POLICY ISSUE

Information

January 18, 2017 SECY-17-0009

FOR: The Commissioners

FROM: Victor M. McCree

Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: STAFF’S STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE UNCONTESTED 

HEARING FOR ISSUANCE OF A COMBINED LICENSE FOR NORTH 

ANNA POWER STATION UNIT 3 

PURPOSE:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC or Commission) staff has completed its 

review of the application for a combined license (COL) to authorize construction and operation 

of North Anna Unit 3, located in Louisa County, Virginia. This subsequent combined license

(SCOL) application incorporates by reference the codified version of the Economic Simplified 

Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) design certification rule (DCR) which is contained in Title 10 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 52, Appendix E, “Design Certification Rule for 

the U.S. Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor.” The ESBWR DCR was published in the 

Federal Register (FR) on October 15, 2014 (79 FR 61943), and was effective November 14, 

2014. The ESBWR DCR references Revision 10 of the ESBWR Design Certification Document 

(DCD), dated April 1, 2014 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML14104A929). In addition, the applicant incorporates by reference 

the North Anna Power Station (NAPS) early site permit (ESP) (ESP-003), last amended on 

January 30, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12297A207).

The staff presents this information paper pursuant to the revised Internal Commission 

Procedures dated March 24, 2016. Issuance of this paper follows the issuance of the North 

Anna Unit 3 COL final safety evaluation report (FSER) on January 12, 2017 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML16259A210). The agency issued the North Anna Unit 3 COL final supplemental

CONTACTS: James Shea, NRO/DNRL Tamsen Dozier, NRO/DNRL

301-415-1388 301-415-2272
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environmental impact statement (hereafter referred to as the COL SEIS), NUREG 1917,

"Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the Combined License (COL) for North 

Anna Power Station Unit 3" Final Report, in March 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML100680117). This Commission paper references a draft COL for North Anna Unit 3 and a 

draft record of decision (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML16242A135 and ML16275A000, 

respectively). 

This paper serves as the staff’s primary prefiled testimony for the uncontested (mandatory) 

hearing for determining whether to issue the COL for North Anna Unit 3. This paper, with its 

references, also provides the information requested to support the Commission’s determination 

that the staff’s review has been adequate to support the findings set forth in 10 CFR 52.97, 

“Issuance of Combined Licenses,” and 10 CFR 51.107, “Public hearings in proceedings for 

issuance of combined licenses; limited work authorizations.”

In accordance with the Internal Commission Procedures, this paper focuses on nonroutine 

matters with regard to areas of particular importance in supporting the findings related to 

10 CFR Part 51, “Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related 

Regulatory Functions,” and 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear 

Power Plants.” Nonroutine matters are matters that relate to any unique features of the facility 

or novel issues that arose as part of the review process.

The staff’s review of the combined license application (COLA) for North Anna Unit 3 is complete. 

SUMMARY:

This paper addresses each of the findings in 10 CFR 52.97(a) and 10 CFR 51.107(a) and (d) 

and provides an adequate basis for the Commission to conclude that each of these findings can 

be made for the COLA for North Anna Unit 3. This paper also focuses on nonroutine matters 

such as unique features of the facility or novel issues that arose as part of the review process. 

This paper does not address routine aspects of the safety and environmental review process. 

BACKGROUND:

I. Application History

Application, Ownership, and Location

On November 27, 2007, Virginia Electric and Power Company, doing business as Dominion 

Virginia Power (Dominion) and Old Dominion Electric Power Company (ODEC), submitted an 

application to the NRC for a COL to construct and operate an ESBWR at the NAPS ESP site in 

Louisa County, Virginia (ADAMS Accession No. ML073320913). The site of the proposed North 

Anna Unit 3 is within the existing boundaries of the currently operating NAPS site. The site is 

located on the shore of Lake Anna, approximately 64 kilometers (km) (40 miles (mi)) 

north-northwest of Richmond, Virginia. Two operating nuclear generating units, North Anna 

Units 1 and 2, are located within the NAPS site. 

Dominion most recently updated the COLA for North Anna Unit 3 on June 30, 2016 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML16208A322). The publicly available portions of the application are available 

in ADAMS and on the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col/northanna/documents.html. Portions of the application that contain nonpublic information, including 
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the security plan, which contains Safeguards Information, are located on the NRC’s secure local 

area network.

Dominion is a regulated public utility engaged in the power generation and electric service 

delivery business within a 96,600 square kilometer (30,000 square mile) service area in Virginia 

and northeastern North Carolina. On March 8, 2012, Dominion updated the COLA for North 

Anna Unit 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12090A199). In the revised application, Dominion 

stated that it has acquired sole title to the portion of NAPS on which Unit 3 would be located, 

would own Unit 3, and would construct and operate Unit 3. Dominion and ODEC own the 

remainder of NAPS, including the existing nuclear units and the independent spent fuel storage 

installation (ISFSI) at that site, as tenants in common, with respective undivided ownership 

interests of 88.4 and 11.6 percent, respectively. Dominion is the licensed operator of the 

existing facilities, with control of the NAPS site and existing facilities and authority to act as 

ODEC’s agent. Dominion currently owns Surry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Kewaunee Power 

Station; and Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3.

Additional information about the applicant and ownership appears in Part 1 (General and 

Financial Information) of the COLA for North Anna Unit 3. Additional information about the site 

location and characteristics appears in Part 2 (Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)), Chapters 1 

and 2, of the COLA. As noted previously, the COLA references the NAPS ESP, by which the 

NRC approved the suitability of the site.

Referenced Design Certification 

The COLA for North Anna Unit 3 references the ESBWR certified design. GE-Hitachi Nuclear 

Energy was the applicant for the certification of the ESBWR design. The NRC issued the FSER 

as NUREG-1966, “Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Certification of the Economic 

Simplified Boiling-Water Reactor Standard Design,” in April 2014 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML14100A304) and supplemented it in September 2014. On October 15, 2014, the NRC 

published the ESBWR design certification final rule (ADAMS Accession No. ML14274A552) in 

the (FR) (79 FR 61943). The COLA for North Anna Unit 3 references the ESBWR certified 

design, including DCD Revision 10, as documented in Appendix E, “Design Certification Rule 

for the ESBWR Design,” to 10 CFR Part 52.

Referenced Early Site Permit

The COLA for North Anna Unit 3 incorporates by reference the NAPS ESP (ESP-003), (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML12297A207). To document its review of the ESP application, the NRC issued 

an FSER in September 2005 (NUREG-1835), which was supplemented in November 2006

(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML052710305 and ML063170371, respectively.) The staff issued a 

final environmental impact statement (EIS) (NUREG-1811, Volumes 1 and 2) for the ESP in 

December 2006 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML063480261 and ML063480263). Following an 

uncontested (mandatory) hearing, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) issued 

findings and an order authorizing issuance of the ESP (ADAMS Accession No. ML071800470)

on June 29, 2007.

The NAPS ESP authorizes certain activities related to the construction of up to two nuclear units 

at the NAPS site. The NRC reviewed and approved those activities in accordance with the 

regulations in effect on September 25, 2003 (the date of the ESP application submittal), and 

referred to the rules in effect at that time. The ESP contains terms and conditions related to the 

authorized construction activities. The ESP also states that a COLA referencing the ESP will 
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include an environmental protection plan (EPP) for the construction and operation of the 

proposed reactor.

On October 9, 2007, the NRC published revisions to its rule related to limited work 

authorizations (LWA) (72 FR 57422). The revised 10 CFR 50.10 includes a definition of 

“construction” that excludes from NRC jurisdiction certain activities such as site preparation and 

building of service facilities for the site. However, in the statement of considerations for this 

rulemaking, the agency indicated that the ESP applications under consideration as of the 

effective date of the LWA final rule, which include a request to conduct LWA activities, need not 

comply with the content of application requirements in the final rule. The term “construction” in 

the NAPS ESP EIS and COL SEIS therefore includes activities that are now considered 

“preconstruction” in the Office of New Reactors (NRO) EISs that the NRC issued based on the 

revised rule. 

Overview of the Approach for a Combined License Referencing an Early Site Permit

For a COLA that references an ESP, the NRC staff prepares a supplement to the ESP EIS in 

accordance with 10 CFR 51.92(e). Therefore, the staff relied upon the analysis in the NAPS 

ESP EIS as the basis for preparing the COL SEIS. The NAPS ESP used the plant parameter 

envelope (PPE) approach, in which no specific reactor design was chosen as the source of 

parameters for analysis during the ESP review. Instead, the review relied upon a set of design 

parameters that served as a surrogate for actual design information. The applicant’s 

environmental report in support of the ESP, and subsequently the staff’s ESP EIS, evaluated 

the impacts at the site from the construction and operation of two new units with design 

characteristics bounded by a PPE. At the ESP stage, Dominion deferred topics that, under 

NRC regulations, are optional for ESP applicants, namely: the analyses of the economic, 

technical, and other benefits and costs of the project; the evaluation of alternative energy 

sources; and the analysis of the severe accident mitigation design alternatives. Consequently, 

pursuant to 10 CFR 51.92, “Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact Statement,” the 

staff’s environmental review of the COLA for North Anna Unit 3 focused on those issues that 

were either deferred or unresolved at the ESP stage and any new and potentially significant 

information for issues that were resolved during the ESP review, including information where the 

chosen ESBWR design fell outside the design parameters specified in the ESP. 

For information to be significant for consideration in the environmental review of a COLA

referencing an ESP, it must have the potential to affect the staff’s finding or conclusions from 

the ESP EIS. The staff’s environmental review of the COLA included an audit where the staff 

reviewed environmental information and analyses conducted by the applicant in the preparation 

of its environmental report for the COLA and evaluated the applicant’s methodology for 

identifying and evaluating the significance of new information to determine if the applicant’s 

process was reasonable. Based on its independent review, the staff determined that the 

applicant’s process was a reasonable approach for identifying and evaluating new and 

potentially significant information. The staff identified additional new information that warranted 

further analysis and evaluated it in the course of the staff’s preparation of the COL SEIS. 

Dominion’s COLA includes an EPP that the staff evaluated in the COL SEIS. This EPP 

contains measures and controls related to the construction and operation of North Anna Unit 3,

including provisions that consistent with 10CFR 51.50(c)(1)(v) were evaluated and approved in

the ESP. The staff’s proposed EPP includes applicable measures and controls proposed by 

Dominion in its COLA EPP.
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Design-Centered Review Approach; Change to U.S. Advanced Pressurized-Water Reactor 

Design and Back to ESBWR

Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-06, “New Reactor Standardization Needed to Support the 

Design-Centered Licensing Review Approach,” dated May 31, 2006 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML053540251), describes the design-centered review approach (DCRA). The DCRA is a 

policy intended to promote COLA standardization. In this approach, the NRC designates the

first COL referencing a design as the reference combined license (RCOL) and considers 

additional COLs as SCOLs. This policy directs the staff to perform one technical review for 

each standard issue outside the scope of the design criteria and to use this decision to support 

decisions on multiple COLAs. In this context, “standard” refers to essentially identical 

information and may include information provided by the applicant(s) to resolve plant-specific 

issues.

When Dominion originally submitted the COLA for North Anna Unit 3 in November 2007 the 

NRC designated it as the RCOL for the ESBWR design center. The staff issued a safety 

evaluation report (SER) with open items that documented a review of both standard and 

site-specific information. In May 2010 Dominion informed the NRC that it had changed reactor 

technology and had selected the U.S. Advanced Pressurized-Water Reactor (US-APWR) for its 

COLA for North Anna Unit 3. By letter dated April 25, 2013, Dominion notified the NRC staff 

that it planned to revert back to ESBWR reactor technology for its COLA for North Anna Unit 3. 

Dominion then submitted a revised application that incorporated by reference the ESBWR DCD, 

Revision 9, by letter dated December 18, 2013. Because Fermi Unit 3 had become the RCOL 

for the ESBWR in the interim, North Anna Unit 3 became an SCOL for the ESBWR design 

center and incorporated all responses to standard requests for additional information (RAI) in its

FSAR.

When Dominion announced its decision to switch from the ESBWR to the US-APWR design in 

2010, the staff had already completed its environmental review and had issued the COL SEIS 

(March 2010). Based upon Dominion’s revised application to change its referenced design to 

the US-APWR, the staff determined this change warranted a supplement to the COL SEIS. On 

February 7, 2011, the staff issued a notice of intent to prepare an SEIS in conjunction with its 

review of Dominion’s revised application. When Dominion notified the NRC of its intent to revert 

back to the ESBWR design (April 2013) the staff had not yet completed its draft supplement to 

the COL SEIS. Although the ESBWR design was the design evaluated in the COL SEIS, the 

design had changed in areas that could affect environmental determinations, as documented in 

the COL SEIS. The staff completed a review of those changes, along with an evaluation of new 

information unrelated to the reactor design change. The staff determined that none of the new 

information identified to date was sufficiently significant to warrant continuing with the staff’s 

intent to prepare an SEIS. Therefore, on January 29, 2015, the NRC withdrew its previously 

noticed intent to supplement the COL SEIS (80 FR 4949). 

