americanchemistry.com ® 700 Second St., NE | Washington, DC 20002 | (202) 249.7000

Sent Electronically

March 30 , 2012

Air and Radiation Docket and Information Center U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Re : Docket ID No. EPA

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- 0435 , National Emission Standa rds for Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions: Group IV Polymers and Resins; Pesticide Active Ingredient Production; and Polyether Polyols Production (77 Fed. Reg. 1268 , January 9 , 2012)

Dear Sir or Madam:

The American Chemistry Council (ACC) 1 is plea sed to submit these comments on EPA’s National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions: Group IV Polymers and Resins; Pesticide Active Ingredient Production; and Polyether Polyols Production (77 Fed. Reg. 1268, January 9, 2012)

. ACC repres ents the leading companies engaged in the business of chemistry , and ACC members operate facilities subject to these subparts. ACC is also a member of and fully supports the comments of the SSM Coalition and the Residual Risk Coalition (R2C).

Thank you in advance for your consideration of ACC’s comments. If you have any questions, or need clarification on any of our comments, please contact me at lorraine_gershman@americanchemistry.com or 202

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Sincerely yours,

Lorraine Krupa Gershman, P.E. Director, Regulatory/Technical Affairs

Attachment

1 The American Chemistry Council (ACC) represents the leading companies engaged in the business of chemistry. ACC members apply the science of chemistry to make innovative products and services that make people's lives better, healthier and safer. ACC is committed to improved environmental, health and safety performance through Responsible Care ® , common sense advocacy designe d to address major public policy issues, and health and environmental research and product testing. The business of chemistry is a $720 billion enterprise and a key element of the nation's economy. It is one of the nation’s largest exporters, accounting fo r ten cents out of every dollar in U.S. exports. Chemistry companies are among the largest investors in research and development. Safety and security have always been primary concerns of ACC members, and they have intensified their efforts, working closely with government agencies to improve security and to defend against any threat to the nation’s critical infrastructure.Docket EPA

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i I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The American Chemistry Council (ACC) is pleased to submit commen ts on the Environmental Protection Agency‟s (EPA or Agency) proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutant (NESHAP): Group IV Polymers and Resins (P&R IV); Pesticide Active Ingredient Production (PAI); and Polyether Polyols Production (PE PO)

. ACC member companies operate a number of facilities that will be subject to the proposed provisions

. ACC strongly objects to the proposed monitoring requirements for pressure relief devices (PRDs) in all three subparts

. ACC sees nothing in Section 112 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) that provides EPA the authority required to justify its proposed, onerous PRD monitoring requirements

. Further, EPA has provided no data to support its contention that PRD releases are not being identified

, and has similarly provided no data to support the contention that releases are not being controlled in a timely manner

. F inally, EPA has grossly underestimated the costs of installing such monitors

. The proposal to mandate monitoring of pressure relief devices is all the more unreasonable since the Agency has acknowledged (in another rulemaking) that PRD monitors are not expected to result in any emission reductions

. As there is no legal basis for this proposal, and no record adequate to ground the proposal to require PR Ds to be monitored, EPA should withdraw these requirements.

ACC also recommends that EPA revise the proposed standards for startup and shutdown to reflect that facilities will not be able to comply with production based standards in subpart JJJ during startup and shutdown, and to provide work practice standard s instead.

ACC is concerned about the mandatory use of the Electronic Reporting Tool (ERT), particularly at this time when relevant test methods are not yet incorporated into the ERT

. Without an opportunity to review the ERT data submittal requirements for each test method, ACC is unable to provide meaningful comments at this time on the impacts of the requirement.

Finally, ACC urges EPA to allow for a periodic excused excursion where the loss o f parameter monitoring data occurs and the applicable emission limit is not exceeded

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ii 

### Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary

................................ ................................ ................................ ................. i

II. Proposed Standards For Startup and Shutdown

................................ ................................ ...... 1
A. Emission Ratio Standard

................................ ................................ ................................ .. 1

B. Destruction / Capture Efficiency Limit

................................ ................................ ............ 1
C. Use of Alternative or Backup Controls

................................ ................................ ............ 2

III. Malfunctions and Affirmative Defense

................................ ................................ ............... 3

IV. EPA Should Withdraw the Proposed Pressure Relief Device Monitoring requirements

.... 4
A. EPA Lacks Authority and Justification for the PRD Requirements

................................ 6
B. EPA L acks Record Support

................................ ................................ .............................. 7
C. If EPA Moves Forward with Standards for PRDs, the Agency Must Follow the Statutory Requirements for Standard Setting

................................ ................................ . 11

D. If EPA Moves Forward w ith t he PRD Requirements, Numerous Changes Are Necessary

................................ ................................ ................................ ........................ 12
1. All PRDs should not be subject to release standards

................................ .................. 12
2. The rules should apply to a “pressure release” and not “any release”

....................... 14
3. EPA should add alte rnative monitoring approaches for PRD releases

...................... 16
4. EPA must clarify that other parameters can be estimated

................................ .......... 25
5. Recommended rule language

................................ ................................ ...................... 25

6. EPA must include a compliance date for existing sources to implement any new monitoring requirements.

................................ ................................ ............................ 26

V. Other I ssues W ith t he P r o posed Rul e s

................................ ................................ .................. 26
A. The Reference to FIFRA Form 3540

- 16 Must Be Corrected in Subpart MMM

........... 26

B. Electronic Reporting Tool (ERT)

................................ ................................ ................... 27
1. Anticipated Benefits

................................ ................................ ................................ ... 27
2. Methods supported by the Electronic Reporting Tool

................................ ................ 28
3. The timing and methods for including Method 18 have not been determined or shared with the regulated community

................................ ................................ .................... 29
4. Without formal notice of changes to the ERT, the regulated community is at risk of

non

- compliance

................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 29
5. Use of the ERT does not reduce the burden on the regulated community and makes timely report submittal more difficult

................................ ................................ ........ 29

6. There is no mechanism for obtaining extensions for special circumstances

.............. 30

7. As the requirements for Method 18 reports are unknown, so are the costs

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iii C. The B urden I mposed by the A ffirmative D efense S tandards H as B een G reatly U nder E stimated by EPA.

................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 30

D. Excused Excursion Comments for Subparts JJJ and PPP

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1. Subpart JJJ

- EPA should allow an excused excursion during each semi

- annual reporting period for loss of monitoring data that has no impact to the environment. 31
2. Subpart PPP

- EPA should allow an excused excursion during each semi

- annual reporting period for loss of monitoring data that has no impact to the environment. 32

E. Subpart MMM S hould B e R evised to M ake I t C onsistent with Subpart JJJ.

................ 32
ATTACHMENT A

– AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE COST ESTIMATE

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1 II. PROPOSED STANDARDS F OR STARTUP AND SHUTD OWN
EPA notes in the preamble that “in proposing the standards in these rules, the EPA has taken into account startup and shutdown periods and has not proposed different standards for those periods because we expect the difference in emission levels during per iods of startup and shutdown are insignificant and that facilities in these source categories should be able to comply with the standards during these times.” (77 Fed. Reg. 1284.) However, this expectation does not hold true for all facilities, particular ly those subject to Subpart JJJ

.

A. Emission Ratio Standard

The current emission standard for Subpart JJJ is expressed as a unit of emission per unit of production ratio

. During startup and shutdown, compliance with these emission standards becomes difficul t to demonstrate in some scenarios and impossible in others

. For example, a continuous PET production process using terephthalic acid complying with § 63.1316(b)(2)(i) would be subject to mass emission limits expressed as 0.04 kg HAP per Mg of polymer pro duced for the raw material section and 0.04 kg HAP per Mg of polymer produced for the esterification section

. Similar limits are also established for DMT

- based PET production under § 63.1316(b)(1)(i)

. Compliance for these PET production processes is demons trated using performance testing at maximum emission loading conditions

. Maximum emission loading conditions normally occur when production rates are also at a maximum

. As polymer production processes are also regulated under new source review permits, the emission points are also limited to maximum hourly and annual emission rates

. The combination of restrictions effectively limits the source

. Under startup and shutdown conditions, the polymer production rate is either at zero or is near zero, which forc es the ratio of emission rate to production to infinity

. Emissions begin as equipment is being filled and the reactions are initialized; however, measureable polymer production does not occur for hours after the introduction of feed materials to the produc tion
process

. As a result, during the initial hours of startup, the denominator of the rate equation is at zero, which forces any emission value to infinity.

ACC believes that an effective remedy is for EPA to establish a work practice standard that requi res the use of the same emission limiting practices for startup and shutdown conditions that are used to demonstrate compliance with the standard.

B. Destruction / Capture Efficiency Limit

Compliance with the 98% destruction / capture efficiency standard all owed under 40 CFR 63.1316(b)(1)(v) or (2)(v) / 40 CFR 63.113(a)(1) and (2) is not always possible under situations during startups or shutdowns

. Achieving high destruction efficiencies from combustion of dilute gas streams is increasingly difficult as th e incoming organic concentration approaches zero

. In the case of startup where equipment is at ambient conditions and material transfers are being initially made, the emissions from the initial filling of vessels of heavy liquid fluids can be quite dilute

. For example, the vapor pressure of ethylene glycol as supplied from an ambient, atmospheric storage vessel isDocket EPA

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2 0.0026 psia (18.3 Pa at 30 o C per Design Institute for Physical Property Research, American Institute of Chemical Engineers (DIPPR)). At full sat uration, the maximum concentration of ethylene glycol in vapors expelled from vessel filling would be only 180 ppmv

. To achieve greater than 98% destruction efficiency would require the exit concentration to be less than 3 ppmv, which may not be practicall y achieved.

Unfortunately, the conditions that create this scenario effectively eliminate the practical ability of industry to capture the data to consistently demonstrate the actual impacts

. Startups and shutdowns are limited in number as the success of polymer production is dependent upon consistent operation with the minimum number of production outages

. Even for planned production outages, the window of opportunity to gather data is exceptionally limited by both the duration of the startup / shutdown c ondition and the knowledge of the facility to predict exactly the time of occurrence

. In addition, executing performance testing during a startup or shutdown is an unnecessary distraction

. Distractions during non

- steady

- state operations are highly undesira ble in regards to safe operating practices

. Therefore, ACC believes that the value of such data is both negligible and overly burdensome

. ACC believes that an effective remedy is to establish an allowance for a work practice standard that requires the r outing of emissions to a destruction or capture device that has been demonstrated to achieve the 98% efficiency or less than 20 ppmv emissions standard during continuous steady state operations.

C. Use of Alternative or Backup Controls

One ACC member company facility operates two continuous PET production lines that use emission control devices capable of providing backup emission controls

. Each is equipped with an organic destruction unit to control emissions

. Each destruction unit is capable of destroying emissions from the esterification section of one line and the polymerization reaction section of both lines as operated under normal, maximum production rate conditions

. An alternative control scheme is possible where the esterification section can be op erated in a manner to minimize vapor emissions enough to allow a single destruction unit to handle both lines

. The use of this scheme is managed under the facility‟s operating procedures and in accordance with the existing provisions for startups, shutdown s and malfunctions as defined in subpart JJJ

. During the period where the operating modes are switched, process parameters vary significantly from steady state conditions

. Although the goal for every switch between methods is to completely route all emissi ons through the single destruction unit, the variation experienced can dictate that a portion of vent gas is routed to a secondary vent for pressure control

. The duration of the event is measured, and emission values are estimated and reported via the stat e‟s emission inventory program as well as under the Title V permit program.

