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67–798 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 112–55 

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE 

CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 17, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE

CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Feierstein, Hon. Mark, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the 

Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC ..... 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Marco Rubio . 39 

Kaplan, Richard H., president and CEO, Inter-American Foundation, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 21 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1 

Mora, Frank O., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC ..................... 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 25 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Marco Rubio . 40 

Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement .................... 5 

Valenzuela, Hon. Arturo, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ............................ 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Marco Rubio . 41 

(III)

(1) 

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Udall, and Rubio. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Western 

Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs Subcommittee will come to order. 

Let me first welcome all of our guests and witnesses. I know that 

Senator Rubio, who I understand will be the ranking member once 

we fully organize, is on his way from a vote on the floor. 

Let me further say that I am chairing this hearing even though 

we have not organized our full and subcommittees, although it is 

my expectation when we do I will be the chair of this subcommittee. We wanted to get the work started, and we appreciate 

Chairman Kerry allowing us to do so. 

I want to take this opportunity to welcome the members of what 

I expect the subcommittee to be, based upon the choices of members on both sides, certainly Senator Rubio, who will be the ranking member of the subcommittee, and we look forward to working 

with him. Let me welcome all the new members of the subcommittee, Senator Boxer, Senator Shaheen, Senator Udall, Senator DeMint, and Senator Lee from Utah; and those who are returning to the subcommittee from the last Congress, Senators 

Webb, Barrasso, and Isakson. 

I look forward to chairing the subcommittee when we are fully 

organized, and I intend to use the chairmanship to place attention 

on an area of the world that I personally believe has not had the 

full attention of U.S. foreign policy in a way that it needs to; in a 

way that is in our national interest and our national security. It 

is our intention to—working with the chairman—have a robust 

schedule of hearings on the vital issues facing the United States in 

this hemisphere. 

Now, since it is our hope that this hearing will set the tone for 

the rest of the work to come, I’m going to ask you to bear with us 

2 

a few minutes. I will deliver a longer opening statement than we 

will normally have, but it is a scene-setter, so I ask you to bear 

with me a few moments. 

I welcome Senator Rubio, who I just spoke about a moment ago. 

Insufficient focus on the Western Hemisphere by governments of 

our country going back to both parties has not always been so. The 

Good Neighbor Policy during the FDR Presidency was an era during which we were fully engaged, and in March of this year we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Alliance for Progress announced 

by President John F. Kennedy. President Kennedy did shine the 

spotlight on the region, and I want to quote directly from his vision. He said: ‘‘We propose to complete the revolution of the Americas, to build a hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable 

standard of living and all can live out their lives in dignity and in 

freedom.’’ 

We can certainly say now that the region has made very significant progress. Today most of the countries in Latin America are 

free and participate in representative democracies, with the exception of Cuba. Within the past 10 years there’s also been much 

material progress. So from the long view of history, political and 

economic gains have indeed been made. Latin America therefore 

commands a new respect and needs to be treated with respect. 

That is why we seek a deeper partnership with Latin America 

than ever before. At the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and 

Tobago last year, the President proclaimed a policy of partnership 

with the Americas and next month he is embarking on a trip to 

strengthen that partnership. He will visit Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador. Each of those countries have made proud political and economic achievements. Brazil has truly emerged as a country no 

longer of the future, but very much of the present. Chile’s advances 

are known to all and its epic rescue of the miners from the bowels 

of the Earth is tribute to its respect for life, Chilean technical 

know-how—with a little help of a United States company—and 

Chilean pride. El Salvador has been a true ally in our fight to 

establish a democracy in Iraq and we value their friendship as we 

seek to curb the scourge of narcotrafficking in Central America 

together. 

The progress of the region is clearly evident on the economic 

front. According to new projections by the United Nations Economic 

Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the region’s 

economy grew by 6 percent last year and is projected to grow by 

another 4.2 percent this year. 

Culturally as well as economically, Latin America is a vibrant 

and dynamic region. It has not only resources, but a resourceful 

people that have allowed it to grow and develop. It has its own values, its own institutions, its own attitudes toward government, its 

own challenges, and its own solutions—institutional, cultural, and 

technological. 

I think it’s important to understand these if we hope to forge a 

meaningful relationship, a practical policy, and a fruitful partnership with the countries of Latin America. Now, I know that each 

country and region has its own characteristics, but in this first 

hearing we want to explore our relationship with Latin America as 

a whole. I think it’s only appropriate to take a holistic view as a 

3 

starting point that will give us a reference point from which to drill 

down and get more specificity in subsequent hearings. 

I propose, therefore, that we look at our policy on Latin America 

through a prism that includes four lenses: values, institutions, attitudes, and technology. Anthropologists use this framework to understand societies and I think it will serve our purposes as well. 

Let’s begin with the question of values. In talking about values, 

I mean to highlight a belief system, a core set of values that serves 

as an organizing principle for society. In the United States, there 

is no question that among the values of liberty, order, and equality, 

liberty ranks high above the others. We love our freedom and we 

are prepared to sacrifice for it. We hold it dear above life itself. It 

is with that conviction that Patrick Henry made his case for independence from Britain and uttered the immortal cry: ‘‘As for me, 

give me liberty or give me death.’’ 

It is that value that American soldiers take with them when they 

fight our Nation’s wars. It is that value we uphold when we stand 

up for freedom—of expression, of worship, of assembly, and the 

right to have our grievances heard at the expense of stability or 

order. 

It is these values that inspired the people in Tahrir Square in 

Egypt last week and today in the streets of Tehran. It is what 

makes our democracy vibrant and enables us to represent the 

rights of others. 

There is also a place for order when it comes to protecting lives 

and property, as well as in providing for the welfare of those less 

fortunate in our society. Liberty allows us to acquire property and 

to care for the less fortunate and gets the place of honor in our ideological pantheon. It is an honored place that is protected from 

competing ideologies such as fascism and communism. 

As we examine our relationship with Latin America, I find it important to understand where each of the countries of the region 

place the value of order and equality in relation to the value of liberty, in order to determine what is or should be our policy toward 

governments that are based on ideals that are less than democratic 

and less respectful of the rights of others than in self-preservation. 

Institutions that give stability to societies enable them to develop 

from cultures to civilizations. Strong institutions protect the rights 

of citizens and allow nations to defend themselves against threats 

to the state and its citizens. Strong democratic institutions prevent 

one person from dominating and instead allow an assembly to represent the rights of the people and create laws on their behalf. It 

also includes an independent judiciary that makes clear what the 

law is and applies due process in protecting citizens’ rights. 

As we examine our relationship to countries in Latin America, 

we need to ask what strong institutions prevail that recognize the 

rule of consent by the governed, have the security of its citizens in 

mind, and are governed by the rule of law. 

Institutions, of course, have no relevance and do not resonate 

without acceptance by the people in their interaction with their 

representatives. Representatives who do not hear from their constituents are not able to determine what laws are in their best interests. A society without a civic attitude, without the willingness 

to participate, and without the ability to interact with its repVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:17 Aug 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\021711-C.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
4 

resentatives, cedes its voice to others who may or may not react 

wisely to the challenges of the times. Civil society most definitely 

has a role to play in a healthy political culture. Access by citizens 

to their government or governing bodies ensures that their voices 

are being heard and provides the legitimacy that governing bodies 

need to function effectively and efficiently in the service of their 

citizens. 

This is one of the questions we need to ask about countries in 

Latin America: How strong is civil society, the sense of civil responsibility and engagement? How strong is the legitimacy of governments that have to face challenges from organized crime and from 

drug trafficking organizations? And in which areas can we work 

together to make improvements? 

Finally, when I speak of technology I mean the tools a society 

has at its disposal to improve the quality of life for a society as a 

whole and for the individuals within it. I include the advances of 

modern science to defeat diseases like cholera, malaria, tuberculosis. I include advances in energy security in the fields of 

nuclear, solar, wind, and renewable fuels. I include all those tools 

that enable us to secure our borders, explore space, manage the 

effects of climate change, and those that will help us produce economic growth and opportunity in this century. 

From time immemorial, man has been able to improve his lot 

only with the creation of tools that help him solve his problems. 

That is no less the case today as we explore our relationship with 

the economies in the region. Here we have many areas in which 

we can cooperate and strengthen our partnerships, both in the public and private sectors. So let’s keep that in mind as we explore our 

opportunities for cooperation in the hemisphere. 

Our relationship with the hemisphere is one of neighbor to 

neighbor, working cooperatively to improve the quality of life for all 

citizens in the Americas and to uphold the values, institutions, and 

attitudes contained in the Inter-American Democratic Charter that 

we believe best serve our citizenry and advance the social, political, 

and economic development of the people of the Americas. And it’s 

in that spirit that I look forward to holding some future hearings, 

working with Senator Rubio. 

Finally, I have said many times, as a member of this committee, 

that many of the things debated in this country today emanate 

from issues that exist in the hemisphere. If we talk about undocumented immigration in this country, it stems in part from the challenge of societies with civil unrest or dire economic circumstances. 

If we talk about our young people who get addicted to drugs, it is 

in part the demand and the creation of opportunities for the supply 

of that demand to emanate from the hemisphere. If we talk about 

diseases that have resurfaced after having been eliminated within 

our hemisphere, disease knows no boundaries or borders. If we are 

talking about creating regional opportunities for growth of American services and products, which would create jobs here at home, 

it is a tremendous opportunity to advance. And the list goes on and 

on. 

So I view the work of this subcommittee as something that is 

integral to the national interest, the national security, and the 

5 

national economy of the United States, and that’s how we intend 

to proceed. 

With that, let me invite our soon to be ranking member, because 

we haven’t formally organized, Senator Rubio, the junior Senator 

from Florida, who I look forward to working very closely with, to 

move the interests of our collective hemispheric engagement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Senator and Mr. Chairman, for holding this meeting. If I need to, when we ratify this, I’ll come back 

and give the opening statement again a second time, just to make 

sure. But I appreciate your leadership on the committee and for 

holding this hearing. I think, as we talked before, if I’m correct, 

this subcommittee only met a handful of times over the last few 

years, and unfortunately I think it’s reflective of a lack of vision toward the region by multiple administrations from both political 

parties. 

That being said, I think there’s been a tremendous amount of 

progress made in this hemisphere. With the sad exception of Cuba 

and a handful of increasingly authoritarian regimes in the area, 

Latin American leaders increasingly recognize the legitimacy of 

free and fair elections, of promarket economic policies, and unprecedented cooperation to curb transnational crime. 

I think the best example of that would be Colombia. This is a 

country that almost 2 decades ago was nearly a failed state. In the 

process, it has now over the last two decades defeated the Communist narcoguerrillas. It has expanded democratic spaces and 

strengthened independent government institutions, and it has 

opened markets and increased economic competition. 

I think it reminds us that Colombia today—and I think the panelists, I hope, will agree—is our strongest ally in the region and 

certainly an example to the region of the promise of tomorrow, 

when there is real leadership and a vision for tomorrow. 

But their work is not complete, which is one of the main reasons 

it’s imperative that our Congress approve our seriously delayed 

trade promotion agreement with both Colombia as well as Panama. 

With the exception of Nicaragua, the nations of Central America 

are working hard to overcome the legacy of the cold war conflicts, 

to build democratic institutions, and to bring security to their citizens. Unfortunately, the U.S. response I think to some of these rising challenges—and again, I don’t mean that in the partisan context—appears confusing, inconsistent, and timid. 

Let me say I am pleased that the President will be traveling to 

the region shortly. I think that that’s a promising first step in this 

new year, and I think there’s much more to be done. 

I also believe that in many respects the United States and its 

confusing policy toward the region has often created a vacuum that 

has allowed us to lose market-share in many of these strategic 

partners that we have in the region, that at a time when other nations around the world are recognizing the promise of Latin America, the promises of the Western Hemisphere, and are more than 

eager to fill it, while we look elsewhere or nowhere at all. So I hope 

that that will be a focus of the subcommittee as well. 

6 

Let me thank the panelists for being a part of this. I hope we’ll 

have future repeated engagement on this issue. I personally believe, not just because of where I’m geographically located in Florida, but because I truly believe that the 21st century can be a western hemispheric century, one where the true and full promise of 

equality and opportunity can bear fruit in multiple nations and it 

will enrich us all. So I hope that we can be leaders in that regard. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your leadership on this issue and I look 

forward to the testimony of the panel. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

With that, let me introduce the rather distinguished panel of witnesses with us today as we start off this series of hearings. Let me 

take a few minutes to introduce them all collectively and then we’ll 

hear from them. 

