` 

ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 

ANNUAL REPORT 

Calendar Year 2015 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Enforcement 

Washington, DC 20555 
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CONTENTS 

I. Program Overview .......................................................................................................... 1 

A. Mission and Authority ............................................................................................... 1 

B. Assessment of Escalated Enforcement Actions .................................................... 4 

1. Escalated Enforcement Trends .......................................................................... 6 

2. Civil Penalty Actions ........................................................................................... 8 

3. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties .................................................... 11 

4. Enforcement Program Timeliness ................................................................... 12 

5. Alternative Dispute Resolution ........................................................................ 15 

C. Nonescalated Enforcement .................................................................................... 17 

II. Enforcement Case Work ............................................................................................... 21 

A. Significant Enforcement Actions ........................................................................... 21 

B. Hearing Activities .................................................................................................... 22 

C. Enforcement Orders ................................................................................................ 22 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigations ....................... 23 

E. Actions Involving Individuals and Nonlicensee Organizations .......................... 23 

F. Enforcement Action Involving Discrimination ..................................................... 23 

G. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions .......................................................................................... 24 

1. Discretion Involving Interim Enforcement Guidance ..................................... 24 

2. Discretion Involving No SDP Performance Deficiency .................................. 25 

3. Discretion Involving Violations Identified Because of Previous 

Enforcement Actions ........................................................................................ 25 

4. Discretion Involving Special Circumstances .................................................. 26 

5. Notices of Enforcement Discretion .................................................................. 28 

H. Withdrawn Actions .................................................................................................. 29 

III. Ongoing Activities ........................................................................................................ 31 

A. Enforcement Policy ................................................................................................. 31 

1. Enforcement Policy Revisions ......................................................................... 31 

2. Enforcement Guidance Memoranda ................................................................ 31 

B. Knowledge Management and Improvement Initiatives ........................................ 32 

C. Regional Accomplishments ................................................................................... 34 

D. Calendar Year 2016 Focus Areas ........................................................................... 34 
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TABLES 

Table 1 – Escalated Action Trends ................................................................................... 6

Table 2 – Civil Penalty Information ................................................................................... 9

Table 3 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Region and Program Office ................ 36

Table 4 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of Licensee, Nonlicensee, or 

Individual .......................................................................................................... 37

Table 5 – Escalated Enforcement Action Trends by Type of Licensee ....................... 38

FIGURES 

Figure 1 – How the NRC Regulates .................................................................................... 1

Figure 2 – Escalated Enforcement by Type of Action (CY 2015) ..................................... 4

Figure 3 – Escalated Enforcement by Business Line (CY 2015) ..................................... 5

Figure 4 – Escalated Action Trends (CY 2011 to CY 2015) .............................................. 7

Figure 5 – Escalated Action Trends by Business Line (CY 2011 to CY 2015) ................ 8

Figure 6 – Civil Penalty Trends by Business Line (CY 2011 to CY 2015) ..................... 10

Figure 7 – Percentage of Civil Penalties by Business Line ........................................... 11

Figure 8 – Escalated Enforcement Associated with ROP SDP Findings ...................... 12

Figure 9 – Non-OI Case Timeliness Trends (Average Number of Days) ....................... 14

Figure 10 – OI Case Timeliness Trends (Average Number of Days) ............................. 15

Figure 11 – ADR Confirmatory Orders Issued (CY 2011 to CY 2015) ............................ 16

Figure 12 – Calendar Days from NRC Action to Issuance of Confirmatory Order ....... 17

Figure 13 – Nonescalated Enforcement Trends (CY 2011 to CY 2015) ......................... 18

Figure 14 – Nonescalated Enforcement Trends by Region (CY 2011 to CY 2015) ....... 19

APPENDICES 

Appendix A - Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties ............................................A1

Appendix B - Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties .......B1

Appendix C - Summary of Orders .....................................................................................C1

Appendix D - Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions Against Individuals .........D1

Appendix E - Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions Against Nonlicensees ..... E1
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Executive Summary 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) effectively carried out the agency’s 

Enforcement Policy and Program in calendar year (CY) 2015. NRC headquarters and 

regional offices continued to focus on appropriate and consistent enforcement of the 

agency’s regulations. 

Escalated Enforcement Action Data 

The Enforcement Policy defines an escalated enforcement action as a notice of violation 

(NOV) with a severity level (SL) of III or greater (SL I, II, and III NOVs); NOVs associated 

with an inspection finding that the significance determination process (SDP) evaluates as 

having low to moderate (white) or greater safety significance; civil penalties (CPs); NOVs to 

individuals; orders to modify, suspend, or revoke NRC licenses or the authority to engage in 

NRC-licensed activities; orders issued to impose civil penalties; and enforcement-related 

confirmatory orders (COs). During CY 2015, the NRC issued 80 escalated enforcement 

actions under traditional enforcement and the reactor oversight process (ROP). Of these 

actions, 15 involved CPs totaling $259,700, 4 were enforcement orders without an imposed 

CP, and 61 were escalated NOVs without a proposed CP. 

The total number of escalated enforcement actions decreased in CY 2015 by approximately 

6 percent when compared to CY 2014. This 1-year trend was largely the result of a 

decrease in the number of escalated actions issued to nuclear materials user licensees. 

Over the past 5 years, the number of escalated enforcement actions issued by the agency 

has shown an overall declining trend; however, CY 2015 was consistent with the average 

number of escalated enforcement actions issued over the past 3 years. Section I of the 

annual report provides additional information on these trends. 

Noteworthy Program Accomplishments 

The Office of Enforcement (OE) issued four new or revised enforcement guidance 

memoranda (EGM) to support consistent enforcement decisions. OE also assessed 

Region III’s implementation of the agency’s enforcement program, with an emphasis on 

nonescalated enforcement for reactor and material licensees. Additionally, members of the 

OE staff supported an inspection, led by the Office of New Reactors, of Chicago Bridge and 

Iron Company’s (CB&I’s) implementation of a CO issued in 2014 following a successful 

alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session. 

Significant Cases 

In CY 2015, the agency processed a number of significant cases that required extensive 

coordination and cooperation between internal and external stakeholders. These significant 

cases included: (1) an SL II violation with a proposed CP issued to CB&I, (2) two NOVs 

associated with a yellow SDP finding issued to Arkansas Nuclear One relating to the failure 

to design, construct, and maintain flood barriers to protect safety-related equipment from 

flooding, (3) an NOV associated with a yellow SDP finding issued to Oyster Creek Nuclear 

Generating Station regarding the design and installation of replacement electromatic relief 

valves, and (4) a CO issued to Columbia Generating Station as a result of an ADR 

settlement agreement for violations involving inattentive nuclear security officers. 
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I. Program Overview 

A. Mission and Authority 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) regulates 

the civilian uses of nuclear 

materials in the United States 

to protect public health and 

safety, the environment, and 

the common defense and 

security. The agency 

accomplishes this mission 

through: licensing of nuclear 

facilities and the possession, 

use, and disposal of nuclear 

materials; the development 

and implementation of 

requirements governing 

licensed activities; and 

inspection and enforcement 

activities to ensure 

compliance with these 

requirements. 

The NRC conducts various types of inspections and investigations designed to ensure that 

the activities it licenses are conducted in strict compliance with the Commission’s 

regulations, the terms of the licenses, and other requirements. 

The sources of the NRC’s enforcement authority are the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and the Energy Policy Act 

of 2005. These statutes give the NRC broad authority with respect to its enforcement 

program. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 expanded the definition of byproduct material, 

placing additional byproduct material under the NRC’s jurisdiction including both naturally 

occurring and accelerator-produced radioactive materials (NARM). The agency carries out 

its enforcement authority through Title 10, “Energy,” of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR) Part 2, “Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure,” Subpart B, “Procedure for 

Imposing Requirements by Order, or for Modification, Suspension, or Revocation of a 

License, or for Imposing Civil Penalties.” The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 

provides the statutory framework for the Federal Government to use alternative dispute 

resolution (ADR). 

 

Figure 1 – How the NRC Regulates 
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The NRC Enforcement Policy establishes the general principles governing the NRC’s 

Enforcement Program and specifies a process for implementing the agency’s enforcement 

authority in response to violations of NRC requirements. This statement of policy is 

predicated on the NRC’s view that compliance with its requirements has a key role in 

ensuring safety, maintaining security, and protecting the environment. The Enforcement 

Policy applies to all NRC licensees, to various categories of nonlicensees, and to individual 

employees of licensed and non-licensed firms involved in NRC-regulated activities. 

The NRC enforces compliance as necessary. Enforcement actions serve as a deterrent, 

emphasize the importance of compliance with regulatory requirements, and encourage the 

prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations. In addition, because 

violations occur in a variety of activities and have varying levels of significance, the NRC 

Enforcement Policy contains graduated sanctions. 

Enforcement authority includes using notices of violation (NOVs), civil penalties (CPs), 

demands for information, and orders to modify, suspend, or revoke a license. The NRC staff 

may exercise discretion in determining the appropriate enforcement sanctions to be taken. 

Most violations are identified through inspections and investigations and are normally 

assigned a severity level (SL) ranging from SL IV for those of more than minor concern to 

SL I for the most significant. 

The ROP supplements the enforcement process for operating nuclear reactors. A similar 

process has been implemented to assess findings at new reactor construction sites. Under 

the ROP, violations are not normally assigned an SL but instead are assigned “significance” 

by assessing their associated inspection findings through the ROP. Under this program, the 

NRC determines the risk significance of inspection findings using the significance 

determination process (SDP), which in turn assigns the colors of green, white, yellow, or red 

with increasing risk significance. Findings under the ROP may also include licensee failures 

to meet self-imposed standards. As such, ROP findings may or may not involve a violation 

of a regulatory requirement. Violations and findings assigned a greater-than-green color are 

considered escalated enforcement actions. While the ROP can process most violations at 

operating power reactors, it cannot address aspects of some violations; such violations 

require the NRC to follow the traditional enforcement process. 

Under the ROP, violations that result in actual safety or security consequences, affect the 

ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, or involve willfulness are 

processed under the traditional Enforcement Policy. In addition, while ROP findings are not 

normally subject to CPs, the NRC does consider CPs for any violation that involves actual 

consequences. SL IV violations and violations associated with green ROP findings are 

normally dispositioned as non-cited violations (NCVs). Inspection reports or records 

document NCVs and briefly describe the corrective action that the licensee has taken or 

plans to take, if they are known at the time the NCV is documented. Additional information 

about the ROP is available at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html. 

The Office of Enforcement (OE) develops policies and programs for the enforcement of NRC 

requirements. In addition, OE oversees NRC enforcement activities, giving programmatic 

and implementation guidance to regional and headquarters offices that conduct or are 

involved in enforcement activities, and strives to ensure consistency between regional and 

program office implementation of the agency’s Enforcement Program. 
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The NRC’s enforcement Web site is available at http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/enforcement.html and presents a variety of information, such as the 

Enforcement Policy; the Enforcement Manual; and current temporary enforcement guidance 

contained in enforcement guidance memoranda (EGM). This Web site also has information 

about escalated enforcement actions the NRC has issued to reactor and materials 

licensees, nonlicensees (vendors, contractors, and certificate holders), and individuals. In 

keeping with NRC practices and policies, details associated with most security-related 

actions and activities are not available on the NRC’s public Web site. 

 
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B. Assessment of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

Escalated enforcement actions include the following: 

• NOVs, including SL I, II, or III violations 

• NOVs associated with red, yellow, or white SDP findings (for operating reactor 

facilities) 

• CP actions 

• enforcement orders (including confirmatory orders (COs) that result from the ADR 

process, and orders to suspend, revoke or modify an NRC license) 

During CY 2015, the NRC issued 80 escalated enforcement actions to licensees, 

nonlicensees, and individuals. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these actions, by the 

category of the action, for CY 2015. 

Figure 2 – Escalated Enforcement by Type of Action (CY 2015)

The most common type of escalated enforcement action was an NOV without a CP, with 61 

of the 80 escalated actions (or 76 percent) issued during the year fitting this category. This 

percentage is consistent with the overall distribution of escalated enforcement actions during 

the past 5 years, where approximately 74 percent of all escalated actions issued between 

CY 2011 and CY 2015 have been NOVs without a CP. Generally speaking, a large 

percentage of NOVs without CPs is considered a positive outcome because it demonstrates 

that a majority of licensees identify and correct violations – a goal of the Enforcement 

Program. 
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The remaining 24 percent of escalated enforcement actions were split between NOVs and 

orders with a CP, and orders without a CP. As shown in Table 1 (on page 6), the NRC 

issued 15 CP actions (19 percent) and 4 orders without a CP (5 percent). The 15 CP 

actions included 13 NOVs, and 2 orders imposing a CP. 

Figure 3 shows the distribution of escalated enforcement actions based on the business 

line, or type of licensee to whom the NRC issued escalated enforcement actions in CY 

2015. For this figure, individual actions were included in the appropriate category of 

licensee, instead of being counted separately. Tables 3 and 4 at the end of this report give 

further details by identifying the region or program office that initiated the action, as well as 

additional details on the type of licensee, nonlicensee, and individual involved. 

Figure 3 – Escalated Enforcement by Business Line (CY 2015) 

As shown in Figure 3, operating reactor licensees received the largest percentage of all 

escalated enforcement actions (48 percent) issued by the NRC in CY 2015. This was 

followed by nuclear materials users who received 40 percent of all escalated enforcement 

actions. In CY 2015, the NRC issued five escalated actions to fuel facilities, two escalated 

actions to decommissioned sites, two escalated actions to a new reactors vendor, and one 

to a new reactor licensee. The new reactors’ enforcement actions were evaluated and 

issued under the traditional enforcement process, because the violations involved 

willfulness. Most findings and performance deficiencies identified at new reactor sites are 

evaluated under the Construction Reactor Oversight Process (cROP). 
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1. Escalated Enforcement Trends 

As previously noted, the NRC issued 80 escalated enforcement actions in CY 2015. 

The 80 actions represent an approximately 6 percent decrease from the number of 

actions issued in CY 2014. Table 1 shows a breakdown of the total number of 

escalated enforcement actions issued by the NRC over the past 5 years by type of 

enforcement action. Figure 4 (on page 7) displays this information in graphical form. 

Table 1 – Escalated Action Trends1

 CY 2011 CY 2012 CY 2013 CY 2014 CY 2015 Average 

Escalated NOVs 

(w/o CPs) 88 79 55 60 61 69 

NOVs and Orders 

w/ CPs 14 16 11 10 13 13 

Orders Imposing 

CPs 0 0 0 2 2 1 

Orders (w/o CPs) 6 19 10 13 4 10 

Total 108 114 76 85 80 93 

As shown in Table 1, the total number of escalated enforcement actions issued in 

CY 2015 is less than the 5-year average. However, while the overall trend is in the 

downward direction, CY 2015 was consistent with the most recent 3-year average. 

Figure 4 suggests that the trends observed since 2011 have been largely influenced 

by the number of escalated actions that do not involve a CP. Since 2011, the total 

number of orders and escalated actions with a CP has consistently been between 11 

and 16 actions, averaging 13 to 14 per year. 

To help explain the reasons for these trends, Figure 5 (on page 8) provides escalated 

enforcement trends between CYs 2011 and 2015 based on business lines. As shown 

in Figure 5, CY 2015’s decrease in escalated actions when compared to CY 2014 may 

be attributed to the decrease in the number of escalated enforcement actions issued to 

materials user licensees. The decrease was offset by the fact that five escalated 

actions were issued to fuel facilities in CY 2015 (no escalated actions were issued to 

fuel facilities in 2014). When considering the past 5 years, the data show that the 

overall declining trend in escalated actions has primarily resulted from a general, but 

steady, decrease in the number of escalated actions issued to materials users since 

CY 2011. During this period, the number of escalated actions issued to materials 

users decreased by approximately 50 percent when compared to the number of 

escalated actions issued in the CY 2011–12 time frame. 

 

1 Note: Information reported for prior CYs may have been adjusted in this year’s annual report to reflect more 

accurate data that was not available at the time the CY 2014 annual report was published.
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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Tables 4 and 5 at the end of this report offer a more detailed breakdown of 

enforcement actions issued during CY 2015 by the type of licensee. 

The nuclear materials users’ 5-year trend has been largely caused by a decline in 

enforcement actions issued to radiographers (a 73 percent reduction when compared 

to the CY 2011–12 time frame), hospitals (a 57 percent decrease from CY 2011–12), 

and gauge user licensees (a 26 percent reduction from the CY 2011–12 time frame). 

The staff’s analysis of the materials user trend has not been conclusive. However, two 

causal factors may have affected the trend in the expected direction, therefore 

accounting for a substantial portion of the change but likely not the entire change. 

During the first year of the most recent 5-year period, the number of cases involving 

security-related increased controls violations was high because of the implementation 

of the additional requirements. Secondly, in CY 2011, the SL criteria of violations 

associated with certain gauge cases were changed from SL III to SL IV, reducing the 

number of escalated actions issued thereafter. 

Figure 4 – Escalated Action Trends (CY 2011 to CY 2015) 

The decrease from 2014 to 2015 for nuclear materials users may be attributed to 

gauge user licensees and individual actions. In 2015, the NRC issued 10 escalated 

actions to gauge users, and is a notable decrease from the 17 actions issued in 2014. 

However, the 10 escalated actions issued last year were largely consistent with the 

5-year average of 12 per year. The number of escalated actions issued to individuals 
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within the nuclear materials user business line also dropped from five in CY 2014 to 

one in CY 2015. 

Figure 5 also shows that the number of escalated enforcement actions issued to 

operating reactor licensees between CYs 2011 and 2015 has been largely steady, 

ranging between 31 and 38 actions per year. The only exception to this trend occurred 

in CY 2012 when the NRC issued 51 escalated actions to operating reactors. Of these 

violations, 21 were associated with white SDP findings under the ROP, and six were 

associated with yellow and red SDP findings (which increased significantly over 

previous CYs). Also, CY 2012 experienced an unusually high number of violations 

issued to licensed reactor operators because of the multiple cases involving deliberate 

misconduct and Internet usage at River Bend in CY 2011. 

Figure 5 – Escalated Action Trends by Business Line (CY 2011 to CY 2015) 

2. Civil Penalty Actions

In CY 2015, the agency processed 15 enforcement actions that involved CPs. Ten of 

the 15 CP actions were associated with materials user licensees, including four 

separate SL III violations totaling $28,000, issued to CampCo, Inc. One CP action of 

$11,200 was associated with a SL II violation issued to a nonlicensee vendor 

supporting new reactor construction (CB&I). A CP in the amount of $70,000 was also 

issued to the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant for SL III violations of fire watch 

requirements. 
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Six of the 15 cases also involved “willfulness,” which is defined as either deliberate 

misconduct or careless disregard. The Commission is particularly concerned with the 

identification of willful violations. The NRC’s regulatory program is based on licensees 

and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating 

with candor; therefore, the agency may consider a violation involving willfulness to be 

more egregious than the underlying violation, taken alone, would have been, and it 

may increase the SL accordingly. 

Table 2 compares CP assessments proposed, imposed, and paid for the most recent 5 

calendar years and the 5-year average. When reviewing the information in this table, it 

is important to note that an enforcement action may include more than one CP or more 

than one violation. In addition, a CP may be proposed in 1 year and paid or imposed 

in another year. In some cases, the NRC has approved a CP payment plan whereby a 

licensee is permitted to pay the CP in regular installments. Finally, the amount of a 

proposed CP may be reduced, for example, as a result of exercising discretion as part 

of a settlement agreement developed during ADR. 

Table 2 – Civil Penalty Information

 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 

No. of Proposed 

CPs 10 13 10 9 12 11 

No. of Imposed 

CPs † 3 3 1 3 3 3 

No. of Paid CPs 13 13 8 8 12 11 

Amount of 

Proposed CPs $108,750 $404,700 $211,400 $56,700 $214,200 $195,650 

Amount of 

Imposed CPs $29,500 $14,000 $1,000 $85,400 $45,500 $35,080 

Amount of Paid 

CPs $130,529 $404,450 $176,500 $110,362 $176,364 $199,641 

† Imposition cases and associated CP amounts reflect CPs issued via an order and includes both (1) orders 

imposing a CP after a licensee does not pay a proposed CP, and (2) CPs agreed to in an ADR case that are 

included in the case CO. In the first scenario, the case is a subset of the proposed CP cases in that 

imposing the CP is the next step after a licensee does not pay a proposed CP. However, in the second 

scenario, an ADR settlement, potentially with a CP, can, and typically does, occur before any proposed CP. 

The total number of CPs (proposed and imposed) issued in CY 2015 was slightly 

larger than the number of CPs issued in CY 2014, and was consistent with the 

average number issued over the last 5 years. However, the total CP dollar amount 

(proposed and imposed amounts) increased significantly (approximately 83 percent) in 

CY 2015 when compared to CY 2014. 
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The number of CPs associated with ADR settlement agreements was the same in CY 

2015 as in CY 2014 (one CP was imposed). In this case, Energy Northwest agreed to 

pay a penalty of $35,000 as part of an ADR settlement agreement relating to violations 

at its Columbia Generating Station facility. 

Figure 6 – Civil Penalty Trends by Business Line (CY 2011 to CY 2015) 

Figure 6 shows the total dollar amount of proposed and imposed CPs, by licensee 

business lines, in CY 2015 and the preceding 4 years. Figure 7 (on page 11) shows 

the share of the total CP amounts issued over the past 5 years between each of the 

operating reactor, nuclear materials user, fuel facility and other licensee business 

lines. Often certain business lines may peak in a particular year because of a single 

CP (e.g., River Bend and Turkey Point in 2012). As a consequence, a single year 

often does not indicate a trend—an important factor to consider in assessing possible 

trends. 

Appendix A includes a brief description of each of the CP actions for CY 2015. 

Security-related issues involving NOVs with CPs are not addressed in Appendix A; 

however, the number of NOVs associated with security related issues is included in 

the data discussed in this report. 
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Figure 7 – Percentage of Civil Penalties by Business Line 

3. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties

In accordance with Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement Policy, a CP may not be 

warranted for escalated enforcement actions evaluated under traditional enforcement if 

certain criteria are met. For instance, (1) the identified violation is the first nonwillful 

SL III violation identified in the past 2 years or during two inspections at the licensee’s 

facility and the licensee took adequate corrective action to prevent its recurrence, or 

(2) this was not the first nonwillful SL III violation identified in the past 2 years or during 

two inspections, but the licensee self-identified the violation and took adequate 

corrective action to prevent its recurrence. Violations assessed under the SDP 

normally are not considered for CPs. However, CPs are considered for violations 

associated with ROP inspection findings that involve actual consequences. In 

addition, the agency may use enforcement discretion, when deemed appropriate, to 

refrain from proposing a CP, regardless of the normal CP assessment process 

described above. 

In CY 2015, the NRC issued 61 escalated NOVs without CPs. These actions were 

predominately issued to operating reactor licensees (38 of 61), and materials user 

licensees (21 of 61). Eight of the 21 NOVs issued to materials licensees were 

associated with gauge users. Of the operating reactors’ violations, 14 were associated 

with white SDP findings under the ROP, and 3 violations were related to yellow SDP 
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findings. For a third consecutive year, the NRC issued no red SDP findings with 

associated violations in CY 2015. Figure 8 (below) shows escalated NOV trends for 

SDP findings over the past 5 years. As indicated in Figure 8, the 17 escalated 

enforcement actions associated with SDP findings that were issued in CY 2015 

represented a decrease from CY 2014. 

Figure 8 – Escalated Enforcement Associated with ROP SDP Findings 

In CY 2015, there were four escalated NOVs without CPs issued to fuel facility 

licensees. In the 4 years before 2015, fuel facility licensees averaged two escalated 

NOVs each year. Appendix B to this report summarizes each of the NOVs issued 

without a CP, as well as the NOVs associated with SDP findings. Security-related 

issues involving NOVs without CPs are not addressed in Appendix B; however, the 

number of NOVs associated with security-related issues is included in the data 

discussed in this report. 

4. Enforcement Program Timeliness 

Escalated enforcement actions are issued in cases involving violations assessed at 

SL I, II, or III, if they are dispositioned under the traditional enforcement process, 

violations associated with white, yellow, or red findings issued to facilities participating 

in the ROP, and orders that impose sanctions. The timeliness associated with issuing 

escalated enforcement actions to reactor and materials licensees is an output measure 

(external goal) reported annually to Congress within the NRC’s Performance 
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Accountability Report. The external goals, modified in 2012 to stress the importance 

of timely escalated enforcement actions, are as follows: (1) 100 percent of non-Office 

of Investigations (non-OI) based cases are to be completed with an NRC processing 

time of less than or equal to 160 days, and (2) 100 percent of OI-based cases are to 

be completed with an NRC processing time of less than or equal to 330 days. 

In addition to the external goals, the NRC staff continues to use the additional 

timeliness measures (internal goals) for trending purposes and to provide information 

to support potential improvements to its processes. The internal goals are: 

(1) completing non-OI-based cases in an average NRC processing time of less than or 

equal to 120 days, and (2) completing OI-based cases in an average NRC processing 

time of less than or equal to 180 days. 

The NRC processing time starts on the latest of the following dates: (1) the inspection 

exit for non-OI cases, (2) the date of the OI memorandum forwarding the report to the 

staff for OI related cases, (3) the date that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 

indicates that the NRC may proceed for cases either prosecuted or reviewed for an 

extended period of time by DOJ, or (4) the date of the U.S. Department of Labor 

decision that is the basis for the action. The cases are grouped together and treated 

as a single case whenever two or more enforcement action numbers are associated 

with one action. 

In CY 2015, four non-OI related actions were issued in more than 160 processing 

days. Thus, the staff did not meet the external goals for dispositioning non-OI cases in 

2015. In addition, one of the 17 OI-related enforcement actions was not issued in 

fewer than 330 processing days. Therefore, the staff also did not meet the external 

goals for dispositioning OI-related enforcement actions in 2015. This was the first time 

the staff has not met the external goals for processing both OI and non-OI cases in the 

same year. The five cases that did not meet the external timeliness goals involved a 

variety of licensees from the operating reactors and materials users’ business lines, 

and included three of the four regions. All of the cases involved a greater than normal 

level of technical complexity, which often resulted in differing views from members of 

the staff. Two of the cases included the use of ADR mediation. The issue in one other 

case was classified and included a variety of differing views. 

A number of steps have been taken and others will be considered to streamline the 

SDP and enforcement processes (e.g., increased use of the modified panel process). 

OE will work closely with the staff in identifying enforcement cases that are likely to 

involve complex technical issues and/or case-specific challenges, to help elevate and 

resolve potential differing views earlier in the enforcement process. These actions, 

coupled with additional emphasis on timeliness, will lead to improved performance in 

this area. 

Figure 9 (on page 14) also shows that, on the average, the agency required 96 

processing days to issue a non-OI related enforcement action. This is less than the 

goal of 120 processing days and is generally consistent with trends for the past 5 

years. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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Figure 9 – Non-OI Case Timeliness Trends (Average Number of Days)

Figure 10 (on page 15) provides the case processing timeliness trends for OI-related 

escalated enforcement actions for the five most recent CYs. The figure shows that, on 

average, the agency required 220 days to issue an OI-related enforcement action in 

CY 2015. This number is significantly greater than the internal goal of 180 days, and 

is the second year in a row where there has been a reversal from the steady decline in 

average processing time that was observed between 2011 and 2013. This negative 

(increasing) trend was affected by four cases with processing times of greater than or 

equal to 300 days. In all four instances, the cases involved a variety of complex 

circumstances that required a significant amount of time early in the process to 

determine the appropriate initial course of action. The staff will continue to monitor this 

trend and seek other ways to improve case processing timeliness. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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Figure 10 – OI Case Timeliness Trends (Average Number of Days) 

5. Alternative Dispute Resolution 

ADR refers to a variety of voluntary processes, such as mediation and facilitated 

dialogue that can be used to assist parties in resolving disputes and potential conflicts 

outside of courts using a neutral third party. The NRC employs mediation for its postinvestigation ADR program, using a neutral third party with no decisionmaking 

authority, to help the parties attempt to reach an agreement. The process is voluntary 

in terms of the decision to participate and the content of the final agreement. 

The term ''post-investigation ADR'' refers to the use of mediation after OI has 

completed its investigation and an enforcement panel has concluded that pursuit of an 

enforcement action appears to be warranted. Post-investigation ADR also includes all 

escalated nonwillful, traditional enforcement cases with a proposed CP. 

Under the NRC’s post-investigation ADR process, mediation may be offered at three 

points in the enforcement process: (1) before a predecisional enforcement 

conference; (2) after the initial enforcement action is taken, typically the issuance of an 

NOV or proposed imposition of a CP; or (3) with the imposition of a CP and before a 

hearing request. The staff believes that for certain escalated enforcement actions, 

mediation affords the staff an opportunity to institute broader or more comprehensive 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

16

corrective actions to better ensure public health and safety than outcomes typically 

achieved through the traditional enforcement process. 

As Figure 11 shows, the post-investigation ADR program averages approximately five 

COs per year. In CY 2015, the NRC participated in three post-investigation ADR 

mediations, and all three resulted in orders confirming the terms of the parties’ 

agreement. A fourth CO was issued in early CY 2015, following a successful ADR 

mediation session held in December 2014. In the past 5 years, more than 95 percent 

of the cases that used post-investigation ADR resulted in a settlement agreement, with 

only one ADR case that was unable to reach a settlement. In this one instance, the 

parties signed an agreement in principle; however, the individual involved was 

unresponsive when asked to sign the consent and waiver form. 

Figure 11 – ADR Confirmatory Orders Issued (CY 2011 to CY 2015)

In CY 2015, the staff continued its focus on enhancing the post-investigation ADR 

program’s timeliness, transparency, and overall effectiveness. While recent program 

enhancements initiated in CY 2012 continue to have a positive effect on the ADR 

process from the time an ADR offer is made (see Figure 12 on page 17), over the past 

4 years, the time taken to review OI investigative materials, bring a case to panel, and 

issue a choice letter has continued to increase steadily. OE plans to pursue ways to 

improve case timeliness by decreasing the time it takes to review a case and offer 

ADR. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

17 

Figure 12 – Calendar Days from NRC Action to Issuance of Confirmatory Order 

C. Nonescalated Enforcement 

The Enforcement Program Annual Report has historically focused on escalated enforcement 

actions with little information regarding nonescalated enforcement provided. Nonescalated 

actions include SL IV NOVs and NCVs under traditional enforcement and NOVs and NCVs 

associated with green SDP findings under the ROP. In recent years, OE has recognized 

that the ability to trend data for nonescalated enforcement across the programs needs to be 

improved. One of the challenges in tracking and trending nonescalated enforcement actions 

is that these actions are recorded in separate databases by the regions and program offices. 

