[ DO NOT PUBLISH] 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________
No. 20

- 13067

Non

- Argument Calendar

____________________
WASEEM DAKER,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL CARR, SAMUEL SCOTT OLENS, PATRICIA BETH ATTAWAY BURTON, JOSEPH DROLET, TINA M. PIPER, et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. USCA11 Case: 20-13067 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 1 of 52 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13067

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docke t No. 1:20

- cv

- 01679

- WMR

____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Waseem Daker, a state prisoner , appeals pro se the sua sponte dismissal of his complaint against the Attorney General for the State of Georgia, staff attorneys , the State of Georgia, and the Georgia Department of Law. The district court dismissed Daker’s complaint for fail ur e to state a claim

. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). We affirm

. Daker complained tha t state entities and officials violated his rights to access the courts and to due process under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

. Daker alleged that

o fficials submitt ed proposed orders to s tate courts without serving him with a copy and that the officials’ conduct resulted in their motions being granted, his motions being denied, or his cases being dismissed

. Daker sought equitable relief and money damages

. Over Daker’s objections, t he district court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The district court ruled that the officials were USCA11 Case: 20-13067 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 2 of 520

- 13067 Opinion of the Court 3
entitled to absolute immunity
, that the State and its department

were not person s subject to suit under section 1983 , and that Daker failed t o state a claim for monetary damages because his allegations

“ that he would have prevailed in his state court actions but for the [officials’] failure to serve him with their proposed order s . . . [were] entirely conclusory .” The district court also ruled that Daker failed to state a claim for equitable relief . The district court explained that Daker had the remedy of appeal if the “proposed orders signed by the state court were entered in error
, ” but in the absence of such

error, Daker suffere d no injury and “lack[ed] standing to claim equitable relief.” Daker has abandoned any challenge that he could have made to the dismissal of his claim s against the State and the D epartment and of his claim against state o fficials for money damage s

. Arguments not raised on appeal are abandoned. Timson v. Sampson , 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008)

. And Daker does not dispute that the state entities were not persons subject to suit
, see GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Ga

. , 687 F.3d 1244, 1254 (11th Cir. 2012)
, or that the o fficials enjoyed absolute immunity f rom suit for money damages
, see Hart v. Hodges , 587 F.3d 1288, 1295

– 96 (11th Cir. 2009)

. The district court did not err by dismissing Daker’s claims against the officia ls for equitable relief. To establish standing, Daker had to satisfy three requirements: an injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Elend v. Basham , 471 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006)

. “[F] or an injury to suffice for prospective relief, ” Daker USCA11 Case: 20-13067 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 3 of 54 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13067
had to allege that he faced “a real and immediate threat of future harm.” Id. at 1207. But Daker described past conduct by officials. His “past exposure to [alleged] illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) ) (alterations adopted and ellipses omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it sua spont e dismissed Daker ’s complaint without giving him leave to amend his pleading

. “A party may amend [his] pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) ; see Brown v. Johnson , 387 F.3d 1344,
1348

– 49 (11 th Cir. 2004) . But a district court need not g ive a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint when amendment would be futile

. L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson , 982 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2020)

. Daker ’s “ alleg ations of possible future injury [w ere ] not sufficient” to establish an injury in fact for purposes of standing. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA , 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration adopted ). He assume d that state courts w ould grant relief that state officials might request in proposed orders, but “it is just not possible for a litigant to prove in advance that the judicial system will lead to any particular result in his case.” Id. at 413

– 14 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas , 495 U .S. 149, 159

– 60 (1990 ) ). Without an allegation t hat an “injury is certainly impending,” Daker’s “ alleged injury is .

. . too speculative [to establish standing] for Article III purposes.” Id. at USCA11 Case: 20-13067 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 4 of 520

- 13067 Opinion of the Court 5
409. Daker was not entitled to leave to amend his complaint b ecause the district court could “rule out any possibility that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.” Brown , 387 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank , 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999))

. We AFFIRM the dismissal of Daker’s complaint

. USCA11 Case: 20-13067 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 5 of 5