Dr. Arturo Valenzuela has served as the Assistant Secretary for 

the Western Hemisphere at the Department of State since November 2009. He was previously the professor of Government and 

director of the Center for Latin America Studies at Georgetown 

University. He is a specialist on the origins and consolidation of 

democracy and the institutional dimensions of democratic government. We look forward to his expertise and testimony today. 

Mr. Feierstein is the Assistant Administrator for USAID for 

Latin America and the Caribbean. He has previously served at 

USAID as the Director of the Agency’s Global Elections Office. He’s 

worked in the State Department as a Special Assistant to the 

United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States 

and prior to that was director for Latin America and the Caribbean 

at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, overseeing programs to strengthen democratic institutions in developing countries; something of great interest and concern. We look 

forward to his comments. 

Mr. Kaplan is the president and chief executive officer of the 

Inter-American Foundation. He joined the foundation on November 

1, 2010, and although he’s been there a short period of time, we’re 

looking forward to great things. From 1994 to 2010 he served at 

the Inter-American Development Bank, most recently as the chief 

adviser to the executive vice president. Before assuming that position, he served as chief of the Environment and Natural Resources 

Management Division for Mexico, Central America, Dominican Republic, and Haiti, where he was responsible for all IDB programs 

in those countries related to agriculture, rural development, among 

others, and a lending portfolio in excess of $2 billion. 

Dr. Mora is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs. From 2004 to 2009, Dr. Mora was the professor of National Security Strategy and Latin American Studies at 

the National War College, the National Defense University. He has 

taught courses on strategy, global security, and Latin American 

politics to senior military and civilian officers. He’s worked as a 

consultant to the Library of Congress, the U.S. Department of the 

Air Force, Army, CIA, the Institute for National Security Studies, 

the National Democratic Institute, the U.S. State Department, the 

OAS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff—Who have you not worked for?—the 

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Southern Command, and the 

7 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. So we’re thrilled to get you here 

for free today. [Laughter.] 

With that, let me ask Secretary Valenzuela to start. Please limit 

your testimony to about 5 minutes or so. Your full statements all 

will be entered into the record, and what we want to do is give the 

maximum amount of time to explore different topics with you after 

you lay your foundation. 

With that, Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ARTURO VALENZUELA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. VALENZUELA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and future acting cochair of the committee. I want to take this opportunity to acknowledge the debt that we have to this committee for 

the interest and commitment that you have to U.S. policy in the 

Western Hemisphere, and I will just highlight a few points from 

my written testimony that will be put into the record. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m pleased to tell you that this administration is 

deeply engaged in the Americas in this 50th anniversary year of 

the Alliance for Progress. Since our earliest days in office, the 

Obama administration has been working hard to safeguard democratic values and fundamental freedoms, promote economic opportunity, strengthen regional security, and advance U.S. interests. 

We strongly believe that the United States has important national 

security interests at stake in the Western Hemisphere and that the 

best way to advance these interests is through proactive engagement with all of the countries of the Americas. 

That is why Secretary Clinton has traveled to the region more 

frequently than any other Secretary of State in modern American 

history, and that is why President Obama chose to use his State 

of the Union Address to announce that he will be traveling to 

Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador later this spring to ‘‘forge new alliances across the Americas.’’ 

We believe that the United States has a vital stake in the success of Latin America and the Caribbean, and that a United States 

policy that contributes to that success will benefit all of the peoples 

of the Americas, including people in our own country. We also 

know that Latin America’s future depends on the consolidation of 

vibrant democratic institutions that are responsive to their citizens 

and capable of expanding the boundaries of freedom, creating 

greater social prosperity, unlocking the economic potential of market, and deepening the rule of law. 

Our strategy has already achieved important results. Today twothirds of the populations of most countries in the region now have 

a very favorable impression of the United States, an increase of 10 

to 20 points over the 2008 levels. 

Today we are very optimistic about the state of the hemisphere. 

Since taking office in November 2009, I have traveled extensively 

throughout the Americas, making 51 stops in 23 countries. 

Through these visits, I have witnessed the convergence of two powerful and positive trends: the consolidation of successful market 

democracies that are making big strides in meeting their peoples’ 

needs and the growing global integration of Latin America. 

8 

The greatest regional challenges, including inequality, impunity, 

insufficient respect for human rights, and lack of opportunity, are 

receding in most countries in the Americas. Furthermore, nations 

of the hemisphere are realizing their stake in global issues, like 

food security, climate change, transnational crime, and economic 

competitiveness. 

Let me note from the outset that there are continuing areas of 

concern, of course. Venezuela is one. I want to underscore that, despite the rhetoric of the Venezuela Government proclaiming the triumph of socialism for the 21st century, today Venezuela’s influence 

in the region has markedly declined, with only 30 percent of the 

region holding a positive view of Venezuela, which is less than half 

of the favorability ratings of the United States. 

Furthermore, the administration remains unwaveringly committed to supporting the Cuban people’s desire to freely determine 

their own future, and to that end we’ve taken steps to empower the 

Cuban people through increased contact and exchange. Indeed, we 

recognize that achieving our goals in the Americas will require 

building stronger institutions of democratic governance that respect 

fundamental civil and human rights. 

In 2011, several Latin American and Caribbean countries will 

hold Presidential elections. We join others in welcoming elections 

that are credible expressions of the popular will, and we also encourage all countries to facilitate domestic and international observation of the election process. 

We’re working hard to strengthen our economic relationships 

with Latin America, including moving forward with the two pending free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama. President 

Obama has instructed USTR to intensify engagement with the 

Colombians and Panamanians to resolve outstanding concerns related to these trade agreements as soon as possible this year. 

Building a new spirit of inter-American partnership is especially 

important at a time when we face a constrained budget environment. This administration’s top priorities include critical citizen 

safety programs to support the hemisphere’s ability to combat drug 

trafficking and transnational crime, and to achieve these goals 

we’re implementing the Merida Initiative with Mexico, the Central 

American Regional Security Initiative, and the Caribbean Basin 

Security Initiative. 

Robust programs in Colombia are key to firmly secure the country’s democratic and security gains of recent years, and the President’s 2012 foreign assistance request for the Western Hemisphere 

reflects these priorities. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion let me say that the Obama administration’s Latin America policy is informed, engaged, dynamic, collaborative, and optimistic about what the future will hold for the 

countries of the Americas. And I thank you for your attention and 

I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Valenzuela follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ARTURO A. VALENZUELA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to begin by thanking you 

for this opportunity to testify before you today and for the level of interest and attention that you dedicate to the Western Hemisphere and U.S. policy in the region. 

I also want to congratulate you for your assignment as chairman of the Western 

9 

Hemisphere Subcommittee. I look forward to continuing to work with you and with 

the other members of this committee to advance U.S. interests in the hemisphere. 

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to tell you that this administration is deeply engaged 

in the Americas. Since the earliest days in office, the Obama administration has 

worked tirelessly to safeguard democratic values, promote economic opportunity and 

social inclusion, strengthen regional security, and advance U.S. interests. We believe 

the United States has important national interests at stake in the Western Hemisphere, and the best way to advance these interests is through proactive engagement with all of the countries of the Americas. That is why Secretary Clinton has 

traveled to the region more frequently than any other Secretary of State in modern 

American history. And that is why President Obama chose to use his State of the 

Union Address to announce that he will travel to Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador 

later this spring ‘‘to forge new alliances across the Americas.’’ 

The Obama administration is committed to leadership in the Western Hemisphere 

that is guided by a set of core principles. First, we believe that the best framework 

for engaging with the Americas is one based on mutual partnership and coresponsibility. As President Obama stated at the Summit of the Americas in 2009, ‘‘There 

is no senior partner and junior partner in our relations; there is simply engagement 

based on mutual respect and common interests and shared values.’’ Second, we believe that working through multilateral channels in concert with the nations of the 

Americas is critical to advancing our interests. While it is important that we maintain strong and vibrant bilateral relationships, the solutions to the challenges we 

face will be more impactful, durable, and sustainable if we partner with nations 

that share our common values and goals. Third, we believe that the United States 

has a vital stake in the hemisphere’s prosperity—and that contributing to its success is good policy, because it benefits all the people of the Americas. We also know 

that the success of Latin America and the Caribbean will continue to rely on the 

consolidation of vibrant democratic institutions that are responsive to their citizens 

and capable of expanding the boundaries of freedom, creating greater social prosperity, unlocking the economic potential of markets, deepening the rule of law, and 

fostering respect for human rights. 

Today, we are optimistic about the hemisphere’s course. Indeed, the Western 

Hemisphere is experiencing a period of economic progress that is a far cry from the 

troubles of the past. Not only did the region avoid the worst effects of the financial 

crisis, but current growth rates are projected to exceed 4 percent this year. And politically speaking, we welcome the reduction in tensions among the nations of the 

Andean region and note the smooth transfer of power that has occurred in many 

countries throughout the Americas. Indeed, the nations of Latin America and the 

Caribbean are undeniably promising partners in confronting crucial regional and 

global challenges. In much of the region, we are seeing the convergence of two powerful and positive trends: the consolidation of successful market democracies that 

are making big strides in meeting their peoples’ needs; and growing global integration. The greatest regional challenges—including inequality, lack of transparency 

and accountability, insufficient respect for human rights, ineffective institutions, 

and lack of opportunity—are receding in most countries in the Americas. Nations 

of the hemisphere are realizing their stake in new global challenges, like food security, climate change, transnational crime, and economic competitiveness. 

There are many examples of the Western Hemisphere’s emerging diplomatic and 

economic influence. Brazil has positioned itself as a key actor in global economic forums like the G20. It was Mexico’s skillful diplomacy that brought the most recent 

United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun to a successful conclusion. 

On a per capita basis, Uruguay contributes more troops to United Nations peacekeeping missions than any other nation. Colombia is sharing its judicial reform and 

security expertise and working with partners such as Mexico and the Central American nations in a coordinated fashion. Canada has been a steadfast partner in addressing crucial issues that range from global climate change to securing the peace 

in Afghanistan to restoring the health of the world economy. Member nations of the 

Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are leading in collective efforts to address citizen security challenges in the subregion. These are just a few examples of democratic societies with whom we can join in new networks of partnership around the 

world in order to help meet the tests of our times. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, Secretary Clinton recently unveiled the 

groundbreaking QDDR process to enhance our capacity to lead through civilian 

power. As she has emphasized, advancing American interests and values will require leading other nations in solving shared problems in the 21st century. Therefore, we must increase our reliance on our diplomats and development experts as 

the first face of American power. 

10 

In 2011, the concepts underpinning the QDDR will also guide our approach of 

‘‘dynamic engagement’’ that seeks to advance U.S. interests in partnership with the 

Americas as a whole, while recognizing the value of accommodating diverse needs 

and interests. The Obama administration has focused our efforts on four overarching priorities critical to people in every society: building effective institutions of 

democratic governance, promoting social and economic opportunity for everyone; securing a clean energy future; and ensuring the safety and security of all of our citizens. All this we seek to achieve while harnessing and strengthening multilateral 

and regional institutions, especially the Organization of American States. 

We recognize that achieving our goals will require helping to build stronger institutions of democratic governance that respect fundamental freedoms and human 

rights. As we have recently witnessed during the Presidential election process in 

Haiti, ensuring that democratic elections respect the will of the people is essential 

to maintaining political legitimacy and social stability. This goal united all of the 

hemisphere as well as nonhemispheric partners that have made a commitment to 

assisting Haiti in the wake of last year’s devastating earthquake. In 2011, several 

Latin American and Caribbean countries will hold Presidential and legislative elections, including Guatemala, Nicaragua, Guyana, Peru, and Argentina. We join others in welcoming elections that are a credible expression of the popular will, and 

we encourage all countries to facilitate domestic and international observation and 

to establish mechanisms capable of mitigating disputes that may arise through the 

election process. 

While many countries in the Americas have strong and healthy democracies, we 

all still have more work to do. As we engage with our partners to strengthen democratic institutions and civil society throughout the Americas, we are cognizant of the 

continuing weaknesses in democratic procedures and practices and the threats to 

their consolidation. Collectively, we need to be clear-eyed and proactive in addressing risks to our common agenda. Those include attempts to expand majoritarian or 

populist rule at the expense of fundamental minority rights, effective democratic 

governance, or dialogue and consensus within the rule of law. And while we congratulate the popular leaders who have opted to leave office in accordance with the 

institutions of democratic governance, rather than promoting constitutional changes 

to benefit incumbents, we regret the opposite trend in several countries. 

