@o •U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION March 2009 •° FIEO NCERRG LTR

o• RESEARCH Division 5

REGULTOYGUIDE

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.77

(Draft was issued as DG-501 1, dated December 2008)

(New Regulatory Guide)

INSIDER MITIGATION PROGRAM

A. (U) INTRODUCTION

(U) This guide describes an approach that the staff of the U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission

(NRC) considers acceptable for an insidcr mitigation program (IMP) at nuclcar power reactor facilities..

Title 10. of. the Code of Federal Regulations (10.. CFR) Section 73.55, "Requirements for Physical.

Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors against Radiological Sabotage," specifically

paragraph (b)(7) states that licensees shall establish, maintain, and follow an access authorization program

hin accordance with. 10. CFR 73.56, "Personnel Access Authorization Requirements. forNuclear Power

Plants." The licensee's physical security plan must include descriptions ofthe access authorization

program and the IMP. Furthermore, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(b)(9), licensees shall dcsign and

implement the, IMP to. oversee, and monitor the, initial and continuing trustworthiness, and. reliability of

individuals granted unescorted access or retaining unescorted access authorization to a protected or vital

areas. The IMP should use defense-in-depth mcthodologics to minimize the potcntial for an insider to

adversely affect, either directly. or indirectly, the licensee's capability to prevent significant core damage

or spent fuel sabotage..

(U) This document provides guidance for an IMP that would meet the requirements in

10 CFR 73.55(b)(7) and (b)(9) and the latest NRC staff endorsed version of the industry's guidance

document, Nuclear Energy. Institute. (NEI). 03-01,. "Nuclear Power. Plant Access Authorization Program."

These sources provide. an acceptable approach for an IMP. that meets the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55 as

part of the liccnsee's physical security plan. These sources arc also consistcnt with the guidancc

described in this regulatory, guide.

(U) The NRC issues regulatory guides to describe and makc available thc methodsithat the NRC staff considers acceptable for

use in implemcnting specific parts of the agency's regulations, techniques that the staff uses in evaluating specific problems or

postulated accidents, and data that the staff needs in reviewing applications for: permits. and liccnses. Regulatory guides arc not

substitutes for regulations, and compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions that differ from those set forth in

regulatory guides will be deemed acceptable if they provide a basis for the finding required for thle issuance or continuance of

permit or license by the Commission.

(U) This guide was issued after consideration of comments received from stakeholders.

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(U) Regulatory. guides are issued in 1 0. broad divisions-l, Power Reactors; 2, Research and Test Reactors; 3, Fuels and Materials Facilities; 4, Environmental. and Siting; 5, Materials and Plant Protection; 6, Products; 7, Transportation; 8, Occupational HeIalth;

9, Antitrust and Financial Review; and 10, General.

(U) This regulatory guide contains guidance on how licensees should implement an IMP. Licensees

may employ methods other than those described herein for. meeting the. Commission's regulations if tihe

choscn measures satisfy the stated Commission requirement(s). The approaches and examples describcd

in this regulatory guidance provide one, methodology for satisfying the Commission's, requirements for an

IMP at nuclear power. reactor. facilities.

(U) Licensees with. operating reactors licensed under 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of

Production and Utilization Facilities;" and 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for

Nuclear Power Plants," can apply the guidance in this regulatory guide before fuel is allowed on site

(protected area)..

(U) Any information collection activities mentioned in this regulatory guide are included as

requirements in. 10 CFR 73.8, "Information Collection Requirements," which provides thae regulatory

basis for this guide. The NRC considers the guidance contained in this document to be the most current

concerning acceptable approaches.

(U) The NRC issues. regulatory guides to describe methods that the staff considers acceptable for use.

in implementing specific. parts of the, agency's regulations, to. explain techniques that, the staff uses, in

evaluating specific. problems or POstulated accidents, and to provide guidance to applicants; Regulatory

guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance with them is not required.

(U5). Thisiregulatory guide relates to information collection requirements covered by 10 CFR Part 73,

and that the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) approved under. OMB control number 3150-0002.

The NRC may neither condUct nor sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, an information

collection request or requirement unless the requesting document displays. a currently valid 0MB control

number.

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B. (U) DISCUSSION

(U) Bccause of changes. to the threat, cnvironment after thc evcnts of Septembcr 11, 2001, the

Commission began reevaluating physical protection program requirements at nuclear power reactor

facilities. This changing threat environment resulted in several significant protection and regulatory

enxhancements, to ensure that licensees maintain the capability to provide high. assurance of the health and.

safety of the public against the design-basis threat (DBT). Specifically, the provisions of 10 CFR 73.1,

"Purpose and Scope," describe how an insider might cauise or assist in radiological sabotage.

Furthermore, in a Commission order dated April 29, 2003 (EA-03-086), the NRC required licensees to

address the insider threat. Pursuant to this order, licensees updated their site security plans to specify how

they will comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.1 and the DBT order.

