NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir

to the Consensus Rule?

by Leo G. Michel

Strategic Forum

S

ince its creation in 1949, the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

has developed a tradition of making

decisions by consensus. This requirement for

general agreement among all members on

positions or actions taken in the name of

NATO has survived serious internal rifts and

four rounds of enlargement.

Yet influential Americans are asking

whether the consensus rule impedes the

ability of NATO to make rapid and effective

decisions—especially on military operations. Concerns predate the agreement

reached in November 2002 on a fifth round 

of enlargement involving seven Central and

East European states, but they have also

been fueled by resentment over intraAlliance divisions related to the war in Iraq.

In May 2003, the Senate gave voice to these

concerns by asking the Bush administration

to raise the possibility of changing the 

consensus rule and “suspending” a NATO

member before the North Atlantic Council.

Options exist to facilitate decisionmaking on the planning and conduct of operations that would not fundamentally change

the role of consensus, a procedure whose

advantages should not be underestimated.

However, a judicious balance needs to be

found between the desire for efficient military action in response to common threats

and the need to ensure that all members have

a chance to be heard. Moreover, if the United

States were to seek changes, it would face 

a Catch-22: the consensus rule can only be

altered by consensus.

It should come as no surprise that North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials are

fond of citing Mark Twain’s retort to doomsayers

that reports of his death were greatly exaggerated. Having survived many rough tests since its

birth, the 54-year-old alliance is still working to

recover from a bruising disagreement among its

members over the decision by some to oust

Saddam Hussein’s regime. Its services, however,

are still very much in demand:

■ About 37,000 NATO-led military personnel

remain on crisis management duty in the Balkans.

■ NATO recently launched its first out-ofEurope operation, taking command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in

Afghanistan.

■ In July 2003, the Senate voted unanimously

to encourage the Bush administration to seek help

from NATO in Iraq.

■ Several prominent Members of Congress

and nongovernmental experts have called for a

NATO peacekeeping mission between Israelis and

Palestinians.

But how does NATO make such commitments? Will a large—and enlarging—

Alliance be capable of planning and managing potentially complex military operations in

the future? Or do the drawbacks of running 

a “war by committee” (as some have described the 1999 Kosovo air campaign) make

NATO an unwieldy instrument for managing

modern coalition warfare? All of these questions revolve around the perceived ability of

NATO, or lack thereof, to make timely and

effective decisions to respond to 21st-century

threats in a way that equitably shares the risks

and responsibilities of Alliance membership.

Consensus: A Primer

Although international security affairs

cognoscenti often refer to the NATO consensus

rule, the North Atlantic Treaty does not specify

how collective decisions are to be made, with

one exception: the Article 10 provision that

“unanimous agreement” is necessary to invite

a state to join the Alliance. Absent any explicit

voting procedure, NATO has developed a set of

customary practices.

Most decisions are based on draft proposals circulated to all Allies by the Secretary

General, who chairs the North Atlantic Council

(NAC), or by the chairperson (always an International Staff [IS] official) of one of the hundreds of NATO committees and working groups.

These draft proposals may be initiated by the

Secretary General, the IS, or individual Allies.

Written proposals generally are preceded by

consultations in a variety of forums, including

bilateral or multilateral discussions in allied

capitals, allied missions at NATO Headquarters,

the NAC, and committees and working groups

established by the NAC. Such consultations are

useful—in some cases, critical—to identify

possible concerns or objections among Allies

and to craft mutually acceptable solutions.

When a written decision or statement of

position is deemed necessary, but some or all of

the Permanent Representatives (PermReps) or

their alternates cannot provide their respective

authoritative national positions at the time of 

a specific NAC or committee meeting, the

Secretary General or relevant committee chairperson may opt to circulate the draft proposal

under a silence procedure.1 If no Ally breaks

silence—that is, notifies the IS in writing of its

objection before the deadline set by the Secretary General or committee chairperson—the

No. 202

August 2003

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

No. 202, August 2003
proposal is considered approved. However, if one

or more Ally breaks silence, the proposal is

normally referred back to the relevant body for

further work to reach consensus. As a rule,

NATO does not publicly identify which countries

break silence, although national positions may

be leaked (sometimes by the country breaking

silence) if the issue is contentious. Moreover, as

there is no formal voting procedure, there is no

formal abstention procedure, either.

The Secretary General routinely aids

consensus building through informal discussions at NATO headquarters with individual

Allies or groups of Allies. He also can influence

Alliance deliberations through his public statements and private meetings and correspondence with senior officials, legislators, or opinion leaders of allied governments. However, the

Secretary General or other senior IS officials

cannot overrule an Ally’s position. Indeed, any

perceived effort by a NATO official to run

roughshod over an Ally’s objections is apt to

provoke sympathetic objections from other

Allies who are wary of any precedent that could

diminish their future prerogatives.2

The Power of the Rule

The consensus rule represents more than a

mechanistic decisionmaking procedure. It

reflects the NATO structure as an alliance of

independent and sovereign countries, as

opposed to a supranational body, and exemplifies for many the “one for all, all for one” ethos

of the organization’s collective defense commitment.3 NATO decisions are the expression of the

collective will of its member governments,

arrived at by common consent. Under the rule,

no Ally can be forced to approve a position or

take an action against its will. This is especially

important for decisions on the potential use of

military force, which are among the most

politically sensitive for any Ally.

