Defense

underpinned by a multifaceted communications and information system (CIS) that provides the connectivity and networks

to conduct military operations. Related but separate NATO doctrines cover the functions of intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance.

The Prague Summit

The Prague NATO summit decisions were major steps in moving NATO toward C2 capabilities to accomplish the future military

tasks of the alliance. NATO leaders agreed that a new military command structure, while still capable of Article 5 collective defense, is

to be reorganized and optimized for the more immediate mission of

crisis response. A far smaller command structure will be decided

upon by June 2003, one that will also be more mobile, flexible, and

prepared than the current 1997-era structure. NATO leaders also

decided to create by October 2004 a NATO Response Force (NRF) of

“technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and

sustainable force(s) . . . to move quickly to wherever needed, as

decided by the Council.” In addition, NATO intends to accelerate its

investment in common-funded communications and information systems that are essential to an operational, network-centric response

force to be ready within 2 years.

What makes Prague more compelling than earlier post-Cold

War summits at Washington, Madrid, Brussels, and Rome is that it

was preceded by a genuine sense of transatlantic convergence on

two points. First, members agreed on the need for a smaller military

structure designed around minimum military requirements. Second,

the allies foresaw that proximate future threats, such as terrorism,

require the availability of a small but potent force capable of engaging in combat operations on short notice at far greater distances

than before, perhaps well outside of Europe. Harmony on these

points signaled the end of a long migration from exclusive focus on

collective defense to full investment in military capabilities to

respond to threats well beyond NATO borders—a painstaking and

contentious evolution that has taken more than 10 years.

Overview

No military function is more critical to operational success

than effective command and control (C2). There also is no more

daunting military function to get right when it comes to the

employment of complex multinational formations in the fastpaced arena of crisis response. Since the Cold War, the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—unique as an alliance

with a permanent standing C2 structure—has ventured into a

broader spectrum of missions and across a wider geographical

area of operations, posing far greater C2 challenges than the single-mission, fixed-territory defense of the past. Threats to NATO

interests have increased, demanding military structures and

capabilities that can be employed on shorter notice and further

outside NATO territory. At the same time, more sophisticated

information-based battle systems and technologies are driving

the need for increasingly interoperable forces. A key factor for

success in this new environment will be a more agile, flexible, and

responsive NATO C2 architecture for the 21st century.

The NATO summit at Prague in November 2002 was a major

milestone in the evolution of alliance command structure and

future military force posture. Prague decisions outlined a new

arrangement that will take several years and significant investment by both NATO and each member state to put in place.

Although many details must still be worked out, early momentum

toward the Prague goals is strong and encouraging. Those efforts

should not falter at a time of new and proximate threats to NATO

member territory and citizens, or collective interests.

Alliance military commanders direct their organizations

through the architecture of the distinctive NATO political-military process called consultation, command, and control (C3

).

Although C3 is a single NATO process, consultation is focused on

the political process of consensus decisionmaking among allies,

while command and control (C2

) is a military function achieved

through the full array of NATO military command and force

structures, doctrinal command relationships, and technical

standards and interoperability agreements. NATO C2 is also

Transforming NATO Command

and Control for Future Missions

by Charles L. Barry

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

JUNE 2003

Number 28

Horizons

June 2003 Defense Horizons 1
The Prague summit declaration offered refreshing words of commitment to field specific capabilities and renewed determination to

end the long downturn in defense investments. Under an initiative

called the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), NATO members

signed up for specific capabilities improvements, including more than

100 commitments related to C2 and information systems. The United

States is watching anxiously for hard evidence from each of its allies

in the vital areas identified in the PCC. At least at the NATO level, the

two common-funded accounts that support C2—the military headquarters structure and the communications and information systems

that support them—should realize higher priority and new resources

in the budgets just ahead as a result of the PCC.

The post-Prague NATO challenge is to maintain momentum on

the twin goals of producing a new command structure and creating

the NRF by the end of 2004—a short period in terms of achieving

decisions in a consensus-driven alliance. Past initiatives are testimony to the difficulties of consensus decisionmaking on matters

related to military capabilities. The 1997 command structure revision was 5 years in the making and is still not entirely in place even

as NATO has chosen to make sweeping additional changes. The 1994

initiative to create Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) is finally to

be made operational 10 years later. The burden of creating an operational NRF by 2004 falls most directly on old-line European NATO

nations rather than on either the United States, which already has

forces ready to participate, or on newer NATO members, who will

mainly provide niche capabilities and from whom less will be

expected initially.

Command Structure through 2004

The 1990s saw NATO evolve gradually from a one-mission

alliance into a European region emergency response agency. Along the

way, the alliance reduced its Cold War military structure from a completely fixed-site, 4-tiered, 65-headquarter hierarchy to a more manageable 3-tiered, 20-headquarter structure with demonstrated capabilities to deploy C2 headquarters and sizable forces to the Balkans to

conduct stability operations, crisis response, and even combat operations. By 1999, crisis response just beyond NATO borders had become

the primary mission of the integrated military command. In the

interim, military ingenuity had to create many ad hoc C2 solutions to

meet crises in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. The 1997 command

structure also saw a shift in focus from the strategic level of operations

to the regional level. In many respects, what NATO achieved in this

period both met the needs of new missions and represented a substantial shift in thinking for so ponderous an organization.

However, the array of missions—peacekeeping (by the Stabilization Force in Bosnia), peace enforcement (by the Implementation Force in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force in Kosovo), preventative

deployment (Operation Amber Fox in Macedonia), embargo

2 Defense Horizons June 2003

Charles L. Barry is a defense management consultant who specializes in

transatlantic relations, transformation strategies, and information

technologies. He may be contacted via e-mail at cbarryusa@aol.com. The

author is indebted to Colonel Anthony Cucolo, Joint Staff J5, Colonel Jim

Karr, CIS Director, Southlant, Mr. Tom Cooper, NATO C3 Staff, and Dr. Diego

Ruiz-Palmer, NATO International Staff, for their advice and reviews during

preparation of this paper.