Recent developments in Venezuela raise serious concerns in this context. Particularly worrisome, among other measures, is the delegation of the legislative authority 

to the executive that extended beyond the terms of office of the outgoing National 

Assembly, undermining the authority of the new assembly and thereby circumscribing popular will. This violates the doctrine of the separation of powers and 

therefore contravenes the Inter-American Democratic Charter. That said, we are 

heartened by the presence of a coherent opposition in the National Assembly as 

Venezuela’s institutions must reflect the range of views in society in order for democracy to prosper. 

During 2010, Honduras made significant progress in strengthening governance, 

promoting national reconciliation, addressing some of the problems of human rights 

violations, and restoring diplomatic relations with many countries in the hemisphere. As President Lobo has said, he has sought to redirect the country on a path 

toward democratic normalization following the disruption of the institutional order 

that took place in June 2009. In our view, he has prepared the groundwork for the 

restoration of Honduras to the Organization of American States. The U.S. Government is supporting Honduras through robust programs managed by several agencies, including the Departments of the Treasury, Defense, Homeland Security, State, 

and USAID, and we will seek new ways to support the country’s efforts to achieve 

its economic development objectives. 

Since taking office, President Obama has made clear his commitment to supporting the Cuban people’s desire to freely determine their own future. During the 

first 2 years of the Obama administration, we have taken measures to increase contact between separated families and to promote the free flow of information to, from, 

and within Cuba—including new measures that will enable more Americans to travel to the island for academic, religious, and people-to-people exchanges. And we have 

engaged the Cuban Government directly on key bilateral matters like migration and 

direct mail service. However, we deplore the Cuban Government’s recent announcement that Cuban prosecutors intend to seek a 20-year sentence against U.S. citizen 

Alan Gross. Mr. Gross is a dedicated international development worker who was in 

Cuba providing support to members of the Cuban Jewish community. We strongly 

urge his unconditional release. 

Though our hemispheric agenda remains manifestly inclusive and seeks points of 

convergence even in difficult cases, we remain steadfast in our commitment to core 

principles and recognition of key values such as human and labor rights, media freeVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:17 Aug 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\021711-C.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
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dom, and the importance of robust democratic institutions. Building a new spirit of 

inter-American partnership is especially important at a time when we face a constrained budget environment. Now more than ever, our budget choices must be strategic, and we must align limited funding resources to the areas where our resources 

can make a critical difference. 

The President’s 2012 foreign assistance request for the Western Hemisphere includes funding for critical citizen safety programs that will support the hemisphere’s 

ability to combat drug trafficking and transnational crime. These threats to the rule 

of law in Latin America and the Caribbean also threaten U.S. national security, and 

strengthening the region’s capacity to combat them is in our national interest. We 

support full fiscal year 2012 funding from Congress for the Merida Initiative with 

Mexico, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, and the Caribbean Basin 

Security Initiative as vital for the achievement of these goals. In Colombia, continued funding is key to firmly secure the country’s transformational gains on security, 

democracy, human rights, and the illicit drug industry, while U.S. cooperation with 

Mexico is critical to the success of Mexico’s effort to fight drug trafficking and 

strengthen its institutions. 

The 2010 poll by the public opinion research firm Latinobarometro also confirmed 

one of the core precepts of the Obama administration’s policy toward the hemisphere: that the greatest concern of citizens throughout the hemisphere is achieving 

safety and security and combating the rise of international crime. Against this backdrop, the United States and Mexico have built an especially close partnership over 

the past 2 years, in large part through our cooperative law enforcement efforts to 

dismantle transnational organized criminal groups. The Congress has appropriated 

$1.5 billion to support the Merida Initiative assistance programs. By the end of 2010 

the U.S. Government had delivered 11 helicopters, millions of dollars worth of other 

equipment, and trained over 6,000 Federal Police investigators and corrections staff 

as well as over 3,000 prosecutors and judicial authorities. We have shifted Merida’s 

focus away from supplying critical equipment to providing more training and technical assistance. Along these lines, we are partnering with Mexico to help institutionalize justice sector reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for human 

rights—and build a stronger institutional basis, including at the community level, 

for combating crime and the drug trade and enhancing citizen safety. In addition, 

the United States is increasing its own domestic law enforcement efforts to dismantle Mexican narcotics supply networks in our country, and combat the smuggling of illegal financial proceeds and weapons into Mexico. Although the road ahead 

remains challenging, we are certain that this is the right approach that will lay the 

groundwork for long-term sustainable results. 

We have learned that a successful approach to security challenges must be a comprehensive regional one. That is why the United States is also working to enhance 

citizen safety through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (previously 

part of the Merida Initiative), which has received $260 million to date, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, which began last year with an initial investment 

of $45 million. These programs are central to our strategy to break the power, violence, and impunity of the region’s drug, gang, and criminal organizations and 

strengthen law enforcement and justice sector institutions. Recognizing that the 

United States is one of many players in the security sector, we are encouraging 

partners and donors in the field and in capitals to better coordinate their efforts to 

avoid program redundancy and to improve overall impact. Donors can better leverage resources where they have comparable advantage, such as coordinating with 

host nations on law enforcement and rule of law programs. This week we met with 

the European Union, Spain, Canada, the U.N., and other partners, and the multilateral development banks to better coordinate international responses. 

Our engagement with Central America is especially pivotal. Through our Central 

America Security Strategy, we are reassessing how we can more rapidly, and effectively, reverse the worrisome decline of citizen safety in Central America. At the 

President’s and Secretary’s direction, we are examining ways in which to enhance 

cooperation on citizen security, especially focused on Central America, in a way that 

ensures we are mindful of and addressing gaps that transnational criminal organizations may be seeking to exploit. We are working with partners to ensure that Central America is both a development and foreign policy priority, and that pooled 

donor resources have a greater chance of positively affecting the trajectory there. 

Our support for Central America and the Caribbean is by no means limited to 

security. In El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, the U.S. Government’s Millennium Challenge Corporation has spent almost $800 million in recent years modernizing farms and building or improving hundreds of miles of highway. In the Caribbean, through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the 

United States works with 15 Caribbean countries to treat and prevent exposure to 

12 

HIV, provide care and treatment and eliminate the stigma and discrimination associated with the disease. 

In addition, the United States continues to prioritize economic growth programs 

that leverage the emerging leadership potential and resources of many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Innovative, partnership-based initiatives like the 

Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas and Pathways to Prosperity initiative will support Latin America and the Caribbean’s ability to lead its own development by encouraging others to assume leadership roles and commit their own 

resources in order to promote key policy innovations. Latin America and the Caribbean will also benefit from the administration’s Feed the Future and Global Health 

Initiatives, which will help foster healthy, prosperous societies. 

U.S. economic engagement with the Western Hemisphere extends far beyond foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean. The Western Hemisphere remains a critical economic partner to the United States and many of our neighbors 

are also among our top trading partners. In 2009, total U.S. merchandise trade between the U.S. and Latin America and the Caribbean reached $524 billion and 40 

percent of Latin America and the Caribbean’s exports flowed to the United States, 

making us the region’s single largest export destination. The Western Hemisphere, 

including Canada, absorbs 42 percent of U.S. exports and total trade with the hemisphere reached $1.5 trillion in 2009. Earlier this month, President Obama and 

Prime Minister Harper released a declaration intended to keep the United States 

safe while increasing American jobs through minimizing bottlenecks and nontariff 

barriers. Around 84 percent of our overall trade with the region takes place with 

our 10 FTA partners in the hemisphere. NAFTA alone represents the largest free 

trade area in the world, accounting for $735 billion in trade in 2009. The administration continues to work with our NAFTA and CAFTA–DR partners on improving 

the flow of trade through regulatory cooperation and trade capacity-building programs. In addition, the U.S. continues to be the largest investor in the region, supplying approximately 37 percent of the foreign direct investment (FDI), which totaled $34 billion in 2008. 

Remittances have also become a critical dimension of the economic relationship 

between the United States and our neighbors. While the flow of U.S. remittances 

to Latin America and the Caribbean declined about 11 percent following the 2008 

financial crisis, the overall figure of $62 billion in 2009 remains impressive and underscores the strong family ties with the region. We are currently initiating programs, such as the BRIDGE initiative that was launched in El Salvador and Honduras last year, that seek to harness the investment potential of these remittances 

to help these countries fund vital infrastructure improvements. 

The Western Hemisphere will be a key target of the President’s National Export 

Initiative, known as NEI. As part of his strategy for restoring strong economic 

growth in the United States, President Obama has called for doubling U.S. exports 

in 5 years—an ambitious goal. Last month’s deal with South Korea paves the way 

for congressional approval of a long-stalled FTA with a crucial Asian ally, and creates a valuable example of how best to move forward on our other two pending 

FTAs with Colombia and Panama. President Obama has instructed U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk to intensify engagement with the Colombians and Panamanians to resolve outstanding concerns relating to these trade agreements as soon as 

possible this year. If we are successful, we will move those forward for congressional 

consideration immediately thereafter. 

Our efforts to advance economic opportunity are complemented by initiatives to 

expand social inclusion and provide support to marginalized groups. We also seek 

to advance gender equity through education, outreach, and government-to-government dialogue. A new area of emphasis is our effort to combat discrimination based 

on sexual orientation, and we are prepared to speak out forcefully to denounce violence against lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered persons in the Americas. 

We have made significant strides in supporting racial and ethnic inclusion throughout the region, including with indigenous communities. We look forward to increasing these efforts during 2011, which the United Nations has named the International Year for People of African Descent. 

Secretary Clinton attended the inauguration of Brazilian President Dilma 

Rousseff to underscore our commitment to elevate our bilateral relationship with 

this rising power to a new level. The United States and Brazil share many common 

interests and values and are natural partners on a wide range of regional and global 

issues. We have made important progress in that front over the last year. Brazil 

was the first country to take the lead in an initiative under the Energy and Climate 

Partnership of the Americas. The United States commends Brazil’s leadership in 

Haiti, along with that of many other Latin American and Caribbean countries, and 

we are pursuing opportunities to work together on development projects in Central 

13 

America and Africa. Brazil stands out in the global marketplace for the tremendous 

potential opportunities it offers U.S. companies. We will work with American exporters and investors to take advantage of that potential and would like to devote more 

resources to efforts that strengthen our bilateral mechanisms with Brazil, such as 

the Economic Partnership Dialogue. President Obama’s visit will be incredibly important to our efforts to establishing a strong working relationship with President 

Rousseff and her government. 

In South America, the United States has forged especially strong partnerships 

with Colombia, Peru, and Chile. Our relations with these countries have never been 

so comprehensive, with both regional and global dimensions. Last fall, President 

Obama met with his counterpart, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, at the 

United Nations in New York where they announced the creation of the High Level 

Partnership Dialogue, which Deputy Secretary Steinberg launched when he traveled 

to Colombia in October. The Dialogue marks a new chapter to broaden our maturing 

and wide-ranging relationship, making Colombia an ever-more vital strategic partner. We are working to finalize a new framework agreement with Bolivia that will 

reaffirm both governments’ commitment to engagement based on mutual interest 

and respect, and in a manner consistent with our laws and policies regarding assistance and counternarcotics cooperation. We have engaged Ecuador on a range of important bilateral, regional, and global issues. And we have also struck a new tone 

in our dialogue and engagement with Uruguay and Paraguay. We strongly believe 

it serves U.S. interests when we engage both with our friends and allies as well as 

those countries with which we may not see eye to eye. 

This approach goes beyond traditional relationships between governments. Peopleto-people contacts build mutual understanding and bring to light our shared values. 

Our diplomatic posts throughout the Western Hemisphere reach youth, civil society 

groups, opinion leaders, and others who take a constructive interest in the future 

of their society and how it relates to its neighbors. Educational and cultural programs, outreach through new and traditional media, and diverse voices from U.S. 

culture are all ways we project our values and translate our policy goals into ideas 

and actions that affect people’s lives. 

It is important to note that the Obama administration’s strategy of engagement 

has contributed to a shift in Latin American public opinion. According to the 2010 

poll by Latinobarometro, two-thirds of the population in most countries had favorable attitudes toward the United States—an increase of 10 to 20 points from 2008 

levels. The role of the United States in Latin America is also overwhelmingly viewed 

as positive. This suggests that the Obama administration’s strategy has reversed 

the dangerous depletion of good will toward the United States that had occurred 

during the prior decade. 

