Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Controls Over SBInet Program Cost and 
 

Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

OIG-10-96 June 2010 
Office ofInspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 25028 

Homeland 

Security 

JUN.1 62010 , 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of2002 (Public Law.107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the effectiveness of controls to monitor the cost and schedule of 

Customs and Border Protection's Secure Border Initiative technology program. It is 

based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, 

direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We 

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

/~oe.~

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1
 


Background..........................................................................................................................2 
 

Results of Audit ..................................................................................................................3 
 

Contractor Oversight Activities Need Improvement ....................................................4 
 

Additional Staff Are Needed to Manage the SBInet Program.......................................9 
 

Recommendations........................................................................................................10 
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................11 
 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................15 
 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report.......................................17 
 

Appendix C: Major Program Events .........................................................................23 
 

Appendix D: Key Program Documents.....................................................................24 
 

Appendix E: Major Contributors to This Report ......................................................26 
 

Appendix F: Report Distribution ..............................................................................27 
 

Abbreviations 

ANSI/EIA American National Standards Institute/Electronics Industries Alliance 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EVM Earned Value Management 

EVMS Earned Value Management System 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

SBI Secure Border Initiative 

SBInet Secure Border Initiative (Technology Solution) 

STO Systems Task Order 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

OIG
 
 Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

We conducted an audit of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s 

control of its Secure Border Initiative technology program. Our 

objective was to determine whether the program office has 

implemented adequate controls to ensure that cost overruns are 

avoided and established milestones are met. To accomplish this 

objective, we reviewed four task orders for the program in fiscal 

year 2008, totaling approximately $267 million. 

Customs and Border Protection needs to improve its control of 

contractor activities on the Secure Border Initiative technology 

program. Specifically, program officials did not ensure that 

contractors maintain up-to-date information in the primary 

management tool designed to provide managers with advance 

information regarding potential cost overruns and program 

progress. In addition, SBInet program officials did not ensure that 

a program event was properly completed before progressing to the 

next event and did not adequately document their review and 

acceptance of accomplishments and criteria at program events. 

Finally, the low number of government personnel to oversee 

contractor activities increased the SBInet program office’s risk that 

program cost and schedule could not be adequately managed. 

Consequently, the SBI program office’s ability to ensure that both 

current and future program goals are accomplished is reduced. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection has taken steps to improve 

Secure Border Initiative technology program oversight by using 

the Defense Contracting Management Agency personnel to assist 

with contract administration and reissuing important program 

documentation. During January of 2010 the Secretary directed the 

Department of Homeland Security to conduct a thorough 

evaluation of the SBInet program to consider options that may 

better meet border security needs. We are making four 

recommendations to Customs and Border Protection that will 

enhance the program office’s ability to ensure that costs are 

contained, schedules are met, and performance requirements are 

accomplished. CBP concurred with the four recommendations and 

are in the process of implementing corrective actions. 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 

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Background 

In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). The SBI program is 

a comprehensive, department-wide effort to secure the Nation’s 

borders. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was 

tasked with serving as agent for the execution of the SBI program. 

Since fiscal year 2005, Congress has appropriated more than $3.6 

billion for SBI. DHS estimates that the total cost to complete the 

acquisition phase of the program on the southwest border will be 

$7.6 billion for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. Approximately 

$5.1 billion of the $7.6 billion is for the design, development, 

integration, and deployment of fences, roads, vehicle barriers, 

sensors, radar units, and command, control, and communications 

equipment. The remaining $2.5 billion is for integrated logistics 

and operations support. 

A component of the overall SBI effort is the Secure Border 

Initiative Net (SBInet), a major acquisition program initiated to 

gain operational control of the borders by designing a new 

integrated system of technology, infrastructure, and personnel. In 

September 2006, the department awarded a three-year, indefinite 

delivery/indefinite quantity contract to the Boeing Company to 

integrate and implement a technology solution to monitor the 

southwest border. As of February 2010, CBP had awarded 13 task 

orders to Boeing, for approximately $1.2 billion for the SBI 

program. 

The SBInet program office is responsible for planning, acquiring, 

and deploying the appropriate combination of technology and 

tactical infrastructure for border security. The program office is 

also responsible for ensuring effective oversight of the SBInet 

program, including cost and schedule control, which entails 

analysis and reporting on program status information. Relevant 

and timely program cost and schedule data must be provided to 

and reviewed by program officials to detect early warning 

indicators of potential problems and to facilitate preventive or 

corrective actions. 

The department’s ability to monitor SBInet has been a continuing 

concern. In November 2006, we reported that the department 

needed to build the organizational capacity to manage the SBInet 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

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program and implement processes to mitigate workforce turnover. 1 

At program initiation, the department did not have the acquisition 

workforce required to plan, oversee, and execute SBInet. More 

recently, in June 2009 we reported that CBP had not established 

adequate controls and effective oversight of contract workers 

responsible for providing SBI program support services.2 

In addition, in September 2008 the Government Accountability 

Office found significant risk of the SBInet program not meeting 

mission needs and performing as intended, as well as the risk of 

increased program cost and time-consuming system rework.3 The 

Government Accountability Office attributed these risks to the 

continually changing scope and timing of SBInet capabilities, the 

absence of properly defined and managed requirements, the 

absence of a program schedule to guide the execution of the 

program and schedules that continually change, and ineffectively 

managed testing. During January of 2010 because of growing 

concerns regarding the efficacy of the implementation of SBInet 

planning and technologies, the Secretary of DHS requested a 

department-wide reassessment of the program. The objective was 

to identify alternatives that may more efficiently, effectively and 

economically meet border security needs. Subsequent to this 

reassessment the Secretary froze all SBInet funding beyond 

SBInet’s initial deployment to the Tuscson and Ajo regions until 

the rassessment is complete. 