Even Article 5, the treaty’s key collective

defense provision, stops short of mandating the

type of assistance to be provided by each Ally in

the event of an attack against the territory of

another.4 It is important to recall that the United

States insisted on qualified language in this

article largely to assuage concerns in Congress

that its constitutional power to declare war not

be ceded to any multilateral organization.

At the same time, the consensus rule

allows NATO to respect distinctive national

legislation that may bear upon the ability of

Allies to contribute to certain NATO operations.

For example, Norway and Denmark do not

allow peacetime stationing of foreign troops or

nuclear weapons. Similarly, German law

requires a simple parliamentary majority to

approve military deployments outside Germany, whereas Hungarian law requires a twothirds majority. Iceland, for its part, does not

have a national military force. Through the

rule, NATO can build political and military

solidarity through the Alliance as a whole

without imposing one-size-fits-all standards

on its diverse membership.

The consensus rule forces Allies to undertake the widest possible consultations to build

support for their ideas. No Ally, large or small,

can be taken for granted. Despite its prominent

role in the Alliance, the United States also relies

on the consensus rule to protect its interests, to

shape the views of others, and to integrate ideas

offered by others to improve its proposals.

While sacrosanct in principle, the rule has

proved flexible in practice. Three examples

illustrate this point.

The French Connection. Following

France’s decision to withdraw from the NATO

Integrated Military Structure in 1966, the other

Allies turned increasingly to the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) to consider and decide

upon most defense matters and issues related to

collective defense planning. Created in 1963,

the DPC was seldom used before the French

withdrawal. Similarly, a Nuclear Planning

Group (NPG), with the same membership as

the DPC, was established soon after the French

withdrawal to discuss specific policy issues

associated with nuclear forces. Although

remaining active in the NAC, France was neither bound by, nor did it seek to impede, decisions made by consensus in the DPC or NPG.

In 1992, as NATO considered whether to

launch its first out-of-area crisis response

operation—maritime and air surveillance

operations in the Adriatic in support of United

Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution

713, which imposed an embargo on arms

deliveries to Yugoslavia—the DPC allies agreed

by consensus to discuss the issue in the NAC.

This move eased the way for French participation in the operation, which was favored by

Paris and broadly welcomed by other Allies.

This also set the precedent for the de facto

leading role of the NAC (versus the DPC) in

subsequent crisis response operations in

Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Thus, while

remaining formally outside the Integrated

Military Structure, France has been a major

player in decisionmaking and planning—as

well as a leading force contributor—for all

three of those non-Article-5 NATO operations. It

also took part in the April 2003 NAC decision to

bring the ISAF in Afghanistan under NATO

command and control in August 2003. (French

forces have participated in ISAF since its formation in January 2002.)

Kosovo. The 1999 NATO air campaign,

Operation Allied Force, against the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia has been widely described—and decried by some—as a “war by

committee.” Accounts differ regarding the

NATO decisionmaking process during the

campaign, but few challenge the existence of

severe intra-Alliance strains; these ranged from

issues regarding the legitimacy of NATO military action without an explicit UNSC resolution

to the military strategy and tactics pursued

during the conflict.5 On balance, however, the

consensus rule probably did more to help than

hinder an ultimately successful NATO effort.

The rule allowed Allies with differing

views—some emphasizing the humanitarian

crisis and human rights abuses, others worried

by the precedent of NATO “offensive” action

against a sovereign state—to find enough

common ground to endorse, or at least not to

block, Allied Force. The rule was particularly

important for the Greek government, which

ultimately decided not to break silence on key

NAC decisions authorizing the use of force

despite polls showing that some 95 percent of

its public opposed NATO intervention. At the

same time, Greece opted out of direct involvement in the combat operations.

2 Strategic Forum No. 202, August 2003

Leo G. Michel is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. Comments may be addressed to Mr. Michel at michellg@ndu.edu.

through the consensus

rule, NATO can build

political and military

solidarity without

imposing one-size-fits-all

standards
The nuance between a decisionmaking

procedure that allows an Ally to acquiesce in a

collective decision (despite its public or private

reservations) and a procedure that would

oblige that state to cast a yea or nay vote in

the NAC may appear, at first blush, insignificant. In practice, the nuance matters enormously. If PermReps had been required to

“raise hands” to approve Allied Force, the

Greek government may not have been able to

resist the domestic political pressure to vote

against it. Such a move by Greece might have

made it easier for one or two other reluctant

Allies to follow suit.

The inherent flexibility of the consensus

rule also was demonstrated in decisionmaking

on the timing, strategy, and tactics of Allied

Force. For example, during the crisis, the NAC

frequently decided not to engage subordinate

committees. This kept sensitive NAC discussions

as private as possible and facilitated its rapid

decisions, normally with a 48-hour (or less)

turnaround. Then-Secretary General Javier

Solana played a key role in reconciling divergent views within the NAC using a “summary

of discussions,” one of several techniques

devised to avoid putting any single Ally “on the

spot.” Furthermore, the NAC delegated to

Solana the authority to implement, suspend, or

terminate the Limited Air Response—the first

phase of the air campaign. In this way, the NAC

ceded (by consensus) the decision to Solana to

initiate a preapproved spectrum of airstrikes.

There were differences later among Allies over

target selection and mission assignments, but

these generally were solved through bilateral

channels outside NATO and involved only the

parties directly concerned.

