1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48927

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CORY DEMETRIUS WRIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Opinion Filed: April 10, 2023

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Cynthia Yee-Wallace, District Judge; Hon. Nancy Baskin, District 

Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and sexual

abuse of a child under sixteen years, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth A. Allred, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Elizabeth A. Allred argued.

Hon. Raúl Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge

Corey Demetrius Wright appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a 

minor under sixteen and sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years. Wright argues the district 

court erred in denying his challenge to the State’s exercise of a peremptory challenge under Batson 

v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986); admitting Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence; denying 

his motion for a mistrial; and denying his I.R.E. 412 motion. Wright also asserts the State 

committed misconduct when it failed to fully redact the CARES interview of the victim. 

Additionally, Wright argues even if the alleged errors are harmless, their accumulated impact 

amount to cumulative error. The district court did not err and even if the court did err, any error

was harmless, and Wright is not entitled to relief based on cumulative error. The judgment of 

conviction is affirmed. 
2

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDUAL BACKGROUND

The State charged Wright with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, 

Idaho Code § 18-1508, two counts of aggravated assault, I.C. §§ 18-901(b), 18-905, two counts of 

sexual abuse of a child under sixteen, I.C. § 18-1506, and one count of attempted lewd conduct 

with a minor under sixteen, I.C. §§ 18-1508, 18-306. The charges arose from alleged conduct 

against A.W. and A.S., Wright’s daughter and his daughter’s half-sister. Prior to trial, the parties 

filed several motions to determine the admissibility of certain evidence. The State moved to

introduce evidence, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), that Wright had recently been

released from a seven-year prison term. The evidence included, in part, a text message 

conversation between Wright and Patti Stuart, A.S.’s mother and A.W.’s guardian, after Stuart

confronted Wright with allegations he abused A.S. A portion of the text message conversation 

included Wright’s response to Stuart’s statement that Wright had inappropriately touched A.S., 

which read, in part, “[i]t had been 7 years and I got carried away. I didn’t have sex with her it’s 

important you know that.” While the State alleged it should be able to use this statement as 

evidence under I.R.E. 404(b), Wright maintained the reference to “7 years” in the text message

implied that Wright had previously been incarcerated and, therefore, it should be excluded. 

After a hearing, the State conceded the evidence could not be introduced to show Wright 

had been in prison, but argued it was relevant to show motive or intent. The district court found 

Wright’s reference to “7 years” in the text message did not explicitly state or implicitly indicate

that Wright had been incarcerated during this time. Consequently, the district court held the State

could introduce the challenged text message during trial as well as evidence that Wright had been 

away from the family for seven years. However, the district court told the State it could not 

introduce evidence that Wright’s incarceration was the reason for the absence, or add any 

information to, or context for, the text message. The district court also ruled that the State could 

not tell the jury why Wright had been away from the family for seven years or that he was in a 

place where he was not around women.

Wright filed a motion to exclude A.S.’s and A.W.’s forensic interviews and other medical 

records from St. Luke’s Children at Risk Evaluation Services (CARES), including the video of the 

forensic interviews (CARES interviews). Wright argued the interviews were inadmissible under 

I.R.E. 803(4) and 803(24) and, alternatively, the admission of the interviews would violate his
3

rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

After a hearing, the district court issued a preliminary ruling regarding the admissibility of the 

CARES medical records, including the CARES interviews, reserving its final ruling on the matter 

until trial when it would know whether the victims were testifying and could consider any other 

additional relevant foundational evidence. The district court found portions of A.S.’s and A.W.’s 

CARES interviews would likely be admissible under I.R.E. 803(4) if they pertained to a medical 

purpose, but the portions of the interviews that did not serve a medical purpose would likely be 

inadmissible. Although the district court did not order the State to redact portions of the interviews, 

based on the previous hearing about the text messages, the State understood the need to redact any 

reference to Wright’s incarceration or his lack of access to females.

Wright also filed a motion pursuant to I.R.E. 412 to introduce evidence at trial that A.S. 

allegedly made prior false allegations of sex crimes. Wright submitted police reports from a 2015 

investigation (2015 allegations) in Arizona to support his claim that A.S. had previously falsely 

accused a family friend of inappropriate touching. Wright argued because the police reports did 

not indicate that any charges were filed against the family friend, Wright demonstrated that A.S.’s 

2015 allegations were false and, therefore, he should be permitted to impeach A.S. about the prior 

allegation at trial through cross-examination. After a hearing, the district court found that Wright 

had not established the 2015 allegations were false and denied Wright’s motion to introduce 

evidence related to the 2015 allegations. Wright filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial 

of his I.R.E. 412 motion, which the district court also denied. 

The matter proceeded to trial and thirty-four potential jurors reported to serve. Each party 

was given approximately thirty minutes1for voir dire and three peremptory challenges.

2

 Each 

party used all three of its peremptory challenges. The State used one of its peremptory challenges

to strike Juror 28. Wright challenged the strike of Juror 28, arguing the State’s peremptory

challenge to Juror 28 was race-based and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 

1 The district court stated that although the goal was to give each side thirty-minutes, it would 

extend the time if necessary.

2 The limitation on peremptory strikes was in accord with an Idaho Supreme Court 

Emergency Order regarding trial procedures during the COVID pandemic. Although Wright 

challenged the decision to limit each party to three peremptory strikes below, Wright does not raise 

the issue on appeal. 
4

Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to Batson. The district court found the State did not execute its 

peremptory challenge on the basis of race and denied Wright’s Batson challenge. 

During its case-in-chief, the State introduced the text messages between Stuart and Wright.

Wright reiterated his previous objection: allowing the jury to hear the phrase or read the text 

message about “7 years” implied that Wright had been incarcerated during that time. The district 

court overruled the objection, and the text messages were admitted. The State also introduced 

videos of A.S.’s and A.W.’s CARES interviews. After A.S.’s CARES interview was played for 

the jury, Wright moved for a mistrial. Wright argued the video was not properly redacted by the 

State as ordered by the district court because the video of the CARES interview included a 

statement by A.S. that Wright “was gone for seven years and he wasn’t able to have sex with a girl 

for seven years,” and the statement necessarily implied Wright had been incarcerated for seven 

years.

The district court agreed the statement at issue should have been redacted, but found the 

error did not justify a mistrial. The district court ordered the State to redact the statement from the 

video before the video went to the jury for deliberations. Further, the court informed the jury that 

a portion of the video exhibit had been redacted and reserved its decision on whether to give a 

limiting instruction regarding the video. After the State rested its case-in-chief, Wright again 

moved for a mistrial relying on his previous argument. The district court denied the motion. After 

both parties rested, the district court instructed the jury not to consider evidence that had been

excluded, stricken, or redacted and not to speculate about why Wright was previously away from 

his family for a period of time.

The jury found Wright guilty of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen for manual-togenital contact of A.S. and sex abuse of a child under sixteen years for grabbing A.S.’s breasts 

and/or buttocks. The jury was unable to reach a verdict for sexual abuse of a child for conduct 

relating to A.W. and found Wright not guilty of all other charges. Wright timely appeals. 

II.

ANALYSIS

Wright makes several claims on appeal, each of which is addressed below. 

A. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Wright’s Batson Challenge 

Wright argues the district court erred in denying his Batson challenge because the State 

violated his right to equal protection when it used a peremptory challenge to strike Juror 28 from 
5

the venire. Wright argues the district court’s finding that the State did not strike Juror 28 with 

discriminatory intent is clearly erroneous because the record shows “100% of Black potential 

jurors were excluded; no questions were asked of the only Black juror; other jurors who were not 

questioned by the State were selected to serve on the jury; and the prosecutor made 

misrepresentations while presenting the ‘race-neutral’ reason for striking” Juror 28. In response, 

the State argues Wright’s claim fails because he failed to make a prima facie case for 

discriminatory intent, the State offered a race-neutral reason for the peremptory strike, and the 

district court’s finding that the strike was not made with discriminatory intent is not clearly 

erroneous. 

A party violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by exercising 

a peremptory strike based on a prospective juror’s race. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 

127, 146 (1994); Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. When a party asserts such a violation occurred, the trial 

court uses a three-part burden-shifting framework to assess whether the challenged peremptory

strike was based on an impermissible discriminatory motive. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-98. First, 

the party asserting a violation must make a prima facie showing of two facts. The moving party 

“must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group.” Id. at 96. Cognizable racial groups 

“are those which have historically been subjected to discriminatory treatment and have from timeto-time required aid from the courts in securing equal treatment under the law.” State v. Foster, 

152 Idaho 88, 91, 266 P.3d 1193, 1196 (Ct. App. 2011). The moving party must then show that

the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of a

cognizable racial group. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). Second, if a prima facie case 

is established, the burden shifts to the opposing party to present a nondiscriminatory, race-neutral 

reason for striking the prospective juror. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The focus of this second 

step is on the facial validity of the opposing party’s explanation; it “does not demand an 

explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995); State 

v. Ish, 166 Idaho 492, 502, 461 P.3d 774, 784 (2020). Thus, unless a discriminatory intent is 

inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will be considered race-neutral. Purkett, 514 U.S. 

at 768; Ish, 166 Idaho at 502, 461 P.3d at 784. Third, if the opposing party articulates a facially 

valid reason for the peremptory strike, the trial court must determine whether purposeful 

discrimination has been established, i.e., whether the prospective juror was removed based on race. 

See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363 (1991) (plurality opinion); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. 
6

In this third step, the trial court considers the totality of the circumstances, including the weight of 

the proffered race-neutral explanation(s) in light of all the relevant facts, circumstances, and 

arguments presented, to determine whether the peremptory strike was substantially motivated by 

discriminatory intent. Flowers v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2243-44 (2019); 

Ish, 166 Idaho at 503, 461 P.3d at 785. Ultimately, “[i]n the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, 

the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory 

challenge should be believed.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. As such, the trial court’s 

determination of discriminatory intent largely turns on its evaluation of credibility. Id. at 364. 

A peremptory strike is not unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially 

disproportionate impact; proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is still required. Id. at 

359-62. Racially discriminatory intent or purpose “implies more than intent as volition or intent 

as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker . . . selected . . . a particular 

course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 

identifiable group.” Id. at 360. 

Throughout this three-step process, the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial 

motivation remains with the party asserting a violation. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. Although the 

determination of whether the constitutional requirements have been met is reviewed de novo, a 

trial court’s finding of discriminatory intent under the third prong of Batson is a pure issue of fact 

and, as such, will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364; 

Ish, 166 Idaho at 501, 461 P.3d at 783.