We are also continuing to help the Haitian people rebuild after the terrible earthquake that struck the country a year ago. As President Obama emphasized shortly 

after the earthquake, U.S. commitment to Haiti will be sustained. We are proud of 

the role of the United States in the unprecedented bilateral and multilateral cooperation in support of Haiti. Since the earthquake, the U.S. Government has spent 

$1.1 billion in humanitarian relief assistance and an additional $406 million in recovery assistance toward job creation, rubble removal, shelter solutions, health and 

other priorities. In addition, the U.S. Government has pledged $1.15 billion in new 

money toward reconstruction. To date, we have disbursed more than $332 million 

to provide debt relief and contribute to the Haiti Reconstruction Fund. This has allowed the Haitian Government to use its resources to support the construction and 

repair of houses, remove rubble in critical areas of Port-au-Prince, establish funds 

to finance private sector activity, and provide education assistance. The United 

States has also provided over $43 million in assistance since the onset of the cholera 

crisis in October 2010, for medical supplies and services; and cholera treatment facilities and information campaigns to increase public awareness of prevention and 

treatment of the disease. 

A democratic transfer of power is vital to Haiti’s long-term peace, stability and 

opportunity for economic growth. The United States and the international community support an election process in Haiti that reflects the will of the Haitian people. 

A free and fair process will allow the incoming government to enjoy full legitimacy, 

while representing the best way to promote stability and reconstruction. Since the 

November 28 election, our message has been consistent: the people of Haiti have 

the right to choose their leaders. The Haitian Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)’s 

February 3 announcement of the final results of the November elections was an important milestone in this electoral process. The United States stands ready to assist 

Haitian electoral authorities in the next round of elections, currently scheduled for 

March 20, to promote a free and fair electoral process and reduce the level of fraud 

and irregularities that affected the first round. As Haiti moves forward with the secVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:17 Aug 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\021711-C.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
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ond round of elections, it is essential that all political actors, including candidates 

and their supporters, continue to work peacefully and within the law. In short, there 

has been progress, and, while uneven, it has deepened the resolve and commitment 

to Haiti of the international community, including the United States. 

In conclusion, our hemispheric policy is based on the premise that the United 

States has a vital interest in contributing to the building of stable, prosperous, and 

democratic nations in this hemisphere that can play a pivotal role in strengthening 

a rules-based international system capable of meeting today’s global challenges. As 

President Obama and Secretary Clinton have said, policy must be conducted on the 

basis of mutual respect and shared responsibility through dialogue and engagement. 

The United States must be a more effective and determined partner in helping 

countries throughout the Americas achieve their own chosen paths as determined 

by their own people. Today, the Obama administration’s Latin America and Caribbean policy is informed, engaged, dynamic, and collaborative—and optimistic about 

what the future will hold for the countries of the Americas. 

I thank you for your attention. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Feierstein. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK FEIERSTEIN, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, 

thank you for the invitation to testify today. I welcome the opportunity to share with you how USAID is advancing prosperity and 

security in the Americas. 

During my 4 months on the job, I’ve been heartened by bipartisan expressions of support for USAID. There is widespread recognition that the agency’s work advances our national interest. Our 

investments to promote economic growth, stem drug trafficking, 

and combat disease in Latin America and the Caribbean produce 

jobs, safer streets, and a healthier environment in our country. 

This is a propitious time in the Americas. Political and economic 

progress has produced a mature set of partners with which we can 

advance common objectives. At the same time, USAID is implementing innovative approaches to development. These dynamics 

present us with a historic opportunity to make sustainable gains 

that will leave citizens throughout the Americas better off. 

The hallmark of this administration’s approach to development is 

sustainability. As President Obama said when he announced his 

development policy last September, the purpose of development is, 

‘‘creating the conditions where our assistance is no longer needed.’’ 

USAID is taking steps to achieve that objective. First, we are accelerating the shift from providing aid to building the capacity of 

countries to provide for themselves. Our overriding goal in Latin 

America and the Caribbean is to strengthen the capacity of governments and civil society to expand economic opportunity, strengthen 

democratic governance, and improve citizen security. 

Second, we are increasingly collaborating with businesses, 

because long-term development and job creation depend upon an 

active and vibrant private sector. 

Third, we are consolidating resources in priority countries and 

priority sectors. We are guided by President Obama’s pledge to 

‘‘focus our efforts where we have the best partners and where we 

can have the greatest impact.’’ 

15 

As countries reach a point when they no longer need our assistance, we will recruit them to work with USAID as fellow donors. 

Such partnerships will be especially important in dealing with 

issues that require a multinational response, such as gang activity 

and drug trafficking. 

Areas of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean suffer 

today from the highest rates of nonpolitical violence in the world. 

As regional leaders develop strategies to combat crime, it’s in our 

interest to support them. The flow of drugs into this country harms 

our youth and saps strength and resources from our communities. 

The lack of security also threatens to undermine our other development work. Crime discourages business investment, diverts valuable resources, and corrodes state institutions. 

In response, the Obama administration had deepened the Merida 

Initiative and expanded the security effort into the Caribbean. 

USAID is continuing our longstanding work to strengthen judicial 

systems. But the heart of our effort in this area involves preventive 

measures, namely providing youth vulnerable to the lure of crime 

with positive alternatives. 

We are also committed to maintain and advance democracy in 

the hemisphere. Despite overall democratic gains, there has been 

a narrowing of political space in some countries and unrelenting repression in another. Autocratic governments might try to make it 

more difficult to work in solidarity with citizens struggling to exercise basic human rights, but the United States will not yield in our 

support for those who want to enjoy universally recognized rights. 

Mr. Chairman, the hemisphere’s development challenges converge in one form or another in Haiti, USAID’s highest priority in 

the hemisphere. As we move into the second year of post-earthquake reconstruction, we are implementing our new approach to 

development. We are partnering with Haitian Government institutions, ramping up our collaboration with the private sector, and implementing novel approaches. 

We’re encouraged by the progress made in Haiti over the past 

year. The number of people living in camps has fallen by more than 

half a million. The U.S. Government alone has removed nearly 1.5 

million cubic meters of rubble. More Haitians have access to clean 

water today than before the quake, and the cholera epidemic has 

stabilized. 

To be sure, the challenges before us in Haiti are formidable. With 

over 800,000 Haitians still living in camps, moving people into permanent housing is a top priority. Another is clearing remaining 

rubble. Beyond these needs, Haiti’s long-term development plan is 

in place, with United States efforts focused on infrastructure, 

health, agriculture, and governance. 

We are optimistic about Haiti’s prospects. The Haitian’s people’s 

determination not just to survive, but to thrive, reminds us all 

what is in reach when we join forces for the common good. 

That dynamic in Haiti is repeated every day in various forms in 

the largest cities and smallest villages throughout the Americas. 

We help each other not only because it’s the right thing to do, but 

because our well-being is linked to people throughout this vast and 

diverse hemisphere. 

16 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee’s 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feierstein follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARK FEIERSTEIN

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. thank you for the invitation to testify today. I appreciate and welcome the opportunity to share what the U.S. Agency 

for International Development is doing to advance prosperity and security in the 

Americas, and I am eager to hear your advice and counsel as well. 

It is also an honor to testify with my colleagues, Assistant Secretary Arturo 

Valenzuela, Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank Mora, and President Robert Kaplan. 

As a college student, I read Dr. Valenzuela’s work on political development in the 

Americas. He helped shape my thinking then, and I cannot think of a more accomplished diplomat to frame the policy environment within which USAID operates in 

the hemisphere today. 

Mr. Chairman, during my 4 months on the job, I have had the benefit of meeting 

with you, other Members of Congress and your staffs to discuss development challenges and opportunities in the Americas. Your ideas have enriched my thinking, 

and have already improved USAID’s strategic and programmatic approach in Latin 

America and the Caribbean. 

I have also been heartened by the bipartisan expressions of support for USAID’s 

work in the Americas. There is widespread recognition about how the agency’s investments advance our national interest. USAID’s work is not charity. Our programs may reflect the generosity of the American people, but they are not only from 

the American people, as the agency’s motto says; they are for the American people. 

When we help stabilize and grow economies closely tied to our own, we help develop markets for our products. When we help farmers in coca producing areas of 

Colombia harvest legal crops or steer vulnerable youth in Central America toward 

constructive endeavors, we help to stem the flow of drugs to our communities. When 

we reduce deforestation in the Amazon, we help stabilize rainfall cycles for farmers 

in our country. And when we reduce the prevalence of disease in the Americas, we 

help keep our communities healthy. 

President Obama’s upcoming visit to Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador underscores 

that amidst competing global priorities and challenges, the Americas remain a vital 

strategic partner for the United States. 

The President’s trip comes at a most propitious time. The hemisphere is more 

prosperous, more democratic, and more independent today than ever before. Sound 

financial management has helped spur several years of robust economic growth. 

Thanks to greater access to education and innovative social programs, poverty has 

declined and income inequality narrowed in many countries. Citizens are better organized and governments more responsive to their needs. 

Despite this progress, few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are 

poised to be classified as ‘‘developed.’’ Poverty rates in Latin America and the Caribbean remain high, with millions working outside the formal economy and denied access to credit. Many economies are characterized by a lack of diversification and low 

productivity. Crime rates have reached frightening levels, overwhelming ill-equipped 

judicial bodies. Schools are failing to prepare students for modern job opportunities. 

Governments are not collecting the revenues they need to provide essential services, 

rendering weak state institutions even more ineffective. Climate change is posing 

new economic threats. And some countries are even regressing politically, as governments impose new restrictions on political activity. 

Although many of these challenges are not new, we are better positioned than 

ever to make progress on them. As governments and civil society have advanced, 

they have become better development partners for the United States. At the same 

time, USAID, under the energetic leadership of Administrator Raj Shah, is implementing innovative approaches to development, based on lessons learned from 

around the world. These two dynamics—a more mature hemisphere and a more 

modern and effective development approach—present the United States and our 

neighbors with a historic opportunity to make sustainable development gains that 

will leave citizens throughout the Americas better off. Our overriding goal in Latin 

America and the Caribbean is to strengthen the capacity of governments, civil society and the private sector to expand economic opportunity, strengthen democratic 

governance, and improve citizen security. 

The hallmark of the Obama administration’s approach to development is sustainability. Of all the metrics we use to gauge our success, none is more important than 

reaching the point at which we can close up shop in a country. As President Obama 

17 

said when he announced his new development policy in September, the purpose of 

development ‘‘is creating the conditions where our assistance is no longer needed.’’ 

There are a number of steps USAID is taking to achieve that objective. First, we 

are accelerating the shift from being an agency that provides aid to one that builds 

the capacity of countries to provide for themselves. We are donating less food and 

putting greater emphasis on helping farmers to increase agricultural production and 

access markets. Those changes are already evident in Haiti and Central America, 

where farmers we are assisting have experienced rising incomes. 

Similarly, we will continue to provide life-saving medical care, where needed, but 

we are placing a greater emphasis on improving the capacity of governments to 

manage their own health systems and provide affordable and high-quality care for 

their citizens. In Paraguay and Guatemala, for example, we are supporting the Ministry of Health’s efforts to broaden the reach and efficiency of the country’s medicine 

supply system. 

As school attendance rates have risen in recent years, we are emphasizing the improvement of education quality. In Jamaica, for example, we are supporting the government’s efforts to increase early grade literacy and the acquisition of math skills. 

We are also dedicating fewer resources for one-time elections and more to enhance 

the capacity of government agencies to provide essential services. That means not 

just strengthening Congresses and municipalities, but helping Ministries of Health 

to guarantee high-quality, affordable care and Ministries of Education to ensure 

that children are being prepared for 21st century jobs. 

Second, to strengthen institutions abroad, we are channeling resources more directly through governments, local NGOs and the private sector. We will continue 

to use outside contractors where appropriate, but will direct more assistance to local 

entities in order to strengthen them and reduce dependence on outside assistance. 

In Peru, for example, we are providing direct assistance to the national counterdrug 

agency and municipal governments to develop economic alternatives for former coca 

growers. In the coming weeks, we plan to give every USAID mission in the hemisphere a target for the share of its program portfolio to be channeled through organizations in their host countries. 