The potential to emit from these activities has been established through performance testing and is limited by a new source review permit

. The limits are expressed in both hourly and annual
rates

. The state within which the facility operates maintains an air toxics program. The emissions of hazardous air pollutants under this permit were evaluated by the state for impacts and the impacts were found to be acceptable.Docket EPA

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3 By eliminatin g the startup, shutdown and malfunction plan provisions, the alternative control option is potentially eliminated and emissions that have been evaluated for impacts and found to be acceptable are potentially converted into excess emission events

. ACC respe ctfully requests that the provision be modified to allow the safe operation and transfer of operations from one operating mode to a secondary operating mode

. We suggest that the following language be included in the final rule , perhaps at the end of §63.13 35(b)(1)(A) :

Emissions experienced from the transfer of operations from a primary emission control mode to a secondary control mode are not excess emissions where such emissions have been predicted and included in the facility’s new source review permit and where such emissions when added to emissions experienced from the primary emission control scenario are not in excess of the relevant control standard on a 12

- month rolling sum.

III. MALFUNCTIONS AND AFF IRMATIVE DEFENSE

ACC is a member of an ad hoc coaliti on of trade associations and business organizations, the “SSM Coalition, which was formed to review and comment on EPA‟s approach to startup, shutdown and malfunction (SSM) events since the vacatur of the SSM exemption in the 40 CFR part 63, Subpart A Gene ral Provisions in 2008. Sierra Club v. EPA , 551 F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010)

. The SSM Coalition is filing lengthy comments on this proposed rulemaking and ACC adopts and incorporates those comments herein through referen ce. ACC would like to highlight some of the overarching concerns expressed in those
comments.

ACC believes that EPA has misinterpreted the Sierra Club decision, and is basing it proposed approach to SSM events in this rulemaking on unreasonable and insuff iciently supported assumptions about the nature of SSM and emissions during those periods. EPA‟s requirements that sources meet emission standards established for normal operations “at all times”, including SSM events, is not compelled by the Clean Air Act nor case law, including the Sierra Club decision

. This is particularly true when dealing with a malfunction event.

ACC believes that the following Agency‟s conclusions are meritless and self

- serving :

 That EPA need not consider emissions during a malfunc tion when developing emissions standards;

 it need not consider malfunctions in determining the level of emission reduction “achieved” by the best performing sources; and,

 it can disregard dealing with malfunction events because doing so presents “signifi cant difficulties” 1

EPA has for decades recognized that technology based standards, whether promulgated under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, or other federal statute have inherent limitations. So too have the courts: a “technology based standard disca rds its fundamental premise when it ignores the limits inherent in technology.” NRDC v. EPA , 859 F 2d. 156, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Even in this proposed rulemaking, EPA concedes that “even equipment that is properly designed and

1 77 Fed. Reg. 1268, 1284 (Jan. 9, 2012).Docket EPA

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4 maintained can sometimes fail and that such failures can sometimes cause an exceedance of the relevant emission standard.” 2

Since the 2008 vacatur of the SSM exemption in the General Provisions, in comments on a number of proposed NESHAP rules ACC has advocated that the Sierra Club ruling does not preclude EPA from adopting a §112 emission standard for SSM periods that is different from a §112 emission standard established for normal operations. Specifically, a §112(h) work practice standard would be perfectly suited for achieving maximum emission reductions during a malfunction event. ACC fails to understand why the Agency continues to resist exercising the discretion give n to it by Congress in § 112(h) to establish a work practice standard if it is not feasible for the Agency to prescribe or enforce a numeric emission standard.

Instead of addressing malfunction events through the § 112 standard setting process, EPA
propos es that sources must meet the same strict emission limitations established for normal operations during a malfunction, but may raise an “affirmative defense” to civil penalties for exceedances of those emission limitations during a malfunction. One would p resume that the “affirmative defense” would be in response to an EPA enforcement action, but that is not the case. EPA would disallow a source from raising an “affirmative defense” unless the source (1) notifies EPA no later than 2 business days after the malfunction has occurred and (2) submits a lengthy written report documenting that it has met all of the required factors established by EPA in the affirmative defense provisions of each subpart

. EPA therefore is shifting the burden to the source to show t hat it has met each and every factor required (some of which are overly broad, ambiguous and bear little relation to the malfunction event) and the source must present all of this evidence to EPA before the Agency has even initiated an enforcement action.

It is unclear where EPA finds the legal authority to substitute this “affirmative defense” for its obligation under § 112 to establish emission standards based on emission reductions “achieved” by best performing sources, including the emission reductions that are “achieved” through a work practice standard or other requirements during a malfunction event. Moreover, the affirmative defense provisions are so unreasonable and impracticable that even EPA believes it will be asserted by sources rarely, i.e., 1 or 2 instances for all sources subject to subparts JJJ, MMM and PPP over the 3

- year period covered by this ICR. 77 Fed. Reg. at 1305.

We discuss EPA‟s cost estimates associated with a source raising the affirmative defense at the end of these comments.

IV. EPA SHOULD WITHDRAW THE PROPOSED PRESSUR E RELIEF DEVICE MONITORING REQUIREME NTS

For all three MACT standards addressed in this rulemaking, EPA proposed

- at §63.1331(a)(9) for Group IV Polymers and Resins, §63.1363(b)(4) for Pesticides Active Ingredients, and § 63.1434(c) for Polyether Polyols

– to establish that “[a]ny release to the atmosphere from a pressure relief device in organic HAP service constitutes a violation.” To monitor such releases, facilities would be required to “install, main tain and operate release indicators” to identify and

2 Id.Docket EPA

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5 record each pressure release and notify operators that a pressure release has occurred. 77 Fed. Reg. 1308

. ACC strongly objects to these proposed requirements

. As discussed in the following sections

, E PA has provided neither proper legal authority nor an adequate record basis for its proposed monitoring requirements for pressure relief devices (PRDs)

. Therefore , EPA must withdraw these proposed requirements

. Only after collecting relevant information an d identifying an appropriate legal authority can EPA proceed with rulemaking to address releases from PRDs.

This proposal suggests a lack of understanding of the role of PRDs in chemical plants and the complexity of issues that are addressed through good engineering practices applied in designing systems that are specific to the processes in which they are employed

. PRDs play an essential role in ensuring the safety of a chemical plant

. PRDs are designed and installed to prevent equipment from exceeding m aximum allowable working pressures during upset conditions such as power failures, fires, process operating upsets, and other situations outside of the operators‟ control

. PRDs prevent catastrophic breaches of process equipment, which would result in far h igher emissions than those resulting from a release from a PRD

. PRDs minimize the loss of process materials to the surrounding environment and the operation of a PRD is typically the last line of defense in cases where multiple layers of protection have be en executed but have failed to keep an overpressure situation under control

. The systems that are protected by pressure relief systems vary widely across the chemical industry due to the demands of the processes which they protect and the hazards posed b y the chemicals used in those processes

. For example, systems can range in operating pressures from slightly above atmospheric to many multiples of atmospheric pressures

. Some systems must manage the potential for explosive decomposition

. Some must manage sticky materials such as hot glue

. Some must manage multiphase systems of gas/liquid or even gas/liquid/solid streams

. The choices typically are made through a systematic evaluation of the risk posed by the system specific situations

. A variety of tools su ch as Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Fault Tree Analysis, or Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) are available for identifying the risks

. The precise design of the overall system includes not simply the PRD but the overall processes, procedures, mo nitoring systems and controls which are used to minimize the potential for a release.

Although the Agency may view its propos al against any PRD release as an incentive to preventing releases, it may result in unintended consequences

. By establishing that any release is a violation of the Clean Air Act, EPA is essentially asking plant operators to choose either to allow the release to occur resulting in a violation, or prevent the release thus creating the potential for a catastrophic breach that will endan ger both the lives of the plant employees and the community neighbors

. Any standard prohibiting releases to the atmosphere from PRDs must include appropriate routes to demonstrate the legal status of the vent without prejudging the owner/operator by a pres umption of non

- compliance

. The EPA also appears to fail to consider that due to the importance of PRDs to process safety, these devices are part of the site preventive maintenance program and are routinelyDocket EPA

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6 tested/inspected by a trained third party or on

- site personnel

. Such testing and maintenance reduce the potential of PRD malfunctions and premature opening.

A. EPA Lacks Authority and Justification for the PRD Requirements

First, and most fundamentally, EPA fails to identify adequate statutory authority for its PRD proposal

. EPA cannot impose such requirements without explicit authority as EPA is “a creature of statute,” that has “only those authorities conferred upon it by Congress.” Michigan v. EPA

, 268 F.3d 1075, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

. Here, EPA at mos t references general authority under CAA § 112, 77 Fed. Reg. 1270, for these expansive requirements

. However, upon closer examination, nothing in Section 112 provides the authority required to justify proposing these PRD requirements.

CAA § 112(d)(6) F irst, CAA § 112(d)(6) cannot provide authority for EPA to establish a new emission or work practice standard for PRDs, as that provision is limited by its own terms to adjusting existing standards

. Section 112(d)(6) authorizes EPA only to “revise as necess ary ... emission standards promulgated under this section.” CAA § 112(d)(6)

. Since there are no “emission standards [already] promulgated” regarding emissions from PRD releases , there is nothing that EPA can “revise” in pursuit of its goal of imposing an ent irely new set of standards. 3

Even if EPA were to argue that its actions could somehow be authorized under § 112(d)(6), EPA has taken no steps to demonstrate that its proposed actions are warranted under that provision

. Section 112(d)(6) does not provide EPA broad latitude to establish novel regulatory regimes, but instead sets out specific and precise criteria EPA must apply for determining whether a revision of an emission standard should be made. Specifically, EPA is obligated to “tak[e] into account de velopments in practices, processes, and control technologies.” Id

. EPA has provided no information in the record to demonstrate that it has critically examined any “practices, processes, [or] control technologies,” much less that the information indicates that a new standard is warranted

. In fact, as the data and information ACC discusses below demonstrate, there is no factual basis to take such actions.

CAA § 112(d)(3) By providing that any “release events would be violations of the emissions standards,” 77 Fed. Reg. 1285, EPA is effectively establishing a new zero emissions NESHAP limit for PRDs

. Section 112(d)(3), however, identifies specific requirements for EPA to follow in setting such a new standard, including certain benchmarking analysis EPA has n ot performed here

. Specifically, § 1 12(d)(3) requires EPA first to identify the best performing sources in a particular source category and then set standards based on the performance of a certain number of those sources. There is no evidence that EPA has taken any steps to identify best performers, much less to calculate an emission limit based on the performance of those sources.

