J. Dent 

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

REGION I 

2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100 

KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 

February 29, 2016 

Mr. John Dent 

Site Vice President 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 

600 Rocky Hill Road 

Plymouth, MA 02360-5508 

SUBJECT: PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION – SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION 

REPORT (PHASE ‘A’) 05000293/2016008 

Dear Mr. Dent: 

On January 15, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed Phase ‘A’ of 

Inspection Procedure (IP) 95003, “Supplemental Inspection for Repetitive Degraded 

Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs or One Red Input,” at 

your Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim). The enclosed inspection report documents the 

inspection results, which were discussed with you and members of your staff. 

Consistent with the NRC Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix in Inspection Manual Chapter 

0305, “Operating Reactor Assessment Program,” the NRC is performing this supplemental 

inspection because Pilgrim transitioned into the Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column 

(Column 4), as discussed in the mid-cycle assessment letter, dated September 1, 2015 

(ML15243A2591). This phase of the inspection reviewed Entergy Nuclear Operations, 

Inc. (Entergy’s) progress in addressing corrective action program weaknesses identified during 

previous inspections. Its objectives were to verify that Entergy’s evaluations of, and corrective 

actions for, significant performance deficiencies were sufficient to correct the deficiencies and 

prevent recurrence. Additionally, the inspection assessed whether Entergy’s evaluations into 

these significant deficiencies were of a depth commensurate with the significance of the issue, 

root and contributing causes of risk-significant deficiencies were identified, and corrective 

actions were taken to correct immediate problems and to prevent recurrence. 

To accomplish these objectives, this inspection reviewed long-standing open corrective actions. 

It also reviewed a sample of NRC violations that were not reviewed by other inspections to 

determine if Entergy had taken appropriate actions to address the issue. It reviewed Entergy’s 

program for classification of adverse versus non-adverse condition reports, a sample of nonadverse condition reports to ensure they were categorized correctly, and any condition reports 

documenting misclassification (i.e., adverse vs. non-adverse) of condition reports. 

 

1 Designation in parentheses refers to an Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) accession number. Documents referenced in this report are publicly available using the 

accession number in ADAMS. 
J. Dent -2- 

Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that there were no longstanding risk-significant issues documented in the corrective action program that were not 

addressed, or assigned appropriate corrective actions and due dates. The inspectors 

concluded that, in general, Entergy classified, evaluated, and developed appropriate actions to 

correct past NRC violations. The inspectors also determined that Entergy appropriately 

classified condition reports as adverse or non-adverse. As such, based on the results of this 

inspection, as well as a review of performance indicators and inspection results from the fourth 

quarter of 2015, the NRC concluded that Pilgrim continues to operate safely, and additional 

regulatory actions beyond those prescribed for plants in Column 4 are not required at this time. 

This inspection served as a partial completion of IP 95003, Section 02.02.a. Accordingly, 

Pilgrim will remain in the Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column of the Action Matrix until the 

NRC completes the required scope of IP 95003. 

This report documents one finding of very low safety significance (Green), which was also 

determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety 

significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is 

treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC 

Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 

30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with 

copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United 

States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident 

Inspector at Pilgrim. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment 

discussed in the enclosure, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this 

inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, 

and the NRC Resident Inspector at Pilgrim. 

 
J. Dent -3- 

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's 

“Rules of Practice,” a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be 

available electronically for public inspection in the NRC’s Public Document Room or from the 

Publicly Available Records component of the NRC's ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the 

NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading 

Room). 

Sincerely, 

 /RA David C. Lew for/ 

Daniel H. Dorman 

Regional Administrator 

Docket No. 50-293 

License No. DPR-35 

Enclosure: 

Inspection Report 05000293/2016008 

 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information 

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ 
J. Dent -3- 

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's 

“Rules of Practice,” a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be 

available electronically for public inspection in the NRC’s Public Document Room or from the 

Publicly Available Records component of the NRC's ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the 

NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading 

Room). 

