFOR unit. For illustrative purposes, this part of appendix B will continue to use the HTFS separate 

motorized infantry brigade as the example baseline Threat unit. It remains the Threat unit with subordinates 

most closely resembling those of the initial listing of units for the task organization in Step 7. The end 

result is the conversion of the “Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade” spreadsheet into the “Brigade 

Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light)” spreadsheet reflecting all of the units in the task 

organization. The completed organization will include a complete listing of all personnel and equipment, 

by subordinate unit, in the newly formed BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) and the totals for the BTG.

BRIGADE

TACTICAL GROUP

(Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt)

BTG

HQ

MOTORIZED

INFANTRY

BATTALION

ANTITANK

BATTALION

(Div)

GUERRILLA

BATTALION

(Hunter/Killer)

SPF

COMPANY

RECON

BATTALION

(Mtzd)(Sep)

COMPOSITE

ARTILLERY

BN (Sep)

SPF

DEEP ATK/

RECON PLT

AIR DEFENSE

BATTALION

(Mtzd) (Sep)

ENGINEER

BATTALION

(Sep)

SNIPER

COMPANY

MEDICAL

COMPANY

(Sep)

MAINT

BATTALION

(APC/Mtzd)

SIGNAL

COMPANY

(Sep)

CHEMICAL

DEFENSE

CO (Sep)

MATERIEL

SUPPORT

BATTALION

MECHANIZED

INFANTRY

BN (APC)

Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light) _______

B-12 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

B-47. There are several steps to modifying an existing spreadsheet into the example task-organized BTG 

(Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt). None of these steps is difficult but most are sequential.

Step 9c(1). Save Chart as New Chart

B-48. Save the spreadsheet titled “Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade” in the HTFS as the “Brigade 

Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light).” In the Save As process, save the new chart under the “01 

BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt)” folder created in Step 9a. The resulting chart will serve as the basis for 

making the necessary modifications.

Step 9c(2). Change Chart Title in Row 1

B-49. In the newly saved spreadsheet “Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) Antiarmor-Light),” at the top of 

the page (Row 1), change the title line from “Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade” to read “Brigade 

Tactical Group (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Light).”

Step 9c(3). Modify the List of Subordinate Units in Row 2

B-50. Row 2 of the spreadsheet should reflect the units in the BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt). For consistency 

in the task-organizing process, Row 2 should show the subordinate units in the same sequential order as 

they appear in the organizational chart shown in figure B-5 on page B-12. Thus, Row 2 for the BTG (Mtzd) 

(Antiarmor-Lt) should appear as shown in figure B-6.

Figure B-6. Rows 1 and 2

B-51. Therefore, the next task is to modify the subordinate units (old Sep Mtzd Inf Bde) listed in Row 2 to 

reflect the units selected to be part of the task-organized BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt). This modification 

consists of several steps of deleting some units not used in the task organization and adding new columns to 

provide a space for including new units into the task organization:

 Change “Brigade Headquarters” in Column B to read “BTG Headquarters.” The asterisk (note) 

still applies; so it remains.

 The “Motorized Infantry Bn X3” in Column C should be modified to reflect two motorized 

infantry battalions required for the task-organized BTG vice the three originally in the separate 

motorized infantry brigade. Change the “X3” to “X2”. Delete all the items of equipment 

numbers in Column C under the motorized infantry battalion. They are no longer correct, since 

these numbers reflect three battalions rather than the two required now. Delete the numbers now 

rather than try to recall later if the numbers reflect two or three battalions. Later, at Step 9c(4)(a), 

it will be time to enter the proper numbers of equipment for the total of two motorized infantry 

battalions. Keep the note reference ** after the “X2.” However, Note ** at the bottom of the 

page is now incorrect and must be modified to read: “The values in this column are the total 

number for two battalions.” Repeat on all pages.

 The two tank battalions in Columns D and E of the original chart are not part of the BTG. To 

delete these two columns, highlight the entire columns by clicking on the “D” and “E” at the top 

of the chart, then go to Edit at the top left of the screen, and click Delete.

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 BTG Headquarters * Motorized Infantry Bn X2 ** Mechanized Infantry Bn (APC) Guerrilla Bn (Hunter/Killer) Antitank Bn (Sep Bde, Div, Nondiv) * Composite Artillery Battalion * Recon Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  SPF Company Sniper Company (Div) SPF Deep Attack/Recon Plt Air Defense Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  Engineer Battalion (Sep Bde) Materiel Support Battalion * Maintenance Battalion, APC/Mtzd Signal Company (Sep) * Chem Defense Co (Sep Bde) * Medical Company (Sep Bde) * TOTAL

 Brigade Tactical Group (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Light)

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-13
Appendix B

Note. To remove a column or row from a spreadsheet, do not use the “Del” button on the 

keyboard; that only “clears” the content of cells in the column or row, but the column or row still 

exists (just with empty cells). Columns (labeled A, B, C, and so forth) or rows (labeled 1, 2, 3, 

and so forth) can be removed only by highlighting the entire column or row and then going to 

the toolbar at the very top of the screen and clicking on Edit/Delete.

 Now it is necessary to add the mechanized infantry battalion (APC), which is a new unit, to the 

chart. However, there is no column in which to put it. The mechanized infantry battalion (APC) 

should be listed in the proper sequence (reflecting the sequence in the BTG organizational 

graphic in figure B-5 on page B-12). Therefore, this battalion is placed directly to the right of the 

“Motorized Infantry Bn X2” in Column C. Highlight the original Column D, click on Insert at 

the top of the screen, and then click on Columns. There should now be an empty Column D in 

between the “Motorized Infantry Bn X2” in Column C and the antitank battalion (now in 

Column E). The newly inserted Column D should automatically be included in the summing 

formulas which roll up the personnel and equipment numbers to provide totals in the right-hand 

column. Click on the cell in Column D, Row 2, which is still vacant. Type in one space and then 

“Mechanized Infantry Bn (APC).” The one space before typing moves the text off the line for 

easier reading. The personnel and equipment numbers will be added in Step 9c(4)(b).

 Add the guerrilla battalion (hunter/killer) as the fourth entry. This is also a new unit to the BTG, 

and thus there is no column in which to put it. The guerrilla battalion (hunter/killer) must also be 

listed in the proper sequence (as in the organizational graphic in figure B-5 on page B-12). 

Therefore, this battalion must be directly to the right of the mechanized infantry battalion (APC) 

in column D. Highlight the current Column E, click on Insert at the top of the screen, and then 

click on Columns. There should now be an empty Column E in between the mechanized 

infantry battalion (APC) in Column D and the antitank battalion in what is now Column F. This 

new column also should automatically be included in the summing formulas. Click on the cell in 

Column E, Row 2, which is still vacant. Type in one space and then “Guerrilla Battalion 

(Hunter/Killer).” The personnel and equipment numbers will be added in Step 9c(4)(c).

 Column F, (Antitank Battalion), Column G (Composite Artillery Battalion), and Colum H 

(Recon Battalion) do not require any modification. They remain as they were in the separate 

motorized infantry brigade. The personnel and equipment numbers in these organizations are 

correct and require no further action.

 The sniper platoon now in Column I is not part of the BTG. Delete Column I, Sniper Platoon, by 

clicking on the “I” at the top of the chart to highlight the entire column, then clicking on Edit at 

the top left of the screen, and clicking Delete.

 The SPF company is the eighth entry. This is another unit new to the BTG. Once again, there is 

no column in which to enter it. The SPF company should be listed in the proper sequence (as in 

the organization graphic in figure B-5 on page B-12). The SPF company must be positioned 

directly after the Recon Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde) now in column H. Highlight the current Column I, 

click on Insert at the top of the screen, and then click on Columns. There should now be an 

empty Column I between the Recon Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde) in Column H and the air defense 

battalion (Mtzd) (Sep Bde) which moved to Column J. Click on the cell in Column I, Row 2, 

which is still vacant. Type in one space and then “SPF Company.” The personnel and equipment 

numbers will be added in Step 9c(4)(e).

 The sniper company is the ninth entry. This is another unit new to the BTG. Once again, there is 

no column in which to enter it. The sniper company is placed directly to the right of the SPF 

company now in Column I. Highlight the current Column J, click on Insert at the top of the 

screen, and then click on Columns. There should now be an empty Column J between the SPF 

company in Column I and the air defense battalion (Mtzd) (Sep Bde) which moved to Column 

K. Click on the cell in Column J, Row 2, which is still vacant. Type in one space and then 

“Sniper Company.” The personnel and equipment numbers will be added in Step 9c(4)(f).

 The SPF deep attack/reconnaissance platoon is the tenth entry. This is another unit new to the 

BTG. Once again, there is no column in which to enter it. The SPF deep attack/reconnaissance 

platoon should be positioned directly to the right of the sniper company now in Column J. 

B-14 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

Highlight the current Column K, click on Insert at the top of the screen, and then click on 

Columns. There should now be an empty Column K between the sniper company in Column J 

and the air defense battalion (Mtzd) (Sep Bde) which moved to Column L. Click on the cell in 

Column K, Row 2, which is still vacant. Type in one space and then “SPF Deep Attack/Recon 

Plt.” The personnel and equipment numbers will be added in Step 9c(4)(g).

 The following units listed in Columns L thru R require no further action—

 Column L = Air defense battalion.

 Column M = Engineer battalion.

 Column N = Materiel support battalion.

 Column O = Maintenance battalion.

 Column P = Signal company.

 Column Q = Chemical defense company.

 Column R = Medical company.

 The totals in Column S will be automatically calculated using the summing formulas. No action

is required for this column. Once the personnel and equipment numbers have been added to new

and modified units and the chart completely updated, Column S (Total) will accommodate the

update by automatically calculating the sums. For additional guidance on automatic summation,

see Using Spreadsheets to Facilitate Roll-Ups in the section on Building from the Bottom Up

later in this appendix.

Note. When making changes to the unit titles in Row 2, do not forget to carry those changes to 

all of the pages in the chart. Also check any asterisks in Row 2 and ensure the notes to which 

they are linked at the bottom of the page(s) still apply.

Step 9c(4). Update Personnel and Equipment Numbers

B-52. Once Row 2 has been modified to reflect all of the units in the BTG, the personnel and items of 

equipment must be updated. The items of equipment in Column A are modified by adding equipment not 

listed in the baseline Spreadsheet and deleting equipment no longer used by units in the task organized 

BTG. After all the proper items of equipment are reflected in Column A, training planners must enter the 

appropriate personnel and equipment totals for each individual unit in Columns B through R.

Note. When entering numbers in columns, it is recommended to highlight the column currently 

being worked on, in order to limit confusion and avoid placing numbers into the wrong column. 

Highlight the column by clicking on the letter designating that column at the very top of the 

spreadsheet and then click on the Fill Color icon in the toolbar and select a color. The column 

will remain highlighted during entry of numbers. (Just clicking on the letter at the top of the 

column temporarily highlights the entire column, but the highlighting turns off as soon as one 

clicks on a cell to enter data.) When entries in that column are complete, click on the letter at the 

top of the column again, then click on the Fill Color icon and select No Fill to turn off the 

highlighting in the completed column.

B-53. Task-organized units generally require additional types of equipment. Specific types of equipment in 

Column A should not be deleted until the Spreadsheet is completely finished. If the item of equipment is 

deleted too early in the process, the piece of equipment may not be available in the event another unit 

modified later in the process requires that piece of equipment. Trainers would then need to go back and reenter the item they just deleted (by creating a new row and filling in the information). The best method is to 

wait until all other modifications to the Spreadsheet have been made and then delete the rows for any items 

of equipment for which the total is Column S is a zero.

B-54. Make sure that all units carried over from the original Spreadsheet have not been altered in ways that 

would change their personnel and equipment numbers. Units that have been modified, or are new, to the 

BTG must have the appropriate personnel and equipment numbers entered into the chart (cell by cell). The 

data must be entered individually by unit (column). Units new to the BTG often have some items of 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-15
Appendix B

equipment that were not included in the original equipment listing in Column A. New rows for these 

additional items of equipment will be added, one unit (column) at a time, when updating the equipment 

data.

B-55. In this example BTG, the following units require new or modified personnel and equipment data:

 Column C: Motorized Infantry Battalion (x2).

 Column D: Mechanized Infantry Battalion (APC).

 Column E: Guerrilla Battalion (Hunter/Killer).

 Column I: SPF Company.

 Column J: Sniper Company.

 Column K: SPF Deep Attack/Reconnaissance Platoon.

B-56. Step 9c(4)(a). Column C: Motorized Infantry Battalion (x2). In the HTFS organizational 

directories, go to Volume II – Echelons Above Division, 01 Separate Combat Brigades, 04 Sep Motorized 

Inf Bde, 03A Mtzd Inf Bn Equip.xls to select the appropriate baseline unit. Multiply the total numbers in 

Column L (in the Mtzd Inf Bn chart) by two, to reflect the total numbers for the two motorized infantry of 

battalions that are part of the BTG. Transfer the numbers of the motorized infantry battalion (which have 

been multiplied by two) into the appropriate cells in Column C, Motorized Infantry Bn X2 of the BTG 

(Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) chart.

Note. The values in Column C (of the BTG chart) are the total numbers for two battalions. 

Ensure that the footnote with the same number of asterisks as in the reference at the top of 

Column C, Row 2 states this. This column does not require any modifications to the equipment 

list in Column A. It is simply a matter of changing the numbers from three battalions to two 

battalions.

Note. In this particular example, neither of the motorized infantry battalions in Column C was 

task-organized into a detachment. If that were the case, it would be necessary to create a separate 

column for the unit that became a BDET, since its personnel and equipment numbers would be 

different from those of a battalion. Even if both the motorized infantry battalions retained in this 

BTG were transformed into BDETs, it is unlikely that they would both be task-organized in the 

same way. Therefore, the two BDETs would still require separate columns in the Spreadsheet.

B-57. Step 9c(4)(b). Column D: Mechanized Infantry Battalion (APC). In the HTFS organizational 

directories, go to Volume I – Division and Divisional Units, 02 Mechanized Infantry Division (APC), 04 

Mech Inf Bde (APC), 03A Mech Inf Bn (APC) Equip.xls to select the appropriate baseline unit. Transfer 

the numbers of the mechanized infantry battalion (APC) from Column K (TOTAL) of the mechanized 

infantry battalion (APC) into the appropriate cells in Column D, Mechanized Inf Bn (APC) of the BTG 

(Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) chart. Start with transferring the personnel numbers and then add the numbers of 

equipment.

B-58. Some of the types of equipment belonging to the mechanized infantry battalion (APC) are yet not 

listed in Column A. This equipment must be added. Although the process is sequential, it is simple. 

Trainers should begin updating (adding) personnel and equipment numbers in Column D of the 

Spreadsheet until they run across an item of equipment not listed in Column A.

B-59. The first item of equipment not listed in Column A of the BTG Spreadsheet is the ACRV, 1V152. 

The proper sequential placement for the ACRV, 1V152 in the BTG Spreadsheet is between the ACRV, 

1V14-3, Cmd & Observation Post in Row 11 and the ACRV 1V15-3, Cmd & Observation Post in Row 12. 

A new row (in which to place the ACRV, 1V152) needs to be created in between Rows 11 and 12. In order 

to insert the new row, highlight the entire Row 12 from the left side of the chart. Once Row 12 is 

highlighted, click on Insert at the top of the screen, and then Row. A blank row has now been inserted 

between previous Rows 11 and 12. In Column A of that row, type “ACRV, 1V152.” Since there is one 

ACRV, 1V152 in the mechanized infantry battalion (APC), add the number “1” in Row 12 (ACRV, 

1V152), Column D (Mech Inf Bn (APC). 

B-16 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

B-60. Once the new row has been added and filled in with the updated data/number, ensure the automatic 

summing formula is entered in Column S “Total” on the right side of the chart. To create the correct 

formula for automatic summing in the “Total” column, users can click on any cell in the “Total” column 

containing the correct formula for its row and Copy and Paste that formula into the “Total” cell in the new 

row; the letters designating the row in the formula should automatically change to the letter of the new row. 

The chart should automatically add the numbers in columns B thru R, with the total shown in Column S.

B-61. Continue transferring the numbers from the mechanized infantry battalion (APC) personnel and 

equipment chart to the BTG chart. Insert any new rows necessary. Fill them out and follow the instructions 

above until Column D, mechanized infantry battalion (APC) is completed in the BTG chart. When 

complete, move on to Column E, guerrilla battalion (hunter/killer).

B-62. Step 9c(4)(c). Column E: Guerrilla Battalion (Hunter/Killer). In the HTFS organizational

directories, go to Volume III – Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations, 01 Guerrilla Brigade, 02 

Guerrilla Bn, Guer Bde, 02A Guer Bn-Equip.xls to select the appropriate baseline unit. Transfer the 

personnel and equipment numbers from the HTFS guerrilla battalion (hunter/killer) Spreadsheet to Column 

E, guerrilla battalion (hunter/killer) of the BTG chart in accordance with the instructions above. Once the 

transfer and update is complete, move on to Column I, SPF Company. 

B-63. Step 9c(4)(d). Column F (Antitank Bn) thru Column H (Recon Bn). These units were part of the 

baseline HTFS separate motorized infantry brigade. Since no internal modifications are involved here, the 

columns for these units are complete and require no modification.

B-64. Step 9c(4)(e). Column I: SPF Company. In the HTFS organizational directories, go to volume II – 

Nondivisional Units, 02 Combat Brigades, 01 Special-Purpose Forces Brigade, 03B SPF Bn Equip.xls, 

Column C (SPF Company in the equipment chart) to select the appropriate baseline unit. In this case, the 

SPF company is not listed separately in the document. In that document, it is rolled up as a part of “SPF 

Company (X3)” of the SPF Battalion. Therefore, the numbers in Column C of the SPF Bn Spreadsheet 

must be divided by three to acquire the number for a single SPF company. Once the personnel and 

equipment numbers for only one SPF company have been determined, transfer those numbers into Column 

I, SPF Company, of the BTG chart in accordance with the instructions above. Once the transfer and update 

is complete, move on to Column J, Sniper Company.

B-65. Step 9c(4)(f). Column J: Sniper Company. In the HTFS organizational directories, go to volume I 

– Divisions and Divisional Units, 04 Motorized Infantry Division, 11 Sniper Co to select the appropriate

baseline unit. Then transfer the sniper company numbers into Column J, Sniper Company, of the BTG chart 

in accordance with the instructions above.

B-66. Step 9c(4)(g). Column K: SPF Deep Attack/Reconnaissance Platoon. In the HTFS organizational 

directories, go to volume II – Nondivisional Units, 02 Combat Brigades, 01 Special-Purpose Forces 

Brigade, 03B SPF Bn Equip.xls, Column D (SPF Deep Attack/Reconnaissance Platoon in the equipment 

chart) to select the appropriate baseline unit. Then transfer the Deep Attack/Reconnaissance Platoon 

numbers into Column K, SPF Deep Attack/Reconnaissance Platoon, of the BTG chart in accordance with 

the instructions above.

B-67. Step 9c(4)(h). Column L through Column R. These units were part of the baseline HTFS separate 

motorized infantry brigade. Since no internal modifications are involved here, the columns for these units 

are complete and require no modification.

B-68. Step 9c(4)(i). Column S: Total. This column automatically totals the equipment numbers in 

Columns A through R. It should not require any action.

Step 9c(5). Delete Unused Rows

B-69. Once the Spreadsheet is complete and all units have their equipment entered, it is easy to determine 

which items of equipment are not needed in the chart. A look at the totals column (the last Column on the 

right-hand side) reveals that some items of equipment have “0” (zero) for the total. These items of 

equipment may then be deleted. After reviewing the notes at the bottom of the page for applicability, the 

final formatting adjustments may then be made to the Spreadsheet. 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-17
Appendix B

Step 9c(6). Update Notes

B-70. The “Notes” listed at the bottom of the page amplify either the units listed in Row 2 or items of 

equipment listed in Column A. Care must be taken to ensure the asterisk (*) reference(s) in Row 2 or 

Column A match the appropriate note(s). For the convenience of the user, the notes pertaining to units in 

Row 2 (which appears at the top of each page in a multi-page Spreadsheet) are repeated at the bottom of 

each page. Update these notes as necessary, to correspond to changes in organization or equipment.

Step 9c(7). Format the Chart

B-71. In this BTG example, the personnel and equipment chart is five pages long (323 rows) and 19 

columns wide. This example chart uses portrait orientation and fits on a standard-size, 8.5x11-inch paper. If 

necessary, equipment charts can easily be formatted to landscape orientation to fit the standard-size paper. 

The heights of the rows and widths of columns are adjusted by first highlighting the row (or column), 

clicking on Format at the top of the screen and selecting Row (or Column) and adjusting the row height (or 

column width). Several attempts may be needed until the adjustments are satisfactory. In order to fit this 

chart on standard paper, with a portrait orientation, the following format parameters were used:

 Column Width.

 A = 36.14 

 B through Column R= 4.29

 S (Totals) = 5

 Row Height.

 1 = 25

 2 = 170

 All other rows = 13

Step 9c(8). Completed Chart

B-72. The task-organized Brigade Tactical Group (Motorized) (Antiarmor-Light) personnel and equipment 

roll up in should now be complete. The completed BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) equipment charts are seen 

in figures B-7 through B-11 (on pages B-19 through B-23).

B-18 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 BTG Headquarters * Motorized Infantry Bn X2 ** Mechanized Infantry Bn (APC) Guerrilla Bn (Hunter/Killer) Antitank Bn (Sep Bde, Div, Nondiv) * Composite Artillery Battalion * Recon Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  SPF Company Sniper Company (Div) SPF Deep Attack/Recon Plt Air Defense Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  Engineer Battalion (Sep Bde) Materiel Support Battalion * Maintenance Battalion, APC/Mtzd Signal Company (Sep) * Chem Defense Co (Sep Bde) * Medical Company (Sep Bde) * TOTAL

 Officer 41 74 33 35 26 39 26 14 5 4 38 23 25 32 5 6 47 473

 NCO 43 402 133 211 73 151 82 27 42 8 124 104 59 94 20 30 31 1634

 Enlisted 105 1396 555 765 355 515 378 118 78 25 595 572 487 497 118 111 109 6779

Total Personnel 189 1872 721 1011 454 701 486 159 135 37 757 699 571 623 143 147 187 8892

ACRV, 1V110, Battery FDC 2 2

ACRV, 1V13-3, Fire Control Post 4 4

ACRV, 1V14-3, Cmd & Observation Post 4 4

ACRV, 1V152, Artillery Command Post 1 1

ACRV, 1V15-3, Cmd & Observation Post 1 1

ACRV, 1V16-3, Fire Control Post 1 1

ACV, BMP-1KSh, Cmd & Staff Veh 1 2 8 11

ACV, BRDM-2UM 1 1

ACV, BTR-80, Kushetka, Cmd & Staff Veh 6 1 2 4 1 2 2 2 20

ACV, BTR-80, Kushetka, Comms Jammer 2 2

ACV, BTR-80, Kushetka, Ground Station 1 1

ACV, BTR-80, Kushetka, Radar Intcpt/DF 3 3

ACV, BTR-80, Kushetka, Radio Intcpt/DF 3 3

ACV, Air Def, Sborka w/DOG EAR Radar 4 4

Air Def Acq & Coord Unit, ACU (Crotale) 3 3

APC, BTR-80A 2 46 2 9 59

APC, BTR-80AK, Command Veh 4 2 6

Artillery Locating Radar, IL220U/IL219 1 1

ATGM Launcher Vehicle, AMX-10 HOT 3 12 12

CRV, BRDM-2M w/ATGM Lchr, HOT 3 1 13 14

CRV, BRM-3K, Combat Recon Veh 3 3

IFV, BMP-2M 9 7 16

Mobile Recon Post, PRP-4M 4 12 16

Multipurpose Vehicle, MT-LBT 12 1 13

SAM Launcher, Firing Unit (Crotale) 6 6

Sound Ranging Set, SORAS 6 1 1

Sensor Vehicle-Tracked, HJ-62C 2 2

Towed AA Gun/Missile Sys, Skyguard 4 4

 w/Aspide MK 1 Missile Launcher & 8 8

 Towed AA Gun, GDF-003 8 8

Truck, Command and Staff Vehicle 13 4 1 1 1 20

9-mm Pistol, PM 4 114 37 39 3 3 7 159 37 3 3 3 3 44 459

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M 170 1478 380 289 654 345 30 99 5 654 574 540 586 121 141 143 6209

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U 15 214 269 162 44 134 88 26 96 122 28 34 22 6 1260

5.45-mm LMG, RPK-74 10 10

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM 765 46 811

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS 90 90

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM 10 160 41 64 8 12 32 14 34 24 8 38 3 5 11 464

7.62-mm LMG, RPK 80 80

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant 30 30

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD 66 36 6 1 28 36 6 2 181

.50 BMG Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 12 6 6 14 36 3 77

12.7-mm HMG, NSV 8 94 28 9 38 29 29 16 26 3 76 20 22 31 14 5 448

23-mm Chain Gun 3 3

35-mm AGL-Light, W-87 7 66 42 4 7 16 4 2 7 2 2 159

40-mm AGL-Heavy, CIS 40 12 18 4 34

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 141 141

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30 43 344 150 87 123 103 29 65 5 115 104 39 101 31 31 15 1385

Page 1 (continued) .. 

 Brigade Tactical Group (Mtzd) (Antiarmor)

Personnel

Equipment

NOTES:

* Same basic organization for IFV, APC, and motorized units. APC units substitute wheeled APCs for IFVs in the tracked units, etc.

 ** The values in this column are the total number for two battalions.

 *** Tactical Utility Veh, Amphib, VBR w/Trailer, Amphib, can be substituted for Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469

Figure B-7. BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) Personnel and Equipment List, Page 1

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-19
Appendix B

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 BTG Headquarters * Motorized Infantry Bn X2 ** Mechanized Infantry Bn (APC) Guerrilla Bn (Hunter/Killer) Antitank Bn (Sep Bde, Div, Nondiv) * Composite Artillery Battalion * Recon Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  SPF Company Sniper Company SPF Deep Attack/Recon Plt Air Defense Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  Engineer Battalion (Sep Bde) Materiel Support Battalion * Maintenance Battalion, APC/Mtzd Signal Company (Sep) * Chem Defense Co (Sep Bde) * Medical Company (Sep Bde) * TOTAL

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 or 18 9 9 36

 60-mm Commando Mortar, M70

73-mm Recoilless Gun, SPG-9/9M 3 3

82-mm Recoilless Gun, Type 65-1 9 9

81-mm W-87, or 82-mm 2B14-1 Mortars 6 6

 or 100-mm Mortar, Type 71

 or 120-mm Mortar, Type 86 (W86)

107-mm MRL, Type 63/63-1 or Type 85 3 3

120-mm SP Combination Gun, 2S23 6 6

120-mm Towed Combo Gun, 2B16 12 12

 or 120-mm Towed Mortar, MO-120-RT

122-mm MRL, 9A51/PRIMA 6 6

125-mm Antitank Gun, 2A45M 12 12

155-mm SP How, G6/Rhino 18 18

Air Defense/Antiarmor System, Starstreak 3 3 6

ATGM Launcher, 9P151, AT-13/METIS-M 4 4

ATGM Launcher, HOT-3 6 7 13 26

ATGM Launcher, Manportable, AT-13 9 9

ATGM Lchr, Manportable-SR, Eryx 18 5 2 12 3 40

ATGM Launcher, Milan 3 18 18

ATGL-Long Range, RPG-29 36 18 54

ATGL, Panzerfaust 3-T600 3 58 31 21 1 3 14 3 3 4 141

ATGL, RPG-7V 62 62

ATDL, Armbrust 54 36 24 3 2 119

ATDL, RPG-22 102 26 128

ATDL, RPG-27 15 154 94 65 54 85 28 4 88 66 32 40 14 8 747

Bunkerbuster 4 26 3 9 42

Demolition Material Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

Demolition Set, Underwater 3 4 7

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series 6 138 45 77 8 15 6 27 6 3 27 15 9 15 2 3 402

MANPADS Launcher, SA-14 2 2

MANPADS Launcher, SA-18 12 6 6 6 18 48

Mine Detector, Handheld 5 5 10

Minefield Control Set 6 6 12

Mine-Scattering System, Manport, PKM 3 30 25 2 24 14 3 2 24 127

Mines (AP&AT) Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

Aircraft, Ultra-Light 6 6

Ambulance 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 30

Ambulance, BMM-1 3 3 6

Armored Engineer Tractor, IMR-2M 1 1

ARV, Tracked 3 3 3 3 3 5 20

ARV, Tracked, BREM-1 3 3

ARV, Tracked, Repair (w/crane), RM-G 3 3

ARV, Wheeled, BREM-K 6 6

Back Hoe, Wheeled 2 2

Boat, Assault w/Motor 11 11

Boat, Inflatable, Zodiac 4 4

Bridge, Tank-Launched, AVLB 3 3

Bridge, Truck-Launched, TMM-3 4 4

Ditching Machine, MDK-3 2 2

Dozer 1 1

Engineer Recon Vehicle, IRM 3 3

Fork Lift, Tactical 1 1

Front End Loader, Wheeled 2 2

Light Strike Vehicle, FAV 14 14

 Brigade Tactical Group (Mtzd) (Antiarmor) (continued)

Page 2 (continued) .. 

 *** Tactical Utility Veh, Amphib, VBR w/Trailer, Amphib, can be substituted for Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469

NOTES:

 * Same basic organization for IFV, APC, and motorized units. APC units substitute wheeled APCs for IFVs in the tracked units, etc.

 ** The values in this column are the total number for two battalions.

Figure B-8. BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) Personnel and Equipment List Continued, Page 2

B-20 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 BTG Headquarters * Motorized Infantry Bn X2 ** Mechanized Infantry Bn (APC) Guerrilla Bn (Hunter/Killer) Antitank Bn (Sep Bde, Div, Nondiv)  Composite Artillery Battalion * Recon Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  SPF Company Sniper Company SPF Deep Attack/Recon Plt Air Defense Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  Engineer Battalion (Sep Bde) Materiel Support Battalion * Maintenance Battalion, APC/Mtzd Signal Company (Sep) * Chem Defense Co (Sep Bde) * Medical Company (Sep Bde) * TOTAL

Medical Aid Station, BMM-2 1 1 2

Medical Aid Station,Van 2 2

Mine Detector Vehicle, DIM 2 2

Minefield Breaching Vehicle, UR-77 2 2

Minefield Breach Sys-Explosive ZRP-2 18 3 4 27 52

Minelayer, GMZ-3 3 3

Minelayer, Scatterable, UMZ 9 9

Minelayer, Towed, PMZ-4 3 3

Motorcycle 24 6 10 3 3 12 3 3 3 3 3 73

NBC Recon Vehicle, RKhM/RKhM-4-01 3 3

Radar, EW/TA/AD C2, GIRAFFE AMB 2 2

Route-Clearing Vehicle, BAT-2 2 2

Skid Loader w/Trailer 2 2

Tactical Utility Veh, Amphib, VBR *** 12 1 9 22

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469 *** 21 146 19 3 21 42 52 52 21 56 17 29 35 12 3 22 551

Tracked Amphibian, PTS-2 12 12

Tracked Ferry, PMM-2 8 8

Tractor, Grader 1 1

Transloader 24 32 56

Truck, Concrete 1 1

Truck, Crane 2 2 2 7 2 2 5 8 4 34

Truck, Crane Shovel 2 2

Truck, Decon, ARS-14K 6 1 7

Truck, Decon DDA-52/66 4 1 5

Truck, Decon, TMS-65M 4 4

Truck, Dump 3 3

Truck, Heavy 10 80 90

Truck, Heavy w/Crane 9 9

Truck, Kitchen 1 4 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 20

Truck, Light 9 28 13 26 16 22 7 10 4 22 18 5 16 9 2 8 215

Truck, Light (Digital Data) 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 14

Truck, Light (Prime Mover) 12 3 15

Truck, Light (Wire) 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11

Truck, Medium 6 80 9 15 22 48 11 1 44 69 73 45 1 20 34 478

Truck, Medium, Refrigerated 1 1

Truck, Medium w/Crane 19 2 21

Truck, Meterological Complex 1 1

Truck, POL (5,000-Liter) 4 4 12 5 25

Truck, POL (7,000-Liter) 7 7

Truck, Sawmill 1 1

Truck, Signal 1 1

Truck, Tractor, HET 8 8

Truck, Van 1 1

Truck, Water (2,000-Liter) 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 22

Truck, Water (9,500-Liter) 6 17 23

Truck, Water Purification 1 1

Truck, Wrecker 6 3 3 3 3 3 7 28

UAV, Fox-AT2 4 4

UAV Launcher, Trailer, 2-Axle 1 1

UAV, Manportable, Skylark 6 6

UAV Transport, Truck, Medium 1 1

Van, Hospital 9 9

Van, Light 12 12

Van, Maintenance 1 6 1 3 15 1 17 3 3 68 118

Van, Missile Test & Maint 12 12

Van, Signal 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 15

Van, Signal (Net) 2 2

Page 3 (continued) .. 