In sum, while extraordinary efforts were

required to maintain consensus throughout

Allied Force, these arguably were vital to preserving NATO solidarity and ultimately achieving its stated objectives in Kosovo.

September 11. The consensus rule did

not prevent NATO from acting quickly—that is,

within 24 hours of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001—to invoke, for the first time in

its history, Article 5. Although the immediate

operational impact of that action was negligible,

the NAC decision was a powerful political statement of solidarity that was warmly welcomed by

the United States. After all, the shock of the

attacks was soon compounded by warnings of

additional, imminent, and potentially catastrophic terrorist strikes.

Did the existence of the rule, however,

prevent NATO from assuming a more prominent role in the campaign against terrorism,

especially during the first several months after

September 11? Probably not. Other factors

clearly motivated the U.S. approach, such as

America’s unquestioned right to self-defense in

response to a direct attack on its territory; an

early recognition that NATO could not coordinate all the tools—diplomatic, intelligence,

economic, financial, law enforcement, as well

as military—needed for a sustained campaign

against organizations such as al Qaeda; and

the need to enlist and maintain support from

the vast majority of non-NATO and Muslim

states who reject terrorism. (The latter goal

made it critical to avoid sending any public

signal that the campaign was NATO’s war

against terrorism—or worse, NATO’s war

against Muslims.6

) An additional factor in U.S.

thinking with respect to the campaign in

Afghanistan was the limited capability of most

Allies to support long-range power projection.

Thus, the United States supported an important

but not lead role for NATO.

Still, the rule’s existence did have some

effects. It probably facilitated the October 4,

2001, NAC agreement on eight specific measures of assistance requested by the United

States, including the deployment of five airborne warning and control system (AWACS)

aircraft and crews to help defend U.S. airspace.

The consensus procedure allowed every Ally to

contribute to the collective effort in areas

identified on the approved menu but did not

obligate Allies to take action in every area. On

the other hand, the consensus rule allowed one

Ally (not the United States) to block a proposal

in the NAC in late 2001 that would have directed NATO military authorities (NMAs) to

develop planning options for NATO support to

humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan.

Concern over the Rule

If the consensus rule is not broken—at

least not severely—why fix it? Proposals to

reexamine the NATO decisionmaking process

reflect two broad types of future-oriented concerns: the anticipated effects of enlargement

and the prospect of a growing number of

impasses over the planning and launching of

NATO operations. While these concerns are

interrelated, there are notable differences in

their presumed targets.

Enlargement Jitters. Before September

11, key Members of Congress and some in the

Executive Branch were of two minds on the

breadth of a fifth round of NATO enlargement,

although there was little doubt that the Alliance would issue invitations to at least a few

Central and East European states at its November 2002 summit in Prague.7 On the one hand,

the geopolitical rationale for a robust enlargement to help complete a “Europe whole and

free” was widely accepted.8 On the other hand,

Congress repeatedly signaled its concern—as it

had prior to the 1997 invitations to the Czech

Republic, Hungary, and Poland—that the

Prague invitees must be prepared politically

and militarily to become security providers,

not just security consumers, vis-à-vis NATO.

The political jitters were symbolized by the

so-called Meciar problem in the Slovak Republic. In 1998, Vladmir Meciar, the authoritarian

and corrupt Slovak prime minister since 1992,

was ousted by a broad coalition of opposition

parties, but he remained an influential political force. Would NATO risk embarrassment,

some in Washington wondered, if Slovak voters

returned Meciar or his party to power once

their country was invited to join? Worse, following Slovak accession to NATO, would a new

Meciar-dominated government hesitate to

abuse the consensus rule and paralyze the

Alliance if it served his narrow political interests? Moreover, Meciar was not a unique case;

similar concerns were voiced, for example,

regarding former Romanian and Bulgarian

political figures.

The ability and willingness of some NATO

aspirants to meet their defense capabilities

commitments to the Alliance also worried

American lawmakers and officials. The socalled burdensharing debate was as old as

NATO itself, and Members of Congress were well

aware that several longtime Allies—as well as

newer Allies such as Hungary—had disappointing records when it came to providing the

forces and capabilities the Alliance required.

Would a robust enlargement, some worried,

bring more free riders into the Alliance, eroding its military effectiveness? The consensus

rule clearly was not the cause of any Ally’s

military deficiencies. Yet it did complicate

efforts to exert peer pressure within NATO on

weak performers, who not surprisingly resisted

efforts by the United States, the Secretary General, and some other Allies to publish more

No. 202, August 2003 Strategic Forum 3
4 Strategic Forum No. 202, August 2003

data on the defense capabilities performance of

individual members.

In the months following September 11,

such political and military concerns about

enlargement receded as the aspirants demonstrated support for the U.S.-led campaign

against terrorism and, in most cases, willingness to address defense reform and modernization issues. During their 2002–2003 hearings

on enlargement, Senate and House committees

turned to other issues. Would the addition of

several new members, albeit well-intentioned,

slow down the urgent transformation needed to

give NATO the capabilities and structures to

meet 21st-century threats such as terrorism, its

state supporters, and the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction? Or would enlargement make it even harder to reach a

consensus on threats to the Alliance, the strategy and capabilities necessary to meet those

threats, and—most of all—a decision to take

military action promptly, perhaps preemptively,

to protect common security interests?

The Rule under Fire. If enlargement

jitters first focused congressional attention on

NATO decisionmaking, the contentious intraAlliance dispute over Iraq in early 2003 apparently convinced some Senators that the consensus rule must be changed.