Figure 1. Current NATO Command Structure (1999)

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

MILITARY COMMITTEE CUSRPG

SC EUROPE SC ATLANTIC

RC NORTH* RC SOUTH* RC EASTLANT RC WESTLANT RC SOUTHLANT

STRIKFLTLANT* SUBACLANT • CC AIRSOUTH

• CC NAVSOUTH

• JSRC SOUTHWEST

• JSRC SOUTH

• JSRC SOUTHCENTER

• JSRC SOUTHEAST

• CC AIRNORTH

• CC NAVNORTH

• JSRC NORTH

• JSRC NORTHEAST

• JSRC CENTER

 = Three CJTFs, two land-based, 

one sea-based.

Operational 2004.

Legend: CUSRPG = Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group; SC = Strategic Command; RC = Regional Command; 

CC = Component Command; JHQ = Joint Sub-Regional Headquarters; CJTF = Combined Joint Task Force;

STRIKFLTLANT = Striking Fleet Atlantic; SUBACLANT = Submarines Allied Command Atlantic
Figure 2. Future NATO Command Structure

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

MILITARY COMMITTEE

NRF

CJTF HQ CJTF HQ Sea-Based

CJTF HQ

NAVSOUTH

AIRSOUTH

LANDSOUTH

NAVNORTH

AIRNORTH

LANDNORTH

JF COMD NORTH JF COMD SOUTH JF ATLANTIC EDUCATION

ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION

JOINT

WARFARE

CENTRE

FUTURE 

CAPABILITIES

Research & Tech

High Readiness Forces (HRF) and Forces at Lower Readiness (FLR)

trained, equipped, and maintained under national control until 

committed to NATO

Three CJTFs: two land-based, one 

sea-based. NRF deploys under 

CJTF. All operational 2004

Legend: CUSRPG = Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group; ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS = NATO operational command; 

ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION = NATO Transformation Command; NRF = NATO Response Force; CJTF = Combined 

Joint Task Force. HQs/Forces in white boxes are nonpermanent elements of NATO C ; JF COMD = Joint Forces Command

JFCOM STRATEGIC 

CONCEPTS, POLICY 

AND REQUIREMENTS

MULTINATIONAL

Centres of 

Excellence

enforcement (Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic), and actual

combat (Operation Allied Force over Serbia and Kosovo)—their

sudden nature, and the proximity of additional missions even further from NATO territory all threaten to stretch the still-mainlyfixed NATO C2 apparatus beyond its design limits. Furthermore, the

third tier of the current command structure, organized ostensibly to

foster jointness and multinationality at seven joint subregional commands (JSRCs), is failing. Some JSRC headquarters are seriously

understaffed, as nations give higher priority to deployed headquarters in the Balkans and to high readiness forces at home. Moreover,

the JSRCs have little authority over other activities, such as Partnership for Peace requirements. In short, they have few day-to-day

missions of real substance. Low funding and sparse training or exercise opportunities reportedly is causing morale to deteriorate. Due

to these factors and the press to prepare for future missions, many

de facto changes are likely to be in place before the new command

structure is due to be operational in 2004.

NATO and Transformation

Command structure decisions taken at the Prague summit set

a course toward a leaner structure of greater future utility. Two different strategic commands, one operational and one functional, will

dominate the structure. A single Allied Command for Operations

(ACO) based in Europe will provide C2 over all NATO operational

forces and will lead a far more streamlined command structure. The

other strategic command will be the first-ever NATO functional

command, a new Allied Command Transformation (ACT), with the

mission of transforming NATO military capabilities into a much

more interoperable and network-centric force. NATO staffs are to

flesh out the rest of the structure by June 2003 following the criteria contained in the Minimum Military Requirement document

agreed by defense ministers in September 2002. NATO leaders have

not yet officially named the new strategic commands beyond the

general references in the Prague Declaration; however, a number of

important details about each command have been decided.

Allied Command for Operations

The Prague agreement directed that an allied command for

operations would have two subordinate joint force headquarters

(JFHQs), each able to generate a land-based CJTF, and a third joint

headquarters, able to launch a sea-based CJTF. The two JFHQ commands will be supported by three component (multinational but

single service) commands comprised respectively of land, air, and

maritime forces. The peacetime mission of the component commands will be both to strengthen interoperability and to train and

exercise forces and command elements for commitment under

CJTFs and the new NRF. There are also to be fewer combined air

operations centers (CAOCs) than the 11 now maintained within the

air forces of NATO members.

June 2003 Defense Horizons 3
The final details of the future military structure are to be

approved by defense ministers in June 2003, with implementation,

including location decisions and command billet allocations (always

a sensitive matter in NATO), likely by the end of 2004. Figure 2

depicts the two future strategic commands. Allied Command Operations is structured with land, air, and maritime component commands under two JFHQs, plus a separate maritime joint force headquarters. Three CJTFs and one NRF indicate the expected

organizational locations of the most ready response forces. The

future of the longstanding Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group was

not addressed at Prague, so it is shown in its old position, but all elements of the old structure are subject to review as NATO moves

toward a leaner force.

The missions for ACO, which will be NATO’s only operational

strategic command, include collective defense across an expanded

NATO territory (the enduring Article 5 mission), Partnership for

Peace activities, conducting NATO training and exercises with member and partner forces, Balkan operations in Bosnia and Kosovo,

responding to the Prague political commitment to deepen contacts

with Mediterranean Dialogue countries, and support of United

Nations (UN) operations in Afghanistan. Added to this substantial

list of activities will be the Prague mandate to be prepared to

respond to crises well beyond NATO territory, mainly by deploying

and employing NATO CJTFs and NRFs as directed by the North

Atlantic Council. Already, NATO has agreed to support Polish-led

forces in Iraq. The large and diverse ACO mission portfolio suggests

the need for a highly capable command, one that is fully automated,

expertly staffed, and well supported by modern, redundant, and

secure communications. The command will need the agility to

engage in planning, training, and operating across the full spectrum

of NATO engagement, at times simultaneously.

Allied Command Transformation

The strategic command for transformation will be responsible

for maintaining momentum in the transformation of NATO forces

and for deepening interoperability. Its specific tasks are still being

defined. However, based on early staff planning and the similarity of

the ACT transformation missions to those of U.S. Joint Forces Command (the commander of which is likely to be dual hated as the commander of ACT at some point in the future), the command will have

several important doctrine, force, and concept development roles. It

will be setting guidelines, identifying benchmarks, and acting as the

executive agent for NATO military authorities on transformation. It

will be expected to assist in transformation planning by the militaries of allies and partners. The command will be in North America

at the current location of Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), but

it will also have a prominent presence in Europe to help shape transformation alliance-wide. Much of ACT resources and energies will be

directed into experimentation and to working with ACO to achieve

readiness objectives, exercise goals, and training standards.

Four other significant missions can be foreseen for ACT. The

first is to engage in bringing transformational concepts into the

design and execution of partnership activities, especially in the fulfillment of individual membership action plans. A second mission

will be to establish a high-fidelity, rapid feedback alliance center for

transformation lessons learned to identify concepts useful not only

to NATO planners and decisionmakers but to national force and doctrine developers as well. The third area is for Transformation Command to assert influence on funding priorities for NATO testbeds and

laboratories, especially at the testbeds and laboratories of the NATO

Consultation, Command, and Control Agency (NC3A) where future

communications and information technologies are researched.

Finally, ACT will oversee the incorporation of transformational doctrine and concepts into official NATO military materials and school

curricula, the outcome of which will be the education and training of

a new generation of NATO officers for future missions.

ACT may also be asked to provide direct guidance to nations in

terms of enhancing interoperability and network-centric capabilities

through review of nation contributions to the alliance under the NATO

force planning process. As the command most responsible for furthering the effects of interoperability as well as transformation, it would

make sense for ACT to comment on the state of progress toward these

goals in national as well as NATO-funded programs. Such objective

assessments by ACT would help NATO know where to place future

emphasis, and it could also help defense ministers to argue more successfully for resources to meet NATO interoperability and transformational guidelines. Along these lines, ACT might eventually produce

forward-looking NATO transformation and interoperability planning

guidance for use by nations in meeting NATO force goals.

Carving out a substantial, productive ACT role will require solid

backing from NATO political leaders. As a first-ever functional command within the alliance, other national and NATO entities already

address, in varying degrees, the functions that ACT is expected to

gather under its mandate. The most important relationship to work

out is between ACT and ACO with regard to transformation, interoperability, and measuring the degree to which NATO capabilities meet

those goals. A significant signal will be sent if ACT is assigned a key

role in the defense planning process to review national force contributions and to provide a report to NATO political leaders on transformation. Within NATO common-funded procurement, ACT should

have a similar influential role in making interoperability evaluations

of requirements documents, especially CIS hardware and software.

CJTF and NATO Response Force

The CJTF headquarters concept requires a deployable C2 capability embedded within the design of nondeployable regional headquarters. When activated, preselected staffs from the parent command, subordinate commands, and sister commands assemble on a

permanent nucleus staff and constitute a deployable CJTF headquarters. The CJTF headquarters (HQ) can control a force up to a corps

and similarly sized air forces and naval task forces. The forces under

a CJTF are drawn from the readiest national forces of NATO members

and partners. NATO plans call for a land-based CJTF embedded at

each of the two current regional commands of Allied Command

Europe (ACE) and a sea-based CJTF under the Striking Fleet

Atlantic of ACLANT. The same three CJTFs will be in the new command structure; however, all will be under Allied Command Operations (see figure 2). CJTFs are to become the primary NATO means

for future crisis response, yet they are also able to meet Article 5 collective defense requirements. NATO has indicated it may have two

4 Defense Horizons June 2003
CJTFs deployed concurrently, although the traditional six-month

NATO rotation concept would make that a daunting scenario. A variant of the NATO CJTF concept is to provide a CJTF headquarters and

support assets to the European Union (EU) for EU-led operations.

Command and control arrangements for the NRF, at this writing, are still being deliberated by NATO. Several options are under

consideration: deployment under a permanent NATO command,

such as one of the Joint Force HQs; as a separate coalition force

under a headquarters provided by a NATO nation; or under a NATO

CJTF. Most NRF deployments are expected to be under the last scenario, with a CJTF HQ providing command and control. Since a CJTF

HQ is designed to provide C2 for a force three times the size of an

NRF, the NRF can also be characterized as the lead element of a

larger follow-on force under a CJTF HQ, thereby affording NATO the

ready option to expand operations as necessary. Another advantage

of using a CJTF HQ for command and control of the NRF is that its

sizable structure includes a Multinational Joint Logistics Center

(MJLC), which will be essential to sustain the NRF as well as followon forces, since the NRF is likely to deploy with limited supplies.

For the NRF and CJTF concepts to work in tandem, the developing NATO NRF concept will have to harmonize response times and

other factors with existing CJTF criteria (or CJTF yardsticks may be

modified). The response criterion for a CJTF is 60 days, and mission

duration is planned to last up to 2 years. As NATO collaborates on the

NRF design, U.S. advocates are proposing a pool of between 21,000

and 28,000 high-readiness forces from which a combined joint task

force of variable size can be tailored and deployed within 5 to 30 days,

accompanied by 30 days of logistical sustainment. There are numerous ways CJTF and NRF C2 and other readiness criteria can be harmonized, but more guidance is needed for military planners to draft

common deployment plans. One C2 issue will be whether the existing

CJTF design, which is a large headquarters of almost 2,000 personnel

(when logisticians, communicators, security, and support elements

are included), will need to be modified to incorporate a more austere

and agile tactical C2 element that can deploy quickly with an NRF.

Guidance will also be needed with respect to the deployment of two

CJTFs. For example, if an NRF deploys, will a second, on-call NRF be

stood up along with a second (likely sea-based) CJTF?

A related task in standing up the NRF is to identify both the

resources and support elements that a successful NRF employment

will require. For example, with only 30 days of sustainment, an NRF

would need some support forces to be deployable in a time frame to

provide replenishment as on-hand supplies are consumed. In fact,

any NRF mission will require an array of support forces—such as

embarkation support assets, strategic and tactical transport, long

line communications providers, strategic intelligence resources, air

defense, combat search and rescue, medical evacuation, and other

assets—to be in almost as high a state of readiness as the NRF itself.

Both NRF and CJTF will place new demands on the most ready

forces of member nations. The highest readiness forces of nations

are few and are also those called upon for stability operations in the

Balkans, NATO exercises, Partnership for Peace activities, and

(recently) support of UN operations in Afghanistan. These enduring

missions and NRF and CJTF will increase competition for scarce

forces and resources, at least during periods of NATO exercises and

national training.

The vintage 1996 CJTF headquarters concept will require

updating as it is melded to the newer NRF concept. Recent exercises

indicate that when an embedded CJTF is deployed, it decimates the

parent regional headquarter C2 capability until it can be reconstituted by substantial staff replacements. In addition to the impact the

current concept has on its parent headquarter capabilities, the time

lag in standing up the CJTF and the reality that the CJTF staff may

be able to exercise together only once every 2 years must be considered. When activated, having limited experience in working together

will be a significant factor in early staff performance for crisis

response. All these factors suggest that a more permanent arrangement may work better in the long run. NATO may find that merging

the CJTF concept and the parent JFHQs operational concept into a

single standing headquarters along the lines of U.S. combatant commands is the best solution.

An EU Military Role

In December 1999, EU members agreed to have the ability by

June 2003 to deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least 1 year, land

forces up to corps size (60,000) plus comparable air and maritime

forces. The stated purpose of this force is to give the Union a military

capability to respond to international crises by conducting humanitarian, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement operations when the

alliance as a whole is not engaged. The forces that EU NATO members

have committed to the Union in most cases are dual-tasked for similar

NATO operations under the NRF and CJTF. For that reason, the European Union employs NATO standard operating procedures.

The European Union is committed to not duplicate unnecessarily the assets and capabilities that can be made available for its

June 2003 Defense Horizons 5

Table 1: Supported Future Reaction Forces

Reaction Size Response Time Joint Initial Operation Beyond

Force (up to) (days) Duration Strategic C2 Missions Combined Ready Europe

CJTF 60,000 60 2 years NATO or EU humanitarian relief operation Yes 2004 Possible

(HUMRO), peacekeeping 

operation (PKO), crisis 

response

NRF 21,000 5–30 30 days + NATO or coalition crisis response Yes 2004 Yes

ERRF 60,000 60 1 year + EU or NATO HUMRO, PKO, crisis response Yes 2003 No (initial)
operations by NATO. That principle is reflected in the EU Rapid

Reaction Force (ERRF) C2 concept, which is based on commands

provided by nations and is not an in-place C2 structure like NATO.

During contingency planning, EU members indicate two types of

headquarters elements that they would be willing to commit for a

particular plan. One is a non-deploying operations headquarters

(OPS HQ) that would oversee the operation and provide the political-military interface to the EU Council and Military Staff. The other

is the deployable and subordinate Force Headquarters (Force HQ)

responsible to the OPS HQ for mission execution. NATO also has

offered an OPS HQ capability to the European Union, which would be

comprised of the Deputy Allied Commander, Operations (who is

always a European) and designated European members of NATO

staffs. The NATO arrangement would facilitate the provision of other

NATO assets and capabilities, though the OPS HQ would respond to

the EU Council rather than NATO authorities. In March 2003, the

European Union launched its first operation in Macedonia using a

NATO OPS HQ. Many aspects of the NATO–EU arrangement will

have to be fine-tuned, not least of which are the circumstances

under which C2 assets will return to NATO.

NATO and the European Union have declared that the ERRF

and the NRF are complementary, however the two organizations will

have to collaborate on priorities so that conflicts are averted. Most

observers expect that NATO CJTF and NRF will respond to missions

potentially involving combat operations, and that, at least for the

next several years, the EU force will focus on less taxing humanitarian and peacekeeping operations while the Union gets its systems

and processes up and running smoothly. That division of labor should

deconflict requirements for front line forces (even though the EU

Helsinki Force Catalogue includes most of members’ best combat

equipment), but perhaps not for support forces that provide capabilities common to both missions areas. It must be noted that neither

the Helsinki commitment nor the 1992 Petersburg Tasks limit the

European Union to missions of any specific size, region, or mission

category. However, as one EU official noted, the Union has to learn

how to walk first, even if eventually will run too.

Regardless of how missions are assigned, demand will overlap

on limited high-value resources such as C2 elements, communications, transportation, logistics, and funding. Part of the solution may

be for the Union to create more of its own support capabilities, such

as strategic lift and communications, assets that would also benefit

NATO if the allies were to act under the alliance. However, since the

European Union has agreed to act only when NATO is not engaged,

the immediate issue (by 2004) will be to coordinate both NATO and

EU training goals within the time and resource constraints of fewer,

smaller exercises.

NATO Force Structure

Although NATO has a permanent command structure it has few

standing forces in peacetime. Most permanent personnel are

assigned to the command structure already described. The rest are

assigned to a few standing naval forces and in-place planning staffs,

communications elements, or air defense and air surveillance units.

The bulk of NATO forces are committed on a mission-by-mission

basis by member nations, usually as preplanned under the NATO

biennial force planning process. The forces provided by nations comprise the extension of NATO command and control down through the

tactical level, primarily though single-service headquarters commanding organic troops, flights and ships.

An agreed NATO Force Structure document (called MC 317/1)

lets nations know what NATO expects from their force contributions

in terms of readiness, unit size, deployability, rotation durations, and

sustainment, as well as command and control. This guidance helps

nations determine the number and readiness requirements for tactical C2 headquarters for land, air, maritime, and certain specialized

forces. Current NATO guidance calls for nations to designate certain

deployable land and maritime headquarters as High Readiness Force

(HRF) headquarters, and other C2 elements as Forces of Lower

Readiness (FLR). HRF headquarters constitute the NATO crisis

response C2 under the NRF and CJTF concepts. At present NATO has

access to only one deployable air headquarters, a Combined Air

Operations Center (CAOC) from the United States, however more

are planned.

Promulgating NATO standards for C2 readiness and interoperability is as important for nations as it is for the alliance. Nations use

the NATO force structure guidance as input in prioritizing their

forces for resource planning. The NATO force structure document

establishes criteria for both national and multinational forces.

6 Defense Horizons June 2003

Table 2: NATO Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Environment

Manager NATO Command, Control, and Communications Agency (NC3A)

Operator NATO Communications and Information Systems Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA)

Standards (approved December 2000) NATO Command, Control, and Communications Technical Architecture (NC3TA)

Major Features ■ includes several major systems upgrades

■ contains COTS-based hardware and software

■ addresses need for mobility

■ integrates networks (for example, LAN and WAN) but still hierarchial and not network technologies

Conclusions NATO moving on the correct path and needs to stay the course

NATO members must invest in NATO standards, procurement of upgradeable technologies, and interoperability
Communications and Information Systems

Military command and control, along with all political and

military business of the alliance, is supported by a NATO-wide

architecture of communications and information systems (CIS)—

better known outside NATO as command, control, communications,

and computers (C4). NATO CIS support for command and control

is comprised of systems’ hardware and software, as well as the policies and architecture that define how CIS connects and supports

NATO land, air, and maritime forces.

CIS connectivity must reach across the whole of NATO territory

and wherever forces are deployed (for example, at sea or in the

Balkans) and must also tie NATO headquarters in Brussels to all

member capitals and link appropriate headquarters of the integrated

military structure to national military commands. The system incorporates voice, data, messaging, and video teleconferencing in both

secure and clear channel modes. Information and communications

traffic is passed via terrestrial lines, surface-based wireless networks,

and satellites. NATO CIS has kept pace with the rapid evolution in

information age conduits, including use of local area networks

(LANs), wide area networks, intranets, and the Internet itself, in

addition to digital radio and optical cable means to transmit voice,

data, and video information. A significant portion of NATO CIS is

deployed on commercial equipment.

CIS is a defense support function overseen since 1996 by the

NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Organization (NC3O).

That reorganization of the alliance CIS function was undertaken to

posture NATO for the growing application of information systems to

C2, in particular for mobile network development. The NC3O develops

the technical architecture, standards and protocols, and overall system design from the military tactical level to the political strategic

level. The NATO CIS general purpose environment is characterized as

having two interoperable domains, a NATO-wide network domain that

June 2003 Defense Horizons 7

Table 3: Major Communications and Information Systems Supporting Military Command and Control

Allied Command Europe One of two strategic military C2 systems. Provides automated C2 support for commanders throughout ACE using

(ACE) Automated Command common hardware and software. Services include collaborative software tools, Web services, and Microsoft Office/

and Control Information Windows 2000. Decision support software allows assessment and exchange of a combined air, land, and maritime

Systems (ACCIS) NATO-wide operational picture. Baseline fielding is due for completion in 2004.

Maritime Command and Second strategic C2 system. Has been operational at more than 60 sites for some time due to a much earlier 

Control Information System initiative by ACLANT and the U.S. Space and Warfare Command. COTS-based open architecture system operating

(MCCIS) over all command levels with proven interoperability. Chosen as the platform for initial NATO Common Operational

Picture.

NATO General-Purpose Future backbone architecture. Will tie all military C2 elements together. Deployment began in 2002 in three comCommunications System mercial components, including data, voice, and real-time semipermanent bandwidth on-demand. Communicates

(NGCS) via telephone, message, wireless, and satellite links; can be both secure and nonsecure, using military and commercial leased systems.

NATO Integrated Communications Initial Voice Switched Network (IVSN) is the present telephone network for only about 12,000 subscribers. Will be

System (NCS)—Comprised of four transitioning to a NATO-wide future system of switched digital networks for voice, data, and video transmissions 

main subsystems in the near future as a part of NGCS.

NATO Message System (NMS) is replacing the Telegraph Automatic Relay Equipment (TARE) over the next 2 years.

State-of-the-art email and secure message system that incorporates a client-server COTS-based military message

handling system able to run on either a Windows or Unix.

Terrestrial Transmission System is an operational-level network (approximately two-thirds NATO-owned and onethird civil-authority-owned) of tropospheric scatter and microwave links extending from northern Norway through

central Europe to eastern Turkey.

NATO IV Satellites (IVA [1991] and IVB [1993]) are the latest deployed NATO satellites and make up the satellite

communications “leg” of NICS. Each has a 10-year planned life cycle. SATCOM post-2000, the next generation

NATO satellite, is scheduled to replace IVA and IVB by 2004 for global wideband video, voice, and data links.

Joint Tactical Information Distribution Link 16 is updated late 1970s technology brought to full production in 1997. Currently fielded on NATO airborne 

System (JTID—also called Link 16) warning and control systems and among a few NATO member forces (United States, United Kingdom, France) on

tactical aircraft, ships, and land forces. Acts as jam-resistant, spread-spectrum, secure communicatin identification

and navigation system for automatic data and voice links among land, air, and maritime forces in real time. Each

terminal receives the overall tactical situation automatically in real-time updates. A newer, smaller version of

JTIDS, the NATO Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), was fielded for installation in smaller

fighters (such as the F–16). Thousands of additional units are programmed for installation by NATO allies, significant boosting alliance network-centric warfare capabilities. Considered a key future network-centric system.

Crisis Response Operations in NATO Windows NT Information System initially developed for Implementation Force in Bosnia. Still used with over 1,000

Open Systems (CRONOS) mailboxes and several thousand workstations. Secure connectivity up to NATO Secret between CRONOS and

several national and coalition systems

NATO Air Command and Control Facilitates planning, tasking, execution, and ssurveillance of all air operations over NATO member territory.

System (ACCS) Additional ACCS capabilities available to support a CJTF out of area. Based on open system architecture and

emphasizes COTS components. First level of operational capability (ACCS LOC1) to be completed by 2005.
links fixed and mobile users into a set of common systems, and a

users domain made up of LANs, tactical wireless communications,

leased lines, and similar systems. This bi-fold environment provides

communications and information connectivity in peacetime, crisis,

and conventional war. A separate special purpose segment is reserved

for a nuclear operational environment.

Since its establishment, NC3O has pushed CIS toward greater

mobility and interoperability, and toward the use of commercial

off-the-shelf (COTS) products and systems. It does this through its

authority to invest in user-oriented laboratory test bedding and

field prototyping, techniques that involve operational users in

assessing technologies that might improve NATO operational capabilities. NC3O uses evolutionary acquisition procedures to assess

and field new systems and equipment that can be clearly specified,

competitively procured, and implemented with low risk. One such

program was the sourcing of COTS information technologies to

equip NATO peace-support operations in the Balkans rapidly with

essential CIS support systems.

NATO CIS serves two broad, overlapping spheres: political consultation and military C2

. At the strategic political-military level, the

NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS) is the primary

backbone for connectivity from the strategic military commands to

NATO headquarters staffs and to alliance member capitals for collective decisionmaking, including nuclear matters. The military side

of CIS provides connectivity from the strategic military commands to

lower-level commands, down to fixed sites and deployed units (such

as CJTFs), providing for alliance-wide operational C2, albeit still

through a hierarchical rather than a peer-to-peer architecture.

Along with political consensus on future missions and a new

command structure, NATO has also agreed to a new technical architecture (see section below on setting CIS standards) to provide the

standards for CIS that will push investment toward transformational

networks and systems. Together, these initiatives fulfill a strategy for

complete C2 redesign. When they are substantially in place, NATO

forces will be poised to respond to crises well beyond NATO territory

and to perform a wide range of military tasks, from peace operations

to combat operations. Attention now shifts to the commitment of

national and NATO funds for expeditious fielding of new and

upgraded CIS capabilities. Some of the most critical systems and

their status are described in table 3.

New missions and technologies have forced new concepts and

architectures on the NATO CIS managers at every level. The most central shift is toward what NATO calls “network-enabled capabilities”

embedded in far more capable and further dispersed forces. The goal

is to link commands and forces in a peer-to-peer network, not just at

the top of hierarchical structures. There would be universal access to

a common operational picture for all elements—a ship, aircraft,

ground unit, or a headquarters at any echelon or component. The

added value of networks is substantial, affording alliance commanders

faster, more complete battlespace information and force synchronization. That reality lies at the core of the future NATO CIS concept. The

potential of network-enabled capabilities has been validated during

NATO operations in the Balkans and has set the azimuth for the NATO

CIS investments.

For network enabled capabilities to move from the drawing

board to operational use in complex joint and combined scenarios,

NATO must meld complex technological standards, alliance CIS doctrine, and operational employment concepts. More than seven years

of research, experimentation and ad hoc operational solutions have

to coalesce into flexible, open-ended operational concepts that identity specific investment goals. The new NATO C3 Technical Architecture also must be put into place. The next major step is for NATO

members and partners to prioritize with some urgency the operational CIS needs of the alliance. Then the hardest part will come,

committing steady, substantial investments to CIS; enough resources

to field “reach down, reach across” network connectivity that truly

operationalize recent agreements and standards. Only more investment can push expansion of the network. Finally, as a system materializes, vigorous attention to lessons learned will identity the gaps

and limits of network centric command and control, and effective

new capabilities will emerge. Already, experience shows NATO will

have to grapple with some of the risks of networking, such as information overload and the tendencies toward centralization of decisionmaking and loss of individual initiative at the tactical level.

C2 Relationships and Procedures

A comprehensive analysis of military command and control

must include a discussion of command relationships. NATO has a

well-established menu of carefully defined command relationships

(see table 4) that provides both military and political flexibility and

triggers clear lines of responsibility between commands as well as

between the alliance and its member forces. NATO used unique command relationships to overcome early Russian sensitivities to providing its national forces for peace operations under NATO in the

Balkans. Command relationships identify the specific authorities

that higher commanders are given over subordinate units, such as

8 Defense Horizons June 2003

Table 4: NATO Commander Relationships: Cold War to Present

Operational Command Assigns missions, deploys units, reassigns forces, and retains or delegates operational or tactical control

Operational Control Directs forces to accomplish specific, limited missions (including deployment) and delegates tactical control of

units but not of their components

Tactical Command Assigns tasks to forces under command to accomplish missions assigned by higher authority

Tactical Control Controls local movement or maneuver of subunits to accomplish specific missions assigned by higher authority

Coordinating Authority Coordinates actions of units of two or more countries, services, or forces. Can require consultations but cannot

compel agreement
whether they are responsible for positioning subordinate forces and

whether they are authorized to subdivide assigned units.

The sometimes confusing domain of longstanding NATO C2 relationships, responsibilities, and procedures is usually given too little

attention in designing future networked C2 systems and flexible

structures. After all, the agreed command relationships will determine how new command structures and communication systems will

be employed in future missions. Command relationships compose

the essential fine print that allowed General Michael Jackson,

British commander of forces in Kosovo, to refuse the order of General Wesley Clark, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to

deploy to Pristina airport ahead of advancing Russian forces in 1999.

The present NATO menu of command relationships dates back

to the early 1980s, and the definitions may be more suited for lawyers

than commanders in battle (see table 4). Moreover, they were agreed

principally to protect national prerogatives over how and for what

purposes forces handed over to NATO would be employed in strict

pursuit of a narrow alliance purpose—for example, collective

defense of allied territory.

