Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the ca se.

APPELLANT PRO SE : RODNEY W. ROBINSON Pittsburg h , Pennsylvania


## IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

RODNEY W. ROBINSON, ) ) Appellant

- Plaintiff , ) ) vs. ) No. 45A03

- 1107

- SC

- 3 51 ) ARTHUR CASHWELL & ROXIE BATTLE, ) ) Appellees

- Defendants

. )

APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Cath eron Paros , Judge Pro Tem pore Cause No. 45D07

- 1011

- SC

- 791
April 12, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECIS ION

– NOT FOR PUBLICATION BARNES, Judge2 Case Summary Rodney Robinson appeals the small claims court ’s entry of judgment against him
and in favor of Arthur Cashwell and Roxie Battle (collectively , “the Defendants”) on Robinson’s claim against them. We affirm.
Issue s Robinson raises three issues, which we reorder and restate as:
I. whether the small cl aims court properly entered judgment against him ; II. whether the small claims court properly denied his request for a continuance ; and
III. whether the Cashwell ’ s actions constituted criminal conversion.
Facts The Defendants own apartments in Gary. O n December 21, 2009, Robinson
leased an apartment owned by the Defendants

. At that time, Cashwell thought Robinson
owned a white Chevy 350 pickup truck

. Robinson actually owned a box truck. Robinson moved into the apartment the next day and parked his t ruck in the parking lot. On December 23, 2009, Robinson took a bus to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. On December 24, 2009, another tenant was concerned that the truck was suspicious looking and called the police. T he police searched the truck and found no co ntraband. Cashwell did not know the truck belonged to Robinson or any other tenant and had it towed. On November 8, 2010, Robinson filed a claim against the Defendants alleging that they improperly had his truck towed. Robinson sought damages in the am ount of $905 ,3

which included towing fees, the $40 he paid a friend to try to get the truck back while he was out of town, transportation expenses while h is truck was impounded, bus fare from Pittsburg h , the cost to have the lock on the truck fixed, and the costs of litigation . On December 8, 2010, a hearing was held on Robinson’s claim, and the small claims court entered judgment against Robinson and in favor of the Defendants. Robinson filed a motion to correct error and, after a hearing at which Robinso n did not appear, the small
claims court denied the motion to correct error. Robinson now appeals. 1 Analysis

“ We review facts from a bench trial under the clearly erroneous standard with due deference paid to the trial cour t’ s opportunity to assess witne ss credibility.” Branham v.
Varble , 952 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind. 2011)

. This deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions because the trials are informal with the sole objective of dispensing speedy ju stice between partie s according to the rules of
substantive law. Id. “I t is incumbent upon the party who bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that it is entitled to the recovery sought. ” Eppl v. DiGiacomo , 946 N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)

. Because Robinson bor e the burden of proof on his claim before the small claims court, he ap peals from a negative judgment. See id. “ We will not reverse a negative judgmen t unless it is contrary to law. A judgment is contrary to law
when the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, but the trial court
reached a different conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).

1 No transcript of the hearing exists. Robinson filed a verified statem ent of the evidence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 31(A). The small claims court refused to certify Robinson’s statement of the evidence and filed its own verified statement of the evidence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 31(D).4

As a preliminary matter, we note that the Defendants have not filed an appellee ’ s brief. Under that circumstance, we do not undertake to develop the Defendants’ arguments. See Branham , 952 N.E.2d at 746 . Rather, we will reverse on Robinson’s prima facie showing of reversible error. See id. I. Judgment against Robinson Robinson argues that the small claims court erred in finding against him o n his complaint to reco ver damages associated with the towing of his truck. He asserts that the
small claims court improperly demanded proof of ownership whe n his possessory interest and ownership of the truck were uncontested. At the hearing, Cashwell a sserted that the rental application showed Robinson owned a white Chevy pickup truck and that he did
not know that the box truck b elonged to a tenant when he had it towed. In support of this assertion, the rental application indicating such was admitted i nto evidence without any objection from Robinson. At the conclusion of the hearing, the small claims court asked Robinson if he had any evidence that he presented to Cashwell to prove he owned a box truck instead of a pickup truck. Robinson indicated tha t he had the title at home and would like a continuance to get the title . The small claims court denied this request and ruled in favor of the Defendants because they “had no reason to believe the subject vehicle belonged to Plaintiff since it was not lis ted on the credit application and that the
Defendants acted reasonabl y under the circumstances.” Trial Court’s Verified Statement of Evidence p. 13. At issue was whether Cashwell knew it was Robinson’s truck when he had it
towed , not whether Robinson ac tually owned the truck. As such, Robinson has not5

persuaded us that the small claims court required him to prove ownership of the truck in
order to recover.
I I. Continuance Robinson argues that , because the small claims court required proof of ownershi p at the hearing, it abused its discretion when it denied his request to let him go home and get the title to the truck. “ A trial court ’ s decision to grant or deny a motion to continue a trial date is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and there is a st rong presumption the trial court properly exercised its discretion .” Gunashekar v. Grose , 915 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ind. 2009) . “ A denial of a motion for continuance is abuse of discretion only if the movant demonstrates good cause for granting it .” Id.
We are not convinced that the small claims court required Robinson to prove he owned the truck. Instead, the small claims court was trying to ascertain whether
Cashwell should have known that Robinson owned the box truck when Cashwell had it
towed. Even if Robinson could have produced the title to the truck, it would have been irrelevant to the resolution of this question. Robinson has not established that the small
claims court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance.
III. Criminal Conversion Robinson argues that Cashwell’s actions amounted to criminal conversion and suggests he is entitled to treble damages. Robinson, however, did not assert this criminal conversion theory in his complaint or at trial or request treble damages

. Although Robinson’s motion to correct mentions this theory of recovery, a party may not raise an issue for the first time in a motion to correct error or on appeal. See Troxel v. Troxel ,6

737 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind. 2000) . Because Robinson did not properly raise this issue to
the small claims court, it is waived.
Conclusion Robinson has not made a prima facie showing of error on his claims that the small
claims court improperly required him to establish ownership of the truck, that the small
claims court ab used its discretion in denying his request for a continuance, or that
Cashwell’s actions amounted to criminal conversion. We affirm.
Affirmed. KIRSCH, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.