Operating reactors information is recorded in the Reactor Program System (RPS), materials 

users’ nonescalated actions are stored in the Web-based licensing (WBL) system, and new 

reactors construction data is maintained in the Construction Inspection Program Information 

Management System (CIPIMS). 

On October 15, 2015, OE completed a review of tracking systems used for nonescalated 

enforcement actions in selected program areas. The review was performed, in part, due to 

commitments made in response to a 2008 audit by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 

that identified recommendations for tracking nonescalated violations (OIG-08-A-17). OE’s 

report identified the need for more detailed guidance from the respective program offices to 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

18

improve consistency and completeness of nonescalated enforcement data, as well as to 

clarify tracking expectations. Furthermore, the report highlighted the value of each program 

area uniformly applying a single electronic tracking system, available to multiple users, that 

offers both electronic searching and collection of similar information to address informational 

needs. A more effective use of these systems will allow for a more complete presentation of 

the agency’s use of nonescalated enforcement actions to achieve licensee compliance with 

NRC regulations. 

Figure 13 provides information that was obtained by querying data from the RPS, WBL and 

CIPIMS systems. OE notes that information for CY 2015 may be artificially low because 

violations are recorded by the event date, and there is often a time lag between this date, 

the date of the inspection report, and the date this information is recorded in RPS, WBL and 

CIPIMS. Data for CYs 2011–2014 was adjusted from prior annual reports to reflect the most 

current information available. 

Figure 13 – Nonescalated Enforcement Trends (CY 2011 to CY 2015)

As shown in Figure 13, the NRC has issued approximately 700 to 900 nonescalated 

enforcement actions each year to operating reactors, and nuclear materials users have 

received, on average, 140 to 175 nonescalated actions for the 4 most recent calendar years. 

New reactor licensees have been issued approximately nine nonescalated actions in each 

of the last 4 years. 

In 2013, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report titled “Nuclear Power: 

Analysis of Regional Differences and Improved Access to Information Could Strengthen 

NRC Oversight.” The report’s second finding related to the enforcement program generally, 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

19 

and stated that “differences exist across NRC regions in identifying and resolving findings, 

and NRC has taken some steps to address them.” More specifically, GAO discussed the 

fact that the identification of nonescalated findings, which equate to very low risk 

significance, differed from region to region. GAO also noted that some steps had been 

taken to address these differences but that a comprehensive review of the reasons had not 

been undertaken. The number of escalated findings, which equate to greater risk 

significance, was more consistent across regions. In 2014, the NRC performed a study to 

address, in part, Recommendation 1 of the GAO report, and this study revealed that the 

regions were screening performance deficiencies for more than minor findings and 

assigning identification credit to findings of very low safety significance differently. As a 

result, the staff undertook efforts in CY 2015 to enhance its procedures, and plans to 

complete procedural revisions and training in 2016 in order to enhance predictability of the 

screening process. 

Figure 14 – Nonescalated Enforcement Trends by Region (CY 2011 to CY 2015)

Figure 14 provides the trend of nonescalated enforcement actions issued by the regional 

offices for the past 5 years. The information was obtained from RPS and was “normalized” 

to show the average number of nonescalated actions per operating reactor in each of the 

regions. As seen in Figure 14, there has been a general improvement in the consistency 

between the regional offices in the number of nonescalated enforcement actions issued 

since CY 2012. There, however, remains significant differences between the regions, with 

the number of nonescalated enforcement actions ranging between 4.3 and 11.8 actions per 

operating reactor. OE will continue to work with NRR to monitor these trends in CY 2016.
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

20

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Enforcement Program Annual Report 

21 

II. Enforcement Case Work 

A. Significant Enforcement Actions 

In CY 2015, the agency was involved in several significant enforcement actions that 

required coordination among internal stakeholders beyond the typical enforcement case and 

that were noteworthy in some aspects. 

Chicago Bridge and Iron Company 

On April 20, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV and Proposed Imposition of CP in the amount of 

$11,200 to the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CB&I). This action is based on an SL II 

problem involving deliberate misconduct on the part of CB&I officials and employees related 

to a dropped module incident that occurred at the company's Lake Charles, LA, fabrication 

facility on March 1, 2013. Specifically, the CB&I officials and employees attempted to cover 

up an incident involving the dropping of a submodule destined for the Virgil C. Summer 

Nuclear Station. Immediately following the incident, the former rigging manager deliberately 

instructed subordinate employees to omit key information from incident investigation 

statements, including: (a) that the submodule had, in fact, dropped approximately 3.5 feet, 

(b) improper rigging equipment (nylon slings) had been used and had broken, and (c) the 

submodule had sustained damage. The actions of the CB&I officials and employees also 

caused the company to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production 

and Utilization Facilities”; Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants 

and Fuel Reprocessing Plants”; Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” for failing to promptly 

identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. 

Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 

On January 22, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a yellow SDP finding to 

Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy). The finding was associated with the failure to design, 

construct, and maintain the flood barriers for the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 and 2, 

auxiliary building and emergency diesel fuel storage building to protect safety-related 

equipment from flooding. Entergy was cited for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, 

Criterion III, “Design Control,” and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, 

Procedures, and Drawings.” Both violations included multiple examples for each violation. 

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

On April 27, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a yellow SDP finding to the 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (licensee) for a violation identified at its Oyster Creek 

Nuclear Generating Station. The violation involved the failure to comply with 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, which required the licensee to establish measures 

for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and 

processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and 

components (SSCs). Specifically, from the original installation of electromatic relief valves 

(EMRVs) in 1969 until the valves were redesigned and reinstalled during the 2014 refueling 

outage, the EMRV actuators were inadequate because, when they were placed in an 

environment subject to the vibration associated with plant operation, the mechanical 

tolerance between posts and guides created a condition where the springs could wedge 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

22

between the guides and the posts, jamming the actuator plunger assembly. In addition, 

given the original design of the valve, the maintenance refurbishing processes were not 

adequate to maintain the required internal tolerances to prevent excessive fretting and wear 

of the internal components. As a consequence, two of the five EMRVs were inoperable for 

more than 24 hours in violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.B. 

Columbia Generating Station 

On September 28, 2015, the NRC issued a CO to Energy Northwest, to formalize 

commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute mediation session held on 

August 6, 2015. The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between 

Energy Northwest and the NRC regarding a violation that involved nuclear security officers 

at Columbia Generating Station being willfully inattentive while on duty, which resulted in the 

security officers not meeting the requirement to be available at all times inside the protected 

areas for their assigned response duties, contrary to 10 CFR 73.55(k)(5)(iii). In light of the 

significant corrective actions Energy Northwest had taken, and subject to the satisfactory 

completion of the additional actions it committed to take, as described in the CO, the NRC 

will not issue a NOV for the apparent violation. Those actions include, but are not limited to: 

(1) conducting a common cause evaluation, (2) revising its annual compliance and ethics 

computer-based training to address deliberate misconduct, (3) presenting at an industry 

forum to discuss the events that led to the CO, (4) conducting a targeted nuclear safety 

culture assessment, and (5) paying a CP of $35,000. 

B. Hearing Activities 

On July 18, 2014, Mr. James Chaisson submitted a Request for Hearing in response to an 

order prohibiting his involvement in NRC-licensed activities that was issued on July 11, 

2014. An Atomic Safety Licensing Board (ASLB) panel was established in August 2014 for 

appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 2.346(i). The ASLB issued a hearing notice 

and an initial scheduling order granting the hearing request. In that order, the ASLB also 

directed the staff and Mr. Chaisson to discuss the possibility of settling the case and to 

report to the Board regarding their efforts. A prehearing conference was held on 

December 17, 2014. Mr. Chaisson and the NRC staff eventually reached a preliminary 

agreement on April 14, 2015; however, the ASLB was, on several occasions, unable to 

convene a conference with the parties to discuss the agreement due to the unavailability of 

Mr. Chaisson. When a telephone conference was finally held on June 10, 2015, the Board 

discussed a number of items relating to the settlement agreement. As a result, the parties 

submitted a revised version of the settlement agreement for the Board’s consideration on 

July 1, 2015. The proposed settlement agreement included a ban on Mr. Chaisson 

engaging in NRC-licensed activities as a radiographer and other positions until he 

completes certain requirements, including training; however, he is permitted to work as a 

radiographer’s assistant in the interim. The agreement also specified limited work 

restrictions that required him to provide various notifications to the NRC, including each time 

he accepts employment with an NRC licensee. On July 2, 2015, the ASLB approved the 

settlement agreement. 

C. Enforcement Orders 

In CY 2015, the NRC issued seven orders to licensees, nonlicensees, and individuals. This 

number represented approximately a 56 percent decrease in the number of orders issued 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

23 

when compared to 2014. The seven orders included four COs that were issued to confirm 

commitments associated with ADR settlement agreements. One of the ADR-related COs 

included a requirement to pay a CP as a result of the settlement agreement. A fifth CO was 

issued to an individual who had been the subject of previous enforcement action to place 

agreed-to restrictions on this person’s duties as a radiation safety officer or assistant 

radiation safety officer. Two orders imposed CPs to materials user licensees. 

As shown in Table 1, the number of orders the NRC issued in CY 2015 decreased from 

CY 2014, in part, because of a decrease in the number of orders to operating reactor 

licensees and individuals at reactor sites. Appendix C includes a brief description of the 

enforcement orders issued in 2015. 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigations 

In CY 2015, an OI investigation supported 29 percent of the escalated enforcement actions 

(23 of the 80) issued by the agency. This figure is essentially identical to the percentage 

supported by OI investigations in CY 2014. The escalated actions supported by OI 

investigations include the following: 

• 9 of the 15 escalated NOVs and orders with CPs (60 percent) 

• 11 of the 61 escalated NOVs without CPs (18 percent) 

• 3 of the 4 enforcement orders without CPs (75 percent) 

The 23 enforcement actions supported by OI investigations are consistent with the average 

number of enforcement actions supported by OI investigations over the previous 4 years 

(CY 2011 through CY 2014). The percentage of enforcement actions supported by an OI 

investigation over the past 5 year period (CY 2011 through CY 2015) is approximately 27 

percent. 

E. Actions Involving Individuals and Nonlicensee Organizations 

In CY 2015, the agency issued 14 escalated enforcement actions to licensed and 

unlicensed individuals. This number is included in the total number of escalated 

enforcement actions (NOVs and orders) that the agency issued in 2015. Appendix C 

summarizes the orders that were issued to individuals and Appendix D summarizes the 

NOVs issued to individuals in CY 2015. These appendices do not include individual 

enforcement actions involving security related violations. The number of escalated actions 

issued to individuals in CY 2015 (13) is very consistent with the average number of actions 

issued between CY 2011 and CY 2015 (13.2 per year). 

The agency issued one escalated enforcement action to a nonlicensee organization in 

CY 2015. Appendix E summarizes this action. 

F. Enforcement Action Involving Discrimination 

In CY 2015, there was one escalated enforcement action resulting from a substantiated 

allegation of discrimination. The allegation arose from an incident involving a former 

contractor employee who was terminated, in part, for notifying the licensee that the 

employee smelled alcohol on the employee’s immediate supervisor’s breath during duty 

hours. The case was handled through the ADR process, and licensee commitments are 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

24

reflected in a CO that was issued in March 2015. Between CY 2011 and CY 2015, the NRC 

has handled, on average, one substantiated discrimination case each year; however it is not 

unprecedented to have a year where there was no escalated enforcement action taken 

because of discrimination. 

G. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions 

The NRC may choose to exercise discretion and either escalate or mitigate enforcement 

sanctions or otherwise refrain from taking enforcement action within its statutory authority. 

The exercise of discretion allows the NRC to determine actions that are appropriate for a 

particular case, consistent with the Enforcement Policy. After considering the general tenets 

of the Policy and the safety and security significance of a violation and its surrounding 

circumstances, the NRC may exercise judgment and discretion in determining the severity 

levels of violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions. 

In CY 2015, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion in 39 cases to address violations of 

NRC requirements. This number reflects a 26 percent increase in the number of cases in 

which discretion was used from CY 2014 (31 cases) and a 50 percent increase from CY 

2013 (26 cases). Although 2015 saw an increase in the number of cases where discretion 

was used when compared to 2014, this year could be viewed more accurately as part of a 

three-year decreasing trend caused, in large part, by a corresponding decrease in the use of 

discretion in accordance with EGM-09-004 to disposition violations of the naturally occurring 

and accelerator-produced radioactive materials (NARM) requirements. Below is a 

discussion of the significant cases dispositioned using enforcement discretion in CY 2015. 

1. Discretion Involving Interim Enforcement Guidance 

In 22 cases, the NRC used discretion in accordance with either the Interim 

Enforcement Policy related to fire protection and permanent implant brachytherapy 

issues (Sections 9.1 and 9.2 of the Policy) or an EGM. 

• The NRC dispositioned six violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-11-004, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Violations of Security 

Requirements for Portable Gauges,” dated April 28, 2011. Enforcement 

discretion in the form of a reduced severity level may be exercised for violations 

of 10 CFR 30.34(i) if certain criteria are met as described in EGM-11-004. 

Although the pilot program was completed, the provisions of this EGM will remain 

in effect until the Enforcement Policy is revised to incorporate the EGM. 

• The agency dispositioned two violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-09-004, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Violations of Naturally 

Occurring and Accelerator-Produced Radioactive Materials (NARM) 

Requirements,” dated May 13, 2009. Enforcement discretion may be exercised 

for violations of the NARM requirements if certain criteria are met as described in 

the EGM. The two cases that used this guidance represent a sharp decline over 

CY 2012 when the staff used this guidance to disposition 17 cases. Two cases 

used this guidance in CY 2014, and five cases used this guidance in CY 2013. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

25 

• The NRC continued to perform fire protection inspections at power reactor sites 

to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, “Fire 

Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 

1979.” Violations of these requirements that were identified at sites transitioning 

to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805) and that 

met the criteria as stated in the Interim Enforcement Policy, “Enforcement 

Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)” warranted 

enforcement discretion and NOVs were not issued. Two documented cases 

involved this type of discretion. 

• In April 2013, the staff issued EGM-13-003, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning 

Violations Involving 10 CFR 35.60 and 10 CFR 35.63 for the Calibration of 

Instrumentation to Measure the Activity of Rubidium-82 and the Determination of 

Rubidium-82 Patient Dosages.” The agency dispositioned three cases that met 

the criteria under this guidance. 

• The NRC dispositioned nine violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-11-003, “Dispositioning Boiling Water Reactor Licensee Non-Compliance 

with Technical Specification Containment Requirements during Operations with a 

Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel,” dated October 4, 2011. Enforcement 

discretion may be exercised for violations of certain TS requirements at boiling 

water reactors under EGM-11-003. 

• In July 2013, the Commission issued an Interim Enforcement Policy, Section 9.2, 

“Enforcement Discretion for Permanent Implant Brachytherapy Medical Event 

Reporting (10 CFR 35.3045).” This section set forth criteria for using 

enforcement discretion in certain medical event reporting scenarios. There were 

no documented cases involving this type of discretion in 2015. 