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

To support the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) in providing an independent 

review and report to the Commission on the COLA for North Anna Unit 3, the staff presented the 

results of its safety review to the ESBWR subcommittee on October 19, 2016. The staff 

presented the results of its review of the COLA for North Anna Unit 3 to the ACRS Full 

Committee on November 9, 2016. ACRS issued its final letter regarding the North Anna COLA 
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on November 15, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16312A412). This letter is discussed further 

below.

II. Outreach

Public Meetings

Before the NRC docketed the COLA for North Anna Unit 3, the staff held a public outreach 

meeting in Louisa County, Virginia, on October 24, 2007, to discuss the safety and 

environmental review of the anticipated COLA, to describe opportunities for public participation 

in the review process, and to take questions from the public. On April 16, 2008, the staff held a 

scoping meeting in Louisa County, Virginia, to discuss the environmental scoping process and 

to give members of the public an opportunity to comment on environmental issues that the NRC 

should consider during its review of the application. After issuing the draft SEIS (DSEIS) in 

December 2008 the staff held a public meeting in Louisa County, Virginia, on February 3, 2009, 

to present an overview of the DSEIS and to accept comments on the document. 

While reviewing the application, the staff conducted approximately 100 public meetings and 

public conference calls.

Federal Register Notices

The NRC published FR notices, as required, for key milestones of the licensing process as 

follows:

• On December 4, 2007, the NRC published a notice of issuance of ESP-003 to Dominion 

Nuclear North Anna, LLC, for approval of a site located near Lake Anna in Louisa 

County, VA, approximately 64 km (40 mi) north-northwest of Richmond, Virginia, for one 

or more nuclear power reactors (72 FR 68202).

• After the NRC received the COLA on November 27, 2007, the agency published notice 

of such receipt in the FR on December 12, 2007 (72 FR 70619).

• The NRC docketed the COLA on January 28, 2008, and published a notice of docketing 

on February 4, 2008 (73 FR 6528).

• On March 10, 2008, the NRC published a notice of hearing and opportunity to petition for 

leave to intervene (73 FR 12760). On April 18, 2008, the NRC published a supplement 

to the notice of hearing and opportunity for leave to intervene, which included 

procedures for access to sensitive unclassified non-Safeguards Information and 

Safeguards Information for contention preparation (73 FR 12760). On June 2, 2008, the 

NRC published a correction to the notice of hearing and opportunity for leave to 

intervene to correctly identify the applicants (73 FR 31516).

• On March 13, 2008, the NRC published a notice of intent to prepare an SEIS

(73 FR 13589). On July 17, 2008, the NRC published a correction and supplement to 

the notice of intent to prepare an SEIS (73 FR 41132). 
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• On December 24, 2008, the NRC published a notice of the availability of the draft COL 

SEIS for public comment and notice of public meetings to present an overview of the 

draft COL SEIS and accept public comments (73 FR 79197). 

• On March 24, 2010, the NRC published a notice of availability of the COL SEIS for North 

Anna Unit 3 (75 FR 14207). 

• On February 7, 2011, the NRC published a notice of intent to prepare an SEIS and 

conduct scoping in conjunction with its review of Dominion’s revised application for

the US-APWR (76 FR 6638).

• On January 29, 2015, the NRC published a notice of withdrawal of its intent to 

prepare an SEIS, based on the applicant’s decision to return to the ESBWR, which 

was the design originally referenced and evaluated in the COL SEIS (80 FR 4949). 

• On April 27, May 4, May 11, and May 18, 2016, the NRC published notices of the

COLA in accordance with Section 182c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended (AEA), and 10 CFR 50.43(a)(3) (81 FR 24900, 81 FR 26837, 81 FR 29308, 

and 81 FR 31263).

Consultations

In accordance with Section 657 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the NRC consulted with the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. As part of its environmental review in accordance with

the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable statutes, including the 

Endangered Species Act and the National Historic Preservation Act, the staff consulted with and 

obtained input from the appropriate Federal, State, local, and Tribal organizations. Consultation 

with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) is currently in progress to determine whether that 

agency concurs with the staff’s determination that the construction and operation of North Anna 

Unit 3 will have no adverse effect on Federally protected species.

Adjudicatory Actions

On March 10, 2008, the NRC published in the FR (73 FR 12760) a notice of hearing and 

opportunity to petition for leave to intervene in the North Anna Unit 3 COL proceeding.1

 On 

April 18, 2008, the NRC published in the FR (73 FR 21162) a supplement to the notice of 

hearing and opportunity to petition for leave to intervene. Two organizations, Blue Ridge 

Environmental Defense League (BREDL), and People’s Alliance for Clean Energy (PACE), 

petitioned for leave to intervene (ADAMS Accession No. ML081330002). The North Carolina 

Utilities Commission (NCUC) submitted a request to participate as an interested State under 

10 CFR 2.315 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081300423). On August 15, 2008, an ASLB

established for the COL proceeding granted BREDL’s petition and approved NCUC’s request to 

participate. The Board found that PACE lacked standing and denied its petition. Of BREDL’s 

contentions, the Board only admitted Contention 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082320065). 

This contention, as narrowed by the Board, alleged that Dominion’s COLA failed to adequately 

explain how Dominion would meet regulations on the disposal of Class B and C low-level 

radioactive waste (LLRW) in the absence of an offsite disposal facility.

 1 For background on contested adjudicatory matters resolved in the NAPS ESP proceeding, see LBP-06-24, 

64 NRC 360 (2006).
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Dominion subsequently filed an update to its COLA on May 21, 2009, which provided its plan for 

managing LLRW (ADAMS Accession No. ML091520636). The Board found that this additional 

information made Contention 1 moot and, therefore, dismissed it (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML092310462). However, the Board retained jurisdiction over the case to 

consider a new LLRW contention submitted on June 26, 2009. The Board admitted the new 

contention, in part, on November 25, 2009 (LBP-09-27, ADAMS Accession No. ML093290168).

Contention 10, as narrowed by the Board, challenged the Dominion claim that good fuel 

performance would reduce the volume of Class B and C waste generated and thus questioned 

the adequacy of Dominion’s LLRW management plan. On June 29, 2010, Dominion filed a 

notice of revision of its COLA, incorporating the US-APWR design instead of the ESBWR. As 

the revised COLA did not contain the claim of improved fuel efficiency, the Board found that 

Contention 10 was moot and dismissed it (LBP-10-17, ADAMS Accession No. ML102450665). 

In the same order, the Board denied admission of an additional proposed contention. Although 

this resolved all admitted and pending contentions, the Board retained jurisdiction to consider 

new contentions BREDL might file pursuant to a previous scheduling order. 

On September 22, 2011, BREDL submitted Contention 14, concerning the necessity of changes 

to the COLA in light of an earthquake that occurred near the proposed reactor site on 

August 23, 2011. Following a consent motion by all parties, Contention 14 was held in 

abeyance pending an assessment by Dominion of whether changes to the Unit 3 application 

should be made in light of the earthquake (ADAMS Accession No. ML11293A207).

While Contention 14 was still in abeyance, Dominion appealed the Board’s decision not to 

terminate the hearing after the resolution of all other contentions. Dominion argued that the 

Board should have terminated the hearing at that point, as there were no unresolved 

contentions remaining. The Commission agreed with Dominion that the Board had erred in 

keeping the adjudicatory record open; the Commission held that new contentions would need to 

meet the standards for reopening the record, and it remanded the proceeding to the Board for 

the limited purpose of ruling on a motion to reopen the record with respect to Contention 14 

(CLI-12-14, ADAMS Accession No. ML12159A164). 

On March 7, 2014, BREDL filed a motion to reopen the proceeding and admit an amended 

Contention 14. On June 13, 2014, the Board denied the motion and rejected Contention 14 

(LBP-14-08, ADAMS Accession No. ML14164A543). 

A contention, motion to reopen, and suspension petition concerning safety issues related to the 

disposal of spent nuclear fuel were filed in this proceeding and others on September 29, 2014. 

The Commission denied the contention, motion to reopen, and suspension petition on

February 26, 2015 (CLI-15-4, ADAMS Accession No. ML15057A288). On January 28, 2015, a 

petition was filed to supplement the EISs in this and other proceedings to reference the

“Continued Storage” generic environmental impact statement (GEIS) (NUREG-2157; see 

below). The Commission denied this petition on April 23, 2015 (CLI-15-10, ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15113A280). The intervenors subsequently filed a hearing request, intervention petition, 

and motion to reopen, seeking admission of a “placeholder” contention on the NRC’s reliance 

on the Continued Storage Rule and GEIS. The Commission denied these requests on 

June 9, 2015 (CLI-15-15, ADAMS Accession No. ML15160A174).

Currently, all contested issues in this proceeding have been resolved.
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Other Significant Adjudicatory Matters

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan in March 2011 a 

petition to suspend all reactor licensing decisions and certain aspects of ongoing licensing 

proceedings were filed in several proceedings beginning on April 14, 2011. Although the 

petition was not filed in this proceeding, the petition filed in other proceedings included 

references to North Anna Unit 3. On September 9, 2011, the Commission denied the 

suspension petition but granted the intervenors' request for a safety analysis to the extent that 

the NRC would conduct a short-term and long-term lessons-learned analysis of the Fukushima 

accident (CLI-11-05, ADAMS Accession No. ML11252B072). 

On February 27, 2014, a petition was filed in this and other proceedings to suspend licensing 

decisions pending the resolution of a rulemaking petition on the environmental impacts of 

high-density spent fuel pool storage. The Commission denied this petition on July 17, 2014 

(CLI-14-07, ADAMS Accession No. ML14198A127). 

III. Review Process/Methodology

The key processes and methodologies used to ensure quality, consistency, and completeness 

in the preparation of the FSER and COL SEIS are described below. 

NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for 

Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light-Water Reactor] Edition” (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML070660036). The principal purpose of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) is to ensure the 

quality and uniformity of staff safety reviews. The staff uses the SRP as a routine tool for 

evaluating the safety of nuclear power plant designs. The SRP, comprehensively updated 

in 2007, is the most definitive basis available for demonstrating whether an application meets 

the Commission’s regulations. Each section of the SRP outlines the specific regulations that will 

be met when the review is complete, including the general design criteria (GDC) from 

Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic 

Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.”

NUREG-1555, “Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power 

Plants: Environmental Standard Review Plan.” This guidance, including a 2007 update that 

addresses environmental reviews for COLAs, includes environmental SRPs that staff uses 

when conducting environmental reviews of applications related to nuclear power plants, in 

accordance with NEPA and the NRC’s NEPA implementing regulations in 10 CFR Part 51.

NUREG-2157, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel,” issued September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14198A440). The NRC 

prepared a final GEIS that establishes a regulatory basis for the final rule entitled “Continued 

Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel.” As directed by 10 CFR 51.23(b), the impacts assessed in 

NUREG-2157 are deemed to be incorporated in an EIS for an ESP or a COL.

SRM-SECY-12-0025, “Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to 

Lessons Learned from Japan’s March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami,”

dated March 9, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120690347). This staff requirements 

memorandum (SRM) gives direction to the staff on implementing the Commission-approved 

recommended actions to be taken in response to Fukushima lessons learned. 
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SECY-06-0019, “Semiannual Update of the Status of New Reactor Licensing Activities and

Future Planning for New Reactors,” dated January 31, 2006 (ADAMS Accession

No. ML053530315). Under the DCRA, NRO has used, to the extent practicable, a “one

issue—one review—one position” strategy to optimize the review effort and resources needed to

perform these reviews. Within the ESBWR design center, the staff has conducted one

technical review for each reactor design issue and is using this one decision to support the

review of multiple COLAs.

Regulatory Guides. Regulatory guides (RGs) provide guidance to licensees and applicants on 

implementing specific parts of the NRC's regulations, techniques used by the staff in evaluating 

specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the staff in its review of 

applications for permits or licenses. Chapter 1, Table 1.9-202, “Conformance with Regulatory

Guides,” of the applicant’s FSAR identifies the RGs associated with the COLA for North Anna

Unit 3 and notes whether the applicant conformed to or departed from each RG. This list does 

not include departures from regulatory guidance associated with the ESBWR DCD and the 

NAPS ESP that have been incorporated by reference.