Sincerely, 

 

 /RA David C. Lew for/ 

Daniel H. Dorman 

Regional Administrator 

Docket No. 50-293 

License No. DPR-35 

Enclosure: 

Inspection Report 05000293/2016008 

 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information 

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ 

DISTRIBUTION: (via email) 

DDorman, RA 

DLew, DRA 

MScott, DRP 

JColaccino, DRP 

RLorson, DRS 

BSmith, DRS 

ABurritt, DRP 

MFerdas, DRP 

CBickett, DRP 

LCline, DRP 

BLin, DRP 

ECarfang, DRP, SRI 

SElkhiamy, DRP, RI

SHorvitz, DRP, RI 

ACass, DRP, AA 

RIyengar, RI OEDO 

RidsNrrPMPilgrim Resource 

RidsNrrDorlLPL1-1 Resource 

ROPReports Resource

 

 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH5\Reports\Final\2016\95003 Phase A Final.docx 

 ADAMS Accession No. ML16060A018 

 SUNSI Review 

 Non-Sensitive 

 Sensitive 

 Publicly Available 

 Non-Publicly Available 

OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/ORA 

NAME RClagg/ALB for LCline/LMC ABurritt/ALB MScott/MLS DDorman/DCL for 

DATE 2/26/16 2/26/16 2/26/16 2/29/16 2/29/16 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
1 

Enclosure 

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

REGION I 

Docket No. 50-293 

License No. DPR-35 

Report No. 05000293/2016008 

Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) 

Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 

Location: 600 Rocky Hill Road 

Plymouth, MA 02360 

Dates: January 11 – 15, 2016 

Inspectors: R. Clagg, Senior Resident Inspector, Team Leader 

N. Embert, Operations Engineer 

N. Floyd, Reactor Inspector 

J. Pfingsten, Reactor Engineer (observing) 

Approved by: Arthur L. Burritt, Chief 

Reactor Projects Branch 5 

Division of Reactor Projects 
2 

SUMMARY 

Inspection Report 05000293/2016008; 01/11/2016 – 01/15/2016; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 

(Pilgrim); Supplemental Inspection – Inspection Procedure (IP) 95003.

The inspection was conducted by a senior resident inspector, an operations engineer, a reactor 

inspector, and a project engineer. The inspectors identified one non-cited violation (NCV), 

which was of very low safety significance (Green). The significance of most findings is indicated 

by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using 

Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, “Significance Determination Process,” dated April 29, 

2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, “Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting 

Areas,” dated December 4, 2014. All violations of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC’s Enforcement Policy, dated 

February 4, 2015. The NRC’s program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear 

power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, “Reactor Oversight Process,” Revision 5. 

The NRC performed this supplemental inspection in accordance with IP 95003, “Supplemental 

Inspection for Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple 

Yellow Inputs or One Red Input,” to review Energy’s progress in addressing corrective action 

program (CAP) weaknesses identified in previous inspections. This inspection served as partial 

completion of IP 95003, Section 02.02.a. 

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems 

 Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” because Entergy 

did not promptly correct a condition adverse to quality for the core spray system. 

Specifically, though Entergy identified in March 2015 that core spray system leakage was 

the likely cause of voiding in the system, Entergy had not taken timely action to identify the 

source of the leakage and address the issue. Entergy’s immediate corrective actions 

included entering the issue into the CAP as a condition report (CR)-PNP-2016-00201 and 

generating a work order to repair seat leakage from the core spray test return line motoroperated valve, MO-1400-4A. 

The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612, Appendix B, “Issue Screening,” and determined this 

issue is more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have 

the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, an unmonitored 

increase in core spray system leakage could result in an unanalyzed condition where the 

operability of the core spray system cannot be assured. In accordance with IMC 0609, 

Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” dated 

July 1, 2012, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance 

(Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical 

specification (TS) trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance 

with the licensee’s maintenance rule program. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the 

area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, because Entergy did not 

thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of 

conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, Entergy failed to fully 

evaluate the source of core spray system leakage identified in CR-PNP-2015-01406 

because they closed out the CR to another CR with a different focus. [P.2] (Section 4OA4.2)
3 

