TO BIZERTE 

WITH THE II CORPS 

23 April - 13 May 1943 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1990 
First printed by the Historical Division, War Department, 

for the American Forces in Action series, 1943 

CMH Pub 100-6 

For s.ll~· by the Superi ntendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
Foreword to CMH Edition 

To Bizerte With the /I Corps (23 April-13 May 194]) is one of 

a series of fourteen studies of World War II operations originally 

published by the War Department's Historical Division and now 

returned to print as part of the Army's commemoration of the 

fiftieth anniversary of that momentous clash of arms. These 

volumes, prepared by professional historians shortly after the events 

described, provide a concise summary of some of the major 

campaigns and battles fought by American soldiers. The skillful 

combination of combat interviews with primary sources, many 

of which are now lost, gives these unassuming narratives a special 

importance to military historians. The careful analysis of key 

operations provides numerous lessons for today's military students. 

I am pleased that this entire grou p of studies will once again 

be available. I urge all military students and teachers to use them 

to enhance our collective awareness of the skill, leadership, daring, 

and professionalism exhibited by our military forebears. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 September 1989 

III 

HAROLD W. NELSON 

Colonel, FA 

Chief of Military History 

Foreword 

IN THE THICK OF BATTLE, the soldier is busy doing 

his job. He has the knowledge and confidence that his job 

is part of a unified plan to defeat the enemy, but he does not 

have time to survey a campaign from a fox hole. If he should 

be wounded and removed behind the lines, he may have even 

less opportunity to learn what place he and his unit had in 

the larger fight. 

AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION IS a series prepared 

by the War Department especially for the information of 

wounded men. It will show these soldiers, who have served 

~heir country so well, the part they and their comrades played 

in achievements which do honor to the record of the United 

States Army. 

G. C. MARSHALL, 

Chief of Staff. 

v 
WAR DEPARTMENT 

Military Intelligence Division 

Washington 25, D. C. 

25 November '943 

To B izerte With The I I Corps is the first of a 

senes called AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION. The series is 

designed exclusively for military personnel and primarily for wounded 

in hospitals. It aims to tell them the military story of the campaigns 

and battles in which they served. No part of this pamphlet may be 

republished without the consent of the A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington 25, D. C. 

This pamphlet is based on the best military records now available. 

Maps were prepared by the Historical Section, Army War College. 

All photographs, except of terrain models, are by the U. S. Army 

Signal Corps. Terrain models were made by the Camouflage Branch, 

Engineer Board, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Readers are urged to send 

co=ents, criticisms, and additional information directly to the Historical Branch, G-2, War Department, Washington 25, D. C. 

v, 
Table of Contents 

INTRODUCTION 

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN FOR NORTH AFRICA 

PREPARATIONS FOR THE LAST BATTLE 

Plans of the Eighuenth Army Group 

The Alliu Control the Air 

The II Corps Moves /0 the Norlh 

SUMMARY OF II CORPS ACTION 

THE FIRST PHASE 

The II Corps Drives to Matmr 

Page 

2 

2 

3 

4 

8 

A TERRAIN OF HILL FORTRESSES 9 

PLAN OF ATTACK IN THE SOUTHERN ZONE II 

THE 1ST DIVISION PUSH TO DJEBEL SIDI MEFTAH (23-27 

APRIL) 12 

The 26th Regimental Combat Team 12 

The 16th Regimental Combat Team 1"1-

The 18th Regimental Combat Team lS 

THE ATTACK IS WIDENED 16 

Advance to Hill 609 16 

The 34th DIvision Captu,"s Hill 609 18 

Th e 1St Division Reaches the F.dge 0/ the Hills 21 

THE 1ST ARMORED DIVISION SOUTH OF THE TINE (23 

APRIL-2 MAY) 23 

THE 9TH DIVISION IN THE NORTHERN ZONE 26 

The Plan of Attack 26 

l efna Is Outflanked 28 

Action North of the Sedjenane (24-27 April) 3' 

THE GERMAN RETREAT AND THE CAPTURE OF MATEUR . 34 

VII 
THE SECOND PHASE 

Axis Resisfance Is Broken 

PLANS FOR THE WIND UP OF THE CAMPAI(; N 

General Situation on 2 May 

Plans aI/h. Eightunth Army Croup 

Plans 01 th. IT Corps 

THROUGH TO CHOUIGUI 

Holding Attack of the lSt Division 

The 34th Division Captures Eddekhila and Chouigui 

NORTH OF THE LAKES TO BIZERTE 

BREAKTHROUGH BY THE 1ST ARMORED DIVISION 

Dj.bd Achkd . 

The Drive Through Ferryville to the East 

The Drive to Protville 

THE AXIS SURRENDERS 

CONCLUSION 

TAKING COUNT 

THE WORLD ACKNOWLEDGES THE VICTORY 

• • • 

ANNEX NO.1: UNITS TAKING PART IN THE BIZERTE 

CAMPAIGN . 

ANNEX NO.2: DECORATIONS 

VIII 

Page 

37 

37 

37 

38 

38 

39 

39 

40 

44 

44 

46 

48 

49 

51 

52 

54 

57 
Maps 

No. 

, ,8th Army Group, Plan of Operations in Northern Tunisia 

Inside back cover 

2 Operations of the First Phase, 23 April-3 May '943 Faces Page 9 

3 The Southern Area, First Phase Inside back cover 

41st Division Drive to Djebel Sidi Meftah, 23-27 April 1943 

Inside back cover 

5 Hill 609-Djebel d Anz Area, 27 April-2 May 1943 

Inside back cover 

6 The 1st Armored Division in the Tine Valley, 23 April1 May '943 Inside back cover 

7 9th Division Attack on the Ainchouna-Jefna Positions, 23 

April-I May '943 Inside back cover 

8 Northern Area, 60th CT and Corp Franc, 23 April-2 May 

1943 Inside back cover 

9 Operations of the Second Phase, 4""9 May 1943 . Faces Page 37 

10 The Southern Area, Second Phase 

II The Northern Area, Second Phase 

Inside back cover 

Inside back cover 

12 Summary of II Corps Operations in Northern Tunisia, 23 

April""9 May 1943 Inside back cover 

Sketches 

Page 

I Djebel Cheniti Area, 4-8 May 1943 

2 Mateur-Ferryville Area, 6-J May 1943 45 

IX 
Photographs 

Lt. Gen. O. N. Bradley 

Maj. Gen. Terry Allen 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Eddy . 

Maj. Gen. C. W. Ryder 

Maj. Gen. E. N. Harmon 

The Melah Valley from the Southwest 

Djebel Sidi Meftah Area from the Southwest 

Hill Positions in the Line of the Advance to Hill 609 from the 

5 

6 

6 

6 

6 

10 

West 17 

Hill 609 (Djebel Tahent) from the Southwest 19 

Objectives of the 9th Division from the West 27 

Terrain of the Attack on the Ainchouna-Jefna Positions from 

the West . . . . . . . . 29 

Supply Line in the Sedjenane Zone 32 

American Infantry on the Road to Mateur 35 

Infantry Battalion Approaching Bizerte 4 I 

Bizerte 

Additional Terrain Studies 

x 

50 

65 
INTR O DUCTI O N 

The Final Campaign for North Africa 

A DELEGATION OF GERMAN OFFICERS arrived at 

American Headquarters south of Ferryville at 0926 on the morning 

of 9 May 1943. Their mission was to surrender the remnants of a 

once proud unit of the Wehrmacht, the formidable Fifth Panzer 

Army. On the same morning, two German staff officers reported at 

the Command Post of the 1st Armored Division southeast of Bizerte 

to request an armistice. Three days later, General Jiirgen von 

Arnim was captured at Ste. Marie du Zit. Marshal Giovanni Messe, 

commanding the Italian First Army, surrendered unconditionally to 

the British Eighth Army on '3 May. The long battle for North 

Africa was ended. 

These events were the culmination of grand strategy but were 

made possible only by the heroic struggle of Allied soldiers across 

the coastal areas of North Africa, through deserts, mountains, and 

swamps. Troops of the II Corps, U. S. A., who had entered the fight 

for Africa with the invasion on 8 November '942, played a prominent 

role in me decisive final battle which opened on 23 April. 

The stage had been set for that battle by a campaign, lasting for 

months, in which German and Italian troops were finally penned 

into the northeastern part of Tunisia. Starting 23 October from El 

Alamein, General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's Eighm Army had 

pushed the Afrika Korps 1,500 miles along the desert coast of North 

Africa and into the Marem Line in southern Tunisia. Within 2 

weeks of me November landings in Northwest Africa, British and 

American forces under General Dwight D. Eisenhower were driving from Algeria into western Tunisia in an effort to seize the great 

ports of Tunis and Bizerte. German reinforcements, rushed into 

Africa in the nick of time, stopped the advance just short of the 

I 
Tunis plain. With operations now made difficult by the rainy 

winter season, the Allied Army fought bitter engagements in the 

mountains from Sedjenane Station to Medjez el Bab. To the south, 

American units in hard fighting stopped savage German drives 

through Kasserine Pass toward the Allied base at Tebessa and kept 

pressure on the long Axis communications between Field Marshal 

Rommel and Tunis. 

In late March, Rommel's forces were driven from the Mareth Line 

toward the north. Protecting his line of retreat, the enemy fought 

a stubborn delaying action against the Americans and the British in 

the El Guettar-Gafsa area. By 22 April the equivalent of 5 Italian 

and 9 German divisions were at bay for what they planned to be a 

protracted defense of Tunis and Bizerte. But the Axis was not allowed a breathing space to strengthen its defenses. The Allied 

forces, united under General Sir Harold R. Alexander as the Eighteenth Army Group, were already preparing the blow that was to 

destroy the enemy forces in a battle lasting 21 days. 

Preparations for the Last Batde 

PUNS OF THE EIGHTEENTH ARMy GROUP 

(Map No. I, inside hack cover) 

General Alexander's Eighteenth Army Group included the 

British-Frencb First Army under Lt. Gen. Sir Kenneth A. N. Anderson, the British Eighth Army under General Sir Bernard L. 

Montgomery, and the United States II Corps commanded by Maj. 

Gen. (now Lt. Gen.) Omar N. Bradley. For administrative purposes, the II Corps was under the First Army. Supporting the 

First Army and II Corps were the 242d Group (RAF), the XII Air 

Support Command, and the Tactical Bomber Force. Thus for the 

final drive to capture Tunisia, General Alexander had more than 

20 divisions, in 3 main groups, on a front of about 140 miles. 

General Montgomery's Eighth Army held the Allied right flank 

in the mountainous Enfidaville sector. Its role was to maintain 

pressure on the enemy in this area and to advance against his route 

of escape into the Cap Bon Peninsula. The main Allied attack was 

to be delivered in the center of the front by the forces of the British2 
French First Army; seven infantry divisions (three French) and 

nearly three armored divisions. In this area lay the two principal 

natural corridors into the Tunis plain: the valleys of the Medjerda 

and the Miliane. While the French XIX Corps, in the Miliane 

valley, drove northeast, the main effort was to be along the Medjez 

el Bab-Tunis axis, in an area where armored units could best 

maneuver. The United States II Corps, with the Corps Franc 

d'Afrique, was to operate on the left flank of the British attack, with 

the high ground southeast of Mateur and the heights between Jefna 

and Garaet Acllkel as principal objectives. This attack would endanger the flank and rear of enemy forces facing the British drive. 

In its simplest outline, the Allied plan was for a powerful thrust 

in the center heavily supported by armor, with secondary attacks on 

the flanks to hold the enemy down and prevent him from concentrating to meet the main effort. 

THE ALLIES CoNTROL THE Am 

For the months preceding the battle the heavy bombers of the 

Strategic Air Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. James H. Doolittle, 

had been carrying out raids against Axis shipping, supply lines, and 

air bases in Tunisia and in Europe, with signjficant results for the 

battle for North Africa. As the Tunisian campaign developed, the 

attacks were directed at the transportation facilities and ports of 

Sicily and southern Italy, especially Naples, Messina, and Palermo. 

Meanwhile medium bombers and fighters were striking at enemy 

surface and aerial shipping in the Sicilian Strajt. Allied air attacks 

and the activities of the British Navy were making precarious any 

long-term existence of the Axis forces in Tunisia. 

The Tactical Air Force, commanded by Air Marshal Sir Arthur 

Coningham, was prepared to collaborate with the field armies in 

bombing and strafing rear installations, roads, and convoys. In one 

sense the final phase of the Tunisian campaign began not on 23 

April but on the nights of 18 and 19 April, when the Allies employed 

90 rught bombers against German airdromes and destroyed 129 Axis 

planes, including 72 out of 100 enemy transports. On 22 April 

the Tactical Air Force destroyed 20 ME-323 6-engine transports 

carrying the equivalent of a regiment into Tunisia. 

By the opening of the battle on 23 April, the Allied Air Force 

3 
had won the mastery of the air from the Luftwaffe. One major 

result, it is believed, was the enemy's inability to secure knowledge 

of the surprise move of the II Corps from southern to northern 

Tunisia until after it was completed. During the first 2 days of 

action, the Tactical Air Force made 1,500 sorties, but from 25 

April to 5 May weather conditions grounded most of the planes. 

Air power was to play an important role again on 6 and 7 May, 

when the Allied Air Force blasted the enemy in the Medjerda Valley 

and contributed powerfully to the decisive breakthrough by the 

First Army. 

THE II CORPS MOVES TO THE NORTH 

When General Anderson, commanding the First Army, issued his 

operational orders for the final phase of the Tunisian campaign, the 

II Corps was completing an action in southern Tunisia. In order to 

reach assigned positions for the attack on 23 April, the II Corps had 

to move more than 100,000 men, plus equipment of all types, an 

average distance of '50 miles over difficult country and across the 

communication lines of the First Army. In addition, supplies for 

the coming operation had to be assembled from bases and ports 

many miles to the west. The accomplishment of this move was 

one of the outstanding achievements of transport and supply in the 

North African campaign. The 9th Division reached the northern 

area and began relieving British units on 12 April. The 1st Division 

arrived in its zone on 16 April. Forward units of the 1st Armored 

Division came into the Beja sector on 22 April, followed by the 

34th Division on the following day. 