 

2. Discretion Involving No SDP Performance Deficiency 

Section 2.2.4.d of the Enforcement Policy states that violations of NRC requirements 

normally falling within the ROP SDP process for operating power reactors for which 

there are no associated SDP performance deficiencies (e.g., a violation of TS, which is 

not a performance deficiency) are normally dispositioned using discretion, similar to 

that described in Section 3.2 of this Policy. In 2015, eight cases involved the use of 

discretion in accordance with Section 2.2.4.d of the Policy. Three of the cases 

involved TS violations relating to reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage 

requirements, three additional cases involved TS violations attributable to equipment 

failures that were not considered avoidable, and one case involved an operating 

reactor licensee’s protective actions recommendation strategy for its emergency 

response plan. The eighth case was associated with an access authorization control 

violation that was not a performance deficiency. 

3. Discretion Involving Violations Identified Because of Previous 

Enforcement Actions 

The staff may exercise enforcement discretion, in accordance with Section 3.3 of the 

Enforcement Policy, if the violation was identified by the licensee as part of the 

corrective action for a previous enforcement action and the violation has the same or 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

26

similar root cause as the violation for which enforcement action was previously taken. 

In CY 2015, three violations were dispositioned consistent with the guidance of Section 

3.3 of the Policy. Two of the three cases involved violations of NRC regulations 

identified by licensees following extent of condition reviews, and related to violations of 

facility change requirements under 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests and Experiments,” 

and changes to emergency plans in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q). The third case 

was associated with wrongdoing at the CB&I. On September 25, 2014, the NRC 

issued a CO to enhance actions that CB&I had previously agreed to take to further 

address issues relating to willful violations of NRC requirements and deliberate 

misconduct. The staff exercised enforcement discretion to not pursue escalated 

enforcement because the staff concluded that the root causes for the apparent 

violations were similar to the root causes of the violations that led to the issuance of 

the CO and because of the comprehensive corrective actions being taken by CB&I. 

4. Discretion Involving Special Circumstances 

Seven cases involved use of discretion to disposition violations in accordance with 

Section 3.5, “Special Circumstances,” of the Enforcement Policy. Below is a brief 

discussion of the cases dispositioned in CY 2015. 

• The NRC refrained from proposing a CP in a case involving an SL III violation of 

10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests and Experiments,” after it was discovered that 

the licensee had removed a severe electrical power outage detection protection 

system without completing a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation and without submitting the 

proposed change to the NRC for review and approval. The staff considered the 

licensee’s corrective actions to date, the technical complexities of resolving this 

issue and the absence of previous escalated enforcement actions, and 

concluded that special circumstances were warranted to grant discretion to not 

propose a CP of $70,000 for the SL III violation. (EA-14-126) 

• The NRC exercised discretion to refrain from issuing an NOV to a radioactive 

materials licensee for an SL III violation of 10 CFR 40.46, “Inalienability of 

Licenses,” for failing to obtain written NRC approval before an indirect transfer of 

control as a result of the merger of two companies. The merger occurred in 

2007, and the licensee did not understand that this action constituted an indirect 

transfer of control under 10 CFR 40.46. At that time, there was also apparently 

some confusion in communications between the licensee and the NRC regarding 

the approval of the transfer. Therefore, in light of the fact that the licensee took 

actions necessary to terminate its site license and transfer control of the site to 

the U.S. Department of Energy, the NRC exercised discretion to not issue a NOV 

in accordance with Section 3.5 of the Policy. (EA-15-094) 

• The NRC exercised discretion to refrain from issuing an NOV to a Federal 

Government (military) materials licensee for an SL IV violation of 10 CFR 

30.36(d)(4) for the failure to notify the NRC within 60 days when no principal 

activities occurred in a separate building in 24 months. The NRC considered that 

the licensee’s license renewal application described the need to store devices for 

normal and emergency operations, and for the management and performance of 

material life cycle functions and services. In addition, the license included 

ambiguous information that did not fully capture the intended storage and life 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

27 

cycle management as a principal activity. Therefore, the NRC refrained from 

issuing an NOV, in part, due to inadequate or unclear licensing documentation. 

(EA-15-169) 

• The NRC refrained from proposing a CP in a case involving an SL III violation of 

10 CFR 30.34(i) for the failure of a licensee to use a minimum of two 

independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable 

gauges from unauthorized removal when the gauges were not under the control 

and constant surveillance of the licensee. Specifically, the violation that was 

identified at the storage facility should have been considered a second example 

of a similar violation cited in a February 2015 NOV and, if included in the 2015 

NOV, no CP would have been proposed. Based on these circumstances, 

including the scope and timeframe of the previous inspection, and the prompt 

and comprehensive corrective actions taken by the licensee, the NRC exercised 

discretion to not propose a CP. (EA-15-141) 

• The NRC exercised discretion to refrain from issuing an NOV to an operating 

reactor licensee for an SL III violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 

17, “Electric Power Systems,” requirements. Specifically, the licensee failed to 

properly construct and install the 138 kV switchyard grounding system and the 

supporting infrastructure of the switchyard to provide an offsite power source that 

permitted the functioning of SSCs important to safety. The NRC determined that 

the violation resulted from matters not reasonably within the licensee’s control; 

and that the failure to meet the requirements could not be readily identified and 

addressed. (EA-15-005) 

• The NRC exercised discretion to refrain from issuing an NOV to a Federal 

Government (military) master materials licensee (MML) for an SL IV violation of 

10 CFR 30.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information,” and 10 CFR 35.24, 

“Authority and Responsibilities for the Radiation Protection Program.” The NRC 

exercised discretion to not issue a notice of violation in recognition of the 

enforcement action taken under the licensee’s MML. (EA-15-142) 

• The NRC exercised discretion to refrain from issuing an NOV to an operating 

reactor licensee for a violation of 10 CFR 50.59. The violation was associated 

with the use of complex programmable logic device based solid state protection 

system cards, and was identified during the discretion period outlined in EGM 

14-002. Because the circumstances of this case met the criteria for granting 

enforcement discretion, the NRC exercised discretion in accordance with 

Section 3.5. (EA-15-209) 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

28

5. Notices of Enforcement Discretion 

Occasionally, circumstances might arise where a power reactor licensee’s compliance 

with a TS or other license condition would require a plant transient or performance 

testing, inspection, or other system realignment that is of greater risk than the current 

specific plant conditions. In these circumstances, the NRC staff may choose not to 

enforce the applicable requirements. The staff exercises this enforcement discretion, 

designated as a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) in accordance with Section 

3.8 of the Enforcement Policy, only if it is clearly satisfied that the action is consistent 

with protecting the public health and safety. The staff may also issue NOEDs in cases 

involving severe weather or other natural phenomena when it determines that 

exercising this discretion will not compromise safety. NOEDs require justification from 

a licensee or certificate holder that documents the safety basis for the request and 

provides other information the staff deems necessary to issue an NOED. In contrast to 

the ten NOEDs issued in CY 2014, the NRC issued only two NOEDs during CY 2015, 

briefly discussed below: 

• NOED 15-4-01: The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion on 

May 29, 2015, to the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) to not enforce 

compliance with the actions required in Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, 

Unit 3, TS 3.5.3, “Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)—Operating,” 

Required Action B.1. When one ECCS train is inoperable, limiting condition for 

operation (LCO) Required Action B.1 directs the licensee either to restore the 

affected train to operable status within 72 hours or else place Unit 3 in 

operational mode 3 (hot standby) within the next 6 hours. On May 27, 2015, 

APS removed the Unit 3 high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump “A” from 

service for routine preventative maintenance and declared the pump inoperable. 

A routine oil sample taken from the HPSI motor outboard bearing appeared dark 

in color, and analysis revealed the presence of metal particles indicative of 

bearing babbitt material. APS made three attempts to flush debris from the 

bearing, but subsequent sampling reconfirmed the presence of babbitt material 

after each flush. Based on these results, Palo Verde maintenance personnel 

disassembled the pump outboard motor bearing. Inspections and measurements 

revealed an improper axial adjustment of the motor coupling, which caused the 

motor shaft to be displaced toward the outboard motor bearing. APS determined 

that it would not be able to replace the bearing, reassemble the pump, and 

complete postmaintenance testing within the 72 hours allowed by the TS LCO. 

Based on its review, the NRC exercised discretion to not enforce compliance with 

the completion times associated with the TS Required Actions for a period of 

24 hours beyond the 72-hour TS LCO affected by the repair, until May 31, 2015. 

• NOED 15-4-02: The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion to Luminant 

Generation Company LLC on July 10, 2015, to not enforce compliance with the 

actions required in Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP), Units 1 

and 2, TS 3.5.2, “ECCS—Operating,” Condition B, Required Action B.1. On 

July 7, 2015, the licensee discovered a potential through-wall leak from a pipe 

segment in the Unit 2, train B safety injection pump room during routine system 

walkdowns. CPNPP personnel noted approximately 1 to 2 cups of boric acid had 

accumulated on the floor underneath a test connection valve. The source of the 

leakage was determined to be from a socket weld connection. On July 7, 2015, 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

29 

the shift manager declared Unit 2, train “B,” ECCS, inoperable and entered 

TS 3.5.2, Condition B. Required Action B.1 of TS 3.5.2 required restoration of 

the train(s) to an operable status within 72 hours. Further, TS 3.5.2 required that, 

if Required Action B.1 could not be met within 72 hours, Unit 2 would be required 

to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 in 12 hours. Luminant requested that an 

NOED be granted for an additional 25 hours to complete repairs to the leaking 

socket weld. Based on its review of information provided by the licensee, 

including compensatory measures taken, the NRC exercised discretion to not 

enforce compliance with TS 3.5.2, Condition B, Required Action B.1, for an 

additional period of 25 hours, which expired on July 11, 2015. 

H. Withdrawn Actions 

Licensees can challenge enforcement actions for several reasons; for example, a 

licensee might dispute the requirements, the facts of the case, the agency’s 

application of the Enforcement Policy, or the significance of the violation. Licensees 

may provide clarifying information that was not available at the time of the inspection, 

and this may affect a finding of noncompliance. 

In addition, OE has established a metric for quality of enforcement actions based on 

the number of disputed and withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions. The goal is 

fewer than four withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions in a calendar year per 

region. This metric does not include violations that are withdrawn on the basis of 

supplemental information that was not available to an inspector before the assessment 

of an enforcement sanction. In CY 2015, the agency issued approximately 850 

nonescalated enforcement actions to reactor, materials, fuel facility and new reactor 

licensees. This number is generally consistent with the decreasing trend in the 

number of nonescalated enforcement actions issued annually in the past 3 years. Of 

these actions, eight nonescalated enforcement actions were disputed. This number is 

consistent with the average number of actions that have been disputed between CYs 

2011 and 2015. In CY 2015, the NRC withdrew only two nonescalated actions. In 

both cases, the actions were withdrawn by the NRC after it had received additional 

information that was not available to the staff before issuance of the original action. 

The two actions are also on par with the number of actions withdrawn each year 

between CY 2011 and 2015. As a result, the goal for disputed violations was met in 

CY 2015 indicating that NOVs and other nonescalated enforcement actions were 

prepared properly and accurately. 

In CY 2015, the agency issued 80 escalated enforcement actions and none of these 

cases were formally disputed. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

30

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Enforcement Program Annual Report 

31 

III. Ongoing Activities 

A. Enforcement Policy 

1. Enforcement Policy Revisions 

The NRC Enforcement Policy (Policy) is periodically revised to reflect regulatory 

changes, operating experience, and stakeholder input. On October 9, 2014, the NRC 

published a proposed revision to the Policy for a 45 day comment period in the Federal 

Register (79 FR 61104). On October 15, 2014, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 

submitted a request (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML14297A314) to extend the comment period for an 

additional 30 days. After taking this request under consideration, the staff extended 

the due date for public comments to December 22, 2014; however, NEI was the only 

stakeholder to submit comments (ADAMS Accession No. ML14364A020). The staff’s 

review and response to the public comments continued into CY 2015. On 

December 13, 2015, the Executive Director for Operations issued a Notation Vote 

Commission Paper (SECY-15-0163) requesting approval of the proposed revisions 

and permission to publish the document in the Federal Register. The Commission’s 

review is ongoing. 

More substantive proposed revisions to the Policy include: 

• a rewrite of Section 6.13, “Information Security,” to incorporate a more 

risk-informed approach for assessing the significance of information security 

violations 

• the implementation of the cROP 

• miscellaneous modifications to: (1) Section 7.0, “Glossary,” (2) Section 6.0, 

“Violation Examples,” and (3) Section 2.3.4, “Civil Penalty” 

2. Enforcement Guidance Memoranda 

OE issues EGMs to provide guidance on the interpretation of specific provisions of the 

Enforcement Policy. Links to the full text of all publicly available EGMs are available 

on the NRC’s public Web site, and are contained in Appendix A to the Enforcement 

Manual. The office issued four EGMs during CY 2015, summarized below. 

• On January 15, 2015, the staff issued EGM-14-003, “Enforcement Discretion Not 

to Cite Violations Involving Bolt and Stud Non-Destructive Examination 

Qualification Programs, While Rulemaking Changes Are Being Developed.” The 

purpose of this EGM is to provide guidance for granting enforcement discretion 

for the use of bolt and stud nondestructive examination procedures, personnel 

and equipment qualified through the Performance Demonstration Initiative to 

meet the requirements of Supplement 8 to Appendix VIII to Section XI of the 

American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

32

• On June 2, 2015, the staff issued Revision 1 to EGM 15-001, “Documentation of 

Security-Related Information in Publicly Available Cover Letters Related to 

Enforcement Documents.” This EGM provides guidance with respect to the 

generation of publicly-available cover letters related to enforcement documents 

that contain security-related information (i.e. physical security, information 

security, and material control and accounting) for all NRC licensed facilities (e.g., 

power reactors, fuel facilities, and material licensees). The purpose of a publicly 

available cover letter is to transmit the overall inspection results or enforcementrelated actions in which the specific security-related details are not available to 

the public. The guidance balances the need to withhold certain information from 

public disclosure while at the same time carrying out the NRC’s Enforcement 

Policy for security related noncompliances in an open and transparent manner. 

Revision 1 superseded EGM 15-001 that was issued on April 2, 2015. 

• On June 10, 2015, the staff issued EGM 15-002, “Enforcement Discretion for 

Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance.” This EGM provides 

guidance for granting enforcement discretion in certain circumstances where an 

operating power reactor licensee does not comply with a plant’s current sitespecific licensing basis for tornado-generated missile protection. Recently, 

licensees and the NRC have identified several facilities that have not conformed 

to their licensing basis for tornado-generated missile protection and are therefore 

not in compliance with applicable regulations. This EGM allows the staff to 

exercise discretion when a licensee implements compensatory measures that 

provide additional protection such that the likelihood of tornado missile effects is 

lessened. 

• On October 23, 2015, the staff issued EGM 15-003, “Enforcement Discretion Not 

to Cite Certain Violations of Section V of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 for NonSubmittal of Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 

Changes by Operating Reactor Licensees, While Rulemaking Changes Are 

Being Developed.” This EGM provides guidance with respect to granting 

enforcement discretion for not submitting emergency plan and emergency plan 

implementing procedure (EPIP) updates solely in accordance with Section V of 

Appendix E, “Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and 

Utilization Facilities,” to 10 CFR Part 50. Section V submittals impose a 

significant administrative burden on the licensees and the NRC staff that is no 

longer necessary or practical. Subsequently, the NRC staff eliminated this 

collection requirement through rulemaking on December 1, 2015 (80 FR 74980). 