3 ACC notes that 40 CFR 63.165 establishes leak detection and repair work practice standards for PRDs in gas/vapor service. The regulatory requirements clearly distinguish a “release” from a “leak.”Docket EPA

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7 CAA § 112(f) EPA makes clear that its proposed standards for PRDs are not being promulgated under § 112(f)‟s residual risk authority

. EPA explains that the PRD provisions are ones that are being done separately “ [i]n addition to the [Residual Risk and Technology Review] performed regarding the NESHAP.” 77 Fed. Reg. 1283 (emphasis added)

. Further, the record is devoid of
any s uggestion that EPA engaged in the “Benzene NESHAP” two step analysis required to promulgate a standard for PRDs under § 112(f)

. See 77 Fed. Reg. 1270

- 71 (explaining EPA‟s
two

- step process)

. As discussed below, EPA lacks the basic information necessary to c onduct such an analysis.

B. EPA Lacks Record Support

EPA also has failed in its fundamental task of ensuring that it bases its actions on informed decision

- making regardless of statutory authority

. The requirements for agency rulemaking are clear: the Suprem e Court requires that an “agency [] examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983) (citation omitted)

. The agency must show that it has taken a “hard look at the salient problems before it.” Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FERC , 890 F.2d 435, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quotation marks and citations omitted)

. EPA‟s proposal, however, does not meet these basic rulemaking standards

. Far from being based on an “examin[ation of] the relevant data” or reflecting a “hard look,” EPA‟s proposal is premised purely on the Agency‟s vague “concern” that there “may” be a large number of PRD releases. 77 Fed. Reg. 1285

. EPA has not gathered, much less reviewed, information sufficient to justify the action it is proposing

. Thus, the agency has failed to “demonstrate a reasonable connection between the f

acts on the record and the resulting policy choice.” Small Ref. Lead Phase

- Down Task Force v. EPA , 705 F. 2d 506, 520 (1983) (citation omitted).

EPA Did Not Supply Supporting Data

. EPA states as justification for the proposed PRD monitoring requirements t hat “we are concerned that a large number of these releases that occur may emit large quantities of HAP, may not be identified and controlled in a timely manner and may be due to repeat problems that have not been corrected.” (77 Fed. Reg. 1285) EPA canno t base a proposed requirement on something that “may” occur without any data to support the concern, especially when the Agency is proposing a requirement that will result in the enormous costs discussed below.

EPA has provided no data to support the con tention that releases are not being identified. EPA has provided no data to support the contention that releases are not being controlled in a timely

manner

. Further, EPA has provided no reports, affidavits, or testimonies of agency inspectors where a sing le instance of an unidentified release has occurred

. In fact, EPA has not provided any information related to a single PRD release.

If there are data to support its claims, then EPA is obliged to present the data for public examination and comment prior t o initiating a regulatory action

. EPA‟s “justification” for its proposed PRD monitoring requirements is less than transparent and provides no basis for the imposition of new and costly requirements.Docket EPA

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8 The regulated industry already provides reports for unpermitted releases of hazardous materials

. The burden falls clearly and plainly on reporting facilities to provide accurate and timely reports

. There are a number of regulations that require the reporting of these emissions

. These include the PVC NESHAP (40 CFR 61, Subpart V), the HON (40 CFR 63, Subparts F, G, H), Group IV Polymers and Resins NESHAP (40 CFR 63, Subpart JJJ), Polyether Polyol NESHAP (40 CFR 63, Subpart PPP), Pesticide Active Ingredient NESHAP (40 CFR 63, Subpart MMM), MON (40 CFR 63, Subp art FFFF), Polymers and Resins I NESHAP (40 CFR 63, Subpart U), NESHAP for Equipment Leaks

– Control Level 2 (40 CFR 63, Subpart UU), Title V Reporting, EPCRA, and CERCLA.

The regulated community is well aware of PRD events that result in emission release s, and takes action both to report and correct such events

. However, EPA neither collected nor analyzed any of this information. By failing to provide any data, EPA falls short in demonstrating that new and additional reporting requirements for releases fr om PRDs are justified

. Therefore, if EPA finalizes these proposed PRD requirements, ACC believes its actions will be arbitrary and capricious as the Agency has “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem” and has “offered an explanati on for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n , 463 U.S. at 43. The information that ACC provides in its comments below shows that EPA‟s concern is unwarranted and its proposed actions are unnecessary.

ACC Collected Data Regarding PRD Releases

. During the comment period, ACC collected data from a few member companies regarding releases from PRDs in the chemical sector

. The information collected addresses PRDs in the chemical sector and is not limited to the seven chemical sector source categories addressed in this proposal

. The information collected from ACC member companies represents 40 chemical sector sites

. The information gathered included the total number of PRDs, the number of releases, the amou nt of pollutant released, the methods for indicating a pressure release has occurred, causes for the pressure release, and the mechanism used for reporting the release

. At these 40 sites, there are over 14,000 PRDs in service

. The number of PRDs range from 1 PRD on a specific process unit to 2,300 at an entire facility

. Most of the data are for 2011

. It is important to note that almost all of the data reported to ACC by member companies had already been reported to EPA or its delegated authorities

.

Below are summaries of our preliminary findings:

PRD Releases Are Identified Using a Variety of Methods

. EPA claims that PRD releases may not be identified and controlled in a timely manner

. ACC strongly disagrees with this claim

. Several monitoring methods are commonly used by companies to identify PRD releases

. In fact, the goal is to identify the conditions that lead to the potential for the activation of PRDs before they occur, and to execute the responses appropriate to the situation. This measured, multi

- f aceted approach provides layers of protection. It typically includes the use of multiple monitoring systems and alarms that also may include automatic shutdownDocket EPA

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9 sequences for certain portions of the operation to prevent any release from the PRD.

Releases w ere primarily identified using a variety of methods that measure pressure: pressure indicators, pressure transmitters, and pressure gauges. In many cases, the indicators have high pressure alarms to notify operators

. In addition, PRD releases were identifi ed through fixed area monitors, upstream rupture disks, monitoring with an OVA, and routine visual inspections

. Current leak detection and repair programs contain methods for using audio, visual and olfactory detection of PRD releases

. These methods are ty pically sufficient to detect a venting PRD due to the oft accompanied loud noise from a high pressure relief.

PRD Releases to the Atmosphere Are Extremely Infrequent

. For the 14,139 PRDs represented by the ACC data, a total of 1 81 releases were identified

. Therefore, a little more than 1 percent of the PRDs at these chemical plants had a release

. This clearly is inconsistent with EPA‟s unsupported claim that such releases are

common.
PRD Releases are Typically of Short Duration

. Not only do chemical plant operators identify releases in a timely manner, they also correct them as soon as possible

. EPA appears not to recognize that when a PRD releases, it typically indicates an issue that needs to be quickly resolved in order to continue normal process operat ion

. Failure to do so can result in safety issues and production losses

. Therefore, even without any requirement to detect PRD releases and correct them, it is in the best interest of a plant operator to do so promptly.

For those situations when a release did occur, the ACC information collected shows that over 75 percent of the releases lasted for a period of less than 30 minutes

. In fact, almost 40 percent of the releases had durations of less than 1 minute.

Emissions to the Atmosphere from PRD Releases Are Usually Small

. EPA maintains that releases may emit large quantities of HAP

. As discussed in the previous section, operators have significant incentive to identify PRD releases and correct the situation as soon as possible

. This has the effect of limi ting the quantity of both HAP and VOC released without the need for additional regulation

. In the data collected from member companies, the emissions per release were generally small

. Almost 80 percent of the releases resulted in emissions of less than 500 pounds

. Additionally, over 2 0 percent of the releases resulted in emissions of less than 1 pound

. However, the data collected from ACC member companies do show that emissions to the atmosphere from PRD releases are not always insignificant

. Given that P RD releases are usually the result of a build

- up of excess pressure in the system, the high pressure high flow rate streams can result in higher levels ofDocket EPA

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10 emissions

. Approximately 1 1 % of the releases reported resulted in emissions of over 1 ton of HAP or V OC.

As stated before, PRDs minimize emissions by preventing failure of equipment and loss of containment

. It is logical to conclude that the emissions identified would be even greater without the application of layers of protection and installation of PRD s that are specifically designed for their application.

It is important to note that the circumstances where higher emissions occurred were identified through existing monitoring methods

. Further, the facilities worked to correct the release as quickly as possible

. The proposed requirements would not provide any additional information to owners and operators related to the occurrence of these higher emission releases

. Further, it would not result in faster resolution of the situation

.
In conclusion, chem ical plant owners and operators already engage in a variety of effective procedures to identify when PRDs release and emit to the atmosphere

. When a release does occur, safety considerations and process economics ensure that the release and resolution of i ssues is addressed as soon as possible

. Data Regarding PRD Releases From Petroleum Refineries Was Available from the South Coast Air Quality Management District

. EPA references the “ Proposed Amended Rule 1173

– Control of Volatile Organic Compound Leaks and Releases from Components at Petroleum Facilities and Chemical Plants ” from the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) as a source for information related to PRD monitoring

. Information was gathered by the SCAQMD to support this rulemaking

. While the data only represented Petroleum Refineries in the District, it does provide additional information regarding PRD release frequency and emissions

. Refineries reported a total of 770 atmospheric PRDs (565 in gas/vapor service and 205 in liquid se rvice) to SCAQMD

. A total of 42 releases were reported over a 4 year period from these 770 PRDs, or an average of 10.5 releases per year

. Therefore, just over 1 percent of the PRDs released each year

. If one conservatively assumed that every one of these r eleases occurred on a PRD in gas/vapor service the result would be that each gas/vapor PRD releases, on average, around once every 54 years . This does not seem to support EPA‟s statements regarding a “large number of releases.”

Of the data reported from t hese South Coast refineries, 62 percent of the releases resulted in emissions of less than 500 lbs

. No information was provided related to the duration of each release

. As noted above, this data is only represented for Petroleum Refineries and is not
repre sentative of the chemical sectors subject to this proposal.

Despite the fact that EPA used cost information from SCAQMD in estimating the financial impacts of the PRD monitoring requirement, EPA appears to have ignored the data regarding the amount of the emissions from PRD releases

. In addition, EPA failed to acknowledge that the SCAQMD rule allows for different types of monitoring methods for PRDs

. In fact, only petroleum facilities are required to install anDocket EPA

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11 electronic monitor on each PRD in that rule

. Chemical plants can install either a tamper

- proof electronic valve monitoring device or utilize electronic process controls that provide continuous parameter monitoring.

We do not believe it is appropriate for EPA to cite the SCAQMD data as supportive o f this proposal without discussing the applicability of the SCAQMD 1173 rule, and the SCAQMD data.