The dispute was an extension of differences at the time within the UNSC. The United

Kingdom, with American support, favored a

new UNSC resolution explicitly authorizing the

use of force against Iraq, while France and

Germany opposed such a step. When the U.S.

PermRep first suggested in late January that

NMAs begin planning for the defense of Turkey

in view of the potential threat from Iraq, 

Belgium, France, Germany, and (initially)

Luxembourg balked. Such planning, they

argued, was premature at best; at worst, in

their view, it would send a harmful political

signal that NATO accepted the “logic of war”

with Iraq, thus prejudicing their nations’

positions at the United Nations.

The dispute came to a head with Turkey’s

formal request, on February 10, for consultations in the NAC.9 As part of those consultations, the Chairman of the Military Committee

briefed the NAC on the potential Iraqi threat

and explained the timelines necessary to prepare plans to reinforce Turkish defenses. When

Turkey’s PermRep requested that the NAC direct

the NMAs to prepare such plans for consideration by the NAC, three allied PermReps—soon

revealed to be those of Belgium, France, and

Germany—again objected. Secretary General

George Robertson quickly circulated a formal

decision sheet, whereupon those three Allies

formally broke silence.

The now very public argument lasted

several more days before Belgium and Germany agreed, for a variety of reasons, to a facesaving compromise: Turkey’s request was

moved from the NAC to the DPC, where France

is not represented. The DPC quickly reached

consensus, on February 16, on guidance to the

NMAs to prepare plans to help protect Turkey

through, for example, the deployment of NATO

AWACS and support to Allied deployments of

theater missile and chemical and biological

defense capabilities. The NMAs completed the

planning in the next few days, and on February

19, the DPC authorized the NMAs to implement

the agreed assistance to Turkey.

Although NATO officials understandably

tried to put the best face possible on the incident—Secretary General Robertson described it

as “damage above, not below, the waterline”—

its impact, particularly in Washington, should

not be underestimated.10 For some, at least, the

consensus rule appeared to have outlived its

usefulness. As Senator Jack Reed (D–RI) told

his colleagues on May 8:

First, I agree that we must eliminate the

“consensus rule,” the antiquated requirement in the NATO charter that nearly prevented NATO from protecting one of its own

members, Turkey, before the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. . . . Secondly, I support the need for a new rule in

NATO that authorizes the members of the

alliance to suspend the membership of any

country in NATO which no longer supports

the ideals of the alliance. The recent refusal

of support on the part of some of our NATO

allies during the build-up for and execution

of Operation Iraqi Freedom has shown the

need for such a change.11

The Congress Speaks

Senator Reed’s remarks were delivered in

the context of Senate floor action on its resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the

treaty protocols on NATO enlargement. The

resolution, which passed 96–0, contains a

“Sense of the Senate” amendment sponsored

by Senators Carl Levin (D–MI), Pat Roberts

(R–KS), and John Warner (R–VA). While the

amendment does not endorse Senator Reed’s

prescriptions, it clearly reflects an undercurrent

of impatience with customary NATO decisionmaking procedures. In brief, the amendment

recommends that the President place on the

NAC agenda for discussion, by late 2004:

■ the NATO consensus rule

■ “the merits of establishing a process for

suspending the membership in NATO of a member

country that no longer complies with the NATO

principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the

rule of law.”

The amendment also provides for a Presidential report on such discussions to the appropriate congressional committees. The report

would describe, inter alia:

■ “methods to provide more flexibility to the

Supreme Allied Commander Europe to plan potential contingency operations before the formal (NAC)

approval of such planning”

■ “methods to streamline the process by

which NATO makes decisions with respect to conducting military campaigns.”

Additional legislative action related to the

consensus rule followed over the summer.

Specifically, the fiscal year 2004 Defense 

Authorization Bill pending before Congress was

amended to require the Secretary of Defense to

report to appropriate committees on his recommendations for “streamlining defense, military,

and security decisionmaking within NATO.” At

least some sponsors of the amendment appear

to favor increased, perhaps exclusive, reliance

on the DPC (versus the NAC) for any decision

affecting Alliance defense capabilities and force

structures, to include the NATO Response Force

(NRF) now being set up.12

The administration’s next steps on these

congressional suggestions are not clear. Before

the May 8 Senate action, however, Secretary of

State Colin Powell expressed the administration position: “We believe that the current

decision-making procedures work well and

serve United States interests. . . . NATO is an

alliance, and no NATO member, including the

United States, would agree to allow Alliance

the contentious 

intra-Alliance dispute

over Iraq apparently

convinced some Senators

that the consensus rule

must be changed
decisions to be made on defense commitments

without its agreement.”13

Possible New Approaches

In view of past experience and Congressional expectations, how might NATO streamline its decisionmaking process?

To begin tackling this question, one must

first appreciate that NATO makes literally

thousands of decisions annually, each of which

is tied, directly or indirectly, to a consensus

procedure. With few exceptions, these decisions

fall into five broad categories:

■ broad political and military strategies,

which are reflected in documents such as the

Alliance Strategic Concept and Ministerial Guidance

and in decisions regarding enlargement

■ military structure and planning functions,

covering areas such as the NATO command and

force structure, capabilities development, and

contingency operational planning related to potential military missions

■ authorizing, monitoring, and adjusting

collective defense and crisis management operations, such as Article 5 assistance to the United

States following September 11 and NATO-led operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan

■ organizational and management concerns,

to include defining the responsibilities and overseeing the operations of the IS, International Military

Staff, and various NATO agencies

■ resource and budgeting issues involving

NATO collective assets, personnel, infrastructure,

and operational funding.

