```
                                                                 
Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations (24-MAY-02,
GAO-02-707R).							 
                                                                 
Between fiscal years 1996 and 2001, the United States provided	 
$3.45 billion in direct contributions and $24.2 billion in	 
voluntary or indirect contributions to 33 U.N. peacekeeping	 
operations in such areas as the Congo, Sierra Leone, Kosovo,	 
Bosnia, and, most recently, Afghanistan. The prospects for	 
implementing peace agreements are enhanced if all major parties  
to the conflict participate in negotiating the agreements and if 
these agreements include specific authority and mechanisms for	 
their enforcement. Peace operations are more likely to succeed if
the military forces carrying out the operations have clear	 
objectives, sufficient resources, and the authority to carry out 
their tasks. Military forces can help create a secure environment
for civilian work to proceed. Moreover, the slow or late	 
deployment of a peace operation's civil administrators might	 
impede efforts to establish good governance. Finally, peace	 
operations tend to be more successful when locals participate at 
every reasonable opportunity.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-707R					        
    ACCNO:   A03412						        
  TITLE:     Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations    
     DATE:   05/24/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International organizations			 
	     International relations				 

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GAO-02-707R

     

     * Summary

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

May 24, 2002

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

Subject: Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations

Peacekeeping operations play an important role in advancing U.S. security
interests. The operations attempt to maintain international security in
locations such as the Congo, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Bosnia, and most
recently Afghanistan. Between fiscal years 1996 and 2001, we estimate that
the United States provided $3.45 billion in direct contributions and $24.2
billion in voluntary or indirect contributions to 33 U.N. peacekeeping
operations in these and other locations. 1

In light of the substantial U.S. commitments to ongoing peace operations
and the potentially high costs for new operations in Central Asia and
elsewhere, in late January and early February 2002 we briefed staff from
your committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on our
observations of three aspects of multidimensional peace operations: (1)
negotiating and enforcing peace agreements; (2) using military force to
create a secure environment in which a peace agreement can be implemented;
and (3) administering and rebuilding civic functions. This correspondence
summarizes that briefing, which was drawn from our extensive past work
examining peace operations. Enclosure I documents the information we
provided to you in the briefing.

Since 1990, we have issued 33 reports dealing with 16 of these operations.
We have undertaken field studies while those operations were occurring and
provided analyses to Congress on peacekeeping efforts in these countries.

                                    Summary

In summary, we found that the prospects for implementing peace agreements
are enhanced if all major parties to the conflict participate in
negotiating the agreements and if these agreements include specific
authority and mechanisms for their enforcement. For example, the peace
agreement for Cambodia had 18 signatory nations, which gave the United
Nations the authority and support it needed to confront the Khmer Rouge
and conduct elections. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as
Bosnia), the Dayton Accords specifically

1

U.N. Peacekeeping: Estimated U.S. Contributions, Fiscal Years 1996--2001
(GAO-02-294, Feb. 11, 2002).

gave the Office of the High Representative authority to implement the
accords, including adopting a common citizenship law, introducing a new
currency, and removing local officials obstructing the peace process.
Similarly, in Kosovo, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had
authority to provide security, which it used to demilitarize the Kosovo
Liberation Army. These mechanisms were critical to begin building durable
local institutions that could resolve disputes and enforce decisions.
Moreover, to end hostilities, political agreements sometimes defer
politically sensitive issues that must be dealt with later, such as the
final political status of the disputed city of Brcko in Bosnia and the
creation of a war crimes tribunal for Cambodia.

Peace operations are more likely to succeed if the military forces
carrying out the operations have clear objectives, sufficient resources,
and the authority to carry out their tasks. Military forces can help
create a secure environment for civilian work to proceed. For example, the
NATO-led deployments in the Balkans since the mid-1990s had sufficient
troops and equipment and clear authority to enforce the agreements. These
operations quickly created secure conditions to allow civilian
organizations to conduct elections, begin reconstruction, and initiate
police training. In contrast, U.N.-led peacekeeping missions in Somalia
and in Bosnia in the early 1990s failed, in part, because they lacked
sufficient troops and arms. In addition, the peacekeeping mission in
Bosnia lacked clear authority to carry out its mandates. Furthermore, we
have observed that non-U.N. multinational forces have tended to fare
better than those led by the United Nations because they had a clearer
understanding of the rules guiding the use of force and a greater
certainty that individual national contingents would carry out the orders
of the peace operation's leadership. In Bosnia, the NATO-led successor
force to the U.N. peacekeeping mission had sufficient troops, equipment,
and readily available reinforcements, and its objectives were clearly
understood both by its troops and by the local authorities. In contrast,
one national contingent of a U.N.-led force in Somalia conducted
negotiations with a warlord opposed to the peace operation, while the rest
of the force was trying to capture him.