Interim Staff Guidance. For areas where the existing SRP does not contain review guidance, 

the staff prepared and used interim staff guidance (ISG) documents, found at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/isg/. The ISGs clarify technical review 

approaches and address questions related to processes and licensing. The following list 

indicates the ISGs the staff used in the review of the COLA for North Anna Unit 3 and the FSER 

section(s) to which each ISG primarily relates:

• DC/COL-ISG-1, “Interim Staff Guidance on Seismic Issues of High Frequency Ground 

Motion,” dated May 19, 2008; FSER Section 3.7.2

• DC/COL-ISG-7, “Assessment of Normal and Extreme Winter Precipitation Loads on the 

Roofs of Seismic Category I Structures,” dated June 23, 2009; FSER Section 2.3.1

• DC/COL-ISG-8, “Necessary Content of Plant-Specific Technical Specifications,” dated 

December 9, 2008; FSER Chapter 16

• DC/COL-ISG-13, “Assessing the Radiological Consequences of Accidental Releases of 

Radioactive Materials from Liquid Waste Tanks for Combined License Applications,” 

issued January 2013; FSER Sections 2.4.13, 11.2

• DC/COL-ISG-14, “Assessing the Radiological Consequences of Accidental Releases of 

Radioactive Materials from Liquid Waste Tanks in Ground and Surface Waters for 

Combined License Applications,” issued January 2013; FSER Sections 2.4.13, 11.2

• DC/COL-ISG-16, “Compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) and 10 CFR 52.80(d)” 

(nonpublic), dated June 9, 2010; FSER Section 19A

• DC/COL-ISG-17, “Ensuring Hazard-Consistent Seismic Input for Site Response and Soil 

Structure Interaction Analyses,” dated March 24, 2010; FSER Section 3.7.1

• DC/COL-ISG-20, “Seismic Margin Analysis for New Reactors Based on Probabilistic 

Risk Assessment,” dated March 15, 2010; FSER Sections 19.2 and 19A
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• DC/COL-ISG-22, “Interim Staff Guidance on Impact of Construction of New Nuclear 

Power Plant Units on Operating Units at Multi-Unit Sites,” dated May 11, 2012; FSER 

Section 1.4

• JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 0, “Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying 

Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-DesignBasis External Events, “dated August 29, 2012; FSER Section 20.1

• JLD-ISG-2012-03, Revision 0, “Compliance with Order EA-12-051, “Reliable Spent Fuel 

Pool Instrumentation,” dated August 29, 2012; FSER Sections 20.2 and 20.3

• NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, “Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants,” issued 

November 2011; FSER Section 13.3

Office Instructions. In its review, the staff followed administrative guidance contained in a 

number of office instructions. These internal documents address a range of procedural matters, 

including the staff’s process for issuing RAIs, handling audits, ensuring the qualification and 

training of technical staff and managers, ensuring consistency between staff offices, and 

overseeing interactions with applicants, intervenors, and public stakeholders.

New and Significant Review Process. The staff has developed a generic process to address 

circumstances in which there is an extended delay between the issuance of the final EIS for a 

particular license application review and the start of that proceeding’s mandatory hearing phase 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13199A170). This process provides guidance to the environmental 

staff on identifying potentially new and significant information after the draft EIS or final EIS is 

issued to determine its significance and to consider whether the information requires a 

supplement to the draft EIS or final EIS in accordance with 10 CFR 51.72(a) or 51.92(a).

IV. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Report

The ACRS review of the North Anna 3 COL application culminated with a letter to the 

Commission dated November 15, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16312A412), concluding 

that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that North Anna Unit 3 can be built and operated 

without undue risk to public health and safety and that the Commission should approve the 

North Anna Unit 3 COL application; (2) the North Anna Unit 3 site-specific departures and 

exemptions from the ESBWR DCD in the areas of seismic design and analysis, electrical power 

distribution system, liquid effluent discharge, and design for hurricane wind generated missiles 

are acceptable and should be approved; and (3) there is reasonable assurance that the ESBWR 

design and North Anna Unit 3 site satisfy the requirements resulting from the Fukushima NearTerm Task Force Recommendations (ADAMS Accession No. ML14252A294). The ACRS letter 

did not identify any further issues or actions required by the staff. The staff responded to the 

ACRS in a letter dated December 22, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16340A261), in which 

the staff thanked the ACRS for their time and efforts.
The Commissioners - 12 -

DISCUSSION:

I. Excluded Matters

This section discusses matters that were previously addressed and resolved in the context of 

other reviews undertaken as part of the 10 CFR Part 52 process. Such excluded matters 

include issues addressed under the ESBWR design certification review or the NAPS ESP

review.

The SER and EIS for the NAPS ESP contain a complete list of matters resolved by the ESP. In 

the ESP proceeding, the ASLB conducted an uncontested (mandatory) hearing that considered 

the adequacy of the staff’s review, including such aspects as site characterization (hydrology, 

soil, vadose zone, groundwater, and aquifers), tritium, zero release commitment (of 

radionuclides into any potential liquid pathways), radiological releases and doses from normal 

operations, surface water impacts and possible mitigation measures, seismic safety, and 

environmental impacts of alternatives. Following the proceeding, the Board determined that the 

staff’s safety and environmental reviews were adequate and supported issuance of the ESP 

(see NAPS ESP initial decision on the uncontested hearing, LBP-07-09, dated June 29, 2007

(ADAMS Accession No. ML071800470)). The Commission issued its order approving issuance 

of the ESP on November 20, 2007 (see Memorandum and Order, CLI-07-27, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML073240391).

A full discussion of matters resolved by the ESBWR DCR, and thus excluded from the 

uncontested hearing, can be found in the final rule (79 FR 61943). As explained in the rule, 

those resolved matters include, for example, all nuclear safety issues associated with the 

information in the FSER and Supplement 1, Tier 1 and Tier 2 information, the documents listed 

in the table to the DCR, and the rulemaking record for certification of the ESBWR design, with 

the exceptions specified below. The ESBWR rulemaking also resolves all environmental issues 

concerning severe accident mitigation design alternatives associated with the information in the 

NRC’s environmental assessment for the ESBWR design and NEDO-33306, Revision 4, 

“ESBWR Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives,” dated October 2010 for plants 

referencing the DCD with site characteristics that fall within those site parameters in 

NEDO-33306.

The ESBWR DCR does not provide finality on certain matters that, therefore, remain for COL 

applicants to consider. These include, for example, generic technical specifications and other 

operational requirements such as human factors engineering procedure development and 

training program development; hurricane loads on certain structures, systems, and components 

(SSCs) described in the generic DCD that are not bounded by the total tornado loads analyzed 

in the generic DCD; hurricane-generated missile loads on certain SSCs described in the generic 

DCD that are not bounded by tornado-generated missile loads analyzed in the generic DCD; 

and two limited aspects of spent fuel pool level instrumentation design (in regard to the 

connection of an independent power source and how the instrumentation will maintain its design 

accuracy following a power interruption or change in power source without recalibration). 

Furthermore, several tables in the DCD identify COL areas that interface with corresponding 

areas of the certified design. Tables 1.8-1 and 1.8-2 of the DCD list the interfaces between the 

COL and the certified design. Table 1.10-1 identifies the COL information items that address 

areas for which a COL applicant referencing the ESBWR design must provide additional 

supporting information to meet a regulatory requirement. The staff review of the COLA for North 

Anna Unit 3 confirmed that the applicant satisfactorily addressed all interface items and COL 

information items.
The Commissioners - 13 -

II. Exemptions, Departures, and Variances

Exemptions from NRC Regulations

The COLA for North Anna Unit 3 identified five requests for exemption from NRC regulations. 

An exemption request is required when the COL applicant takes a departure from Tier 1, 

generic technical specifications (TS) and other operational requirements identified in a DCD. 

These requests require NRC review and approval. The staff evaluated and found acceptable 

the five exemptions from NRC regulations requested by the applicant. These exemption 

requests are summarized in Table 1 below and discussed in more detail below:

Table 1: North Anna Unit 3 COLA Exemptions Table

COL 

Part 7 

Exemption

Description Regulation

Location of 

Evaluation in 

FSER

1 An exemption is requested to apply the 

same regulations for the special nuclear 

material (SNM) control and accounting 

(MC&A) program description under 

10 CFR Part 52 as for licensed reactors 

under 10 CFR Part 50.

10 CFR 70.22(b), 

70.32(c), 74.31, 

74.41, 74.51

Chapter 1 

Section 1.5.4

2 An exemption is requested for certain 

information depicted on DCD Tier 1,

Figure 2.13.1-1, “Electric Power 

Distribution System Functional 

Arrangement,” Sheet 1.

As permitted by 

10 CFR 52.7 and 

Section VIII.A.4 of 

the DCR

Chapter 8

Section 8.1

3 An exemption is requested for a new 

definition in Tier 1 and a change to 

DCD Tier 1, Table 5.1-1, footnote (4) to 

define the Unit 3 safe-shutdown 

earthquake (SSE) for purposes of 

performing the verification, through 

inspections, tests, and analyses, that 

applicable acceptance criteria specified 

in DCD Tier 1 inspections, tests, 

analyses, and acceptance criteria 

(ITAAC) are met for the seismic design, 

analyses, and qualification of SSCs.

10 CFR 50.12, 

52.7, and

52.63(b)(1).

Chapter 3

Section 3.7
The Commissioners - 14 -

COL 

Part 7 

Exemption

Description Regulation

Location of 

Evaluation in 

FSER

4 An exemption is requested to change 

the following definition, “The liquid 

waste management system (LWMS)

either returns processed water to the 

condensate system or discharges to the 

environment via the circulating water 

system.” This description is changed 

to, “The LWMS either returns 

processed water to the condensate 

system or discharges to the 

environment using the liquid radwaste 

effluent discharge pipeline.”

10 CFR 50.12, 

52.7, and 

52.63(b)(1).

Chapter 11

Section 11.2

5 An exemption is requested to modify

footnote 7 to DCD Tier I, Table 5.1-1, to 

specify that the Unit 3 site-specific 

missile velocities derived in accordance 

with RG 1.221, “Design-Basis 

Hurricane and Hurricane Missiles for 

Nuclear Power Plants,” issued 

October 2011, are used in the design of 

structures housing Regulatory 

Treatment of Non-Safety Systems

(RTNSS) equipment when the sitespecific missiles are more severe than 

the missiles specified in the DCD.

10 CFR 50.12, 

52.7, and 

52.63(b)(1).

Chapter 19

Appendix 19A

North Anna Unit 3 Exemption 1

In accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(b), current applicants requesting a license to possess SNM 

must submit a full description of their MC&A program and show compliance with 10 CFR 74.31, 

“Nuclear Material Control and Accounting for Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic 

Significance”; 10 CFR 74.33, “Nuclear Material Control and Accounting for Uranium Enrichment 

Facilities Authorized To Produce Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significance”; 

10 CFR 74.41, “Nuclear Material Control and Accounting for Special Nuclear Material of 

Moderate Strategic Significance”; or 10 CFR 74.51, “Nuclear Material Control and Accounting 

for Strategic Special Nuclear Material,” as applicable. Also, in accordance with 

10 CFR 70.32(c), applicants requesting a license to possess SNM in a quantity exceeding 

1 effective kilogram are subject to a condition to maintain and follow an MC&A program for SNM 

in which decreases to the program’s effectiveness will be submitted as a license amendment 

request under 10 CFR 70.34, “Amendment of Licenses.” However, the requirements in 

10 CFR 70.22(b) and 10 CFR 70.32(c) contain an exclusion for licensees governed by 

10 CFR Part 50, including existing nuclear power plants. 

In addition, the regulations referenced by 10 CFR 70.22(b) (10 CFR 74.31, 74.33, 74.41, 

and 74.51) either do not apply to reactors or explicitly exclude reactors licensed under 

10 CFR Part 50. The COLA for North Anna Unit 3 was submitted, and accepted, as a licensing 

action for a nuclear power plant under 10 CFR Part 52, rather than 10 CFR Part 50. The 
The Commissioners - 15 -

exclusions described above in 10 CFR Part 70, “Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear 

Material,” and 10 CFR Part 74, “Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material,” 

do not include 10 CFR Part 52 applicants, even though, for the purposes of the requirement, the 

applications are for the same facility type. For both 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52 

applicants, Subpart B, “General Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements,” of 

10 CFR Part 74 (excluding 10 CFR 74.17, “Special Nuclear Material Physical Inventory 

Summary Report”) contains the appropriate MC&A performance requirements. 

The applicant requested an exemption from the requirements in 10 CFR 70.22(b), 70.32(c), 

74.31, 74.41, and 74.51, that an SNM license application describe an MC&A program and that 

the applicant establish, implement, maintain, and follow an MC&A program. The applicant 

provided a full discussion of the exemption request and noted that the cited regulations include 

exceptions from these requirements for nuclear reactors licensed under 10 CFR Part 50. The 

purpose of the request was to achieve an exception similar to the exemption already granted by 

regulation to a reactor applicant licensed pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC has also 

granted the same exemption to the applicants for previously issued COLs.