The State used a peremptory strike to remove Juror 28 from the venire. Wright challenged

the strike, arguing that Juror 28 was “the only [B]lack juror on the entire panel” and was struck 

with discriminatory intent. In response, the prosecutor disagreed that Juror 28 was Black and 

explained the reason for the use of the peremptory strike--that he had not asked Jurors 28-34 any 

questions because of the statistical unlikelihood they would become part of the jury. The district 

court found the State offered a race-neutral reason for the peremptory strike and its proffered 

reason was credible. Thus, the district court denied Wright’s Batson challenge. 

1. Prima facie case 

The first step of a Batson analysis requires Wright to make a prima facie showing that both 

he and the struck juror are each a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor 

exercised its peremptory challenge to remove the juror because of the juror’s race. Batson, 476 
7

U.S. at 96-97. For the purpose of applying the Batson analysis, a Black individual is a member of 

a cognizable racial group. Id.

In this case, the paucity of the record prevents this Court from determining whether Wright 

made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. While there is evidence in the record that 

Wright is Black, the record does not contain juror demographic information, juror questionnaire

responses, or other evidence about the race of the members in the venire, including Juror 28. The 

only information about Juror 28’s race is Wright’s trial counsel’s assertion to the district court 

during the Batson challenge that Juror 28 was “the only [B]lack juror on the entire panel” and that 

there was “no other reason for [the State’s] striking other than the fact that she is [B]lack, that she 

showed support for Black Lives Matter, and that she was offended by the ‘All lives matter’

question.” However, unsworn oral or written representations, even those of an officer of the court, 

are not evidence. See Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 716, 274 P.3d 11, 17 (Ct. App. 2012). 

Wright offered no evidence in the trial court or on appeal to support his claim that Juror 28 is 

Black, the prosecutor disputed that Juror 28 is Black, and the district court did not make a factual 

finding related to Juror 28’s race or to the broader issue of whether Wright made a prima facie 

showing for the first step of the Batson analysis. 

Other courts have noted the importance of a developed record for Batson discrimination 

claims. Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding without well-crafted record, 

Batson challenge depends on labored piecing together of transcript fragments to intuit race and 

ethnicity of jurors and reconstruct and imagine what might have happened); State v. Bennett, 843 

S.E.2d 222, 232 (N.C. 2020) (if there is any question as to prospective juror’s race, issue should 

be resolved by trial court based upon questioning of juror or other proper evidence); Asbury v. 

Georgia World Cong. Ctr., 442 S.E.2d 822, 824 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding record insufficient 

for appellate court to determine whether trial court erred because record did not show identity of 

individual panel members with any certainty). In this case, we decline to assume the most critical 

factual finding--the race of Juror 28--with no evidence from which to draw that conclusion. Wright 

failed to provide an adequate record to determine whether he met his burden of establishing a 

prima facie showing of racial discrimination under the first step of Batson. 

a. Implicit finding of prima facie case 

Wright argues the lack of explicit factual findings on the first step of Batson is not 

dispositive of his claim for two reasons. First, Wright argues the district court made an implicit 
8

finding that Juror 28 is Black by addressing the merits of the second and third prongs of Batson

when it denied his Batson challenge. Second, Wright argues that whether he met the first prong 

of the Batson challenge is moot because when the prosecutor defended its peremptory strike, the 

district court moved to the second and third steps of the Batson analysis, thereby answering the 

ultimate question. We will address each assertion. 

Wright argues the district court implicitly found he established a prima facie case of racial 

discrimination. The State argues that Wright failed to establish a prima facie showing of racial 

discrimination because Wright failed to establish that Juror 28 is Black, failed to establish any 

discriminatory motive for the peremptory strike, failed to provide any authority that the district 

court implicitly found Juror 28 is Black, and failed to show the strike was exercised with 

discriminatory motive simply because the district court addressed the second and third parts of the 

Batson analysis. The State further argues that precedent precludes this Court from supplying the 

necessary factual predicates for the first step of Wright’s Batson challenge. 

The State’s proffered race-neutral reason under the second step and the district court’s 

finding under the second and third steps did not require the court to make the predicate factual 

findings for the first step of Batson. Instead, the second and third steps only required the district 

court to address whether the State offered a facially race-neutral reason for the strike and whether 

the district court found this reason credible. Accordingly, the district court’s finding that the State 

was sincere in its race-neutral reason for striking Juror 28 does not necessarily require a factual 

determination that Juror 28 is Black. Thus, the district court did not implicitly find Juror 28 is 

Black or that the totality of the circumstances raises an inference that the peremptory challenge

was exercised because of a discriminatory motive. Wright has failed to make a prima facie 

showing of racial discrimination under the first step of Batson. 

Even if we assume the district court implicitly found Juror 28 is Black, implicit factual 

findings are clearly erroneous unless they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 

State v. Floyd, 159 Idaho 370, 372, 360 P.3d 379, 381 (Ct. App. 2015) (“Implicit findings should 

be overturned only if not supported by substantial evidence.”). Here, there is no evidence in the 

record of any potential juror’s race, including Juror 28’s. Wright argues that Juror 28’s “strong 

feelings” indicated in her answer to the “Black Lives Matter” questions also provide evidence of 

her race, and concomitantly, evidence of the State’s discriminatory intent in striking her. Juror 

28’s response to the Black Lives Matter questions does not make it more likely than not that Juror 
9

28 belonged to a cognizable racial group and was peremptorily stricken from the venire for a 

racially discriminatory reason. 

In light of the above, we reject the argument that the district court implicitly found the 

predicate facts to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination or that such facts are 

supported by substantial and competent evidence. 

b. Mootness of prima facie case 

Wright argues that, under Hernandez, the determination of whether he met his burden of 

showing a prima facie case for racial discrimination is moot because the State offered a raceneutral reason for the strike and the district court ultimately addressed whether discriminatory 

intent was established in steps two and three of the Batson analysis. 

The portion of Hernandez on which Wright relies explains that once the party contesting 

the Batson challenge has offered a race-neutral reason for the strike, whether the moving party 

properly made out a prima facie case is no longer relevant because, at this point, the trial court has 

all the evidence necessary to determine whether the juror strike was the result of intentional 

discrimination under the third prong. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. Pursuant to Hernandez, once 

a trial court rules on the third prong of the Batson analysis, it has applied the more stringent burden 

of proof and ruled on the ultimate factual issue; therefore, whether the moving party met the 

preliminary, lower prima facie burden of proof is irrelevant. Id.; see also United States Postal

Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (holding prima facie requirement

was “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic”; “it is merely a sensible, orderly way

to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of

discrimination”).

In Hernandez, the defense raised a Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of 

four Latino jurors. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355-356. The prosecutor stated he was not certain as

to the racial identity of two of the jurors and did not strike them because of their race but because

he felt the two would not accept the interpreter’s interpretation. Id. at 356. On appeal, the New 

York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, noted that though the ethnicity of one challenged

bilingual juror remained uncertain, the prosecutor had challenged the only three prospective jurors

with definite Hispanic surnames. Id. at 358. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed the 

judgment, holding that the prosecutor had offered a legitimate basis for challenging the individuals

in question and deferring to the factual findings of the lower New York courts. Id. Thus, while 
10

Hernandez noted that a trial court could rule on the third step because it had all the information 

necessary to resolve the case, that conclusion rested, in part, on the factual findings of the lower 

court, which included some evidence of the race of the struck jurors. 

We agree that Hernandez holds that once a court rules on the third step of the Batson

analysis, the question of whether the moving party has established his initial, prima facie case is 

irrelevant for purposes of shifting the burden of proof to the State. However, we decline to hold

that a court’s willingness to shift the burden of proof means that all the necessary factual predicates 

for the claim have been established. Whether Wright met a prima facie case of intentional racial 

discrimination does not preclude this Court from proceeding through the Batson analysis but does 

not mean Wright established a prima facie case that Juror 28 is Black, or that the State used its 

peremptory strike with discriminatory intent. As such, Wright’s Batson challenge fails because 

Wright failed to make a prima facie showing that Juror 28 is a member of a cognizable racial group 

and was struck with discriminatory intent. 

Nonetheless, because the State offered an explanation for the peremptory challenge and the 

district court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, this Court will address 

the merits of Wright’s Batson claim. Accordingly, we turn to the second step of Batson; whether 

the State offered a race-neutral reason to support the peremptory strike. 

2. State’s race-neutral reason 

Once the opponent of the Batson challenge offers a reason for the use of the peremptory 

strike, the trial “court must determine whether, assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory 

challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 

359. At this step, the trial court looks only to the facial validity of the explanation. “Unless a 

discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed 

race neutral.” Id. at 360. The disparate impact of the strike on the racial composition of the jury 

is not conclusive when determining whether the proffered reason for the strike is race-neutral. Id. 

at 362.

Wright argues the State did not assert a race-neutral reason for the peremptory strike. In 

support of this conclusion, Wright cites to Ish and argues the State failed to offer a race-neutral 

explanation that was “clear and reasonably specific” and “related to the case to be tried” or provide 

“legitimate reasons” for the use of the strike. Wright alleges “the State made bald allegations that 

they did not strike the juror with discriminatory intent and provided a pretextual reason for striking 
11

the juror.” Wright’s argument on this issue mischaracterizes both the record and the legal authority 

cited. 

First, Wright’s allegation that the State’s proffered explanation for the peremptory strike 

was a bald assertion of non-discriminatory motive fails to consider the full context of the 

prosecutor’s response to Wright’s allegation of a Batson violation. The State’s full explanation

was as follows: 

Your Honor, No. 1, she did not appear to the State as [B]lack.3 I don’t know where 

defense is even coming with that. As far as why I struck her, your Honor, is because 

I didn’t talk to her row. I didn’t know anything about her. The number game got 

a little bit away from me, and so I was able to talk to everybody else, and so 

that’s--the reason why I struck her is because I didn’t know anything about her. 

And your Honor, further, what makes this incredibly offensive to me is one of the 

victim[s is B]lack.

So I want--I want an absolutely nonracist jury because I want her to be 

listened to and treated--and not just her, but many of the witnesses in this case are 

[B]lack, State witnesses. And so we absolutely did not do that, and I--I don’t think 

she looked that [B]lack. She certainly didn’t to me, and so I don’t--I don’t think a 

Batson challenge is appropriate anyway.

The State’s explanation to the district court outlined that it used the peremptory strike in question 

because it: (1) did not perceive Juror 28 to be Black; (2) did not know enough about Juror 28

because, as it explained during voir dire, it did not question Jurors 28-34; (3) believed those jurors 

were statistically unlikely to be selected for the final jury; and (4) wanted a nonracist jury so the 

testimony of the victim and some witnesses, who are Black, would not be discounted because of 

their race. 