We also observed that the slow or late deployment of a peace operation's
civil administrators might impede efforts to establish good governance. In
both Kosovo and Cambodia, the slow deployment of the operations' civil
administration allowed the dominant factions in each country to take over
key government posts and key ministries. This undercut the chance to build
fair government and control political corruption. Also, peace operations
are more successful if their civil administration components respond to
the countries' evolving needs and are coordinated with military
operations. For example, in Kosovo, the peace operation responded to the
emerging need to control civil unrest by providing police forces trained
in riot control. In Cambodia, the high degree of civil-military
coordination allowed the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees
within 1 year, which allowed legitimate elections to proceed. Finally,
peace operations tended to be more successful when locals participated at
every reasonable opportunity. In Bosnia, for example, growing local
economic and civic participation in peace implementation efforts allowed
more moderate political candidates to gain support, thus reducing the
political influence of opponents of the peace process.

                                   Background

Our observations apply to multidimensional peace operations-operations
that have security, political, and humanitarian objectives that are
undertaken simultaneously or sequentially to build a sustainable peace.
Multidimensional operations are typically conducted in two phases. In the
first phase, during an ongoing conflict, multinational military forces try
to provide stability in a country that may have multiple warring factions,
a humanitarian crisis, the breakdown of government and law enforcement,
economic collapse, and rampant corruption. The multinational forces'
mandates might include protection of humanitarian operations and providing
the security necessary for the United Nations or other negotiator to
broker a political settlement.

In the second phase, the United Nations typically leads or authorizes a
peace operation with regional security forces, such as those provided by
NATO, and multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank. To
build a sustainable peace, the operation conducts complex and costly tasks
associated with, for example, improving or restoring the rule of law,
rebuilding infrastructure and economic institutions, monitoring human
rights, safeguarding humanitarian and refugee resettlement operations,
overseeing democratic reform and transfers of power via elections, and
controlling corruption.

                             Scope and Methodology

To prepare our briefing, we analyzed 33 GAO reports on peace operations
produced since 1990. These reports included case studies in 16 countries,
most of which included in-country fieldwork. In addition, GAO has produced
more than 45 reports on activities related to peacekeeping, including
refugee assistance and rule of law issues. We examined political
agreements, use of military force, and civil administration aspects of
numerous peacekeeping operations, but we drew our examples from some of
the largest multidimensional peacekeeping operations in four
countries-Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Although we noted
elements that contributed to the relative success or failure of these
peace operations, we did not generalize the results of these case studies
as applying to all future peace operations or attempt to determine which
aspects of past operations might apply to specific peace operations in the
future. From this analysis, we derived overall issues or questions
associated with effective peace implementation operations that could be
raised in the oversight of any future peacekeeping operation.

The roles of the United Nations and other international organizations
varied widely in the multidimensional peace operations conducted in each
of these countries. First, we examined the accomplishments of the United
Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (1991-1992) and the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992-1993). These U.N. missions were
established to ensure the implementation of a comprehensive political
settlement. The United Nations had overall responsibility for maintaining
the ceasefire, monitoring human rights, organizing elections, providing
civil administration, implementing law and order, and helping resettle
refugees.

In Somalia, the United Nations at first shared responsibility for the
implementation of the peace operation with a multinational military force
led by the United States. The U.N. Operation in Somalia (1992-1995)
conducted a humanitarian operation while the multinational military force
provided security. The U.N. mission subsequently assumed responsibility
for enforcing the peace and replaced the multinational troops with a
U.N.-led military force.

The U.N.-led Protection Force (1992-1995) in Bosnia and elsewhere in the
former Yugoslavia at first provided humanitarian aid and then
unsuccessfully attempted to establish the peace and security necessary to
negotiate an overall peace agreement. Once a U.S.-led effort to negotiate
a peace agreement succeeded in late 1995, responsibility for the peace
implementation operation in Bosnia was divided among a number of
international organizations. The Office of the High Representative
oversees the civilian tasks of the peace agreement, which are carried out
by the United Nations, the European Union, and other international
organizations. The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995
to the present) focuses primarily on monitoring and restructuring local
police forces and mine clearance efforts. The NATO-led Stabilization Force
in Bosnia implements the military tasks related to maintaining the
ceasefire and disarmament of the former warring parties.

In contrast to the limited U.N. role in Bosnia, the United Nations Mission
in Kosovo (1999 to the present) serves as an interim government and
coordinates all aspects of the recovery and reconstruction of the province
pending a final resolution of its political status. The NATO-led
international security presence, or Kosovo Force, enforces the related
military agreements and helps the U.N. mission provide public security and
order.

