IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 27,999 4 JESSE TRUJILLO, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Denise Barela Shepherd, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 Vicki W. Zelle, Assistant Appellate Defender 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellant 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 FRY, Chief Judge. 19 Defendant Jesse Trujillo appeals his c onviction for battery against a household 20 member. He contends that the trial court improperly prevented him from cross21 examining Victim about her history of mental health issues, that it erroneously 222 excluded a letter allegedly sent to him by Victim, and that it denied him a fair trial 1 based on the doctrine of cumulative error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 2 BACKGROUND 3 Defendant’s conviction stems from an in cident that occurred on April 23, 2006, 4 in the residence shared by Defendant and Victim. A verbal ar gument escalated into 5 a physical altercation. Vic tim testified that Defendant angrily pushed and struck her 6 several times before she called 911. The police and paramedics arrived very shortly 7 thereafter, and Victim was taken to the hos pital in an ambulance due to severe back 8 pain that she was experiencing. 9 Defendant was charged, and the matter pro ceeded to a jury trial in metro court. 10 Three evidentiary issues arose, whic h are the subject of this appeal. 11 First, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any testimony about 12 mental disorders with which Victim had allegedly been diagnosed. Because 13 Defendant had neither medical records nor anexpert witness and because the evidence 14 lacked relevance, the prosecutor argued for exclusion of any evidence regarding either 15 Victim’s diagnoses or their possible effect s. Defendant responded that Victim should 16 be permitted to testify about her own ment al state. The prosecutor replied that 17 testimony about a witness’s then-existing mental state is different from testimony 18 about a witness’s mental illnesses. The trial court ultimately ruled in the State’s favor, 193 holding that it would not permit questioning about any diagnoses without an expert 1 to lay a foundation as to the effect thatthe diagnoses might have had on Victim’s 2 perception at the time of the underlying events or at the time of trial. The court further 3 noted that even if such evidence was rele vant, its prejudicial effect would outweigh 4 any probative value. 5 Second, in the course of cross-examination, the defense inquired whether 6 Victim had sent a letter of apology to Defe ndant. Victim denied doing so. On re7 direct, she reiterated her denial, indicated th at she did not recognize the letter to which 8 defense counsel had referred or the handwriting, and offe red that the envelope was 9 similar to an envelope that Defendant had used to send a letter to her while he was 10 incarcerated. Subsequently, Defendant tes tified that he had received a letter from 11 Victim in which she apologized for hitti ng him. The prosecutor objected. The 12 defense asserted that the letter should beadmitted as evidence that Victim sought 13 contact with Defendant after the underlying incident, that Victim apologized, and as 14 evidence of Victim’s state of mind, specifically to demonstrate lack of fear. The court 15 ultimately excluded the letter. 16 Third, on cross-examination, Victim acknowledged that she had previously 17 stated that Defendant had been following her in late June or early July. Later, 18 Defendant testified that he could not possibly have been following Victim as she had 194 indicated because he was incarcerated atthe time. Although Defendant sought to 1 further establish that he had been incarcer ated on the underlying charges, the district 2 court prohibited him from testifying as to why he was in custody. 3 The jury ultimately returned a guilty verd ict on the charge of battery against a 4 household member. Defendant initially appealedto the district court, which affirmed. 5 He now seeks further review of the foregoing evidentiary issues. 6 DISCUSSION 7 Victim’s Alleged Mental Disorders 8 Upon the State’s motion, the trial court prohibited any inquiry into Victim’s 9 alleged mental disorders. Defendant argues that the trial court’s ruling was in error 10 and violated his constitutional right to confrontation. 11 We have reviewed the transcripts with care and find no indication that 12 Defendant ever invoked his constitutional rights generally , or his Sixth Amendment 13 or Confrontation Clause rights specifically . Although the parties and the trial court 14 discussed the admissibility of the disputedmedical evidence at length, the debate 15 concerned the applicability of various ru les of evidence. General requests for 16 evidentiary rulings and for clarificati on on the scope of cross-examination are 17 insufficient to preserve claims of constitutional error. See State v. Silva , 18 2008-NMSC-051, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 815, 192 P.3d 1192 (holding that “a request for 195 clarification on the scope of cross-examin ation” was insufficient to preserve a 1 Confrontation Clause argument, where counsel “did not argue that refusing the 2 opportunity to ask questions . . . would viol ate [the d]efendant’s constitutional rights 3 generally, nor did counsel takethe more desirable approach and argue specifically that 4 [the d]efendant’s Sixth Amendment or Confrontation Clause rights would be 5 infringed”); State v. Lucero , 104 N.M. 587, 591, 725 P.2d 266, 270 (Ct. App. 1986) 6 (concluding that the confrontation issue was not preserved because the defendant’s 7 objection asked merely for an evidentiary ru ling and did not alert the trial court to a 8 constitutional error). Thus, we confine our review to the claim of evidentiary error. 