This explanation is not a bald assertion under Ish. The Ish Court held:

Batson’s second step “does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even

plausible.” The focus is on “the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation,” so

“[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the

reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” For instance, a juror’s demeanor can 

supply a valid race-neutral reason. Likewise, a prosecutor’s challenge based on a 

juror’s “long, unkempt hair . . . mustache, and . . . beard” has been found to satisfy

Batson’s second step. What a prosecutor may not do is provide overly general

reasons such as “demeanor” or baldly assert that they did not exercise the

challenges with discriminatory motive.

3 The State’s comments about Juror 28’s appearance may have been a result of the fact that 

the jurors were all wearing masks and were seated approximately six feet apart to comply with the 

Idaho Supreme Court’s Emergency Order regarding conducting trials during the COVID 

pandemic.
12

Ish, 166 Idaho at 502, 461 P.3d at 784 (citations omitted). Thus, even if focusing on the last 

sentence of the above quote, the bald assertion referenced would simply be a broad statement by 

the prosecutor that he did not exercise his peremptory challenge with a discriminatory motive. 

Here, the prosecutor provided neither an overly general statement nor a bald assertion 

regarding his motive. Instead, the State’s explanation was specific and related to the case to be 

tried. The State’s reason was also race-neutral, as nothing in the explanation shows that the 

prosecutor chose not to ask questions of the back two rows of potential jurors during voir dire 

because he wanted to prevent a Black individual from serving on the jury. Accordingly, the State 

offered a race-neutral reason for the peremptory strike as required under the second step of Batson.

4

 

Thus, the district court’s finding that the State offered a nondiscriminatory, race-neutral reason for 

peremptory striking Juror 28 was not clearly erroneous.

3. Discriminatory intent 

We turn to the third step in the Batson analysis; whether there was purposeful 

discrimination in the State’s use of a peremptory strike against Juror 28. The United States

Supreme Court has made clear that the trial court’s decision on the third step, whether there was 

discriminatory intent in the strike, represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference 

on appeal: 

In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether

counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.

There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence

often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with

the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on

demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.

The district court found the State’s explanation was credible and supported by its actions 

during voir dire, finding: 

I specifically took note that the State did not get to the back two rows [of the venire], 

which is why I inquired of [the State] to see if he wanted to follow up on that, and 

I think he just made a calculation that we wouldn’t get to those back two rows, so 

I take his response as both valid and honest and not pretextual. So I will deny the 

motion based on United States v. Batson. I had observed that that occurred in court, 

that the State did not--purposely did not question the rows that Juror No. 28 was in 

4 Wright’s additional arguments concerning the legitimacy of the State’s proffered 

justification for the strike are only relevant to the third step of the analysis--whether the district 

court believed the State’s race-neutral reason for the strike. 
13

because I just think the State did not anticipate they were not gonna get to them, 

and I certainly followed up with that. So I think that reason is both valid and not 

pretextual. So I will go ahead and deny the motion based on Batson.

The State’s strategic decision to focus on potential jury members that were more 

statistically likely to serve on the jury was evident during the voir dire process. Thirty-four 

individuals attended jury selection for the selection of fourteen jurors (twelve jurors and two 

alternates). The potential jurors were assigned a number that represented the potential juror’s seat 

in the final jury panel. For example, Juror 1 was seated in the first seat of the jury panel; unless 

struck, Juror 1 would be Juror 1 for the trial. As such, only Jurors 1-14 were originally slated to 

serve on the jury. 

Wright and the State were each given thirty minutes to question the venire and three 

peremptory strikes. The district court did not limit its respective voir dire to any particular section 

of the venire. However, after the district court’s voir dire, some of the jurors had been excused for 

cause. The prosecutor made a strategic decision to focus his limited voir dire time on the remaining 

jurors most statistically likely to be selected for the final jury, i.e., Jurors 1-27, and ignore the last 

two rows of potential jurors, Jurors 28-34. The State demonstrated this strategy throughout its voir 

dire. For example, after the State asked if any potential jury panel member had “a friend, a family 

member, or know someone who has been a victim of sexual abuse,” the State followed up with 

each potential juror in numerical order, stopping before the last two rows. At that point, the State

said: “All right. So I’m gonna not ask the last two rows. Spoiler: Mathematically, it’s highly 

unlikely you’ll make this jury, but it is possible, but I’m gonna pass you for now.” The State did 

not deviate from this strategy throughout the rest of jury selection; it never engaged in any 

individualized questioning beyond Juror 27. 

The State’s calculation that no one from the last two rows of potential jurors would likely 

serve on the jury held true throughout much of voir dire. After the district court’s voir dire, two 

potential jurors, Jurors 6 and Juror 29, were excused for cause; Juror 28 did not replace either of 

them. The State successfully challenged Juror 13 for cause; Juror 28 did not replace that juror. 

The district court then inquired of hardships and, as a result, excused Juror 12 and Juror 15; Juror 

28 did not replace either of those jurors. The State then successfully challenged Juror 22 for cause;

Juror 28 did not replace that juror. During Wright’s voir dire, Wright successfully struck Juror 7 

for cause; Juror 28 did not replace that juror. Wright’s last challenge for cause, which successfully 

removed Juror 3, caused Juror 28 to be the last potential juror to be seated in the 20-person pool 
14

from which peremptory strikes would be used. Thus, it was not until Wright’s last challenge for 

cause that Juror 28 became potential Juror 14. Given the above record, we conclude that the district 

court’s finding of no discriminatory intent in the State’s use of a peremptory strike against Juror 

28 was not clearly erroneous. 

Despite the district court’s conclusion, Wright argues the district court erred in finding the 

State did not have discriminatory intent in striking Juror 28 because the State’s proffered reason 

for striking Juror 28 was pretextual in light of its lack of questioning of Juror 28 before striking 

her and because the “statistical evidence, evidence of disparate questioning, side-by-side 

comparisons, and the prosecutor’s misrepresentation of the record” demonstrate discriminatory 

intent. We disagree. 

a. State’s lack of questioning of Juror 28 does not show the proffered 

reasons for the strike were pretextual 

Wright argues the State’s proffered reason was merely pretextual because “[w]hile there is 

no requirement that a party must question a venire member during voir dire, jurisprudence holds 

that a lack of questioning before exercising a peremptory challenge is evidence that the explanation 

is sham and a pretext for discrimination.” Wright cites to Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 246 

(2005) (Dretke) and Alex v. Rayne Concrete Serv., 951 So. 2d 138, 154 (La. 2005) as support for 

this argument, but Wright mischaracterizes the holdings in these cases and, therefore, his argument 

is unpersuasive. 

Wright cites to Dretke as holding that a party’s failure “to ask questions about information 

that would be considered important is evidence of pretext because it shows that the answers would 

not have mattered as the party was going to strike the juror regardless.” However, this is not the 

holding of Dretke. In Dretke, a capital case, there were twenty Black members of the 108-person 

venire; of those twenty, nine were excused for cause or by agreement and ten were peremptorily 

stricken by the State. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 240-41. One of the potential Black jurors stricken by 

the State was Fields, who “expressed unwavering support for the death penalty” in both the juror 

questionnaire and in response to direct questioning during voir dire; “testified that he had no 

religious or philosophical reservations about the death penalty and that the death penalty deterred 

crime”; and twice indicated that he could sit on the jury and decide to impose the death penalty. 

Id. at 242. Although Fields made some comments about rehabilitation, he also said his belief 

would not inhibit his decision to impose the death penalty. Id. Fields stated he had a brother who 
15

had been convicted of a crime, but that would not interfere with his ability to sit on the jury. Id. at 

243.

After the State used a peremptory strike on Fields, the defendant challenged the peremptory 

strike as a race-based strike.

5

 Id. at 236. The State explained it struck Fields because of concern

about whether Fields could impose the death penalty because Fields said “he could only give death 

if he thought a person could not be rehabilitated.” Id. The State also expressed concerns that 

Fields’ religious beliefs might affect his jury service. Id. When defense counsel pointed out that 

the State had mischaracterized Fields’ statements, the State “neither defended what he said nor 

withdrew the strike.” Id. at 246. Instead, it proffered a new explanation--that Fields’ brother had 

a prior conviction. Id. 

The Supreme Court noted the State mischaracterized Fields’ testimony and that “in light 

of Fields’ outspoken support for the death penalty, we expect the prosecutor would have cleared 

up any misunderstanding by asking further questions before getting to the point of exercising a 

strike.” Id. at 244. The Court noted the State’s latter explanation “reek[ed] of afterthought” and 

that given Field’s comments regarding his brother (the two were not close and Fields did not know 

much about the conviction), the Court expected the State to engage in additional inquiry if, as it

proffered, it was concerned about the conviction. Id. at 246. The Court specifically noted: “[T]he 

State’s failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it 

is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for 

discrimination.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Dretke does not hold, as Wright asserts, that “failing 

to ask questions about information that would be considered important is evidence of pretext” but 

rather, failing to ask questions on the topic that served as the basis for the State’s explanation of 

the strike raises a suggestion that the proffered explanation is pretextual.

Wright’s citation to Alex is similarly unpersuasive. Wright argues Alex supports the similar

proposition that a prosecutor’s failure to “‘engage in any voir dire examination’ of the challenged 

prospective juror” is evidence that the juror’s subsequent exclusion was pretext for discrimination. 

However, Wright’s reliance on Alex omits important facts. In Alex, there were four Black potential 

jurors in the jury pool. Alex, 951 So. 2d at 147. Plaintiff’s counsel asked Charlot, one of the Black 

jurors: “Can you think of any reason that you don’t want to serve?” Charlot answered, “None 

5 Miller-El’s trial occurred prior to the issuance of the Batson opinion but the objection was 

treated on appeal as a Batson challenge.
16

whatsoever.” Id. The trial court excused one of the Black jurors for cause, and defense counsel

then used peremptory challenges to strike the other three, one of whom was Charlot. Id. After 

counsel for Alex raised a Batson challenge, defense counsel explained he struck the juror in 

question because he did not get “good vibes” from her, thought she did not like him, and that it 

was “just kind of a gut feeling.” Id. at 148. 

The Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that while “gut feelings” may factor into the 

decision to utilize a peremptory challenge, this reason alone does not constitute a race-neutral 

explanation. Id. at 153. Thus, the court held that “the failure of [the defendant] to engage in any 

voir dire examination of Charlot, when coupled with its purely intuitive basis for her exclusion, is 

further evidence its explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 154 (emphasis 

added). Accordingly, Alex does not stand for the proposition that a party’s failure to ask questions 

of a potential juror alone constitutes per se discriminatory intent. Here, the State did not rely on 

intuition for its decision to strike Juror 28, nor did it fail to question Juror 28 so that it could strike 

her. As such, we do not find Alex persuasive as applied to this case. 

