POLICY ISSUE 

(Affirmation) 

December 15, 2016 SECY-16-0142

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: Victor M. McCree 

 Executive Director for Operations 

SUBJECT: DRAFT FINAL RULE—MITIGATION OF BEYOND-DESIGN-BASIS EVENTS 

(RIN 3150-AJ49) 

PURPOSE: 

To obtain Commission approval to publish a final rule that establishes requirements for the 

mitigation of beyond-design-basis events (MBDBE) for nuclear power reactor licensees and 

applicants. 

SUMMARY: 

The staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a draft final rule 

Federal Register (FR) notice (FRN) (Enclosure 1) that would establish MBDBE requirements. 

This rule (1) makes generically applicable requirements previously imposed by order for the 

mitigation of beyond-design-basis external events and for remotely monitoring the spent fuel 

pool wide-range level, (2) includes provisions to have an integrated response capability, and 

(3) addresses six petitions for rulemaking (PRMs). The staff also considered two nonconcurrences in the finalization of the draft final rule and its supporting guidance: 

NCP-2016-018 related to loss of all alternating current (ac) and direct current (dc) electrical 

power and NCP-2016-014 related to use of risk information to address reevaluated seismic 

hazard information. 

CONTACTS: Timothy A. Reed, NRR/DPR 

 301-415-1462 

 Eric E. Bowman, NRR/JLD 

 301-415-2963
The Commissioners - 2 -

BACKGROUND: 

As discussed in Section I of the draft FRN, the NRC has undertaken numerous regulatory 

actions following the 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi event in Japan. These actions began with the 

work of the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) and the development of the associated NTTF 

recommendations. The NRC’s response to the NTTF Report, which was an enclosure to 

SECY-11-0093, “Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the 

Events in Japan,” dated July 12, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11186A950), was provided in SECY-11-0124, 

“Recommended Actions To Be Taken without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report,” 

and SECY-11-0137 “Prioritization of Recommended Actions To Be Taken in Response to 

Fukushima Lessons Learned.” These two papers identified actions to be taken in the near term 

and prioritized the NTTF recommendations. The near-term actions ultimately culminated in the 

issuance of three orders; a request for information, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.54(f), that addressed several regulatory issues; and two 

Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR). The regulatory efforts to address lessons 

learned from Fukushima have evolved over time, and the two rulemaking activities discussed in 

the ANPRs were consolidated into the MBDBE rulemaking. 

The NRC staff (staff) developed and provided to the Commission a proposed rule in 

SECY-15-0065, “Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events 

(RIN 3150-AJ49),” on April 30, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15049A201). The Commission 

issued its direction on the proposed rule on August 27, 2015, in Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SRM)-SECY-15-0065 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15239A767). In accordance 

with the Commission’s direction, the staff revised the proposed rule and issued it for a 90-day 

public comment period on November 13, 2015 (80 FR 70609). In addition to seeking comment 

on the proposed rule and supporting draft guidance, the FRN also requested feedback on a 

number of specific topics related to the proposed rule and on the potential cumulative effects of 

regulation (CER). The agency also published three draft regulatory guides for comment with the 

proposed rule. 

The comment period closed on February 11, 2016. The NRC received 20 comment 

submissions that the staff reviewed and considered in the development of the final MBDBE rule, 

as described in Enclosure 2. During development of the final rule, the staff held a public 

meeting to discuss CER and used the feedback obtained at that meeting to inform 

implementation requirements in the final MBDBE rule. 

DISCUSSION: 

The draft final rule applies to power reactor applicants and licensees and includes the following 

provisions: 

• Provisions that make generically applicable requirements previously imposed by 

Order EA-12-049, “Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements 

for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,” dated 

March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735), for the mitigation of 

beyond-design-basis external events. These requirements constitute the majority of the 
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requirements in this rule, and are located mainly in 10 CFR 50.155(b)(1), with portions in 

paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (g) as described further below. 

• Requirements for licensees to consider the effects of the reevaluated seismic and 

flooding hazards information within the mitigation strategies and guidelines, in 

accordance with the Commission direction provided in SRM-COMSECY-14-0037 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15089A236), “Staff Requirements - COMSECY-14-0037 - 

Integration of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the 

Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards,” dated March 30, 2015. These requirements appear 

in 10 CFR 50.155(b)(2). 

