Enclosure 

Protecting People and the 

Environment 

SEMIANNUAL STATUS REPORT ON THE 

LICENSING ACTIVITIES AND REGULATORY DUTIES OF THE 

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

April–September 2016 

Note: The period of performance covered by this report includes activities that occurred from the first day of 

April 2016 to the last day of September 2016. The transmittal letter to Congress accompanying this report provides 

additional information to keep Congress fully informed on the current licensing and regulatory activities of the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
i 

CONTENTS 

I. Reactor Oversight Process ............................................................................................... 1

II. Implementing Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulations ................................. 1

III. Status of Issues Tracked in the Reactor Generic Issues Program.................................... 2

IV. Licensing Actions and Other Licensing Tasks .................................................................. 3

V. Status of License Renewal Activities ................................................................................ 5

VI. Summary of Reactor Enforcement Action ......................................................................... 7

VII. Power Reactor Security and Emergency and Incident Response Activities ................... 13

VIII. Power Uprates ................................................................................................................ 15

IX. New Reactor Licensing ................................................................................................... 16

X. Response to Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Accident in Japan ......................... 23

XI. Planned Rulemaking Activities ........................................................................................ 25
1 

I. Reactor Oversight Process 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continues to use the Reactor Oversight 

Process (ROP) at all nuclear power plants to assess the performance of reactor licensees and 

to guide the assignment of inspection resources. Using inputs from both self-assessments and 

independent evaluations, the NRC continuously assesses the ROP to enhance the 

effectiveness and efficiency of the program. The NRC staff meets with interested stakeholders 

periodically to collect feedback on the effectiveness of the process, which is also considered 

when making future refinements to the ROP. 

The agency’s most recent performance assessments show that all plants continue to operate 

safely. The NRC issued a press release on September 2, 2016, summarizing the 2016 midyear 

assessment of nuclear power plant performance and the associated mid-cycle assessment 

letters sent to each licensee, which are publicly available on the NRC Web site. The NRC has 

also updated the Web site to reflect the latest performance assessments as of the end of the 

second quarter of calendar year 2016. 

II. Implementing Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulations 

Currently, 46 operating nuclear power reactors have committed to transition to the risk-informed, 

performance-based fire protection licensing basis permitted under Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.48(c), also known as National Fire Protection Association 

(NFPA) Standard 805, “Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water 

Reactor Electric Generating Plants.” Of these 46 reactor units, 34 have already transitioned to 

an NFPA 805 licensing basis and the NRC staff is currently reviewing 10 others. The NRC 

anticipates completing its evaluation of 9 of the 10 submitted transition plans by the end of the 

second quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2017 and the tenth one by December 31, 2017. The agency 

expects to receive one license amendment application for the remaining two reactor units in 

FY 2018. 

Six licensees have submitted proposals to implement 10 CFR 50.69, “Risk-Informed 

Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power 

Reactors.” The staff is reviewing these submittals, and the NRC staff and industry are clarifying 

guidance needed to complete the related safety evaluations. 

Following the March 2011 event at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan, the 

NRC developed and issued orders to implement a comprehensive set of recommendations that 

would enhance the mitigating strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, 

containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities following a beyond-design-basis external 

event. While the equipment and strategies were specifically intended to mitigate the effects of a 

beyond-design-basis external event, the equipment can also be used for other functions and 

could help mitigate some design-basis events as well. The NRC staff is evaluating how 

mitigating strategies equipment (referred to as FLEX) may be credited in various risk-informed 

regulatory decisions. In December 2015, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted two white 

papers on this topic for staff review. In August 2016 the NRC issued a letter explaining how use 

of the industry white papers could affect the NRC’s evaluation of licensees’ requests to credit 

FLEX equipment in risk-informed decisionmaking. The letter also discussed the NRC staff’s 

plans to develop additional guidance on this topic. 
2 

III. Status of Issues Tracked in the Reactor Generic Issues Program 

During this reporting period (April–September 2016) the staff progressed in reviewing, 

assessing, and implementing, as appropriate, two proposed generic issues (GIs) and three GIs 

that are in the implementation stage. During the period, the staff also began a screening 

evaluation of a potential issue involving high-energy arcing faults at nuclear power plants. In 

addition, the staff posted a new dashboard on the status of GIs on the NRC’s public Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/gen-issues/dashboard.html. 

The two proposed GIs are (1) GI-193, regarding the potential for air binding of the emergency 

core cooling system (ECCS) pumps from a blowdown of the containment atmosphere into the 

torus following a large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), and (2) PRE-GI-017 on the 

possible adverse effects of seiches on maintaining suction to the service water pumps for 

nuclear power plants on the Great Lakes. The staff concluded, based on its assessment of the 

safety significance of both GIs, that the GIs did not warrant further regulatory actions. 

Therefore, these proposed GIs were screened out of the GI process. The staff documented its 

conclusions in issue closure letters dated June 16, 2016, and September 8, 2016, respectively. 

The other three GIs that the staff is currently monitoring are GI-191, GI-199, and GI-204. These 

GIs are currently in the implementation stage of the resolution process. The subsections below 

summarize the actions associated with these three open GIs. 

GI-191, “Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor (PWR) Sump 

Performance” 

This GI concerns the possibility that, after a LOCA in a PWR, debris accumulating on the ECCS 

sump screen may result in clogging and restrict water flow to the pumps. Because of this GI 

and the related Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, “Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on 

Emergency Recirculation during Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors,” dated 

September 13, 2004, all PWR licensees increased the size of their containment sump strainers, 

which has significantly reduced the risk of the strainers clogging. 

A related issue to GI-191 is the potential for debris to bypass the sump strainers and enter the 

reactor core. In 2008, the NRC staff determined that additional testing was necessary to 

resolve this issue. The industry completed additional testing and submitted topical report 

WCAP-16793-NP, “Evaluation of Long-Term Cooling Considering Particulate, Fibrous and 

Chemical Debris in the Recirculating Fluid.” In 2013, the NRC staff issued its safety evaluation 

based upon Revision 2 of this topical report as an acceptable model for assessing the effects on 

core cooling from fibrous particulate and chemical debris that have bypassed the sump 

strainers. The Pressurized-Water Reactor Operating Group submitted a new topical report, 

WCAP-17788, “Comprehensive Analysis and Test Program for GSI-191 Closure (PA-SEE1090)—Cold Leg Break Evaluation Method for GSI-191 Long-Term Cooling,” intended to justify 

higher fiber limits than previously approved by the NRC. The Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards (ACRS) discussed this topical report at a meeting on October 20, 2015. The NRC 

staff will brief ACRS again once the staff completes its review in the spring of 2017. 

Based on the interactions with stakeholders and the results of industry testing, in 2012, the NRC 

staff developed three options for licensees to resolve GI-191 and proposed them to the 

Commission. The Commission approved the closure options on December 14, 2012. 

Licensees have since notified the NRC of the option that they have selected. In addition, the 

NRC staff has developed a risk-informed draft final rulemaking, 10 CFR 50.46c, “Performance-
3 

Based Emergency Core Cooling System Acceptance Criteria,” which includes provisions to 

allow licensees to use a risk-informed alternative to address the effects of debris on long-term 

core cooling. The Commission is currently evaluating the draft final rule. 

As of September 2016, all plants with the smallest challenges have successfully resolved 

GI-191. The staff issued GL 2004-02 closeout documentation to these licensees. The 

remaining plants anticipate completing their actions by December 2018. 

GI-199, “Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern 

United States for Existing Plants” 

This GI addresses how current estimates of the seismic hazard level at some nuclear sites in 

the central and eastern United States might be higher than the values used in their original 

designs and previous evaluations. The scope was expanded later to include plants in the 

western United States. Following collaboration with the Electric Power Research Institute, the 

NRC issued a safety/risk assessment report to licensees and other stakeholders through 

Information Notice 2010-18, “Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in 

Central and Eastern United States on Existing Plant.” 

After the nuclear event at Fukushima, the NRC incorporated GI-199 into the work being 

performed in response to the accident, which is discussed further in Section X, “Response to 

Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Accident in Japan,” of this report. 

GI-204, “Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures” 

This GI relates to potential flooding effects from upstream dam failures on nuclear power plant 

sites, spent fuel pools, and sites undergoing decommissioning with spent fuel stored in spent 

fuel pools. This GI is being addressed as part of the efforts associated with the NRC response 

to the Fukushima nuclear accident, which is discussed further in Section X, “Response to 

Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Accident in Japan,” of this report. 