REPORT DETAILS 

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 

 

4OA4 Supplemental Inspection (95003) 

.1 Inspection Scope 

The NRC performed this supplemental inspection in accordance with IP 95003, 

“Supplemental Inspection for Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded 

Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs or One Red Input,” to review Entergy’s progress in 

addressing CAP weaknesses identified in previous inspections. This inspection served 

as partial completion of IP 95003, Section 02.02.a. The objectives of this inspection 

were to verify that Entergy’s evaluations of, and corrective actions for, significant 

performance deficiencies have been sufficient to correct the deficiencies and prevent 

recurrence. IP 95003 provides specific guidance for this objective and directs the 

inspectors to evaluate whether Entergy’s evaluations into significant deficiencies are of a 

depth commensurate with the significance of the issue; that root and contributing causes 

of risk-significant deficiencies are identified; and corrective actions are taken to correct 

immediate problems and to prevent recurrence. Specifically, inspectors: (1) sampled 

long-standing open corrective actions; (2) reviewed a sample of NRC violations that 

have not been reviewed by other inspections to determine if Entergy has taken 

appropriate actions to address the issues; and (3) reviewed Entergy’s program for 

classification of adverse versus non-adverse CRs, reviewed a sample of non-adverse 

CRs to ensure they are categorized correctly, and reviewed any CRs documenting 

misclassification (i.e., adverse vs. non-adverse) of CRs; 

.2 Evaluation of the Inspection Requirements 

2.01 Review of Licensee Control Systems for Identifying, Assessing, and Correcting 

Performance Deficiencies 

a. Determine whether licensee evaluations of, and corrective actions to, significant 

performance deficiencies have been sufficient to correct the deficiencies and prevent 

recurrence. 

 .1 Review of Long-Standing Open Corrective Actions 

The inspectors reviewed Entergy’s CAP procedures which described the administrative 

process for initiating and resolving problems, primarily through the use of CRs. To verify 

that corrective actions were being properly evaluated, assigned a significance 

commensurate with their safety importance, and appropriately completed or extended, 

inspectors reviewed CRs initiated prior to October 1, 2013, with corrective actions that 

were still open at the time of the inspection. The inspectors determined that for the CRs 

reviewed, Entergy, in general, was effective in completing corrective actions or assigning 

appropriate due date extensions for these issues. The team identified one example, 

listed below, where the corrective actions for an issue were not taken in a timely manner. 

 In the documentation for CR-PNP-2008-02638, a heat load analysis determined that 

the control room temperature would reach 114°

F with a loss of normal heating, 

ventilation, and air conditioning, and potentially cause an operator habitability issue. 
4 

As a corrective action, Entergy staff developed a modification to install an 

augmented cooling system in order to mitigate the high temperatures. The corrective 

actions for this condition were extended multiple times until final suspension of the 

modification project in 2015. The inspectors evaluated this issue using IMC 0612, 

Appendix B, “Issue Screening,” and determined that this issue was minor. The 

inspectors noted that there are no current licensing or design basis documents that 

establish control room temperature limitations for operator habitability; however, 

there would be increased staffing challenges due to heat stress management and 

the resultant short stay times. Entergy entered this observation into their CAP for 

further evaluation as CR-PNP-2016-00276. 

 .2 Review of Corrective Actions for Past NRC Violations 

 

The inspectors reviewed Entergy’s CAP procedures which described the administrative 

process for initiating the review of issues, specifically inspection report findings identified 

by the NRC, primarily through the use of CRs. The inspectors reviewed a sample of 

CRs initiated as a result of NRC violations issued since October 1, 2013. The inspectors 

determined that, in general, Entergy appropriately initiated CRs as a result of NRC 

violations. CRs were classified in accordance with procedure guidance, investigations 

were conducted at the level specified by the CAP, and suitable corrective actions were 

developed. The inspectors reviewed corrective actions and determined that, in general, 

they were completed or appropriately extended. The inspectors identified an issue 

where the corrective actions for NRC violations were not adequately completed. 