Results of Audit 

CBP needs to improve its control of contractor activities on the 

SBI technology program. Specifically, program officials did not 

ensure that contractors maintain up-to-date information in the 

primary project management tool designed to provide managers 

with advance information regarding potential cost overruns and 

program progress. In addition, SBInet program officials did not 

ensure that a program event was properly completed before 

progressing to the next event and did not adequately document 

their review and acceptance of accomplishments and criteria at 

program events. Finally, the low number of government personnel 

1 Risk Management Advisory for the SBInet Program Initiation, DHS OIG-07-07, November 2006. 2 Better Oversight Needed of Support Services Contractors in Secure Border Initiative Program,, 

DHS OIG-09-80, June 2009. 3 Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology 

Investment, Government Accountability Office (GAO-08-1086, September 10, 2008). 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

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to oversee contractor activities increased the SBInet program 

office’s risk that program cost and schedule could not be 

adequately managed. Consequently, the SBI program office’s 

ability to ensure that both current and future program goals are 

accomplished is reduced. 

Contractor Oversight Activities Need Improvement 

Project Management Tool Not Kept Up-to-Date 

CBP personnel did not ensure that current baseline information 

was entered into the Earned Value Management System (EVMS), 

the primary oversight system designed to provide management 

with advance information of potential cost overruns and schedule 

slippages. A baseline is time-phased information used to measure 

work performance. It provides the basis for all program-planning 

activities; cost estimates; and project and program status 

determination, analysis, and reporting. 

Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11,4 the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation, and DHS guidance require the use of an 

EVMS to monitor performance on major investments and systems 

under development, such as SBInet. Also, the contract requires the 

contractor to provide the system that meets the criteria as defined 

in the current American National Standards Institute/Electronic 

Industries Alliance (ANSI/EIA) Standard 748-1998, Earned Value 

Management Systems, approved May 19, 1998. Together, these 

criteria require that task orders in support of programs that have 

assets in the development, modernization, or enhancement phase to 

use EVMS to measure the cost, schedule, and performance of those 

assets against the established baseline. Similarly, Guideline 8 of 

the ANSI/EIA Standard, as well as references within the 

contractor’s Cost Management Plan and the Integrated Master Plan 

Manual, stipulate that work be baselined as soon as possible after 

the contractor receives the authority to proceed, regardless of 

whether an integrated baseline review has been conducted and 

unless contractual authorization says otherwise. An integrated 

baseline review is the process to establish and maintain an 

understanding between the contractor and the government of the 

baseline as a means of mitigating risk. 

4

 Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11, Preparing and Submitting Budget Estimates, August 

2009. 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

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When implemented correctly, Earned Value Management (EVM) 

provides managers with the necessary information to ensure that 

day-to-day decisions keep program performance consistent with 

established objectives. Without accurate baseline information to 

reflect cost and schedule variances, management is hampered in its 

ability to make viable operational decisions. EVM assists with 

work planning, performing work activities according to the plan, 

and measuring accomplishments against the plan. EVM mitigates 

the risk of cost and schedule overruns, bringing visibility and 

advance warning of problems before tasks are completed, and 

providing opportunities for proactive corrective actions. EVM also 

provides a forecast of final program cost and schedule outcomes. 

Essential to EVM is a cost baseline—the time-phased budget 

information used to measure work performance. This cost baseline 

provides the reference point for all program-planning activities, 

cost estimates, and project and program status determinations, 

analysis, and reporting. 

We reviewed four fiscal year 2008 task orders each valued at over 

$20 million. For one of the task orders, the Integrated Logistics 

Support task order, the contractor was not required to use EVM 

because it was classified as a level-of-effort task order. The other 

three task orders showed that the EVM process had not been 

working as an effective management cost control tool for the 

SBInet program. Outdated or incomplete baseline information for 

these task orders hampered accurate EVM tracking and subsequent 

cost control. Baseline information for the Arizona Deployment 

Task Order and incremental work in the System task order and 

Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Common 

Operating Picture task order were not updated in EVMS. The 

contractor and program office chose to wait until the integrated 

baseline review was conducted or incremental work was 

definitized before entering such data. Accordingly, managers were 

only able to review actual costs incurred with no basis for 

comparing actual money spent to projections, greatly increasing 

the risk that program managers could not identify cost overruns, 

measure progress, and track and schedule performance. 

Since June 2008, CBP has contracted with the Defense Contract 

Management Agency to provide surveillance of the contractor’s 

EVMS. This surveillance was not in place for the FY 2008 

information on the task orders included in this review. Defense 

Contract Management Agency representatives are included in 

program meetings with the contractor and have served to promote 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

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contractor cooperation regarding inclusion of baseline information 

in the EVMS by issuing Corrective Action Reports. 

Review and Acceptance Of Program Events Not Adequately 

Documented and Properly Completed 

SBInet program officials did not adequately document their review 

and acceptance of accomplishments and criteria at program events 

due to the absence of an established process for doing so. As a 

result, documentation does not exist to demonstrate that 

contractors produced deliverables, such as radar and camera units, 

that met project objectives and schedules. Also, SBInet officials 

did not ensure that a program event was properly completed before 

progressing to the next event increasing the risk of significant 

rework and associated project delays. 

Inadequate Documentation of Program Events 

Major system acquisitions like SBInet typically are divided into 

program events. These program events are identified in the 

Integrated Master Schedule and Integrated Master Plan and include 

target dates, milestones and tasks to be accomplished by all major 

System Program Office, System Prime Contractor, and other 

SBInet stakeholders. 

According to the SBInet Program Management Plan, management 

review of key milestones provides an effective mechanism for 

reporting, tracking, and managing project progress and ensuring 

that delivered products and services meet established project 

objectives and schedules. 

The SBInet program office does not have an established process 

for documenting and archiving historical information on 

government decisions and acceptance of program events. This 

reduces the program office’s ability to ensure that a program event 

actually occurred, produced the intended results, and transpired 

within established timeframes, as well as whether deliverables met 

program objectives before the program progresses further. 