(U) A l icensee' s access authorization program, fitness-for-duty program, and behavior: observation

program (BOP) provide the framework for addressing the. insider, threat. Once ant individual has. been

granted unescorted access to protected and vital areas of a power reactor facility, preventing an adverse

event becomes dependent on detecting the insider through one of these programs andlor by denying the

undetected insider the opportunity to commit the. act by other means, such as physical and cyber

protective security measures, as appropriate. Performance-based program requirements are intended to

generically satisfy the minimum level of perfonnance that a licensee's physical protection program must

achieve to provide adequate protection and. minimize. the. potential for an insider to adversely affect, either.

directly or indirectly, the licensee's capability to prevent significant core damage or spent fuel sabotage.

(QUO-SRI) Pursuant to 10 CFR. 73.55(b)(7) and (b)(9), which provide the. necessary flexibility for

licensees to address the complexities of an insider threat, the. NRC staff has nonetheless, established the

minimum criteria required to. meet the DBT goal of mitigating the active insider, active violent insider, or

passive, insider in Section C of this guide.

(b)(7)(F

(U) The JMP elements are designed to address a broad context of trustworthiness and reliability issues

to minimize the potential for adverse actions by an insider. An insider may create an adverse condition

other, than radiological sabotage that could affect, the licensee's, ability, to respond to a safety or security.

event or could affect the nonmal operation of the plant. Licensees should consider, and be sensitive to,

subtle changes in an indiv idual's behav•ior or actions ov er time and use appropriate IMP elements (e.g.,

behavioral, observation program), to assess and mitigate potential adverse, acts. by insiders.

(U) A trusted person with protected or vital area access, or access to digital computer and

communications systems and networks from outside the protected area, can pose a significant threat to the

safety and security of a nuclear power plant.. Licensees may be. unable to identify the cause, of incidents

that are indicative of potential tampering, which makes it difficult to conclusively determine if a condition

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that was discovered was the result of tampering.. Irrespective of whether security events involve acts that

are. within the scopc of 10. CFR 73.lI and the. DBT, acts of malfeasance. or tampering are particularly.

serious, matters because of the potential, adverse, impact to. the safety and security of the nuclear power

plant. These events demonstrate the need for an IMP that ensures the trustworthiness and reliability of

specific individuals, working for, or supporting a nuclear, power plant..

(U) The broad spectrum of issues related to insider threats ranges from the premeditated actions of an

individual acting as a single. source of origin, to. events that, might be sufficient to. motivate someone, to.

act, such as extortion. The highly unpredictable threat requires a comprehensive, approach to addressing

both the intent and capability, of the potential insider. Licensee internal organizations should coordinate

to, provide the defense-in-depth necessary, to mitigate the insider threat.. An example offthis is the, need for

security and human resources personnel, to work closely with employee assistance program (EAP)

personnel to. ensure that an individual demonstrating the potential to harm themselves or others. is reported

to appropriate security personnel for evaluation as a potential insider threat without, creating the.

perception that seeking help. via the EAP will result in adverse action..

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C. (U) REGULATORY POSITION

1. (U) General Requirements

(U) In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 73 (10 CFR 73), "Physical

Protection of Plants and Materials,". Section 73.55, "Requirements for physical protection of licensed

activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage," the Commission has established design

requirements for a nuclear power reactor facility physical protection program, including the performance

criteria to detect, assess, interdict, and. neutralize threats up. to and including the DBT of radiological

sabotage, thereby preventing significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage. Under 10 CFR 73.55(b)(7)

and(b)(9), licensees shall establish, maintain, and implement an access authorization program and IMP in

accordance with 10. CFR 73.56 and describe the. programs in their physical security plans. The IMP must

be designed and implemented to oversee and monitor the initial, and continuing trustworthiness and

reliability of individuals granted unescorted access or retaining unescorted access authorization to a

protected or. vital area, and. implement defense-in-depth methodologies, to minimize the potential for an

insider to adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, a licensee's capability to prevent significant core

damage or spent fuel sabotage.

(U) In 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," Section 73.56, "Personnel

Access Authorization Requirements. for. Nuclear Power Plants," a licensee is required to establish and

implement a program, as a part of its physical security plan, for granting unescorted access to protected

and vital areas of a nuclear power plant. This program's objective is to provide high assurance that

individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable and do not constitute an unreasonable

risk to public health and safety, including the potential to. commit radiological sabotage..

(U) This document contains guidance for an acceptable IMP that would meet the requirements of

10 CFR 73.55(b)(7) and (b)(9). .Furthermore, the latest NRC staff endorsed version of NEI 03-01 also

describes an approach that the NRC. staff has. found acceptable. in meeting the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56

with respect to. an IMP. as part of the licensee's physical security. plan, and is consistent with the guidance.

described in this regulatory guide..

2.. (U). Elements of an Acceptable Insider Mitigation Program

(U) Threat is a function of intent and capability... To provide defense-in-depth against threats, a

licensee should establish an IMP that will address both the, human reliability factors associated with intent

and physical protection measures to mitigate the capability of a potential insider to commit an adverse act.

(U) As a minimum to mitigate the potential for an insider, an IMP should consist of the following "

elements for all personnel with unescorted access authorization to the protected and vital areas of a

facility: (1) a security determination (clearance or access authorization); (2) initial and random substance

abuse testing; (3) p~sychological assessments which may include a medical evaluation;. (4) review by the

immediate supervisor at least annually; (5) a security determination of the periodic reinvestigation..

2.1. (U) Insider Mitigation Prog~ram Elements-Critical Group

2.1.1. (U).. Participationi

(U) Though insiders. may occupy, any position within a licensee's organization and elements of the

IaMP apply to. all personnel that are. in an unescorted. access authorization status, some groups are

considered to have a higher potential for insider threat (i.e., greater capability) because of their

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knowledge, access to, or possession of weapons inside the protected area of a licensed facility. Pursuant

to 10 CFR 73.56(i)(1)(v,)(B), for any individual, in the critical group the trustworthiness and reliability

determination must be based on a criminal history update and credit history re-investigation within 3

years of the date on. which these elements were last completed, or more frequently, based on job

assignments as determined by the licensee or applicant and a psychological re-assessment within 5 years

of the date on which this element was last completed:

Individuals who perform one or more of the following job functions must be in the critical group:

* All licensed reactor operators.

* Non-licensed operators. Non-licensed operators include those individuals responsible for the

operation of plant systems and components, as directed by a reactor operator or senior reactor

operator. Non-licensed operators. also monitor plant instrumentation and equipment and principally

perform their duties outside the control room.

* Individuals who have extensive knowledge of defensive stratcgies and designa and/or implementation

of the plant's defensive strategies, including:.

a. site security. supervisors

o site security. managers

o corporate security, managers (nuclear and/or applicable contractor security managers)

o. security training instructors

* Individuals in a position to grant an applicant unescorted access or unescorted access authorization,

including assess authorization managers. However, this requirement does not apply to qualified

contractor/vendors (C/Vs) that certify elements of the access authorization program.

* Individuals who have access, extensive knlowledge, or administrative control over plant digital

computer and communication systems and networks as identified in 73.54, including:.

o plant network systems administrators

o IT personnel who are responsible for securing plant networks

Note:. the term "IT personnel" should also consider. personnel who have the ability and

access to change the configuration of control systems (e.g., Supervisory Control and Data

Acquisition (SCADA) systems) or other systems that use embedded devices (e.g.,

Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROMs)).

• Individuals assigned a duty. to search for contraband (e.g., wecapons, explosives, or inccndiary

devices).

* Individuals qualified for and assigned duties as: armed security officers, armed responders, alarnm

station operators, response team leaders, and armorers.

(b)(7)(F)

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(b)(7)(F)

(U) The decision to include additional personnel in the critical group should be based on the

licensee's IMP, goals and performance objectives associated wvith mitigating Active Insiders (Al), Active.

Violent Insiders (AVI), and Passive Insiders (P1). However, thosc personnel referenced under

10 CFR 73.56(i)(1)(v)(B), must be included in the IMP. The NRC staff's policy concerning the insider

during security performance evaluation testing is contained in RG 5.69, "Guidance for the Application

of the. Radiological Sabotage Design-Basis Threat in the Design, Development, and

Implementation of a Physical Security Program that meets 10 CFR 73.55 Requirements."

2.1.2. (U) Initial Security Determination

(U) Initial security measures for completing background investigations and other programmatic

elements required by the NRC, through the implementation of the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56 and

10 CFR 73.57, "Requirements for. Criminal History Checks of Individuals Granted Unescorted Access to

a Nuclear Power Facility or Access to Safeguards Information by Power Reactor Licensees," and the

latest NRC staff endorsed guidance of NEI 03-01, provide high assurance that persons initially, selected

for unescorted access or unescorted access authorization are trustworthy and reliable and do not present a

risk to public health and safety or the common defense and security.

2.1.3 (U) Drug and Alcohol Testing--Pre-access, Random, For cause, Post-event, and Followup

(U) Drug and alcohol testing is an important element of the access authorization and fitness-for-duty

programs. Pre-access, random, for cause, p)ost event, and followup. testing provides a deterrent that

supports both safety and security and reinforces the fundamental concepts of trustworthiness and

reliability.

(U) The Pre-access, Random, For cause, Post-event, and Followup drug and alcohol testing element

of an IMP may be implemented by applying the guidance. for meeting the requirements of

10 CFR Part 26, "Fitness for Duty Programs," and the latest NRC staff endorsed guidance described in

NEI 03-01, "Nuclear Power Plant Access Authlorization Program."

2.1.4 .(U). Psychological Assessments including Medical Evaluations-ilnitial and Periodic

(U) Initial psychological assessments should ensure that any testing mechanism applied, in whole ,or

in part, to. a psycho'logical determination of suitability for unescorted access includes the opportunity to

detect the need for a medical evaluation as described in paragraph (c) below. As required under

10 CFR 73.56(e), the psychological assessment must be designed to evaluate the possible adverse impact

of any noted psychological characteristics on the individual's trustworthiness and reliability..

(U) The psychological assessment must include the following:

a. (U) The administration and interpretation of a standardized, objective, professionally

accepted psychological test that provides information to identify indications of

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disturbances in personality, or p)sychopathology. that may have adverse implications for an

individual's trustworthiness. and. reliability.

b. (U) Predetermined thresholds established for each scale in accordance with 10 CFR

73.56(e)(2) must be applied in interpreting the results of the psychological test to

determine whether an individual shall be interviewed by a licensed psychiatrist or

psychologist. .If the individual receives scores on the psychological test that identify'

indications of disturbances in personality or psychopathology that may have implications

for an individual's trustworthiness and reliability the.psychological assessment must

include a clinical interview. .The initial and periodic assessment should have the

additional focus of careful consideration of the psychopathology of the interviewee..

Psychiatrists or clinical psychologists with the appropriate clinical training and

experience should carefully, apply procedures of evaluation assessment and diagnosis.

.derived from scientific research.

c. (UY) The administrationl of a psychological assessmcnt may trigger a. medical evaluation

to determine thae presence of any mental or physical condition that may cause a

significant defect in the trustworthiness, reliability, or judgment of the individual.

Medical evaluations, triggered by. a psychological reconmmendation, should include a

review of the individual's, prescribed medications to ensure that these medications do not

impair the person's~judgmnent to the extent that trustworthiness and reliability, are

jeopardized. Individuals, identified as candidates for further medical review should be.

referred to a physician for further evaluation. Medical personnel should evaluate possible.

medical conditions, including those that may result from the use of illegal drugs, the.

abuse of prescribed or over-the-counter medications, or the excessive, habitual use of

alcohol, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR. Part 26.

(U). Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.56(i)(l)(v)(B), the psychological assessment must be conducted at

intervals not to exceed once every 5 years for individuals in a critical group. Interviews used in the

assessment should be conducted in a semi-structured manner and include, the recognition, of medical

conditions that could result in impaired judgments or could adversely impact the fitness-for-duty. or

trustworthiness and reliability of those. individuals who currently have unescorted access or unescorted

access authorization status. While other. types of interviews are. permitted, a face-to-face, interview

conducted by an interviewer trained, to look for precursors of insider behavior is preferable for identifying

persons. with potentially undesirable behavioral issues.

(U) Prior to any psychological or medical assessment, the physician practitioner should review a

cur'ent position description of the person being interviewed and the most recently completed supervisory.

review, if applicable and if the. review: contains infonnation• that could assist the. physician practitioner in

their assessment.

(U) The interviewing psychiatrists or clinical psychologists with the appropriate clinical training and

experience should incorporate the most recent supervisory review as one measure of the assessment..

(U) If, in the course of conducting the psychological assessment, the licensed psychologist or

psychiatrist identifies or discovers any information, including a medical condition, that could adversely

impact the fitness-for-duty or trustwvorthiness and reliability, of. any individual, based on standards

identified in the regulation, who currently has unescorted access or unescorted access authorization status,

10 CFR 73.56(e)(6) requires that he or she inform:. (I) the reviewing official of the discovery within 24

hours, of the discovery; and (2). the medical. personnel designated in the site implementing procedures,

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who shall ensure that an appropriate evaluation of the possible medical condition is conducted under the.

requirements of 10 CFR Part 26.

(U) Licensees shall take appropriate action, in accordance with procedures, if disqualifying

information is provided as a result of a psychological assessment or to admninistratively withdraw

unescorted access for any worker who has not met the psychological reassessment criterion.

2.1,5 (U) Annual Review by Immediate Super'isor:

(U) A review conducted by the assigned supervisor has value as an integral part of the BOP required

by 10 CFR 73.56(i)(l)(iv).. This review creates a platform for interaction between the supervisor and the

employee to the extent that the supervisor has the opportunity. to become cognizant of any condition that

may cause the employee to act or behave, in an unconventional manner. In addition, the supervisory

review provides an opportunity for the supervisor to consider whether any circumstances may indicate the

need to. refer the employee for additional medical or psychological review.

In some cases, the supervisor may not have frequent enough interaction with the individual

tharoughout the review period needed to form an informed and reasonable opinion regarding the

individual's behavior, trustworthiness, and reliability.,. In this situation, the individual is also subject to an

annual supervisory review in accordance with the requirements of the licensee's or applicant's BOP. The,

interview may consist of: face-to-face contact, gathering of informaation from personnel who have

frequent interaction with the individual, or Other documented methods of gathering information to ensure

the supervisor can attest to the individuals continued trustworthiness, and reliability. Additionally, the

licensee should provide appropriate initial training of newly assigned supervisors and annual combined

supervisory/worker refresher training. This process. should be defined in licensee procedurcs and policies.

(U) The supervisory review may be satisfied by incorporating information developed over the.

covered period. (i.e., annually) regarding the behavioral characteristics of the employee supervised. This

information would typically include deviations from the behavioral norm that have been reported to the

supervisor through the implementation of the BOP, as wvelt as those deviations from the behavioral norm

personally observed by the supervisor. This review serves two purposes. First, it can identify issues

related to physical or. mental impairment that fall under the general' performance objective of

10. CFR Part 26. Second, it can identify issues related to trustworthiness and reliability..

2.1.5. a BOP Training

Licensees should ensure that the BOP training includes: (1) the recognition that changes in

emotional state can happen quickly; (2) typical conditions that can trigger behavioral anomalies;

(3). the need for early intervention after the recognition of changes in behavior that typically

indicate changes in emotional state; (4) the recognition of uncharacteristic deviations in coworker interactions, uncharacteristic absences from work, uncharacteristic inattention to detail, or

suspected alcohol or drug abuse; and (5) the need to report the above conditions to the

employee's assigned supervisors or fitness-for-duty program manager.

2.1,6. (U) Periodic Reinvestigation of Security Determination

(U) Pursuant to. 10 CFR 73.56(i)(1)(v)(B)(1-5), members of the critical group must be reinvestigated

within 3. Years. of the datc on which the criminal history update and credit history re-evaluation were last

completed, or more fi-equently, based on job assignment as determained by the licensee or applicant, and a

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psychological re-assessment within 5 years of the date on which this element was last completed. The requirements of this section apply, to all individuals with unescorted access authorization or. unescorted

access who are members of the critical group. Individuals who have not satisfied the reinvestigation.

requirements shall have unescorted access authorization or unescorted access administratively withdrawn

until the reinvestigation has been completed, or the worker should be reassigned to non-critical, group

positions until the required critical group reassessment can be completed.

(U) The reinvestigation shall include the following:

a. (U) A review of criminal history records obtained under 10 CFR 73.56(d)(7) and

1 0 CFR 73.57, or as the Commnission may require, or as Federal statute may direct.

Licensees should compare data returned from the criminal history. records check with the

access authorization records of the person named in the record to ensure that the person

has complied with the self-reporting requirements in 10 CFR 73.56(g). Submissions of

fingerprints for the review of criminal history informationt should be handled separately.

from investigations for outage staffing to preclude inadvertent outage staffing delays.

b. (U) Licensees shall obtain a full credit history and review the history for the period

provided as required by 10 CFR 73.56(d)(5). The individual should complete new

consent to screen and Federal Credit Reporting Act disclosure and authorization

statement forms before'initiating this reinvestigation.

c. (U) Licensees shall take appropriate action if disqualif~ying information is discovered

during any reinvestigation rcvicw..

(U) The start of the interval, for the next reinvestigation should be the date the reviewing official

completed a concurrent review of both the credit history and criminal history information. To provide for

reasonable. consistency Of the. timeframe under review, the reviewing official should ensure that the.

receipt of the credit history and the criminal history information are within 30 days of each other.

3. (U) Fitness-for-Duty Considerations related to 10 CFR Section 26.10, "General

Performance Objectives"

(U) The use of illegal drugs and the intentional misuse of legal drugs and alcohol are only a few of

the potential causes for concern with respect to an individual's state of mind as it relates to an insider

threat.. In addition, physical and mental conditions that arc. not related to cithcr of these. may drivc an

individual to commit an adverse act. For example, sedative-hypnotic products (e.g., sleep disorder drugs).

are widely prescribed and have been associated' with adversc behavior, including aggression, sleep

driving, and suicidal thoughts. Licensees should refcr to NRC Information Notice 2007-31, "U.S. Food

and Drug Administration Announcement Related to Certain Sleep Disorder Drugs," dated November 13,

2007, for more information. In the context of insider threat, licensees should understand the relationships

between BOP relating to identifying and reporting suspicious behavior, the. fitness-for-duty. program

relating to the evaluation of impairment-related behavior that could impact th~e trustworthiness and

reliability of an individual, and the access authorization program that determines suitability for unescorted

access.

(U) Licensees are expected to consider the potential insider threat when making fitness-for-duty

determinations associated with observed abnormal behavior.

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4. (U1) Access to Vital Areas

(U) As. required by 10 CFR 73.56(.j), a licensee, shall establish, implement, and maintain a list of

individuals who are authorized to have unescorted access to specific nuclear power plant vita] areas

during nonemergeney conditions. The list must include only those individuals who have a continued

need for access to. those specific vital, areas in order to. perform their, routine, duties and responsibilities.

The list must be approved by a cognizant licensee or applicant manager or supervisor who is responsible

for directing the work activities ofthe individual who is granted unescorted access to each vital area. The

list nmust be updated and reapproved no. less. frequently than every 31. days. The. intent is to minimize

insidcr threats by reducing the. number of individuals having unescorted v'ital area access, and by limiting

vital area access to those personnel requiring it to. perform their duties.

(U) In determining continued need, licensees should consider event response, weckend or. holiday

emergencies, or other "off-hours" operational responses. The licensee may determine that some

individuals are required to remain on the~..lisjt. _Personnel.-who fall into thi!s category will be evaluated at

the licensee's discretion. However, personnel should be evaluated by a cognizant licensee or applicant

manager or supervisor who is responsible. for directing the. work•activities of the individual..