IV. Licensing Actions and Other Licensing Tasks 

Licensing actions related to operating power reactors include orders, license amendments, 

exemptions from regulations, relief from inspection or component testing, topical reports 

submitted on a plant-specific basis, or other actions requiring NRC review and approval before 

licensees can carry out certain activities. The FY 2016 NRC Congressional Budget 

incorporated two output measures related to licensing actions—the number of licensing actions 

completed per year and the age of the licensing action inventory. 

Other licensing tasks for operating power reactors include the following: 

• licensee responses to NRC requests for information through GLs or bulletins; 

• NRC responses to petitions filed for enforcement action under 10 CFR 2.206, “Requests 

for Action under This Subpart;” 

• NRC review of generic topical reports; 
4 

• responses by the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to requests for assistance 

from the agency’s regional offices; 

• NRC inspection of licensee analyses under 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests and 

Experiments;” 

• updates to final safety analysis reports; and 

• other licensee actions not requiring NRC review and approval before licensees can carry 

them out. 

The FY 2016 NRC Congressional Budget incorporates two output measures related to other 

licensing tasks—the number of other licensing tasks completed each year and the age of the 

other licensing task inventory. 

Table 1 shows the actual FY 2013, FY 2014, FY 2015, and FY 2016 results and the FY 2016 

goals for the NRC Congressional Budget performance indicators for operating power reactor 

licensing actions and other licensing tasks. The NRC continues to work on the Fukushima 

Tier 1 activities under aggressive schedules that require close monitoring to ensure that the 

implementation of the activities is successful. The agency prioritizes all licensing action reviews 

in accordance with their safety significance; however, because of Fukushima-related work 

competing for the same critical skill sets, the backlog inventory of operating reactor licensing 

actions increased. In late FY 2014 the staff redistributed resources to support the stabilization 

and reduction of the licensing action backlog. As a result, the NRC saw the backlog inventory 

stabilize in FY 2015. The backlog has further reduced in FY 2016 to within performance 

standards. To improve the agency’s projections, manage workload, and identify needed skills, 

the NRC issued a regulatory information summary to request that licensees supply information 

on their plans to submit licensing actions over the next 3 years. The agency also has 

undertaken or planned a number of additional initiatives, including enhancing workload 

management processes, providing more effective management attention, piloting an issue 

resolution process, and upgrading workload management tools. The agency continues to 

communicate with licensees to maintain the information as relevant. The NRC’s senior 

management remains heavily engaged in monitoring the licensing action workload towards 

maintaining target performance goals. 

 
5 

Table 1 Results and FY 2016 Goals for Congressional Budget Performance Indicators 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 

Output 

Measure

FY 2013 

Actual

FY 2014 

Actual 

FY 2015 

Actual FY 2016 Goals FY 2016 Actual 

Licensing 

actions 

completed per 

year 

668 607 792 7301 837 

Age of 

inventory of 

licensing 

actions 

95% 

≤ 1 year 

and 100% 

≤ 2 years 

87% 

≤ 1 year 

and 99% 

≤ 2 years 

88% 

≤ 1 year 

and 99% 

≤ 2 years 

95% 

≤ 1 year and 

100% 

≤ 2 years 

95% 

≤ 1 year 

and 100% 

≤ 2 years 

Other 

licensing tasks 

completed per 

year 

529 402 461 500 641 

Age of 

inventory of 

other licensing 

tasks 

97.6% 

≤ 1 year 

and 100% 

≤ 2 years 

87% 

≤ 1 year 

and 100% 

≤ 2 years 

87% 

≤ 1 year 

and 97% 

≤ 2 years 

90% 

≤ 1 year and 

100% 

≤ 2 years 

90% 

≤ 1 year 

and 99% 

≤ 2 years 

2% 

Improvement 

in timeliness 

indicators 

≥ 90% for 

1-year licensing 

action indicator 

≥ 89% for 

1-year other 

licensing task 

indicator 

95% 

90% 

V. Status of License Renewal Activities 

The NRC has issued renewed licenses to 83 power reactor units licensed to operate. Two units 

with a renewed license have since permanently shut down. The NRC has 8 license renewal 

applications (LRAs) for 12 reactor units under review. 

Applications Currently under Review 

The following is the status of each application under review during the reporting period. 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 

On April 30, 2007, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (“Entergy”), submitted an LRA for Indian 

Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3, to extend the operating licenses for 20 years beyond 

the current license periods. In December 2015 the staff issued for public comment a draft 

second supplement to the December 2010 final supplemental environmental impact statement

(SEIS) to address new information and other developments since Supplement 1 to the final 

SEIS was issued in June 2013. The comment period closed in March 2016; the staff expects to 

 

1 The Congressional Budget performance indicator is limited by the number of licensing action requests submitted or 

accepted the previous FY. 
6 

issue the final SEIS supplement in January 2017. On November 6, 2014, the staff issued 

Supplement 2 to the safety evaluation report (SER). The staff briefed ACRS on SER 

Supplement 2 on April 23, 2015. Additionally, activities related to the Atomic Safety and 

Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing process continued. Several adjudicatory issues remain 

outstanding. The NRC staff continues to review relevant new information and will supplement 

its existing evaluations, as necessary. The current schedule for a final licensing decision is to 

be determined pending the resolution of adjudicatory matters. 

The operating license for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 was set to expire on 

September 28, 2013, and the operating license for Unit 3 was set to expire on December 12, 

2015. Given the timely submittal of the LRA for both units, continued operation is permitted 

under NRC regulations and the Administrative Procedure Act until the NRC determines whether 

to issue renewed licenses. A final determination will be made once the staff’s review is 

complete and the hearing process is concluded. Entergy has implemented aging management 

programs for both Units 2 and 3, as described in the LRA, and the NRC continues normal 

reactor oversight to ensure safe operations.

Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 

On November 24, 2009, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. submitted an LRA for Diablo Canyon 

Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, to extend the operating licenses for 20 years beyond the 

current license periods. In June 2016, the applicant announced that it had reached an 

agreement with interested parties not to seek license renewal for Units 1 and 2, and requested 

that the staff suspend its review of the LRA, pending approval of the agreement by the 

California Public Utilities Commission. The applicant further stated that should the California 

Public Utilities Commission approve the agreement, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. would 

withdraw its LRA. In July 2016 the staff informed the applicant that it had suspended its review 

of the LRA. 

Seabrook Station, Unit 1 

On June 1, 2010, NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, submitted an LRA for Seabrook Station, 

Unit 1, to extend the operating license for 20 years beyond the current license period. In 

April 2013 the staff issued a second draft SEIS, which included a revised severe accident 

mitigation alternatives analysis and updates to comply with the NRC’s revised environmental 

protection regulations. During the reporting period, the staff also worked toward resolution of 

the open items identified in the staff’s June 2012 SER. In July 2015, the staff issued the final 

SEIS. Additionally, the staff completed activities related to the ASLB hearing process. The 

safety review remains in progress to resolve a technical issue regarding the alkali-silica reaction 

(ASR) affecting some concrete structures; all other open items are closed. The NRC staff also 

performed onsite inspections in February and March 2016 related to license renewal. The NRC 

staff continues to work with the applicant to ensure it properly addresses technical issues for 

closure of the SER ASR open item. The current schedule for remaining milestones is to be 

determined. 

South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 

On October 28, 2010, South Texas Project (STP) Nuclear Operating Co. submitted an LRA for 

STP Units 1 and 2, to extend the operating licenses for 20 years beyond the current license 

periods. The staff issued the final SEIS in November 2013 and the license renewal SER with 

open items in January 2013. One item that remains open involves the selective leaching of 
7 

aluminum bronze piping and components. The NRC staff continues to work with the applicant 

to resolve the issue. All other open items have been resolved, and the staff is working to 

document their closure. The current schedule for remaining milestones is to be determined.

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 

On November 1, 2011, Entergy submitted an LRA for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, to 

extend the operating license for 20 years beyond the current license period. During the current 

reporting period, the staff completed its work toward resolution of the open items identified in the 

staff’s January 2013 SER. The staff issued its final SER in April 2016. In May 2016 the ACRS 

subcommittee conducted its meeting on Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The full ACRS committee 

meeting is scheduled for October 2016 and a final decision is expected in December 2016. 