B. Knowledge Management and Improvement Initiatives 

In CY 2015, OE engaged in several knowledge-management and continuous improvement 

activities. Some of the ongoing activities being conducted to maintain an adequate 

knowledge base include supporting training, completing reviews and self-assessments, 

developing internal office procedures, mentoring new staff members with more experienced 

staff, and conducting counterpart meetings. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

33 

Enforcement Counterpart Meeting 

The regional and headquarters enforcement staff held a counterpart meeting on 

September 22 – 24, 2015, to discuss ways to improve the enforcement process and 

enhance communications among staff. Topics included: (1) proposed Enforcement Policy 

changes, (2) regional coordination with the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and OE on 

investigations, (3) lessons learned on recent significant enforcement actions, (4) revised 

Enforcement Manual guidance, and (5) ways to improve consistency within the Enforcement 

Program between the regions and program offices. The meeting resulted in a number of 

action items to improve the Enforcement Program. 

Reviews and Assessments 

In CY 2015, OE completed one regional enforcement assessment. In May 2015, a team of 

enforcement specialists from OE and Region I, as well as a senior resident inspector from 

Region IV completed an assessment of Region III’s Enforcement Program. The primary 

focus of the review was to ensure that the Enforcement Program is being consistently 

implemented in the region. The assessments also provided the opportunity to share “best 

practices” between the regions and to enhance knowledge management for the 

enforcement process. The assessments involved the review of nonescalated enforcement 

actions and processes, which do not normally involve headquarters. The team concluded 

that Region III maintains a strong enforcement program, and effectively implements the 

Enforcement Policy, Enforcement Manual and processes, largely because of the effective 

collaboration among inspectors and Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff. The 

success of the Region III Enforcement Program was further attributed to the continued 

support provided by the region’s management team. 

A review of the assessment program will be conducted in CY 2016 and program 

modifications, if necessary, will be incorporated during future assessments. 

Continuous Improvement Initiatives 

The Enforcement Manual was revised five times during the year to provide additional 

guidance to the staff. The most recent revision was completed on December 10, 2015, 

which included expansion of the use of modified panels. The NRC incorporated several 

recommended changes from the Enforcement Manual feedback process were incorporated 

this year reducing the backlog of items by approximately 75 percent. 

OE continues to improve the internal procedures used to execute various aspects of the 

Enforcement Program. During CY 2015, internal procedures associated with assigning 

enforcement specialists and OGC attorneys to cases involving OI investigations were 

revised to improve the staff’s effectiveness and efficiency. The process improvements 

included a new OI report tracking system that allows better communications on assigned 

cases among OE, OGC and the regions. 

Training

OE enhanced staff knowledge of the Enforcement Program, particularly associated with 

wrongdoing, in all regional and headquarters offices by conducting joint OE and OGC’s 

Materials Litigation and Enforcement Division management presentations in each region 

and during multiple presentations at headquarters. The training focused on the various 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

34

elements of willfulness associated with potential wrongdoing cases as well as the 

documentation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, violations in nonescalated enforcement 

actions. Staff members shared “best practices” at these training sessions. OE will continue 

to evaluate additional training needs and opportunities. 

C. Regional Accomplishments 

In CY 2015, Region I and Region II conducted periodic self-assessments of the enforcement 

program to ensure effective performance and to identify opportunities for continuous 

improvement. The self-assessments encompassed both the reactor and materials arenas; 

considered performance associated with the development and issuance of both 

nonescalated and escalated enforcement actions; and included activities that required a 

high degree of coordination with other NRC stakeholders. 

Overall, the self-assessments showed that the regions were effectively implementing the 

Enforcement Program. Recommendations were made for any weaknesses identified. 

In addition to assessments, the enforcement staff (1) trained regional technical staff, in part, 

on the revised Enforcement Policy, recent EGMs, and proper enforcement documentation 

requirements for inspectors and (2) participated on inspector qualification review boards as 

necessary. 

D. Calendar Year 2016 Focus Areas 

During CY 2016, OE plans to address several activity areas that include: (1) a proposed 

revision to the Enforcement Policy, (2) the development of interim enforcement policies and 

implementation guidance, (3) continuing to support agency efforts to understand regional 

differences with respect to enforcement (particularly in the area of nonescalated 

enforcement), (4) improvement in average escalated case timeliness, both for OI and non-OI 

based cases, and (5) continued development of enforcement staff expertise. 

• A proposed revision to the Enforcement Policy is being considered, which could 

include: clarification of whether SDP findings from the ROP should be included in 

licensee performance history when a traditional enforcement action is being processed 

for a potential CP; revision to different areas of violation examples to clarify and reflect 

staff experience in specific areas; incorporation of an expanded scope for the ADR 

program; revisions associated with the implementation of cROP; and risk-informing 

information security violations. 

• Several interim enforcement policies and enforcement guidance memoranda will be 

considered in CY 2016. 

• Action items identified during the 2015 Enforcement Counterpart Meeting will be 

addressed during CY 2016. 

• OE will continue to support the agency effort to modify procedures and conduct 

training to enhance the predictability of screening very low safety significance findings. 

• An increasing focus will be placed on case timeliness during CY 2016, particularly 

those involving complex technical or regulatory issues that may challenge timeliness 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

35 

metrics. Increasing management attention will focus on more timely decision making, 

particularly in such complex cases 

• Continued development of enforcement staff across the agency will be attained 

through training and enhanced internal procedures. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

36

Table 3 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Region and Program Office

 NOVs w/o CPs Orders w/o CPs 

NOVs and Orders 

w/ CPs Total 

REGION I 19 1 1 21

REGION II 9 1 1 11

REGION III 19 2 4 25

REGION IV 11 0 2 13

NMSS 1 0 4 5

NRR 1 0 1 2

NRO 1 0 1 2

NSIR 0 0 0 0

OE 0 0 0 0

OIP 0 0 1 1

Total 61 4 15 80

Key to Offices 

• NMSS – Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

• NRR – Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

• NRO – Office of New Reactors 

• NSIR – Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 

• OE – Office of Enforcement 

• OIP – Office of International Programs 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

37 

Table 4 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of Licensee, 

Nonlicensee, or Individual

 

NOVs w/o 

CPs 

Orders w/o 

CPs 

NOVs and 

Orders w/ CPs Total 

Operating Reactor 23 2 2 27 

Gauge 8 0 2 10 

Individual Actor - Reactors 8 0 0 8 

Materials Distributor 2 0 5 7 

Fuel Facility 4 1 0 5 

Hospital 5 0 0 5 

Radiographer 4 0 0 4 

Other 1 0 1 2 

Licensed Operator 2 0 0 2 

Nonoperating Reactor 1 0 1 2 

Import / Export 0 0 1 1 

Individual Actor - Materials 0 1 0 1 

Academic 1 0 0 1 

Physician (M) 0 0 1 1 

Vendor - New Reactors 0 0 1 1 

Research Reactor 0 0 1 1 

New Construction - Reactor 1 0 0 1 

Individual Actor - Vendor 1 0 0 1 

Total 61 4 15 80 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

38

Table 5 – Escalated Enforcement Action Trends by Type of Licensee 

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 

Operating Reactor 28 40 30 29 27 154 

Gauge 16 11 5 17 10 59 

Radiographer 18 12 5 6 4 45 

Hospital 12 11 8 4 5 40 

Fuel Facility 7 4 3 0 5 19 

Individual Actor - Materials 3 8 2 5 1 19 

Materials Distributor 3 5 2 1 7 18 

Licensed Operator 3 7 2 4 2 18 

Individual Actor - Reactors 0 3 1 5 8 17 

Physician (M) 2 0 3 4 1 10 

Irradiator 6 1 2 1 0 10 

Academic 1 0 4 3 1 9 

Vendor - New Reactors 0 0 3 1 1 5 

Nonoperating Reactor 0 0 0 1 2 3 

Research Reactor 0 0 2 0 1 3 

New Construction - Reactor 0 1 1 0 1 3 

Import / Export 0 1 0 0 1 2 

Well Logger 1 0 1 0 0 2 

Decommissioned Reactor/Site 0 1 0 1 0 2 

Individual Actor - Vendor 0 0 0 0 1 1 

Individual Actor - Fuel Facility 1 0 0 0 0 1 

Vendor - Operating Reactors 0 1 0 0 0 1 

Waste Disposal 0 0 1 0 0 1 

Unknown 1 0 0 0 0 1 

Other 6 8 1 3 2 20 

Total 108 114 76 85 80 463 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

A1 

Appendix A – Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties*

Civil Penalties Issued to Operating Reactor Licensees 

Tennessee Valley Authority EA-14-003 

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 

On March 9, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Notice of 

Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (NOV/CP) in the amount of $70,000 to 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for a Severity Level (SL) III problem involving two 

violations. The first violation involved the failure to conduct compensatory fire watches as 

required by TVA corporate procedures and Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR) 50.48, “Fire Protection.” Specifically, on multiple occasions during October and 

November 2012, hourly fire watches required as compensatory measures for fire protection 

equipment that was out of service in the emergency diesel generator building were not 

performed. In addition, the designated fire watch foremen willfully failed to have proper 

oversight of fire watch activities. The second violation involved the failure to maintain 

complete and accurate records as required by 10 CFR 50.9(a). Specifically, on multiple 

occasions during the same time frame, fire watch patrol records were falsified when 

individuals initialed that fire watches were completed when in fact, these fire watches had 

not been performed. 

Texas A&M University Nuclear Science Center EA-14-230 

College Station, Texas 

On October 22, 2015, the NRC issued an SL III NOV/CP in the amount of $3,500 to Texas 

A&M University, Engineering Experiment Station, Nuclear Science Center (NSC), for two 

violations of NRC requirements, collectively characterized as an SL III problem. The first 

violation involved the Texas A&M NSC staff's failure to maintain complete and accurate 

records in all material respects. Specifically, on or after May 15, 2013, the reactor 

operations manager falsified the May 14, 2013, reactor operations log shutdown checklist 

required by Technical Specification (TS) 6.3 when he certified that the shutdown procedures 

were performed when in fact they had not been performed. The shutdown checklist is a 

safety record that the licensee is required to maintain for inspection by the NRC staff and 

the completeness and accuracy of this safety information is material to the NRC inspection 

process. The second violation involved the failure of Texas A&M NSC to maintain the 

minimum facility staffing required by TS 6.1.3, “Staffing,” when the reactor was not secured 

as defined by TSs 1.23 and 1.26. TS 6.1.3 requires at least two individuals, a senior reactor 

operator and either a licensed reactor operator or operator trainee, to be on duty when the 

reactor is not secured. Specifically, on the evening of May 14, 2013, the senior reactor 

operator and reactor operator left the facility complex unattended. The reactor was not 

secured on the night of May 14-15, 2013, in that the reactor contained sufficient fissile 

material to attain criticality under optimum conditions, and the reactor console was not 

secured, because not all scrammable rods were fully inserted and verified down. 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

A2

Civil Penalties Issued to Materials Licensees 

Patriot Engineering and Environmental EA-14-162 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

On February 4, 2015, the NRC issued a NOV/CP in the amount of $3,500 to Patriot 

Engineering and Environmental for an SL III violation. Specifically, on September 4, 2014, 

the licensee failed to maintain control and constant surveillance or use a minimum of two 

independent physical controls to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal as 

required by 10 CFR 20.1802, “Control of Material Not in Storage,” and 10 CFR 30.34(i). An 

authorized user failed to maintain control and constant surveillance over a gauge containing 

licensed material and that gauge was driven over by construction equipment. 

ATC Group Services, Inc. EA-13-251 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

On March 27, 2015, the NRC issued an Order Imposing a CP to ATC Group Services, Inc. 

Following the NRC’s November 19, 2014, NOV/CP in the amount of $3,500, the licensee 

requested that the violation be deemed an SL IV violation. The NOV was issued for the 

failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that was in an 

unrestricted area and that was not in storage. Specifically, a company employee left the 

gauge locked in the back of an open-bed truck in a store parking lot in Indianapolis, IN, with 

the truck door unlocked and the keys in the ignition. After carefully considering the 

information provided by the licensee in its written response, the NRC concluded that an 

adequate basis did not exist for either a reduction of the severity level or mitigation of the 

civil penalty and imposed the $3,500 CP by order. 

MISTRAS Group, Inc. EA-14-225 

Burr Ridge, Illinois 

On June 30, 2015, the NRC issued a NOV/CP in the amount of $7,000 to MISTRAS Group, 

Inc. (Mistras), for an SL III problem for two related violations. The violations involved a 

failure to obtain an export license as required by 10 CFR 110.5, “Licensing Requirements,” 

and a failure to submit an advance notification of shipment to the NRC and the Canadian 

Government as required by 10 CFR 110.50(c). Specifically on or about July 24, 2014, 

Mistras exported two iridium-192 sealed sources to Canada, without obtaining a required 

specific export license and did not provide the required export notifications to the NRC and 

the Canadian government in advance of the export of sources to Canada. 

Bradley D. Bastow, D.O. EA-14-116 

South Haven, Michigan 

On August 4, 2015, the NRC issued an Order Imposing a CP in the amount of $7,000 to a 

medical licensee, Bradley D. Bastow, D.O. (licensee). On November 6, 2014, the NRC 

issued an NOV/CP in the amount of $7,000 to the licensee for an SL III problem involving 

failure to meet the terms of a Confirmatory Order (CO) issued on September 3, 2013, as 

part of an alternative dispute resolution settlement agreement to resolve issues discovered 

during an inspection and an investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations. In 

April 2014, the NRC performed a followup inspection and determined that the licensee either 

did not meet the terms of the CO or did not meet them in the time specified by the order. Of 

particular concern was the failure to restore compliance to one of the initial violations that 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

A3 

formed the basis of the CO (i.e., providing a calibrated and operable well counter or 

submitting a license amendment request for alternate instrumentation). Not having this 

instrumentation has a direct health and safety impact on the licensee’s staff and patients in 

that, without the instrumentation, the licensee staff are not able to provide accurate 

contamination readings. 

CampCo, Inc. EA-14-080 

Los Angeles, California 

On December 10, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV/CP in the amount of $28,000 to CampCo, 

Inc. for four SL III violations, including the following: (1) willful failures to implement 

requirements in 10 CFR 30.3, “Activities Requiring License,” with 10 CFR 30.15, “Certain 

Items Containing Byproduct Material”(requirements for a license to distribute the byproduct 

material), (2) willful failures to implement requirements in 10 CFR Part 32.16, “Certain Items 

Containing Byproduct Material: Records and Reports of Transfer” (requirements to file 

annual reports with the NRC), (3) failure to comply with 10 CFR 32.16 (a) and (b) 

(information required for filing), and (4) failure to comply with an existing license requirement 

to provide certificates demonstrating that the devices are manufactured according to 

established standards and with no more than authorized quantities of byproduct material. 

Specifically, the violations occurred as follows: (1) between 2005 and March 2013, 

CampCo, Inc. initially transferred, for sale or distribution, timepieces containing tritium 

(hydrogen-3) sealed sources to persons exempt from regulations and did so without first 

obtaining a license or amendment to its existing license, (2) CampCo failed to file annual 

reports detailing transfers of byproduct material made in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, 

(3) CampCo failed to include all the required information in its annual reports that were filed 

at the request of the NRC for transfers during the years identified in Item 2 above, and 

(4) CampCo failed to ensure that each lot of timepieces it received containing tritium were 

accompanied by the required certificate for Equipe and Reactor watches between 2011 and 

2013 and for additional watches before that time period. 

