Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Readiness, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

April 2003 MILITARY 

READINESS 

DOD Needs a Clear 

and Defined Process 

for Setting Aircraft 

Availability Goals in 

the New Security 

Environment 

GAO-03-300 
Less than one-half of the 49 key active-duty aircraft models that GAO 

reviewed met their MC or FMC goals during fiscal years 1998-2002. The 

levels of mission capability varied by military service and type of aircraft, 

and the levels at which the goals were set also varied widely, even among the 

same type of aircraft. However, the MC and FMC goals for each model 

changed little over time. Since 1998, only 11 of 49 aircraft models (22 

percent) experienced a change to their goals. Seven of the changes were to 

raise the goals to higher levels. Difficulties in meeting the goals are caused 

by a complex combination of logistical and operational factors. 

Percentage of Aircraft Models Meeting MC and FMC Goals, Fiscal Years 1998-2002 

Despite their importance, DOD does not have a clear and defined process for 

setting aircraft availability goals. The goal-setting process is largely 

undefined and undocumented, and there is widespread uncertainty among 

the military services over how the goals were established, who is responsible 

for setting them, and the continuing adequacy of MC and FMC goals as 

measures of aircraft availability. Uncertainty and the lack of documentation 

in setting the goals ultimately obscures basic perceptions of readiness and 

operational effectiveness, undermines congressional confidence in the basis 

for DOD’s funding requests, and brings into question the appropriateness of 

those goals to the new defense strategy. DOD guidance does not define the 

availability goals that the services must establish or require any objective 

methodology for setting them. Nor does it require the services to identify one 

office as the coordinating agent for goal setting or to document the basis for 

the goals chosen. DOD officials told GAO that the guidance has not been 

updated since 1990 to reflect the new security environment of increased 

deployments and other changes since the end of the Cold War. 

The attacks on 9/11/2001 show that 

threats to U.S. security can now 

come from any number of terrorist 

groups, at any number of locations, 

and in wholly unexpected ways. As 

a result, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) is shifting to a new defense 

strategy focused on dealing with 

uncertainty by acting quickly 

across a wide range of combat 

conditions. One key ingredient of 

the new strategy is the availability 

of aircraft to carry out their 

missions. Key measures of 

availability include the percentage 

of time an aircraft can perform at 

least one or all of its assigned 

missions, termed the “mission 

capable” (MC) and “full mission 

capable” (FMC) rates, respectively. 

At the Subcommittee’s request, 

GAO examined whether key DOD 

aircraft have been able to meet MC 

and FMC goals in recent years, and 

DOD’s process for setting aircraft 

availability goals. 

GAO recommends that DOD review 

the current goals to ensure that 

they have a valid basis and are 

appropriate to the new defense 

strategy, and revise its instructions 

to ensure that such measures are 

based on a clearly defined and 

documented process and objective 

methodology. DOD concurred or 

partially concurred with all of 

GAO’s recommendations and 

outlined planned actions to address 

them. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-300.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Neal Curtin at 

(757) 552-8100 or Curtinn@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-300, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

April 2003

MILITARY READINESS

DOD Needs a Clear and Defined Process 

for Setting Aircraft Availability Goals in 

the New Security Environment 
Page i GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

DOD Aircraft Experienced Widespread Problems in Meeting MC 

and FMC Goals 8

Mission Capable Problems Caused by a Combination of Factors 16

DOD’S Goal-Setting Process Is Largely Undefined and 

Undocumented 24

Conclusions 31

Recommendations for Executive Action 32

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Appendix I Mission Capable Goals and Rates, Fiscal Years 

1991-2002 36 

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 51 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 53 

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 57 

Tables 

Table 1: Key DOD Aircraft Models 6

Table 2: Air Combat Command Interim MC Goals, Fiscal Years 

2000-2002 16

Table 3: Aircraft Ages and 2002 MC Rates/Goals 19

Figures 

Figure 1: Percentage of Aircraft Models Meeting MC and FMC 

Goals, Fiscal Years 1998-2002 9

Figure 2: Percentage of Aircraft Models Meeting MC Goals by 

Service, Fiscal Years 1998-2002 10

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Figure 3: Average Annual MC Rates by Service, Fiscal Years 1998-

2002 11

Figure 4: Average Annual FMC Rates by Service, Fiscal Years 1998-

2002 12

Figure 5: Average Annual MC Rates by Aircraft Type, Fiscal Years 

1998-2002 13

Figure 6: Average Annual FMC Rates by Aircraft Type, Fiscal Years 

1998-2002 14

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

FMC full mission capable 

GAO General Accounting Office 

MC mission capable 

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. 

Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 

copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product. 
Page 1 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

April 7, 2003 

The Honorable Joel Hefley 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, clearly demonstrated that the 

U.S. security landscape has changed. The familiar Cold War threats of 

large-scale wars between nation states in predictable areas such as the 

Koreas and the Middle East have been joined by a broad array of new 

threats characterized by surprise and uncertainty. Attacks on U.S. security 

can now come from any number of terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, in 

any number of locations, and in wholly unexpected ways. As a result of the 

changed security environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

rethought defense strategy and is shifting to a “capabilities-based” 

approach focused on contending with uncertainty by enhancing its ability 

to act quickly and decisively across a wide range of combat conditions and 

locations. 

One key ingredient of the new strategy is the availability of aircraft to 

carry out their assigned missions. DOD requires each military service to 

establish availability goals for aircraft and other major weapon systems, 

and measures of the degree to which those goals are met.1

 Key measures 

include the percentage of time that an aircraft can perform at least one or 

all of its assigned missions, termed the “mission capable” (MC) and “full 

mission capable” (FMC) rates, respectively. MC and FMC goals and rates 

are fundamental indicators of readiness expectations. They are also used 

by DOD as indicators of maintenance and supply effectiveness and are 

made available to the Congress for its general oversight of DOD. 

Moreover, the level at which the goals are set also influences large 

amounts of military spending for aircraft procurements, spare parts 

inventories, and other resources needed to meet the goals. However, our 

recent reports have identified problems in meeting MC goals among 

 1

See Department of Defense Instruction 3110.5, Materiel Condition Reporting for MissionEssential Systems and Equipment, Sept. 14, 1990. 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

certain aircraft. For example, we reported in June 2000 that many of the 

cargo aircraft needed to meet wartime airlift requirements were not 

meeting MC goals.2

Concerned that the new capabilities-based strategy may be difficult to 

carry out if aircraft are experiencing problems in meeting existing 

availability goals, you requested that we examine DOD’s structure for 

establishing MC and FMC goals for aircraft in the Air Force, Army, Navy, 

and Marine Corps. This report addresses (1) whether key active-duty 

aircraft have been able to meet existing MC and FMC goals, (2) the causes 

of any difficulties in meeting those goals, and (3) whether DOD has a clear 

and defined process for setting aircraft availability goals. We performed 

our review from February through November 2002 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix II describes 

the scope and methodology of our work. 

Less than one-half of DOD’s key active-duty aircraft models have met their 

MC and FMC goals since 1998.3 For example, during fiscal years 1998-2002, 

only 23-35 percent of the 49 aircraft models we reviewed were able to 

meet their MC goals. Similarly, some 31-49 percent of the models met their 

FMC goals during the same period. In most cases, the actual rates were at 

least 5 percentage points below the goals. The level of mission capability 

varied by military service and by type of aircraft. The Army and Air Force 

had the highest average MC rates, at 77-83 percent over the past 5 years; 

followed by the Marines, at about 71-75 percent; and the Navy, at 61-67 

percent. Rates have increased slightly since fiscal year 2001 in all services 

except the Navy. Average MC rates were the highest for helicopters, at 76-

80 percent; followed by cargo aircraft and tankers, at 75-79 percent; 

fighter/attack aircraft, at 75-77 percent; bombers, at 64-69 percent; and 

electronic command/control aircraft, at 60-67 percent. Average FMC rates 

followed similar rank order patterns. The level at which the goals were set 

showed little consistency, varying widely even among the same type of 

 2

See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: Air Transport Capability Falls 

Short of Requirements, GAO/NSIAD-00-135 (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2000). 

3

We focused our report on fiscal years 1998-2002 because the Navy and Marine Corps 

changed their reporting system in 1998 and were unable to provide data separated by 

service for previous years. (The Marine Corps is a separate service under the Department 

of the Navy and follows Navy regulations governing MC and FMC goals and performance 

measures.). Appendix I provides MC and FMC data for all services, including Army and Air 

Force data back to fiscal year 1991. 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

aircraft. For example, MC goals for the bombers and fighters in our review 

ranged from 50 to 80 percent and 65 to 83 percent, respectively. While the 

level at which the goals were set showed little consistency, MC and FMC 

goals have changed little over time. Since 1998, only 11 of 49 aircraft 

models (22 percent) experienced a change to their goals. Seven of these 

changes were to raise the goals. 

Difficulties in meeting the goals are caused by a combination of 

interrelated logistical and operational factors, with no dominating single 

problem. For example, depending upon the missions and capabilities it 

was designed to provide, each aircraft can be inherently complex and 

prone to failure or be simple and easy to maintain and available more 

often. Complex aircraft require well-trained and experienced maintenance 

personnel. However, service officials frequently cited shortages of such 

personnel as a key cause of difficulties in meeting MC goals, and we have 

cited this as a major problem area for years. Age and overuse of the 

aircraft were cited as key factors as well. While age may affect MC rates, 

we found no statistical evidence that age alone explains the difficulties in 

meeting the MC goals. MC rates are also undermined by spare parts 

shortages. Such shortages may be particularly troublesome for older 

aircraft as they near the end of their projected life and spare parts 

inventories are reduced. We have previously reported on problems with 

spare parts shortages, and DOD is taking steps to increase the inventories 

of some parts.4

 Finally, perceived low funding levels and the way that 

maintenance systems are structured were also viewed as keys to low MC 

rates. For example, increases in the use of centralized depot-level 

maintenance were cited as a cause of maintenance delay and lowered MC 

rates. We have raised concerns for years that DOD’s downsizing of its 

depot infrastructure and workforce was done without sound strategic 

planning and that investments in facilities, equipment, and personnel have 

not been sufficient to ensure the long-term viability of the depots. 

