NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CRAIG M., Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, S.M., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0565 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300JD201600086 

The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer PC, Anthem

By Florence M. Bruemmer

Counsel for Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda Adams 

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety

FILED 5-29-2018
CRAIG M. v. DCS, S.M. 

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David W. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Craig M. challenges the juvenile court’s order finding that 

termination of his parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests. We 

affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Craig M. (“Father”) and Sarah H. (“Mother”) adopted two 

sisters, S.M. and V.M., who were removed from their biological parents in 

California.1 About ten months later, in January 2015, Mother and Father 

divorced and agreed that Father would become the children’s primary 

custodial parent. 

¶3 In May 2015, Nevada law enforcement received reports that 

Father had sexually assaulted V.M., then eleven years old. V.M. confirmed 

the reports. She told police that Father had sex with her on the very 

morning of her interview and had been sexually abusing her for an 

extended period. DNA evidence supported her allegations. The State of 

Nevada charged Father with sexual assault of V.M. Meanwhile, the 

Nevada Division of Child and Family Services removed both V.M. and S.M. 

from Father. S.M. was placed with Mother. V.M. ended up in foster care. 

A Nevada court terminated Father’s parental rights to V.M. on grounds of 

abandonment, unfitness and risk of harm.

¶4 Father absconded from Nevada in August 2016 as he awaited 

his criminal trial. Four months later, the Arizona Department of Child 

Safety (“DCS”) received a report that S.M. was living with Father and 

Father’s sister in Arizona. DCS investigated and learned that Father had 

been arrested several days earlier and left S.M. with his sister, without heat, 

water or food. Father was extradited to Nevada to face the criminal 

charges. 

 

1 Mother is S.M. and V.M.’s biological aunt. 
CRAIG M. v. DCS, S.M. 

Decision of the Court

3 

¶5 DCS seized temporary custody of S.M., placed her in foster 

care and petitioned the juvenile court to find her dependent as to Father 

and Mother. The court adjudicated S.M. dependent and approved 

concurrent case plans of family reunification and severance and adoption, 

which later changed to severance and adoption. 

¶6 Against that backdrop, DCS moved to terminate Father’s 

parental rights to S.M. in September 2017. DCS alleged that termination 

was justified on various grounds, including Father’s neglect of S.M., abuse 

of V.M. and the recent termination of his parental rights to V.M. See A.R.S. 

§§ 8-533(B)(2), (10). DCS further alleged termination was in S.M.’s best 

interests.2

¶7 The juvenile court issued a detailed minute entry after a 

contested severance hearing in November 2017, finding that DCS proved 

the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and 

proved that termination was in S.M.’s best interests by a preponderance of 

the evidence. Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 8-235(A). 

DISCUSSION

¶8 To terminate parental rights, a court must find by clear and 

convincing evidence at least one statutory ground articulated in A.R.S. § 8-

533(B) and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination 

is in the child’s best interests. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 

246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000). We will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly 

erroneous. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 

2002). We accept the court’s findings of fact unless no reasonable evidence 

supports them, id., and view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

upholding the order. See Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 

97, ¶ 20 (App. 2009). 

¶9 Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding of three 

statutory grounds for severance. Instead, he only argues that termination 

of his parental rights was not in S.M.’s best interests. The best-interests 

prong requires the court to assess “how the child would benefit from a 

severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship.” Mary Lou 

C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004) (quotation 

omitted).

 

2 Mother relinquished her parental rights.
CRAIG M. v. DCS, S.M. 

Decision of the Court

4 

¶10 The court did not clearly err in making its best-interests 

determination. The court heard testimony from a DCS case manager that 

termination of Father’s parental rights was in S.M.’s best interests because 

it would allow her to have permanency and stability and would let the 

adoption process proceed, whereas a denial of termination would keep S.M.

in foster care. The case manager testified that S.M. is adoptable and DCS 

was working to identify an adoptive home for her. And although an 

adoptive home had not yet been identified, the case manager testified that 

termination of Father’s parental rights was needed to prevent or delay that 

process from moving forward. Id. 

¶11 Father’s arguments are not persuasive. He claims that he has 

a bond with S.M., she previously lived with him and he was her primary 

caregiver for 12-18 months before his incarceration. He thus argues the 

court should have waited until his February 2018 criminal trial was finished 

before deciding whether to terminate his parental rights, especially because 

DCS had not yet identified an adoptive home for S.M. We disagree. To 

postpone termination until after Father’s criminal trial would only further 

delay S.M.’s path to stability and permanency. See Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn 

F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 15 (2016) (noting that once a juvenile court finds a 

statutory ground for severance, “in considering best interests, the court 

must balance the unfit parent’s ‘diluted interest’ against the independent 

and often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life”) 

(quotation omitted). S.M. is only eight years old and rightly seeks a family 

who will love and protect her. 

¶12 Father further argues that an acquittal on the charges against 

him would “negate” the court’s best-interests findings. We again disagree. 

To reiterate, a Nevada court has already found by clear and convicting 

evidence that Father sexually assaulted V.M. Father cannot undo or erase 

that finding, even if ultimately absolved under a heightened criminal 

standard, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor did Father contest DCS’s 

allegations in this case. In sum, the absence of a criminal conviction would 

not alter the analysis or conclusion that termination is in S.M.’s best interest. 
CRAIG M. v. DCS, S.M. 

Decision of the Court

5 

CONCLUSION

¶13 The juvenile court properly terminated Father’s parental 

rights to S.M. We affirm.