Fermi Unit 2 

On April 30, 2014, DTE Electric Co. submitted an LRA for Fermi Unit 2 to extend the operating 

license for 20 years beyond the current license period. During the reporting period, the staff 

continued work on the environmental and safety reviews of the application. The staff published 

the draft SEIS for comment in October 2015. The comment period on the draft SEIS closed in 

December 2015. Activities related to the ASLB hearing process are complete. The staff issued 

the SER with open items in January 2016 and the final SER in July 2016. A final license 

renewal decision is expected in November 2016. 

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 

On December 9, 2014, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon), submitted an LRA for 

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, to extend the operating licenses for an additional 

20 years beyond the current license periods. During the reporting period, the staff continued 

work on the environmental and safety reviews of the application. The staff published the draft 

SEIS for comment in February 2016 and the final SEIS in August 2016. The staff issued the 

final SER in June 2016. The NRC renewed the operating licenses on October 19, 2016. 

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 

On March 30, 2016, Entergy submitted an LRA for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, to 

extend the operating license for 20 years beyond the current license period. During the 

reporting period, the staff completed the acceptability review and issued the project schedule. 

VI. Summary of Reactor Enforcement Action 

The reactor enforcement statistics in Tables 2–4 below are arranged by region, half-year, most 

recent half-year, FY to date, and two previous FYs for comparison purposes. Table 2 provides 

the nonescalated reactor enforcement data. Table 3 provides escalated reactor enforcement 

data associated with traditional enforcement, while Table 4 provides this information for actions 

associated with the ROP. The severity level assigned to the violation (i.e., traditional 

enforcement) generally reflects the significance of a violation. However, for most violations, the 

significance of a violation is assessed using the significance determination process under the 

ROP. The ROP uses risk insights, where appropriate, to assist the NRC in determining the 

safety or security significance of inspection findings identified within the ROP. 
8 

These tables are followed by brief descriptions of the escalated reactor enforcement actions 

associated with traditional enforcement and the ROP (as well as any other significant actions) 

taken during the applicable calendar half-year. 

Table 2 Nonescalated Reactor Enforcement Actions 

NONESCALATED REACTOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Region I Region II Region III Region IV TOTAL 

Cited 

Severity 

Level IV or 

Green 

1st Half FY 16 2 5 2 2 11 

2nd Half FY 16 2 1 0 1 4 

FY 16 YTD Total 4 6 2 3 15 

FY 15 Total 4 7 1 10 22 

FY 14 Total 8 5 3 2 18 

Noncited 

Severity 

Level IV or 

Green 

1st Half FY 16 81 74 87 97 339 

2nd Half FY 16 88 63 84 93 328 

FY 16 YTD Total 169 137 171 190 667 

FY 15 Total 137 103 182 224 646 

FY 14 Total 124 147 223 257 751 

TOTAL 

Cited and 

Noncited 

Severity 

Level IV or 

Green 

1st Half FY 16 83 79 89 99 350 

2nd Half FY 16 90 64 84 94 332 

FY 16 YTD Total 173 143 173 193 682 

FY 15 Total 141 110 183 234 668 

FY 14 Total 132 152 226 259 769 

NOTE: The nonescalated enforcement data in Table 2 reflect the cited and noncited violations 

either categorized at Severity Level IV, the lowest level, or associated with green findings during 

the indicated time periods. The numbers of cited violations are based on Enforcement Action 

Tracking System data that may be subject to minor changes following verification. The monthly 

totals generally lag by 30 days because of the time needed for inspection report and 

enforcement development. These data do not include green findings that do not have 

associated violations. 

 
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Table 3 Escalated Reactor Enforcement Actions Associated with Traditional 

Enforcement 

ESCALATED REACTOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 

ASSOCIATED WITH TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT 

Region I Region II Region III Region IV TOTAL 

Severity 

Level I 

1st Half FY 16 0 0 0 0 0 

2nd Half FY 16 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 16 YTD Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 15 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 14 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

Severity 

Level II 

1st Half FY 16 0 0 0 0 0 

2nd Half FY 16 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 16 YTD Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 15 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 14 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

Severity 

Level III 

1st Half FY 16 0 0 1 1 2 

2nd Half FY 16 2 0 0 0 2 

FY 16 YTD Total 2 0 1 1 4 

FY 15 Total 3 2 0 1 6 

FY 14 Total 1 0 0 0 1 

TOTAL 

Violations 

Cited at 

Severity 

Level I, II, 

or III 

1st Half FY 16 0 0 1 1 2 

2nd Half FY 16 2 0 0 0 2 

FY 16 YTD Total 2 0 1 1 4 

FY 15 Total 3 2 0 1 6 

FY 14 Total 1 0 0 0 1 

NOTE: The escalated enforcement data in Table 3 reflect the Severity Level I, II, or III 

violations or problems cited during the indicated time periods. 

 
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Table 4 Escalated Reactor Enforcement Actions Associated with the ROP 

ESCALATED REACTOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 

ASSOCIATED WITH THE ROP

Region I Region II Region III Region IV TOTAL 

Violations 

Related to 

Red 

Findings 

1st Half FY 16 0 0 0 0 0 

2nd Half FY 16 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 16 YTD Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 15 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 14 Total 0 0 0 0 0 

Violations 

Related to 

Yellow 

Findings 

1st Half FY 16 0 0 0 0 0 

2nd Half FY 16 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 16 YTD Total 0 0 0 0 0 

FY 15 Total 1 0 0 2 3 

FY 14 Total 0 0 0 2 2 

Violations 

Related to 

White 

Findings 

1st Half FY 16 0 0 0 0 0 

2nd Half FY 16 2 0 0 0 2 

FY 16 YTD Total 2 0 0 0 2 

FY 15 Total 4 1 5 0 10 

FY 14 Total 1 2 3 4 10 

TOTAL 

Related to 

Red, 

Yellow, or 

White 

Findings 

1st Half FY 16 0 0 0 0 0 

2nd Half FY 16 2 0 0 0 2 

FY 16 YTD Total 2 0 0 0 2 

FY 15 Total 5 1 5 2 13 

FY 14 Total 1 2 3 6 12 

NOTE: The escalated enforcement data in Table 4 reflect the violations or problems cited 

during the indicated time periods that were associated with either red, yellow, or white findings. 

These data do not include red, yellow, or white findings that do not have associated violations. 

Reactor Escalated Enforcement Actions and Other Significant Actions Taken 

The list below includes security-related actions and confirmatory actions not included in the 

tables above. The NRC does not make details of security-related violations publicly available. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Ginna Nuclear Power Plant), EA-16-128 

On September 20, 2016, the NRC issued a notice of violation with a white significance 

determination process finding to Exelon for a violation identified during an inspection of the 
11 

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna). The white finding, an issue of low to moderate safety 

significance, will require additional NRC inspections. The finding involves an inadvertent 

change Exelon made that introduced an error to the Ginna emergency plan. Specifically, 

Exelon implemented a revision to the emergency action level table for the fission product barrier 

matrix that was incorrect with respect to the emergency action level threshold associated with a 

potential loss of containment barrier. This could have resulted in an untimely declaration of a 

general emergency or a failure to declare a site area emergency during an actual event. A 

notice of violation was issued based on Exelon’s failure to meet 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2), which 

requires that a holder of a license under 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and 

Utilization Facilities,” shall follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that 

meets the requirements in Appendix E, “Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production 

and Utilization Facilities,” to 10 CFR Part 50 and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the 

planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), EA-16-022 

On September 1, 2016, the NRC issued a confirmatory order to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 

Station (Davis-Besse) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute 

mediation session. The agreement resolves the apparent deliberate failure of a licensed 

operator to comply with a condition of his license and the operator’s failure to provide 

Davis-Besse with information that was complete and accurate in all material respects for the 

submittal of required updates on the operator's medical condition. Davis-Besse agreed to a 

number of corrective actions, including (1) a management discussion with each licensed 

operator in regard to this event, (2) revisions to operator requalification training materials to 

incorporate facts and lessons learned from this event, (3) management communications on 

expectations and requirements for complete and accurate medical reporting to operations 

personnel subject to those requirements, (4) training to address the provisions of 10 CFR 50.9, 

