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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

In re Estate of JOYCE GAIL BLOHM. 

KATHY BLOHM and PAMELA BLOHM and 

HUNTINGTON BANK, Co-Personal 

Representative, 

 Petitioners-Appellees, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 2, 2014 

v No. 315400 

Oceana Probate Court 

ANGELA L. ERDMAN, Co-Personal 

Representative, 

LC No. 11-000055-DE 

 Respondent-Appellant. 

Before: FITZGERALD, P.J., and SAWYER and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 The trial court granted petitioner’s cross-motion for summary disposition. Respondent 

now appeals and we reverse. 

 In November 2012, the Oceana County probate court entered an order granting 

petitioners’ cross-motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and denying 

respondent’s motion. Decedent had executed three separate wills, all of which dictated that the 

remainder of her estate be divided into three equal shares for her daughters; this includes her 

most recent will executed in May 2006. Before her death, decedent purchased four annuities 

through Huntington Bank, naming respondent as sole beneficiary of all four. When decedent 

named only respondent as a beneficiary, Kelsey Smith, who worked at the bank, asked why she 

wanted respondent to be the sole beneficiary, and decedent responded, “Angela knows what I 

want done with it.” Smith also stated in her deposition that decedent had made comments to her 

about decedent’s daughters’ lack of knowledge on handling money and that decedent was afraid 

they would spend all the money too quickly. Theresa Mouw was a Huntington financial advisor 

who worked with decedent as well and discussed the adverse tax implications of a single 

beneficiary with decedent. 

 At the close of discovery, all parties filed motions for summary disposition pursuant to 

MCR 2.116(C)(10). Respondent argued that decedent’s will was plain and unambiguous, and by 
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its plain terms the will did not consider the annuity benefits as being included in the residue of 

the estate. Therefore, a resort to extrinsic evidence to prove otherwise was unnecessary. 

Petitioners wanted the extrinsic evidence admitted to clarify decedent’s intentions, which were 

that the parties were to share the annuity benefits equally. 

 The court held the decedent intended the annuities to be shared equally between the 

parties. “It is clear to me that [the decedent] intended for her will to provide equally for her 

daughters and that the provisions of Section IV were intended to accomplish that purpose.” The 

trial court thus denied respondent’s motion and granted petitioners’ motions under MCR 

2.116(C)(10). We disagree. 

 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred when it held that a latent ambiguity 

existed in the will and in allowing extrinsic evidence to be used to determine what this ambiguity 

meant. We agree. 

 This Court reviews summary disposition rulings de novo. Walsh v Taylor, 236 Mich App 

618, 621; 689 NW2d 506 (2004). “Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) 

if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 

(2003). The role of the probate court in will cases is to determine and give effect to the intent of 

the testator. In re Bair Estate, 128 Mich App 713, 716; 341 NW2d 188 (1983). 

 Throughout decedent’s life, she established several joint banking accounts with 

respondent, which she stated were “for my convenience only,” and her will directed that these 

accounts be included in the residue of the estate: 

“I hereby acknowledge that during my lifetime I have established certain jointly 

owned money market, checking, and limited liability company bank accounts 

with my daughter, Angela L. Erdman. I state that these joint account 

arrangements were made by me for my convenience only, and it was not intended 

by me that the net balance remaining in each of said accounts at the time of my 

death would be a gift to my said daughter. Instead, I specifically direct my CoPersonal Representatives that the net balance of each account shall be included in 

the residue of my estate hereunder.” 

It is clear that decedent differentiated between bank accounts and her other forms of investments. 

But an annuity is not a bank account; it is a contract which provides payments at a certain 

interest rate. Annuities are a form of insurance product, almost the exact opposite of life 

insurance; they provide financial protection against a very long life by giving a constant stream 

of income. We agree with respondent that, unlike the other bank accounts which were jointly 

owned, the annuities were wholly owned by decedent who named respondent as the sole 

beneficiary, which implies that decedent intended to leave these annuities directly to respondent 

alone. 

 There is no ambiguity in the will. Rather, decedent purchased the annuities after 

executing her last will; as such, the assets that were used to purchase the annuity contracts are no 
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longer part of the estate. These annuities have an assigned beneficiary (respondent) and, as such, 

this money belongs directly and solely to her and are not part of the estate in probate. 

 In light of our conclusion that there was no ambiguity in the will and, therefore, the 

annuities are not part of the estate, we need not address respondent’s remaining issues on appeal. 

 Reversed. Respondent may tax costs. 

/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro