UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 

SECRETARY February 8, 2016 

COMMISSION VOTING RECORD 

DECISION ITEM: SECY-15-0137 

TITLE: PROPOSED PLANS FOR RESOLVING OPEN 

FUKUSHIMA TIER 2 & 3 RECOMMENDATIONS 

The Commission acted on the subject paper as recorded in the Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SRM) of February 8, 2016. 

This Record contains a summary of voting on this matter together with the individual vote 

sheets, views and comments of the Commission. 

Enclosures: 

1. Voting Summary 

2. Commissioner Vote Sheets 

cc: Chairman Burns 

Commissioner Svinicki 

Commissioner Ostendorff 

Commissioner Baran 

OGC 

EDO 

PDR 

'-~V@N-~ . Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

Secretary of the Commission 
VOTING SUMMARY - SECY-15-0137 

RECORDED VOTES 

APPROVED DISAPPROVED ABSTAINING N/P* COMMENTS DATE 

Chrm. Burns x x 12/04/15 

Comr. Svinicki x x 12/22/15 

Comr. Ostendorff x x 12/02/15 

Comr. Baran x x x 01 /08/16 

'Not Participating 

1 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

Chairman Burns 

SECY-15-0137: PROPOSED PLANS FOR RESOLVING 

OPEN FUKUSHIMA TIER 2 & 3 RECOMMENDATIONS 

Approved x Disapproved Abstain Not Participating 

COMMENTS: Below 

Entered in 

STARS 

Yes x 

No 

-- --

Attached x None 
Chairman Burns Comments on SECY-15-0137 

"Proposed Plans for Resolving Open Fukushima 

Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations" 

I commend the staff for providing a timely response to the Commission's direction in the Staff 

Requirements Memorandum to SECY-15-0065, "Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation of BeyondDesign-Basis Events," to provide a plan and schedule for resolving all remaining Tier 2 and 3 

actions. I appreciate the effort to take an additional look at the Tier 2 and 3 recommendations in 

light of the substantial progress made towards completion of the Tier 1 recommendations and 

the significant safety benefit gained as a result. The staff sorted the resolution plans for Tier 2 

and 3 recommendations into three groups: 

Group 1: Recommendations that should be closed now. 

Group 2: Recommendations that the staff's initial assessment has concluded should be 

closed, but for which stakeholder interaction is warranted prior to finalizing its 

assessment. 

Group 3: Recommendations for which the staff has not yet completed its assessment, 

stakeholder interactions, and/or documentation. 

I approve the staff's proposed closure plans for the open Tier 2 and 3 recommendations as 

delineated in SECY-15-0137. Specifically, I approve the staff's recommendation to close the 

items in Group 1. With respect to the potential enhancements to the capability to prevent or 

mitigate seismically-induced fires and floods, I support the staff's recommendation to finalize the 

PRA feasibility study and to inform the Commission if any insights obtained as part of the 

completion of that study change the results of the staff's assessment. For the recommendations 

placed in Groups 2 and 3, the staff should document the final results of each group's evaluation 

following its interaction with external stakeholders and ACRS. The staff should present these 

results and recommendations for closure or appropriate regulatory a · to the Commission for 

approval. 
.· 

TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

COMMISSIONER SVINICKI 

SECY-15-0137: PROPOSED PLANS FOR RESOLVING 

OPEN FUKUSHIMA TIER 2 & 3 RECOMMENDATIONS 

Approved XX Disapproved Abstain Not Participating -- -- --

COMMENTS: Below Attached XX None 

i4rGNATURE 

121 2&115 

ATE 

Entered on "STARS" Yes -------
Commissioner Svinicki's Comments on SECY-15-0137 

Proposed Plans for Resolving Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations 

I approve the staff's proposed closure plans for the open Tier 2 and 3 recommendations as 

summarized in the paper and as detailed in the enclosures to the paper. I approve the closure 

of each recommendation in Group 1 (i.e., items to be closed now) and Group 2 (i.e., items that 

the staff has concluded should be closed but about which it will communicate further with the 

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and/or external stakeholders). For items in Group 

3 (i.e., items for which the staff has not yet concluded its assessment and/or documentation and 

about which the staff will continue external engagement), I approve the staff's closure plans. 

Upon concluding its work for items in Group 3, the staff should inform the Commission if it 

proposes no regulatory action be taken on an item in Group 3 or submit for the Commission's 

review and approval any proposed regulatory action on that item. The staff should also inform 

the Commission promptly if significant analysis is required for items in Group 3, beyond that 

described in SECY-15-0137.