4 
LT. GEN. O. N. BRADLEY 

Commanding General, II Corps 

United States Army 

5 
6 

MAJ. GEN. TERRY ALLEN 

Commanding General. at Division 

United States Army 

MAJ. GEN. C. W. RYDER 

Commanding General. 34th Division 

Uniled Stales Army 

MAJ. GEN. M. S. EUI)Y 

Commanding General. 9th Division 

United Slates Army 

MAJ. GEN. E. N. HARMON 

Commanding General. at Armored Division 

United Stales Army 
let Division 

Maj. Gen. Terry Allen 

16th, 18th, and 26tb 

Regimental Combat Teams 

'l 

Organization of the United States n Corps (23 April-9 May 1943) 

(See Annex No. I, page 54, for Troop List) 

II CORPS 

Lt. Gen. O. N. Bradley 

let Armored Division 9th Division 

Maj. Gen. E. N. Harmon Maj. Gen. M. S. Eddy 

34th Division 

Yaj. Gen. C. W. Ryder 

Corps Franc d'Afrique Brig. Gen. P. J. Magnan 

6th Armored Infantry Regiment 39tb, 47tb, and 60tb 133d, 13~th, and 168th 

let Armored Regiment Regimental Regimental 

13th Armored Regiment Combat Teams Combat Teams 
Summary of II Corps Action 

The operation of the II Corps, U. S. A., lasted '7 days and involved 

advances of 25 to 50 miles by four divisions. As ordered by General 

Alexander, our main effort was made on the right flank. Three 

divisions began the attack on a I3-mile front where advance by the 

II Corps would best support the big British thrust in the Medjerda 

Valley. On the northern part of our front, one division and the 

Corps Franc d'Afrique struck at enemy defenses west of Mateur. 

The easiest way to follow the II Corps battle is to see it in terms 

of the two main phases in which the action developed in point of 

time. In the first phase, 23 April to 3 May, the II Corps stormed or 

outflanked all the major German hill fortresses, and forced an enemy 

retreat to a line east of Mateur and the Tine Valley on the last hills 

protecting the roads to Bizerte and Tunis. In the second phase, 4 to 

9 May, the II Corps struck the new enemy line in key areas, broke 

through to capture Bizerte and Chouigui, and forced the surrender 

of all Axis troops left in its zone. 

The II Corps was not fighting isolated battles; its action was always 

geared to a coordinated Allied operation. Although the larger story 

cannot be told here, the battle of Tunisia was won by the Eighteenth 

Army Group. The II Corps played its part, and played it well, in a 

great Allied victory. 

8 
c 

-

LINE I 

MA Yi (/E",--4 __ MA,-Y __ ~ 

I 

I 

.J 

~-----4":"t 

" 

..-': IZERTE 

.. -

MAP NO.2 

o 

I 

OPERATIONS 

OF THE FIRST PHASE 

23 APRIL- 3 MAY 1943 

10 

i 

MILE S 

PREPARED BY 

2 0 

I 

A W. C. 

,".c< p. ~l 

THE STORY OF THE FIRST PHASE 

(23 April-3 M.<y) 

IN THE SOUTHERN part of the II Corps zone, the opening 

drives were made ineo the high ground bordering the Oued Tine 

Valley. By 26 April the 1st Division had gained 5 hard miles 

north of the valley, wresting the hills from German hands in 

bloody fighting marked by successful night attacks and effective 

use of artillery. The 34th Division and the 1st now teamed up 

for a further advance. Swinging ineo action west of Sidi Nsir, 

the 34th climaxed its drive by taking Hill 609, while the 1st 

pushed eastward anOther 5 miles. Meanwhile, the 6th Armored 

lnfantry made steady progress along the edge of the range south 

of the Oued Tine. By I May, these coordinated efforts had taken 

all the key hill fortresses in the southern zone, and the Tine 

Valley was opened for an armored blow. 

The 9th Division had been equally successful eo the north. 

lcs combat teams fought through the hills north of Jefna eo out, 

flank that strong position. By 1 May, the spearheads of the 9th 

were in sight of the plain near Garaet Achkel, and the Germans 

were pulling out of Jefna. 

Forced in two areas to the edge of the hill belt protecting 

Mateur, the Germans risked disaster and knew it. With the 

I st Armored Division on their heels, they withdrew beyond 

Mateur and inco the hills just west of Chouigui. In 10 days, the 

11 Corps had driven the enemy back 15 eo 18 miles and unhinged his whole northern Aank. Mateur was our main prize 

in this first phase of the battle. With that key center of communications in OUf possession, the stage was set for the final 

phase of the batde for northern Tunisia. 

The detailed account which follows will be clearer by occasional reference eo this map and eo six additional maps (Nos. 3-8) 

which will be found inside the back cover of chis book, 
THE FIRST PHASE 

The II Corps Drives to Mateur 

A Terrain of Hill Fortresses 

(Map No.2, !acil1g page 9) 

THE II CORPS, holding 3 front of about 40 miles from Cap Serrat 

to the Medjerda Valley, was to attack highly organized enemy positions in terrain as difficult as can be found in the whole battle area. 

A belt of rugged hill country, 15 to 20 miles in depth, lay between 

the American lines and Mateur, a center of enemy communications 

and key to the Bizerte area. The map suggests a main ridge pattern 

running from southwest to northeast-roughly, the direction planned 

for the II Corps attack. In detail, however, the hills and ridges form 

a jumbled maze, providing no broad corridors for an advance. The 

high ground averages 500 to I ,OOO feet above the narrow valleys. 

In the bare country south of the Sidi Nsir-Mateur road, where trees 

and brush are scarce, the rocky slopes steepen at times into cliffs. 

The valleys offered little or no cover, and, as one officer remarked, 

"The enemy on his hill positions was constantly looking right down 

your tluoat." In the sector nortl) of Sidi Nsir to the coast, the problem of cover ran to tl)e opposite extreme. Here, in equally rugged 

country, the valleys and lower slopes are covered with dense scrub. 

Movement of any sort was difficult; paths for guns or supplies had 

to be hacked out by hand. 

Four small rivers flow through the hills toward Mateur and 

Garaet (Lake) Achkel, but none of these streams opens up an easy 

route for an attack to follow. The Sedjenane, Melah, and Djoumine 

wind in deep and narrow valleys dominated by steep hills. The 

most southern of the four, the Oued (River) Tine, has a valley 

sometimes 2 or 3 miles wide, but still too narrow for easy passage 

9 
10 
if the adjacent heights are held by the enemy. Only two hardsurfaced roads cross the hills to Mateur: the highway from Sedjenane, following the Melah Valley, and the Beja road in the Djoumine Valley. These roads were of more importance to the II Corps 

operations as lines of rear supply than as routes of access to Mateur. 

For the rest, mere trails and paths connect the scattered Arab villages 

and farms. 

The rugged country facing the II Corps had two disadvantages for 

our men. It was narurally suited to defensive fighting, and was very 

familiar to the enemy. Skilled in all the arts of defensive warfare, 

the Germans had organized strong positions during the months they 

had held the area. The narrow valleys, followed by streams and 

roads, were blocked in depth by minefields. Machine-gun and 

mortar posts on the hills, and artillery directed from excellent observation posts, controlled the natural corridors of approach. 

Advance through country of this sort had to be made the hard 

way. The valleys had to be cleared of mines and the enemy driven 

from the high ground, but the fight for the high ground was no 

simple matter of taking a few key heights. Although a hill like 

6<J9' dominated the country for miles around, it was flanked on all 

sides by smaller but still difficult hills which must be taken in order 

to approach the main enemy position. Again and again the attack 

encountered a group of mutually supporting positions, and an advance of a mile or two might demand the capture of half a dozen 

hills on a narrow front. The II Corps was in for hill-ta-hill fighting, 

with each main hill a fortress. 

Plan of Attack in the Southern Zone 

(Map No.3, insid, back cover) 

In the southern part of the II Corps zone, the 1st Division (Maj. 

Gen. Terry Allen), the 34th Division (Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder), 

and the 1st Armored Division (Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon) were 

to make the main attack on a front of 13 miles. Through the area 

facing the American troops ran two chief routes to MateUf: the 

Djoumine Valley, followed by a highway and railroad, and the 

I Hill numbers designate height in meters above sea level; 609 meters= 1998 feet. 

II 
Oued Tine Valley. The narrow Djoumine Valley was completely 

controlled by steep hill positions. The broader Oued Tine Valley 

seemed to offer the one main corridor to the northeast for an armored striking force. General Bradley realized, however, that such 

an attack might run into a natural ·'mousetrap." The valley, heavily 

mined, was flanked by ridges and hills on both sides and narrowed 

as it ran east. The advance of armored units depended on control 

of the hills. 

The opening attack was, therefore, made into the hills which 

dominate the upper Tine Valley. The ]st Division, organized in 

three regimental combat teams, was to clear the hills north of the 

Oued Tine; the 6th Armored Infantry of the ]st Armored Division 

was to attack the hills on the southern rim of the valley. The flank 

north of the Beja-Mateur road was to be covered by a combat team 

of the 34th Division, which was just coming into that zone. The 

rest of the 34th Division and units of the 1st Armored were in support. 

The 1st Division Push to Djebel Sidi 

Meftah (23-27 April) 

The ]st Division jumped off on a 6-mile front, extending from 

the hills just south of Sidi Nsir to the Tine Valley. The direction 

of the attack led into a belt of hills 7 miles deep from Kef eI Goraa 

(Hill 575) to the eastern end of Djebel (Hill) Sidi Meftah (Map 

NO.4, inside back cover) . Three strongpoints turned out to be the 

keys of German defense, and the story of the first days centers on 

the fighting for Hills 575, 400, and 407. These heights fell in the 

zones of attack of the 26th, ]6th, and ]8th Regimental Combat 

Teams. 

THE 26TH REGIMEI'TAL COMBAT TEAM 

The enemy facing the 26th Regimental Combat Team was advantageously established, especially on Kef el Goraa (Hill 575). 

The approaches to his strongpoints, through smooth and roundtopped hills, offered little concealment except for occasional patches 

of short wheat. The enemy positions were strongly prepared and 

well camouflaged. Rocky hide-outs offered excellent protection 

against the air bursts of our artillery. During the attack on Hill 

12 
~ 

w 

OJ. TOUT" OJ. 

Djebel Sidi Meftah Area from the South west 

Photographed from terrain model prepared by Camouflage Branch, Engineer Board, Fort Bel voir, Virginia 

I 

OJAR 
575, the infantry and detachments of the 1st Engineers cleared 1,800 

mines from the area, particularly from the wheatfields. 

The attack of the 26th Infantry jumped off before dawn on 23 

April behind a concentration by the 33d Field Artillery Battalion 

and part of the Corps Artillery. The 1st Battalion captured Hill 

565 at 0355 against light opposition. When the advance continued 

across the valley, heavy enemy fire caused many casualties, and the 

attack stalled 300 yards short of the main objective. Meanwhile, the 

2d Battalion, in support of the 1st, had moved up to Hill 565, and 

its forward elements reached a point 1,000 yards south of 575 in a 

flanking movement. Enemy troops on the forward slopes of the 

hill forced them back with heavy fire. Having failed to capture 

their objective, the two battalions withdrew to Hill 565. 

On 24 April, our artillery intermittently shelled enemy positions 

on Hill 575. The 3d Battalion of the 26th, having been relieved on 

the left by units of the 34th Division, moved up to support a renewed 

attack planned for 25 April. By this time the 16th Infantry had 

outflanked Hill 575 by capturing three important hills to the southeast. According to a prisoner-of-war report, the enemy had pulled 

out of Hill 575 at 0200, the hour when our attack jumped off, leaving 

only a rear guard. The 2d Battalion occupied the hill at 0350, and 

a few hours later the 1st Battalion had possession of Hill 533 to the 

north. The 3d Battalion advanced northeast of 575 and continued 

along the ridge toward Djebel Touta (Hill 444), which was occupied 

in the afternoon. As the 1st Division pushed forward, the 2d 

Battalion of the 168th Infantry (34th Division) moved southeast 

from Hill 344 and took over Hills 533 and 575. 

THE 16m REGIMENTAL CoMBAT TEAM 

Early on 23 April, while the 26th Combat Team was making its 

initial attack on 575, the 16th Infantry advanced into the hills to 

the soutlleast and by the end of the morning had taken Hills 415 and 

374. The enemy fought stubbornly, subjecting our troops to mortar 

and artillery fire from the slopes of Hill 407. Hill 400 saw the hardest fighting and changed hands three times before it was finally 

taken, shortly before noon. On the next day, witl, Hill 400 in its 

possession, the 16th Infantry was able to capture three more heights: 

Hills 491 and 469, to the north, and 394, midway between 400 and 
407. During the night of 24-25 April, the Germans withdrew on 

the whole division front. The 16th Combat Team had played an 

important part in forcing this retirement. In the follow-up of the 

enemy movement, the 16th occupied Hill 342 as division reserve. 

THE 18TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM 

To clean out enemy positions on the division's right the 2d Battalion of the 18th Regimental Combat Team, with the 1st battalion, 

13th Armored Infantry attached, advanced on 23 April against Hill 

350 on the west side of the main Tine Valley. The early stages 

of the attack were successful, but counterattacks by elements of the 

10th Panzer Division from Hill 407 pushed the 2d Battalion off the 

high ground by 0730. To protect the flank toward 407, the 2d Battalion moved with tank support through minefields around the 

north side of Hill 350 to attack Hill 306. After 5 hours of stilf 

fighting, marked by numerous counterattacks, the 18th Combat 

Team had captured both Hill 350 and Hill 306. In spite of heavy 

casualties, particularly in E Company, it went on to strike at 407, a 

mile to the northwest. 

The main attack on 407 jumped off early the next morning, 24 

April, against initial stubborn resistance and heavy fire of all weapons. 

Nevertheless, the hill fortress was in our hands by 0400. There was 

much evidence that its power to resist had been weakened by poundings from our artillery, and especially by a heavy concentration laid 

down for an hour before the attack. 

Threatened with the loss of all commanding ground in this area, 

the enemy continued to keep Hill 407 under heavy fire and counterattacked Hill 306 about 0900. Despite success at Hill 306, there 

were signs that the enemy was preparing to pull out to the east, and 

by the morning of 25 April a German withdrawal was under way. 

The 18th Combat Team was thus enabled to move several miles 

forward; and by 1400 on the 25th, leading elements reached the 

western end of the long Djebel Sidi Meftah ridge (point 347), 

occupying Hill 340 on the way. Part of the heights at the entrance 

to the main Tine Valley had been conquered. 

15 
The Attack is Widened 

(Map NO.5, i.sid. back cov,,) 

By 26 April the 1St Division had attained its initial objectives and 

controlled all the high ground south of a line from Hill 575 to Hill 

347 (Djebel Sidi Mehah). However, the division now had a long 

flank on the left, exposed to enemy counterattack from strong positions on high ground. Corps Headquarters saw that any further 

progress eastward would increase the danger to this flank. 

