## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate Distric t of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 19

- 00 330

- CV

___________________________

On A ppeal from the 141st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 141

- 307634

- 19
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel and Kerr, JJ. Mem o randum Opinion by Justice Gabriel 

### T ARRANT 

### C OUNTY 

### , T EXAS 

### , Appellant

V



### . J EFFREY 

### D. L E RNER 

### , Appellee2 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Tarrant County, Texas (the County) , cont en ds in th is ac cel erated interlocutory appeal that the specific waiver of immunity from suit for injunctive relief provided in the Cou nty Purchasing A c t (CPA) does not extend to provide sub ject

matter juri sdiction o ver appellee Jeffrey D. Lerner ’ s claim und er the Uni form
Declarat ory Judgm ents Act ( U DJA) based on the County ’ s alleged vi olations of the
CPA

. Because the narrow wa iver of immunity in the CP A applies only to cla ims for injunctive relief and not to UDJA cl aims , the trial court erred by denying the County ’ s plea to the j urisdic tion based on the County ’ s immunity from suit

. I. BACKGROUND Since 1983, the County has had a contractual relationshi p with Dispute
Re solutio n Services of North Texas (DRS) to manage the C ounty ’ s alternative

dispu t e

- resoluti on servi ce s for “ citizen disputes

. ” Al t hough the contrac t was r enewed

annua lly, sometimes retroactively, Tarran t County did not seek competitive bid s for the management contract , valu ed at over $4 00,000 per year

. For t he County ’ s 201 8 fiscal year

— October 1, 2017, to September 30, 2018

— the m anagement contrac t was to expire on September 30 , 201 8

. O n August 1 5 , 2018, appellee Jeffrey Lerner contacted the Cou nty and asked for the opportunity to bid for
th e manage ment con tr act for fiscal year 2019

. The County in formed Lerner on August 31 , 2018, that i t intended to renew the contract with DRS. On December 27 , 2018, the County ’ s c ommi ssione rs c ourt , as p art of its consent agend a, appro ved the3

ma nagement contract w ith DRS for fiscal year 2019

— October 1, 201 8 , to September 30, 20 19

. 1
Four months later, Lerner filed suit against Tarrant County for violating the
CPA b ased on th e County ’ s f ail ure to comply with the CPA ’ s com petit ive

- bidding requirements. See Tex. Loc. Gov ’ t Code Ann. § 262.02 3

. Lerner pleaded for a declarat ion under the U DJA that the fiscal year 2019 management contract bet ween the Coun ty a nd DRS was void based on the C PA violation , for a te mporary an d
pe rmanent injunction barring further performance under the noncompliant

mana gement contract under the CPA , and for attorney ’ s fees under the UDJA

. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § § 37.0 03 (a) , .00 4 , .009 ; Tex. Loc. Gov ’ t Code
An n. § 26 2 .033

. Tar ra nt County filed a pl ea to the jurisd iction, arguing that it had go vernmental immunity from Lerner ’ s claims for declaratory relief and for attorney ’ s fees under the UDJA , which h a d no t been wai ved by either the UDJA or the CPA

. Tarrant Coun t y concede d that its immunity was w a ived for purpo ses of Lerner ’ s requ est for injunctive
relief under the expres s terms of the CPA

. See Tex. Loc. Gov ’ t Code Ann. § 262.033.

1 Th e record su g

gests t hat on June 4, 201 9, the commissione rs court granted permission for the County to take bid s from d isput e

- re so l ution prov iders fo r the fiscal year 2020 management contract
. A t oral argument, counsel for the C ounty represen ted that t he Cou nty has public ly pos ted a request for proposals

. See Tex. Loc. Gov ’ t Code Ann. § 262.0295.4

On Au gust 22, 2019, t he tria l court held a nonevidentiary hearing on Lerner ’ s

t e m por ary

- injunction requ est and Tarrant County ’ s plea to the jurisdiction and orally
denied both

. 2 The tri al cou rt sign ed a nonspecific order to that effect on Septe mber 12 , 2019

— before the expiration of the management contract f or fiscal year 2019

. Tarra n t County app eals the denial of its plea; Lerner does not app eal the
denial of a tem porary injunction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (a) (4) , (8 ).
II. JURISDICTION When a political subdivision of the State is immune from sui t, a cour t l a cks subject

- mat ter jurisdiction

. Tex. Dep ’ t of Transp. v. Jones

, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam)

. Governmental i mmunity will bar UDJA actions agains t the Stat e and it s politica l subdivisions absent a clear legislative waiver. Tex. Dep ’ t of Tr a nsp . v. Sefz

ik , 355 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam)