* Same basic organization for IFV, APC, and motorized units. APC units substitute wheeled APCs for IFVs in the tracked units, etc.

 Brigade Tactical Group (Mtzd) (Antiarmor) (continued)

 ** The values in this column are the total number for two battalions.

 *** Tactical Utility Veh, Amphib, VBR w/Trailer, Amphib, can be substituted for Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469

NOTES:

Figure B-9. BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) Personnel and Equipment List Continued, Page 3

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-21
Appendix B

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 BTG Headquarters * Motorized Infantry Bn X2 ** Mechanized Infantry Bn (APC) Guerrilla Bn (Hunter/Killer) Antitank Bn (Sep Bde, Div, Nondiv)  Composite Artillery Battalion * Recon Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  SPF Company Sniper Company SPF Deep Attack/Recon Plt Air Defense Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  Engineer Battalion (Sep Bde) Materiel Support Battalion * Maintenance Battalion, APC/Mtzd Signal Company (Sep) * Chem Defense Co (Sep Bde) * Medical Company (Sep Bde) * TOTAL

Van, Signal (Relay) 3 3

Van, Signal (SATCOM) 2 2

Van, Signal (Tactical Phone) 3 3

Van, Sound Ranging 1 1

Van, Survey 2 2

Trailer, Amphibious, PKP 12 12

Trailer, Air Compressor 1 1 2

Trailer, Cargo, 1-Axle 6 24 12 19 17 17 6 4 4 16 16 6 23 15 4 3 192

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle 6 80 9 15 20 60 11 1 65 67 150 42 1 14 33 574

Trailer, Decon (OWR DEKON 6000) 4 1 5

Trailer, Generator 2 6 2 3 3 8 3 14 5 3 17 11 14 91

Trailer, Kitchen 1 1 1 1 4

Trailer, POL (2,000-Liter) 2 2

Trailer, POL (4,200-Liter) 8 4 4 10 4 4 4 4 4 17 63

Trailer, POL (5,800-Liter) 12 12

Trailer, Semi, HET 8 8

Trailer, Refrigerated, 2-Axle 1 1

Trailer, Ultra-Light Aircraft 3 3

Trailer, Utility, Amphib *** 12 1 9 22

Trailer, Utility *** 21 144 19 3 21 42 52 52 21 14 56 17 32 35 12 3 17 561

Trailer, Van 8 8

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter) 1 12 1 4 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 9 41

Trailer, Water (2,000-Liter) 2 1 3

Trailer, Water (4,200-Liter) 21 21

Trailer, Water (5,800-Liter) 6 6

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels & Grenades Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

Aiming Circle/Goniometer 10 2 18 4 34

Anti-Veh/Anti-Personnel Wire-Rolls 9 Assort 9

Automated Fire Control System 8 4 1 13

Binocular Laser Rangefinder 15 372 92 86 39 84 59 62 45 18 53 54 13 19 6 10 1027

Boat, Assault w/Motor Assort Assort Assort

Boat, Inflatable, Zodiac, w/Motor 6 6

Camera, CCD-UAV 4 4

Camera Digital 12 6 11 21 34 12 13 109

Camera, FLIR-UAV 4 4

Closed-Circuit Rebreather System 24 24

Comms Radio DF Set, Manportable 12 3 15

Comms Radio Intercept Set, Manportable 12 3 15

Diving Set, Indiv, SCUBA 24 23 47

Electrical, Carpentry, & Plumbing Sets Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

Electric Welding/Cut Equip, Underwater 4 4 8

Electronic Plotting Board 12 6 2 6 6 3 3 18 56

Flexible Stor Tank (POL) (500/1000-Liter) 4 2 6

Flexible Stor Tank (Water) (500/1000-Liter) 4 2 6

Flexible Storage Tank (40,000-Liter) 4 4 5 2 15

Generator Set, Portable 10 23 33

GPS Jammer, Manportable, 4-25 Watt 48 6 54

GPS Receiver, Handheld 47 570 129 94 105 225 118 154 64 33 251 193 230 205 43 47 65 2573

GPS Receiver, Divers, Underwater w/Ant 8 8

Laser Guidance Unit, 9S53 12 12

Laser Rangefinder 6 6 8 2 22

Laser Target Designator 40 16 14 12 17 16 36 3 2 156

Laser Target Designator Pod-UAV 4 4

 Brigade Tactical Group (Mtzd) (Antiarmor) (continued)

NOTES:

Page 4 (continued) .. 

 * Same basic organization for IFV, APC, and motorized units. APC units substitute wheeled APCs for IFVs in the tracked units, etc.

 ** The values in this column are the total number for two battalions.

 *** Tactical Utility Veh, Amphib, VBR w/Trailer, Amphib, can be substituted for Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469

Figure B-10. BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) Personnel and Equipment List Continued, Page 4

B-22 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 BTG Headquarters * Motorized Infantry Bn X2 ** Mechanized Infantry Bn (APC) Guerrilla Bn (Hunter/Killer) Antitank Bn (Sep Bde, Div, Nondiv)  Composite Artillery Battalion * Recon Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  SPF Company Sniper Company SPF Deep Attack/Recon Plt Air Defense Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde)  Engineer Battalion (Sep Bde) Materiel Support Battalion * Maintenance Battalion, APC/Mtzd Signal Company (Sep) * Chem Defense Co (Sep Bde) * Medical Company (Sep Bde) * TOTAL

Litters, Medical 10 12 22

Medical Set, Autopsy 1 1

Medical Set, Dental 3 3

Medical Set, General 1 4 10 15

Medical Set, Surgical 2 7 9

Minefield Control Sets 13 13

Mine Detector, Handheld 16 16

Mixer, Concrete 1 1

Mortuary Set 2 2

Observation Scope, Day/Night 12 18 16 36 3 85

Oxygen Support System (Abn) Assort Assort

Periscopic Aiming Circle, PAB2A 11 11

Parachutes, Cargo Assort Assort

Parachutes, High-Altitude Precision Assort Assort

Parachutes, Individual Assort Assort

Parachutes, Powered Assort Assort

Parachutes, Ramair Assort Assort

Pharmacy Set 1 1 2

Piledriver, Set 1 1

Radar, GSR, Manportable, Fara-1 1 60 29 12 11 24 3 2 142

Radar, GSR, Portable, Credo-1E 6 3 1 10

Sensor Sets 6 4 3 20 15 3 2 53

Soil Penetrometer, Portable 2 6 8

Antenna, GPS Jamming, Directional 12 3 15

Antenna, Mast HF/UHF/VHF 6 3 12 3 3 35 18 3 3 3 3 3 28 2 125

Antenna, Satellite 6 3 12 3 3 35 18 3 3 3 3 3 16 1 112

Telephone Field Cable, 1 km 16 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 96

Telephone, Landline 30 15 15 15 15 15 8 15 15 15 15 173

Telephone Set 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 48

Telephone Switchboard 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 15

Tent, Command Post 3 3

Tent, General Purpose 21 21

Tent, Medical 6 6

Tent, Medical Aid Station 2 4 6

Tent, Medium 1 1

Tent, Mortuary, Refrigerated 1 1

UAV Ground Station, Computer, Laptop 4 3 7

UAV Maintenance & Repair Kit 4 3 7

Water Purification Set 1 1

Wire Cutter, Set 13 3 16

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie 10 170 33 30 20 45 44 36 14 27 11 4 444

Night-Vision Goggles 6 608 21 89 50 199 44 67 74 18 188 195 222 191 17 35 56 2080

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) 50 328 70 33 95 224 103 61 26 14 233 226 231 196 40 62 84 2076

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30) 43 344 150 87 123 95 29 65 5 115 104 39 101 31 31 15 1377

Night-Vision Sight (Aiming Circle) 6 11 4 21

 Base Station, LR Cordless Telephone 15 15

 Handheld, LR Cordless Telephone 67 67

 Handheld, Satellite Telephone 32 14 46

 Handheld, Very-Low-Power 8 388 117 233 18 57 80 148 79 37 44 45 7 24 4 1 14 1304

 Manpack, Burst Transceiver 17 14 31

 Manpack, Low-Power 2 174 45 62 69 125 54 51 39 4 56 68 186 98 17 25 5 1080

 Manpack, SATCOM Transceiver 19 4 23

 Vehicle Mount, High-Power 1 1

 Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power 76 248 96 43 84 190 109 60 24 14 217 134 54 68 81 37 49 1584

 Vehicle Mount, Radio-Relay 4 4

 Vehicle Mount, SATCOM Transceiver 19 14 33

 Warning Receiver 10 38 14 11 20 35 47 34 1 4 48 21 21 27 2 12 4 349

 Brigade Tactical Group (Mtzd) (Antiarmor) (continued)

* Same basic organization for IFV, APC, and motorized units. APC units substitute wheeled APCs for IFVs in the tracked units, etc.

 ** The values in this column are the total number for two battalions.

Page 5

Radios:

NOTES:

 *** Tactical Utility Veh, Amphib, VBR w/Trailer, Amphib, can be substituted for Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469

Figure B-11. BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) Personnel and Equipment List Continued, Page 5

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-23
Appendix B

Step 9d. Adjust Equipment Tiers

B-73. In this example, there was no demonstrable need to change the equipment listed in the HTFS 

organizational directories for the units making up this task organization to equipment in a different tier (or 

to something in the same tier listed in a substitution matrix). Four tiers of system capability are available, 

with Tier 1 representing the greatest level of capability and modernization. The separate motorized infantry 

brigade used as the base unit for the BTG task organization is a Tier 2 unit. Tier 2 reflects modern, 

competitive systems fielded in significant numbers for the last 10 to 20 years. The SPF company and the 

SPF deep attack/reconnaissance platoon added to the BTG are elite units that have more high-technology, 

state-of-the-art, Tier 1 equipment. The guerrilla battalion that becomes part of this BTG has a mixture of 

Tier 3 and Tier 4 equipment. However, forces with lower-tier systems can use adaptive tactics or make 

adaptive use of existing technologies is ways that challenge the technological advantages of modern forces.

B-74. Thus, the OPFOR units selected to counter ARTs have a mix of Tier 1, 2, 3, and 4 units, which are 

appropriate for the OPFOR in this situation. In other situations, however, organizations in the HTFS

directories may or may not reflect the appropriate mix of systems for a particular training requirement. 

When necessary, therefore, the Tier Tables and Systems Substitution Matrices in the Worldwide Equipment 

Guide (WEG) are another tool for trainers and planners to use to alter systems in simulations to reflect 

different levels of modernity and capability. The proper mix (tiering) of threat weapons and equipment has 

a major impact on the quality of training received. See chapter 4 for further detail on Tier Tables and 

Systems Substitution Matrices.

Step 9e. Update Folders and File Paths

B-75. Once the organizational graphics and personnel and equipment data for the Hybrid Threat taskorganized BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) have been completed, the paths to the documents and files may need 

to be reorganized and arranged to reflect the conversion from a HTFS organization to a task-organized unit. 

Trainers can arrange the folders and files to suit their needs or whatever they are the most comfortable with. 

However, the use of a sequential numbering of folders and files ensures the units are presented in the 

proper sequence when accessed in Windows Explorer. This method has proven by far to be the simplest 

when dealing with a large number of documents, many with similar titles. For the BTG (Mtzd) (AntiarmorLt), the recommended folders (in bold), documents, and spreadsheet titles are as shown in figures B-12 (on 

pages B-26 and B-26).

B-24 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

Note. In order to keep path lengths within practical limits, folder and file names had to be shortened by using 

abbreviations (some of which are not used within the documents and spreadsheets themselves).

01 BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) (or title/number assigned for training) (Folder)

01 BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) (Folder)

01 BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt).doc

01A BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) Equip.xls

02 BTG Hqs and Staff (Folder)

02 Bde Hqs and Staff.doc

03 Motorized Infantry Bn (x2) (Folder)

03 Motorized Inf Bn.doc

03A Mtzd Inf Bn-Equip.xls

03B Mtzd Inf Co-Equip.xls

03C Mtzd Inf Plt-Equip.xls

03D Weapons Plt-Equip.xls

04 Mechanized Infantry Bn (APC) (Folder)

04 Mech Inf Bn (APC).doc

04A Mech Inf Bn (APC)-Equip.xls

05 Guerrilla Battalion (Hunter-Killer) (Folder)

01 Guer Bn (Hunter-Killer).doc

02 Guer Bn-Equip.xls

03A Hunter-Killer Co, HK Bn-Equip.xls

03B Hq and Cmd Sect, HK Co-Equip.xls

03C Hunter-Killer Group, HK Co-Equip.xls

03D Hunter-Killer Sect 1,2, and 3-Equip.xls

03E Hunter-Killer Sect 4-Equip.xls

04A Guer HK Co-Equip.xls

04B Hq and Svc Sect, Guer Co-Equip.xls

04C Guer Plt, Guer Co-Equip.xls

04D Wpns Plt, Guer Co-Equip.xls

05A Wpns Co, Guer Bn-Equip.xls

06 Antitank Battalion (Sep Bde) (Folder)

06 AT Bn (Sep).doc

06A AT Bn (Sep)-Equip.xls

07 Composite Artillery Bn (Sep Bde) (Folder)

07 Composite Arty Bn (Sep).doc

07A Composite Arty Bn (Sep)-Equip.xls

08 Recon Battalion (APC-Mtzd) (Sep) (Folder)

08 Recon Battalion (APC-Mtzd) (Sep).doc

08A Recon Battalion (APC-Mtzd) (Sep)-Equip.xls

09 SPF Company (Folder) (not a separate unit in HTFS; must be broken out)*

09 SPF Company.doc

09A SPF Company-Equip.xls

*Note. This is not separate stand-alone unit in the HTFS organizational directories. It is organic to a

larger organization and must be split out in order to use it in a task-organization. The best method is

to copy the parent organization to a blank document and Save As a separate unit. In

this case the document is saved as “SPF Company.doc.” The process is similar for the spreadsheets.

Simply locate the spreadsheet of the parent unit and Save As a new chart with the title

of the subordinate unit being split out (SPF Company-Equip.xls). Once saved as a new spreadsheet simply

delete all that does not apply. What is left should be the spreadsheet for the

split-out organization (SPF Company).

(continued) 

Figure B-12. Folders and Files for Task Organization

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-25
Appendix B

TASK-ORGANIZED OPFOR (continued)

Note. In order to keep path lengths within practical limits, folder and file names had to be shortened by using 

abbreviations (some of which are not used within the documents and spreadsheets themselves).

10 Sniper Company (Div) (Folder)

10 Sniper Company (Div).doc

10A Sniper Company (Div)-Equip.xls

11 SPF Deep Attack-Recon Plt (Folder) (not a separate unit in HTFS; must be broken out)*

11 SPF Deep Attack-Recon Plt.doc

11A SPF Deep Attack-Recon Plt-Equip.xls

12 Air Defense Bn (Mtzd) (Sep Bde) (Folder)

12 Air Defense Bn (Mtzd) (Sep).doc

12A Air Defense Bn (Mtzd) (Sep)-Equip.xls

13 Engineer Battalion (Sep Bde) (Folder)

13 Engineer Battalion (Sep) (APC-Mtzd).doc

13A Engineer Battalion (Sep) (APC-Mtzd)-Equip.xls

14 Materiel Support Battalion (Sep Bde) (Folder)

14A Materiel Support Battalion.doc

14B Materiel Support Battalion-Equip.xls

14C Ammo Trans Co-Equip.xls

14D Cargo Trans Co-Equip.xls

15 Maintenance Battalion (APC-Mtzd) (Folder)

15 Maint Bn (APC-Mtzd).doc

15A Maint Bn (APC-Mtzd)-Equip.xls

16 Signal Company (Sep Bde) (Folder)

16 Signal Company (Sep).doc

17 Chemical Defense Co (Sep Bde) (Folder) 

17 Chemical Defense Co (Sep).doc

17A Chemical Defense Co (Sep)-Equip.xls

18 Medical Company (Sep Bde) (Folder)

18 Medical Company (Sep).doc

18A Medical Company (Sep)-Equip.xls

02 Local Insurgent Organization (or fictitious title assigned for training) (Folder)

01 Local Insurgent Organization.doc

02 Local Insurgent Organization-Equip.xls

03 Direct Action Cells-Insurgency-Equip.xls

04 Direct Action Cells-Multifunction-Equip.xls

05 Technical Support Cell-Equipment.xls

*Note. This is not separate stand-alone unit in the HTFS organizational directories. It is organic to a 

larger organization and must be split out in order to use it in a task-organization. The best method is 

to copy the parent organization to a blank document and Save As a separate unit. In 

this case the document is saved as “SPF Deep Attack-Recon Plt.doc.” The process is similar for 

the spreadsheets. Simply locate the spreadsheet of the parent unit and Save As a new chart 

with the title of the subordinate unit being split out (SPF Deep Attack-Recon Plt-Equip.xls). Once 

saved as a new spreadsheet, simply delete all that does not apply. What is left should be the 

spreadsheet for the split-out organization (SPF Deep Attack-Recon Plt).

Figure B-12. Folders and Files for Task Organization (Continued)

B-26 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

STEP 10. CONSTRUCT THE LOCAL INSURGENT ORGANIZATION

B-76. The sub-steps for creating the appropriate local insurgent organization are the same as those outlined 

for the BTG task organization in Step 9. Therefore, the discussion here will be limited to the differences.

B-77. One key difference is that insurgent organizations are irregular forces, meaning that there is no 

“regular” table of organization and equipment. There is no “standard” structure for an insurgent 

organization. Thus, the baseline insurgent organizations in the HTFS organizational directories represent 

only the “default setting” for a “typical” insurgent organization. The organizational graphic for a “typical” 

local insurgent organization (see figure B-3 on page B-7) therefore included several dashed boxes 

indicating the possibility of different multiples of the basic cell types. The baseline organizational charts 

and lists of personnel and equipment include many “Notes” on possible variations in organization or in 

numbers of people or equipment within a given organization.

B-78. When developing an OB for a specific insurgent organization for use in training, training planners 

need to take several things into consideration:

 What functions the insurgents need to be able to perform.

 What equipment is needed to perform those functions.

 How many people are required to employ the required equipment.

 The number of vehicles in relation to the people needed to drive them or the people and

equipment that must be transported.

 Equipment associated with other equipment (for example, an aiming circle/goniometer used with

a mortar or a day/night observation scope used with a sniper rifle).

B-79. When task-organizing insurgent organizations, guerrilla units might be subordinate to a larger 

insurgent organization, or they might be loosely affiliated with an insurgent organization of which they are 

not a part. A guerrilla unit or other insurgent organization might be temporarily subordinated to or affiliated 

with a regular military organization.

B-80. For illustrative purposes, the local insurgent organization in this example uses the “default setting” 

shown in the spreadsheet in the organizational directories (see figure B-14). This provides a reasonable 

number of multifunction direct action cells (four) and at least one of each of the other types of more 

specialized direct action cells and other cells. Since the ARTs chosen for the U.S. training unit’s METL did 

not specify what kind of insurgent actions or terror tactics would be employed, this “default” organization 

offers a wide variety of capabilities that can stress the training unit’s METL. For details on the local 

insurgent organization, including personnel and equipment listings, see appendix C. In this example, the 

local insurgent organization is not actually part of the BTG, but rather is only loosely affiliated with it.

Step 10a. Create Folders

B-81. Since the local insurgent organization is affiliated with the BTG in this example, a folder “02 Local 

Insurgent Organization” was already created in Step 9a (see figure B-4). Now it is time to make necessary 

modifications to the files that go into that folder.

Step 10b. Modify Organizational Graphics

B-82. Since the “default setting” shown in the HTFS Spreadsheet seems appropriate for the local insurgent 

organization in this example, only a few modifications are necessary in the organizational graphic. Save the 

Document as a new document under the “02 Local Insurgent Organization” folder created in Step 9a. In the 

document, change the title line by deleting the “(Typical).” Open the graphic and delete all the dashed 

boxes. The result is shown in figure B-13 on page B-28. If desired for training purposes, change the generic 

name “Local Insurgent Organization” to a fictitious name, such as “Glorious Path Organization.”

B-83. The Document in the HTFS organizational directories also includes several pages of “Notes.” 

Trainers will need to delete or modify notes that do not apply to this particular local insurgent organization.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-27
Appendix B

TECHNICAL

SUPPORT

CELL

TRANSPORT

CELL

FINANCE

CELL

TRAINING

CELL

RECRUITING

CELL

MEDICAL

CELL

INFORMATION

WARFARE

CELL

DA CELL

(Information

Warfare)

DA CELL

(Kidnapping

& Extortion)

DA CELL

(MultiFunction)

PLANNING

CELL

CI & INTERNAL

SECURITY

CELL

DA CELL

(Mortar

& Rocket)

DA CELL 

(Assassin/

Sniper)

INTELLIGENCE

CELL

LOGISTICS

CELL

COMMS &

TRADECRAFT

CELL

SHELTER

CELL

(Safe Houses)

CIVIL

AFFAIRS

CELL

LOCAL

INSURGENT

ORGANIZATION

Local Insurgent Organization ______________________________

Figure B-13. Local Insurgent Organization (Affiliated)

Step 10c. Modify Personnel and Equipment Charts

B-84. The training planners in this example elected to use the “default setting” for subordinate units, as 

shown in the local insurgent organization Spreadsheet in the HTFS organizational directories. Therefore, no 

modifications are necessary. The result is figure B-14.

B-85. For a given local insurgent organization (other than the one chosen for this example), it may be 

necessary to change the numbers of various types of cells in the organization from the “default setting” 

shown in the HTFS organizational directories. The “default” local insurgent organization has four 

multifunction direct action cells. If the desired organization needs a different number of such cells, training 

planners will have to divide the personnel and equipment by four and multiply by the actual number of 

these cells. If the actual OB has only one of these cells, it will be necessary to delete the “(X4)*” after 

“Direct Action Cell (Multifunction)” in Row 2 and the corresponding Note at the bottom of the 

spreadsheet. If the actual number of such cells is a multiple other than “(X4),” the asterisk should remain, 

but the Note must change “four” to the appropriate number.

B-86. The “default” local insurgent organization has one of each of the other possible types of cells. In an 

actual OB, some of these types of cells could appear in multiples. Both the organizational chart and the 

personnel and equipment chart must be modified to reflect the actual numbers of each type of cell. When 

there are multiple units in several columns of the Spreadsheet, it is simpler to use the same reference 

asterisk(s) in Row 2 for each such unit, with one Note saying: “The values in these columns are the total 

number for multiple cells for each type.”

B-87. Likewise, some types of cells might not be used in a particular insurgent organization. In that case, it 

will be necessary to delete their boxes in the organizational chart and their columns in the spreadsheet.

B-28 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 Local Leader Direct Action Cell (Multifunction) (X4) * Direct Action Cell (Assassin/Sniper)  Direct Action Cell (Kidnap/Extortion) Direct Action Cell (Information Warfare) Direct Action Cell (Mortar & Rocket) Intelligence Cell CI & Internal Security Cell Planning Cell Information Warfare Cell Technical Support Cell Logistics Cell Comms & Tradecraft Cell Finance Cell Shelter Cell Training Cell Recruiting Cell Transport Cell Civil Affairs Cell Medical Cell TOTAL

Total Personnel 1 32 8 8 8 13 5 5 5 13 21 5 8 5 5 5 5 8 5 6 171

9-mm Pistol, PM 1 8 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 9 4 5 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 79

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS 1 16 4 4 4 7 3 3 3 11 13 3 6 3 3 3 3 6 3 4 103

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM 4 1 1 1 1 8

7.62-mm LMG, RPK 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant 4 2 1 1 1 9

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 or 1 1

 60-mm Commando Mortar, M70

107-mm Lchr Single-Tube, Type 85, 1 1

 or 107-mm Single-Tube, MONOTUBE

ATGL, RPG-7V 8 2 2 2 2 16

ATDL, RPG-22 4 1 1 1 1 8

Demolitions Fuze/Detonators Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

Demolitions Materiel Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

IED, Individual, Vest 3 3

IED, Vehicle Borne (VBIED) 2 2

IED, WMD 1 1

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 16 4 4 4 4 20 52

Mines (AP&AT) Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

Motorcycle/motorscooter/bicycle 3 3

Sedan, Civilian 4 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 31

Truck, Medium, Commercial 1 1

Truck, Pickup 1/2 ton, Civilian 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 16

Van, Civilian 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 10

Aiming Circle/Goniometer 1 1

Antenna, Satellite 2 2 3 2 1 10

Binoculars 4 2 2 1 3 3 2 1 2 5 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 35

Camcorder, Video 4 1 2 3 2 2 1 4 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 34

Camera, Digital 4 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 4 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 35

Electrician Set 1 1 8 10

GPS Receiver, Handheld 1 4 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 9 2 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 49

Laser Rangefinder, Handheld 2 2

Litters, Medical 3 3

Medical Set 2 2

Observation Scope, Day/Night 2 2

Night-Vision Goggles 4 4 1 2 3 2 2 1 2 4 2 4 1 2 2 2 4 2 2 46

Radios:

 Base Station, LR Cordless Telephone 2 1 1 4

 Cell Phone 1 12 3 3 4 7 5 5 5 12 51 5 5 5 5 5 5 8 5 6 157

 Computer, Desktop 4 8 2 3 3 1 3 24

 Computer, Laptop 1 4 1 1 8 3 5 5 5 12 13 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 2 96

 Computer, PDA 1 4 1 1 8 3 5 5 5 12 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 2 94

 Handheld, LR Cordless, Telephone 1 4 1 1 4 2 5 5 5 8 13 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 1 83

 Handheld, Very-Low-Power 1 32 8 8 8 13 5 5 5 12 21 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 6 162

 Manpack, Low-Power 4 8 5 17

 Portable, Satellite Telephone 1 4 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 38

 Vehicle Mount, Medium Power 1 1 2

* The values in this column are the total number for four Multifunction Direct Action Cells.

Local Insurgent Organization

Page 1

Personnel

NOTES :

Figure B-14. Local Insurgent Organization Equipment (Affiliated)

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-29
Appendix B

B-88. As indicated in notes in the Document for the HTFS local insurgent organization, there might be 

cases where the functions normally performed by specialized cells would be combined into a single cell. If 

the structure of the “Direct Action Cell (Multifunction)” does not cover the requirements for the necessary 

merging of functions, training planners might need to create a new, task-organized cell that combines the 

necessary functions. Examples of the latter might be a combined Intelligence and Information Warfare 

Cell, a combined Logistics and Transport Cell, or a combined Recruiting and Training Cell. If it is 

necessary to create such “hybrid” cells, training planners will need to use the “bottom-up” process to get 

the right organization, personnel, and equipment at the lowest level and then roll it up into the next higher 

organization.

Step 10d. Adjust Equipment Tiers

B-89. In this example, there was no demonstrable need to change the equipment listed in the HTFS local 

insurgent organization to equipment in a different tier (or to something in the same tier listed in a 

substitution matrix). When necessary, however, the Tier Tables and Systems Substitution Matrices in the 

Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) are another tool for trainers and planners to use to alter systems in 

simulations to reflect different levels of modernity and capability. Although four tiers of systems capability 

are available, a typical local insurgent organization, as shown in the HTFS organizational directories, 

would have mostly Tier 4 equipment. However, even an insurgent organization, especially one that is well 

financed, can have some higher-tier systems, perhaps in certain niche technology areas. The proper mix 

(tiering) of OPFOR weapons and equipment has a major impact on the quality of training received. 

Organizations in the HTFS directories may or may not reflect the appropriate mix for a particular training 

requirement.

B-90. For this example, Tier 4 was deemed appropriate. However, forces with lower-tier systems can use 

adaptive tactics or make adaptive use of existing technologies is ways that challenge the technological 

advantages of modern forces. See chapter 4 for further detail on Tier Tables and Systems Substitution 

Matrices.

Step 10e. Update Folders and File Paths

B-91. Once the organizational graphics and personnel and equipment data for the OPFOR task-organized 

local insurgent organization have been completed, the paths to the documents and files in may need to be 

reorganized and arranged to reflect the conversion from a HTFS organization to a task-organized unit. The 

users can arrange the folders and files to suit their needs or whatever they are the most comfortable with. 

However, the use of a sequential numbering of folders and files ensures the units are presented in the 

proper sequence when accessed online. This method has proven by far to be the simplest when dealing with 

a large number of documents, many with similar titles. For the local insurgent organization, the 

recommended folders (in bold), documents, and spreadsheet titles are as shown in figure B-13 on page B28.

BUILDING FROM THE BOTTOM UP

B-92. For the sake of simplicity, the BTG (Mtzd) (Antiarmor-Lt) example above did not include any task 

organizations below the BTG level. In reality, however, it may be necessary to task-organize at lower levels 

in order to achieve the desired challenges to the training unit. If all units in an OB come straight out of the 

HTFS organizational directories with no modifications, that OB probably does not portray adequately the 

OPFOR’s ability to organize its forces adaptively to achieve the optimal effect.

B-93. Training planners need to start at the very bottom to look for places where task-organizing is 

appropriate to the training requirements. At whatever organizational level the need for a task organization 

is identified, they must make the appropriate modifications to personnel, equipment, and organization 

charts. Then, they must roll up the personnel and equipment to the place in the OB where the higher-level 

headquarters has received no assets from outside its own original organization—thus, it is not a detachment 

or a tactical group, but has the same name given to it in the HTFS.

B-30 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

STEP 9. CONSTRUCT TASK-ORGANIZED BTG SUBORDINATES

B-94. The same basic procedures used in the BTG example in the first part of this appendix also apply to 

the creation of lower-level task organizations. One difference is that many organizations below brigade 

level do not have a spreadsheet in the HTFS organizational directories. Instead, they list personnel and 

equipment numbers as part of the basic Document for the organization in question. If training planners 

task-organize any of these lower-level units, however, it is recommended to use Spreadsheets as a tool to 

keep things straight when rolling up modified personnel and equipment numbers into each successive 

higher organization.

B-95. Adjustments and/or modification to the existing organizations and equipment charts are 

uncomplicated and easy to make, as long as the adjustments are taken one at a time and remain bite-size. 

Otherwise, the trainer making the changes might easily become completely overwhelmed and lost in the 

process.

Step 9a. Create Folders 

B-96. If one or more of the BTG subordinates is task-organized into a detachment, the folder name should 

change to reflect that. If one of the two motorized infantry battalions becomes a detachment, or if both 

become detachments but in different ways, this will require two separate folders to replace the single folder 

“03 Motorized Infantry Bn (x2).”

Step 9b. Modify Organizational Graphics

B-97. Any change from company to CDET or battalion to BDET status needs to be reflected in the 

appropriate organizational graphics. This affects the graphic for the unit becoming a detachment, as well as 

the graphic for the parent unit to which the detachment is subordinate. When the unit task-organized as a 

detachment is one of multiple like units displayed as “stacked” boxes in the organizational graphic for its 

parent organization, it will need to be “unstacked” and split out from like units that did not become 

detachments.

Step 9c. Modify Personnel and Equipment Lists

B-98. In the interest of space, the HTFS organizational directories did not use spreadsheets for some 

smaller units. For those units, personnel and equipment were listed in the portion of the directory. This 

Document contains three basic sets of information: organizational graphics; personnel information, and 

principal items of equipment (unless personnel and equipment are listed in a separate spreadsheet). A 

typical personnel and equipment list for a lower-level OPFOR unit is similar to the infantry squad, infantry 

platoon (extracted from the HTFS motorized infantry battalion folder) shown in figure 2-2 in chapter 2

(page 2-4). Appendix D contains the complete motorized infantry company and the motorized infantry 

battalion personnel and equipment spreadsheet. The complete motorized infantry battalion, the motorized 

infantry brigade, and the motorized infantry division are all available in the HTFS organizational 

directories on ATN. 

Total Personnel and Principal Items of Equipment

B-99. The recommended process for making modifications and adjustments to personnel and equipment is 

similar to the way the organizations were built in the HTFS organizational directories—from bottom up. 

The process of building the necessary units, with any required modifications, begins with the very lowest 

levels and culminates in the desired OPFOR countertask capability at the highest levels.

B-100. For the lowest-level units, the Document in the organizational directories includes a listing of all 

individual members of the unit, their title or function, and their assigned personal weapons. (See figure 2-5 

in chapter 2 [page 2-20] for the example of the infantry squad.) For example, at infantry squad level, make 

the changes to each individual’s weapons and equipment first. After these changes have been made, add up 

all the personnel and equipment in the squad to update the listings of “Total Personnel” and “Principal 

Items of Equipment” in the document. Then move to the next level (the infantry platoon), make changes, 

and add all the totals for the platoon. The listing of total personnel and principal items of equipment for the 

infantry platoon includes the entire infantry platoon and all its subordinates: the platoon headquarters, three 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-31
Appendix B

infantry squads, and a weapons squad. All of equipment and personnel of these subordinates are rolled up 

into the listing for the infantry platoon organization. The infantry platoon and other infantry company 

subordinates are, in turn, rolled up to become the infantry company. The infantry company and other 

battalion subordinates are then rolled up to become the motorized infantry battalion, and so forth. If 

training planners change anything in any subordinate unit, it affects the roll-up for the next higher unit.