DOD does not have a clear and defined process for setting aircraft 

availability goals. DOD’s goal-setting process is largely undefined and 

undocumented, and there is widespread uncertainty among the services 

over how the goals were established and who is responsible for setting 

them. Furthermore, the services have basic questions about the adequacy 

 4

See U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Force Depot Maintenance: Management 

Improvements Needed for Backlog of Funded Contract Maintenance Work, GAO-02-623

(Washington, D.C.; June 20, 2002). 
Page 4 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

of those goals as measures of aircraft availability. Uncertainty and the lack 

of documentation in setting MC and FMC goals ultimately obscures basic 

perceptions of readiness and operational effectiveness, undermines 

congressional confidence in the basis for funding requests, and brings into 

question the appropriateness of those goals to the new defense strategy. 

For example, the services could not explain and document how the 

original MC and FMC goals were set for any of the aircraft in our review. 

Navy and Air Force officials believed that the goals were generally based 

on analyses of historical performance rates of similar aircraft and/or 

subjective judgment. Moreover, in many cases, the services identified 

multiple offices as being responsible for setting the goals. But when 

contacted, each believed that the other was responsible. Some officials 

questioned which goals—the MC goals, the FMC goals, or some other 

goal—were the right ones to use in the new security environment. For 

example, a new measure of aircraft availability is being developed for the 

new Joint Strike Fighter, and MC and FMC goals are not being used. 

DOD’s instruction provides little or no guidance on these and other key 

issues. 5 For example, it requires the services to establish availability goals 

but does not define which goals should be established, even though it 

specifically requires the services to collect condition status information on 

MC, FMC, and other availability measures. The instruction also provides 

no standardized methodology for setting goals, requiring only that they 

include estimates of maximum aircraft performance, assuming peacetime 

usage levels and full funding of logistical support systems. Nor does it 

require the services to identify the pros and cons of setting the goals at 

different levels and the guiding principles used to make those decisions. 

Finally, it does not require the services to identify one office as the 

coordinating agent for goal setting or to document the basis for the goals 

chosen. DOD officials told us that the instruction has not been updated 

since 1990 to reflect the new security environment of increased 

deployments and other changes since the end of the Cold War. 

To ensure that aircraft availability goals are appropriate to the new 

defense strategy and consistent with a clear and defined process, we are 

recommending that DOD and the services (1) determine whether different 

types of goals are needed; (2) validate the basis for the existing goals; and 

(3) revise Instruction 3110.5 to clearly define the goals required to be 

established and their performance measures, establish a standard 

methodology with objective principles of analysis to be used by all 

 5

See DOD Instruction 3110.5. 
Page 5 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

services in setting goals, and require each service to identify a focal point 

for the development and documentation of the goal setting process. 

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with our 

recommendations. However, it believed that including the performance 

measures associated with the goals in Instruction 3110.5 would result in 

their being used as the primary measure of the overall state of materiel 

readiness. We agree that determinations of overall materiel readiness 

require consideration of a variety of factors beyond those identified in 

Instruction 3110.5. However, to avoid confusion and misunderstanding 

about basic aircraft performance, it is necessary to clearly identify the 

performance measures associated with the availability goals selected. This 

does not preclude the use of other metrics in broader assessments of 

materiel readiness. DOD also believed that the individual services, not the 

department, should be responsible for establishing their own detailed 

methodologies for goal setting because of the potential for variations in 

service environments and the types of goals used. We also agree that the 

services should have some leeway to accommodate differences between 

them. However, we continue to believe that all services should adhere to a 

standard set of overarching principles of analysis to safeguard objectivity 

and transparency in the goal-setting process. Such principles could be 

established in coordination with the services. The services could then 

develop detailed methodologies consistent with these principles but 

tailored to their own environments. For these reasons we made no change 

to our recommendations. 

DOD aircraft are used to perform a variety of different missions. However, 

for the purpose of this report, we have grouped them into five basic 

categories: (1) various models of fighter/attack aircraft, such as the F/A-18 

Hornet, provide air superiority or close air support of ground forces; (2) 

bombers, such as the B-1 Lancer, provide long- and short-range delivery of 

heavy munitions; (3) electronic command and control aircraft, such as the 

E-3 Sentry, provide airspace and battlefield reconnaissance, command, 

and control services; (4) tankers and cargo aircraft, such as the KC-135 

Stratotanker and the C-5 Galaxy, respectively, provide air refueling 

services and the ability to carry troops and equipment anywhere in the 

world; and (5) helicopters, with their ability to hover as well as conduct 

long- and short-range operations, are used for a variety of missions, 

including transportation of troops and equipment, air assault and 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

reconnaissance, and search and rescue operations. Our review included a 

total of 49 different aircraft models (over 5,600 individual aircraft in 2002) 

in these five categories.6

 These aircraft were considered by the services to 

be their key active-duty operational aircraft.7

 Table 1 lists these aircraft 

models, along with the military service using them, and their MC and FMC 

goals for fiscal year 2002. 

Table 1: Key DOD Aircraft Models 

2002 mission capable/full mission capable goals in percents 

Category 

Fighter/Attack 

aircraft Bombers 

Electronic 

command/control 

Tankers/Cargo 

aircraft Helicopters 

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

A-10 Thunderbolt 

Air Force 

82a

/NAb

B-1 Lancer 

Air Force 

67a/NAb

E-3 Sentry 

Air Force 

85a/NAb

C-5 Galaxy 

Air Force 

75a/45b

AH-64A Apache 

Army 

75a/70b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

F-15 Eagle 

Air Force 

83a

/NAb

B-2 Spirit 

Air Force 

50a/NAb

E-8 Joint Stars 

Air Force 

75a/NAb

C-17 Globemaster 

Air Force 

88a/78b

AH-64D Apache 

Army 

75a/70b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

F-15E Eagle 

Air Force 

81a

/NAb

B-52 Stratofortress 

Air Force 

80a/NAb

RC-135 Rivet Joint 

Air Force 

75a/NAb

C-130 Hercules 

Air Force 

75a/48b

UH-60A Black Hawk 

Army 

80a/75b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

F-16 Fighting Falcon 

Air Force 

83a

/NAb

 U-2 

Air Force 

85a/NAb

C-141 Starlifter 

Air Force 

80a/59b

UH-60L Black Hawk 

Army 

80a/75b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

F-117 Nighthawk 

Air Force 

80a

/NAb

 S-3B Viking 

Navy 

70a/54b

KC-135 Stratotanker 

Air Force 

85a/77b

CH-47D Chinook 

Army 

75a/70b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

F-14A Tomcat 

Navy 

65a

/50b

 E-2C Hawkeye 

Navy 

70a/54b

KC-10 Extender 

Air Force 

85a/77b

OH-58D Kiowa 

Army 

75a/70b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

F-14B Tomcat 

Navy 

65a

/50b

 P-3C Orion 

Navy 

85a/61b

KC-130F Hercules 

Marines 

72a/53b

SH-60B Seahawk 

Navy 

77a/58b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

F-14 D Tomcat 

Navy 

71a

/61b

 EA-6B Prowler 

Navy / Marines 

73a/54b

KC-130R Hercules 

Marines 

75a/58b

SH-60F Seahawk 

Navy 

75a/60b

 6

Three models (F/A-18A, F/A-18C, and EA-6B) were used by both the Navy and Marines. 

For our analyses, the Navy and Marine versions of each were considered to be separate 

models. 

7

To determine which aircraft should be included in the scope of our review, we used 

listings of key active duty aircraft provided by each service. We excluded aircraft operated 

by reserve units from the scope of our review, as well as active duty aircraft used for 

training and for transporting service officials on official business. 
Page 7 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

2002 mission capable/full mission capable goals in percents 

Category 

Fighter/Attack 

aircraft Bombers 

Electronic 

command/control 

Tankers/Cargo 

aircraft Helicopters 

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

F/A-18A Hornet 

Navy /Marines 

75a

/58b

 MH-53E Sea Dragon 

Navy 

70a/60b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

F/A-18C Hornet 

Navy / Marines 

75a

/58b

 CH-46E Sea Knight 

Marines 

80a/77b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

F/A-18D Hornet 

Marines 

75a

/58b

 CH-53D Sea Stallion 

Marines 

73a/65b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

F/A-18E Super Hornet 

Navy 

75a

/58b

 CH-53E Super Stallion 

Marines 

70a/60b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

AV-8B Harrier 

Marines 

76a

/70b

 AH-1W Super Cobra 

Marines 

85a/75b

Aircraft 

Service 

Goal 

 UH-1N Huey 

Marines 

85a

/75b

Source: Military services’ records. 

Legend: NA = not applicable. 

a

2002 mission capable goal. 

b

2002 full mission capable goal. 

DOD Instruction 3110.5, dated September 1990, requires all military 

services to establish quantitative availability goals and corresponding 

condition status measurements for these aircraft and other missionessential systems and equipment. The goals established must estimate the 

maximum aircraft performance that is achievable on the basis of the 

aircraft’s design characteristics and planned peacetime usage, and 

assuming full funding and optimal operation of the peacetime manpower 

and logistic support systems. Military personnel, civilian contractors, or 

both may perform the required maintenance under these systems. The 

instruction prescribes a basic set of condition status measures, including 

FMC, partial MC, and MC, that each service must use to describe the 

capability of systems or equipment. FMC indicates that an aircraft has all 

of the mission-essential systems and equipment it needs to perform all of 

its missions installed and operating safely. Mission-essential systems are 

those required to perform primary functions such as fire control, bombing, 

communications, electronic countermeasures, or radar. Partial MC 

indicates that an aircraft has the operable mission-essential equipment it 

needs to perform at least one of its missions, but not all. For example, an 

aircraft expected to be able to carry troops into combat during wartime in 
Page 8 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

all weather conditions, as well as to be able to fly humanitarian missions 

during peacetime, would be considered partial MC if some of its 

equipment were broken and it could fly only humanitarian missions in 

clear weather. MC consists of the sum of the partial MC and FMC 

measures; that is, the number of MC aircraft is equivalent to the sum of the 

aircraft rated partial MC and the aircraft rated FMC. This report focuses 

on MC and FMC goals because the Army, Navy/Marines, and parts of the 

Air Force do not establish separate partial MC goals. 