The staff evaluated this exemption request and determined that such an exemption is 

authorized by law, will not present undue risk to the public health or safety, and is consistent 

with the common defense and security, and that special circumstances are present as 

described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) because the Commission determined that these 

requirements are unnecessary for similar 10 CFR Part 50 applicants. The staff’s evaluation of 

the exemption request appears in the FSER section listed in the table above.

North Anna Unit 3 Exemptions 2–5

The applicant for North Anna Unit 3 requested Exemptions 2 through 5 from the provisions of 

10 CFR Part 52, Appendix E, Section III.B, which requires an applicant referencing a certified 

design to incorporate by reference Tier 1 information. In Exemption 2, the applicant proposed 

revising the ESBWR DCD Tier 1, Figure 2.13.1-1, Sheet 1, to accommodate site space 

constraints by adding an intermediate switchyard to revise the location information for the main 

generator circuit breaker and the two motor-operated disconnects. In Exemption 3, the 

applicant found that site-specific seismic conditions described in FSAR Chapter 2 and 

Section 3.7.1 are not bounded by the ESBWR DCD seismic design parameters. Therefore, 

North Anna Unit 3 defines the SSE to include the certified seismic design response spectra 

(CSDRS) and the site-specific foundation input response spectra (FIRS) for each seismically 

qualified structure. This exemption is related to the partial seismic exceedances of the sitespecific horizontal and vertical FIRS when compared to the ESBWR CSDRS and represents 

changes to the DCD Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 2* information as described in the Departure NAPS 

DEP 3.7-1. In Exemption 4, the applicant proposed revising the ESBWR DCD Tier 1 description 

of the LWMS discharge for North Anna Unit 3. In Exemption 5, the applicant proposed a sitespecific ESBWR DCD Tier 1 departure from DCD Tier 1, Table 5.1-1, “Envelope of ESBWR 

Standard Plant Site Parameters,” which includes criteria for the design of structures housing 

RTNSS SSCs to resist maximum hurricane winds and hurricane-wind-generated missiles. 

The staff evaluated these four exemption requests and determined that such exemptions are

authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent 

with the common defense and security, and that special circumstances under 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2)(ii) are present because application of the regulation in the particular circumstances 

would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule or outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in 
The Commissioners - 16 -

standardization caused by the exemption. The staff’s full evaluation of these four ESBWR 

Tier 1 exemption requests appear in the FSER sections listed in the above table.

Departures from ESBWR Design Control Document, Revision 10

The COLA for North Anna Unit 3 identified six departures from the ESBWR design. Departures 

by a COL applicant from Tier 1, Tier 2*, generic TS and other operational requirements in a 

DCD require NRC approval. Departures by a COL applicant for Tier 1, generic TS, and other 

operational requirements require NRC approval in the form of an exemption. The Tier 2 

departures are subject to a process similar to that set forth in 10 CFR 50.59, as described in 10 

CFR Part 52, Appendix E, Section VIII.B.5, and do not necessarily require NRC approval. Part 

7 of the COLA describes, justifies, and evaluates the departures against criteria in 10 CFR Part 

52, Appendix E, Section VIII.B.5 to determine whether the applicant could implement the 

departure without NRC approval. Part 7 of the COLA also identifies the affected sections in the 

FSAR. The staff evaluated the applicant’s proposed departures from information in the ESBWR 

DCD, Revision 10, and the evaluations are presented in the FSER sections as presented in the 

Table 2 below:

Table 2: North Anna Unit 3 COLA Departures Table

DCD 

Departure 

Number

Location of Evaluation in North 

Anna Unit 3 COLA

Staff Evaluation 

FSER Section Description

NAPS DEP 

3.7-1

FSAR Sections 1.3, 1.11, 2.0, 

3.7, 3.8, 4.2, 9.1, 19.1, 19.2, 

19.5, and Appendices 3A, 3C, 

3G, and 19A

FSER Sections 

1.3, 2.0, 3.7, 3.8, 

3.9, 3.12, 4.2, 

and 19A

Ground Response Spectra for 

Seismic Structural Loads and 

Floor Response Spectra

NAPS DEP 

8.1-1

FSAR Section Figure 8.1-1, 

Sheet 1, and Section 8.2.1.2.1

FSER Section 

8.1

Electrical Power System 

Functional Arrangement

NAPS DEP 

8.1-2

FSAR Section 8.1.5.2.4 and 

Table 8.1-1R

FSER Section 

8.1 Switchyard Surge Protection

NAPS DEP 

11.4-1

FSAR Sections 1.2.2.10.2, 

1.2.2.16.9, 11.4, 11.4.1, 

11.4.2.2.1, 11.4.2.2.2, 11.4.2.2.4, 

11.4.2.3.1,

12.2 and 12.3; FSAR Tables 1.9-

11R, 9A.5-5R, 11.4-1R, 11.4-2R, 

12.2-22R, and 12.3-8R; and

FSAR Figures 1.2-21R, 1.2-22R, 

1.2-23R, 1.2-24R, 1.2-25R, 

9A.2-20R, 9A.2-21R, 9A.2-22R,

9A.2-23R, 9A.2-24R, 11.4-1R, 

11.4-2R, 12.3-19R, 12.3-20R, 

12.3-21R, 12.3-22R, 12.3-39R,

12.3-40R, 12.3-41R, 12.3-42R, 

12.3-61R, 12.3-62R, 12.3-63R, 

and 12.3-64R

FSER Sections 

11.4 and 12.2

Long-term, Temporary Storage 

of Class B and C Low-Level 

Radioactive Waste
The Commissioners - 17 -

• NAPS DEP 3.7-1 Ground Response Spectra for Seismic Structural Loads

and Floor Response Spectra

The proposed NAPS DEP 3.7.1 is a result of the North Anna site-specific FIRS exceeding the 

CSDRS at certain frequencies and involves changes to ESBWR DCD Tier 1 and Tier 2* 

information. The applicant revised the definition for the SSE to include the site-specific FIRS for 

each seismically qualified structure. Changes were identified in FSAR Sections 1.3, 1.11, 2.0, 

3.7, 3.8, 4.2, 9.1, 19.1, 19.2, and 19.5, and FSAR Appendices 3A, 3C, 3G, and 19A. The staff 

evaluated the NAPS DEP 3.7-1 in the appropriate sections of the FSER for each applicable 

section of the North Anna 3 FSAR and found it to be acceptable.

Because the SSE is defined in DCD Tier 1, a request for exemption from DCD Tier 1 

information was provided in Exemption 3 as described above. The staff evaluated this 

exemption request and found it acceptable in Section 3.7.1 in the FSER. This departure also 

involves Tier 2* information related to the redefinition of the operating basis earthquake (OBE). 

The changes to the OBE definition are identified in FSAR Section 3.7.1 and reviewed in FSER 

Section 3.7.1. 

• NAPS DEP 8.1-1 Electrical Power Distribution System Functional Arrangement

Because of physical space constraints on the North Anna Unit 3 site for the switchyard, the 

applicant proposed NAPS DEP 8.1-1 in order to change the on-site power supply system 

specified in ESBWR DCD Tier 1, Figure 2.13.1-1, Sheet 1, “Electric Power Distribution System 

Functional Arrangement,” to accommodate an intermediate switchyard as part of the on-site 

power supply system for the ESBWR standard plant design. The intermediate switchyard does 

not change the functions performed by plant components. Because the requested departure 

involves DCD Tier 1 information, a request for exemption is provided as Exemption 2, which is 

described above. The staff evaluated this exemption request and found it acceptable in Section 

8.1 of the FSER.

• NAPS DEP 8.1-2 Switch Yard Surge Protection

The applicant proposed NAPS DEP 8.1-2 in order to identify exceptions related to switchyard 

surge protection from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) C62.23, 

“Application Guide for Surge Protection of Electric Generating Plants” (as endorsed by RG 

1.204, “Guidelines for Lightning Protection of Nuclear Power Plants”), which is described in Tier 

2 information in the ESBWR DCD. The staff found that the applicant addressed each 

subsection of the standard for which an exception was taken, reviewed each exception, and 

concurred with the applicant that either the subsection did not apply in the case of North Anna 

Unit 3 or that the measures taken provided equivalent protection. The staff therefore found this 

departure to be acceptable, as discussed in Section 8.1 of the FSER.

NAPS DEP 

12.3-1 FSAR Section 11.2.3.2 FSER Section 11.2

Liquid Radwaste Effluent 

Discharge Piping Flow Path

NAPS DEP 

19A-1

FSAR Section 2.0 

Table 2.2-201, and 

Appendix 19A

FSER Section 

19, Appendix 

19A

Design of Structures Housing 

RTNSS Equipment for 

Hurricane-Wind-Generated 

Missiles
The Commissioners - 18 -

• NAPS DEP 11.4-1 Long-term, Temporary Storage of Class B and C Low-Level 

Radioactive Waste

The ESBWR DCD states that the radwaste building (RWB) provides onsite storage space for a 

6-month volume of packaged low-level radioactive waste. The applicant proposed NAPS DEP 

11.4-1 in order to configure the North Anna Unit 3 RWB to accommodate a minimum of 10 

years of Class B and C waste, while maintaining space for at least 3 months of packaged Class 

A waste. This departure is accomplished by reconfiguring the arrangement of systems and 

components within the design of the ESBWR RWB. The applicant provided various revised 

tables and figures for the new arrangement of systems and components in the reconfigured 

RWB. The applicant stated that NAPS DEP 11.4-1 only affects Tier 2 information. The staff 

confirmed that the departure only affects Tier 2 information and found the departure to be 

acceptable, as discussed in Section 11.4 and 12.2 of the FSER.

• NAPS DEP 12.3-1 Liquid Radwaste Effluent Discharge Piping Flow Path

The applicant proposed NAPS DEP 12.3-1 in order to change ESBWR DCD Tier 1 information 

related to the definition of the LWMS system discharge for North Anna Unit 3. The LWMS either 

returns processed water to the condensate system or discharges it to the environment. NAPS 

DEP 12.3-1 changes the discharge pathway to the environment from the circulating water 

system, as specified in the ESBWR DCD, to the liquid radwaste effluent discharge pipeline. 

Therefore, a request for exemption from DCD Tier 1 information is provided in Exemption 4 as 

described in the North Anna Unit 3 COL FSAR. The staff evaluated this exemption request and 

found it acceptable in Section 11.2 of the FSER.

The applicant also proposed NAPS DEP 12.3-1 in order to change the North Anna Unit 3 liquid 

effluent discharge pathway described in the ESBWR DCD Tier 2 information. The changes are 

to not use the cooling tower blowdown line to transfer radwaste effluent to the environment; and, 

to extend the liquid radwaste effluent discharge pipeline to transfer liquid radwaste from the 

LWMS, in the RWB, to the environment. This departure will simplify design and construction of 

the cooling tower blow-down line. The staff has reviewed this departure and agrees with the 

applicant that this Tier 2 departure does not change the function of this pipeline as described in 

the ESBWR DCD, and that the liquid radwaste effluent discharge pipeline will be extended to 

transfer liquid radwaste effluent from the LWMS directly to the environment only as necessary. 

The staff found this departure acceptable, as described in Section 11.2 of the FSER.

• NAPS DEP 19A-1 Design of Structures Housing RTNSS Equipment for Hurricane

Wind Generated Missiles

The applicant proposed a site-specific Tier 1 DCD departure from DCD Tier 1, Table 5.1-1, 

“Envelope of ESBWR Standard Plant Site Parameters,” which includes criteria for the design of 

structures housing RTNSS SSCs to resist maximum hurricane winds and hurricane wind 

generated missiles. Therefore, a request for exemption from DCD Tier 1 information is provided 

in Exemption 5 as described in the North Anna Unit 3 COL FSAR. This departure also involved 

conforming changes to Tier 2* information in order to clarify that the design of RTNSS structures 

will account for the most limiting hurricane missile.

Since the ESBWR DCD approval, the NRC has issued new guidance related to hurricane 

generated missiles in RG 1.221, “Design Basis-Hurricane and Hurricane Missiles for Nuclear 

Power Plants.” The applicant requested that DCD Tier 1 Table 5.1-1 be modified to take into 

account both the hurricane generated missiles described in the ESBWR DCD and the Unit 3 
The Commissioners - 19 -

site-specific hurricane generated missiles evaluated in accordance with the new guidance in RG 

1.221. The staff found this departure and exemption request to be acceptable, and the 

evaluation is in Section 19, Appendix 19A of the FSER as noted above.