For example, the Preliminary Design Review milestone was closed 

as part of the entrance criteria to continue with the subsequent 

program event. There was no documented evidence of government 

acceptance and closure of this milestone prior to entering the next 

program event. (See Appendix C for a list of major program 

events.) 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

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In another example, the program office was unable to provide 

documentation supporting the closeout of two of the five program 

events we requested for the Command, Control, Communication 

and Intelligence Common Operating Picture task order, and was 

not able to provide documentation reflecting the government’s 

review and resulting decisions for all five program events. The 

program office only maintained PowerPoint documents of the 

contractor’s briefings on program events. These documents do not 

provide adequate detail to facilitate proper contract management 

and oversight. 

Program Events not Properly Completed 

Program events have associated accomplishments and criteria that 

must be met to begin (entrance criteria) or successfully completed 

(exit criteria) before progressing to the next event in the program. 

Events are normally considered complete after all entry and exit 

criteria have been satisfied; all issues have been addressed and 

assessed, the status agreed upon; and an updated risk assessment 

has been completed. When program events are not successfully 

accomplished before progressing to the next event there is 

increased risk that significant resources may be wasted because 

identified deficiencies or other problems have not been properly 

resolved. Proceeding with events without being ready or without 

successful completion of previous events simply because the 

“scheduled date” occurs, is considered a “scheduled-driven” 

approach to project management. The Integrated Master Plan is 

event driven and not schedule driven and each program event 

should occur based on the completion of its supporting 

accomplishments and criteria supporting those accomplishments. 

SBInet program event criteria has not been properly satisfied 

before the program continued to move forward. For example, in 

early 2007, CBP accepted and closed out the Systems Requirement 

Review even though the event deliverables did not meet project 

objectives. This occurred because of the program office’s desire to 

keep moving forward to meet established schedules, i.e. scheduleddriven. The Systems Requirement Review was one of the early 

major program events requiring the government and the contractor 

to develop, define, and agree on program requirements. In a 

December 2009 letter from the contractor to the SBInet Program 

Office, the contractor stated that premature acceptance and closure 

of the Systems Requirement Review event without successfully 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

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completing its criteria, resulted in significant rework during both 

the detail design and test planning phases of SBInet program. 

More recently the Department’s Acquisition Review Board took 

steps to ensure that the System Qualification Test program event 

was completed and all issues addressed before moving forward 

with subsequent program events. For instance, the SBInet Test and 

Evaluation Master Plan identified specific exit criteria to move 

from developmental testing to system deployment and testing 

under operational conditions. System Qualification Test is one of 

two key events in the exit criteria. System Qualification Testing 

disclosed five major deficiencies: 

1. Tower sway in windy conditions; 

2. Radar generated clutter; 

3. Radar circuit breakers frequently tripped; 

4. Camera image blurry in windy condition; and 

5. Frequent computer crashes. 

In September 2008, the DHS Acquisition Review Board issued a 

SBInet Acquisition Decision Memorandum mandating the 

completion of more system testing before proceeding to 

deployment. In February 2009, the Acquisition Review Board 

issued another Acquisition Decision Memorandum stating that full 

deployment at the first site in Tucson 1, and deployment at the 

second site Ajo-1, both in Arizona, were not authorized until the 

System Qualification Testing issues were resolved. Later, in May 

2009 the Acquisition Review Board approved deployment in the 

first and second sites after being briefed on the resolution or 

mitigation of the System Qualification Testing issues. However, as 

of February 2010 the SBInet Program Office has not yet 

considered the System Qualification Testing program event as 

closed and with all issues assessed although deployment of the 

technology solution to the first site in Tucson 1 commenced in 

May 2009. 

Moving forward with the SBInet program without adequate 

satisfaction of program events criteria and resolution of its 

significant issues could result in a deployed system that does not 

fully meet program objectives and the waste of significant 

resources. The absence of updated baselines and documented 

events review and acceptance dates makes it difficult for the 

government to hold contractors accountable for not meeting 

timeframes or not making progress towards accomplishing 

acquisition expectations. Also, improper closeout of program 

events increases the risk of project delays and wasted resources. 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

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Assurance of due diligence for closure and documentation of 

government review decisions should be made for all SBInet 

program events to ensure significant resources are not wasted, and 

project objectives are met and accomplished within intended 

timeframes. 

Additional Staff Are Needed to Manage the SBInet 

Program 

Being fully staffed with qualified personnel is important for 

implementing effective controls over program costs and schedules. 

The low number of government personnel to oversee contractor 

activities increased the SBInet program office’s risk that program 

cost and schedule could not be adequately managed. 

At the time of our review, the SBInet Program Office had only two 

schedule analysts and one earned value analyst on board 

performing Earned Value and Schedule Management activities for 

the entire program. These three employees were all Support 

Services Contractors responsible for important cost and schedule 

oversight activities, such as ensuring that the reported schedule and 

earned value information were accurate. 

For example, according to the SBInet Program Management Plan, 

the schedule management staff must develop and maintain a 

cohesive Integrated Master Schedule and Integrated Master Plan. 

Along with this, the earned value management staff is responsible 

for maintaining the Work Breakdown Structure, and for assisting 

with assessing compliance with the ANSI standards for EVM and 

performing earned value surveillance activities, which include 

developing, implementing, and maintaining program baselines. 

(See Appendix D for a list of key program documents and their 

purpose.) 

Since early stages of the SBInet acquisition, the SBInet Program 

Office has faced challenges in maintaining adequate staffing, as we 

highlighted in several prior audit reports.5 In addition to these 

challenges, the SBI Program Officials stated that the initial 

assumption that commercial off the shelf technology would be 

available to cover SBInet needs, serving as a basis for determining 

staffing requirements, ultimately proved to be wrong. 

Consequently, staffing needs should be reassessed. 