B-101. The build progresses upward from there, individual-by-individual, weapon-by-weapon, system-bysystem, page-by-individual page, until each subordinate organization is built and rolled up into its parent 

organization. This is a very detailed process requiring knowledge at many different levels. Often, the 

organizational directories specify even the vehicle in which each individual rides. If there is a key to 

success in building a proper OPFOR organization to stress specific training requirements (other than 

knowledge or research), it is to focus on bite-size portions. Address only one page at a time. Follow this 

procedure a step at a time until the organization is complete, whether it is a company or CDET, a battalion 

or BDET, a brigade or BTG, a division or DTG, or an OSC.

B-102. The personnel and equipment lists in the document do not automatically roll up numbers for a 

total. At this stage, each individual unit (and multiples of units) must be totaled manually. The sum is then 

entered manually in building the personnel and equipment list for the parent organization. Because of the 

possibility of human error in rolling up the totals, it is recommended to use as a tool for doing this process 

in a systematic and accurate manner. Once trainers have built the appropriate personnel and equipment 

totals in an Spreadsheet, they can transfer these numbers into the corresponding document.

Using Spreadsheets to Facilitate Roll-Ups

B-103. Training planners may need to create a new spreadsheet for a lower-level organization that did not 

have a spreadsheet in the HTFS organizational directories, in order to keep track of adjustments to it. If so, 

an easy way to create one is to make a copy of the spreadsheet of a higher-level organization that includes 

the unit in question. That way, the spreadsheet automatically has rows for all the equipment types needed 

for the smaller subordinate unit (and some other rows that may need to be deleted). It also has summing 

formulas in its “Total” column for adding up equipment numbers in each row. Find the existing spreadsheet

to serve as the basis for the new one. Then, Save As and rename this spreadsheet with the name of the 

smaller unit or task organization.

B-104. The next step is to clear (but not delete) the columns for units that will not be used in the smaller 

baseline organization. Do not clear Column A with equipment names or the “Total” column. Also, do not 

clear the columns for any unit(s) of the original parent organization that will be added to this lower-level 

base unit during task-organizing (see note below).

Note. If any unit(s) from original parent organization will become part of the task organization 

based on the smaller unit, trainers may wish to “save” the columns for these units rather than 

having to re-create them. However, retaining the columns for these units in their original 

positions can interfere with the next step (creating a spreadsheet with personnel and equipment 

totals for the smaller base organization). Therefore, it is necessary to temporarily move the 

columns for these units to be saved to a position to the right of the “Total” column; thus, for the 

time being, they will not affect the building of the new totals for the smaller baseline unit from 

the summing formulas contained in the cells of the “Total” column (for summing of columns to 

its left). To do so, highlight the column(s) to be saved, click on Edit/Copy, highlight a column to 

the right of the “Total” column, and click on Edit/Paste. Once trainers have built the correct 

totals for the smaller base unit and are ready to begin task-organizing, they can move these 

“saved” columns into their correct positions at the left. To do so, highlight the column(s) to be 

moved, click on Edit/Cut, highlight a column to the left of the “Total” column, and click on 

Edit/Paste.

B-105. Then create new column headings in Row 2 for the target smaller unit’s original subordinates and 

break down the original overall personnel and equipment totals among them, using numbers from the 

appropriate documents. When entering numbers in columns, it is recommended to highlight the column 

currently being worked on, in order to limit confusion and avoid placing numbers into the wrong column. 

B-32 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Building a Hybrid Threat Task Organization

Highlight the column by clicking on the letter designating that column at the very top of the Spreadsheet 

and then click on the Fill Color icon in the toolbar and select a color. The column will remain highlighted 

during entry of numbers. (Just clicking on the letter at the top of the column temporarily highlights the 

entire column, but the highlighting turns off as soon as one clicks on a cell to enter data.) When entries in 

that column are complete, click on the letter at the top of the column again, then click on the Fill Color

icon and select No Fill to turn off the highlighting in the completed column. Make sure that the numbers 

summed in the “Total” column match the totals for the base unit, before task-organizing (see note below).

Note. When creating a Spreadsheet for a smaller baseline unit that does not have one in the 

HTFS organizational directories, trainers should ensure that the resulting personnel and 

equipment totals match the previous HTFS listings. As a quality-control yardstick, they should 

compare the totals in the new Spreadsheet with the totals shown in a HTFS Document for the 

smaller unit or in that unit’s column of the Spreadsheet for its parent unit. This quality control 

measure should occur before the trainers begin making modifications to the smaller unit—

adding or deleting from the base units originally subordinate to it—during the task-organizing 

process.

B-106. At this point, move columns for any temporarily “saved” to the right of the “Total” column into 

their correct positions to the left (see note above). This may again place numbers in the “Total” column for 

some equipment rows not used in the smaller base unit.

B-107. Then insert new columns for additional units made subordinate in the task organization, look up 

those units in the organizational directories, and enter their equipment numbers in the appropriate rows. At 

this point, it may be necessary to insert additional rows in the spreadsheet in order to accommodate 

equipment types that were not in the base unit or its parent organization. To create the right formula for 

automatic summing of a new row in the “Total” column, users can click on any cell in the “Total” column 

containing the correct formula for its row and Copy and Paste that formula into the “Total” cell in the new 

row; the letters designating the row in the formula should automatically change to the letter of the new row. 

To determine whether there is a formula associated with a cell in the “Total” column, click on that cell; it 

there is a formula, it should appear in the formula bar at the top of the screen—for example, 

“=SUM(B26:L26)” for automatically summing the numbers in Columns B through L of Row 26. To copy 

this formula into another row, highlight the cell that has a formula and then click on Edit/Copy. The 

selected cell will appear with a flashing dotted line around it. Then move the cursor to the cell that needs 

the formula and click on Edit/Paste. This cell will then receive the same formula, except that it will have a 

different row number—for example, “=SUM(B27:L27).” Repeat the Edit/Paste procedure to insert similar 

formulas into as many cells as needed. Finally, hit the “Esc” (escape) key to stop the flashing on the 

original cell from which you copied the formula. The spreadsheet should automatically revise the summing 

formulas to include any added columns (if the inserted column is not to the left of columns included in the 

original formulas).

B-108. After completing the above steps, any row with a “0” (zero) in the “Total” column should contain 

equipment not actually found in the unit that is the subject of this spreadsheet. Double-check the source 

documents and charts for the numbers entered manually to make sure this is true. Then delete the rows for 

equipment not found in this unit (before and after task-organizing). Delete any columns not used for this 

unit’s subordinates.

B-109. Upon completion of each stage for lower-level subordinates of an organization, it is recommended 

that trainers enter the data into a spreadsheet for the next-higher organization. When the spreadsheet has 

appropriate summing formulas entered into it, it rolls up the numbers automatically into personnel and 

equipment totals for the higher organization. The automatic roll-up feature of significantly reduces 

mathematical fatigue and resultant errors. The Spreadsheets provide quick access to totals of personnel and 

primary equipment at each echelon, which are the information most frequently needed.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 B-33
Appendix B

Note. As trainers build to each successively higher-level organization, they must keep in mind 

that some units or parts of units that were originally directly subordinate to that command in the 

HTFS are now subordinate to a lower-level task organization. Personnel and equipment totals for 

those units should now be rolled up into the higher organization as part of the respective lowerlevel task organization. Therefore, it will be necessary to delete or decrement some entries in 

Spreadsheets for the higher-level organization in order to avoid double-counting these assets.

Step 9d. Adjust Equipment Tiers

B-110. A big difference when building task organizations from the bottom up is that this step is likely to 

occur at an earlier stage in the process. Start the substitution at the lowest level where the system is found, 

so that the numbers of it (and related systems) get rolled up into higher organizations. In an infantry squad, 

for example, trainers could select a different assault rifle or a different antitank grenade launcher from the 

appropriate Tier Table or Systems Substitution Matrix. Some substitutions might apply only to elite units 

(for example, SPF) or to a unit given niche technology for a special mission. The proper mix (tiering) of 

Threat weapons and equipment has a major impact on the quality of training received. See chapter 4 for 

further detail on Tier Tables and Systems Substitution Matrices.

Step 9e. Update Folders and File Paths

B-111. Once the organizational graphics and personnel and equipment data have been completed up to the 

desired organizational level, the paths to the documents and files on the ATN site may need to be 

reorganized and arranged to reflect the conversion from HTFS organizations to task-organized units. 

Trainers might need to arrange newly created Spreadsheets or documents in their proper places in the 

sequence. They can arrange the folders and files to suit their needs or whatever they are the most 

comfortable with. However, the use of a sequential numbering of folders and files ensures the units are 

presented in the proper sequence when accessed in Windows Explorer. This method has proven by far to 

be the simplest when dealing with a large number of documents, many with similar titles.

STEP 10. CONSTRUCT OTHER TASK ORGANIZATIONS

B-112. Then, the training planners start again at the lowest level in any other part of the OB that requires a 

task organization. Again, they build up the place where the higher headquarters has received no assets from 

outside its own original organization and would still have the same name as in the HTFS. They repeat this 

process for as many “branches” of the organizational “tree” as need task organization.

B-34 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Appendix C

Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS 

Organizational Directories

This appendix provides an example of the information for a local insurgent 

organization found in the threat force structure (HTFS) organizational directories. It 

also describes various cells within such an organization.

Note. For illustrative purposes, this TC contains several examples from the online HTFS

organizational directories. Readers are reminded that even the baseline OPFOR organizations are 

subject to change over time. Therefore, readers should always consult the online directories for 

the latest, most up-to-date versions of organizational data.

INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

C-1. Insurgent organizations have no regular “table of organization and equipment” structure. The 

mission, environment, geographic factors, and many other variables determine the configuration and 

composition of each insurgent organization and its subordinate cells.

C-2. Insurgent organizations are typically composed of from three to over 30 cells. All of the direct action 

cells could be multifunction (or multipurpose), or some may have a more specialized focus. The single 

focus may be a multifunction direct action mission, assassination, sniper, ambush, kidnapping, extortion, 

hijacking and hostage taking, or mortar and rocket attacks. Each of these may be the focus of one or more

cells. More often, the direct action cells are composed of a mix of these capabilities and several 

multifunction cells. There are also a number of types of supporting cells with various functions that provide 

support to the direct action cells or to the insurgent organization as a whole. Thus, a particular insurgent 

organization could be composed of varying numbers of multifunction or specialty direct action cells, 

supporting cells, or any mix of these.

LOCAL INSURGENT ORGANIZATION EXAMPLE

C-3. This appendix provides an example of a typical local insurgent organization, taken from volume III 

of the HTFS organizational directories. For illustrative purposes, this example includes a reasonable 

number of multifunction direct action cells (four) and at least one cell of each of the 18 other, more 

specialized types. The dashed boxes in the organizational graphic indicate the possibilities for varying 

numbers of each type of cell, depending on the functions required for the insurgent organization to 

accomplish its mission. For the overall local insurgent organization and for any cell where organizational 

diagrams show varying numbers of subordinate teams, personnel and equipment totals reflect only the cells 

in solid boxes.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-1 
Appendix C 

Local Insurgent Organization (Typical)

TECHNICAL

SUPPORT

CELL

TRANSPORT

CELL

FINANCE

CELL

TRAINING

CELL

RECRUITING

CELL

MEDICAL

CELL

INFORMATION

WARFARE

CELL

DA CELL

(Information

Warfare)

DA CELL

(Kidnapping

& Extortion)

DA CELL

(MultiFunction)

PLANNING

CELL

CI & INTERNAL

SECURITY

CELL

DA CELL

(Mortar

& Rocket)

DA CELL 

(Assassin/

Sniper)

INTELLIGENCE

CELL

LOGISTICS

CELL

COMMS &

TRADECRAFT

CELL

SHELTER

CELL

(Safe Houses)

CIVIL

AFFAIRS

CELL

LOCAL

INSURGENT

ORGANIZATION

Local Insurgent Leader (x1)....................PM/AKMS

Total Personnel...................... 171

NOTES: See next page.

C-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Local Insurgent Organization (Typical) (continued)

NOTES: 

1. Personnel and equipment totals for the “typical” example reflect only the cells shown in solid boxes in the

organizational diagram for the Local Insurgent Organization (Typical).

2. Insurgent organizations are amorphous. Their ability to continually adapt to all aspects of their environment

is directly relational to their survivability and lethality. These dynamic organizations manifest themselves

primarily by their unpredictability; their ability to influence and to blend in with the population; their shifting 

architectures, affiliations, alliances, behaviors, TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures), and players; and their 

spectrum of lethality—ranging from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD).

3. The term local insurgent organization includes any insurgent organization below regional, provincial, or

district level. This includes small cities, towns, villages, parishes, communities, neighborhoods, and/or other 

lower-level insurgent organizations. Cities with a large population or covering a large area may be considered 

regions; therefore, they may control several local insurgent organizations.

4. The leader of any insurgent organization may be one individual, with or without advisors; several individuals

and advisors; or a council. The leader may also be a tribal, cultural, political, or religious leader. A leadership 

council may be comprised of tribal, religious, political, secular, radical sectarian, or other personnel, or any 

combination of the above.

5. There are several factors that differentiate the structure and capability of the insurgent organization (direct

action cells) from the structure and capability of a guerrilla organization. The insurgent organization is primarily 

a covert organization. Its structure is cellular and more typical of groups using terror tactics, while the 

guerrilla’s organization reflects their kinship to a more formal military structure (battalion, company, platoon or 

hunter/killer [H/K] group, H/K section, H/K team). 

The weapons of the insurgents are generally limited to small arms, RPG-7Vs, and IEDs with very few 

crew-served weapons (82-mm mortar, 107-mm single tube rocket launcher). A guerrilla organization contains 

weapons up to and including 120-mm mortars, ATGMs, and MANPADS, and can conduct limited mine warfare 

and sapper attacks. While both organizations are very effective and lethal in close and populated terrain, the 

guerrilla organizations can perform more typical fire and maneuver tactics. The guerrilla organization can, and 

often does, use terror tactics; however, it is best suited to conduct irregular or unconventional warfare tactics.

6. Local insurgent organizations are not always subordinate to a regional, national, or transnational insurgent

organization. The local insurgent organization may not be associated with a larger insurgent movement in any 

way. Local insurgent organizations can be either subordinate or loosely affiliated, or they may be completely 

autonomous/independent of regional and national insurgent organizations. Similarly, a regional insurgent 

organization may or may not be associated with or subordinate to a larger insurgent organization. Any 

relationship of independent local insurgent organizations to regional or national structures may be one of 

affiliation or dependent upon only a single shared or similar goal. These relationships are generally fluctuating 

and may be fleeting, mission dependent, event- or agenda-oriented, or for any other reasons or motivations. 

7. Many insurgent organizations operate independently, without central guidance or direction from the overall

movement. In some cases, the local insurgent organization may provide only financial support and general 

guidance to their action elements (organic direct action cells). There may be loose coordination of attacks due to 

a specific affiliation, after which the organizations revert back to their independent modes.

Continued

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-3 
Appendix C 

Local Insurgent Organization (Typical) (continued)

NOTES: (continued)

8. The decentralized characteristic of many of the insurgent organizations enhances the security of the 

organization by effectively eliminating the ability of the enemy to penetrate the organization. This same 

decentralized structure allows the organization to survive to fight another day without a current leader. When 

the leader of the organization is eliminated, the remaining direct action cells (or cell members) simply merge 

into another insurgent organization, splinter off on their own, or offer their services up for bid. When individual 

fighters are killed, they are simply replaced, with limited down time for the cell.

9. Local insurgent organizations may have some type of relationship with guerrilla organizations and/or 

criminal organizations or noncombatants, based on similar or a shared goal(s) and/or interest(s). The nature of 

the shared goal or interest determines the tenure and type of relationship and the degree of affiliation. The 

affiliation with criminal organizations is dependent only on the needs of the criminal organization at a particular 

time. In some cases, lower-level guerrilla organizations may be subordinate to a local insurgent organization. 

10. Insurgent organizations generally do not possess much of the heavier and more sophisticated equipment 

that guerrilla organizations possess. Some examples of equipment and capability the guerrillas have in their 

organizations that the insurgents generally do not have are: 73/82/84-mm recoilless guns; 100-mm and 120-mm 

mortars; 107-mm MRLs; 122-mm rocket launchers; 12.7-mm HMGs; .50-cal BMG antimateriel rifles; ATGMs; 

MANPADS; GPS jammers; and mine warfare and signals intelligence capabilities. In the event the insurgents 

require these weapons or capabilities, they may either obtain them from guerrillas or the guerrilla organization 

may provide its services depending on the relationship between the two organizations at the time.

11. Insurgent organizations receive a wide variety of support from noncombatants, on and off the battlefield. 

The support provided by many different categories of noncombatant’s ranges from only being sympathetic to 

the goals of the insurgents, to providing monetary support, to actively supporting and engaging in combat 

alongside the insurgents and/or guerrillas. The relational dynamics includes all of the players in the insurgents’ 

environment. Direct action personnel may use, fight alongside of, or assist affiliated forces and guerrillas to 

achieve their common goals or for any other agenda.

12. Although the local insurgent organization may use irregular or unconventional warfare and/or terror tactics 

to achieve their goals, their primary tactic is terror. The local insurgent organization is the action arm of the 

overall insurgent movement. The subordinate direct action cells are the actual fighters and shooters. They 

perform the sabotage and assassinations, IED emplacement, and other functions. 

13. The mission, environment, geographic factors, and many other variables determine the configuration and 

composition of each insurgent organization and its subordinate direct action cells. Insurgent organizations are 

typically composed of anywhere from 3 to over 30 cells (22 cells is the “default” for a “typical” local insurgent 

organization). The cells can be all multifunction (or multipurpose), or each with a different focus, or all the 

cells may be composed of a single focus or specialty, supporting cells, or any mix of these. The single focus 

may be a multifunction direct action mission, assassination, sniper, ambush, kidnapping, extortion, hijacking 

and hostage-taking, or mortar and rocket attacks. Each of these may also be the focus of one or two cells 

(possibly more). More often, the direct action cells are composed of a mix of these capabilities and several 

multifunction cells, regardless of the number of cells employed at one time.

Continued

C-4 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Local Insurgent Organization (Typical) (continued)

NOTES: (continued)

14. Most insurgent organizations are composed of mix of separate specialty cells and multifunction cells, all 

designed to operate independently (if necessary) once they have started their missions. The insurgent 

organization will always possess all the specialty capabilities listed above (although not necessarily in separate 

cells). 

15. The multifunction direct action cell should be used as a default for all direct action cells not requiring 

unique specialties. The multifunction direct action cell possesses all of the specialized capabilities to a lesser 

degree. Every direct action cell is capable of performing all of the missions listed above. When not engaged in 

specialized activities, the specialized cells also serve as multifunction direct action cells. 

16. The people in an insurgent organization are likely to be indistinguishable from the local population (other 

than weaponry, which they may conceal or discard) because they generally are part of the population. This is a 

great strength. Their ability to blend in with the population usually has direct impact on their survivability. 

When weapons are required, insurgents may attempt to appear as if they are local militia, police, security 

guards, or other acceptable armed groups.

17. Insurgent organizations usually contain a mixture of men, women, and children. Local women and children 

may be used as runners, videographer/camera operators, messengers, scouts, guides, suicide bombers, drivers, 

porters, snipers, lookouts, or in other roles. They may also emplace and/or detonate IEDs, booby traps, and 

mines. Women (and possibly children) may be fighters and participate in “drive-bys,” assassinations, ambushes 

and/or assaults. They may also serve (willingly or unwillingly) as suicide bombers.

18. The intelligence, counterintelligence and security, planning, information warfare, logistics, communications 

and tradecraft, technical support, finance, training, recruiting, transport, civil affairs, shelter, and medical cells 

also subordinate to the insurgent organization either support the role of the direct action cells or exploit their 

successes. Some insurgent organizations may not have separate cells for all of the above functions; however, 

someone in the organization must be designated to perform these functions. For example, the intelligence cell 

may also incorporate the counterintelligence and security functions, or a local cell working out of a member’s 

home may not require additional shelter or transportation.

19. Key events (and results) of all direct action cell activities are digitally recorded on video and still cameras. 

Upon mission completion, the digitized recordings are turned over to the information warfare cell for 

manipulation and exploitation. The videographer/camera operator may attempt to blend in with the crowds and 

may disassociate him/herself from the operation. In other situations, the key event/activity will be staged for the 

camera. 

20. Depending on the mission, the local insurgent organization may be augmented by any and every type of 

personnel and/or vehicle. Vehicles could be motorcycles, trucks, agricultural trucks, commercial trucks, liquid 

cargo carriers (for POL or water), flat beds, busses, farm trailers, tractors, sedans, 1⁄2 ton civilian pickup trucks 

(such as Toyotas or Nissans), high-mobility/all terrain vehicles, bicycles, or carts. 

21. Insurgents may have no vehicles or supplies at all and depend completely on caches, porters, or other 

transportation or supply means. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. Insurgents 

may requisition or confiscate local civilian transportation assets and materiel. This includes the use of civilian 

personnel for porters and possibly as lookouts and security personnel. Draft animals may also be used as 

bearers or porters. 

22. For additional information on the insurgent organization see TC 7-100.3.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-5
Appendix C 

Local Insurgent Organization (Typical) (continued)

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM...............................................79

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ..........................27

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS...............................103

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM .....................................8

7.62-mm LMG, RPK........................................27

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant.................9

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ...................27

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 or

60-mm Commando Mortar, M70...........1

107-mm Single-Tube, Type 85 or

107-mm Single-Tube, MONOTUBE.....1

ATGL, RPG-7V ...............................................16

ATDL, RPG-22 ..................................................8

Demolition, Fuzes & Detonators............Assorted

Demolition Materiel ...............................Assorted

IED, Individual, Vest..........................................3

IED, Vehicle Borne (VBIED).............................2

IED, WMD .........................................................1

Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)...............52

Mines (AP, AT, & AV) ..........................Assorted

Motorcycle/motorscooter/bicycle .......................3

Sedan, Civilian .................................................31

Truck, Medium, Commercial .............................1

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian...........................16

Van, Civilian.....................................................10

Aiming Circle/Goniometer.................................1

Antenna, Satellite..............................................10

Binoculars.........................................................33

Camcorder, Video.............................................34

Camera, Digital.................................................35

Electrician Set...................................................10

GPS Receiver, Handheld ..................................49

Laser Rangefinder, Handheld .............................2

Litters, Medical...................................................3

Medical Set.........................................................2

Observation Scope, Day/Night ...........................2

Night-Vision Goggles.......................................46

Radios:

Base Station, Long Range

Cordless Telephone................................4

Cell Phone..........................................157

Computer, Desktop ..............................24

Computer, Laptop ................................96

Computer, PDA....................................94

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone.............................................83

Handheld, Very-Low-Power..............162

Manpack, Low-Power..........................17

Portable, Satellite Telephone ...............38

Vehicle Mount, Medium Power.............2

C-6 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Local Insurgent Organization (Typical) (continued) ______________________________ 

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 Local Leader Direct Action Cell (Multifunction) (X4) * Direct Action Cell (Assassin/Sniper)  Direct Action Cell (Kidnap/Extortion) Direct Action Cell (Information Warfare) Direct Action Cell (Mortar & Rocket) Intelligence Cell CI & Internal Security Cell Planning Cell Information Warfare Cell Technical Support Cell Logistics Cell Comms & Tradecraft Cell Finance Cell Shelter Cell Training Cell Recruiting Cell Transport Cell Civil Affairs Cell Medical Cell TOTAL

Total Personnel 1 32 8 8 8 13 5 5 5 13 21 5 8 5 5 5 5 8 5 6 171

9-mm Pistol, PM 1 8 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 9 4 5 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 79

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS 1 16 4 4 4 7 3 3 3 11 13 3 6 3 3 3 3 6 3 4 103

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM 4 1 1 1 1 8

7.62-mm LMG, RPK 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant 4 2 1 1 1 9

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 or 1 1

 60-mm Commando Mortar, M70

107-mm Lchr Single-Tube, Type 85, 1 1

 or 107-mm Single-Tube, MONOTUBE

ATGL, RPG-7V 8 2 2 2 2 16

ATDL, RPG-22 4 1 1 1 1 8

Demolitions Fuze/Detonators Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

Demolitions Materiel Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

IED, Individual, Vest 3 3

IED, Vehicle Borne (VBIED) 2 2

IED, WMD 1 1

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 16 4 4 4 4 20 52

Mines (AP, AT & AV) Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

Motorcycle/motorscooter/bicycle 3 3

Sedan, Civilian 4 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 31

Truck, Medium, Commercial 1 1

Truck, Pickup 1/2 ton, Civilian 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 16

Van, Civilian 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 10

Aiming Circle/Goniometer 1 1

Antenna, Satellite 2 2 3 2 1 10

Binoculars 4 2 2 1 3 3 2 1 2 5 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 35

Camcorder, Video 4 1 2 3 2 2 1 4 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 34

Camera, Digital 4 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 4 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 35

Electrician Set 1 1 8 10

GPS Receiver, Handheld 1 4 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 9 2 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 49

Laser Rangefinder, Handheld 2 2

Litters, Medical 3 3

Medical Set 2 2

Observation Scope, Day/Night 2 2

Night-Vision Goggles 4 4 1 2 3 2 2 1 2 4 2 4 1 2 2 2 4 2 2 46

Radios:

 Base Station, LR Cordless Telephone 2 1 1 4

 Cell Phone 1 12 3 3 4 7 5 5 5 12 51 5 5 5 5 5 5 8 5 6 157

 Computer, Desktop 4 8 2 3 3 1 3 24

 Computer, Laptop 1 4 1 1 8 3 5 5 5 12 13 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 2 96

 Computer, PDA 1 4 1 1 8 3 5 5 5 12 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 2 94

 Handheld, LR Cordless, Telephone 1 4 1 1 4 2 5 5 5 8 13 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 1 83

 Handheld, Very-Low-Power 1 32 8 8 8 13 5 5 5 12 21 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 6 162

 Manpack, Low-Power 4 8 5 17

 Portable, Satellite Telephone 1 4 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 38

 Vehicle Mount, Medium Power 1 1 2

* The values in this column are the total number for four Multifunction Direct Action Cells.

Local Insurgent Organization

Page 1

Personnel

NOTES :

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-7 
Appendix C

Direct Action Cells (Typical), Insurgent Organization _____________________________

DIRECT

ACTION

CELLS

(Examples)

DA CELL

(MultiFunction)

DA CELL

(Mortar

& Rocket)

DA CELL

(Assassin/

Sniper)

DA CELL 

(Kidnapping

& Extortion)

DA CELL

(Information

Warfare)

Total Personnel........................ 69

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM...............................................17

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ..........................10

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS.................................35

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM .....................................8

7.62-mm LMG, RPK........................................10

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant.................9

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ...................10

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 or

60-mm Commando Mortar, M70...........1

107-mm Single-Tube, Type 85 or

107-mm Single-Tube, MONOTUBE.....1

ATGL, RPG-7V ...............................................16

ATDL, RPG-22 ..................................................8

Demolition, Fuzes & Detonators............Assorted

Demolition Materiel ...............................Assorted

Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)...............32

Mines (AP, AT, & AV) ..........................Assorted

Sedan, Civilian ...................................................9

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian.............................7

Van, Civilian.......................................................2

Aiming Circle/Goniometer.................................1

Antenna, Satellite................................................2

Binoculars.........................................................12

Camcorder, Video.............................................12

Camera, Digital.................................................12

Electrician Set.....................................................1

GPS Receiver, Handheld ..................................10

Laser Rangefinder, Handheld .............................2

Observation Scope, Day/Night ...........................2

Night-Vision Goggles.......................................14

Radios:

Cell Phone............................................29

Computer, Desktop ................................4

Computer, Laptop ................................17

Computer, PDA....................................17

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone.............................................12

Handheld, Very-Low-Power................69

Portable, Satellite Telephone ...............10

NOTES: See next page. 

C-8 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Direct Action Cells (Typical), 

Insurgent Organization (continued) ___________________________________________

NOTES: 

1. Personnel and equipment totals for the “typical” direct action cells in this example reflect only the cells 

shown in solid boxes in the organizational diagram for the Direct Action Cells (Typical).

2. The direct action cells are the action element of the insurgency movement. They contain the actual fighters 

and shooters of the insurgency. The direct action cells perform the sabotage and assassinations, IED/VBIED 

(and suicide bombers) emplacement and detonation, extortion, kidnapping, hostage-taking, sniping, firing of 

mortars and rockets, and other functions. Direct action cells may also use irregular or unconventional warfare 

tactics when these tactics better suit their mission, but their primary tactic to achieve their goals is terror. The 

organizational structure, weapons mix, and other factors limit the direct action cell’s ability to use tactics other 

than terror tactics.

3. The mission, environment, geographic factors, and many other variables determine the configuration and 

composition of each direct action cell. Direct action cells do not have a fixed structure. Cell composition is not 

fixed and varies from cell to cell, mission to mission, and environment to environment. The structure, 

personnel, equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements. The size, specialty, and 

number of cells employed also depend on the size, number, and specialties required for specific missions, 

environment, geographic factors, and other variables.

4. The insurgent organization may consist of as few as one direct action cell or as many as 20 or more direct 

action cells, depending on the mission and other factors. The “default” number of direction action cells is eight 

(four multifunction cells and four specialty cells). 

5. A direct action cell typically contains from 6 to 10 personnel (8 personnel is the default, which includes 2 

drivers). The cells can be as small as 2 people or consist of over 20 people (broken into teams if necessary), 

depending on mission, vehicle requirements, support and security personnel, and other variables.

6. Direct action cells easily lend themselves to be broken down into subordinate teams whenever necessary. 

Example direct action teams may include functions such as security team, support team, transportation team, or 

sniping team. As always, this depends on the size of the cell, the nature of its mission, cell dispersion, 

command and control requirements, and other variables or functions required for mission success.

7. Direct action personnel may use, fight alongside of, or assist affiliated forces and guerrillas to achieve their 

common goals or for any other agenda.

8. In order to accommodate capabilities representing missions unique to the OPFOR insurgent organization, 

several example direct action cell structures are provided, each representing a different specialty and capability. 

Some examples of these specialty cells include, but are not limited to, assassination and sniper; kidnapping and 

extortion; information warfare; and mortar and rocket cells.

9. Direct actions cells can be all multifunction, or each with a different focus, or all the cells may be composed 

of a single focus or specialty, or any mix of these. The single focus may be a multifunction direct action 

mission, assassination, sniper, ambush, kidnapping, extortion, hijacking and hostage-taking, computer attack, or 

mortar and rocket attacks. Each of these may also be the focus of one or two cells (possibly more). More often, 

the direct action cells are composed of a mix of these capabilities and several multifunction cells, regardless of 

the number of cells employed at one time. 

Continued

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-9
Appendix C

Direct Action Cells (Typical),

Insurgent Organization (continued) ___________________________________________

NOTES: (continued)

10. All direct action cells are designed to operate independently (if necessary) once they have started their 

mission. The insurgent organization will always possess all the specialty capabilities listed above (although not 

necessarily in separate cells). The multifunction direct action cell should be used as a default for all direct action 

cells not requiring unique specialties. The multifunction direct action cell possesses all of the specialized 

capabilities to a lesser degree. Every direct action cell is capable of performing all of the missions listed above. 

When not engaged in specialized activities, the specialized cells also serve as multifunction direct action cells.

11. In some cases, the insurgent organization may only provide financial support and general guidance to its 

subordinate direct action cells. While these direct action cells may not be completely independent of the 

insurgent organization, they may be forced to provide for themselves in several areas. A typical example of this 

is a smaller direct action cell separated from the parent organization by distance, population, or ability to 

communicate securely (or all of these). It may not have access to the expertise or products (IEDs) provided by 

the technical support cell. An IED cell of this nature is generally quite small and may consist of only three or 

four personnel, including a lookout, a triggerman, and the IED emplacer. The IED cell emplaces the IEDs, and 

the triggerman detonates them at the appropriate time. Direct action (multifunction) IED cells of this type may 

represent a fairly large number of direct action cells. 

12. Direct action cells are dispersed. They are not normally colocated with each other or with the control 

element of the local insurgent organization. Although in some cases direct action cells may come together to 

provide mutual support to another cell, they usually carry out their mission independent of other cells. The 

direct action cells may be widely dispersed due to geographical reasons, to cover a large segment of the 

population, or for security reasons. The dispersion of the direct action cells not only distributes the influence of 

the insurgency to a wider area, but also enhances the security of the local insurgent organization. 