Many of DOD’s key aircraft have been unable to meet their MC and FMC 

goals since at least 1998. For example, during fiscal years 1998-2002, only 

23-35 percent of the 49 aircraft models we reviewed were able to meet 

their MC goals, and 31-49 percent met their FMC goals.8

 In most cases, the 

actual rates were at least 5 percentage points below the goals. Average MC 

and FMC rates varied by service and type of aircraft. For example, the 

Army and Air Force had the highest average MC rates, followed by the 

Marines and the Navy. These rates have increased slightly since fiscal year 

2001 in all services except the Navy. Among aircraft types, the average MC 

rates varied from 60 to 80 percent. Average MC rates were the highest for 

helicopters, followed by cargo aircraft and tankers, fighter/attack aircraft, 

bombers, and electronic command/control aircraft. While the rates have 

fluctuated, MC and FMC goals have generally remained constant over 

time. Since 1998, only 11 of 49 aircraft models (22 percent) experienced a 

change to their goals—and 7 of these changes were to raise the goals. 

DOD’s key, high-demand aircraft have experienced widespread difficulties 

in meeting MC and FMC goals since at least 1998. (Appendix I provides a 

full listing of MC and FMC goals, rates, and other information by year for 

each aircraft model we reviewed.) For example, during fiscal years 1998-

2002, the percentage of aircraft models meeting their MC goals never 

 8

FMC goals appear to be more difficult to meet because aircraft must be capable of 

performing more missions to meet them than MC goals. However, since the FMC goals 

were always lower, this resulted in higher percentages of aircraft models meeting the FMC 

goals in fiscal years 1998-2001. For example, current MC goals range from 3 to 30 

percentage points higher than FMC goals, with an average difference of 13 percentage 

points. 

DOD Aircraft 

Experienced 

Widespread Problems 

in Meeting MC and 

FMC Goals 

Less Than One-Half of the 

Aircraft Models Met Goals 
Page 9 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

exceeded 35 percent. (See fig. 1.)9 During this period, the rates for the 

individual aircraft models were more than 5 percentage points below their 

MC goals in 62 percent of the cases. The percentage of aircraft models 

meeting FMC goals during the same period ranged from 31 to 49 

percentage points, and 71 percent of the cases were more than 5 

percentage points below the goals. 

Figure 1: Percentage of Aircraft Models Meeting MC and FMC Goals, Fiscal Years 

1998-2002 

At the service level, Army aircraft generally met their MC goals the most 

frequently, followed by the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy. (See fig. 2.) 

The same rank order held for FMC goals. 

 9

The services provided overall yearly MC and FMC rates for each aircraft model we 

reviewed. We computed the percentage of aircraft models meeting their MC and FMC goals 

by taking the ratio of the total number of aircraft models meeting the goal in that year to 

the total number of aircraft models that could have met the goals in that year. 
Page 10 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Figure 2: Percentage of Aircraft Models Meeting MC Goals by Service, Fiscal Years 

1998-2002 

As previously shown in table 1, the level at which the goals were set 

showed little consistency, varying widely even among the same type of 

aircraft. For example, MC goals for the bombers in our review ranged from 

50 to 80 percent, and MC goals for the fighters, from 65 to 83 percent. 

Actual MC rates also varied between services and the various aircraft 

types. MC and FMC rates are based on the ratio of the number of hours an 

aircraft was actually available to the total number of hours it could have 

been available. The Navy/Marines and Air Force reduce the latter figure by 

the amount of time an aircraft was away for scheduled depot maintenance, 

while the Army does not make this adjustment. We computed the average 

rates by service and aircraft type from service data on the total number of 

hours each aircraft model was MC and FMC, and the total hours each 

aircraft model was available each year. 

Actual MC Rates Varied by 

Service and Type of 

Aircraft 
Page 11 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

The average annual MC and FMC rates for the services as a whole are 

shown in figures 3 and 4. The Army and the Air Force had the highest 

average MC rates, at 77-83 percent during fiscal years 1998-2002; followed 

by the Marines, at about 71-75 percent; and the Navy, at 61-67 percent. A 

similar pattern follows for the average FMC rates for the services. 

Figure 3: Average Annual MC Rates by Service, Fiscal Years 1998-2002 
Page 12 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Figure 4: Average Annual FMC Rates by Service, Fiscal Years 1998-2002 

When grouped by type of aircraft, average annual MC rates were highest 

for helicopters (76-80 percent), cargo/tankers (75-79 percent), and 

fighter/attack aircraft (75-77 percent). Average annual MC rates for 

bombers (64-69 percent) and electronic command/control aircraft (60-67 

percent) were somewhat lower. Average FMC rates showed similar rank 

orders. (See figs. 5 and 6.) 
Page 13 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Figure 5: Average Annual MC Rates by Aircraft Type, Fiscal Years 1998-2002 

Note: EC/C refers to electronic command and control aircraft 
Page 14 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Figure 6: Average Annual FMC Rates by Aircraft Type, Fiscal Years 1998-2002 

Note: EC/C refers to electronic command and control aircraft. 

MC and FMC goals have generally remained constant over time. Since 

1998, only 11 of 49 aircraft models (22 percent) experienced a change to 

their MC goals, FMC goals, or both. Seven models had their goals raised, 

and three had their goals lowered. One model’s MC goal was changed but 

then returned to its initial level. Ten of the 11 changes were for aircraft 

operated by the Air Force. The remaining change was for a Marine Corps 

aircraft. (See app. I for additional details.) 

In fiscal year 2002, for example, the Air Force raised the MC goal for its E8 Joint Stars electronic command and control aircraft from 73 to 75 

percent. According to officials, the E-8 is a relatively new (3-year-old) 

aircraft that is slowly increasing its performance level as it matures and 

Air Force maintenance personnel understand the aircraft better. The 

increase in the MC rate was based on an analysis of actual E-8 MC rates 

Goals Generally Remained 

Constant over Time 
Page 15 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

that were showing an upward trend in performance. The Air Force is the 

only service that routinely conducts formal reviews of its goals. Air Force 

officials told us that they generally try to keep the goals high because it is 

difficult to stop the goals from dropping further once they begin to be 

lowered. Moreover, officials believed that contractors need to be held to 

high standards to keep spare parts inventories and other aspects of 

maintenance at high levels. In another case, the MC goal for the Marine 

Corps’ F/A-18D Hornet fighter was raised from 60 to 75 percent, and its 

FMC goal, from 46 to 58 percent at the beginning of fiscal year 2000. 

According to Navy documents, this increase was due to a change in the 

aircraft’s assigned mission. 

While most of the goals were either unchanged or increased, the Air 

Force’s Air Combat Command developed a set of interim goals in fiscal 

year 2000 for some of the fighters, bombers, and electronic 

command/control aircraft under its command. These interim goals were 

lower than its official MC goals.10 In 1999, the Command determined that 

problems with suppliers and manpower shortages were undercutting its 

ability to meet MC goals and lowering unit morale. To combat this 

problem, the Command developed the interim goals listed in table 2. In 

2002, the Command returned to using the pre-2000 goals for all but six 

aircraft (A-10, E-3, F-15 C/D, F-15 E, RC-135, and U-2). According to 

Command officials, the lower goals applied only to their units. Goals for 

suppliers remained at official levels to keep spare parts inventories high. 

Neither the other services nor the Air Force’s other major commands 

responsible for aircraft operations have developed interim goals. 

 10The Air Force refers to the MC and FMC goals as “standards.” For simplicity and 

consistency with the other services, we use the term “goals” throughout this report. 
Page 16 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Table 2: Air Combat Command Interim MC Goals, Fiscal Years 2000-2002 

Percent 

2000 2001 2002 

Aircraft MC goal Interim goal MC goal Interim goal MC goal Interim goal 

A-10 84 74 84 78 82 78 

B-1 67 57 67 63 67 NA 

B-52 80 79 80 NA 80 NA 

E-3 85 73 85 81 85 83 

F-15 C/D 83 75 83 77 83 81 

F-15 E 80 75 80 77 81 77 

F-16 84 79 84 81 83 NA 

RC-135 75 65 75 72 75 72 

U-2 85 83 85 84 85 80 

Source: U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command. 

Legend: NA = not applicable 

According to DOD officials, difficulties in meeting MC and FMC goals are 

caused by a complex combination of interrelated logistical and operational 

factors, with no dominating single problem. The complexity of aircraft 

design, the lack of availability and experience of maintenance personnel, 

aircraft age and usage patterns, shortages of spare parts, depot 

maintenance systems and other operational factors, and perceived funding 

shortages were all identified as causes of difficulties in meeting the goals. 

As indicated below, our work found that some indicated factors were valid 

causes, while the impact of others was less certain. 

Officials believe that the complexity of military aircraft affects its 

availability, and thus its ability to meet MC goals. Military aircraft are 

designed to handle a specific set of missions and provide a specific set of 

capabilities over a projected useful lifespan. According to officials, each 

aircraft can be inherently complex and maintenance intensive, or, 

depending upon the missions and capabilities it was designed to provide, 

simple and easy to maintain. For example, the B-2 bomber had the lowest 

MC rates (32-44 percent) of any aircraft we reviewed. However, according 

to Air Combat Command officials, one reason for these low rates is the 

complex design of the aircraft. The B-2 is a very advanced aircraft with 

low observable (stealthy) characteristics using new composite materials, 

and Air Force personnel are still learning how to maintain the aircraft. In 

contrast, the B-52 bomber had some of the highest MC rates (76-84 

percent) of all the aircraft we reviewed. According to Air Force officials, 

Mission Capable 

Problems Caused by a 

Combination of 

Factors 

Aircraft Design Considered 

Key 
Page 17 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

the B-52 is a relatively simple and flexible design intended for ease of 

maintenance and durability. 