What is clear from these definitions is that they were suited for

a formal, vertical command structure engaged in the single, welldefined mission. However, NATO may be outgrowing these stiff

arrangements as the allies employ multinational formations in Bosnia

well below the division level. Lingering emphasis on national prerogatives, many of which nations are ill equipped to execute—such as

logistics support—creates a situation in which field commanders act

more as coordinators than commanders. The more NATO adopts network-warfare concepts and rapid response roles, the less appropriate

the current menu of command arrangements becomes.

Another concern arises out of more diverse NATO missions and

command arrangements. Rapid response impacts the timing of force

turnover from national to NATO control, as well as from one command

to another. When a commander actually takes command determines

whether he is really directing or only coordinating such essential premission functions as operational training, deployment readiness, and

logistics planning. Sensitive command relationships and national versus multinational responsibilities are genuine issues, yet, without

streamlining, they will encumber rapid action and could endanger

both mission and forces. The need to address outdated modalities and

to agree to arrangements more suited for new NATO missions of timecritical deployments and crisis response has already been demonstrated. In essence, the allies need to push down controls and accept

more decentralized operational and tactical decisionmaking.

Interoperability

Interoperability goals are as old as the alliance, but they have

never been more important or more arduously pursued. As national

forces transform and improve their readiness, it will be even more

essential that NATO standards related to interoperability of command networks and communications systems become a priority

design specification for every affected national system. In the past,

NATO interoperability features included in U.S. and allied equipment designs were easy prey when faced with trimming systems to

meet budget constraints. In a future networked force, interoperability of forces and headquarters at every echelon becomes even

more critical. American systems now include interoperability as a

key performance parameter; however, interoperability is defined as

within U.S. forces, not NATO interoperability. The United States and

its allies have more work to do before national and NATO standards

are sufficiently harmonized.

Command and control is the most crucial medium for interoperability. As NATO shifts toward network-centric operations, demanding closer cooperation among more dispersed forces, the importance

of interoperable C2 grows exponentially. Forces that expect to operate

together must at least be able to communicate with each other via

both voice and data formats, even though they are not yet equipped

with other systems that are at or close to the leading edge of technology. NATO has a new command structure, standards, and equipment in the pipeline for its international headquarters that will satisfy these requirements. What hampers NATO is the lack of national

investment of member states in the costly proposition of conversion

to NATO architectures and standardized equipment. European NATO

members are reluctant to invest in national systems that are NATO

compatible in addition to being compatible with non-NATO national

systems. Every additional interface represents increased cost. The

United States is also guilty of assigning NATO interoperability a lower

priority in equipment design and technology transfer decisions. As a

result, present NATO interoperability languishes at a modest level of

manual connectivity and mainly procedural interfaces. In the NATO

hierarchy of interoperable force capabilities, this means most of

NATO interoperates at Levels 1 or 2 (see figure 3).

The NATO military structure has always sought (and in some

measure achieved) interoperability by linking C2 structures at the

top. It is now pursuing the means to work more closely and effectively together down through organizations, where sensors and

shooters, logisticians and intelligence specialists, operate together.

The future promises still greater demand for interoperable networked command and control. In addition to the great complexity of

incompatible national C2 systems already in place and the significant

cost associated with adopting NATO standards, interfacing, and

direct links, the chief obstacle is also that nations have not given sufficient priority to proliferating NATO-compatible gear across

national systems and nodes that increasingly need secure, highspeed, broadband voice/data communications with allied counterpart systems and nodes as well as with NATO.

Fortunately, the goal of networking allied military forces fits

into the natural, continuous modernization of both NATO and

national C2 systems. Equipment is becoming obsolete at a faster

pace, and the programming of replacements is almost continuous for

many defense budgets. Through targeted and protected investment,

backed by both political and military determination, much of NATO

can move from Level 2 to Level 3 interoperability and genuine networking, at least through interface protocols.

The NATO interoperability vision should be a robust, flexible

structure sharing high volumes of information almost instantaneously

among many nodes that are more technologically sophisticated, and

doing so effectively even under the stress of long-range, short-notice

operations characterized by rapidly changing command and force

geometries. The rigid C2 hierarchy of years past must transform to be

June 2003 Defense Horizons 9
characterized by greater flexibility and more direct, lateral connectivity. The core function of command and control—the art and science of

conducting military operations over joint, multinational forces—will

remain fundamentally the same, executed through a familiar hierarchical structure. However, the information flows for C2 will become a

networked system that requires new C2 doctrine—new ways to take

advantage of opportunities for action. The information structures

required for success under the new doctrine will bear little resemblance to those of the past. To realize the potential of these information-based concepts, it will be essential that interoperable connectivity

be much faster and more reliable than in the past.

Setting CIS Standards: NC3TA

In December 2000, the alliance approved the NATO Command,

Control, and Communications Technical Architecture (NC3TA). The

new technical architecture is an open system, COTS-focused design

aimed at achieving near-term interoperability requirements. For

example, NC3O worked with manufacturers to promulgate NATO

Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4591 on Narrow Band Voice

Coders (i.e., commercial cellular telephones that incorporate NATOstandard encryption technology). Providing industry with information such as STANAG 4591 speeds CIS interoperability by defining a

user market and encouraging manufacturers to provide the latest

technology at competitive prices.

Technical standards play a crucial if inconspicuous role as systems are modernized or transformed. Without adherence to standards, ever more complex arrays of information systems will mean

more is worse rather than better. NATO has more than 1,700 standards in nearly 1,000 agreements across all domains and has close to

300 more under development, many addressing information architectures. NC3TA identifies the services, building blocks, interfaces, standards, profiles, and related products, and it provides the technical

guidelines for implementation of NATO C3 systems. These represent

the minimum rules governing the specification, interaction, and

interdependence of the parts of the NATO C3 system, the purpose of

which is to create interoperability.