13. Direct action personnel are likely to be indistinguishable from the local population (other than weaponry, 

which they may conceal or discard) because they generally are part of the population. Their ability to blend in 

with the population usually is in direct relationship to their ability to survive. When weapons are required, they 

may attempt to appear as if they are local militia, police, security guards, or other acceptable armed groups.

14. Depending on the mission, direct action cells may be augmented by any and every type of personnel and/or 

vehicle. Vehicles could be motorcycles, trucks, agricultural trucks, commercial trucks, liquid cargo carriers (for 

POL or water), flat beds, busses, farm trailers, tractors, sedans, 1⁄2 ton civilian pickup trucks (such as Toyotas or 

Nissans), high-mobility/all terrain vehicles, bicycles, or carts. Insurgent personnel may have no vehicles or 

supplies at all and depend completely on caches, porters, or other transportation or supply means. 

15. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. The cells may requisition or confiscate 

local civilian transportation assets and materiel. This includes the use of civilian personnel for porters and 

possibly as lookouts and security personnel. Draft animals may also be used as bearers or porters. 

Continued

C-10 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Direct Action Cells (Typical), Insurgent Organization (continued)

NOTES: (continued)

16. Direct action personnel may be a mixture of men, women, and children. Local women and children may be

used as runners, videographer/camera operators, messengers, scouts, guides, suicide bombers, drivers, porters, 

snipers, lookouts, or in other roles. They may also emplace and/or detonate IEDs, booby traps, and mines. 

Women (and possibly children) may be fighters and participate in “drive-bys,” assassinations, ambushes, and/or 

assaults. They may also serve (willingly or unwillingly) as suicide bombers.

17. Key events (and results/successes) of all direct action cell activities are digitally recorded on digital video

and still cameras. Upon mission completion, the recordings are turned over to the information warfare cell for 

manipulation and exploitation. The videographer/camera operator may attempt to blend in with the crowds and 

may disassociate him/herself from the operation. In other situations the key event/activity will be staged for the 

camera. Sympathizers among the local populace may also serve in this role.

18. For additional information, see TC 7-100.3.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-11
Appendix C

Direct Action Cell (Multifunction), Insurgent Organization

DA CELL

(MultiFunction)

Cell Leader (x1)......................................................... PKM 

Asst Cell Leader (x1)..................................... AKM/BG-15

Grenadiers (x2) .............................................. RPG/AKMS 

Security Pers/Marksman (x1)..................... Mosin/Nagant

Security Pers (x1)...................................................... RPK

Driver (x2) ........................................................PM/AKMS

Total Personnel.............................. 8 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 2 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 4 

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM ..................................... 1 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant................. 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

ATGL, RPG-7V ................................................. 2 

ATDL, RPG-22 * ............................................... 1 

Demolition, Fuzes&Detonators ** .........Assorted

Demolition Materiel *** ........................Assorted

Improvised Explosive Device (IED)  .......... 4 

Mines (AP, AT, & AV) ** *** ...............Assorted

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian............................. 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 1 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 1 

Camera, Digital................................................... 1 

Electrician Set..................................................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 1 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 3 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 1 

Computer, PDA...................................... 1 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 1 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 8 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTES: See next page. 

 ___________________________________________ 

* The ATDL is issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. They are not assigned to

an individual.

 ** Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes, 

sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, radio

frequency [RF], pressure release).

 *** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

   Each multifunction direct action cell has at least four assorted types of IED and remote detonation 

devices. The number and type of IED varies and is determined by the current mission. 

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is 

mission dependent and varies.

C-12 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Direct Action Cell (Multifunction), Insurgent Organization (continued)

NOTES: 

1. The multifunction direct action cell is the backbone of the insurgency. These are the fighters. These cells may

also use irregular or unconventional warfare tactics when these tactics better suit their mission, but their primary 

tactic to achieve their goals is terror. When using IEDs, the multifunction direct action cell usually breaks down into 

teams.

2. Bombs (specifically IEDs) are the weapon of choice for the insurgent organization. They are inexpensive,

relatively easy to build, and extremely destructive. Bombs may be very sophisticated or extremely simple. Bombs 

(IEDs) are used in support of assassination, maiming, sabotage, and producing mass casualties. The multifunction 

direct action cells acquire IEDs (usually unassembled pre-manufactured components) from the technical support 

cell. The multifunction cell assembles and adds fuzes and detonators to the IEDs. The IED team usually includes at 

least three people; a lookout, a triggerman, and the IED emplacer. The team emplaces the IEDs, and the triggerman 

detonates them at the appropriate time. If additional assistance or IED expertise is required, they receive it from the 

technical support cell. 

3. In some cases, the insurgent organization may only provide financial support and general guidance to its

subordinate direct action cells. While these direct action cells may not be completely independent of the insurgent 

organization, they may be forced to provide for themselves in several areas. A typical example of this is a smaller 

direct action cell separated from the parent organization by distance, population, or ability to communicate securely 

(or all of these). The cell may not have access to the expertise or products (IEDs) provided by the technical support 

cell. An IED cell of this nature is generally quite small and may consist of only three or four personnel, including a 

lookout, a triggerman, and the IED emplacer. The IED cell emplaces the IEDs, and the triggerman detonates them at 

the appropriate time. Small direct action (multifunction) IED cells of this type may represent a fairly large number 

of direct action cells.

4. The multifunction cells can also perform sabotage, assassinations, extortion, kidnapping, hostage-taking, sniping,

and firing of mortars and rockets, and other functions. The multifunction direct action cell is the basic direct action 

cell structure. All direct action cells are built around this structure. 

5. The mission, environment, geographic factors, and many other variables determine the configuration and

composition of each direct action cell. Direct action cells do not have a fixed structure. Cell composition is not 

fixed and varies from cell to cell, mission to mission, and environment to environment. The structure, personnel, 

equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements. Personnel select weapons appropriate to 

the mission. The RPG, RPK, and/or sniper rifle may be needed in some cases and not in others. Other weapons and 

equipment are added as required. 

6. There may be as few as one multifunction direct action cell as many as twenty or more multifunction direct

action cells, depending on the mission and other factors. The default number of multifunction direction action 

cells is four. 

7. The multifunction cell typically contains from 6 to 10 personnel (8 personnel is the default, which includes 2

drivers). The cells can be as small as two people or consist of over 20 people (broken into teams if necessary), 

depending on mission, vehicle requirements, support and security personnel, and other variables.

Continued 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-13
Appendix C

Direct Action Cell (Multifunction), 

Insurgent Organization (continued) ___________________________________________ 

NOTES: (continued)

8. The multifunction direct action cell should be used as a default for all direct action cells not requiring unique

specialties. All multifunction cells are cross-trained to perform all functions and thus possess all of the 

specialized capabilities to a lesser degree. When not engaged in specialized activities, the specialized cells also 

serve as multifunction direct action cells.

9. Direct action personnel may be a mixture of men, women, and children. Local women and children may be

used as runners, videographer/camera operators, messengers, scouts, guides, suicide bombers, drivers, porters, 

snipers, lookouts, or in other roles. They may also emplace and/or detonate IEDs, booby traps, and mines. 

Women (and possibly children) may be fighters and participate in “drive-bys,” assassinations, ambushes and/or 

assaults. They may also serve (willingly or unwillingly) as suicide bombers. These functions can also be 

performed by personnel outside of the cell.

10. Direct action personnel may use, fight alongside of, or assist affiliated forces, other direct action cells, and

guerrillas to achieve their common goals or for any other agenda.

11. Key events (and results/successes) of all direct action cell activities are digitally recorded on digital video

and still cameras. Upon mission completion, the recordings are turned over to the information warfare cell for 

manipulation and exploitation. The videographer/camera operator may attempt to blend in with the crowds and 

may disassociate him/herself from the operation. In other situations, the key event/activity will be staged for the 

camera. Sympathizers among the local populace may also serve in this role.

12. For additional information on insurgent direct action cells, see TC 7-100.3.

C-14 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Direct Action Cell (Assassination and Sniper), Insurgent Organization

SNIPER

TEAM

DA CELL 

(Assassin

& Sniper)

DA TEAM

(Assassin

& Sniper)

Cell Leader/Team Leader/Obs (x1)............... AKM/BG-15

Team Leader/Observer (x1).................. AKM/BG-15/PKM

Sniper/Designator (x2) ....................... Mosin/Nagant/RPK

Assistant Sniper/Grenadier (x2) ..................... RPG/AKMS 

Driver/Security Pers (x2) ..................................PM/AKMS

Total Personnel.............................. 8 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 2 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 2 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 4 

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM ..................................... 1 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 2 

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant................. 2 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 2 

ATGL, RPG-7V ................................................. 2 

ATDL, RPG-22 .................................................. 1 

Demolition, Fuzes & Detonators * .........Assorted

Demolition Materiel ** ..........................Assorted

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) ***............ 4 

Mines (AP, AT & AV) **** ..................Assorted

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian............................. 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 2 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 1 

Camera, Digital................................................... 1 

Electrician Set..................................................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 1 

Laser Rangefinder, Handheld ............................. 2 

Observation Scope, Day/Night ........................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 4 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 3 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 1 

Computer, PDA...................................... 1 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 1 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 8 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTES: See next page. ___________________________________________ 

* Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

 ** Includes remotely detonated mines, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is 

mission dependent and varies.

 *** Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes, 

sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, radio

frequency [RF], pressure release).

**** Each assassination and sniper direct action cell has at least four assorted types of IED and remote 

detonation devices. The number and type of IED varies and is determined by the current mission.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-15
Appendix C

Direct Action Cell (Assassination and Sniper), Insurgent Organization

(continued) _______________________________________________________________

NOTES: 

1. The primary mission of the assassination and sniper cell is to terrorize the population and/or to assassinate

preselected persons. The cell may indiscriminately select individual targets in crowded marketplaces or 

religious and political gatherings with the sole intent to terrorize. This direct action cell is extremely lethal in 

conducting individual assassinations and ambushes. 

2. An assassination is a deliberate action to kill political leaders or VIPs, versus the killing of common people,

which is considered murder. The insurgent assassinates or murders people it cannot intimidate, who have left 

the group, or who have some symbolic significance for the enemy or world community. Insurgent organizations 

may refer to these killings as “punishment.” Many targets of assassination are symbolic and often have a great 

psychological impact on the enemy. For example, assassinating an enemy negotiator or successful 

businessperson can demonstrate the enemy’s inability to protect its own people.

3. An assassination and sniper cell could select its own targets based on opportunity, as long as hitting such

targets supports (or does not conflict with) the overall goals of the insurgent organization. However, the 

insurgent leadership can exercise centralized control as necessary, in order to orchestrate concerted action or to 

achieve a specific goal in its area of influence.

4. Assassination methods include remotely-detonated bombing, the use of firearms, and poisoning. The target’s

vulnerabilities determine the method of assassination. For example, a target (individual) who drives to work 

along the same route each day may be vulnerable to a sniper attack. Each action requires detailed planning by 

many cells. The insurgent leadership and/or the planning cell selects the assassination target after considering 

the input from the other cells. The assassination cells take actions similar to those taken for a kidnapping. The 

difference is that a kidnapping seeks to keep the target alive, while an assassination or murder does not.

5. The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements.

Weapons appropriate to each mission are selected. The other equipment is left behind or cached. The RPG, 

RPK, and/or sniper rifle may be needed in some cases and not in others. Other weapons and equipment are 

added as required. The assassination and sniper cell has the same base-line of weapons and equipment as the 

multifunction direct action cell. 

6. The assassination and sniper cell consists of two teams. The cell leader serves as the team leader of one

team. Each team consists of five men: a team leader/observer (spotter), a sniper (shooter)/target designator, an 

assistant sniper, a security person, and a driver. If a vehicle is not required, the driver may serve as an 

additional security person or ammo bearer. 

7. When the role of the assassination and sniper cell reverts to that of a multipurpose cell, the following role

shifts occur. The cell leader remains as the cell leader and a team leader of one of the teams. He retains the 

assault rifle AKM, with the 40-mm under-barrel grenade launcher BG-15. The team leader of the second team 

puts aside his AKM/BG-15 and becomes the machinegunner, carrying a 7.62-mm general-purpose machinegun 

PKM. He remains in charge of the second team. The snipers in both teams put aside their Mosin/Nagant sniper 

rifles and become the gunners of the 7.62-mm light machineguns RPK. The assistant sniper/designator puts 

aside his 7.62-mm Carbine AKMS and becomes a grenadier with an RPG-7V. All cell members assist in 

carrying ammunition and RPG rounds.

8. Every direct action cell is capable of performing all of the insurgent organization missions. When not

engaged in specialized activities, the assassination and sniper cell serves as a multifunction direct action cell. 

Depending on mission requirements, the assassination and sniper cell may also serve as a reconnaissance 

element, a stay-behind element, or provide security for other direct action cells. For additional information, see 

TC 7-100.3.

C-16 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Direct Action Cell (Kidnapping and Extortion), Insurgent Organization

DA CELL

(Kidnapping

& Extortion)

Cell Leader (x1) ............................................... PKM 

Asst Cell Leader (x1) ........................... AKM/BG-15

Grenadiers (x2)..................................... RPG/AKMS 

Security Pers/Marksman (x1)............ Mosin/Nagant

Security Pers (x1) ............................................ RPK

Driver (x2)...............................................PM/AKMS

Total Personnel.......................... 8 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 2 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 4 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM ..................................... 1 

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant................. 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

ATGL, RPG-7V ................................................. 2 

ATDL, RPG-22 * ............................................... 1 

Demolition, Fuzes&Detonators ** .........Assorted

Demolition Materiel *** ........................Assorted

Improvised Explosive Device (IED)  .......... 4 

Mines (AP, AT & AV) ** *** ................Assorted

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Van, Civilizan..................................................... 1 

Binocular ............................................................ 2 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 2 

Camera, Digital................................................... 2 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 1 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 3 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 1 

Computer, PDA...................................... 1 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 1 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 8 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTES: See next page. 

 ___________________________________________ 

* The ATDL is issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. They are not assigned to

an individual.

 ** Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes, 

sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, radio

frequency [RF], pressure release).

 *** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

   Each kidnapping and extortion direct action team has at least four assorted types of IED and remote 

detonation devices. The number and type of IED varies and is determined by the current mission. 

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is 

mission dependent and varies.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-17
Appendix C

Direct Action Cell (Kidnapping and Extortion), 

Insurgent Organization (cont)________________________________________________ 

NOTES: 

1. The primary mission of this direct action cell is to conduct kidnapping, extortion, hijacking, and hostagetaking. These acts help to finance the organization and serve to influence and/or terrorize the population. Each 

action, particularly a kidnapping, requires detailed planning and support by a number of other cells.

2. A kidnapping and extortion cell could select its own targets based on opportunity, as long as hitting such

targets supports (or does not conflict with) the overall goals of the insurgent organization. However, the 

insurgent leadership can exercise centralized control as necessary, in order to orchestrate concerted action, and 

might identify certain targets or types of targets in order to achieve a specific goal in its area of influence.

3. The intelligence cell provides information on the target’s vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and routine behavior.

Every member of the insurgent organization, as well as sympathizers, can help gather this target information. 

The intelligence cell must thoroughly analyze the target so that it can advise the insurgent leadership, the 

planning cell, and/or the kidnapping and extortion cell on selection of the target site and method of kidnapping. 

Human intelligence is vital when planning and conducting a kidnapping, and the intelligence cell continuously 

conducts surveillance on the target to identify potential security flaws. It then determines flaws that the direct 

action cell can exploit. 

4. The intelligence cell and/or the kidnapping and extortion cell conducts detailed reconnaissance and

surveillance of potential kidnap sites to determine the best site, considering cover, concealment, and escape 

routes in its evaluation. Once the target and site are selected, the kidnapping and extortion cell (and/or the 

planning cell and intelligence cell) conducts detailed analysis to provide the kidnapping and extortion direct 

action cell with the requisite data on the target. The information required depends on the location of the target 

and site but includes

• The exact route the target uses.

• The method of conveyance.

• Specifics of conveyance, such as its size, shape, speed, and construction.

• The number of security personnel, their location, disposition, and type of weapons used.

• The target’s likes, dislikes, allergies, habits, and routines.

5. After planning and reconnaissance, the kidnapping and extortion direct action cell conducts the actual action.

For a kidnapping, the cell leader designates a specific team to conduct the kidnapping. After receiving 

intelligence, the team rehearses specific kidnapping techniques, such as an ambush or abduction, and finalizes 

planning. The team plans the escape route in great detail because of the complexities of transporting the victim. 

It usually disables the victim to make the escape easier. The team determines the best method of disabling the 

victim (such as drugging, stunning, or binding him).

6. The information warfare cell helps create and maintain the fear caused by kidnapping and extortion through

its propaganda and media manipulation means.

7. Every direct action cell is capable of performing all of the insurgent organization missions. When not

engaged in specialized activities the kidnapping and extortion direct action cell serves as a multifunction direct 

action cell. All cell members assist in carrying ammunition and RPG rounds.

8. For additional information, see TC 7-100.3.

C-18 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Direct Action Cell (Information Warfare), Insurgent Organization

DA CELL

(Information 

Warfare)

Cell Leader/Sr INFOWAR Spec (x1)................ PKM 

Asst Cell Leader/Sr INFOWAR Spec (x1)AKM/BG-15

INFOWAR Spec (Video)/Grenadier (x1)RPG/AKMS 

INFOWAR Spec (Comms)/Grenadier (x1)RPG/AKMS 

Computer Tech/Security Pers (x1)................... RPK

INFOWAR Spec/Marksman (x1)....... Mosin/Nagant

INFOWAR Spec/Driver (x2)....................PM/AKMS

Total Personnel.......................... 8 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 2 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 4 

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM ..................................... 1 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant................. 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

ATGL, RPG-7V ................................................. 2 

ATDL, RPG-22 * ............................................... 1 

Demolition, Fuzes&Detonators ** .........Assorted

Demolition Materiel *** ........................Assorted

Improvised Explosive Device (IED)  .......... 4 

Mines (AP, AT, & AV) ** *** ...............Assorted

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Van, Civilizan..................................................... 1 

Antena, Satellite.................................................. 2 

Binocular ............................................................ 1 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 3 

Camera, Digital................................................... 3 

Electrician Set..................................................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 2 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 4 

Computer, Desktop ................................ 4 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 8 

Computer, PDA...................................... 8 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 4 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 8 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 3 

NOTES: See next page. ___________________________________________ 

* The ATDL is issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. They are not assigned to

an individual.

 ** Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes, 

sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, radio

frequency [RF], pressure release).

 *** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

   Each direct action cell (information warfare) has at least four assorted types of IED and remote 

detonation devices. The number and type of IED varies and is determined by the current mission. 

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is 

mission dependent and varies.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-19
Appendix C

Direct Action Cell (Information Warfare), 

Insurgent Organization (continued) ___________________________________________ 

NOTES: 

1. The direct action cell (information warfare) supports the insurgent organization’s information warfare

(INFOWAR) plan and may or may not receive guidance from the information warfare cell. The direct action 

nature of this cell and its title indicate the nature of its objective, purpose, and role. IED and other attacks are 

often used to support the overall information warfare plan. These attacks may also be used in a manner to cause 

(shift) blame for the attack to their enemy. 

2. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the direct action cell (INFOWAR)

may be capable of several functions. Some example functions performed by this cell are selective sabotage 

actions; information management; media manipulation (misinformation and disinformation—psychological 

warfare [PSYWAR]); communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda and indoctrination videos, 

broadcast successes of the direct action teams); civic actions; and assist in the cyber-mining for intelligence. 

All of these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals.

3. Some of the functions may require specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation function

(PSYWAR) may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, a tribal, ethic, or cultural leader; or 

other experts. Portions of the direct action cell (INFOWAR) are probably dispersed.

4. The mission, environment, geographic factors, and many other variables determine the configuration and

composition of each direct action cell. Direct action cells do not have a fixed structure. Cell composition is not 

fixed and varies from cell to cell, mission to mission, and environment to environment. The structure, 

personnel, equipment, and weapons mix, all depend on specific mission requirements. Personnel select weapons 

appropriate to the mission. The RPG, RPK, and/or sniper rifle may be needed in some cases and not in others. 

Other weapons and equipment are added as required, such as computers, computer rigged vehicles, specialized 

antennas, and communications. 

5. The direct action cell (INFOWAR) typically contains from 6 to 10 personnel (8 personnel is the default,

which includes 2 drivers). The cells can be as small as 2 people or consist of over 20 people (broken into teams 

if necessary), depending on mission, vehicle requirements, support and security personnel, and other variables. 

Some functions can also be performed by personnel outside of the cell.

6. There may be as few as one direct action cell (INFOWAR) to over 20 direct action cells (INFOWAR),

depending on the mission and other factors.

7. Direct action personnel may be a mixture of men, women, and children. Local women and children may be

used as runners, videographer/camera operators, messengers, scouts, guides, suicide bombers, drivers, porters, 

snipers, lookouts, or in other roles. They may also emplace and/or detonate IEDs, booby traps, and mines. 

Women (and possibly children) may be fighters and participate in “drive-bys”, assassinations, ambushes and/or 

assaults. They may also serve (willingly or unwillingly) as suicide bombers.

8. Every direct action cell is capable of performing all of the insurgent organization missions. When not

engaged in specialized activities, the direct action cell (INFOWAR) serves as a multifunction direct action cell. 

All cell members assist in carrying ammunition and RPG rounds.

9. Several members of the direct action cell (INFOWAR) may be hired information warfare specialists or “gun

fighters.”

10. For additional information on direct action information warfare, see TC 7-100.3.

C-20 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Direct Action Cell (Mortar and Rocket), Insurgent Organization

DA CELL

(Mortar

& Rocket)

DA TEAM

(Rocket)

DA TEAM

(Mortar)

Cell Leader (x1)........................................... PM/PKM

Total Personnel .......................... 13

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 3 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 2 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 7 

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM ..................................... 1 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 2 

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant................. 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 2 

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 

or 60-mm Commando Mortar, M70 *.... 1 

107-mm Lchr Single-Tube, Type 85, 

or 107-mm Single-Tube, 

MONOTUBE......................................... 1 

ATGL, RPG-7V ................................................. 2 

ATDL, RPG-22 ** ............................................. 1 

Demolition, Fuzes&Detonators *** .......... Assort

Demolition Materiel  .......................Assorted

IED ** *** .......................................................... 4 

Mines (AP, AT & AV) ****** ..............Assorted

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 2 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian............................. 2 

Aiming Circle/Goniometer................................. 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 3 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 2 

Camera, Digital................................................... 2 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 3 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 3 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 7 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 3 

Computer, PDA...................................... 3 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 2 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power................13

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTES: See next page. 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-21
Appendix C

Direct Action Cell (Mortar and Rocket), Insurgent Organization (continued)

 ___________________________________________ 

* 81/82-mm mortars (W-87 81-mm or 2B14-1 82-mm) may be substituted for the 60-mm mortar. When

81/82-mm mortars are used, the team size is increased by three personnel (ammo bearers) for a total

team size of seven personnel.

 ** The ATDL is issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. They are not assigned to 

an individual.

 *** Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes, 

sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, radio 

frequency [RF], pressure release).

   Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

 ** *** Each mortar and rocket direct action cell has at least four assorted types of IED and remote detonation 

devices. The number and type of IED varies and is determined by the current mission. 

****** Includes remotely detonated mines, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is 

mission dependent and varies.

NOTES:

1. The primary purpose of the mortar and rocket direct action cell is to either terrorize or influence the local

populace and governing authorities. It may indiscriminately fire into crowded marketplaces and religious 

gatherings with the intent to terrorize. Targets may also include religious or national icons and/or landmarks.

2. These attacks are often used to support the overall information warfare plan. They may also be used in a

manner to cause (shift) blame for the attack to their enemy.

3. Every direct action cell is capable of performing all of the insurgent organization missions. When not

engaged in specialized activities, the mortar and rocket direct action cell serves as a multifunction direct action 

cell. The mortars, rockets, and associated equipment may be cached or left behind, in which case the members 

carry the weapons and munitions load similar to the multifunction cell. All cell members assist in carrying 

ammunition and RPG rounds.

4. In some cases, a 120-mm Mortar, Type 86 (W86) may be substituted for the 81/82-mm mortar or 60-mm

mortars. However, this substitution requires a light truck to transport each 120-mm mortar. Generally, 

however, if the insurgents require 100-mm or 120-mm mortars, they look to the guerrillas for support.

5. Improvised 107-mm single-tube rocket launchers are common. The improvised launchers may be fabricated

from PVC pipe, iron, or any other available material. Improvised 107-mm rocket firing pads can be constructed 

of dirt, bamboo frames, crossed stakes, road embankments, and a dike between two rice fields, the brim of a 

combat trench, an earth mound, or a bomb crater.

6. For additional information, see TC 7-100.3.

C-22 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Direct Action Team (Mortar), Direct Action Cell (Mortar and Rocket)

DA TEAM

(Mortar)

(60-mm)

Mortar Team Leader/Asst Cell Ldr (x1) .............. AKM/BG-15

Mortar Gunner/Marksman (x1)......... Type 90/Mosin-Nagant

Asst Mort Gunner/Grenadier (x1) ....................... RPG/AKMS 

Ammo Bearer/Asst Grenadier (x1) ............................. AKMS

Driver/Ammo Bearer (x1) ........................................... AKMS

Driver/ Security Pers (x1) ........................................PM/RPK

Total Personnel.............................. 6 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 2 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM ..................................... 1 

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant................. 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 

or 60-mm Commando Mortar, M70 *.... 1 

ATGL, RPG-7V ................................................. 1 

ATDL, RPG-22 ** ............................................. 1 

Demolition, Fuzes&Detonators *** .......Assorted

Demolition Materiel  .......................Assorted

IED ** *** .......................................................... 2 

Mines (AP, AT & AV) ****** ..............Assorted

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian............................. 1 

Aiming Circle/Goniometer................................. 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 2 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 1 

Camera, Digital................................................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 3 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 2 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 4 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 1 

Computer, PDA...................................... 1 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 1 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 7 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTES: See next page. 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-23
Appendix C

Direct Action Team (Mortar), 

Direct Action Cell (Mortar and Rocket) (cont) ___________________________________ 

 ___________________________________________ 

* 81/82-mm mortars (W-87 81-mm or 2B14-1 82-mm) may be substituted for the 60-mm mortar. When

81/82-mm mortars are used, the team size is increased by three personnel (ammo bearers) for a total

team size of seven personnel.

 ** The ATDL is issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. They are not assigned to 

an individual.

 *** Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes, 

sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, radio 

frequency [RF], pressure release).

   Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

 ** *** Each mortar direct action team has at least two assorted types of IED and remote detonation devices. 

The number and type of IED varies and is determined by the current mission. 

****** Includes remotely detonated mines, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is 

mission dependent and varies.

NOTES:

1. The primary purpose of the mortar direct action team is to either terrorize or influence the local populace and

governing authorities. It may indiscriminately fire into crowded marketplaces and religious gatherings with the 

intent to terrorize. Targets may also include religious or national icons and/or landmarks.

2. These attacks are often used to support the overall information warfare plan. They may also be used in a

manner to cause (shift) blame for the attack to their enemy. 

3. As with all direct action cells, key events (and results/successes) are digitally recorded on digital video and

still cameras. Upon mission completion, the recordings are turned over to the information warfare cell for 

manipulation and exploitation. The videographer/camera operator may attempt to blend in with the crowds and 

may disassociate him/herself from the operation. In other situations, the key event/activity will be staged for the 

camera. Sympathizers among the local populace may also serve in this role.

4. When the mortar and ammunition are transported in a vehicle, the ammo bearer may not be required.

Additional ammo bearers may be used when necessary. Noncombatant personnel or draft animals may also be 

used as bearers or porters.

5. In some cases, a 120-mm Mortar, Type 86 (W86) may be substituted for the 81/82-mm mortar. However,

this substitution requires a light truck to transport each 120-mm mortar. Generally, however, if the insurgents 

require 100-mm or 120-mm mortars they look to the guerrillas for support. 

6. For additional information, see TC 7-100.3.

C-24 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Direct Action Team (Rocket), Direct Action Cell (Mortar and Rocket)

DA TEAM

(Rocket)

(107-mm)

Rocket Team Leader (x1).......................... AKM/BG-15

Rocket Gunner/LMG Gunner (x1)............ Type 85/RPK

Asst Rocket Gunner/Grenadier(x1)............. RPG/AKMS 

Ammo Bearer/Asst Grenadier (x1)...................... AKMS

Driver/Ammo Bearer (x1).................................... AKMS

Driver/Security Per/Marksman (x1)...............PM/AKMS

Total Personnel.............................. 6 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 1 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 4 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

107-mm Lchr Single-Tube, Type 85, 

or 107-mm Single-Tube, 

MONOTUBE......................................... 1 

ATGL, RPG-7V ................................................. 1 

Demolition, Fuzes & Detonators * .........Assorted

Demolition Materiel ** ..........................Assorted

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) ***............ 2 

Mines (AP, AT & AV) **** ..................Assorted

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian............................. 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 1 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 1 

Camera, Digital................................................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 1 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 3 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 1 

Computer, PDA...................................... 1 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 1 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 6 

NOTES: See next page. 

 ___________________________________________ 

* Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes,

sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, radio

frequency [RF], pressure release).

 ** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

 *** Each rocket direct action team has at least two assorted types of IED and remote detonation devices. 

The number and type of IED varies and is determined by the current mission.

**** Includes remotely detonated mines, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is 

mission dependent and varies.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-25
Appendix C

Direct Action Team (Rocket), 

Direct Action Cell (Mortar and Rocket) (continued) ______________________________ 

NOTES: 

1. The primary purpose of the rocket direct action team is to either terrorize or influence the local populace and

governing authorities. It may indiscriminately fire into crowded marketplaces and religious gatherings with the 

intent to terrorize. Targets may also include religious or national icons and/or landmarks.

2. These attacks are often used to support the overall information warfare plan. They may also be used in a

manner to cause (shift) blame for the attack to their enemy. 

3. As with all direct action cells, key events (and results/successes) are digitally recorded on digital video and

still cameras. Upon mission completion, the recordings are turned over to the information warfare cell for 

manipulation and exploitation. The videographer/camera operator may attempt to blend in with the crowds and 

may disassociate him/herself from the operation. In other situations, the key event/activity will be staged for the 

camera. Sympathizers among the local populace may also serve in this role.

4. When the rockets are transported in a vehicle, the extra ammo bearer may not be required. Additional ammo

bearers may be used whenever necessary. Noncombatant personnel or draft animals may also be used as 

bearers/porters.

5. Improvised 107-mm single-tube rocket launchers may be common. They may be fabricated from PVC pipe,

iron, or any other available material. Improvised 107-mm rocket firing pads can be constructed of dirt, bamboo 

frames, crossed stakes, road embankments, and a dike between two rice fields, the brim of a combat trench, an 

earth mound, or a bomb crater.

6. For additional information, see TC 7-100.3.

C-26 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Intelligence Cell, Insurgent Organization

INTELLIGENCE

CELL

Cell Leader/Sr Intel (x1)..........................PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Leader (x1) ..............................PM/AKMS

Targeting (x1) ............................................... AKMS

Driver/Intel Pers (x1)......................PM/AKM/BG-15

Driver/Intel Pers (x1)..................................PM/RPK

Total Personnel.......................... 5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 4 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 2 

Binoculars........................................................... 3 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 2 

Camera, Digital................................................... 2 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 2 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 5 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 5 

Computer, PDA...................................... 5 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 5 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 5 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTES: See next page.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-27
Appendix C

Intelligence Cell, Insurgent Organization (continued)

NOTES:

1. The intelligence cell plans, coordinates, and implements the insurgent intelligence collection plan and

provides intelligence information to internal and external consumers. The cell also conducts reconnaissance to 

obtain information about the activities, tactics, and resources of the enemy. Reconnaissance methods include 

surveillance, use of informants, and infiltration of enemy organizations. Observation is the most common 

method used to conduct reconnaissance. 

2. In addition to conducting intelligence analysis, typical activities of any intelligence cell in the insurgent

organization may include tracking enemy movements; determining enemy TTP; scouting potential targets; 

establishing enemy vulnerabilities; selecting attack locations; and stalking potential assassination targets.

3. Intelligence cell personnel may serve in any occupation (such as a taxi or delivery driver, or truck driver)

which allows them to blend in with the population and still provides them the flexibility and mobility needed to 

gather information.

4. Every member of the insurgent organization is an intelligence-gathering mechanism. The insurgent

organization usually produces its own general intelligence and targeting information, to include enemy orders of 

battle. Information in raw form may be freely provided by sympathizers conducting surveillance on behalf of 

the insurgent organization while living, traveling, or working near either a target area or the enemy. Raw 

information may also be purchased locally from affiliated insurgents, guerrillas, or criminal organizations. 

5. The insurgent organization’s intelligence is usually superior to the enemy’s due to its intimate first-hand

knowledge of all aspects of the local environment, penetration of governmental structures, relationships with the 

population, and its ability to maintain observation across the countryside or urban area.

6. Collecting information, overtly and clandestinely, is a continuous function performed by every insurgent

organization. Overt activities include the open collection of information by individuals who circulate among the 

people. Clandestine activities involve secret collection of information. This can include information collected 

through the use of extortion, bribery, or coercion. Groups clandestinely collect information using electronic 

devices and human-intelligence agents who may join or infiltrate popular organizations, government 

organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. 

When planning any action, an intelligence cell analyzes information from both overt and clandestine 

sources. “Sleeper agents,” members of the insurgent organization (or insurgent movement) who may reside 

within the target area for years, often have the specific mission of gathering information. The information they 

gather may later serve to support direct action missions.

7. The information gathered by the insurgent organization is used to plan future activities and determine the

feasibility of planned actions. In the offense, efforts are concentrated on the enemy at his location and the area 

surrounding the target. In the defense, the reconnaissance effort is to determine when and where the enemy will 

conduct offensive actions against friendly forces. When affiliated with a higher (regional or national) insurgent 

organization, the information may be further disseminated for combined attacks. 

8. For additional information on insurgent intelligence activities and operations, see TC 7-100.3.

C-28 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Counterintelligence and Internal Security Cell, Insurgent Organization

CI AND

SECURITY

CELL

Cell Leader (x1) ......................................PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Ldr/Ch CI (x1)..........................PM/AKMS

Chief Security (x1) ........................................ AKMS

Driver/CI Per (x1)...........................PM/AKM/BG-15

Driver/Security Pers (x1)............................PM/RPK

Total Personnel.......................... 5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 4 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian............................. 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 2 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 1 

Camera, Digital................................................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 2 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 5 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 5 

Computer, PDA...................................... 5 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 5 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 5 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTES: 

1. The local insurgent organization must place great emphasis on the conduct of internal counterintelligence

(CI) activities because of the criticality of maintaining cohesion within the hazardous environment in which it 

operates, and the susceptibility to infiltration by enemy agents. If the local insurgent organization is infiltrated it 

will not survive.

2. It is within the CI and security cell that all operations security (OPSEC) measures for the organization’s

activities, as well as other security measures, are developed, disseminated, and enforced. In most organizations, 

violation of these security rules can result in immediate death to the violator and/or his family members. 

Members of the CI and security cell infiltrate other cells to identify security weaknesses or breaches. This cell is 

responsible for maiming or assassinating current or former insurgent members who commit breaches. Paranoia 

among the members actually increases security, since all members desire to remain free of suspicion. 

Individuals assigned to the CI and security cell are usually mature, experienced, or senior in the organization.

3. The cellular structure of the organization helps ensure against the compromise of the identity, location, or

activities of leaders and members of other cells should there be a breach of internal security.

4. For additional information, see TC 7-100.3.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-29
Appendix C

Planning Cell, Insurgent Organization

PLANNING

CELL

Cell Leader/Sr Planner (x1) ....................PM/AKMS

Asst Ldr/Current Plans (x1) ....................PM/AKMS

Current Plans (x1)......................................... AKMS

Future Plans/Driver (x1).................PM/AKM/BG-15

Asst Plans/Driver (x1)................................PM/RPK

Total Personnel.......................... 5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 4 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian............................. 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 2 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 1 

Camera, Digital................................................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 1 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 5 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 5 

Computer, PDA...................................... 5 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 5 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 5 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTE: For additional information, see TC 7-100.3.

C-30 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Information Warfare Cell, Insurgent Organization _______________________________ 

INFORMATION

WARFARE

CELL

Cell Leader/Sr INFOWAR Spec (x1).........PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Leader/Sr INFOWAR Spec (x1) . PM/AKMS

INFOWAR Specialist (Video) (x2) ................... AKMS

INFOWAR Specialist (Comms) (x2)................ AKMS

Computer Technician (x2)............................... AKMS

INFOWAR Specialist (x1)................................ AKMS

INFOWAR Specialist (x1)....................... AKM/BG-15

INFOWAR Specialist/Driver (x1) ..................PM/RPK

INFOWAR Specialist/Driver (x2) ...............PM/AKMS

Total Personnel............................ 13

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 5 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................. 11

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 2 

Van, Civilian....................................................... 1 

Antenna, Satellite................................................ 2 

Binoculars........................................................... 2 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 4 

Camera, Digital................................................... 4 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 2 

Radios:

Cell Phone............................................12

Computer, Desktop ................................ 8 

Computer, Laptop ................................12

Computer, PDA....................................12

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 8 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power................12

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 5 

NOTES: 

1. The information warfare (INFOWAR) cell plans, coordinates, and implements the insurgent organization’s

INFOWAR plan and provides guidance and assistance to the direct action cells (INFOWAR) whenever 

required. IED and other attacks are often used to support the overall information warfare plan. These attacks 

may also be used in a manner to cause (shift) blame for the attack to their enemy. 

2. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the INFOWAR cell may be capable

of several functions. Some example functions performed by the INFOWAR cell are information management 

(internal methods, links, and security); media manipulation (PSYWAR) and public affairs designed to influence 

the population; communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda videos, broadcast successes of 

direct action teams, printing); rumor control (misinformation and disinformation); selective sabotage actions; 

civic actions; indoctrination training; fund-raising (including international); recruiting; and assist in cybermining for intelligence. All these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals. 

3. Some of the functions may require specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation function

(PSYWAR) may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, a tribal, ethic, or cultural leader; or 

other experts. Portions of the INFOWAR cell are probably dispersed.

4. For additional information on information warfare, see TC 7-100.3.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-31
Appendix C

Technical Support Cell, Insurgent Organization

TECHNICAL

SUPPORT

CELL

DEMOLITION,

SABOTAGE,

& IED TEAM

SUICIDE

IED TEAM

(INDIV & VEH)

WMD

SUPPORT

TEAM

Cell Leader (x1) ......................................PM/AKMS

Total Personnel........................ 21

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 9 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 4 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................. 13

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 4 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 4 

Demolition, Fuzes/Detonators * .............Assorted

Demolition Materiel ** ..........................Assorted

IED, Individual, Vest ***................................... 3 

Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED) ***....................... 2 

IED, WMD *** .................................................. 1 

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) ***..........20

Mines (AP, AT, & AV) **** .................Assorted

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 4 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian............................. 1 

Van, Civilian....................................................... 4 

Binoculars........................................................... 5 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 4 

Camera, Digital................................................... 4 

Electrician Set..................................................... 8 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 9 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 4 

Radios:

Base Station, Long-Range

Cordless-Telephone ............................... 2 

Cell Phone............................................51

Computer, Laptop ................................13

Computer, PDA...................................... 9 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone.............................................13

Handheld, Very-Low-Power................21

Manpack, Low-Power............................ 2 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 5 

Vehicle Mount, Medium Power............. 1 

NOTES: See next page.

C-32 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Technical Support Cell, Insurgent Organization (continued)

 ___________________________________________ 

* Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes,

sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, radio

frequency [RF], pressure release).

 ** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

 *** The number and types of IEDs and fuzing varies. Each demolition, sabotage, and IED team has at least 

10 IEDs fabricated and on-hand at any given time. Each suicide IED team has at least three IED vests 

and two VBIEDs fabricated and on-hand at any given time (the two VBIEDs may be any type of 

vehicle). Each WMD support team has at least one WMD IED fabricated and on-hand at any given 

time; others may be in various stages of manufacture.

 **** Includes remotely detonated mines, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is 

mission dependent and varies.

NOTES: 

1. The number of teams subordinate to the technical support cell is not fixed and varies depending on the

specific mission, environment, geographic factors, and many other variables. Personnel and equipment totals for 

the “typical” technical support cell in this example reflect only the teams shown in solid boxes in the 

organizational diagram for the Technical Support Cell. The “default” is two demolition, sabotage, and IED 

teams, one suicide IED team, and one WMD support team.

2. The technical support cell is the primary bomb factory for the insurgent organization. This cell manufactures

IEDs, suicide bombs (individual and vehicular), WMDs, and booby traps (booby traps are actually a 

subcategory of IEDs). It is responsible for all acquisition, manufacturing, and storage of IEDs, road-side 

bombs, WMD, suicide bombs (individual and vehicle), side-attack (AT and anti-vehicle) mines, and other 

tactical demolitions and fuzing (including remote detonators).

The cell prepares these devices for distribution to other elements of the insurgent organization or affiliated 

organizations and/or persons. Some technical support cells may be located in factories in small villages (or 

other remote areas or local accommodations) where they build their IEDs and then smuggle them into cities, 

where suppliers may then sell them (distribute them) to insurgent organizations. For security and survival, all of 

these activities are generally surreptitious.

3. Bombs (specifically IEDs) are the weapon of choice for the insurgent organization. They are inexpensive,

the materials are readily available, are relatively easy to build, and are extremely destructive. Bombs may be 

very sophisticated or extremely simple. Bombs (IEDs) easily lend themselves to terrorizing the population and 

are used in support of assassination, maiming, sabotage, mass casualties, and mass disruption. The mix is 

always mission-dependent and always varies. Direct action cells (multifunction) acquire IEDs (usually 

unassembled pre-manufactured components) from the technical support cell. The direct action (multifunction) 

cell then assembles and adds fuzes and detonators to the IEDs. 

At a minimum, the direct action (multifunction) IED team or a small multifunction cell using IEDs usually 

includes at least three people: a lookout, an IED emplacer, and the triggerman. The multifunction team (or cell) 

emplaces the IEDs, and the triggerman detonates them at the appropriate time. Whenever training, additional 

assistance, or IED expertise is required, the direct action (multifunction) teams or cells receive it from the 

technical support cell. 

4. IED attacks are often used to support the overall information warfare plan. They may also be used in a

manner to cause (shift) blame for the attack to their enemy.

Continued

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-33
Appendix C

Technical Support Cell, Insurgent Organization (continued)

NOTES: (continued)

5. Some direct action (multifunction) cells may not have access to the expertise or products (IEDs) provided by

the technical support cell. In these cases, the direct action (multifunction) cells receive the appropriate training 

from the technical support cell enabling them to manufacture limited qualities of IEDs for their own use. 

6. Although members of the technical support cell are very capable of emplacing and detonating IEDs and

other demolitions, they normally do not do so. Their expertise is far too critical for them to routinely go on 

direct action missions. Direct action cells emplace and trigger the IEDs. On occasion, a representative from the 

technical support cell may be required to accompany the direct action cell to properly emplace and detonate the 

device, especially when dealing with WMD IEDs.

7. The technical support cell may train, advise, and provide expertise to direct action teams, especially the

multifunction teams, on how, where, and when, to emplace and detonate munitions and on the proper assembly, 

fuzing, and detonation of the devices. Technical support cell personnel also provide instruction on remotely 

detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, road-side bombs, tactical demolitions, WMD, suicide bombs, and sideattack (AT and anti-vehicle) mines. 

8. The OPFOR commonly uses IEDs as “secondary devices” to detonate on the arrival of responding

personnel. IEDs can be detonated by a variety of means, including remote, command, electrical, trip wire, 

pressure, time, and others. 

9. Insurgent organizations use indiscriminate techniques such as mass casualty activities, weapons of mass

effects/disruption, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, to accomplish their 

goals. Those insurgent organizations requiring specific expertise in the fabrication, emplacement, and 

detonation of radiation (dirty bombs) and biological weapons acquire the expertise and material from outside 

the local insurgent organization.

10. CBRN weapons are the potential weapon of choice for organizations employing terror tactics, since the

actual or threat of use of CBRN weapons is real and very feasible. Insurgents might threaten the use of these 

weapons as “saber rattlers” in response to political or military actions, or they may actually use these weapons 

to terrorize the population. 

11. Most insurgent organizations have easy access to toxic industrial chemicals (TICs). TICs are highly toxic

commercial chemical substances with acute toxicity that are produced in large quantities for industrial purposes. 

They can be solid, liquid, or gas. These are the normal weapons of choice for the WMD support team.

12. Cell personnel may be a mixture of men, women, and children. Local women and children may be used as

scouts, guides, suicide bombers, drivers, lookouts, or in other roles. Whenever necessary, they may also 

emplace and/or detonate IEDs, booby traps, and mines. They may also serve (willingly or unwillingly) as 

suicide bombers.

13. Cell composition is not fixed and varies from cell to cell, mission to mission, and environment to

environment. This includes the personnel, equipment, and weapons mixes. Personnel select equipment and 

weapons appropriate to the mission.

14. For additional information on the technical support cell, see TC 7-100.3.

C-34 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Demolition, Sabotage, and IED Team, Technical Support Cell

DEMOLITION,

SABOTAGE

& IED TEAM

Team Leader/Sr Demo Expert (x1).........PM/AKMS

Asst Tm Ldr/Demo Expert/Electrician (x1).... AKMS

Demo Specialist/Communications (x1)......... AKMS

Demo Specialist/Computer Tech (x1)........PM/RPK

Demo Specialist/Fuze (x1)................... AKM/BG-15

Total Personnel.......................... 5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 2 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Demolition, Fuzes/Detonators * .............Assorted

Demolition Materiel ** ..........................Assorted

Mines (AP, AT, & AV) *** ...................Assorted

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) ****........10

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Van, Civilian....................................................... 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 1 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 1 

Camera, Digital................................................... 1 

Electrician Set..................................................... 2 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 1 

Radios:

Base Station, Long-Range

Cordless-Telephone ............................... 1 

Cell Phone............................................15

Computer, Laptop .................................. 3 

Computer, PDA...................................... 2 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 3 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 5 

Manpack, Low-Power............................ 2 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

Vehicle Mount, Medium Power............. 1 

NOTES: See next page.

 ___________________________________________ 

* Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes,

sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, RF,

pressure release).

 ** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

 *** Includes remotely detonated mines, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is 

mission dependent and varies.

**** The number and types of IEDs and fuzing varies. The demolition, sabotage, and IED team has at least 

10 IEDs fabricated and on-hand at any given time. Other IEDs may be in various stages of 

manufacture.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-35
Appendix C

Demolition, Sabotage, and IED Team, 

Technical Support Cell (continued) ___________________________________________ 

NOTES: 

1. The demolition, sabotage, and IED team is the primary IED and tactical munitions factory for the technical

support cell. This team manufactures IEDs, suicide bombs (individual and vehicular), and booby traps (booby 

traps are actually a subcategory of IEDs). It is responsible for all acquisition, manufacturing, and storage of 

IEDs, suicide bombs, road-side bombs, side-attack (AT and anti-vehicle) mines, and other tactical demolitions 

and fuzing (including remote detonators). If necessary, this team could also fabricate WMD.

The team prepares these devices for distribution to other elements of the insurgent organization or affiliated 

organizations and/or persons. Some demolition, sabotage, and IED teams may be located in factories in small 

villages (or other remote areas or local accommodations) where they build their IEDs and then smuggle them 

into cities, where suppliers may then sell them (distribute them) to insurgent organizations. For security and 

survival, all of these activities are generally surreptitious.

2. The number of demolition, sabotage, and IED teams subordinate to the technical support cell is not fixed and

varies depending on the specific mission, environment, geographic factors, and many other variables. The 

default is two demolition, sabotage, and IED teams. All technical support cells have at least two demolition, 

sabotage, and IED teams.

3. All demolition, sabotage, and IED team personnel may serve as drivers. They are also cross-trained to

perform all functions necessary to fabricate IEDs.

4. Although members of the demolition, sabotage, and IED team are very capable of emplacing and detonating

IEDs and other demolitions, they normally do not do so. Their expertise is far too critical for them to routinely 

go on direct action missions. Direct action cells emplace and trigger the IEDs. On occasion, a representative 

from the demolition, sabotage, and IED team may be required to accompany the direct action cell to properly 

emplace and detonate the device. 

5. The demolition, sabotage, and IED team may train, advise, and provide expertise to direct action teams,

especially the multifunction teams, on how, where, and when, to emplace and detonate munitions and on the 

proper assembly, fuzing, and detonation of the devices. Demolition, sabotage, and IED team personnel also 

provide instruction on remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, road-side bombs, tactical demolitions, and 

side-attack (AT and anti-vehicle) mines. 

6. The OPFOR commonly uses IEDs as “secondary devices” to detonate on the arrival of responding

personnel. IEDs can be detonated by a variety of means, including remote, command, electrical, trip wire, 

pressure, time, and others. 

7. Team personnel may be a mixture of men, women, and children. Local women and children may be used as

scouts, guides, suicide bombers, drivers, lookouts, or in other roles. Whenever necessary, they may also 

emplace and/or detonate IEDs, booby traps, and mines. They may also serve (willingly or unwillingly) as 

suicide bombers.

8. Team composition is not fixed and varies from team to team, mission to mission, and environment to

environment. This includes the personnel, equipment, and weapons mixes. Personnel select equipment and 

weapons appropriate to the mission.

9. These attacks are often used to support the overall information warfare plan. They may also be used in a

manner to cause (shift) blame for the attack to their enemy.

10. For additional information, see TC 7-100.3.

C-36 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Suicide IED TEAM (Individual and Vehicular), Technical Support Cell

SUICIDE

IED TEAM

(Indiv & Veh)

Team Leader/Sr Demo Expert (x1) ............................PM/AKMS

Asst Tm Ldr/Demo Expert/Electrician/Fuze (x1) ..............AKMS

Demo Specialist/Communications (x1) ............................AKMS

Demo Specialist/Computer Tech (x1) .......................... PM/RPK

Demo Specialist/Mechanic/Welder (x1) .................. AKM/BG-15

Total Personnel.............................. 5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 2 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Demolition, Fuzes/Detonators * .............Assorted

Demolition Materiel ** ..........................Assorted

Mines (AP, AT, & AV) *** ...................Assorted

IED (Individual) Vest   ................................ 3 

Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED) ** **..................... 2 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian............................. 1 

Van, Civilian....................................................... 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 1 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 1 

Camera, Digital................................................... 1 

Electrician Set..................................................... 2 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 1 

Radios:

Cell Phone............................................10

Computer, Laptop .................................. 3 

Computer, PDA...................................... 2 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 3 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 5 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTES: See next page.

 _________________________________________________ 

* Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes,

sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, RF,

pressure release).

 ** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

 *** Includes remotely detonated mines, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is 

mission dependent and varies.

**** The number and types of IED/VBIEDs and fuzing varies. The suicide IED team has at least three IED 

vests and two VBIEDs fabricated and on-hand at any given time. The two VBIEDs may be any type of 

vehicle. Other IED vests and VBIEDs may be in various stages of manufacture.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-37
Appendix C

Suicide IED TEAM (Individual and Vehicular), 

Technical Support Cell (continued) ___________________________________________ 

NOTES: 

1. The number of suicide IED/VBIED teams subordinate to the technical support cell is not fixed and

varies depending on the specific mission, environment, geographic factors, and many other variables. The 

default is one suicide IED/VBIED team. All technical support cells have at least one suicide IED/VBIED 

team.

2. All suicide IED/VBIED team personnel are cross-trained to perform all functions necessary to fabricate

IEDs and VBIEDs including automotive welding and fabrication.

3. Although members of the IED/VBIED team are very capable of detonating IED/VBIEDs and other

demolitions, they normally do not do so—even to detonate a suicide IED/VBIED carried or driven by 

someone else. Their expertise is far too critical for them to routinely go on direct action missions. Direct 

action cells are responsible for the emplacement and detonation of the IED/VBIEDs.

4. Suicide bombers/drivers are recruited by the recruiting cell, and turned over to direct action cells to

properly emplace the individual-carried IEDs and VBIEDs. Once the direct action cell has ensured the 

proper emplacement of the IED/VBIED, they can either trigger the IED/VBIEDs remotely or use other 

detonation methods. On occasion, a representative from the IED/VBIED team may be required to 

accompany the direct action cell to ensure proper emplace and detonation of the device/VBIED. 

5. For additional information on suicide IED (individual) and VBIEDs, see TC 7-100.3.

C-38 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Support Team, 

Technical Support Cell _____________________________________________________ 

WMD

SUPPORT

TEAM

Team Leader/Sr Demo Expert/Chem Tech (x1)..............PM/AKMS

Asst Tm Ldr/Demo Expert/Electrician/Fuze (x1) ................... AKMS

Demo Specialist/Communications/Radiation (x1) ................. AKMS

Demo Specialist/Computer Tech (x1)................................. PM/RPK

Demo Specialist/Chemical Spec (x1) ........................... AKM/BG-15

Total Personnel .............................. 5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 2 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS .................................. 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Demolition, Fuzes/Detonators *.............Assorted

Demolition Materiel ** ..........................Assorted

Mines (AP, AT, & AV) *** ...................Assorted

IED, WMD **** ................................................ 1 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Van, Civilian ...................................................... 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 1 

Camcorder, Video .............................................. 1 

Camera, Digital .................................................. 1 

Electrician Set .................................................... 2 

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 3 

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 1 

Radios:

Cell Phone ........................................... 10

Computer, Laptop.................................. 3 

Computer, PDA..................................... 2 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 3 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 5 

Portable, Satellite Telephone................. 1 

NOTES: See next page.

 ____________________________________________ 

* Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes,

sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, RF,

pressure release).

 ** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

 *** Includes remotely detonated mines, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is 

mission dependent and varies.

**** The number and types of WMD (CBRN) IEDs and fuzing varies. The WMD support team has at least 

one WMD IED fabricated and on-hand at any given time. Others may be in various stages of 

manufacture.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-39
Appendix C

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Support Team, 

Technical Support Cell (continued) ___________________________________________ 

NOTES: 

1. To accomplish their goals, insurgent organizations use indiscriminate techniques such as mass casualty

activities; weapons of mass effects/disruption; bombings or standoff attacks; or chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Those insurgent organizations requiring specific expertise in the 

fabrication, emplacement, and detonation of radiation (dirty bombs) and biological weapons acquire the 

expertise and material from outside the local insurgent organization. 

2. The primary purpose of the WMD support team is to create weapons used to either terrorize or influence the

local populace and governing authorities. Such weapons may be indiscriminately placed in crowded 

marketplaces and religious gatherings with the intent to terrorize. Targets may also include religious or national 

icons and/or landmarks.

3. CBRN weapons are the potential weapon of choice for organizations employing terror tactics, since the

actual or threat of use of CBRN weapons is real and very feasible. Insurgent organizations may obtain or use 

CBRN weapons for a variety of motives. Insurgents might threaten the use of these weapons as “saber rattlers” 

to raise the ante in response to foreign political or military actions, or to achieve a specific objective, or they 

may actually use these weapons to terrorize the population. 

4. The number of WMD support teams subordinate to the technical support cell is not fixed and varies

depending on the specific mission, environment, geographic factors, and many other variables. The default is 

one WMD support team. All technical support cells have at least one WMD support team.

5. Most WMD support teams have easy access to toxic industrial chemicals (TICs). TICs are highly toxic

commercial chemical substances with acute toxicity that are produced in large quantities for industrial purposes. 

They can be solid, liquid, or gas. These are the normal weapons of choice for the WMD support team.

6. Although members of the WMD support team are very capable of emplacing and detonating WMD IEDs

and other demolitions, they normally do not do so. The team member’s expertise is far too critical for them to 

routinely go on direct action IED emplacement missions. Direct action cells emplace and trigger the IEDs. On 

occasion, a representative from the WMD support team may be required to accompany the direct action cell to 

ensure proper emplacement and detonation of the weapon. 

7. All WMD support team personnel are cross-trained to perform all functions necessary to fabricate WMD

IEDs. 

8. WMD IED attacks are used to support the overall information warfare plan. They may also be used in a

manner to cause (shift) blame for the attack to their enemy. For example, even though a mass release of TICs 

causing numerous noncombatant casualties was due to an IED explosion, the insurgent organization might be 

able to blame the casualties on the enemy as an intentional act.

9. For additional information on insurgent CBRN weapons and WMD and their employment, see TC 7-100.3.

C-40 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Logistics Cell, Insurgent Organization

LOGISTICS

CELL

Cell Leader/Sr Logistician (x1).........................PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Leader (x1)........................................PM/AKMS

Logistics Specialist (x1).......................................... AKMS

Spt Spec/Driver (x1)................................ PM/AKM/BG-15

Spt Spec/Driver (x1)............................................PM/RPK

Total Personnel .............................. 5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 4 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS .................................. 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian............................. 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 1 

Camcorder, Video .............................................. 1 

Camera, Digital .................................................. 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 2 

Radios:

Cell Phone ............................................. 5 

Computer, Desktop................................ 2 

Computer, Laptop.................................. 3 

Computer, PDA..................................... 5 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 5 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 5 

Portable, Satellite Telephone................. 1 

NOTES: 

1. The logistics cell is the resource planner for the insurgent organization. It is responsible for the planning,

acquisition, and distribution of all resources—human and materiel.

2. For additional information, see TC 7-100.3.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-41
Appendix C

Communications and Tradecraft Cell, Insurgent Organization

COMMS & 

TRADECRAFT

CELL

Cell Leader/Sr Comms (x1)..............................PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Leader (x1).............................................. AKMS

Tradecraft Spec (x1)............................................... AKMS

Comms Spec/Driver (x1).........................PM/AKM/BG-15

Computer Tech/Driver (x1)........................................ RPK

Courier/Comms Spec/Motorcycle (x3)..............PM/AKMS

Total Personnel.............................. 8

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................5

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................1

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS...................................6

7.62-mm LMG, RPK..........................................1

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 .....................1

Motorcycle/motor scooter/bicycle ......................3

Sedan, Civilian ...................................................1

Van, Civilian.......................................................1

Antenna, Satellite................................................3

Binoculars...........................................................1

Camcorder, Video...............................................2

Camera, Digital...................................................2

GPS Receiver, Handheld ....................................4

Night-Vision Goggles.........................................4

Radios:

Base Station, Long-Range

Cordless-Telephone ...............................1

Cell Phone..............................................5

Computer, Desktop ................................3

Computer, Laptop ..................................5

Computer, PDA......................................5

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone...............................................5

Handheld, Very-Low-Power..................5

Portable, Satellite Telephone .................3

Vehicle Mount, Medium Power.............1

NOTES: 

1. The communications and tradecraft cell is the communications planner for the insurgent organization. The 

cell facilitates communications inside and outside of the organization. It also provides a courier service and 

maintains dead-drop locations and other tradecraft (clandestine) communications. Close coordination is 

maintained with the INFOWAR cell for Internet communications.

2. The communications and tradecraft cell advises on the feasibility of all insurgent activities from a 

communications perspective. It determines the internal communications equipment necessary for the success of 

direct action missions. The cell also provides communications, tradecraft, and steganography expertise and 

training as required. 

3. Typically, the courier uses a ubiquitous civilian model motorcycle, moped, motor scooter, bicycle, sedan, or 

even a taxi. The courier probably will not have an overt weapon or radio and will appear to be a noncombatant. 

Another insurgent may ride with the courier as a lookout or to provide security. Depending on the 

circumstances, some couriers may not use vehicles and will be used instead as foot messengers. Couriers may 

be male, female, or even children. Messages may be written, digital, via Internet, encrypted, or memorized and 

presented orally.

4. The cell is equipped with small SATCOM antennas, long-range cordless telephones, and provides digital and 

secure communications. 

5. For additional information on insurgent communications and tradecraft, see TC 7-100.3.

C-42 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Finance Cell, Insurgent Organization

FINANCE

CELL

Cell Leader/Ch Financial Off (x1)............................. PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Leader (x1)/Future Plans (x1)................... PM/AKMS

INFOWAR integration/Finance Spec (x1).......................AKMS

Finance Spec/Driver (x1)................................ PM/AKM/BG-15

Accountant/Driver (x1)................................................PM/RPK

Total Personnel .............................. 5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 4 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS .................................. 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 2 

Antenna, Satellite ............................................... 2 

Binoculars........................................................... 1 

Camcorder, Video .............................................. 1 

Camera, Digital .................................................. 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 1 

Radios:

Base Station, Long-Range

Cordless-Telephone............................... 1 

Cell Phone ............................................. 5 

Computer, Desktop................................ 3 

Computer, Laptop.................................. 5 

Computer, PDA..................................... 5 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 5 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 5 

Portable, Satellite Telephone................. 3 

NOTES: 

1. The finance cell is the financial and economic planner for the insurgent organization. It plans fund-raising

activities (including bribery, extortion, and robbery, and operating front companies) to finance and resource the 

insurgent organization’s activities. This includes local, regional, and links to national and international fundraising activities. The cell also determines the roles of direct action cells and other cells in acquiring additional 

funds for the insurgent organization.

2. Finance personnel establish and monitor internal and external funding and funds management mechanisms.

Similarly, skilled INFOWAR operators appeal to the local and international community, possibly through the 

media, for political, monetary, and logistics support. 

3. The finance cell determines the internal financial requirements necessary for the success of direct action

missions.

4. Recruiting may be wittingly or unwittingly financed from both governmental and nongovernmental

donations and grants.

5. For additional information on the role and mission of the finance cell and funding the insurgent

organization, see TC 7-100.3.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-43
Appendix C

Shelter (Safe Houses) Cell, Insurgent Organization

SHELTER

CELL

Cell Leader (x1)................................................PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Leader (x1)........................................PM/AKMS

Insurgent (x1)......................................................... AKMS

Insurgent/Driver (x1)................................PM/AKM/BG-15

Insurgent/Driver (x1)............................................PM/RPK

Total Personnel.............................. 5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 4 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Van, Civilian....................................................... 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 2 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 1 

Camera, Digital................................................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 2 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 5 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 5 

Computer, PDA...................................... 5 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 5 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 5 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTES: 

1. The shelter cell plans for, and provides, secure accommodation (safe houses) for direct action cells, visiting

and high-ranking insurgents, and other cell members. Maximum use is made of local assistance and facilities 

regardless of capability. Sympathizers in the local populace may volunteer their homes, equipment, vehicles, 

and services.

2. Whenever necessary, the shelter cell conducts coordination with the intelligence, planning, logistics, and

transportation cells.

3. For additional information, see TC 7-100.3.

C-44 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Training Cell, Insurgent Organization

TRAINING

CELL

Cell Leader/Ch Trainer (x1)............................PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Leader/Sr Trainer (x1).....................PM/AKMS

Training Spec (x1)................................................ AKMS

Training Spec/Driver (x1).......................PM/AKM/BG-15

Training Spec/Driver (x1)...................................PM/RPK

Total Personnel.............................. 5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 4 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 Ton, Civilian ........................... 1 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 1 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 1 

Camera, Digital................................................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 2 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 5 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 5 

Computer, PDA...................................... 5 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 5 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 5 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTES: 

1. The training cell plans and facilitates training for the insurgent organization. Basic instruction covers the

organization, duties, and responsibilities of the insurgent organization; basic marksmanship; surveillance and 

intelligence-collection methods; and basic tactical instruction and communications techniques. Examples of 

specialized instruction may include advanced tactical instruction, such as the proper conduct of ambushes, 

assassination, and sniper activities; advanced surveillance and intelligence-collection methods; kidnapping and 

extortions; and advanced skill training.

2. Training may be centralized or conducted at the cell level depending on the structure and mission of the

insurgent organization. Generally, it is a combination of both, with the basics taught in a centralized location 

and specific mission and functional training conducted at the local cellular level.

3. For additional information on insurgent training, see TC 7-100.3.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-45
Appendix C

Recruiting Cell, Insurgent Organization

RECRUITING

CELL

Cell Leader/Ch Recruiter (x1) .................PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Leader/Sr Recruiter (x1) ..........PM/AKMS

Recruiting Spec (x1) ..................................... AKMS

Recruiting Spec/Driver (x1)............PM/AKM/BG-15

Recruiting Spec/Driver (x1)........................PM/RPK

Total Personnel.......................... 5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 4 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 3 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 2 

Antenna, Satellite................................................ 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 1 

Camcorder, Video............................................... 1 

Camera, Digital................................................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 2 

Radios:

Cell Phone.............................................. 5 

Computer, Desktop ................................ 1 

Computer, Laptop .................................. 5 

Computer, PDA...................................... 5 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone............................................... 3 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 5 

Portable, Satellite Telephone ................. 1 

NOTES: See next page.

C-46 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Recruiting Cell,

Insurgent Organization (continued) ___________________________________________ 

NOTES:

1. The recruiting cell is the manpower resourcing and recruitment planner for the insurgent organization.

Insurgent organizations may attempt to recruit current or former members of national armed forces, both as 

trained operatives and as agents in place. Recruiting may be for particular skills, training, and/or qualifications 

and may not be tied to ideological characteristics. Recruits might not be aware of the true nature of the 

organization they are joining.