Variances from the North Anna Power Station Early Site Permit

An applicant for a COL who references an early site permit may include requests for variance 

from one or more site characteristics, design parameters, or terms and conditions of the early 

site permit, or from the site safety analysis report. The COLA for the North Anna Unit 3 

identified requests for 18 variances from the NAPS ESP per the requirements in 10 CFR 

52.39(d) and are described in Table 3 below. In the identified FSER sections, the staff 

evaluated each variance request and determined that, for each variance, the alternative 

information supplied by the applicant was acceptable. Part 7, Section C, of the COLA describes 

the variances in detail. These variances are summarized in Table 3 below:

Table 3: NAPS ESP Variances

ESP Variance Number Location of 

Evaluation in FSER Description and Justification

NAPS ESP VAR 2.0-1 Section 2.3.5

This is a variance from ESP Site Safety Analysis 

Report (SSAR) Table 2.3-16 in order to use the 

site-specific Unit 3 maximum long-term dispersion 

estimates (χ/Q and D/Q) values as provided in 

FSAR Table 2.3-16R.

This variance is acceptable because the Unit 3 

maximum long-term dispersion estimates (χ/Q 

and D/Q) values were calculated for the ESBWR 

design site meteorological data and were used to 

determine Unit 3 doses. The estimated annual 

doses from normal gaseous effluent releases 

remain within applicable limits, as shown in FSAR 

Table 12.2-201.

NAPS ESP VAR 2.0-2 Section 2.4.12

This is a variance from ESP SSAR Table 1.9-1 in 

order to use the site-specific Unit 3 maximum 

hydraulic conductivity value as provided in FSAR 

Section 2.4.12.1.2.

This variance is acceptable for two reasons:

1. Compliance with 10 CFR Part 20, “Standards 

for Protection against Radiation,” is 

demonstrated in FSAR Section 2.4.13 with the 

use of a hydraulic conductivity value of 3.0 

meter(m)/day (9.9 feet (ft)/day) to evaluate 

radionuclide concentrations and associated 

doses resulting from a postulated accidental 

release of liquid effluents in the groundwater

pathways. The calculated radionuclide 

concentrations and associated doses are 

conservative, as the hydraulic conductivity of 
The Commissioners - 20 -

3.0 m/day (9.9 ft/day) is the maximum value 

identified in FSAR Table 2.4-16R.

2. The groundwater flow model used to evaluate 

the maximum ground water level elevation at 

the Unit 3 site incorporated the hydraulic 

conductivity values measured during the Unit 

3 subsurface investigation. The maximum 

groundwater level elevation in the power block 

area is predicted to range from approximately 

82.3 to 86.8 m (270 to 284 ft) North American 

Vertical Datum of 1988 (NAVD88) (82.6 to 

88.7 m (270.9 to 284.9 ft) National Geodetic 

Vertical Datum of 1929 (NGVD29)). The 

maximum groundwater level elevation in the 

power block area around seismic Category I 

structures is approximately 86.1 m (282.6 ft)

NAVD88 (86.4 m (283.5 ft) NGVD29) or 2.3 m 

(7.4 ft) below the design plant grade elevation 

of 88.4 m (290 ft) NAVD88 (88.7 m (290.9 ft)

NGVD29). As shown in FSAR Table 2.0-201, 

this Unit 3 site characteristic value for 

maximum groundwater level elevation falls 

within the DCD site parameter value in DCD 

Table 2.0-1. The ESBWR design assumes a 

maximum groundwater level no higher than 

0.61 m (2 ft) below the design plant grade 

elevation at a site and the Unit 3 site 

characteristic value of 2.3 m (7.4 ft) below the 

Unit 3 design plant grade meets this

requirement.

NAPS ESP VAR 2.0-3 Section 2.4.12

This is a variance from ESP SSAR Table 1.9-1 in 

order to use the site-specific Unit 3 hydraulic 

gradient value as provided in FSAR Section 

2.4.12.1.2.

This variance is acceptable because compliance 

with 10 CFR Part 20 is demonstrated in FSAR 

Section 2.4.13 with the use of the higher hydraulic 

gradient of 1.5 m (5 ft) per 30.5 m (100 ft) to 

evaluate radionuclide concentrations and 

associated doses as a result of a postulated 

accidental release of liquid effluents in the 

groundwater pathways.
The Commissioners - 21 -

NAPS ESP VAR 2.0-4 Section 2.5.2

This is a variance from the following:

1. ESP SSAR Figure 2.5-48A in order to use the 

site-specific Unit 3 horizontal and vertical 

spectral acceleration values for the ground 

motion response spectra (GMRS) values as 

provided in FSAR Figure 2.5.2-313;

2. ESP SSAR Section 2.5 References 1, 115, 

120 and 121 in order to use FSAR Reference 

2.5-233.

3. ESP SSAR Section 2.5.2.7 information on the 

OBE is moved to FSAR Section 3.7.

This variance is acceptable for the following 

reasons:

1. The variance in the ground motion response 

spectra (GMRS) control point location is 

justified because its location at a hypothetical

outcrop under the reactor building/fuel building 

(RB/FB) foundation is representative of the 

Unit 3 site below the foundations for the 

seismic Category I structures in the power 

block area. This location is also consistent 

with NUREG-0800, SRP Section 2.5.2, 

“Vibratory Ground Motion,” which specifies 

that the GMRS be defined on an outcrop or a 

hypothetical outcrop that will exist after 

excavation.

2. The variance in the horizontal and vertical 

spectral acceleration values results from and 

is justified not only by the change in control 

point location but also from application of 

updated methodology and data, consistent 

with current NRC guidance. The Unit 3 site 

GMRS was derived using the performancebased approach endorsed in RG 1.208, “A 

Performance-Based Approach to Define the 

Site-Specific Earthquake Ground Motion,”

issued March 2007 and the new models and 

databases for the central and eastern United 

States (CEUS) seismic source 

characterization (CEUS-SSC). To evaluate 

the potential significance of any 

reinterpretation of past earthquakes and to

consider the impact of more recent seismicity, 

including the 2011 magnitude (M) 5.8 Mineral, 
The Commissioners - 22 -

VA, earthquake, the CEUS-SSC earthquake 

catalog was reviewed and updated for the 

period 2009 through mid-December 2011. 

Therefore, by using RG 1.208 and updating 

the CEUS-SSC, the Unit 3 GMRS is 

acceptable. The number of frequencies was 

increased to 38, based on the minimum 

number of points specified in RG 1.206, 

“Combined License Applications for Nuclear 

Power Plants (LWR Edition),” issued 

June 2007 and RG 1.208. The site safety 

analysis report (SSAR), which presents 

21 points, was written before these documents 

were issued. Therefore, the FSAR was 

updated to conform to the existing guidance. 

3. The specification of the OBE in SSAR Section 

2.5.2.7 is moved to FSAR Section 3.7,

because neither SRP Section 2.5.2 nor the 

DCD requests that the OBE information be 

described in FSAR Section 2.5.2. Further, 

given that OBE instrumentation is likely to be 

at a surface location, the definition of the OBE 

ground motions should consider the site 

response of multiple possible surface or at 

grade locations, which is not assessed in 

FSAR Section 2.5.2 but is in FSAR Section 

3.7. Therefore, the OBE is defined in FSAR 

Section 3.7.

NAPS ESP VAR 2.0-5 Section 2.4.13

This is a variance request from ESP SSAR Tables 

1.9-1 and 2.4-20 in order to use the site-specific 

Unit 3 distribution coefficient (Kd) values as

provided in FSAR Table 2.4-206.

This variance is acceptable because compliance 

with 10 CFR Part 20 is demonstrated in FSAR 

Section 2.4.13 with the use of the minimum sitespecific Kd values to evaluate radionuclide

concentrations and associated doses as a result 

of a postulated accident release of liquid effluents 

in the groundwater pathways.

NAPS ESP VAR 2.0-6 Section 15.4

This is a variance from the accident source terms 

provided in ESP SSAR Chapter 15 in order to use 

the source terms as provided in ESBWR DCD 

Chapter 15, Sections 15.3 and 15.4 for analyses 

of design basis accidents.

This variance is acceptable for the following 

reasons:
The Commissioners - 23 -

1. Calculated doses for the ESBWR design are 

shown in DCD Chapter 15 to be within limits 

set by regulatory guidance documents and 

applicable regulations. These DCD analyses 

determined design-basis accident dose results 

based on assumed site parameters for shortterm (accident) meteorological dispersion 

factors (χ/Q)

2. Unit 3 site-specific short-term (χ/Q) values are 

demonstrated in FSAR Table 2.0-201 to fall 

within (are less than) the associated DCD site 

parameter values. Therefore, the dose 

consequences for the design-basis accidents 

evaluated in DCD Chapter 15 are bounding 

and applicable for the Unit 3 site, and, as 

shown in DCD Chapter 15 analyses, are within 

limits set by regulatory guidance documents 

and applicable regulations.

NAPS ESP VAR 2.0-7 Section 2.4.21,

Section 2.0

This is a variance from the following:

1. ESP-003 Appendix A Figure 1 in order to use 

the set of values as provided in FSAR Figure 

2.0-205 as State Plane coordinates.

2. Removal of Note 2 from ESP SSAR, Figure 

1.2-4.

This variance is acceptable for the following 

reasons:

1. The use of values given in FSAR Figure 2.0-

205 as State Plane coordinates corrects an

administrative error and establishes the 

correct State Plane coordinates.

2. Note 2 from ESP SSAR, Figure 1.2-4 states 

that “Abandoned Unit 3 and 4 Reactor Building 

Mat Foundations are to be removed.” The 

removal of this note is acceptable because the 

layout of the North Anna Unit 3 ESBWR 

design ensures that all Seismic Category I 

structures will be founded on new concrete fill 

with underlying sound rock, and all safetyrelated or Seismic Category I or II structures 

will be located away from the abandoned mat 

foundations. Therefore, removal of the 

abandoned mat foundations is not necessary.
The Commissioners - 24 -

NAPS ESP VAR 2.3-1 Section 2.3.1

This is a variance from ESP-003 Appendix A, ESP 

SSAR Section 2.3.1.3.2, and ESP SSAR Tables 

1.9-1 and 2.3-1 in order to use the site-specific 

Unit 3 site characteristic values for tornadoes as 

provided in FSAR Section 2.3.1.3.2 and Table 

2.3-225.

This variance is acceptable because compliance 

with NRC regulations, including 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix A, GDC 2, “Design Bases for Protection 

against Natural Phenomena,” is demonstrated by 

conformance to RG 1.76, Revision 1, “DesignBasis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear 

Power Plants,” issued March 2007. The use of 

RG 1.76, Revision 1, is also consistent with the 

site parameter values for an ESBWR, as shown in 

FSAR Table 2.0-201. The comparisons in that 

table demonstrate that the DCD site parameters 

for tornado characteristics bound the values for 

Unit 3.

NAPS ESP VAR 2.4-1 Section 2.4.12

This is a variance from ESP SSAR Section 

2.4.12.1.2 in order to use the site-specific Unit 3 

values for void ratio, porosity and seepage 

velocity of saprolite as provided in FSAR Section 

2.4.12.1.2.

This variance is acceptable because compliance 

with 10 CFR Part 20 is demonstrated in FSAR 

Section 2.4.13, which evaluates radionuclide 

concentrations and associated doses as a result 

of a postulated accidental release of liquid 

effluents in the groundwater pathways.

NAPS ESP VAR 2.4-2 Section 2.4.12

This is a variance from ESP SSAR Table 2.4-17 in 

order to use corrected information for the sitespecific Unit 3 values regarding the North Anna 

Power Station (NAPS) water supply wells as 

provided in FSAR Table 2.4-17R.

This variance is acceptable because the corrected 

and new information continues to support the 

conclusions in FSAR Section 2.4.12.1.3 that “[a]ny 

groundwater supply required by the new units 

would likely come from an increase in the storage 

capacity for the existing wells or from drilling 

additional wells. In either event, additional 

groundwater withdrawal by the new units is not 

expected to impact any offsite wells due to: 1) 

their distance from the site, 2) the direction of the 

hydraulic gradient toward Lake Anna and the 

lake’s recharge effect, and 3) the existence of 
The Commissioners - 25 -

hydrologic divides between the ESP site and the 

offsite wells.”

NAPS ESP VAR 2.4-3 Section 2.4.12

This is a variance from ESP SSAR Table 2.4-15 in 

order to use corrected information for the sitespecific Unit 3 information regarding observation 

well No. WP-3 as described in FSAR Table 2.4-

15R. 

This variance is acceptable for the following 

reasons:

1. The new, corrected information continues to 

show that there are observation wells installed 

for the ISFSI. There is no change to the 

information on these wells in FSAR Section 

2.4.12.1.2, which states, “[t]he other wells 

being monitored (P- and WP-) were installed 

previously for Units 1 and 2 groundwater 

monitoring purposes around the service water 

reservoir and the ISFSI, respectively. FSAR 

Figure 2.4-206 shows the locations of the 

observation wells.”