Service officials also frequently linked shortages of the total number of 

maintenance personnel, as well as their experience level, to the failure to 

meet MC goals. Navy officials told us that the growing sophistication of 

their aircraft in general requires maintenance personnel to take longer to 

learn the complex computer and electronic skills needed to handle the 

aircraft. However, high demand for these skills in the private sector makes 

it difficult to retain personnel with these maintenance skills, leading to 

turnover and increasing the difficulty in meeting the MC goals. Similarly, a 

recent study published in the Air Force Journal of Logistics found that 

the number and experience level of maintenance personnel correlated 

highly with the MC rates of F-16 aircraft.11 As the number of experienced 

personnel assigned to an aircraft increased, the MC rates increased as 

well. Army officials also cited shortages of experienced maintenance 

personnel as a cause of lower MC and FMC rates. However, they also 

stated that it may be possible to raise the rates by maximizing the time that 

maintenance personnel actually spend maintaining the aircraft. For 

example, one Army Audit Agency study in 1998 found that maintenance 

personnel at one unit were spending about 70 percent of their time on 

nonmaintenance activities such as administrative duties, training, and time 

attending to personal duties.12

Personnel management is an area that we have cited as a major 

management challenge and program risk for DOD.13 For years, DOD has 

been wrestling with shortages of key personnel because of retention 

problems. In 1999 we reported that the majority of factors cited as sources 

of dissatisfaction and reasons to leave the military were related to work 

 11Steven A. Oliver, et al, “Forecasting Readiness: Regression Analysis Techniques,” Air 

Force Journal of Logistics (fall 2001): 1, 3, 31-43. 

12Army Audit Agency, Aviation Maintenance: 25th Infantry Division (Light) and U.S. Army 

Hawaii, AA 98-185 (May 4, 1998). 

13See U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: 

Departments of Defense, State, and Veterans Affairs, GAO-01-492T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

7, 2001). 

Availability and 

Experience of 

Maintenance Personnel 

Have an Impact 
Page 18 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

circumstances, such as the lack of spare parts and materials needed to 

perform daily job requirements.14

The advancing age and usage patterns of aircraft were other factors often 

cited by service officials as reasons why aircraft did not meet MC goals. 

DOD’s inventory of aircraft is getting older. The Congressional Budget 

Office recently reported that from 1980 to 2000, the average age of activeduty Navy aircraft rose from 11 years to more than 16 years; Air Force 

aircraft, from 13 to more than 20 years; and Army helicopters, from 10 to 

over 17 years.15 Logistics officials told us that aging influences on MC rates 

typically follow a cyclical pattern over the life of an aircraft. When aircraft 

are initially introduced, they go through a “shake down” period and have 

low MC rates as new equipment and supply systems stabilize and 

maintenance personnel learn to understand the aircraft. Eventually, MC 

rates begin to rise and then stabilize at a higher working level. However, as 

more and more flying time is accrued over the passing years, problems due 

to materials and parts fatigue, corrosion, and obsolescence increase, and 

MC rates begin to fall again. Modernization programs are then instituted to 

replace worn and obsolete equipment, and the pattern begins again. 

Although age may affect MC rates, we found no statistical evidence that 

age alone explains difficulties in meeting MC goals. For example, our 

analysis of average aircraft ages and 2002 MC rates found no indication 

that older aircraft have the lowest MC rates. (See table 3.)16 With an 

average age of 40 years, the B-52 is the second oldest aircraft in DOD’s 

inventory. However, its MC rate of 81 for 2002 and historical MC rates 

consistently in the upper 70s and low 80s rank it among the highest 

performers we reviewed. According to Air Force officials at the Air 

Combat Command, in addition to their simplicity, B-52s have a relatively 

low number of actual flight hours, averaging about 16,000 hours each 

despite their age. These officials believed that accrued flight hours are a 

more appropriate measure of wear and tear than chronological age. 

 14See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed 

Service Members in Retention Critical Specialties, GAO/NSIAD-99-197BR (Washington, 

D.C.: August. 16, 1999). 

15Congressional Budget Office, CBO Paper: The Effects of Aging on the Costs of Operating 

and Maintaining Military Equipment (Washington, D.C.: August 2001). 

16We performed a statistical test of the relationship between average age in years and the 

MC level and found no relationship between those two factors. 

Aircraft Age and Usage 

Patterns Also Believed to 

Influence Availability 
Page 19 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Moreover, according to these officials, the B-52 was originally scheduled 

to retire in the mid-1990s. However, because of its durability and 

flexibility, the Air Force decided to retain the aircraft until the average age 

reaches 32,000 hours, projected at about 2040. 

Table 3: Aircraft Ages and 2002 MC Rates/Goals 

Aircraft 

model 

Average 

age (years)

2002 MC 

rate/goal 

(percent)

Aircraft 

model 

Average 

age 

(years) 

2002 MC 

rate/goal 

(percent) 

KC-130F 40.1 64/72 F-14D 15.3 67/71 

B-52 40.0 81/80 B-1 14.6 61/67 

KC-135 39.6 82/85 CH-47D 14.4 75/75 

RC-135 38.3 76/75 AH-64A 14.2 83/75 

C-141 35.0 74/80 SH-60B 13.7 63/77 

CH-46E 33.6 76/80 CH-53E 13.7 70/70 

CH-53D 31.9 78/73 AH-1W 12.3 73/85 

C-130 29.2 81/75 MH-53E 11.5 48/70 

UH-1N 27.6 69/85 F-16 11.1 80/83 

S-3B 26.2 43/70 F-117 10.7 83/80 

KC-130R 25.4 65/75 SH-60F 10.6 54/75 

P-3C 24.5 61/85 F-15E 10.2 76/81 

E-3 22.0 74/85 F/A-18C-Navy 10.2 66/75 

F-14A 21.0 69/65 F/A-18CMarine 10.2 82/75 

A-10 20.1 76/82 E-2C 10.2 51/70 

C-5 20.0 66/75 F/A-18D 9.6 78/75 

EA-6B-Navy 19.8 58/73 OH-58D 8.5 88/75 

EA-6BMarine 19.8 68/73 UH-60L 7.6 84/80 

F-15C/D 18.7 79/83 B-2 7.4 44/50 

UH-60A 18.4 76/80 AV-8B 7.0 71/76 

U-2 18.3 76/85 C-17 4.1 83/88 

KC-10 16.9 83/85 AH-64D 3.3 83/75 

F-14B 16.0 73/65 E-8 3.0 84/75 

F/A-18ANavy 16.0 62/75 F/A-18E 1.8 71/75 

F/A-18AMarine 16.0 80/75 

Source: Military services’ data. 

Logistics officials also believe that MC rates are affected by usage patterns 

and whether the aircraft is operated under the conditions for which it was 

designed. Officials told us that the large increase in deployments in recent 

years has caused many DOD aircraft to be operated at rates higher than 

expected during their design, thus accelerating aging problems. For 
Page 20 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

example, according to the Air Force Journal of Logistics study, F-15 

fighters sent to Saudi Arabia in 1997 were flown at over three times their 

normal rate.17

Shortages of spare parts have been recognized by us and others for years 

as a major contributor to lower-than-expected MC rates. As a result, we 

have also cited DOD inventory management as a major management 

challenge and program risk since 1990.18 Service officials continued to cite 

spare parts shortages as a frequent cause of difficulties in meeting MC 

goals. Spare parts shortages are caused by a number of problems, 

including underestimates of demand, and contracting and other problems 

associated with aging aircraft or small aircraft fleets. 

We have reported on DOD’s problems in estimating aircraft spare parts 

requirements for years. For example, in 1999 and again in 2001, we 

reported that shortages of spare parts caused by inaccurate forecasting of 

inventory requirements was degrading MC rates for key Air Force aircraft 

such as the B-1B bomber, C-5 cargo planes, and F-16 fighters.19 In 2001 we 

reported that key Navy aircraft were also having readiness problems 

because of spare parts shortages resulting from underestimates of 

demand.20 Officials continued to raise this issue as an underlying factor in 

spare parts shortages. In addition, some officials also believed that the 

higher operating tempos associated with increased deployments have 

caused parts to fail quicker than expected, exacerbating weaknesses in 

forecasting inventory requirements. 

Air Force officials told us that aging aircraft, in particular, may experience 

parts shortages and delays in repairs because original manufacturers may 

no longer make required parts. To obtain a new part, officials must wait 

for it to be manufactured. However, this may not be a high priority for the 

 17Steven A. Oliver, et al (fall 2001). 

18See GAO-01-492T. 

19See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: Continuing Challenges in 

Managing Inventories and Avoiding Adverse Operational Effects, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-83

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 1999), and U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Force 

Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and Maintenance Effectiveness, 

GAO-01-587 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2001). 

20See U.S. General Accounting Office, Navy Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting 

Operations and Maintenance Effectiveness, GAO-01-771 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001). 

Spare Parts Inventories 

Critical 
Page 21 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

commercial supplier because of the relatively low profit potential. 

Alternatively, another company could make the part if the original 

manufacturer were willing to give up its proprietary rights. However, this 

can take longer and be more expensive than simply waiting for the original 

manufacturer. Moreover, officials also told us that spare parts inventories 

are sometimes reduced when aircraft are nearing the end of their 

projected life. For example, Air Force officials said that in the mid-1990s 

they began to shut down the spare parts supply for the B-52 because of its 

anticipated retirement. This resulted in a depletion of inventories, the 

canceling of contracts, and ultimately a drop in MC rates from 1997 to 

2000. As a result of the decision to retain the B-52, the supply system is 

recovering and MC rates are moving up. 

Similarly, the size of the aircraft fleet can also influence spare parts 

inventories and MC rates. According to officials, manufacturers may see 

little profit in stocking large inventories of spare parts for a small fleet of 

specialized military aircraft. Small fleets of aircraft can also suffer from 

having their MC rates strongly influenced by the MC failures of just a few 

aircraft. Large fleets of aircraft also have an advantage in having more 

opportunities to remove serviceable parts from one aircraft and install 

them in another—termed “cannibalizing”—thus helping to insulate their 

MC rates from the impact of parts shortages. However, we recently 

reported that while cannibalization is a widespread practice among the 

services, it increases maintenance personnel workloads and lowers morale 

and retention.21

Air Force and Navy officials cited changes to their maintenance 

approaches as a significant cause of slower repair times and lowered MC 

rates. In the mid-1990s the Air Force changed from a three-level 

maintenance approach to a two-level approach.22 This change moved much 

of the intermediate maintenance functions, such as the replacement or 

 21See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Aircraft: Services Need Strategies to 

Reduce Cannibalizations, GAO-02-86 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2001). 