We discussed our briefing with officials from the Departments of State and
Defense and incorporated their technical comments where appropriate. We
also reviewed numerous nongovernmental reports and documents on
peacekeeping and discussed our briefing with peacekeeping experts. We
considered relevant peacekeeping analyses and expert opinions in
completing our briefing.

We conducted work for this report from December 2001 to February 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this letter to the Chairs and Ranking Minority
Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Armed
Services Committee, and other interested committees. This letter will also
be available on GAO's home page at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please
call me at (202) 5128979. Key contributors to this report included Tet
Miyabara, B. Patrick Hickey, Dave Maurer, Richard Boudreau, Addison Ricks,
and Lynn Cothern.

Joseph A. Christoff, Director International Affairs and Trade

Enclosure

                        U.N. Peace Operations 1996oe2001

                                  Source: GAO.

                           Phases of Multidimensional
                                   Operations

Typical

Conditions:

Ongoing Conflict Multinational forces try to restore or provide stability
and security, typically to:

     o Regional security threats  o Protect humanitarian operations;
     o Multiple warring parties  o Provide a transition time for a U.N.
       operation to
     o Genocide, famine, deploy. rape, and torture
     o Courts, police, and markets not

functioning U.N. operations try to:

o Crime and  o Facilitate implementation of political accord;

corruption rampant

o Help establish and control interim government.

Typical Conditions: U.N.-led or coalition-led multilateral operations,
with Post Conflict World Bank and others:

     o Unstable  o Provide stability with a multinational force; government 
       o Help build police and justice system;
     o Widespread  o Help construct administrative and political

corruption

     o Complex and institutions;
       costly tasks  o Help build economic institutions-banking, finance,
     o Multiple NGOs and treasury;
     o Shattered

                     o Provide for economic reconstruction;

economy

     o A need to  o Provide refugee return and repatriation; reintegrate
       fighters  o Ensure that basic human rights are honored;
     o Rule of law lacking

o Advise and oversee elections, transfers of power.

                          GAO Work on Peace Operations

Participation of major internal and external parties in negotiations
enhanced prospects for implementing agreements.

     o The international community backed the High Representative in
       enforcing the Dayton Accords, which had been signed by representatives
       of all major parties to the conflict;
     o U.N. military in Somalia lacked an internationally sanctioned peace
       accord, thus depriving its activities of legitimacy with parts of the
       Somali population;
     o China and 18 nations signed the Cambodian agreement and supported its
       implementation despite Khmer Rouge opposition.

U.N. returns refugees to Cambodia. Police cadets graduate in Kosovo.

Writing specific activities into a peace agreement enhanced implementation
of the agreement.

     o Cambodian peace settlement set timelines for the repatriation of
       refugees, which the U.N. used to force the pace of repatriation;
     o Kosovo Agreements gave the U.N. and the OSCE responsibility for the
       creation of a Kosovo police force and allowed NATO to demilitarize the
       Kosovo Liberation Army;
     o Dayton Accords defined the rules and schedule for disarming the
       parties, which NATO enforced when violations occurred.

Wolfgang Petrisch is high representative for Kosovars greet entering KFOR
troops.
Dayton implementation in Bosnia.

 For successful implementation, agreements often required mechanisms for their
                        interpretation and enforcement.

     o To enforce Dayton Accords, the Office of the High Representative
       annulled laws and removed officials;
     o In Kosovo, the NATO military force was charged with enforcing peace;
     o Initially, U.N. operations in Cambodia did not have a special
       prosecutor's office to enforce human rights; human rights were widely
       abused.

Kosovo`s status is unresolved. Brcko is important to all ethnic groups in
Bosnia.

  To end hostilities, parties sometimes deferred politically sensitive issues.

     o Parties to the Kosovo conflict agreed on ceasefire and repatriation of
       refugees but left final political status of Kosovo undecided;
     o Dayton Accords drew boundaries between the
       parties but left open eventual control of Brcko, a
       strategic city in Bosnia;
     o Paris peace negotiations used participation of Khmer Rouge to create a
       peace settlement but did not provide for a war crimes tribunal.

Source: Department of National Defence, Canada.

Khmer Rouge faction retained weapons in Canadian peacekeepers evacuate
civilians violation of Cambodian disarmament agreement. wounded in
Srebrenica.

      Military forces with insufficient resources often met with failure.