The next moves, therefore, were coordinated blows by the 34th and 

1St Divisions. The 34th was to attack into the hills east and west 

of Sidi Nsir, with Hill 60g (Djebel Tahent) as a key objective. Supported on its flank by this attack, the 1St Division was to carryon 

its offensive eastward and complete the opening of the Tine Valley. 

The ground facing the 34th Division was as hard to fight through 

as the area just won by the 1St Division. The German right flank 

was anchored on Djebel el Hara, west of Sidi Nsir and dominating 

the highway and railroad from Beja to Mateur. To the east, the 

enemy held Hills 435, 490, and 6og. From these heights, as a result 

of the retirement forced by the 1St Division, the enemy line now ran 

sl;ghtly south of east to the eastern end of Djebel Sidi Meftah. 

THE ADVANCE TO HILL 60g 

The attack on the 34th Division was aimed at one of the strongest 

defensive areas in the German line. The enemy had held this 

ground for months and had used th;s time to organize a whole series 

of positions protecting the valley to Mateur and the road from Sidi 

Nsir to the Tine Valley. Outstanding in height, Hill 60g was the 

key fortress in this area, and its approaches were defended by supporting positions on hills almost as difficult. 

Two of the more important outlying defenses of Hill 60g were 

the ridge of Djebel el Hara and Hill 375. The key features of the 

ridges were two high points (407 and 473) . Across a wadi to the 

northeast, Hill 375 was a supporting position. Our capture of these 

strongly fon;fied hills would compel the Germans to fall back east 

of Sidi Nsir. 

The enemy held on through 3 days of artillery fire and infantry 

attacks. On 25 April, the 175th Field Artillery Battalion and several 
OJ. El HARA SIOI NSIR o 531 

~ Hill Positions in the Line of the Advance to Hill &J9 from the West 

-., Photographed from terrain model prepared by Camouflage Branch, Engineer Board. Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
battalions of Corps Artilby laid down a heavy fire on Djebel el Hara. 

The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 168th Regimental Combat Team 

then began their assault, but enemy machine-gun and mortar fire 

halted the advance after slight progress. On 25-26 April, the artillery fired numerous concentrations on Hills 407 and 473 to soften 

enemy positions. On 27 April, after renewed heavy shelling by the 

artillery, the infantry again attacked. The 2d Battalion moved up 

from the southeast and obtained a foothold on the southern slopes of 

Djebel el Hara. On the next day, while the 2d Battalion mopped 

up Hills 473 and 407, the 1st Battalion went on to capture Hill 375. 

While this success was being achieved on the left, the 135th Regimental Combat Team was finding harder going toward Hill 609. 

Its first effort was directed at Hill 490, which protected the approach 

to 609. In the opinion of the men who finally captured it, Hill 490 

was "tough." When the attack jumped off at 0430 on 27 April, the 

3d Battalion had to cross a stream bed to get to the 6oo-foot hill, and 

the enemy, firmly entrenched, was ready for the doughboys. Nearing the base of the hill, the 3d Battalion was under fire from machine 

guns, mortars, and artillery. At 1600, after hours of hard fighting, 

the 3d had troops on 490, but they were forced to withdraw. In a 

night attack, K Company gained an advantage which was decisive, 

and by morning of 28 April the hill was occupied. Enemy artillery 

started shelling with air bursts, causing heavy casualties. In the 

afternoon the Germans made four counterattacks, two of them rather 

weak, which were subdued by riRe fire, and two despecate attempts 

which were only repulsed by artillery. Hill 490 was ours. 

THE 34TH DIVISION CAPTURES HILL 609 

Hill 609 was now accessible but promised no easy conquest. With 

wall-like cliffs at several points, this Rat-topped fortress dominated 

the open country on all sides. Plans for the capture of 609 included 

the taking of two supporting strongpoints, Hill 461 by the 2d Battalion of the 135d1, and Hill 531 by the 1St Battalion. From these 

hills, the 1st and 2d Battalions were to attack 609 from the southeast 

and northwest, respectively, while the 3d Battalion made a feint at 

the southwestern end and carried out a holding action. The 2d 

Battalion of the 168th was to operate against the enemy to the 

north of Hill 609. 

J8 
19 
American artillery fire, strong and incessant, had pounded away 

all day on 28 April. The valley resounded with the rumble of shells 

and the splitting of rock. At 0500 on the 29th the attack began. 

The 3d Battalion of the 135th moved across the valley from Hill 490 

to take. a position at the base of Hill /log near its southwest approach. 

Owing to enemy resistance at 531 and 461, the 1st and 2d Battalions 

were unable to move as planned against Hill /log. The holding 

action of the 3d Battalion then became, in fact, an unsupported 

frontal attack on a formidable hill fortress. 

During the morning the battalion had worked its way to three 

rocky knolls at the base. There they met a shower of mortar shells, 

and intermittent artillery fire, which chipped off great chunks of rock 

but caused few casualties. The battalion withdrew a short distance 

and reorganized. By IIOO one unit reached the Arab village under 

the cliffs on the south side of the hill. Again the enemy machinegun and mortar fire was heavy. In bitter, tricky fighting, our troops 

snaked their way in and out among the rocks. By dusk the 3d 

Battalion had made a half-mile advance up the southern slopes. 

The attack was renewed at about 0500 the next morning. The 

3d Battalion of the 135th Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 133d 

Infantry, led by Company I (medium tanks) of the 1st Armored 

Regiment, advanced rapidly under a heavy fire which knocked out 

two tanks. Tanks and infantry moved with excellent coordination 

and cooperation; one report states that the infantry "grabbed and 

held onto the tails of their tanks." The 2d Battalion of the 168th 

moved at the same time to attack the northern nose of /log. There 

they were later joined by the 1st Battalion of the 133d. After cleaning out the foothills and machine-gun nests beyond them, our infantry gained the northern slopes and by nightfall controlled most 

of the summit. Some units then gave assistance to the 1st Battalion, 

fighting on 531. The 3d Platoon of the tank company, which had 

undergone heavy antitank fire, returned under cover of the 2d Platoon to the assembly area behind 490. Enemy artillery fire kept up 

during the day and during the afternoon was very intense. 

But the battle for /log was not over. On the night of 30 April 

the 2d Battalion of the 168th Infantry took over from the 135th 

Infantry. Still holding positions on the northeastern slopes, the 

enemy counterattacked at dawn, supported by machine-gun and 

20 
heavy mortar fire. The attacking force was spotted early, and a 

platoon of Company F shifted its position, let the Germans get 

within 200 yards, and by devastating surprise fire repulsed the effort. 

This was one of the outstanding actions which established our hold 

on~. Following their counterattack, the Germans withdrew but 

continued to dive-bomb the hill and place artillery fire on it during 

the day. Tersely summarizing these operations, General Bradley 

wrote: "A strong enemy attack was repulsed. Fighting all day was 

intense and bloody. The enemy was engaged with bayonet and 

grenade, and there were many cases of outstanding bravery." 

The great effort made by the enemy to hold and then to recapture Hill ~ is evidence of its importance in the battle for this 

whole hill area. The success here of the 34th Division went far to 

safeguard and assist the advance which the 1st Division was making 

in the hiIls farther to the east. 

THE 1ST D,V,S,ON REACHES THE EDGE OF THE H,LLS 

The 1St Division, with the 34th Division swinging into action on 

its left flank, had resumed its attack to the northeast. Progress in 

this direction would outflank Hill ~ and would still further clear 

the way for advance down the Tine Valley. Djebel el Anz and 

Djebel Badjar were the immediate objectives of this drive; beyond 

them, the Germans would have little commanding ground for continued defense of the approaches to Mateur and the Chouigui hills. 

On the 1St Division's left and under fire from the enemy on Hill 

~, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 16th Infantry advanced on Hill 

531. This position, supporting Hill ~ and about a half mile south, 

was partially occupied on 28 April, but the enemy still held the reverse slopes. On the next day the enemy counterattacked against 

Hill 531, but I Company held the position. 

Another strategic position was Hill 523, lying east of Hill ~. 

The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, attacked this strongpoint on 29 

April with artillery support, but made little headway. On 30 April 

the 1St Battalion joined in the attack, and the hill fell to a bayonet 

charge before 0300. The attack carried on northeast about a half 

mile to take Hill 545. The enemy counterattacked furiously and 

recovered both positions, which were vital to his defense of Hill ~. 

While the enemy counterattack was in progress, Company H of 

21 
the 1St Armored Regiment was moving up from its bivouac near 

Beja to support the 16th Infantry. The enemy had succeeded in 

recovering both Hill 545 and Hill 523 before the tanks arrived. 

When the tank platoons of Company H moved into the valley before 

523, our infantry was pinned down by enemy machine-gun and rifle 

fire. The 1St Platoon took up a defiladed position behind a steep 

cliff in the middle of the area while the 2d Platoon attempted to 

move down the valley. Enemy 47-mm guns knocked out three 

tanks, including that of the company commander. The rest of the 

2d Platoon then joined the 1st Platoon in its defiladed position, and 

the tanks, once more moving down the valley, destroyed two 47-mm 

guns and a machine-gun nest. The difficult terrain, however, prevented the tanks from advancing to their objective, and the infantry 

was still pinned down by rifle fire. 

The foil of 609 made Hill 523 of no further importance to the 

enemy. The reconnaissance section of a tank destroyer battalion, 

attached to the 34th Division, established an observation post on 523 

prior to daylight on I May. On the next morning our troops moved 

in, skirting the minefield left by the Germans at the base of the hill. 

On the center of the 1St Division front, the 26th Regimental Combat Team struck toward Djebel el Anz. The enemy began a withdrawal from points east of Djebel Touta late in the afternoon on 27 

April. The 26th Combat Team followed the withdrawal, and its 

patrols reached Djebel el Anz, north of a track to Tebourba. On the 

next day, 28 April, a stiff contest developed for possession of Djebel 

eI Anz and its surrounding heights. The 26th Infantry held part of 

the key hill before 0700 and during the afternoon was compelled to 

fight off 2 counterattacks in which the enemy took heavy losses, 

especially from our devastating artillery fire. The 7th Company of 

the German 755th Regiment lost all but 30 or 40 of its men, according to a prisoner-of-war report. As night fell, the enemy was very 

active on Hill 286 northeast of Djebel el Anz. While our troops 

consolidated their positions during the next day, the enemy regrouped 

his forces for counterattack. Five times on 30 April the Germans 

tried to recapture Djebel el Anz, but every attempt was repulsed. 

On the long ridge bordering the Tine Valley, the 18th Regimental 

Combat Team encountered relatively less opposition and made the 

22 
farthest advance to the east. On the morning of 28 April, the 18th 

Infantry occupied Diebel Sidi Meftah without opposition as far as 

point 281 and then felt out enemy positions on the north and south 

sides of Diebel Badiar. An enemy counterattack, which developed 

between Diebel el Anz and Diebel Badiar shortly before noon, was 

broken up by concentrated artillery fire. Advance elements of the 

18th Infantry reached point 216, on the eastern end of Diebel Sidi 

Meftah, in the face of artillery fire from the east. For the next 3 

days the front was relatively quiet, and the enemy maintained his 

positions on and around Diebel Badiar. But on 2 May heavy motor 

traffic indicated that the Germans were withdrawing to the north 

and east. The fall of Diebel el Anz and the enemy's failure to 

recapture it made his position on Diebel Badiar untenable . 

• • • • • • • 

From 23 April to I May the 1st Division accomplished a lQ.mile 

advance which gained for it the full control of the hills north of the 

Tine Valley. On the other side of the "Mousetrap" units of the Ist 

Armored Division were matching this progress. 

The 1st Armored Division South of the Tine 

(23 April-2 May) 

At the start of the II Corps action, most of the 1st Armored Division was held in corps reserve. Before armor could play its full 

part, the Tin~ Valley must be opened up. The 1st Armored made 

its contribution to this effort by use of the 6th Armored Infantry 

(Map No.6, inside back cover). 

Attached to the Ist Division, which was attacking the hills on the 

north side of the valley, the 6th Armored Infantry had a parallel 

assignment on the southern edge. Here again the enemy had to be 

driven out of hills from which his artillery fire could control movement along the valley. These hills were on tlle western Rank of a 

long irregular belt of rugged ground dominated by Diebel el Ang 

(Hill 668) and separating the zones of the II Corps and the First 

Army. Action by the 6th Armored Infantry had to be coordinated 

with the British fight for Heidom and for control of tlle eastern side 
of this belt. In effect, the 6th Armored Infantry was securing both 

the right flank of the main effort of the II Corps and the left flank 

of a diJIicult and important operation by the British. 

When the battle began, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 6th 

Armored Infantry were occupying positions on a line southwest 

from Djebel Bech Chekaoui. On 23 April the 3d Battalion was to 

attack eastward at 0330 against Hill 526; then proceed a mile northeast to attack Hills 420 and 481, and Hill 485 a half mile to the 

south. (This drive was described in a field order as being a "right 

hook" delivered generally along the division's right boundary.) The 

1st Battalion was to drive north from Djebel Bech Chekaoui and 

seize Hills 493 and 395. As the 3d Battalion progressed in its 

attack, the 1st was to swing east in support. Assault guns and mortars were to support the 3d Battalion, with the 68th Field Artillery 

Battalion in direct support. 

The attack by the 3d Battalion jumped off as scheduled on 23 

April after a 2o-minute concentration by the 68th Field Artillery 

Battalion. Hill 526 was taken without opposition. Company G 

then started toward Hill 485 but was driven back by mortar fire 

from the west edge of Hill 420. While Company H organized Hill 

526, Company I assembled in a wadi behind the hill and at 0845 

began a drive around the west side of Hill 347 to attack Hill 420. 

By afternoon advanced elements were on the end of the ridge but 

could not consolidate their position. Although Hill 485 was occupied by 1800, a night attack failed to clean up Hill 420, and the 

enemy held on to 420 and 481 through the next day. 

The 1st Battalion, after occupying 493 and 395, had turned northeast and found the enemy strongly established on Hill 388. Company B gained a part of the crest in a night attack but was dislodged early on 24 April by a strong German counterattack. The 

1st Battalion prepared a new effort. Our artillery dropped a very 

effective I5-minute concentration of high explosive on Hill 388 in the 

afternoon, and by 2300 Company C captured the position. Company B moved up to aid in holding against possible counterattacks. 

Patrols sent out on 25 April reported no enemy for 1,000 yards 

around Hill 388, and prisoners stated that the Germans were withdrawing to positions 5 miles to the east. Again the prisoners testified to the accuracy of our artillery, which had prevented food and 
ammUrutlOn from being brought up. Other factors were instrumental in causing the withdrawal. While the 6th Armored was 

penetrating the hills bordering the Tine, the British on the right 

flank were making headway and had seized Heidous. The Germans now gave up a whole series of strongly organized positions 

north of Djebel eI Ang, and fell back to a second line of defense 

in the hills on the edge of the Tine Valley east of the Bed Farm. 