9 Generally, a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for 10 abuse of discretion. State v. Elinski , 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 11 1209. “An abuse of discretion arises when the evidentiary ruling is clearly contrary 12 to logic and the facts and ci rcumstances of the case.” State v. Armendariz , 13 2006-NMSC-036, ¶ 6, 140 N.M. 182, 141 P.3d 526. 14 As previously stated, Defendant sought to question Victim about mental 15 disorders with which she may have been diagnosed and the potential impact of such 16 disorders on her perceptions. Defendant contends that these matters bore upon her 17 credibility, see generally State v. Taylor , 103 N.M. 189, 194-95, 704 P.2d 443, 448-49 18 (Ct. App. 1985) (observing that questions re garding a witness’s ability to perceive and 196 remember relate to credibility ), which was a key issue, and consequently, the line of 1 inquiry should have been permitted. Although we agree th at credibility was a critical 2 issue below, it nevertheless remained incumb ent upon the defense to comply with the 3 Rules of Evidence. 4 A variety of evidentiary concerns we re raised below. The rules governing 5 relevance, scientific, technical, or sp ecialized knowledge, and unfair prejudice were 6 all debated. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that these concerns provide 7 ample support for the court’s ruling. 8 In his briefs on appeal, Defendant contends that Victim was competent to testify 9 about her own mental condition as it existed at the time of the incident, including any 10 mental disorders with which she had been diagnosed, on the theory that she was aware 11 of the symptoms she experi enced, the treatment she received, and the overall effects 12 of her mental illnesses. Defendant cites Rule 11-602 NMRA, as well as Russell v. 13 Russell , 101 N.M. 648, 687 P.2d 83 (1984), in support of his contention that Victim 14 could have been questioned about her mental diagnoses. We are unpersuaded. 15 Rule 11-602 provides that witnesses may not testify to matters which are 16 outside the realm of their personal know ledge. Because this rule accommodates 17 testimony about witnesses’ personal experiences and percep tions, the trial court held 18 that Victim could be questioned about her perceptions, feelings, emotions, motives, 197 and the like. However, the defense clearly sought to move beyond this area of inquiry 1 into the realm of specific medical diagnoses as well as the potential impact of Victim’s 2 alleged mental disorders on her abilityto accurately perceive events. The record 3 contains nothing to suggest that this sort of specialized medical information was 4 within Victim’s personal knowledge. 5 Nor does Russellsuggest a different result. In that case, the witness’s past 6 medical problems, including toxic shock syndr ome, respiratory failure, cardiac arrest, 7 and two recent hospitalizations, were esta blished by documentaryevidence, but she 8 was allowed to testify as to the current state of her health. 101 N.M. at 649, 687 P.2d 9 at 84. The court held that the witness “hadthe ability to describe the present pain she 10 was experiencing and her di fficulty in breathing.” Id. We are unpersuaded that 11 admission of the witness’s testimony in Russell as to her physical condition at the time 12 of the trial can be analogized to the presen t case, in which Defendant sought to cross13 examine Victim as to any diagnoses of me ntal illnesses and the potential impact of 14 such diagnosed conditions upon her at th e time of the underlying incident. While 15 Russellillustrates that testimony as to subjective perceptions of the current state of 16 one’s physical health, such as difficulty inbreathing and pain, may not require expert 17 testimony, diagnoses of mental disorders and the potential impact of such conditions 18 present distinct concerns. 198 The trial court concluded that any ev idence concerning mental disorders with 1 which Victim may have been diagnosed as well as the effect of such disorders on 2 Victim’s perceptions would have fallen within the realm of scientific, technical, or 3 specialized knowledge. Consequently, Defe ndant could not develop evidence of that 4 nature through cross-examination of Victim, a lay witness. See generallyRule 11- 5 701(C) NMRA (providing that lay witnesses cannot testify to opinions or inferences 6 “based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge”). Rather, expert 7 testimony would have been required. 8 Defendant takes issue with the trial court’s view, contending that the impact of 9 mental illness on a witness’s ability to accurately perceive events is “immediately 10 evident,” “clear,” “commonly known,” or “commonly understood,” such that expert 11 testimony should not have beenrequired. We disagree. Generally speaking, the 12 causes and effects of medical conditions fall within the realm of expert testimony. See 13 Woods v. Brumlop , 71 N.M. 221, 225, 377 P.2d 520, 523 (1962) (holding that only 14 a medical expert is competen t to testify as to the cau se and effect of a medical 15 condition). The need for sp ecialized knowledge seems especially acute where, as 16 here, mental disorders are at issue. Contrary to Defendant’s suggestion, the effects of 17 the various mental disorders with which Victim was allegedly diagnosed cannot be 18 regarded as common knowledge. 