. Al though the UDJA contains a limited and inapp licable waiver of immunity for ch allenges to the validity of an ordina nce or

statute , see Tex. Civ . Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.006(b) ; Sefzik , 35 5 S.W.3d at 6 21 , the UDJA is “ not a general waiver of sovere ign immunity. ” Tex. Parks & Wildlife

2 The trial court b ased its r u l ing on the fact that on ce the contract expired, Lerner ’ s claims would be moot on September 30, 2019 : “ I ’ ll deny you r motion to dismiss for lack of ju risd iction, because I don ’ t think i t matters anyway. You ’ re never going to try this thing. It ’ s go ing a w a y. So if you want to a ppeal i t, appeal it. ” The record indicates that the trial court denied the temporary injunctio n because Ler ner had f ail e d to show the requisite harm. In our de novo rev iew, these statements are not binding. See Schmitz v. D enton C ty. Cowboy Church , 550 S.W

. 3d 342, 35 2

– 53 (Te x. App.

— Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied) (op. on reh ’ g)

.5

Dep ’ t v. Sawyer Tr. , 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011) ; see also Town of Shady Shore s v. Swanson , No. 18

- 0413, 2019 WL 6794327 , at * 6 (Tex. Dec. 13, 2019)

. Thu s , go vernment al immunity “ will bar an otherwise proper [U] DJA claim that has t he
effect of est ablishing a right to reli e f against the S t ate for which the Legislature has

not waived sov ereign im munity. ” Sawyer Tr. , 354 S.W.3d at 388.
The County argu es th a t t he trial court erred by denying the jurisdictional plea
b eca use it was entitled to im m unity fro m Ler ner ’ s UDJA claim and attendant claim for attorney ’ s fees , 3 which depr iv ed t h e t ri al court of s ubject

- matter jurisdiction over those claims

. We rev

iew t h e trial cou rt ’ s denia l d e novo as a question of law. Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry . Co. v. City of Hous. , 4 87 S. W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016) ; Harris Cty. Hosp. Dist. v. T

om ball Reg ’ l Hosp. , 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (T ex. 2009)

. In this review, we construe the p leadi n gs liber al l y, taking all factual assertions as true a nd looking to
Lerner ’ s intent. See Hec

k man v. Wil

liams on Cty. , 369 S.W.3d 137, 149

– 50 (Tex. 2012).
Lerne r bo re the burden o f alleging facts affirma tively demonstrat ing that the trial
court ha d su bject

- matter j uri sdic tion over his UDJA

- based claims

— facts constit uting
a claim for which the Co unty ’ s gover nmenta l immunity from suit had been waived

. See Zach ry C

onstr. Cor p. v. Port of Hous. Auth. of Harris Cty. , 449 S.W.3d 98, 110 (Tex. 2014); Heckman , 369 S.W.3d a t 1 49

– 50 ; Schmit z , 550 S.W

. 3d at 351

.

3 W e will refer to Lerner ’ s clai m fo r declaratory rel ief and request for a ttorney ’ s fees authorized under the UDJA as the “ UDJA

- based claims. ”6

Ler ner co ntends that the CPA waive s the County ’ s immunity for purposes of his UDJA

- based claims as well as for h is cla im f or injun c tive relief

. It is so lely within the p rovince of the Legislature to con sent t o a su it ag ainst a gover nmental entity

. See
Ben Bo lt

- Palito Blanco Cons ol. ISD v. Tex. Poli tical Prop./Cas. Jt. Se lf

- Ins. Fund , 212 S .W.3d 320, 326 ( Tex. 2006); Tex. Nat. Res. Con servation Comm ’ n v. IT

- Davy , 74 S.W.3 d 849, 854 (Tex. 2002). Such a w aiver is eff ectua ted only thro ugh clear and unambiguou s lan guage. Tex. Gov ’ t Code Ann. § 311.034 ; S wanson , 2019 WL 6794327 , at * 7 ; Tooke v. City of M exia , 197 S.W.3d 325, 328

– 29 (Tex. 2006)

. The immunity waiver contained in the CPA is specific and narr ow ly dr a wn :

“ Any pr operty tax pa ying citi zen of the county may enjoin p erf ormance under a

contrac t mad e by a county in violation of [the CPA]. ” Tex. Lo c. Gov ’ t C ode Ann. § 262.033. Clearly, the Legislature intended to waive immunity for injunctive

- relief

c laims arising fro m CPA violati ons , but that i s the only wa iver in the CPA. The unambiguous lan guage of th is statutory waive r does not include request s for

atto rney ’ s fees or for declarat ory relief. See City of New Br aunfels v. Carowest Land, Ltd. , 549 S. W.3 d 1 63, 171

– 72 (Tex. App.