2. Often, legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for insurgent organizations. Recruiting is

often associated with the proliferation of a radical religious sect or groups associated with militant ethnic or 

nationalist agendas. The organizations from which individuals can be recruited need not necessarily be violent 

or illegal themselves, but simply contain populations that are sympathetic to the same goals as the insurgent 

organization. 

3. The recruiting cell uses many varied and different methods to persuade potential insurgents to join them.

Some of these methods/reasons may be monetary, religious, ethic, nationalistic, anger, promise of power, or 

fear. Recruiting may be wittingly or unwittingly financed from both governmental and nongovernmental 

donations and grants.

4. Insurgents may also use coercion and leverage to gain limited or one-time cooperation from useful

individuals. This cooperation can range anywhere from gaining information to conducting a suicide bombing. 

Blackmail and intimidation are also common forms of coercion. Threats to family members are also employed. 

Coercion is often directed at personnel in government security and intelligence organizations.

5. Internal security is the primary concern of the insurgent organization when recruiting. Once a potential

recruit has passed the intense screening process and has been preselected for recruitment, he/she is then closely 

monitored by the CI and internal security cell prior to full recruitment. Insurgents at all levels are well aware 

that, if the local insurgent organization is infiltrated, it (or the insurgents in it) will not survive.

6. The Internet is a powerful recruitment tool. The recruiting cell maintains close coordination with the

information warfare cell. 

7. For additional information on insurgent recruiting methods and practices, see TC 7-100.3.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-47
Appendix C

Transportation Cell, Insurgent Organization

TRANSPORT

CELL

Cell Leader/Ch Transportation (x1) ..................PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Ldr/Sr Spt Spec (x1).................PM/AKM/BG-15

Transport Spec (x1).............................................PM/RPK

Transport Spec/Driver (x1)..................................... AKMS

Spt Spec/Driver (x4)............................................... AKMS

Total Personnel.............................. 8

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................2

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................1

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS...................................6

7.62-mm LMG, RPK..........................................1

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 .....................1

Sedan, Civilian ...................................................2

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian.............................1

Truck, Medium, Commercial .............................1

Van, Civilian.......................................................1

Binoculars...........................................................1

Camcorder, Video...............................................1

Camera, Digital...................................................1

GPS Receiver, Handheld ....................................4

Night-Vision Goggles.........................................4

Radios:

Cell Phone..............................................8

Computer, Laptop ..................................3

Computer, PDA......................................3

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone...............................................3

Handheld, Very-Low-Power..................8

Portable, Satellite Telephone .................1

NOTES: See next page.

C-48 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Transportation Cell, 

Insurgent Organization (continued) ___________________________________________ 

NOTES: 

1. The transportation cell plans and facilitates transportation for the insurgent organization. It responds to

transportation requirements of other cells in the organization, especially the logistics and direct action cells. If 

sufficient (or specific) transportation is not available, the transportation cell will either provide or arrange it. 

2. Insurgents may have no vehicles or supplies at all and depend completely on caches, porters, or other

transportation or supply means. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. 

3. Depending on the mission, the local insurgent organization may be augmented by any and every type of

personnel and/or vehicle. Vehicles could be motorcycles, trucks, agricultural trucks, commercial trucks, liquid 

cargo carriers (for POL or water), flat beds, busses, farm trailers, tractors, sedans, 1⁄2 ton civilian pickup trucks 

(such as Toyotas or Nissans), high-mobility/all terrain vehicles, bicycles, or carts. 

4. Insurgents requisition or confiscate local civilian transportation assets and materiel. Anything of

transportation value will be used, or confiscated. This includes the use of civilian personnel for porters and 

possibly as lookouts and security personnel. Draft animals may also be used as bearers and/or porters. 

5. The vehicles in the transportation cell are indistinguishable from civilian vehicles and are always kept as

dispersed as possible, in order to prevent detection and destruction by enemy forces. Rarely, if ever, will all 

vehicles in the cell be colocated. 

6. Whenever possible, vehicles will be dispersed for use by locals as commercial, delivery, agricultural, general

cargo, construction, militia, and general-purpose vehicles used in everyday life. When required, the 

transportation cell will assemble the appropriate mix of vehicles to transport items and/or personnel to a specific 

location. The vehicles then melt back into the general population and environment. 

7. Insurgents rely heavily on local and packaged water and POL products (fuel, oil, grease, or lubricants).

These packages range from 1- and 5-gallon cans to 55-gallon drums. 

8. For additional information on insurgent transportation, see TC 7-100.3.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-49
Appendix C

Civil Affairs Cell, Insurgent Organization

CIVIL

AFFAIRS

CELL

Cell Leader/Ch Civil Affairs (x1) .......................PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Leader/Sr Civil Affairs (x1) ................PM/AKMS

Civil Affairs Spec/Videographer (x1)....................... AKMS

CA & Media Spec/Driver (x1) ..................PM/AKM/BG-15

CA Spec/Driver (x1) ............................................PM/RPK

Total Personnel.............................. 5

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................4

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................1

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS...................................3

7.62-mm LMG, RPK..........................................1

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 .....................1

Sedan, Civilian ...................................................1

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian.............................1

Binoculars...........................................................1

Camcorder, Video...............................................2

Camera, Digital...................................................2

GPS Receiver, Handheld ....................................2

Night-Vision Goggles.........................................2

Radios:

Cell Phone..............................................5

Computer, Desktop ................................3

Computer, Laptop ..................................5

Computer, PDA......................................5

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone...............................................5

Handheld, Very-Low-Power..................5

Portable, Satellite Telephone .................2

NOTES: 

1. The civil affairs cell is responsible for the planning, preparation, and implementation of all civil affairs 

activities for the insurgent organization. The civil affairs cell may work closely with the information 

warfare cell for media manipulation.

2. Key events (and results/successes) of all insurgent organizations are digitally recorded on digital video 

and still cameras. The recordings are turned over to the information warfare cell for manipulation and 

exploitation and/or to sympathetic media for local or worldwide distribution. 

3. The videographer/camera operator may attempt to blend in with the crowds and may disassociate 

him/herself from the operation. In other situations, the key event/activity will be staged for the camera. 

Sympathizers in the local populace may also serve in this role.

4. For additional information, see TC 7-100.3.

C-50 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Local Insurgent Organization from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Medical Cell, Insurgent Organization

MEDICAL

CELL

Cell Leader/Ch Medic (x1) ...............................PM/AKMS

Asst Cell Leader/Sr Medic (x1).........................PM/AKMS

Medic (x1) .............................................................. AKMS

Medic/Driver (x1).................................................... AKMS

Medic Asst/Driver (x1)............................. PM/AKM/BG-15

Medic Asst/Driver (x1).........................................PM/RPK

Total Personnel .............................. 6 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 4 

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS .................................. 4 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Sedan, Civilian ................................................... 1 

Truck, Pickup 1⁄2 ton, Civilian............................. 1 

Van, Civilian ...................................................... 1 

Binoculars........................................................... 1 

Camcorder, Video .............................................. 1 

Camera, Digital .................................................. 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Litters, Medical.................................................. 3 

Medical Set, General.......................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 2 

Radios:

Cell Phone ............................................. 6 

Computer, Laptop.................................. 2 

Computer, PDA..................................... 2 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 1 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 6 

Portable, Satellite Telephone................. 1 

NOTES: 

1. Insurgent medics are combatants. When necessarythey fight. A medical aid station is usually set up in a

(fairly) safe area, while other medics may accompany direct action cells or other insurgents. Insurgent medical 

personnel may be a mixture of men and women. Women may make up 50% or more of the medical cell 

strength.

2. The insurgent force has a limited medical capability; however, local medical support is probably available to

differing degrees. Whenever possible, insurgent medical care is coupled with local medical assets in the area. 

Maximum use is made of local medical assistance and facilities regardless of medical capability. 

3. Insurgents may or may not have the services of a civilian medical officer (physician) available. If available,

the physician can provide immediate trauma stabilization and minor surgical intervention, while the medics 

provide limited medical intervention, minor surgery, and treatment of most common illnesses and lesser 

wounds.

4. Sympathizers in the local populace may volunteer their homes, equipment, vehicles, and services.

Sympathizers may also assist in the evacuation of wounded insurgents to civilian, militia, state, or even military 

facilities. Insurgents may receive assistance from local civilian medical personnel to treat their ill and wounded. 

Noncombatants may also be conscripted or forced to serve as litter bearers. When necessary, supported 

insurgent direct action cells receive litters from the medical cell to transport wounded. The supported insurgent 

force provides its own litter bearers.

5. Severe and longer-term medical care relies on evacuation to civilian or other medical facilities. More routine

and excess ill and wounded are backhauled in general-purpose cargo vehicles, carts, or even taxis to a civilian 

medical facility.

6. Whenever possible, medical functions are performed in tents, tunnels, caves, or local accommodations. In

some instances, the medical cell will attempt to collocate with a village clinic.

7. For additional information on medical care available to insurgents, see TC 7-100.3.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 C-51
This page intentionally left blank. 
Appendix D

Motorized Infantry Company from the HTFS Organizational 

Directories 

This appendix provides an example of the information for an infantry company and 

its subordinates, as found in the Hybrid Threat Force Structure (HTFS) organizational 

directories under the motorized infantry battalion. It also includes the spreadsheet for 

the personnel and equipment in the motorized infantry battalion as a whole. 

Note. For illustrative purposes, this TC contains several examples from the online HTFS

organizational directories. Readers are reminded that even the baseline OPFOR organizations are 

subject to change over time. Therefore, readers should always consult the online directories for 

the latest, most up-to-date versions of organizational data.

INFANTRY AND MOTORIZED INFANTRY COMPANIES 

D-1. OPFOR infantry units that are not mechanized (equipped with APCs or IFVs) may be motorized 

infantry (truck-mounted) or just plain infantry (without trucks). The infantry company has sufficient assets 

to transport the headquarters and primary weapons systems such as mortars and ATGMs (weapons 

platoon). To transport the three infantry platoons over distance, however, it is dependent upon 

augmentation from the transportation platoon of a motorized infantry battalion. Movement of the entire 

infantry company (organic and individual weapons, equipment, ammunition, and supplies) requires an 

additional six medium trucks (two per platoon). When an infantry company receives these transportation 

assets, it becomes a motorized infantry company. Its subordinate infantry platoons and their infantry squads 

become motorized infantry platoons and squads. Once the move is complete, the trucks return to the 

battalion transportation platoon. At that point, the company again becomes essentially an infantry company, 

with infantry platoons and infantry squads.

MOTORIZED INFANTRY COMPANY EXAMPLE

D-2. The example on the following pages comes from the Motorized Infantry Brigade folder in volume I 

of the HTFS organizational directories. Therefore, the infantry company in question is part of a motorized 

infantry battalion. Since it is truck-mobile, with trucks available from the transportation platoon of the 

motorized infantry battalion, it is a motorized infantry company.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-1 
Appendix D

Infantry Company, Inf and Mtzd Inf Bn__________________________________

HQ & SVC

SECTION

WEAPONS

PLATOON

INFANTRY

COMPANY

INFANTRY

PLATOON

Total Personnel......... 181 O-6/N-43/E-132

NOTES:

1. The infantry company has sufficient assets to transport the headquarters and primary weapons 

systems such as mortars and ATGMs (weapons platoon). It is dependent upon augmentation from 

higher (battalion transport platoon) to transport the three infantry platoons over distance. Movement 

of the entire infantry company (organic and individual weapons, equipment, ammunition, and 

supplies) requires an additional six medium trucks (two per platoon). Once the move is complete the 

trucks return to the battalion transport platoon. 

2. The infantry company may also be augmented by motorcycles or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles 

depending on the mission.

D-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Motorized Infantry Company from the TFS Organizational Directories

Infantry Company, Inf and Mtzd Inf Bn (continued)

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM...............................................18

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M...................131

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U............................21

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * ................................12

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD * ..........................11

.50-cal Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 *.................. 2 

12.7-mm HMG, NSV * ...................................... 8 

35-mm AGL-Light, W-87 * ............................... 9 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30....................30

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 *........................ 3 

ATGM Launcher, Milan 3 **............................. 3 

ATGM Lchr, Manportable-SR, Eryx *............... 3 

ATGL-Long Range, RPG-29 * .......................... 6 

ATGL, Panzerfaust 3-T600 * ............................. 9 

ATDL, Armbrust *** ......................................... 9 

ATDL, RPG-27 *** ........................................... 4 

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series.........................23

Minefield Breaching SystemExplosive Charge, ZRP-2   ............. 3 

Mine-Scattering System, 

Manportable, PKM ................................ 3 

Mines (AP&AT) ** */*****...................Assorted

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469..................... 7 

Truck, Light........................................................ 3 

Truck, Medium .................................................. 2 

Trailer, Cargo, 1-Axle........................................ 2 

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle........................................ 2 

Trailer, Utility .................................................... 7 

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter) ............................... 1 

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades............................. Assorted

Aiming Circle/Goniometer................................. 1 

Binocular Laser Rangefinder * ........................ 42

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................. 53

Laser Target Designator **................................ 3 

Observation Scope, Day/Night * or ** .............. 2 

Radar, GSR, Manportable, Fara-1 ...................... 3 

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie................. 14

Night-Vision Goggles...................................... 61

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) ........................ 12

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30).............. 30

Night-Vision Sight (Aiming Circle)................... 1 

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ............... 48

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 6 

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power.......... 12

Warning Receiver.................................. 1 

_______________________________

* With II night sight.

 ** With thermal sight.

 *** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary.

   No dedicated operator/BOI. It is carried until needed

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-3 
Appendix D

Headquarters and Service Section, Inf Co

HQ & SVC 

SECTION

COMMAND

TEAM

SUPPLY &

TRANSPORT

TEAM

SUPPORT

TEAM

Total Personnel................ 12 O-2/N-2/E-8

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M .....................12

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * ..................................3

12.7-mm HMG, NSV * ......................................2

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30......................3

ATDL, RPG-27 ** .............................................3

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series ** ......................2

Minefield Breaching SystemExplosive Charge, ZRP-2 ***................3

Mine-Scattering System, 

Manportable, PKM ***..........................3

Mines (AP&AT) ***/***** ...................Assorted

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469 .....................2

Truck, Light........................................................1

Truck, Medium...................................................2

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle ........................................2

Trailer, Utility.....................................................2

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter) ............................... 1

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades.............................Assorted

Binocular Laser Rangefinder * .......................... 2

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 5

Laser Target Designator **** ............................ 1

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie ................... 1

Night-Vision Goggles ........................................ 1

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) .......................... 5

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30)................ 3

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 3

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 1

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power............ 5

Warning Receiver.................................. 1

NOTE: The headquarters and service section may be augmented by additional vehicles, trucks, 

tactical utility vehicles (TUVs), motorcycles, or high-mobility/all-terrain vehicles depending on the 

mission.

_______________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary.

 *** No dedicated operator. It is carried by the headquarters and service section until needed.

   With thermal sight.

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines.

D-4 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Motorized Infantry Company from the TFS Organizational Directories

Command Team, HQ & Svc Section

COMMAND

TEAM

Company Commander (O) (x1)............................ AK-74M

RTO (x1) .............................................................. AK-74M

Driver (TUV) (x1)...................................... AK-74M/GP-30

Total Personnel ..................... 3 O-1/N-0/E-2 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M....................... 3 

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM */** ............................. 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30...................... 1 

ATDL, RPG-27 *** ........................................... 1 

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series........................... 1 

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469..................... 1 

Trailer, Utility..................................................... 1 

Binocular Laser Rangefinder * ........................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 1 

Laser Target Designator **** ............................ 1 

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 1 

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) .......................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30)................ 1 

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 1 

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 1 

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power............ 1 

Warning Receiver.................................. 1 

_______________________________

* With II night sight.

 ** A 7.62-mm GP MG is mounted on the utility vehicle. A tripod mount is also carried for the 

ground support role. Whoever is not driving operates the vehicle MG.

 *** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary.

**** With thermal sight. No dedicated operator. 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-5 
Appendix D

Support Team, HQ & Svc Section

SUPPORT

TEAM

Deputy Commander (O) (x1)................................AK-74M

First Sergeant (N) (x1).............................. AK-74M/GP-30

Driver (Trk) (x1)....................................................AK-74M

Driver (TUV) (x1)..................................................AK-74M

Medic (x1) ............................................................AK-74M

Total Personnel..................... 5 O-1/N-1/E-3

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M .......................5

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM */** .............................1

12.7-mm HMG, NSV */** .................................1

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30......................1

ATDL, RPG-27 *** ...........................................1

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series *** ....................1

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469 .....................1

Truck, Light........................................................1

Trailer, Utility.....................................................1

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter)................................1

Minefield Breaching SystemExplosive Charge, ZRP-2  ..............1

Mine-Scattering System, 

Manportable, PKM ** ** ....................... 1

Mines (AP&AT) ***/*****...................Assorted

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades.............................Assorted

Binocular Laser Rangefinder * .......................... 1

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 2

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) .......................... 2

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30)................ 1

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 2

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power............ 2

_______________________________

 * With II night sight. 

 ** A 12.7-mm HMG is mounted on the light truck. A 7.62-mm GP MG is mounted on the 

TUV. A tripod mount is also carried for the ground support role. Whoever is not driving 

operates the vehicle MG.

 *** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary.

   No dedicated operator. It is carried by the support team until needed.

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines.

D-6 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Motorized Infantry Company from the TFS Organizational Directories

Supply & Transportation Team, HQ & Svc Section

SUPPLY &

TRANSPORT

TEAM

Supply Sergeant (N) (x1) ..................................... AK-74M

Driver/Sup Spec (x2)............................................ AK-74M

Sup Spec (x1) .......................................... AK-74M/GP-30

Total Personnel ..................... 4 O-0/N-1/E-3 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M....................... 4 

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM */** ...........................12

12.7-mm HMG, NSV */** ................................. 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30...................... 1 

ATDL, RPG-27 *** ........................................... 1 

Truck, Medium................................................... 2 

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle ........................................ 2 

Minefield Breaching SystemExplosive Charge, ZRP-2   ............. 2 

Mine-Scattering System, 

Manportable, PKM ** ** ....................... 2 

Mines (AP&AT) ***/***** .................. Assorted

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) .......................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30)................ 1 

Radio:

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power............ 2 

NOTE: Corner mounted mechanical hoists are used to load/unload the vehicles.

_______________________________

* With II night sight.

 ** A 12.7-mm HMG is mounted on one medium truck and a 7.62-mm GP MG is mounted on 

the other. Whoever is not driving operates the vehicle MG. A tripod mount is also carried

for the ground support role.

 *** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary.

   No dedicated operator. It is carried by the transport team until needed. 

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-7 
Appendix D

Infantry Platoon, Inf Co

INFANTRY

PLATOON

PLATOON

HQ

INFANTRY

SQUAD

WEAPONS

SQUAD

Total Personnel................ 43 O-1/N-9/E-33

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................5

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M .....................29

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U..............................6

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * ..................................3

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD * ............................3

12.7-mm HMG, NSV */** .................................1

35-mm AGL-Light, W-87 * ...............................2

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30......................8

ATGM Lchr, Manportable-SR, Eryx *...............1

ATGL-Long Range, RPG-29 *...........................2

ATGL, Panzerfaust 3-T600 * .............................3

ATDL, Armbrust ................................................3

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series *** ....................7

Mines (AP&AT) ***/****.....................Assorted

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469..................... 1

Trailer, Utility .................................................... 1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder * .......................... 9

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................. 10

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie ................... 2

Night-Vision Goggles ...................................... 10

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) .......................... 1

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30)................ 8

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power................ 10

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 1

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power............ 1

NOTES: 

1. The infantry platoon has sufficient assets to transport the platoon headquarters and weapons squad. 

It is dependent upon augmentation from higher (battalion transport platoon) to transport the three 

infantry squads over distance. Movement of the entire infantry platoon (organic and individual 

weapons, equipment, ammunition, and supplies) requires an additional 2 medium trucks. Once the 

move is complete the trucks return to the battalion transport platoon. 

2. One of the infantrymen is cross-trained as a medic.

3. The infantry platoon may be augmented by motorcycles or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles 

depending on the mission.

_______________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** A 12.7-mm HMG is mounted on the TUV. A tripod mount is also carried for the ground 

support role. Whoever is not driving operates the vehicle HMG.

 *** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon–BOI may vary.

**** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mine mix 

is mission dependent and varies.

D-8 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Motorized Infantry Company from the TFS Organizational Directories

Platoon Headquarters, Inf Plt

PLATOON

HQ

Platoon Leader (O) (x1) .......................................AK-74M

Platoon Sergeant (N) (x1) ........................ AK-74M/GP-30

RTO (x1) ..............................................................AK-74M

Driver (TUV) (x1)..................................................AK-74M

Total Personnel .....................4 O-1/N-1/E-2

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M.......................4

12.7-mm HMG, NSV */** .................................1

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30......................1

Mines (AP&AT) ***/****.....................Assorted

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469.....................1

Trailer, Utility.....................................................1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder *...........................1

GPS Receiver, Handheld ....................................2

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie................... 1

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 2

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) .......................... 1

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30)................ 1

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 2

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 1

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power............ 1

_______________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** A 12.7-mm HMG is mounted on the vehicle. A tripod mount is also carried for the ground 

support role. Whoever is not driving operates the vehicle HMG.

 *** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon–BOI may vary.

**** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mine mix 

is mission dependent and varies.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-9
Appendix D

Infantry Squad, Inf Plt

INFANTRY

SQUAD

Squad Leader (N) (x1)..........................................AK-74M

Asst Sqd Ldr (N) (x1)............................................AK-74M

Machinegunner (x1) ........................................... PKM/PM

Asst Machinegunner (x1) .....................................AK-74M

Sniper/Marksman (x1)............................................... SVD

Grenadier (x1).......................................PZF3-T/AKS-74U

Asst Grenadier (x1) ..............................................AK-74M

Rifleman (x2)............................................ AK-74M/GP-30

Total Personnel..................... 9 O-0/N-2/E-7

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................1

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M .......................6

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U..............................1

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * ..................................1

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD * ............................1

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30......................2

ATGL, Panzerfaust 3-T600 * .............................1

ATDL, Armbrust ................................................1

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series **...................... 2

Mines (AP&AT) **/***.........................Assorted

Binocular Laser Rangefinder * .......................... 2

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 2

Night-Vision Goggles ........................................ 2

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30)................ 2

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 2

NOTES:

1. The infantry squad consists of at least two maneuver fire teams. The squad leader may choose to 

command one fire team while the assistant squad leader commands the second. The infantry squad 

may be augmented by elements from the weapons squad—in which case the infantry squad may 

operate with three maneuver fire teams (or anti-armor hunter-killer teams). 

2. The squad leader and assistant squad leader both have NVGs, a handheld radio, LRF, and GPS. 

The riflemen also support other weapons including the machinegunner, the ATGL grenadier, the 

sniper/marksman, or attachments from the weapons squad.

3. Some squads may have a second machinegunner in lieu of the rifleman (mission dependent). In 

this case the second rifleman becomes the assistant machinegunner. You gain a PKM and PM for the 

machinegunner and an AK-47M for the assistant machinegunner but lose the two AK-74M/GP-30s 

the riflemen carried previous to the substitution. 

_______________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon–BOI may vary.

 *** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mine mix 

is mission dependent and varies.

D-10 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Motorized Infantry Company from the TFS Organizational Directories

Weapons Squad, Inf Plt

WEAPONS

SQUAD

Squad Leader (N) (x1) .........................................AK-74M

Asst Squad Leader (N) (x1) ..................... AK-74M/GP-30

ATGM Gunner (x1).....................................Eryx/AKS-74U

Asst ATGM Gunner (x1).......................................AK-74M

Grenadier (x2)......................................RPG-29/AKS-74U

Asst Grenadier (x2)..............................................AK-74M

AGL Gunner (x2)................................................W-87/PM

Asst AGL Gunner (x2)..........................................AK-74M

Total Personnel ...................12 O-0/N-2/E-10

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................2

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M.......................7

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U..............................3

35-mm AGL-Light, W-87 * ...............................2

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30......................1

ATGM Lchr, Manportable-SR, Eryx *...............1

ATGL-Long Range, RPG-29 * ..........................2

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series ** ......................1

Mines (AP&AT) **/*** ........................ Assorted

Binocular Laser Rangefinder * .......................... 2

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 2

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie................... 1

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 2

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30)................ 1

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 2

NOTES: 

1. The squad leader and the assistant squad leader both have a handheld radio, LRF, and GPS. The 

squad leader has a thermal viewer while the assistant squad leader has an NVG. 

2. The weapons squad may be employed as a squad or it may be allocated to support separate 

infantry squads. This augmentation enables the infantry squad to operate with three maneuver fire 

teams (or anti-armor hunter/killer teams).

_______________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon–BOI may vary.

 *** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mine mix 

is mission dependent and varies.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-11
Appendix D

Weapons Platoon, Inf Co

WEAPONS

PLATOON

PLATOON

HQ

AGL

SECTION

MORTAR

SECTION

(60-mm)

ATGM

SECTION

SNIPER

SECTION

Total Personnel................... 42 O-1/N-14/E-25

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................3

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M .....................32

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U..............................3

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD * ............................2

.50-cal Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 */**.............2

12.7-mm HMG, NSV */** .................................3

35-mm AGL-Light, W-87 * ...............................3

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30......................3

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 *........................3

ATGM Launcher, Milan 3 ***...........................3

ADTL, RPG-27 ..................................................1

Mines (AP&AT)  /** *** .................Assorted

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469 ** ................2

Truck, Light **...................................................2

Trailer, Cargo (1-Axle).......................................2

Trailer, Utility.....................................................2

Aiming Circle/Goniometer................................. 1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder * ........................ 13

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................. 18

Laser Target Designator ***.............................. 2

Observation Scope, Day/Night * or *** ............ 2

Radar, GSR, Manportable, Fara-1...................... 3

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie ................... 7

Night-Vision Goggles ...................................... 26

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) .......................... 4

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30)................ 3

Night-Vision Sight (Aiming Circle)................... 1

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power................ 15

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 2

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power............ 4

NOTE: The weapons platoon may be augmented by motorcycles or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles 

depending on the mission.

_______________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** A 12.7-mm HMG is mounted on the vehicle. A tripod mount is also carried for the ground 

support role. Whoever is not driving operates the vehicle HMG.

 *** With thermal sight.

   Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon–BOI may vary.

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mine mix 

is mission dependent and varies.

D-12 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Motorized Infantry Company from the TFS Organizational Directories

Platoon Headquarters, Wpns Plt

PLATOON

HQ

Platoon Leader (O) (x1) ....................................... AK-74M

Platoon Sergeant (N) (x1) ........................ AK-74M/GP-30

Driver (TUV) (x1).................................................. AK-74M

Driver (Trk) (x2).................................................... AK-74M

RTO (x1) .............................................................. AK-74M

Total Personnel ..................... 6 O-1/N-1/E-4 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M....................... 6 

12.7-mm HMG, NSV */** ................................. 2 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30...................... 1 

Mines (AP&AT) ***/ .....................Assorted

Tactical Utility Vehicle ...................................... 1 

Truck, Light ** ***............................................. 2 

Trailer, Cargo (1-Axle)....................................... 2 

Trailer, Utility..................................................... 1 

Binocular Laser Rangefinder *........................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 2 

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 2 

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) .......................... 3 

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30)................ 1 

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 2 

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 1 

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power............ 3 

NOTE: Corner-mounted mechanical hoists are used to load/unload the vehicles.

_______________________________

* With II night sight.

 ** A 12.7-mm HMG is mounted on both light trucks and the TUV. A tripod mount is also 

carried for the ground support role. Whoever is not driving, or an infantryman, operates the

vehicle HMG.

 *** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon–BOI may vary.

   Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mine mix 

is mission dependent and varies.

** *** One truck transports both the mortar and AGL sections while the other truck transports the 

ATGM section. When the trucks are not required for direct support to the weapons platoon 

they re-subordinate to the infantry company supply & transportation team to provide general 

support to the company. 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-13
Appendix D

Mortar Section (60-mm), Wpns Plt, Infantry Company

MORTAR

SECTION

(60-mm)

MORTAR

SQUAD

Total Personnel ................... 9 O-0/N-3/E-6

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 *........................3

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M .......................9

Aiming Circle/Goniometer.................................1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder *...........................3

GPS Receiver, Handheld ....................................3

Night-Vision Goggles ........................................ 9

Night-Vision Sight (Aiming Circle)................... 1

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 3

NOTES: 

1. The mortar section leader also serves as the squad leader of one of the three squads.

2. The mortar section receives transportation support from the weapons platoon headquarters. This 

section may be augmented by motorcycles or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles depending on the 

mission.

3. The section may be allocated by squad.

_______________________________

 * 81/82-mm mortars (W-87 81-mm or 2B14-1 82-mm) may be substituted for the 60-mm light 

mortar. When 81/82-mm mortars are used the squad size is increased by three personnel 

(ammo bearers) for a total squad size of five personnel (section size of 16 personnel).

D-14 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Motorized Infantry Company from the TFS Organizational Directories

Mortar Squad, Mortar Section

MORTAR

SQUAD

Squad Leader (N) (x1) ......................................... AK-74M

Gunner (x1).......................................................... AK-74M

Asst Gunner/Ammo Bearer (x1)........................... AK-74M

Total Personnel ..................... 3 O-O/N-1/E-2 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 *........................ 1 

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M....................... 3 

Binocular Laser Rangefinder *........................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 3 

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 1 

NOTES: 

1. The mortar section leader also serves as the squad leader of one of the two squads.

2. The mortar squad receives transportation support from the weapons platoon headquarters. This

squad may be augmented by motorcycles or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles depending on the 

mission. 

_______________________________

* 81/82-mm mortars (W-87 81-mm or 2B14-1 82-mm) may be substituted for the 60-mm light

mortar. When 81/82-mm mortars are used the squad size is increased by three personnel

(ammo bearers) for a total squad size of five personnel (section size of 16 personnel).

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-15
Appendix D

ATGM Section, Wpns Plt

ATGM

SECTION

ATGM

TEAM

SECTION

HQ

Section Leader (x1).....AK-74M

Total Personnel................ 10 O-0/N-4/E-6

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

ATGM Launcher, Milan 3 *...............................3

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M .......................7

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U..............................3

Mines (AP&AT) **/***.........................Assorted

Binocular Laser Rangefinder ****.....................4

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 4

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie ................... 4

Night-Vision Goggles ...................................... 10

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 4

NOTES: 

1. The ATGM section may be employed as a section or it may be allocated by team to each infantry 

platoon.

2. The ATGM section receives transportation support from one of the light trucks in weapons platoon 

headquarters. This section may be augmented by motorcycles or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles 

depending on the mission.

3. The ATGM section receives antitank or anti-vehicle mine warfare support for antiarmor ambushes 

etc from the infantry elements in the company or from the battalion/brigade. Some mines are carried 

in the weapons platoon headquarters vehicle until needed.

_______________________________

 * With thermal sight.

 ** Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mine mix 

is mission dependent and varies.

 *** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon–BOI may vary.

**** With II night sight.

D-16 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Motorized Infantry Company from the TFS Organizational Directories

ATGM Team, ATGM Section

ATGM

TEAM

Team Leader/ATGM Asst Gunner (N) (x1).........AK-74M

ATGM Gunner (x1)...........................................AKS-74U

ATGM Asst Gunner/Ammo Bearer (x1)..............AK-74M

Total Personnel....................3 O-0/N-1/E-2

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

ATGM Launcher, Milan 3 *...............................1

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M.......................2

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U..............................1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder **.........................1

GPS Receiver, Handheld ....................................1

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie................... 1

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 3

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 1

NOTE: The ATGM team receives its transportation support from one of the light trucks in weapons 

platoon headquarters. This team may be augmented by motorcycles or high-mobility/all terrain 

vehicles depending on the mission.

_______________________________

 * With thermal sight.

 ** With II night sight.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-17
Appendix D

Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGL) Section, Wpns Plt

AGL

SECTION

AGL

TEAM

SECTION

HQ

Section Leader (x1).....AK-74M

Total Personnel................ 10 O-0/N-4/E-6

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................3

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M .......................7

35-mm AGL-Light, W-87 * ...............................3

Binocular Laser Rangefinder *...........................3

GPS Receiver, Handheld ....................................4

Radar, GSR, Manportable, Fara-1...................... 3

Night-Vision Goggles ........................................ 7

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 4

NOTE: The AGL section may be employed as a section or it may be broken up into teams to support 

separate infantry platoons. 

_______________________________

 * With II night sight.