5. (U) Physical Protection Measures - Specific. Elements

(U) In considering program elements needed to mitigate the Al and AVI, licensecs should develop a

four part program that will:

a. (U) ensure licensed operators are properly trained to recognize indications of tampering,

which includes mis-positioning of equipment until dispositioned otherwise, to report such

conditions. in a timely manner, and to compensate for degraded conditions as appropriate;

b. ensure armed security officers are properly trained to recognize indications of obvious

tampering;

c. ensure personnel who receive plant access training are. trained in. recognizing beh~aviors or

conditions adverse to safe operations and security of the facility;

b. (U) develop procedures, and training requirements to react effectively to conditions.

relatedto actual or suspected tampering;

c. (U) ensure that indications, oftampering are included in the corrective action program;

and (b)(7)(F)

e. The program should identify target set equipment that:

(b)(7)(F)

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(IU) While thle above engineered and administrative physical protection measures relate to target set

equipment, licensees should remain aware that tampering with non-target, set equipment, such as safety or

security equipment, can adversely affect the ability to respond to events as required in compliance with

the regulations.

(b)(7)(F)

(U) Licensees should train security personnel to recognize and respond to obvious indications of

tampering. .Except where precluded by immediate personnel safety concerns, operations abnormalities, or

restrictions under guidelines to keep. radiation dose rates as low as reasonably. achievable, an armed

security officer should patrol accessible areas that contain target set elements.

(U) Licensee procedures should describe the operations and security response to actual tampering

events. .Any. suspected tampering event should be entered into, the licensee's corrective action program.

(b)(7)('F)

)

I ' • .............. I

(b)(7)(F). ..... I............ The Nuclear Energy Institute's NEL 03-12, latest NRC endorsed revision, "Security Plan Template," describes the specifics of a patrol program that the NRC has found acceptable.

(b)(7)(F) I

(b)(7)(F) I ........ Section 4.6.4, "Insider Mitigation," and Section 5,

"Security. System Technology," of SAND2007-559 1, "Nuclear Power Plant Security Assessment

TechnicalManual," issued September 2007, outlines additional guidance for these types of measures..

(OUO-SRI).. Licensees should ensure that searches. are performed in an acceptable. manner, that: will

ensure personnel are searched for contraband (explosives and firearms) before entering the facility. This

makes, contraband searches an integral physical protection element of tlhe IMP.

D. (U) IMPLEMENTATION

(U). This section provides information to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC's plans for using

this regulatory guide. No imposition or backfit is intended or approved in connection with its issuance.

except as discussed. below.

(U) As is the case with all NRC regulatory guides, licensees are not required to implement any of the

guidance described in .this document. .However, except in cases in which an applicant or licensee

proposes or has established a. method for complying with specified portions of the NRC's regulations that.

differs from the methods described in this. regulatory.guide, the NRC staff plans to use this guide to

evaluate the adequacy of a licensee's IMP program..

(U) The methods described herein will be used in evaluating: (I) submittals in connection with

applications for. construction permits, standard plant design certifications, operating licenses, early

site permits,. and combined licenses; and. (2). submittals from operating reactor licensees who voluntarily

propose to. initiate system modifications if there is a clear nexus between the proposed modifications and

the subject for which guidance is provided herein.

RG 5.77, Page 12 , rr--r--l ,• Al I If ~ rii-r- f '•. I r1 '•rI'l IT--ifl-/ I")f'- A •Lr~r~ i r'fl?~rP •~L A/ .- i'-f~rl

UI-jU-IL,,~ UC,1- ~JL;{4. T -- ,i._...,ijixi i i -i-\.Li"•. i i-i__J iji-i ...di ,iVir'5 i i'•,Ji"
OFFICIAL USE ONLY--SECURIT'Y-RELATED. i NFO..•,v,..,........ ,,,.,,

(U) BACKFIT STATEMENT

(U) The staff prepared a backfit analysis for the final power reactor security rule for wvhich this

regulatory guide provides guidance. See 74 FR 13926, 13968 (March 27, 2009). This regulatory guide

presents the first instance of NRC staff guidance on the amnended rule.. Accordingly, the backfit statement

in the final 2009. power. sccurity rules applies to this regulatory guide. No. further consideration of

backfitting is. necessary for this regulatory guide.

RG 5.77, Page 13
(U) GOSSARY

(U) active insider-- a person who,. while in an. unescorted access. status and. within, the.

protected. area, takes direct action to. assist a DBT. (e.g.,. participates in. planning,, uses. an.

authorized key card to open a controlled access, door, creates an. operational. or security

diversion, impedes. a response to. the threat)..

(U) active, violent insider-- a person who, while in an unescorted access status and within the

protected area,. takes direct action to harm plant components, a member of the, security.

force, or plant staff with the intent of preventing the operation of equipment or of

preventing, the person. harmed from participating in protective, or. recovery, strategies,, or

who takes, action to. engage and/or, divert operations. or security, resources, from normal.

protective or recovery strategies.