Third, we are increasingly collaborating with businesses. Long-term development 

and job creation depend upon an active and vibrant private sector. By partnering 

with private companies, we not only leverage resources; we create durable enterprises that will provide long-term development dividends. For example, spurred on 

by an incentive fund created by USAID and the Gates Foundation, the telecommunications company Digicel introduced a mobile banking service that will provide any 

Haitian with a cell phone with access to financial services. When we partner with 

private companies on initiatives like that, we achieve the development hat trick. We 

save money and advance our development objectives; firms gain access to markets 

and sources of supplies; and the poor improve their livelihoods. 

In order to achieve our sustainable development objectives, we are also consolidating resources in priority countries and sectors. We are guided by President 

Obama’s pledge at the United Nations to ‘‘focus our efforts where we have the best 

partners and where we can have the greatest impact.’’ For USAID, that will mean 

operating in fewer countries; in each country working in fewer sectors; and in each 

sector, implementing fewer programs. In Latin America and the Caribbean, we are 

closing two missions. In recognition of the gains that Panama has made since we 

reopened our office there in 1990, we will be closing the mission and winding down 

our programming. And in a cost-saving measure, we plan to manage our Guyana 

projects from one of our regional offices. Steps like these will enable us to shift program resources and staff to countries where the need is greatest and where we are 

confident we have strong partners to achieve our development goals. 

We are also reducing our work in some sectors in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as family plan. We will continue to look for smart ways to exit other sectors, as well as other countries, and revisit our portfolio of programs to make sure 

we are utilizing our resources in the most effective way possible. 

In the field of development, where there is so much need, determining funding 

priorities is a challenge, and I can understand why a decrease in funding in any 

area might be disappointing. The question is not whether help is needed in a given 

area, because the response would almost always be an unequivocal yes. Rather, the 

question is where can the United States Government best leverage our scarce resources and most effectively deploy our range of agencies to have a transformative 

and lasting impact. 

As countries reach a point when they no longer need our assistance, we will actively recruit them to work with USAID as a fellow donor. We are already working 

with countries like Brazil and Chile, which have valuable lessons to share from 

18 

their recent successes in achieving broad-based economic growth. We are looking to 

expand upon those arrangements and form new ones. 

Such partnerships will be especially important in dealing with development issues 

that respect no borders and require a coordinated, multinational response. In Latin 

America and the Caribbean, USAID is confronting two transnational threats in particular. The first is the escalating gang activity and drug trafficking. 

Areas of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean are suffering from the highest rates of nonpolitical violence in the world. In some countries in the region, murder rates are nearly 10 times higher than in the United States. As regional leaders 

develop strategies to counter the crime wave, it is in our interest to support their 

efforts. In an increasingly globalized world, organized crime, like disease and environmental degradation, penetrates borders. The flow of drugs through the Caribbean and Central America often continues into this country, harming our youth and 

sapping strength and resources from our communities. 

The lack of security also threatens to undermine all our other development work 

in the region. Crime is discouraging business investment and diverting public and 

private resources that could otherwise be used for more productive investments. 

Organized crime is corroding state institutions, undermining faith in democracy. 

Drug trafficking organizations have a greater presence in some areas than the government. Given the primacy of improving the security environment, we plan to 

channel as much of our resources in the region as possible to promote security and 

reduce the influence of organized crime. The President’s 2012 foreign assistance request for the Western Hemisphere reflects the importance of programs that advance 

the common security interests of the United States and our neighbors. 

Beyond our self-interest in helping to combat organized crime and drug trafficking, we have an obligation to do so along our southern border. As Secretary Clinton has noted, the demand for drugs in the United States drives much of the illicit 

trade, while guns purchased in the United States are used in violent crimes in Mexico and other neighboring countries. USAID programs are an integral part of President Obama’s National Drug Control Strategy and its goals to significantly reduce 

drug use and its consequences in the United States by 2015. 

The Obama administration is deepening President Bush’s constructive Merida Initiative to combat crime in Mexico and Central America and expanding the effort 

into the Caribbean. USAID is continuing our longstanding work to strengthen the 

capacity of judicial systems to fairly and effectively provide justice; but the heart 

of our work now involves supporting preventive anticrime measures, namely providing youth vulnerable to the lure of crime with positive and productive alternatives. That means creating safe urban spaces, providing job training, and engaging in concerted efforts to keep children in school. 

As Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean are mostly transit points for the 

movement of drugs, we also continue to work with drug-producing countries to cut 

off the source. In Colombia, USAID has helped reduce coca production by as much 

as 85 percent in the geographic areas where we collaborated with the government 

and local communities. Today, thousands of farmers in Colombia who once cultivated coca are now growing legal crops, thanks to USAID assistance. Where guerrilla groups and drug trafficking organizations once operated with impunity in 

ungoverned terrain, peace is returning and civilian agencies of the state are arriving 

to provide services. 

As countries deal with crime’s debilitating impact on development, another emerging issue—one with truly transnational impact—looms large for the region’s economies: global climate change. The increase in average temperatures, changes in rainfall patterns, rising sea levels, glacier melts and extreme weather patterns linked 

to climate change are predicted to have an adverse economic impact on an already 

vulnerable region. 

Many of the region’s key economic activities, such as agricultural production in 

Central and South America and tourism in the Caribbean, are acutely sensitive to 

climate change. Added to this is the strain on national budgets when droughts, 

heavy flooding or powerful hurricanes siphon off scare resources to finance disaster 

relief and recovery efforts. 

Through the Obama administration’s Global Climate Change Initiative, we are responding to this threat by strengthening the capacity of communities and governments in Central and South America to improve land-use management to minimize 

deforestation, a principal source of emissions in Latin America. We are also working 

with the small island nations of the Caribbean to develop adaptation plans to protect critical industries and resources. And we are exploring partnerships with the 

private sector to devise creative ways to mitigate the economic costs of catastrophic 

events like hurricanes and flooding. 

19 

Many of these challenges may seem daunting, but the United States is fortunate 

to have an impressive set of institutional partners to work with. Unfortunately, we 

cannot always work as closely with all governments in the region as we would like. 

Nevertheless, even in some of the more politically challenging settings, we have 

been able to identify particular ministries and officials eager to work with us to advance common objectives. And when that is not feasible, we are often able to collaborate with capable NGOs. 

In some countries, our objectives are more elemental. While the hemisphere has 

experienced impressive democratic gains in recent years, there has been a narrowing of political space in some countries and unrelenting repression in another. 

Freedom House reports that 10 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are 

only ‘‘partly free,’’ with political rights and civil liberties decreasing in six countries 

in the past 2 years. Governments fearful of their own people are restricting the 

rights of individuals, the media, civic organizations and political parties. 

Autocratic governments might try to make it more difficult to work in solidarity 

with citizens struggling to exercise basic human rights, like freedom of expression 

and freedom to assemble. But the United States will not yield in our support for 

those who want to enjoy universally recognized human rights. 

Mr. Chairman, the many development challenges I have discussed today converge 

in one form or another in Haiti, USAID’s highest development priority in the hemisphere. As we move into the second year of post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction, we are already implementing our new approach to development. We are 

partnering successfully with Haitian Government institutions to respond to the cholera epidemic; address security; and boost the economy. We are ramping up our partnerships with the private sector to generate jobs and benefit from innovative approaches to tackling development challenges, like the mobile banking initiative. And 

we are including the Haitian people in the reconstruction effort. As contracts are 

awarded in the coming months, we will be reaching out to Haitian organizations to 

maximize their ability to compete. To the extent possible, we want to partner with 

local entities, rather than outside contractors, in order to creating lasting local 

capacity. 

We are encouraged by the progress made in Haiti over the past year. In coordination with other donors and in support of the Government of Haiti, USAID has saved 

countless lives, began to build the country back better and strengthened the government’s capacity to provide for its citizens. The number of Haitians living in camps 

has fallen by 700,000 since last spring. The U.S. Government alone has removed 

over 1.3 million cubic meters of rubble. More Haitians have access to clean water 

and health services today than before the earthquake. And thanks to the leadership 

of the Haitian Ministry of Health, with the support of the international community, 

the cholera epidemic has stabilized, with the number of cases growing more slowly 

and the fatality rate down. 

To be sure, the challenges before us are still formidable. With over 800,000 Haitians still living in camps, moving people into safe resilient housing is one of our 

top priorities. Another is clearing away the remaining rubble. To make more 

progress on this front, we need help from other donors and the Government of Haiti 

in addressing land tenure issues and prioritizing funding for rubble removal and resettlement of the displaced. 

Beyond these immediate needs, Haiti’s long-term development plan is now in 

place, with United States efforts focused in four areas: infrastructure, health, agriculture and governance. In a major reconstruction development last month, we 

reached agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank and one of the 

world’s largest garmentmakers to develop an industrial park with the potential to 

double the size of Haiti’s textile sector. 

Despite the daunting challenges in Haiti, I am hopeful about the country’s prospects. We have been encouraged by the ability of Haitian Government agencies to 

rebound from the devastating earthquake and will be eager to work with the new 

government when it comes on board. But fundamentally, it is the tenacity and resilience of the Haitian people that inspire and drive us. Their unrelenting determination not just to survive, but to thrive, reminds us all of what is in reach when we 

join forces for the common good. 

That dynamic in Haiti—of peoples, organizations, and governments coming together—is being repeated every day in various forms in the largest cities and smallest villages throughout the Americas. We help each other not only because it is the 

right thing to do and is an expression of our values, but because our well-being is 

linked to that of people throughout this vast and diverse hemisphere. As the peoples 

of Latin America and the Caribbean become more prosperous and more secure, so 

will we. Ultimately, successful development abroad will depend on efforts in the 

20 

countries themselves. But USAID stands ready to help, because it is in our national 

interest to do so. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee’s questions. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Kaplan. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT H. KAPLAN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. KAPLAN. Chairman Menendez, future Ranking Member 

Rubio, members of the subcommittee, congratulations in advance 

on your committee assignments and we look forward to working 

with you and all of the committee members. It is my pleasure to 

testify before you today on behalf of the Inter-American Foundation, a small independent foreign assistance agency of the U.S. 

Government that works directly with the organized poor in Latin 

America and the Caribbean. 

Policy deliberations naturally emphasize broad trends and impacts at the national or regional level, and I appreciate your interest in bringing a community perspective to the table. We know 

from our own country’s experience that healthy communities 

strengthen democracy, create economic opportunities, and enhance 

social resilience. For four decades, the Inter-American Foundation 

has been providing small grants to support self-help ideas and solutions proposed by the poor themselves. The impact of the IAF’s 

grants can be life-changing. Our grants help start or expand small 

businesses, create jobs, develop skills, and access markets for local 

products. They promote inclusion of disadvantaged groups or address basic needs, such as nutrition or access to clean drinking 

water, sanitation, or health care. 

Regardless of the immediate purpose, the fundamental long-term 

objective is to enhance local social capital as people work together 

to solve their most pressing problems and in the process build 

stronger communities and more stable societies. 

The experience of the IAF staff working directly with the organized poor in 21 countries gives us firsthand insight into their concerns and aspirations. 

While there’s been much progress throughout the region, many 

challenges remain. There are still deep pockets of poverty where 

people struggle to meet their most basic needs. Globalization has 

opened opportunities, but it has also made the poor more vulnerable to economic shocks. Lacking better alternatives, the poor often 

settle on land exposed to hurricanes, earthquakes, or man-made 

hazards. Too often, the poor fall victim to traffickers and illicit 

activities and the destabilizing violence that comes with them. 

Despair at lack of opportunities at home leads some to migrate, 

despite the personal risk and the immediate cost to their own families and communities. 

We receive hundreds of proposals every year from grassroots 

groups with imaginative ideas for overcoming these challenges. 

These groups embrace democratic values and are committed to participating actively in civic life. They believe in the opportunities 

available in the market economy and have a fervent desire to join 

in. These are decent, hardworking people living in difficult circumstances, but full of spirit and the will to succeed. Their creativity and perseverance despite the odds are inspiring. 

21 

The proposals the IAF receives build on the proponent’s own resources and what they are able to mobilize from others. Since the 

agency’s founding in 1969, grantees have contributed or mobilized 

almost $1 billion, far exceeding the IAF’s own $665 million. 

Supporting initiatives designed and implemented by the poor is 

a good investment. It increases the likelihood of long-term success 

and enhances local social capital and capacity to solve other problems or take advantage of future opportunities. 

The scale of the Inter-American Foundation’s program is very 

small and it is clear we must work in partnership with others. The 

flexibility that comes with being small and independent allows us 

to experiment, share our experience with others, and encourage 

others to—and bring others to the table. 