22Under the three-level approach, maintenance is divided into organizational, intermediate, 

and depot categories. Organizational maintenance is performed at the air base level and 

includes functions such as inspections, minor repairs, and servicing. Intermediate 

maintenance generally takes place at shops on the air bases and consists of activities such 

as calibration, repair, or the emergency manufacture of parts, and technical assistance. The 

more sophisticated depot maintenance requires more extensive facilities and is conducted 

at government or contractor industrial facilities. 

Maintenance Approach 

and Other Operational 

Factors May Affect MC 

Rates 
Page 22 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

emergency manufacture of parts, away from the air base level to 

centralized maintenance depots. According to officials at both the Air 

Combat Command and Air Mobility Command, these changes slowed the 

pace of repairs significantly. Repair expertise was taken away from the 

base level, and aircraft were shipped away from home base more often for 

repairs. Moreover, officials believed that many experienced maintenance 

people were lost as they refused to move to other locations associated 

with the reorganizations. In this regard, our 1996 review of depot closures 

noted that DOD’s outplacement program helped limit the number of 

involuntary separations and that jobs were often available for employees 

willing to relocate.23

The Army continues to use a three-level maintenance system, as does the 

Navy. However, Navy officials said they also changed their system in the 

mid-1990s by introducing the integrated maintenance concept. This 

approach, in contrast to the Air Force approach, increased the amount of 

aircraft modernization and other work performed at the base level during 

a time when funding for depot-level work was being reduced. However, 

officials believed this change overloaded the base-level maintenance 

systems and ultimately lowered reported MC rates. 

From fiscal year 1988 to fiscal 2001, DOD reduced the number of major 

depots from 38 to 19. During this same period, the maintenance workforce 

was reduced by about 60 percent (from 156,000 to 64,500). These 

reductions were the result of overall force structure reductions since the 

end of the Cold War, as well as DOD’s desire to reduce costs by relying 

more on the private sector for the performance of depot maintenance. We 

have raised concerns that DOD’s downsizing of its depot infrastructure 

and workforce was done without sound strategic planning and that 

investments in facilities, equipment, and personnel in recent years have 

not been sufficient to ensure the long-term viability of the depots.24

Other operational factors can also affect MC rates. For example, from 1997 

to 2000, the Air Force’s B-1 bomber had a major power system problem 

that lowered MC rates by 12 points. To address the problem, the Air 

 23See U.S. General Accounting Office, Closing Maintenance Depots: Savings, Workload, 

and Redistribution Issues, GAO/NSIAD-96-29 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 1996). 

24See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome 

Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System, GAO-02-105 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 

2001). 
Page 23 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Combat Command instituted a system of frequent video teleconferences 

between the offices involved in the maintenance response to provide more 

intensive management of the response. This approach worked, as the MC 

rate climbed by 9 points by 2002. Management integration between the 

operations and logistics sides of the organization was also viewed as key. 

Good coordination between these two groups is essential because of the 

complex and multifaceted causes of MC problems. Finally, Air Force 

officials noted that some of the problems with Air Force MC rates could be 

explained by a change in reporting procedures. During the mid-1990s, the 

Air Force returned an aircraft to MC status after it was repaired but prior 

to the actual check flight to ensure that it was operating correctly. Now, 

the aircraft must pass the check flight before being classified as MC. 

Officials believe that this change would tend to lower MC rates slightly. 

Officials from all services cited underfunding of spare parts inventories, 

maintenance depots, and other aspects of the maintenance and supply 

systems as a key problem. For example, Army and Navy officials told us 

that they often use remanufactured parts instead of new parts to save 

money. 

DOD reports in its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report that it has 

increased funding for spare parts and depot maintenance requirements.25

For example, the report indicates that funding for depot maintenance 

increased from $5.58 billion to $7.01 billion from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal 

1999 (most recent year that data are available). However, the report also 

acknowledges an unfunded requirement of about $1.18 billion in fiscal 

year 1999. Notwithstanding claims regarding the lack of funding for spare 

parts, we recently reported that when provided additional funds for spare 

parts, DOD was unable to confirm that those additional funds were used 

for that purpose.26

The pressures for more funding to maintain DOD’s aircraft may well go up 

even more in coming years as the aircraft inventory continues to age. The 

Congressional Budget Office estimates that spending for operations and 

 25See U.S. Department of Defense, Government Performance and Results Act: Department 

of Defense FY 2000 Performance Report (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2001). 

26See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: Information on the Use of Spare 

Parts Funding Is Lacking, GAO-01-472 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2001). 

Funding Levels Raise 

Concerns 
Page 24 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

maintenance for aircraft increases by 1 to 3 percent for every additional 

year of age.27

Despite the importance of MC and FMC goals as measures of readiness 

and logistical funding needs, we found widespread uncertainty over how 

the services’ MC and FMC goals were established and who is responsible 

for establishing them, as well as basic questions about the adequacy of 

those goals as measures of aircraft availability. The services could not 

explain and document how the original MC and FMC goals were set for 

any of the aircraft in our review. Furthermore, some officials questioned 

which goals are the best to use in reviewing aircraft availability: MC goals, 

FMC goals, or perhaps a new type of goal. DOD’s instruction provides little 

or no guidance on these and other key issues. DOD officials told us that 

the instruction has not been updated to reflect the current environment of 

increased deployments and other changes since the end of the Cold War. 

MC and FMC goals are used as fundamental measures of readiness 

throughout DOD, used as indicators of operational effectiveness, and used 

to help determine the size of spare parts inventories and other logistical 

resources needed to maintain aircraft availability. As a result, the level at 

which the goals are set can influence not only perceptions about 

operations and readiness, but also millions of dollars in spending for 

logistical operations. 

In addition to the requirement to maintain MC and FMC data set forth by 

DOD Instruction 3110.5, the services use MC and FMC measures as a 

component of overall unit readiness determinations under DOD’s Global 

Status of Resources and Training System.28 The System requires 

commanders to rate their unit’s readiness at levels 1 (highest) through 5 on 

the basis of a combination of their professional judgment and the 

readiness ratings in four specific areas: personnel, training, equipment on 

hand, and equipment condition. MC and FMC measures are used to 

determine the ratings for equipment condition. For example, the Army 

measures equipment condition (termed “serviceability” by the Army) for 

 27See Congressional Budget Office (August 2001). 

28The Global Status of Resources and Training System is the automated reporting system 

within DOD used as the central registry of readiness information for all U.S. operational 

units. 

DOD’S Goal-Setting 

Process Is Largely 

Undefined and 

Undocumented 

Goals Are Important 

Indicators of Readiness, 

Operational Effectiveness, 

and Logistical Funding 

Needs 
Page 25 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

aircraft by using the FMC rate. An FMC rate of 75 percent or more is 

required for a level-1 readiness rating, the highest available. Congress also 

requires DOD to include Status of Resources and Training System 

information on the condition of equipment as well as specific information 

on equipment that is not mission capable in its quarterly readiness reports 

to Congress. These reports assist Congress in its general responsibilities 

for overseeing DOD readiness and operations. 

Similarly, according to DOD and service officials, MC and FMC goals are 

used as management tools within DOD units to diagnose problems and 

motivate personnel. For example, officials in the Air Combat Command 

told us that their use of lower interim goals beginning in fiscal year 2000 

was an attempt to raise unit morale that had suffered as a result of their 

inability to meet the actual goals owing to shortages of personnel and 

spare parts. In this regard, DOD’s instruction specifically calls for the 

services to use the goals and condition status measurements, such as MC 

and FMC, to review maintenance and supply effectiveness and to have 

programs to identify and correct problems with systems and equipment. 

Service officials told us that the goals also affect DOD’s funding levels 

because the goals are used to help determine the size of spare parts 

inventories and other logistical resources needed. Higher goals require 

more money to maintain parts inventories and other resources needed to 

achieve the goals. For example, officials told us that in the early 1990s, a 

$100 million contract for logistics support for one Air Force aircraft 

contained an MC goal of 90 percent. During this period, the contractor 

kept supply bins full of parts and MC goals were met. However, in the mid1990s a new contractor was brought in, and the MC goal was dropped to 

85 percent. According to Air Force officials, their decision to lower the MC 

goal by 5 percentage points allowed the contractor to lower spare parts 

inventories and reduced the price of the maintenance contract by $10 

million. However, MC rates also dropped and eventually fell below the 

new goal. The services have developed mathematical models to determine 

the size and cost of the spare parts inventories needed to support various 

levels of MC and FMC goals and other measures of aircraft availability. For 

example, the Navy uses a model called “Readiness Based Sparing” that 

takes a given FMC goal and determines the level of funding and spare 

parts inventories needed to reach that goal. Such models are useful in the 

case of spare parts inventories. However, we were not able to identify any 

models in widespread operational use that integrated the other influences 

on MC rates, such as maintenance personnel assigned, into an overall 

model able to predict the impact of changes in those resources on MC and 

FMC rates. Army and Air Force officials told us that they had recently 
Page 26 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

developed such integrated models, and they are currently in limited use to 

test their validity. Navy officials told us that they did not yet have an 

integrated model. 

The potential amount of funds affected by the level at which MC and FMC 

goals are set is large. Military service estimates of the spending of 

operations and maintenance funds for aircraft spares and repair parts 

were over $7 billion in fiscal year 2001.29 This figure does not include 

spending from other sources such as procurement and working capital 

funds. 

Precisely how MC and FMC goals are established is unknown. DOD 

officials said that a combined DOD and military service team establishes 

operational requirements and MC goals during the acquisition process. 

After approval, these requirements are recorded in the Operational 

Requirements Document or other documents associated with the process. 

According to officials, part of this process involves an engineering analysis 

of the expected operational availability of the aircraft and the underlying 

level of maintenance support elements needed. “Operational availability” 

is an engineering term referring to the probability that equipment is not 

down owing to failure.30 In comparison, MC and FMC goals represent the 

expected percentage of time that an aircraft will be able to perform at 

least one or all of its missions, respectively. 