(U) administrative withdrawal of UAA/UA--a process to temporarily withhold UAAIUA from

an. individual, while action is taken to. complete or. update an element of the UAA

requirements.

(U) annual--requirements specified as. "annual'. should be. scheduled at a nominal 12-monthi

periodicity. .Performance may. be. conducted, up. to three. months before to three. months

S after the scheduled date.

(U) applicant--, applicants for an operating license, or holders of a combined construction

permit and operating license (combined license), who choose to implement their access

authorization programs,. which were approved by the. Commission. in their Physical.

Security. Plan,. prior to receiving their operating licenses or their Commission findings..

(U) background investigation (BI)--information from all. BI elements to. be. collectively

evaluated, by the. reviewing, official pursuant to a determination, of trustworthiness, and

reliability of an. individual.. Depending. upon. the. BI period,, the. BI. elements may. include

any or all of the following: verification of true identity, employment verification with

suitable inquiry (includes education in lieu of employment and. military. service, as

employment),, a credit check, and ch~aracter, and reputation. determination.

(U) behavior observation program (BOP)--an awareness, program, that meets requirements

of both the access authorization and fitness-for-duty programs. Personnel are trained to

report legal actions;, to. possess. certain knowledge and, abilities. (K&A's). related, to. drugs

and alcohol and. the recognition. of behaviors adverse, to the. safe. operation, and security

of the facility by observing the behavior of others in the workplace and detecting and

reporting. aberrant behavior, or. changes in. behavior, that might adversely impact an

individual's trustworthiness or. reliability,. and. undergo an. annual supervisory review.

(U) critical group--any individual, who. performs job functions that are. critical to the safe. and.

secure. operation of the licensee's, facility. .This individua[ includes any i~ndivdual who.

has been. granted. UA or. certified UAA and. performs one. or. more of. the. following job

functions:.

a. (U) any individuals who have extensive knowledge of facility defensive strategies

or who design and/or, implement the. plant's defense strategies;

RG 5.77, Page 14
b. (U) any individuals in a position to grant an. individual unescorted access or to

certify an individual unescorted access authorization;

c. (U) any individuals assigned a duty to search for contraband (e.g., weapons,•

explosives, incendiary devices);

d. (U) any individuals who have access, extensive knowledge, or administrative

control over plant digital computer and communication systems and networks as

identified in § 73.54; and

e. any individual identified in 10 CFR 73.56(i)(!)(v)(B)(5).

(U). insider--a person who has been granted unescorted access or unescorted access

*authorization under the requirements of 10 CER 73.56 or has the ability to access

information systems that: (1) connect to systems that connect to plant operating

systems; or (2) contain sensitive information that may assist an insider in an attempted

act of Sabotage.

.(U) passive insider--a person who provides or attempts to provide safeguards or Other

relevant information regarding a licensee's physical configurations, designs, strategies,

or capabilities to. any person who does not have a functional or operational need to

know.

(U) position description--a statement or description outlining the essential functions. of. a job.

and the potential exposures and hazards associated with those functions, or the

environment in. which the. functions, are. executed..

(U). reinvestigation--a periodic inquiry or assessment conducted to ensure that individuals

continue to meet UAAIUA or FF0 program suitability requirements as defined in latest

version of NEI 03-01 that describes an approach that the. NRC staff, has found.

acceptable.

(U) reviewing, official--the licensee or, if applicable, CN/persons designated by their company

to be responsible for reviewing and evaluating all data collected about an individual,

including potentially disqualifying information, in order to determine whether the

individual maybe authorized UAA or granted UA.

(U) semi-structured interview--an interview with an individual applying for UAA or a person

maintaining UAA,. conducted. by a psychiatrist or a licensed, psychologist with. clinica[.

experience as required by applicable state requirements, containing questions

determined appropriate by the interviewing psychiatrist or licensed psychologist which

vary the. focus and content of the. interview,, depending on the written assessment, the

observations of the interviewer, and the interviewee's responses to questions. The

semi-structured interview may contain any other evaluative measure determined

appropriate by the psychiatrist or licensed psychologist.

(U) tampering--deliberately damaging, disabling, or altering equipment necessary for safe

shutdown or security equipment necessary for the protection of the facility in order to

defeat their function and/or prevent them from operating..

(U). target set--the combination of equipment or operator actions which, if all are prevented

from performing their intended safety function or prevented from being accomplished,

would likely result in significant core damage (e.g., non-incipient, non-localized fuel

melting, and/or core disruption) barring extraordinary action by plant operators. A target

RG 5.77, Page 15
OFFE'EIC'IAL US ION "LY S ECU"IT ~ELATfED' RD• INFORMl:)liATl~iO'Nl

set with respect to spent fuel sabotage is draining the spent fuel pool leaving the spent

fuel uncovered for a period of time, allowing spent fuel heat up. and the associated

potential for release of fission products.