NRC Inspection Report 05000293/2014002 (Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14129A282) documents an NCV 

(2014002-02) related to an inadequate procedure for determining operability of the 

shutdown transformer. Specifically, an NSTAR calculation concluded that certain 

alternative offsite power lines did not satisfy Pilgrim’s minimum voltage criteria for the 

shutdown transformer, but this information was never incorporated into the degraded 

23kV line procedure for determining the operability of the shutdown transformer. 

Entergy procedure EN-LI-102, “Corrective Action Program,” requires Entergy staff to 

document the receipt of NRC violations as a CR; however, this did not occur. The 

inspectors noted that EN-LI-102 would have likely directed performance of an apparent 

cause evaluation and could have prevented the receipt of a second NCV for a similar 

issue in 2015. NRC Inspection Report 05000293/2015003 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15317A030) documents an NCV (2015003-03) issued for an inadequate operability 

assessment of the shutdown transformer because Entergy staff did not appropriately 

evaluate changes made to the shutdown transformer when an alternate offsite power 

configuration was used that resulted in the transformer being inoperable. The inspectors 

noted that the degraded 23kV procedure contained incorrect information at that time, 

which the operations staff used during the operability evaluation. The inspectors 

determined that Entergy’s failure to document NCV 2014002-02 as a CR and perform a 

cause evaluation in accordance with EN-LI-102 was a performance deficiency. Because 

this issue is an additional contributor to the inadequate operability assessment, and the 

enforcement aspects of the inadequate operability assessment are already addressed 

as NCV 2015003-03, this issue is not being documented as a separate finding. Entergy 

entered this issue into their CAP as CR-PNP-2016-00302 for further evaluation. 

 
5 

 .3 Review of Classification of Adverse Versus Non-Adverse Condition Reports 

The inspectors reviewed Entergy’s CAP procedures which described the administrative 

process for initiating the review of problems, primarily through the use of CRs. In 

Entergy procedure EN-LI-102, “Corrective Action Program,” adverse conditions are 

defined as those conditions which include conditions adverse to quality plus conditions 

related to areas such as design basis, licensing basis, NRC regulations and 

commitments, and equipment required to support safety-related equipment. Nonadverse conditions are those conditions that do not fall within the definition of adverse 

conditions and are not required to be tracked in the CAP. 

The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs generated since September 2014, when 

Entergy implemented the process for classifying CRs as adverse or non-adverse. The 

inspectors determined that Entergy appropriately classified CRs as adverse or nonadverse. The inspectors did identify a gap in the guidance contained in procedure ENLI-102 for the classification of CRs as adverse or non-adverse. Specifically, the 

inspectors identified that guidance for classifying CRs as adverse tended to require an 

actual adverse impact. No clear guidance exists for those situations where an actual 

adverse impact does not occur (i.e., close calls or near misses). This has the effect of 

creating a gap in the guidance where the classification of CRs is at the discretion of the 

reviewing body. The inspectors identified that in these situations, the reviewing body 

tended to classify CRs as non-adverse. The inspectors did not identify any CRs where 

the classification as non-adverse was subjective and resulted in a negative 

consequence. Entergy documented this observation in their CAP as CR-HQN-2016-

00039. 

b. Findings 

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, 

Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” because Entergy did not promptly correct a condition 

adverse to quality for the core spray system. Specifically, though Entergy identified in 

March 2015 that core spray system leakage was the likely cause of voiding in the 

system, Entergy had not taken timely action to identify the source of the leakage and 

address the issue. 

Description. On January 27, 2015, during a loss of offsite power event, the ‘A’ loop of 

core spray experienced indications of voiding in the discharge line. Following an inquiry 

by NRC inspectors, Entergy entered the issue into their CAP as CR-PNP-2015-01406. 

Subsequent engineering analysis, completed in March 2015, confirmed the presence of 

voiding and assessed the impacts of the voiding on core spray system operability. The 

inspectors reviewed CR-PNP-2015-01406 and noted that Entergy determined the core 

spray system remained operable, and also identified core spray system leakage as a 

likely cause of the voiding. The enforcement aspects associated with the failure to 

identify partial voiding in the core spray system are documented in NRC Inspection 

Report 05000293/2015007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15147A412) as NCV 2015007-

05. 

