NExTera

ENERGY

f SEABROOK

May 16, 2012

SBK-L-12101

Docket No. 50-443

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Attention: Document Control Desk

One White Flint North

11555 Rockville Pike

Rockville, MD 20852

Seabrook Station

NextEra Energy Seabrook License Renewal Application

Structures Monitoring Program Supplement-Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring

References:

1. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC letter SBK-L-10077, "Seabrook Station Application for

Renewed Operating License," May 25, 2010. (Accession Number ML101590099)

2. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC letter SBK-L-12061, "Seabrook Station Response to

Request for Additional Information, NextEra Energy Seabrook License Renewal

Application - Supplemental Response - Alkali Silica Reaction (ASR)", March 30, 2012

(Accession Number ML12094A364).

3. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC letter SBK-L-12088, "Supplemental Response- (RAI)

Follow-up B.2.1.31-1, Item 1, NextEra Energy Seabrook License Renewal Application,"

April 18, 2012. (Accession Number ML 121 10A407)

In Reference 1, NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (NextEra) submitted an application for a

renewed facility operating license for Seabrook Station Unit 1 in accordance with the Code of

Federal Regulations, Title 10, Parts 50, 51, and 54.

In References 2 and 3, NextEra provided supplemental information related to staff RAIs

regarding the ongoing analysis of Alkali-Silica Reaction.

In this Supplement are changes to the License Renewal Application (LRA) associated with

management of cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates in concrete structures.

The existing Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31, has been augmented by a plant specific

Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program, B.2.1.3 IA. Enclosure 1 contains changes to

LRA Chapter 3 tables associated with the aging management review. Enclosure 2 contains

changes to LRA Appendix A - Updated UFSAR Supplement, and Appendix B - Aging

Management Programs.

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, P.O. Box 300, Lafayette Road, Seabrook, NH 03874
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12010 1/Page 2

The changes are explained, and where appropriate to facilitate understanding, portions of the

LRA are repeated with the change highlighted by strikethroughs for deleted text and bolded

italics for inserted text. In some instances the entire text of a section has been replaced or added.

In these cases a note is included in the introduction indicating the replacement of the entire text

of the section.

Commitment number 71 has been added. There are no other new or revised regulatory

commitments contained in this letter. Enclosure 3 provides a revised LRA Appendix A - Final

Safety Report Supplement Table A.3, License Renewal Commitment List, updated to reflect the

license renewal commitment changes made in NextEra Energy Seabrook correspondence to date.

If there are any questions or additional information is needed, please contact Mr. Richard R.

Cliche, License Renewal Project Manager, at (603) 773-7003.

If you have any questions regarding this correspondence, please contact Mr. Michael O'Keefe,

Licensing Manager, at (603) 773-7745.

Sincerely,

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC.

Paul 0. Freeman

Site Vice President

Enclosures:

Enclosure 1- Changes to the Seabrook Station License Renewal Application Associated with

Chapter 3 - Aging Management Review Results

Enclosure 2- Changes to the Seabrook Station License Renewal Application Associated with

Appendix A - Updated UFSAR Supplement, and Appendix B - Aging Management

Programs

Enclosure 3- LRA Appendix A - Final Safety Report Supplement Table A.3, License Renewal

Commitment List
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12101/Page 3

cc:

W.M. Dean,

J. G. Lamb,

W. J. Raymond,

A.D. Cunanan,

M. Wentzel,

NRC Region I Administrator

NRC Project Manager, Project Directorate 1-2

NRC Resident Inspector

NRC Project Manager, License Renewal

NRC Project Manager, License Renewal

Mr. Christopher M. Pope

Director Homeland Security and Emergency Management

New Hampshire Department of Safety

Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management

Bureau of Emergency Management

33 Hazen Drive

Concord, NH 03305

John Giarrusso, Jr., Nuclear Preparedness Manager

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Emergency Management Agency

400 Worcester Road

Framingham, MA 01702-5399
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12101/ Page 4

N ExTera1M

SEABROOK

I, Paul 0. Freeman, Site Vice President of NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC hereby affirm that the

information and statements contained within are based on facts and circumstances which are true and

accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Sworn and Subscribed

Before me this

day of May, 2012

Paul 0. Freeman

] Site Vice President

Notary
Enclosure 1 to SBK-L-12101

Changes to the

Seabrook Station License Renewal Application

Associated with

Chapter 3 - Aging Management Review Results
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 2 of 40

Introduction

Enclosure 1 contains an update to the information provided in the NextEra Energy Seabrook

License Renewal Application (LRA), Section 3.5. The LRA is being updated as a result of

recent operating experience and additional information regarding the managing of aging

effects associated with Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR).

Description of Changes

CHANGES TO LRA CHAPTER 3

The following changes have been made to Section 3.5 of the Seabrook License Renewal

Application (LRA). For clarity, entire sentences or paragraphs from the LRA are provided

with deleted text highlighted by strikethroughs and inserted text highlighted by bolded italics:

1. In sections 3.5.2.1.1 (on page 3.5-3), 3.5.2.1.2 (on page 3.5-4), 3.5.2.1.4 (on page 3.5-6),

3.5.2.1.5 (on page 3.5-8), 3.5.2.1.7 (on page 3.5-10), and 3.5.2.1.8 (on page 3.5-11) the

following program is added to the list of aging management programs listed under the

heading "Aging Management Programs."

* Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program (B.2.1.31A)

2. In section 3.5.2.2.1.10, on page 3.5-17, the 3rd and the 4th paragraphs are revised as

follows:

Concrete aggregates used in Seabrook Station concrete structures were selected per

ASTM C33, which uses ASTM C295 "Petrographic Examination of Aggregates for

Concrete." Aggregates identified as potentially reactive were not used at Seabrook

Station. Seabrook Station Operating Experience has indicated that Alkali-Silica

Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures and will require monitoring through the

Period of Extended Operation (PEO).

Hawevef, Seabrook Station ee-seovatively-manages cracking due to expansion and

reaction with aggregates through the Seabrook Station ASME Section XI, Subsection

IWL Program, B.2.1.28, and--the Seabrook Station Structures Monitoring Program,

B.2.1.31, and Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31A.

3. In section 3.5.2.2.2.1, on page 3.5-19, Item 5 is revised as follows:

Concrete in inaccessible areas is evaluated for expansion and cracking due to reaction

with aggregate. Tests and petrographic examinations performed according to ASTM

C227-50 or ASTM C295-54 had initially verified that aggregates used are not reactive.

H.2..3 , Seabrook Station Opnser'atively managecs Eackingduc to xanin and

r-eaction with aggrcgatcs thfough the Seabrook Station Structures Monitoring Proegrami,

.2413-h. Seabrook Station Operating Experience (OE) has indicated that Alkali-Silica
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 3 of 40

Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures and will require monitoring through the

Period of Extended Operation (PEO).

Seabrook Station manages cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates

through the Seabrook Station Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31 and the

Seabrook Station Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31A.

4. In section 3.5.2.2.2.2, on page 3.5-21, the 3rd and the 4

&h paragraphs of Item 2 are revised

as follows:

Concrete aggregates used in Seabrook Station concrete structures were selected per

ASTM C33, which uses ASTM C295 "Petrographic Examination of Aggregates for

Concrete." Aggregates identified as potentially reactive were not used at Seabrook

Station. Seabrook Station Operating Experience (OE) has indicated that Alkali-Silica

Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures and will require monitoring through the

Period of Extended Operation (PEO).

Nevcrtheless, Scabrook Station uses the Seabrook Station Structures Monitoring

to expansion and r.eation .gg.egate. with . Seabrook Station manages cracking due to

expansion and reaction with aggregates through the Seabrook Station Structures

Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31 and the Seabrook Station Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31A.

5. In section 3.5.2.2.2.4, on page 3.5-24, the 2nd paragraph of Item 3 is revised as follows:

Concrete in inaccessible areas is evaluated for expansion and cracking due to reaction

with aggregate. Tests and petrographic examinations performed according to ASTM

C227-50 or ASTM C295-54 had initially verified that aggregates used are not reactive.

Neveffheless, Seabrook Station manages beth cracking due tex anin and reacto

with aggregates and Inres fieprsity, and pefmeability, and loss of material duet

leaching of ealciutm hydroxide with the Seabrook Station Structurfes Moenitoring Pro)grami,

B.2.14.3 . Seabrook Station Operating Experience (OE) has indicated that Alkali-Silica

Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures and will require monitoring through the

Period of Extended Operation (PEO). Seabrook Station manages cracking due to

expansion and reaction with aggregates through the Seabrook Station Structures

Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31 and the Seabrook Station Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31A. Increase in porosity and permeability, and loss of

strength due to leaching of calcium hydroxide is managed by the Seabrook Station

Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31.
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 4 of 40

6. In Table 3.5.1, on page 3.5-32, line item 3.5.1-15 is revised as follows:

Agin Further

Compnen Agiing:EffeetfDssso Component Management Ev.aluation Discussion

Number ..... Program Recommended.

3.5.1-15 Concrete

elements: walls,

dome, basemat,

ring girder,

buttresses,

containment,

concrete fill-in

annulus (as

applicable)

Increase in

porosity

permeability due

to leaching of

calcium

hydroxide;

cracking due to

expansion and

reaction with

aggregate

ISI (lWL) for

accessible areas.

None for

inaccessible

areas if concrete

was constructed

in accordance

with the

recommendation

s of ACI 201.2R

Yes, if concrete

was not

constructed as

stated for

inaccessible areas

The Seabreek MANR r-esuilts

conclude that crackingdu

to expansien and reactio

with aggregate is not an

aging mechanimrquin

management for the

contaunment stfucieatw

Seabf-oele

Concrete was constructed

equivalent to

recommendations in ACI

201.2R. Seabrook Station

Operating Experience has

indicated that Alkali-Silica

Reaction (ASR) is present

in site structures and will

require monitoring

through the Period of

Extended Operation

(PEO).

Seabrook manages loss of

material due to leaching of

calcium hydroxide with the

ASME Section XI,

Subsection 1WL Program,

B.2.1.28.

Cracking due to

expansion and reaction

with aggregates is

managed through the

ASME Section X1,

Subsection IWL Program,

B.2.1.28 and Alkali-Silica

Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring Program,

B.2.1.31A.

Further evaluation is

provided in LRA

Subsection 3.5.2.2.1.10.
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 5 of 40

7. In Table 3.5.1, on page 3.5-36, line item 3.5.1-27 is revised as follows:

Item Aging Further

Numer Cxiponent.Aigfet Management .Evalation Discussion Mecbnis, IProgram Re~ommnded-____________

3.5.1-27 All Groups

except Group 6:

accessible and

inaccessible

interior /

exterior

concrete

Cracking due to

expansion due to

reaction with

aggregates

Structures

Monitoring

Program None

for inaccessible

areas if concrete

was constructed

in accordance

with the

recommendation

s in ACI 201.2R77

Yes, if not within

the scope of the

applicant's

Structures

Monitoring

Program or

concrete was not

constructed as

stated for

inaccessible areas

This item is not applieable

to Seabroek.

The Seabrooek AAMR results

eenclude that r-eaction wit

aggregates is not

signifieant and The

concrete was constructed

consistent with the

recommendations of ACI

201.2R. Seabrook Station

Operating Experience has

indicated that Alkali-Silica

Reaction (ASR) is present

in site structures and will

require monitoring

through the Period of

Extended Operation

(PEO).