D-18 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Motorized Infantry Company from the TFS Organizational Directories

Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGL) Team, AGL Section

AGL

TEAM

Team Leader/Asst AGL Gunner (N) (x1).............. AK-74M

AGL Gunner (x1)................................................ W-87/PM

Radar Operator/Ammo Bearer (x1)...................... AK-74M

Total Personnel ..................... 3 O-0/N-1/E-2 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM................................................. 1 

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M....................... 2 

35-mm AGL-Light, W-87 * ............................... 1 

Binocular Laser Rangefinder *........................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 1 

Radar, GSR, Manportable, Fara-1 ...................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 2 

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 1 

_______________________________

* With II night sight.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-19
Appendix D

Sniper Section, Wpns Plt

SNIPER

SECTION

Squad Leader/Sr Sniper (N) (x1)............ AK-74M/GP-30

Team Leader/Observer (N) (x1) ............. AK-74M/GP-30

Sniper/Designator (x2).............................SVD or M82A1

Driver (TUV) (x1) ................................................AK-74M

Total Personnel ................... 5 O-0/N-2/E-3

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M .......................3

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD * ............................2

.50-cal Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 *..................2

12.7-mm HMG, NSV */** .................................1

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30......................2

ATDL, RPG-27 *** ...........................................1

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469 **** ............1

Trailer, Utility.....................................................1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder *...........................2

GPS Receiver, Handheld ....................................2

Laser Target Designator ***** ..........................2

Observation Scope, Day/Night * or *****.........2

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie ...................2

Night-Vision Goggles.........................................2

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver)...........................1

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30)................2

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power..................2

Manpack, Low-Power............................1

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power.............1

D-20 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Motorized Infantry Company from the TFS Organizational Directories

NOTES: 

1. The sniper section consists of two sniper teams. The squad leader serves as the team leader of one 

sniper team. Each sniper team consists of a team leader/observer (spotter) and a sniper 

(shooter)/target designator.

2. The sniper carries either a 7.62-mm or .50 BMG sniper rifle depending on the mission. The other 

rifle remains behind with the TUV or headquarters element. 

3. The primary mission of the sniper section is to serve in the conventional sniper-countersniper role. 

Depending on mission requirements however, the sniper team may also serve as a reconnaissance 

element, a laser target designation team (artillery sniper), a stay-behind element, or as part of a 

hunter/killer team.

4. The sniper section may be augmented by motorcycles or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles 

depending on the mission.

_______________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** 12.7-mm HMGs are mounted on the TUVs and the truck. A tripod ground mount is also 

carried. Whoever is not driving operates the HMG.

 *** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon; therefore the BOI may vary.

   ATVs and/or motorcycles may be substituted for TUVs.

** *** With thermal sight.

Note. The following pages show the personnel and equipment for the entire motorized infantry 

battalion, in spreadsheet format.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-21
Appendix D

Motorized Infantry Battalion

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 Battalion Headquarters Motorized Infantry Company X3 * Towed Mortar/Combo Gun Btry Recon Platoon ATGM Platoon AGL Platoon MANPAD Platoon Signal Platoon Transport Platoon Materiel Support Platoon TOTAL

 Officers 7 18 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 37

 NCO 2 129 15 7 10 10 4 5 3 16 201

 Enlisted 14 396 51 35 30 26 26 28 25 67 698

Total Personnel 23 543 71 43 41 37 31 34 29 84 936

9-mm Pistol, PM 3 54 57

5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M 20 393 70 34 34 37 25 34 29 63 739

5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U 63 1 9 7 6 21 107

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM 2 36 9 9 6 1 3 7 7 80

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD 33 33

.50-cal Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 6 6

12.7-mm HMG, NSV 3 24 5 3 7 3 2 47

35-mm AGL-Light, W-87 1 27 1 4 33

40-mm AGL-Heavy, CIS 40 6 6

40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30 4 90 17 16 13 8 8 7 9 172

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 9 9

120-mm Towed Combo Gun, 2B16

 or 120-mm Towed Mortar, MO-120-RT 6 6

ATGM Launcher, HOT-3 3 3

ATGM Launcher, Milan 3 9 9

ATGM Lchr, Manportable-SR, Eryx 9 9

ATGL-Long Range, RPG-29 18 18

ATGL, Panzerfaust 3-T600 1 27 1 29

ATDL, Armbrust 27 27

ATDL, RPG-27 4 12 7 15 10 7 7 3 1 11 77

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series 69 69

MANPADS Launcher, SA-18 6 6

Minefield Breach System-Explosive ZRP-2 9 9

Mine-Scattering System, Manport, PKM 9 3 3 15

Mines (AP&AT) Assort Assort Assort Assort

Ambulance 3 3

ACRV, 1V110 1 1

Medical Aid Station, Van 1 1

Motorcycle **** 9 3 12

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469 6 21 8 7 10 7 7 3 1 3 73

Truck, Command and Staff Vehicle 1 1 2

Truck, Crane 1 1

Truck, Kitchen 2 2

Truck, Light 9 3 1 1 14

Truck, Light (Digital Data) 1 1

Truck, Light (Prime Mover) 6 6

Truck, Light (Wire) 1 1

Truck, Medium 6 20 14 40

Truck, Water (2,000-Liter) 2 2

Truck, Wrecker 3 3

Van, Maintenance 3 3

Van, Signal 1 1

(continued) 

Personnel

Equipment

Motorized Infantry Battalion

NOTES:

 * The values in this column are the total number for three companies.

 ** High-mobility/all-terrain vehicles can be substituted for motorcycles.

D-22 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Motorized Infantry Company from the TFS Organizational Directories

Motorized Infantry Battalion (continued) ________________________________

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 Battalion Headquarters Motorized Infantry Company X3 * Towed Mortar/Combo Gun Btry Recon Platoon ATGM Platoon AGL Platoon MANPAD Platoon Signal Platoon Transport Platoon Materiel Support Platoon TOTAL

Trailer, Cargo, 1-Axle 6 3 2 1 12

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle 6 20 14 40

Trailer, Generator 1 2 3

Trailer, POL (4,200-Liter) 4 4

Trailer, Utility 6 21 8 7 10 7 7 3 3 72

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter) 3 1 2 6

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels & Grenades Assort Assort

Aiming Circle/Goniometer 3 2 5

Automated Fire Control System 4 4

Binocular Laser Rangefinder 5 126 10 17 10 11 7 186

Camera Digital 6 6

Electronic Plotting Board 6 6

GPS Receiver, Handheld 5 159 17 17 16 11 8 10 11 31 285

Laser Rangefinder 3 3

Laser Target Designator 9 5 3 3 20

Observation Scope, Day/Night 6 6

Radar, GSR, Manportable, Fara-1 9 3 9 3 6 30

Radar, GSR, Portable, Credo-1E 3 3

Sensor Sets 3 3

Antenna, Mast HF/UHF/VHF 3 3

Antenna, Satellite 3 3

Telephone Field Cable, 1 km 8 8

Telephone, Landline 15 15

Telephone Set 4 4

Telephone Switchboard 1 1

Thermal Viewer, Handheld, Sophie 4 42 5 16 10 1 7 85

Night-Vision Goggles 183 28 11 18 23 4 1 36 304

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) 7 36 16 16 10 7 7 11 21 33 164

Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30) 4 90 17 16 13 8 8 7 9 172

Night-Vision Sight (Aiming Circle) 3 3

 Handheld, Very-Low-Power 3 144 12 5 5 10 11 1 3 194

 Manpack, Low-Power 18 15 13 9 7 8 17 87

 Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power 10 36 17 7 10 7 7 14 2 14 124

 Warning Receiver 4 3 4 7 1 19

Page 2

Radios:

Motorized Infantry Battalion (continued)

NOTES:

* The values in this column are the total number for three companies.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 D-23
This page intentionally left blank. 
Appendix E

Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from the HTFS 

Organizational Directories

This appendix provides an example of the information for a guerrilla hunter/killer 

company and its subordinates, as found in the Hybrid Threat Force Structure (HTFS) 

organizational directories under the guerrilla battalion. It also includes the 

spreadsheets for the personnel and equipment in the guerrilla hunter/killer company 

and for the guerrilla battalion as a whole. 

Note. For illustrative purposes, this TC contains several examples from the online HTFS

organizational directories. Readers are reminded that even the baseline OPFOR organizations are 

subject to change over time. Therefore, readers should always consult the online directories for 

the latest, most up-to-date versions of organizational data.

GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS

E-1. Guerrilla organizations come in various shapes and sizes. They may be as large as several brigades or 

as small as a platoon and/or independent hunter/killer (H/K) teams. The structure of the organization 

depends on several factors including the physical environment, sociological demographics and 

relationships, economics, and support available from external organizations and countries. In any case, a 

guerrilla organization might be affiliated with forces from other countries or external organizations. 

E-2. The composition of the guerrilla brigade may vary. A basically rural, mountainous, or forested area 

with no major population centers might have a guerrilla brigade with only one or two battalions (or five or 

six companies) with little or no additional combat support or combat service support. A guerrilla brigade 

operating astride a major avenue of approach, or one that contains several major population (urban) or 

industrial centers, might be a full guerrilla brigade with additional combat support or combat service 

support elements.

E-3. Often a brigade-sized guerrilla force may not be appropriatea guerrilla battalion or a taskorganized battalion may be sufficient. A typical task-organized-battalion might have four or five guerrilla 

H/K companies, organic battalion units, and a weapons battery from brigade (with mortar, antitank, and 

rocket launcher platoons) and possibly IEW support.

GUERRILLA HUNTER/KILLER COMPANY EXAMPLE

E-4. The guerrilla H/K company is simply a restructured guerrilla company. Therefore, they both contain 

the same number of personnel and similar numbers of equipment. The guerrilla company fights 

unconventionally with platoons, squads, and fire teams. When organized for combat as a guerrilla H/K 

company, it also fights unconventionally, but with H/K groups, sections, and teams. The task-organized, 

lethal H/K team structure is ideal for dispersed combat such as fighting in built-up areas, especially urban 

combat. Complete battalions and brigades—or any part thereof—can be organized for combat as H/K units.

E-5. A guerrilla battalion may be any combination of guerrilla companies or guerrilla H/K companies. 

When a battalion consists predominantly of guerrilla H/K companies, it may be considered a guerrilla H/K 

battalion. The guerrilla H/K company/battalion is especially effective and lethal in close environments 

(such as urban, forest, or swamp). The structure that makes H/K teams virtually impossible to isolate and 

kill in a dispersed fight also allows them to melt into the population and terrain whenever necessary.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-1 
Appendix E

Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company, Guerrilla Battalion_____________________________

GUERRILLA

HUNTER/KILLER

COMPANY

HQ & CMD

SECTION

COMMAND

TEAM

(Forward)

COMPANY

TRAINS

SNIPER

SECTION

COMPANY

SCOUTS

HUNTER

/KILLER

SECTION

HUNTER

/KILLER

TEAM

HUNTER

/KILLER

GROUP

Total Personnel................. 228 O-6/N-49/E-173

NOTES: 

1. The guerrilla company can be organized for combat into a “guerrilla hunter/killer (H/K) company.” Guerrilla 

company assets are augmented and restructured for combat into task organized lethal H/K teams. The H/K team 

structure is ideal for dispersed combat such as fighting in built-up areas, especially urban combat. Complete 

battalions and brigades can be organized for combat as H/K units. The guerrilla H/K company is broken into 

three H/K groups. Each group has four sections of three infantry H/K teams each. The company contains a total 

of 36 H/K teams—39 H/K teams if the two sniper teams and the company scouts are counted.

2. The guerrilla H/K company has sufficient assets to transport munitions and materiel for the immediate fight. 

The two organic trucks (one light, one medium) provide the company a degree of operational autonomy from 

the battalion. The area of responsibility for guerrilla units may be fairly large. The company is dependent upon 

support from higher (i.e., battalion transport platoon), or external sources to transport materiel, (caches, civilian 

augmentation), for a sustained fight.

3. Vehicles may be a mix of military and civilian. The guerrilla company may be augmented by military or 

civilian vehicles (motorcycles, trucks, cars, bicycles, carts, or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles) or personnel 

depending on the mission. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. The commander 

may requisition or confiscate local civilian transportation assets and materiel. This includes the use of 

noncombatant personnel to serve as porters. The guerrillas may have no vehicles at all and depend on caches, 

porters, or other transportation means.

4. The guerrillas may, or may not, be in uniform. They may wear civilian clothing and be indistinguishable 

from the local population (other than weaponry which they may conceal or discard). Some, or all, may be “parttime” soldiers and melt into the general populace when not assembled to conduct paramilitary operations.

E-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from the HTFS Organizational Directories

Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company, Guerrilla Bn (continued) ________________________ 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM...............................................12

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ........................166

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS ................................21

7.62-mm LMG, RPK........................................18

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * ................................12

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant ................ 9 

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD * ............................ 2 

.50-cal Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 *.................. 2 

12.7-mm HMG, NSV * ...................................... 2 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ...................28

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 or

60-mm Commando Mortar, M70 **...... 3 

82-mm Recoilless Gun, Type 65-1 *.................. 3 

ATGL, RPG-7V ...............................................18

ATDL, RPG-22 *** .........................................28

Demolition Materiel   ......................Assorted

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series **  ....................24

Mines (AP&AT) *****..........................Assorted

Truck, Light........................................................ 1 

Truck, Medium................................................... 1 

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle ........................................ 1 

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter) ............................... 1 

Generator Set, Portable ...................................... 1 

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades............................. Assorted

Aiming Circle/Goniometer................................. 3 

Binocular Laser Rangefinder ........................... 15

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................. 13

Observation Scope, Day/Night *........................ 2 

Antenna, Mast HF/UHF/VHF............................ 1 

Antenna, Satellite ............................................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles...................................... 12

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) .......................... 2 

Radios:

Base Station, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 1 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 6 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ............... 54

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 7 

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power............ 2 

Warning Receiver.................................. 1 

NOTE: The guerrilla hunter/killer company is simply a restructured guerrilla company. Therefore, they both 

contain the same number of personnel and similar numbers of equipment (see footnotes **/*** below).

 ____________________________________________ 

* With II night sight.

 ** The H/K company may have three additional three 60-mm Commando Mortars, M70 (for a total of 

six), distributed to H/K Team Two in Section One for each H/K group. Additional personnel are not 

required.

 *** Although based on personnel and equipment numbers of the guerrilla company, the H/K company has 

additional equipment due to the dispersed nature of H/K team employment. RPG-22 (+7), RPO-A 

(+4).

   Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The 

mix is mission dependent and varies.

Note. See next page for listing of personnel and equipment of the guerrilla hunter/killer 

company in spreadsheet format, broken down by subordinate organizations.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-3 
Appendix E

Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company, Guerrilla Bn (continued) ________________________

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 HQ and Command Section Hunter/Killer Groups (x3) * TOTAL

 Officers 3 3 6

 NCO 7 42 49

 Enlisted 14 159 173

Total Personnel 24 204 228

9-mm Pistol, PM 12 12

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM 22 144 166

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS 21 21

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM 12 12

7.62-mm LMG, RPK 18 18

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant 9 9

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD 2 2

.50-cal Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 2 2

12.7-mm HMG, NSV 2 2

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 7 21 28

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 or

 60-mm Commando Mortar, M70 ** 3 3

82-mm Recoilless Gun, Type 65-1 3 3

ATGL, RPG-7V 18 18

ATDL, RPG-22   4 24 28

Demolitions Materiel ** * Assort Assort Assort

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series **** 3 21 24

Mines (AP&AT) ***** Assort Assort Assort

Truck, Light 1 1

Truck, Medium 1 1

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle 1 1

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter) 1 1

Generator Set, Portable 1 1

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels & Grenades Assort Assort Assort

Aiming Circle/Goniometer 3 3

Antenna, Mast HF/UHF/VHF 1 1

Antenna Satellite 1 1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder 6 9 15

GPS Receiver, Handheld *** 7 6 13

Observation Scope, Day/Night 2 2

Night-Vision Goggles *** 6 6 12

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) 2 2

Radios:

 Base Station, LR Cordless Telephone 1 1

 Handheld, LR Cordless Telephone 3 3 6

 Handheld, Very-Low-Power 9 45 54

 Manpack, Low-Power 4 3 7

 Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power 2 2

 Warning Receiver 1 1

NOTES:

 * The values in this column are the total number for three H/K Groups. 

 ** The H/K Co may have an additional three 60-mm Cmdo Mortars, M70, (for total of 6), 

 distributed to H/K team Tw o in Section One for each H/K Group. Additional personnel

 are not required.

 *** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions

   The H/K Company has additional items of this equipment due to the dispersed

 nature of employment. RPG-22 (+7), RPO-A (+4) 

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, & side-attack (AT & AV) mines

Hunter/Killer Company, Guerrilla Bn

Page 1

Personnel

Equipment

E-4 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from HTFS Organizational Directories

Headquarters and Command Section, Hunter/Killer Company_____________________ 

COMMAND

TEAM

(Forward)

COMPANY

TRAINS

SNIPER

SECTION

COMPANY

SCOUTS

HQ & CMD

SECTION

Total Personnel ...................24 O-3/N-7/E-14

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ..........................22

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD * ............................ 2 

.50-cal Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 *.................. 2 

12.7-mm HMG, NSV * ...................................... 2 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 7 

ATDL, RPG-22 .................................................. 4 

Demolition Materiel **/*** ...................Assorted

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series ** ...................... 3 

Mines (AP&AT) **/****.......................Assorted

Truck, Light........................................................ 1 

Truck, Medium................................................... 1 

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle ........................................ 1 

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter)................................ 1 

Generator Set, Portable....................................... 1 

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades..............................Assorted

Antenna, Mast HF/UHF/VHF............................ 1 

Antenna, Satellite ............................................... 1 

Binocular Laser Rangefinder ............................. 6 

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 7 

Observation Scope, Day/Night *........................ 2 

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 6 

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) .......................... 2 

Radios:

Base Station, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 1 

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 3 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 9 

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 4 

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power............ 2 

Warning Receiver.................................. 1 

NOTE: The headquarters and command section may be augmented by additional military and civilian vehicles, 

trucks, bicycles, carts, tactical utility vehicles (TUVs), motorcycles, or high-mobility/all-terrain vehicles, etc., 

depending on the mission. The headquarters and command section may have no vehicles at all and depend on 

caches, porters, or other transportation and resupply means.

 ____________________________________________ 

* With II night sight.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator.

 *** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

**** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The 

mix is mission dependent and varies.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-5 
Appendix E

Command Team, Hq & Cmd Section, Hunter/Killer Company______________________

COMMAND

TEAM 

(Forward)

Company Commander (O) (x1)...............................AKM

Dep Cdr-Tactics (O) (x1) .........................................AKM

First Sergeant (N) (x1)..................................AKM/BG-15

RTO (x1)..................................................................AKM

Messenger/Runner (x1)................................AKM/BG-15

Medic (x1)................................................................AKM

Total Personnel ................... 6 O-2/N-1/E-3

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................6

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 .....................2

ATDL, RPG-22 * ...............................................1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder..............................2

GPS Receiver, Handheld ....................................2

Night-Vision Goggles.........................................1

Radios:

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 2

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 2

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 1

NOTES: 

1. The command team locates forward with H/K company.

2. The former weapons platoon leader now performs as a “deputy commander for tactics.”

___________________________________________

 * Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary.

E-6 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from HTFS Organizational Directories

Company Trains , Hq & Cmd Section__________________________________________ 

COMPANY

TRAINS

Deputy Commander (O) (x1)..................................... AKM 

Trains Sr Sgt (N) (x1)..................................... AKM/BG-15

Supply Sergeant (N) (x1) ............................... AKM/BG-15

Driver/Sup Spec (x2)................................................. AKM 

Sup Spec (x3) ........................................................... AKM 

Total Personnel ..................... 8 O-1/N-2/E-5 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 8 

12.7-mm HMG, NSV */** ................................. 2 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 2 

ATDL, RPG-22 *** ........................................... 2 

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series *** .................... 2 

Demolition Materiel ***/  ...............Assorted

Mines (AP&AT) ** */*****...................Assorted

Truck, Light........................................................ 1 

Truck, Medium................................................... 1 

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle ........................................ 1 

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter)................................ 1 

Antenna, Mast HF/UHF/VHF ............................ 1 

Antenna, Satellite ............................................... 1 

Binocular Laser Rangefinder ............................. 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 2 

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades............................. Assorted

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) .......................... 2 

Radios:

Base Station, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 1 

Handheld, LR Cordless-Telephone ....... 1 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 3 

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 1 

Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power............ 2 

Warning Receiver.................................. 1 

NOTES: 

1. The deputy commander is in charge of the company trains.

2. Two vehicle-mounted 12.7-mm HMGs assist in the security of the company trains and in an AA role. They

may be brought forward with tripod mounts to assist in the battle.

3. The former weapons platoon sergeant now serves as the trains’ senior sergeant.

4. Some local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. The commander may requisition or

confiscate local civilian transportation assets. Noncombatant personnel or draft animals may be used as 

bearers/porters. May be augmented by military or civilian vehicles (motorcycles, trucks, cars, bicycles, carts, or 

high-mobility/all terrain vehicles) or personnel.

5. Corner-mounted mechanical hoists are used to load and unload the two trucks.

 ____________________________________________ 

* With II night sight.

 ** A 12.7-mm HMG is mounted on both trucks. Whoever is not driving operates the vehicle HMG. A 

tripod mount is also carried for the ground support role.

 *** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator. 

   Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

** *** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The 

mix is mission dependent and varies.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-7 
Appendix E

Sniper Section, Hq & Cmd Section ___________________________________________

SNIPER

TEAM

SNIPER

SECTION

SNIPER

TEAM

Section Leader/Sr Sniper (N) (x1) ................AKM/BG-15

Team Leader/Observer (N) (x1) ...................AKM/BG-15

Sniper/Designator (x2).............................SVD or M82A1

Assistant Sniper (x2) ...............................................AKM

Total Personnel ................... 6 O-0/N-2/E-4

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................4

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD * ............................2

.50-cal Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 *..................2

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 .....................2

Binocular Laser Rangefinder..............................2

GPS Receiver, Handheld ....................................2

Observation Scope, Day/Night *........................ 2

Night-Vision Goggles ........................................ 2

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 2

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 1

NOTES: 

1. The sniper section consists of two sniper teams. The section leader serves as the team leader of one sniper 

team. Each sniper team consists of a team leader/observer (spotter) a sniper (shooter)/ target designator and an 

assistant sniper. The assistant sniper provides additional security, transports equipment, and may serve as a 

sniper/observer backup.

2. The sniper carries either a 7.62-mm or .50-cal sniper rifle depending on the mission. The other rifle is 

carried by the assistant sniper until needed. 

3. The primary mission of the sniper section is to serve in the conventional sniper-countersniper role. 

Depending on mission requirements however the sniper team may also serve as a reconnaissance element, a 

stay-behind element, or as part of a hunter/killer team.

4. The sniper section may be augmented by available military or civilian vehicles (cars, trucks, motorcycles, 

carts, bicycles, or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles) depending on the mission.

___________________________________________

 * With II night sight.

E-8 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from HTFS Organizational Directories

Company Scouts, Hq & Cmd Section _________________________________________ 

COMPANY

SCOUTS

Scout Team Ldr/Sr Scout (N) (x1) .............. AKM/BG-15

Asst Tm Ldr/Scout (N) (x1)...................... AKM/RPG-22

Scout/RTO (x1)...................................................... AKM 

Scout (x1).................................................. AKM/RPO-A 

Total Personnel .................. 4 O-0/N-2/E-2 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 4 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

ATDL, RPG-22 * ............................................... 1 

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series * ........................ 1 

Mines (AP&AT) */**.............................Assorted

Binocular Laser Rangefinder**.......................... 1 

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 1 

Night-Vision Goggles........................................ 3 

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 2 

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 1 

NOTES: 

1. The scout team leader/senior scout is the former recoilless gun section leader. The assistant team leader is

the former machinegun section leader. The RTO/Scout is the former RTO for the weapons platoon, and the 

remaining scout is a former supply specialist with the HQ &Svc Section.

2. Transportation when required will be provided by either the TUVs from the command team or the trucks

from the trains.

 ____________________________________________ 

* Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator.

 ** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines.

 *** With II night sight.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-9 
Appendix E

Hunter/Killer Group, Guer H/K Company_______________________________________

HUNTER/

KILLER

GROUP

H/K

SECTION

FOUR

H/K

SECTION

ONE/TWO/THREE

GROUP

HQ

Total Personnel................... 68 O-1/N-14/E-53

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................4

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ..........................48

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS...................................7

7.62-mm LMG, RPK..........................................6

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * ..................................4

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant.................3

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 .....................7

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 or

60-mm Commando Mortar, M70...........1

82-mm Recoilless Gun, Type 65-1 *..................1

ATGL, RPG-7V .................................................6

ATDL, RPG-22 ** .............................................8

Demolition Materiel *** ........................Assorted

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series **...................... 7

Mines (AP&AT) **/***.........................Assorted

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades.............................Assorted

Aiming Circle/Goniometer................................. 1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder ............................. 3

GPS Receiver, Handheld.................................... 2

Night-Vision Goggles ........................................ 2

Radios:

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 1

Handheld, Very-Low-Power................ 15

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 1

NOTES: 

1. The H/K groups are identical, as are Sections One, Two, and Three of the groups. Section Four is organized 

differently.

2. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. The commander may requisition or 

confiscate local civilian transportation assets. Noncombatant personnel or draft animals may be used as 

bearers/porters. Ammunition and assorted mines are distributed (cross-leveled) amongst members of the group.

3. The guerrilla H/K group may be augmented by military or civilian vehicles (motorcycles, trucks, cars, 

bicycles, carts, or high-mobility/all-terrain vehicles) or personnel depending on the mission.

4. One of the guerrillas is cross-trained as a medic.

___________________________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator. 

 *** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

***** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The 

mix is mission dependent and varies.

E-10 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from HTFS Organizational Directories

Group Headquarters, Guerrilla H/K Company___________________________________ 

GROUP

HQ

Group Leader (O) (x1)............................................. AKM 

Group Sergeant (N) (x1)............................... AKM/BG-15

RTO (x1) ................................................................. AKM 

Total Personnel.................... 3 O-1/N-1/E-1 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 3 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

Binocular Laser Rangefinder.............................. 2 

GPS Receiver, Handheld .................................... 2 

Night-Vision Goggles......................................... 2 

Radios:

Handheld, Long-Range CordlessTelephone .............................................. 1 

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 2 

Manpack, Low-Power ........................... 1 

________________________________________

* With II night sight.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-11
Appendix E

Hunter/Killer Sections One, Two, Three, H/K Group One & Two____________________

H/K

SECTION

ONE, TWO, THREE

H/K

TEAM THREE

H/K

TEAM TWO

H/K

TEAM ONE

Total Personnel................... 16 O-0/N-3/E-13

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................1

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ..........................10

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS...................................2

7.62-mm LMG, RPK..........................................2

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * ..................................1

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant.................1

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 .....................2

ATGL, RPG-7V .................................................2

ATDL, RPG-22 **............................................. 2

Demolition Materiel **/** .....................Assorted

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series **...................... 2

Mines (AP&AT) **/****.......................Assorted

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades.............................Assorted

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 3

NOTES: 

1. H/K Sections One, Two, and Three are identical. The subordinate teams (One, Two, and Three) differ.

2. Some teams may have a 7.62-mm GP MG, PKM in lieu of a 7.62-mm LMG, RPK (mission dependent). 

Equipment may be transferred between H/K sections and teams.

3. Depending on the tactical circumstances, some sections/teams may have additional ammo bearers. 

Noncombatant personnel or draft animals may also be used as bearers/porters.

___________________________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator.

 *** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

**** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The 

mix is mission dependent and varies.

E-12 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from HTFS Organizational Directories

H/K Team One, Sections One, Two, Three______________________________________ 

TEAM

ONE

Section/Team Leader (N) (x1)...................... AKM/BG-15

Light Machinegunner (x1)........................................ RPK

Grenadier (x1) ........................................ RPG-7V/AKMS 

Asst Grenadier (x1) ................................................. AKM 

Sniper/Marksman (x1)...............................Mosin/Nagant

Total Personnel.................... 5 O-0/N-1/E-4 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 2 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS .................................. 1 

7.62-mm LMG, RPK.......................................... 1 

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant ................ 1 

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ..................... 1 

ATGL, RPG-7V ................................................. 1 

Demolition Materiel */**....................... Assorted

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades............................. Assorted

Mines (AP&AT) */*** .......................... Assorted

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 1 

NOTE: The team leader also serves as the section leader.

 ____________________________________________ 

* Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator.

 ** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

 *** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The 

mix is mission dependent and varies.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-13
Appendix E

H/K Team Two, Sections One, Two, Three _____________________________________

TEAM

TWO

Asst Section Ldr/Team Ldr (N) (x1)..............AKM/BG-15

Light Machinegunner (x1)........................................ RPK

Grenadier (x1) ........................................ RPG-7V/AKMS

Asst Grenadier (x1) .................................................AKM

Ammo Bearer (x1) .......................................AKM/RPO-A

Rifleman (x1).............................................AKM/RPG-22

Total Personnel ................... 6 O-0/N-1/E-5

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................4

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS...................................1

7.62-mm LMG, RPK..........................................1

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 .....................1

ATGL, RPG-7V .................................................1

ATDL, RPG-22 * ...............................................1

Demolition Materiel */** .......................Assorted

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series **...................... 1

Mines (AP&AT) **/***.........................Assorted

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades.............................Assorted

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 1

________________________________________

 * Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator.

 ** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

 *** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The 

mix is mission dependent and varies.

E-14 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from HTFS Organizational Directories

H/K Team Three, Sections One, Two, Three ____________________________________

TEAM

THREE

MG Tm Ldr (N)/Asst MG gunner (x1) ......................AKM

Machinegunner (x1) ..........................................PKM/PM

Rifleman (x1).............................................AKM/RPG-22

Rifleman (x1)...............................................AKM/RPO-A

Ammo Bearer (x1)...................................................AKM

Total Personnel....................5 O-0/N-1/E-4

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................1

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................4

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * ..................................1

ATDL, RPG-22 ** .............................................1

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series ** ......................1

Demolition Materiel **/*** ...................Assorted

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades............................. Assorted

Mines (AP&AT) **/**** ...................... Assorted

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 1

________________________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator.

 *** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

**** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The 

mix is mission dependent and varies.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-15
Appendix E

Hunter/Killer Section Four, H/K Group ________________________________________

H/K

SECTION

FOUR

H/K

TEAM THREE

(RCL Gun)

H/K

TEAM TWO

(Mortar)

H/K

TEAM ONE

(MG)

SECTION

HQ

Total Personnel ................. 17 O-0/N-4/E-13

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................1

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ..........................15

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS...................................1

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * ..................................1

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 or

60-mm Commando Mortar, M70...........1

82-mm Recoilless Gun, Type 65-1 *..................1

ATDL, RPG-22 ** .............................................2

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series ** ......................1

Demolition Materiel **/*** ...................Assorted

Mines (AP&AT) **/****.......................Assorted

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades.............................Assorted

Aiming Circle/Goniometer................................. 1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder ............................. 1

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 4

NOTES: 

1. Section Four is constructed using augmentation from the company weapons platoon. It is augmented with 

one (of three) 7.62-mm GP MG, PKMs; one (of three) Type 90, 60-mm mortars; and one (of three) 82-mm 

Type 65-1 recoilless guns from the company weapons platoon.

2. The teams may receive additional transportation support from the headquarters and command section.

3. Ammunition is also distributed amongst members of the company. Some teams may have additional ammo 

bearers. Noncombatant personnel or draft animals may also be used as bearers/porters.

___________________________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator.

 *** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.

**** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The 

mix is mission dependent and varies.

E-16 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from HTFS Organizational Directories

Section Headquarters, Hunter/Killer Section Four _______________________________ 

SECTION

HQ

Section Ldr/MG Section Ldr (x1).............................AKM 

Total Personnel.................... 1 O-0/N-1/E-0 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 1 Radio:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 1 

NOTE: The section leader was formerly the MG section leader for the platoon MG section.

 ____________________________________________ 

* With II night sight.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-17
Appendix E

Team One (Machinegun), Hunter/Killer Section Four_____________________________

TEAM

ONE

(Machinegun)

MG Tm Ldr (N)/Asst MG gunner (x1) ......................AKM

Machinegunner (x1).......................................... PKM/PM

Ammo Bearer (x1) .....................................AKM/RPG-22

Ammo Bearer (x1) .......................................AKM/RPO-A

Total Personnel ................... 4 O-0/N-1/E-3

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

9-mm Pistol, PM.................................................1

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................3

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * ..................................1

ATDL, RPG-22 ** .............................................1

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series ** ......................1

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades.............................Assorted

Mines (AP&AT) **/***.........................Assorted

Radio:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 1

NOTE: This team was formerly in the machinegun section, company weapons platoon. 