At 2200, on 26 April, the 1st Armored Division took over the Tine 

Valley zone. The main effort on 27 April was to be made east of 

the Tine by Combat Command A, which included the 6th Armored 

Infantry and the 8,st Armorized Reconnaissance Battalion. Combat 

Command B moved into position at the south end of the "Mousetrap" and prepared to counter any enemy thrust up the valley. 

Carrying on its mission of opening the Tine Valley and covering 

the British advance on the right, the 6th Armored attacked Hills 299 

and 315, key positions in the new German barrier, and less than a 

mile apart. On 27 April, the 3d Battalion was to move north from 

3'2 against 315 while the 1st Battalion drove northeast from 293 

against Hill 299. When the 3d Battalion made its effort early in the 

morning, it was stopped by a German counterottack that carried 

through to Hill 3'2, driving Companies H and I off that hill. The 

3d Battalion recovered the hill at '400, after artillery smashed the 

German counterattack. Meantime, the 1st Battalion had been unable to advance. The 2d Battalion, released from Combat Command B, moved up during the night of 27 April to relieve the 3d 

Battalion on Hill 3'2. 

On 28 April the 1st Battalion prepared to renew its assault against 

Hill 299 while the 2d Battalion advanced against Hill 3'5. The 

Germans again counterattacked the 2d Battalion on Hill 3'2, and 

again artillery drove them back. At 1600 both battalions moved forward. The 2d Battalion captured Hill 3'5 at 18QO and began to 

organize for defense. The 1st Battalion reached Hill 299 and slowly 

worked forward against strong opposition. The fight continued 

through the night, the 2d Battalion aiding with fire from 3'5. Most 

of Hill 299 was occupied by 1055 on 29 April, but booby traps, mines, 

and 4 active German machine guns slowed progress. During the 

night, German troops worked in between Hills 299 and 3'5 to fire 

on both positions. The 1St Battalion had suffered heavy casualties 
and was bolding Hill 299 with only 80 men. Because of tbis reduced 

strength, the 3d Battalion was ordered to take over the defense of 

the hill and relieve the 1st Battalion at 2200 on 30 April. A few 

enemy infantry clung to the north slope of Hill 299 until about 1800 

on I May, but the main position was ours. The 6th Armored was 

ordered to hold on in a defensive line on 2 May. 

In some of tbe heaviest fighting of the campaign, the 1st Armored 

Division had accomplished its mission and had done its part to 

spring the "Mousetrap." While the 6th Armored Infantry forced 

the hills south of the Oued Tine, the 8,st Reconnaissance Battalion 

had been clearing the minefields in the valley, and the tanks of the 

1st Armored Division were preparing for a drive north to Mateur. 

The 9th Division in the Northern Zone 

PLAN OF ArrACK 

In the northern part of the II Corps zone, the 9th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. M. S. Eddy) and the Corps Franc d'Afrique (Col., 

now Brig. Gen., P. J. Magnan) were conducting an offensive which, 

however "secondary" in the scheme of operations, was achieving 

very useful results. This action took place so far from the Sidi 

Nsir-Tine Valley area as to constitute in effect a separate battle, but 

one which had its place in the Corps' plans and the Corps' success. 

On 23 April, the 9th Infantry Division and the Corps Franc 

d'Afrique held a 28·mile front extending from the sea to a point 

5 miles west of Sidi Nsir. (Map No.2, facing page 9.) The II 

Corps plan provided that the 9th Division would seize the Ainchouna-J efna area, where the Germans held hill fortresses dominating the approach to Mateur through the Sedjenane Valley. In 

executing this mission, the 9th Division had to meet difficulties imposed both by terrain and by the very broad front involved. 

The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron and the 34th Reconnaissance 

Troop were assigned to patrol vigorously in the 9-mile gap between 

the 9th and 34th Divisions. No attempt was made to send large 

units through this area, which gave no access to better routes. Furthermore, it was cut up by small streams, had few trails, and led 

into rough terrain dominated by flanking ridges. The 47th Regi-
~ 

DJ. EL AZZAG 

(GREEN HILL) 

DJ. EL AJRED 

(BALD ~ILL) 

Objectives of the 9th Division from the West 

Photographed from rerrain model prepared by Camou Ra ge:: Branch, Engineer Board. FOri Belvoir, Virginia 
mental Combat Team was assigned to make a holding attack 

against the Jefna position. The 39th Regimental Combat Team 

was to strike at the Djebel Ainchouna strongpoints north of Jefna. 

The 60th Regimental Combat Team and the Corps Franc d'Afrique 

were to drive eastward against the more lightly held positions on 

both sides of the Sedjenane River. The main German positions 

around lefna were to be outflanked through the hills to the north. 

JEFNA Is OUTFLANKED 

(Mal' NO.7. inside back cover) 

The lefna position, one of the strongest German defenses in all 

northern Tunisia, included two heavily fortified hills lying a mile 

and a half west of Jefna Station and commanding the Mateur road: 

Djebel el Azzag (Green Hill) on the north of the road and Djebel el 

Ajred (Bald Hill) on the south. 

The 47th R<gimental Combat Team, relieving the British 138th 

Brigade on '3 April, took up positions 5 miles from lefna Station on 

both sides of the road and prepared to exert pressure toward Jefna. 

Bald and Green Hills were subjected to air bombardment and heavy 

artillery fire. On 23 April, from positions near Hill 39B (Djebel ez 

Zeboudj), the 3d Battalion moved toward lefna against relatively 

light opposition and occupied two hills about a mile to the east. 

These positions were held with only slight changes until 3 May, 

while strong patrols operated as far east as Green Hill. Meanwhile 

the 1st Battalion on the south of the road jumped off from Hill 610 

(Djebel el Mehachem) and advanced in 4 days through a series of 

hills to within a mile of Bald Hill. Hill 605 (Kef Maksour) was 

occupied on the first day (23 April). After strong artillery preparation on 25 April, Hills 59B and 502 were captured. Further advances 

were made on 26 April, and Hill 501 was occupied during the day, 

after artillery fire had cleared the hill of enemy troops. 

From 29 April to 2 May, while the 39th Regimental Combat Team 

was outRanking Jefna on the north, the 47th Infantry maintained 

pressure on the main German positions at Bald and Green Hills. 

Patrolling was very active, and artillery fire constantly harassed the 

enemy. Nevertheless, the Germans held tenaciously to their wellprepared fox holes and emplacements on the forward slopes of 
~ 

• 

OJ. AINCHOUNA OJ. EL AJREO 

(BALD HILL) 

'" 

Terrain of the Attack on the Ainchouna-Jefna Positions from the West 

Photographed from terrain model prepared by C.1rnoufiagc Hranch, Engineer Board, FOri Belvoir, Virginia 
Green and Bald Hills. Prisoners captured on 2 May stated that they 

had been ordered to withdraw toward Bizerte. Patrols confirmed 

this enemy movement; on 3 May the 47th occupied Bald and Green 

Hills, and reconnaissance of the Tefna- Mateur road showed it to be 

free of enemy troops. The withdrawal of the enemy from the very 

strong Tefna position can be explained only in terms of the successful 

flanking maneuver in progress to the north. 

The 39th Regimental Combat Team had moved onto the spur 

of high ground south of the Oued Sedjenane on I4- 15 April to 

relieve the British 1st Parachute Brigade. The three battalions then 

occupied a triangular area made by Djebel Guerba, Djebel Rachtouil, 

and Djebel el Oumela. Four miles east of the center of this area lay 

Djebel Ainchouna, a series of peaks and ridges about 4 miles long. 

Minefields guarded the approaches to this high ground, and the 

enemy positions afforded excellent observation and good fields of 

fire. Enemy artillery, wherever weak, could be supplemented by 

tanks employed as mobile artillery. To make an attack, our troops 

were compelled to struggle through scrub 3nd high underbrush and 

up rough, steep slopes. 

Between 20 April and the morning of the attack, the 39th Combat 

Team moved forward to the base of Hill 432, without encountering 

opposition. The attack against Hill 438, the dominating height on 

Djebel Ainchouna, jumped off at about 0600 on the 23d, with the 1st 

and 3d Battalions on the line and the 2d Battalion in reserve. The 

enemy fought stubbornly with rifle, mortar, and machine-gun fire 

and grenades. As the fight continued on 24 April, the 1st Battalion 

suffered numerous casualties, including the battalion commander, the 

executive officer, the intelligence officer, and the Heavy Weapons 

Company commander. On 25 April, Hill 438 was finally captured 

by the 1st and 3d Battalions. 

During the remainder of the first phase of the campaign, the 39th 

Combat Team zigzagged from hill to hill, driving the enemy back 

toward the Mateur plain. On 26 April the 2d Battalion captured 

Hill 498, a mile southeast of Ainchouna, and Hill 513, a half mile 

northeast of 498. While the 3d Battalion took over Hill 498, the 2d 

Battalion pushed on to the east, and on 27 April occupied the 

south slopes of Hill 382. 

The 2d Battalion met strong opposition at Hill 382, which resisted 

30 
for 4 days, but the other two battalions were able to move rapidly. 

At daybreak on 28 April the ISt Battalion drove the enemy from 

Hill 164, 2 miles north of Ainchouna, and then turned southeast to 

take Hills 336 and 377, located about 2 miles north of 382. 

On 30 April the combat team concentrated its attacks to wipe out 

the enemy positions in the 382 area. The 1st Battalion attacked Hill 

406, less than a mile northwest of Hill 299, captured it before 1000, 

and then aided the 3d Battalion in a successful drive over Hill 299· 

At daybreak the 2d Battalion, supported by the Cannon Company 

and Divisional Artillery, launched an attack against Hill 382 that 

swept the entire strongpoint. 

The 39th Combat Team was now able to exert the strongest pres· 

sllre on the Jefna position. After the capture of Hills 299 and 382, 

our infantry held the high ground and had the advantage of dominant observation. German supply routes, dumps, and installations 

supporting the Jefna defenses were brought under heavy artillery 

fire. In one day the 26th Field Artillery Battalion fired more than 

4,000 rounds with devastating effect. On 1 May the Germans began 

their withdrawal to the northeast, and when patrols pushed forward the next day they found quantities of abamloned enemy equip-. 

ment. The 39th Combat Team was then only 3 miles west of the 

eastern edge of the hill mass and had completely outflanked the 

Green Hill-Bald Hill positions. 

ACTION NORTH OF THE SEDJENANE (24-27 APRIL) 

The 9th Division put its main effort into the successful flanking 

attack on Jefna. Farther to the north, the 60th Combat Team and 

the Corps Franc carried out an operation which extended the flanking movement all the way to the coast and insured that no part of 

the Axis line would escape pressure (Map No.8, inside back cover). 

This operation took place in the scrub-covered mountains nortb of 

the Sedjenane Valley. A road to Bizerte winds through the region, 

but communications were even more difficult than in the zone farther 

to the south. 

A member of tbe 60th Combat Team has described the terrain as 

a continuous challenge to the ingenuity, perseverance, and fortitude 

of our troops. Supplies, weapons, and ammunition had to be carried by burros, which were often hard to obtain. Numerous patches 

31 

of dense scrub, almost impenetrable, hindered advancing troops and 

required the use of a trail-breaker. The few roads in the area were 

mined, but the barely distinguishable trails were practically free of 

mines and booby traps. Because of liaison difficulties and the speed 

of the advance, attacking units frequently lost contact with their 

artillery support. 

German positions were sometimes defended by a single barbed 

wire strung so as to break a rush. Frontal attacks were highly impractical because the enemy had the advantage in well-placed machine guns and mortars. Consequently, as in other areas captured 

by the II Corps, our tactics in this zone were built around Ranking 

maneuvers by small units. Because of the excellent opportunity 

offered for concealment, retreating enemy troops frequently fell 

back into the scrub, waiting for nightfall and a chance to infiltrate 

by patrols. 

Starting from Djebels Mergueb and Msid on the 23d, the 60th 

Combat Team had occupied Hills 165 and 253 (Djebel Oum eI 

Adame) and Hill 294 (Djebel Dardyss) about 4 miles north of 

Ainchouna, on 24-25 April. Djebel Dardyss was shelled heavily 

by the Germans at about 1000 on 25 April, but our troops held on. 

While the Corps Franc pushed toward Bizerte on the northern 

Rank, the 60th Combat Team assaulted hill positions on both sides 

of the Sedjenane Valley. On the north, the 2d Battalion moved 

northeast from Djebel Dardyss-Djebel Oum eI Adame toward Hill 

299 (Krain1 Lerhmed), which was occupied on 28 April. The next 

day the battalion advanced northeast about 2 miles to Djebel Hazemat (Hill 273) and remained there for 3 days patrolling positions to 

the front. South of the valley, the 1st Battalion moved northeast 

from Hill 208 toward Kef Sahan (Hills 337 and 299) . One platoon 

occupied Hill 337 on 28 April, and lhe rest of the battalion came up 

the next day. On 30 April, the 1st Battalion continued southeast to 

occupy Djebel Guermach (Hill 490). 

By 29 April the 3d Battalion had advanced northeast about 2 miles 

to Kef el Zrabin (Hill 230). In this area the enemy held out 

strongly at Kef en Nsour (Points 412 and 523), lying 2 miles northeast of Djebel Guermach. Two positions in front of Kef en Nsour 

were taken on 30 April and I May. With the assistance of one 

company of the 1st Battalion, the 3d Battalion captured Kef en 

33 
NSOUI the next day. Our units had driven to the edge of the hill 

belt overlooking the Mateur plain and Garaet Achkel, and here 

again the Germans were fighting on the eastern rim of the best 

defensive ground. 

By 2 May, in the northern sector, the enemy faced the fact that his 

strongest positions were lost or outflanked. The 9th Division had 

helped to make inevitable the German retreat to the east. 

The German Retreat and the 

Capture of Mateur 

At every point where the II Corps attacked, the enemy had offered 

bitter and stubborn resistance, marked by frequent counterattacks to 

recover lost ground. Despite all their efforts, by I May the Germans 

were in a critical situation in the whole II Corps zone. (For the 

line showing the German position at this date, turn to Map No.2, 

facing page 9). 

The II Corps advance had dislodged the enemy from his best 

defensive positions in two areas. In the south, our main effort 

had fully opened the corridor to Mateur down the Tine Valley. By 

his failure to retake Djebel el Anz and Hill 609, the enemy was left 

fighting on the edge of the high ground, with lower rolling country 

behind him to Mateur. In this country there was no such series 

of naturally strong positions as the II Corps had just conquered. 