Nonetheless, all Seabroo

-stfutural components

applicable to-this itemwil

be moenitor-ed by the

Cracking due to

expansion and reaction

with aggregates will be

monitored by the

Structures Monitoring

Program, B.2.1.31 and

Alkali-Silica Reaction

(ASR) Monitoring

Program, B.2.1.31A.

Further evaluation is

provided in LRA

Subsection 3.5.2.2.2.1,

Item 5.
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12 101

Page 6 of 40

8. In Table 3.5.1, on page 3.5-42, line item 3.5.1-36 is revised as follows:

ItmAig tet/Aging Further

Numbier Component: M h, - Managenient Evaluation " , isjcussion

3.5.1-36 Group 6: all Cracking due to Accessible areas: Yes, if concrete Consistent with NUEC

accessible / expansion / Inspection of was not -80-.

inaccessible reaction with Water Control constructed as The concrete was

reinforced aggregates Structures stated for constructed consistent

concrete Associated with inaccessible areas with the recommendations

Nuclear Power ofACI 201.2R. Seabrook

Plants. None for Station Operating

inaccessible Experience has indicated

areas if concrete that Alkali-Silica Reaction

was constructed (ASR) is present in site

in accordance structures and will require

with the monitoring through the

recommendation Period of Extended

s in ACI Operation (PEO).

201.2R77 The Structures Monitoring

Program, B.2.1.31 and

Alkali-Silica Reaction

(ASR) Monitoring

Program, B.2.1.31A, will

manage degradation of

accessible and inaccessible

concrete components for

cracking due to expansion /

reaction with aggregates.

Further evaluation is

provided in LRA

Subsection 3.5.2.2.2.4,

Item 3.

9. In Table 3.5.2-1, starting on page 3.5-53, line items associated with 3.5.1

are revised and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

-27 and 3.5.1-36

I ntnddAgin'g'Effect Aging Table,

1component Type i qiig Mnamn .I Nt. Funcion Material, Environment'; -Reurn aagm t3.l No

BSAS Concrete Monitoring A

NONESSENTIAL Program

SWITCHGEAR Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-27 3.5.A-2

BUILDING Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Air (ASR)

Outdoor Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 7 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

BSAS Concrete Program

(Sump) FIRE Structural Raw Water Expansion III.A3-

PUMPHOUSE SucwaRaWae Exflon Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-27

PUMPHOUSE Support Concrete (External) and Cracking Akl-iia 23512

Exposed to Raw Reaction (T-03)

Water (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

BSAS Concrete Structures

(Sump) STEAM Monitoring A

GENERATOR Program

BLOWDOWN Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion . Alkali-Silica 23.5.1-27 3.5.A-2

RECOVERY Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

BUILDING Exposed to Raw (ASR) Water Monitoring E, 517 Program

Structures

BSAS Concrete Monitoring

DISCHARGE Program E, 511

TRANSITION Air Indoor III.A6- STRUCTURE Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-36

Exposed to Air Support (External) Reaction (T-17)

Indoor (ASR) E, 517

Uncontrolled Monitoring

Program

StructuresBSAS Concrete Monitoring

DISCHARGE Program E, 511

TRANSITION Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A51 2 3.5.1-3 6

STRUCTURE Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-17)

Exposed to Air (AcSR) E, 517

Outdoor Monitoring

Program

Structures

BSAS Concrete Monitoring

DISCHARGE Program E, 511

TRANSITION Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica Aa-iA.3 2 3.5.1-3 6

STRUCTURE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-17)

Exposed to Air (AcSR) E, 517

Outdoor Monitoring

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 8 of 40

Structures

BSAS Concrete Monitoring

DISCHARGE Program E, 511

TRANSITION Structural Raw Water Expansion Aa-i 2.3 SRCUE Spot Concrete ~ rcig Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-36

STRUCTURE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T- 17) Exposed to Raw (ASR) E, 517

Water Monitoring

Program

Structures

BSAS Concrete Monitoring A FIRE Program FIRE Air Indoor PUMPHOUSE Structural Expansion III.A3- Concrete Uncontrolled Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Indoor (A SR)

Uncontrolled Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

BSAS Concrete Program

FIRE III.A3- PUMPHOUSE Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-27 ExposedCo(External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

BSAS Concrete Monitoring

INTAKE Program E, 511

TRANSITION Air Indoor III.A6- Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-36

Exposed to Air Support (External) Reaction (T-17)

Indoor (ASR) E, 517

Uncontrolled Monitoring

Program

Structures

BSAS Concrete Monitoring INTAKE Program E, 511 INTAKEIII.A6-

TRANSITION Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica Aa-i 2 2.3 3.5.1-36

STRUCTURE Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T- 17)

Exposed to Air (ASR) E, 517

Outdoor Monitoring

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12 101

Page 9 of 40

Structures

BSAS Concrete Monitoring

INTAKE Program E, 511

TRANSITION Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Aa-i Alkali-Silica 2. 2 3.5.1-363

STRUCTURE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T- 17)

Exposed to Air (ASR) E, 517

Outdoor (S)E 1 Monitoring

Program

Structures

BSAS Concrete Monitoring

INTAKE Program E, 511

TRANSITION Structural Raw Water Expansion Aa-i 2. 3

STRUCTURE Support Concrete (External) and Cracking Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-36 Exoedt RwReaction (T- 17) Exposed to Raw (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

BSAS Concrete Monitoring A

NONESSENTIAL Program

SWITCHGEAR Air Indoor III.A3- BUILDING Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Support (External) Reaction (T-03)

Indoor (ASR) E, 517

Uncontrolled Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring

Program E, 511

BSAS Concrete III.A6-

REVETMENT Flood Concrete Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-36 BelowBarrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T- 17)

(ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring

Program E, 511

BSAS Concrete Soil Expansion III.A6-

REVETMENT Support Concrete Soil ansin Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-36

Below Grade (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-17)

(ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12 101

Page 10 of 40

517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction

(ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will

be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring

Program.
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 11 of 40

10. In Table 3.5.2-2, starting on page 3.5-68, line items associated with 3.5.1-15, and 3.5.1-

27 are revised and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

Inede ,Aginig Effect NUREg Table Intend(G-1801. !Component Type Ft Material Environment Requiring. Management I3.X-1 Note

~Managernent PreiiiH ~Item

Structures

Monitoring A

CNT-CE- Program

Reinforced Shelter, Concrete Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A1-2 3.5.1-27

Concrete Below Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Grade (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

CNT-CE- Program

Reinforced Structural Concrete Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A1-2 3.5.1-27

Concrete Below Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Grade (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

CNT-CE- Program

Reinforced Shelter, Air Indoor Expansion III.A 1-2

Concrete Exposed Protection Concrete Uncontrolled Alkali-Silica 3 5.1-27

to Air Indoor (External) and Cracking Reaction 3 .

Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

CNT-CE- Program

Reinforced Structural Air Indoor Expansion III.A 1-2

Concrete Exposed Pressure Concrete Uncontrolled Alkali-Silica 3 5.1-27

to Air Indoor Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction 3 .

Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring

CNT-CE- Program A

Reinforced Structural Air Indoor Ucnrl Ed Expansion xAlkali-Silica ILA1-2 511-2

Concrete Exposed Strt Concrete Uncontrolled (T-03)

to Air Indoor Support (External) and Cracking Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 12 of 40

CNT-CEReinforced

to Air Outdoor

CNT-CEReinforced

to Air Outdoor

CNT-CEReinforced

to Air Outdoor

CNT-CEReinforced

to Air Outdoor

CNT-CEReinforced

to Air Outdoor
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12 101

Page 13 of 40

CNT-CEVAReinforced

Concrete Below

Grade

CNT-CEVAReinforced

Concrete Below

Grade

CNT-CEVAReinforced

to Air Indoor

Uncontrolled

CNT-CEVAReinforced

to Air Indoor

Uncontrolled

CNT-CEVAReinforced

to Air Indoor

Uncontrolled
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 14 of 40

CNT-CEVAReinforced

to Air Indoor

Uncontrolled

CNT-CEVAReinforced

to Air Outdoor

CNT-CEVAReinforced

to Air Outdoor

CNT-CEVAReinforced

to Air Outdoor

CNT-CEVAReinforced

to Air Outdoor
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 15 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

CNT-CI- Program

Reinforced Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A4-2 Concrete Exposed Fir Concrete Uncontrolled. Alkali-Silica 3.5.1-27

to Air Indoor Barrier (External) and Cracking Reactio(T-03)

Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

CNT-CI- Program

Reinforced Flood Air Indoor Expansion JII.A4-2

Concrete Exposed Barrier Barrieral) Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Aai-liaeton(Y-03) 3 51-27 .Alkali-Silica 

to Air Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring £, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

CNT-CI- Program

Reinforced Air Indoor Expansion III.A4-2

Concrete Exposed Barrie Concrete Uncontrolled ansin Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

to Air Indoor Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

CNT-CL- Program Reinforced Air Indoor Corc ed Structural Expansion III.A4-2 Concrete Exposed Support Concrete Uncontrolled 3 51-27 .Alkali-Silica 

to Air Indoor (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E,517

Program

ASME Section

XI,

CNT-CS- Subsection A

Reinforced Fire Air Indoor Expansion IWL Program

Concrete Exposed Fir Concrete Uncontrolled IalA(3.5.1-15 tAiinor Barrier (Etra) and Cracking Alkali-Silica (C-04)

to Air Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 16 of 40

ASME Section

XI,

CNT-CS- Subsection A

Reinforced Flood Air Indoor Expansion IWL Program

Concrete Exposed toArInor Barierae Concrete Uncontrolled ( t) Epan and Cracking in- Alkali-Silica (C-04) 3.51-15 3511

to Air Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

ASME Section

XI, A

CNT-CS- Subsection

Reinforced CoceeEpsd Concreteg Exposede HIELB Cnrt Air Uncontrolled Indoor Expansion IWL Program I1.AI-3 3511

toniree In oo d Shielding (e nterol)d and Cracking Alkali-Silica (C-04) 3.5.1-15

to Air Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

ASME Section

XI,

CNT-CS- Subsection A

Reinforced Missile Air Indoor Expansion IWL Program

Concrete Exposed Barrie Concrete Uncontrolled a clA(3.5.1-15 tAiInor Barrier (Etra) and Cracking Alkali-Silica (C-04)

to Air Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

ASME Section

XI,

CNT-CS- Subsection A

Reinforced Shelter Air Indoor Expansion I Program A-3

Concrete Exposed Concrete Uncontrolled ansin AI-Aa-0 3.5.1-15 to Air Indoor Protection (External) and Cracking Alkali-Silica (C-04)

Unoto ole Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

ASME Section

XI,

CNT-CS- Subsection A

Reinforced Air Indoor IWL Program

Concrete Exposed Shielding Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-SiliAa (C-04) 3.5.1-15

to Air Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 17 of 40

517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction

(ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will

be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring

Program.
Enclosure I

SBK-L-12101

Page 18 of 40

11. In Table 3.5.2-4, starting on page 3.5-128, line items associated with 3.5.1-27 are revised

and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

StruceTable

Copnn Tje> Intended.AigEfc gn G101 Componet TNop Material E~nvironment Ruing jMan~agement-' l 3.X-1 Note

Mýanagemeint KProgram Ie -~ '~tent,

Structures

MYS - Concrete Monitoring A

CONTROL ROOM Air IndoorProgram

MAKEUP AIR Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 INTAKE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

STRUCTURE Air (ASR)

Indoor Uncontrolled (ntr) E, 517 Monitoring

Program

Structures

MYS - Concrete Monitoring A

CONTROL ROOM Ground Program

MAKEUP AIR Structural Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

INTAKE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

STRUCTURE Below (ASR)

Grade (A Monitoring tr) E, 517

Program

Structures

MYS - Concrete Monitoring A

CONTROL ROOM Program

MAKEUP AIR Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

INTAKE Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

STRUCTURE (ASR)

Exposed to Weather Monitoring rE, E 5171

Program

Structures

MYS - Concrete Monitoring A

CONTROL ROOM Program

MAKEUP AIR Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

INTAKE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

STRUCTURE (ASR) Ra

Exposed to Weather Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 19 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete Program

ENCLOSURE FOR Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2

CONDENSATE Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled nd Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

STORAGE TANK Air (External) Reaction

Indoor Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete Program

ENCLOSURE FOR Structural Air Indoor Expansion JJI.A3-2

CONDENSATE StSupporl Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

STORAGE TANK Air (External) Reaction

Indoor Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete Program

ENCLOSURE FOR Stctal Ground Expansion III.A3-2

CONDENSATE Strt Concrete Water/Soil ansin Alkali-Silica (TI.3) 3.5.1-27

STORAGE TANK Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T03)

Below Grade (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete Program ENCLOSURE FOR MsieArOtor EpninIIA- CONDENSATE Brie Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica 1I.A3-2 3.5.1-27

STORAGE TANK Barrier Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Weather (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete Program ENCLOSURE FOR StutrlArOtor EpninI.3- CONDENSATE Strt Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica II.A3-2 3.5.1-27

STORAGE TANK Support Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Weather (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

I___ _ 1_ _ 1_ Program I _I _I
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12 101

Page 20 of 40

Structures

MYS - Concrete NON Monitoring A

SAFETY RELATED Air IndoorProgram

ELECTRICAL DUCT Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

BANKS/MANHOLES Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Indoor (taRe

Uncontrolled Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete NON Program

SAFETY RELATED Ground

ELECTRICAL DUCT Strt Concrete Water/Soil xpansion Alkali-Silica (T0A32 3.5.1-27

BANKS/MANHOLES (External) Reaction

Below Grade (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete NON Program

SAFETY RELATED Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

MANHOLES Exposed Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

to Weather (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

MYS - Concrete Monitoring A

SAFETY RELATED Air IndoorProgram

ELECTRICAL DUCT Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

BANKS/MANHOLES Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Indoor ( a Re

Uncontrolled Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring

MYS - Concrete Program A

SAFETY RELATED Structural Ground Expansion III.A3-2

ELECTRICAL DUCT Strt Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-0 3.5.1-27

BANKS/MANHOLES (External) Reaction

Below Grade (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12 101

Page 21 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete Program

SAFETY RELATED Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

MANHOLES Exposed Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

to Weather (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete Program

SAFETY RELATED Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

MANHOLES Exposed Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

to Weather (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete Air IndoorProgram

SERVICE WATER Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

ACCESS VAULT Air Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Indoor Uncontrolled (AESR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

MYS - Concrete Ground Eaogr31

SERVICE WATER Structural Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

ACCESS VAULT Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Below Grade (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring

MYS - Concrete Program A

SERVICE WATER Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

ACCESS VAULT Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Raw Water (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 22 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete Program STATION Ground

BLACKOUT Structural GrudExpansion III.A3-2 3512 BLACKOUT .tSupport Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T.A03) 3.5.1-27

STRUCTURES Below (External) Reaction

Grade (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete Program STATION BLACKOUT Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion AlkaiSii II.A3-2 3.5.1-27 STRUCTURES Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Weather (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

Structures

MYS - Concrete Sump Monitoring A

CONTROL ROOM Program

MAKEUP AIR Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

INTAKE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

STRUCTURE (ASR)eac

Exposed to Raw Water Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

MYS - Concrete Sump Monitoring A

NON SAFETY Program

RELATED ELECTRICAL DUCT Strt Conc Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica (T.A32 3.5.1-27

BANKS/MANHOLES Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Raw (ASR) E, 517

Water Monitoring

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

MYS - Concrete Sump Program

SAFETY RELATED Raw Water Expansion IIIA3-2

ELECTRICAL DUCT Structural Concrete (External) and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

BANKS/MANHOLES Reaction

Exposed to Raw Water (ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction

(ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will

be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring

Program.
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12 101

Page 23 of 40

12. In Table 3.5.2-5, starting on page 3.5-15 1, line items associated with 3.5.1-27 are revised

and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

AgYing Effect AigTbe

NýConipobenit Type Inedd Material Environment R~equiring Management, G11 3.-1 Note". FunctionManagem.ent P.o•oran]i I tei

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

PST - Reinforced Flood Ground EII.A1-2

Concrete -CDG- BFloo Barierand Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Cracking Alkali-Silica Reactio (T-03) 3.5.1-27

Below Grade (External) Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

PST - Reinforced Ground Expansion . ILI-2

Concrete -CDG- Structural Concrete Water/Soil ansin Alkali-Silica (T-2 3.5.1-27

Below Grade Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -CDG- Fire Air Indoor Expansion' III.A1-2

Exposed to Air Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -CDG- Air Indoor

Exposed to Air Supt Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica (T-A3) 3.5.1-27

Indoor Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -CDG- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A1-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (AcSR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 24 of 40

PST - Reinforced

Concrete -CDGExposed to Air

Outdoor

Shelter,

Protection Concrete Air Outdoor

(External)

Expansion

and Cracking

Structures

Monitoring

Program

Alkali-Silica

Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring

Program

III.A 1-2

(T-03)-

A

3.5.1-27

E, 517

Structures

Monitoring A, 512

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -CDG- Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A 1-27

Exposed to Raw Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Water (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program PS-T - ~~~~~~GroundExasoIIA32 3517

Concrete - Structural Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

CEHMS- Below Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Grade (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete - Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

CEHMS- Exposed Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

to Air Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

Program PST Concrete - Reinforced -EFP- Flood F o dGround Concrete Water/Soil Expansion E p ni nIIA Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 - 3.5.1-27

Below Grade (External) and Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 

1

SBK-L-12101

Page 25 of 40

PST 

- Reinforced

Concrete -EFPBelow Grade

PST - Reinforced

Concrete -EFPExposed to Air

Indoor

Uncontrolled

PST - Reinforced

Concrete -EFPExposed to Air

Indoor

Uncontrolled

PST - Reinforced

Concrete -EFPExposed to Air

Outdoor

PST - Reinforced

Concrete -EFPExposed to Air

Outdoor
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 26 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A, 512

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -EFP- Structural Raw Water Expansion Alki-Sii III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Raw Support Cte(External) and Cracking Realn (T-03)

Water Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

PST - Reinforced Ground Expansion 1.A5-2

Concrete -FSB- Flood Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

Below Grade (External) Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

PST - Reinforced Ground Expansion III.A5-2

Concrete -FSB- Structural Concrete Water/Soil ansin Alkali-Silica (T-2 3.5.1-27

Below Grade Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -FSB- Fire Air Indoor Expasion III.A5-2

Exposed to Air Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -FSB- Air Indoor Expansion III.A5-2

Exposed to Air Shielding Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 27 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -FSB- Structal Air Indoor Expansion III.A5-2

Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -FSB- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A5-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -FSB- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A5-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A, 512

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -FSB- Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A5-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Raw Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Water (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

Program PST - Reinforced F o dGround E p ni nIIA - Concrete -PAB- Flood Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica II.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Below Grade (External) Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure I

SBK-L-12101

Page 28 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

Program PST Concrete - Reinforced -PAB- Structural St u t rlGround Concrete Water/Soil E ansin p ni nII Alkali-Silica A - III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Below Grade Support (External) Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -PAB- Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2

Exposed to Air BFir Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -PAB- Structural Air Indoor

Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion AlkaliSii (TI03) 3.5.1-27 Indoor (External) and Cracking Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -PAB- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (AcSR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -PAB- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (AcSR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure I

SBK-L-12101

Page 29 of 40

PST - Reinforced

Concrete -PCEWBelow Grade

PST - Reinforced

Concrete -PCEWBelow Grade

PST - Reinforced

Concrete -PCEWExposed to Air

Indoor

Uncontrolled

PST - Reinforced

Concrete -PCEWExposed to Air

Indoor

Uncontrolled

PST - Reinforced

Concrete -PCEWExposed to Air

Indoor

Uncontrolled
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12 101

Page 30 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -PCEW- Structural Air Indoor Expansion Expnsin IlI.A3-2 Ii. 3 51-2

Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-0 3.5.1-27

Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -PCEW- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -PCEW- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A, 512

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -PCEW- Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Raw Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Water (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

Program PST - Reinforced F o dGround E p ni nIIA - Concrete -PHA- Flood Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica (TI.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Below Grade (External) Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 31 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

PST - Reinforced Structural Ground Expansion III.A3-2

Concrete -PHA- Spot Concrete Water/Soil an rcig Alkali-silica (T0) 3.5.1-27 Below Grade Suctura (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -PHA- Fire Air Indoor Expansion I11.A3-2

Exposed to Air Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled Alkali-Silica (T03) 3.5.1-27

Indoor (External) and Cracking Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -PHA- Structural Air Indoor

Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (TI03) 3.5.1-27

Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -PHA- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

PST - Reinforced Ground

Concrete -TFA- Flood Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica (T.A32 3.5.1-27

Below Grade (External) Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12 101

Page 32 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

Program PST Concrete - Reinforced -TFA- Structural St u t rlG Concrete Water/Soil round E ansin p ni nII Alkali-Silica (IT.A3-2 A - 3.5.1-27

Below Grade Support (External) Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -TFA- Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2

Exposed to Air Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -TFA- Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2

Exposed to Air Shielding Concrete Uncontrolled (T-03) 51-27

Indoor (External) and Cracking Reaction 3 .

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -TFA- Structural Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2

Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -TFA- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 33 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -TFA- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (AcSR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

PST - Reinforced Ground Expansion I1I.A3-2

Concrete -WPB- Flood Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

Below Grade (External) Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

PST - Reinforced Structural GroundConcreteoWate

Concrete -WPB- SGrt Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica (TI.3) 3.5.1-27

Below Grade Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -WPB- Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2

Exposed orir to Air Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) .5.1-27

Indoor Barrier (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -WPB- Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2

Exposed to Air Shielding Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 34 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -WPB- Structural Air Indoor Expansion . J.A3-2

Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -WPB- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (3-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

PST - Reinforced Program

Concrete -WPB- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction

(ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will

be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring

Program.

13. In Table 3.5.2-7, starting on page 3.5-242, line items associated with 3.5.1-27 are revised

and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

Intndd Agin- Effect Aging G-1 80

Componeent Type Material Environment Requirini r g Manahgement V I,, 3.X-l Note

Function HManagement.l Irgamitem

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

TUR - Concrete Structural Raw Water Expansion III.A3-2

(Sump) - Exposed Support Concrete (External) and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

to Raw WaterReaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 35 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

TUR - Concrete - Structural Air Outdoor Expansion III.A3-2

Exposed to Air Concrete xrn and in Alkali-Silica 3.5.1-27

Outdoor Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

Program

TUR - Concrete - Structural Air Indoor Expansion . J.A3-2

in Air Indoor Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

Uncontrolled (External) Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction

(ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will

be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring

Program.