In this case, we are not persuaded that the State’s failure to ask Juror 28 any questions 

during voir dire is evidence of discriminatory intent when its stated and executed voir dire strategy 

was to focus questioning on only those rows of potential jurors most statistically likely to serve on

the jury--a strategy observed and acknowledged by the district court. 

b. Statistical evidence in the record does not demonstrate discriminatory 

intent 

Wright argues statistical evidence in the record demonstrates discriminatory intent so as to 

make the district court’s finding under the third step of Batson clearly erroneous. In support, 

Wright argues that the United States Supreme Court found statistical evidence persuasive for 

establishing discriminatory intent in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003) (Cockrell). 

However, in context, Cockrell is inapplicable to the facts of this case. 

Wright relies on Cockrell for the proposition that the statistical evidence in this case 

provides evidence of discriminatory intent because the Court in Cockrell found that “in total, 10 

of the State’s 14 peremptory strikes were used against African-Americans. Happenstance is 

unlikely to produce this disparity.” Id. at 342. While true insofar as it goes, this limited quotation 

does not provide the context of the Cockrell opinion. In Cockrell, the Court noted that although it 

was relevant that 91% of the potential Black jurors were struck during the voir dire process, those 

numbers were not the sole basis for the defendant’s Batson claim. Id. at 331-32. In addition to the 
17

statistical evidence, the defendant presented the testimony of judges, current and former assistant 

district attorneys, and others who had observed firsthand the conduct of the district attorney’s 

office over the years. Id. at 334. The defendant also presented evidence of disparate questioning 

in the voir dire of his trial of potential jurors based on race; a unique state practice called “jury 

shuffling,” which had been used at least twice by the state to remove potential Black jurors from 

the front of the defendant’s jury panel; and extensive pattern and practice evidence of the district 

attorney’s office to systematically exclude Blacks from serving on juries, including the adoption 

of a formal policy to exclude minorities from jury service. Id. at 333-35. Thus, it was in light of 

all of the evidence, not just the statistical evidence, that the Supreme Court found the defendant

had established discriminatory intent. Id. at 341. 

To the extent Cockrell relies on a pattern of striking ten out of fourteen potential Black 

jurors, no such pattern exists in this case. In fact, Wright does not allege any pattern of 

discriminatory strikes because the pattern does not exist; there is only a single peremptory 

challenge at issue in this case. While Wright makes much of the fact that “the State used one of 

its three peremptory challenges to strike 100% of the Black prospective jurors,” there is no factual 

support for his claim because, as noted above, there is no evidence that Juror 28 is Black. But 

even if Wright could get past that dispositive fact, generally speaking, striking the only person of 

color does not necessarily equate to discriminatory intent because “[t]he Supreme Court has never 

held that 100% exclusion rate is conclusive proof of discriminatory intent and has always used 

qualified language regarding statistical analysis.” Ish, 166 Idaho at 504, 461 P.3d at 786. As noted 

by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence in Hernandez:

An unwavering line of cases from this Court holds that a violation of the 

Equal Protection Clause requires state action motivated by discriminatory intent; 

the disproportionate effects of state action are not sufficient to establish such a 

violation. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976), we explained that 

“our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without 

regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional

solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 372-73 (Justice O’Connor, with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in 

judgment). Accordingly, we do not find the striking of one juror, who is allegedly Black, provides 

the statistical evidence to establish the State’s proffered reason for the peremptory strike was 

pretextual. 
18

c. Disparate questioning does not show discriminatory intent 

Wright argues there was disparate questioning because the State “asked questions of most, 

but not all other potential jurors.” First, this limited argument is insufficient for us to conclude 

that the district court’s credibility determination was clearly erroneous. Second, although Wright 

asserts the State engaged in disparate questioning because the prosecutor did not ask Juror 28 any 

questions, the prosecutor did not ask any questions of any potential jurors in the back two rows 

because he did not believe any of them had a statistical likelihood of serving on the jury. Thus, 

the State treated all potential jurors similarly situated to Juror 28 the same. Accordingly, Wright 

has not established disparate questioning shows the prosecutor’s proffered reason for the strike 

was pretextual. 

d. Side-by-side comparisons do not show discriminatory intent 

Wright argues side-by-side comparisons, i.e., striking a juror of a protected class for certain 

responses given in voir dire, but not striking jurors outside the protected class for the same reason,

is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination. Specifically, Wright argues if the State’s 

strategy was to strike all potential jurors it did not question, then it should have struck Jurors 21 

and 30, both of whom were selected to sit on the final jury panel but were not questioned by the 

State. We are unpersuaded. 

First, underlying Wright’s side-by-side comparison analysis is the unestablished factual 

predicate that all other members of the venire, including Jurors 21 and 30, are of a different race 

than Juror 28. The district court did not make this factual finding, and there is no evidence in the 

record to support this factual assertion. As previously articulated, appellate courts have repeatedly 

discussed the importance of a developed appellate record for Batson claims, and we have 

previously held “when a court engages in the comparative juror analysis, it should do so with an 

inclusive record.” State v. Ornelas, 159 Idaho 394, 396, 360 P.3d 1075, 1077 (Ct. App. 2015). 

We do not have a record that provides any evidence about the race of any member of the venire,

and we decline to make assumptions about the race, gender, or ethnicity of a prospective juror 

based on reference to a name, a description of physical appearance, or an unsupported, challenged 

assertion about a person’s physical characteristics, race, gender, or ethnicity. Without an appellate 

record providing some evidence that Juror 28 is Black and other jury members similarly situated 

are not Black, we cannot engage in any comparative analysis of the jury to determine the validity 
19

of Wright’s assertions that the side-by-side comparison of Juror 28 to Juror 21 demonstrates the 

prosecutor’s proffered reason for the strike was pretextual. 

Second, Wright’s argument as it relates to Juror 30 mischaracterizes the circumstances of 

Juror 30’s selection to sit on the final jury panel. At the time of voir dire, the record demonstrates 

that Jurors 28 and 30 were treated exactly the same by the State: the prosecutor did not follow up 

with individualized questioning of either of them. However, after jury selection and Wright’s 

Batson challenge, the court excused one of the two alternate jurors selected. The district court told 

the parties that because the number of people contracting COVID was decreasing, it thought the 

trial could be completed with just one alternate juror; the State agreed with the district court. 

However, because Wright wanted two alternates, the district court agreed to select another juror 

from those who remained in the venire. The district court told the parties the alternate would be 

selected from Jurors 30-35, and because the parties had already had the opportunity to complete 

voir dire on these jurors, it would not reopen voir dire prior to the alternate being chosen. The 

district court stated it would limit any additional voir dire to “any reason for cause that has come 

up between now and the last time, that may cause someone else to go off the list.” Each party was 

given one peremptory challenge, and unless one of those challenges was directed at Juror 30, Juror 

30 would be the final juror chosen for the fourteen-person jury. In that limited context, both the 

State and Wright declined to voir dire the six prospective jurors, and Juror 30 was chosen to sit on 

the jury. 

Thus, during voir dire, Juror 30 was treated identically to Juror 28, and it was only after

the initial jury had been selected and after Wright’s Batson challenge that Juror 30 was selected to 

replace a juror who had been excused. The change in circumstances that led to Juror 30 being 

selected as the fourteenth juror, despite no additional questioning by the State, does not establish 

discriminatory intent to strike Juror 28. 

e. Prosecutor’s alleged misrepresentations do not show discriminatory 

intent and does not make the district court’s finding that there was not 

discriminatory intent clearly erroneous 

Finally, Wright argues the State’s explanation that it struck Juror 28 because it “didn’t 

know anything about her” when it knew about her feelings about the Black Lives Matter movement 

and “was able to talk to everybody else,” when it did not talk to Juror 21, were misrepresentations 

sufficient to support an inference that its proffered reason for the strike was pretextual. In support 

of his argument, Wright relies on Ish, 166 Idaho at 508, 461 P.3d 790 for the assertion that a 
20

“prosecutor’s misrepresentation of the record supports an inference that the proffered reason to 

strike a juror was pretext.” 

First, Ish is inapposite because, while the citation Wright provides is correct insofar as it 

goes, it does not reflect the context from which it is taken. In Ish, the defendant’s case received a 

significant amount of local media attention. Id. at 498, 461 P.3d at 780. As a result, although the 

trial took place in Pocatello, Idaho, the district court ordered the jury pool be selected from Twin 

Falls, Idaho; the jury would be sequestered in Pocatello and juror names would not be used or 

released. Id. 

During voir dire, Juror 3, a person of color, was examined privately as she had indicated 

some knowledge of the case due to media coverage. Id. Based on her responses, Ish challenged 

Juror 3 for cause. Id. The State opposed the challenge, arguing Juror 3 said she was committed 

to setting aside what she heard in the media and would decide the case based only on the facts. Id. 

at 507, 461 P.3d at 789. The district court denied Ish’s motion to strike Juror 3 for cause. Id. 

Thereafter, the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to strike Juror 3, and Ish raised a Batson

challenge. The prosecutor’s explanation--that he struck Juror 3 because of her exposure to the 

media--was precisely the opposite stance taken by the prosecutor in response to defense counsel’s 

challenge to Juror 3 for cause. Id. Moreover, the prosecutor agreed with the district court’s 

erroneous characterization that it was the State, not Ish, that previously attempted to strike Juror 3 

for cause. Id. The district court denied the defendant’s Batson challenge. Id. 

On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held the district court’s finding that the strike of 

Juror 3 was not racially motivated and was clearly erroneous because the decision rested, in part, 

on the district court’s misunderstanding that it was the State, not the defendant, who challenged 

Juror 3 for cause. Id. at 508, 461 P.3d at 790. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court also concluded: 

Here, it is unclear whether the prosecutor misrepresented the record. For instance,

the district court’s question about the for-cause challenge could have been visually

directed at defense counsel and the prosecutor merely affirmed before defense

counsel could. Indeed, defense counsel, at no point below, corrected the district

court’s misapprehension concerning the for-cause challenge despite the opportunity

to do so at the Batson hearing and after the district court entered its written decision. 

Likewise, the State’s written Batson brief merely indicates that Juror 3 was 

challenged for cause without indicating the source of the challenge. Accordingly,

we are unable to infer that the prosecutor misrepresented the record in this case, but 

we take the ambiguous nature of the record into consideration.
21

Id. Thus, Ish does not stand for the proposition which Wright asserts nor is it particularly 

persuasive as applied to the facts of this case. 

