SECRETARY 

DECISION ITEM: 

TITLE: 

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 

March 9, 2016 

COMMISSION VOTING RECORD 

SECY-15-0168 

RECOMMENDATIONS ON ISSUES RELATED TO 

IMPLEMENTATION OF A RISK MANAGEMENT REGULATORY 

FRAMEWORK 

The Commission acted on the subject paper as recorded in the Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SRM) of March 9, 2016. 

This Record contains a summary of voting on this matter together with the individual vote 

sheets, views and comments of the Commission. 

~ l~ill4 -1_yV 

Enclosures: 

1. Voting Summary 

2. Commissioner Vote Sheets 

cc: Chairman Burns 

Commissioner Svinicki 

Commissioner Ostendorff 

Commissioner Baran 

OGC 

EDO 

PDR 

AnnetteC\Jietti-Cook 

Secretary of the Commission 
VOTING SUMMARY - SECY-15-0168 

RECORDED VOTES 

NOT 

APPROVED DISAPPROVED ABSTAIN PARTICIPATING COMMENTS DATE 

Chrm . Burns x x 02/25/16 

Cmr. Svinicki x x 02/11 /16 

Cmr. Ostendorff x x 01 /28/16 

Cmr. Baran x x 02/02/16 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

Chairman Burns 

SECY-15-0168: RECOMMENDATIONS ON ISSUES 

RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF A RISK 

MANAGEMENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 

Approved X Disapproved Abstain Not Participating 

COMMENTS: Below 

Entered in STARS 

Yes x --

No 

-- --

Attached X None 

t.~ February 2016 

Date 
Chairman Burns Comments on SECY-15-0168 

Recommendations on Issues Related to Implementation of a 

Risk Management Regulatory Framework 

In this paper, the staff presents its recommendations regarding the Risk Management 

Regulatory Framework outlined in NUREG-2150, as well as associated consideration of a risk 

management policy statement. The staff also discusses its actions based on direction from the 

Commission in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) associated with SECY-13-0132, 

"U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Recommendation for the Disposition of 

Recommendation 1 of the Near-Term Task Force Report." Finally, the staff provides 

information on the interrelationships between various risk-informed nuclear power reactor safety 

initiatives. 

I appreciate the effort that went into developing this paper and the associated documents. 

have carefully reviewed the staff's recommendations and discussed this subject with the nonconcurring individual, whom I commend for the clear presentation of her views. I strongly 

support risk-informed, performance-based regulation as an agency philosophy, and we should 

continue to pursue means to risk-inform our regulatory approach within the existing framework. 

In the current fiscal environment, however, we must make tough decisions about the activities 

we pursue and focus on those with tangible benefits to our safety and security mission. 

Therefore, I support the staff's recommendations to maintain the existing regulatory framework 

for the nuclear power reactor safety program area and refrain from developing an overarching , 

agency-wide risk management policy statement. The staff stated that its ongoing activities to 

implement specific risk-informed approaches will continue regardless of the decision on an 

agency-wide risk management policy statement, and I wholeheartedly agree that they should. 

More specifically, I approve the staff's recommendation to use the existing risk-informed 

framework to continue to make regulatory improvements where appropriate, without creating a 

formal mandatory or voluntary risk-informed licensing basis for operating reactors at this time. 

The staff stated that it believes that the adoption of a risk-informed regulatory framework, similar 

in concept to an RMRF, would provide the greatest benefits for new reactor designs that employ 

non-traditional technologies and that it would continue to engage stakeholders interested in 

pursuing such a risk-informed framework. In developing the licensing process for advanced 

reactor designs, the staff should evaluate options for establishing a risk-informed, performancebased framework and present them for Commission consideration when appropriate. 

I also approve the staff's recommendation not to adopt a new "design-basis extension" category 

of events. I support the staff's plans to revise internal rulemaking guidance, addressing the 

regulatory attributes, such as documentation and treatment of equipment associated with 

beyond-design-basis requirements. The staff should inform the Commission when this revision 

is complete. 