• Requirements previously in 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) for mitigation of the effects of a loss of 

a large area of the plant due to explosions or fire. These requirements appear in 

10 CFR 50.155(b)(3). 

• Requirements to integrate the above capabilities with the emergency operating 

procedures. These requirements appear in 10 CFR 50.155(b)(4). 

• Reasonable protection requirements that enable the proper degree of regulatory 

assurance to be applied to the equipment and structures, systems, and components 

(SSCs) that perform a beyond-design-basis function for the purposes of the MBDBE 

rule. These requirements appear in 10 CFR 50.155(c)(2) and (c)(3). 

• Supporting requirements for the integrated response capability that include staffing, 

communications, training, drills or exercises, and documentation of changes. These 

requirements are found in 10 CFR 50.155(b), (c), (d), (e) and (g). 

• Provisions that make generically applicable requirements previously imposed by 

Order EA-12-051, “Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool 

Instrumentation (Effective Immediately),” dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML12056A044), for remotely monitoring the spent fuel pool wide-range level. These 

requirements appear in 10 CFR 50.155(f). 

• Requirements that facilitate the decommissioning of reactors that are subject to this rule. 

These requirements appear in 10 CFR 50.155(a)(2). 

• Provisions that rescind orders, including Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051, for which 

the MBDBE rule will now provide the governing substantive requirements. These 

requirements appear in 10 CFR 50.155(i). 

• Provisions that facilitate the removal of a variety of license conditions for which the 

MBDBE rule will now provide the governing substantive requirements. These 

requirements appear in 10 CFR 50.155(i). 
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Discussion of Public Comments and Changes to the Rule 

The final MBDBE rule reflects a number of changes and improvements compared to the 

proposed rule. These changes stemmed from the staff’s consideration of the public comments 

provided on the proposed rule. Section IV of the draft final MBDBE rule FRN (Enclosure 1) and 

the supporting comment response document (Enclosure 2) provide a discussion of the public 

comments. The staff made changes to the MBDBE rule in the following areas: 

• Reevaluated Hazards 

The staff moved the treatment of reevaluated seismic and flooding hazard information to 

10 CFR 50.155(b)(2) in the final MBDBE rule. This revision provides licensees with 

flexibility in how to address the effects of the reevaluated hazard information within the 

mitigation strategies and guidelines. For example, licensees may develop event-specific 

approaches that consider the damage state and use all available equipment and SSCs, 

not necessarily assuming a loss of all ac power and a loss of normal access to the 

ultimate heat sink, if either would not be a consequence of the hazard. This rule 

structure provides better alignment of the final MBDBE rule and its supporting guidance 

than had been provided in the proposed rule and implements the Commission’s direction 

in SRM-COMSECY-14-0037. 

• Reasonable Protection 

The staff clarified the rule’s supporting statement of considerations to explain that the 

application of reasonable protection is linked to whether the SSC or equipment is 

performing a design-basis function or a beyond-design-basis function. This revision to 

the MBDBE rule also improves alignment between the MBDBE rule and its supporting 

guidance. 

• Loss of All AC Power 

The staff clarified the final MBDBE rule to better convey that the loss of all ac power 

condition must be addressed. Specifically, the staff removed the word “extended” from 

the set of conditions that the strategies and guidelines of § 50.155(b)(1) must be able to 

address, which formerly read “an extended loss of all ac power.” The new rule text 

avoids confusion with the term “extended loss of ac power” used in the industry 

guidance supporting the final rule. The staff also clarified the rule’s supporting statement 

of considerations regarding how the MBDBE rule and guidance address a loss of all ac 

power. Two staff members, who had provided public comment on the proposed rule, 

submitted a non-concurrence package (Enclosure 3) to object to the staff’s resolution of 

their comments. 

• Relocation and Revision of Staffing and Communications Requirements 

Public comment on the proposed rule suggested that the rule could be clarified by 

relocating the staffing and communications requirements from the proposed Section VII 

of Appendix E, “Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization 
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Facilities,” of 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization 

Facilities,” to 10 CFR 50.155, “Mitigation of Beyond Design-Basis Events.” The final 

MBDBE rule relocates these requirements into 10 CFR 50.155. The staffing and 

communications requirements are now directly linked to the implementation of mitigation 

strategies. This change improves the clarity of the final MBDBE rule and reflects 

licensees’ implementation of Order EA-12-049. 