Second, we decline to characterize the prosecutor’s statements in this case as similar to the 

type of misrepresentation in Ish that would lead to a conclusion that the proffered reason for the 

strike was a pretext for racial discrimination. To say the prosecutor misrepresented the record by 

stating he “didn’t know anything about” Juror 28 when he knew Juror 28’s responses to defense 

counsel’s questions about Black Lives Matter, and “was able to talk to everyone else,” when he 

did not ask follow-up questions to Juror 21, does not fairly reflect the record. The context of the 

prosecutor’s explanation indicates that because of his strategic decision to focus on Jurors 1-27 

during voir dire, he did not know enough about Juror 28 and felt more comfortable with the jurors 

he focused attention on during his questioning. While the prosecutor could have been more precise 

in his language regarding what he “knew” about Juror 28, imprecise language does not equate to 

a misrepresentation. This Court concludes that the prosecutor’s imprecision does not render his 

statements pretextual, especially when viewed in the context of the record and the State’s 

demonstrated and articulated voir dire strategy. Accordingly, Wright has not established that the 

alleged prosecutorial misrepresentations show the State’s proffered reason for the strike was 

pretextual.

Ultimately, we are left with two views of the limited record before us. Either the State was 

genuine in its explanation that it pursued a strategy to focus its limited examination time on the 

jurors it believed were most likely to serve on the fourteen-member jury to the exclusion of the 

back two rows of jurors which included Juror 28; or, this explanation was pretextual and the State

was motivated to remove Juror 28 because of her alleged race. A district court can measure 

credibility by, among other factors, “the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how 

improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in 

accepted trial strategy.” Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 339. When considering the third step of Batson

challenges, “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice 

between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 369. 

The district court took a permissible view of the evidence in crediting the State’s 

explanation, explicitly finding the prosecutor’s explanation for his peremptory strike of Juror 28 

was credible and not pretextual. The prosecutor offered a verifiable and legitimate explanation for 

the peremptory challenge of Juror 28; defended the use of peremptory challenges without being 
22

asked to do so by the district court; stated he did not know that Juror 28 is Black; and asserted that 

the race of multiple witnesses for the State, including one of the victims, undermined any motive 

to exclude Black potential jurors from the final jury. Any of these factors could be taken as 

evidence of the prosecutor’s sincerity and, thus, provide substantial and competent evidence 

supporting a conclusion that the State did not exercise its peremptory challenge with 

discriminatory intent. See Flowers, ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2243-44 (in third step of Batson, 

trial court considers totality of circumstances, including weight of proffered race-neutral 

explanation in light of all relevant facts, circumstances, and arguments presented, to determine 

whether peremptory strike was substantially motivated by discriminatory intent). 

In sum, the district court determined that the State’s use of a peremptory strike to remove 

Juror 28 was not racially motivated and none of Wright’s arguments or cited authority render the 

court’s credibility determination clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the district court did not err in 

denying Wright’s Batson challenge after finding there was no discriminatory intent in the State’s 

use of a peremptory strike against Juror 28. 

B. The District Court Did Not Err in Admitting the Text Message at Issue During Trial,

But Even If It Did, Any Error Was Harmless 

During trial, the State admitted Wright’s text message to Stuart that stated, in part, that “it 

had been 7 years and I got carried away.” Wright alleges the district court erred in admitting that 

part of the text message because the language impermissibly implied that he had been incarcerated; 

therefore, the text message should have been excluded from evidence because it was not relevant 

and was unduly prejudicial as the jury may have convicted him on this ground. We disagree that 

the district court erred by allowing the text message to be admitted and, even if it did, any error 

was harmless. 

Although Wright only challenges the “[i]t had been 7 years” phrase in one of the text 

messages between Stuart and himself, a more contextual overview of the text messages and the 

procedural history of their admission is helpful. In a pretrial hearing, the State agreed to redact 

certain portions of the text message exchange at issue.

6

 After the redaction, the text messages the 

State sought to admit read as follows: 

6 At the hearing, the State acknowledged it would need to redact references to probation 

officers or prison. The district court agreed that these explicit references should be redacted and 

concluded it did not need to issue a ruling based on the State’s concessions. The State sought to 
23

Stuart-0902 hours: [A.S.] just told me what’s been going on. You need to be 

out of my house today. Find someplace anyplace to stay. I 

can’t believe I trusted you and this is what you do. 

Stuart-0902 hours: I have nothing to say to you. You need to get your stuff and

find someplace else to stay. Period. [A.S.’s sister] knows 

also so she doesn’t want you anywhere near her. 

Wright-0912 hours: I am genuinely 100% sorry and I totally understand how you 

feel. I can promise you it will never agin [sic]. 

Stuart-0912 hours: You need to explain to cj why you need to leave. I honestly 

want you gone before we get home. Right now. I can’t 

believe you’d do this. 

Stuart-0913 hours: You should have thought about that before you touched my 

daughter.

Wright-0918 hours: You[’re] right patti there’s nothing I can say that explain 

away my actions. It had been 7 years and I got carried away. 

I didn’t have sex with her it’s important you know that. I 

feel like a fool. Truth is this is the last thing I wanted to 

happen and I’m so sorry.

Stuart-0921 hours: You[r] apology means nothing at this point. Show me you 

are not that man and leave without me having to call and 

report this.

Wright-0923 hours: I’m going to leave patti just give me like an hr to figure 

something out.

Stuart-0925 hours: That’s fine you have till 1 pm before we get home.

Stuart-1148 hours: Have you left the house?

Stuart-1150 hours: I cannot not report this. 

The district court issued several rulings about the admissibility of the text messages. In relevant 

part, the court found the portion of the text message exchange which included the phrase “it had 

been 7 years,” did not need to be redacted because the challenged phrase:

could be relevant to a materially disputed issue concerning the crime charged other 

than propensity, because it doesn’t reference prison and merely says it had been 

seven years and I got carried away. 

I think it could be viewed as a relevant statement, potentially viewed as 

some sort of admission regarding his actions by the jury. So I think it is offered for 

a purpose other than propensity. 

However, the district court also made clear that it would not allow the State to introduce evidence 

that Wright was in prison for seven years or that he was not around females unless Wright opened 

the door to the evidence. 

admit the remainder of the text message conversation as evidence of Wright’s motive under Idaho 

Rule of Evidence 404(b). 
24

Prior to the admission of the text message at issue, the jury heard from multiple witnesses 

that Wright had been absent from the family’s lives for the previous seven years. A.S. testified 

that Wright had been absent from the family’s life for the past seven years; A.W. testified that 

Wright had been absent from her life for the previous seven years; and Stuart testified that Wright 

had been out of their lives for the past seven years or so. This testimony was admitted without 

objection from Wright. 

During Stuart’s testimony, the State sought to admit the text message conversation between 

Stuart and Wright, including the message that stated “[i]t had been 7 years.” Defense counsel 

objected and noted that while he had not previously objected to the testimony that Wright had been 

absent from the family for seven years, he nonetheless asked the district court to consider that 

testimony in the context of a renewed objection to the admission of the text message. The district 

court overruled Wright’s objection, and the text message conversation as detailed above was

admitted. 

1. The district court did not err in admitting the challenged text message 

Wright argues the district court erred in admitting the challenged text message. 

Specifically, Wright alleges the district court erred in conducting its I.R.E. 403 balancing analysis 

because: (1) the evidence that “it had been 7 years” was irrelevant; and (2) the inference in the 

text message was that Wright had been in prison for the previous seven years and such inference 

was so prejudicial that any probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice. 

Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence. I.R.E. 401; State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 670, 462 P.3d 1125, 1134 (2020). 

Whether a fact is of consequence or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories 

presented by the parties. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010). There 

is no requirement that evidence be relevant only to a disputed issue under I.R.E. 401, only that 

evidence be probative and material to be admissible. I.R.E. 401; Garcia, 166 Idaho at 671, 462 

P.3d at 1135. However, even relevant evidence can be excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial. For 

example, pursuant to I.R.E. 404, evidence of other crimes or wrongs may be relevant, but cannot 

be admitted for the purpose of showing a defendant’s propensity for criminal behavior. 

Nonetheless, evidence of other crimes or wrongs may be admissible if the prosecution provides 
25

notice, and the evidence is relevant to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” I.R.E. 404(b).

A trial court engages in a two-tiered analysis to determine the admissibility of I.R.E. 404(b) 

evidence. State v. Fox, 170 Idaho 846, 861, 517 P.3d 107, 122 (2022). The first tier concerns the 

relevancy of the evidence at issue. Id. The trial court “must determine whether there is sufficient 

evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact” and “whether the evidence of the other act 

would be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than 

propensity.” Id. The first tier is reviewed de novo. Id.

The second tier requires the trial court to perform a balancing test pursuant to I.R.E. 403. 

Id. Under this balancing test, the evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. The second tier is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. Id. When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate 

court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived 

the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted 

consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached 

its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 

(2018).

Wright concedes the State’s offer of proof was sufficient under the first tier of the 

I.R.E. 404(b) analysis, but alleges the portion of the challenged text message that “it had been 7 

years” was not relevant for a non-propensity purpose. In context, the statement that “it had been 

7 years and I got carried away,” in response to an accusation that Wright inappropriately touched 

A.S. is probative of Wright’s motive or intent for his behavior. Therefore, in the context of the 

text messages, the statement that “it had been 7 years” meets the threshold for relevance; it has a 

tendency to make a fact that is of consequence--whether Wright inappropriately touched A.S.--

more likely as it provides some information about why Wright engaged in the inappropriate 

touching. As such, the “[i]t had been 7 years” portion of the text message was admissible under 

the first tier of the I.R.E. 404(b) analysis. 

We next address whether the probative value of the text message is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Wright argues the challenged portion of the text 

message “had little, if any, probative value.” The factual underpinning of Wright’s prejudice 

argument is that the only inference (or even the most likely inference) from the phrase “[i]t had 
26

been 7 years” is that Wright had been in prison for seven years. Wright offers no other reason to 

establish the evidence is unfairly prejudicial; thus, without the necessary factual underpinning, 

Wright’s argument fails. There is nothing in the text message conversation that explicates or 

implies that “it” or the challenged phrase has the meaning Wright assigns it, and this Court declines 

to engage in multi-level speculation to arrive at the conclusion Wright would have us reach. 

Further, prior to the admission of the text message, A.S., A.W., and Stuart each testified, 

without objection, that Wright had been absent from their lives for seven years. Thus, the 

relevance of the challenged statement was not substantially outweighed by the minimal, if any, 

prejudice attached to it. Accordingly, the district court did not err in admitting the challenged 

portion of the text message. 

2. The text message was harmless 

Even if the district court erred in admitting the “[i]t had been 7 years” portion of the text 

message, any error was harmless. Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial. State v. Stell, 162 

Idaho 827, 830, 405 P.3d 612, 615 (Ct. App. 2017). Where a criminal defendant shows an error 

based on a contemporaneously objected-to, nonconstitutional violation, the State then has the 

burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not 

contribute to the jury’s verdict. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017). 