Service officials reviewed the acquisition documents for many of the 

aircraft in our review, but were unable to explain and document how the 

actual MC and FMC goals were chosen. According to officials, many of 

these aircraft were acquired 20 to 30 years ago, under processes that have 

changed over the years, and with no clear documentation of the basis for 

the specific goal chosen. Moreover, there was often confusion over which 

organizations were responsible for setting the goals. 

 29See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: Better Reporting on Spare Parts 

Spending Will Enhance Congressional Oversight, GAO-03-18 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 

2002). 

30Operational availability is calculated by dividing the mean time between maintenance 

events by the sum of the mean time between maintenance events and mean downtime 

(time needed for corrective and preventive maintenance and waiting time). 

Methods Used to Set Goals 

Unknown 
Page 27 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

For example, Navy officials pointed to a 1996 Center for Naval Analyses 

study that attempted to determine how the MC and FMC goals for Navy 

aircraft were originally computed.31 According to the study, however, “no 

one knows the origin of the numbers or the method used to compute 

them. Now, the numbers are routed to knowledgeable people for revision, 

which are made without documenting the rationale for the changes.” In a 

July 17, 2002, letter to us, the Navy further explained that it believed that 

the MC goals were established in the early 1980s “to be in line with the 

reported status quo for the day” with “no analytical rigor applied at the 

time of their birth.” We requested a written explanation of how the goals 

were set because, despite repeated referrals to various offices over several 

months, no Navy official could explain how the goals were established or 

identify the responsible office. According to Navy officials, there was 

uncertainty between the program and policy offices as to who is 

responsible for establishing the goals and who should answer our 

questions. 

Similarly, Army officials could not explain how their goals were set, and 

two separate Army organizations believed the other was responsible for 

setting the goals. The Army’s written response to our request for an 

explanation of how the goals were set (dated July 31, 2002) was prepared 

by officials from the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and 

forwarded to us by a letter from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Logistics. The Deputy Chief of Staff’s letter states that MC goals for Army 

aircraft are extracted from the System Readiness Objective contained in 

the Operational Requirements Document established during an aircraft’s 

acquisition, and that the Training and Doctrine Command is responsible 

for establishing the System Readiness Objectives.32 However, the Training 

and Doctrine Command’s letter states that it does not set System 

Readiness Objectives and that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics is 

responsible for establishing readiness goals. Nonetheless, the Training and 

Doctrine Command researched the operational requirements documents 

for the Army aircraft in our review in an attempt to answer our question 

about how the MC and FMC goals were set. The Command’s letter 

identified the operational availability requirements for most of the aircraft 

but did not explain how these requirements were set or make any 

reference to the MC or FMC goals. Officials from the Office of the Deputy 

 31See Center for Naval Analyses, Naval Aviation Goals Study (Alexandria, Va.: June 1996). 

32The System Readiness Objective is defined as the measurable criterion used to assess the 

ability of a weapons system to undertake a set of missions at planned utilization rates. 
Page 28 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Chief of Staff for Logistics told us that the Army is considering changing 

the FMC goals for all its aircraft to 75 percent to match the requirement for 

the highest-level readiness rating for equipment serviceability under the 

Global Status of Resources and Training System’s criterion. They did not 

know how the 75-percent-readiness-rating criterion was chosen. 

Air Force officials also could not explain how the initial MC and FMC 

goals for their aircraft were established. Officials from the Air Combat 

Command—responsible for Air Force fighters, bombers, and electronic 

command/control aircraft in our review—told us that they could find no 

historical record of the process used to establish most of the goals. 

Similarly, officials from the Air Mobility Command—responsible for the 

cargo and tanker aircraft—stated that the Command was formed in 1992 

out of elements from the Military Airlift and Strategic Air Commands and 

did not know how the previous Commands had established the goals. 

According to these officials, each of the major Commands that operate 

aircraft and other major weapon systems in the Air Force is responsible 

for establishing its own MC goals, and no one has published a standardized 

methodology to use. Moreover, some of the documentation related to the 

goals was lost when the Military Airlift and Strategic Air Commands were 

deactivated. Similar to the Navy, however, officials from both Commands 

believed that the goals were set on the basis of the historical performance 

of similar aircraft and/or subjective Command judgments. 

While Air Force officials could not explain how the initial goals were 

established, they told us that their annual reviews of the goals are based 

on a mix of historical trend analysis and requirements reviews. The Air 

Force is the only service that conducts formal reviews of its goals each 

year. According to officials from the Air Mobility and Air Combat 

Commands, until 1997-98, reviews of the goals in both Commands were 

based on an analysis of actual historical MC and FMC rates. For example, 

analysts at the Air Mobility Command compared the goals with the actual 

rates for the previous 2 years. Depending upon actual performance, the 

goal could then be changed, sometimes on the basis of subjective 

judgments. According to Air Combat Command officials, the MC goal for 

the B-2 bomber was set in fiscal year 2000 using an analysis of historical 

rates and command judgment. The first B-2 was delivered in 1993. 

In 1997-98, the two Air Force Commands began to develop so-called 

“requirements-based analyses” to review the standards. According to 

officials at the Air Combat Command, for example, it was recognized that 

the historical approach to reviewing the standards can perpetuate 

relatively low standards because it simply accepts the low funding levels 
Page 29 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

and other problems that may lower MC rates without focusing on actual 

mission needs. The new approach attempts to factor in wartime 

operational requirements, peacetime flying hour requirements for pilot 

training, and other such requirements. A mix of both approaches is 

currently used by the commands to review the goals. 

The services also differed in their treatment of other important aspects of 

managing the goals, such as whether to vary the goals on the basis of an 

aircraft’s deployment posture. The Navy was the only service to tier its 

goals on the basis of its traditional practice of cyclical deployment 

schedules on board its ships and aircraft carriers. Operational aircraft in 

the Navy follow a cyclical pattern of deploying to sea on aircraft carriers 

and other vessels for a set period of time, such as 6 months. Once the 

deployed units are replaced, they experience a stand-down period during 

which they recover from the rigors of deployment until it is time to begin 

preparing for the next movement. The Navy varies the intensity of its 

maintenance and its MC and FMC goals according to this pattern. Navy 

aircraft more than 90 days away from a deployment have goals that are 5 

percentage points lower than aircraft within 90 days of a deployment, and 

aircraft actually deployed have goals that are 5 percentage points higher 

than those within 90 days of deploying.33 In comparison, aircraft in the 

Marine Corps34 and other services have a level approach to maintenance 

where the goals do not vary, and maintenance is kept at a relatively 

constant level. Navy officials believed that the cyclical approach to 

maintenance could lower overall MC rates over time compared with the 

level approach. This is because of the reduced maintenance attention 

when the aircraft are not deployed. 

Some officials questioned whether the MC and FMC goals are adequate 

measures of an aircraft’s availability. For example, officials from the Air 

Force’s Air Mobility Command stated that they focused on the MC goal 

and not the FMC goal because their primary readiness objective is the 

specific mission currently assigned, not every possible mission the aircraft 

 33As agreed with Navy officials, we used “overall” MC and FMC goals in our analyses of 

Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. The overall goals are a combined goal for the various 

categories of deployment status. 

34Marine Corps aircraft share the same goals as the Navy aircraft. However, according to 

officials, Marine Corps aircraft do not follow the cyclical pattern of deployments and thus 

maintain the same goal throughout the year. 

Adequacy of MC and FMC 

Goals Questioned 
Page 30 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

was designed for. Moreover, the Air Combat Command did not even 

establish FMC goals. This Command was the only one we reviewed that 

did not set FMC goals for its aircraft. Air Combat Command officials told 

us that they could find no documentation to explain why the Command 

did not establish FMC goals. 

In contrast, Army officials stated that their units focus primarily on the 

FMC goal because it is directly connected to readiness ratings under the 

Status of Resources and Training System. Furthermore, Navy officials 

stated that the military is moving away from the MC and FMC goals in 

newer aircraft, such as the Joint Strike Fighter. This is because the MC and 

FMC goals provide only a limited historical perspective and do not address 

issues that are important to war-fighting commanders such as how often 

an aircraft can fly missions over the course of a day and the probability 

that the aircraft will complete its mission. The Joint Strike Fighter, for 

example, is using a concept called “mission reliability” instead of MC and 

FMC goals. Mission reliability is the probability that the Joint Strike 

Fighter will complete its required operational mission without a failure. 

According to Navy officials, the predictive value and information on flight 

frequency and reliability provided by this new measure is very valuable to 

war-fighting commanders and is better for mission-planning purposes than 

the MC and FMC measures. Officials said that the mission-reliability 

concept could be used throughout DOD’s inventory of aircraft. 

DOD Instruction 3110.5 provides only vague or no guidance on many of 

the key issues raised in this report. For example, the instruction requires 

each military service to establish availability goals for its mission-essential 

systems and equipment, and a corresponding set of condition status 

measures relative to those goals. The instruction specifically identifies MC, 

FMC, and other specific capabilities as measures that the services must 

maintain. However, it does not identify the specific goals that must be 

established—MC, FMC, or any other—or the primary readiness objective 

to be served. In this regard, the instruction states that the services should 

assume planned peacetime usage in setting the goals. According to Air 

Force officials, peacetime usage can be more taxing than wartime usage 

because of the extra training and other requirements. Air Combat 

Command officials told us that they believed that the instruction regarding 

what goals—including the FMC goal—were required to be established was 

unclear. 

The instruction also provides little guidance on the methodology to be 

used in setting the goals. It states that the services should provide 

DOD Instruction Provides 

Little or No Guidance on 

Key Issues 
Page 31 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

estimates of the maximum performance that is achievable, given the 

design characteristics of the aircraft, and that full funding and optimal 

operation of the logistics support system should be assumed. Service 

officials said they believe that actual levels of funding, personnel, spare 

parts inventories, and other key resources should be factored into the 

process of setting the goals, since full funding has not been provided for 

years. The instruction is silent on the issue of whether it is appropriate to 

use historical trends of similar aircraft in determining the goals, as 

opposed to a more analytical approach using actual requirements, for 

example. The instruction is also silent on whether the aircraft availability 

goals should vary on the basis of the aircraft’s deployment posture. 