199 In the absence of any expert testimony explaining how the diagnosed conditions 1 could have impacted Victim’s ability to perceive events, the probative value of the 2 disputed evidence b ecomes negligible. Cf. State v. Meadors , 121 N.M. 38, 48, 908 3 P.2d 731, 741 (1995) (observing that eviden ce of a witness’s medical condition was 4 of minimal probative value where the de fense failed to demonstrate how cross5 examination on this subject would have undermined the witness’s credibility). By 6 contrast, evidence of Victim’s numerous mental disorders would clearly have had a 7 highly prejudicial impact, as the trial court observed belo w. Although Defendant 8 contends that the trial court should nothave taken this into consideration, we perceive 9 no error. To the contrary, we conclude that the trial court acted well within its 10 discretion in concluding that the minimal probative value of the evidence in question 11 was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, such that the evidence 12 was properly excluded pursuant to Rule 11-403 NMRA. Cf. Meadors , 121 N.M. at 13 48, 908 P.2d at 741 (arriving at a similar conclusion upon balancing negligible 14 probative value against unfair prejudice). 15 Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in precluding him from asking 16 Victim whether she had ever intentionally injured herself. Th e trial court allowed 17 Defendant to ask Victim if sh e had caused her own injuries in this case. Similarly, the 18 trial court permitted Defendant to testify that Victim had intentionally injured herself 1910 in the past. However, the court precluded any inquiry into specific instances of self1 harm by Victim in the past. 2 We conclude that under Rule 11-608( B) NMRA, the trial court properly 3 excluded evidence of previous instances in which Victim might have injured herself 4 because such questioning would have been directed to specific instances of prior 5 conduct that do not concern character for truthfulness. See generally State v. Scott , 6 113 N.M. 525, 530, 828 P.2d 958, 963 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that under Rule 11- 7 608(B), a defendant may cross examine a w itness about specific instances of conduct 8 if that conduct is probative of untruthfulness, and the trial court has discretion to 9 determine whether the prior conduct is probative of untruthfulness). Because prior 10 acts of self-harm by Victim would not have been probative of her truthfulness, inquiry 11 into such acts would have been speci fically foreclosed by Rule 11-608(B). 12 In summary, we uphold the trial court’s decision to prohibit Defendant from 13 questioning Victim about any prior mental health diagnoses and instances of self14 destructive behavior. 1511 The Letter 1 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding a letter of apology 2 allegedly sent by Victim to Defendant after the altercation that led to the criminal 3 charges. Defendant frames this as both a C onfrontation Clause issue and as a general 4 evidentiary error. However, because we find no indication that Defendant ever 5 mentioned the Confrontation Clause or otherw ise alerted the trial court that its ruling 6 violated his right to confront the witne sses, we conclude th at Defendant failed to 7 preserve his Confrontation Clause claim. See Silva , 2008-NMSC-051, ¶ 10; Lucero , 8 104 N.M. at 591, 725 P.2d at 270. We theref ore review the trial court’s ruling for 9 abuse of discretion. See Elinski , 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 8. 10 The defense offered the le tter of apology “to prove th at [Defendant] could have 11 received some kind of contact from [Victim ].” When the trial court inquired about 12 relevance, Defendant argued that th e letter showed Victim’s state of 13 mind—specifically, lack of fear. 14 To the extent that the letter was o ffered to prove that Victim contacted 15 Defendant, Rule 11-608(B) presents an impediment. Rule 11-608(B) generally 16 provides that “[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 17 attacking or supporting the witness’s charact er . . . may not be proved by extrinsic 18 evidence.” Scott , 113 N.M. at 530, 828 P.2d at 963 (noting that Rule 11-608(B) 1912 “prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence for the purpose of attacking a witness’s 1 credibility”). Victim’s alleged act of se nding Defendant a letter appears to constitute 2 an instance of “specific conduct” that cannot be proved by extrinsic evidence under 3 Rule 11-608(B). 4 To the extent that Defendant offered the letter to prove state of mind, we 5 question how either the act of sending the letter or its contents could be said to 6 demonstrate lack of fear on Victim’s part. And even if we were to set these 7 misgivings aside, we note that the letter was allegedly written by Victim eleven days 8 after the underlying incident. Victim’s state of mind at that time would appear to be 9 entirely irrelevant. The exclusion of the letter was therefore appropriate. See 10 generally Rule 11-402 NMRA (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”). 