alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 10.93 Obtaining default order.

When a respondent has failed to (a) file an answer as provided in § 10.23 of these rules or (b) failed to appear or file a notice of appearance as provided in § 10.62 of these rules or (c) failed to file a statement under the shortened procedures as provided in § 10.92 of these rules, the Division of Enforcement may move the Administrative Law Judge to enter findings and conclusions and a default order against that respondent based upon the matters set forth in the complaint, which shall be deemed to be true for purposes of this determination.
<PAGE>

                                                               EXHIBIT 32.2

             CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                               AS ENACTED BY
               SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Ardent Health
Services LLC (the "Company") for the period ended September 30, 2004 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, R. Dirk Allison, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

                                                  /s/ R. Dirk Allison
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  R. Dirk Allison
                                                  Chief Financial Officer
                                                  October 12, 2005
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Williams, Appellant.

[820 NYS2d 793]

Judgment, Supreme *739Court, New York County (Herbert J. Adlerberg, J., at plea; Budd G. Goodman, J., at sentence), rendered on or about April 22, 2004, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833 [1976]). We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal.

Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 460.20, defendant may apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals by making application to the Chief Judge of that Court and by submitting such application to the Clerk of that Court or to a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of this Department on reasonable notice to the respondent within 30 days after service of a copy of this order, with notice of entry.

Denial of the application for permission to appeal by the judge or justice first applied to is final and no new application may thereafter be made to any other judge or justice. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Sweeny, Catterson, McGuire and Malone, JJ.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

 FULL WRITTEN EXPLANATION 

Approval 

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission voted to close the following meeting: 

Thursday, June 2, 2016 

2:00 PM Discussion of Management and Personnel Issues (Closed - Ex. 2 and 6) 

 

The Commission voted 4 to 0 on March 8, 2016, to close this discussion on internal personnel 

practices and personal information as public disclosure of which would not protect personal privacy or 

be in the public interest. 

 

Attendance 

Part 1 

- Commissioners 

- EDO 

- DEDO for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal, Compliance, Administration, and Human 

Capital Programs 

- CHCO 

- CFO 

Part 2 

- Commissioners 

Contact Person for More Information 

Denise McGovern, Office of the Secretary (301-415-0681) 

 

 /RA/ 

 Denise McGovern 

 Office of the Secretary 

 April 26, 2016
#### Village of Piermont, Respondent, v. Storch Trucking Company, Inc., et al., Appellants, and Sette Engineering Company, Respondent.

In an action by the plaintiff village to recover for damage to property alleged to have been caused by the negligence of Sette Engineering Company and Storch Trucking Company, Inc., and Philip Kenrow, the latter two defendants appeal from so much of an amended judgment which is in favor of the plaintiff against them and which dismisses their cross complaint against defendant Sette Engineering Company. Judgment insofar as appealed from unanimously affirmed, with one bill of costs to respondents. No opinion. Present — Nolan, P. J., Wenzel, MacCrate, Schmidt and Murphy, JJ.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14

- 1674 Filed June 24, 2015 IN THE INTEREST OF K.R., Minor Child, J.R., Petitioner

- Appellee, C.W., Father, Respondent

- Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeffrey D. Farrell , Judge.

A father appeals an order terminating his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Molly E. Alley of Oliver Gravett Law Firm, P.C., Windsor Heights, for appellant. Nicholas Cooper and Sara S. James of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee. Cami N. Eslick of Eslick Law , Indianola, attorney for minor child.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.2

MULLINS, J. The mother of a four

- year - old child petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the father. After hearing testimony and receiving exhibits into evidence at trial, the court terminated the father’s parental rights. The fathe r has appealed. The father argues there was not clear and convincing evidence that he abandoned the child under Iowa Code section 600A.8(3)(c) (2013) and termination was not in the child’s best interests. We have reviewed the record de

n ovo. The distric t court filed a written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order that identified and considered all the issues presented. We approve of the reasons and conclusions in the opinion and determine a full opinion would not augment or clarify existing ca se law

. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(d).
The district court properly determined that the father had failed to maintain substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child and had failed to contribute to the support of the child in a reasonable amoun t. The mother did not go out of her way to make it easy for the father , but the responsibility to be a parent remained with him. We further find that his actions defy his expression s of subjective intent to parent the child , and t he father has failed to demonstrate any genuine intent to assume any duties imposed by the parent

- child relationship. See Iowa Code §§ 600A.8(3)(c), .2(19). In August of 2012, the father moved to the east coast to live with a woman he met on the internet and only met once in pe rson, and has remained unemployed for the last three years. We agree termination of the father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child

.3

Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 21.26 (1)(d)

. AFFIRMED.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-7769

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

TIAWAN R. BAILEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Charles H. Haden II, Chief

District Judge. (CR-97-39, CA-98-670-2)

Submitted: March 25, 1999 Decided: March 31, 1999

Before WILKINS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Tiawan R. Bailey, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Lee Keller, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on

November 24, 1998, the district court’s records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on November 25, 1998. Pursuant to

Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is

the date that the order was physically entered on the docket sheet

that we take as the effective date of the district court’s

decision. Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir.

1986).

2

PER CURIAM:

Tiawan Bailey seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp.

1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find

no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district

court. See United States v. Bailey, Nos. CR-97-39; CA-98-670-2

(S.D.W. Va. Nov. 25, 1998).* We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
### Part C—Facilities Assistance
Exhibit 13.2





Certification of Principal
Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted
 Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, Paul Ditchburn, the Chief Financial Officer ofBrooge Energy
Limited (the “Company”), hereby certify, that, to my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Company’s Annual Report on Form 20-F for the years ended
December 31, 2018, December 31, 2019, December 31, 2020, December 31, 2021, December 31, 2022 and unaudited Interim Condensed Financial
Statements for June 30, 2022 (the “Reports”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or l5(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Reports fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|Date:              | April 26, 2023          | 
|------------------ | ----------------------- | 
|                   |                         | 
|/s/ Paul Ditchburn |                        
|Name:              | Paul Ditchburn          | 
|Title:             | Chief Financial Officer |
NUMBER 13-21-00399-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

 

BUDDY JENE WOOLRIDGE, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 36th District Court

of San Patricio County, Texas.

ORDER

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina

Order Per Curiam

Before the Court is appellant's pro se motion for access to the appellate record.

Appellant's counsel has filed an Anders brief, and appellant has been unable to examine 

the record in order to file a pro se brief. 

Accordingly, we grant appellant’s motion and it is hereby ordered that the trial court 

ensure that appellant has the opportunity to fully examine the appellate record on or 
2

before fifteen (15) days from the date this order issues. It is further ordered the trial court 

notify this Court as to the date upon which the appellate record was made available to 

appellant. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Furthermore, Appellant shall have thirty (30) days from the day the appellate

record is first made available to him to file his pro se brief with this Court. The State shall 

have twenty days thereafter to file its response, if any.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the

19th day of May, 2022.
§ 802.70 Acquisitions subject to order. An acquisition shall be exempt from the requirements of the act if the voting securities or assets are to be acquired from an entity pursuant to and in accordance with: ( a ) An order of the Federal Trade Commission or of any Federal court in an action brought by the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice;
( b ) An Agreement Containing Consent Order that has been accepted by the Commission for public comment, pursuant to the Commission's Rules of Practice; or
( c ) A proposal for a consent judgment that has been submitted to a Federal court by the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice and that is subject to public comment.
[63 FR 34594, June 25, 1998]
### subpart 15—national institute on drug abuse
September 16, 2014 

MEMORANDUM TO: Mark A. Satorius 

 Executive Director for Operations 

FROM: Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary /RA/ 

SUBJECT: STAFF REQUIREMENTS – SECY-14-0038 – PERFORMANCEBASED FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERSIGHT 

The Commission has approved the staff’s recommended Option 2, to continue to apply lessons 

learned to the current emergency preparedness regulatory framework rather than pursuing 

rulemaking at this time. 