Entergy entered this NCV into the CAP as CR-PNP-2015-05537. Entergy procedure 

EN-LI-102, “Corrective Action Program,” Revision 25, requires a ‘B’ level apparent cause 

evaluation be performed for NRC-documented NCVs. The inspectors reviewed CRPNP-2015-05537 and noted it was closed to a root cause evaluation documented in CR-
6 

PNP-2015-05533, which was originally initiated to address programmatic issues 

regarding failures to identify conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors noted that 

CR-PNP-2015-05533 did not evaluate the technical issue of core spray system leakage 

and the potential for system voiding if the non-safety-related condensate transfer system 

was lost, as was identified in CR-PNP-2015-01406. 

In November 2015, Entergy initiated CR-PNP-2015-09156 as a result of an identified 

increase of leakage into the torus and elevated temperatures in the test return line of the 

‘A’ loop of core spray header. The inspectors reviewed CR-PNP-2015-09156 and noted 

that Entergy documented the elevated temperatures could be an indication of 

condensate transfer leaking out of the core spray system through the test return line. In 

December 2015, Entergy identified the core spray test return line motor operated valve, 

MO-1400-4A, as the source of leakage from the core spray system into the torus. 

Though the valve leakage was documented in a work order, the inspectors noted that 

this issue was not entered into the CAP until January 12, 2016. The inspectors also 

noted that Entergy did not have a process in place to monitor for increases in core spray 

system leakage which could result in an unanalyzed condition where the operability of 

the core spray system cannot be assured. 

Entergy procedure EN-LI-102 defines a condition adverse to quality, in part, as a failure, 

malfunction, or deficiency that has the potential to affect safety-related functions of 

systems, structures, or components. The inspectors concluded core spray system 

leakage was a known condition adverse to quality since March 2015, based on the 

information documented in CR-PNP-2015-01406 and the subsequent engineering 

analysis. Because Entergy did not adequately evaluate the technical aspects of this 

issue in CR-PNP-2015-05533, identification of the source of the leakage was delayed 

until December 2015. Therefore, the inspectors also concluded that Entergy did not 

promptly correct this condition adverse to quality as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, 

Criterion XVI. Entergy documented this issue in CR-PNP-2016-00201 and CR-PNP2016-00311. 

Analysis. The inspectors determined that not promptly identifying and correcting a 

condition adverse to quality, as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, was a 

performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612, Appendix B, “Issue 

Screening,” and determined this issue is more than minor because if left uncorrected, 

the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety 

concern. Specifically, an unmonitored increase in core spray system leakage could 

result in an unanalyzed condition where the operability of the core spray system cannot 

be assured. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, “The Significance Determination 

Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” dated July 1, 2012, the inspectors determined 

the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an 

actual loss of function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as high 

safety-significant in accordance with the licensee’s maintenance rule program. 

The inspectors determined this issue had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem 

Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, because Entergy did not thoroughly evaluate 

issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions 

commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, Entergy failed to fully evaluate 

the source of core spray system leakage identified in CR-PNP-2015-01406 because 

they closed out the CR to another CR with a different focus. [P.2] 
7 

Enforcement: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” states, in part, 

that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are 

promptly corrected. Contrary to the above, from March 2015 until January 2016, 

Entergy failed to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving 

core spray system leakage. Entergy’s immediate corrective actions included entering 

the issue into the CAP as CR-PNP-2016-00201 and generating a work order to repair 

valve MO-1400-4A. Because the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) and 

was entered into Entergy’s CAP as CR-2015-00311, this violation is being treated as an 

NCV, in accordance with section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 

05000293/2016008-01, Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct Core Spray System 

Leakage)

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit 

On January 15, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. John Dent, 

Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that all 

proprietary information examined during the inspection had been returned to the 

licensee. 