Thus, we examine whether the alleged error complained of in the present case was harmless. See 

id. Harmless error is error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the 

issue in question, as revealed in the record. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 674, 462 P.3d at 1138. This 

standard “requires weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the 

erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the error.” Id. 

If the error’s effect is minimal compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt without the error, then the error did not contribute to the verdict 

rendered and is harmless. Id. The reviewing court must take into account what effect the error 

had, or reasonably may have had, on the jury in the context of the total setting and in relation to 

all else that happened, which necessarily includes the evidence presented. Kotteakos v. United 

States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).

We first consider the probative force of Wright’s challenged statement. As previously 

discussed, the statement “[i]t had been 7 years” does not imply that Wright had been incarcerated 

for the past seven years. Further, the jury repeatedly heard, without objection, from A.S., A.W., 
27

and Stuart that Wright had been absent from the family for the previous seven years. Thus, any 

additional evidence provided by the text message stating that “it had been 7 years,” was merely 

cumulative evidence that Wright had been absent for seven years and therefore has little, if any, 

probative force. 

Additionally, the district court specifically instructed the jury not to consider where Wright 

may have been during his absence from the family and to avoid speculating about the reason for 

Wright’s absence. We presume that the jury followed the district court’s instructions, see State v. 

Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 

481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996), and Wright does not point to any evidence in the record 

to indicate the jury disregarded this instruction. Consequently, we cannot say that the admitted 

text message had any effect on the jury in relation to the other evidence presented. The jury heard 

that Wright was absent for seven years and presumably did not speculate where Wright may have 

been. Thus, any error in admitting the challenged portion of the text message was harmless. 

C. The District Court Did Not Err by Denying Wright’s Motion for a Mistrial 

Wright alleges the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial because the 

State’s failure to redact A.S.’s statement that it had been “[s]even years since [Wright] had slept 

with a girl” from the video of her CARES interview violated the district court’s previous ruling 

and implied that Wright had recently been incarcerated for seven years. Wright alleges this failure 

resulted in prejudicial evidence being presented to the jury and constituted reversible error. 

The parties agree the district court’s pretrial order arising from the challenge to the text 

messages applied to all other evidence the State admitted during trial. Accordingly, the State 

redacted the statements from the video of A.S.’s CARES interview that it believed would violate 

the district court’s pretrial order and provided a redacted copy of the interview to Wright. After 

reviewing the video, Wright’s counsel asked the State to make additional redactions; the State 

agreed to make some of the redactions; and the remainder of the challenges were resolved by the 

district court. Each time the State redacted the video, a copy of the newly redacted video was 

provided to Wright’s counsel. However, the copy of the video exhibit of A.S.’s CARES interview 

which the State admitted and published to the jury included a statement by A.S. that it had been 

“[s]even years since [Wright] had slept with a girl.” The statement came in the middle of a video 

that was more than an hour long, where A.S. described multiple instances of alleged abuse with a 

high level of detail. After detailing one allegation, A.S. recalled:
28

A.S.: [Wright] said he was sorry and that I had to understand that it had 

been seven years. Umm . . . .

Interviewer: You talked about how he said that you would have to forgive him and 

that it had been seven years. What was he talking about?

A.S.: Seven years since he had slept with a girl. 

After the video was played for the jury, Wright’s counsel objected to an “additional” 

hearsay statement in the video. The State responded that it had “done [its] best” to redact the video 

and had given each iteration of the redacted video to Wright’s trial counsel so that if “thingsslipped 

through,” defense counsel would catch it. The State noted that Wright’s counsel did not bring to 

the State’s attention that the most recently redacted copy of the video contained the challenged 

statement by A.S. The district court overruled the objection. 

Wright then made a motion for a mistrial on the grounds that:

the State has routinely mentioned with witness after witness and then twice in that 

video [Wright] being away for seven years. I believe they also brought it up in their 

opening. They have been very deliberate to say he was away for seven years, he 

was gone for seven years. In the CARES’s video, [A.S.] says twice, he was gone 

for seven years and he wasn’t able to have sex with a girl for seven years. 

After the video of A.S.’s CARES interview had been published to the jury, the district court 

ordered the State to redact the statement at issue from the CARES video before it went back with 

the jury for deliberations. Wright requested the district court to not instruct the jury that a portion 

of the CARES video had been redacted, but the court declined to adopt Wright’s suggestion and 

instead informed the jury that “the Court took up a legal matter over the lunch recess, and the Court 

has redacted a limited portion of the video that was played to you previously.” Wright argues that 

the State’s repeated mention of Wright’s absence for seven years throughout the trial was not 

accidental and that the repeated reference combined with the additional context that it had been 

“seven years since he has been with [a] girl or hasn’t been with a girl for seven years” indicated 

there was only one conclusion the State wanted the jury to draw--that Wright had been 

incarcerated--and that inference was “incredibly prejudicial.” The State explained that it explicitly 

referenced the “seven years” in questions to various witnesses so the witnesses would not be able 

to expound on the answer and to keep the witnesses from providing any answer that would exceed 

the district court’s order precluding any explanation of why Wright was previously absent from 

the family for seven years. 

The district court asked Wright’s counsel if the references to seven years in the video had 

been on the redacted copy that was provided to defense counsel, and counsel responded, “I don’t 
29

recall. I don’t have a reason to believe not. But frankly, we’ve been going back and forth on 

redactions the whole time and I don’t recall.” The State responded that the challenged statements 

had been on every redacted version of the video given to Wright’s counsel. The State further 

indicated that in the days before the trial started, it reviewed the audio of the hearing wherein the 

district court described the information to be redacted from the text messages to ensure it redacted 

similar information from the CARES videos. The State understood the district court’s prior ruling 

to preclude any reference to Wright’s incarceration and that he had not been around women, but 

that it could include references to Wright’s absence for seven years, and thought it had redacted 

the video accordingly. Wright’s attorney responded that while the parties had “gone back and 

forth” on the redactions, it was not the defense’s burden to ensure the State complied with the 

district court’s order regarding redaction. The defense had “tried [its] best” (to review the video), 

but it was “on the State” to follow court orders, not the defense. 

In criminal cases, motions for mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. A 

mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant when there occurs during the trial an error 

or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial 

to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial. I.C.R. 29.1(a). Our standard for 

reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for mistrial is well established:

[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his 

discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. 

Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for 

mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. 

Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse of 

discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of 

reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident 

that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will 

be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible 

error.

State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983). Error is not reversible 

unless it is prejudicial. Stell, 162 Idaho at 830, 405 P.3d at 615. The Idaho Supreme Court clarified 

the harmless error standard for an objected-to, nonconstitutionally-based error in Garcia. This 

standard requires weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the 

erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the 

error. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 674, 462 P.3d at 1138. The reviewing court must take into account 

what effect the error had or reasonably may have had on the jury in the context of the total setting 
30

and in relation to all else that happened, which necessarily includes the evidence 

presented. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764. If the error is harmless, it cannot be reversible error 

because it has minimal continuing impact on the trial.

The threshold inquiry on appeal in evaluating the denial of a motion for a mistrial is 

whether the State introduced error. State v. Richardson, 168 Idaho 25, 30, 478 P.3d 754, 759 (Ct. 

App. 2020). In this case, the State introduced the error by failing to redact the relevant portion of 

the video. 

We next consider the probative force of the admission of A.S.’s statement in the CARES 

interview that it “had been seven years since [Wright] slept with a girl.” It is well established that 

the admission of improper evidence does not automatically require a mistrial, State v. Grantham, 

146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 97 P.3d 

1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004), and a trial court’s curative instruction is a factor to consider when 

determining the probative force of the error. Richardson, 168 Idaho at 31, 478 P.3d at 760. Thus, 

where improper evidence is introduced into a trial and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to 

disregard such evidence, we presume that the jury followed the court’s instructions. See Kilby, 

130 Idaho at 751, 947 P.2d at 424; Hudson, 129 Idaho at 481, 927 P.2d at 454. We normally 

presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently 

presented to it, unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow

the trial court’s instructions and a strong likelihood that the evidence would have a devastating

effect to the defendant. Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d at 136.

The district court instructed the jury that, “[t]hroughout the trial, you have heard evidence 

the defendant was not around his family for a period of time. You are not to speculate as to why 

this occurred.” Wright acknowledges the district court gave a limiting instruction, but argues both 

that the admission of the statement at issue was “so prejudicial that there was no practical way to 

cure the error,” and, even if the error could be cured, the court’s modification of the exhibit and 

limiting instruction were insufficient. We disagree.7

7 We note that Wright argues the redaction was insufficient to cure the error because “[t]he 

jury was not told what was redacted, at the request of defense counsel, or that they could no longer

consider the portion that had been redacted.” Additionally, Wright alleges the limiting instruction 

was insufficient because it only told the jury not to consider why Wright had not been around his 

family, not why he had not had sex, thus, it “failed to fully limit the consideration of the improper 

evidence.” However, Wright invited both alleged errors.
31

Wright fails to establish that this Court should set aside the presumption that the jury 

followed the district court’s instruction. Wright does not point to evidence in the record 

establishing an overwhelming probability that the jury was unable to follow the district court’s 

instruction and that there was a strong likelihood the statements had a devastating effect on 

Wright’s defense. The statement at issue does not relate to an admission that Wright had 

previously been incarcerated, but instead that he had not “slept with a girl” in seven years. Despite 

Wright’s argument to the contrary, that statement does not give rise to the implication that Wright 

had been incarcerated. We cannot conclude there was an overwhelming probability that the jury 

was unable to follow the district court’s instruction and that there was a strong likelihood the 

statements had a devastating effect on Wright’s defense. 

Even if the jury thought the statement implied that Wright been incarcerated during that 

time, the district court’s limiting instruction specifically told the jury not to “speculate as to why” 

Wright was absent during this time. The jury was instructed to ignore and, thus, not consider in 

its deliberations why Wright was away from the family, and there is nothing in the record that 

indicates the jury was unable to do so. Moreover, any effect the alleged implication may have had 

on the jury was further minimized in light of A.S.’s testimony. 

A.S. testified, without objection, that during the month of May 2019, Wright touched her 

in a sexual way. Among other allegations, she described that, throughout the month of May 2019, 

Wright would “grab me by my waist. He would grab my boobs. He would, I guess you would 

say, finger me above the clothes.” A.S. testified that this occurred “basically just any time where 

First, after deciding that it would redact the statement at issue from the CARES video, the 

district court specifically inquired whether Wright would “want the jury instructed that a portion 

of [the CARES] video has been stricken,” and Wright’s counsel responded that they did not. 