• Flexible Scheduling 

The NRC realized that the nuclear industry would be challenged by the proposed 2-year 

compliance date for the MBDBE rule and requested feedback on whether this schedule 

provided sufficient time to address the reevaluated hazards information given planned 

schedules for procurement and implementation of plant modifications and programmatic 

changes. In consideration of that feedback, including the feedback provided during a 

public meeting held on November 10, 2016, the staff added a flexible scheduling 

provision into the final MBDBE rule as 10 CFR 50.155(h)(2). 

• Rescission of Orders and Removal of License Conditions 

A central objective of the MBDBE rulemaking is to make generically applicable the 

requirements initially imposed under Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051, giving due 

consideration to lessons learned from the implementation of the orders and feedback 

obtained from interested stakeholders through public comment on the proposed MBDBE 

rule. The staff looked broadly at all the orders and license conditions that the 

requirements of the MBDBE rule will replace and has included as 10 CFR 50.155(i) 

provisions that rescind the orders and facilitate the removal of license conditions. This 

reduces the administrative burdens on licensees. 

Backfitting and Issue Finality 

The staff has drafted a backfitting and issue finality assessment to support the final MBDBE 

rule (Enclosure 4). This assessment addresses the following changes to the final MBDBE rule: 

• Reevaluated Hazards 

As discussed above, the final MBDBE rule contains requirements for applicable 

licensees to address within their mitigating strategies the effects of the reevaluated 

seismic and flooding hazards information developed in response to the NRC letter dated 

March 12, 2012, issued under 10 CFR 50.54(f). The underlying basis for inclusion of 

this requirement in the final MBDBE rule appears in COMSECY-14-0037, “Integration of 

Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Reevaluation of 

Flooding Hazards,” dated November 21, 2014, and its associated SRM. For the reasons 

provided in Enclosure 4, the staff concludes that the requirements for licensees to 

address the effects of the reevaluated hazards information, as incorporated within the 

MBDBE rule, are part of Order EA-12-049 on mitigating strategies and do not constitute 

a new instance of backfitting. 
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• Removal of Multiple Source Term Dose Assessment 

The NRC received public comments concerning its backfitting justification under 

10 CFR 50.109, “Backfitting,” for the multiple source term dose assessment 

requirements included in the proposed MBDBE rule. The staff reexamined the 

backfitting justification and concluded that the supporting backfitting justification for the 

proposed multiple source term dose assessment requirements did not meet the criteria 

for imposition under 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(ii). After further consideration, the staff 

concluded that the requirements should be removed from the final rule for the reasons 

stated in Section IV.E of the MBDBE final rule FRN. 

• Revision to Staffing and Communications Requirements 

As discussed above, the staff revised the staffing and communications requirements, 

and relocated them to 10 CFR 50.155. The requirements for both staffing and 

communications are linked directly to the mitigation strategy requirements of 

10 CFR 50.155(b). As already discussed, this reflects the implementation of 

Order EA-12-049 since both staffing and communications are essential to implement 

that order and both were addressed as part of it. Accordingly, the staffing and 

communications requirements in the MBDBE rule neither constitute backfits nor violate 

issue finality. The staff removed the proposed staffing analysis requirement from the 

final MBDBE rule, although it remains part of the supporting guidance because it 

provides an acceptable method for initially determining staffing requirements. 

Petitions for Rulemaking 

As discussed in Section III of the enclosed final MBDBE rule FRN, the MBDBE rule provides the 

final resolution of five PRMs submitted in July 2011 by the Natural Resources Defense Council 

Inc.: PRM-50-97, PRM-50-98, PRM-50-100, PRM-50-101, and PRM-50-102. The dockets for 

these PRMs were previously closed, and the NRC notified the petitioner that the NRC would 

address the issues raised in the PRMs in the MBDBE rule. Each of the five PRMs relies on one 

of NTTF Report recommendations 4.1, 7.5, 8.4, 9.1, and 9.2 as its sole basis. The MBDBE rule 

addresses each of these recommendations and therefore resolves the issues raised by the 

PRMs, concluding the NRC’s consideration of these PRMs. 

 

An additional PRM, PRM-50-96, filed by Mr. Thomas Popik, requested that the NRC amend its 

regulations to require facilities licensed by the NRC to assure long-term cooling and unattended 

water makeup of spent fuel pools in the event of long-term losses of power due to geomagnetic 

storms caused by solar storms. As discussed in Section III of the enclosed final MBDBE rule 

FRN, the final MBDBE rule addresses this PRM, in part, but does not resolve it completely. 