Civil Penalties Issued to Fuel Cycle Facility Licensees 

None 

Civil Penalties Issued to New Reactor Licensees 

None 

Civil Penalties Issued to Decommissioning and Low Level Waste Licensees 

None 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B1 

Appendix B – Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation without 

Civil Penalties*

Notices of Violation Issued to Operating Reactor Licensees 

Entergy Operations, Inc. EA-14-088 

Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 and 2 

On January 22, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Notice of 

Violation (NOV) associated with a yellow significance determination process (SDP) finding to 

Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy). The finding was associated with the failure to design, 

construct, and maintain the flood barriers for the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 and 2 

auxiliary building and emergency diesel fuel storage building to protect safety-related 

equipment from flooding. Entergy was cited for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” 

Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing 

Plants,” Criterion III, “Design Control,” and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, 

“Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.” Each violation included multiple examples. 

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. EA-14-126 

Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3 

On February 10, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. for a 

Severity Level (SL) III violation of 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests, and Experiments,” 

involving the failure to obtain a license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, “Application 

for Amendment of License, Construction Permit, or Early Site Permit,” before implementing 

a change that resulted in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a 

malfunction of a structure, system, or component important to safety previously evaluated in 

the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR). Specifically, Dominion allowed a design 

change to the offsite power system (removal of the severe line outage detection system, a 

system described in the UFSAR), and failed to conduct a written evaluation or provide a 

basis for the determination that the change did not require a license amendment in 

accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2). 

Pacific Gas and Electric Company EA-14-010 

Diablo Canyon Power Plant 

On February 11, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Pacific Gas and Electric Company for an 

SL III violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) involving the failure to apply and receive approval from 

the Commission for a proposed change that decreased the effectiveness of the approved 

emergency plan (EP). In addition, a white SDP finding was issued. This white finding, an 

issue with low-to-moderate significance to safety, will require additional NRC inspections. 

The finding involves a change to the EP, which decreased its effectiveness. Specifically, on 

November 4, 2005, without approval from the NRC, the licensee removed instructions in its 

EP implementing procedures for making protective action recommendations for members of 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B2

the public who are located on the ocean within the 10-mile emergency planning zone, thus 

decreasing the plan's effectiveness. 

Entergy Operations, Inc. EA-14-168 

Palisades Nuclear Plant 

On February 23, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a white SDP finding to 

Entergy Operations, Inc., for two violations involving the failure to comply with the 

requirements of 10 CFR 20.1201(c) and Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, during control 

rod drive housing replacement activities between February 6 and March 8, 2014, at the 

Palisades Nuclear Plant. Specifically, the licensee failed to (1) properly use the deep-dose 

equivalent, and (2) determine the effective dose equivalent using a dosimetry method 

approved by the NRC, as required by 10 CFR 20.1201(c). In addition, the licensee failed to 

establish a procedure for personnel monitoring covering all practical worker positions and 

shielding geometries, as required by TS 5.4.1.a. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-14-235 

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 

On February 24, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Exelon Generation Company, LLC for an 

SL III problem involving two related violations identified as a result of an inspection at its 

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna). The first violation involved Ginna’s submittal to 

the NRC of information that was not complete and accurate in all material respects, as 

required by 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information.” Specifically, on 

October 8, 2008, Ginna submitted a senior reactor operator application that did not specify 

that the applicant had a medical condition that required medication for hypertension. 

Subsequently, the NRC issued a senior reactor operator license to the individual without a 

medical restriction. The second violation involved the failure to notify the NRC within 

30 days of a permanent disability of a licensed senior operator, as required by 

10 CFR 50.74(c). Specifically, the Ginna staff was informed in July 2008 that the operator 

was taking prescribed medication for hypertension. Ginna did not report this permanent 

medical condition to the NRC when it submitted NRC Form 396 as part of the senior 

operator license application in October 2008, and during subsequent biennial requalification 

medical examinations in 2010 and 2012. Ginna also did not request an amended license 

with a condition to account for the medical issue until July 16, 2014. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-14-180 

Indian Point 3 

On March 16, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV, characterized as an SL III problem, to Entergy 

for a violation of 10 CFR 50.9 and 10 CFR 55.3, “License Requirements.” This violation 

involved the failure to provide information to the Commission that was complete and 

accurate in all material respects and the failure to notify the NRC of a change in a licensed 

operator’s medical condition. Specifically, Entergy submitted an NRC licensed operator 

renewal application that certified the medical fitness of an applicant. This information was 

inaccurate in that the applicant had a medical condition that did not meet the minimum 

standards of 10 CFR 55.33(a)(1) which required a restricting license condition to use a 

therapeutic device. Entergy also did not report this change in a permanent medical 

condition to the NRC within 30 days, nor did Entergy request an amended license with a 

condition to account for the medical issue. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B3 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-15-001 

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 

On March 26, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a white SDP finding to Exelon 

for a violation, identified as a result of an inspection at its Dresden Nuclear Power Station, 

Unit 3, involving the failure to establish measures to ensure the suitability of materials, parts, 

equipment, and processes essential to the safety-related functions of structures, systems, 

and components as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. Specifically, the 

licensee failed to ensure that the application of the automatic depressurization system 

electromatic relief valve (ERV) actuators, which are essential to perform the safety-related 

reactor vessel depressurization and overpressure protection functions, remained suitable for 

operation. As a result, multiple failures of the 3E ERV occurred during testing before 

operating cycle D3C23, as well as an indeterminate period of inoperability and unavailability 

greater than allowed by the Unit 3 TS during operating cycle D3C23. The 3E ERV 

inoperability during the operating cycle was identified after the failure of the valve during its 

first operational test following the Unit 3 shutdown for refueling. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. EA-14-158 

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 

On March 30, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a white SDP finding to 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., for the licensee’s failure to maintain accurate 

records of radioactive waste being stored in designated areas, which resulted in a violation 

of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant TS 5.4.1. Specifically, information regarding the location 

and contents of the high-integrity containers was not updated when the contents of process 

shield #10 were changed. This failure to maintain accurate records resulted in a Type B 

quantity of radioactive material being shipped in a container that was not approved or tested 

for that purpose. The significance of this event was based on the increased risk to the 

public and the accident hazard posed when a Type B quantity of radioactive material was 

shipped in a container that was not approved or tested for that purpose. 

Tennessee Valley Authority EA-14-179 

Watts Bar, Unit 2 

On April 7, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to the Tennessee Valley Authority for a violation, 

identified as a result of an inspection and investigation at its Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, 

involving the licensee employees’ willful failure to follow a procedure for activities affecting 

quality in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, 

Procedures, and Drawings.” Specifically, on or about December 19, 2011, contract 

employees assigned to install anchor bolts for overhead base plates, which support 

safety-related ventilation in the containment building, willfully failed to remove and replace, 

or obtain site engineering approval for, newly installed wedge bolt anchors that exceeded 

5 degrees of perpendicular, as required by the licensee’s procedure. Out of tolerance 

anchor bolts on two hangers were bent (straightened) to within 5 degrees of perpendicular 

using a nonapproved modified tool. All four overhead base plates of the two hangers had at 

least one bent (weakened) bolt. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B4

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-14-192 

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station 

On April 10, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Exelon for an SL III problem involving two 

related violations identified as a result of an inspection at its Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station 

(NMP). The first violation involved the failure on multiple occasions to notify the NRC within 

30 days of medical conditions of licensed reactor operators (ROs) and senior reactor 

operators (SROs) that involved permanent disabilities or illnesses, as required by 

10 CFR 50.74(c). Specifically, between June 2001 and September 2014, the NMP staff was 

informed that operators were taking prescribed medication for such conditions as 

hypertension, post-traumatic stress disorder, attention deficit disorder, and asthma. NMP 

did not report these permanent medical conditions to the NRC when it submitted NRC 

Form 396 as part of the operators’ license application process. Additionally, NMP did not 

restrict these same licensed ROs and SROs from performing licensed duties when the 

individuals had disqualifying medical conditions, in accordance with 10 CFR 55.25, 

“Incapacitation Because of Disability or Illness.” The second violation involved the NMP 

submittal of information to the NRC that was not complete and accurate in all material 

respects, as required by 10 CFR 50.9. Specifically, on multiple occasions between 

September 2002 and February 2012, NMP submitted applications for operators that certified 

the medical fitness of the applicants and that did not identify any needed license operator 

restrictions regarding disqualifying medical conditions or related prescription medication. 

Each of the applicants had medical conditions that did not meet the minimum standards of 

10 CFR 55.33(a)(1). Subsequently, the NRC, based in part on this inaccurate information, 

issued reactor operator licenses without the required restricting license conditions. 

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC EA-14-237 

Duane Arnold Energy Center 

On April 16, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a white SDP finding to NextEra 

Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (licensee) for a violation identified at its Duane Arnold Energy 

Center involving the failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, 

“Control of Special Processes,” which required the licensee to maintain measures to ensure 

that special processes are controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using 

qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes, standards, specifications, criteria, 

and other special requirements. Specifically, between November 5 and 10, 2012, the 

licensee did not adequately control the application of the torus coating, a special process, 

because the requirements associated with wet film thickness measurements and conditions 

for recoat application were not contained in design specifications and vendor 

documentation, nor were they included in qualified procedures. The licensee’s failure to 

establish adequate quality controls during the application of a torus coating resulted in an 

unqualified torus coating in excess of the debris loading margin of the emergency core 

cooling system’s suction strainer design. This finding did not present an immediate safety 

concern, because the unqualified torus coating in excess of the design margin was removed 

during an outage before the reactor resumed operation. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-14-178 

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station 

On April 27, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a yellow SDP finding to Exelon 

(licensee) for a violation identified at its Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The 

violation involved the failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, which 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B5 

required the licensee to establish measures for the selection and review for suitability of 

application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the 

safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components. Specifically, from the 

original installation of electromatic relief valves (EMRVs) in 1969, until the valves were 

redesigned and reinstalled during the 2014 refueling outage, the EMRV actuators were 

inadequate because, when they were placed in an environment where the actuator was 

subject to vibration associated with plant operation, the mechanical tolerance between posts 

and guides created a condition where the springs could wedge between the guides and the 

posts, jamming the actuator plunger assembly. In addition, given the original design of the 

valve, the maintenance refurbishing processes were not adequate to maintain the required 

internal tolerances to prevent excessive fretting and wear of the internal components. As a 

consequence, two of the five EMRVs were inoperable for more than 24 hours, in violation of 

TS 3.4.B. 

AmerGen Energy Co., LLC EA-14-186 

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station 

On April 27, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a white SDP finding to Exelon 

(licensee) for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, involving the failure to 

review the suitability of an application for a different maintenance process, at its Oyster 

Creek Nuclear Generating Station, that was essential to a safety-related function of the 

emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Specifically, from May 13, 2005, to 

September 9, 2014, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of the acceptance criteria for a 

new EDG belt maintenance process, which resulted in the EDG’s cooling fan shaft being 

susceptible to fatigue failure, which occurred on July 28, 2014. Additionally, because the 

licensee was not aware of the EDG’s inoperability between 2005 and 2014, the required 

actions of the TS were not followed. 

Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC EA-15-022 

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station 

On June 22, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a white SDP finding to 

Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC (Susquehanna). The finding was associated with the failure to 

implement the 15-minute assessment, classification, and declaration period for a potential 

loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) barrier emergency action level (EAL) at Susquehanna 

Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. Specifically, Susquehanna interpreted the 15-minute 

assessment, classification, and declaration clock to start when operator actions were, or 

were expected to be, unsuccessful in isolating an RCS leak, rather than when the EAL 

thresholds were exceeded. Susquehanna's incorrect interpretation of the 15-minute 

assessment and declaration period degraded its ability to make a timely site area 

emergency declaration. The NOV involved the failure to comply with the requirements of 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), “Emergency Plans”; 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2), “Conditions of License”; and 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.2., “Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 

Production and Utilization Facilities.” 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-15-064 

Clinton Power Station 

On August 11, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a white SDP finding to Exelon 

for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. This violation involved the failure 

to review the suitability of application of the Division 3 shutdown service water pump 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B6

modifications, which were essential to the safety-related functions of the high-pressure core 

spray system. Specifically, on or about October 3, 1995, the licensee failed to ensure the 

modified pump internals would not degrade under expected operating conditions in a way 

that affected the safety function. The licensee determined the pump failed at the conclusion 

of its surveillance run on May 30, 2014, but this condition did not reveal itself until the pump 

failed to start on September 16, 2014. This resulted in the pump being inoperable for 

approximately 108 days, a period greater than the allowed limiting condition for operation 

outage times provided in the plant TS. Additionally, because the licensee was not aware of 

the pump’s inoperability during the unit’s operation cycle, the required actions of the TS 

were not followed. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-15-081 

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 

On September 1, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a white SDP finding to 

Entergy for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action.” 

This violation involved the failure to establish measures to promptly identify and correct a 

significant condition adverse to quality, or take corrective actions to preclude repetition, 

relating to a component that is essential to performing the automatic depressurization 

system (ADS) safety-related functions. Specifically, the licensee failed to determine that the 

ADS ‘A’ safety/relief valve (SRV) did not open upon manual actuation on February 9, 2013. 

The licensee, therefore, did not take action to preclude repetition, which resulted in the 

failure of the ADS ‘C’ SRV to operate upon manual actuation on January 27, 2015. 

Additionally, because the licensee was not aware of the ‘A’ SRV’s inoperability from 

February 9, 2013, until January 27, 2015, a period greater than the allowed TS outage time, 

the required actions of the TS were not followed. 

Entergy Operations, Inc. EA-15-043 

River Bend 1 

On September 10, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a white SDP finding to 

Entergy for a violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c) involving River Bend Station’s simulator failure to 

accurately reproduce the operating characteristics of the facility. Specifically, as of 

January 30, 2015, the simulator failed to demonstrate the expected plant response to 

operator input and to normal, transient, and accident conditions to which the simulator has 

been designed to respond. These simulator modeling issues led to negative training of 

operators, which contributed to operator challenges to control the plant and maintain plant 

parameters during a reactor scram in the actual plant that occurred on December 25, 2014. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-15-115 

Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 

On September 16, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV associated with a white SDP finding to 

Exelon for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. This violation involved 

the failure to review the suitability of application of the ADS ERV actuators, which are 

essential to performing the safety-related reactor vessel depressurization and overpressure 

protection functions. This resulted in a failure of the 2C ERV, and an indeterminate period 

of inoperability and unavailability greater than allowed by the TS during the operating cycle. 

The 2C ERV inoperability during the operating cycle was identified after the failure of the 

valve during its first operational test in a mid-cycle outage. Additionally, because the 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B7 

licensee was not aware of the valve’s inoperability between 2013 and 2015, the required TS 

actions were not followed. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-15-171 

Palisades Nuclear Plant 

On November 24, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV, characterized as SL III, to Entergy for a 

violation of 10 CFR Part 50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information.” This violation 

involved the failure to provide information to the Commission that was complete and 

accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the licensee submitted Letter 

No. PNP 2014-015 to the NRC, which inaccurately stated the effective full-power years for 

which the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code acceptance criteria 

would be met at Palisades Nuclear Plant. The NRC staff used this information to grant the 

licensee’s proposed alternative to regulatory requirements. On May 22, 2015, the licensee 

submitted Letter PNP 2015-037 with a corrected analysis. The error in letter PNP 2014-015, 

and the resultant change to the analysis results in letter PNP 2015-037, represented a 

significant reduction in the time to reach the ASME Code acceptance criteria limits. 