The possible approaches outlined below

will focus on the issues of contingency operational planning (options 1 and 2) and the

approval and conduct of military missions

(options 3 and 4), as these involve the greatest

political sensitivities for Allies. It should be

noted, however, that NATO has taken modest

steps over the past year to streamline its decisionmaking process in other areas—for example, by reducing the number of its committees

and increasing the Secretary General’s authority in day-to-day management and budgetary

decisions. Additional steps are under consideration to include revamping the “defense planning” process that identifies NATO-wide capabilities requirements and establishes

commitments by individual Allies toward

meeting those requirements.

Option 1: “Threatened Ally” Rule.

Broadly speaking, under existing rules, the

NMAs prepare only those contingency operational plans for which the NAC has provided

political guidance. Historically, this has constrained formal contingency operational planning to a relatively small number of Cold Warstyle Article 5 scenarios, although a few years

ago, the Military Committee (MC) was given

limited authority to initiate contingency planning covering a range of medium- and longerterm threats. The NAC, however, has retained the

authority for initiating and approving all operational plans developed in response to an actual

or fast-breaking crisis. As seen in the February

2003 dispute, the existing consensus rule can

slow that initiation process if, for example, one

or more Allies fear this planning authorization

will send an unwelcome political signal.

Under a “threatened Ally” rule, any Ally (or

combination of Allies) could request that the

NMAs prepare contingency operational planning

options if it sees a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. The

request would be automatically approved by the

NAC, unless a consensus of other Allies objects.

Pros: This option would be consistent with

Article 4 of the Treaty.14 However, while respecting the principle of consensus, the option shifts

the burden of proof from the “threatened” to

the “nonthreatened” Allies. The latter would

require a consensus to determine that such

contingency operational planning was unneeded or unwise—a high threshold for most

Allies to cross. For example, had such a rule

existed in February 2003, Turkey’s request that

NATO begin planning for possible defensive

assistance would have been approved quickly

and an embarrassing public stalemate might

have been avoided.

By abbreviating the NAC role in authorizing the start of contingency operational planning, NATO gains a potentially faster turnaround between the appearance of a threat and

the NMA preparation of military options. At the

same time, the NAC would retain its power to

decide by consensus whether any of the planning options is modified or eventually adopted.

Cons: For some Allies, this option might

appear to carry a risk of politically provocative

planning requests by one or more Allies to deal

with imagined or grossly exaggerated threats.

Those threats might reflect deteriorating relations between Allies or between an Ally and a

neighboring country that is outside the Alliance. However, the history of NATO should be

very reassuring on this point: there is no precedent of an Ally making a frivolous proposal to

undertake contingency operational planning.

Moreover, any Ally contemplating such a move

would run a high risk of receiving an embarrassing rebuff from the rest of the Alliance,

including the United States.

Option 2: “SACEUR’s Discretion”

Rule. Under this option, the NAC would grant

broad discretionary authority to the Supreme

Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), to

prepare and update, as necessary, contingency

operational plans for a broad range of potential

NATO military missions. The SACEUR would

keep the Secretary General and MC informed of

such plans.

Pros: This rule would adopt at NATO

essentially the same approach used by the

United States for its unified combatant commanders. The latter are expected to keep fully

abreast of evolving threats in their areas of

responsibility and to develop and maintain

contingency operational plans to counter those

threats. Such planning is considered prudent

business as usual and in no way prejudices the

President’s decisionmaking authority to commit

U.S. forces to a specific operation.

As in option 1, the NAC would retain its

power to decide whether any of the planning

options are executed. However, the availability

of contingency operational planning by the

SACEUR likely would shorten the time needed

by the NAC to consider its response to a fastbreaking crisis. This option also would have

avoided the February 2003 impasse over planning for Turkey’s defense.

The rationale for such a move is especially compelling in light of the Alliance’s

decision to create the NRF. The NRF, as envisioned by most Allies, is to be capable of initiating a deployment to wherever it is needed

within several days of a NAC decision. To meet

such an ambitious response time and maximize NRF effectiveness, considerable contingency operational planning will be necessary,

recognizing that any such advance planning

will always need to be adjusted in light of the

actual crisis at hand.

No. 202, August 2003 Strategic Forum 5

NATO makes literally

thousands of decisions

annually, each of which 

is tied to a consensus

procedure
Cons: Such an option might raise two

main concerns: first, it departs from longstanding NATO practice that the NAC (or DPC)

must, as a rule, agree on political guidance to

the NMAs before they undertake operational

planning options; and second, to some Allies,

it might appear to delegate too much discretion to the most senior U.S. military officer in

the Alliance.15

To address the aforementioned concerns,

the option might be modified to give the Secretary General (by tradition, always a European)

the authority to direct the SACEUR to prepare

contingency operational plans based on the

Secretary General’s sense of the NAC, that is,

without recourse to a formal NAC decision. This

arrangement—similar to that used by Secretary

General Solana during the Kosovo crisis—could

achieve the desired practical results, while preserving some political wiggle room for those

Allies who might be hesitant, for a variety of

reasons, to have such planning initiated by the

NAC. Of course, if the Secretary General is not an

activist personality, he or she might be reluctant

to exercise such discretionary authority.