14. In Table 3.5.2-8, starting on page 3.5-247, line items associated with 3.5.1-27 are revised

and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

LheddUAginigEffect AgingTal

Co•mponent Type Material Environment Re 'iiii)ng Management I 3X- Not0 Function, Management Volr.n Vj2 y31 Nt Prga -w I tem

Structures

Monitoring A

WCS - Concrete - Program CIRCULATING Structural GroundConcreteoWate WATER Srtr Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

PUMPHOUSE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Below Grade (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A

CIRCULATING Program

WATER Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

PUMPHOUSE in Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Indoor ( r eato Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 36 of 40

Structures

Monitoring A

WCS - Concrete - Program CIRCULATING Shelter, Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 51-27

PUMPHOUSE Protection Concrete (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

WCS - Concrete - Program

CIRCULATING

WATER Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

PUMPHOUSE in Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Raw Water (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A

SERVICE Program WATER Ground COOLING Structural Groil Expansion III.A3-2 3.5 1-27

COLIGSupport Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3512

TOWER Including (External) Reaction

Switchgear Rooms (ASR)

Below Grade Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A

SERVICE Program WATER COOLING Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.51-27 TOLING Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

TOWER Including Reaction

Switchgear Rooms (ASR)

in Air Outdoor Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A

SERVICE Program WATER IIA- COOLING Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica IIIA32 51-27 TOLING Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

TOWER Including Reaction

Switchgear Rooms (ASR)

in Air Outdoor Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 37 of 40

Structures

WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A

SERVICE Program

WATER Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

COOLING - Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

TOWER in Raw (ASR)

Water Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A

SERVICE Program

WATER Ultimate Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

COOLING Heat Sink (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

TOWER in Raw (ASR)

Water Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A

SERVICE Program

WATER Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2

COOLING TWR Fir Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

Including Swgr (External) Reaction

Rms in Air Indoor (ASR)

Uncontrolled -M11onitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A

SERVICE Program

WATER Stctal Air Indoor Expansion JII.A3-2

COOLING TWR Strt Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

Including Swgr S (External) Reaction

Rms in Air Indoor (ASR)

Uncontrolled Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

WCS - Concrete - Program

SERVICE Stctal Ground Expansion III.A3-2

WATER Support Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

PUMPHOUSE (External) Reaction

Below Grade (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12101

Page 38 of 40

Structures

WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A

SERVICE Program

WATER Fire Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

PUMPHOUSE in Barrier (External) and-Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Indoor (xra Re Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A

SERVICE Air IndoorProgram

WATER Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

PUMPHOUSE in Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Indoor (ASR)

Uncontrolled Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

WCS - Concrete - Program

SERVICE III.A3-2

WATER Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27

PUMPHOUSE in Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction

Air Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

WCS - Concrete - Program

SERVICE Shelter, Air Outdoor Expansion AlkliSili III.A 3.5.1-27

WATERVICE Concrete (Exter IA(T-03)-

PUMPHOUSE in Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction

Air Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

Structures

Monitoring A

WCS - Concrete - Program

WATER Structural Raw Water Expansion AlkliSii III.A3-2 3.5.1-27

SAERVIESrcua Concrete (External)ic and5Cackin

PUMPHOUSE in Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Raw Water (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction

(ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will

be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring

Program.
Enclosure I

SBK-L-12101

Page 39 of 40

15. The following four line items which were added under SBK-L- 11063 dated April 14,

2011 (Ref. Page 6 of 7 of Enclosure 2) are revised and a new plant specific note 517 is

added as follows:

giAin TablUR ComponentdType Material Environment Requiring. Management G- iX- Note

~CmoetTp ucin-Management jTyi..ogram Vol.I

Iteem

ASME Section

XI,

Subsection A

CNT-CS- Cracking due JWL Program

Reinforced Missile Concrete Raw Water to expansion/ I1.A1-3 3.5.1-15

Concrete Exposed Barrier (External) reaction with Alkali-Silica (C-04)

to Raw Water aggregates Reaction

(ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

ASME Section

XI, A

Subsection

CNT-CS- Cracking due IWL Program

Reinforced Shelter, Concrete Raw Water to expansion/ IL.A1-3 3.5.1-15

Concrete Exposed Protection (External) reaction with Alkali-Silica (C-04)

to Raw Water aggregates Reaction

(ASR) E, 517

Monitoring

Program

ASME Section

XI, A

Subsection

CNT-CS- Structural Cracking due IWL Program

ReinforcedPressure Concrete Raw Water to expansion/ IL.AI-3 3.5.1-15

Concrete Exposed Prre (External) reaction with Alkali-Silica (C-04)

to Raw Water aggregates Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

ASME Section

XI, A

Subsection

CNT-CS- Cracking due IWL Program

Reinforced Structural Concrete Raw Water to expansion/ II.A 1-3 3.5.1-15

Concrete Exposed Support (External) reaction with Alkali-Silica (C-04)

to Raw Water aggregates Reaction

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517

Program

517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction

(ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will
Enclosure 1

SBK-L-12 101

Page 40 of 40

be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring

Program.

16. The concrete fire barriers that are included in section 3.3 of the LRA have .credited the

Fire Protection Program as the aging management program in section 3.3. Because all of

the concrete fire barriers are also structural concrete covered in section 3.5, they will also

be inspected by the Structures Monitoring Program as specified in section 3.5. All of the

AMR line items with structural concrete that are subject to Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR)

in section 3.3 are also listed in section 3.5, where the new Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring Program is being added to the Structures Monitoring Program. This will

ensure that the concrete fire barriers will also be inspected for ASR and no changes are

needed to section 3.3 to address ASR.
Enclosure 2 to SBK-L-12101

Changes to the

Seabrook Station License Renewal Application

Associated with

Appendix A - Updated UFSAR Supplement

and

Appendix B - Aging Management Programs
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12101

Page 2 of 18

Introduction

Enclosure 2 contains an update to the information provided in the NextEra Energy Seabrook

License Renewal Application (LRA), Appendix A and Appendix B. Included in this update

are changes which augment the existing Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31, by addition

of a plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program, B.2.1.3 IA. The ASR

Monitoring Program will be used to augment the existing Structures Monitoring Program to

identify plant structures affected by ASR, monitor its progression and take corrective action

such that intended functions are maintained.

CHANGES TO LRA APPENDIX A

The following changes have been made to Appendix A of the Seabrook License Renewal

Application (LRA). For clarity, entire sentences or paragraphs from the LRA are provided

with deleted text highlighted by strikethroughs and inserted text highlighted by bolded italics:

Add line A.2.1.3 1A to APPENDIX A - Table of Contents, page A-I17, as follows:

A .2.1.31 Structures M onitoring Program ....................................................................................... A- 16

A.2.1.31A Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring ................................................. A-17

a) Add Item #31A to Section A.1.1, on page A-5, as follows:

31. Structures Monitoring Program (A.2.1.31)

31A. Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring (A.2.1.31A)

b) Add new section A.2.1.31A to page A-17, as follows:

A.2.1.31A ALKALI-SILICA REACTION (ASR) MONITORING

The Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program manages cracking due to expansion and

reaction with aggregates of concrete structures within the scope of license renewal. The program

is consistent with the ten elements of an acceptable aging management program as described in

NUREG-1800 Appendix A.1, Section A.1.2.3 and Table A.1-1.

The Structural Monitoring Program performs visual inspections of the concrete structures at

Seabrook for indications of the presence of alkali-silica reaction (ASR). ASR is detected by

visual observation of cracking on the surface of the concrete. The cracking is typically

accompanied by the presence of moisture and efflorescence. Concrete affected by expansive

ASR is typically characterized by a network or "pattern" of cracks. ASR involves the formation

of an alkali-silica gel which expands when exposed to water. Microcracking due to ASR is

generated through forces applied by the expanding aggregate particles and/or swelling of the

alkali-silica gel within and around the boundaries of reacting aggregate particles. The ASR gel

may exude from the crack forming white secondary deposits at the concrete surface. The gel also
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12 101

Page 3 of 18

often causes a dark discoloration of the cement paste surrounding the crack at the concrete

surface. If pattern or map cracking typical of concrete affected by ASR is identified, an

evaluation will be performed to determine further actions.

To manage the aging effects of cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates in

concrete structures, the existing Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31, has been augmented

by this plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31A. The ASR

Monitoring Program is structured according to the guidelines in ACI 349.3R, "Structural

Condition Assessment of Buildings."

ASR is detected by visual observation of cracking on the surface of the concrete. The cracking is

typically accompanied by the presence of moisture and efflorescence. Monitoring of crack

growth is used to assess the long term implications of ASR and specify monitoring intervals.

A Combined Cracking Index (CCI) and Individual Crack Width criteria are established as

thresholds at which structural evaluation is necessary. The CCI represents the expansion along

the entire perimeter of the 20-inch by 20-inch square. A CCI of less than the 1.0 mm/i and

Individual Crack Width of less than 1.0 mm can be deemed acceptable with

deficiencies. Deficiencies determined to be acceptable with further review are trended for

evidence offurther degradation. A CCI of 1.0 mm/im or greater, or an Individual Crack Width of

1.0 mm or greater requires structural evaluation.

The Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program will monitor at least 20 locations that

represent the highest CCI values recorded during the baseline inspections. Follow-up inspection

of these locations will be performed at six month intervals.

c) Add Commitment #71 to Table A.3, "License Renewal Commitment List", page A-43 as follows:

A.3 LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENT LIST

UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT LOCAT LOCATION SCHEDULE

Alkali-Silica Reaction Implement the Alkali-Silica Reaction Prior to entering the

71 (ASR) Monitoring (ASR) Monitoring Program B.2.1.31A period of extended

Program operation.
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12101

Page 4 of 18

CHANGES TO LRA APPENDIX B

The following changes have been made to Appendix B of the Seabrook License Renewal

Application (LRA). For clarity, revised sections include entire sentences or paragraphs from

the LRA and are shown with deleted text highlighted by strikethroughs and inserted text

highlighted by bolded italics:

a) Revise Appendix B - Table of Contents, page B-2 to add line B.2.1.31A to as follows:

B.2.1.31 Structures M onitoring Program ................................................ B-164

B.2.1.31A Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program ..................... B-1 74

b) Revise B.1.5, "NUREG-1801 CHAPTER XI AGING MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS"

on page B-9 to add line 31A to as follows:

31 Structures Monitoring Program (B.2.1.31) [Existing]

31A. Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program (B.2.1.31A) [New]

c) Revised B.2.0, "Aging Management Correlation Chart- NUREG-1801 To Seabrook

Station Programs", on page B-14 as follows:

~NU~RiG-m81

NumerNUJREG 1801 Program 1⁄4 SeabrdOk Stationi Program

Seabrook Station Plant Specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Program Monitoring

d) Add to B.2.0, "NUREG-1801 Chapter XI Aging Management Programs", new Section

B.2.1.31A, Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program in its entirety, to page B174, as follows:

B.2.1.31A ALKALI-SILICA REACTION MONITORING PROGRAM

Program Description

NextEra Energy Seabrook Operating Experience (OE) indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction

(ASR) is present in concrete structures and will require monitoring through the Period of

Extended Operation.
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12101

Page 5 of 18

Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is a reaction that occurs over time in concrete between

alkaline cement paste and reactive, non-crystalline silica in aggregates. An expansive gel

is formed within aggregates resulting in micro cracks in aggregates and in the adjacent

cement paste. Because the ASR mechanism requires the presence of water, ASR has

been predominantly detected in groundwater impacted portions of below grade structures,

with limited impact to exterior surfaces of above grade structures.

The ASR developed at Seabrook because the concrete mix designs utilized an aggregate

that was susceptible to Alkali-Silica Reaction, which was not known at the time.

Although the testing was conducted in accordance with the ASTM C289 standard, this

standard was subsequently identified as limited in its ability to predict long term ASR.