The staff should be vigilant in continuing to assess the NRC's emergency preparedness 

program and should not rule out the possibility of moving to a performance-based framework in 

the future. The Commission notes the potential benefit of a performance-based emergency 

preparedness regimen for small modular reactors, and the staff should return to the 

Commission if it finds that conditions warrant rulemaking. 

cc: Chairman Macfarlane 

 Commissioner Svinicki 

 Commissioner Ostendorff 

 OGC 

 CFO 

 OCA 

 OPA 

 Office Directors, Regions, ACRS, ASLBP (via E-Mail) 

 PDR
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT RULES 13a-14(b) OR 15d-14(b)AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

Melvin L. Flaniganhereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.      He is theChief Financial Officer of DTS, Inc.

2.      The Form 10-Qreport of DTS, Inc. for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2007fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

3.      The information contained in the Form 10-Qreport of DTS, Inc. for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2007fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of DTS, Inc.
| Dated: May 15, 2007 |     |
|--------------------------|----------|
|                     |     |
|                     | By:      | /s/ MELVIN L.  FLANIGAN |
|                     |     | Melvin L. Flanigan |
|                     | * * | *Chief Financial Officer* |

 

A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to DTS, Inc.and will be retained by DTS, Inc. and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission upon request.

----
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 13

- 00238

- CR

Christopher Ray Bishop

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§ From the 371st District Court

o f Tarrant County ( 1302741D )

March 27, 2014

P er C uriam

(nfp)



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the re cord on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

PER CURIAM
### §12655a. Limitation on purchase of capital equipment

Not to exceed 10 percent of the amount of assistance made available to a program agency under this division shall be used for the purchase of major capital equipment.

(Pub. L. 101–610, title I, §199B, formerly §122, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3140; Pub. L. 102–10, §5(2), Mar. 12, 1991, 105 Stat. 30; renumbered §199B and amended Pub. L. 103–82, title I, §101(a), (e)(3), Sept. 21, 1993, 107 Stat. 788, 815.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 12542 of this title prior to renumbering by Pub. L. 103–82, §101(a).

#### Amendments

1993—Pub. L. 103–82, §101(e)(3), amended section generally, substituting provisions relating to limitation on purchase of capital equipment for provisions relating to allocation of funds.

1991—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 102–10 inserted "service" after "youth".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1993 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 103–82 effective Oct. 1, 1993, see section 123 of Pub. L. 103–82, set out as a note under section 1701 of Title 16, Conservation.
#### Elizabeth Markert, as Administratrix, etc., of Joseph L. Markert, Deceased, Respondent, *v.*Long Island Railroad Company, Appellant.

First Department,

December 1, 1916.

See head note in *Markert*v. *Long Island R. R. Co. (ante,*p. 467).

Appeal by the defendant, Long Island Eailroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New *473York on the 26th day of June, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury for $11,500, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 2d day of June, 1914, denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

*John J. Graham,*for the appellant.

*Jeremiah A. O’Leary,*for the respondent

Per Curiam:

We are of opinion that the verdict is against the weight of evidence. The judgment and order are, therefore, reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the ' event.

Present — Clarke, P. J., McLaughlin, Laughlin, Dowling and Page, JJ.; Dowling and Page, JJ., dissented and voted for affirmance.

Judgment and order reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.
#### § 143.6 Referral for litigation.

Claims that cannot be collected by the Commission under this part or for which collection action cannot be ended or suspended under 4 CFR part 104 will be referred to the Department of Justice for litigation.
#### Silas Williams, Administrator, Appellee, v. Mt. Vernon Car Manufacturing Company, Appellant.

(Not to be reported in full.)

Abstract of the Decision.

1. Negligence, § *221*
      ***
      *—when instruction not confining jury to negligence alleged erroneous.*In an action to recover for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant, an instruction which fails to confine the jury to the particular negligence alleged in the declaration as the cause of the injury sustained, but allows *272them to base their finding upon any character of negligence shown by the evidence, is erroneous.

*271Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson county; the Hon. William H. Green, Judge, presiding.

Heard in this court at the March term, 1915.

Reversed and remanded.

Opinion filed December 1, 1915.

Statement of the Case.