Some Allies might argue that such an

option is unnecessary, as they assume that

informal contingency operational planning is

ongoing and would be available quickly in a

crisis. This is not, however, a convincing argument. It implicitly acknowledges the usefulness

of greater planning flexibility but sends a

confusing “don’t ask, don’t tell” message to the

multinational military planners. Indeed, Allies

who are European Union (EU) members logically should favor a broad spectrum of contingency operational planning by NATO, as the EU

has assured access to NATO operational planning capabilities under arrangements finalized

in late 2002. More robust planning within

NATO would benefit the EU ability to mount

crisis response missions where NATO as a whole

has decided not to engage.

Option 3: Empowering “Coalitions

within NATO.” Under this approach, a NAC

consensus would continue to be required to

authorize a NATO operation. In a departure

from current practice, however, the NAC could

mandate a NATO committee of contributors

(NCC), chaired by the Secretary General, to

carry out the operation on behalf of the 

Alliance. This committee would be comprised of

those Allies prepared to contribute forces or

capabilities to the operation, and it would enjoy

full access to NATO common assets and capabilities (for example, NATO AWACS and communications systems) and the NATO command

structure. It would approve the concept of

operations, rules of engagement, military activation orders given to the SACEUR, and other

needed steps to implement the operation. The

Secretary General would periodically brief Allies

who are not members of the NCC on significant

developments affecting the operation, but those

Allies would not participate in determining the

daily management of the operation. Finally,

those Allies who have elected not to belong to

the NCC could not by themselves reopen its

mandate in the NAC; to do so, they would need

support from some threshold (for example, at

least one-third) of the NCC membership.

Pros: This option would preserve the

consensus rule for approving NATO operations.

It would track with past practice, whereby an

Ally with reservations about a particular operation will not break silence if there is overwhelming sentiment in the NAC to proceed. It

also would take into account the potentially

greater difficulty of reaching common threat

assessments among all Allies where nonArticle-5 crises outside the Euro-Atlantic region

are involved—especially as such crises might

have very disparate impacts on interests of

individual Allies and, as a result, their willingness to employ military force.

The NCC would make it easier for those

Allies who do share a common threat assessment to draw on NATO assets and proceed with

the Alliance’s political blessing to implement

non-Article-5 crisis response missions. By

removing the ability of those who are not

engaged in the operation to influence its dayto-day conduct, this approach could accelerate

decisionmaking and avoid the image of war 

by committee attributed to Operation Allied

Force. The NCC also would be inclusive rather

than exclusive: no Ally could block another’s

participation, and Allies who are unable to

contribute at the outset would retain the option

of joining the NCC at a later stage. Finally, the

NCC might be particularly appealing to Allies

who are also EU members, as a similar “committee of contributors” arrangement exists in

the EU European Security and Defense Policy

to accommodate the potential contributions of

non-EU members to EU-led operations.16

Cons: The option would raise some important practical issues. For example, NATO

presumably would need to agree on relatively

transparent standards that discourage some

Allies from providing a minimal contribution

(in relation to their national capabilities)

simply to secure a seat at the NCC table. The

issue of ensuring rough parity between an Ally’s

practical contribution to an operation and its

influence over operational decisions is not new,

but past NATO practice has been to deal with

this behind the scenes on a case-by-case basis.17

A more difficult question is whether an

NCC approach would erode the NATO “one for

all, all for one” ethos. For example, this option

conceivably might make it easier—that is,

politically more respectable—for some Allies to

opt out of NATO-led operations. This in turn

could weaken their incentives to develop the

military capabilities needed to support a range

of potential NATO missions.

Moreover, any NCC option would need to

avoid inflaming some Allies’ suspicions that

Washington views NATO essentially as a toolbox

from which the United States selects a few partners to join in U.S.-led coalitions of the willing.

The toolbox notion is deeply troubling to other

Allies, as it implies that their forces and capabilities would become instruments for policies and

military operations decided by the United States

with minimal, if any, real consultation within

the Alliance. None of the other Allies would find

it politically possible over the long term to

sustain such a position. An NCC that ensured

Allies a significant role in decisionmaking,

commensurate with their contributions, would

alleviate such concerns.

Option 4: “Consensus Minus” Rule.

Under this rule, a NAC consensus would remain the preferred decisionmaking mechanism to authorize a NATO operation. However,

if consensus were not possible, the NAC could

authorize an operation by a process similar to

the EU qualified majority vote (QMV).

Under the QMV process, the EU Treaty

assigns each member a number of votes

weighted on the basis of its population, with a

6 Strategic Forum No. 202, August 2003

this approach could 

accelerate decisionmaking

and avoid the image of

war by committee

attributed to Operation

Allied Force
correction factor to give some added protection

to members with the smallest populations. The

current 15 EU members have a total of 87 votes,

with individual allocations ranging from 10

votes for each of the 4 largest—Germany, the

United Kingdom, France, and Italy—to 2 votes

for the smallest, Luxembourg. A proposal subject to QMV must receive at least 62 votes for

approval, which effectively prevents the 4 largest

countries from forcing through a measure

opposed by all the others and similarly prevents

any 2 of the largest from blocking a measure

supported by all the others. Under its draft

constitution, which is under review by an intergovernmental conference, the QMV allocations

must be changed to reflect the EU enlargement

from 15 to 25 members in 2004. It is important

to note, however, that the existing EU Treaty

and the draft constitution specifically exempt

“decisions having military or defense implications” from QMV procedures.18 Such decisions

must be made unanimously, although EU

members have an option to abstain.