“Completeness and Accuracy of Information,” (5) revisions to existing fleet procedures 

governing licensed operator medical reports, (6) a presentation at the Nuclear Medical 

Resources Professionals User Group on the facts of this case, and (7) submission of an article 

to a widespread trade publication based on the facts and lessons learned from this event. In 

consideration of these commitments, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a notice of violation 

and will consider the confirmatory order as an escalated enforcement action for a period of 

1 year from its effective date. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station), EA-16-057 

On July 6, 2016, the NRC issued a notice of violation with a white significance determination 

process finding to Exelon for a violation of Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” 

of Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing 

Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50 and of Technical Specification 3.7.C.2. The violation was for failing 

to appropriately prescribe an activity affecting quality, in documented instructions, associated 

with maintenance of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station emergency diesel generators 

(EDGs). Specifically, since 2002, Exelon did not have appropriate work instructions for 

replacement of the EDG cooling flexible hose every 12 years as specified by Exelon’s 

procedure and vendor information. As a result, a flexible coupling hose remained in service for 

approximately 22 years and was subject to thermal degradation and aging that eventually lead 

to the failure of EDG No. 1 during a surveillance test on January 4, 2016. In addition, based on 

an analysis of hose failure and a review of past operability, the NRC determined that EDG No. 1 
12 

was inoperable for a period greater than its technical specification allowed outage time of 

7 days. 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (Wolf Creek Generating Station), EA-15-224 

On June 9, 2016, the NRC issued a notice of violation to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating 

Corporation for an escalated enforcement action. The details of the finding have been withheld 

from the public because they are security-related information. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Palisades Nuclear Plant), EA-15-039 

On May 16, 2016, the NRC issued a confirmatory order to Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades) 

to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute mediation session. The 

confirmatory order memorializes the resolution of the apparent violations identified during an 

investigation into a leaking safety injection refueling water tank (SIRWT) at Palisades. 

Palisades agreed to a number of corrective actions, including but not limited to (1) ensuring that 

site personnel understand lessons learned from this matter, (2) sharing lessons learned from 

this matter with other reactor licensees, (3) reviewing the applicable procedures in light of the 

lessons learned from events associated with leakage of the SIRWT and revising these 

procedures as appropriate, and (4) modifying its current program of public outreach. In 

consideration of these commitments, the NRC has agreed to refrain from issuing a civil penalty 

and a notice of violation. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), EA-15-247 

On April 11, 2016, the NRC issued a notice of violation to Entergy for a Severity Level III 

problem involving two related violations of NRC requirements. The first violation involved the 

failure to conduct compensatory fire watches as required by Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station’s 

corporate procedures and 10 CFR 50.48, “Fire Protection.” Specifically, on multiple occasions 

between June 1, 2012, and June 26, 2014, fire watch personnel failed to examine the areas 

involved in the hourly fire watch postings for evidence of fire or conditions that may lead to a 

fire. The second violation involved the failure to maintain complete and accurate records as 

required by 10 CFR 50.9(a). Specifically, on multiple occasions during the same timeframe, log 

sheets for hourly fire watches were falsified when an individual initialed that fire watches were 

completed when, in fact, these fire watches had not been performed. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), EA-15-100 

On April 6, 2016, the NRC issued a confirmatory order to Entergy to formalize commitments 

made as a result of an alternative dispute resolution mediation session held on 

February 19, 2016. Entergy made the commitments as part of a settlement agreement between 

Entergy and the NRC about the deliberate violations of requirements under 10 CFR 50.9, 

10 CFR 50.48, and 10 CFR 73.56(f)(3) (related to personnel access authorization requirements 

for nuclear power plants). The violations involved seven individuals at Waterford Steam Electric 

Station, Unit 3, who deliberately failed to conduct compensatory hourly fire watch inspections 

and falsified their fire watch tour logs, a licensee supervisor who deliberately failed to identify 

and take corrective actions when provided with information of suspected wrongdoing by fire 

watch individuals, and a licensee manager who deliberately provided incomplete and inaccurate 

information to an access authorization reviewing official about the trustworthiness and reliability 

of a contract fire watch individual. Entergy agreed to a number corrective actions, including 
13 

(1) conducting an Entergy nuclear fleet common-causes evaluation, and, if general industry 

insights are identified, sharing them at an industry forum, (2) revising or issuing fleetwide 

procedures to enhance Entergy’s management and oversight of supplemental workers, 

(3) providing the common requirements for fire watch programs, and (4) providing a process to 

address requests for the reinstatement of unescorted access authorization for workers whose 

authorization has been temporarily suspended. In consideration of the commitments outlined in 

the confirmatory order, the NRC agreed to not issue a civil penalty or a notice of violation. 

VII. Power Reactor Security and Emergency and Incident Response Activities 

The NRC continues to maintain an appropriate regulatory infrastructure and to perform its 

licensing and oversight functions to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, 

promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment. NRC security and 

emergency preparedness and incident response programs contribute to fulfilling this mission. 

Security 

The NRC continues to conduct force-on-force inspections at each nuclear power reactor and 

Category I fuel cycle facility on a regular 3-year cycle. Each force-on-force inspection includes 

both tabletop drills and exercises that simulate combat between a mock adversary force and the 

licensee’s security force. These inspections assess the ability of power reactor licensees to 

defend against the design-basis threat (DBT) of radiological sabotage. Force-on-force 

exercises also provide valuable insights that enable the NRC to evaluate the effectiveness of 

licensee security programs. Category I fuel cycle facilities use a similar process to assess the 

effectiveness of the licensees’ protective strategy against two DBTs—one for radiological 

sabotage and another to prevent the theft or diversion of special nuclear material. 

The NRC is developing a final rule that would amend security requirements in 10 CFR Part 73, 

“Physical Protection of Plants and Materials,” to implement the statutory authority provided to 

the Commission under Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Section 

161A preemption authority allows the Commission to designate classes of facilities eligible to 

apply for NRC authorization to use various types of weapons and large-capacity 

ammunition-feeding devices, notwithstanding State, local, and certain Federal firearms laws and 

regulations prohibiting such possession and use. The final rule being developed by the NRC 

sets forth the requirements that licensees must meet when applying for this authority. The NRC 

has worked closely with the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of the Attorney General; the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

and other interested stakeholders in developing the rulemaking. In advance of the final 

rulemaking, the NRC has designated, through orders, seven power reactor licensees, one 

Category I strategic special nuclear material licensee, and one “at-reactor” independent spent 

fuel storage installation licensee as being eligible to apply for Section 161A preemption authority 

to address the site-specific needs of these facilities. In addition, the final rule will revise the 

regulations in 10 CFR Part 73 to include enhancements that were identified through a 

comprehensive review of the emergency event notification regulations. 

The NRC plans to publish a proposed rule in 2017 that would amend the drug-testing 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, “Fitness-for-Duty Programs,” to better align NRC drug testing 

requirements with those of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ 2008 version of 

“Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs.” Specifically, the 

proposed changes will broaden the panel of drugs to be tested during required drug testing; 
14 

lower cutoff levels for certain types of drug testing; improve the testing methods to identify 

subversion attempts; and improve the clarity, organization, and flexibility of the rule language. 

The NRC continues to be an active participant in the Integrated Response Program, which is a 

partnership between Federal Government agencies and the nuclear industry to improve the 

tactical responses of Federal, State, and local law enforcement to beyond-DBT events at 

nuclear power plant sites. 

Cyber Security 

In accordance with 10 CFR 73.54, “Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems 

and Networks,” nuclear power plant licensees and new license applicants are required to 

provide high assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks are 

adequately protected against cyber attacks. These licensees must implement a cyber security 

program to ensure that safety, important-to-safety, security, and emergency preparedness 

functions are protected from cyber attacks. Because of the significant amount of work and lead 

time required to fully implement the provisions called for in the licensees’ NRC-approved cyber 

security plans, interim milestones were established to focus efforts on the highest priority 

activities. Licensees implemented measures to protect their highest priority digital assets by 

December 31, 2012. 

The NRC has developed an oversight program for cyber security that includes an inspection 

program, inspector training, and a process for evaluating the significance of inspection findings. 