2. The corrected reference point elevation 

resulted in minor revisions to FSAR Table 2.4-

15R and FSAR Figures 2.4-207 through 2.4-

214b, which contain the piezometric head 

contour maps for the site. The changes in 

observed groundwater levels for well No. WP3, while not near the plant area for Unit 3, 

have been incorporated into the latest revision 

of the groundwater flow model. The revised 

post construction piezometric head contour 

map (FSAR Figure 2.4-216) indicates that the 

maximum groundwater level elevation in the 

power block area around seismic Category I 

structures is approximately 86.1 m (282.6 ft) 

NAVD88 (86.4 m (283.5 ft) NGVD29). The 
The Commissioners - 26 -

changes in observed groundwater levels for 

well No. WP-3 are also accounted for in the 

analysis of a postulated, accidental release of 

radioactive liquid effluents to the groundwater 

at the Unit 3 site.

NAPS ESP VAR 2.4-4 Sections 2.4.3 and 

2.4.11

This is a variance from ESP SSAR Section 

2.4.1.3, which described a lake level of 249.14 ft 

(75.93m) NAVD88, in order to use the lake level 

of 249.39ft (76.01 m) NAVD88 as provided in 

FSAR Section 2.4.1.3.

This variance is acceptable because the new lake 

level is addressed as an input to various 

hydrological evaluations in FSAR Section 2.4 (for 

example, storage allocations, flooding, and 

groundwater). This FSAR section demonstrates 

that the increase in lake level does not result in 

hydrological site characteristics that could affect 

the safe design or siting of Unit 3.

NAPS ESP VAR 2.4-5 Sections 2.4.3

This is a variance from ESP SSAR Section 2.4, 

which described the Lake Anna probable 

maximum flood (PMF) level of 266.53ft (81.24m) 

NAVD88, in order to use a revised value of 266.56 

ft (81.25m) NAVD88 as provided in FSAR Section 

2.4.

This variance is acceptable because the new PMF 

level is addressed in FSAR Section 2.4. This 

FSAR section demonstrates that the increase in 

the PMF level does not result in hydrological site 

characteristics that could affect the safe design or 

siting of Unit 3.

NAPS ESP VAR 2.5-1 Section 2.5.5

This is a variance from ESP SSAR Section 2.5.5 

information regarding slopes and safety of slopes 

in order to use revised site-specific Unit 3 

information as provided in FSAR Section 2.5.5.

This variance is acceptable because the slopes 

being considered in FSAR Section 2.5.5 are 

lower, less steep, and have a smaller applied 

seismic acceleration than the slopes analyzed in 

SSAR Section 2.5.5. As a result, the Unit 3 

slopes have a higher computed factor of safety 

against failure and are shown to be stable under 

both long-term static and short-term seismic 

conditions.
The Commissioners - 27 -

NAPS ESP VAR 12.2-1 Section 12.2

This is a variance from the ESP Application 

Environmental Report Table 5.4-9 in order to use 

updated site-specific Unit 3 gaseous effluent dose 

information as provided in FSAR Table 

12.2.18bR.

This variance is acceptable because estimated 

annual doses from normal gaseous effluent 

releases remain within applicable limits. FSAR 

Table 12.2-18bR shows the annual gaseous 

pathway doses to the maximally exposed 

individual (MEI) for Unit 3 and compares each to 

the corresponding estimate from the ESP

Environmental Report Table 5.4-9. Not all doses 

increased as a result of changes in long-term 

dispersion estimates because the normal release 

source term is lower for Unit 3 than the composite 

source term used to bound the multiple reactor 

types considered in the ESP application.

NAPS ESP VAR 12.2-3 Section 12.2

This is a variance from ESP SSAR Section 2.3.5.1 

in order to use the site-specific Unit 3 maximum 

annual liquid release values as provided in FSAR 

Table 12.2-29bR.

This variance is acceptable for the following 

reasons:

1. The estimated Unit 3 concentrations of normal 

liquid effluent releases remain within the 

applicable concentration limits, and the annual 

doses from normal liquid effluent releases 

remain within applicable limits.

2. The estimated Unit 3 concentrations of normal 

liquid effluent releases for all nuclides meet 

the 10 CFR Part 20 concentration limits, as 

shown in FSAR Table 12.2-19bR. The 

estimated annual doses from Unit 3 to the MEI 

from liquid effluents are compared with the

applicable limit in FSAR Table 12.2-202. The 

Unit 3 dose meets the limit in Appendix I, 

“Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and 

Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the 

Criterion ‘As Low as is Reasonably 

Achievable’ for Radioactive Material in 

Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor 

Effluents,” to 10 CFR Part 50, and the Unit 3 

dose estimates are lower than the 

corresponding ESP values.
The Commissioners - 28 -

NAPS ESP VAR 12.2-4 Section 12.2

This is a variance from ESP SSAR Section 2.3.5.1 

in order to use updated information as provided in 

FSAR Table 12.2-203 for conservative dose 

estimates of direct radiation from the existing 

Units 1 & 2 and the independent spent fuel

storage installation (ISFSI).

This variance is acceptable because the dose 

estimates are more conservative and complete 

with the addition of the dose contributions from 

direct radiation from the existing units and the 

ISFSI. As shown in FSAR Table 12.2-203, the 

annual total body, thyroid, and bone doses for the 

site, including the doses from the existing units 

and the ISFSI, meet the applicable limits in 

40 CFR Part 190, “Environmental Radiation 

Protection Standards for Nuclear Power 

Operations.”

NAPS ESP VAR 12.2-5 Section 12.2

This is a variance from ESP SSAR Section 2.3.5.1 

in order to use updated site-specific Unit 3 

maximum gaseous effluent release values as 

provided in FSAR Table 12.2-17R.

This variance is acceptable because the 

estimated Unit 3 concentrations of normal 

gaseous effluent releases remain within the 

applicable concentration limits, and the annual 

doses from normal gaseous effluent releases 

remain within applicable limits. The estimated 

Unit 3 concentrations of normal gaseous effluent 

releases for all nuclides meet the 10 CFR Part 20

concentration limits as shown in FSAR 

Table 12.2-17R. The estimated annual doses 

from Unit 3 to the MEI from gaseous effluent 

releases are compared with the applicable limit in 

FSAR Table 12.2-201. The Unit 3 doses meet the 

limits in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, and the 

Unit 3 dose estimates are lower than the 

corresponding ESP values.
The Commissioners - 29 -

III. Nonroutine, Unique Facility Features or Novel Issues

Safety Matters

North Anna Unit 3 Site-Specific Seismic Analyses

Following the issuance of the NAPS ESP in 2006 relevant new information became available 

that required the applicant to revise its site-specific seismic hazard analysis. This re-analysis of 

seismic hazard resulted in a GMRS that exceeds the ESBWR CSDRS at several frequencies. 

Based on these exceedances, the applicant conducted additional analyses of the SSCs that 

may be impacted by vibratory ground motion to ensure that the plant could adequately 

accommodate the site-specific seismic hazard. The staff’s review of the seismic hazard and 

subsequent analysis of SSCs is detailed in the following sections.

1. Mineral, Virginia, Earthquake

On August 23, 2011, a magnitude (M)5.8 earthquake occurred near the town of Mineral, 

Virginia, approximately 18 km (11 mi) southwest of the North Anna Unit 3 site. Additionally, in 

2012, the NRC issued NUREG-2115, “Central and Eastern United States Seismic Source 

Characterization for Nuclear Facilities,” a new seismic source characterization model, and, in 

2013, a new ground motion model was developed and approved for use in nuclear power plant 

seismic hazard assessments in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) region. 

The Mineral, Virginia, earthquake was located within the Central Virginia Seismic Zone, which is 

a recognized intraplate seismic zone in the CEUS and is characterized by low to moderate 

seismicity. No evidence of surface rupture has been documented at the site of the earthquake. 

This was one of the largest magnitude earthquakes instrumentally recorded in eastern North 

America since the 1988 M5.9 Saguenay, Canada, earthquake and the most damaging 

earthquake in the CEUS since the 1886 M6.8 Charleston, South Carolina, earthquake. The 

Mineral, Virginia, earthquake was recorded at North Anna Unit 1 to be 0.26 g at the basemat 

and 0.38 g at the higher elevation containment deck. These accelerations are the strongest 

motions ever recorded at a U.S. nuclear power plant. 

Because of the Mineral, Virginia, earthquake, the staff requested additional information from the 

applicant on the North Anna Unit 3 site probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA). 

When the new NUREG-2115 CEUS-SSC became available in January 2012, the NRC issued 

RAI 01.05-1, dated June 25, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12177A435), asking the North 

Anna Unit 3 COL applicant to evaluate the potential impacts of the CEUS-SSC model on the 

seismic hazard, consistent with the need to consider the latest available information in the 

PSHA for the North Anna site, specified in RG 1.208. The applicant revised its PSHA and 

recalculated the GMRS at the North Anna Unit 3 site to address both the new information from 

the CEUS-SSC model and the August 2011 Mineral, Virginia, earthquake. The applicant 

compared the new GMRS to the CSDRS for the ESBWR design. The CSDRS defines the SSE

design ground motion for the ESBWR standard plant structure. This comparison demonstrated 

that the CSDRS bounds the new GMRS at frequencies up to 40 hertz, and GMRS exceeds the 

CSDRS by not more than 10 percent at the higher frequencies. The applicant conducted 

additional analyses, described below, to ensure that the plant can accommodate the potentially 

higher ground motion. The applicant also compared the CSDRS and the GMRS with recordings 

of the Mineral, Virginia earthquake and demonstrated that CSDRS envelops the observed 

earthquake’s spectra. The staff performed detailed confirmatory analysis of seismic information 
The Commissioners - 30 -

that includes seismicity of the region and subsurface geophysical characterization used by the 

applicant. The staff performed independent calculations of the seismic hazard using the new 

models and confirmed the applicant’s findings. The staff therefore concludes that the models 

used and the resulting seismic hazard developed for the proposed North Anna Unit 3 site are 

acceptable.

2. Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra Exceedances and Structural Analysis

GDC 2, in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, requires that nuclear power plants be capable of 

withstanding the most severe earthquakes that have been historically reported for the site and 

surrounding areas. Under 10 CFR 52.79(d)(1), for a COLA referencing a design certification, 

sufficient information must be provided to demonstrate that the characteristics of the site fall 

within the site parameters specified in the DCD.

The site-specific seismic hazard at the North Anna Unit 3 site exceeds the seismic design 

hazards analyzed in the ESBWR DCD at certain frequencies. The site-specific horizontal and 

vertical seismic response spectra as shown in the North Anna Unit 3 COL, FSAR 

Figures 2.0-201 through 2.0-204 for RB/FB, control building (CB), and firewater service 

complex (FWSC), exhibit exceedances at certain frequencies when compared to the ESBWR 

CSDRS (also termed the SSE). The applicant evaluated this issue and took a departure NAPS 

DEP 3.7-1 from the ESBWR DCD in the North Anna Unit 3 COLA. Since this departure involves 

changes to ESBWR DCD Tier 1, Table 5.1-1, which defines the SSE, the applicant also 

requested an exemption (Exemption 3) from the DCD Tier 1 information. This departure also 

includes a redefinition of the OBE for plant shutdown because the OBE is based on one-third of 

the SSE.

Because of the exceedances described above, the applicant performed site-specific 

soil-structure interaction (SSI) analyses of the RB/FB, CB, and FWSC structures and revised 

the SSE definition to include both the ESBWR CSDRS and the site-specific FIRS for each 

seismically qualified SSC. At North Anna Unit 3, the applicant’s seismic design, analyses, and 

qualification of SSCs use both the CSDRS and the site-specific FIRS. The applicant’s 

site-specific SSI analyses, as described in FSAR Appendix 3A, indicate that the site-specific 

seismic demand, including the in-structure response spectra (ISRS) exceed the corresponding 

DCD seismic demand in some locations.

FSAR Appendix 3A indicates that the site-specific ISRS exceed the corresponding DCD ISRS. 

The ISRS are used as input for seismic qualifications of equipment, systems, and components. 

As described in FSAR Appendix 3A.18.2, the applicant developed site-specific design ISRS for 

all damping values and locations of the RB/FB, CB, and FWSC. The site-specific ISRS that 

exceeded the standard design ISRS is used in conjunction with the standard design ISRS for 

the seismic design and qualification of equipment and components, as discussed below under 

“Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra Exceedances and Structures, Systems, and 

Components Analysis.”