Accordingly, PRM-50-96 remains under NRC consideration. 
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Implementation Guidance 

As discussed in Section IX of the enclosed final MBDBE rule FRN, the staff will publish three 

regulatory guides concurrent with the publication of the final rule: 

(1) Regulatory Guide 1.226, “Flexible Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis 

Events,” endorses with clarifications the methods and procedures promulgated by the 

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) in NEI 12-06, “Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies 

(FLEX) Implementation Guide,” Revision 3. This regulatory guide provides licensees 

and applicants with an acceptable method of implementing the provisions in the MBDBE 

rule for the mitigation of beyond-design-basis external events, primarily in 

10 CFR 50.155(b)(1), (b)(2), (c), and (g). This regulatory guide includes the lessons 

learned from implementation of Order EA-12-049 and provides guidance for addressing 

the effects of the seismic and flooding reevaluated hazards. This regulatory guidance 

also addresses the Commission direction in SRM-SECY-15-0065 for coordination of 

voluntarily maintained Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) with the 

integrated response capability under 10 CFR 50.155(b). 

(2) Regulatory Guide 1.227, “Wide-Range Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation,” endorses 

with exceptions and clarifications NEI 12-02, “Industry Guidance for Compliance with 

NRC Order EA-12-051, ‘To Modify License with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool 

Instrumentation,’” Revision 1. This guidance remains substantially unchanged from the 

guidance issued to support Order EA-12-051 and provides an acceptable method for 

implementing the MBDBE rule requirement in 10 CFR 50.155(f). 

(3) Regulatory Guide 1.228, “Integrated Response Capabilities for Beyond-Design-Basis 

Events,” endorses with clarifications (1) NEI 12-01, “Guidelines for Assessing 

Beyond-Design-Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities,” 

(2) NEI 13-06, “Enhancements to Emergency Response Capabilities for 

Beyond-Design-Basis Events and Severe Accidents,” and (3) NEI 14-01, “Emergency 

Response Procedures and Guidelines for Beyond-Design-Basis Events and Severe 

Accidents.” This regulatory guidance includes lessons learned from the implementation 

of Order EA-12-049 and provides guidance for addressing the requirements of 

10 CFR 50.155(b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), (d), and (e). This regulatory guidance also 

addresses the Commission direction in SRM-SECY-15-0065 for coordination of 

voluntarily maintained SAMGs with the integrated response capability under 

10 CFR 50.155(b). 

Non-concurrence on the Final MBDBE Rule 

The staff received two non-concurrences associated with the MBDBE rulemaking. 

The first non-concurrence (NCP-2016-018), provided as Enclosure 3, recommended that the 

final MBDBE rule requirement in 10 CFR 50.155(b)(1) be revised to require licensees to assume 

a loss of all ac and dc power when developing the mitigation strategies and guidelines for 

beyond-design-basis external events. The staff’s position is that inclusion of an assumed loss 

of dc power would not provide a substantial safety improvement beyond the requirement to 

assume a loss of all ac power already imposed by Order EA-12-049. As discussed previously, 
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the staff clarified the final MBDBE rule regarding the loss of all ac power requirement by 

removing the word “extended” from the rule language and making clarifications to the supporting 

statement of considerations. The staff also included a more thorough explanation in the 

comment response document, provided as Enclosure 2, for the staff’s position that a loss of dc 

power need not be included as a generic assumption. The non-concurrence also addressed the 

environmental qualification of instrumentation and control equipment. As documented in 

SECY-16-0041, “Closure of Fukushima Tier 3 Recommendations Related to Containment 

Vents, Hydrogen Control, and Enhanced Instrumentation,” dated March 31, 2016, the staff 

determined that imposition of such a regulatory requirement would not meet the backfitting 

criteria of 10 CFR 50.109. Therefore, no changes were made to the final rule with respect to 

this issue. 