Pros: There is no inherent contradiction

between a QMV procedure, if agreed among all

Allies, and the principle that the NAC must

authorize any NATO operation. Depending on

its modalities, a QMV procedure could make it

very difficult, perhaps impossible, for one Ally

or a small number of Allies to block an operation desired by others. This option could be

combined with option 3, allowing an NCC to be

mandated by QMV.

Cons: This option would represent a

radical break with NATO tradition and carry the

highest risk of undermining its political and,

eventually, military cohesion. The task of

designing and negotiating a QMV system appropriate for a political-military alliance of

sovereign states would be daunting, at best, and

bitterly contentious, at worst. A populationbased formula similar to that of the EU would

be unacceptable to a number of small and

middle-sized Allies, some of whom are among

the most solid contributors to NATO-led operations. Formulas based on indexes such as

defense spending as a percentage of gross

domestic product or the size, readiness, and

capabilities of national forces available for

NATO-assigned missions would be complicated

and need adjustment on a regular basis.

Moreover, it would be extremely difficult,

if not impossible, to gain NATO approval for a

QMV formula that did not provide at least a

theoretical possibility that the United States

could be outvoted in the Alliance—a possibility

that the Congress certainly would find intolerable. Similarly, it is hard to see why Allies (including the United Kingdom and Spain) who

have strongly opposed a QMV procedure for

military and defense matters within the EU

would find it easier to swallow in NATO. As

United Kingdom Minister for Europe Denis

MacShane stated in June 2003:

After a great deal of blah blah, foreign

policy often ends up with a decision on

whether a soldier is to risk his life somewhere.

The idea that an institution in Brussels can

at the present time send out a young man

from my constituency or from a German or

Spanish town to risk his life, or even to die, is

unthinkable for me. When we now send our

boys out, this has been decided by our government, answerable to parliament.19

Although Minister MacShane was responding to a question about QMV in the EU, his

remarks almost certainly reflect broader European sentiment with regard to NATO as well.

In sum, options exist to facilitate decisionmaking on the planning and conduct of operations without fundamentally changing the

consensus rule, but none is cost-free. Only

option 4 is clearly beyond the pale—for both

the United States and its Allies.

The Suspension Issue

As previously noted, the Senate recommendation that the NAC discuss “a process for suspending the membership in NATO of a member

country” appears to be a shot across the bow of

two groups: current Allies (Belgium, France, and

Germany) who disagreed with the U.S. invasion

of Iraq; and the seven countries invited to join

the Alliance in Prague. In addition, some Senators might have wanted to put down a warning

marker to several NATO aspirants beyond the

Prague invitees, such as Albania, Macedonia,

and Croatia. Regardless of its motivation, the

Senate resolution raises a number of fundamental issues on NATO ability to sanction the behavior of its members.

The North Atlantic Treaty itself is silent on

the question, although Article 13 provides for an

Ally to withdraw voluntarily 1 year after depositing a “notice of denunciation” with the United

States. Still, the Alliance has dealt with members whose governments have not always supported democratic values. When such situations

arose—for example, with Greek and Turkish

military regimes in the late 1960s and early

1970s—other Allies effectively isolated or excluded them from sensitive discussions. In those

instances, suspending either or both would have

risked sparking a nationalist backlash against

the Allies—or possibly a war between the two

long-time adversaries.

In contrast, the EU Treaty contains a

detailed, three-stage process for suspension:

first, a determination that there is “clear risk of

a serious breach” of basic EU principles, including “respect for human dignity, liberty,

democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect

for human rights”; second, a determination

that a serious breach has occurred; and finally,

a decision (under QMV procedures) to suspend

certain rights, including voting rights, of the

EU state in question. The EU has never invoked

the suspension process, although its members

agreed to limited political sanctions against

Austria in 2000.20

It is not clear that the EU offers a useful

model for NATO. While there can be no guarantee that a corrupt or authoritarian leadership

will never come to power in one of the states

recently invited to join the Alliance, chances of

this happening in the foreseeable future appear

relatively slim—thanks, in part, to the NATO

Membership Action Plan for aspirant states.

Similarly, if the Senate intended to underscore

its concern that incoming Alliance members

follow through on pledges to modernize their

military structures, the resolution’s language

misses the mark. It does not address the issue of

several current Allies who are solid democracies

but lackluster performers in terms of providing

relevant military capabilities to NATO.

Ultimately, any presumed benefit in raising the suspension issue now must be weighed

against the downsides of telling incoming

Alliance members, in effect, that the United

States is worried enough about their future

performance that it might favor changing the

rules of the game just as they are entering the

Alliance. Such a perceived message might

the Alliance has dealt

with members whose

governments have not

always supported

democratic values

No. 202, August 2003 Strategic Forum 7
undercut strong pro-NATO sentiment in the

aspirant countries and risk a backlash against

Washington not unlike that generated against

Paris when President Jacques Chirac scolded the

new EU invitees in February 2003 for “having

missed a good opportunity to shut up” when

they expressed support for U.S. policy on Iraq.21

As for the three Allies who openly differed

with the United States (and, it should be recalled, with many of the other Allies as well)

on Iraq, it appears that bilateral relations,

while still problematic, have thawed somewhat

since the Senate crafted its resolution. This

may, over time, reduce Senate interest in

pressing the administration to explore ways to

sanction those three, especially France,

through NATO mechanisms.