Moreover, it includes no requirement for the services to identify the 

readiness and cost implications of setting the goals at different levels, to 

help clarify the pros and cons of available choices and the guiding 

principles used to decide on those choices. 

Similarly, the instruction provides little organizational structure for the 

goal-setting process in DOD. For example, it does not require the services 

to identify one office as the coordinating organization for goal-setting and 

other related activities. Furthermore, it does not require the services to 

document the basis for the goals chosen or outline any of the basic 

historical documentation that should be maintained for goal-setting and 

other key activities during the process. 

According to DOD officials from the office responsible for the instruction, 

DOD Instruction 3110.5 dates back to the 1970s when readiness concerns 

had reached a high point. The focus was on getting the services to set 

benchmark readiness goals, and the instruction gave them latitude to 

choose those goals, the methods for setting them, and the processes for 

managing them. The instruction was revised in 1990. However, officials 

told us that it has not been updated to reflect the current environment of 

frequent deployments and other changes since the end of the Cold War, 

and some now consider it a relic. 

We performed our work from February through November 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The 

final publication of this report was delayed by the impact on DOD’s report 

review and classification process of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 

2001 and DOD’s preparations for potential conflict in Iraq. 

While many of DOD’s key aircraft are not meeting MC and FMC goals, it is 

difficult to determine how significant this problem is because of the Conclusions 
Page 32 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

uncertainty and lack of documentation of the basis for the existing goals. 

Moreover, without knowing the basis for the existing goals, it is also 

difficult to know whether that basis is appropriate for the demands of the 

new defense strategy. 

DOD’s Instruction 3110.5 fails to clearly define the specific availability 

goals that all services must establish. Without the perspective provided by 

clear, consistent, and up-to-date goals, the perceptions of actual 

performance are subject to continuing uncertainty and disagreement, and 

confidence in the funding requests based on those perceptions is 

undermined. Moreover, the lack of a standard methodology for the 

services to use in setting the goals removes a safeguard for objectivity 

from the process, risking the possibility that the methods used do not 

realistically reflect actual requirements. This risk is increased when there 

is uncertainty or disagreement over basic questions such as whether it is 

appropriate to base the goals on a historical analysis or an analysis of 

actual requirements, and whether full funding of logistical support systems 

should be assumed in an era of reduced funding. Furthermore, the absence 

of information on the readiness and cost implications of setting the goals 

at different levels results in a lack of understanding of the pros and cons of 

available choices and the guiding principles used to make those decisions. 

Ultimately, inappropriately set goals can unnecessarily raise or lower the 

cost of spare parts inventories and other logistical resources by millions of 

dollars. 

Also, DOD’s instruction requires the services neither to designate one 

office to coordinate the establishment and maintenance of aircraft 

availability goals, nor to document the basis for the goals chosen or other 

key issues in the process. Clear responsibilities and requirements in these 

areas are fundamental to the effective management of any performance 

system. Without the transparency provided by adequate documentation of 

the process, neither DOD nor the Congress can be reasonably assured that 

the services have selected the optimal goals on the basis of preferred 

principles. 

To ensure that aircraft availability goals and their performance measures 

are appropriate to the new defense strategy and based on a clear and 

defined process, we recommend that (1) DOD and the services determine 

whether different types of aircraft availability goals are needed, (2) as 

appropriate, DOD and the services validate the basis for the existing MC 

and FMC goals, and (3) the Secretary of Defense revise DOD Instruction 

3110.5 to 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 33 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

• clearly define the specific aircraft availability goals required to be 

established by the military services and their accompanying 

performance measures; 

• establish a standard methodology identifying objective principles of 

analysis to be used by all services in setting the goals, including an 

identification of the readiness and cost implications of setting the goals 

at different levels; and 

• require each service to identify one office to act as a focal point for 

coordinating the development of the goals and for maintaining a 

documentary record of the basis for the goals chosen and other key 

decisions in the goal-setting process. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially 

concurred with all our recommendations. The department agreed to 

determine whether different types of aircraft availability goals are needed, 

including the option of tailoring such goals to unique military service and 

mission requirements. DOD also agreed to validate the basis for the 

existing goals, including the DOD Instruction 3110.5 requirement that full 

funding of support systems be assumed in establishing availability goals. 

In addition, DOD indicated that it would explore alternative 

methodologies for setting goals, such as one based on unit deployment 

cycles currently in use by the Navy. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation for a series of 

revisions to DOD Instruction 3110.5. It agreed with our recommendation 

that the instruction be revised to require each service to designate a focal 

point for the development and historical documentation of the goal-setting 

process. However, DOD did not agree with the part of our 

recommendation calling for it to include the performance measures 

associated with the aircraft availability goals in the instruction. DOD 

believed that that requirement implied that those performance measures 

should be the sole or primary measure of the overall state of materiel 

readiness. That was not our intent. Our recommendation is meant to 

ensure that the goals and accompanying performance/status measures 

selected are clearly defined in the instruction. As pointed out in the report, 

this is not currently the case. We agree that determinations of overall 

materiel readiness require the consideration of a variety of factors, such as 

maintenance manning and supply fill rates, as well as metrics such as an 

aircraft’s availability. However, we believe that the instruction should 

continue its current requirement to include performance/condition status 

measures relative to those goals. Clearly identifying the goals that are 

sought and their performance measures in the instruction will help avoid 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 34 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

further uncertainty and disagreement over the level of basic aircraft 

performance, and does not preclude the consideration of other metrics in 

broader assessments of overall readiness. For these reasons, we believe 

no change to our recommendation is needed. 

DOD also disagreed with the part of our recommendation calling for the 

Secretary of Defense to revise the instruction to establish a standard 

methodology identifying objective principles of analysis to be used in 

setting the goals. It believed that the services should establish the detailed 

analytical methodology because the types of goals and their basis may 

vary by service, and the services have a better understanding of the 

differences and complexities of their individual environments. We agree 

with the need for some leeway at the service level to handle individual 

differences between them. However, we continue to believe that all 

services should adhere to a standardized set of overarching principles of 

analysis in order to safeguard objectivity and transparency in the goal 

setting process. Such principles could be identified in coordination with 

the services during the department’s planned evaluation of the basis for 

the current goals and alternative methodologies. The services could then 

develop detailed methodologies consistent with these principles but 

tailored to their individual environments. Consequently, no change to our 

recommendation is required. 

The department’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the 

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate 

congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, 

and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, 

Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 35 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Please contact me at (757) 552-8100 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Neal P. Curtin 

Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management Team 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 36 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

 

Aircraft type Service Model Age (yrs.) Cost/Flying hours Indicators 

Helicopter Army CH-47D 14.4 $2,258 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Army OH-58D 8.5 $1,014 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Army AH-64A 14.2 $2,442 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Army UH-64D 3.3 $3,115 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Army UH-60A 18.4 $1,354 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Army UH-60L 7.6 $1,189 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Navy SH-60B 13.7 $2,265 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Navy SH-60F 10.6 $2,683 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and 

Rates, Fiscal Years 1991-2002 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 37 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Percent 

FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

74 71 64 73 77 75 76 74 70 75 74 75 

70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 

72 69 63 71 75 73 74 72 66 72 71 72 

 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

72 59 78 85 79 83 86 88 88 85 86 88 

70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 

62 53 70 80 77 79 81 84 83 81 82 84 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

77 77 73 77 75 83 84 84 83 67 79 83 

70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 

65 69 65 70 71 80 82 81 79 62 75 79 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

 69 75 64 73 83 

70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 

 61 67 57 64 80 

80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 

69 70 70 75 75 76 78 80 79 76 76 76 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

65 67 68 71 72 73 75 77 75 72 72 73 

80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 

70 70 66 77 81 85 86 88 86 85 82 84 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

66 68 63 73 76 82 84 86 84 82 79 82 

77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 

 61 59 61 62 63 

58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 

 41 38 40 41 44 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

 69 74 74 61 54 

60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 

 56 55 54 47 41 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 38 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

 

Aircraft type Service Model Age (yrs.) Cost/Flying hours Indicators 

Helicopter Navy MH-53E 11.5 $7,108 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Marines CH-46E 33.6 $3.138 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Marines CH-53D 31.9 $4,502 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Marines CH-53E 13.7 $6,640 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Marines AH-1W 12.3 $2,518 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Helicopter Marines UH-1N 27.6 $1,873 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Air Force A-10 20.1 $2,247 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 MC interim 

goal 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 39 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Percent 

FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 

70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 

 56 62 61 56 48 

60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 

 41 47 54 48 38 

 

80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 

 78 78 79 78 76 

77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 

 72 72 72 72 68 

73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 

 72 77 80 85 78 

65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 

 63 69 76 72 64 

70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 

 70 71 65 61 70 

60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 

 61 64 58 52 58 

85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 

 77 76 76 74 73 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

 66 66 67 64 61 

85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 

 79 79 77 76 69 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

 69 65 68 64 55 

84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 

91 92 87 89 88 87 84 78 75 71 72 76 

 74 78 78 

 

91 91 85 88 87 85 79 73 72 70 68 75 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 40 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

 

Aircraft type Service Model Age (yrs.) Cost/Flying hours Indicators 

Fighter Air Force F-15C/D 18.7 $6,694 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 MC interim 

goal 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Air Force F-15E 10.2 $7,970 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 MC interim 

goal 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Air Force F-16 11.1 $3, 446 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 MC interim 

goal 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Air Force F-117 10.7 a MC goal 

 MC rate 

 MC interim 

goal 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Navy F-14A 21.0 $9,097 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Navy F-14B 16.0 $7,341 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Navy F-14D 15.3 $8,042 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 41 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Percent 

FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 

83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 81 83 83 83 

86 86 84 82 82 82 81 78 76 77 79 79 

 75 77 81 

 

83 84 83 80 79 79 80 76 74 76 77 77 

80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 81 80 80 81 

88 87 83 83 82 81 79 77 76 77 74 76 

 75 77 77 

 