(U) unescorted access (UA)-- status granted to an individual after satisfactorily completing all

regulatory requirements for UAA and FFDA, and the individual has completed plant

access training; is subjected to a behavioral observation program; is placed in a random

drug and alcohol testing program; and is provided, the physical means to gain UA to the

protected area.

(U) unescorted access authorization (UAA)--status in the. access, authorization process, after

the individual satisfactorily completes all required elements as specified in Section 6

(including the. FFDA elements: consent, self-disclosure, suitability inquiry, drug and

alcohol testing elements defined in 10 CER Part 26, being subject to a BOP and training

in the FED K&A's),which were evaluated by a licensee reviewing official who then made

a favorable determination, relative to the, individual's trustworthiness, reliability and

fitness-for-duty.

RG 5.77, Page16
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SECURITY-RELATED 1NFORMATIOHI

(U) REFERENCES

(U) 1. 1 0 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC.'

(U) 2. NEI 03-0 1, "Nuclear Powver Plant Access Authorization Program," Nuclear Energy Institute,

Washington, DC.

(U) 3. 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.

(U3) 4. 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Ccrtifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,"

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.

(U) 5. EA-03-086, "Design-Basis Threat Order," U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC, April 29, 2003.

(U:) 6. 10 CFR Part 26, "Fitness for Duty Programs," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC.

(Ul) 7. Information Notice 2007-31, "US Food and Drug Administration Announcement Related to

Certain Sleep Disorder Drugs," U.S. Nuclear: Regulatory. Commission, Washington, DC,

November 13. 2007.2

(U) 8. NEI 03-12, "Security Plan Template," Nuclear. Energy Institute, Washington, DC.

(U) 9. SAND2007-559 I, "Nuclear Power Plant Security Assessment Technical Manual," Sandia

National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, September 2007. -

(U) 10. 71 FR 62664,."Power Reactor Security Requirements,". Federal Register, Volume 71,

Number 207, pp. 62664-62874, Washington, DC, October 26, 2006.s

Add a reference for the Proposed and Final Rules.

1 (U). All NRC rcgulations listed herein arc available electronically through the Elcectronic Reading Room on the. NRC's

public Web site, at hrtp:I/A~vw.nre.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfrI. .Copies are also available for inspection

or copying for a fcc from the NRC's Public Documcnt Room (PDR) at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD;

the mailing address is USNRC PDR, Washington, DC 20555; telephone (301) 415-4737 or (800) 397-4209;

fax (301) 415-3548; and email PDR(~1nrc.gov.

2 (U) All information notices listed herein were published by the NRC and are available electronically through the

Electronic Reading Room on the NRC's public Web site, at

htp:f/lwww.nrc. uov/readine-rm/doc-collections/cen-comm/info-notices/. Copies are also available for inspection or

copying for a fee from the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD; the mailing

address is USNRC PDR, Washington, DC 20555; telephone (301) 415-473.7 or (800) 397-4209; fax (301) 415-3548;

anld email PDR(Tnrcegov.

(U) All Federal Register notices listed herein were issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulator5, Commission and are

available for inspection or copying for a fee from the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) at 11555. Roekville Pike,

Rockvillc, MD; the mailing address is USNRC PDR. Washington, DC 20555; telephone (301) 415-4737 or (800) 397-

4209; fax (301) 415-3548; and e-mail PDR(l•,nrc.gov. Many are also available electronically through the Federal

Register Main Page of the public GPOAccess Web site, which the U.S. Government Printing Office maintains

at http://www.e•poaccess.gov/fr/index.html.

RG 5.77, Page 17

OFF,,.,,.,L U.....,,E.. ONL','--SECU RrT;-RELATED I ........ N FO!,,rMATl" ION,,
(U5) BIBLIOGRAPHY

(OUO-SRI). PERS-TR-94-001, "Assessment of Position Factors that Increase Vulnerability to

Espionage," Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center. Provides guidance, that

may assist a licensee in determining which positions may be vulnerable to an insider threat based

on local conditions.

RG 5.77, Page 18
OFFl'IC"IAL US ON", t•KLY SE CUIR"I ~~• RLATED"'rl' INFORMA,,,1x1-TION

(U). BIBLIOGRAPHY

(OUO-SRI) PERS-TR-94-00 1, "Assessment of Position Factors that Increase Vulnerability to

Espionage," Departmuent of Defense Personnel Security Research Center. Provides guidance that

may assist a licensee in determining which positions may be vulnerable to an insider threat based

on local conditions.

ADAMS. Accession No.:. ML09072 1034

OFFICE: NSIR/DSP/RSRLBITL NSIRIDSPIRSRLB/BC NSIRIDSP/DDRS OGC.

NAME: BSchnetzler DHuyck SMorris B Jones

wI/comments wI/comments Subject to

edits

DATE: 03/20/09 03/24/09 03/26/09 0411 4/09

OFFICE: NSIRIDSO/ NSIR/DSP

NAME: BWestreich RCorreia_______

DATE: 05/30/09 06/ /09 ______________

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

RG 5.77, Page 18

OFFICIAL USE ONY-EU!T-EAE INFORrMATION