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
A-1 

Attachment 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel: 

J. Dent, Site Vice President 

S. Asplin, Senior System and Components Engineer 

G. Blankenbiller, Manager, Chemistry 

J. Gerety, Manager, Systems and Components 

D. Miller, Maintenance Department Performance Improvement Coordinator 

P. Miner, Regulatory Assurance 

J. O’Donnell, System Engineer 

J. Ohrenberger, Manager, Maintenance 

E. Perkins, Manager, Regulatory Assurance 

A. Zelie, Manager, Radiation Protection 

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened and Closed 

05000293/2016008-01 NCV Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct 

Core Spray System Leakage (Section 

4OA4.2) 

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 

Procedures 

2.1.1, Startup from Shutdown, Revision 193 

2.2.5, Shutdown Transformer, Revision 30 

2.2.93, Main Condenser Vacuum System, Revision 76 

2.2.94.5, Main Condenser Backwash, Revision 14 

2.4.36, Decreasing Condenser Vacuum, Revision 35 

2.4.51, Hotwell Level Control Failures, Revision 20 

2.4.149, Loss of Control Room Air Conditioning, Revision 12 

2.4.A.23, Loss/Degradation of 23kV Line, Revision 18 

2.4.A.23, Loss/Degradation of 23kV Line, Revision 23 

2.4.B.6, Loss of Bus B6, Revision 4 

5.3.13, Loss of Essential DC Bus D6, Revision 30 

8.C.34, Operations Technical Specifications Requirements for Inoperable 

Systems/Components, Revision 61 

ARP-C903L-C5, RHR A Disch. Header Pressure Lo, Revision 17 

ARP-C903L-E7, CS A Disch. Header Pressure Lo, Revision 17 

ARP-C903R-C7, Injection Header Break Detection, Revision 27 

EN-LI-101, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations, Revision 12 

EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program, Revision 23 

EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program, Revision 25 

EN-LI-118, Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 21 
 A-2 

EN-LI-118, Cause Evaluation Process Revision 22 

EN-OM-123, Fatigue Management Program, Revision 12 

EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10 

EN-NS-102, Fitness for Duty Program, Revision 15 

EN-RP-100, Radiation Worker Expectations, Revision 9 

EN-RP-101, Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas, Revision 11 

I-NI-235 Setpoint uncertainty calculation for Core Spray header/sparger high delta P alarm, 

Revision 0 

Drawings 

M242, P&ID Core Spray System, Revision 53 

Miscellaneous 

Apparent Cause Evaluation titled "EDG-B Inadequate Operability Determination" (CR-PNP2015-9218), dated December 30, 2015 

Apparent Cause Evaluation titled "Inadequate EDG Common Cause Determination Result in TS 

Violation" (CR-PNP-2015-9543), dated January 6, 2016 

Apparent Cause Evaluation titled "Incorrect Shutdown Transformer Operability Determination" 

(CR-PNP-2015-7787), dated November 24, 2015 

Pilgrim Corrective Action Excellence Plan, dated August 2, 2015 

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications, Revision 298 

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 30 

PNP CRG Summary Agenda Report Prescreen Meeting, dated January 14, 2016 

Snapshot Assessment Report titled "PI Vulnerabilities," dated January 5, 2016 

RWP 2015078, LOW Impact Work in RA’s, HRA’s, LHRA’s and/or Areas >100,000 dpm/100 cm2. 

Includes System Breaches, Revision 0 

SSW Pump B (P-208B) Vibration Data, 4/2015-12/21/2015 

Non-Cited Violations 

05000293/2013008-01, Inappropriate Fatigue Rule Waiver 

05000293/2014002-02, Inadequate Procedure for Determining Operability of the Shutdown 

Transformer 

05000293/2014003-03, Failure to Follow Licensed Operator Medical Requirements. 

05000293/2014008-01, Failure to Fully Derive the Cause of a Manual Scram 

05000293/2014008-02, Failure to complete several corrective actions as required by program 

Requirements. 

05000293/2015002-01, Ineffective Corrective Action Leads to Cavitation of Residual Heat 

Removal Pump. 