Therefore, the information is considered material to the NRC for its review of the proposed 

alternative to regulatory requirements in letter PNP 2014-15. 

Notices of Violation Issued to Materials Licensees 

NewFields Mining Design and Technical Services EA-14-169 

Elko, Nevada 

On January 16, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to NewFields Mining Design and Technical 

Services for an SL III violation involving failure to implement the requirements of 

10 CFR 30.34(i). Specifically, on September 23, 2014, the licensee failed to use the 

required minimum of two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure 

two portable gauges from unauthorized removal at a temporary job site. The gauges were 

located inside a metallic box in the licensee’s trailer without any independent physical 

controls present, and the gauge was not under the direct control and constant surveillance 

of the licensee. 

High Mountain Inspection Services, Inc. EA-14-182 

Casper, Wyoming 

On February 11, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to High Mountain Inspection Services, Inc. 

for an SL III violation involving the failure to comply with 10 CFR 34.49(b), which requires a 

licensee to conduct a radiation survey of a radiographic exposure device and the guide tube 

after each radiographic exposure when approaching the device or guide tube. Specifically, 

on October 7, 2014, the radiographer's assistant approached the radiography exposure 

device and guide tube without a survey instrument after completing a radiographic exposure 

of a pipe weld at a temporary job site located near Wright, WY. There was no unnecessary 

radiation exposure or overexposure to workers as a result of this violation. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B8

Testing Engineers and Consultants, Inc. EA-14-221 

Troy, Michigan 

On February 24, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Testing Engineers and Consultants, Inc., 

for an SL III violation involving the failure to use a minimum of two independent physical 

controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal, 

whenever portable gauges are not under the control and constant surveillance of the 

licensee, as required by 10 CFR 30.34(i). Specifically, on November 6, 2014, the inspector 

observed a portable gauge at a temporary job site with only one barrier (a single padlock on 

the transportation case) preventing unauthorized removal of the portable gauge. 

Megan, LLC EA-14-188 

Bridgeport, Connecticut 

On February 25, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Megan, LLC, (Megan) for an SL III 

problem involving six violations. The first violation included multiple failures to maintain two 

independent controls to form a tangible barrier to secure its portable nuclear gauges from 

unauthorized removal whenever the gauges were not under Megan’s control and constant 

surveillance, as required by 10 CFR 30.34(i). Specifically, on October 27, 2014, the 

licensee stored a portable gauge outside of its locked storage cage with no physical barriers 

in place to secure it from unauthorized removal, and on October 28, 2014, the portable 

gauges were stored at two different temporary job sites, one inside a personal and one 

inside a company vehicle with the doors and/or trunk locked, consisting of one physical 

barrier but without an additional barrier, as required. The other five violations involved 

Megan’s failures to: (1) seek NRC approval before acquiring and possessing licensed 

materials exceeding the maximum amount authorized by its NRC license, (2) possess or 

have access to a radiation survey meter, as required by its NRC license, (3) request a 

license amendment after appointing a new radiation safety officer in place of the individual 

listed on its license, (4) maintain a log book to track the use of portable gauges at temporary 

job sites, as required by its NRC license, and (5) train its HAZMAT employees within the 

3-year timeframe required by U.S. Department of Transportation regulations and 

10 CFR Part 71, “Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material.” 

Beaumont Health System EA-14-236 

Royal Oak, Michigan 

On March 9, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Beaumont Health System for an SL III 

violation involving the failure to develop, implement, and maintain written procedures to 

provide high confidence that each administration was in accordance with the written 

directive, as required by 10 CFR 35.41(a). In accordance with 10 CFR 35.41(b)(2), the 

procedures required by 10 CFR 35.41(a) must address verifying that the administration is in 

accordance with the treatment plan, if applicable, and the written directive. Specifically, on 

October 30, 2014, the licensee administered yttrium-90 to the posterior portion of the right 

lobe of a patient’s liver, and the licensee’s procedures did not require verification that the 

dose was in accordance with the applicable treatment plan and written directive. As a 

result, a medical event occurred, where the patient received a dose that was 20.8 percent 

more than the prescribed dose. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B9 

Schultz Surveying & Engineering, Inc. EA-14-238 

Poplar Bluff, Missouri 

On March 31, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Schultz Surveying & Engineering, Inc., for 

an SL III violation involving the failure to confine possession and use of byproduct materials 

to the locations and purposes authorized by the license, as required by 10 CFR 30.34(c). 

Specifically, between January 31, 2013, and December 16, 2014, the licensee possessed 

and stored byproduct material at facilities located in Lake Ozark and Branson, MO. These 

locations were not authorized by the license. 

Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. EA-15-008 

Cary, North Carolina 

On April 10, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. 

(Siemens) for an SL III violation. The violation involved the failure to file NRC Form 241, 

“Report of Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement States,” at least 3 days before engaging in 

licensed activities within NRC’s jurisdiction, as required by 10 CFR 150.20, “Recognition of 

Agreement State Licenses.” Specifically, between September 6, 2011, and August 8, 2014, 

Siemens, a licensee of the State of North Carolina, used byproduct material within NRC’s 

jurisdiction on numerous occasions without filing the required documentation with the NRC. 

Blevins Asphalt Construction Co., Inc. EA-15-073 

Mt. Vernon, Missouri 

On May 29, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Blevins Asphalt Construction Co., Inc., for an 

SL III violation. The violation involved the failure to maintain control and constant 

surveillance or use a minimum of two independent physical controls to secure a portable 

gauge from unauthorized removal, as required by 10 CFR 20.1802 and 10 CFR 30.34(i). 

Specifically, on July 30, 2014, an authorized user failed to maintain control and constant 

surveillance over a gauge containing licensed material, and that gauge was driven over by 

the individual’s vehicle. 

LKS Inspection Services, LLC EA-15-034 

Kapolei, Hawaii 

On June 8, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to LKS Inspection Services, LLC, for an SL III 

problem that involved the failure to meet the following regulations: (1) 10 CFR 34.47(a), 

requiring individuals acting as radiographers to wear a direct reading dosimeter, an 

operating alarm rate meter, and a personal dosimeter at all times, and (2) 10 CFR 34.47(a), 

requiring, in part, that pocket dosimeters be recharged at the start of each shift. Specifically, 

on January 27, 2015, an LKS Inspection Services radiographer failed to wear an alarming 

rate meter during radiographic operations, and two radiographers failed to recharge their 

pocket dosimeters at the start of the shift. 

La Crosse BWR ISFSI EA-15-026 

La Crosse, Wisconsin 

On June 22, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Dairyland Cooperative for an SL III problem 

involving two violations identified as a result of an inspection at its La Crosse boiling-water 

reactor (LACBWR) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). The first violation 

involved the failure to submit a license amendment to the NRC for changes to the LACBWR 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B10

emergency plan (EP) that reduced its effectiveness before implementing the changes, as 

required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). Specifically, on October 29, 2012, the licensee 

implemented changes that reduced the effectiveness of the LACBWR EP and failed to 

submit a license amendment application to the NRC before implementing the changes. The 

second violation involved several examples where the licensee failed to maintain the 

effectiveness of its EP, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2). Specifically, on several 

occasions between September 20, 2012, and September 8, 2014, the licensee failed to 

follow approved EP normal and night shift staffing requirements. In addition, from 

June 20, 2011, through December 31, 2013, the licensee failed to follow its approved EP for 

conducting exercises and drills. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform an annual plant 

emergency exercise from 2011 through 2013 and failed to perform certain plant and ISFSI 

annual drills between 2011 and 2013, including fire drills in 2011 and 2012, a medical drill in 

2013, and a health physics drill in 2012. 

Monongalia General Hospital EA-15-062 

Morgantown, West Virginia 

On July 14, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Monongalia General Hospital (MGH) for an 

SL III violation. The violation involved the failure to have two written directives dated and 

signed by an authorized user before the administration of I-131 sodium iodide, as required 

by 10 CFR 35.40(a). Specifically, on February 8, 2013, and on February 26, 2013, MGH 

administered I-131 sodium iodide, and the two individuals that signed and dated the written 

directives were not listed as authorized users on its NRC license. 

Howard University Hospital EA-15-053 

Washington, DC 

On August 25, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Howard University Hospital (HUH) for an 

SL III problem for two related violations. The violations involved: (1) the failure to control 

and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is in an unrestricted area and 

not in storage, as required by 10 CFR 20.1802, and (2) the failure to secure licensed 

materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas from unauthorized removal or 

access as required by 10 CFR 20.1801, “Security of Stored Material.” Specifically, on 

August 31, 2013, a package containing an iridium-192 source was delivered to the hallway 

outside the HUH Central Supply Department room, a controlled or unrestricted area, and the 

licensee did not control or maintain constant surveillance of the source for approximately 

4.5 hours. In addition, between August 31, 2013, and September 3, 2013, the package was 

stored in a locked room to which unauthorized HUH staff had access. 

Howard University EA-15-078 

Washington, DC 

On August 25, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Howard University (HU) for an SL III 

violation. The violation involved a failure to notify the NRC within 24 hours after the 

discovery of an unplanned contamination event, in accordance with 10 CFR 30.50(b). 

Specifically, in February/March 2008, HU discovered that a storage room had been 

contaminated with material from a vial containing millicurie quantities of cesium-137 and 

prohibited entry into the room for several months until decontamination was complete. 

However; from February/March 2008 until May 7, 2015, HU did not notify the NRC within 

24 hours as required, after the discovery of the contamination event. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B11 

McLaren Medical Center Bay Region EA-15-111 

Bay City, Michigan 

On August 27, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to McLaren Medical Center Bay Region for an 

SL III violation involving the failure to develop, implement, and maintain written procedures 

to provide high confidence that each administration is in accordance with the written 

directive, as required by 10 CFR 35.41(a). Specifically, as of February 6, 2015, the licensee 

failed to include specific steps in its procedure for verifying the catheter position to ensure 

the administration was in accordance with the written directive. As a result, a medical event 

occurred, as the patient received an unintended dose of approximately 2.6 Gray (260 rad) to 

the skin of the right thigh. 

Cal Testing Services, Inc. EA-15-117 

Griffith, Indiana 

On October 9, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Cal Testing Services, Inc., for an SL III 

violation involving the failure to ensure each individual who acts as a radiographer or a 

radiographer’s assistant wears a direct reading dosimeter, an operating alarm rate meter, 

and a personnel dosimeter at all times during radiographic operations, as required by 

10 CFR 34.47(a). Specifically, on March 20, 2015, a radiographer’s assistant wore an 

inoperable alarm rate meter while performing radiographic operations. 

Testing Engineers & Consultants, Inc. EA-15-141 

Troy, Michigan 

On October 23, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Testing Engineers & Consultants Inc., for 

an SL III violation. The violation involved the failure to use a minimum of two independent 

physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized 

removal when the portable gauges were not under the control and constant surveillance of 

the licensee, as required by 10 CFR 30.34(i). Specifically, from 2011 until June 19, 2015, 

during offduty hours, nonlicensee building tenants had access to the storage room’s locked 

door, which resulted in a single physical barrier securing the gauges from unauthorized 

removal. 

CTI and Associates, Inc. EA-15-157 

Wixom, Michigan 

On November 23, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to CTI and Associates, Inc., for an SL III 

violation of both 10 CFR 20.1801 and 10 CFR 30.34(i). The violation involved the failure to 

secure licensed material in a portable gauge from unauthorized removal or access, with a 

minimum of two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers, while the gauge 

was stored in a controlled or unrestricted area and not under the control and constant 

surveillance of the licensee. Specifically, the licensee left an unattended gauge inside an 

unlocked shipping container that was accessible to the public. 

ECS Mid-Atlantic, LLC EA-15-148 

Hanover, Maryland 

On December 14, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to ECS Mid-Atlantic, LLC, for an SL III 

violation. The violation involved a failure to control and maintain constant surveillance or 

failure to use two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure a 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B12

portable gauge from unauthorized removal, as required by 10 CFR 20.1802 and 

10 CFR 30.34(i). Specifically, on June 8, 2015, a portable gauge was left unattended and 

uncontrolled at a job site at the U.S. Naval Academy, and it was not secured with any 

physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure it from unauthorized removal. 

JOMA Shop, LLC EA-15-196 

Brooklyn, New York 

On December 21, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to JOMA Shop (JOMA) for an SL III 

problem for two related violations. The violations involved a transfer of watches containing 

byproduct material without the NRC license, as required by 10 CFR 30.3(a), and an import 

of material into the United States without having the required license for possession of the 

material, as required by 10 CFR 110.5, “Licensing Requirements.” Specifically, beginning 

around May 2013, JOMA initially transferred 7,617 tritium watches to unlicensed persons 

without obtaining a specific license authorizing such transfers, and before April 2012, JOMA 

imported these watches without having a possession license issued by the State of New 

York, or without first obtaining a specific import license from the NRC. 

Notices of Violation Issued to Fuel Cycle Facility Licensees 

Honeywell International, Inc. EA-15-015 

Metropolis, Illinois 

On April 20, 2015, the NRC issued an SL III NOV to Honeywell International, Inc., for failing 

to declare an Alert in response to a hydrofluoric acid release at its Honeywell Metropolis 

Works facility. Specifically on October 26, 2014, the licensee emergency responders failed 

to declare an Alert in response to a hydrofluoric acid release from the feeds material 

building, which resulted in a hazardous situation that migrated outside of the building but 

stayed within the restricted area or inner fence line. 

Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. EA-15-021 

Lynchburg, Virginia 

On June 18, 2015, the NRC issued an SL III NOV to Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear 

Operations Group, Inc. The violation involved the licensee’s failure to ensure that, under a 

credible abnormal condition, all nuclear processes were subcritical, including use of an 

approved margin of subcriticality. Specifically, the licensee did not identify a credible 

abnormal condition that could potentially lead to a high-consequence criticality event and did 

not establish sufficient controls to ensure subcriticality of cleanout activities performed in the 

low-level dissolver catch tray. 

Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. EA-15-214 

Lynchburg, Virginia 

On December 30, 2015, the NRC issued an SL III to Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear 

Operations Group, Inc. The SL III problem consisted of two violations. The first violation 

involved the licensee’s failure to establish adequate management measures to ensure that 

an administrative control identified as an item relied on for safety (IROFS) was implemented 

and maintained such that it was available and reliable to perform its function. Specifically, 

on or before July 13 and 14, 2015, the licensee failed to provide adequate training to 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B13 

operators in the Specialty Fuels Facility (SFF) to ensure that an administrative IROFS for 

limiting the amount of interstitial moderating material in a process glovebox was 

implemented correctly. The second violation involved the licensee’s failure to apply 

sufficient controls to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of a high-consequence event to 

highly unlikely. Specifically, on or before July 13 and 14, 2015, the licensee failed to limit 

the likelihood of an inadvertent criticality to highly unlikely in the SFF when operators 

performed actions that rendered a control on interstitial moderating material mass 

unreliable. The unreliability of this control resulted in the likelihood of an inadvertent 

criticality shifting from highly unlikely to unlikely, based on the licensee’s integrated safety 

analysis. 