1 

In this paper, the staff has presented a complete and coherent set of actions to resolve the Tier 

2 and 3 recommendations in a timely way, while respecting the important consideration of 

Fukushima lessons learned. As we approach the five year anniversary of the Great Tohoku 

earthquake and tsunami in March of next year, I find the staff's presentation of the status of 

activities to be a natural outgrowth and evolution of the careful and systematic approach the 

NRC has taken to its regulatory response to the events at Fukushima. As the staff notes in the 

paper, "[t]he majority of the open items consist of recommendations to evaluate the need for 

further regulatory action, rather than a recommendation to take a specific regulatory action .... 

As such, for each recommendation , the staff's reassessment began with an evaluation of the 

issue in light of existing requirements and voluntary measures to confirm their adequacy and to 

determine if any recommendation would provide for a substantial safety improvement. ... [F]or 

the majority of the open Tier 2 and 3 recommendations , the staff's evaluation has determined 

that the NRC's existing regulatory framework and requirements are adequate and that no further 

regulatory action or analysis is needed." 

In sum, the staff is justifiably proud of the technical integrity of the work they have done. 

Closure of certain of our initial recommendations is now timely and appropriate, based on this 

work. The important oversight of implementation of Tier 1 work is ongoing, of course, and will 

be for some time. As well, by virtue of our nature as a continuous-learning organization, we will 

continue to monitor and assess other efforts, such as any technical learnings revealed in the 

decommissioning of damaged Fukushima units or international results regarding long-term 

health studies in the areas around Fukushima Dai-ichi. Through this approach, we will continue 

our essential work in ensuring the post-Fukushima safety enhancements are appropriately 

incorporated in the NRC's existing oversight programs here in the United States. 

12/ /15 

1 In summary, if supported by a majority, recommendations in Groups 1 and 2 are closed and closure 

plans for recommendations in Group 3 are approved. Should the Commission fail to establish a majority 

on any of these points by splitting evenly 2-2, the outcome is as determined in the Commission's 

procedure on resolution of a 2-2 split vote; as operative in the instant case, "where the staff has authority 

to act but discretion requires it to first consult with the Commission before taking a proposed action ... 

the SRM may advise the staff that it may proceed with its action even though the Commission has been 

unable to act." Internal Commission Procedures, Appendix 5, "Resolution of a 2-2 Vote," at 1-2. 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

Commissioner Ostendorff 

SECY-15-0137: PROPOSED PLANS FOR RESOLVING 

OPEN FUKUSHIMA TIER 2 & 3 RECOMMENDATIONS 

Approved XX Disapproved Abstain Not Participating 

COMMENTS: Below 

Entered in 

STARS / 

Yes / -- No 

-- -- --

Attached XX None 

Date 
Commissioner Ostendorffs Comments on SECY-15-0137: 

"Proposed Plans for Resolving Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations" 

I approve the staff's proposed plan and schedule for resolving remaining open Fukushima Tier 2 

and 3 actions. I also approve closure of the actions identified in "Group 1" in SECY-15-0137, as 

recommended by the staff. 

I am proud of the significant accomplishments that have been achieved by the staff in response 

to the March 2011 accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi. The NRC's actions to enhance safety in 

response to the Fukushima lessons learned are thoughtful and comprehensive. I am also 

particularly pleased with the way in which the NRC has upheld its principles of good regulation 

and adhered to its regulatory framework in making these important regulatory decisions. As I 

discussed in my vote on SECY-15-0065, the remaining Tier 2 and Tier 3 post-Fukushima 

actions needed to be evaluated in light of the risk reduction from the proposed Mitigation-ofBeyond-Design-Basis-Events rulemaking and other ongoing regulatory action actions. The staff 

has done that. 

Since March of 2011 , I have been involved in all of the post-Fukushima Commission decisionmaking. I have watched closely as these issues have evolved from the original task force report 

and as the NRC's regulatory actions have come to fruition . I believe the Tier 1, 2 and 3 

approach has served the Agency well and has resulted in a holistic evaluation of lessons 

learned that prioritized those actions with the greatest potential for safety improvement. I 

personally believe that we have achieved the safety enhancements necessary to address the 

Fukushima lessons learned with the regulatory actions that we have taken thus far. On that 

basis, I am comfortable in closing the remaining Tier 2 and Tier 3 items. However, I respect the 

need for the staff to complete its evaluation in certain areas, to engage stakeholders on its 

proposed resolution, and to thoroughly document its conclusions. It was never the 

Commission's expectation that all remaining issues would result in regulatory actions. Rather, 

the intention was that these items needed greater assessment to determine if regulatory action 

was warranted. The Tier 2 and 3 issues for which regulatory action was warranted have already 

been pulled forward and integrated with the ongoing Tier 1 actions. 