The applicant used the seismic load demands obtained from the site-specific SSI analyses 

(including the impact of adjacent buildings) to determine the structural adequacy for those SSCs 

that it evaluated as part of the standard design. The site-specific evaluations presented in the 

COLA for North Anna Unit 3, FSAR Appendix 3G, show that the standard design, including sitespecific design changes, is adequate to resist the site-specific seismic load demands in 

combination with the nonseismic ESBWR standard plant loads. Specifically, as discussed in the 

NAPS DEP 3.7-1 departure justification presented in the COLA for North Anna Unit 3, FSAR 
The Commissioners - 31 -

Part 7, the applicant identified the changes that are necessary to ensure that the SSCs are 

seismically adequate to meet the site-specific seismic demand. Changes to the certified design

identified by the applicant include the arrangement of some steel reinforcements and shear ties, 

the size of a steel girder, weld size, and anchor bolt sizes. No changes to the thickness of the 

concrete walls and slabs were needed.

As documented in Chapters 3.7 and 3.8 of the FSER, the NRC staff reviewed the information 

provided in the COLA and the responses to RAIs, performed confirmatory analyses, and 

conducted additional technical audits of the site-specific seismic analyses and structural 

evaluation of the ESBWR structures. The staff confirmed that site-specific design evaluation of 

the standard plant structures used the site-specific seismic demand. The staff found that the 

analysis model, industry codes and standards, structural materials and their properties, loads 

and load combinations, acceptance criteria, and the method of applying loads were consistent 

with those used in the ESBWR standard design.

The staff verified that the acceptability of the standard plant structures for site-specific 

conditions is demonstrated by comparing the site-specific structural demands (forces, moments, 

shear, etc.) with the ESBWR structural capacities at the same set of selected elements as those 

considered for standard design. The staff also verified that the site-specific SSE loads are 

combined with other non-seismic loads in the standard design using the same finite element 

model used for the standard design. The staff further reviewed the design changes that are 

identified by the applicant (FSAR Appendices 3G.7 through 3G.10 and COLA Part 7) to

maintain the standard design. The staff confirmed that with the identified changes the 

calculated combination of site-specific seismic loads and non-seismic load does not exceed 

structural acceptance limit of the ESBWR standard design. No changes to the member sizes 

(e.g., wall and slab thicknesses, beam and column sizes) were necessary. Therefore with the 

identified design changes, the staff confirmed that the standard design is acceptable at the

North Anna 3 site.

3. Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra Exceedances and Fuel Analysis

The staff reviewed the North Anna site-specific seismic exceedance departure as it relates to 

the changes the applicant made to Chapter 4.2 to ensure the GE14E fuel assembly and 

ESBWR Marathon control blade mechanical designs were still able to withstand loads resulting 

from natural phenomena, as required by GDC 2. 

The staff reviewed the applicant’s changes to Chapter 4.2 and performed a regulatory audit on 

the overall methodology and calculations. The staff confirmed that the calculations represent 

the most limiting seismic motions and that the applicant’s method for determining the maximum 

seismic acceleration in the horizontal and vertical directions is consistent with RG 1.92, 

“Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis,” 

Revision 2, issued July 2006. The staff also confirmed that the applicant’s methodology for 

calculating the seismic accelerations of the fuel assemblies and control blades is identical to the 

methodology described in the DCD. The staff confirmed that the calculated combination of 

hydrodynamic accident loads with the higher North Anna Unit 3 site-specific seismic loads does

not cause the fuel assembly or control blade capacity limits to be exceeded. Additionally, the 

staff confirmed that under the combination of seismic and hydrodynamic loads the scram 

insertion time limits are met; therefore, GDC 2 requirements are met. 

Additionally, the staff reviewed the applicant’s site-specific ITAAC in Part 10 of the COLA,

Table 2.4.19-1, Item 1. The staff confirmed that this site-specific ITAAC will ensure that the 
The Commissioners - 32 -

applicant will complete a full analysis before fuel load using the as-built characteristics of the 

control blades and other reactor components to confirm that the site-specific combined loads on 

the control blade remain bounded by the control blade capacity limits and the scram insertion 

time limits. The staff confirmed that the successful completion of the site-specific ITAAC for the 

control blades and ITAAC Item 15 in the ESBWR DCD, Table 2.1.1-3, ensures that the as-built 

fuel assembly and the as-built control blades comply with GDC 2.

4. Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra Exceedances and Structures, Systems, and 

Components Analysis

Because of the ESBWR DCD seismic exceedances discussed above, the staff reviewed North 

Anna Unit 3 FSAR Section 3.7.1, “Seismic Design Parameters,” NAPS DEP 3.7-1, and verified 

that, according to this section, the Unit 3 SSE design ground motion applies to the seismic 

design, analysis, and qualification of North Anna Unit 3 plant SSCs. The staff also verified that, 

according to this section, for each structure and each equipment location within the buildings, 

the site-specific ISRS that exceed the standard design ISRS are used in conjunction with the 

standard design ISRS for seismic design and qualification of equipment and components. As 

documented in FSER Chapter 3, the staff confirmed that the seismic design methodology for 

SSCs is in accordance with the applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers and IEEE 

codes and standards accepted by the NRC staff. This is the standard process for SSC design 

once the seismic inputs to the SSCs are known, and the staff therefore found it acceptable. The 

applicant will complete ITAAC for the detailed seismic Category I SSCs, and the staff will verify 

the completion of the ITAAC via inspections. 

Environmental Matters

The NRC staff issued the COL SEIS for North Anna Unit 3 in March 2010. Since that time, the 

staff has assessed whether new information should supplement the COL SEIS, using the “Staff 

Process for Determining if a Supplement to an Environmental Impact Statement is Required in 

Accordance with 10 CFR 51.92(a) or 51.72(a),” dated November 24, 2014 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13199A170). Based on the staff’s review, documented in the COL SEIS, and on 

implementation of the above-mentioned process for determining whether a supplement is 

warranted, the NRC staff found no novel issues for the environmental review of the COLA for 

North Anna Unit 3.

IV. Combined License Findings

10 CFR 52.97(a)(1):

(i) The applicable standards and requirements of the Act [AEA] and the Commission’s 

regulations have been met.

The staff reviewed the COLA for North Anna Unit 3 and evaluated it against the 

applicable regulations in 10 CFR Parts 20, 26, 30, 31, 32, 40, 50, 51, 52, 55, 70, 73, 74, 

100, and 140. The staff performed this evaluation using applicable portions of the SRP, 
The Commissioners - 33 -

ISG documents, RGs, bulletins, NUREGs, and generic letters. Based on the staff’s

review, documented in the FSER2 and COL SEIS, the staff concludes that, for the 

purpose of issuing a COL for North Anna Unit 3, the applicable standards and 

requirements of the AEA and the Commission’s regulations have been met.

(ii) Any required notifications to other agencies or bodies have been duly made.

The NRC took the actions required by Section 182(c) of the AEA and 10 CFR 50.43(a). 

In April 2008 the NRC published notices of the application in the local newspapers: The 

Richmond Times-Dispatch, The Daily Progress, The Free-Lance Star, and The Central 

Virginian. On April 20, 2016, the NRC notified the Virginia State Corporation 

Commission (ADAMS Accession No. ML16064A508), NCUC (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML16064A507), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML16064A506) about the COLA for North Anna Unit 3. In addition, the 

staff published a notice of the application in the FR on April 27, May 4, May 11, and 

May 18, 2016 (81 FR 24900, 81 FR 26837, 81 FR 29308, and 81 FR 31263). 

Based on the staff’s completion of notification to regulatory agencies and the public 

notices described above, the staff concludes that, for the purposes of issuing a COL for 

North Anna Unit 3, all required notifications to other agencies or bodies have been duly 

carried out.

(iii) There is reasonable assurance that the facility will be constructed and will operate in 

conformity with the license, the provisions of the Act, and the Commission’s regulations.

The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant to ensure that the plant will be 

constructed and will operate in conformity with the license, applicable provisions of the 

AEA, and applicable regulations. This includes the FSAR and other portions of the 

application, including general and financial information; technical specifications; the 

emergency plan; requests for departures, variances, and exemptions; the quality 

assurance (QA) plan; and the security plan. 

In areas where the staff found that the information submitted initially was incomplete or 

insufficient to allow it to reach a reasonable assurance conclusion, the staff issued RAIs 

to the applicant to obtain additional information. The staff reviewed the applicant’s

responses to ensure that the additional information provided was sufficient to support the 

staff conclusion. As necessary, the staff also conducted audits of the applicant’s records 

and calculations and performed its own confirmatory calculations to confirm applicant 

statements.

In some cases, the staff’s reasonable assurance finding required the imposition of 

license conditions or ITAAC as part of the license. The draft COL lists the license 

conditions, including those resulting from the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force 

recommendations, and ITAAC. The basis for each license condition or ITAAC appears

in the technical evaluations in the North Anna Unit 3 COL FSER or in the FSER

 2 During the course of the final safety review, a non-concurrence was filed related to changing the text in the 

FSER regarding the staff’s acceptance of the applicant’s description of the inservice testing operational 

program. Staff management and the non-concurring individual were able to agree to a resolution of the

concerns and the non-concurring individual ultimately concurred on the document. In accordance with 

Management Directive 10.158, “NRC Non-Concurrence Process,” the resolution of the non-concurrence is 

documented in NCP-2016-022 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML17011A203).
The Commissioners - 34 -

prepared for the NAPS ESP and in the ESBWR DCD FSER referenced by the COLA for

North Anna Unit 3.

On the basis of the staff’s review of the application discussed in this information paper 

and documented in the FSER and SEIS, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of 

issuing a COL for North Anna Unit 3, there is reasonable assurance that the facility will 

be constructed and will operate in conformance with the license, the provisions of the 

AEA, and the Commission’s regulations.

(iv) The applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage in the activities 

authorized.

The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant about technical and financial 

qualifications. 

a. Technical Qualifications. The staff reviewed information provided by the 

applicant on its technical qualifications. The review included an evaluation of the 

applicant’s operating experience, organizational structure, and QA program. 

Dominion has over 48 years of experience in the design, construction, and 

operation of nuclear generating plants. Dominion has designed, constructed,

and currently operates North Anna Units 1 and 2 and Surry Units 1 and 2 in 

Virginia; and Dominion currently operates Millstone Units 2 and 3 in Connecticut.

The combined electric generation of the six operating units is in excess of 

5,600 megawatts electric. Dominion holds 10 CFR Part 50 licenses for these six

nuclear power plants and has shown it can build and operate them. Dominion

has also demonstrated the ability to choose and manage the oversight of nuclear 

steam supply system vendors, architect-engineers, and constructors of nuclearrelated work. The staff’s review of the applicant’s organizational structure 

concluded that the management, technical support, and operating organizations 

are acceptable. The staff reviewed the QA program and found it acceptable. 

This QA program includes requirements that will be implemented by the 

applicant’s engineering, procurement, and construction contractor.

The staff’s evaluation of this information appears in Sections 1.4 and 

Chapters 13 and 17 of the FSER. Based on its evaluation of the applicant’s 

experience with nuclear power plants, its operating organization, and its QA 

program, the staff finds that the applicant is technically qualified to hold a 

10 CFR Part 52 license in accordance with 10 CFR 52.97(a)(1)(iv).

b. Financial Qualifications. The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant 

about its financial qualifications to safely construct, operate, and decommission 

the proposed North Anna Unit 3 reactor. Specifically, the review included an 

evaluation of the applicant’s financial qualifications; financial assurance for 

decommissioning; applicability of foreign ownership, control, or domination

(FOCD); and financial protection in the form of nuclear insurance and indemnity. 

In its review of financial qualifications, the staff evaluated information on the total 

costs to build North Anna Unit 3, including expenditures associated with 

engineering of the facility, procurement of materials, construction costs, owners’ 

costs (e.g., environmental studies and permitting, and legal fees), financing 

costs, inflation, as well as information on sources of funding available to the 

owner. Applicable regulations and guidance considered by the staff include 
The Commissioners - 35 -

10 CFR 50.33, “Contents of Applications; General Information”; Section I.A.2, 

“Source of Construction Funds,” of Appendix C, “A Guide for the Financial Data 

and Related Information Required To Establish Financial Qualifications for 

Construction Permits and Combined Licenses,” to 10 CFR Part 50; 10 CFR 

50.75, “Reporting and recordkeeping for decommissioning planning;” 10 CFR 

50.38, “Ineligibility of certain applicants;” 10 CFR Part 140, “Financial Protection 

Requirements and Indemnity Agreements”; 10 CFR 52.97(a)(1)(iv); 

NUREG-1577, “Standard Review Plan on Power Reactor Licensee Financial 

Qualifications and Decommissioning Funding Assurance,” Revision 1, issued 

February 1999; and guidance in the Standard Review Plan, “Foreign Ownership, 

Control, or Domination of applicants for Reactor Licenses,” dated June 1999 (64 

FR 52357-52359).