5 OIG-09-80 and OIG-07-07. 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

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The low number of staff performing Earned Value and Schedule 

Management activities highly increases the risk of the program 

office not being able to properly control SBInet cost and schedule 

and timely react to operating issues encountered, such as the result 

of not using commercial off the shelf technology. During the time 

of our review, the SBInet acquisition was undergoing significant 

changes requiring updates to important program cost and schedule 

documents. The SBInet program office was operating without an 

approved Integrated Master Schedule, and the contractor was using 

a Work Breakdown Structure that had not been vetted by the 

government and was in non-compliance with ANSI Guideline 8 

requiring the use of baseline information as soon as possible. 

According to program office staff responsible for earned value and 

schedule management activities, the low number of personnel with 

adequate authority to perform earned value and schedule 

management activities in the program office reduced their ability 

to respond to such issues when they arose and affected their ability 

to complete all assigned tasks. 

To improve overall management and oversight of SBInet

contractor activities, the SBInet Program Office was in the process 

of re-structuring in 2009. During the time of our review a 

government employee was added to serve as direct supervisor of 

the schedule and earned value analysts. Having a government 

employee as focal point for the analysts should improve the 

Program Office’s authority to ensure contractor compliance with 

contract requirements, such as reporting accurate schedule and 

earned value information. In addition, the SBI Program Office was 

in the process of developing a long-range Human Capital Plan to 

describe the necessary competencies of the acquisition workforce, 

along with the individual skill sets and levels needed to execute 

and sustain current and future acquisition efforts. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Commissioner of Customs and Border 

Protection require the SBInet Program Office to: 

Recommendation #1: Ensure that no work effort, subject to 

earned value management system requirements, is performed 

without adequate corresponding performance measurement 

baselines in the Earned Value Management System, as required by 

prescribed guidelines. 

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Recommendation #2: Develop and implement a process to 

document government review and acceptance of program events’ 

accomplishments and criteria. Documentation should clearly show 

program office evaluation and justification for approval and 

acceptance of all accomplishments and criteria for a program event 

to certify deliverables met project objectives and events were 

adequately completed before the program progresses. 

Recommendation #3: Ensure that program events have been 

properly completed to include satisfaction of all entry and exit 

criteria; all issues have been addressed and assessed, the status 

agreed upon; and an updated risk assessment before proceeding 

with subsequent program events. 

Recommendation #4: Reevaluate the SBInet program staffing 

plan and have an adequate number of earned value and schedule 

management analysts to support the current workload for the 

SBInet acquisition and to implement all control duties assigned, as 

prescribed in the Program Management Plan. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CBP concurred with the four recommendations and the 

recommendations are considered resolved. The recommendations 

will remain open until CBP provides documentation of the 

measures taken to address them. CBP’s response to the 

recommendations and our analysis is presented below. A copy of 

CBP’s written response is included in Appendix B. 

CBP’s Comment to Recommendation #1: CBP concurred with 

this recommendation but suggested revising the recommendation 

language to make it less broad. 

OIG Analysis: To further clarify the recommendation language 

we reworded it to “Ensure that no work effort, subject to earned 

value management system requirements, is performed without 

adequate corresponding performance measurement baselines in the 

Earned Value Management System, as required by prescribed 

guidelines.” 

This recommendation is resolved but will remain open until CBP 

provides documentation of the measures taken to address this 

recommendation. 

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CBP’s Comment to Recommendation #2: CBP concurred with 

this recommendation and reported measures that it is undertaking 

to address it. CBP set December 2010 as the due date for 

completion of reported measures. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved but will remain 

open until CBP establishes that it has implemented the process and 

tools to manage program information requirements for program 

events. 

CBP’s Comment to Recommendation #3: CBP concurred with 

this recommendation but stated that the report inaccurately 

concludes CBP did not assess all issues prior to commencing TUS1 deployment. CBP also stated that not every single criterion 

needs to be fully resolved prior to advancing in the program and 

the Program Manager is to make a risk-based determination on 

whether, and how to advance based on the nature of open work 

(unfulfilled criteria) and the scope of the ensuing tasks. CBP 

stated a risk assessment was performed for the program resulting in 

the February 2009 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) 

mandating to commence only limited deployment at the TUS-1 

site. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved but will remain 

open until CBP demonstrates that steps have been taken to 

preclude the recurrence of this issue. See OIG analysis to CBP’s 

Comment #1 below, for additional OIG comments. 

CBP’s Comment to Recommendation #4: CBP concurred the 

recommendation. CBP also commented that it expressed concerns 

regarding our assessment of the number of staff performing earned 

value and schedule management activities during the time of our 

review. They asserted that, at the time, they had an adequate 

number of analysts to perform all assigned control responsibilities. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved but will remain 

open until CBP provides documentation defining roles and 

responsibilities of personnel dedicated to perform cost and 

schedule management activities and this information can be 

aligned with the organizational charts. 

Our report statement that additional staff were needed is supported 

by CBP’s actions in March of 2009, when they reorganized the 

program office and initiated hiring actions to achieve an 

appropriate number of government earned value and schedule 

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management analysts to be deployed throughout the program 

office. 

CBP’s General Comments to the Report: 

In addition to the comments to the recommendations, CBP made 

general comments to the report. The following paragraphs 

summarize CBP’s comments and provide OIG comments. 

CBP Comment #1: CBP expressed concerns regarding our 

assessment that CBP proceeded with the deployment of the 

technology solution without having assessed all major issues 

identified at the System Qualification Testing program event. CBP 

also requested the OIG report be revised to (1) reflect the 

Department’s ADM approval for limited TUS-1 construction 

documented in the February 2009 ADM, which they state the 

current report reflects as not authorized, and to (2) reflect that the 

limited deployment outcome was in fact based on an actual riskbased analyses and decision-making process regarding risk and 

remaining work as part of the formal acquisition review process. 

OIG Analysis: The OIG reported that CBP proceeded with the 

program when significant program events had not been properly 

completed. Their System Qualification Testing was a key program 

event that disclosed five major deficiencies. Based on our analysis 

of the data collected, as of February 2010 CBP had not yet 

assessed whether corrective actions for all the major issues 

identified at the System Qualification Testing program event were 

effective, yet they proceeded with deployment of the technology 

solution. 