The second non-concurrence (NCP-2016-014), provided as Enclosure 5, is a non-concurrence 

on a draft Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) document, JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 2, “Compliance 

with Order EA-12-049, ‘Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation 

Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events.’” JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 2, provides 

guidance for the implementation of Order EA-12-049. This ISG reflects lessons learned in the 

implementation of Order EA-12-049 and provides the substantive guidance for implementation 

of the MBDBE rule. This non-concurrence concerns the use of risk information in Appendix H to 

NEI 12-06, as a means to address reevaluated seismic hazard information in accordance with 

the 10 CFR 50.155(b)(2) requirement. The staff specifically requested input on the issues 

raised in the non-concurrence as part of the request for public comment on the draft ISG 

(81 FR 79056), for which the comment period ended on December 12, 2016. The final version 

of RG 1.226 will incorporate the guidance in JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 2, considering the 

public comments received, and will be issued concurrent with the final MBDBE rule. 

Implementation and Cumulative Effects of Regulation Considerations 

As discussed in Section XI of the enclosed final MBDBE rule FRN, the staff followed its CER 

process. The staff engaged external stakeholders throughout this rulemaking. Section II of the 

enclosed final MBDBE rule FRN describes the public involvement activities, including multiple 

public meetings, as well as opportunities for public comment on documents including two 

ANPRs, two draft regulatory bases, and the proposed MBDBE rule. In addition, because the 

MBDBE rule is making Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 generically applicable, the 

involvement of external stakeholders has been more extensive for this rule than just the 

MBDBE-rule-specific activities described in Section II of the enclosed final MBDBE rule FRN. A 

very large number of public meetings took place during the development of the supporting 

guidance for both EA-12-049 and EA-12-051, as well as during the development of the orders 

themselves. That guidance, as previously discussed, has evolved to become the supporting 

regulatory guidance for the MBDBE rule. 

Recognizing the potential challenges associated with implementation of the MBDBE rule, the 

NRC included in the FRN for the proposed rule a request for feedback related to CER. It also 

specifically requested feedback on the cost estimates provided in the regulatory analysis (see 

Enclosure 6), the proposed implementation schedule and how scheduling challenges might best 

be addressed, and potential unintended consequences of the proposed rule. In accordance 

with the CER process, the staff published three draft regulatory guides for public comment 

together with the proposed rule. 
The Commissioners - 9 -

As a result of the feedback, the final MBDBE rule contains a flexible scheduling provision. This 

provision provides licensees that received the 10 CFR 50.54(f) request for information issued on 

March 12, 2012, an option to adjust the MBDBE rule implementation schedule to enable full 

consideration of the effects of the seismic and flooding reevaluated hazards information, as 

would be required by 10 CFR 50.155(b)(2). A public meeting held on November 10, 2016, 

focused on the flexible scheduling provision and sought to obtain additional CER feedback to 

further inform implementation of the MBDBE rule. As a result of the comments received at that 

meeting, the staff made further adjustments to the compliance requirements in 

10 CFR 50.155(h)(1) to provide an additional year for licensees with General Electric reactors 

with Mark I and Mark II containments to implement the MBDBE rule. This additional time 

reflects issuance of Order EA-13-109, “Order Modifying License with Regard to Reliable 

Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions,” in 

June 2013, more than a year later than Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051. The implementation 

of Order EA-13-109 may affect the implementation of the mitigation strategies for those 

licensees. The additional time allows licensees to make procedure changes and perform 

training once. 

Regulatory Analysis 

The staff revised the regulatory analysis for the MBDBE final rule in response to public 

comments. The most significant revision to the final MBDBE rule regulatory analysis was to 

account for the costs associated with addressing the reevaluated hazard information. The 

revised regulatory analysis reflects the feedback obtained on these costs in response to the 

NRC’s specific request. As a result of the revised regulatory analysis estimated costs, the 

MBDBE rule is categorized as a major rule because the rule is likely to result in an effect on the 

economy that exceeds $100 million. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

The NRC staff recommends that the Commission do the following: 

 

• Approve the enclosed rulemaking package and final rule notice (Enclosure 1) for 

publication in the Federal Register. 

• Note the following: 

– The staff has made the final versions of the three regulatory guides supporting 

this rule available to the Commission for information. 

– The staff will inform the appropriate congressional committees of this action. 

– The Office of Public Affairs will issue a press release when the NRC publishes 

the final rule in the Federal Register. 
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RESOURCES: 

The MBDBE rule activities are appropriately budgeted in the Operating Reactors Business 

Line. There is no need to change the budgeted resources as a result of this paper. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has no legal objection to this SECY paper and rulemaking 

package. Because budgeted resources have not changed as a result of this paper, the Office of 

the Chief Financial Officer has not reviewed this paper or the final rule. 