The agency accomplished this collaboratively with stakeholders, including members of industry 

and representatives from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The NRC 

completed inspection activities related to the interim milestones in calendar year 2015. In 2016, 

the NRC, along with industry, is preparing for full implementation inspection activities that will 

begin in calendar year 2017. 

The agency amended 10 CFR Part 73 by adding timely notification requirements for certain 

operating reactor cyber security events. The new regulation (10 CFR 73.77, “Cyber Security 

Event Notification”) requires cyber security event notifications that will contribute to the NRC’s 

analysis of the reliability and effectiveness of licensees’ cyber security programs, playing an 

important role in the continuing effort to provide high assurance that digital computer and 

communication systems and networks are adequately protected against cyber-attacks, up to 

and including the DBT. This requirement also increases the NRC’s ability to respond to 

emergencies, monitor ongoing events, assess trends and patterns, and identify precursors of 

more significant events. This rulemaking also enhances the NRC’s ability to inform other 

licensees, DHS, and Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies of events related to 

cyber security. 

The NRC staff proposed several options to the Commission in SECY-14-0147 for implementing 

cyber security for fuel cycle facilities. In response, the Commission issued a staff requirements 

memorandum related to SECY-14-0147 that directed the staff to initiate a high-priority, 

expedited rulemaking. The NRC staff completed the regulatory basis for the proposed 

rulemaking in March 2016. The proposed and draft final rule packages are scheduled to be 

submitted to the Commission in March 2017 and October 2018, respectively. 

The NRC is implementing a cyber security roadmap (SECY-12-0088, “The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission Cyber Security Roadmap,” dated June 25, 2012), to evaluate the need for cyber 
15 

security requirements for other NRC license holders, including nonpower reactors, independent 

spent fuel storage installations, and byproduct materials licensees. Implementation of the 

roadmap will help the NRC to determine and ensure that appropriate levels of cyber security 

protection are implemented promptly and efficiently at all NRC-licensed facilities. 

Emergency Preparedness and Incident Response 

Previous status reports provided updates on the NRC’s path forward with regard to emergency 

preparedness communications and staffing issues identified in the NRC’s assessment of the 

accident at Fukushima. In addition, during this reporting period, all 62 power reactor sites 

implemented multiunit/multisource dose assessment capabilities. The NRC staff incorporated 

these enhancements related to emergency preparedness into the proposed rulemaking 

package on the mitigation of beyond design-basis events (MBDBEs). The NRC is in the 

process of addressing the public comments received on the MBDBE rule in support of preparing 

a final rulemaking package. 

In April 2012, the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) began a 

multiyear initiative to revise NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, “Criteria for Preparation and 

Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear 

Power Plants,” Revision 1, issued November 1980, one of the key guidance documents for 

developing and evaluating onsite and offsite emergency plans for nuclear power plants and for 

the State and local government response organizations whose personnel would respond to the 

plant sites. In FY 2014, the joint NRC/FEMA working group completed initial drafts of the 

introductory information and the emergency plan evaluation criteria. NRC and FEMA staff 

jointly conducted a series of public meetings in FY 2014 to solicit feedback from stakeholders 

and members of the public on the initial drafts. A final draft of this document was completed in 

FY 2015 and issued for a 90-day public comment period on May 29, 2015. The comment 

period was extended to October 13, 2015, in response to requests from stakeholders. As of 

September 30, 2016, the NRC and FEMA completed jointly adjudicating the comments and are 

currently conducting their internal reviews to finalize the document. 

The NRC continues to work with States to replenish potassium iodide supplies for use as a 

supplement to public protective actions within the 10-mile emergency planning zones around 

nuclear power plants. 

All physical security and emergency preparedness program licensing reviews for new power 

reactor applications remain on schedule. The NRC staff is using its established licensing 

process to ensure that the safety and environmental reviews meet all milestones and provide 

appropriate opportunities for stakeholder input. 

VIII. Power Uprates 

Licensees have applied for and implemented power uprates since the 1970s as a way to 

increase the power output of their plants. The NRC staff has reviewed and approved 157 power 

uprates to date. Approximately 22,037 megawatts thermal (MWt) or 7,346 megawatts 

electric (MWe) in electric generating capacity (the equivalent of about seven large nuclear 

power plant units) have been gained through power uprates at existing plants. The NRC 

currently has one power uprate application under review. 

In December 2015, NRC staff conducted its most recent survey of nuclear power plant 

licensees’ plans to submit power uprate applications over the next 5 years. This survey and 
16 

additional more recent information indicate that licensees plan to request power uprates for 

10 nuclear power plants during the next 5 years. 

IX. New Reactor Licensing 

The NRC is focusing on licensing and construction activities that support large light-water 

reactor (LWR) applicants and licensees. The agency is also pursuing activities to enhance the 

regulatory framework and infrastructure for small modular reactors and advanced non-LWRs. 

The NRC’s new reactor program also is actively engaged in several international cooperative 

activities addressing safety reviews of new reactor designs and in improving the effectiveness 

and efficiency of inspections and the collection and sharing of construction experience. 

Reviews of Applications for Large Light-Water and Small Modular Reactors 

The NRC is currently reviewing applications for new, large LWRs that have been submitted 

under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear 

Power Plants.” The NRC has received a submittal for one new early site permit (ESP) 

application and expects to receive its first small modular reactor design certification (DC) 

application in December 2016. 

Early Site Permit Reviews 

Public Service Electric Gas (PSEG) Power, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear, LLC 

PSEG Power, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear, LLC, submitted an ESP application on May 25, 2010. 

This application uses the plant parameter envelope approach, which includes design parameter 

information from four reactor designs, namely the U.S. EPR (formerly the U.S. Evolutionary 

Power Reactor), the Advanced Boiling-Water Reactor (ABWR), the U.S. Advanced PressurizedWater Reactor (US-APWR), and the Advanced Passive 1000 (AP1000®). 

On September 25, 2015, the NRC staff issued the final SER for the PSEG ESP application, 

completing the final milestone for the staff’s safety review. The NRC staff issued the final 

environmental impact statement (FEIS) for the application on November 13, 2015. 

On March 24, 2016, the ASLB conducted the mandatory hearing for the PSEG ESP application. 

The NRC staff and the applicant provided oral testimony in response to ASLB questions. On 

April 26, 2016, the ASLB released its decision recommending that the NRC issue the ESP, 

which the agency did on May 5, 2016. 

Tennessee Valley Authority Clinch River Early Site Permit Application

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) submitted an ESP application in May 2016 for the Clinch 

River site near Oak Ridge, TN. This application is based on a plant parameter envelope 

characterizing several small modular LWR designs. Based on feedback received during the 

staff’s acceptance review, TVA sent a letter dated August 11, 2016, proposing to provide 

supplemental information to the NRC in support of its application. The NRC has accepted 

TVA’s proposal and in the interim, their application remains in a tendered status until the 

supplemental information is received and the application is accepted by the staff. 
17 

Design Certification Reviews 

U.S. EPR 

AREVA, Inc., submitted the U.S. EPR DC application on December 11, 2007. On 

February 25, 2015, AREVA, Inc., requested that the NRC suspend the application review until 

further notice. The NRC staff’s review of the U.S. EPR DC application remains in suspension. 

US-APWR 

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI), submitted its US-APWR DC application on 

December 31, 2007. On November 5, 2013, MHI issued a letter informing the NRC of its plans 

to implement a coordinated slowdown of licensing activities related to the application review. 

The NRC staff has been performing a limited-scope review of the US-APWR DC application 

since March 24, 2014, and will continue with this limited review until further notice from the 

applicant. 

Advanced Power Reactor 1400 (APR1400) 

On December 23, 2014, Korea Electric Power Corp. and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., 

Ltd., submitted to the NRC their application for the certification of the APR1400 standard plant 

design, for use in the U.S. domestic energy market. The NRC staff developed a six-phase 

milestone schedule for completing the application review within a 42-month timeframe and has 

completed Phase 1 of its technical review (issuing requests for additional information (RAIs) and 

developing a preliminary SER) on schedule. The NRC staff continues to implement its review 

strategy by addressing many of the RAIs early in the review process to ensure that the review 

milestones can be achieved within the schedule. The Phase 2 review (issuing a SER with open 

items) has been completed for many chapters in the DC application. In addition, the NRC staff 

completed ACRS subcommittee meetings (Phase 3) in September and October 2016 for SER 

Chapters 2, 5, 11, and 10. 