Current language in the report was not intended to represent that, 

based on the February 2009 Acquisition Decision Memorandum, 

all deployment at the first site was not authorized. To further 

clarify, we reworded the report to reflect “full deployment at the 

first site in Tucson-1 and deployment at the second site Ajo-1, both 

in Arizona, were not authorized until the Systems Qualification 

Testing issues were resolved.” 

CBP Comment #2: CBP expressed concerns regarding our 

assessment of the number of staff performing earned value and 

schedule management activities. They stated we only talk about 

three analysts with database responsibility and forgot to 

acknowledge the “at least five contract analysts assigned to the 

Boeing task orders providing program control support throughout 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

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2008.” CBP also stated that we erroneously conclude a causal 

relationship between a perceived low number of analysts and 

increased program risk. 

OIG Analysis: Our finding that CBP had three analysts 

performing cost and schedule management duties and that this low 

number of personnel increases program risk, was based on 

documents provided by CBP and information obtained from 

interviews with program personnel and senior program officials. 

During our review senior program officials also stated that they 

would agree that the low number of program staff increases the 

risk to promptly respond to issues that arise in the acquisition 

process. 

CBP Comment #3: CBP commented that the report mistakenly 

states that “commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology would be 

available to cover SBInet needs was a failed program assumption.” 

CBP stated that the current SBInet solution in Tucson is 

predominantly COTS equipment. They also stated that the number 

of cost and schedule analysts needed in the program has no 

relationship to the COTS aspect of the program. 

OIG Analysis: Senior program officials stated during the course 

of our review that when originally determining the staffing needs, 

the assumption was made that “commercial-off-the shelf items 

would work and consequently large staff would not be needed. 

However, this assumption was later proven to not be valid.” 

CBP’s experience with Project 28 showed challenges using the 

commercial-off-the-Shelf technology equipment. Although, 

commercial-off-the-shelf equipment is being used, there have been 

major challenges with the integration of the commercial-off-theshelf technology. System integration is part of the SBInet program 

needs. Consequently, we agree with the senior program official 

statement that the assumption that commercial-off-the-shelf 

technology would be available to cover SBInet needs was a failed 

program assumption. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Our objective was to determine whether the SBInet Program 

Office has proper control over the SBInet program to ensure that 

schedules are met and costs are contained. We initiated this 

review in response to the FY 2007 Homeland Security 

Appropriations Conference Report, which directed the Inspector 

General to review and report on SBI contract actions in excess of 

$20 million. 

For our audit, we selected and reviewed the following four task 

orders associated with SBInet contract actions over $20 million for 

Fiscal Year 2008: 

•

•

•

•

	 Arizona Deployment Task Order, 

	 Command Control Communications and Intelligence 

Common Operating Picture Task Order, 

	 Integrated Logistics Support Task Order and, and 

	 System Task Order. 

Together, the four task orders totaled approximately $267 million. 

Our office identified control processes and procedures in place and 

tested whether these controls were working as intended for the four 

task orders. 

We conducted fieldwork at Customs and Border Protection 

Headquarters in Washington, D.C. We interviewed program 

officials in the SBInet Program Office and the SBI Acquisition 

Office, as well as government personnel from the Defense Contract 

Management Agency who currently provide certain contract 

administration services to DHS. We also reviewed key program 

documents and pertinent policies and procedures. 

We reviewed pertinent EVM criteria, obtained and reviewed fiscal 

year 2008 EVM Reports, and reviewed corrective action requests 

developed by the oversight agency, Defense Contract Management 

Agency. We met with schedule analysts, earned value analysts and 

project managers to understand how the program office establishes 

and uses milestones, schedules, and EVMS reports. We reviewed 

key program documents, such as the Acquisition Program 

Baseline, the Program Management Plan, the Systems Engineering 

Plan, the Integrated Master Schedule, and the Integrated Master 

Plan. Finally, we analyzed data to determine whether and how 

cost goals and milestones were met. 

SBInet Program Office Needs to Enhance Control Over the Program’s Cost and Schedule 
 

Page 15
 

SBInet Program Office Needs to Enhance Control Over the Program’s Cost and Schedule 
 

Page 16
 


Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We conducted our audit from October 2008 through May 2009 

under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. 
SBInet Program Office Needs to Enhance Control Over the Program’s Cost and Schedule 
 

Page 17
 


131111 Ptonmyh'ama A'enue ,,-W

\'\'"hingl<>n, DC !IlH9

u.s. Customs md

Border Protection

April 29. 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD L. SKIl\NER

INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF IIOMELAKD SECURITY

FROM: Assistant Commissioner ~"~'i(tf«!.l&

Office oflntemal Affllirs CS"'" -- - ( , U.S. Customs lind Border Protection

SUBJECT: Response to the Office of Inspector Generlll·s Draft Report

Entitled, "Controls 0\ er SBIIlt'/l'rogram Cost and Schedule

Could Ix: Impro\ed··

Thank )OU for providing us with a copy of your dwft report entitled. "Controls O\er

5131111'1 Progrnm Cost and Schedule Could be Improved:· and the opportunity to comment

on the issues in this report. The report identifies measures that the U.S. Customs:md

Border Protection (CBP) SBll1el Program Office e:m take 10 enhance the o\erall

effectiveness of cost lind schedule comrols.

CBP acknowledges and appreciales the changes that \\ere made hy the Office of

Inspector General (OIG) in its draft report based on Ihe discussions that were held at the

exit conference.

The report conmins four recommendations for CI3P lIction, CI3P concurs \\ ilh Ihe

fl."'Commendalions:md believes the inlent of Recommendations I. .) and 4 have been

satisfied by actions taken to improve cost and schedule m:magement at both the

Depanment and the program level.