In SRM-SECY-15-0065, the Commission directed the staff to provide the Commission with a 

plan and schedule for resolving all remaining Tier 2 and Tier 3 actions, resulting in SECY-15-

0137. The staff did an outstanding job in analyzing the remaining Tier 2 and 3 actions and 

preparing SECY-15-0137 in the time since SRM-SECY-0065 was issued. The staff viewed 

remaining Tier 2 and 3 actions with an eye toward what incremental risk reduction was possible 

in light of the already completed Tier 1 and 2 actions. The staff also viewed these actions 

recognizing that any proposed new requirements must be appropriately justified in the context of 

the backfit rule. I thank the staff for its efforts and also thank the Advisory Committee for 

Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) for providing valuable insights during its review of the staff's 

proposed plans and for providing timely input to support Commission deliberations. 

With regard to the actions the staff has proposed for "Group 2" (i.e., recommendations that the 

staff's initial assessment has concluded should be closed but for which interaction with the 

ACRS or external stakeholders is warranted prior to finalizing the assessment), the staff should 

provide an information paper to the Commission no later than the end of March 2016. This 

paper should describe insights gained from ACRS and stakeholder interactions and should 

provide the staff's final assessment. 

1 
Finally, I approve the staff's plan and schedule for addressing the "Group 3" actions (i.e. , 

recommendations for which the staff has not yet completed its assessment, stakeholder 

interactions, and/or documentation). In the six-month status updates on post-Fukushima 

actions, the staff should continue to provide an update on these actions until they are closed. 

For the Tier 3 action regarding "Evaluation of Other Natural Hazards," the staff should provide 

an information paper to the Commission no later than May 2016, as an interim deliverable with 

the results of Task 2, "Determine and apply screening criteria to appropriately exclude certain 

natural hazards from further generic evaluations, or exclude some licensees from considering 

certain hazards." 

The staff should promptly request Commission approval in a notation vote paper if the staff's 

preliminary assessment of any of the Group 2 or 3 actions changes , such that additional 

regulatory action should be considered, or if significant analysis is required beyond that 

described in SECY-15-0137. 

2 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

Commissioner Baran 

SECY-15-0137: PROPOSED PLANS FOR RESOLVING 

OPEN FUKUSHIMA TIER 2 & 3 RECOMMENDATIONS 

Approved X Disapproved X Abstain Not Participating 

COMMENTS: Below 

Entered in 

STARS 

Yes XX 

-- No 

-- --

Attached X None 

Date 
Commissioner Saran's Comments on SECY-15-0137, 

"Proposed Plans for Resolving Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations" 

In this policy paper, the NRC staff is seeking Commission approval of the staff's 

proposed plans to resolve and close the open Tier 2 and Tier 3 recommendations developed in 

response to the March 11 , 2011, Fukushima accident. Although the open items were not placed 

in the highest priority category for which work was started "without delay," the open Tier 2 and 

Tier 3 items constitute about half of the Commission-directed post-Fukushima activities. The 

staff's current proposal places ten open items into Groups 1, 2, or 3. The staff recommends (A) 

closing Group 1 items now without further assessment or stakeholder interaction; (B) closing 

Group 2 items once the staff's initial assessment is finalized after additional interaction with the 

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) or external stakeholders; and (C) adopting 

the staff's closure plans for the Group 3 items, for which the staff has not yet completed its 

assessment. The staff proposes to inform the Commission of the final results of its Group 2 

evaluations by the end of March 2016 and its Group 3 evaluations by the end of 2016. 

Several general principles guide my evaluation of the staff's proposed resolution of the 

open Tier 2 and Tier 3 action items. 

First, Fukushima lessons learned activities were placed in Tier 2 or Tier 3 based on skill 

set availability or the need for more analysis, not because they are not potentially significant 

safety issues. The staff and the Commission assigned priority levels to these Near-Term Task 

Force recommendations in late 2011 because they reflect important lessons learned from the 

Fukushima accident that required additional attention. 