NuScale Small Modular Reactor Design Certification Application

On May 28, 2014, NuScale and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) completed a cooperative 

agreement in which DOE will award up to $217 million to support NuScale’s DC application for 

its small modular reactor. By letter dated June 17, 2015, NuScale announced that it would 

submit a DC application by December 2016. 

On June 30, 2015, the NRC staff issued in the Federal Register the draft design-specific review 

standard for the NuScale design for public notice and comment. The NRC staff has reviewed 

the 680 public comments received and issued the final design-specific review standard sections 

between June and August 2016. 

NuScale began submitting topical reports on various aspects of the reactor design for NRC staff 

review. The staff has accepted and started the technical review on several reports on topics 

including instrumentation and control, and electrical systems. NuScale plans to submit 

additional reports later in 2016. 

The NRC staff recently completed a readiness assessment of the NuScale DC application. As 

described in the agency’s letter to NuScale dated October 7, 2016, the staff concluded that, 

while portions of the planned application appear to be proceeding according to NuScale’s 
18 

internal schedule, work remained for NuScale to address technical information and 

completeness deficiencies before the application would be acceptable for docketing. The staff 

expects to receive NuScale’s DC application in December 2016. 

Design Certification Renewals 

ABWR Renewal (Toshiba) 

On November 2, 2010, Toshiba submitted an application for renewal of the ABWR DC; it 

submitted Revision 1 of its application on June 22, 2012. By letter dated May 25, 2015, Toshiba 

requested that NRC staff postpone further review of its application until July 2016. 

Subsequently, in a letter dated June 9, 2016, Toshiba withdrew its DC renewal application for 

the ABWR design. 

ABWR Renewal (General Electric-Hitachi) 

On December 7, 2010, General Electric-Hitachi (GEH) submitted an application for renewal of 

the ABWR DC. The NRC staff issued a letter to GEH on July 20, 2012, describing certain 

design changes (28 items) that should be considered for inclusion in the application. On 

May 7, 2015, the NRC staff met with the applicant to discuss how GEH intends to address the 

28 items and several RAIs issued on other topics. By letter dated January 8, 2016, GEH 

submitted proposed changes to the ABWR design control document (DCD) to redesign the 

containment overpressure protection system (COPS) piping in order to meet the COPS flow 

rate requirement established in the DCD Tier 1 information. The NRC staff has communicated 

to GEH that eight items remain open, and the agency plans to issue supplemental RAIs or 

conduct public meetings to resolve these items. GEH submitted its revised application on 

February 19, 2016, to incorporate changes to the DCD. The staff issued a milestone schedule 

letter to GEH on August 30, 2016, projecting the completion of the staff’s safety review in 

March 2018. 

Combined License Application Activities 

The NRC staff has received a total of 18 COL applications to date. The NRC has issued 

combined licenses (COLs) for four sites (Vogtle Units 3 and 4; V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3; 

Fermi Unit 3; and STP Units 3 and 4). Three COL application reviews are currently suspended 

at the request of the applicants because of changes in the applicants’ business plans 

(Bellefonte, Harris, and Comanche Peak). Seven COL applications have been withdrawn (River 

Bend, Bell Bend2, Victoria County, Nine Mile Point, Callaway, Calvert Cliffs, and Grand Gulf). 

During the reporting period, the NRC staff was actively reviewing four COL applications for a 

total of seven units, as discussed below. 

Levy County COL Application 

On July 30, 2008, Progress Energy Florida, Inc., submitted a COL application for two AP1000 

units to be located at its site in Levy County, FL. Duke Energy Florida, LLC took over as the 

 

2 On August 30, 2016, Talen Energy submitted a letter to the NRC requesting the withdrawal of its COL application 

for the Bell Bend Nuclear Power Plant. By letter dated September 22, 2016, the NRC approved Talen Energy’s 

request to withdraw the Bell Bend COL application. 
19 

applicant following a corporate merger between Progress Energy, Inc. and Duke Energy 

Corporation. The NRC staff issued its FEIS for the Levy County COL application on 

April 27, 2012, and its final SER on May 31, 2016. 

The Commission held the mandatory hearing for the Levy COL on July 28, 2016. On 

October 20, 2016, after the close of the reporting period, the Commission authorized the 

issuance of the licenses and the licenses were issued to Duke Energy Florida, LLC on 

October 26, 2016. 

William States Lee III COL Application 

On December 13, 2007, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, submitted a COL application for 

two AP1000 units at its Lee site near Charlotte in Cherokee County, SC. The NRC issued the 

FEIS on December 27, 2013, and the final SER on August 1, 2016. 

The Commission held the mandatory hearing for the Lee COL on October 5, 2016, shortly after 

the close of the reporting period. The Commission expects the issue an order on the hearing in 

December. 

Turkey Point COL Application 

On June 30, 2009, Florida Power & Light submitted a COL application for two AP1000 units at 

the existing Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station site in Miami-Dade County, FL. 

The NRC staff completed its safety review and presented the advance final SER to ACRS on 

August 19, 2016. On February 27, 2015, the NRC staff submitted the draft environmental 

impact statement (DEIS) for the COL application for Turkey Point, Units 6 and 7, to the 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The staff developed the DEIS in cooperation with 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Jacksonville District and the National Park Service. 

The NRC received approximately 11,000 comments on the DEIS; a majority of those comments 

are identical form letters. The NRC received comments from other Federal agencies, including 

EPA, National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service. To respond to and resolve some of the issues raised in the comments, the NRC staff 

performed further technical analysis and conducted multiple Federal inter-agency meetings. 

The NRC met with other Federal agencies in late April 2016 to discuss the resolution of the 

comments and expects to complete the environmental and safety reviews in November 2016. 

The mandatory hearing will be scheduled shortly thereafter. Additionally, activities related to the 

ASLB hearing process continued. 

North Anna, Unit 3, COL Application 

On November 27, 2007, Dominion Virginia Power (Dominion) submitted a COL application for 

an Economic Simplified Boiling-Water Reactor (ESBWR) at its North Anna Power Station site 

near Richmond in Louisa County, VA. The NRC issued the FEIS in February 2010. 

On June 28, 2010, Dominion submitted a revised application to cite a different design, the 

US-APWR. However, on April 25, 2013, Dominion notified the NRC of its intent to revert to the 

ESBWR design. Dominion submitted its partially revised COL application in July 2013 to reflect 

its revised design decision and submitted all remaining application sections to the NRC in 

December 2013. 
20 

On October 22, 2014, Dominion submitted a seismic closure plan that described a modified 

approach to certain aspects of its seismic analysis to address exceedances of the ESBWR 

seismic design limitations. The schedule that Dominion outlined in its closure plan included 

issuing technical reports and responses to staff questions through calendar year 2015. On 

December 16, 2015, Dominion provided its third and final submittal to the NRC, which included 

RAI responses and COL application markups. The NRC staff completed the safety review for 

the North Anna, Unit 3, COL application and exceeded the public milestone schedule by about 

3 months. The agency sent a revised schedule letter to Dominion on August 31, 2016, that 

projected issuance of the final SER in January 2017. A mandatory hearing will then be 

scheduled. 

Regulatory Infrastructure 

The NRC continues to enhance its regulatory infrastructure to support the planning, licensing, 

and oversight of new and advanced reactor applications by carrying out timely and effective 

policy decisions and by enhancing and updating regulatory guidance for LWRs, small modular 

reactors, and non-LWRs. In addition to updating regulatory guidance, the NRC continues to 

review its internal processes to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its application 

review process. The NRC conducts these regulatory infrastructure enhancements openly and 

transparently with several opportunities for external stakeholder input. In addition, the NRC 

rigorously assesses licensing and oversight performance and uses the results to inform these 

regulatory infrastructure activities. 

Examples of infrastructure activities conducted during the reporting period are described below. 

Revision to Regulatory Guide 1.206, “Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants 

(LWR Edition),” Issued June 2007 

The NRC staff continues its work on revising Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.206, “Applications for 

Nuclear Power Plants.” The revision will clarify the guidance to encompass applicants for all 

licensing processes under 10 CFR Part 52, including DCs and ESPs. The revision will also 

capture important lessons learned from recent licensing actions on large LWRs, but it has 

general applicability to all applications under 10 CFR Part 52. The revision is being informed by 

ongoing interactions with stakeholders and the public. During the period covered by this report, 

the staff conducted a public meeting (on May 3, 2016), to solicit stakeholder input on the 

development of guidance on select regulatory topics to be included in the revised RG 1.206, 

and a final public meeting (September 26, 2016), to solicit stakeholder feedback on the 

remaining regulatory topics before the draft guide is made available for public comment through 

a Federal Register notice. 

Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) Updates 

The NRC staff continues its systematic update of NUREG-0800 to support reviews of COL, DC, 

and ESP applications; limited work authorization applications; and license amendment requests. 

During this reporting period, the staff published two notices in the Federal Register requesting 

public comment on proposed revisions to the review guidance for (1) steam generator materials 

and design and (2) structural and systems engineering inspections, tests, analyses, and 

acceptance criteria (ITAAC). In addition, the staff published several notices in the Federal 

Register making available the final review guidance for 50 sections of NUREG-0800 previously 

issued as proposed guidance. The final review guidance includes sections on severe accidents, 

instrumentation and controls, steam generator materials and design, radioactive waste 
21 

management, conduct of operations, seismic qualification, and system quality group 

classification. 

Environmental Guidance Updates 

The NRC staff continues to work on updating RG 4.2, “Preparation of Environmental Reports for 

Nuclear Power Stations” (last revised in 1976), and NUREG-1555, “Standard Review Plans for 

Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power Plants: Environmental Standard Review Plan” (last 

revised in 2007), to support reviews of ESP, DC, and COL applications; limited work 

authorization requests; and license amendment requests. The staff is incorporating lessons 

learned from the first set of environmental reviews for new reactors. In addition, it is updating 

the guidance to address reviews of small modular reactors, greenhouse gas emissions, and 

issues related to climate change. The staff expects to issue a draft of RG 4.2 for public 

comment towards the end of calendar year 2016. The staff expects to issue a draft of the 

revised NUREG-1555 for public comment in mid- to late 2017. Additionally, the staff is carrying 

out other guidance development and knowledge management activities in the areas of (1) 

updating NUREG-KM-0001 on Three Mile Island accident cleanup lessons learned, 

(2) implementation of new Council on Environmental Quality guidance and staff guidance on 

greenhouse gas emissions, and (3) development of a new RG 4.24, “Aquatic Environmental 

Studies for Nuclear Power Stations.” 

Construction Oversight under 10 CFR Part 52 

The NRC issued COLs to Southern Nuclear Operating Co. and several co-owners on 

February 10, 2012, for two AP1000 units at the Vogtle site near Augusta, GA, and to 

South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. on March 30, 2012, for two AP1000 units at the V.C. Summer 

site near Columbia, SC. As construction progresses, the NRC has increased the pace of 

construction inspections to verify compliance with the agency’s regulations and to ensure that 

the new plants are constructed in accordance with their COLs. Recent NRC inspections have 

focused on activities such as concrete placement, welding, module fabrication, and civil or 

structural engineering activities. NRC inspection activities will continue to increase as licensees 

broaden the scope of construction activities. 

The NRC staff continues to apply lessons learned from the review of submitted ITAAC closure 

notifications and to improve the processes that support ITAAC closure. The staff has facilitated 

several public workshops to solicit input, exchange views, and reach consensus on emerging 

issues, including the reviews of uncompleted ITAAC notifications that should lessen the 

resources that will be required during the surge of ITAAC Closure Notifications at the later 

stages of construction. 

The NRC has established the Construction Reactor Oversight Process (cROP) at the sites of 

the four new Vogtle and V.C. Summer reactor units. Using practices similar to those of the 

ROP, the NRC continues to meet periodically with interested stakeholders to collect feedback 

on the effectiveness of the process, which is then considered in making future refinements to 

the cROP. The agency’s most recent performance assessments demonstrate that reactor 

construction is being conducted safely and all four units are performing well against the cROP 

criteria. Plant assessments and the latest cROP-related information are publicly available on 

the NRC Web site. 
22 

Vendor Inspections 

The NRC staff is implementing an inspection program for vendors supporting operating plants 

and plants under construction. Focus areas for new reactors include integrated system 

validation for the control room simulators, digital instrumentation and control systems, modular 

fabrication, and reactor coolant pumps. As issues are identified, the staff follows up with the 

vendors to ensure that corrective actions are being implemented and that the quality of 

components supplied to the operating plants is consistent with their safe use, in accordance 

with the NRC’s regulations. 

Operator Licensing 

During the reporting period, the NRC administered operator licensing examinations for Southern 

Nuclear Operating Co.’s Vogtle Units 3 and 4. Of the 19 candidates, 18 passed. The NRC 

administered similar examinations at South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.’s V.C. Summer, Units 2 

and 3. Those results are not yet available. 

Non-Light-Water Reactors 

As the NRC prepares to review and regulate a new generation of non-LWRs, the agency 

developed a vision and strategy to assure NRC readiness to conduct its mission for these 

technologies effectively and efficiently. The staff described the vision and strategy in “NRC 

Vision and Strategy: Safely Achieving Effective and Efficient Non-Light Water Reactor Mission 

Readiness,” Revision 1, which was published in the Federal Register on July 21, 2016, for 

stakeholder input. The public comment period closed on September 19, 2016. 

The NRC's approach under this non-LWR vision and strategy consists of two phases. Phase 1 

is the conceptual planning phase used to lay out the vision and strategy, gather public feedback, 

and finalize the NRC's approach. Phase 2 includes detailed internal work planning efforts, 

development, and task execution. Both phases began in 2016. Phase 1 is expected to be 

completed in 2016, and Phase 2, which has multiple activities, has a target completion date of 

not later than 2025. 

The NRC’s non-LWR vision and strategy has three strategic objectives—enhancing technical 

readiness, optimizing regulatory readiness, and optimizing communication. Technical readiness 

activities will seek to evaluate, clarify, and resolve critical technical and policy issues that need 

to be addressed for effective and efficient non-LWR reviews. Among other things, the NRC 

recently renewed an existing interagency agreement with DOE that includes exploring 

regulatory issues and research needs for novel fuel designs. Additionally, the NRC will work 

with its stakeholders to facilitate proposed revisions to industry codes and standards to address 

certain non-LWR designs and develop related requirements. 

As part of its activities related to the regulatory readiness strategic objective, the NRC will seek 

to optimize the regulatory framework for non-LWR reviews and licensing processes. In the near 

term (0–5 years), the staff will examine opportunities for flexibilities within the existing regulatory 

framework. Potential examples of these flexibilities include the use of a staged-review process 

and the use of conceptual design assessments during the preapplication period. 

The NRC will also complete development of advanced reactor design criteria in the near term. 

As part of that effort, DOE completed a report entitled, “Guidance for Developing Principal 

Design Criteria for Advanced (Non-Light Water) Reactors,” and submitted it to the NRC in 
23 

December 2014. The NRC reviewed the report and plans to issue an RG on design criteria for 

advanced non-LWRs. To support that goal, the NRC published draft design criteria for 

advanced reactors on the NRC’s public Web site on April 7, 2016, and opened a 60-day public 

comment opportunity on that draft. The informal public comment period closed on 

June 8, 2016. A public meeting took place October 11, 2016, shortly after the reporting period, 

where the NRC presented the proposed resolution to the public comments. The agency will 

schedule additional opportunities for the public to comment after it issues a draft RG in 2017. 

Over the longer term, the NRC will examine whether a new risk-informed, performance-based 

regulatory framework for non-LWRs would be beneficial, effective, and efficient. 

As part of its activities related to the communications strategic objective, the NRC will continue 

to conduct public meetings with stakeholders. The NRC will also continue to share information 

with various national and international groups, including DOE, the Organisation for Economic 

Co-operation and Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA), the Generation IV International Forum, and the NRC’s international 

regulatory counterparts. The NRC chairs NEA’s ad hoc group for international regulators of 

non-LWRs known as the Group on the Safety of Advanced Reactors. The purpose of the Group 

is to bring interested regulators together to discuss common interests, practices, and problems 

and address both the regulatory interests and research needs. The NRC also chairs the IAEA 

Small Modular Reactor Regulators’ Forum. The purpose of the Forum is to identify, understand, 

and address key regulatory challenges that may emerge in future regulatory discussions on 

small modular reactors. 