Second, when the district court asked Wright about its proposed limiting instruction of 

“[t]hroughout the trial, you’ve heard evidence the defendant was not around his family for a period 

of time. You are not to speculate as to why this occurred, nor are you to consider that fact in your 

deliberation,” Wright’s counsel responded that it did not want any limiting instruction to be given 

but, if the court decided to give one, they “would ask you to give it as it is.” Thus, Wright’s counsel 

never asked for the district court to alter the jury instruction to reflect any of the language Wright 

now alleges should have been included and has invited the error about which he now complains. 

See State v. Richardson, 168 Idaho 25, 31-32, 478 P.3d 754, 760-61 (Ct. App. 2020) (holding

despite his previous objections to giving curative instruction as unhelpful, because defendant 

ultimately agreed to curative instruction given, he invited any claim of error related to instruction).
32

it was just me and him.” This mirrored A.S.’s description of Wright’s behavior that A.S. gave 

during her CARES interview:

Interviewer: When were the other times that he has touched your vagina?

A.S.: It was everyday with that.

Interviewer: Everyday with what?

A.S.: Just the physically grabbing stuff.

Interviewer: Ok.

A.S.: I guess you could say fingering, but it was never underneath my 

clothes.

A.S. further disclosed during the CARES interview that her depression and anxiety became 

worse after May 2019 and that she contemplated suicide. Stuart testified that although she did not 

witness any of the behavior which A.S. testified about, she did notice changes in A.S.’s behavior 

throughout the month in which Wright lived with them. She explained that prior to Wright moving 

in and throughout early May, A.S. was outgoing and spent much of her time around the family.

However, toward the end of May things changed; A.S. became withdrawn, spent a lot of time in 

bed, and started to wear big shirts and sweatshirts. Stuart further testified that while A.S. was 

mostly an “A student” who took advanced placement classes, after May 2019, her grades declined. 

Stuart explained that A.S. no longer took advanced placement classes and her grades included four 

Ds, one C, and one B. Similarly, one of A.S.’s sister’s testified that in May 2019, A.S. didn’t 

interact with other family members as much as she used to and she spent more time with her other 

sister, A.W. Shannon Sorini, an expert in the area of child sexual abuse, testified that it is very 

common for people around a child who is being sexually abused to not notice the abuse. Sorini

testified that although children’s coping responses to sexual abuse may vary, children may exhibit 

depression, anxiety, suicidal thoughts, and changes in their academic performance as a result of 

the abuse. 

Finally, although Wright testified and denied ever sexually abusing A.S., the text messages 

that were admitted demonstrated that when Wright was confronted with A.S.’s allegations, Wright 

appeared to acknowledge and accept responsibility for the touching, responding: “You[’re] right 

patti there’s nothing I can say that explain away my actions.”8 

8 Wright argued at trial that the context of the text messages was not that he was 

acknowledging he inappropriately touched A.S. Instead, Wright argued that A.S. was the sexual 

aggressor, claiming she was rubbing against him and behaving in a sexually explicit way towards 

him, and it was Wright’s failure to address A.S.’s inappropriate behavior that he told Stuart would 

never happen again. 
33

This Court is satisfied that any effect the statement in the CARES interview had, or 

reasonably may have had, on the jury in relation to all of the evidence presented was minimal and 

did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Wright’s

motion for a mistrial.

D. Wright Did Not Establish a Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct 

Wright alleges the State’s failure to properly redact A.S.’s statement in her CARES 

interview in accordance with the district court’s pretrial ruling amounted to prosecutorial 

misconduct. In response, the State alleges this argument is unpreserved because Wright did not 

assert a claim of prosecutorial misconduct below. The State cites to State v. Neimeyer, 169 Idaho 

9, 13, 490 P.3d 9, 13 (2021) for the proposition that a reviewing court “will not hold that a trial 

court erred in making a decision on an issue . . . that it did not have the opportunity to address.”

Id. (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019)). Rather, in most 

instances, a party must raise an issue before the trial court in order to preserve the issue for appeal. 

Id. Alternatively, the State argues the claim is unsupported by the record. 

Although our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the prosecutor is 

expected to be diligent and leave no stone unturned, the prosecutor is nevertheless expected and 

required to be fair. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007). However, in 

reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct we must keep in mind the realities of trial. Id. 

A fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated 

the standard for analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct:

The first step in a prosecutorial misconduct analysis “is to determine whether the 

alleged conduct actually rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.” This Court 

has said, “[p]rosecutorial misconduct occurs when the State ‘attempts to secure a 

verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the 

evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from 

that evidence.’” “[T]he prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the 

facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.”

State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 122, 443 P.3d 129, 136 (2019) (citations omitted). When there has 

been a contemporaneous objection, we determine factually if there was prosecutorial misconduct 

and then determine whether the error was harmless. Id.; State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 88, 156 

P.3d 583, 589 (Ct. App. 2007). A conviction will not be set aside for small errors or defects that 

have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial. State v. Baker, 161 Idaho 

289, 299, 385 P.3d 467, 477 (Ct. App. 2016).
34

Regardless of whether the issue is preserved, this Court declines to find any prosecutorial 

misconduct in this case. As noted above, the State reviewed the district court’s order and believed 

it had redacted the CARES video consistently with that order; nothing in the record indicates the 

State intentionally disregarded the district court’s order or that in failing to make the redaction it 

was trying to unfairly obtain a conviction. After each redaction, the State provided a copy of the 

newly redacted video to defense counsel. Defense counsel acknowledged that the parties had 

“gone back and forth” on the redactions, the defense counsel had a copy of the redacted video 

containing the statement, and the redacted video had been provided prior to trial. The district court 

found both sides had an opportunity to bring the issue to the court’s attention prior to the video 

being played because counsel for both sides had either actually reviewed or had the opportunity to 

review the redacted video. In this context, it appears that the failure to redact the statement was 

an oversight by the State, not an attempt to obtain a conviction on an improper ground or engage 

in inflammatory tactics. Thus, we decline to find the State engaged in misconduct. 

Additionally, the admission of A.S.’s statement in her forensic CARES interview was 

harmless as we presume the jury followed the district court’s instructions and the admission of the 

statement did not have such probative force when weighed against the evidence in the case, 

excluding the statements, as to have a continuing effect on the trial. Accordingly, any alleged error 

was harmless and, as such, is not grounds for vacating Wright’s conviction based on alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct. 

E. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Wright’s I.R.E. 412 Motion

Wright alleges the district court erred by denying his I.R.E. 412 motion to present evidence 

that “A.S. had a history of making false allegations of sexual abuse.” Wright argues the district 

court erred when it denied his motion to allow him to cross-examine A.S. about these prior 

allegations under both I.R.E. 412(b)(3) and (b)(5). Specifically, Wright asserts that the district 

court used an incorrect legal rubric to determine whether A.S.’s prior claims were false and in 

weighing the probative value against the prejudicial effect of the evidence. Wright also argues 

A.S.’s claims of prior sexual abuse are admissible under I.R.E. 412(b)(3) because her prior 

allegations were false and under I.R.E. 412(b)(5) because failing to allow Wright to impeach and 

cross-examine A.S. about the prior false allegations would deprive him of his Sixth Amendment 

right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
35

Generally, evidence of a sex crime victim’s past sexual behavior is not admissible in a 

criminal case. I.R.E. 412(a),(b); State v. Chambers, 166 Idaho 837, 841, 465 P.3d 1076, 1080 

(2020). These laws aim both to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, 

potential embarrassment, and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of the 

victim’s prior sexual behavior and to encourage victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to 

participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders. Id.; see also Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory 

committee’s note to 1994 amendment. However, I.R.E. 412(b)(1)-(5) also provides a defendant 

in a criminal case the ability to introduce evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rule when 

that evidence is potentially relevant to the charged offense. The purpose of providing the 

exceptions contained in I.R.E. 412 “is to protect the defendant’sright to a fair trial, while protecting 

the victim from public embarrassment from the disclosure of past sexual behavior.” Chambers, 

166 Idaho at 843, 465 P.3d at 1082. Among the circumstances in which specific instances of the 

victim’s past sexual behavior may be admitted under I.R.E. 412(b) are: 

(3) an alleged victim’s prior false allegations of sex crimes made at an earlier time; 

or

. . . .

(5) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.

A defendant who intends to introduce evidence falling within one of the exceptions 

recognized in I.R.E. 412(b) must make a written motion to offer such evidence, describing the 

evidence and stating the purpose for which it is to be offered, generally no later than five days 

before the date on which the trial is scheduled to begin. I.R.E. 412(c)(1)(A),(B). Before admitting 

evidence under this rule, the trial court must conduct an in-camera hearing at which the parties 

may call witnesses, including the alleged victim, and offer other relevant evidence. 

I.R.E. 412(c)(2). “[I]f the relevance of the evidence which the defendant seeks to offer depends 

upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court . . . must accept evidence on the issue of 

whether such condition of fact is fulfilled and determine the issue.” Id. Ultimately, if the trial 

court determines “the evidence that the defendant intends to offer is relevant and that the probative 

value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, the evidence must be admitted.” 

I.R.E. 412(c)(3). 

Prior to trial, Wright filed a motion pursuant to I.R.E. 412(b)(3) and (b)(5) to allow the 

introduction of evidence that A.S. made prior false allegations of sex crimes. As evidence of his 

claim, Wright filed the police reports from Arizona as an addendum to his motion. Wright asserted 
36

that in Arizona in 2015, A.S. alleged that a family friend sexually abused her by manual to genital 

contact and, while the Arizona police “conducted a full investigation,” the accused was never 

arrested or prosecuted based on these allegations. Wright argued:

While the reports do not indicate the specific thought process or reasoning of law 

enforcement and the Arizona prosecuting agency that handled this case, it can be 

reasonably extrapolated that after conducting its investigation law enforcement 

could not establish probable cause that this crime actually occurred and that [the 

accused] committed it. 

Wright asserted that he had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that A.S. had made 

previous, false allegations of sex crimes under I.R.E. 412; he should be permitted to cross-examine 

A.S. about this issue because it was relevant to her credibility; and the probative value of the 

evidence significantly outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice.

The State opposed the motion, arguing there was no evidence that A.S.’s 2015 allegations

were false and allowing the introduction of the 2015 allegations at trial would be irrelevant and 

unduly prejudicial. The district court held a hearing on the motion at which the parties offered 

oral argument. Wright offered no additional evidence, relying solely on the police reports 

contained in his addendum to support his claim.