To manage the aging effects of cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates in

concrete structures, the existing Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31, has been

augmented by this plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program,

B.2.1.3 IA. The ASR Monitoring Program will be structured according to the guidelines

in ACI 349.3R, "Structural Condition Assessment of Buildings. "

Evaluations of a structure's condition are completed according to the guidelines set forth

in the Structural Monitoring Program (the Seabrook Station Maintenance Rule program

that implements the Structures Monitoring Program). The acceptance guidelines in the

Structural Monitoring Program are a three-tier hierarchy similar to that described in ACI

349.3R-96, which provides quantitative degradation limits. Under this system, structures

are evaluated for ASR as detailed in the following Table. ASR affected areas classified

to be Unacceptable (requires further evaluation) or Acceptable with Deficiencies are

monitored in accordance with the Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program.

Recommendation for Combined Cracking PructgralMonategoring Individual Concrete lndex Individual Crack Width

tComponents CCI

Unacceptable (requires Structural Evaluation 1.0 m/m or greater 1.0 mm or greater

further evaluation)

Quantitative Monitoring 0.5 mm/m or greater 0.2 mm or greater

Acceptable with and Trending

Deficiencies QAny area with indications of pattern cracking or

sQualitative Monitoring water ingress

Routine inspection as Area has no indications of pattern cracking or water

Acceptable prescribed by Structures

Monitoring Program ingress - No visual presence of ASR
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12 101

Page 6 of 18

Industry Expert Engagement

Alkali-Silica Reaction is a newly identified aging mechanism to Seabrook and little or no

experience exists in management of its aging effects in the US nuclear industry. NextEra

has engaged several subject matter experts with knowledge of ASR and its impact on

concrete structures. Based on this expertise, NextEra has concluded that the mechanical

properties of the in-situ structures, that are highly reinforced with rebar steel, are

expected to be higher than the results from core bore testing (4" concrete bore with no

rebar).

Principle references used in development of this aging management program consist of

the following input of subject matter experts and both nuclear and non-nuclear sources:

- "Report on the Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Mitigation of Alkali-Silica Reaction in

Transportation Structures," U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Federal Highway

Administration, January 2010, Report Number FHWA-HIF-09-004.

- "Structural Effects of Alkali-Silica Reaction: Technical Guidance on the Appraisal of

Existing Structures," Institution of Structural Engineers, July 1992.

- ORNL/NRC/LTR-95/14, "In-Service Inspection Guidelines for Concrete Structures in

Nuclear Power Plants," December 1995."

- "Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures and

Attachments", MPR-3727, Revision 0, April 2012.

Monitoring

Monitoring of ASR associated cracks is an effective method for determining ASR

progression. Monitoring of ASR associated cracks at Seabrook is implemented with two

measurements. One is Cracking Index (CI) and the other is Individual Crack Width.

The CI is a quantitative assessment of cracking present in the cover concrete of affected

structures. A CI measurement is taken on accessible surfaces exhibiting ASR pattern

cracking. The process for determining the Cracking Index (CI) is described in the Federal

Highway Administration (FHWA) document FHWA-HIF-09-004, "Report on the

Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Mitigation of Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) in Transportation

Structures." The Cracking Index is the summation of the crack widths on the horizontal

or vertical sides of a 20-inch by 20-inch square on the ASR-affected concrete surface.

Since each side of the square is 0.5 m, the Cracking Index in a given direction is reported

in units of min/m.

The horizontal and vertical Cracking Indices are averaged to obtain a Combined Cracking

Index (CCI) for each area of interest. The CCI represents the expansion along the entire

perimeter of the 20-inch by 20-inch square. Criteria used in assessment of expansion is

expressed in terms of CCI and based on recommendations provided in MPR-3727,

Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12101

Page 7 of 18

and Attachments. The CCI and individual crack width are compared to ASR screening

criteria and categorized for Qualitative or Quantitative Monitoring and Trending and

Structural Evaluation.

The progression of ASR degradation of the concrete is an important consideration for

assessing the long term implications of ASR and specifying monitoring intervals. The

most reliable means for establishing the progression of ASR degradation is to monitor

expansion of the concrete in situ.

Individual Crack Width measurement is also an effective method for assessment of ASR

affected areas. Screening criteria used in the assessment of Individual Crack Width,

expressed in terms of mm, are based on recommendations provided in MPR-3727,

Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures

and Attachments.

NextEra has performed a baseline inspection and ASR associated cracks have been

evaluated and categorized. NextEra has assessed 131 accessible areas to date in this

manner. The areas affected by ASR have been identified and assessed for apparent

degradation from ASR, including estimation of in situ expansion. The results are

presented in MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction

on Concrete Structures and Attachments. Monitoring of Cracking Index and Individual

Crack Width of at least 20 areas identified in the baseline inspection as having the largest

CCI will be performed at six month intervals. Trend data from these follow-up

inspections will be used in determining the progression of ASR degradation and a basis

for any change to the frequency of the inspection of ASR affected areas. Documentation

and trend data will be maintained in accordance with the Structures Monitoring Program

and established guidelines of ACI 349.3R, "Structural Condition Assessment of

Buildings. "

Acceptance Criteria

Several published studies describe screening methods to determine when structural

evaluations of ASR affected concrete are appropriate and how to prioritize such

evaluations. In MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica

Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments, these studies were reviewed for

applicability. The report concludes: "while these screening methods are based on lightly

or unreinforced concrete structures, they are useful in the absence of criteria directly

relevant to the highly-reinforced concrete structures used in nuclear generating

facilities, " and, "Confinement provided by reinforcing steel and other restraints is a key

factor regarding the impact of ASR on reinforced concrete structures. Confinement limits

ASR expansion of the in situ structure, which reduces the extent of deleterious cracking

and the resultant reduction in concrete properties. "
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12101

Page 8 of 18

NextEra has performed a baseline inspection and ASR associated cracks have been

evaluated and categorized. NextEra has assessed 131 accessible areas to date in this

manner. The areas affected by ASR have been identified and assessed for apparent

degradation from ASR, including estimation of in situ expansion. The results are

presented in MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction

on Concrete Structures and Attachments. This report provides recommendations and the

basis for thresholds used in the Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program. The

ASR Monitoring Program establishes the screening criteria for ASR affected areas. ASR

affected areas are screened and categorized for Qualitative or Quantitative Monitoring

and Trending and Structural Evaluation.

A Combined Cracking Index (CCI) of less than the 1.0 mm/m and Individual Crack

Width of less than 1.0 mm can be deemed Acceptable with Deficiencies. Areas with

deficiencies determined to be acceptable with further review are trended for evidence of

further degradation. Documentation and trend data will be maintained in accordance

with the Structures Monitoring Program and established guidelines of ACI 349.3R,

"Structural Condition Assessment of Buildings. "

Areas with a CCI of 1.0 mm/m or greater, or an Individual Crack Width of 1.0 mm or

greater are deemed Unacceptable and require a structural evaluation. This evaluation is

performed to ensure impacted structures are in compliance with the Current Licensing

Basis and is documented in the Corrective Action Program. The engineering evaluation

will be typical to those structural evaluations that have already been performed for

Alkali-Silica Reaction. The Engineering Evaluation will consider the need to perform a

detailed appraisal to determine potential capacity reductions, or the need to perform

special studies, testing, and monitoring. Additionally, Corrective Actions requiring repair

are entered in the Work Control Program for implementation.

Evaluation

Evaluations are performed to ensure impacted structures are in compliance with the

Current Licensing Basis. These evaluations are documented in the Corrective Action

Program. Additionally, Corrective Actions requiring repair are entered in the Work

Control Program for implementation. Deficiencies determined to be acceptable by

engineering review are trended for evidence of further degradation.

Conclusion

To manage the aging effects of cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates in

concrete structures, the existing Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31, has been

augmented by this plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program,

B.2.1.3 IA. The ASR Monitoring Program will be structured according to the guidelines

in ACI 349.3R, "Structural Condition Assessment of Buildings. "
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12 101

Page 9 of 18

A Combined Cracking Index (CCI) of less than the 1.0 mm/m and Individual Crack

Width of less than 1.0 mm can be deemed Acceptable with Deficiencies. Areas with

deficiencies determined to be acceptable with further review are trended for evidence of

further degradation. A CCI of 1.0 mmn/m or greater, or an Individual Crack Width of 1.0

mm or greater are deemed Unacceptable and require further evaluation.

NextEra has performed a baseline inspection and ASR associated cracks have been

evaluated and categorized. NextEra has assessed 131 accessible areas to date in this

manner. The areas affected by ASR have been identified and assessed for apparent

degradation from ASR, including estimation of in situ expansion. Monitoring of CI and

Individual Crack Width of at least 20 areas identified in the baseline inspection as having

the CCI will be performed at six month intervals. Measurement of Cracking Index and

Individual Crack Width will be performed in the same areas as the baseline. Trend data

from these follow-up inspections will be used in determining the progression of ASR and

a basis for any change to the frequency of the inspection.

Program Elements

ELEMENT 1 - SCOPE OF PROGRAM

The Seabrook Station Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program provides for

management of aging effects due to the presence of ASR. Program scope includes

concrete structures within the scope of the License Renewal Structures Monitoring

Program. License Renewal structures within the- scope of this program include:

* Containment Building (including equipment hatch missile shield)

* Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area

* Service Water Cooling Tower including Switchgear Rooms

* Control Building

* Control Building Make-up Air Intake Structures

* Diesel Generator Building

* Piping (RCA) Tunnels

* Main Steam and Feed Water East and West Pipe Chase

* Waste Processing Building

* Tank Farm

* Condensate Storage Tank Enclosure

* Emergency Feed Water Pump House Building, including Electrical Cable

Tunnels and Penetration Areas (Control Building to Containment)

* Fuel Storage Building
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12101

Page 10 of 18

* Primary Auxiliary Building including RHR Vaults

* Service Water Pump House

• Service Water Access (Inspection) Vault

* Circulating Water Pump house Building (below elevation 21'-0)

* Safety Related Electrical Manholes and Duct Banks

* Pre-Action Valve Building

* Miscellaneous Non-Category I Yard Structures

o SBO Structure - Transformers and Switch Yard foundations

o Non-Safety-Related Electrical Cable Manhole, Duct Bank Yard

Structures foundations

o Switchyard and 345 KV Power Transmission foundations

* Non-Category I Structures

o Turbine Generator Building

o Fire Pump House

o Aboveground exterior tanks 1-FP-TK-35-A, 1-FP-TK-3 5-B, 1-FP-TK36-A, 1 -FP-TK-36-B and 1 -FP-TK-29 foundations.

o Fire Pump House Boiler Building

o Non Essential Switchgear Building

o Steam Generator Blowdown Recovery Building

o Intake & discharge Transition Structures

The Seabrook Station Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program manages the

effects of cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates.

ELEMENT 2 - PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

There are no preventive actions specified in the Seabrook Station Structures Monitoring

Program, which includes implementation of NUREG-1801 XI.S5, XI.S6, and XI.S7.

These are monitoring programs only. Similarly, the ASR Monitoring Program does not

rely on preventive actions.
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12 101

Page 11 of 18

ELEMENT 3 - PARAMETERS MONITORED/INSPECTED

The Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program manages the effects of cracking

due to expansion and reaction with aggregates.

The program focuses on identifying evidence of ASR, either past or present, which could

lead to expansion due to reaction with aggregates. The program is consistent with

published guidance for condition assessment of structures affected by ASR.

ASR is detected by visual observation of cracking on the surface of the concrete. The

cracking is typically accompanied by the presence of moisture and efflorescence.

Concrete affected by expansive ASR is typically characterized by a network or "pattern"

of cracks. ASR involves the formation of an alkali-silica gel which expands when

exposed to water. Microcracking due to ASR is generated through forces applied by the

expanding aggregate particles and/or swelling of the alkali-silica gel within and around

the boundaries of reacting aggregate particles. The ASR gel may exude from the crack

forming white secondary deposits at the concrete surface. The gel also often causes a

dark discoloration of the cement paste surrounding the crack at the concrete surface.