11 On appeal, Defendant now argues that th e trial court should have admitted the 12 letter for impeachment purposes pursuant to Rule 11-613(B) NMRA because its 13 contents conflicted with Victim’s testim ony at trial that she did not apologize for 14 hitting Defendant, that she did not seek cont act with Defendant after the incident, and 15 that she was afraid of Defendant. Taking a charitable view of the transcript, the only 16 aspects of this argument that were suggested below concern Victim’s alleged conduct 17 in sending the letter and lack of fear of Defendant. However, it is the alleged act of 18 sending the letter that disputes Victim’s st atement that she did not seek contact with 1913 Defendant after the accident; the contents of the letter are irrelevant on this issue. As 1 previously stated, Rule 11-608(B) bars ex trinsic evidence. As mentioned above, we 2 are not persuaded that the content of the lette r demonstrates lack of fear. Accordingly, 3 to the extent that the argument was a dvanced below, the trial court could have 4 properly excluded the letter on the ground that it lacked impeachment value. 5 Because Defendant did not specifically ar gue below that the apologetic content 6 of the letter conflicted with Victim’s tes timony at trial, we decline to address the 7 matter. However, Defendant di d indicate to the trial court that he sought to prove that 8 Victim made an apology. We note that this aspect of the letter may have been material 9 and could have had so me impeachment value, insofar as Victim had expressly denied 10 apologizing for hitting Defendant. However, we ultimately perceive no error. While 11 the trial court may have pr evented Defendant from publishing the letter to the jury, it 12 allowed him to testify at trial that Victim sent him a letter of apology. Because the 13 trial court permitted De fendant to present evidence of the letter’s existence and its 14 contents and to impeach Victim through hi s own testimony, we perceive no prejudice, 15 and thus, no reversible error. See generally State v. Ervin , 2002-NMCA-012, ¶ 17, 16 131 N.M. 640, 41 P.3d 908 (filed 2001) (“[W]ithout prejudice, there is no reversible 17 error.”). 18 Defendant’s Incarceration: Cumulative Error 1914 Finally, Defendant contends that his c onviction should be set aside pursuant to 1 the doctrine of cumulative error. “The doc trine of cumulative error requires reversal 2 when a series of lesser impr oprieties throughout a trial are found, in aggregate, to be 3 so prejudicial that the defendant was deprivedof the constitutional right to a fair trial.” 4 State v. Duffy , 1998-NMSC-014, ¶ 29, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807, holding modified 5 on other grounds by State v. Gallegos , 2007-NMSC-007, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 6 828. The doctrine of cumulative error is strictly applied. State v. Martin , 101 N.M. 7 595, 601, 686 P.2d 937, 943 (1984). It cannot be the basis for reversal when “the 8 record as a whole demonstrates that a defendant received a fair trial.” Id. 9 Based upon our decision to affirm on the i ssues discussed above, we are of the 10 opinion that the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply to those issues. See State 11 v. Larson , 107 N.M. 85, 86, 752 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing that 12 where there is no error ther e can be no cumulative error). 13 In addition to the issues previously disc ussed, Defendant complains that the trial 14 court did not allow him to explain to the jury why he was incarcerated. Victim 15 testified that she had previously stated th at she saw Defendant following her, thereby 16 violating his conditions of release. In order to impeachVictim, Defendant sought to 17 testify that he was incarceratedat that time on the charges inthis case. The trial court 18 allowed Defendant to testify that he was incarcerated but refused to allow Defendant 1915 to indicate that he was incarcerated on the charges in this case. The trial court 1 explained that it did not want the jury to acquit on the ground that Defendant had 2 already served time for the underlying offense. 3 On appeal, Defendant explains that his inability to testify as to the reason he 4 was incarcerated unduly prejudiced him becau se, without knowing w hy he was in jail, 5 the jury might have inferred that he had committed other criminal offenses. However, 6 Defendant never advanced this argument below. See generally State v. Harrison , 7 2000-NMSC-022, ¶ 27, 129 N.M. 328, 7 P.3d 478 (“[The d]efendant, in order to 8 preserve an argument for appeal, must alert the trial court as to which theory is at issue 9 in order to allow the trial court to rule on the objection.”). 10 On appeal, the reviewing court will not c onsider issues not raised in the trial 11 court unless the issues invol ve matters of jurisdictional or fundamental error. In re 12 Aaron L ., 2000-NMCA-024, ¶ 10, 128 N.M. 641, 996 P.2d 431. Although Defendant 13 does not argue fundamental error, we note that Defendant’s unpreserved issue does 14 not rise to such a level, insofar as the evidence could properly have been excluded on 15 grounds that the danger of unfair prejudi ce outweighed any slight probative value. 16 See generallyRule 11-403. 17 CONCLUSION 18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s conviction. 1916 IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

2 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge 3 WE CONCUR: 4

5 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 6

7 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 8