Second , although I share the staff's interest in addressing the open Tier 2 and Tier 3 

items in a timely way, they should not be resolved and closed without an open-minded 

examination of the safety issues based on the latest information. The Near-Term Task Force 

and staff recommended a fresh reevaluation of these issues, not a regurgitation of decades-old 

studies. As an agency, we need to "resolve" these open items with thoughtful analysis informed 

by the latest data, not through hurried, administrative close-outs. 

Third, proposals to address and resolve the open items must be supported by thorough 

safety analysis, not just a casual prediction of how a backfit analysis might turn out. If the staff 

concludes that additional action is unnecessary for a particular item, that conclusion needs to be 

supported by an in-depth safety examination. For the analysis that is performed, the staff must 

examine both the quantified and unquantified benefits and costs of potential regulatory actions. 

This approach is consistent with the staff's 2013 plan for final closeout of lessons-learned 

activities, which stated: "Regardless of the final outcome of a given activity, the staff plans to 

document its clear and thorough justification when it determines that an activity should be 

considered complete, and that justification will be provided to the Commission for each activity 

as determinations are made."1 

Finally, in the absence of a final analysis, it would be premature for the Commission to 

approve today the closure of a given action item sometime next year. I agree with Chairman 

Burns that the staff should finalize its preliminary analyses in order to make recommendations 

for closure or appropriate regulatory action for the Group 2 and 3 items before the Commission 

makes a decision about how to proceed on those items. The staff should present its complete 

1 See SECY-13-0095, "Fourth 6-Month Status Update on Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's 

March 11 , 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami" (Sep. 6, 2013) and Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SRM). 

1 
analyses and the resulting proposed approaches for resolution of the Group 2 and 3 items to the 

Commission for approval. Each Group 2 and 3 action item should remain open until the 

Commission approves its closure. 

With these basic principles in mind, I discuss each of the open Tier 2 and Tier 3 activities 

below. 

Evaluation of Other External Natural Hazards (Enclosure 1) 

In response to comments from ACRS and section 402 of the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2012, which directed NRC to "require reactor licensees to re-evaluate the 

seismic, tsunami, flooding , and other external hazards at their sites" and determine whether 

their design bases need to be updated, the staff is proposing to evaluate natural external 

hazards other than seismic and flooding hazards "using existing information and processes" to 

"assess the need for further regulatory actions." The staff proposes a four-step process to 

further evaluate the risks to nuclear power plants from other external hazards: (1) determine 

which natural hazards other than seismic and flooding should be reviewed; (2) develop and 

apply screening criteria to focus the evaluations on the external hazards with higher probabilities 

of requiring further action; (3) perform site-specific technical evaluations for hazards and sites 

that have not screened out; and ( 4) based on these evaluations, determine if additional licensee 

or regulatory actions are warranted . 

In my view, this basic four-step framework is a reasonable way to proceed on this open 

item. My approval of this general approach to addressing the other external hazards 

evaluations is contingent on two modifications. First, the staff should comprehensively consider 

all natural external hazards that could have potential safety consequences for a plant, including 

volcanic ash and solar flares. This is necessary to comply with the statutory direction from 

Congress and to ensure that we are meaningfully evaluating all plausible natural threats to U.S. 

reactors. Second, the staff should not begin this process with the assumption that it will only 

use existing information. If the staff determines that it is necessary to seek new or updated 

information to fully understand an external hazard, it should obtain that information. Several of 

the external hazards contemplated by the staff, including drought, extreme temperatures, and 

winter precipitation, are expected to worsen with climate change in some parts of the country. 

For this reason, we cannot assume that the frequency, intensity and duration of these events 

are static. A purely backwards look at historical conditions would not account for these 

changing conditions. Gathering additional information when it is needed is also consistent with 

the approach outlined by the staff in 2012. At that time, the staff proposed to issue 50.54(f) 

letters to request information from licensees about these external hazards, as it did for seismic 

and flooding hazards.

2 The Commission approved this approach in March 2012.

3 

Periodic Reconfirmation of External Hazards (Enclosure 2) 

Recognizing that external hazard data and models will evolve over time, the Near-Term 

Task Force recommended initiating a rulemaking to reevaluate seismic and flooding hazards 

every ten years to address any new and significant information. Similarly, the National 

Academy of Sciences found that "[t]he overarching lesson learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

2 See SECY-12-0025, "Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons Learned 

from Japan's March 11 , 2011 , Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami" (Feb. 17, 2012). 3 See SRM for SECY-12-0025 (Mar. 9, 2012). 