Visual observation of the conditions described above is used to identify the presence of

ASR.

Cracking Index

A Cracking Index is determined for accessible surfaces exhibiting ASR pattern cracking.

The process for determining the Cracking Index (CI) is described in the Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA) document FHWA-HIF-09-004, "Report on the Diagnosis,

Prognosis, and Mitigation of Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) in Transportation Structures. "

The Cracking Index is the summation of the crack widths on the horizontal or vertical

sides of a 20-inch by 20-inch square on the ASR-affected concrete surface. Since each

side of the square is 0.5 m, the Cracking Index in a given direction is reported in units of

min/m.

The horizontal and vertical Cracking Indices are averaged to obtain a Combined Cracking

Index (CCI) for each area of interest. The CCI represents the expansion along the entire

perimeter of the 20-inch by 20-inch square. Screening criteria used in the assessment of

expansion is expressed in terms of CCI and based on recommendations provided in

MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete

Structures and Attachments.

The progression of ASR degradation of the concrete is an important consideration for

assessing the long term implications of ASR and specifying monitoring intervals. The

most reliable means for establishing the progression of ASR is to monitor expansion of

the concrete in situ.
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12101

Page 12 of 18

Crack Width

Crack Width is a measurement of an individual crack width and is reported in units of

mm. Progression of ASR is monitored by periodically measuring the individual crack

width. Screening criteria used in the assessment of individual crack width are based on

recommendations provided in MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station. Impact of

Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments.

ELEMENT 4 - DETECTION OF AGING EFFECTS

ASR is detected by visual inspections performed by qualified individuals. These

individuals must either be a licensed Professional Engineer experienced in this area, or

will work under the direction of a licensed Professional Engineer.

The Seabrook Station Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program provides for

management of aging effects due to the presence of ASR. Program scope includes

concrete structures within the scope of License Renewal.

ASR is a reaction that occurs within the structure of the concrete due to the reaction

between silica from the aggregate and alkali constituents in the cement. The reaction

produces a gel that expands as it absorbs moisture. Expansion of the gel exerts tensile

stress on the concrete resulting in cracking. The cracking propagates on the surface of the

concrete where it is visually identifiable. Typical cracking resulting from ASR is

described as "pattern" or "map" cracking and is usually accompanied by a dark staining

adjacent to the cracks at the surface of the structure. The ASR gel may exude from the

crack forming white secondary deposits at the concrete surface. Visual indications of

pattern cracking, which are often accompanied by staining or residual gel deposits, are

documented and evaluated as deficiencies. To identify and verify the presence of ASR,

the maximum crack width, a cracking index, and a description of the cracking including

any visible surface discoloration are documented. Documentation and trend data will be

maintained in accordance with the Structural Monitoring Program and established

guidelines of ACI 349.3R, "Structural Condition Assessment of Buildings."

ELEMENT 5 - MONITORING AND TRENDING

Monitoring of ASR associated cracks is an effective method for determining ASR

progression. Monitoring of ASR associated cracks at Seabrook is implemented with two

measurements. One is Cracking Index (CI) and the other is Individual Crack Width.

The CI is a quantitative assessment of cracking present in the cover concrete of affected

structures. A CI measurement is taken on accessible surfaces exhibiting ASR pattern

cracking. The process for determining the Cracking Index (CI) is described in the Federal

Highway Administration (FHWA) document FHWA-HIF-09-004, "Report on the

Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Mitigation of Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) in Transportation

Structures. " The Cracking Index is the summation of the crack widths on the horizontal

or vertical sides of a 20-inch by 20-inch square on the ASR-affected concrete surface.
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12 101

Page 13 of 18

Since each side of the square is 0.5 m, the Cracking Index in a given direction is reported

in units of mm/m.

The horizontal and vertical Cracking Indices are averaged to obtain a Combined Cracking

Index (CCI) for each area of interest. The CCI represents the expansion along the entire

perimeter of the 20-inch by 20-inch square. Screening criteria used in the assessment of

expansion is expressed in terms of CCI and based on recommendations provided in

MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete

Structures and Attachments. The CCI is compared to screening criteria and trended to

establish the progression of ASR degradation.

The progression of ASR degradation of the concrete is an important consideration for

assessing the long term implications of ASR and specifying monitoring intervals. The

most reliable means for establishing the progression of degradation is to monitor

expansion of the concrete in situ.

Individual Crack Width measurement is also an effective method for assessment of ASR

affected areas. Screening criteria used in the assessment of Individual Crack Width,

expressed in terms of mm, are based on recommendations provided in MPR-3727,

Revision 0, "Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures

and Attachments."

NextEra has performed a baseline inspection and ASR associated cracks have been

evaluated and categorized. NextEra has assessed 131 accessible areas to date in this

manner. The areas affected by ASR have been identified and assessed for apparent

degradation from ASR, including estimation of in situ expansion. The results are

presented in MPR-3727, Revision 0, "Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction

on Concrete Structures and Attachments." Monitoring of Cracking Index and Individual

Crack Width of at least 20 areas identified in the baseline inspection as having the largest

CCI will be performed at six month intervals. Measurement of Cracking Index and

Individual Crack Width will be performed in the same areas as the baseline. Trend data

from these follow-up inspections will be used in determining the progression of

expansion and a basis for any change to the frequency of the inspection. Documentation

and trend data will be maintained in accordance with the Structural Monitoring Program

and established guidelines of ACI 349.3R, "Structural Condition Assessment of

Buildings. "

Deficiencies being repaired or trended are subject to follow-up inspections of increased

frequency. Newly discovered areas exhibiting visual signs of ASR are identified during

routinely performed Structural Monitoring Program inspections and documented as

deficiencies. Deficiencies are reviewed in accordance with the Structural Monitoring

Program and established guidelines of ACI 349.3R, "Structural Condition Assessment of

Buildings. "
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12101

Page 14 of 18

ELEMENT 6 - ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

Several published studies describe screening methods to determine when structural

evaluations of ASR affected concrete are appropriate and how to prioritize such

evaluations. In MPR-3727, Revision 0, "Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica

Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments," these studies were reviewed for

applicability. The report concludes: "while these screening methods are based on lightly

or unreinforced concrete structures, they are useful in the absence of criteria directly

relevant to the highly-reinforced concrete structures used in nuclear generating

facilities, " and, "Confinement provided by reinforcing steel and other restraints is a key

factor regarding the impact of ASR on reinforced concrete structures. Confinement limits

ASR expansion of the in situ structure, which reduces the extent of deleterious cracking

and the resultant reduction in concrete properties."

NextEra has performed a baseline inspection and ASR associated cracks have been

evaluated and categorized. NextEra has assessed 131 accessible areas to date in this

manner. The areas affected by ASR have been identified and assessed for apparent

degradation from ASR, including estimation of in situ expansion. The results are

presented in MPR-3727, Revision 0, "Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction

on Concrete Structures and Attachments." Based on site specific assessment and review

of industry source documentation this report provides recommendations for screening

thresholds used in the Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program. Using these

thresholds, ASR affected areas are screened and categorized for Qualitative or

Quantitative Monitoring and Trending and Structural Evaluation.

A Combined Cracking Index (CCI) of less than the 1.0 mmn!m and Individual Crack

Width of less than 1.0 mm can be deemed Acceptable with Deficiencies. Areas with

deficiencies determined to be acceptable with further review are trended for evidence of

further degradation.

A CCI of 1.0 nmm/m or greater, or an Individual Crack Width of 1.0 mm or greater are

deemed Unacceptable and require a structural evaluation. Structural evaluations are

performed to ensure impacted structures are in compliance with the Current Licensing

Basis are documented in the Corrective Action Program. The engineering evaluation will

be typical to those structural evaluations that have already been performed for AlkaliSilica Reaction. The Engineering Evaluation will consider the need to perform a detailed

appraisal to determine potential capacity reductions, or the need to perform special

studies, testing, and monitoring. Additionally, Corrective Actions requiring repair are

entered in the Work Control Program for implementation.
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12 101

Page 15 of 18

ELEMENT 7 - CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Structural evaluations are performed to ensure impacted structures are in compliance with

the Current Licensing Basis are documented in the Corrective Action Program. The

NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Program and Nuclear Fleet procedures will be

utilized to meet Element 7 Corrective Actions. (Ref: LRA A. 1.5 and B. 1.3.)

ELEMENT 8 - CONFIRMATION PROCESS

NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Program and Nuclear Fleet procedures will be

utilized to meet Element 8 Confirmation Process. (Ref: LRA A. 1.5 and B. 1.3.)

ELEMENT 9 - ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Program and Nuclear Fleet procedures will be

utilized to meet Element 9 Administrative Controls. (Ref: LRA A. 1.5 and B. 1.3.)

ELEMENT 10 - OPERATING EXPERIENCE

The primary source of OE, both industry and plant specific, was the Seabrook Station

Corrective Action Program documentation. The Seabrook Station Corrective Action

Program is used to document review of relevant external OE including INPO documents,

NRC communications and Westinghouse documents, and plant specific OE including

corrective actions, maintenance work orders generated in response to a structure, system

or component deficiencies, system and program health reports, self-assessment reports

and NRC and INPO inspection reports.

The Seabrook Station Corrective Action Program is used to track, trend and evaluate

plant issues and events. Those issues and events, whether external or plant specific, that

are potentially significant to the ASR Monitoring Program are evaluated. The ASR

Monitoring Program is revised, as appropriate, if these evaluations show that program

changes will enhance program effectiveness.

Historically, NextEra Energy Seabrook (NextEra) has experienced groundwater

infiltration through cracks, capillaries, pore spaces, seismic isolation joints, and

construction joints in the below grade walls of concrete structures. Some of these areas

have shown signs of leaching, cracking, and efflorescence on the concrete due to the

infiltration. During the early 1990's an evaluation was conducted to assess the effect of

the groundwater infiltration on the serviceability of the concrete walls. That evaluation

concluded that there would be no deleterious effect, based on the design and placement of

the concrete and on the non-aggressive nature of the groundwater.
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12101

Page 16 of 18

In 2009, NextEra tested seasonal groundwater samples to support the development of a

License Renewal Application. The results showed that the groundwater had become

aggressive and NextEra initiated a comprehensive review of possible effects to in-scope

structures.

A qualitative walkdown of plant structures was performed and the "B" Electrical Tunnel

was identified as showing the most severe indications of groundwater infiltration.

Concrete core samples from this area were removed, tested for strength and elasticity

values, and subjected to petrographic examinations. While the results showed that both

strength and elasticity values had declined, they remained within the design margin. The

results of the petrographic examinations also showed that the samples had experienced

Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR).

NextEra initiated an extent of condition evaluation and concrete core samples were taken

from five additional areas of the plant - areas that showed characteristics with the greatest

similarity to the "B" Electrical Tunnel. Additional concrete core samples were also taken

from an expanded area around the original concrete core samples in the "B" Electrical

Tunnel.

Tests on these core samples confirmed that the original "B" Electrical Tunnel core

samples show the most significant ASR. For the five additional areas under investigation,

final results of compressive strength and modulus testing indicate that the compressive

strength in all areas is greater than the strength required by the design of the structures.

Modulus of elasticity was in the range of the expected value except for the Diesel

Generator, Containment Enclosure Buildings, Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse, and the

Equipment Vaults which were less than the expected value in localized areas.

Evaluation of the test results shows that the affected structures to be fully capable of

performing their safety function but margin had been reduced. The areas are potentially

subject to further degradation of material properties due to the effects of ASR.