One example is our relationship with a network of corporate 

foundations from the region, which allows us to lever our investment two-to-one while helping private donors advance beyond charitable philanthropy to have a long-term sustainable development 

impact. 

The IAF has consistently encouraged a culture of results as part 

of our programs. Since 2000 we have required all grantees to report 

their progress by applying a grassroots development framework 

designed to track both tangible and intangible results. This resultsbased approach helps all of us learn what works and adjust 

accordingly. 

Funding small-scale self-help development and entrepreneurship, 

the Inter-American Foundation supports the efforts of disadvantaged people throughout the hemisphere to escape poverty, improve 

livelihoods, and participate more actively in their nation’s civil society. Through our respectful and responsive approach, the IAF develops goodwill toward the United States and maintains a positive 

presence at the community level, including in countries where bilateral government relations may be strained. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion let me say that cost-effective investments at the grassroots that help make Latin America and the 

Caribbean a better place in which to live are fundamentally in the 

interest of the United States. This was Congress’ mandate to the 

Inter-American Foundation four decades ago and it is as important 

and relevant today as ever. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kaplan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT N. KAPLAN

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Rubio, and members of the subcommittee, 

it is my pleasure to testify before you today on behalf of the Inter-American Foundation (1AF), a small independent foreign assistance agency of the U.S. Government 

that works directly with the organized poor in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Policy deliberations naturally consider broad trends and impacts at the national or 

regional level, and I appreciate your interest in bringing a community perspective 

to the table. We know from our own country’s experience that healthy communities 

strengthen democracy, create economic opportunities and enhance social resilience. 

For four decades, the Inter-American Foundation has been providing small grants 

to support grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean. We invest 

in self-help ideas and solutions proposed by the poor themselves, and we work with 

them directly. Our grants to local and community-based groups complement their 

own resources to address a problem or take advantage of an opportunity to improve 

families’ livelihoods where they live. Individual grants may help start or expand 

small businesses, create jobs, develop skills or access markets for local products. 

22 

They may promote inclusion of disadvantaged groups or address basic needs, such 

as nutrition or access to clean drinking water, sanitation, or health care. Regardless 

of the immediate purpose of the limited funding we provide, the fundamental longterm objective is to enhance local social capital as people work together to solve 

their most pressing problems, and in the process build stronger communities and 

more stable societies. 

The experience of the IAF’s staff working directly with the organized poor in 21 

countries gives us firsthand insight into their concerns and aspirations. While there 

has been significant progress throughout the region over the last few decades, many 

challenges remain. There are still deep pockets of poverty where people struggle to 

meet even their most basic needs. In many places, public and private institutions 

are not yet able to engage the poor effectively to help them along a viable path out 

of poverty. Globalization has opened opportunities, but it has also made the poor 

more vulnerable to economic shocks such as rising food or fuel prices. Lacking better 

alternatives, the poor often settle on land that is particularly exposed to hurricanes, 

earthquakes or man-made hazards. Too often, the poor fall victim to criminal opportunists trafficking in drugs or women and children and to the destabilizing violence 

that comes with them. And despair at lack of opportunities at home leads some to 

leave, despite the personal risks and the immediate cost to their own families and 

communities. 

At the IAF, we receive hundreds of proposals every year from grassroots groups 

with imaginative ideas for overcoming these challenges. We see in their organizations their embrace of democratic values and their desire to participate actively in 

civic life. Their proposals illustrate their strong belief in the opportunities available 

in a market economy. These are decent, hard-working people living in difficult circumstances but full of spirit and the will to succeed. Their creativity and perseverance, despite the odds, are inspiring. 

Assistant Secretary Valenzuela recently told an audience at the Brookings Institution that U.S. policy toward Latin America must be ‘‘respectful, responsive, and 

realistic.’’ This has been the Inter-American Foundation’s approach at the grassroots 

since the beginning. In 1975, an appraisal of the IAF and its grantees during the 

first 5 years was titled ‘‘They Know How’’ to acknowledge the capabilities of our 

partners and to underline the central tenets of the IAF’s responsive approach and 

respect for local knowledge. We provide an opportunity for marginal populations to 

articulate their principal challenges and map a way forward. In the process, this 

approach strengthens bonds within communities, as well as engagement with society at large. 

The proposals we receive identify a funding gap after taking into account the proponents’ own resources and what they are able to mobilize from others. Since the 

agency’s founding in 1969, grantees have contributed or mobilized almost $1 billion—far exceeding the IAF’s $665 million investment. In deciding whether to fund 

a proposal, IAF staff confirm on the ground that the communities themselves play 

a protagonist role. This approach both increases the likelihood of success and enhances local social capital so that community groups can build on the experience to 

solve other problems or take advantage of future opportunities. 

The scale of the Inter-American Foundation’s program is very small, and it is 

clear to us that we must work in partnership with others. We have always tried 

to use the flexibility and agility that comes with being small and independent to 

experiment, share our experience and encourage others to bring their resources to 

bear. For example, over the last several years, we have developed a robust relationship with a network of corporate foundations from the region that, by cofunding 

with us, have learned to direct their own programs to address long-term development needs rather than short-term charity. Through this relationship, the IAF 

levers its investment two-to-one and nurtures a still-incipient culture of private 

philanthropy in the region. 

We can also play a useful role by complementing and extending the impact of 

large public or private development projects. Over the years, we have seen 

marginalized communities lose out or be displaced if they are located in the footprint of multimillion dollar investments in infrastructure, natural resources extraction or tourism. By providing timely support to these communities, the IAF may be 

able to help them take advantage of the economic opportunities that accompany 

these investments instead. 

The Inter-American Foundation has consistently encouraged a culture of results 

as part of our program of development grants. Since 2000, all grantees have been 

required to report on their progress by applying a ‘‘grassroots development framework’’ that the IAF designed to track both tangible and intangible results. Grantees 

submit reports every 6 months, and the data are independently verified on site. 

More recently, we have begun to return to communities 5 years after the IAF’s supVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:17 Aug 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\021711-C.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
23 

port has ended in order to assess the ongoing impact. This results-based approach 

helps us and our grantees learn what works and adjust accordingly. 

By funding small-scale, self-help development and entrepreneurship, the InterAmerican Foundation supports the efforts of disadvantaged people throughout the 

hemisphere as they begin to break out of poverty, improving conditions for themselves and future generations, and participate more actively in their nation’s civil 

society. Through its support, the IAF develops goodwill toward the United States 

and maintains a positive presence at the community level, including in countries 

where bilateral governmental relations may be strained. 

Cost-effective investments at the grassroots that help make Latin America and 

the Caribbean a better place in which to live are fundamentally in the interest of 

the United States. This is the mandate with which Congress charged the InterAmerican Foundation four decades ago, and it is as important and relevant today 

as ever. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Dr. Mora. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK O. MORA, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. MORA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I’d like to begin by thanking you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for your interest in U.S. defense policy 

in the Americas. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that nice introduction. 

I value the insights and the work of this committee in advancing 

U.S. interests in the hemisphere. Indeed, my hope is that I can 

help you better do your job by being transparent in mine, and that 

my testimony today is responsive in this regard. 

Mr. Chairman, the Defense Department is focused on strengthening its relationships in the Americas by using defense diplomacy 

to institutionalize ties. This approach is a byproduct of the Obama 

administration’s commitment to equal partnership in the region. As 

the President made clear in his remarks at the Summit of the 

Americas in 2009, from a defense standpoint the framework of 

partnership makes perfect sense because interdependence goes beyond economics and culture. It also includes security and defense. 

In an age of transnational security challenges, nations can no 

longer afford to go it alone. In fact, we act unilaterally at our own 

peril, because these problems require multinational solutions. Collective action is essential for homeland security and for the security 

of our neighbors. 

U.S. defense policy in the region is therefore guided by one principal objective and that is to be a partner of choice. The institutionalization of relationships is critical to the security of the region 

because we require continuity to make progress in countering 

transnational challenges. For this reason, we have chosen to forge 

defense cooperation agreements, also known as DCAs, with countries such as Brazil and Colombia. DCAs provide long-term umbrella frameworks for security relationships. They also have the 

added benefit of providing transparency, a key element of building 

trust and confidence on defense issues, and a point that Brazil and 

Colombia have understood well. 

Bilateral working groups, also known as BiWGs, are another important formal mechanism for sustaining our relationships in the 

region. Since I became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

24 

Western Hemisphere Affairs, we have participated in BiWGs with 

countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, 

and Peru. Each BiWG is different, of course, with a specific emphasis on those issues or areas of most importance to the bilateral relationship. But they all allow for senior level discussion. 

These discussions normally result in a structure and a plan for 

how we should move forward and cooperate. I believe BiWGs provide an important blueprint for our strategic engagement in the 

region. 

Of particular note, Mr. Chairman, I would note, I would take notice of a strategic dialogue that we will begin next month when I 

will travel to Uruguay to participate in our first-ever strategic dialogue. So our list of BiWGs soon will increase. 

A BiWG with Mexico was held for the first time in 2010, an indication of our increasing collaboration against a shared threat. In 

addition, we are working closely with Mexico to develop a strategy 

to tackle emerging threats along its southern border with Guatemala and Belize. 

In 2010 we also held the first binational human rights dialogue 

with Mexico, an initiative we are working to establish on an annual 

basis. Similarly, our BiWGs with Brazil has been revitalized. After 

a 6-year lull, the BiWG was reconvened in November 2008 in Brasilia and has met regularly ever since. 

In addition to the BiWG and the defense cooperation agreement, 

we signed a general security military information agreement, 

GSMIA, in November 2010 to facilitate the exchange of classified 

information with Brazil. In sum, United States-Brazil defense cooperation is closer today than at any time since 1977, when Brazil 

unilaterally withdrew from a military cooperation agreement with 

the United States. 

Of course, Brazil’s selection of the Super Hornet would be another key element in broadening our cooperation for the future. As 

part of this proposal, the U.S. Government has allowed for significant technology sharing with Brazil. In fact, this is technology that 

has been provided only to our close partners, which is a clear indication of the strength of our partnership with Brazil. 

Our diplomatic approach is also yielding impressive results with 

regards to natural disaster response. At the 2010 Conference of 

Defense Ministers of the Americas in Bolivia, Secretary Gates 

spearheaded a proposal, cosponsored by 13 countries, that seeks to 

develop a framework for military support to civilian-led disaster relief operations and to standardize a system for facilitating collaboration among militaries during these crises. 

Finally, I would like to underscore that U.S. Southern Command 

and U.S. Northern Command are vital to our efforts in building 

partnerships by supporting humanitarian assistance, security 

assistance, training, military education, peacekeeping exercises, 

and multinational operations, which brings together many nations 

to confront illicit trafficking in a collaborative environment. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to close by reiterating that this is 

just a snapshot of our activities in the Americas, but I hope it has 

provided you with a sense of how we approach engagement in the 

region. 

I very much look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

25 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mora follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK O. MORA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to begin by thanking 

you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for your interest in U.S. 

defense policy in the Americas. I value the insights and work of this committee in 

advancing U.S. interests in the hemisphere. Indeed, my hope is that I can help you 

better do your job by being transparent in mine, and that my testimony today is 

responsive in this regard. 

Mr. Chairman, the Defense Department is focused on strengthening its relationships in the Americas by using defense diplomacy to institutionalize ties. This 

approach is a by-product of the Obama administration’s commitment to equal partnership in the region, as the President made clear in his remarks at the Summit 

of the Americas in 2009. 

From a defense standpoint, the framework of partnership makes perfect sense because interdependence goes beyond economics and culture; it also includes security 

and defense. In an age of transnational security challenges, nations can no longer 

afford to go it alone. In fact, we act unilaterally at our own peril because these problems require multinational solutions. Collective action is essential for our homeland 

security and for the security of our neighbors. U.S. defense policy in the region is 

therefore guided by one principal objective: To be a partner of choice. 

The institutionalization of relationships is critical to the security of the region because we require continuity to make progress in countering transnational challenges. For this reason, we have chosen to forge defense cooperation agreements 

(DCAs) with countries such as Brazil and Colombia. 

DCAs provide long-term, umbrella frameworks for security relationships. They 

also have the added benefit of providing transparency, a key element of building 

trust and confidence on defense issues, and a point that Brazil and Colombia have 

understood well. 

Bilateral Working Groups (BWGs) are another important formal mechanism for 

sustaining our relationships in the region. Since I became the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, we have participated in BWGs with countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru. 