2 
accident is that nuclear plant licensees and their regulators must actively seek out and act on 

new information about hazards that have the potential to affect the safety of nuclear plants."4 

The staff determined that its current processes for assessing new external hazard 

information are too passive. As the staff explained, "NRC's current practice generally involves 

initiating a hazard reassessment either after the occurrence of a major event that challenges a 

plant's design basis or after receipt of information determined to have the potential to 

significantly impact plant safety." The staff found that "there is no existing NRC process that 

actively seeks to determine if there is new hazard information available." According to the staff, 

"when new information is identified, there is the potential that the information could be evaluated 

in isolation, rather than through a methodical evaluation of the cumulative effect of new data, 

models, and methods that accrue over time." Therefore, the staff proposes to develop, by the 

end of 2016, a method to "enhance existing NRC processes and programs to ensure that 

information related to external hazards is proactively and routinely evaluated in a systematic 

manner." 

I agree with the staff that NRC's current practices for assessing new external hazard 

information are too passive and reactive, and I approve the staff's proposal to actively seek out 

new scientific information that may deepen and refine our understanding of external hazards. 

Periodic or continuous reassessment of external hazards is particularly important in light of the 

impacts of climate change on some hazards, such as flooding and drought, because these 

climate-related hazards are expected to exceed historical levels in the future. I look forward to 

the details of the staff's proposal to ensure the proactive and routine evaluation of new external 

hazard information in a systematic manner. I approve the staff's laudable goal of establishing a 

proactive and effective process for identifying and holistically considering the latest science but 

reserve judgment on whether a rulemaking is needed to establish periodic reevaluation 

requirements until the staff presents a concrete plan for attaining this goal. 

Seismically-Induced Fires and Floods (Enclosure 3) 

The Near-Term Task Force found that "[s]eismically induced fires have the potential to 

cause multiple failures of safety-related systems and could create fires in multiple locations at 

the site." The Task Force also concluded that "[s]eismically induced flooding events can 

potentially cause multiple failures of safety-related equipment." The Task Force therefore 

recommended that NRC evaluate potential enhancements to the capability of nuclear power 

plants to prevent or mitigate seismically-induced fires and floods. 

The staff proposes to close this action item without any enhancements to address 

seismically-induced fires and floods. According to the staff, the Commission-directed5 

development of a probabilistic risk assessment methodology to evaluate potential 

enhancements is challenging and would require "additional time and resources" to test, refine, 

and finalize a methodology. Citing several existing regulatory requirements, the staff then offers 

conclusory statements that "based on the information gathered thus far, the staff did not identify 

any information that indicates that [seismically-induced fires and floods] represent a significant 

safety issue" and "[t]he staff believes that the risk of a [seismically-induced fire or flood] would 

not be large enough to justify additional safety enhancements." 

4 National Academy of Sciences, "Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving 

Safety of U.S. Nuclear Plants" (July 24, 2014). 5 See SRM for SECY-11-0137 (Dec. 15, 2011 ). 

3 
The staff's response does not meaningfully address the concerns behind the Near-Term 

Task Force recommendation. The staff acknowledges that "the risk from a [seismically-induced 

fire or flood] is difficult to quantify because of the lack of methods and data for assessing 

concurrent hazards," but then assumes that the risks are not significant. What the risks actually 

are is unknown. In determining that further regulatory action is not warranted, the staff relies on 

the robustness of existing fire protection programs, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 

Standard 805, and the seismic walkdowns conducted after Fukushima. But fire protection 

systems (as well as certain pipes and tanks) are not required to be seismically qualified so that 

they can withstand earthquakes. NFPA 805 is a voluntary standard that fewer than half of the 

existing reactor units have committed to adopt. And the post-Fukushima seismic walkdowns did 

not require licensees to correct problems in the absence of a regulatory requirement to do so. 

In concluding that no additional action needs to be taken, the staff also cites existing regulations 

on internal flood protection that would have been known to the Task Force, mentions FLEX 

equipment that is not specifically related to addressing seismically-induced fires and floods, and 

notes that none of the past seismically-induced fire events have occurred in the United States. 

Frankly, it is a laundry list of not very convincing reasons for why nothing more needs to be 

done in this area. 