Full use of our armor was now possible, and a successful American 

attack north from Djebel Badjar might easily become a breakthrough, cutting off German units still in the hills to the northwest. 

The maneuvers of the 9th Division had rendered the enemy's 

Jefna strongpoints untenable. The flanking columns of the 9th 

Division had pushed so far northeast of J efna that the Germans 

here also were hanging on to the edges of the last high ground 

protecting the Mateur plain. 

To avoid disaster, the enemy facing the II Corps undertook a general retreat on the night of I-2 May and the next day. His forces 

in the southern sector withdrew eastward, to positions located from 

Ferryville south toward Chouigui and Eddekhila. Here, on a northsouth belt of hills, the Axis forces might still hope to protect Te34 
American Infantry on the Road to Mateur 

35 
bourba and the Tunis plain. North of Garaet Achkel the Axis 

pulled back to the hills bordering that lake and prepared a last-ditch 

stand on the main road to Bizerte. 

The enemy retreat was followed up at once by a powerful striking 

force. General Harmon, commanding the 1St Armored Division, 

ordered Combat Command B to move north from the Tine Valley 

to Mateur. At about 1100 on 3 May the 8ISt Reconnaissance Battalion entered Mateur, quickly followed by other units. This prompt 

and aggressive action undoubtedly interfered with the enemy's plan 

for withdrawal and hampered his organization of defensive positions 

between Mateur and Ferryville. That this move upset the enemy 

was shown by his desperate efforts to hold the 1st Armored Division 

at Mateur. Infantry, armor, artillery, and planes were rushed into 

the breach from other parts of the front. ME-I09's bombed Mateur 

heavily from 3 to 5 May, trying to knock out rebuilt bridges. Dive 

bombers and artillery attacked our troops fiercely in an attempt to 

halt the advance. 

The capture of Mateur meant that the m1in system of German defense in the north was broken. The pressure thus put on the enemy 

prevented him from effective concentration to meet the British drive 

in the Medjerda Valley. The II Corps had taken the first major 

prize of the Allied attack. 
.. 

.. ' 

.,11 ./ .... ", ••• 

?f' ,_ . ..... ~ ; 

.. " "" - """ ~~ ;_.,. "0' .... 

MAP NO. 9 

INE 

\ /' OPERATIONS 

~I..'O:~\ \ OF THE SECOND PHASE 

1-~" 4 - 9 MAY 1943 

1- 0 10 20 

( ~ \ +~ C===~~===C~~=~==~ 

/' ~ MILES 

-!!>«-~ ~ ~ I 

PREPARE D BY H IS TORI CAL SECT, A W ~ 

THE STORY OF THE SECOND PHASE 

(4 May-13 May) 

THE LAST PHASE of the II Corps battle opened on 4 May. 

Without giving the Germans time to rest or to organize their 

new positions, the II Corps dealt savage blows at three points 

in the enemy line. One blow fell north of Garaet Achkel, 

where the 9th Division and the Corps Franc cleared the hills 

around Djebel Cheniti in 2 days and then struck through at 

Bizerte. By 7 May one armored spearhead had reached Ferryville and was fanning Out to the east; another armored force 

lunging east from Mateur was halfway to the Medjerda Valley. 

While the 1st Division held the enemy on Kef en Nosoura, the 

34th broke through the hills near Eddekhila and reached Chou igui on 7 May. 

Bizerte was in our hands by 8 May, and the German lines in 

the north were broken beyond hope of recovery. Meanwhile, 

the British First Army had delivered the knockout blow of the 

Tunisian campaign. A crushing tank attack which had reduced 

the German center at Massicault reached Tunis by evening of 

7 May. Axis resistance faded rapidly. Nearly all the enemy 

forces north of Tunis surrendered on 9 May. The bag of the 

II Corps in the entire operation was some 42,000. In 4 more 

days the last Axis troops were rounded up, and the campaign 

for North Africa was over. 

The story of the second phase is illustrated on the map attached to this page and on Maps 10 and 11 inside the back cover. 
THE SECOND PHASE 

Axis Resistance Is Broken 

Plans for the Wind up of the Campaign 

GENERAL SITUATION ON 2 MAY 

THE HARD-WON SUCCESS of the II Corps and the forced 

retreat of the Germans in its zone came at a welcome moment 

from the standpoint of the whole Allied operation. 

On the right of the Eighteenth Army Group, the British Eighth 

Army had advanced to Takrollna but was held up by heavily mined 

defensive positions. In the center, where the most powerful attacking forces had been grouped, the First Army had gained some 

ground toward Tebollrba allli Massicault, but no breakthrough had 

yet been made. On I May, First Army orders directed a regrouping 

of forces for a fresh effort, with reinforcement of the center by an 

armored division and other units from the Eighth Army. Our 

victory in the north came at just the right time to give strongest 

support to the renewed effort in the center. The German retreat 

east of Mateur strained the whole enemy line of defense. With the 

II Corps at Mateur, the right Aank of the Germans was endangered. 

From that area our forces not only threatened Bizerte [() the north 

but could move directly against the rear of the German forces defending Tebourba. Our advance pUl additional stress on the already 

weakening Axis lines ano played an important part in the enemy 

collapse a few days later. 

PLANS Of THE EIGHTEENTH ARMY GROUP 

(Map NO.9. lacing pag, J7) 

In order to complete the destruction of Axis forces in Tunisia, the 

Eighteenth Army Group on 3 May instructed the First Army to attack ano capture Tunis. On right and left, the Eighth Army and 

37 
the II Corps were to exert maximum pressure to prevent the enemy 

from reinforcing his units facing the First Army. After taking 

Tunis, the First Army would exploit to t'1e southeast and east in 

order to cut off tbe Cap Bon Peninsula while the Eighth Army 

pressed forward to the Hammamet area from the south. 

On 4 May, the First Army instructed the V Corps to attack on a 

narrow front. The IX Corps was to pass througb the V Corps and 

capture the inner defenses of Tunis. The II Corps would seize tbe 

higb ground east and west of Cbouigui and take Bizerte. 

PLANS OF THE II CORPS' 

In the northern zone of its front the II Corps planned to isolate 

Axis troops in the area of Garaet Achkel-Lac de Bizerte. The task 

was assigned to the 9th Infantry Division and the 1st Armored 

Division. To drive the enemy on the west and north sides of Garaet 

Acbkel back toward Bizerte, two regimental combat teams of the 

9tb Division and the Corps Franc d'Afrique were to operate northwest of the lake. The 1st Armored Division was to push nortbeast 

from Mateur to Ferryville, and then east on the south side of Lac de 

Bizerte in order to cut the Axis line of retreat from Bizerte to Tunis. 

South of the Mateur-Tebourba road, the enemy had fallen back 

east of the Oued Tine to a defensive line in steep hills following the 

curve of the river. While the 1st Division advanced northeast from 

Djebel Badjar against the northern end of this line, the 34th Division 

was to drive to the east against Eddekhila and Chouigui. 

Through to Chouigui 

( May No. /0, inside back cover) 

The new German line in the southern zone east of the Tine ran 

from Kef en Nosoura on the north to a cluster of strongpoints be-

: At noon on 30 April the 3d Di\'i~ion (~bj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscon, Jr.) had been 

alerted to move to the: 11 Corps zone. Within 7 days after the receipt of its order, the ('mire 

divisi<.ln had travelled over 700 miles to its destination. On 8 May the 15th Regimental 

Combat Team was prepared to assist the 1st Di\'i~ion in anack southeast ot Mateur. The 

rest of the division was rcady to move into the Ferryville arc:a and to go on to mop up 

any remaining rc~is(ancc in the peninsula cast of the Tunis-Bizerle road. By 9 Mar, however, the efforls of the II Corps were: so successful that the 3d Division was not needed. 

The division was the:n assigned the mission of guarding 38,000 pri,oner~ of war in :l. cage 

west of Mateur and of collecting and guarding captured matericl. 
tween Eddekhila and Chouigui, 10 miles to the south. Rising 

steeply 600 to 1,000 feet above the plain, the hills gave the enemy very 

strong defensive positions protecting Tebourba. These might be 

turned, however, from the north along the Mateur-Djedeida road, 

and, if the attack of the British V Corps succeeded, the enemy on 

these hills would be cut off from retreat toward Tunis. 

HOLDING ATTACK OF THE 1ST DIVISION 

I n preparation for an assault on the northern end of the German 

line, the 1St Division on 5 May occupied tbe bigh ground west of 

the Tine facing the hill mass of Djebel Douimiss, held by the BarenIhin Regiment. The next day the 18th and 26th Regimental Combat 

Teams attacked across the Tine into these hills, supported by H 

Company of the 1St Armored Regiment. The armored unit was 

held up by minefields and the collapse of a bridge over a deep wadi. 

By nightfall the 18th Infantry had suffered numerous casualties and 

was forced to withdraw west of the Tine during the night. Tllis 

move left the 26th Infantry holding a salient on the right, and its 

withdrawal was necessary. The division was then ordered to maintain pressure against the enemy and to prevent any westward movement. Our troops held their lines west of the Tine on 7 May, and 

on the following day the Barenthin Regiment withdrew. 

THE 34TH D,V,SION CAPTURES EDDEKHILA AND CHOUIGUI 

South of the 1St Division, the 34th started from the Djebel Badjar 

area on 3 May in a drive eastward to Chouigui, the objective. The 

168th Infantry led; the 175th Field Artillery Battalion was in support. Patrols of the 168th moved east across the Oued Tine plain 

without encountering enemy units. The main road leading to 

Chouigui from the west was patrolled vigorously on 4 May past St. 

Joseph Farm and up to Eddekhila, again without meeting opposition. 

The enemy held the hills south and east of the plain, however, and 

an attack over the open ground north of Eddekhila would be costly. 

So, once more, the 34th Division took the hill route. On 5 May, 

the 168th moved into the rugged country southwest of Eddekhila. 

The advance over broken ground and steep slopes was slow and 

difficult, but at the end of the day the 168th Infantry forced the 

enemy out of Eddekhila. 

39 
On 6 May, while the J33d pushed a protective Rank south and 

east of Eddekhila, the 168th turned northward along the hills toward 

the Chouigui pass. The Germans offered bitter resistance and held 

up the advance in front of Hill 285. An early morning attack on 

7 May carried 285 and the neighboring heights to within a mile of 

the pass. The Germans then withdrew from Chouigui, and units 

of the 34th Division occupied the town late in the afternoon. At 

Chouigui, the 34th Division had reached an ultimate objective 

assigned to the II Corps in the operationa l orders of 19 April. 

At the same time that the 34th was carrying through to Chouigui, 

the massive attack of the British V Corps, given tremendous air and 

artillery support, aclllcved a decisive breakthrough in the center. 

Massicault was reached on 6 May, and on 7 May British armor drove 

through to the city of Tunis. From that time, enemy units were 

surrendering rapidly in the whole northern Tunisian area, making 

further movements part of a mopping-up process. While the 168th 

Infantry operated to end resistance in the Chouigui sector, the 135th 

Infantry moved on 9 May to clean out positions to the north. The 

813th Tank Destroyer Battalion, with Company K of the 135th Infantry and the 34th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop attached, operated 

east out of Chouigui. 

North of the Lakes to Bizerte 

(Map No. 11, inside back covt:r, tlnd Sketch No. I, page 42) 

After the German retreat in the northern sector, the new enemy 

defense extended from Djehel Cheniti (north of Garaet Achkel) 

southeast through Ferryville, and then south on the high ground 

northeast of Mateur. Djebel Achkel, south of the lake, remained 

a useful hut isolated stronghold. The new line harred the roads to 

Ferryville and Bizerte around the shore of Garaet Achkel, but its 

stability depended upon control of two groups of commanding hills: 

those around Djehel Cheniti and those southeast of Garaet Achkel 

protecting the Ferryville isthmus. If the Axis lost Djebel Cheniti, 

its troops north of Garaet Achkel would have to fall back on Bizerte 

or risk being trapped at Ferryville by the 1St Armored Division, 

driving north from Mateur. Should the 1St Armored succeed in 

penetrating the strongpoints sollth of Ferryville, the German forces 
to the north would be cut off and those to the south would be 

outflanked. 

The 9th Division and the Corps Franc attacked the German positions north of Garaet Achkel, where Diebel Cheniti was the center 

of the German strength. The tactics against Cheniti were similar to 

those used earlier to reduce Jefna. The Corps Franc and the 60th 

Combat Team delivered a holding attack against the strongpoints 

(Hills 207 and 168); the 47th Combat Team outflanked Cheniti on 

the north. 

Infantry Battalion Approaching Bizerte 

On 4 May the Corps Franc occupied three hills west of Diebel 

Cheniti. A weak enemy counterattack down the western slopes of 

Cheniti was broken up by our artillery. On 5 May the 47th Infantry moved up from Jefna and began its flanking movement to 

drive the enemy from hills on the left of the Corps Franc. The 2d 

Battalion advanced up Diebel Zouitina and turned east to Hill 208, 

which it took in the afternoon. Continuing the attack, the 2d 

Battalion had captured Hill 223, and the 3d was on 165 to the northeast by the end of the next day. The 47th Combat Team was now 

due north of Cheniti and in a position to threaten the Bizerte road. 

On 6 May, while the 47th was attacking to the north, the 60th 
i:i 

DJEBEL CHENITI AREA 

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ACHI(EL 

f/1I< 

SKETCH NO. I 

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ito' 

PREPARED BY HISTORICAL SECT., A.W.C. 
Infantry passed through the Corps Franc and assaulted Hills 168 and 

20'], key positions on Djebel Cheniti. The 1st Battalion jumped off 

at 1300 and 3 hours later had driven the enemy from Hill 168. A 

half mile to the south, on Hill 2OJ, they met stronger resistance. An 

artillery concentration disorganized the enemy, and our infantry 

attacked before the Axis troops could recover. By nightfall part of 

the hill was captured, but the Germans still held out on the southeastern slopes. 

On 7 May the 47th and 60th Combat Teams advanced to cut the 

Bizerte road. The 2d Battalion of the 47th Infantry attacked from 

Hill 223 and captured Hill 131, 2 miles to the southeast. The 3d 

Battalion occupied Hill 125, about 2 miles north of 131, and held it 

against an armored counterattack in the afternoon. The 60th Infantry continued its attack toward the east, cleaned up the south 

slopes of Djebel Cheniti, and by the end of the morning reached 

Hill II4, east of the Bizerte road. 