Notices of Violation Issued to New Reactor Licensees 

None 

Civil Penalties Issued to Decommissioning and Low Level Waste Licensees 

None 

Notices of Violation Issued to Individuals 

NOVs issued to individuals are discussed in Appendix D 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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Enforcement Program Annual Report 

C1 

Appendix C – Summary of Orders*

Orders Issued to Operating Reactor Licensees 

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. EA-13-188 

Millstone Power Station Unit 2 

On August 26, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Confirmatory 

Order (CO) to Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC), to formalize commitments made 

as a result of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session held on 

July 15, 2015, and two followup conference calls. The commitments were made as part of a 

settlement agreement between DNC and the NRC regarding an apparent violation of 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.59, “Changes, Tests, and 

Experiments.” The apparent violations involved implementing changes to documents 

related to the Millstone Unit 2 spent fuel decay time limits and the Millstone Unit 2 chemical 

and volume control system charging pumps without the NRC’s approval and providing 

incomplete and inaccurate information to the NRC. One of the apparent violations was 

considered to have been willful. In response to these apparent violations, DNC agreed to 

complete a number of actions as fully discussed in the CO. In consideration of those 

actions, the NRC agreed not to pursue further enforcement action. 

Energy Northwest EA-14-240 

Columbia Generating Station 

On September 28, 2015, the NRC issued a CO to Energy Northwest, to formalize 

commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on August 6, 2015. The 

commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between Energy Northwest and 

the NRC regarding a violation that involved nuclear security officers at Columbia Generating 

Station being willfully inattentive while on duty, which resulted in their failure to meet the 

requirement to be available at all times inside the protected areas for their assigned 

response duties, contrary to 10 CFR 73.55(k)(5)(iii). In light of the significant corrective 

actions Energy Northwest had taken and subject to the satisfactory completion of the 

additional actions it committed to take, as described in the CO, the NRC will not issue a 

Notice of Violation for the apparent violation. Those actions include, but are not limited to: 

(1) conducting a common-cause evaluation, (2) revising its annual compliance and ethics 

computer-based training to address deliberate misconduct, (3) presenting at an industry 

forum to discuss the events that led to the CO, (4) conducting a targeted nuclear safety 

culture assessment, and (5) paying a CP of $35,000. 

Northern States Power Company EA-14-193 

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1 

On December 21, 2015, the NRC issued a CO to Northern States Power Company, 

Minnesota (licensee), to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation 

session. The commitments were made by the licensee as part of a settlement agreement 

with the NRC regarding apparent violations of NRC requirements. The agreement resolves 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

C2

the apparent failure to ensure nondestructive examinations (NDE) on spent fuel dry shielded 

canisters (DSCs) were performed in accordance with procedural requirements, and the 

falsification of records when recording the NDE results, contrary to the requirements of 

10 CFR 72.158, “Control of Special Processes”;10 CFR 72.11, “Completeness and 

Accuracy of Information”; and 10 CFR 72.154(c). The licensee agreed to a number of 

corrective actions, including: (1) restore compliance for all affected DSCs, (2) revise 

applicable procedures, (3) present at an industry forum, (4) submit an article to an industry 

publication, and (5) assess the effectiveness of improvements. In consideration of these 

commitments, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing an NOV and the proposed imposition 

of a CP. 

Orders Issued to Materials Licensees 

None 

Orders Issued to Fuel Cycle Facility Licensees 

Honeywell International Inc. EA-14-114 

Metropolis, Illinois 

On March 11, 2015, the NRC issued a CO to Honeywell International, Inc. to reflect 

commitments agreed to during an ADR mediation session conducted on December 9, 2014. 

The CO arose out of an incident involving a former employee of a Honeywell contractor, 

who was terminated, in part, for notifying both Honeywell and the Honeywell contractor that 

the employee smelled alcohol on the employee’s immediate supervisor’s breath during duty 

hours. As a summary, Honeywell committed to (1) conducting presentations and training for 

its employees regarding the policy for raising employee concerns, (2) addressing safety 

issues and management’s response to employee concerns, (3) modifying existing 

processes and developing new processes that provide ongoing support for employee 

protection requirements, and (4) reviewing and updating its Safety Conscious Work 

Environment Policy and incorporating aspects of the NRC’s Safety Culture Policy, as 

appropriate. In exchange, the NRC agreed to not pursue any further enforcement action. 

Orders Issued to New Reactor Licensees 

None 

Orders Issued to Decommissioning and Low Level Waste Licensees 

None 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

C3 

Prohibition Orders Issued to Individuals 

Bradley D. Bastow IA-14-039 

On August 4, 2015, the NRC issued a CO prohibiting Dr. Bradley D. Bastow, radiation safety 

officer (RSO) for Cardiology II, P.C., from serving as an RSO until he demonstrates training 

and his commitment to compliance with regulatory requirements. Dr. Bastow’s continued 

noncompliances related to ensuring that radioactive materials are used safely, securely, and 

in compliance with the applicable requirement have resulted in the NRC’s lack of confidence 

in his capacity as an RSO. This order does not prevent Dr. Bastow from serving as an 

authorized user. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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Appendix D – Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

Against Individuals*

Orders 

Orders issued to individuals during 2015 are discussed in Appendix C. 

Notices of Violation 

Mr. Michael D. Richardson IA-15-001 

On March 6, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Notice of 

Violation (NOV) to Mr. Michael D. Richardson, a former licensed reactor operator at the 

McGuire Nuclear Station, for a Severity Level (SL) III violation of Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 55.53(j). Specifically, on November 17, 2014, Mr. Richardson 

reported for duty and actively performed licensed senior operator duties as the operations 

shift manager. During that shift, he participated in the Duke Energy Carolinas random 

fitness-for-duty (FFD) testing program, and on November 20, 2014, the Duke Energy 

medical review officer determined that Mr. Richardson tested positive for an illegal 

substance. 

Mr. Bryan J. Buchanan IA-14-040 

On April 20, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Mr. Bryan J. Buchanan, a former rigging 

manager at the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CB&I), for an SL III violation of 

10 CFR 52.4, “Deliberate Misconduct.” Specifically, on March 1, 2013, Mr. Buchanan 

deliberately instructed subordinate employees at CB&I’s Lake Charles facility (CB&I-LC) to 

knowingly omit from statements supporting an incident investigation report that: (1) the 

V. C. Summer CA 01-20 submodule had dropped approximately 3.5 feet, (2) improper 

rigging equipment (nylon slings) had been used and had broken, and (3) the submodule had 

sustained damage. These actions caused other CB&I-LC employees to submit incomplete 

and inaccurate information to their employer, a contractor to an NRC license holder, 

regarding the incident, and caused the company to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, 

“Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities”; Appendix B, “Quality Assurance 

Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants”; Criterion XVI, “Corrective 

Actions,” for failing to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. 

Mr. Frederick Horvath IA-15-033 

On July 22, 2015, the NRC issued Mr. Frederick Horvath, a former electrical maintenance 

first line supervisor at NextEra's Seabrook Station (Seabrook), an SL III NOV for a violation 

of 10 CFR 50.5, “Deliberate Misconduct.” Specifically, on February 11, 2015, while 

employed at Seabrook, Mr. Horvath engaged in deliberate misconduct by subverting an FFD 

drug test. After notification that he was selected for a random drug and alcohol test, 

Mr. Horvath left the site and provided false information to NextEra about why he did not 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

D2

report to the FFD sample collection site within 2 hours of notification, as required by 

10 CFR 26.31, “Drug and Alcohol Testing,” and NextEra procedures. Mr. Horvath returned 

to the site approximately 61⁄2 hours after the designated time and submitted to the test. 

Mr. Jesse Meyer IA-15-032 

On August 3, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Mr. Jesse Meyer, a former licensed senior 

reactor operator at First Energy Nuclear Operations Company's (FENOC's) Beaver Valley 

Power Station (BVPS), for an SL III violation of 10 CFR 50.5, for deliberately submitting to 

the licensee information related to his arrest on June 22, 2014, for driving under the 

influence, that he knew was incomplete and inaccurate. Specifically, between June 22 and 

June 27, 2014, Mr. Meyer performed licensed activities at BVPS and deliberately failed to 

report the arrest within 48 hours, as required by 10 CFR 73.56(g) and FENOC procedures. 

Mr. Meyer stated that he was aware of FENOC’s arrest reporting requirements for 

individuals maintaining unescorted access authorization (UAA), but he did not report his 

arrest until June 27, 2014. This information was material to the NRC, because the agency 

requires that individuals report any legal actions so that licensees may evaluate the 

circumstances and redetermine the reported individual’s unescorted access or UAA status. 

Mr. Rudy Ontiveros IA-15-060 

On September 25, 2015, the NRC issued Mr. Rudy Ontiveros, formerly employed as a 

security officer, an SL III NOV for a violation of 10 CFR 50.5. Specifically, Mr. Ontiveros 

deliberately submitted inaccurate information to Energy Northwest’s Columbia Generating 

Station (licensee), when completing a reinstatement personnel history questionnaire (PHQ). 

He indicated on his PHQ that he had not violated the licensee’s FFD program and had not 

used illegal substances in violation of Federal law since his last unescorted access period, 

when in fact he had done both. Mr. Ontiveros subsequently admitted that he had used an 

illegal substance and that he submitted a substitute urine sample in an effort to subvert the 

FFD test to avoid detection of illegal substance usage. The submittal of accurate 

information is material to the NRC and is required by NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 26, 

“Fitness for Duty Programs.” 

Mr. Jason Smith IA-15-059 

On October 16, 2015, the NRC issued Mr. Jason Smith, formerly employed as a contract 

employee, an SL III NOV for a violation of 10 CFR 50.5. Specifically, during a pre-access 

FFD drug test, Mr. Smith deliberately submitted a substitute urine sample and certified by 

signature on an Energy Northwest custody-and-control form that the urine sample he 

submitted for testing was his and not adulterated. Mr. Smith admitted to submitting a 

substituted sample to subvert the FFD test and provided the device used for substitution 

after the testing facility collector noted that the sample was not within the acceptable 

temperature range. The submittal of this urine sample was material to the NRC, because 

drug testing is required by NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 26. 

Mr. Greg Stasny IA-15-054 

On October 22, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Mr. Greg Stasny, the former manager of 

reactor operations at the Texas A&M University Nuclear Science Center (NSC), for an SL III 

violation of 10 CFR 50.5. Specifically, on or after May 15, 2013, Mr. Stasny deliberately 

falsified the May 14, 2013, reactor operations log shutdown checklist required by NSC 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

D3 

Technical Specification 6.3 when he certified that the shutdown procedures were performed 

when in fact they had not been performed. The shutdown checklist is a safety record that 

the licensee is required to maintain for inspection by the NRC staff, and the completeness 

and accuracy of this safety information is material to the NRC inspection process. 

Mr. Mawuena Gnamavo IA-15-061 

On October 30, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Mr. Mawuena Gnamavo for an SL IV 

violation of 10 CFR 71.8(b)(2) involving deliberate misconduct that caused his employer, 

Columbiana Hi-Tech (CHT), a certificate holder, to be in violation of the 10 CFR 71.7(a) 

requirement for knowingly submitting inaccurate quality and nondestructive examination 

inspector training and experience documents to CHT. Specifically, shortly after 

Mr. Gnamavo’s initial hire date of January 30, 2012, he provided falsified documents to 

CHT, consisting of a letter of recommendation and a training certificate. These documents 

were used by CHT as part of the basis to certify Mr. Gnamavo as a qualified inspector in 

both visual and dye penetrant examinations. Mr. Gnamavo then inspected and approved 

important-to-safety welds, without the required qualifications, on equipment and components 

regulated under 10 CFR Part 71, “Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”; 

and 10 CFR Part 72, “Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater-Than-Class 

C Waste.” 

Mr. John Underwood IA-15-062 

On November 16, 2015, the NRC issued Mr. John Underwood, a former licensed senior 

reactor operator at Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc., Farley Nuclear Plant (Farley), an 

SL III NOV for violation of 10 CFR 55.53(d) and (j). Specifically, on June 2, 2015, 

Mr. Underwood reported for duty and actively performed licensed senior operator duties as 

the operations shift manager. During that shift, he participated in the Farley random FFD 

testing program, and on June 10, 2015, the Farley medical review officer determined that 

Mr. Underwood tested positive for an illegal substance. 

Mr. Anthony Xenakis IA-15-066 

On December 4, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Mr. Anthony Xenakis, a former licensed 

reactor operator at the Surry Power Station, for an SL III violation of 10 CFR 55.53(j). 

Specifically, on February 3, 2015, Mr. Xenakis reported for duty at the Surry Power Station 

and was subject to a followup FFD test. Based on the results of the FFD test, the Dominion 

medical review officer determined that Mr. Xenakis tested positive for an illegal substance. 

On February 26, 2015, the Surry Power Station terminated Mr. Xenakis’s license. 

Mr. Mickey Lovell IA-15-028 

On December 28, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Mr. Mickey Lovell for SL III violations of 

10 CFR 72.12, “Deliberate Misconduct,” paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2). These violations 

involved the deliberate failures to ensure that liquid penetrant nondestructive tests, a special 

process, were conducted in accordance with the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 

procedure. Specifically, from September 5, 2013, through October 17, 2013, Mr. Lovell 

deliberately failed to comply with procedure steps involving the developing time before final 

interpretation of 28 welds on the 6 separate spent fuel storage dry shielded canisters he 

examined. Additionally, Mr. Lovell failed to accurately record the nondestructive evaluation 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

D4

results. The information was not accurate, because the developer dwell times were 

overreported. 

Mr. Larry Yeates IA-15-029 

On December 28, 2015, the NRC issued an NOV to Mr. Larry Yeates for SL III violations of 

10 CFR 72.12, paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2). These violations involved the deliberate failure 

to ensure that liquid penetrant nondestructive tests, a special process, were conducted in 

accordance with the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant procedure. Specifically, from 

September 5, 2013, through October 17, 2013, Mr. Yeates deliberately failed to comply with 

procedure steps involving the developing time before final interpretation of 38 welds on the 

6 separate spent fuel storage dry shielded canisters he examined. Additionally, Mr. Yeates 

failed to accurately record the nondestructive evaluation results. The information was not 

accurate, because the developer dwell times were overreported. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

E1 

Appendix E – Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions Against 

Nonlicensees 

(Vendors, Contractors, and Certificate Holders)*

Civil Penalties Issued to Nonlicensees 

Chicago Bridge & Iron EA-14-085 

Lake Charles, Louisiana 

On April 20, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $11,200 to the Chicago Bridge and 

Iron Company (CB&I). This action is based on a Severity Level II problem involving 

deliberate misconduct on the part of CB&I officials and employees related to a dropped 

module incident that occurred at the company's Lake Charles, LA, fabrication facility on 

March 1, 2013. Specifically, the actions stem from violations of Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 52.4, “Deliberate Misconduct,” by various CB&I officials and 

employees who attempted to cover up an incident involving the dropping of a submodule 

destined for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. Immediately following the incident, the 

former rigging manager deliberately instructed subordinate employees to omit key 

information from incident investigation statements, including: (a) that the submodule had, in 

fact, dropped approximately 3.5 feet, (b) improper rigging equipment (nylon slings) had been 

used and had broken, and (c) the submodule had sustained damage. The actions of the 

CB&I officials and employees also caused the company to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, 

“Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities”; Appendix B, “Quality Assurance 

Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants”; Criterion XVI, “Corrective 

Actions,” for failing to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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