88 85 79 82 79 80 77 75 75 74 72 75 

84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 83 84 84 83 

90 91 91 89 88 86 82 79 79 80 80 80 

 79 81 83 

 

90 91 89 88 86 82 79 75 78 78 77 78 

80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 

100 84 62 67 78 85 84 79 83 77 81 83 

 80 80 80 

 

100 81 55 67 78 85 84 79 83 77 81 83 

65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 

 64 71 72 73 69 

50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 

 56 62 64 59 57 

65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 

 74 79 76 77 73 

50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 

 65 71 69 69 59 

71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 

 61 64 72 72 67 

61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 

 49 52 54 46 38 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 42 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

 

Aircraft type Service Model Age (yrs.) Cost/Flying hours Indicators 

Fighter Navy F/A-18A 16 $4,463 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Navy F/A-18C 10.2 $4,604 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Navy F/A-18E 1.8 a MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Marines F/A-18A 16.0 $4,463 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Marines F/A-18C 10.2 $4,604 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Marines F/A-18D 9.6 $3,751 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Fighter Marines AV-8B 7.0 $5,351 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 43 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Percent 

FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

 50 58 44 55 62 

58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 

 30 42 35 36 53 

 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

 72 70 71 68 66 

58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 

 59 60 62 57 52 

 75 75 75 75 

 68 71 

 58 58 58 58 

 43 33 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

 85 85 81 77 80 

58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 

 80 78 74 72 75 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

 82 82 82 82 82 

58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 

 77 75 77 74 74 

60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 75 75 75 

 77 82 82 76 78 

46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 58 58 58 

 72 76 76 67 65 

76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 

 62 61 61 57 71 

70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 

 54 51 55 48 60 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 44 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

 

Aircraft type Service Model Age (yrs.) Cost/Flying hours Indicators 

Bomber Air Force B-1 14.6 $14,343 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 MC interim 

goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Bomber Air Force B-2 7.4 $6,736 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Bomber Air Force B-52 40.0 $6,575 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 MC interim 

goal 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

EC/C Air Force E-3 22.0 $3,788 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 MC interim 

goal 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

EC/C Air Force E-8 3.0 $3,057 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

EC/C Air Force RC-135 38.3 $2,825 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 MC interim 

goal 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 45 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Percent 

FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 

65 65 65 65 65 65 67 67 67 67 67 67 

57 58 59 67 68 70 64 51 52 52 60 61 

 57 63 67 

 

1 4 7 11 11 39 54 39 39 28 23 36 

 

 50 50 50 

 25 17 24 32 34 42 39 32 44 

 14 4 5 21 19 19 21 9 22 

80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 

76 81 83 82 83 84 77 78 76 79 84 81 

 79 80 80 

 

55 65 69 70 75 76 65 39 28 16 13 31 

85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 

92 91 85 86 86 83 79 72 74 73 76 74 

 73 81 83 

 

89 86 79 82 69 48 42 23 30 26 25 41 

 73 73 75 

 33 50 66 72 66 74 84 

 6 9 20 41 37 45 57 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

70 69 74 77 79 78 73 74 65 59 64 76 

 65 72 72 

 

59 55 48 42 50 62 53 53 43 30 40 45 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 46 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

 

Aircraft type Service Model Age (yrs.) Cost/Flying hours Indicators 

EC/C Air Force U-2 18.3 a MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 MC interim 

goal 

 FMC rate 

 

EC/C Navy S-3B 26.2 $4,754 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

EC/C Navy E-2C 10.2 $4,664 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

EC/C Navy P-3C 24.5 $3,082 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

EC/C Navy EA-6B 19.8 $5,080 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

EC/C Marines EA-6B 19.8 $5,080 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Cargo/Tanker Air Force C-5 20.0 $9,106 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 47 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Percent 

FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 

 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 

 77 78 86 81 80 76 77 76 

 83 84 80 

 

 73 73 84 79 77 72 74 73 

 

70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 

 59 61 63 51 43 

54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 

 31 33 37 30 25 

70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 

 72 73 69 63 51 

54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 

 50 40 40 41 35 

85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 

 64 66 63 62 61 

61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 

 28 23 17 17 12 

73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 

 68 62 58 60 58 

54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 

 50 41 37 39 35 

73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 

 71 74 63 62 68 

54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 

 60 64 53 49 51 

70 70 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

71 75 72 65 64 66 64 63 61 62 65 66 

 60 60 36 37 37 45 45 45 45 

34 42 43 37 37 43 37 39 31 28 19 18 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 48 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

 

Aircraft type Service Model Age (yrs.) Cost/Flying hours Indicators 

Cargo/Tanker Air Force C-17 4.1 a MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Cargo/Tanker Air Force C-130 29.2 $2,225 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Cargo/Tanker Marines KC-130F 40.1 $3,212 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Cargo/Tanker Marines KC-130R 25.4 $2,807 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Cargo/Tanker Air Force C-141 35.0 a MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Cargo/Tanker Air Force KC-135 39.6 $2,384 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

 

Cargo/Tanker Air Force KC-10 16.9 $4,083 MC goal 

 MC rate 

 FMC goal 

 FMC rate 

Source: Military service data. 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 49 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Percent 

FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 

 81 81 88 88 88 88 88 

 52 45 75 87 88 86 85 82 83 83 

 73 73 78 78 78 78 78 

 5 3 41 41 44 49 41 43 31 3 

 

85 85 85 78 78 75 75 75 75 

83 85 83 84 81 80 79 77 74 76 77 81 

 48 48 48 48 

60 62 62 68 64 64 63 55 55 59 58 63 

72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 

 73 70 59 58 64 

53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 

 54 52 36 28 32 

75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 

 71 75 65 64 65 

58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 

 57 54 38 35 35 

80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 

82 83 80 78 74 74 76 74 73 72 74 74 

 60 60 64 58 58 59 59 59 59 

15 23 24 60 62 60 59 54 56 56 58 64 

 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 

89 89 88 86 85 86 86 85 83 79 81 82 

 80 80 71 71 71 77 77 77 77 

64 72 75 73 75 74 76 71 63 41 59 66 

 90 90 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 

93 93 93 90 90 89 86 87 85 83 83 83 

 80 80 77 65 65 77 77 77 77 

88 89 89 84 85 74 66 68 75 76 77 73 

Legend: MC = mission capable, FMC = fully mission capable, FY= fiscal year, EC/C = electronic 

command and control. 

Notes: We used the “overall” MC and FMC goal for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, which is a 

combined goal for the various categories of deployment status used by the Navy and Marines in 

rating aircraft availability. 

Fiscal year 2002 rates are as of February for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, and March 31 for 

the Air Force. 
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, 

Fiscal Years 1991-2002 

Page 50 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Aircraft ages are as of September 30, 2001 for the Navy/Marines; December 31, 2001, for the Air 

Force; and April 2002 for the Army. 

Aircraft costs/flying hour are as of January 2001 for the Army, and September 30, 2001, for the Air 

Force, Navy, and Marines. 

a

No data or only partial cost/flying hour data available. 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 51 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

To identify Department of Defense (DOD) and service policies and 

practices regarding mission capable (MC) goals and rates, we obtained 

briefings, reviewed DOD and service regulations and prior reports by us 

and others; and interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense: the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; headquarters offices of the 

Army, Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force; and aviation commands and 

other locations as appropriate. 

To determine whether key DOD aircraft were meeting established MC and 

FMC goals, we requested that each service identify its key active-duty 

operational aircraft. We excluded reserve units from the scope of our 

review, as well as active-duty training units and executive aircraft used to 

transport officials on official business. The resultant list included a total of 

46 different models of aircraft from the four military services, which we 

categorized into five basic types: bombers, cargo/tanker aircraft, 

electronic command/control aircraft, fighter/attack aircraft, and 

helicopters. Three aircraft models (F/A-18A, F/A-18C, and EA-6B) were 

used by both the Navy and Marine Corps. For our review, we counted the 

Navy and Marine Corps versions of these aircraft as separate models, 

resulting in a total of 49 aircraft models for review. We requested MC and 

full mission capable (FMC) goal and rate data, aircraft age and cost, and 

other data for these aircraft back to 1991 to provide a historical 

perspective on goal and rate history. The Army and Air Force provided 

comprehensive data from fiscal year 1991 to mid-fiscal year 2002. 

However, the Navy and Marine Corps could provide data separated by 

service only from fiscal year 1998 forward. These services changed their 

reporting system in 1998 and were unable to provide comparable data for 

prior years. As a result, we focused our report on the 5-year period 

beginning in fiscal year 1998. However, we included the full array of Army 

and Air Force data in appendix I. We used these data to conduct analyses 

of whether the aircraft were meeting their goals. We also provided each 

service with these databases for review, and they confirmed the results for 

accuracy. 

To identify the causes of difficulties in meeting MC and FMC goals, we 

reviewed prior reports by us and others and conducted a variety of 

comparative analyses of our data by service, aircraft type, model, age, 

cost, and fiscal year. We then held discussions with each service to gain 

their perspectives on the causes of observed difficulties in meeting the 

goals. 

To determine whether DOD has a clear and defined process for setting MC 

and FMC goals, we reviewed DOD Instruction 3110.5 and other regulations 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 52 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

and conducted discussions with officials from the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and service headquarters in Washington, D.C., and with 

officials from the headquarters of the Air Force’s Air Mobility and Air 

Combat Commands; the Naval Air Systems Command; and Army Training 

and Doctrine Command officials at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Because of the 

difficulty in obtaining clear information on this issue, we also wrote formal 

letters of inquiry to the Secretaries of the Army and Navy requesting 

clarification of how the goals were established. Their responses to those 

letters of inquiry were used in preparing our report. 

We performed our work from February through November 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The 

final publication of this report was delayed by the impact on DOD’s report 

review and classification process of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 

2001, and DOD’s preparations for potential conflict in Iraq. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 53 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 54 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 55 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 56 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 57 GAO-03-300 Military Readiness 

William C. Meredith (retired) 

John W. Nelson (404) 679-1949 

In addition to those named above, Bernice Benta, Katherine Chenault, and 

R.K. Wild made key contributions to this report. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(350147) 
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