05000293/2015002-02, Inadequate Operability Determination for the X017B EDG Results in TS 

Violation 

05000293/2015003-01, Main Control Room Annunciators 10 CFR 5065(a)(2) Not Met 

05000293/2015003-02, Inadequate EDG Common Cause Determination Results in TS Violation 

05000293/2015003-03, Inadequate Operability Assessment of the Shutdown Transformer 

05000293/2015003-05, Failure to Comply with RWP Instructions to Contact RP Prior to 

Dogbone Gasket Removal

05000293/2015007-04, Failure to Follow RCIC System Manual Restart Procedure 

05000293/2015007-05, Failure to Identify Conditions Adverse to Quality Associated with Core 

Spray Discharge Header Voiding. 

05000293/2015010-01, Inadequate Procedures for Placing Main Turbine in Service 

05000293/2015010-03, Inadequate Guidance and Invalid Compensatory Measures for Out of 

Service EAL Instrumentation 
 A-3 

Work Orders 

WO-PNP-345964 WO-PNP-364652 WO-PNP-374809 

WO-PNP-413495 WO-PNP-417535 WO-PNP-425180 

WO-PNP-425181 WO-PNP-426647 WO-PNP-426894 

WO-PNP-427869 WO-PNP-430632 WO-PNP-434935 

Condition Reports 

CR-HQN-2016-00039* 

CR-PNP-2008-02638 

CR-PNP-2011-04353 

CR-PNP-2012-00907 

CR-PNP-2012-01359 

CR-PNP-2012-01520 

CR-PNP-2012-02466 

CR-PNP-2012-02677 

CR-PNP-2012-04248 

CR-PNP-2012-05404 

CR-PNP-2013-00378 

CR-PNP-2013-01154 

CR-PNP-2013-01183 

CR-PNP-2013-01464 

CR-PNP-2013-01566 

CR-PNP-2013-01571 

CR-PNP-2013-01819 

CR-PNP-2013-02140 

CR-PNP-2013-02283 

CR-PNP-2013-04190 

CR-PNP-2013-04302 

CR-PNP-2013-04338 

CR-PNP-2013-04819 

CR-PNP-2013-05222 

CR-PNP-2013-05464 

CR-PNP-2013-07350 

CR-PNP-2013-08119 

CR-PNP-2014-00092 

CR-PNP-2014-00247 

CR-PNP-2014-00861 

CR-PNP-2014-00869 

CR-PNP-2014-01785 

CR-PNP-2014-05565 

CR-PNP-2014-05968 

CR-PNP-2014-06955 

CR-PNP-2015-00145 

CR-PNP-2015-00566 

CR-PNP-2015-00570 

CR-PNP-2015-00952 

CR-PNP-2015-01194 

CR-PNP-2015-01406 

CR-PNP-2015-03060 

CR-PNP-2015-04056 

CR-PNP-2015-04106 

CR-PNP-2015-04218 

CR-PNP-2015-04393 

CR-PNP-2015-05197 

CR-PNP-2015-05331 

CR-PNP-2015-05337 

CR-PNP-2015-05502 

CR-PNP-2015-05514 

CR-PNP-2015-05519 

CR-PNP-2015-05528 

CR-PNP-2015-05536 

CR-PNP-2015-05537 

CR-PNP-2015-05607 

CR-PNP-2015-05630 

CR-PNP-2015-05658 

CR-PNP-2015-05699 

CR-PNP-2015-05722 

CR-PNP-2015-05736 

CR-PNP-2015-05743 

CR-PNP-2015-05884 

CR-PNP-2015-05885 

CR-PNP-2015-05906 

CR-PNP-2015-05907 

CR-PNP-2015-05915 

CR-PNP-2015-05928 

CR-PNP-2015-05937 

CR-PNP-2015-05974 

CR-PNP-2015-06006 

CR-PNP-2015-06011 

CR-PNP-2015-06024 

CR-PNP-2015-06215 

CR-PNP-2015-06226 