Each BWG is different, with a specific emphasis on those issues or areas of most 

importance to the bilateral relationship, but they all allow for senior-level discussion. These discussions normally result in a structure and plan for how we should 

move forward and cooperate. I believe BWGs provide an important blueprint for our 

strategic engagement in the region. 

Of particular note, I will travel in March to Uruguay to participate in a first-ever 

bilateral Strategic Dialogue with Uruguay, so our list of BWGs will soon increase. 

A BWG with Mexico was held for the first time in 2010—an indication of our increasing collaboration against a shared threat. In addition, we are working closely 

with Mexico to develop a strategy to tackle the emerging threats along its southern 

border with Guatemala and Belize. In 2010, we also held the first Binational 

Human Rights dialogue with Mexico, an initiative we are working to establish on 

an annual basis. 

Similarly, our BWG with Brazil has been revitalized. After a 6-year lull, the BWG 

was reconvened in November 2008 in Brasilia and has met regularly ever since. In 

addition to the BWG and DCA, we signed a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in November 2010 to facilitate the exchange of classified 

military information. In sum, United States-Brazil defense cooperation is closer 

today than at any time since 1977, when Brazil unilaterally withdrew from a military cooperation agreement with the United States. 

Of course, Brazil’s selection of the Super Hornet would be another key element 

in broadening our cooperation for the future. As part of this proposal, the U.S. Government has allowed for significant technology-sharing with Brazil. In fact, this is 

technology that has been provided only to our closest allies and partners, which is 

a clear indication of the strength of our partnership with Brazil. 

Our diplomatic approach is also yielding impressive results with regards to natural disaster response. At the 2010 Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas 

(CDMA) in Bolivia, Secretary Gates spearheaded a proposal—cosponsored by 13 

other countries—that seeks to develop a framework for military support to civilianled disaster relief operations and to standardize a system for facilitating collaboration among militaries during these crises. Clearly, the region is coming together to 

ensure we are best prepared when another Haiti-like disaster strikes. 

Finally, I would like to underscore that U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command are vital to our efforts in building partnerships by supporting humanVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:17 Aug 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\021711-C.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
26 

itarian assistance, security assistance, training, military education, peacekeeping, 

exercises, and multinational operations like that of Joint Inter-Agency Task Force– 

South (JIATF-South), which brings together many nations to confront illicit trafficking in a collaborative environment. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to close by reiterating that this is just a snapshot of 

our activities in the Americas, but I hope it has provided you with a sense of how 

we approach engagement in the region. I very much look forward to your questions. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you all for your testimony. It’s 

very helpful to start a foundation here. 

I think we’ll start with 7-minute rounds, based on the number 

of members who are here, and we’ll see how we progress. So the 

Chair recognizes himself. 

Let me start with you, Mr. Secretary. Citizen security and narcotics. My global view is that we’ve made a lot of progress in the 

hemisphere, but there are some areas that still are problematic. In 

the area of citizen security and narcotics trafficking in Mexico, 

Central America, and the Caribbean, I’m not sure that our progress 

is certainly keeping up with that of criminal and drug trafficking 

organizations. Certainly the situation in Mexico is particularly 

gruesome. We have seen as many as 10,000 people murdered as a 

result of showdowns between criminal organizations or between 

those organizations and public authorities. Certainly this past 

Tuesday, two U.S. Immigration officials were shot and one, Special 

Agent Jaime Zapata, was killed, and our thoughts and prayers are 

with him and his family. The agents were on a well-traveled highway in an armored car with diplomatic plates. 

So I’m concerned that our interests and our challenges are incongruous with the essence of what we are trying to do there. I was 

a strong supporter of the Merida Initiative, but I look at the fiscal 

year 2012 budget, which actually decreases funding for counternarcotics efforts and law enforcement by 7 percent for the region, 

and wonder how we do that at a time when we are still facing a 

very significant, severe challenge? We still have the Central America issue. As we seek to pressure the narcotraffickers, working with 

the Mexican Government, that squeezes them into Central America, and then squeezed into the Caribbean, so much so that we 

recently—the United States Government—recently denied the 

Dominican Republic use of certain container ports to ship to the 

United States. 

So help me out here. 

Mr. VALENZUELA. Sure. Mr. Chairman, I think you’re absolutely 

right that there’s nothing perhaps that’s more important for most 

of the citizens in Latin America—and this is throughout the continent—than citizen security. It’s particularly serious in the case of 

Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean—Central America and the 

Caribbean because in some ways they’re caught like a ham in a 

sandwich between Mexico and Colombia. 

We’ve been redoubling our efforts to pay attention to this issue, 

and we’re doing so by strengthening our Merida Initiative and 

working with Mexico as well as expanding our efforts in Central 

America with CARSI, with the Central American Regional Security 

Initiative. We just had a meeting this Monday with the European 

Union, with the Canadians, with others, because this has to be an 

international response, and coordinating better other donors is allowing us to strengthen our own strategic approach to this as well. 

27 

The Europeans provide about one-third of assistance to Central 

America, for example, in some of the other areas. 

But our focus, Mr. Chairman, very specifically is on trying to 

bring down the drug trafficking organizations and the cartels, but 

at the same time moving to strengthen institutions like police and 

governance, judicial institutions, while at the same time, as Mark 

made it clear in his testimony, we have a whole host of programs 

that are also looking at things like youth at risk in places like El 

Salvador, where this is a significant problem. 

This is an international—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m all for institution-building, which is 

something I advocated for when we were doing Merida, arguing 

that it couldn’t all be firepower. But when we move our budget in 

a direction that is opposite our challenge, we are not aligning ourselves in terms of our challenge and that’s my concern. So I hope 

the administration will work with the Congress to make sure that 

our resources meet our challenges, because I appreciate that the 

European Union is a third and there is another third involved 

there. 

Mr. VALENZUELA. The Inter-American Development Bank, the 

World Bank, and others—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Those are all good, and coordinating, maximizing, and leveraging our effort is fantastic. But I don’t want the 

security of the communities in my State of New Jersey to depend 

upon any of that effort. I want it to depend upon our own. 

Mr. VALENZUELA. I couldn’t agree with you more, and I’d like to 

work—the administration would like to work with the Congress to 

make sure that those levels remain high. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that. 

Let me talk about democracy and development, Mr. Feierstein. 

I am concerned when I look at the AID request for democracy, 

human rights, and governance programs in Latin America, typically around $2 million, which is approximately 1 percent of the 

total funding of $1.9 billion requested for the region. 

Now, it seems to me that, while we celebrate the advances of the 

region, I certainly am concerned by efforts in the region to disguise 

authoritarianism as the exercise of Presidential power or convenient constitutional reforms, as we have seen in Venezuela, in Nicaragua, and as some anticipate in Guatemala prior to the September 

elections. So what steps are we taking, if democracy promotion is 

important to us and important to the citizens of the hemisphere for 

the fulfillment of their own hopes, dreams, and aspirations? Why 

are we not looking at this in a more robust way? 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the question. We have a robust set of programs in Latin 

America and the Caribbean to advance democracy. We think of 

them in three baskets. First, we work in the area of institutionbuilding, strengthening electoral bodies, strengthening Congresses, 

municipalities, and that’s a recognition, as you said, Mr. Chairman, 

and Senator Rubio as well in his opening remarks, of the progress 

that the hemisphere has made. In most cases, we’re talking about 

strengthening institutions, strengthening democracies, as opposed 

to the promotion of democracy. 

28 

But second, I think we need to broaden how we think about governance. We tend to think about Parliaments, mayors’ offices, but 

I think we need to think as well about Ministries of Education, 

Ministries of Health. To the extent that we are trying to create 

local capacity throughout the region and make governments more 

efficient in providing services to their people, the strengthening of 

those institutions is vital as well. 

Finally, there are countries that you mentioned where we are 

seeing a backsliding; and we need to continue our robust programs 

to support civil society, to support political parties, to support a 

range of media, to protect and to try to create political space, and 

of course, in the one country where there are no freedoms, to try 

to help to create civil society networks and help give people the 

opportunity to communicate, both among themselves and with people in other countries. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I’d like to follow up with you, but I will 

wait for the second round and turn to Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Let me start first by kind of describing what I hope is our vision 

for the region, and I think it’s not in conflict with what I’ve read 

in your statement or what the President has stated. I just wrote 

this down here, so it’s a work in progress. But basically my vision 

for the region, I think ours from all the testimony here today, is 

that the Western Hemisphere is a close and mutually respectful 

partnership with our neighbors. We understand that from time to 

time among friends there will be disagreements on policy issues, 

particularly on some international issues, but by and large we’re 

going to find ourselves, if we’re truly partners, on the same side 

more often than not, because we’re going to have very close security and economic ties. 

Is that a fair vision for the future? Do you think that in essence 

describes what our hopes should be for the region? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. I think so. I think so, Senator. There’s no question that we find that we have real, genuine partners in the hemisphere and that we share extraordinary values with the countries 

of the hemisphere. It’s simply not true that there’s a distance 

between us in that regard. 

I think as we move forward constructively to try to advance, each 

country has its interests, but we have common interests, and that’s 

what’s, I think, encouraging about the Western Hemisphere. And 

they are things like strengthening democratic institutions or freedoms, as well as becoming more competitive and a very difficult 

21st century, where Latin America has fallen behind. 

Senator RUBIO. In that light, I want to examine, in the time that 

I have, briefly three key points in the hemisphere that I think are 

critical to any successful carrying out of this vision. The first is 

Mexico. Unfortunately, I think, in recent years we’ve seen statements by some in our government claiming that the country might 

even be on the verge of a failed state. I think it was unfortunate 

that that was the statement that was uttered. 

The reality of it is that, from everything I have read—and please 

correct me if I’m wrong—the Mexican Government appears to be 

deeply intent on confronting this challenge internally and solving 

it, in much the same way Colombia was over the last two decades. 

29 

I was hoping you could elaborate on that briefly, and I think Dr. 

Mora as well may want to comment on that. 

Mr. VALENZUELA. Yes, I certainly would agree with that, Senator. I think that we have a very close, respectful, and constructive 

partnership with Mexico on this. It is a very significant challenge. 

It’s one where we’ve recognized our coresponsibility as a demand 

country with regard to narcotics and so on. But at the same time, 

we’ve moved forward. 

Frank Mora mentioned earlier that for the first time there really 

is an extraordinary cooperation on the security side with Mexican 

authorities. What I’d like to stress—and this goes back to the 

chairman’s point earlier about some of the funding—is that in Mexico in particular we’ve moved from some of the original expenses 

for some of the heavy equipment and things like that, that were 

very expensive, to moving to other areas where they are really significant, particularly setting up police, making the judicial institutions work better, particularly at the local level, and so on and so 

forth. 

This has to be a multipronged policy. It has to be a comprehensive policy. We’re working effectively, I think, together with Mexico 

in order to overcome those challenges. 

Dr. MORA. Yes, Senator, I agree with your assessment of Mexico. 

I think, as the President and Secretary Clinton have expressed, we 

do not believe there is any attempt to overthrow the Government 

of Mexico. We don’t think it’s a weak state or failed state or anything of that sort. 

Certainly we recognize the violence that exists. We are all concerned with that violence. Certainly Mexico is. But I think in part 

I would say, Senator, that part of the reason for the violence is a 

result of some of the success the Mexican Government is having in 

terms of pressuring the drug trafficking organizations, the transnational criminal organizations, creating more conflict. So I think 

that’s important to underscore. 

The other thing I’d like to also emphasize, and Secretary 

Valenzuela mentioned, the kind of cooperation that we’re doing in 

collaboration with Mexico is really extraordinary from a mil-to-mil 

standpoint. We are engaged with our partners, both our partner 

Sedena, which is the National Secretariat of Defense, and the Navy 

on exchange and training and information-sharing, providing 

equipment of course, subject matter exchanges, human rights training—a whole host of activities that we really didn’t do and weren’t 

doing 4 or 5 years ago. 

It’s really a testament to the commitment of both governments, 

President Calderon and the Government of the United States, to 

deal with this very serious—very serious problem. 

Senator RUBIO. I want to move on to the second key part of the 

region, country, and that’s Colombia. We’ve talked about that before in our statements. What exactly are we asking of them in 

order to consummate this trade agreement? First of all, they’re not 

waiting around, as they shouldn’t. They are beginning to examine 

other partnerships around the world as the United States continues to take longer and longer to consummate something that 

makes total sense from both perspectives. So they’re acting in their 

best national interests and moving on without us. 