The new NATO architecture focuses on supporting standardization of information services at the boundaries between NATO

Common Funded (NCF) systems and national systems. These service boundary standards can be used with partners and by members

for nation-to-nation interoperability, as well as among and with NCF

systems. One example cited is that NATO might specify the use of

the joint photographic experts group file format to transmit graphics between systems, but nations may use other formats (such as

bitmap) as an internal preference.

In November 2001, NATO published its plan for selection of

technical services and standards that must be available at the

boundaries (interface) between systems. For example, NATO mandates that Web services be exchangeable using hypertext transfer

protocol, but it does not tell nations or staffs that they must use the

Windows 2000 operating system. By elaborating on a minimum set of

boundary services, NATO reduces the expense (and often eliminates

10 Defense Horizons June 2003

Figure 3. Communications and Information Systems Interoperability Snapshot

Interoperability is the ability of alliance forces and, when appropriate, forces of partners and other nations to train, exercise, and

operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.

The four levels of CIS interoperability are

Level 4:

seamless sharing of information—integrated data transfer applications

Level 3:

seamless sharing of data—common data exchange model

Level 2:

structured data exchange—manual and automated read

Level 1:

unstructured data exchange—manual read only

Most NATO CIS elements interoperate at Level 1 or 2 (for example, secure email, and automated secure message traffic).

Level 4 requires full access across national systems—unlikely due to member prerogatives to maintain some information behind

national firewalls.

The realistic goal should be Level 3—national systems with common data exchange architectures or surrogate interface applications can share appropriate data but are not intrusive.
time-consuming debates) of meeting NATO standards within a system focused on interface standards and not complete system standardization. The boundary architecture is based on the concept of a

federation of fixed and mobile systems and networks that together

comprise a NATO intranet. The system has the Internet standards

and Internet protocols at its core, including the four-layer Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol stack that many commercial

applications (for example, e-mail) use. As the use of Internet standards and accepted protocol stacks testifies, NATO is committed to

the adoption of commercial standards wherever possible. Although

off-the-shelf may be militarized by virtue of fitting it in reinforced

housing or adding military-specific accessories, COTS equipment

itself remains unmodified as much as possible when incorporated

into the NATO CIS inventory.

The NATO consensus decisionmaking processes can be too

tedious for reaching timely agreements on CIS standards, particularly

for information systems. Dramatically shortened life cycles for new

products have become the rule, not the exception. Some standards

arrive well after NC3O is near acceptance of the next system. To deal

with this reality, NATO seeks military-specific CIS standards only

when a significant benefit can be derived and where a desired level of

interoperability can be achieved. NATO looks for evidence of a nearterm standardization benefit and sufficient scale of application.

Wherever possible, existing systems standards or open standards

(that is, COTS standards) are the default.

However, standards remain difficult to put in place, and, even

when agreed, interoperability often proves elusive. Standards can be

ignored or adoption delayed due to prohibitive cost of transition.

Therefore, the NATO goal of developing, implementing, and sustaining

a fully interoperable information system will demand priority

resources by both NATO and national budgets. Agencies such as NC3O

have to keep working for better solutions. Software programmable

radios, as one example of a potential technical solution, are exciting

but still expensive and untested. However, such systems offer hope

and point the way to ultimate success in the goal of interoperable

NATO forces and transformational command and control in the future.

Conclusion

NATO has been adapting its C2 structures, CIS, and related policies steadily since the end of the Cold War and can take satisfaction

in agreements on a leaner command structure, more ready forces,

selective investment in state-of-the-art communications and information systems, and new standards that make genuine interoperability more likely in the future. However, decisions at and since the

Prague summit signal that it is now time to bring the new networked

C2 concept on line. That means more funding and tough choices.

Nations will have to realign investment priorities away from large,

relatively unneeded force postures and toward a transformed command and control capability that can be employed soon in places like

Afghanistan. This is a challenge at the national level, where investment and convergence on new concepts for command and control—

including network-centric operations—still require far more emphasis from military commanders, civilian leaders, and legislatures.

Funding should be re-prioritized toward networked interoperable C2,

and to the extent shortfalls still exist, additional funding should be

allocated at the first budgeting opportunity. It will soon be true that

if you cannot network your national C2 at every level with other allies

and the alliance, you will not be able to participate in NATO’s military structure, even for Article 5 missions.

Though fully networked C2 is the linchpin for future alliance

operations, NATO will not be able to transform all of its C2 structure

at once. Even with off-the-shelf technologies and increased national

funding, it will take time and money before an alliance-wide transformational, network-centric C2 can be achieved and sustained. The

immediate priority should be to establish these capabilities in the

NATO Response Force and in appropriate CJTF HQs responsible for

NRF employment. As NATO’s chief operator, Allied Command Operations commanded by U.S. Marine General James Jones has already

identified the NRF as ‘Priority One’ for C2 investment. The next step

will be organizing, equipping, and training the NRF and external

commands essential to its deployment and employment. That will

require NATO’s other strategic command—ACT, under British

Admiral Ian Forbes, and soon to be led by U.S. Admiral Edmund

Giambastiani, the commander already responsible for all U.S. transformation at Joint Forces Command—to collaborate with ACO on a

rigorous exercise and training program that will transform alliance

doctrine and concepts along with new structures and hardware. At

least for the near term, the NRF will be the focal point of NATO C2

transformation for both strategic commands.

Moreover, C2 transformation cannot be delayed. Allied Command Operations’ C2 capabilities will be tested beyond any previous

deployment when NATO assumes full responsibility for the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, in August

2003. NATO learned during its years of political struggle over CJTF

that not having one did not mean not needing to deploy one on short

notice in the Balkans. Both strategic commands must know that

deploying an NRF, to Afghanistan or some other area of collective

interest, is a distinct near-term possibility. NATO members must be

equally seized with this prospect as they go about fulfilling their specific Prague Capabilities Commitments that will transform command

and control for future missions.

June 2003 Defense Horizons 11

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy through the

Publication Directorate of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

Defense Horizons and other National Defense University publications are available online at

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Hans Binnendijk

Director
12 Defense Horizons June 2003

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