CR-PNP-2015-06227 

CR-PNP-2015-06433 

CR-PNP-2015-06479 

CR-PNP-2015-06544 

CR-PNP-2015-06560 

CR-PNP-2015-06616 

CR-PNP-2015-06770 

CR-PNP-2015-06772 

CR-PNP-2015-06778 

CR-PNP-2015-06798 

CR-PNP-2015-06810 

CR-PNP-2015-06868 

CR-PNP-2015-06884 

CR-PNP-2015-06924 

CR-PNP-2015-06940 

CR-PNP-2015-07042 

CR-PNP-2015-07044 

CR-PNP-2015-07086 

CR-PNP-2015-07107 

CR-PNP-2015-07146 

CR-PNP-2015-07146 

CR-PNP-2015-07163 

CR-PNP-2015-07183 

CR-PNP-2015-07200 

CR-PNP-2015-07262 

CR-PNP-2015-07319 

CR-PNP-2015-07373 

CR-PNP-2015-07378 

CR-PNP-2015-07448 

CR-PNP-2015-07453 

CR-PNP-2015-07460 

CR-PNP-2015-07513 

CR-PNP-2015-07516 

CR-PNP-2015-07526 

CR-PNP-2015-07550 

CR-PNP-2015-07577 

CR-PNP-2015-07623 

CR-PNP-2015-07666 

CR-PNP-2015-07743 

CR-PNP-2015-07787 

CR-PNP-2015-07842 

CR-PNP-2015-07851 

CR-PNP-2015-07901 

CR-PNP-2015-07986 

CR-PNP-2015-07988 

CR-PNP-2015-08001 

CR-PNP-2015-08003 

CR-PNP-2015-08004 

CR-PNP-2015-08054 

CR-PNP-2015-08070 

CR-PNP-2015-08073 

CR-PNP-2015-08075 

CR-PNP-2015-08109 

CR-PNP-2015-08118 

CR-PNP-2015-08133 

CR-PNP-2015-08134 

CR-PNP-2015-08148 
 A-4 

CR-PNP-2015-08153 

CR-PNP-2015-08194 

CR-PNP-2015-08233 

CR-PNP-2015-08271 

CR-PNP-2015-08362 

CR-PNP-2015-08396 

CR-PNP-2015-08438 

CR-PNP-2015-08449 

CR-PNP-2015-08499 

CR-PNP-2015-08540 

CR-PNP-2015-08556 

CR-PNP-2015-08557 

CR-PNP-2015-08568 

CR-PNP-2015-08585 

CR-PNP-2015-08639 

CR-PNP-2015-08650 

CR-PNP-2015-08657 

CR-PNP-2015-08674 

CR-PNP-2015-08742 

CR-PNP-2015-08784 

CR-PNP-2015-08885 

CR-PNP-2015-08892 

CR-PNP-2015-08900 

CR-PNP-2015-08913 

CR-PNP-2015-08940 

CR-PNP-2015-08983 

CR-PNP-2015-09014 

CR-PNP-2015-09032 

CR-PNP-2015-09156 

CR-PNP-2015-09201 

CR-PNP-2015-09204 

CR-PNP-2015-09218 

CR-PNP-2015-09397 

CR-PNP-2015-09405 

CR-PNP-2015-09424 

CR-PNP-2015-09425 

CR-PNP-2015-09454 

CR-PNP-2015-09542 

CR-PNP-2015-09543 

CR-PNP-2015-09544 

CR-PNP-2015-09546 

CR-PNP-2015-09636 

CR-PNP-2015-09676 

CR-PNP-2015-09676 

CR-PNP-2015-09832 

CR-PNP-2015-09846 

CR-PNP-2015-09871 

CR-PNP-2015-09875 

CR-PNP-2015-09904 

CR-PNP-2015-09907 

CR-PNP-2015-95533 

CR-PNP-2016-00201 

CR-PNP-2016-00276* 

CR-PNP-2016-00301* 

CR-PNP-2016-00302* 

CR-PNP-2016-00317* 

*Result of NRC inspection 

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

CR condition report 

CAP corrective action program 

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter 

IP Inspection Procedure 

NCV non-cited violation 

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

TS Technical Specification