I disapprove closing this action item as a Group 1 activity. The staff should instead 

move this action item to Group 3 and develop a reasonable approach to better characterize the 

risks posed by seismically-induced fires and floods. ACRS may be helpful in this regard as its 

members were "confounded that the PRA feasibility study did not identify a reasonable 

approach for [the staff's] assessment." If closure of this activity in Group 1 is approved, the staff 

should continue to engage with stakeholders on "methods and data for assessing concurrent 

hazards." 

Reliable Hardened Vents for Other Containment Designs and Hydrogen Control and 

Mitigation (Enclosure 4) 

On March 12, 2012, NRC issued an initial order requiring boiling water reactors (BWRs) 

with Mark I or Mark II containments to install reliable hardened vents to remove decay heat and 

maintain control of containment pressure. The Commission determined that this requirement 

was necessary to ensure reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and 

safety. The Near-Term Task Force recommended that NRC assess the need to require reliable 

hardened vents for other containment designs. Separately, the Task Force recommended that 

NRC "identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other 

buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

accident." 

The staff proposes to place these action items in Group 2 and does not expect that 

additional regulatory action will be needed to close them. The staff concluded that a 

requirement for reliable hardened vents for other containments, including ice condensers and 

Mark Ill containments, is unlikely to meet the backfit threshold of being a cost-justified 

substantial safety enhancement. 

In my view, there are some significant gaps in the staff's analysis. First, the staff does 

not compare other containments with Mark I and II containments to assess whether other 

designs pose comparable over-pressurization risks or whether requiring reliable hardened vents 

for other containments would provide safety benefits comparable to the vents for Mark I and II 

containments. The staff should compare ice condensers and Mark Ill containments to the Mark 

I and II containments to evaluate whether there is a basis for the Commission to conclude that 

4 
reliable hardened vents should be required for these other containments as a matter of 

adequate protection. 

Second, although the staff is evaluating an ice condenser plant as part of the State-ofthe-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) project, the staff is proposing to close this 

action before receiving these results. In 2012, the Commission approved additional SOARCA 

studies "in a way that complements and supports the post-Fukushima activities including Tier 3 

items."6 These studies are scheduled to be completed by September 2016. Rather than 

speculating about what the results of the studies might show with respect to the benefits of or 

need for reliable hardened vents, the staff should wait for the results of these SOARCA studies 

before reaching any firm conclusions. 

The staff's analysis of large dry pressurized water reactor containments is adequate to 

conclude that those units do not require reliable hardened vents. 

With respect to hydrogen control and mitigation, the staff determined that "issues of 

hydrogen mitigation in the reactor buildings of Mark I and Mark II containment BWRs do not 

merit further consideration because reliable vents will prevent over-pressurization of the 

containments and massive leakage of hydrogen into the reactor buildings." ACRS found that 

this "conclusion neglects the potential for other pathways of hydrogen release to the reactor 

building under severe reactor accident conditions" and advised that it may "be more prudent for 

the staff to perform a comprehensive examination of potential hydrogen release pathways 

before they forego consideration of hydrogen mitigation in the reactor buildings." In addition to 

the ACRS concerns, the staff should consider the new information on hydrogen control and 

mitigation that likely will become available from further analysis of the Fukushima event prior to 

closing this issue. There is no need to prematurely close an action item that has always 

assumed that additional information will be "revealed through further study of the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi accident" just because the data is not yet available. 

I disapprove closing this action item as a Group 2 activity. The staff should move this 

action item to Group 3 and conduct the additional analysis outlined above. 

Enhanced Reactor and Containment Instrumentation (Enclosure 5) 

In response to concerns expressed by the ACRS, the staff added a post-Fukushima 

action item in 2012 to examine whether the agency should require reactor and containment 

instrumentation to be enhanced to withstand beyond-design-basis accident conditions. The 

staff proposes to place this open item in Group 2. 

The staff considered whether to require enhanced instrumentation as part of the ongoing 

Mitigating Beyond-Design-Basis Events rulemaking and determined that it was not needed for 

licensees to effectively implement Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). In the 

current paper, the staff explains: 

The SAMGs were developed and implemented based on a philosophy that makes use of 

available instrumentation, includes backup or alternative means for determining plant 

conditions when the primary means become available or unreliable, and includes a 

course of action to follow when the event degrades to the point where there is no reliable 

instrumentation available. 