The NRC and DOE hosted the second 2-day Advanced Non-Light-Water Reactors Workshop 

on June 7–8, 2016. The focus of this series of workshops is to open a dialogue between key 

stakeholders to discuss challenges in the commercialization of non-LWR technologies and to 

discuss possible solutions. The second workshop included presentations and discussions on 

strategies for non-LWR development and deployment and reactor fuel development and 

qualification. The staff is planning a third workshop with DOE for the spring of 2017. 

In addition, the NRC continues to meet with potential applicants upon request and, as part of its 

activities related to the technical readiness strategic objective, the agency participates in the 

work of numerous standards development organizations. Examples include the American 

Nuclear Society and American Society of Mechanical Engineers standards development 

working groups for non-LWR designs and related topics. 

X. Response to Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Accident in Japan 

The NRC’s response to the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident in Japan during the 

reporting period has focused on implementation of the highest priority (Tier 1) activities and on 

completing evaluations of the lower priority (Tier 2 and 3) activities that have not already been 

addressed. The agency continued to assign resources to address these activities while 

ensuring a balance between putting lessons learned from Fukushima into place and the need to 

ensure that those efforts do not displace ongoing work of greater safety benefit, work that is 

necessary to maintain safety, or other higher priority work. 

The NRC continues to review nuclear power plant licensee plans to achieve compliance with the 

mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders issued in March 2012. The 

NRC has issued interim staff evaluations and has finished auditing licensee implementation of 

these important safety improvements. As of September 30, 2016, approximately 70 percent of 
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all units have fully implemented the mitigating strategies order and more than 90 percent of 

units have implemented the spent fuel pool instrumentation order. By the end of calendar year 

2016 the NRC expects all operating units to have substantially implemented the mitigation 

strategies order, and nearly all units will be in compliance with the spent fuel pool 

instrumentation order. 

In June 2013, the NRC issued a revised order requiring the installation of a 

severe-accident-capable hardened containment vent for boiling-water reactors with Mark I and II 

containments. Licensees are implementing this order in two phases. The NRC received the 

licensees’ integrated plans for compliance with Phases 1 and 2 of that order by June 2014 and 

December 2015, respectively. The NRC has issued interim staff evaluations for Phase 1 and 

has issued the majority of the interim staff evaluations for Phase 2. Licensees will begin coming 

into compliance with this order in fall 2017, with full implementation for all sites by June 2019. 

The NRC also requested that nuclear power plant licensees reevaluate flooding and seismic 

hazards that could affect their sites. If these newly reevaluated hazards are not bound by the 

current design basis, licensees are required to determine whether interim protective measures 

are needed while they complete a longer term evaluation of the hazard’s impact on the plant. 

Following Commission direction, the NRC staff is now implementing the closure plan for the 

flooding hazard reevaluations. As part of this plan, the NRC staff is reviewing flooding hazard 

reevaluation reports submitted by licensees and is issuing an interim assessment of those 

reports. As of September 2016, all but two sites have completed their flooding hazard 

reevaluation reports (FHRRs) and submitted them to the NRC for review. The remaining two 

sites have been granted extensions and are awaiting data from the USACE. The staff will 

establish the due dates for these two sites when the licensee or the NRC receives the data from 

USACE. The NRC has issued staff assessments for 23 of the FHRRs, and the NRC staff 

expects to complete the technical assessment of the remaining FHRRs by the end of 2017. 

Licensees are expected to use the information in the assessment letters to ensure that their 

mitigating strategies can be implemented under the reevaluated hazard conditions. Most 

licensees are expected to complete their mitigation strategies assessment by December 2016. 

Depending on site-specific considerations, other evaluations may be required, beyond those 

associated with mitigating strategies. The staff will determine the need for any other evaluations 

using a graded approach to ensure that plants are appropriately protected against the 

reevaluated flooding hazards. This graded approach focuses on areas with the most potential 

safety benefit. Those sites that had flood-causing mechanisms that exceeded their current 

design basis are required to perform additional analysis (e.g., focused evaluation or integrated 

assessment) to evaluate the site response to the updated flood hazard. The focused 

evaluations are due in mid-2017, and the integrated assessments are due by the end of 2018. 

The NRC staff issued guidance on the graded evaluation approach in July 2016. 

In October 2015, the NRC issued a letter establishing the final list of operating reactor sites that 

will be required to perform a full seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) and other seismic 

evaluations. As discussed in that letter, 20 sites (36 units) will be required to perform an SPRA. 

For the remaining reactors, the NRC staff concluded that sufficient margin exists such that a 

detailed SPRA is not needed. The first SPRAs are due to the NRC in March 2017, and all 

SPRAs will be received by December 2019. Of the remaining sites, 32 will perform 

limited-scope evaluations (i.e., a high-frequency evaluation, low-frequency evaluation, or spent 

fuel pool evaluation). Eleven sites have screened out and will not need any further seismic 

evaluations. As of September 30, 2016, the NRC staff has completed its assessment and 

closed out all required actions concerning seismic hazard reevaluations for 17 sites. 
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Sites that are required to conduct an SPRA submitted interim actions or evaluations in 

December 2014 or January 2016 as part of the expedited seismic evaluation process. These 

evaluations assessed systems and components used to shut down a plant safely under certain 

accident conditions to (1) confirm that a plant has sufficient margin to continue with a longer 

term evaluation without any plant modifications or (2) identify the need to enhance the seismic 

capacity of the plant. The NRC staff has completed its review of the expedited seismic 

evaluation process submittals and found them to be acceptable. 

The Commission previously approved consolidating the station blackout mitigation strategies 

rulemaking with the onsite emergency response capabilities rulemaking, as well as including 

portions of the emergency planning recommendations. The consolidation enables the NRC to 

use resources more efficiently to produce an integrated and coherent set of requirements for 

addressing beyond-design-basis events. In August 2015, the Commission approved the draft 

proposed rule, which was made available for public comment in November 2015. The public 

comment period closed in February 2016. The NRC received 20 public comment letters. The 

NRC staff is reviewing the public comments and will revise the rulemaking package accordingly. 

The staff will deliver the final rule package to the Commission by the end of 2016. 

The NRC has moved forward with resolving the lower priority Tier 2 and 3 recommendations 

that have not already been addressed and provided a proposed resolution for each 

recommendation to the Commission in late 2015. The Commission approved the staff’s 

proposals, including closure of a number of the recommendations. The staff will provide its 

evaluations for the final three open Tier 2 and 3 recommendations to the Commission by the 

end of 2016. 

The NRC continues to place a high level of importance on public interaction for all of the 

activities stemming from the Fukushima lessons learned. The NRC held dozens of public 

meetings in FY 2016 discussing Fukushima lessons learned, and these opportunities for 

collaboration with the public, industry, and other stakeholders have improved the effectiveness 

and efficiency of the NRC’s actions. In addition, the NRC continues to actively engage with the 

international community on the evaluation and response to lessons learned from the accident. 

The Fukushima activities described above demonstrate consistent progress in completing safety 

enhancements at U.S. facilities in response to lessons learned from the accident. The NRC 

expects that the majority of the safety benefit from the post-Fukushima enhancements will be in 

place by December 31, 2016. The work remaining past 2016 is primarily associated with 

completing the severe-accident-capable hardened vents order, activities associated with 

reevaluated flooding and seismic hazards, postorder compliance inspections, and 

implementation of long-term NRC oversight. 

XI. Planned Rulemaking Activities 

As of October 14, 2016, the NRC is working on a total of 81 rulemaking activities. Of these, 62 

are planned rulemaking activities, 2 are approved by the Commission for discontinuation (the 

NRC staff is developing the required documentation to inform the public that the rulemakings 

are discontinued), and 17 are petitions for rulemaking that the NRC is reviewing. The 

62 planned rulemaking activities include 9 rulemakings in response to industry requests, 

7 rulemakings that could reduce or clarify existing requirements, 26 rulemakings that would 

comply with congressional statute or conform NRC regulations to other agency requirements or 

to international treaties or agreements, and 20 rulemakings that could establish new 

requirements. The attachment provides the most current information available as of 
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October 14, 2016, for all planned rulemaking activities, including their priority and schedule. By 

May 2017, the NRC will implement a single tracking and reporting system that will provide realtime updates to the public on all NRC rulemaking activities.