A review of industry related operating experience related to ASR was performed. The

review includes NRC generic communications issued such as Generic Letters, Bulletins,

and Information Notices. Industry operating experience is discussed below:

1. In 1994, ASTM Standard C289 was clarified to caution that the tests described may

not accurately predict aggregate reactivity when dealing with late- or slowexpanding aggregates containing strained quartz or microcrystalline quartz.

2. On August 4, 2010, NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 2010-14 "Containment

Concrete Surface Condition Examination Frequency and Acceptance Criteria."

Seabrook's assessment resulted in updating the IWL program with inspection

guidelines typical to ACI 349.3R.
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12101

Page 17 of 18

3. OE 34348 Operating Experience report submitted by NextEra: Preliminary -

Reduction in Concrete Properties Due to Distress from Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR)

was issued September 30, 2011.

4. On November 11, 2011, NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 2011-20, "Concrete

Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction" to notify the industry based on the Seabrook

issue.

The Seabrook Station plant specific operating experience identified the following:

1. As part of the Seabrook License Renewal process, the aggressiveness of the

groundwater chemistry on concrete structures in contact with groundwater/soil must

be determined. The first two samples collected in June 2009 from well locations

indicate Chloride levels >500 PPM. Since the chloride levels exceed the acceptable

limits, the groundwater was considered aggressive. Groundwater chemistry is now

being performed every five years via the Structures Monitoring Program and

awareness of the aggressive water chemistry is considered in the inspection of

concrete.

2. Concrete core samples were removed from the Control Building B-Electrical Tunnel

in April 2010 and Penetration Resistance Tests (PRT) performed. The results of the

PRT indicated an average concrete compressive strength of 5340 psi and the

concrete core testing indicated an average compressive strength of 4790 psi. An

engineering evaluation was performed to review the results of core samples. The

results show the structure to be fully capable of performing its safety function but

margin had been reduced.

3. In September 2010, Testing was completed on concrete core samples removed from

the walls at elevation (-) 20' in the Control Building B-Electrical Tunnel. The results

of the modulus testing indicate that the average measured elastic modulus to be less

than the expected elastic modulus. An engineering evaluation was performed to

review the results of core samples. The results showed the structure to be fully

capable of performing its safety function but margin had been reduced. Results of

the petrographic examination completed in September 2010 showed that the samples

had experienced Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR).

4. Inspection performed April 2011 on elevation (-) 30' in the Containment CEVA

identified a craze cracking pattern on a localized area of the Containment concrete

shell. The observed craze cracks are tight, less than 40 mils width and contain fine

dry white deposits. There were no other indications of degradation or distress in the

concrete in this area. Craze cracking with white deposits suggests the presence of

alkali-silica reaction. Additional inspections of the exterior face of the Containment

Structure were performed in September 2011. These two locations have been

included in the second-tier evaluation criteria of the program due to the past

groundwater in-leakage and follow-up inspections will be performed. Any identified

crack growth will require additional evaluation. NextEra has previously committed
Enclosure 2

SBK-L-12101

Page 18 of 18

to maintaining the exterior surface of the Containment Structure in a dewatered state

(LRA Commitment #52).

5. In June 2011, as an extent of condition evaluation, five (5) building structures were

investigated to determine if the building concrete was affected by alkali-silica

reaction (ASR). The five (5) building structures were selected based on visual

indications on the inside concrete surfaces and exposure to groundwater infiltration.

An engineering evaluation was performed to review the results of concrete core

samples. The results show these structures to be fully capable of performing their

safety function but margin had been reduced. A root cause evaluation was

performed to determine how the ASR developed and why its presence was not

identified until 2010. The following root causes were identified:

- The ASR developed because the concrete mix designs utilized an aggregate that

was susceptible to Alkali-Silica Reaction, which was not known at the time.

Although the testing was conducted in accordance with ASTM standards, those

testing standards were subsequently identified as limited in their ability to

predict long term ASR.

- The health monitoring program for systems and structures does not contain a

process for periodic reassessment of failure modes that were excluded from the

monitoring criteria to ensure that the monitoring/mitigating strategies remain

applicable and effective.

Exceptions to NUREG-1800

None

Enhancements

None

Conclusion

The Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program provides reasonable assurance

that those structures managed by this program will continue to perform their intended

functions consistent with the current licensing basis for the period of extended operation.
Enclosure 3 to SBK-L-12101

LRA Appendix A - Final Safety Report Supplement

Table A.3 License Renewal Commitment List
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3

Page 2 of 13

A.3 LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENT LIST

UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION

Program to be implemented

prior to the period of

extended operation.

Inspection plan to be

submitted to NRC not later

1. PWR Vessel Internals An inspection plan for Reactor Vessel Internals will be A.2.1.7 than 2 years after receipt of

submitted for NRC review and approval, the renewed license or not

less than 24 months prior to

the period of extended

operation, whichever comes

first.

Closed-Cycle Cooling Enhance cracking, the program to include visual inspection for Prior to the period of 2. Water systems are loss opened of material for maintenance. and fouling when the in-scope A.2.1.12 extended operation

Inspection of Overhead

Heavy Load and Light Enhance the program to monitor general corrosion on the Prior to the period of

3. Load (Related to crane and trolley structural components and the effects of A.2.1.13 extended operation

Refueling) Handling wear on the rails in the rail system.

Systems

Inspection of Overhead

Heavy Load and Light Enhance the program to list additional cranes for Prior to the period of

4. Load (Related to A.2.1.13

Refueling) Handling monitoring. extended operation

Systems

Compressed Air Enhance the program to include an annual air quality test Prior to the period of 5. Monitoring requirement for the Diesel Generator compressed air sub A.2.1.14 extended operation

system.

Enhance the program to perform visual inspection of Prior to the period of penetration seals by a fire protection qualified inspector. extended operation.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3

Page 3 of 13

UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE

LOCATION

Enhance the program to add inspection requirements such

7. Fire Protection as spalling, and loss of material caused by freeze-thaw, A.2.1.15 Prior to the period of

chemical attack, and reaction with aggregates by qualified extended operation.

inspector.

Enhance the program to include the performance of visual Prior to the period of

8. Fire Protection inspection of fire-rated doors by a fire protection qualified A.2.1.15 extended operation.

inspector.

Enhance the program to include NFPA 25 guidance for

"where sprinklers have been in place for 50 years, they Prior to the period of

9. Fire Water System shall be replaced or representative samples from one or A.2.1.16 extended operation.

more sample areas shall be submitted to a recognized

testing laboratory for field service testing".

Enhance the program to include the performance of Prior to the period of

10. Fire Water System periodic flow testing of the fire water system in accordance A.2.1.16 extended operation.

with the guidance of NFPA 25.

Enhance the program to include the performance of

periodic visual or volumetric inspection of the internal

surface of the fire protection system upon each entry to the

system for routine or corrective maintenance. These

inspections will be documented and trended to determine if

11. Fire Water System a representative number of inspections have been A.2.1.16 Within ten years prior to the

performed prior to the period of extended operation. If a period of extended operation.

representative number of inspections have not been

performed prior to the period of extended operation,

focused inspections will be conducted. These inspections

will be performed within ten years prior to the period of

extended operation.

Enhance the program to include components and aging effects Prior to the period of

12. Aboveground Steel required by the Aboveground Steel Tanks. A.2.1.17 extended operation. 1. Tanksexeddoeain

Aboveground Steel Enhance the program to include an ultrasonic inspection Within ten years prior to the 13. Tanks and evaluation of the internal bottom surface of the two Fire A.2.1.17 Witin tenyea pritoth Tanks Protection Water Storage Tanks. period of extended operation.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3

Page 4 of 13

. UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE

LOCATION

Enhance program to add requirements to 1) sample and analyze

14. Fuel Oil Chemistry new fuel deliveries for biodiesel prior to offloading to the A.2.1.18 Prior to the period of

Auxiliary Boiler fuel oil storage tank and 2) periodically sample extended operation.

stored fuel in the Auxiliary Boiler fuel oil storage tank.

Enhance the program to add requirements to check for the Prior to the period of

15. Fuel Oil Chemistry presence of water in the Auxiliary Boiler fuel oil storage tank at A.2.1.18 extended operation.

least once per quarter and to remove water as necessary.

Enhance the program to require draining, cleaning and Prior to the period of

16. Fuel Oil Chemistry inspection of the diesel fire pump fuel oil day tanks on a A.2.1.18 extended operation.

frequency of at least once every ten years.

Enhance the program to require ultrasonic thickness

measurement of the tank bottom during the 10-year

17. Fuel Oil Chemistry draining, cleaning and inspection of the Diesel Generator A.2.1.18 Prior to the period of

fuel oil storage tanks, Diesel Generator fuel oil day tanks, extended operation.

diesel fire pump fuel oil day tanks and auxiliary boiler fuel

oil storage tank.

Reactor Vessel Enhance the program to specify that all pulled and tested Prior to the period of 18. Surveillance capsules, unless discarded before August 31, 2000, are placed in A.2.1.19 extended operation. storage.

Enhance the program to specify that if plant operations exceed

the limitations or bounds defined by the Reactor Vessel

19. Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program, such as operating at a lower cold leg A.2.1.19 Prior to the period of

Surveillance temperature or higher fluence, the impact of plant operation extended operation.

changes on the extent of Reactor Vessel embrittlement will be

evaluated and the NRC will be notified.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3

Page 5 of 13

UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE

LOCATION

Enhance the program as necessary to ensure the

appropriate withdrawal schedule for capsules remaining in

the vessel such that one capsule will be withdrawn at an

Reactor Vessel outage in which the capsule receives a neutron fluence that Prior to the period of 20. Surveillance meets the schedule requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A.2.1.19 extended operation.

H and ASTM El 85-82 and that bounds the 60-year fluence,

and the remaining capsule(s) will be removed from the

vessel unless determined to provide meaningful

metallurgical data.

Enhance the program to ensure that any capsule removed,

21. Reactor Vessel without the intent to test it, is stored in a manner which A.2.1.19 Prior to the period of Surveillance maintains it in a condition which would permit its future use, extended operation.

including during the period of extended operation.

22. One-Time Inspection Implement the One Time Inspection Program. A.2.1.20 Within ten years prior to the

period of extended operation.

Implement the Selective Leaching of Materials Program.

23. Selective Leaching of The program will include a one-time inspection of selected Within five years prior to the

23. SelMaterials components where selective leaching has not been A.2.1.21 Witin fiexyea priort

identified and periodic inspections of selected components period of extended operation.

where selective leaching has been identified.

Buried Piping And Tanks Implement the Buried Piping And Tanks Inspection Within ten years prior to

24. Inspection Program. A.2.1.22 entering the period of

extended operation

One-Time Inspection of Implement the One-Time Inspection of ASME Code Class Within ten years prior to the

25. ASME Code Class 1 A.2.1.23

Small Bore-Piping 1 Small Bore-Piping Program. period of extended operation.

Enhance the program to specifically address the scope of the

program, relevant degradation mechanisms and effects of

26. External Surfaces interest, the refueling outage inspection frequency, the A.2.1.24 Prior to the period of

Monitoring inspections of opportunity for possible corrosion under extended operation.

insulation, the training requirements for inspectors and the

required periodic reviews to determine program effectiveness.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L- 12101 / Enclosure 3

Page 6 of 13

U FSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE

LOCATION

Inspection of Internal Surfaces in 27. Miscellaneous Piping Implement the Inspection of Internal Surfaces in Prior to the period of and Ducting Miscellaneous Piping and Ducting Components Program. A.2.1.25 extended operation.