     o In Somalia, the U.N. had too few troops to provide security throughout
       the country;
     o U.N. lacked sufficient troops and firepower in Bosnia to halt Serb
       attacks against safe havens;
     o U.N. not capable of forcing disarmament in
       Cambodia;
     o NATO had military means to carry out objectives in Balkans.

           Military should have had clear understanding of its role.

     o Troops should understand:
     o Mission objectives;
     o Measures of success;
     o Command and control structure; and
     o Rules of engagement for lethal force.
     o U.N. weak and ineffective in Rwanda during genocide in part because
       U.N. troops and local civilians were unclear about the U.N.'s role;
     o NATO raids on Serb weapons sites in Bosnia aided by troops' and Serbs'
       understanding of NATO role.

NATO secured ethnically divided Mostar, Bosnia.

        Non-U.N. multinational forces fared better than U.N.-led forces

     o Sufficient troops, equipment, and reinforcements more readily
       available;
     o NATO had 60,000 troops in Bosnia;
     o Clearer approach to effectively guide the use of force
     o Some U.N. contingents failed to act during ongoing genocide in Rwanda;
     o Greater certainty that national contingents will carry out orders;
     o Italian contingent in Somalia negotiated with Aidid while rest of U.N.
       force tried to capture him.

U.N. peacekeeper on guard as Cambodians vote. NATO provided security at
ethnic boundaries in Bosnia.

       Military must provide secure climate for civilian work to proceed.

     o Without troops to maintain order, developing rule of law in Somalia
       was impossible;
     o Large NATO deployments into Bosnia and Kosovo quickly created security
       to allow elections, reconstruction, and police training to begin;
     o The U.N. force's inconsistent protection of food delivery allowed
       Bosnian Serbs to manipulate access to food and use it as a weapon.
     o U.N. force in Cambodia provided enough security for credible
       elections.

U.N. police commissioner in Kosovo reports on the consequences of slow
Local Cambodian officials conduct business.

deployment of -desperately needed" international police.

Slow deployment of mission impeded establishment of civil administration.

     o In Kosovo, slow deployment of U.N. mission allowed Kosovo Liberation
       Army to temporarily run civil administration, jeopardizing U.N.
       mission's credibility;
     o Delays in U.N. deployment to Cambodia allowed one party to control key
       government agencies, such as Finance and Defense, undercutting the
       chance to build a fair government and control corruption.

Soldier distributes food aid in Somalia.  Dutch soldiers protect refugee
repatriation in Cambodia.

  Civil administration was most successful when military and civilians worked
                                   together.

     o Poor coordination between military and NGOs in Somalia hindered
       initial food aid efforts;
     o U.N. peacekeepers provided security that allowed the U.N. High
       Commission for Refugees to help 360,000 refugees return to their homes
       in Cambodia within a year;
     o U.N. civilian police force, in coordination with NATO troops, provide
       public security until multiethnic Kosovo police force assumes that
       role.

Bosnian returnees rebuild their community`s Citizen stands before a court
in Cambodia. school.

                    Civil administration was more successful
                      when peace mission had authority to
                              enforce agreements.

     o In Bosnia, the High Representative removed local officials that
       obstructed the return of ethnic minorities to their pre-war homes;
     o The U.N. mission in Cambodia created a corps of human rights
       prosecutors, but it was powerless to act when Cambodian judges refused
       to hear cases.

GAO has reported and testified on corruption in International police in
Kosovo confront rioters. Bosnia.

  Civil administration was more successful when international response matched
                                evolving needs.

     o The mission in Bosnia has been slow to provide resources in response
       to corruption, a problem that threatens implementation of the Dayton
       Accords;
     o The U.N. mission and NATO-led forces in Kosovo responded to potential
       civil unrest needs by providing police forces trained in riot control;
     o In Cambodia, the U.N. responded to immediate needs by reprogramming
       money into quick impact projects that provided jobs and reintegrated
       combatants.

U.N. officials in Somalia attempt to Bosnian-Serb leader Biljana Plavsic
has moderated her
negotiate safe passage for aid shipments politics.
with members of two warring factions.

Civil administration worked best when locals participated at every
reasonable opportunity.

     o With few Somalis in the U.N. mission, local warlords exploited charge
       that the mission was a foreign encroachment on Somalia's sovereignty;
     o From 1996 to 2000, more moderate candidates in Bosnia have gained
       support as economic and civic participation have increased.
     o Has a process been established to create durable local institutions
       that can resolve disputes and enforce decisions peacefully?
     o Are military, civilian, and humanitarian efforts coordinated and
       adequately funded to accomplish common objectives?
     o Do the local population and officials act as key participants in
       making decisions about the operation?
     o What is being done to fight corruption?

                          Overall Issues for Oversight

(320109)
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