These successes against the key hill positions were decisive. By 

1400 on 7 May the enemy was in full retreat, and 6 hours later the 

47th Infantry began its march to Bizerte. On 8 Mayall elements of 

the 47th Combat Team were in position just northwest of the city 

ready to repel any counterattack by the Germans. The 60th Combat Team had occupied the high ground commanding the Ferryville-Bizerte road. The northern Axis flank had collapsed. 

Meanwhile, on 7 May, the 15th Engineer Battalion, following the 

3d Battalion of the 60th Infantry, constructed a ford across Oued 

Douinriss on the Bizerte road. This allowed the 9th Reconnaissance 

Troop to reconnoiter Route II toward Bizerte, and the Reconnaissance Company of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion to reconnoiter Route 57 toward Ferryville. Using this same passage, 

Company A of the 751st Tank Battalion, supported by two companies of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, moved up the Bizerte 

road and entered Bizerte at 1555. The only resistance came from 

snipers armed with rifles and submachine guns, and from a few 

light machine guns. The tanks deployed on the streets to seek out 

and destroy all small-arms fire and machine-gun positions. Some 

fire was received from artillery south of Bizerte. Seven tanks, placed 

as counterbattery, knocked out two artillery pieces. When darkness 

set in, the tank company moved in absolute blackout to bivouac in 

the central section of the Bizerte airport. 

43 
The 9th Reconnaissance Troop had also entered the outskirts of 

Bizerte during the afternoon. Other units of the 9th Division and 

the Corps Franc came in the next day. Before evacuating Bizerte 

the Germans left time bombs in the important buildings and scattered booby traps and mines profusely; even cakes of soap were 

booby-trapped. With an enemy force of undetermined strength 

held between Goulet du Lac, Lac de Bizerte, and the Mediterranean, 

the 9th Division prepared to hold Bizerte and mop up minor 

resistance around the city. 

Breakthrough by the 1st Armored Division 

(Map No. J J, inside back co (II'/', and Sketch No.2, page 45) 

The 1st Armored Division had not b<en able to show its full 

power in the first phase of the operation, although the threat of 

armored attack down the Tine Valley had undoubtedly been a factor 

in forcing the German retreat on 2 May. Now, from the Mateur 

area, the 1St Armored Division was to strike at the cmter of the new 

German line, where two roads led into the Tunis plain: one from 

Mateur through Ferryville to the Tunis-Bizerte highway and the 

other from Mateur to Djedeida. 

The enemy defense of these roads dependetl on holding two hill 

masses. The first, and by far the more important, comprised a 

5-mile belt of hills between the Ferryville and the Mateur-Djedeida 

roads. In these heights lay the main enemy positions. The second 

was the imposing Djebel Achkel, just south of the lake and rising 

more than 1,600 feet above the plain. The 91st Reconnaissance 

Squadron was to take care of Djebel Achkel and guard the division's left flank. The primary attack was made by two combat 

teams, team A operating for a breakthrough at Ferryville and team 

B aiming for control of the road to Djedeida. 

D]EBEL ACHKEL 

The first move was against this isolated height. Not only did 

it flank the intended line of our main attack, but from its top the 

enemy could direct artillery fire on the Mateur plain from batteries 

as far as 8 miles to the east. The 9lSt Reconnaissance Squadron, 

moving to the attack on 4 May, met strong opposition, but by mid44 
afternoon of 5 May our troops had advanced about one-third of the 

way up the mountain and by nightfall had captured the western half, 

taking more than 80 prisoners. 

The remaining enemy forces, only a few hundred strong, put up 

the stubborn resistance that characterized German fighting in this 

MATEUR-FERRYVILLE AREA 

6-1 MAY 1943 

campaign. Enemy installations in stone buildings at the base of the 

mountain held out until blasted by a tank-destroyer unit on 9 May. 

Fighting on the hill continued until II May, when more than 300 

officers and men of the Hermann Goering Division surrenderedbut not until they had verified the report that their general had 

surrendered on the 9th. 

45 
THE DRIVE THROUGH FERRYVILLE TO THE EAST 

On 6 May, the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment began the main 

attack on the hills grouped around Djebel el Messeftine, just southeast of Garaet Achkel. The 1st Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment protected the left flank of the attack, and artillery support was 

given by the 9Ist and 68th Field Artillery Battalions. 

Following an artillery concentration, the 6th Armored Infantry 

moved across the open plain east of the Mateur-Ferryville road and 

into a hill mass 600 to 700 feet high. Not only was the ground 

difficult for armored movement, but the heights were defended with 

strong forces of infantry supported by tanks. On the left, the 2d 

Battalion reached Hill 273, the highest point on the Messftine ridge, 

by 0626. Here the advance was held up. On the right, the 1st 

Battalion attacked Hill 253 on the southeastern end of the ridge. 

This objective and Hill 251, a half mile to the north, were taken by 

IOOO. The enemy still held out at 216, less than a half mile east of 

253. At noon the 3d Battalion was ordered to move out from its 

position west of the Mateur-Ferryville road to drive the enemy from 

Djebel Cheggaga. By 1630, the 3d Battalion had reached its objective and was mopping up. 

The Germans, driven back from the ridge of Messeftine, clung 

stubbornly to a secondary ridge from Hill 265 to 172. In order to 

drive the enemy from these positions, the 1st Armored Division 

launched a coordinated attack by infantry and tanks at 1700. Two 

companies of the 13th Armored Regiment moved up from the right 

flank and passed through the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, 

on Hill 273. The tanks attacked east and southeast against intense 

antitank and artillery fire. Light rain had made the rugged terrain 

slippery, and a platoon leader's tank was destroyed when it slid over 

a 50-foot cliff. While the tanks were maneuvering soutbeast of Hill 

273, tbe enemy counterattacked the bill from the northeast. A confused and bitter figbt took place as tanks battled in the wadies and 

our infantry struggled to hold tbe key heigbts. The enemy overran 

Hills 251 and 253 by 1900 and continued to attack 273. All but one 

platoon of our tanks were ordered to withdraw a half bour later. 

By 2100, the German counterattack had won back the entire ridge 

from 273 to 253; but the 3d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, held 
onto 216 witb the aid of artillery fire. Although the German counterattack against Messeftine was successful on 6 May, the enemy 

could not hold the position because of the advance of Combat Command B on the south. 

Combat Command B, consisting of the 13th Armored Regiment 

and attached units, was operating against the lower hills near the 

Mateur-Djedeida road. Here the enemy had many concealed antitank guns, which had to be rooted out one by one. Late in the 

afternoon, while one battalion supported the attack on Messeftine, 

the rest of Combat Command B was able to clear Djebel eI Assafir 

and advance toward the road junction 6 miles east of Mateur. 

On 7 May, the 1st Armored Division launched a three-pronged 

attack that completedly routed the Germans along the Mateur-Ferryville front. At the nortb end of the German line the 9Ist Reconnaissance Squadron (with the exception of one troop left on Djebel 

Achkel) attacked and captured Djebel ez Zarour. The squadron, 

followed by the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, entered Ferryville shortly 

after noon. In the center, heavy artillery fire chased the enemy from 

the Messeftine ridge and the 6th Armored Infantry occupied the hills. 

Tbe 3d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, advanced from the south 

and found the enemy in full retreat to the east. 

Fresh units were brought up from reserve forces to exploit the 

opening south of Ferryville. The 3d Battalion of the 1st Armored 

Regiment, which had followed the infantry into Ferryville, now 

moved out to the east with the mission of cutting the Tunis-Bizerte 

road, II miles away. 

South of the Lac de Bizerte, the first objectives of the 3d Battalion and its attached units were the bridge over the Oued ben 

Hassine and the high ground southeast and south of tbe bridge, 

about 4 miles from Ferryville. The battalion deployed on the south 

side of the road and advanced to the bridge, which was defended by 

tanks and artillery. While Company G moved south to take the 

enemy on the Rank, the rest of the battalion fired on the high ground 

east of the stream. Company G gained complete surprise in its 

Ranking movement and drove the enemy onto the Rats south of Lac 

de Bizerte. Darkness prevented complete exploitation of the success, but the bridge was taken intact. The 2d Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry, arrived at nightfall to assist in defending the position. 

47 
Only two enemy strongpoints of consequence still held out in 

front of the 3d Battalion. One of these was Hill 151, overlooking 

the road 4 miles east of the captured bridge; the other was Djebel 

Sidi Mansour, a mile south of Hill 151. When units of the 91st 

Reconnaissance Squadron advanced east of the bridge on 8 May, 

enemy fire from Hill 151 ano Sidi Mansour threatened to hold up the 

advance. Company G of the 3d Battalion was ordered to attack 

Hill 151, with Company I in support. Two platoons of Company 

G maintained strong frontal fire while the third platoon maneuvered 

to the south flank and destroyed the enemy. 

Meanwhile, Company I, the assault guns, and the 91st Armored 

Field Artillery Battalion were neutralizing enemy positions on the 

west side of Sidi Mansour. At 1430, Company I began its move to 

the western crest of the hill, with the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry, following to mop up. After the heavy and sustained "snipe 

shoot" that preceded the assault, our forces met no real resistance and 

took 200 prisoners. Beyond the hill to the east, enemy vehicles and 

personnel were streaming in retreat. 

On the last day of the operation, 9 May, the 3d Battalion met 

practically no opposition. At daylight, Company G moved astride 

the Tunis-Bizerte road, while Company H advanced toward the 

viIJage of EI Alia. No difficulty was encountered "except that 

caused by the determination of several thousands of Germans to 

surrender," according to an official report. When news of the surrender was announced, the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, was 

in reserve ready to seize the high ground north and east of EI Alia. 

The unit then moved to guard the beaches west of Metline to 

prevent attempts at escape by sea. 

THE ORNE TO PROlVlLLE 

While Combat Command A cleared the hills north of the MateurDjedeida road on 7 May, Combat Command B moved east on the 

division's right flank. The 2d Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment, with attached units, seized the crossroads 6 miles east of Mateur 

in the morning and then advanced more than 5 miles to the east. 

On 8 May, this force attacked to the northeast on the north side of 

the Djebel eI Besbessia ridge, while the 8ISt Reconnaissance Battalion 

pushed forward to reconnoiter the Tunis-Bizerte road. Advancing 
through rugged terrain, the 2d Battalion cut the road early in the 

afternoon at the east end of Djebel Menzel Raul. 

On 8 May, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Armored Regiment moved 

east from Mateur on the Djedeida road to protect th e right Aank 

of Combat Command B. The first serious opposition was encountered 12 miles east of Mateur at Hill II I , where Companies C 

and B carried the hill but were driven off by artillery and mortar 

fire . The attack was stopped there by nightfall. German defense, 

however, was nearing its end. Next morning, 9 May, Hill 11 I was 

occupied without resistance. Units of the 1st Battalion pushed on 

to Protville, where they met British units west of the town. As the 

battalion went beyond Protville and turned north on the Bizerte 

road, it passed thousands of Axis prisoners and quantities of their 

discarded arms and equipment. In the last 2 days of enemy disintegration, the battalion had covered 40 miles. The 3d Battalion 

of the 13th Armored turned north on the Bizerte road on 9 May 

and then advanced northeast to occupy Porto Farina. 

The Axis Surrenders 

By 7 May it was apparent that the battle for Tunisia w"s won. 

For 2 weeks the enemy had contested every hill furiously and had 

counterattacked incessantly to recove r lost positions. Pushed back 

and dented, his lines had not been broken. But the unrelenting 

Allied pressure finally told. By the night of 7 May, the British 

First Army had driven an armored wedge clear through to Tunis, 

and the Axis armies were cut in half. At the same moment, U. S. 

armored units were in Bizerte, and organized resistance by the 

enemy could not last much longer. In the next 2 days, enemy 

forces were widely sepa rated and cut off from bases and supplies. 

The German units in the Il Corps zone were in a particularly 

hopeless position. The three-pronged eastward drive of the 9th 

Division and the 1st Armored left only minor enemy groups to be 

rounded up in the hills. When Combat Command B of the 1st 

Armored Division met British units at Protville, a main group of 

German forces, pressed on the west by the 1st and the 34th Divisions, 

was stranded in the Tebourba area. On 9 May, the Germans in the 

II Corps area asked for terms. Unconditional surrender was ac49 
cepted by Maj. Gen. Fritz Krause at noon; and, as General Bradley's 

report states, "All organized resistance in Northern Tunisia in front 

of the II Corps carne to an end ." 

Early in the afternoon, six German generals, now prisoners, arrived at II Corps Headquarters. Among them were the commanding generals of the 5th Panzer Army, the 15th Panzer Division, 

Bizerte 

and the Manteuffel Division, the artillery commander of the Afrika 

Korps, and the commanding general of the Luftwaffe at Bizerte. 

Axis resistance in the hill mass southeast of Tunis lasted only a 

few days longer. On 9 and 10 May, British armor cut off the 

escape route to the Cap Bon Peninsula. Under pressure by the 

French on the west and the Eighth Army from the south, the 

remaining Axis forces surrendered by 13 May. 

50 
CONCLUSION 

Taking Count 

THE MISSION OF THE II CORPS had been threefold: to protect the left Rank of the British V Corps; to keep the enemy from 

concentrating in front of the First Army; and to capture certain 

major objectives. The II Corps had completed its mission. It had 

maintained contact all during the operation with the left Rank of the 

British V Corps, which was never menaced. At the beginning of 

the campaign only about 12,000 front-line enemy troops opposed our 

advance; at the close of the operation approximately 40,000 enemy 

troops were in front of the II Corps. All the objectives of the II 

Corps had been captured, both those assigned initially in the Jefna 

and Chouigui areas and the ultimate goal, Bizerte. American 

advances had been coordinated with French and British successes. 

The accomplishment of the mission assigned to the II Corps is a 

record of fighting men with the will and ability to win. It is also 

the record of an army well supplied, well equipped, and expertly led. 

For operations of such scope and intensity, our losses during the 

campaign for Bizerte were small. Outflanking maneuvers around 

strong positions such as Bald Hill and Green Hill in the Jefna sector, 

concentration on key terrain features such as Hill 1lD9, intense artillery bombardment preceding major attacks, and use of armor to exploit infantry successes were important factors in holding casualties to 

a minimum. The following tabulation shows losses of the II Corps. 

Killed Wounded Missing 

1st Division . - 103 J,245 682 

9th Divisioll ___ 82 548 20 

34th Division - . - . 85 470 79 

1st Armored ____ - - - - 68 424 96 

Corps Franc ______ ______ 70 400 ------------ Other Units - - -------- 13 49 -- ------ ---- -

TOL"I -------- --- 421 3, 136 R77 

-----
Losses in materiel were likewise very low. Nine light tanks, 40 

medium tanks, and 19 halftracks were lost. One I55-mm gUll, 

which had received a direct hit by a 500-pound bomb, was destroyed. 