Components

Enhance the program to add required equipment, lube oil Prior to the period of

28. Lubricating Oil Analysis analysis required, sampling frequency, and periodic oil A.2.1.26 extended operation.

changes.

29. Lubricating Oil Analysis Enhance the program to sample the oil for the Reactor Prior to the period of Coolant pump oil collection tanks. A.2.1.26 extended operation.

Enhance the program to require the performance of a one30. Lubricating Oil Analysis time ultrasonic thickness measurement of the lower portion A.2.1.26 Prior to the period of of the Reactor Coolant pump oil collection tanks prior to the extended operation.

period of extended operation.

31. ASME Section XI, Enhance procedure to include the definition of A.2.1.28 Prior to the period of

Subsection IWL "Responsible Engineer". extended operation.

Structures Monitoring Enhance procedure to add the aging effects, additional Prior to the period of 32. Program locations, inspection frequency and ultrasonic test A.2.1.31 extended operation.

Program________________ requirements.

Structures Monitoring Enhance procedure to include inspection of opportunity Prior to the period of Program when planning excavation work that would expose A.2.1.31 extended operation.

inaccessible concrete.

Electrical Cables and

Connections Not Subject Implement the Electrical Cables and Connections Not Prior to the period of

34. to 10 CFR 50.49 Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification A.2.1.32 exte e perion.

Environmental Requirementsextended operation.

Qualification

Requirements

Electrical Cables and

Connections Not Subject

to 10 CFR 50.49 Implement the Electrical Cables and Connections Not Prior to the period of

35. Environmental Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification A.2.1.33 extended operation.

Qualification Requirements Used in Instrumentation Circuits program.

Requirements Used in

Instrumentation Circuits
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12 101 / Enclosure 3

Page 7 of 13

UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE

LOCATION

Inaccessible Power

Cables Not Subject to Implement the Inaccessible Power Cables Not Subject to Prior to the period of

36. E10 CFR 50.49 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements A.2.1.34 ex te e perio n. 3. Environmental extended operation.

Qualification program.

Requirements

Prior to the period of

37. Metal Enclosed Bus Implement the Metal Enclosed Bus program. A.2.1.35 ex te e perio n.

extended operation.

Prior to the period of

38. Fuse Holders Implement the Fuse Holders program. A.2.1.36 exte e perion.

I I I Iextended operation.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3

Page 8 of 13

UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE

LOCATION

Electrical Cable

Connections Not Subject Implement the Electrical Cable Connections Not Subject to Prior to the period of

39. to 10 CFR 50.49 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements A.2.1.37 exte e perion.

Environmental extended operation.

Qualification program.

Requirements

Prior to the period of

40. 345 KV SF6 Bus Implement the 345 KV SF 6 Bus program. A.2.2.1 exte e perion. extended operation.

Metal Fatigue of Reactor Enhance the program to include additional transients Prior to the period of

41. Coolant Pressure beyond those defined in the Technical Specifications and A.2.3.1 extended operation.

Boundary UFSAR.

Metal Fatigue of Reactor Enhance the program to implement a software program, to Prior to the period of

42. Coolant Pressure count transients to monitor cumulative usage on selected A.2.3.1 extended operation.

Boundary components.

Pressure -Temperature The updated analyses will be

Limits, including Low Seabrook Station will submit updates to the P-T curves and submitted at the appropriate

43. Temperature LTOP limits to the NRC at the appropriate time to comply A.2.4.1.4 time to comply with 10 CFR

Overpressure Protection with 10 CFR 50 Appendix G. 50 Appendix G, Fracture

Limits Toughness Requirements.

Environmentally- NextEra Seabrook will perform a review of design basis At least two years prior to

44. Assisted Fatigue ASME Class 1 component fatigue evaluations to determine A.2.4.2.3 entering the period of

Analyses (TLAA) whether the NUREG/CR-6260-based components that extended operation. have been evaluated for the effects of the reactor coolant
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 9 of 13

SBK-L-12 101 / Enclosure 3

UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION

environment on fatigue usage are the limiting components

for the Seabrook plant configuration. If more limiting

components are identified, the most limiting component will

be evaluated for the effects of the reactor coolant

environment on fatigue usage. If the limiting location

identified consists of nickel alloy, the environmentallyassisted fatigue calculation for nickel alloy will be

performed using the rules of NUREG/CR-6909.

(1) Consistent with the Metal Fatigue of Reactor Coolant

Pressure Boundary Program Seabrook Station will update

the fatigue usage calculations using refined fatigue

analyses, if necessary, to determine acceptable CUFs (i.e.,

less than 1.0) when accounting for the effects of the reactor

water environment. This includes applying. the appropriate

Fen factors to valid CUFs determined from an existing

fatigue analysis valid for the period of extended operation

or from an analysis using an NRC-approved version of the

ASME code or NRC-approved alternative (e.g., NRCapproved code case).

(2) If acceptable CUFs cannot be demonstrated for all the

selected locations, then additional plant-specific locations

will be evaluated. For the additional plant-specific

locations, if CUF, including environmental effects is greater

than 1.0, then Corrective Actions will be initiated, in

accordance with the Metal Fatigue of Reactor Coolant

Pressure Boundary Program, B.2.3.1. Corrective Actions

will include inspection, repair, or replacement of the

affected locations before exceeding a CUF of 1.0 or the

effects of fatigue will be managed by an inspection program

that has been reviewed and approved by the NRC (e.g.,

periodic non-destructive examination of the affected

locations at inspection intervals to be determined by a

method accepted by the NRC).
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3

Page 10 of 13

UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATI ON

45. Number Not Used

Protective Coating Enhance the program by designating and qualifying an Prior to the period of

46. Monitoring and Inspector Coordinator and an Inspection Results Evaluator. A.2.1.38 extended operation

MaintenanceEnhance the program by including, "Instruments and

Protective Coating Equipment needed for inspection may include, but not be

Pronitecie Can g limited to, flashlight, spotlights, marker pen, mirror, A.2.1.38 Prior to the period of

Montenand measuring tape, magnifier, binoculars, camera with or extended operation without wide angle lens, and self sealing polyethylene

sample bags."

Protective Coating Enhance the program to include a review of the previous Prior to the period of

48. Monitoring and two monitoring reports. A.2.1.38 extended operation

Maintenance

Protoring Coating Enhance the program to require that the inspection report is to be evaluated by the responsible evaluation personnel, A.2.1.38 Prior to the period of

Monitoring and who is to prepare a summary of findings and extended operation

recommendations for future surveillance or repair.

Within the next two refueling

outages, OR15 or OR16, and

50. ASME Section XI, Perform UT testing of the containment liner plate in the A.2.1.27 repeated at intervals of no

Subsection IWE vicinity of the moisture barrier for loss of material, more than five refueling

outages

51. Number Not Used
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3

Page 11 of 13

UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION

ASME Section XI, Implement measures to maintain the exterior surface of the

52. Subsection I, Containment Structure, from elevation -30 feet to +20 feet, A.2.1.28 By December 31, 2012 in a dewatered state.

Reactor Head Closure Replace the spare reactor head closure stud(s) Prior to the period of Studs manufactured from the bar that has a yield strength > 150 A.2.1.3 extended operation. ksi with ones that do not exceed 150 ksi.

Unless an alternate repair criteria changing the ASME code

boundary is permanently approved by the NRC, or the

Seabrook Station steam generators are changed to Program to be submitted to

54. Steam Generator Tube eliminate PWSCC-susceptible tube-to-tubesheet welds, A.2. 1.10 NRC at least 24 months prior

Integrity submit a plant-specific aging management program to to the period of extended

manage the potential aging effect of cracking due to operation.

PWSCC at least twenty-four months prior to entering the

Period of Extended Operation.

Steam Generator Tube Seabrook will perform an inspection of each steam Prior to entering the period of Integrity generator to assess the condition of the divider plate A.2. 1.10 extended operation assembly.

Closed-Cycle Cooling Revise the station program documents to reflect the EPRI Prior to entering the period of 56. Water System Guideline operating ranges and Action Level values for A.2.1.12 extended operation.

*hydrazine and sulfates.

Closed-Cycle Cooling Revise the station program documents to reflect the EPRI Prior to entering the period of

57. Water System Guideline operating ranges and Action Level values for A.2.1.12 extended operation. Diesel Generator Cooling Water Jacket pH.

Update Technical Requirement Program 5.1, (Diesel Fuel Prior to the period of

58. Fuel Oil Chemistry Oil Testing Program) ASTM standards to ASTM D2709-96 A.2.1.18 extended operation.

and ASTM D4057-95 required by the GALL XI.M30 Rev 1

Nickel Alloy Nozzles and The Nickel Alloy Aging Nozzles and Penetrations program Prior to the period of

59. Penetrations will implement applicable Bulletins, Generic Letters, and A.2.2.3 extended operation. staff accepted industry guidelines.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3

Page 12 of 13

UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION

Buried Piping and Tanks Implement the design change replacing the buried Auxiliary Prior to entering the period of 60. Inspection Boiler supply piping with a pipe-within-pipe configuration A.2.1.22 extended operation.

with leak detection capability.

Replace the flexible hoses associated with the Diesel Within ten years prior to

61. Compressed Air Generator air compressors on a frequency of every 10 A.2.1.14 entering the period of Monitoring Program years. extended operation.

Enhance the program to include a statement that sampling Prior to the period of

62. Water Chemistry frequencies are increased when chemistry action levels are A.2.1.2 extended operation.

exceeded.

Ensure that the quarterly CVCS Charging Pump testing is

continued during the PEO. Additionally, add a precaution to

63. Flow Induced Erosion the test procedure to state that an increase in the CVCS N/A Prior to the period of

Charging Pump mini flow above the acceptance criteria extended operation

may be indicative of erosion of the mini flow orifice as

described in LER 50-275/94-023.

Soil analysis shall be performed prior to entering the period

of extended operation to determine the corrosivity of the

64. Buried Piping and Tanks soil in the vicinity of non-cathodically protected steel pipe A.2.1.22 Prior to entering the period of

within the scope of this program. If the initial analysis extended operation. Inspection shows the soil to be non-corrosive, this analysis will be reperformed every ten years thereafter.

Implement measures to ensure that the movable incore

65. Flux Thimble Tube detectors are not returned to service during the period of N/A Priordto enerin

extended operation. extended operation

66. Number Not Used

Perform one shallow core bore in an area that was

67. Structures Monitoring continuously wetted from borated water to be examined for A.2.1.31 No later than December 31,

Program concrete degradation and also expose rebar to detect any 2015

degradation such as loss of material.

Structures Monitoring Perform sampling at the leakoff collection points for

68. Program chlorides, sulfates, pH and iron once every three months. A.2.1.31 Starting January 2014
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SBK-L-12 101 / Enclosure 3

Page 13 of 13

UFSAR

No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION

Open-Cycle Cooling Replace the Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Plastisol Prior to the period of 69. Water System PVC lined Service Water piping with piping fabricated A.2.1.11 extended operation.

from AL6XN material.

Inspect the piping downstream of CC-V-444 and CC-VClosed-Cycle Cooling 446 to determine whether the loss of material due to Within ten years prior to the

70. Cloed-Cylem Ccavitation induced erosion has been eliminated or A.2.1.12 period of extended

Water System whether this remains an issue in the primary component operation.

cooling water system.

Alkali-Silica Reaction Implement the Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Prior to entering the

71. (ASR) Monitoring Program period of extended

Program operation.