C. If EPA Moves Forward with Standards for PRDs, the Agency Must Follow

the Statutory Requirements for Standard Setting

The proposed amendments to all three s ubparts state that “[a]ny release to the atmosphere from a pressure relief device constitutes a violation of this rule.” As stated earlier in these comments, EPA effectively is proposing to establish a zero emissions standard for PRD releases. However, it is unclear what legal authority is being used for this proposed NESHAP standard. As ACC explained in the comments above, EPA cannot use § 112(d)(6) because this proposal is not a revision to an “existing” standard and EPA cannot use § 112(d)(3) if it is n ot going to follow the statutory requirements established therein, i.e., identify the best performing sources and establish a standard based on what emission reductions are being achieved in practice by the best performers..

If EPA is determined to develo p an emission limit for releases to the atmosphere from PRDs, it must follow the statutory requirements established in § 112 of the CAA.

EPA has not previously established separate standards for malfunctions as “malfunction” events were exempted from meet ing the emission limits established for normal operations

. In the preamble, EPA explains the difficulties in establishing emission standards for malfunctions

–
“Applying the concept of „„best controlled‟‟ or „„best performing‟‟ to a unit that is malfunct ioning presents significant difficulties, as malfunctions are sudden and unexpected events. Further, accounting for malfunctions would be difficult, if not impossible, given the myriad different types of malfunctions that can occur across all sources in th e category and given the difficulties associated with predicting or accounting for the frequency, degree and duration of various malfunctions that might occur. As such, the performance of units that are malfunctioning is not „„reasonably‟‟ foreseeable.” (7 7 Fed. Reg. 1284)

While this argument may be reasonable when considering the entire universe of malfunctions that could possibly occur, the release of a PRD is unique in that the “release” is an inherent function of the device

. ACC believes that EPA, work ing with ACC and SCAQMD data, could have established a work practice standard for PRD releases pursuant to its authority under § 112(h). We urge the Agency to strongly consider this approach.Docket EPA

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12 D. If EPA Moves Forward With The PRD Requirements, Numerous Changes Are Necessary

If EPA chooses to move forward with its proposed approach for PRD releases, it must clarify that not all releases to the atmosphere from a PRD are a violation. For example, EPA must clarify that fugitive releases that are already mana ged by established leak detection and repair (LDAR) regulations are not violations

. Additionally, EPA should eliminate the situation where releases of liquids or gas/vapors that only result in minimal losses to the atmosphere would be classified as automat ic violations. In addition, the rules should only apply to PRDs in organic gas/vapor service that vent to the atmosphere.

ACC objects to the proposed monitoring and alarm requirements for those PRDs that would be covered

. EPA should allow current methods that are successfully being utilized at chemical plants to identify PRD releases to continue to be used

. EPA must also clarify that the monitoring devices/methods only are required to determine that the PRD has released

. Note that, if EPA starts over and c reates reasonable and legally defensible standards for PRD releases, ACC does not question the need to identify PRD releases or to maintain records of these releases

. ACC also does not object to the requirement to report PRD releases in periodic reports.

1. All PRDs should not be subject to release standards

The definition of pressure relief device that applies for these three subparts is as follows:

“ Pressure relief device or valve means a safety device used to prevent operating pressures from exceeding th e maximum allowable working pressure of the process equipment. A common pressure relief device is a spring

- loaded pressure relief valve. Devices that are actuated either by a pressure of less than or equal to 2.5 pounds per square inch gauge or by a vacuum are not pressure relief devices.”

This definition includes a wide universe of PRDs, not all of which should be subject to standards

. ACC recommends that the following PRDs not be subject to release standards:

 PRDs not in gas/vapor service,

 PRDs in systems with little potential for loss to the atmosphere (e.g., chemicals with very low vapor pressures)

,

 PRDs that are routed to a closed vent system and control device, and

 PRDs that are routed to a process.

The requirements should only apply to PRDs in gas/vapor service

. The PRD requirements are being imposed irrespective of cost or benefit

. EPA should exempt PRDs where a release would only result in the release of liquids

. For example, the release of liquid ethylene glycol into a catchment or spill con tainment vessel would not result in atmospheric impacts since the material is a heavy liquid with exceptionally low vapor pressure at ambient conditions. L iquid phase pressure relief systems typically ha ve secondary containment systems to ensure capture an d to minimize loss

. A fully filled liquid system may also only require a very small amount of liquid to pass the relief valve to relieve the overpressure situation

. PRDs in liquid service should not be included.Docket EPA

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13 EPA has long recognized that PRDs in gas/va por service were the ones that warranted regulation

. For instance, the HON LDAR provisions for PRDs in § 63.165 only apply to PRDs in gas/vapor service

. Further, in the Uniform Standards regulations signed by the EPA Administrator on February 24, 2012, the PRD provisions in § § 65.424 (a) and (b) only apply to those in gas/vapor service

. Therefore, EPA should modify the proposed requirements in §§ 63.1331(a)(9), 63.1363(b)(4), and 63.1434(c) to apply only to PRDs in gas/vapor service.

The requirements shoul d also include de minimis values to exclude systems with little potential for loss to the atmosphere

. For example, in polyethylene terephthalate production, one of the primary HAPs is ethylene glycol

. At ambient conditions, it is a heavy liquid exhibiting a very low vapor pressure

. It is well known that a leak of hot ethylene glycol vapor rapidly condenses upon exposure to ambient conditions

. The resulting condensed ethylene glycol typically pools and may be collected for appropriate treatment and disposal

. It would be difficult to create a scenario where ethylene glycol vapors could exit a production site without notice and in sufficient quantities to impact surrounding communities

. Such an event would be large and easily identified, yet this standard impos es the same requirement for a PRD in ethylene glycol (or other heavy liquid) service as might be imposed for a highly volatile, highly toxic hazardous air pollutant.

To further illustrate the problem EPA creates with its proposed broad prohibition, take t he scenario where a vessel filled with low molecular weight polyethylene terephthalate and ethylene glycol is protected from over

- pressurization via a PRD

. If the pressure is relieved via the expelling of this liquid to a secondary vessel, or possibly, to a catchment or wastewater treatment sewer, the vast majority of the material would be liquid

. If even a thousand gallons release of liquid occurs, a miniscule amount of ethylene glycol could vaporize, and yet, the blanket prohibition against any release re sults in a violation

. ACC notes that in other permitted activities, ethylene glycol is commonly stored in fixed roof vessels without any additional emission controls simply because it has a low vapor pressure and poses little potential to emit

. ACC sugge sts that EPA set a de minimis reporting value equal to the reportable quantity (RQ) values in EPCRA and /or CERCLA

. The RQ values vary from chemical to chemical, and the RQ value is typically lower for more hazardous and/or volatile chemicals

. See EPA‟s “Li st of Lists” for RQs for a number of EPA programs. 4

PRDs that release to closed vent systems and control devices should not be subject to the monitoring requirements

. The proposed rule exempts PRDs that route releases to a closed vent system and control device from the release indicator requirements

. EPA‟s intention that releases from these PRDs would not be violations is relatively clear, as the proposed rules indicate that only releases from a PRD “to the atmosphere” are a violation

. However, in order t o avoid potential confusion, EPA should clarify not only that PRDs that route releases to a closed vent system and/or control device are exempt from the release indicator requirements, but that such PRD releases are not subject to standards and thus, are n ot violations

.

4 http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/docs/chem/list_of_lists_revised_7_26_2011.pdfDocket EPA

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14 PRDs that release to a process should be exempt

. EPA should clarify that PRDs that release “to a process” are exempt

. While it could be argued that these situations do not “vent to the atmosphere” and therefore would not be subject to the proposed requirements, it would be helpful to the regulated community if EPA could clearly identify this in the regulation to avoid any potential for misinterpretation.

2. The rules should apply to a “pressure release” and not “any release”

The proposed language in §§ 63.1331(a)(9), 63.1363(b)(4), and 63.1434(c) indicate s that “any release to the atmosphere from a pressure relief device in organic HAP service constitutes a violation of this rule.” This requirement is unreasonable and technically infeasib le as it establishes an unachievable condition of zero emissions from equipment that is inherently capable of leakage by the existence of a seal that is designed to open and close

. This zero emission requirement also could be interpreted to apply to any fu gitive emission that does not meet the definition of a “leak” thereby conflicting with existing leak detection and repair (LDAR) requirements.

P ressure relief systems face widely varying process conditions and in response, a wide variety of pressure relie f devices are in service in the chemical industry

. The most common relief devices are rupture disks and pressure relief valves

. Rupture disks have the disadvantage of permanently opening the process to atmosphere upon actuation

. Pressure relief valves (PRV ) are preferred due to their ability to close after actuation

. To prevent loss of process material through the valve, the valve seat and valve are finely machined to create a tight seal

. A spring applies pressure to close the valve against the seat

. Unless the sealing surfaces match perfectly, gas or liquid can pass through the valve. Current regulations require that PRVs achieve a seal that produces less than an established leak rate but that leak rate has never been placed as a blanket prohibition against emissions because it is technically infeasible to achieve such a standard for all relief systems

. PRDs in gas/vapor service at chemical processing facilities are currently subject to LDAR regulations

. The three subparts incorporate the HON LDAR requirem ents in 40 CFR 63, subpart H

. Specifically, § 63.165 requires PRDs to be operated so that emissions are less than 500 ppm above background except during pressure releases

. Further, each PRD must be monitored within 5 days of a pressure release to verify th e PRD has returned to an operating condition with emissions less than 500 ppm above background

. (§ 63.165) The most commonly accepted method for verifying this concentration is EPA Method 21.

EPA Method 21 provides examples of locations to monitor for po tential leaks

. Section 8.3.1.4 of the method states that sampling/monitoring for leaks from PRDs should occur at the sealing seat interface

. However, it is common for PRDs to be equipped with enclosed extensions that prevent sampling at this interface

. In those instances, Method 21 suggests sampling/monitoring at the “center of the exhaust area to the atmosphere.” Any reading below 500 ppm above background conditions found at these points of the PRD would be in compliance with the existing LDAR requirement s.
Further, a reading above 500 ppm is not a “deviation” unless the leak is not corrected per the work practice standard

. As noted above, process conditions vary widely in the chemical industry

. The materials which pass the valve during a pressure rel ease event may defeat perfect sealingDocket EPA

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15 either through erosion, corrosion, or the adherence of process material to the seat of the valve. Seal performance cannot be anticipated prior to actuation.

In these proposed requirements, any release could be considered a violation

. This could be interpreted to include “allowable emissions” under the LDAR requirements, as defined as an instrument reading less than 500 ppm above background

. Therefore, a facility in compliance with the applicable LDAR provisions could be i n violation of these proposed requirements if there was the slightest concentration measured from the PRD

. The literal writing of this requirement also could be interpreted by an enforcement agency as including fugitives from any part of the PRD, such as t he flanges of the device

. In other words, the proposed language could result in a violation for any fugitive emissions on any component determined to be associated with a PRD above detection level of the instrument.