In addition, I approve the staff's recommendation not to prepare a formal agency-wide definition 

and criteria for defense in depth. I appreciate the staff's effort to collect historical perspectives 

in a knowledge-management report on the defense-in-depth philosophy. Moving forward , I 

support the staff's activities to enhance the defense-in-depth guidance for risk-informed 

licensing basis changes at nuclear power plants in Regulatory Guide 1.17 4. I believe that this 

approach will provide flexibility for various applications while clarifying the staff's expectations 

for licensing-basis change requests. 
Finally, I approve the staff's recommendation not to develop an agency-wide risk management 

policy statement. I note that many previous Commission documents articulate support for riskinformed regulation, from the SRM on SECY-98-144, "White Paper on Risk-Informed and 

Performance-Based Regulation," to the Principles of Good Regulation and the NRC Strategic 

Plan. The Commission recently echoed and strengthened these ideas in the SRM on SECY-15-

0015, "Project AIM 2020 Report and Recommendations," stating that the NRC should identify 

and consider additional opportunities to apply more broadly risk insights to enhance our 

decision-making beyond traditional technical issues. While a Commission policy statement may 

focus attention on our risk-informed activities, it is more likely that success in implementing 

specific existing initiatives will invite further interest and innovation. The staff should continue its 

active engagement with the industry to further pursue means to risk-inform our regulatory 

approaches. 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

COMMISSIONER SVINICKI 

SECY-15-0168: RECOMMENDATIONS ON ISSUES 

RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF A RISK 

MANAGEMENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 

Approved XX Disapproved Abstain Not Participating -- -- --

COMMENTS: Below Attached XX None 

DA TE02/ // 

116 

Entered on "STARS" Yes o _ 
Commissioner Svinicki's Comments on SECY-15-0168 

Recommendations on Issues Related to Implementation of a 

Risk Management Regulatory Framework 

I approve the staff's recommendations that the Commission direct the staff to do the following : 

1) Maintain the existing regulatory framework for the nuclear power reactor safety program area 

and 2) Refrain from developing an overarching, agency-wide risk management policy statement. 

I appreciate the work undertaken by the staff in arriving at these recommendations. I also 

considered carefully the written non-concurrence, the supplemental information provided by the 

non-concurring individual, and insights arising from the thoughtful discussion we had during a 

meeting with the individual. On balance, the staff's recommendations are rooted in a careful 

review of activities currently underway to implement risk-informed approaches within NRG 

program areas and the potential benefits of undertaking further generic exploration and 

definition of risk policies. The staff's assessment was both broad and deep. Based on my 

deliberation, I conclude that the staff's recommendations are well-reasoned and approve them 

on the bases given by the staff in the paper. 

At bottom , the staff recommends that the NRC maintain its existing regulatory framework for 

nuclear power reactor safety and continue to make risk-informed regulatory improvements on 

an incremental basis. The staff notes that regulatory improvements in response to the 

Fukushima Dai-lchi accident are being successfully implemented under the existing regulatory 

framework and that maintaining the existing regulatory framework and processes would 

maintain the approach to regulation that has been successful and is well-understood. I agree. 

As I noted in my vote on SECY-13-0132, "When looked at as a whole, our history demonstrates 

a tremendous coherency in approaching defense-in-depth. Better still, because we do not 

embrace one rote and regimented approach to this foundational concept, the NRC preserves 

flexibility in tailoring applications of defense-in-depth, a flexibility that has served us well and can 

continue to do so." 

Among the staff's specific conclusions is that a new category of events for beyond the design 

basis should not be established within our regulatory framework. I agree and approve the staff's 

approach that all future nuclear power reactor regulations (especially those proposing to impose 

beyond-design-basis requirements) should include consistent and comprehensive rule language 

addressing all necessary regulatory attributes. This is more efficient and transparent, as well as 

providing ease in Commission review of such proposals in deciding whether such beyonddesign-basis requirements are sufficiently justified for inclusion in proposed and final rules 

before the Commission for approval. 

The staff also recommends against developing a definition of and criteria for determining 

adequacy of defense-in-depth. Appropriate consideration of defense-in-depth has been given 

historically through the regulations, policy statements, guidance documents, and nuclear power 

plant design without a formal definition or specific criteria. As noted by Commissioners 

Ostendorff and Baran, in their votes, defense-in-depth can be likened to a "philosophy" rather 

than a "formula ," with parallels to the application of expert judgment needed in arriving at 

determinations of the legal standard of "adequate protection." Their comments bring to mind the 

Circuit Court for the District of Columbia's view in Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRG: 

[T]he "adequate protection" standard may be given content through case-by-case 

applications of [the Commission's] technical judgment rather than by a mechanical 

verbal formula or set of objective standards[.] "Congress did not define 'adequate 

protection,' nor did it command the Commission to define it." ... We elect not to second-
guess the Commission's discretion in "mak[ing] sound judgments about what 'adequate 

protection' requires, by relying on expert engineering and scientific judgment, acting in 

light of all relevant and material information."1 

The work of nuclear safety regulation will always be complex and application of riskmanagement principles in resolving these issues will not in many instances lend itself to generic 

approaches. I am confident - given the quality of the work we do - that we will continue to 

elevate the sophistication of our use of risk-insights throughout all of our program areas as we 

move into the future, including our approach to enterprise risk management for our own NRC 

organization. I agree that the activities that the staff recommends not pursuing here are not 

central to this task. 