The staff’s evaluation of this information appears in Chapter 1 of the FSER. 

Based on the financial information provided by the applicant, the NRC staff 

concludes that Dominion Virginia Power (DUP) is not subject to a review of its 

financial qualifications for operations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.33(f)(2) because it is

considered a Utility pursuant to 10 CFR 50.2, “Definitions;” DVP has 

demonstrated that it possesses or has access to the financial resources 

necessary to meet estimated construction costs and related fuel cycle costs; and 

there are no decommissioning funding assurance, FOCD, or nuclear insurance 

and indemnity concerns. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the applicant is 

financially qualified to construct North Anna Unit 3 and to engage in the activities 

authorized by the licenses. 

(v) Issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the 

health and safety of the public. 

The staff reviewed the COLA for North Anna Unit 3 to ensure that issuance of the 

license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to public health and 

safety. Specifically, the staff evaluated the applicant’s analysis and conclusions about

site-specific conditions, including the geography and demography of the site; nearby 

industrial, transportation, and military facilities; site meteorology; site hydrology; and site 

geology, seismology, and geotechnical engineering, to ensure that issuance of the 

license will not be inimical to public health and safety. With respect to conclusions about

the site suitability issues that were incorporated by reference from the NAPS ESP 

without a variance, the staff verified that none of the criteria for disturbing ESP finality 

were met. The review also evaluated the design of SSCs and equipment to ensure safe 

operation, performance, and shutdown when subjected to extreme weather, floods, 

seismic events, missiles (including aircraft impacts), chemical and radiological releases, 

and loss of offsite power, to the extent not already resolved by the incorporation of the 

ESBWR design. 

The review confirmed that radiological releases and human doses during both normal 

operation and accident scenarios will remain within regulatory limits, which supports the 

staff’s conclusion that issuance of the license will not be inimical to public health and 

safety. The review determined that the security measures to be implemented at the site 

are adequate to protect the facility in accordance with NRC security regulations, which 

supports the staff’s conclusion that issuance of the license will not be inimical to the 

common defense and security. Based on review of this and other information in the 

application, the NRC staff is not aware of any information presenting inimicality concerns 
The Commissioners - 36 -

or FOCD concerns that would require additional assessment for inimicality purposes. In 

addition, the applicant is a wholly-owned United States company that is based in the 

United States and all members of senior management and the Board of Directors are 

also United States citizens.

The review also determined that operational programs identified by the applicant are 

sufficiently described to assure the staff of compliance with regulations. Where the staff 

needed to confirm operational program implementation to reach a reasonable assurance 

finding but the details of program implementation were not governed by specific 

regulatory requirements, the draft license contains license conditions to ensure that

operational programs will be properly implemented and thus that issuance of the COL

will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to public health and safety. 

The staff evaluation addressed the operational programs identified in the SRM, dated 

February 22, 2006, on SECY-05-0197, “Review of Operational Programs in a Combined 

License Application and Generic Emergency Planning Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and 

Acceptance Criteria,” as well as three additional operational programs, including a cyber 

security program, a program for SNM, and an SNM physical security program. The 

staff’s review of the applicant’s emergency planning information, including the major 

features of the emergency plan approved as part of the ESP application and 

incorporated by reference in the COL application, concluded that the emergency plan is 

acceptable and supports the staff’s conclusion that issuance of the license will not be 

inimical to the health and safety of the public.

On the basis of the staff’s review of the application, as discussed in this information 

paper and the referenced documents, the staff concludes that issuance of the COL for 

North Anna Unit 3 will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to public

health and safety.

(vi) The findings required by Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51 have been made.

As discussed below, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing a COL for North 

Anna Unit 3, the environmental review has been adequate to support the findings set 

forth in 10 CFR 51.107(a).

10 CFR 52.97(a)(2):

The staff concludes that there are no acceptance criteria from ITAAC in the referenced 

ESP or standard design certification that the applicant has asserted are met. Therefore, 

no Commission finding under this section is required for the purpose of issuing a COL

for North Anna Unit 3.

10 CFR 51.107(a):

(i) Determine whether the requirements of Sections 102(2) (A), (C), and (E) of NEPA and 

the regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51 have been met.

The staff reviewed the application and evaluated it against the applicable regulations in 

10 CFR Parts 50, 51, 52, and 100. The staff performed this evaluation using applicable 

portions of the environmental SRP (NUREG-1555), issued in 2000 and updated in 2007, 

and ISG documents, RGs, and generic letters.
The Commissioners - 37 -

In accordance with NEPA Section 102(2)(A) (42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A)), the staff prepared 

both the EIS for the NAPS ESP and the COL SEIS, based on its independent 

assessment of the information provided by the applicant and information developed 

independently by the staff, including through consultation with other agencies. The 

staff’s technical analysis used a systematic, interdisciplinary approach to integrate 

information from many fields, including the natural and social sciences. 

In accordance with NEPA Section 102(2)(C)(i–v) (42 USC § 4332(2)(C)(i–v), the COL 

SEIS and the ESP EIS together address (1) the environmental impact of the proposed 

action, (2) any unavoidable adverse environmental effects, (3) alternatives to the 

proposed action, (4) the relationship between local short-term uses of the environment 

and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (5) any 

irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources that would be involved in the 

proposed action should it be implemented.

Appendix F to the ESP EIS and the COL SEIS present correspondence related to the 

staff’s interactions with other Federal agencies during the preparation of these 

documents. Based on the listing of new species after the COL SEIS was issued, 

additional consultations with the USFWS and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 

were initiated. Consultations with NMFS were concluded in November 2016 with that 

agency’s concurrence on the staff’s determination that the construction and operation of 

North Anna Unit 3 is not likely to adversely affect Federally protected species under that 

agency’s jurisdiction (ADAMS Accession No. ML16319A265). In December 2016 the 

staff submitted a Biological Assessment to the USFWS which documents the staff’s 

determination that project activities are not likely to adversely affect Federally protected 

species under that agency’s jurisdiction (ADAMS No. ML16312A321). In addition, 

following the process described earlier for determining whether new information warrants 

a supplemental EIS, the staff completed a significance evaluation to determine whether 

the new information regarding Federally listed species is significant according to 10 CFR 

52.92 (a). The staff determined that the new information is not significant and a 

supplement to the COL SEIS is not warranted (ADAMS Accession No. ML16342B385). 

As supported by all of these documents, the staff concludes that it fulfilled the 

requirement of NEPA Section 102(2)(C) by consulting with and obtaining comments from 

other Federal agencies with jurisdiction by law or special expertise (see 

42 USC § 4332(2)(C)). The staff did not identify any Federal agencies as cooperating 

agencies in preparation of the COL SEIS.

The staff concludes that the COL SEIS demonstrates that the staff adequately 

considered alternatives to the proposed action to the extent that it involves unresolved 

conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources, consistent with the 

requirements of NEPA Section 102(2)(E) (42 USC § 4332(2)(E)). The alternatives 

considered in the COL SEIS include the no-action alternative, energy alternatives, 

system design alternatives, and mitigation alternatives for severe accidents.

For the reasons given above, the staff also concludes that its review meets the NRC’s 

requirements in 10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A, “National Environmental Policy 

Act—Regulations Implementing Section 102(2).” The staff concludes that the 

environmental findings in the FEIS constitute the “hard look” required by NEPA and have 

reasonable support in logic and fact.
The Commissioners - 38 -

(ii) Independently consider the final balance among conflicting factors contained in the 

record of the proceeding with a view to determining the appropriate action to be taken.

Section 10.6.3 of the COL SEIS provides the staff summary of the cost-benefit 

assessment. The staff concluded that, “On balance, the benefits of Unit 3 would 

significantly outweigh the economic, environmental and social costs of the project.”

(iii) Determine, after weighing the environmental, economic, technical, and other benefits 

against environmental and other costs, and considering reasonable alternatives, whether 

the COL should be issued, denied, or appropriately conditioned to protect environmental 

values.

As noted above, in its SEIS, the staff considered the cost-benefit analysis as well as 

reasonable alternatives. Based on that analysis, the staff recommends that the COL be 

issued. The staff based its recommendation on (1) the North Anna Unit 3 COLA

environmental report and responses to staff RAIs, (2) the staff’s review conducted for the 

ESP application and the assessment documented in the ESP EIS, (3) consultation with 

Federal, State, Tribal, and local agencies, (4) the staff’s own independent review,

including new and potentially significant information available since preparation and 

publication of the ESP EIS, (5) the staff’s consideration of public comments related to 

the environmental review, and (6) the assessments summarized in the COL SEIS and 

the ESP EIS, including the mitigation measures identified.

(iv) Determine, in an uncontested proceeding, whether the NEPA review conducted by the 

staff has been adequate. 

The staff conducted an independent evaluation of the application; developed 

independent, reliable information; and conducted a systematic, interdisciplinary review of 

the potential impacts of the proposed action on the human environment and reasonable 

alternatives to the applicant’s proposal. Before developing the DSEIS, the staff issued a 

notice of intent and invited the public to provide any new and potentially significant 

information relevant to the environmental review since issuance of the ESP EIS. The 

staff also provided opportunities for governmental and general public participation during 

the public meeting on the DSEIS and used publicly available guidance in the 

development of its SEIS, in conformance with the requirements of Appendix A, “Format 

for Presentation of Material in Environmental Impact Statements,” to 10 CFR Part 51.

The staff considered the purpose of and need for the proposed action, the environment 

that could be affected by the action, and the consequences of the proposed action, 

including mitigation that could reduce impacts. In the COL SEIS, the staff supplemented 

the ESP EIS’s evaluation of alternatives to the proposed action. The COL SEIS 

considered the no-action alternative, energy alternatives, and system design alternatives 

and the potential impact of conservation measures in determining the demand for power 

and consequent need for additional generating capacity. The ESP EIS and the COL 

SEIS compared the impacts of alternatives with those of the proposed action. The staff

considered any adverse environmental effects that could not be avoided should the 

proposed action be implemented, the relationship between short-term uses of the human

environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any 

irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources that would be involved in the 

proposed project.
The Commissioners - 39 -

The NRC filed the COL DSEIS with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for its 

review, consistent with the requirements in Section 309 of the Clean Air Act (see 

42 U.S.C. § 7609). The staff considered all comments received on the DSEIS and, in 

Appendix E to the COL SEIS, described the manner in which each comment was 

dispositioned.

On these bases, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing the COL, it conducted a 

thorough and complete environmental review sufficient to meet the requirements of NEPA and 

adequate to inform the Commission’s action on the COL request.

COORDINATION:

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection.

/RA/

Victor M. McCree

Executive Director

 for Operations
The Commissioners -37-

STAFF’S STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE UNCONTESTED HEARING FOR ISSUANCE 

OF A COMBINED LICENSE FOR NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNIT 3, (1/18/2017)

ADAMS ACCESSION NO.: ML15341A103 * via email SECY-17-0009

OFFICE PM:DNRL:LB3 LA:DNRL:LB3 PM:DNRL:EPB* LPM:DNRL:LB3*

NAME MEudy SGreen

(MBrown for)

TDozier JShea

DATE 1/4/2017 01/05/2017 1/4/2017 11/14/2016

OFFICE BC:DNRL:LB3* BC:DNRL:EPB* D:NRO/DSEA* D:NRO/DSRA*

NAME JDonoghue JDonoghue SFlanders JMonniger

DATE 11/9/2016 11/9/2016 12/02/2016 12/01/2016

OFFICE D:NSIR/DSP* D:NSIR/DPR* D:NMSS/FCSS* D:NRO/DEIA*

NAME MGalloway

(RFelts for)

MBailey CErlanger MMayfield

DATE 12/05/2016 11/30/2016 12/13/2016 12/02/2016

OFFICE D:NSIR/CSD* D:NRR/DE* D:NRO/DCIP* D: NSIR/DSO*

NAME JAndersen

(JBeardsley for)

JLubinski

(MRoss-Lee for)

MCheok MLayton

DATE 11/28/2016 12/05/2016 11/30/2016 11/21/2016

OFFICE D: NRO/PMDA* D: NRR/DIRS* Tech Editor* OGC*

NAME FMiller CMiller JDougherty MCarpentier 

DATE 11/22/2016 11/30/2016 11/3/2016 12/16/2016

OFFICE D:NRO/DNRL* D:NRO OEDO

NAME FAkstulewicz

(ABradford for)

VOrdaz VMcCree 

DATE 1/4/2017 1/13/2017 1/18/2017

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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2. General Electric-Hitachi, “ESBWR Design Control Document, Revision 10,” 

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- 2 -

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- 3 -

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- 4 -

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- 5 -

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- 6 -

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