Treating a “release” as synonymous wit h a “leak” is extremely problematic and will lead to absurd results

. For example, if a PRD fails to completely reseal and exhibits a slight leak (i.e., fugitive emission are above the “less than 500ppm above background” leak threshold in § 63.165), the owner/operator may believe the production line needs to be immediately shutdown to address the “release” and repair the PRD

. If this is a polymer production line, full shutdowns and re

- starts can generate thousands of pounds of waste or off

- specification polymer

. So, in order to avoid exacerbating a potential violation because of a “release

, ” these requirements as written may force manufacturers to create thousands of pounds of waste

. ACC does not believe this is EPA‟s intent and for that reason strongly urges EPA to distinguish between a “leak” and a “pressure release.”

ACC believes that EPA intended for this new requirement to apply solely to emissions from an actual pressure release, and not allowable fugitive emissions “releases.” The definition of

“ pressure release” that applies for 40 CFR 63, Subparts JJJ and MMM is the same as that found in the HON (40 CFR 63, Subpart H)

. There is no reference to this definition or an alternative definition in 40 CFR 63 Subpart PPP

. ACC urges EPA to add this refere nce to § 63.1423 for consistency.

Pressure release means the emission of materials resulting from the system pressure being greater than the set pressure of the pressure relief device. This release can be one release or a series of releases over a short t ime period due to a malfunction in the process. (40 CFR 63.161)

ACC believes that EPA‟s discussion in the preamble supports the conclusion that it only intended to cover pressure releases

. EPA states that “pressure release events may be associated with un planned, nonroutine discharges.” (77 Fed. Reg. 1285)

. EPA further states that the “proposed provisions will clarify that such release events would be violations of the emissions standards of these rules.”

Therefore, EPA should modify the proposed languag e and replace the words “any release” with “any pressure release.” This would clarify that PRDs operating in compliance with §63.165 would not be subject to a potential violation for a “release.”Docket EPA

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16

3. EPA should add alternative monitoring approaches for PRD releases

A “one

- size fits all” approach is not justified and is counter

- productive

. The proposed regulations require that owners or operators install, maintain and operate “release indicators” on each pressure relief device that will indicate when an emiss ion release has occurred

. Further, the rules require that each indicator be equipped with an alert system that will notify an operator immediately and automatically when the pressure relief device is open

. In addition, this alert must be located such that the signal is detected and recognized easily by an operator.

This design requirement that “a release indicator” must be properly installed on “each pressure relief device” is a “one

- size fits all” approach that is impractical, potentially infeasible, and inappropriate

. Design of pr essure relief systems and the associated monitoring systems should be governed by good engineering practices in accordance with considerations for risks and hazards along with the practical aspects of the specific system.

It is possible to create a more hazardous situation by making process operations more complex

. Complexity can divert attention from more important parameters

. PRD specific units can be prone to false positives (i.e., burst indicators which may provide a false i ndication that the rupture disk has burst simply due to a wiring short)

. The addition of alarms should be made in careful consideration of the hazards against the potential benefits; this is accomplished through careful design and application of good engin eering principles including the use of process hazards analysis

. Establishing blanket requirements across an entire industry is contradictory to good engineering practice.

No one design standard can possibly work in the variety of conditions that exist i n the chemical processing industry

. PRDs come in a variety of sizes and come from a number of different manufacturers

. It is not practicable to require a single type of system to alert operators of their release

. Within a single process, conditions can vary from the processing of light vapors to sticky resins

. What may work in one area may not work in another especially if a quantitative measure of release is made mandatory

. There are significant differences in measuring liquid, vapor and/or
two

- phase fl ow accurately, particularly in transient flow situations. It is impractical to assume one type of design will be adequate.

Polymer and resin production processes are not amenable to monitors that can be coated, plated or plugged in ambient conditions

. Pos t

- PRD vent systems (i.e., the piping downstream of the PRD) are typically under ambient conditions and cannot easily be made to mimic process conditions for the purpose of preventing solids accumulation

. Entry of a solid, resinous or polymeric material int o the vent header can easily defeat monitoring units by solidification

. Once defeated, the monitoring unit becomes useless, or worse, a potential source of misinformation for the operator

. The performance of ultrasonic monitoring units in these types of se rvices is not yet known and may not prove to be sufficiently reliable

. It is unknown if a technically feasible solution is available to address the design requirements alluded to by the proposed requirements.

The emphasis on the imposition of an individua l monitoring system that is specific to a single PRD without allowance for process specific conditions is impractical

. Safe design of pressure relief device systems should allow the consideration of all aspects of the process so that the most effective sys tem can be used. A one

- sized fits all approach to release indicators is inappropriate.Docket EPA

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17 One large ACC member company determined that currently available technology that could be used to comply with the proposed regulation would be based on one of the follo wing devices:

 A pressure switch located downstream of the relief valve;

 An on

- line acoustic monitoring system;

 A low pressure burst indicator; or

 A “tell tail” (a weighted sock) on the relief valve discharge.

This company‟s experience with these device s is that they all have very poor reliability to operate when there is a PRD release

. All these devices, except the low pressure burst indicator, are located downstream of the PRD and will only be called on to operate when the PRD opens

. Since PRDs release so rarely, the device may be in place for many years before needing to operate

. It may be difficult to ascertain reliability when the alarm is rarely, if ever, used.

A n other ACC member company experience d with low pressure burst indicators found that they

are prone to give false alarms. These low pressure burst indicators are affected by small pressure changes, exposure to process temperature changes, and decay of the electronic systems used to sense if the indicator has been violated

. The company has found that these devices are not reliable enough to be trusted to be the sole indication that a PRD has opened, as they tend to fail and give false alarms.

D evice s used to accomplish EPA‟s goal are best designed specifically for that process . For example, one ACC member company indicated that a pressure transmitter located close to the process side of the PRD with a pressure span exceeding the release set pressure is the best option for its facility to detect PRD releases

. These devices have proven to be r eliable indicators of PRD opening s in many situations and are common in the industry

. As noted above, chemical operators already utilize such monitoring, along with inspections and a variety of other methods, to successfully identify when PRDs release

. Add itionally, PR D releases have a distinct pressure trend that can be observed by other process instruments

. These other instruments are important to control the pressure before a release occurs and can be used to help determine if a release occurred

. EPA mus t acknowledge this and allow alternatives, especially in light of the unjustified impacts discussed below.

The blanket design requirements potentially increase hazards

. The physical arrangement of the PRD vent may pose significant hazards to personnel attempting to access equipment placed in or on the vent stack

. Often, PRDs are located in a remote location near the top of process equipment (i.e., PRDs at the top of a distillation column)

. Their physical location limits the potential for personnel expos ure as the PRD discharge point is not near a normally occupied location

. Servicing the PRDs is normally only done when the process is depressurized such as during a facility maintenance turnaround

. Placing monitoring equipment directly into the vent of a PRD has the potential to create additional work which could cause individuals to be placed in a position of greater than normal hazard either due to new work at elevated heights or potential exposure to an unplanned release
event

. For physical arrangement s where this might occur, this is contrary to safe design practicesDocket EPA

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18 and should be avoided

. The use of existing, normally monitored process parameters (e.g. system pressure) avoids placing personnel in elevated risk scenarios

. Additionally, placement of a

m onitoring device in the outlet piping of a PRD will result in a decrease in cross

- sectional area for flow

. In extreme cases this may adversely impact the device‟s ability to pass the requisite flow.

It is possible to create a more hazardous situation by m aking process operations more complex

. Complexity can divert attention from more important parameters

. As discussed earlier, some PRDs can be prone to false positives

. The addition of alarms should be made in careful consideration of the hazards against th e potential benefits; this is accomplished through careful design and application of good engineering principles including the use of process hazards analysis

. Blanket requirements across an entire industry are contradictory to good engineering practice.

E PA‟s impacts assessment is severely flawed

. In Table 21 of the preamble (77 Fed. Reg. 1303), EPA estimated the capital costs of the PRD monitoring devices to be over $14.5 million for all seven source categories, and annual costs just over $2 million/year

. In an attempt to understand these costs, ACC tried to obtain information from the docket which led to a tangled maze that does not appear to support these estimates

. The preamble references a document “ Draft Cost Impacts of the Revised NESHAP for 7 Sourc e Categories ” for PRD costs

. This document 5 provides the PRD costs in Table 21 of the preamble, except there is a discrepancy in the costs for the Polyether Polyols source category that is not explained

. This document explains that the estimated costs of a PRD monitoring system were developed assuming capital costs of $188,913 per facility and annual operating and maintenance costs of $26,897 per year per facility

. These costs were based on an estimated average facility, which was assumed to have 134 PRDs

. To estimate the PRD monitoring system costs for the source categories addressed by these three NESHAPs, EPA indicates that it applied the same estimates that were originally developed in conjunction with the PVC NESHAP analysis

. The supporting documentatio n for these PVC PRD
costs 6 was obtained and reviewed by ACC.

Consistent with what was quoted in the “7 Source Categories” cost document, this PVC costs document estimates that the total capital cost for a PRD monitoring system at 16 of the 17 facilities s ubject to the PVC MACT is $188,913

. This information is presented in Table 6

- 1 of the document

. Further, Table 6

- 1 also shows that these same 16 facilities would incur annual costs of $26,897 for a PRD monitoring system, also consistent with the values use d for the seven source categories addressed in this proposal

. Attachment K of this PVC document is then referenced as providing more detail of the cost calculations

. However, no additional information is presented in the attachment to explain the calculati ons

. A footnote is provided as a reference for the PVC PRD cost calculations that states, “ EPA supplied cost factors from “PVC_PRV_Cost_reductions_110310” option 4, average facility .” However, this document is

5 Memorandum

. Lesley Stobert, EC/R Incorporated, to Paula Hirtz, EPA/OAQPS/SPPD, and Nick Parsons, EPA/OAQPS/SPPD

. Draft Cost Impacts of the Revised NESHAP for 7 Source Categories

. November 7, 2011

. Docket Item EPA

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6 Memorandum. Eastern Research Group, Inc. to Jodi Howard, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. “Costs and Emission Reductions of th e Proposed Standards for the Polyvinyl Chloride and Copolymers (PVC) Production Source Category.” April 13, 2011. (Docket item no. EPA

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19 not included in the docket for public review

. Further, there is nothing in this PVC cost document related to the 134 PRDs per facility cited in the 7 Source Category Cost document.

In association with the final PVC NESHAP, which was signed by the Administrator on February 12, 2012, EPA posted anothe r spreadsheet related to PRD costs in the PVC docket 7 on February 24, 2012

. This spreadsheet presents information related to “wireless monitors” and references a SCAQMD document 8 as the source of the PRD monitoring device costs

. Chapter 6, Section B of this SCAQMD document states that costs were estimated by industry representatives to range from $5,000 to $10,000 for a wireless monitoring device for each individual PRD

. This range of costs included the device parts, installation, and maintenance

. In this above noted spreadsheet, the facility

- wide capital costs listed for the average facility are again listed by EPA as $188,913

. Unlike the previous PVC cost memo, this spreadsheet does identify the assumed number of PRDs per model facility, with the average

- sized facility showing 134 PRDs

. The reference for the source of the PRD counts is “Table 2

- 1” of a 1984 EPA document. 9 ACC obtained this document, and the identified table does include equipment counts for model chemical facil ities

. However, none of the model facilities contains 134 PRDs

. In fact, all 3 of the model units identified in this table contain less than 134 PRDs, with estimates of 11, 42, and 130 PRDs for model units A, B, and C, respectively

. Therefore, there is no reliable reference for the number of assumed PRDs at EPA‟s model plants used for this cost analysis.

