. . 

I 

TXXEA~TORNEYGENERAL 

OF TEXAS 

I AUlSlWJ. TExAa m3vll 

April 4, 1974 

The Honorable Henry Wade Opinion No. H- 270 

District Attorney 

Dallas County Government Center Re: Whether the respondent in 

Dailaa. Texas 75202 a cause filed under the Uniform Reciprocal Support Act 

Dear Mr. Wade: is entitled to a jury trial 

You have aeked our opinion on the question of whether a respondent 

in a cause filed under the Uniform Reciproca! Enforcement of Support 

Act is entitled to a jury trial. 

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act hae been 

enacted 81 Chapter 21 of the Texas Family Code. It derive8 from Art. 

232&3b-4, V. T. C. S., enacted by the 59th Ltgirlature in 1965, and from 

e8rlier similar legislation. 

We considered a similar question in opinion No. H-218 but confined 

our reply to contempt proceeding6 brought under the Uniform Reciprocal 

Enforcement of Support Act where an obligation to support had already 

been validly fixed by another court and in which enforcement by contempt 

of court war the only iaBue. 

Opinion No. H-218 was written in rerrponee to an inquiry by the 

Honorable Tom Hanna, Criminal District Attorney of Jefferson County, 

Texas, and he, like you, haa requested that we broaden the opinion and 

state “whether a respondent in a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 

Support Act to net the amount of child support is entitled to c jury trial.” 

This opinion is intended aa an anrwer to Mr. Hahna’ inquiry 81 well as 

to yours. 

Ae indicated in Mr. Henna’6 supplemental inquiry a court in a 

Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act proceeding hre authop. 1264 
The Honor8ble Henry Wade, page 2 (H-270) 

rity to set the amount of child support. Other issues which might come 

before the court in such a proceeding 8re the need for child support, 

the duty to contribute, which would involve prrenthood, 8nd other rel8ted 

issues. 

We believe thrt such proceedings rre controlled by $11.13 of the 

Tex8a F8mily Code which provide6 8s follows: 

“(a) In 8 suit 8ffecting the parent-child ret.- 

tionrhip, except 8 suit in which adoption ia nought, 

8ny p8rty nuy demand 8 jury trial. 

“(b) The verdict of the jury ie binding on the 

court except with respect to the iaeueo of nunaging 

conaerv.torclhip, poesersion, 8nd support of and 

8cceae to 8 child, on which the verdict ir rdviaory 

only. provided, however, the court may not enter 8 

decree that contravene8 the verdict of the jury on 

the ir#uer of managing coneervatorrhip, porresaion 

of, or 8cceaB to 8 child. ” 

We believe that the 8dvinory jury specified in 0 11.13(b) i6 8vailrble 

in Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act proceeding8 and thus, 

in answer to Mr. Hanna’r supplemental inquiry, such rn 8dvirory jury 

would be available where the court is setting the amount of child support 

in such 8 proceeding. The right to 8 jury concerning other issuea would 

be governed by the terms of § 11.13. 

Accordingly, while 8 jury ie not avrilrble to 8 respondent in 8 

contempt proceeding filed under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement 

of Support Act to enforce 8 previous valid order of child support [see 

Attorney Gener81 Opinion H-218 (1974)], the provisions of 0 11.13 of the 

F8mily Code, making 8 jury avril8ble in suit6 affecting the p8rent-child 

relrtionahip, are appliuble to other leg81 irauea which might arise in 

Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act proceeding8 in rccordrnce 

with the term8 of s8id 0 11.13. 

p. 1265 
. . 

The Honorrble Henry Wade, page 3 (H-270) 

SUMMARY 

A jury ir available to a reopondent in noncontempt Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 

Act proceeding0 if one of the ieauer rpecified in 8 11.13 

of the Family Code ir before the court. 

Very truly yourr, 

P 

A?& 

JOHN L. HILL 

Attorney General of Texrr 

DAVID M. KENDALL, Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

p. 1266