As an inilial mailer. since the OIG's review in 2008. man~ signilic(lnl accomplishmenls

have resulted in substanti\e program management improvemems and results. Chief

among these aceomplishmems are:

• Program Baseline: The Dcparlmem of llomelalld SecurilY (OilS) A1;quisition

Review Board (ARB) haselined the SBlllelBlock I progrnm objectives. strmegy.

major supporting plans (e.g.. test and evaluation. imegrated logistics SlJpporl). and

risks. Through a seri.:s of Acquisition DlXision Memoranda (ADM). the

Department approved fllock I engineering. testing. and deployment activilies

based on thorough reviews of program a<;1;otnplishments:. remaining un1;crtainty

and program risk. and the ullimate need to deliver effective capabililies to the

flordcr I'atrol. The primary result ofthese decisions was to ~tllbilize the progrant

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 
Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

Page 18 
 

2

plans. and more importantly. the associated Boeing camrac! task orders where the

vast majorit) of the funds arc spent. The lack ofslabiIiI) was the primary

impedimenT to efTective earned value management practices cited by the DIG.

• Program l\Ianagl'm('nl: Ne\~ leadership at the Secure Horder lniliati,e (SBI)

government and the Boeing contractor program manllgemcnl offices have

significantly improved SBllle(s focus. discipline. rigor. :md overall dT~tiveness

in planning and program control. As an example. the program leadership team

implemented several comprehensive engineering and testing reviews as pan of an

"event-based" program plan. These added eITons included. among others.

detailed Root Cause-Corrective Action analyses for major deficiencies. and

increasing the amount and complexity of field s)'slCm testing. in order to establish

high conlidcllce in systcm progress before continuing"" ith significant future

investments. Moreover. the 5131 Program Oflice reorganized in early 2009 to

focus and solidify ley systelll engineering and business manag"m"nt disciplines;

5Bl continues updaling or creating program documentation to reinforce cost and

schedule controls.

• Prognlnl Progres.~: SI3I and l30eing have completed - construction ofthe Iir.;t

I3loek I production system in Tucson. Arizona; deployment of camera

SUf\eillanee systems to l3ulTalo and D\...mit under a lixed-price contract and

nearly on schedule; establishment of a full-time maintenance and supply system

for Mobile SUTVcilhmce Systems thal has inereascd operational availabilit)' for

these s)'stems from an initial 55 percent ratc to over 95 percent a\ailability today;

and the Block I deplo) ment to Tucson. built predominantly with commercially

aVllilllble tcchnologies. is in operation today and the Border Patrol opemtors have

experienced positi\ e results with early operations to date.

Thesc accomplishments are evidence and outcomes of improved management controls

estllblishcd over the past year and a half.

Not withstanding our concurrence with the report recommendations. CBP takes exception

tn ~nme of the fincling~ and conclusions in the rlmft repofl, identified hclo'W'

• (page 8. I" and 2"" wholc paragraph) The OIG repon inaccurately eondud,:s that

the SBl Program Omce did not ass<:ss risks prior to commencing TUS-I

deployment. In fact. S81 revielled risks and plans with the OilS ARB. and the

Department rendered a risk-based decision to continue with :I limited deployment

activity while completing ongoing systems engineering and testing elTons.

Specifically. SI3I prescnted to the DlIS ARB the initial System Qualifie3l10n

Testing (SQT) results. including five major "deficiencies." Additionally.SBI

presented clearly the system performance inform3lion gained. the information yet

needed. and the associmed tasks thm could be initiated \\ hile S81 continued (0

address the remaining technical concerns and plllilIling updates. The Depanment

largely agreed with SSl's recommend3lions. and approved in January 2009

(documented in the February 2009 ADM) the initial construdion activities for

TUS·} scnsor and communications towers and the command center upgrades.

 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 
 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

Page 19 
 

3

Also. the Depanment deferred deployment ofsensor pa~loads to TUS-l and

deferred all construction at AJO-l until 5131 completed lind presented additional

engineering and testing information. These dcpanmcntal dl'tisions rdlect the

actual risk-based analyses find decision-making thaI the OIG ciles as missing.

Therefore. the OIG draft report should be corrected 10 (1) renect the Department's

ADM approval for limited TUS-I construction (current draft says TUS-!

construction was not authorized). and (2) renect that the limited deployment

outcome was in fael based on an actual risk-based analyses and decision-making

process regarding risk and remaining work as pan orthe formal acquisition

revic\\ process.

• (page 9. 2n<l and 5'h paragraphs) The DIG incorrectly ciles the full number OrCOSl

and schedule anal)'sts deployed in the SHlnel program. and erroneousl~ concludes

a causal relationship bew.een a perceived 10\\ number of analysts and increased

program risks. The DIG fails to acknowledge the fulll1umber of cost and

schedul~ analysts deployed across the program~ and projects. Throughout 2008.

SBI had at least five contract analysts assigned to the Boeing lask orders

providing program control suppon. as well as thrcc full-timc support analysts

charged with maintaining databases. anaLytical tools. and recurring status

reponing. In formulating its conclusion regarding ··lov. number ofstafT

performing c!lTIled value and schedule management activities...." the 010 only

discusSl..""S the lattcr threl; analysts wilh database responsibilities. Thus. the finding

is not accurate because there were actually up 10 cight analySIS assigm:d for these

responsibilities. and S131 cominucs to assert that this was 1111 adequate number of

analYSIS 10 perform all assigned COntrol responsibilities.

• (page 9. -I1h paragraph) The DIG asserts Ihat SBll1eeds mon: cost and schedule

analysts because of a failed program assumption that ··cornmercial..aff-the-shelf

(COTS) tcchnology would be available to cover SBlllel needs." First. and

contra!) to the OIG's assenion. the current SBlnel solution in operation today ill

Tllcson is in fact predominantl) COTS equipment. So the SBl acquisition

strategy relying on COTS remains \ alid. Additionally. the COTS aspect of the

SBlnl'/ program does not relate at all to the number of COSI and schedule analysts

needed in the program_ so CBP recommends this paragraph be removed.