Action by Silas Williams, administrator of the estate of Willie Williams, plaintiff, against the Mt. Vernon Car Manufacturing Company, defendant, for causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

As alleged, the death was caused by the negligence of the defendant in shifting cars upon the tracks in its manufacturing plant without giving proper warnings, whereby the deceased, an employee, was crushed between the cars.

G. Gale Gilbert, for appellant.

Hart & Williams, Conrad Sohul and Moses Pulverman, for appellee.

See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

Mr. Justice McBride

delivered the opinion of the court.

*2722. Negligence, § *216*-—when instruction on negligence as modified invades province of jury.*In a personal injury action based on the defendant’s negligence, it is erroneous for the court to substitute the word “may” for “should” in the defendant’s instruction, reciting the negligence charged in the declaration, seeking to confine the negligence to that alleged and charging the jury that unless the negligence was of the character so described and alleged in the declaration they should find "the defendant not guilty, inasmuch as by such modification the discretion of the jury was substituted for their duty.

3. Death, § *73*—when instruction erroneous as not limiting damages to pecuniary damages resulting from death.*An instruction in an action for causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover “for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin of the deceased, such damages as the jury may believe from the evidence the said widow and next of kin have sustained by reason of said death, not to exceed in all, however, the sum of ten thousand dollars,” is erroneous in not limiting the damages to the pecuniary damages resulting from the death.
Editorial Note on Part 140
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 140 appear at 89 FR 71813, Sept. 4, 2024.

§ 140.21 Definitions. ( a ) *Classified information.* Information or material that is: ( 1 ) Owned by, produced for or by, or under control of the United States Government, and
( 2 ) Determined pursuant to Executive Order 12356 or prior or succeeding orders to require protection against unauthorized disclosure, and
( 3 ) So designated.
( b ) *Compromise.* The disclosure of classified information to persons not authorized access thereto.
( c ) *Custodians.* An individual who has possession of or is otherwise charged with the responsibility for safeguarding or accounting for classified information.
( d ) *Classification levels.* Refers to Top Secret “(TS)”, Secret “(S)”, and Confidential “(C)” levels used to identify national security information. Markings “For Official Use Only,” and “Limited Official Use” shall not be used to identify national security information.
[48 FR 15464, Apr. 11, 1983]
#### Katherine F. Lindemann, as Executrix, etc., v. Helena M. Richter.

Motion denied, with ten dollars costs. Present — Ingraham, P. J., McLaughlin, Laughlin, Clarke, and Scott, JJ.
#### Dante Albini et al., Appellants, v. Neal Rainey et al., Respondents.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur. (Appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint of Rita Albini on motion at the close of the case, and a verdict of no cause of action as to plaintiff Dante Albini, in an automobile negligence action.) Present — MeCurn, P. J., Vaughan, Kimball, Piper and Wheeler, JJ.
§ 301.43 Use of deceptive trade or corporate names, trademarks or graphic representations prohibited. No person shall use in labeling, invoicing or advertising any fur or fur product a trade name, corporate name, trademark or other trade designation or graphic representation which misrepresents directly or by implication to purchasers, prospective purchasers or the consuming public: ( a ) The character of the product including method of construction;
( b ) The name of the animal producing the fur;
( c ) The method or manner of distribution; or
( d ) The geographical or zoological origin of the fur.
[61 FR 67710, Dec. 24, 1996]
§ 1502.11 Judicial review after waiver of hearing on a regulation. ( a ) A person with a right to submit objections and a request for hearing under § 1502.5(a) may submit objections and waive the right to a hearing. The waiver may be either an explicit statement, or a failure to request a hearing, as provided in § 1502.6(a)(4).
( b ) If a person waives the right to a hearing, the Commission will rule upon the person's objections under §§ 1502.8 through 1502.10. As a matter of discretion, the Commission may also order a hearing on the matter.
( c ) If the Commission rules adversely on a person's objection, the person may petition for judicial review in a U.S. court of appeals under the appropriate statute. ( 1 ) The record for judicial review is the record designated in § 1502.10(e).
( 2 ) The time for filing a petition for judicial review begins on the date of publication of the Commission's ruling on the objections in the Federal Register.