6 See SRM for SECY-12-0092 (Dec. 6, 2012). 

5 
I agree with the ACRS that the "staff should include a detailed demonstration of how the SAMGs 

and calculational aids are capable of leading the operators to take the correct actions, even if 

minimal instrumentation is available or their indications are suspect." I approve treating this 

recommendation as a Group 2 item and look forward to reviewing the staff's final evaluation. 

Emergency Planning Zone Size and Pre-Staging Potassium Iodide Beyond 10 Miles 

(Enclosure 6) 

After the Near-Term Task Force provided its report, the NRC staff identified an additional 

recommendation to reconsider the basis of the emergency planning zone (EPZ) size and 

practices associated with the pre-staging of potassium iodide beyond 10 miles. The staff 

proposes to close this item as part of Group 1 based on its conclusions that "the current size of 

EPZs is appropriate for existing reactors" and the current distribution program for potassium 

iodide tablets within the 10-mile EPZ adequately protects public health and safety. 

The staff's conclusion related to EPZ size appears to be well-supported by studies that 

examined 11 large-scale evacuations involving more than 10 million people, including those in 

response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. The staff explains that "[t]he 11 incidents 

covered wide geographical areas and affected 14 nuclear power plant EPZs, although none of 

the evacuations were related to issues associated with those nuclear power plants." However, 

the staff's discussion of this open item does not specifically describe how the staff assessed the 

adequacy of the potassium iodide distribution program, so this assessment should be provided 

to the Commission for information before closing this item. With that caveat, I approve closing 

this Group 1 item. 

Emergency Preparedness (Enclosure 7) 

The Near-Term Task Force's recommendations 9, 10, and 11 relate to emergency 

preparedness. The Tier 3 open item involves portions of these recommendations. The staff 

proposes six resolution plans to address different aspects of the open item. I approve closing 

the first and sixth resolution plans (relating to recommendations subsumed in the Mitigation of 

Beyond-Design-Basis Events rulemaking and local training) as Group 1 items without additional 

action. Each of the remaining elements of this open item should be moved to Group 3 for 

additional work. 

The second and third elements of this open item relate to the Emergency Response 

Data System (EROS). EROS electronically transmits data about the status of a reactor directly 

to NRC through an internet connection so that the agency has immediate access to accurate, 

real-time information about the plant in the event of an emergency, without the need for frequent 

phone calls interrupting licensee personnel who will be busy addressing the emergency. The 

Near-Term Task Force recommended evaluating whether EROS should be hardened to 

maintain its capability during a severe accident; whether there are alternate methods, such as 

satellite transmission, to transmit EROS data that do not rely on hardwired infrastructure that 

may be unavailable during a severe natural disaster; "whether the data set currently being 

received from each site is sufficient for modern assessment needs"; and "whether EROS should 

be required to transmit continuously so that no operator action is needed during an emergency." 

The Task Force explained that "the current regulatory approach and requirements do not ensure 

that EROS data would be available during a prolonged [station blackout] or during other natural 

disasters when power supplies could be lost and transmission capability may be affected." In its 

2012 prioritization of these issues as a Tier 3 item , the staff stated that it had "determined that 

these aspects of the EROS may need a more integrated and comprehensive set of 

requirements." 

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The staff admits that it "has not made significant progress" on the EROS issues, but 

nonetheless proposes to close them as Group 1 items based on a conclusory prediction that it is 

unlikely that additional action would represent a cost-justified substantial safety enhancement. 

Rather than discussing each of these EROS issues in detail, I will focus on the question of 

whether NRC should pursue an alternate method to transmit EROS data as a backup if internet 

connectivity is unavailable during a severe accident. This question is a good illustration of why 

more work needs to be done to meaningfully evaluate whether additional steps should be taken 

to enhance EROS capability during a severe accident. 

In 1991 , NRC found that requiring EROS was a cost-justified substantial safety 

enhancement. The Commission concluded that requiring EROS would "provide a substantial 

increase in overall protection of public health and safety by ensuring far more accurate and 

timely flow of data for the NRC to fulfill its role during an alert or higher emergency." The 

Commission also stated: "The direct and indirect costs estimated for the implementation of this 

rule are justified in view of this increased protection." Twenty-five years of experience since the 

Commission decided to require EROS have confirmed the benefits of the system . In response 

to my questions, the staff explained that, when a licensee provides data by telephone, "NRC 

can expect the licensee to provide an update about every 20 minutes versus EROS data being 

sent/refreshed every 15 to 60 seconds." The staff also stated that communications by phone 

"could reduce the accuracy of the information provided" and that licensees therefore typically 

provide data on fewer parameters by phone. According to the staff: 

The reduced timeliness and number of parameters that can be tracked using [the 

telephone system] can impact the efficiency of the NRC's independent assessment and 

evaluation functions. Specifically, loss of ready access to multiple data points in nearreal time from EROS can impact the NRC's ability to understand current conditions and 

better predict future conditions and issues. 