A summary ofCBP actions and correcli\'c plans 10 address thc four recommendations is

provided belO\\:

Rt'\:ommendation 1# I: Ensure that no v. ork is performed \\ ilhout adequate

corresponding performance measurcment baselines in thc Earned Value

Management System.

CIJP Response: CBP concurs with the recommendation. For this 2008 re\ie\\. S81

shared two signific.'1nt issues \\ ith Ihe OIG Ihat contributt:d to this deficiency: program

\"ohnililY and breakdowns ill following program processes. O\'('r thc past 18 months, SI3I

has made considerable progress in stabi1i7ing thc program and projl.'Cl plans following the

Department baselining of the Block I program and associated Boeing contract task

orders. This included joint Go\emment-Boeil1g elTorts that established elTcetive

performance baselines for authori...-<:d contracted work. conducted refresher training

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 
 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

Page 20 
 

4

regarding earned value and baseline management practices, and ultimately m:onciled

procedures for maintaining perfonnance measurement baselines consistent with program

and comraclor Earned Value Management System (EV~S) guidelines.

eRP requests thalthc DIG consider updating the Recommendation 1 to read. "Ensure

that all authorized work efTort. subject 10 earned value management system requirements.

is incorporated into the perfonnance measurement baseline in accordance with prescribed

s)'sh:m guidelines:' This change avoids prescribing EVMS policy for work that is not

approprilliely subjecllo EYMS (e.g.. low dollar \aluc efforts on support contracts. level

of elTon tasking. linn-fixed price tasks. C1C.) -the assertion that no work is to be

perfomlcd without an [VMS baseline is simply too broad.

Due Date: CBP believes thc intcm ofthis rcrommcndation has becn satisfied and

requests closure ofthe recommendation.

Recommendation 1: De""e!op and implement a process to documcnt government review

and acceptance of program cvcnts' accomplishments and criteria. Documentation should

clearly show program office evaluation and justification for approval and acceptance of

all accomplishments and criteria for a program evenlto cenif)' deli\ erables meet projcrt

objectives and events are adequately completed before the program progresses.

CHI' Response: CBP concurs with the recommendation. fhe SBI Program Office has

made considerable progress in establishing formal processes and lools to manage

program information requirements for key program events. First. SBl rcdoubled efforts

with the Block I Program Integrated Managcment Plan (IMP) to clearly identify major

program events. the required significant accomplishments. and the associated success

criteria for each ofthe events. In addition. SBl recently stood up thc Systems

Engineering Division and is developing a Tcchnical Revie\\ Manual (TRM) that

documents the artifacts required for reviC\\ andlor fulfillment ofsignificant technical

reviews and program milestones. The re\'iew requirements are being integrated into the

Program IMP to serve as the success criteria for the major program e\ ents. consistent

with the OIG l\."l;ommcndation. A current organizational chart Ivith functional

responsibilities for cach SBl directorate has been prm ided to the orG eleetronieall)'.

Dul' DlIte: Thc cstilllated completion date is December 201 O.

Rccomml'ndation 3: Ensure that program events have been properly completed to

smisfy all cntry and exit criteria. address and assess all issues. agrec on thc status. and

complctc an updatcd risk asscssment before proceeding with subsequent program e\ ents.

CHI' Responst': CBP concurs with the recommendation. Not\\ ithstanding our general

concurrence with this recommendation. CBP is concerned with the accuracy and context

for the findings and analysis supponing this recommendation. In gcneraL exit criteria for

key prugT'llm events arc intponantto ensure thorough task planning and to assess progress

and risks with cOlltinuing beyond the respective key e\"enls. Exit criteria. howe\er. are

not absolute. meaning not every single criterion needs to be fully resolved prior to

advancing in the program. Rather. the Program Manager will make a risk-ba.<;ed

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

5

determination on \"helher. and ho\\. to advance based all the nature ofOpt'n work

(unfulfilled criteria) and the scope of the ensuing tasks.

Such was the casc when SBl and the DHS ARB revie"cd the initial System Qualifkation

Testing (SQT) results and the live major "deficiencies" (refer to page 8 ofthe draft OIG

rcpon). For these specific reviews with the Department. SBI presented clearly the

informalion gained. the information )'et needed. and the asso<.:ialcd tasks thai could be

initiated "hill,' SBI continued to address the remaining technical concerns and planning

updates. The Dcpanmem largely agreed with Sal's recommendations. IIppro\ed in

January 2009 (documented in the February 2009 ADM) the initial construction activities

for TUS-I sensor and communications to\\crs and the command center upgrades (Note:

the OlG draft report does not accurately report this guidance from thc Februar) 2009

ADM). Because of open requirements (I.e.. higher risk). thc Department deferred the

deployment of sensor payloads to TUS-I and deferred all eonstrtlclion at AJO-l until 581

completed and presented additional engineering and tesling information.

1'111: OIG report. therefore. inaccurately concludes (last sentence. first complde

pamgraph. page 8) thalthe 581 Program Office did not assess all issues prior to

commencing TUS·1 deployment. 581 and DHS senior stalTdid assess risks. and

rendered a risk-based decision to continue with a limited deployment aeti\it) as

articulated in the Departmental ADMs.

Due Date: eBp believes the intent of this recommendation has heen satisfied and

requests closure ofthe rcrommcndation.

Recommendation -I: Reevaluate the 513111('1 program staffing plan and ensure that an

adequate number of earned value and schedule management anal} SiS arc in place to

support the current \\orkload for the SBl/lcl acquisition and to implement all control

dutics assigned. as prescribed in the Progmm Management Plan.

eBI' Response: eBp concurs \\ ith the recommendation. In March 2009. the SUI

Program Office reorganized. updated staffing plans. and initialed hiring actions for an

appropriate number of go\emment earned \alue and schedule management analysIS

deployed throughout the program office. In October 2009. the OIG was provided a copy

ofthe then current SBI organ izmion chan and a staffing roster of SBI personnel \\ ith

position alignments. SBI considered the number of earned \ alue and schedule

management analysts sufficient to support the current workload. as prescribed in the

Program Management Plan.