1 880 F.2d 552, 558 (1989) (quoting Revision of Backfitting Process for Power Reactors, 53 Fed. Reg. 

20,603, 20,605-06 (June 6, 1988)) (fifth alteration in original). 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

COMMISSSIONER OSTENDORFF 

SECY-15-0168: RECOMMENDATIONS ON ISSUES 

RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF A RISK 

MANAGEMENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 

Approved X Disapproved Abstain Not Participating 

COMMENTS: Below Attached X None 

Entered in STARS 

Yes X 

-- No 

Date ' I 
Commissioner Ostendorff's Comments on SECY-15-0168: 

"Recommendations on Issues Related To Implementation of a Risk Management 

Regulatory Framework" 

I approve the staff's recommendations to: 1) maintain the existing regulatory framework for 

nuclear power reactor safety and continue to make risk-informed regulatory improvements on 

an incremental basis and 2) not pursue an agencywide risk management policy statement. 

I appreciate the holistic review of these matters as presented by the staff in SECY-15-0168 and 

the discussion of differing views that was provided. Evaluation of these issues has benefited 

greatly from additional in-depth staff consideration, stakeholder input, and review by the 

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. Several recent Commission decisions also have a 

bearing on this vote. These include COMWDM-14-0002, "Improving Safety and Regulatory 

Effectiveness by Enhancing the NRC's Framework for Risk-Informed Decision Making," wherein 

the Commission disapproved a proposal to require operating reactor licensees to submit 

probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) information to the NRC and maintain and update these 

PRAs. Additionally, other ongoing NRC initiatives to enhance the NRC's regulatory processes, 

some of which were directed by the Commission post-Fukushima relate to this issue. These 

include: (1) updates to staff guidance on regulatory analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and the 

consideration of qualitative factors; (2) development of a NUREG to consolidate and document 

the history and associated general observations on defense-in-depth; and (3) improved staff 

guidance for evaluating defense-in-depth issues in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.17 4. These 

incremental enhancements to our existing regulatory framework represent a pragmatic 

approach to enhancing regulatory clarity and transparency in regulatory decision-making. 

During my deliberations on this SECY paper, I benefited from a constructive meeting with a nonconcurring individual. As a result of this discussion, I took a closer look at the issue of defensein-depth. I carefully reviewed the 2011 draft revision to RG 1.17 4. I am pleased with the staff's 

efforts to clarify how licensee-proposed, risk-informed changes should be evaluated to ensure 

that they are consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy. I note that the revision to this RG 

is on hold pending Commission direction on SECY-15-0168 and I encourage the staff to 

complete this revision expeditiously upon issuance of the staff requirements memorandum for 

this SECY. I also reviewed a preliminary draft NUREG on defense-in-depth that is being 

developed in response to SRM-SECY-13-0132. I appreciate the effort that has gone into 

preparing this draft NUREG. When completed, this document will represent a thorough and 

comprehensive review of defense-in-depth that will serve as an effective knowledge 

management tool. I note that this draft NUREG makes numerous references to the July 12, 

2011 , Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) report "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety 

in the 21st Century." The NTTF stated in this report that "[t]he Task Force has found that the 

defense-in-depth philosophy is a useful and broadly applied concept. It is not, however, 

susceptible to a rigid definition because it is a philosophy." This statement resonated with me, 

and I agree that defense-in-depth is a philosophy. I also see a close parallel with the standard 

of adequate protection. The NRC is afforded significant discretion in determining whether the 

adequate protection standard has been met and the NRC makes case-by-case determinations 

on adequate protection. The NRC also makes case-by-case determinations on defense-indepth as demonstrated by the Commission's post-Fukushima decision-making. Based on this 

experience, I do not support additional efforts to develop a specific definition of and criteria for 

determining the adequacy of defense-in-depth. 