If the total capital cost per facility in the 2012 PVC spreadsheet ($188,913) is divided by the assumed number of PRDs (134), the cost per PRD is calcula ted as approximately $1,400

. This is much less than the range of $5,000 to $10,000 presented in the SCAQMD document that EPA references as the source for costs

. In fact, the costs for each wireless monitor on average would be 5 times higher than the amount used to justify the requirements for this proposed rulemaking

. Therefore, EPA used a monitoring system cost that averages $1,400 per PRD, yet the reference for EPA‟s costs cites a cost of $5,000 to $10,000

. There does not appear to be any justification in the docket to support the value of $1,400 per PRD.

Further, in the documentation 10 for the Uniform Standards rulemaking package signed by the EPA Administrator on February 24, 2012, EPA cites the same sources of information to estimate costs but comes up with entirely different PRD counts and costs

. In this same document, EPA goes on to state that “[i] t was assumed that no additional emissions reductions would occur from this (PRD monitoring) requirement, but it would result in additional capital costs.” Id. at page 11

. ACC questions why EPA is requiring the installation of such costly monitors if no emissions reductions are expected.

7 “ Technical Analysis Spreadsheet

– PVC

– Equipment Leaks ”. Docket Item EPA

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8 Final Staff Report, South Coast Air Quality Management District. Proposed Amended Rule 1173

– Control of Volatile Organic Compound Leaks and Releases from Components at Petroleum Facilities and Chemical Plants. May 15, 2007.
9 Guideline Series. Contro l of Volatile Organic Compound Leaks from Synthetic Organic and Polymer Manufacturing Equipment. EPA

- 450/3

- 83

- 006. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. March 1984.
10 Memorandum

. Cindy Hancy, RTI International, to Jodi Howard, EPA/OAQPS, “Analysis of Emissions Reduction Techniques for Equipment Leaks.” December 21, 2011

. Docket Item EPA

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20 ACC would also like to point out that even if EPA had conducted a valid cost analysis using the SCAQMD data, these costs are for wireless monitors only

. There are many situations in a chemical plant where wireless monitors are not technically the best alternative

. A simple situation is where the process unit is remote beyond the potential reach of the wireless transmitters; multiple signal repeaters might be necessary to relay the signal

. As a result, it may be judge d that a hard

- wired system will be more reliable and less prone to failure or interference

. As the SCAQMD study noted, it is more expensive to install wired monitors

. The true cost of installing monitoring systems is much higher than the costs EPA cites

. In conclusion, the cost analysis used to justify the proposed requirement for a monitoring device on every PRD is incorrect

. EPA cannot require monitoring devices on every PRD without first performing a rigorous and realistic cost assessment and presenting that assessment (and supporting documentation) for public comment

. Cost of release indicator is not justified

. As discussed above, EPA estimated the capital costs of the PRD monitoring devices to be over $14.5 million for all seven source categories, and annual costs just over $2 million/year

. These costs, which EPA presumably determined to be reasonable, are based on a cost of $1,400 per PRD.

ACC col lected information from member companies related to the anticipated costs of installing a “release indicator” on “each” PRD

. As with the PRD release information above, the time frame of the comment period did not allow a large number of member companies ad equate time to obtain complete cost information

. Further, there was insufficient time to fully quality assure the data and ascertain the reasons for differences in the estimates

. Following the close of the comment period, ACC would welcome the opportunity to provide additional information to EPA.

However, detailed information was obtained from three member companies

. Since there is no

one

- size fits all solution to meet the proposed requirements, the assumptions of the specific equipment needed varied

. In a ddition, the unclear nature of some aspects of the proposed requirements led to different assumptions regarding what was required to be monitored, which led to differences in the estimates

. The following table summarizes the information from Companies A an d B

. More detailed descriptions of the information, along with additional comments on the technical issues associated with the proposed monitoring requirements, are provided below.

Company Estimated Cost

Per PRD Note/Description

Company A $55,000 Includes flow monitoring equipment, which company A interprets is required by the proposed requirements Company A $15,000 Very preliminary vendor cost (does not include flow monitoring equipment) Company B $35,000 Assumed additional junction box is requi red Company B $19,000 Assumes additional junction box is not required

EPA $1,400 Wireless release indicatorDocket EPA

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21 In addition, Company C provided actual costs from the recent installation of wireless temperature monitoring devices

. The cost was just under $15,000 per monitor

. While PRD monitors are expected to be more expensive, this is another point for comparison with EPA‟s estimate.

Using these estimates, the capital cost for EPA‟s “average” facility (which contains 134 PRDs), would range from ar ound $2 million to over $7 million, as compared to EPA‟s estimate of $188,913 per facility

. Using EPA‟s “average” facility estimates, the total capital cost for all three of these subparts would then range from around $150 million to well over $500 million

. This compares to EPA‟s estimate of $14.5 million

. ACC does not believe that the original costs estimated by EPA can be considered reasonable

. Given the evidence that EPA‟s estimated costs are an order of magnitude too low, EPA must provide significant ju stification that these large costs are warranted

. Following are summaries of the feedback that was received.

Company A: At one site owned by this company, there are two separate process units subject to the Pesticides Active Ingredient NESHAP (subpart MMM)

. Because the company has no experience with wireless PRD monitoring devices, and because these devices have not been demonstrated in the chemical sector, Company A determined that it would not accept the risk of investing in this unproven wireless te chnology

. Therefore, the costs below include wiring and piping

. Also, the environmental professionals and engineers at this company interpret the proposed rule to require continuous flow monitoring, so the comments also address the difficulty/impossibility of this flow monitoring.

Unit 1 has 43 PRDs (36 relief valves and 7 rupture disks) along with 8 storage tank conservation vents that meet the definition of PRD

. Company engineers estimated that the cost of a monitoring device would average around $55,000 per PRD

. This is broken down as follows:

Cost Element Cost per PRD Meter + Wiring $10,000 Piping $30,000 Engineering $5,000 Contingency $10,000 Total $55,000

For the 43 PRDs, the total cost would be around $2.4 million.

However, there were questions raised by the engineers regarding the technical feasibility of installing the necessary equipment

. Meter installations require a specific straight pipe run both upstream and downstream of the meter, creating a smoothing effect to the flowing stre am, in order to function with any degree of accuracy

. These piping meter run lengths vary with meter type, but are generally 20 pipe diameters upstream and 10 diameters downstream of the meter (30 pipe diameters total)

. This extra piping causes frictional pressure drop which makes itDocket EPA

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22 necessary to recalculate the conditions under which the PRD functions

. Standard design practices are to minimize these pipe lengths to take uncertainties out of the function of PRDs as these are the last lines of defense in the protection of human lives.

To summarize specific reasons on why it is not possible to monitor continuously:

1

. Existing PRD device installations at Unit 1 have not been installed with any consideration of monitoring the flow under relieving conditions; 2

. Extra piping = extra pressure drop = approximately 50

- 75% of the existing PRDs will now b e undersized and need replacing; 3

. Physical space to install such piping wou ld not be available to most PRD s ; 4

. Structural steel to support this extra piping in most cases is not installed; and 5

. Monitoring conservation vents is largely impractical.

Assuming that the new piping requirements generate more pressure drop for the PRDs, it was assumed that perhaps 50% of the PRD will be undersized and will need to be replaced at a cost of $5,000 each

. This results in an additional $107,500

. This raises the total cost to install PRD monitoring equipment for this unit to $2.5 million, which represents an overall average cost of around $58,000 per PRD for these 43 P RDs.

This company also received a very preliminary cost estimate from a third party vendor for the release indicator device only (does not include equipment to measure flow)

. This estimate, which was $15,000 per device, included consideration of field lab or and material to run the signal to the control center , allowances for scaffolding or manlift, allowances for interface cards, and engineering and programming.

With regard to the conservation vents that meet the definition of PRD, it would be hugely expensive to have meters installed on these vents, which are generally located on top of thin walled storage tanks on flanges of a minimum of 18" in size

. In order to conform to standard engineering design principles for a meter installation (see discussi on below), the upstream plus downstream meter run piping would create either a large "stack" or horizontal header on the top of the tank.

18" Storage Tank Flange x 30 Pipe Diameters = 540" meter run piping = 45 feet of piping.

S tandard carbon steel pip ing weighs 70.6 lbs/ft; therefore the weight added to the tank would be:

45 feet of piping x 70.6 lbs/ft = 3,177 lbs (this is on the order of a weight of a car on the conservation vent nozzle/tank structure)

. This does not included the weight of the meter and support steel needed.

The existing tank walls, roofs, and nozzles were never designed for these kinds of loads

. Each conservation vent meter installation would have to be evaluated on a case by case basis in a detailed fashion to come up with e ven a rough cost estimate

. Therefore, a cost was not provided for these 8 vents.Docket EPA

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23 Unit 2 has 38 relief valves in HAP service, not including conservation vents or emergency vents on some tanks

. When the engineers at this unit were asked for a cost estimate for monitoring systems to comply with the proposed requirements, they provided the following response:

Adding flow meters would not be feasible in the space provided below most PRV s

. There is not enough straight length of pipe to measure flow

. Adding significant piping for a flow meter plus the meter itself would greatly increase the pressure drop to the P RV and would require recalculation of all P RV sizing and replacement of a significant number of P RVs

. Even if a feasible flow measurement devi ce were found, the cost would be at least $30,000 per installation for meter, piping, P RV, and engineering

. Alternatively, one could put electronic pressure switches in place of the "tattle tail" pressure gauges that currently exist between P RDs and P RVs. These would not be particularly feasible either

. First, they would simply indicate if one had a ruptured disc and would not indicate how much, if any, process fluid is flowing out

. Secondly, the vessels are run at such a low pressure that we may be prone t o false alarms due to pressuring up of the space between the P RD and P RV from the increase in ambient temperature.

Company B: Engineers at this company estimated the costs for generic installation of PSV switches on PRDs at their chemical plants

. They est imated the costs for two separate scenarios:

 Situations where the installation requires an additional junction box, and

 Situations where an additional junction box is not required. The company indicated that this would represent “most of the cases.”

Follo wing are detailed breakdowns of each of these scenarios.

Cost Element Cost per PRD monitor

Additional Junction Box No Additional

Junction Box Material Instruments $4,142 $540 Contracts Instrumentation $2,315 $1,350 Electrical $8,559 $4,973 Scaffolding $900 $900 Equipment Rental $2,048 $1,146 Indirects Project Management $872 $872 Design Engineering $4,920 $2,521 Procurement $109 $109 Construction Management $1,736 $1,033 Miscellaneous $1,326 $871Docket EPA

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24 Special Items Taxes and Fees $698 $252 Freight $57 $17 Subtotal $27,683 $14,585 Contingency $6,860 $4,174 Total Requested Capital $35,000 $19,000

Company C: This company recently installed 30 temperature monitoring units on vent condensers at one of its sites

. Each unit was equipped with a wireless transmitter to reduce the cost of hard

- wiring the temperature transmitter back to the control rooms

. Following is a summary of the costs for these transmitters.