I)u£ Date: CBI' believes the intent ofthis recommendation has been satisfkd and

requests closure of the recommendation.

 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

Page 21 
 
 

Controls Over SBInet Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved 
 

Page 22 
 

6

With regard to the classification ofthe draft report. CBP has not identified an}

infonnation within this report thai I\Quld warmnt a "For Oflicial Use Only"

classification. Technical comments 10 this report Ilere pro\ ided 10 the GIG

electronically.

[f) au have any questions regarding this response. please contact me or hal Ca member of

your staITcontact Ms. PallY Quintana. CBf' Audit Liaison. a\ (202) 344-1038.

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 
 

 

 

 

Appendix C 

Major Program Events 

Major Program Events Scheduled 

Date of 

Review 

Date 

Review 

Took Place 

Date of Review 

Acceptance by 

Government 

System Requirements 

Review 

1/19/07 1/22-23/07 Government close out 

letter is dated 3/20/07. This 

milestone was accepted 

with incomplete 

information. 6 

System Preliminary Design 

Review 

4/27/2007 4/27/2007 This milestone was 

supposed to be closed out 

when B-Specs and 

comments were closed out 

but no Preliminary Design 

Review close out letter 

exists. This Preliminary 

Design Review closed as 

entrance criteria for 

Critical Design Review 

System Critical Design 

Review (BLOCK 1) 

6/25/07 6/3-5/08 Government close out 

letter is dated 10/31/08 

System Qualification 

Testing 

Projected to begin in 

9/2009. 

6

 A close out letter is sent by the government to the contractor once the contractor presents documents 

addressing any deficiencies, comments, or changes that must be made for the government to officially 

accept the review. This is a not a formal process for documenting when the government accepts successful 

completion of a review, nor does the letter show what criteria was met to accept the review. 

SBInet Program Office Needs to Enhance Control Over the Program’s Cost and Schedule 

Page 23 
SBInet Program Office Needs to Enhance Control Over the Program’s Cost and Schedule 
 

Page 24
 


 

 

 

Appendix D 

Key Program Documents 

Key Program 

Document Document Description Purpose of Document 

Integrated The Integrated Master Plan is an event-driven plan The Integrated Master Plan and its supporting detail 

Master Plan that documents the significant accomplishments 

necessary to complete project work and ties each 

accomplishment to a key program event. 

schedule provides an overarching framework against 

which all work is accomplished. It documents all the 

tasks required to deliver a high quality product and 

facilitate success throughout the product's life cycle. 

Integrated The Integrated Master Schedule is an event-based The key milestones in the Integrated Master Schedule 

Master schedule and will include all major program, represent significant events in the program and will be 

Schedule A System Prime (contractor), and other stakeholders' identified during the development of project-level or 

monthly schedule tasks, milestones, and dependencies. The program office schedules. Program management 

deliverable Integrated Master Schedule will provide for review of key milestones ensures an effective 

required by the automated import and export of component mechanism for reporting, tracking, and managing 

contractor. schedules and enable network and "what if" 

analysis to provide program management with 

timely visibility into key dates and milestones to 

ensure effective program management. The 

Integrated Master Plan and Integrated Master 

Schedule are fundamental management tools that 

are critical to performing effective planning, 

scheduling, and execution of work efforts. 

project progress and ensures that delivered products 

and services meet established and agreed to project 

objectives. The Integrated Master Schedule is used by 

the Government and contractor team as the day-to-day 

tools for planning, executing, and tracking program 

technical, schedule, and cost status, including risk 

mitigation efforts. 

Work The Work Breakdown Structure is an exhaustive, Investment programs, projects, and contracts, will use 

Breakdown product-oriented, hierarchical tree structure of EVM against established Work Breakdown Structures 

Structure tasks or deliverables that need to be performed in 

order for an investment program or project to be 

completed. It is the basis for structuring earned 

value management. The Work Breakdown 

Structure is an essential part of earned value 

management cost, schedule, and technical 

monitoring because it provides a consistent 

framework against which to measure progress. 

at sufficient levels to assess performance against 

milestones and allocated budgets. The Work 

Breakdown Structure should be used to develop the 

cost estimate and the program schedule and to set up 

the earned value management performance 

measurement baseline. The Work Breakdown 

Structure can help define high-level milestones and 

cost driver relationships. The Work Breakdown 

Structure enables leadership to make better decisions 

about where to apply contingency reserve and where 

systemic problems are occurring. 
 

SBInet Program Office Needs to Enhance Control Over the Program’s Cost and Schedule 
 

Page 25
 


Appendix D 

Key Program Documents 

Performance 

Measurement 

Baselines 

The performance measurement baseline represents 

the cumulative value of the planned work over 

time. The performance measurement baseline is 

essentially the resource consumption plan for the 

program and forms the time-phased baseline 

against which performance is measured. 

Baselines are necessary for defining the time-phased 

budget plan from which actual program performance is 

measured. Baselines are used to detect deviations from 

the budget plan and give insight into problems and 

potential impacts. Deviations from the baseline 

identify areas where management should focus 

attention. 
SBInet Program Office Needs to Enhance Control Over the Program’s Cost and Schedule 
 

Page 26
 


Appendix E 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Washington, D.C. Office 

Alex Best, Director, Border Security Division 

Inez Jordan, Desk Officer, Border Security Division 

Brandon Landry, Program Analyst 

Melissa Woolson, Program Analyst 

James Bess, Independent Referencer 

Miami, Florida, Field Office 

Yeseira Diaz, Audit Manager 

Armando Lastra, Auditor 

Vanessa Santos, Auditor 
SBInet Program Office Needs to Enhance Control Over the Program’s Cost and Schedule 
 

Page 27
 


Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Under Secretary for Management 

DHS Audit Liaison 

Acting Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection 

Director, SBI Program Executive Office 

OIG Liaison, CBP 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.