2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-20-2014

Chris Washington-El v. Secretary PA Dept of Corr

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 13-3660

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CLD-199 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-3660

___________

CHRIS WASHINGTON-EL,

Appellant

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Sued in his 

individual and official capacity; GEORGE PATRICK; RANDALL BRITTON; DEPUTY 

SUPT. CLOSE; F. HARNETT; BRIAN COLEMAN; DEPUTY SUPT. BURNS; 

DEPUTY SUPT. GATES; MICHAEL ZAKEN; ERIC ARMEL; CAPTAIN LEGGETT; 

SHERWOOD HUGHES; STEPHEN BUZAS; FRANK LEWIS, 

in their individual capacities

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-01688)

District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect and 

Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

March 13, 2014

Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 20, 2014)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM
2

Chris Washington-El appeals pro se from an order of the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, entering judgment in favor of the 

defendants in his civil rights action. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 

judgment of the District Court.

In December 2008, Washington-El filed a complaint, which he amended several 

times, against numerous Department of Corrections (“DOC”) officials and employees. 

His allegations can generally be divided into two categories: (1) due process claims 

related to his initial placement and continued confinement in administrative custody, and 

(2) constitutional challenges to the conditions of his confinement. The violations 

allegedly occurred while Washington-El was incarcerated at SCI-Houtzdale (June 2007 

through February 2008) and SCI-Fayette (February 2008 through November 2009). 

Following a Magistrate Judge’s entry of Reports and Recommendations, the District 

Court – in three separate orders – granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and their 

motion for summary judgment. After the District Court denied Washington-El’s motion 

for reconsideration, he appealed. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 “We review district court 

decisions regarding both summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim 

 

1

The District Court rejected Washington-El’s last remaining claims by final order and 

judgment entered on March 28, 2013. Washington-El filed a timely motion for 

reconsideration on April 10, 2013, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), thereby tolling the time for 

filing an appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). The District Court denied 

reconsideration on July 12, 2013. Washington-El submitted his notice of appeal to prison 

officials for mailing 27 days later, on August 8, 2013. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); 
3

under the same de novo standard of review.” Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 

822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). 

Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 

2006). We review the District Court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration for abuse 

of discretion. See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 

673 (3d Cir. 1999).

On June 13, 2007, Washington-El was transferred from SCI-Graterford to SCIHoutzdale, where, for the majority of his eight-month incarceration there, he was held in 

administrative custody.

2

 He was placed on the Restricted Release List (“RRL”) in 

 

4(c)(1); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). Therefore, the notice of appeal was 

timely as to both the denial of reconsideration and the order granting summary judgment. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Moreover, we now also have jurisdiction to review 

the District Court’s prior orders granting in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss. See

Head v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Tr., 225 F.3d 794, 800 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that 

ruling on motion to dismiss which did not dispose of all claims was rendered appealable 

when District Court later entered summary judgment resolving all outstanding claims). 

2 With respect to Washington-El’s claim that his initial placement in administrative 

custody at SCI-Houtzdale violated his due process rights, the District Court properly held 

that he lacked a protected interest in such placement. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 

78, 88 n.9 (1976) (explaining that prisoners have no legitimate due process concerns in 
4

January 2008, signifying that he could be released from administrative custody only upon 

prior approval of the Secretary of Corrections. In February 2008, Washington-El was 

transferred to SCI-Fayette, where his placement in administrative custody and inclusion 

on the RRL continued. In total, Washington-El was in administrative custody and/or 

included on the RRL during approximately 26 of the 28 months he was incarcerated in 

SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette. 

Washington-El alleged that his continued administrative custody and RRL 

classifications violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Assuming that the circumstances of his incarceration are sufficient to 

trigger procedural due process rights, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995),

Washington-El has failed to demonstrate that he was not afforded proper due process 

protections. We have held that periodic review of inmates indefinitely confined to 

administrative custody meets due process requirements. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 

147 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, Washington-El was timely informed that he was placed in 

administrative custody and included on the RRL because he was considered an escape 

risk. In addition, his numerous challenges to his custody status, both formal and 

informal, were regularly reviewed by members of the Program Review Committee

(“PRC”) at SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette. See id. at 144 (holding that a prisoner who 

 

their prison classifications). We also note that a challenge to Washington-El’s placement 

in administrative custody at SCI-Graterford, as well as other claims, is the subject of a 

separate action filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See Washington-El v. 