— A ustin 2017, pet

. denied ) (holdin g specific
i mmunity waiver for in junctive relief in Municipality P urchasing Act did not waive city ’ s immunity f

rom UDJA claims ) , discussed with approv al in Swanson , 2019 WL
6794327 , at * 7

– 8

. Accor d i ngly, we c annot conclud e that the specific waiver in th e CPA applicable

on ly to claims for injunc tive relief also waives immunity as to Lerner ’ s UDJ A

- ba sed7

claims. To do so would be to ignore or impermissibly expand the express and

una mbiguous lan g

uage c h ose n by th e L egi slature in the CPA

. See , e.g. , S wanson , 2019 WL 6794327 , at * 7 ( “ [W]hile the Legislature has expres sly authorized a suit for
declar ator y judgment against the government in other statutes, it has not done so in the Open Meetings Act[ ;] [t ] h us, the Op en Meetings A ct ’ s clear and unambiguous
waiver of imm un ity does not extend to suits for declaratory relief

. ” ); Zachry Constr. , 449 S .W.3d at 1 0 8

– 10 (

holding in case involving Local Government Contract Claims
Act ’ s provision of authorized r ecove r a ble damage s operate s to “ define the scope ” of immunity waiver) ; Carowest Land , 5 49 S.W.3d at 17 2

– 7 3 (concluding language in Municipality Purch asing Act “ s et the boundaries ” of its waiver of immunity as the express relief provided and did not extend waive r to include UDJA relief)

. The cases
and the attorney general op inion cited by Lerner 4 in sup port of his argument that immunity is waived for h is UDJ A

- ba sed claims are not controlling: The cited
authorities w ere decided befo re the s upreme court unequ ivoca l l y repudiat ed th e notion that the UDJA is a general waiver of i mmunity 5 and did not s pecifically
examine whether the CPA waives immunity for de clarat ory relief

. See Swanson , 2019 WL 6794327 , at * 7

– 8

.

4 Labra do v. C

ty. of El Paso , 132 S.W .3d 581, 593 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2004, no pet.); Securtec

, Inc. v. Cty. of Gre

gg , 106 S. W.3d 803, 816 (Tex. Ap p.

— T exarkana 2003, no pet.) ; Tex. Att ’ y Gen Op. No. GA

- 0247 (2004)

.

5 See, e.g. , Sefzik , 355 S.W.3d at 621; S awyer T r. , 3 5 4 S.W.3d at 388; City of El Paso
v. Heinrich , 284 S.W.3d 366, 37 3 n.6 (T ex. 20 09 )

.8

W e conclude that Lerner failed to plead a UDJA c laim o v er which t he tri al

cour t ha d jurisdiction ; thus, the tr ial court erred by denying the County ’ s plea to the jurisdic tion directed to Lerner ’ s U DJA

- ba sed claims arising from alleged CPA
violations

. W e sustain the County ’ s first issue

. III. CONCLUS ION
T h e CPA ’ s li mite d waiver of immunity d oes not e xtend to Lerner ’ s UDJA

based claims. Base d on this conclu sion, we need not address the Co unty ’ s alternative argument in its second issu e that if sovereign immunity d oes not bar Lerner ’ s UDJA

based claims , the r edundant

- r emedi es doctr in e does

. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We
also need not determine whether Lerner ’ s injunctive

- r elief clai m is now moot based on the expiration of the fis cal ye ar 2019 con tract after the tri al court ’ s denial of a temporary injun ction

. Not only is the record insuff ici ent for us to make such a
determination in light of the mootness excep tions asserted by Lerner , but the County
did n ot s eek the dismissal of Lerner ’ s requ est for a permanent injunction in its plea to the jurisd iction

. 6 A c c ordingly, th e injunctiv e

- relie f claim is not at issue in this appeal.
W e reverse th at portion of the t ri al court ’ s S ep tember 1 2, 2019 order denying the County ’ s plea to the jurisdiction and remand to that court for entry of an order granting the p l ea an d for furthe r, consi stent procee dings. See Tex. R. App. P. 43 .2(d), 43.3(a).

6 Again, L erner did not appeal the denial of his request for a tempor ary injunction.9 /s/ Lee Gabriel
Lee Gabriel Justice
Deli vered: Janua ry 9, 2020