Cost Element Total Actual Project Cost Material/Equipment $188,046 Engineering $181,817 Construction $64,594 Total Cost $438,404

Number of Wireless Temperature Monitors 30 Cost per Monitor $14,613

This company also provided the following observations. 1) These temperature monitoring units typically included a thermowell and probe. 2) The structures were steel framed buildings with mostly steel grating for flooring and with a general height of three to five stories

. Where concrete walls or flooring exist ed , they proved to block wireless signals and required repeati ng units in a very limited number of

cases

. For other Company C facilities, where the building height is taller and where floors and walls are concrete and brick, it is anticipated that additional equipment will be needed. 3) There were no limitations on data capture; one sample every fifteen minutes was adequate

. 4) The company reported that they have experienced occasional signal interference yielding false positive data

. Some of these events appeared to be tied to the proximity to local roads and the use of C B radio on the roads. 5) The company expects that the per unit cost will be higher if PRD monitoring is required

. It points out that the EPA / California assumptions for monitoring equipment are unproven in chemical service (and certainly unknown within this company)

. Company C anticipates that upgrades will be necessary to improve reliability to EPA data capture expectations, and also anticipates that the data provided will only provide one more piece of information and it is unclear whether the data will be truly reliable for all services.Docket EPA

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25

4. EPA must clarify that other parameters can be estimated

Each of the three rules requires that sources submit a PRD deviation report: § 63.1335(e)(9) for Group IV Polymers and Resins; § 63.1363(h)(4) for Pesticides Acti ve Ingredients; and § 63.1439(e)(9) for Polyether Polyols

. These reports must contain the following information:

 The source, nature and cause of the discharge,

 The date, time and duration of the discharge,

 An estimate of the quantity of total organic HAP emitted during the discharge and the method used for determining this quantity,

 The actions taken to prevent this discharge, and

 The measures adopted to prevent future such discharges.

The proposed § 63.1331(a)(9)(i) for Group IV Polymers and Resins, §6 3.1363(b)(4)(i) for Pesticides Active Ingredients, and § 63.1434(c)(1) for Polyether Polyols require that the release indicator indicate “when an emission release has occurred.” There is no indication that EPA intended these monitoring devices to measure other parameters (e.g., duration of discharge, quantity of HAP emitted, etc.) that are required to be reported in the deviation report

. Therefore, EPA must clarify that the information required to be submitted in the PRD Deviation Report can be estimated using available information.

5. Recommended rule language

As discussed in sections V.D.1 through V.D.4, ACC provided rationale for several changes that will need to be made if EPA moves forward with requirements for PRDs

. Accordingly, ACC suggests the foll owing edits (in bold to § 63.1331(a)(9) of subpart JJJ (Group IV Polymers and Resins)

. These same changes are appropriate for § 63.1363(b)(4) for subpart MMM (Pesticides Active Ingredients) and § 63.1434(c) for subpart PPP (Polyether Polyols).

(9) Requi rements for pressure relief devices. For pressure relief devices in organic HAP gas/vapor service , the owner or operator must meet the requirements of this paragraph. Any pressure release to the atmosphere from a pressure relief device in organic HAP gas/v apor service constitutes a violation of this rule. Pressure releases that are routed to a closed vent system and control device and pressure releases routed to a process are not considered releases to the atmosphere

. The owner or operator must utilize one of the methods install, maintain and operate release indicators as specified in paragraphs (a)(9)(i) and (ii) of this section to identify each pressure release

, unless the pressure relief device routes to a closed vent system and control device designed an d operated in accordance with the requirements of this subpart or the pressure relief device routes to a process

. For any pressure relief device s in organic HAP gas/vapor service, the owner or operator must comply with the recordkeeping and reporting provi sions in this paragraph (a) and § 63.1335(e)(9). For any
pressure release, the owner or operator must submit the report specified in § 63.1335(e)(9), as described in paragraph (a)(9)(iii) of this section.Docket EPA

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26 (i) A release indicator must be properly installed on each pressure relief device in such a way that it will For each pressure relief device in organic HAP gas/vapor service, the owner or operator must use one of the methods identified in paragraphs (a)(9)(i)(A) through (C) to indicate when an emission release has occurred. (A) A device that indicates a pressur e release to the atmosphere, (B) A monitor on an associated process system sufficient to indicate a pressure release to the atmosphere, or (C) Daily inspections using audio, visual, or olfactory methods to indicate that a pressure release to the atmosphere has occurred. (ii) Each indicator must be equipped with an alert system that will notify an The indicator, continuous monitor, or inspector must notify an operator within 24 hours of the time when the pressure release has occurred

. relief device is open. The alert must be located such that the signal is detected and recognized easily by an operator.

ACC recommends the following changes for § 63.1335(e)(9) of subpart JJJ

. The same changes are recommended for § 63.1363(h)(4) of subpart MMM and § 6 3.1439(e)(9) of subpart PPP

(9) Pressure relief device deviation report. If any pressure relief device in organic HAP service or any piece of equipment or closed vent system has discharged to the atmosphere, as specified in § 63.1331(a)(9), the owner or o perator must submit the information identified in paragraphs (a)(9)(i) through (v) of this section to the Administrator in the next Periodic Report : This information can be determined using the best available information including, but not limited to, eng ineering judgment and company records.

6. EPA must include a compliance date for existing sources to implement any new monitoring requirements

.

I n the preamble, EPA stated that “the compliance date for PRD monitoring is 3 years from the effective date of t he promulgated standards. This time period will allow facilities to purchase, install and test the equipment.” (77 Fed. Reg. 1302) However, the proposed regulatory amendments do not include this proposed compliance timeframe

. ACC requests that EPA include a 3 year compliance date in the final rule in accordance with the stated intent in the proposal preamble.

V. OTHER ISSUES WITH TH E PRO POSED RULES

A. The Reference to FIFRA Form 3540

- 16 Must Be Corrected in Subpart MMM

The definition of pesticide active ingredient or PAI is found at §63.1361, which states:

Pesticide active ingredient or PAI means any material that is an active ingredient within the meaning of FIFRA section 2(a); that is used to produce an insecticide, herbicide, or fungicide end use pest icide product; that consists of one or more organic compounds; andDocket EPA

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27 that must be labeled in accordance with 40 CFR part 156 for transfer, sale, or distribution. These materials are typically described by North American Industrial Classification System (NAIC S) Codes 325199 and 32532 (i.e., previously known as Standard Industrial Classification System Codes 2869 and 2879). These materials are identified by product classification codes 01, 21, 02, 04, 44, 07, 08, and 16 in block 19 on EPA form 3540

- 16, the Pest icides Report for Pesticide

- Producing Establishments.

The definition needs to be changed to reflect the changes in EPA form 3540

- 16 since the finalization of Subpart MMM in 1999. The box reference and coding reference in the above definition originally specified 1999 for material coding in box 19

. Box (now item number) 19 is part of the company site address entry section and the intended information in the rule is now found in block (item) number 31 "Product Classifications" (reference Attachment 2) in t he 2007 form version

. As a result, a 1999 rule code '09' originally classified with a "Disinfectant, Germicide, Sanitizer" classification code would now indicate the product to be an "Attractant" when the newest version of form 3540

- 16 is used for referenc e.
To clarify the meaning and use of form 3540

- 16 codes, ACC requests a change, acknowledgement or clarification that the definition of PAI used specifically is with reference to the 1999 version of form 3540

- 16

. This would eliminate questions/confusion a nd the need to modify the rule each time the FIFRA form is modified in future years.

B. Electronic Reporting Tool (ERT)

The proposal to require the use of the Electronic Reporting Tool (ERT) is not appropriate as the costs and burdens imposed cannot yet be d etermined. ACC recommends that EPA remove the ERT requirement from this rulemaking

. Until the methods that apply to the regulated community are built into the ERT, it is inappropriate to require its use.

If EPA insists on the inclusion of ERT requirements , then it should be limited to the methods which are incorporated into the ERT at the time of rule proposal. Further, EPA should incorporate a variety of changes to reduce the burdens associated with the rule and which provide a smooth transition for the r egulated community, local agencies, state agencies and EPA

.

1. Anticipated Benefits

The preamble language in these three rules states that the primary benefit anticipated by the proposed rule is to increase the ease and efficiency of data submittal and imp rove data accessibility. (77 Fed. Reg. 1285.) EPA believes that the advantages of submitting performance test data through the ERT include standardized methods to compile and store documentation, clearly states what testing information would be required, a nd a substantial reduction of effort involved for future data collection activities. States, local and tribal agencies would also benefit by allowing for electronic review process rather than manual data assessment

. And finally, EPA would be able to use su bmitted data to improve the overall quality of existing and new emissions factors. ( Id . at 1286.)Docket EPA

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28 While ACC agrees in principle and generally support the goals as stated, we are concerned that the reality for the regulated sources within the affected MACT standards may be different as applied in this case.

2. Methods supported by the Electronic Reporting Tool

As identified by the EPA‟s ERT web site,” [t] he test methods supported by ERT include the following:

Methods 1 through 4 Method 3A Method 5 Methods 5B and 5F Method 6C Method 7E Method 8 Method 10 Method 12 Methods 13A and 13B Method 17 Method 23 Method 25A Method 26 Method 26A Method 29 Method 101 Method 101A Method 102 Method 103 Method 104 Method 108 Method 201A Method 202 Method 0011 Method 0061 Method 315 Method 316 CT Method 39 Performance Standard 2 Performance Standard 3 Performance Standard 4 Custom test methods

- instructions are below.

The pollutants quantified by these test methods include:

- Filterable Particulate Matter

- Condensable Particulate Matter

- Filterable PM10

- Filterable PM2.5

- Acetaldehyde

- Formaldehyde

- Carbon Monoxide

- Chlorine, Chloride, Hydrogen Chloride, Total Chloride

- Nitrogen Oxides (NOx)

- Sulfur Dioxide

- Sulfuric Acid

- Sulfur Trioxide

- Met als including Antimony, Arsenic, Barium, Beryllium, Cadmium, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Hexavelant Chromium, Lead, Manganese, Mercury, Nickel, Phosphorus (yellow or white), Selenium, Silver, Thallium and Zinc

- Total Fluoride

- Hydrogen Fluoride

- Hydroge n Bromide

- Total organic compounds (TOC) (as Carbon, Ethane, Methane, Propane)

- Dioxin/Furan Cogeners

- Coplaner PCB's

- PAH Compounds

- Total Dioxins, Total Mono

- CBs, Total Di

- CBs, Total Tri

- CBs, Total Tetra

- CBs, Total Penta

-Docket EPA

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29 CBs, Total Hexa

- CBs, Total Hepta

- CBs, Total Octa

- CBs, Total Nona

- CBs, and 2,3,3',4,4',5/2,3,3',4,4',5’

– HxCB

- Custom pollutants

- instructions for adding compounds not found in ERT are below . “

While these methods include those for criteria pollutants from combustion sources such might be anticipated from thermal oxidizers or fume incinerators, the limitations imposed by the proposed MACT standards are expressed in terms of hazardous organic pollutants

. In other words, the primary performance test method (Method 18) required for d etermining compliance is not currently included in the list of methods supported by the ERT.