Thirteen mortars,lX) automatic weapons, and abollt 400 other small 

arms were lost. 

Enemy losses ill the campaign are reckoned in tams of the total 

destruction of an army. This is the all-important loss, but even .1 

brief, incomplete statement of some details is of interest. Prisoners 

of war taken by the II Corps numbered 35,934 Germans, 5,861 italians, and 41 others. The enemy killed were estimated at 3,000. In 

addition to the heavy enemy materiel losses in battle, large quantities 

of equipment and supplies were seized by our troops before the 

enemy could destroy them. Seven hundred and fifty motor vehicles, 

45 halftracks, 75 motorcycles, 50 trailers, 250 artillery pieces, 75 mortars, 750 machine guns, 50 tanks, and 30,000 small arms were among 

the major items of booty. Likewise, 1,000 tons of ammunition, 

1,600 tons of rations, 1,000 tons of clothing and equipment, 75 tons 

of medical supplies, and 1,000 tires were captured. 

The World Acknowledges the Victory 

American and French troops of the II Corps distinguished themselves throughout the campaign. "French units under their efficient 

commander, Colonel Magnan, fought with courage and determination . . . in mountainous terrain and suffered many casualties. 

Even though exhausted at the end, they still had but one purpose in mind-to drive the enemy from their shores. Their determination, their courage, and their devotion to their cause were 

an inspiration to our troops." So said General Omar N. Bradley, 

in his report on the operations of the II Corps, and he gave high 

praise to the men of his command: "Some of the II Corps, namely, 

the 1St Infantry Division and elements of the 1St Armored and 34th 

Infantry Divisions, have been fighting in North Africa almost continuously since they landed at Oran on 8 November. Other units 

have been in action in Tunisia for varying periods from 18 January 

onward. Practically all units have fought the enemy both in the 

desert and in the mountains. The II Corps has fought with and 

without air superiority. It has suffered reverses, and it has known 

52 
victory. Officers and men alike understand our enemy and his 

methods. They no longer underestimate or overestimate his abili. 

ties. With the common sense that is characteristic of Americans, 

they have learned that the surest way of living is to outmaneuver 

and outsmart those who oppose us. With their practical sense, their 

understanding of the enemy, their first-hand knowledge of the hardships and dangers of war, and above all else their courage and loyalty, soldiers of the II Corps have played a major role in the winning of a great Allied victory." 

In a special Order of the Day, dated 13 May, General Sir Harold 

R. Alexander, Commander of the Eighteenth Army Group, ado' 

dressed the Allied forces: "Today you stand as the conquerors and 

heroes of the North African shores. The world acknowledges your 

victory; history will acclaim your deeds. British, French, and American arms have swept from these lands the last of the German and 

Italian invaders. As your Commander in the Field, I add my admiration and gratitude to those of the United Nations for this great 

victory, which will go down to history as one of the decisive battles 

of all time." 

53 
Annex No.1 

Units Taking Part in the Bizerte Campaign 

The following items do not constitute an official Station List. 

(ATTACHMENTS AS OF 9 MAY 1943) 

II CoRPs: 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company. 

1ST DIVISION: 

16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry Regiments; 7th, 32d, 33d, and 5th 

Field Artillery Battalions; 1St Engineer Battalion; 1st Quarter. 

master Company; 1st Medical Battalion; 1St Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop ; 1st Signal Company; 70Ist Ordnance Company. 

Attached: 70lst Tank Destroyer Battalion; 105th Coast Artillery 

(AA) Battalion; Detachment, 2624th Signal Service Regiment; 

Air Support Party. 

1ST ARMORED DIVISION: 

1st and 13th Armored Regiments; 6th Armored Infantry Regiment; 27th, 68th, and 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalions; 8Ist 

Armored Reconnaissance Battalion; 16th Armored Engineer Battalion; 141st Armored Signal Company; 1st Armored Supply 

Battalion; 1st Armored Maintenance Battalion; 47th Armored 

Medical Battalion. 

Attached: 91st Reconnaissance Squadron; 776th Tank Destroyer 

Battalion; 443d Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion; Air Support Party. 

9TH DIVISION: 

39th, 47th, and 60th Infantry Regiments; 26th, 60th, 84th, and 

34th Field Artillery Battalions; 15th Engineer Battalion; 9th 

Quartermaster Company; 9th Medical Battalion; 9th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop; 9th Signal Company; 709th Ordnance Company. 

54 
Attached: 62d Armored Field Artillery Battalion; 434th Coast 

Artillery (AA) Battalion; Battery H, 67th Coast Artillery (AA) 

Regiment; 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion; Corps Franc d'Afrique; 

Air Support Party. 

34TH DIVISION: 

133d less 2d Battalion, 135th, and 168th Infantry Regiments; 125th, 

151St, I75th, and 185th Field Artillery Battalions; ro9th Engineer 

Battalion; 109th Quartermaster Battalion; 109th Medical Battalion; 

34th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop; 34th Signal Company; 734th 

Ordnance Company. 

Attached: 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion; 751St Tank Battalion; 

ro7th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion; Air Support Party. 

3D DIVISION (assisted in mopping up) : 

7th, 15th, and 30th Infantry Regiments; roth, 39th, 41St, and 9th 

Field Artillery Battalions; roth Engineer Battalion; 3d Quartermaster Company; 3d Medical Battalion; 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop; 3d Signal Company; 703d Ordnance Company. 

13TH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE: 

1St Field Artillery Observation Battalion; 17th, 36th, and 178th 

Field Artillery Regiments. 

Attached: ro6th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion; Headquarters, 

5th Armored Artillery Group; Battery E, 67th Coast Artillery 

(AA) Regiment; 58th and 65th Armored Field Artillery Battalions; 

1St Battalion, 213th Coast Artillery Regiment, less Batteries C 

and D; 601St Tank Destroyer Battalion. 

2626TH CoAST ARTILLERY BRIGADE (AA) : 

Headquarters, 2626th Coast Artillery Brigade; Batteries C and D, 

213th Coast Artillery Regiment; 3d Battalion, 213th Coast Artillery 

Regiment; ~th, ~2d, and ~th Coast Artillery Batteries (Airborne); 436th Coast Artillery Battalion; 67th Coast Artillery Regiment, less Batteries E and H and 1St and 3d Battalions. 

CoRPS TRooPs: 

Military Police: 202d Military Police Company. 

Armored: 2642d Armored Replacement Battalion. 

Signal: 53d Signal Battalion. 

55 
Attached: Army Pictorial Service; Detachments, 162d and 163d 

Signal Companies; 177th Signal Replacement Company; Detachments, 2624th and 2625th Signal Service Regiments; Detachments, African Headquarters, British, French. 

Medical: 51st Medical Battalion. 

Attached: Detachments, 56th Medical Battalion; 2d and 3d 

Auxiliary Surgical Groups; 2d Battalion, 16th Medical Regiment. 

Attached: Detachments, 2d and 3d Auxiliary Surgical Groups; 

9th, IIth, 15th, and 128th Evacuation Hospitals. 

Engineer: 19th and 20th Engineer Regiments; 2d PlaLOon, 470th 

Engineer Company; 518th Engineer Water Supply Company; 

62d Engineer Topographical Company; Company B, oom Engineer Camouflage Battalion. 

Quartermaster: 26,8th Provisional Quartermaster Truck Battalion; 

1st Battalion, 28th Quartermaster Regiment (Truck), less Companies Band C, but plus Company K and Provisional Truck 

Company; 93d Quartermaster Company; Company A, 205th 

Quartermaster Battalion; Company C, 263d Quartermaster 

Battalion. 

Ordnance: Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Provisional Ordnance Group; Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Medical Detachment, 42d Ordnance Battalion. 

Attached: 53d Ordnance Battalion; 82d, ID9th, and 3485th 

Ordnance Companies; Company A, 67th Ordnance Battalion; 

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Medical Detachment, 188th Ordnance Battalion. 

Attached: 29th, 99'St, and 3488th Ordnance Companies. 

56 
Annex No.2 

Decorations 

(Distinguish~d Service Cross, Distinguished Service Medal, and Silver 

Star Only) 

The following list of decorations is based on the best records available to date but is not necessarily complete. The list is arranged 

alphabetically by name, showing rank, arm or service, residence, 

organization, station, and date of citation. Posthumous awards are 

indicated by an asterisk ("'). 

Distinguished Service Cross 

2D LT. GEOFFREY C. FERRIS·, FA, CONNECTICUT, 1St Division, Tunisia, 

6 May 1943. 

1ST LT. RICHARD L. HARRIS, Inf., New York, organization not indicated, 30 April 1943. 

CAPT. FELIX P. SETTLEMIRE, Inf., Arkansas, organization not indicated, Sedjenane, 23 April 1943. 

LT. CoL. ALBERT A. SVOBODA, Inf., Illinois, 34th Division, Tunisia, 30 

April 1943. 

PFC. ANTHONY P. CoLL, MD, Pennsylvania, organization not indicated, Tebourba, 6 May 1943. 

SCT. BILLIE N. GRICE, CE, Alabama, 20th Enguleer Regiment, 

Bizerte, 8 May 1943. 

S/ Sgt. GERRY H. KISTERS, Cav., Indiana, 1St Armored Division, Tunisia, 7 May 1943. 

S/ Sm:. FRANK J. MATWIZYCK"', Inf., New York, 1St Division, 30 

April 1943. 

Sm:. SAMUEL J. MAZZOTTI, Inf., New York, 1St Division, 25 April 

1943· 

PFC. SIDNEY RAPEPORT"', Inf., Ohio, 1St Division, Tunisia, 6 May 1943. 

57 
Distinguished Service Medal 

MAJ. GEN. OMAR N . BRADLEY, GSC, Missouri, II Corps, North 

Africa, I May 1943. 

BRIG. GEN. LoWELL W . ROOKS, GSC, Washington, Hq. N. A. Theater 

of Operations, 8 May 1943. 

Silver Star 

1ST LT. PAUL ALTOMERIANOS" , Inf., New York, 1St Division, 23 

April '943. 

1ST LT. JOHN V. BARNETTE, FA, North Carolina, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 28 April 1943. 

1ST LT. LINWOOD W. B,LLINGS, Inf., New Hampshire, 1St Division, 

Mateur, 6 May 1943. 

CoL. EUGENE F. CAFFEY, CE, Georgia, organization not indicated, 

Tunsia,-May 1943. 

CAPT. HOWARD F. CASEY, FA, Massachusetts, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 

28 April 1943. 

CAPT. TED H. CoRRY, FA, Oklahoma, 34th Division, Sedjenane, 27 

April '943. 

2D LT. W,LLIAM o. Cox, JR.," In£., Ohio, 1St Division, Tunisia, 28 

April 1943. 

CAPT. ELBERT N. Du PUY, MC, West Virginia, 1st Armored Division, 

Mateur, 7 May 1943· 

CAPT. HOWARD L. FIELDEN, FA, Oklahoma, 1St Armored Division, 

Ferryville, 7 May ' 943. 

1ST LT. JOHN P. FOLEY, Inf., New York, 1St Division, Mateur, 6 May 

'943· 

1ST LT. GEORGE K. FOLK, Inf., Ohio, 1St Division, 23 April '943. 

CAPT. THOMAS A. GREEN", In£., Michigan, 1St Armored Division, 

Mateur, 7 May 1943· 

1ST LT. ALBERT J. HAFT, MC, New York, 9th Division, Bizene, 

7 May '943· 

'ST LT. KENT HERRIN, SC, Tennessee, 9th Division, Bizerte, 7 May 

'943· 

1ST LT. WILLIAM W. KRIEBLE, Inf., Indiana, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 

29 April 1943· 

58 
20 LT. R,CHARD V. LoHRENS, Inf., Illinois, 1st Division, Tunisia, 

I May 1943. 

CAPT. PAUL R. LoWRY, FA, Texas, 9th Division, Tunisia, 28 April 

'943· CAPT. LAUREN E. McBRIDE, Inf., Iowa, organization not indicated, 

Tunisia, II May '943. 

LT. CoL. ROBERT P. Mn.LER, Inf., Minnesota, 1st Division, Tunisia, 

- May '943. 

1ST LT. ALBERT G. PRESTON, JR., Inf., New York, 1St Division, Mateur, 

6 May 1943. 

CAPT. CARL O. RANDALL, JR., Inf., New Hampshire, 1St Division, 

Mateur, 23 April '943. 

1ST LT. DAVID J. ROGERS, FA, Florida, 1St Armored Division, Ferryville, 8 May '943. 

CAPT. FRANCIS J. ROSINSKI, Inf., New Hampshire, 1St Division, Beja, 

23 April 1943. 

CAPT. ISAAC H. ROWAND, FA, Illinois, 9th Division, Tunisia, 28 April 

'943· 

2D LT. JACK C. SAPP, FA, Florida, 9th Division, Sedjenane, I May 

'943· 

CAPT. RAYMOND W. SELLERS, Inf., Washington, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 6 May 1943. 

1ST LT. R. J. SHALLENBERGER, Inf., Massachusetts, 9th Division, Tunisia, - May 1943. 

2D LT. ORION C. SHOCKLEY, Inf., Missouri, 9th Division, Bizerte, 7 

May '943. 

1ST LT. EARL R. SIEBER, Inf., Washington, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 

6 May '943. 

CAPT. ANTHONY SORDILL, MC, New Jersey, 9th Division, r May '943. 

20 LT. JOSEPH STURM, Inf., Ohio, organization not indicated, Mateur, 

7 May 1943· 

1ST LT. Wn.LIAM E. TOLBERT, Inf., Illinois, 1St Division, Tunisia, 

6 May '943. 

CAPT. EDMUND H. TORKELSON, MC, Washington, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 28 April 1943. 

2D LT. ROBERT E. WEAl<, Cav., Florida, 1St Division, Mateur, 7 May 

1943· 

MAJ. JAMES F. WHITE, CE, Ohio, organization not indicated, Tunisia, - May '943. 

59 
2D LT. WILLIAM R. WHITE, AC, Texas, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 27 

April 1943. 

1ST LT. EDWARD F. WOZENSKI, Inf., Connecticut, 1St Division, Mateur,5 May 1943. 

CAPT. JONATHAN YERKES, JR.", Inf., Florida, 1St Division, 25 April 

1943· 

PFC. JAMES ANDERSON, MD, Pennsylvania, 34th Division, Tunisia, 

6 May 1943. 

CPL. ALBERT ANDY, Inf., New York, 9th Division, Tunisia, 24 April 

1943· 

CPL. ROBERT ARDELL, Inf., Wisconsin, 9th Division, 24 April 1943. 