DiGuglielmo, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 06-cv-04517.
5

was placed in administrative custody for eight years was afforded all the process he was 

due because “an ‘informal, nonadversary review’ at which the prisoner has the 

opportunity to state his views, satisfies the requirements of due process” (quoting Hewitt 

v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983))). Moreover, the summary judgment record belies 

Washington-El’s assertion that the periodic reviews were perfunctory, and thus 

inadequate. See Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that 

due process violation occurred where prison officials applied justifications for 

segregation in “rote fashion”). During those reviews, prison officials considered the 

status of an investigation concerning a possible escape plan involving Washington-El, 

reviewed the results of that investigation, assessed whether to recommend Washington-El 

for release to the general population, and responded to his arguments for release from 

administrative custody. Finally, it is difficult to conclude that review was not meaningful 

where, following Washington-El’s contention that the investigation was being 

intentionally delayed, he was released from administrative custody for approximately two 

months. 

We also agree with the District Court that Washington-El failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies with respect to his remaining claims, all of which concern his 

conditions of confinement, rather than his continued placement in administrative custody. 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), inmates must exhaust their 

administrative remedies before filing a suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional 

conduct by prison officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A prisoner must exhaust these
6

remedies “in the literal sense”; no further avenues in the prison’s grievance process 

should be available. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004). “[I]t is the 

prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper 

exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The DOC has an Inmate 

Grievance System, which permits inmates to seek review of issues relating to their 

confinement, see DC-ADM 804, and a separate policy regarding Administrative Custody 

Procedures, which allows inmates to challenge initial and continued administrative 

custody placement, see DC-ADM 802. 

An affidavit prepared by the DOC custodian of inmate grievance records indicated 

that, while confined at SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette, Washington-El appealed to final 

review eight grievances brought under DC-ADM 804. After thoroughly reviewing the 

record, we agree with the District Court that none of those grievances pertained to the 

conditions of confinement claims that he raised in the this lawsuit. Washington-El 

argued, however, that his remaining claims were administratively exhausted through

grievances that he filed pursuant to DC-ADM 802. Importantly, however, the regulatory 

scheme that was in effect during the relevant time period provided that DC-ADM 802 

governed challenges only to initial or continued confinement in administrative custody; 

DC-ADM 804 remained applicable to challenges unrelated to custody status.3 

 

3 DOC regulations provided “access to a formal procedure through which the resolution 

of problems or other issues of concern arising during the course of confinement may be 

sought.” DC-ADM 804 § V (2004). But this general provision was subject to an 

exception which stated that “[i]nitial review of issues relating to the following 
7

Washington-El also claimed that DOC officials advised him that he could not use DCADM 804 to grieve issues related to the conditions of his confinement in administrative 

custody. But such advice allegedly occurred in January 2011, after Washington-El had

been transferred from SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette. Furthermore, while confined in 

those facilities, Washington-El did use DC-ADM 804 to challenge conditions of his 

administrative custody, other than those raised in his complaints. 

Under these circumstances, we conclude that Washington-El failed to state a due 

process claim concerning his continued confinement in administrative custody and failed 

to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his conditions of confinement claims. In 

addition, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of the motion for 

reconsideration, as Washington-El’s arguments did not serve “to correct manifest errors 

of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 

 

Department policies shall be in accordance with procedures outlines therein[:] . . . DCADM 802, Administrative Custody Procedures.” DC-ADM 804 § IV, ¶ H. The 

regulations pertaining to administrative custody, in turn, provided that “[a]n inmate may 

appeal the decision of the PRC concerning his/her initial confinement in [administrative 

custody] to the Facility Manager/designee” and thereafter “may appeal the . . . decision 

. . . to continue him/her in [administrative custody] . . . to the Office of the Chief Hearing 

Examiner.” DC-ADM 802 § 2, ¶¶ C.1 and C.2 (2008). In 2011, after the relevant time 

period in this case, DC-ADM 802 was amended to provide that “[a]ll issues concerning 

an inmate’s placement in [administrative] custody or the duration, conditions or other 

circumstances of his/her [administrative custody] status must be addressed through the 

procedures set for in this directive and may not be addressed through the procedures set 

forth in DC-ADM 801 [pertaining to disciplinary proceedings] or DC-ADM 804.” DCADM 802 § 2, ¶ D.9 (emphasis added).
8

F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the District 

Court.4 

 

4 Washington El’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel is denied.