The district court issued an oral decision. First, the district court explained that it 

considered Wright’s addendum, transcripts, and summaries of witness interviews regarding A.S.’s 

2015 allegations of abuse and noted that whether to allow evidence of prior false accusations of 

sex crimes was a discretionary decision. Second, the district court found the evidence was not 

admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 412(b)(5) because its exclusion would not violate Wright’s 

constitutional rights. The district court recognized that Wright has a constitutional right to confront 

witnesses and could certainly attack A.S.’s credibility “based on the facts that occurred in this 

case,” but it would be unfair to use “allegations that are not proven to be false of a victim’s sexual 

history or allegations of sexual crimes as evidence that she is not telling the truth in the current 

trial.” 

The district court continued that even if the evidence was admissible under 

I.R.E. 412(b)(5), it would not allow the evidence to be admitted because allegations from another 

state that have not been proven false had no relevance in the trial. The district court also held that 

the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, 

allowed extraneous issues to come before the jury, wasted time, and created a second trial within 

a trial on collateral issues that would be unhelpful to the issue before the jury. Accordingly, the 
37

district court found Wright had not established that evidence of A.S.’s 2015 allegations should be 

admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 412(b)(3) or (b)(5) and, accordingly, denied Wright’s motion.

Subsequently, Wright filed a motion requesting the district court reconsider its denial of 

the I.R.E. 412 motion, “specifically in reference to subsection [412](b)(5).” Wright argued he 

“cannot defend himself without being able to fully explore A.S.’s credibility as a witness, which 

inherently includes her history of making sexual abuse allegations” and, therefore, the court should 

reconsider its analysis pursuant to I.R.E. 401 and 403. The district court reiterated that it 

previously “made several findings regarding how there is no evidence that A.S. was untruthful in 

the Arizona proceedings”; without evidence of falsity, the 2015 allegations were not relevant; and 

the probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, and misleading the jury. 

Accordingly, the district court held that while Wright could question A.S. about her credibility 

regarding the events in the current case, evidence of the 2015 allegations would be excluded, and 

the court denied Wright’s motion for reconsideration. 

1. The district court did not err in finding evidence of A.S.’s 2015 allegations was 

not permitted pursuant to I.R.E. 412(b)(3) 

Wright argues the district court erred when it used an incorrect test to deny his I.R.E. 412 

motion under I.R.E. 412(b)(3). Wright claims the district court required evidence that A.S.

recanted her previous statement in order to find the prior allegations are false instead of applying 

the correct test, which is whether the allegations were proven to be false by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Wright also argued the district court incorrectly applied the I.R.E. 403 balancing test in 

weighing the probative value and prejudicial effect of such evidence instead of the I.R.E. 412

balancing test.9

The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test to determine the admissibility of an 

alleged victim’s prior false allegations of sex crimes under I.R.E. 412. Chambers, 166 Idaho at 

845, 465 P.3d at 1084. The first step of the analysis requires the trial court to determine whether 

9 The State argues, in part, that because the district court denied Wright’s motion using 

I.R.E. 412 and I.R.E. 401 and 403, but Wright only challenges the district court’s holding under 

I.R.E. 412, we must affirm on the uncontested basis. Because Wright alleges the district court 

erred both in its application of I.R.E. 412 and its use of I.R.E. 403, Wright challenges both bases 

on which the court made its decision, and this Court will address Wright’s contentions on the 

merits. We also note that, although Wright argues on appeal that the I.R.E. 403 balancing test does 

not apply to evidence admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 412, Wright requested the district court apply an 

I.R.E. 403 analysis to the evidence.
38

the defendant established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prior allegation is false. Id.

If the defendant meets this threshold of establishing falsity, the trial court must determine whether 

the evidence is relevant. Id. at 846, 465 P.3d at 1085. Generally under this second step, evidence 

of prior false allegations will be highly probative. Id. Finally, under the third step, the trial court 

must balance the probative value of the evidence with the danger of undue prejudice pursuant to 

I.R.E. 412(c)(2); if the court determines that “the probative value of such evidence outweighs the 

danger of unfair prejudice,” the evidence is admissible. Chambers, 166 Idaho at 846, 465 P.3d at 

1085. A trial court’s evidentiary ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 840, 465 P.3d 

at 1079. 

The district court did not err in finding that Wright did not meet his burden of showing that 

A.S.’s 2015 allegations were false. We disagree with Wright’s assertion that the district court 

“failed to apply a preponderance of evidence standard when determining whether the prior 

allegation was false, finding instead that the test was whether the alleged victim had recanted.” 

During the I.R.E. 412 motion hearing, the district court specifically asked Wright how the evidence 

he presented showed that the allegations were false by a preponderance of the evidence, stating: 

I understand the police reports, and I have reviewed those have been filed. . . .

But I don’t see how I can--something written down by a police officer, I 

don’t see how the Court can put any weight on those documents for knowing 

whether they support or don’t support that the allegations were true or false. A 

finding of no probable cause is not a finding that the victim has lied or the 

perpetrator has lied. It was never contested. It was never tried. No determination 

was made. There was a decision not to charge the person. 

But that--how does that, by a preponderance of the evidence, show to the 

Court that these were false allegations?

(Emphasis added.) The district court never articulated a different burden of proof, either at the 

hearing or during its subsequent oral decision denying the I.R.E. 412 motion. After articulating 

the correct standard at the I.R.E. 412 hearing, the district court later issued its decision, concluding

that based on the evidence presented, namely “the addendum that was filed by the defendant that 

included the police reports and transcripts or summaries of certain interviews of witnesses 

regarding the 2015 allegations made by A.S. against a person identified and referred to as her 

godfather,” “have not been proven to be false,” and “[t]he evidence proffered does not establish a 

false allegation.”

The district court detailed the evidence before it and explained how Wright failed to 

establish falsity because: (1) nothing in the reports indicated the police did not believe A.S.; 
39

(2) while the reports stated the accused denied he committed the alleged conduct, the reports also 

stated that he declined to take a polygraph test; and (3) the fact that Arizona ultimately did not 

pursue criminal charges as a result of A.S.’s 2015 allegations does not support the inference that 

the allegations were false. The district court also found that no other evidence before it established

that A.S.’s 2015 allegations were false because A.S.: (1) was consistent with her description of 

the 2015 allegations in interviews; (2) did not try to hide the existence of the 2015 allegations from 

law enforcement in the current case and actually brought the allegations to their attention; (3) did 

not demonstrate a pattern of untruthful behavior elsewhere in evidence; and (4) never recanted the 

2015 allegations.

Contrary to Wright’s assertion on appeal that “the district court found that the standard for 

determining if a prior allegation is false was whether or not an accuser had recanted the allegation,” 

the court did not require proof of recantation as the only way to establish that a previous allegation 

is false. Instead, as listed above, the district court assessed the evidence Wright presented and 

found there was no evidence, let alone a preponderance of the evidence, that A.S.’s 2015 

allegations were false. The district court did not find that Wright did not meet his burden in 

establishing that A.S.’s 2015 allegations were false only because A.S. never recanted the 

allegations. In fact, the court outlined multiple reasons why the evidence Wright provided to 

support his motion failed to show the 2015 allegations were false.

While Wright maintains that “the district court has not evaluated” whether the evidence he

provided showed that A.S.’s 2015 allegations were false by a preponderance of the evidence, he 

also asserts “that the evidence proves the prior allegation was false.” We disagree. The police 

reports filed by Wright indicate that in 2015, a police officer in Arizona responded to a report of 

molestation of a child, presumably A.S. According to the reports, A.S. reported that a family 

friend had engaged in manual-to-genital contact with her over a period of time, ending in late 2014.

Approximately a week later, Stuart took A.S. to a hospital for a sexual assault evaluation; a 

different police officer responded and informed Stuart that a sexual assault evaluation would not 

be performed because of the extended time since the last alleged abuse. Stuart asked the officer 

why the accused had not been arrested, and the officer responded that they needed to establish 

probable cause, which they were seeking through a forensic interview of A.S. and anyone else 

relevant to the investigation.
40

Wright relies on the “lack of probable cause” statement but fails to note that the statement 

by police came approximately one week after A.S. made her initial disclosure and before any 

forensic interviews of A.S. A statement made by law enforcement early in an investigation 

provides no information about the falsity of the underlying allegation, and does not establish, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that A.S.’s allegations were false. Similarly, although Wright’s 

counsel asserts no charges were filed, statements by counsel are not evidence. See Zepeda, 152 

Idaho at 716, 274 P.3d at 17 (noting unsworn oral or written representations, even those of officer 

of court, are not evidence). Even if no charges were filed, the lack of formal charges provides no 

information regarding the falsity of A.S.’s statements. In sum, nothing in the record suggests the 

lack of prosecution was because A.S. made false allegations.

Wright also argues the district court erred in finding there was no evidence of falsity 

because the police reports contained information that the accused individual denied the charges. 

The third party’s denial is not evidence of the falsity of A.S.’s statements, it is only evidence of 

the fact of the denial, not the truth of the denial. Accordingly, Wright has failed to establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that A.S.’s 2015 allegations were false, and the district court did 

not err in finding Wright failed to establish the first prong of the I.R.E. 412(b)(3) analysis. 

Consequently, we do not need to make a determination of whether the court erred in its analysis 

of the second and third prongs of the I.R.E. 412 test.

2. The district court did not err in finding evidence of A.S.’s 2015 allegations was 

not permitted pursuant to I.R.E. 412(b)(5) 

Wright alleges the district court erred in denying his I.R.E. 412 motion because evidence 

that A.S.’s 2015 allegations were false is permissible under I.R.E. 412(b)(5) as its exclusion would 

violate his constitutional rights. Wright admits that I.R.E. 412(b)(3) and (b)(5) are “invariably 

intertwined” such that “whether or not A.S. had made a false allegation in the past is critical to 

evaluating admissibility” under both subsections. Wright’s argument concerning the admissibility 

of evidence of A.S.’s 2015 allegations hinges on whether Wright met his burden of establishing 

that they were false. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 219 P.3d 631, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (holding 

defendant must establish falsity of allegation by preponderance of evidence before any 

constitutional rights are triggered). As Wright did not establish that A.S.’s 2015 allegations were 

false by a preponderance of the evidence, we need not address this claim further. 
41

F. There Is No Cumulative Error 

Wright also contends that the cumulative error doctrine applies here, necessitating a 

reversal of his conviction. Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in 

and of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Adamcik, 152 

Idaho 445, 483, 272 P.3d 417, 455 (2012). However, a necessary predicate to the application of 

the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. Id. Wright has failed to demonstrate at least two 

errors, a necessary predicate to the application of the cumulative error doctrine. As such, Wright 

is not entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine.

III.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in denying Wright’s Batson challenge, his I.R.E. 412 motion, 

or his motion for a mistrial. The district court did not err in admitting the text message, but even 

if the admission of the text message was error, such error was harmless. Wright has not established 

prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, there is no cumulative error. Accordingly, the district court 

did not err and the judgment of conviction is affirmed. 

Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.