Indeed, there are good reasons for thinking twice before proceeding down this path.

Even those Allies who supported the United

States on Iraq will resist any move to systematically marginalize French involvement in major

NATO decisions—as envisaged, for example, by

the aforementioned amendment to the FY 2004

Defense Authorization Bill. France remains a

prominent force contributor to NATO-led missions in the Balkans and to ISAF, a major

proponent of improving European defense

capabilities, and a potential serious contributor

to the NRF. Moreover, its key political and

economic role within the EU makes it an

indispensable—albeit sometimes difficult—

partner for all other EU members. More

broadly, it is difficult to imagine any Ally—or

new invitee—would be willing to endorse the

notion, however masked, that a policy disagreement with Washington could be grounds for

suspending a member from the Alliance.

To paraphrase Winston Churchill’s celebrated remark about democracy, the consensus rule is perhaps the worst way to manage

the Alliance—except for all the others. Yet the

rule, as practiced thus far, has not paralyzed

the Alliance in the Balkans or Afghanistan.

With some relatively straightforward adjustments—for example, according greater contingency operational planning authority to

the SACEUR or Secretary General, or establishing a NCC option—the rule, like NATO itself,

can continue to adapt to the 21st-century

security environment.

No Ally, however, will agree to change

current decisionmaking procedures in a manner deemed contrary to its interests. This is a

Catch-22 for NATO: consensus will be needed to

alter the consensus rule. Thus, if United States

were to seek to change the rule, it would need

to build an alliance constituency to do so.

Notes1

Each Ally is represented on the North Atlantic Council

(NAC) by an ambassadorial-level Permanent Representative.

Normally, the NAC meets at least once a week, and, depending on

the issue, some permanent representatives may need guidance or

approval from higher authorities in their capitals. The NAC meets

regularly at the foreign minister and defense minister levels and

holds periodic summits at the heads of state/government level.

The consensus rule applies as well to decisions made and

statements issued at ministerial and summit meetings. 2

Similar customary practices apply to the NATO military

authorities (NMAs), headed by a Military Committee (MC). The

MC includes a military representative from each Ally, and the

chairman of the Military Committee reports to, and receives

political guidance from, the NAC. The International Military

Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Supreme Allied

Commander, Transformation, and various headquarters commands are part of the NMA structure. 3

The rallying cry “one for all, all for one” is found in

Alexander Dumas, The Three Musketeers. 4

Article 5 reads, in part: “The Parties agree that an armed

attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America

shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently

they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in

exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense

recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will

assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems

necessary [emphasis added], including the use of armed force, to

restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” 5

Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo,

and the Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 2001),

offers the most extensive account to date on decisionmaking

during the Kosovo air campaign. 6

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz discussed

these points at the September 26, 2001, NATO Defense Ministerial.

A transcript of his press conference remarks can be found at

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/t09272001_t0926na.

html>. It should be noted that none of the other allied ministers

suggested that NATO assume leadership of military operations

against al Qaeda and the Taliban. 7

Since 1949, the Alliance has grown from 12 to 19

members in 4 rounds of enlargement, adding Greece and Turkey

in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, Spain in

1982, and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999. At

Prague, NATO issued invitations to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

8

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, remarks by the

President in an address to faculty and students of Warsaw

University, Warsaw, Poland, June 15, 2001, accessed at <http://

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html>. 9

Article 4 of the Treaty states: “The Parties will consult

together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial

integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties

is threatened.” A similar situation arose before the 1991 Gulf

War. In that case, NATO deployed AWACS to eastern Turkey shortly

after the invasion of Kuwait but was slow in responding to a

subsequent Turkish request to deploy NATO airstrike assets to

protect against potential Iraqi threats. The latter issue was

resolved without a Turkish invocation of Article 4. 10 Secretary General Lord George Robertson, speech to the

European Institute, Washington, DC, February 20, 2003, accessed

at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030220b.htm>. 11 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record—Senate, May 8,

2003, S5882. 12 At the Prague Summit, NATO leaders agreed to create an

NRF “consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and

air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as

decided by the (NAC).” 13 Colin Powell, letter to Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, May 5, 2003. 14 See endnote 9.

15 The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), is

General James L. Jones, USMC. Like his predecessors who have

served as NATO SACEUR, General Jones is “dual-hatted” as

Commander, U.S. European Command. 16 Barring any surprises in the ongoing NATO and EU

accession processes, 19 Allies will be among the 25 EU members

by mid-2004. 17 Clark, Waging Modern War. 18 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union,

Title V, Article 23; accessed at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/

en/oj/dat/2002/c_325/c_32520021224en00010184.pdf; draft

treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Chapter II, Article

40, para. 4; accessed at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/

Treaty/cv00850.en3.pdf. 19 Interview in Frankfurter Allgemeine, June 20, 2003, 6. 20 At issue was the conservative government’s decision to

form a coalition with the right-wing party headed by Joerg

Haider. By most accounts, the sanctions, which lasted several

months, were more an embarrassment than a success for the

European Union. 21 Press conference of President Jacques Chirac at the EU

Summit, February 17, 2003, accessed at <http://www.elsee.fr/

documents/discours/2003/CP030217.html>.

8 Strategic Forum No. 202, August 2003

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