SGT. ANTHONY A. AULENTI, Inf., Connecticut, 1St Division, Tunisia, 

30 April 1943. 

SjSGT. JOHN F. BAARS, Inf., New Jersey, 1St Division, Tunisia, 26 

April 1943. 

PVT. FRANK J. BAFARO, Inf., Illinois, 1St Armored Division, Fondouk, 

23 April 1943· 

TEe. 5 NEWBORN BATES, MD, Alabama, 1St Division, Tunisia, 23 

April 1943. 

PFC. FRED J. BECKS, Inf., Ohio, 1St Division, 30 April 1943. 

PVT. ALBERT W. BELTHUIS, Inf., Iowa, organization not indicated, 

Tunisia, - May 1943. 

SGT. EARL G. BLAIR, Inf., Texas, 1St Armored Division, Fondouk, 

23 April 1943. 

PFC. HuGO A. BONDONI, Inf., New York, 1St Division, 25 April 1943. 

CPL. HERBERT W. BRASINGTON, Inf., South CalOlina, 9th Division, 

Tunisia, 24 April 1943· 

PFC. WALTER L. BRYSON, In£., Texas, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 24 

April 1943. 

SGT. MARINELLO S. CAPONE", Inf., New Jersey, 9th Division, Tunisia, - May 1943. 

SGT. JAMES D. CHANCELLOR, In£., Oklahoma, 1St Division, 26 April 

1943· 

PFC. NICK W. CfNDRIC, JR., Inf., Pennsylvania, 1St Division, Tunisia, 

28 April 1943· 

SGT. CHARLES H. CLAY, Inf., New York, 1St Division, 30 April 1943. 

1ST SGT. FRANK CoCHRANE, Inf., California, 1St Division, Tunisia, 

28 April 1943· 

60 
PVT. WALTER L. CoLTER, Inf., Ohio, 1St Division, 28 April 1943. 

PVT. CHARLES C. CoNNE, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1St Division, Tunisia, 

6 May 1943. 

PFC. PIERSON S. CRAWFORD, Inf., Connecticut, 1St Division, 29 April 

1943· 

TEc. 5 JOSEPH F. DARDEEN, CE, Ohio, organization not indicated, 

Tunisia, - May 1943. 

PFC. JAMES H. DEAL, MD, Iowa, organization not indicated, Tunisia, - May 1943. 

PVT. ERNEST C. DELANEY, MD, South Dakota, 1St Division, Tunisia, 

I May 1943. 

PVT. THEODORE J. DosKus, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1st Division, 30 April 

1943· 

SGT. LEO B. DUBOIS, Inf., New York, 1St Armored Division, Fondouk, 23 April 1943. 

PFC. GEORGE DULONG, Inf., Massachusetts, 1st Division, Mateur, 7 

May 1943. 

TEc. 5 SAMUEL J. ELLIOTT·, Inf., Indiana, 1st Division, 30 April 1943. 

TEC. 5 LEONARD B. ELLIS, SC, Nebraska, organization not indicated, 

Tunisia, 7 May 1943· 

PFC. FOSTER EVANS, Inf., West Virginia, 1St Division, 30 April 1943. 

PFC. CLAYTON S. FORD, Inf., Michigan, 1St Division, Tunisia, 23 April 

1943· 

PFC. ROBERT L. FRANER, MD, Ohio, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 6 May 1943. 

PVT. W AKREN E. GATES, JR., Inf., Massachusetts, 1St Division, Tunisia, 

26 April 1943. 

CPL. WALTER GAVITT, Inf., Pennsylvania, 9th Division, Tunisia, 24 

April 1943. 

PFC. JOHN J. GERAGHTY, MD, New York, 1St Division, Tunisia, 5 

May 1943. 

TEc. 5 HERMAN GILLIS, CE, Georgia, organization not indicated, 

Tunisia, - May 1943. 

PFC. RALPH F. GOODENOUGH, Inf., Connecticut, 1St Division, Mateur, 

6 May 1943. 

PVT. RALPH W. GRAZIOLA, MD, Vermont, 1St Division, Tunisia, 23 

April 1943. 

SGT. GEORGE J. GRILLO, MD, New Jersey, 9th Division, 3 May 1943· 

61 
SGT. ROBERT E. HENTGES, Inf., Iowa, organization not indicated, 

Tunisia, I May 1943. 

PFC. RICHARD J. JACOBSEN, MD, Iowa, organization not indicated, 

Tunisia, 6 May 1943. 

CPL. THEODORE E. JUNKINS, Inf., Alabama, organization not indicated, Tunisia, I May 1943. 

TEC. 5 DAVID M. KENDALL, JR., SC, New York, 9th Division, Bizerte, 

7 May 1943· 

Pvr. Ross A. LA MONICA, SC, Ohio, 9th Division, Bizerte, 7 May 1943· 

PFC. ROBERT E. LAKIM, MD, Iowa, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 6 May 1943. 

SGT. RAYMOND E. LARSON, FA, Minnesota, 1St Armored Division, 

Tunisia, 8 May 1943. 

S/ SGT. CHARLES O. LEE, Inf., North Carolina, 9th Division, Bizerte, 

7 May 1943· 

SGT. DANIEL S. LUBOWlTZ, Inf., Michigan, organization not indicated, Tunisia, I May 1943. 

1ST SGT. JOSEPH P. MARKSMAN, Inf., Minnesota, organization not indicated, Tunisia, I May 1943. 

Pvr. RALPH MENDOZA, MD, New York, 1St Division, 30 April 1943· 

Pvr.lRA M. MERKLINGER, Inf., New York, 1St Division, 30 April 1943· 

1ST SGT. JOHN W. MILLER, Inf., New York, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 

24 April 1943· 

TEC.5 JOHN J. NEUNDORF, Inf., New York, 1St Division, Tunisia, 23 

April 1943. 

Pvr. JOHN M. NORAK, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1St Division, Tunisia, 26 

April 1943. 

PFC. CLARENCE A. NORDER, FA, Wisconsin, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 

22 April 1943. 

Pvr. JOSEPH V. OKOLOWICZ, Inf., Wisconsin, 1St Division, 30 April 

1943· PFC. KARL W. OWEN, Inf., Michigan, 1St Division, Tunisia, 28 April 

1943· SGT. Roy G. PAQUIN, Inf., Michigan, 9th Division, Tunisia, 24 April 

1943· 

Pvr. JOHN H. PARKER, Inf., Mississippi, 1St Division, Tunisia, 26 

April 1943. 
PVT. MIKE J. PAVELLA, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1St Division, Tunisia, 23 

April 1943. 

Sj SGT. WILLIAM E. PAYNE, Inf., Kentucky, 1st Armored Division, 

Fondouk, 23 April 1943. 

PFC. W A1.TER B. PEEPLES, Inf., Maryland, 1st Division, Tunisia, 23 

April 1943. 

PVT. HAROLD W. PETTYS, Inf., New York, 1st Division, 30 April 1943. 

SGT. ALVIN L. PIERCE·, FA, Tennessee, 13th Field Artillery Brigade, 

Tunisia, 9 May 1943· 

PFC. FRED C. PLANTY, Inf., New York, 1st Division, Tunisia, 26 April 

1943· 

PFC. LEROY A. POTTER·, Inf., Ohio, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 6 May 1943. 

PFC. RICHARD J. POWERS, FA, Massachusetts, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 

22 April 1943. 

PVT. PETER W. PROKITY, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1St Division, 30 April 

1943· 

PVT. MARTIN QUINN, Inf" New Jersey, 1St Division, Tunisia, 23 April 

1943· 

PVT. JOHN J. QUIRKE, MD, New York, 1St Division, Tunisia, 28 April 

1943· 

CPL. FRANK A. RICE, Inf., Ohio, 1St Division, Tunisia, 6 May 1943. 

SGT. JAMES R. ROBERTSON·, Inf., Georgia, 34th Division, Tunisia, I 

May 1943. 

PVT. DAVID W. ROBICHEAU, Inf., Massachusetts, 1St Division, Tunisia, 

26 April 1943. 

TEC. 4 THOMAS K. RUBY, SC, New Jersey, 9th Division, Bizerte, 7 

May 1943. 

SGT. STEPHEN RUZYCKI, AC, New Jersey, organization not indicated, 

Tunisia, - May 1943. 

SjSGT. ALFRED J. SANFORD, Inf., New York, 1St Division, 29 April 

1943· 

PFC. Roy H. SCHEERS, Inf., Michigan, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 24 

April 1943. 

PFC. SEYMOUR SCHNEIDER, MD, New York, 1St Division, Mateur, 

5 May 1943· 

SGT. IRVINE R. SCHOONOVER, Inf., New York, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 

7 May 1943· 
SGT. CLYDE K. Scan, Inf., Illinois, organization not indicated, Tunisia, - May 1943. 

1ST SGT. HAROLD W. SELL, Inf., Wisconsin, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 

27 April 1943. 

PFC. FRANCIS E. SHAW, Inf., New York, 1St Division, Tunisia, 26 

April 1943. 

PFC. EARNEST E. SHUMATE, Inf., Georgia, 1St Division, Tunisia, 

26 April 1943. 

PVT. JOSEPH A. SIENKIEWICZ, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1St Division, Tunisia, 9 May 1943. 

PVT. VINSON E. SMITH, Inf., Alabama, organization not indicated, 

Tunisia, 7 May 1943. 

PFC. RICHARD C. SNOW, MD, Massachusetts, 1st Division, Mateur, 

5 May 1943· 

CPL. MEYER SPIEGEL, Inf., Massachusetts, 1St Division, Tunisia, 26 

April 1943. 

SGT. JOHN M. SPLET, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1st Division, Beja, 29 April 

1943· 

PFC. JOSEPH M. STAID, Inf., Mississippi, 1St Division, Mateur, 4 May 

1943· 

CPL. WOODROW W. TAYLOR, Inf., Ohio, 1St Division, Tunisia, 22 

April 1943. 

CPL. NICK VINCICH, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1st Division, Tunisia, I May 

1943· 

TEC. 4 ROBERT H. W ALDSMITH, Inf., California, 1St Armored Division, Mateur, 6 May 1943. 

PVT. CLAUD L. WATKINS, MD, Oklahoma, 1St Division, Mateur, 

5 May 1943· 

CPL. JAMES R. WILLIAMS, In£., New York, 1St Division, 25 April 1943. 

S/SGT. EARL L. WILLS, MD, New York, 1St Division, 30 April 1943. 

CPL. CHARLES L. WILSON, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1st Division, 30 April 

1943· 

PFC. WALTER W. WISNIEWSKI, MD, Pennsylvania, organization not 

indicated, Tunisia, - May 1943. 

PVT. CARL H. WOODEN, JR., Inf., New York, 1St Division, 29 April 

1943· 

PVT. LoUIS R. ZICK·, Inf., New Jersey, 34th Division, Tunisia, I ' May 

1943· 

PFC. FRANK J. ZYSK, In£., Connecticut, 1St Division, 30 April 1943. 

64 
& 

MateUf, important communications center, was main objective of first 

phase of battle for northern Tunisia. (P. 9 and Maps Nos. 2 and 3). 
8:: 

HILL j09 

Mateur, captured on 3 May 1943 after II Corps, in ten days, overcame 

strongly-fortified German hill defenses. (P. 9, Maps Nos. 2 and 3)· 

-., 
-3' Djebel El Hara and Hill 375, the fortiiied ridge 

west of Hill 1Xl9. (See 

p. 16 and Map NO.5). 
&l 

Sidi Nsir region, defended by the Germans against 34th 

Division attack. (See pp. 16-21 and Maps Nos. 2 and 5). 
-8' 

Hill ~, the main objective in the Sidi Nsir region, was captured 

I May 1943 by the 34th Division. (See p. 21 and Maps Nos. 2 and 5). 
Another View of Hill 609. (See 
pp. 16-21 and Maps Nos. 2 and 5). 
';:J 

c 

~ . -" 

..- :-".~ 

.. ...r~ . .... . , . , .~ ~\'~ . '" ,'-' , .... '" " 

~~"! •. ". . "":s;- ~", .... ;\,,:;t'< ': ' " ~, , ' ..... , 

• 

' 

, 

. ""' 

~" .• ~ ~'..... '""-

~~''"'''' \ T 

~ ............... 

'""",\;,,, 

~ ..' , ___ 

--;"t' 

.1' 

"," 

'.... •• ~ ,~1'- .. . ' ...... 

'" '._ 

_~_ '~l,'._ •. '~. ", ' ", ~ " , """. ''''". -, '.- "..,.,.,., ",.".'. '., 'ro." .... '..... -' , , '. .... ~\"" .".. , .~....... "" ~ , -', ". ," '''' ,,", . ." ...,~ :,.~ ',;' " '~ , ... ~ .... <;'~', ...... 

-,~ -~.' . 

- ... R """," "' iI: _.. .,,' , • 'i.,; "'_ ~:..~( _' ~"~ ~. 

' 

~~ll"A'.' ,i,"~ , 

r f":"il!!l, 

~"_"""-

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.., 

T • 

. -"-

f!! 

, , 

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hi 

-'t 

{ 

" 

OJ, 

, ''T-, -:- • 

11 

Djebel El Anz and Djebel Badjar, objectives of the 1st Division in its drive to 

push the enemy from his positions in the Tine Valley. (See p, 21 and Map NO.5). 

" 

to. 
<;:l 

Hills 388 and 420, two German fortresses that slowed the 6th Armored 

Infantry's drive through the Tine Valley. (See p. 24 and Map No.6). 
:o! 

Region South of the Tine where the 8Ist Reconnaissance Battalion and the 6th Armored 

Infantry prepared way for 1st Armored Division tanks. (See pp. 25-26 and Map No.6). 
:Jl 

KEF MAKSOUR 

T 002 

I 

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DJEBEL EL AJREO 

Series of Hills through which the 1st Battalion of the 47th Regimental Combat Team 

made its advance in the movement to outRank Jeina. (See pp. 28--30 and Map NO.7). 
CJ, 

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J!'NA R.R. STATION 

OJ. EL AZZAG 

OJ El AJRED 

The Je£na Region. Here for three days the Germans held on in their emplacements in 

the face of continued pressure from the 47th Infantry. (See pp. 28--31 and Map NO.7). 
::j 

The Tine River Valley, scene of the 34th Division's push to Chouigui, an 

objective in second phase of operations. (Pp. 39-40, Maps Nos. 9 and 10). 
CHOUIGUI PASS 

The Tine Ri ver Valley (Same section shown inphoto, page 73. Pp. 3!1-40, Maps Nos. 9 and 10). 

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