3. The timing and methods for including Method 18 have not been determined or shared with the regulated community
The regulated community‟s experience with Method 18 is that it is a very broad methodology and can be exceptionally complex to execute and to report

. We are aware of reports which run hundreds to thousands of pages

. In the case of one member company regulated under the Polymer & Resins Group IV NESHAP, exe cuting the methodology requires the use of methods validated under Method 301; this adds to the complexity

. It is our understanding from discussions with EPA that it is aware that Method 18 reporting is complex; that it may be difficult to incorporate into the ERT; and that no time schedule has been defined for development or implementation for this method.

4. Without formal notice of changes to the ERT, the regulated community is at risk of non

- compliance

The only way for the regulated community to know that changes have occurred within the ERT is to directly monitor the web site

. Changes made to the ERT are not formally announced by EPA via the routes normally used for rulemaking (e.g. the Federal Register)

. It will be quite possible for a regulated entity t o be unaware of changes made such as the incorporation of Method 18

. ACC is concerned that the proposal language is in essence an open ended commitment subject to change without notice.

5. Use of the ERT does not reduce the burden on the regulated community and makes timely report submittal more difficult

ACC is concerned that implementation of the ERT will not achieve the desired goals of reducing the burden and improving efficiency. Rather, ACC believes it may duplicate burdens already borne by the regulate d community

. State and local regulatory agencies have established regulatory requirements for planning, executing and reporting performance tests

. The proposed rule does not supersede or replace any state reporting requirements

. In states where reporting requirements are established by state specific rules (e.g., South Carolina), the regulated industry will be subject to dual reporting requirements

. While it is possible that some states may begin to accept data submitted using the ERT in lieu of their alr eady established methods, it is probable that hard copy reports will still be required as separate reports filed to the local or state authorities

. Changes to state regulations will be required to reduce this burden and given the current constraints on sta te and local agencyDocket EPA

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30 resources, this will be a new burden

. The timing of changes at the state and local level will at best be slow and in many cases, will never occur

. At the best, there will be a transition period where duplicate reporting will be required

. ACC is concerned that duplicative reporting requirements will strain the regulated industry to comply with deadlines established by rule for report submittals

. The proposed requirement for ERT submittal is 60 days

. Duplicative reporting makes it more di fficult for the regulated community to comply with the submittal deadline and is an unreasonable burden. As a result, requiring the ERT use is additive and increases the costs borne by the regulated source.

6. There is no mechanism for obtaining extensions for special circumstances

Under proposed §63.1439(e)(10), all reports are due in 60 days

. By not referencing reporting requirements to the general provisions in §63.10(d)(2), there is no allowance for obtaining additional time due to unforeseen circumstances or for the difficulties involved with completing particularly complex reports.

7. As the requirements for Method 18 reports are unknown, so are the costs

It is impossible for the regulated community to fully comment on the cost of duplicating t est reports using the ERT for Method 18 and other methods which are not currently supported by the ERT

. Method 18 reports can consist of hundreds to thousands of pages of field collected data, calculations, and chromatograms

. Until the ERT requirements are known, the costs cannot be estimated.

C. The B urden I mposed by the A ffirmative D efense S tandards H as B een G reatly U nder E stimated by EPA.

EPA has estimated that the costs imposed by “the notification, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements associated with the assertion of the affirmative defense.... for.... any individual incident, including root cause analysis, totals $1,459 annually...” EPA further “ estimate [s] no more than 1 or 2 such occurrences for all sources subject to subparts JJJ, MMM and PPP over the 3 year period covered by this ICR. ( 77 Fed. Reg. 1304 )

ACC member companies experienced with conducting root cause failure analyses estimate that the cost of a full roo t cause failure analysis is at least an order of magnitude greater than EPA estimates

. One ACC member company compiled cost data for conducting root cause failure analyses, and found that such analyses average $15,000 (see attached spreadsheet) . It is true that

e xecuting a failure evaluation can cost much less if the situation warrants. To take the example of the single failure of a thermocouple, the cost would only require a few hours of a professional‟s time to review, evaluate and determine the appropria te course of action. However, if the event must incorporate a full legal review and formal report to the A gency, those costs would remain

. Executing a failure analysis can also be much greater in cost if the situation were complex such as one involving a c atastrophic system failure resulting in property damage, injury, or offsite impacts. In those cases, the numbers of people involved and the number of hours devoted to determining cause and response rise significantly.Docket EPA

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31 ACC believes EPA underestimates the number of events which must be evaluated to determine cause and appropriate responses. For example:

 Even as the data collected by ACC demonstrated that PRD releases are rare, their occurrence frequency is not zero. For example, a single PET production un it may have 150 PRDs. At an actuation rate of 0.5%, this equates to roughly 2 events to evaluate every three years. This is equivalent to the total EPA estimated for the entire industry. Given that the PET production industry in the U.S. is composed of mul tiple facilities, the frequency of evaluations for PRD events is at least an order of magnitude greater than 2 and for the number of facilities covered by the three MACT standards, the value must be greater again.

 As PRDs are components of piping and equ ipment subject to fugitive emission leaks, PRDs can be statistically expected to experience fugitive emission rates above the 500 ppmv leak threshold at a frequency which can be measured. Using the thresholds EPA has established for determining monitoring frequencies, one might predict the occurrence rate to be between 0.0 and 2.0% annually. Even using half of the threshold for the best performance category (0.5%) yields at least one leaking PRD per year. Given the manner in which EPA has banned emissions f rom PRDs, this yields multiple affirmative defense efforts across the industry annually.

ACC urges EPA to reevaluate its assumptions regarding the costs to a facility of asserting an affirmative defense.

D. Excused Excursion Comments for Subparts JJJ and PPP

1. Subpart JJJ

- EPA should allow an excused excursion during each semi

annual reporting period for loss of monitoring data that has no impact to the environment.

EPA in the proposed rule removed the provisions in § 63.1334(g) allowing for excused excursions and revised the provisions in § 63.1 3 35 (e) (6)(xii)(A)(1) that states affected sources having one or more excursions shall submit quarterly reports for a period of 1 year

. EPA should instead reinstate an excused excursion per reporti ng period so loss of monitoring data does not itself result in a violation of the emission standard

. Loss of monitoring data may occur during data transfer or be lost in data storage

. Though redundancies are built to avoid data loss, sometimes it is unprev entable

. In this case, when the monitoring data before and after the “lost data” shows no evidence of improper operation of the control device or an exceedance of the emission limit, then the affected source should not incur an excursion and the incident should instead be an excused excursion

. ACC suggests the following regulatory text:

63.1334(g)

– For the sixth and all subsequent semiannual periods

– one excused excursion is allowed for cases where loss of parameter monitoring data occurs and the

ow ner/operator does not have an exceedance of an applicable emission limit

.Docket EPA

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32

2. Subpart PPP

- EPA should allow an excused excursion during each semi

annual reporting period for loss of monitoring data that has no impact to the environment.

EPA in the proposed rule removed the provisions in § 63.1438(g) allowing for excused excursions and revised the provisions in § 63.14 39(e)(6)(viii)(A)(1) that states affected sources having one or more excursions shall submit quarterly reports for a period of 1 year

. EPA shou ld instead reinstate an excused excursion per reporting period so loss of monitoring data does not in and of itself result in a violation of the emission standard

. Loss of monitoring data may occur during data transfer or be lost in data storage

. Though redundancies are built into systems to avoid data loss, sometimes it is unpreventable

. In the case when the monitoring data before and after the “lost data” show no evidence of improper operation of the control device or an exceedance of the emission limi t, then the affected source should not incur an excursion, and the incident should instead be an excused excursion

. ACC suggests the following regulatory language :

63.1438(g)

– For the sixth and all subsequent semiannual periods

– one excused excursio n is allowed for cases where loss of parameter monitoring data occurs and the owner/operator does not have an exceedance of an applicable emission limit

.

E. Subpart MMM S hould B e R evised t o M ake I t C onsistent with Subpart JJJ

. When considering the total amount of operating hours and the 75% monitoring data requirement for a day , the owner/operator should be allowed to subtract the time during periods of monitoring system breakdowns, repairs, calibration checks, and zero (low

- level) and high

- level adjustme nts

. These provisions should be added to § 63.1366 (b)(7) regarding Excursions

. Such an addition would make Subpart MMM consistent with Subpart JJJ

.Docket EPA

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33 ATTACHMENT A

– AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE COST ESTIMATEDocket EPA

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Comments by the American Chemistry Council

34

Costs Associated with Raising Affirmative Defense

Initial Investigation

Description On

- Site Travel Required Unit Cost On

- Site Travel Required Assignment of Principal Investigator / Mobilization Initiation 1 1 $ 125 $125 $125 Travel Arrangements 0 1 $ 125 $

- $125 Travel Time 0 16 $ 125 $

- $2,000 Airfare 0 1 $600 $

- $600 Lodging 0 4 $100 $

- $400 Meals 0 15 $20 $

- $300 Rental Car / Gas / Parking 0 5 $100 $

- $500 Subtotal

- Mobilization $ 125 $4,050

Principal Investigator Average Labor Hours Unit Cost

Review of Operating Data, Interviews, Other On

- Site Activities 24 $130 $ 3,120

Facilitation / Leading Review (Analysis of Data, Construction of Why

- Trees, etc) 24 $130 $3,120

Collection of Additional Confirmatory Data 8 $130 $1,040

Preparation of Draft Report 16 $130 $2,080 Review of Draft Report 8 $130 $1,040 Revision of Report and Issuance 8 $130 $ 1,040

Subtotal

- Principal Investigator $ 11,440

Site Personnel Review of Operating Data, Interviews, Other On

- Site Activities

-- Operators / Technicans / Maintenance Forces 6 $35 $ 210

-- Line Management / Engineering Staff / HSES Staff 6 $85 $510Docket EPA

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Comments by the American Chemistry Council

35 Participation in Review (Analysis of Data, Construction of Why

- Trees, etc)

-- Operators / Technicans / Maintenance Forces 12 $35 $420

-- Line Management / Engineering Staff / HSES Staff 12 $85 $1,020

Subtotal

- Site Personnel $2,160

Report Draft for Submittal to US EPA ( Includes Cover Letter/Legal Context to Relevant Standards/Application of CBI Claims/Certification of Accuracy) HSES Staff 1 $85 $85 Legal Review by Attorney 2 $210 $420 Verbal Response to Questions by Agency 2 $210 $420

Written Responses to Questions by Agency 2 $210 $420

Subtotal Report $1,345

Simple Cost for Executing an Affirmative Defense $18,995

Labor rates judged typical for fully allocated costs for a US facility.