Reversed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 11, 2023.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00477-CV

JOE SELVERA AND TINA SELVERA, Appellants 

V.

ESTELLA CHAVARRIA, AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND 

ESTATE OF FLORINDA SELVERA, AN INCAPACITATED PERSON, 

Appellee

On Appeal from the Probate Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. PR-0082112

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, Joe Selvera and Tina Selvera, bring this interlocutory appeal of 

the probate court’s temporary-injunction order that does not contain a trial date for 

the permanent injunction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4). 

The order enjoined the Selveras from selling their real property, “making any 

changes to the home” located on the property, and destroying or removing any 

personal property belonging to Florinda Selvera remaining on the property. We 
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conclude the probate court abused its discretion and declare the order void.

The probate court signed the temporary-injunction order in a guardianship 

proceeding after an evidentiary hearing.

1 On appeal, the Selveras argue that the 

order is voidable because it: (1) does not set a trial date on the permanent 

injunction; (2) destroys, rather than preserves, the status quo; and (3) there is no 

evidence to demonstrate the guardian’s probable right of recovery.

Whether to grant or deny a request for a temporary injunction is within the 

trial court’s discretion, and we will not reverse that order absent a clear abuse of 

discretion. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); Walling

v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993). There is no abuse of discretion as long 

as some evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s order. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d 

at 211. The procedural requirements of Rule 683 are mandatory. Qwest Commc’ns. 

Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam). A 

temporary-injunction order that does not meet these requirements is “subject to 

being declared void and dissolved.” Id.; InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz 

Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). 

Among other things, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 requires every order 

granting a temporary injunction to “[set] the cause for trial on the merits with 

respect to the ultimate relief sought.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 683. Here, the order does not 

set the cause for trial on the merits. While appellee admits the order does not 

address a trial setting, she argues that the probate court set the case for trial on the 

1 On June 9, 2023, the Selveras filed an amended petition for writ of mandamus in this 

court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. The Selveras asked this 

court to compel the probate court to vacate the temporary restraining order that it signed and 

dismiss the injunction proceeding, which was pending at the time. However, we denied the 

petition concluding the Selveras had not established they were entitled to mandamus relief. In re 

Selvera, No. 14-22-00400-CV, 2022 WL 2092817, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 

10, 2022, no pet.).
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merits via a docket-control order. Appellee also argues that the probate court has 

indicated its intention to sign a modified temporary injunction. However, the 

clerk’s record neither contains a modified temporary injunction, nor a 

docket-control order; regardless, the order must be complete on its face to comply 

with Rule 683. See Kaufmann v. Morales, 93 S.W.3d 650, 656–57 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (“including a general date on a docket sheet 

does not meet the requirements or the purpose of Rule 683”).

Because the probate court’s order does not comply with the mandatory 

requirements of Rule 683, we conclude the probate court abused its discretion 

when it signed the order. InterFirst Bank San Felipe, 715 S.W.2d at 641; Helix

Energy Sols. Group, Inc. v. Howard, 452 S.W.3d 40, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Therefore, the temporary injunction order is void and 

dissolved for failure to comply with Rule 683. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 683; see also

Qwest, 24 S.W.3d at 337.

We sustain the Selveras’s sole issue and dissolve the probate court’s order 

granting the temporary injunction.

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/s/ Charles A. Spain

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Zimmerer, Spain, and Poissant.

2 We need not address Selveras’s remaining two arguments supporting this issue. See

Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Because this is an interlocutory appeal of the probate court’s order granting 

temporary injunction, only that order is before this court—not the entire trial-court case. We do 

not remand the case to the trial court because the case is not before us. Chappell Hill Sausage 

Co. v. Durrenberger, No. 14-19-00897-CV, 2021 WL 2656585, at *5 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] June 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).