I support the staff's commitments to develop internal rulemaking guidance to ensure that all new 

nuclear power reactor regulations include consistent and comprehensive rule language 
addressing all necessary regulatory attributes, and the staff's plan to engage stakeholders on 

the path forward for 10 CFR 50.46(a). The staff should inform the Commission of the outcome 

of stakeholder interactions before expending additional resources on the 50.46(a) rulemaking 

effort. 

In my votes on SECY-11-0093, "Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions 

Following the Events in Japan," and SECY-13-0132, "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Staff Recommendation for the Disposition of Recommendation 1 of the Near Term-Task Force 

Report," I reiterated my statement at a July 19, 2011 , public meeting that, "While I support 

thoughtful consideration of any potential safety enhancements in a systematic and holistic 

manner, I do not believe that our existing regulatory framework is broken ." I further stated that 

"the current regulatory approach has served the Commission and the public well." Experience 

has borne this out during the NRC's post-Fukushima regulatory decision-making and I am even 

more convinced today of the continuing adequacy of the NRC's regulatory framework. 
TO: 

FROM : 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

Commissioner Baran 

SECY-15-0168: RECOMMENDATIONS ON ISSUES 

RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF A RISK 

MANAGEMENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 

Approved X Disapproved Abstain Not Participating 

COMMENTS: Below 

Entered in STARS 

Yes XX 

No 

-- --

Attached X None 

Date 
Commissioner Saran's Comments on SECY-15-0168, "Recommendations on Issues 

Related to Implementation of a Risk Management Regulatory Framework" 

In this policy paper, the NRC staff recommends (1) maintaining the existing regulatory 

framework for the nuclear power reactor safety program and (2) refraining from developing an 

overarching, agencywide risk management policy statement. I appreciate the staff's work on the 

paper, as well as the high-quality non-concurrence, which I found very helpful in my consideration 

of these issues. 

The first staff recommendation to "maintain the existing regulatory framework for the 

nuclear power reactor safety program area" is very broadly framed . Rather than opine on this 

broad statement, I will focus on the two specific elements of this item: ( 1) a recommendation not to 

establish a formal design basis extension category of requirements and (2) a recommendation not 

to develop a definition of and criteria for determining adequacy of defense in depth. 

I agree with the staff that it is not necessary to establish a formal design basis extension 

category at this time. In my view, it is better for the agency to focus its resources on implementing 

the tangible safety enhancements identified in response to the Fukushima accident. 

I also agree with the staff that it is not necessary to develop a Commission policy statement 

on defense in depth or other formal definition of and criteria for determining the adequacy of 

defense in depth. I concur with the staff's statement that "NRC will continue its long-held 

commitment to the defense-in-depth concept; to the regulation of nuclear reactor issues beyond 

the traditional design-basis events, where appropriate; and to the inclusion of the defense-in-depth 

concept as an essential component of risk-informed regulation." However, I think there is 

significant value in taking a flexible approach to defense in depth, particularly across different 

program areas, such as nuclear reactors, fuel cycle facilities, waste, and materials licensees. As 

the staff paper explains, "[a] high-level defense in depth policy is unlikely to be specific enough to 

be useful to all agency programs." Like a determination of what constitutes "adequate protection," 

decisions about the adequacy of defense in depth may not be amenable to fixed , precise 

definitions. Defense in depth is a philosophy rather than a formula. Nevertheless, I support the 

staff's effort to update Regulatory Guide 1.17 4 on defense in depth in order to improve the clarity of 

the guidance. 

In its discussion of initiatives to advance risk-informed decisionmaking, the staff states that 

"[i]n the area of oversight, the staff is looking at options for risk-informing the response to 

operability issues of low safety significance." An approach that would permit licensees to avoid 

timely compliance with NRC's regulatory requirements raises significant policy issues. The staff 

should provide a notation vote paper to the Commission prior to taking steps to "risk inform the 

response to operability issues of low safety significance." 

I agree with the staff that it is not necessary to develop a Commission policy statement on 

risk management. The non-concurrence is correct that probabilistic risk assessment is only one 

tool for analyzing risk and that the existing probabilistic risk assessment policy statement is not 

equivalent to a risk management policy statement. But, in my view, the agency's resources should 

be focused on higher priority activities with clearer benefits. 

In the paper, the staff states that it will prepare a COMSECY to inform the Commission of 

the results of the stakeholder interactions on the draft final 10 CFR 50.46a Risk-Informed 

Emergency Core Cooling System rule and the staff's plans and schedule for addressing the rule. 

support this approach.