As noted in Section II of the enclosed FRN, the NRC staff has met with the Advisory Committee 

on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) on numerous occasions during the MBDBE rulemaking effort. 

Most recently, the NRC staff met with the ACRS Fukushima subcommittee on 

October 19, 2016, and November 16, 2016, and the ACRS full committee on 

November 30, 2016, to discuss the final MBDBE rule and its supporting guidance. Enclosure 7 

provides the ACRS letter on the draft final rule. Enclosure 8 gives the NRC staff’s response to 

the ACRS letter. 

 /RA by Michael Johnson for/ 

 Victor M. McCree 

 Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosures: 

1. Federal Register Notice 

2. Comment Response Document 

3. Nonconcurrence NCP-2016-018 

4. Backfitting and Issue Finality Assessment 

5. Nonconcurrence NCP-2016-014 

6. Regulatory Analysis 

7. ACRS Letter 

8. Staff Response to ACRS Letter 
The Commissioners - 10 - 

RESOURCES: 

The MBDBE rule activities are appropriately budgeted in the Operating Reactors Business 

Line. There is no need to change the budgeted resources as a result of this paper. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has no legal objection to this SECY paper and rulemaking 

package. Because budgeted resources have not changed as a result of this paper, the Office of 

the Chief Financial Officer has not reviewed this paper or the final rule. 

As noted in Section II of the enclosed FRN, the NRC staff has met with the Advisory Committee 

on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) on numerous occasions during the MBDBE rulemaking effort. 

Most recently, the NRC staff met with the ACRS Fukushima subcommittee on 

October 19, 2016, and November 16, 2016, and the ACRS full committee on 

November 30, 2016, to discuss the final MBDBE rule and its supporting guidance. Enclosure 7 

provides the ACRS letter on the draft final rule. Enclosure 8 gives the NRC staff’s response to 

the ACRS letter. 

 /RA by Michael Johnson for/ 

 Victor M. McCree 

 Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosures: 

1. Federal Register Notice 

2. Comment Response Document 

3. Nonconcurrence NCP-2016-018 

4. Backfitting and Issue Finality Assessment 

5. Nonconcurrence NCP-2016-014 

6. Regulatory Analysis 

7. ACRS Letter 

8. Staff Response to ACRS Letter 

201100264, 201300054 

ADAMS Accession Nos.: Pkg: ML16301A005; SECY: ML16291A186; FRN: ML16292A026, Comment Response 

Document: ML16271A063, Backfitting and Issue Finality Assessment: ML16273A010; Non-concurrence 

NCP-2016-018: ML16312A020; Non-concurrence NCP-2016-014: ML16295A104; Regulatory Analysis: ML16301A009; 

ACRS letter: ML16341B371; Staff Response to ACRS letter: ML16343A146 * via e-mail 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

OFFICE NRR/DPR/PRBM/RS* NRR/DPR/PRMB NRR/JLD NRR/DPR/PRMB:BC NRR/DPR:D NRR/JLD:D 

NAME GLappert TReed EBowman MKhanna LLund MFranovich 

DATE 10/25/2016 10/25/2016 10/25/2016 10/25/2016 11/3/2016 11/4/2016 

OFFICE NRR/DRA:D* NRR/DIRS:D* NSIR:D* QTE* OIS/IRSD* ADM/DAS/RADB:BC* 

NAME JGiitter CMiller 

(MKing for) BHolian CHsu DCullison CBladey 

(J Shepherd-Vladimir for)

DATE 11/10/2016 11/15/2016 11/15/2016 10/19/2016 11/18/2016 11/10/2016 

OFFICE OE:D* NRO:D* RES:D* NMSS:D* Non-Concurrence 

NCP-2016-018 

Non-Concurrence 

NCP-2016-018 

NAME PHolahan 

(RFretz for) VOrdaz MWeber MDapas 

(SMoore for) RMathew TKoshy 

DATE 11/08/2016 11/14/2016 11/10/2016 11/14/2016 10/27/2016 10/27/2016 

OFFICE OGC* NRR:D EDO 

NAME HBenowitz(NLO) WDean VMcCree 

(MJohnson for) 

DATE 11/21/2016 12/02/2016 12/15/2016