So there is no question that EROS would be very valuable during an emergency. The question 

is whether the benefits of having EROS when internet connectivity is lost outweigh the costs of 

installing a backup system that does not rely on a land-based internet connection to transmit 

data to NRC. As the staff explains in the paper, the need to evaluate a backup EROS 

transmission capability was identified as a lesson learned from several natural disasters, 

including Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and the earthquakes in Fukushima and Mineral, 

Virginia. 

The staff previously planned to conduct a pilot to assess whether an EROS backup 

system would be worthwhile. Based on quotes from three vendors, the staff estimated that the 

cost of the data transmission equipment would be between $55,000 and $65,000 to cover four 

nuclear power plant sites. Although this estimate does not include any costs associated with 

updating plant systems to accommodate a more reliable connection, the costs of the equipment 

itself are not exorbitant. A ballpark estimate of equipment costs for the entire U.S. power plant 

fleet would be around $1 million. Yet, without any analysis or explanation of how it weighed the 

pros and cons of a pilot project or broader requirement, the staff merely concluded that "given 

the NRC's role in incident response, the staff does not believe that further assessment will 

identify that requiring an alternative method of transmission of EROS data is justified" under the 

backfit rule. 

This superficial analysis is clearly inadequate. The staff should conduct a full 

examination of the quantified and unquantified benefits and costs of a pilot project to determine 

whether it makes sense to further invest in the reliability and durability of EROS. The staff 

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should fully explore the options for establishing a backup transmission capability so that the 

system will work when we need it most - during a severe natural disaster or accident. The staff 

should move all four of the EROS issues to Group 3 and conduct a thorough analysis of these 

issues. 

The fourth element of this open item involves potential enhancements to the U.S. 

decision-making framework, including the concepts of recovery and reentry. The staff continues 

to work with other federal agencies to revise the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the 

National Response Framework. I appreciate the progress being made to address this NearTerm Task Force recommendation, but the item should remain open until the work is complete. 

The fifth element involves a Task Force recommendation to study the efficacy of realtime radiation monitoring on-site and within the EPZ. The staff explains that it "is documenting 

the historical background of real-time radiation monitoring systems and the justifications for the 

historical decisions." The staff acknowledges that it "has not made substantive progress on this 

recommendation since the development of the initial project plans," but then proposes to close 

the item based on a prediction that it is "unlikely that changes to require real-time radiation 

monitoring would provide a cost-justified substantial safety improvement." This is not a 

meaningful response to the Near-Term Task Force's recommendation to take a fresh look at 

real-time radiation monitoring. A purely backward-looking examination of past findings and 

decisions will miss the significant technological progress that has occurred in this field. As the 

staff recommends, they should treat this issue as a Group 3 item. As part of its work, the staff 

should take a fresh look at the new technologies for real-time radiation monitoring and how they 

could inform emergency preparedness efforts. 

Reactor Oversight Process Modifications (Enclosure 8) 

The Near-Term Task Force recommended expanding the scope of the Reactor 

Oversight Process self-assessment and biennial realignment to more fully include defense-indepth considerations. I approve the staff's proposal to close this as a Group 1 item because the 

staff has been using separate processes to examine potential ROP changes. 

Enhanced Severe Accident Training for NRC Staff (Enclosure 9) 

The Near-Term Task Force recommended enhanced NRC staff training on severe 

accidents, including training resident inspectors on Severe Accident Management Guidelines. 

The staff proposes to close this as a Group 1 item in light of the progress made on a range of 

responsive initiatives. I approve closing this item upon completion of the ongoing activities 

outlined by the staff, including verifying the availability of the new SAMG staff training course 

and updating the inspector qualification program to incorporate training on SAMGs. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, I approve closing all or portions of four Group 1 items (EPZ size, the first 

and sixth elements of emergency preparedness, ROP modifications, and severe accident 

training), subject to the conditions described above. I disapprove closing the remaining Tier 2 

and Tier 3 items until such time as the appropriate analyses are complete and the staff presents 

for Commission approval its final conclusions regarding the need for additional steps or 

regulatory actions. 

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