___________________________________________

 * With II night sight.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator. 

 *** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines.

E-18 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from HTFS Organizational Directories

Team Two (Mortar), Hunter/Killer Section Four _________________________________ 

TEAM

TWO

(Mortar)

Mortar Team Leader (N) (x1) .................................. AKM 

Mortar Gunner (x1).................................... Type 90/AKM

Asst Gunner/Ammo Bearer (x1).............................. AKM 

Ammo Bearer (x1)..................................... AKM/RPG-22

Total Personnel.................... 4 O-0/N-1/E-3 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 4 

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 or

60-mm Commando Mortar, M70 *........ 1 

ATDL, RPG-22 ** ............................................. 1 

Mines (AP&AT) **/***.........................Assorted

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades............................. Assorted

Aiming Circle/Goniometer................................. 1 

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power ................. 1 

NOTE: This team was formerly in the mortar section of the company weapons platoon.

 ____________________________________________ 

* The H/K company may have three additional three 60-mm Commando Mortars, M70 (for a total of

six), distributed to H/K Team Two in Section One for each H/K group. Additional personnel are not

required.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator. 

 *** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-19
Appendix E

Team Three (RCL Gun), Hunter/Killer Section Four ______________________________ 

TEAM

THREE

(RCL Gun)

Team Leader (N) (x1).............................................. AKM 

RG Gunner (x1).....................................RCL Gun/AKMS

RG Asst Gunner (x1)............................................... AKM 

RG Ammo Bearer (x5)............................................. AKM 

Total Personnel ................... 8 O-0/N-1/E-7 

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM ............................ 7 

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS................................... 1 

82-mm Recoilless Gun, Type 65-1 *.................. 1 

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels,

and Grenades..............................Assorted

Mines (AP&AT) **/***.........................Assorted

Binocular Laser Rangefinder.............................. 1 

Radios:

Handheld, Very-Low-Power.................. 1 

E-20 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from HTFS Organizational Directories

NOTE: This team was formerly in the recoilless gun section, company weapons platoon. 

_______________________________

* With II night sight.

 ** Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon—the BOI may vary. No dedicated operator. It is 

carried by the transport team until needed.

 *** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) 

mines.

Note. The following pages show the personnel and equipment for the entire guerrilla 

hunter/killer battalion, in spreadsheet format.

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-21
Appendix E

Guerrilla Battalion Personnel and Equipment __________________________________ 

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 Battalion Headquarters Guer Hunter/Killer Company (x2) Guerrilla Company (x1) Weapons Company

 Recon Platoon Sapper Platoon Transport Platoon Signal Section Medical Section TOTAL

 Officers 7 12 6 6 1 1 1 1 35

 NCO 2 98 49 34 7 9 3 5 4 211

 Enlisted 11 346 173 102 34 41 23 22 13 765

Total Personnel 20 456 228 142 42 51 27 28 17 1011

9-mm Pistol, PM 3 24 12 39

7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM 14 332 166 128 27 39 24 20 15 765

7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS 42 21 10 6 4 7 90

7.62-mm GP MG, PKM 3 24 15 5 6 4 5 1 1 64

7.62-mm LMG, RPK 3 36 18 4 6 8 3 1 1 80

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant 18 9 3 30

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD 4 2 6

.50-cal Antimateriel Rifle, M82A1 4 2 6

12.7-mm HMG, NSV 4 2 3 9

40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 4 56 28 21 10 9 6 4 3 141

60-mm Mortar, Light, Type 90 or 6 3 9

 60-mm Commando Mortar, M70

73-mm Recoilless Gun, SPG-9/9M 3 3

81-mm W-87, or 82-mm 2B14-1 Mortars 6 6

 or 100-mm Mortar, Type 71

 or 120-mm Mortar, Type 86 (W86)

82-mm Recoilless Gun, Type 65-1 6 3 9

107-mm MRL, Type 63/63-1 or Type 85 3 3

ATGM Launcher, 9P151, AT-13/METIS-M 4 4

ATGL, RPG-7V 1 36 18 3 4 62

ATDL, RPG-22 4 56 21 6 6 4 3 2 102

Bunker Buster 4 4

Demolition Materiel ** Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series 48 20 2 3 4 77

MANPADS Launcher, SA-14 2 2

Mine Detector, Handheld 5 5

Minefield Control Set 6 6

Mine-Scattering System, Manport, PKM 2 2

Mines (AP&AT) *** Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

Motorcycle 3 7 10

Tactical Utility Vehicle, UAZ-469 1 1 1 3

Truck, Light 3 2 1 5 3 4 6 2 26

Truck, Light (Digital Data) 1 1

Truck, Light (Prime Mover) 3 3

Truck, Light (Wire) 1 1

Truck, Medium 2 1 2 10 15

Truck, Signal 1 1

Truck, Van 1 1

Truck, Water (2,000-Liter) 0

Van, Maintenance 0

Van, Signal 0

 ** Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, and other tactical demolitions.

*** Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, booby traps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines.

Guerrilla Battalion, Guerrilla Brigade

Page 1 (continued)

NOTES:

* The values in this column are the total number for two companies.

Personnel

Equipment

E-22 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company from HTFS Organizational Directories

Guerrilla Battalion Personnel and Equipment (continued) ________________________ 

Personnel and Items of Equipment

 Battalion Headquarters Guer Hunter/Killer Company (x2)

 Guerrilla Company (x1) Weapons Company Recon Platoon Sapper Platoon Transport Platoon Signal Section Medical Section TOTAL

Trailer, Cargo, 1-Axle 3 4 3 4 2 2 1 19

Trailer, Cargo, 2-Axle 2 1 2 10 15

Trailer, Generator 1 1 1 3

Trailer, POL (2,000-Liter) 2 2

Trailer, Utility 1 1 1 3

Trailer, Water (1,200-Liter) 2 1 1 4

Trailer, Water (2,000-Liter) 2 2

Smoke Pots, Drums, Barrels & Grenades Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort Assort

Aiming Circle/Goniometer 6 3 9 18

Anti-Veh/Anti-Personnel Wire-Rolls 9 9

Automated Fire Control System 1 1

Binocular Laser Rangefinder 3 30 15 20 11 7 86

Camera Digital 9 2 11

Electrical, Carpentry, & Plumbing Sets Assort Assort

Electronic Plotting Board 2 2

Flexible Stor Tank (POL) (500/1000-Liter) 4 4

Flexible Stor Tank (Water) (500/1000-Liter) 4 4

Generator Set, Portable 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 10

GPS Receiver, Handheld 5 26 13 20 11 7 5 6 1 94

Litters, Medical 10 10

Medical Set, General 1 1

Observation Scope, Day/Night 4 2 3 9 18

Sensor Sets 3 3

Tent, Command Post 2 1 3

Tent, Medical Aid Station 2 2

Water Purification Set 2 2

Wire Cutter, Set 13 13

Antenna, Mast HF/UHF/VHF 4 2 1 2 3 12

Antenna, Satellite 4 2 1 2 3 12

Telephone Field Cable, 1 km 8 8

Telephone, Landline 15 15

Telephone Set 4 4

Telephone Switchboard 1 1

Night-Vision Goggles 5 24 12 14 13 11 5 3 2 89

Night-Vision Goggles (Driver) 4 4 2 5 6 4 5 2 1 33

 Base Station, LR Cordless Telephone 4 2 1 1 3 4 15

 Handheld, LR Cordless Telephone 8 12 6 8 9 2 1 21 67

 Handheld, Very-Low-Power 3 108 54 41 10 13 2 2 233

 Manpack, Low-Power 2 14 7 13 4 9 4 7 2 62

 Vehicle Mount, Medium-Power 8 4 2 9 3 4 3 9 1 43

 Warning Receiver 3 2 1 3 1 1 11

Page 2

Radios:

* The values in this column are the total number for two companies.

Guerrilla Battalion (continued)

NOTES:

Equipment (continued)

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 E-23
This page intentionally left blank. 
Glossary 

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AA antiaircraft

abn

ACE

Airborne

analysis and control element

acq acquisition

ACRV artillery command and reconnaissance vehicle

ACU acquisition and coordination unit (air defense)

ACV armored command vehicle

AD air defense

afl affiliated

AGL automatic grenade launcher

ammo ammunition

amphib amphibious

ant antenna

AOR area of responsibility

AP antipersonnel (mine), armor-piercing (ammunition)

APC armored personnel carrier

AP-I armor-piercing incendiary (ammunition)

API-T armor-piercing incendiary tracer (ammunition)

ART Army tactical task

assort assorted

asst assistant

AT antitank

ATDL antitank disposable launcher (one-shot)

ATGL antitank grenade launcher

ATGM antitank guided missile

atk attack

AUTL Army Unified Task List

AV anti-vehicle (mine)

bde brigade

BDET battalion-size detachment

BMG Browning machinegun (.50 cal)

bn battalion

BOI basis of issue

BTG brigade tactical group

btry battery

CA civil affairs

cal caliber

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 Glossary-1 
Glossary

CCD charged-coupled device (camera)

CDET company-size detachment

Cdr commander

Ch chief

chem chemical

CI counterintelligence

CJCSM Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum

cm centimeter(s)

cmd command

cmdo commando

co company

COA course of action

combo combination

comms communications

coord coordination

CRV combat reconnaissance vehicle

CTID Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate, CTID

DA direct action (cell)

DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

decon decontamination

ded dedicated

demo demolitions

Dep deputy

DF direction finding

div division, divisional

DOD Department of Defense

DS direct support

DTG division tactical group

E enlisted

equip equipment

ERA explosive reactive armor

est estimate(d)

EW early warning (radar), electronic warfare

EW electronic warfare

FCS fire control system

FDC fire direction center

FG field group

FLIR forward-looking infrared (thermal sensor)

FM field manual

FOE future operational environment

FOV field of view

Glossary-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Glossary

Frag-HE fragmentation-high-explosive (ammunition)

FSCC fire support coordination center

FW fixed-wing (aircraft)

GP MG general-purpose machinegun

GPS global positioning system

GS general support

GSR ground surveillance radar

guer guerrilla

H/K hunter/killer

HACV heavy armored combat vehicle

HE high-explosive (ammunition)

HEAT high-explosive antitank (ammunition)

HET heavy equipment transporter

HF high frequency (communications)

HMG heavy machinegun

how howitzer

HQ headquarters

Hqs headquarters

IED improvised explosive device

IEW intelligence and electronic warfare

IFC integrated fires command

IFV infantry fighting vehicle

II image intensification (night sighting system)

in inch(es)

INA information not available

indiv individual

inf infantry

intcpt intercept

intel intelligence

IR infrared

ISC integrated support command

ISG integrated support group

INFOWAR information warfare

JP joint publication

JTF joint task force

kg kilogram(s)

km/h kilometers per hour

LAV light armored vehicle

LBR laser beam rider (guidance)

lchr launcher

ldr leader

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 Glossary-3 
Glossary

LMG light machinegun

LML lightweight multiple launcher

LR long-range

LRF laser rangefinder

lt light

LWV lightweight vehicle

m meter(s)

m/s meters per second

maint maintenance

MANPADS manportable air defense system

manport manportable

mech mechanized

METL mission essential task list

MG machinegun

min minute(s)

mm millimeter(s)

MOD Ministry of Defense

MP multipurpose (ammunition)

MRL multiple rocket launcher

MS Microsoft

MTP mission training plan

mtzd motorized

N noncommissioned officer(s)

NCA National Command Authority

NCO noncommissioned officer

nondiv nondivisional

NVG night-vision goggles

O officer(s)

OB order of battle

obs observer

ODCSINT Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

OE operational environment

OPCON operational control

OPFOR opposing force

OPSEC operations security

OSC operational-strategic command

PDA personal digital assistant

pers personnel

Ph probability of hit

plt platoon

POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants

Glossary-4 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Glossary

psnl personnel

PSO private security organization

PSYWAR psychological warfare

RCL recoilless (gun)

rd round(s)

recon reconnaissance

RF radio frequency

RG recoilless gun

RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition

RG recoilless gun

rkt rocket

SACLOS semiautomatic command-to-line-of-sight (guidance)

SAM surface-to-air missile

SATCOM satellite communications

SCP strategic campaign plan

sec second(s)

sect section

sep separate

sgt sergeant

SHC Supreme High Command

SHORAD short-range air defense

SL shoulder-launched

SLAP saboted light armor penetrator (ammunition)

SOCC support operations coordination center

SP self-propelled

spec specialist

SPF Special-Purpose Forces

spt supporting, support

sqd squad

SR short-range

sr senior

SSM surface-to-surface missile

stor storage

sup supply

svc service

sys system

TA

TC

target acquisition

technical circular

TBP to be published

tech technician

TIC toxic industrial chemical(s)

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 Glossary-5 
Glossary

tm team

TOE table of organization and equipment

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

trans transportation

trk truck

trkd tracked

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

TUV tactical utility vehicle

TV television

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UHF ultra-high frequency (communications)

UJTL Universal Joint Task List

U.S. United States

USMC United States Marine Corps

VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

veh vehicle

VHF very-high frequency (communications)

VIP very imnportant person

w/ with

w/o without

WEG Worldwide Equipment Guide

WMD weapons of mass destruction

wpns weapons

SECTION II – TERMS

complex operational environment

The synergistic combination of variables and actors that create the conditions, circumstances, and 

influences that can affect military operations today and in the near- and mid-term.

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of 

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02, ADRP 1-02)

opposing force

A plausible and flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying 

capabilities of actual worldwide forces used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training or developing 

U.S. forces.

Glossary-6 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
References 

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS 

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.

ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, 2 February 2015.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These sources contain relevant supplemental information. These sources available online on the Army

Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil). 

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site

(www.apd.army.mil). 

ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 4-0, Sustainment, 31 July 2012.

ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

AR 525-21, (C) Army Military Deception (MILDEC) Program (U), 28 October 

ATP 3-09.34, Kill Box Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Planning and

Employment, 16 April 2014.

ATP 3-11.50, Battlefield Obscuration, 15 May 2014.

ATP 3-20.15, Tank Platoon, 13 December 2012.

FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting

Peace Operations, 26 October 2003.

FM 3-18, Special Forces Operations, 28 May 2014.

FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 13 May 2014.

FM 3-60, The Targeting Process, 26 November 2010.

FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense Volume 1, 22 March 2013.

FM 3-90-2, Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks Volume 2, 22 March 2013.

FM 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion, 7 April 2008. 

FM 7-15,The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009

FM 7-100.1. Opposing Force Operations. 27 December 2004.

TC 7-100. Hybrid Threat. 26 November 2010.

TC 7-100.2. Opposing Force Tactics. 9 December 2011

TC 7-100.3. Irregular Opposing Forces. 17 January 2014.

TC 7-101. Exercise Design. 26 November 2010.

TC 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, 28 January 2011.

TC 33-02, (S) Psychological Operations Targeting Handbook (U), 1 August 2008.

DEPARTMENT OFDEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Unless otherwise indicated, DOD publications are available on the Defense Technical Information

Center Web site (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dir.html).

DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), 28 August 2014.

JOINTPUBLICATIONS

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 References-1 
References

Most JPs are available online at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.

Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance, 14 July 2008.

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013.

JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 October 2013.

JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations, 7 October 2014.

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.

JP 3-05, Special Operations, 16 July 2014.

JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 22 November 2013.

JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, 24 October 2014.

JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 October 

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 11 September 2013.

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 31 January 2013.

JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 23 December 2010.

JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, 16 October 2013.

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions are available on the Defense Technical Information

Center Web site (http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/instructions.htm).

CJCSI 3110.05E, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan, 30 September 2011.

CJCSI 3211.01E, (S) Joint Policy for Military Deception (U), 25 October 2010.

Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces. http://uscode.house.gov

OTHER DOCUMENTS

AR 350-2, Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program, 9 April 2004. Army Publishing Directorate Web site

(www.apd.army.mil).

PRESCRIBED FORMS

This section has no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FORMS

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD)

Web site (www.apd.army.mil).

DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

References-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. After a 

page reference, the subsequent use of paragraph reference is indicated by the 

paragraph symbol (¶). For topics with multiple entries, bold type indicates the main 

entry.

A 

affiliated forces, 2-57, 2-58, 2-69, 

2-70, 3-11, 3-16, 3-49, 3-54, 

3-76, 3-104, B-8, B-11, B-80

airborne units, 2-37

Air Defense Forces, 2-9, 2-12

Air Force, 2-9, 2-12, 2-37

Air Defense Forces, 2-9, 2-12

Air Force SPF, 2-12, 2-15, 

3-40, 3-66, 3-69

aviation units, 2-45–2-46

in OSC, 3-30

theater air armies, 2-33

army (operational-level 

command), 2-35, 2-39, 2-41, 

2-82, 3-17, 3-27, 3-39

Army (service component), 2-9, 

2-10

airborne units, 2-37

Army aviation, 2-10, 2-45, 3-38

Army SPF, 2-10, 2-15, 2-37. 

3-40, 3-66, 3-69

army group, 2-35, 2-82, 3-17, 

3-27, 3-39

aviation component of IFC, 3-38, 

3-61

aviation units, 2-45–2-46, 3-59

B 

baseline equipment, 4-1–4-12

base(line) unit for task-organizing, 

3-104, B-14

battalions, 2-42

battalion-size detachment, 2-42, 

3-59, 3-64, 3-65, B-97

unit symbols, 3-95

Battle Command Knowledge 

System, p. v, ¶2-79, 4-5 

BDET. See battalion-size 

detachment.

Border Guard Forces, 2-20–2-21, 

3-50

brigades,

divisional brigades, 2-40

maneuver brigades, 2-40–

2-41, 3-56

separate brigades, 2-40, 

2-87, B-15

brigade tactical group, 2-41, 3-48, 

3-50–3-52, 3-54, 3-55, 3-56–

3-58, 3-63, 3-64, p. A-7 

example, B-1–B-17, B-20–B-75, 

B-94–B112

unit symbols, 3-95

BTG. See brigade tactical group.

C 

CDET. See company-size 

detachment.

OE. See contemporary

operational environment.

combatants,

armed combatants, 2-71–2-72, 

pp. A-6–A-7 

paramilitary forces, 1-13, 2-49–

2-73, pp. A-6–A-7 

Threat forces, 2-1–2-47, 3-12–

3-71

unarmed combatants, 2-73, p. 

A-7 

command and support 

relationships, 3-7–3-11

companies, 2-43

company-size detachment, 2-43, 

3-59, 3-64, p. B-6n, ¶B-97

unit symbols, 3-95

complex operational environment, 

pp. vi–vii

constituent forces, 3-8, 3-33, 3-43, 

3-68, p. B-6n

corps, 2-35, 2-41, 2-82, 3-17, 

3-27, 3-39

countertasks. See opposing force, 

countertasks.

criminal organizations, p. 2-2n, p. 

2-4n, ¶2-49, 2-57, 2-68–2-70, 

3-79–3-82

relation to guerrillas, 2-69, 3-81

relation to insurgent 

movement, 2-69, 3-81

relation to PSOs, 3-83

D 

dedicated forces, 3-9, 3-33, 3-43, 

3-59, 3-68

detachments, 3-54, 3-57, 3-59–

3-60, 3-64, 3-65, p. B-6n

unit symbols, 3-95

displaced persons, 2-76, 3-87–

3-88

divisional units, 2-40, 2-87, pp. 

A-1–A-3 

divisions, 2-39, 2-41, pp. A-1–A-3 

division tactical group, 2-39, 2-41, 

3-21, 3-48–3-52, 3-53–3-55, 

3-63, 3-64

unit symbols, 3-95

DTG. See division tactical group.

E 

equipment lists, 2-93, 2-95–2-98

equipment options, pp. 4-1–4-12

baseline equipment, 4-1–4-2 

emerging technology trends, 

4-28–4-30

equipment data, 4-7 

equipment upgrades, 4-25–

4-27

systems substitution matrices, 

4-22–4-24, B-74, B-89–

B-90, B-110

tier tables, 4-8–4-21, B-73–

B-74, B-89–B-90, B-110

Worldwide Equipment Guide, 

1-14, 4-5–4-30

F 

field group, 2-39, 2-41, 3-18, 3-21, 

3-22–3-24, 3-49, 3-52

fighting force structure, 2-35, 2-38, 

3-17, 3-71

foreign government and 

diplomatic personnel, 2-76, 

3-87

G 

General Staff, 2-5, 2-7, 2-8, 2-14, 

2-19, 2-26, 2-29, 2-30, 3-12, 

3-13. 3-23, 3-25, 3-67–3-69

guerrilla forces, 2-49, 2-51–2-53,

2-57, 2-58–2-65, 3-76–3-77, 

E-1–E-3 

guerrilla battalion, 2-62, p. A-6, 

¶B-8, pp. E-21–E-22

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 Index-1 
Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. After a page reference, the 

subsequent use of paragraph reference is indicated by the paragraph symbol (¶). For topics with 

multiple entries, bold type indicates the main entry.

guerrilla brigade, 2-58, 2-61, 

pp. A-6–A-7, ¶E-2–E-3

guerrilla company, 2-63–2-65

hunter/killer battalion, 2-62, 

2-65

hunter/killer company, 2-62, 

2-63–2-65, E-4–E-20

hunter/killer group, 2-63, 2-64

hunter/killer section, 2-64, p. 

E-12, p. E-16

hunter/killer team, 2-58, 2-63, 

2-64, 2-65, pp. E-13–E-15, 

pp. E-18–E-20

relation to criminal 

organizations, 2-69, 3-81

relation to insurgent 

movement, 2-58, 2-59, B-8

relation to Threat forces, 3-16, 

3-76, 3-104, B-8

trained by SPF, p. 2-4n

H

humanitarian relief organizations, 

2-76, 3-87–3-88

hunter/killer units. See guerrilla 

forces.

I

independent mission detachment, 

3-60

infantry units,

infantry company, D-1, pp. 

D-2–D-20

infantry platoon, pp. D-8–D-11

infantry squad, p. D-10

motorized infantry battalion, 

pp. D-21–D-22

motorized infantry company, 

D-1, pp. D-1–D-20

insurgent forces, 2-49, 2-50–2-57, 

2-58–2-59, 3-73–3-75, 3-76, p. 

A-6, ¶B-10, C-1–C-2

higher insurgent organization, 

2-53, 3-75, p. A-6

local insurgent organization, 

2-54–2-56, 3-73, p. A-6, 

¶B-18, B-76–B-91, pp. C-1–

C-52

relation to criminal 

organizations, 2-57, 2-69, 

3-81

relation to guerrillas, 2-51, 

2-57, 2-58, 2-59, 3-76, B-8

relation to Threat forces, 3-16, 

3-76, 3-104

relation to PSOs, 3-83

trained by SPF, p. 2-4n

integrated fires command,

artillery component, 3-36–3-37

aviation component, 3-38

IFC headquarters, 3-35

IFC in division or DTG, 3-40, 

3-54, 3-61

IFC in OSC, 3-33–3-42

integrated support group, 3-41–

3-42

missile component, 3-39

SPF component, 3-40

integrated support command

ISC headquarters, 3-44

ISC in division or DTG, 3-54, 

3-62

ISC in OSC, 3-43–3-46

ISC task-organizing, 3-45–3-46

integrated support group in IFC, 

3-41–3-42, 3-46

internally displaced persons, 2-76, 

3-87–3-88

internal security forces, 2-9, 2-18–

2-25, 2-35, 2-37, 3-16, 3-71

Civil Defense Directorate, 

2-19, 2-25

General Police Directorate, 

2-19, 2-24

Internal Security Forces SPF, 

2-15, 3-66, 3-69

National Security Forces, 2-20, 

2-22

State Security Directorate, 

2-19, 2-20–2-23

L

local populace, 2-73, 2-76, 3-78, 

3-82, 386–3-88, 3-92, pp. C-11, 

C-14, C-22, C-24, C-26, C-40, 

C-44, C-50, 

C-52, E-2

M

maneuver brigades, 2-40–2-41

media, 2-73, 2-76, 3-87–3-88, pp. 

C-18, C-20, C-31, C-43, C-50

medical personnel 

(noncombatant), 2-73, 2-76, 

3-87, 3-91, pp. C-51–C-52

military district, 2-35, 2-41, 2-82, 

3-17, 3-27

military region, 2-35, 2-39, 2-82, 

3-17, 3-27

militia forces, 2-4, 2-9, 2-26–2-28

Ministry of Defense, 2-5, 2-7, 

3-12, 3-13, 3-49

Ministry of the Interior, 2-9, 2-18, 

2-35, 3-49, 3-71

movement support detachment, 

3-60

N

National Command Authority, 2-5, 

2-6, 2-13, 3-12, 3-28

national-level command structure, 

2-5–2-8

National Security Forces, 2-20, 

2-22

Threat forces. See opposing 

force.

Navy, 2-9, 2-11, 2-37

in OSC, 3-30

naval infantry, 3-30, 3-50

Naval SPF, 2-11, 2-15, 3-40

noncombatants, 2-74–2-76, 3-85–

3-89, p. A-7, ¶B-19

armed noncombatants, 2-75, 

3-89, p. A-7

exploitation by OPFOR, 3-86, 

3-90–3-92

unarmed noncombatants, 

2-76, 3-87–3-88, p. A-7

nondivisional units, 2-47, 2-88, pp. 

A-4–A-5, A-7

nongovernmental organizations. 

See humanitarian relief 

organizations.

nonmilitary actors, 1-13

non-state actors, 2-43–2-76, 

3-72–3-89

guerrilla forces. See main 

entry.

insurgent forces. See main 

entry.

noncombatants. See main 

entry.

other paramilitary forces, 3-78–

3-84

paramilitary organizations. See

main entry.

O

obstacle detachment, 3-60

OE. See operational environment 

or complex operational 

environment.

operational environment, p. vi

contemporary, pp. vi–vii

future, p. vii

operational-strategic command, 

2-39, 2-41, 3-18, 3-21, 3-24, 

3-25–3-46, 3-49, 3-52, 3-63, 

3-67–3-69

unit symbol, 3-94

Index-2 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. After a page reference, the 

subsequent use of paragraph reference is indicated by the paragraph symbol (¶). For topics with 

multiple entries, bold type indicates the main entry.

OPFOR. See opposing force.

opposing force, p. vii, ¶1-1 

base unit, 3-104, B-14

command and support 

relationships, 3-7–3-11

countertasks, p. vi, ¶3-100, 

3-101, 3-102, 3-108, p. B-1, 

¶B-5, B-6, B-9, B-10, B-18

definition, 1-1 

doctrine, 1-12, 3-4–3-11

equipment options, pp. 4-1–

4-12

exploitation of noncombatants, 

3-86, 3-90–3-92

fighting force structure, 2-35, 

2-38, 3-17, 3-71

national-level command 

structure, 2-5–2-8 

order of battle, 1-8, p. 2-14n, 

¶2-81, 3-1, 3-4, 3-96–3-109

role in training, 1-4–1-10

roles and relationships in 

training, pp 1-1–1-3 

strategic framework, 3-12, 

3-14–3-16

task-organizing. See main 

entry.

threat force structure. See

main entry.

Threat forces (operational 

level), 2-34–2-36, 3-17–3-46

Threat forces (strategic level), 

2-1–2-33, 3-12–3-16

Threat forces (tactical level), 

2-37–2-47, 3-47–71

unit symbols, 3-93–3-95

order of battle. See opposing 

force, order of battle.

organizational directories, 2-3, 

2-77–2-104

files for OPFOR units, 2-83–

2-102, 3-107, B-22, B-24–

B-75, B-81, B-91

folders for OPFOR unit files, 

2-103–2-104, 

3-107, B-22–B-23, B-75, B-81, 

B-91, B-96, B-111

footnotes, 2-99–2-100

notes, 2-101–2-102

organizational graphics, 2-89–

2-90, 3-107, B-24–B-45, B-82–

B-83, B-97

paramilitary forces. See main 

entry.

personnel and equipment lists, 

2-91–2-98, 3-107, B-46–

B-72, B-84–B-88, B-98–

B-109

unit name, 2-86–2-88, B-27, 

B-49, B-82

OSC. See operational strategic 

command.

P 

paramilitary forces, 1-13, 2-49–

2-73, 3-73–3-84, pp. A-6–A-7 

criminal organizations. See

main entry.

guerrilla forces. See main 

entry.

in DTG, 3-54

insurgent forces. See main 

entry.

other armed combatants, 

2-71–2-72

other paramilitary forces, 3-78–

3-84

private security organizations. 

See main entry.

personnel totals, 2-91–2-94

peacetime threat force structure. 

See threat force structure.

platoons, 2-44

police. See also General Police 

Directorate.

district police, 2-24

local police, 2-24

National Police forces, 2-24, 

3-50

special police, 2-24

populace (local), 2-73, 2-76, 3-78, 

3-82, 386–3-88, 3-92, pp. C-11, 

C-14, C-22, C-24, C-26, C-40, 

C-44, C-50, C-52, E-2 

private security organizations, 

2-49, 2-66–2-67, 3-83–3-84

relation to insurgent or criminal 

organizations, 3-83

relation to transnational 

corporations, 3-83–3-84

R 

reconnaissance detachment, 3-60

Reconnaissance Intelligence 

Surveillance Target Acquisition 

Command (RISTA), 3-11

Reserve component forces, 2-4, 

2-9, 2-26–2-28, 3-16

S 

security detachment, 3-60

security forces. See National 

Security Forces and private 

security organizations.

separate units, 2-40, 2-87, B-15

service components, 2-4, 2-9–

2-28, 3-18, 3-27, 3-47, 3-66, 

3-69, 3-71

special-purpose forces

Air Force SPF, 2-12, 2-15, 

3-66, 3-69

Army SPF, 2-10, 2-15, 2-37, 

3-59, 3-66, 3-69

equipment, 2-97

example, B-9 

Internal Security Forces SPF, 

2-15, 2-20, 2-23, 

3-66, 3-69

Naval SPF, 2-11, 2-15, 

3-66, 3-69

SPF Command, 2-9, 2-14–

2-17, 2-33, 2-37, 3-40, 

3-66, 3-69

SPF component of OSC IFC, 

3-40

SPF detachment, 3-70

SPF team, 3-70

task-organizing, 3-66–3-70

State, the, 2-2 

State Security Directorate, 2-19, 

2-20–2-23

Border Guard Forces, 2-20–

2-21, 3-50

National Security Forces, 2-20, 

2-22

Internal Security Forces SPF, 

2-20, 2-23

Strategic Forces, 2-9, 2-13, 2-37, 

3-39

strategic framework, 3-12, 3-14–

3-16

subordinate units, 3-7 

supporting relationships, 3-10, 

3-59, 3-68

Supreme High Command, 2-7, 

2-8, 2-9, 2-13, 2-14, 2-19, 

2-30–2-33, 3-12, 3-13, 3-47, 

3-50, 3-52, 3-71

T 

tactical groups, 3-48–3-58. See 

also brigade tactical group and 

division tactical group.

unit symbols, 3-95

task organization, p. 3-1. See also

task-organizing.

example, pp. B-1–B-34

unit symbols, 3-93–3-95

task-organizing, pp. 3-1–3-26

bottom-up, B-92–B-112

internal, 3-63–3-65

4 June 2015 TC 7-100.4 Index-3 
Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. After a page reference, the 

subsequent use of paragraph reference is indicated by the paragraph symbol (¶). For topics with 

multiple entries, bold type indicates the main entry.

theater headquarters, 2-13, 2-14, 

2-15, 2-29–2-33, 3-18, 3-22, 

3-27, 3-47, 3-49, 3-52, 3-67–

3-69

transients, 2-76, 3-87

transnational corporations, 2-76, 

3-83, 3-84, 3-87

threat force structure, pp. 2-1–

2-20, ¶2-3 

HTFS organizational 

directories, 2-3, 2-77–2-104, 

pp. A-1–A-7, ¶B-12

role in wartime, 3-17–3-20, 

3-47

U 

United States

Army tactical tasks, 3-99, 

3-100, 3-102, 3-109, B-3, 

B-5, B-7–B-10, B-74, B-80

mission essential task list, p. vi, 

¶1-8, p. 3-1, ¶3-2, 3-32, 

3-78, 3-85, 3-88, 3-96, 

3-98–3-100, B-80

training requirements, 3-2–3-3, 

3-96, 3-106

urban detachment, 3-60

W 

wartime fighting force structure, 

2-35, 2-38, 3-17, 3-71

Worldwide Equipment Guide, 

1-14, 4-5–4-30

emerging technology trends, 

4-28–4-30

equipment data, 4-7 

equipment upgrades, 4-25–

4-27

systems substitution matrices, 

4-22–4-24

tier tables, 4-8–4-21

Index-4 TC 7-100.4 4 June 2015
By Order of the Secretary of the Army

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 

 1513404

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media 

only (EMO).

TC 7-100.4

4 June 2015
 PIN: 105277-000