30 

What are we asking of them? What is the checklist that has to 

be accomplished in order to get this deal done? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. Senator, as we said earlier, the President has 

instructed—in fact, as we speak today there is a USTR-led interagency group in Colombia at this particular point to look at some 

of the outstanding issues that are still on the table with regard to 

that. 

But we certainly see a commitment on the part of this government to move forward on some of the remaining issues that exist. 

Those have to do with issues having to do with labor code and violence against unionists and that kind of thing. 

But let me assure you that we see very close engagement with 

the Colombians to try to, in fact, get to the outstanding issues. 

Senator RUBIO. I guess where I’m getting at with the question 

is: Is there somewhere I can go in this city where someone will give 

me a sheet of paper that will tell me, these are the things that we 

are trying—that we would like Colombia to do in order to consummate this deal? Does that kind of matrix exist, the particular 

metrics that we’re asking them to meet? I’ve been here 6 weeks, 

so maybe it’s out there and I haven’t found that place yet. 

But if someone could show me who has that, so we could perhaps 

be helpful. 

Mr. VALENZUELA. I think the answer is we’re working on it, and 

that this mission in Colombia this week of USTR should help to advance some of the points on that. 

Senator RUBIO. And I won’t belabor the point. But when you say 

we’re working on it, I guess my question is: So we don’t have that 

yet? If the Colombians were here with us today and they told us, 

we want this deal, what do we need to do, our answer would be, 

we’re still working on it? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. We’re working on it, but, look, let me also say 

that I would defer also to USTR on this since they’re the ones that 

have the lead on this issue. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Menendez. 

I share both of their comments about Mexico in terms of worrying about it and worrying about the relationship. New Mexico, 

my State, is a border State and we’re one of four that borders six 

states down in Mexico, and there’s a great deal of worry down on 

the border in terms of the narcotrafficking and the gang activity. 

I think if you went to the border and asked the people on the 

border if they thought things were getting better, you would have 

the perception that it isn’t getting better. And yet the panel here 

seems to say we’re working on it, it is getting better. Dr. Mora, 

you’re talking about the sharing that’s going on in terms of the 

DOD. 

The numbers—we’re seeing the numbers go up in terms of the 

murders, aren’t we? And I know that the President has put on a 

big effort to try to tackle this. But can you give me a sense? What 

would you tell somebody down there on the border that’s saying 

there are murders now occurring in the United States? There’s evidence that these gangs or people are coming over and in the United 

31 

States gang activity is going on related to gangs down in Mexico. 

It’s a very worrisome thing, I think, if you’re down there right on 

the border and hearing all the stories and hearing the reports. 

Please help me out here. 

Dr. MORA. Senator, I’ll talk briefly about that. I think that, as 

I mentioned earlier, I think the more pressure the Mexican Government places on these organizations, the more the violence will 

spill over into other areas, either south to Central America or to 

the Caribbean. Our approach is that we need to be proactive. We 

need to enhance the degree to which we are collaborating and sharing information, in my case with HEDENA and SOMAR, and that 

we are doing. 

Senator UDALL. You’re sharing intelligence, is that correct? 

Dr. MORA. Indeed. 

Senator UDALL. And we haven’t done that for a long time? 

Dr. MORA. I wouldn’t be able to tell you since when. 

Senator UDALL. I think that’s an encouraging development, the 

sharing of intelligence. I know that there is probably a worry on 

our side that by sharing intelligence it’s going to go to the wrong 

places. Is there any evidence that’s happening? 

Dr. MORA. There’s no evidence on my side, Senator. 

Senator UDALL. Please, go ahead. You were continuing. 

Mr. VALENZUELA. If I could simply add to that, that, yes, I think 

that we can certainly understand why citizens in your State and 

others are worried about what’s going on in Mexico. Citizens in 

Mexico are worried about what’s going on in Mexico. But indeed, 

we do feel that the proper measures are being taken in order to 

address this issue. 

We saw similar challenges in some ways, although very different 

in other ways, in other countries have been addressed. Colombia is 

one of them, for example, and I don’t want to draw parallels 

between the two because there are some significant differences as 

well. 

But the point I’m trying to make is that it takes time to make 

some progress on these sorts of things. 

Finally, let me just add the following insight, that this is an 

issue that has to be dealt with on a regional basis. I think that this 

is what we’ve tried to do. The spillover effect into Central America, 

into the Caribbean, is something that we would not want. So we 

have to have an integrated, transnational approach to this phenomenon. When we address it that way, I think that we’re going 

to be successful in getting a grip on this. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Let me ask about USAID. I note in your statement you said that 

the hallmark of the Obama administration is to approach development from the sustainability standpoint, and that the President 

has said creating the conditions where our assistance is no longer 

needed. My understanding—and you talk a little bit about contractors in USAID. Over time, haven’t we gone from personnel on the 

ground, people in the countries, giving assistance to more and more 

contractors and putting an emphasis on U.S. companies and that 

kind of thing? And doesn’t that hurt our ability to really do the 

capacity-building that I think the President’s talking about here? 

32 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. Thank you, Senator, very much. I appreciate the 

question. What we’re trying to do now at AID—— 

Senator UDALL. Can you turn the mike on? 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Dr. Shah, the Administrator of USAID, has introduced a set of 

reforms and the heart of those reforms is what we call procurement 

reform. The goal is to create sustainability, to create local capacity—that is, strengthening governance, NGOs, and the private 

sector. 

What we’re trying to do is move from a model where we tend to 

work with U.S.-based contractors and shift that toward working 

more directly with and channeling resources through local entities. 

That is a process that we’ve already begun, that we intend to accelerate in the coming months and years. 

I can tell you that in my bureau, for example, I’ll be giving every 

one of my missions, every one of our offices in the hemisphere— 

we have 17 of them—specific targets they’ll have to hit in terms 

of the amount of resources going through local entities, as opposed 

to going through outside contractors. 

As President Obama said in his development policy, we’re trying 

to create the conditions whereby our assistance is no longer 

necessary. The only way to get there is to strengthen that local 

capacity. 

At the same time, we’re also trying to work much more closely 

with the private sector in a lot of these countries, not only to leverage resources, but there’s also a recognition that the most effective 

and efficient way to create jobs is via a vibrant private sector. So 

we’ve been able to collaborate and partner with companies in a 

number of arenas. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Thank you all for being here today. I yield back. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator. 

Let’s do a second round. I have a series of questions I want to 

pursue. Let me go back to democracy for a moment. 

I just wanted to make sure I wasn’t wrong, so I had my staff 

check, and we have $37 million from State, but that is mostly rule 

of law, not a lot of support for civil society. Rule of law is important; don’t misunderstand. I think that’s very important. But we 

have about $2 million in AID in democracy promotion. I look at 

what is happening in Venezuela. I look at what is happening in 

Nicaragua. I look at what may very well happen in Guatemala. I 

look at some of the other places, and I say to myself, how do we, 

with those—how much are we really committed to democracy promotion with that? 

What is our ability to really do democracy promotion, which is 

really to help civil society be in a position to make its own claims 

upon its government in a rightful manner, where liberty is one of 

the essential elements? 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. To be honest, it’s not clear 

to me which document you’re referring to. But in terms of our fiscal 

year 2012 budget the President has presented, we have not yet determined how the money would be allocated within each country 

and toward which sectors. 

33 

We are undergoing a process throughout the entire agency, 

including—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. It’s more than $2 million? 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. Well, we are undergoing a process throughout 

the agency, including in my bureau, where every single mission 

basically lays out a strategy which they present to Washington for 

our approval. And I can assure you that as these strategies come 

through my bureau and through my office, we will make a priority 

of the strengthening of democracy. I can’t commit to specific figures 

now—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I know. I’m just trying to push the point 

that—I’m talking about fiscal year 2011 numbers, so if I start there 

I get a sense of where we’re at. So I hope that it will be more 

robust, but I don’t think that we can really say that we are into 

democracy promotion, which I think is incredibly important. 

Look at what is happening in the Arab world. There is a wave. 

We are either part and with that wave and helping it or we are 

behind it. I don’t think that’s unique to the Arab world. 

So I think that it’s important in this regard. So I hope we can 

get you as an advocate. 

In the context of democracy programming, of course, I have to 

raise the question, Mr. Secretary, with you on Cuba. I, of course, 

oppose the President’s stated changes, primarily because I see 

them as open-ended and largely sending huge amounts of money 

to the Castro regime at a time in which that regime has huge economic consequences, as is evidenced by their dismissal of thousands of state workers. And they would never have done that but 

for economic necessity. They would have never reduced the thirdlargest army in the Western Hemisphere during the period of the 

Soviet Union per capita without economic necessity. 

The most hated symbol of the Cuban revolution, the American 

dollar, now freely sought and traded, unfortunately retained only 

by state government entities, was now sought because of economic 

necessity. 

So when I see the new regulations and then I see entities already 

up that say: ‘‘Salza and Afro-Cuban dance. Beginning to advance 

dancers welcome. You can choose to focus’’—I could do this for 

them without going to Cuba. ‘‘You can choose to focus on salza and 

other popular dances, like mamba, cha-cha-cha.’’ This is going to 

create democracy for the people of Cuba? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. Senator, the administration—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. By the way, the price tag is $3,000 for a single person, to go to Cuba to learn salza, cha-cha-cha, and mamba. 

Mr. VALENZUELA. I think I would prefer to sign up with your 

lessons, Senator, if you don’t mind. 

If I might say, look; the President’s policy toward Cuba and the 

intent of these changes in the regulations is because the President 

feels and the administration feels that we need to move forward 

much more effectively to engage directly with the Cuban people, in 

order to encourage their own ability to determine their own future. 

The particular—I would be extremely surprised if the particular 

instance that you referred to, the dance lessons, would be in any 

way countenanced by this kind of a program. 

34 

Senator MENENDEZ. I hope so, because this is a company that got 

from the 1990s to 2004 a series of licenses to do a lot of this. So 

my point is that to the extent that you could get real people engagement, with real itineraries that get to real Cubans, not those 

who are constrained and/or directed by the government to engage 

with citizens—being on a beach in Cuba, having a cuba libre, which 

is an oxymoron, and smoking a cigar made by hands that get a 

fraction of their wages is not my way of how we create freedom. 

So I just hope—I have a long list of these and I hope that you 

will look at them as an exercise. 

Mr. VALENZUELA. If you would share some of those with us. But 

we’re going to work very closely with OFAC, with State Department guidance, to make sure that, in fact, when the licenses are 

given that, in fact, they do meet the objectives of this program, 

which is to engage directly with the Cuban people and have Americans engage directly with the Cuban people. We think that this is 

a way of giving them the kind of space that they need in order to 

become independent of the clutches of the regime. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Kaplan, poverty and inequality have 

longstanding challenges in the hemisphere and, while we have seen 

growth, the reality is that nearly 40 percent of the hemisphere live 

on less than $2 a day. That in my mind will continue to be the 

nature of a huge challenge, and the inequality between those who 

have and have not, we have seen in other parts of the world how 

that can create instability. 

Now, your agency is known for its work in dealing with indigenous needs and responding with real people, identifying problems 

and solutions. How do you identify meritorious projects and how 

have you managed to stay engaged in countries like Bolivia and 

Venezuela while other agencies seem to be struggling to do the 

same? 

Mr. KAPLAN. Thank you, Senator. I also would like an opportunity to talk about what we do as democracy-building as well. I 

think the point that you made before, that anything that’s enhancing, that’s strengthening civic society, civic participation, is also 

contributing to democracy. We consider that the work that we do 

responding directly to proposals presented to us by communities 

throughout the region, where they’re designing their own projects 

and they’re figuring out how to do it themselves, bringing in resources to complement their own resources, and then proceeding to 

learn how to do it, and to fail sometimes, but succeed more times, 

strengthens social capital, strengthens the communities, and is a 

building block for democracy as well. 

So I think all of our programs in fact could be perceived—could 

be presented as democracy-building through that lens, because we 

are responding directly to the requests from the communities. 

To your questions, let me say we receive about 500 project requests every year from across the hemisphere. We can’t fund all 

500. We fund—last year we funded about 75 projects. So we have 

a process of going through those projects, looking at them, and then 

visiting every single one of them, spending time with the community, with the group that’s working with the community directly, 

that is proposing the project, and then proceeding to fund it. 

35 

The projects go forward for 2 or 3 years and there’s a resultsbased process for following up on it, and then strengthening the 

capacity of the communities themselves to report the results, to 

comply with audits, so it’s capacity-building again at the community level and with community organizations. 

In countries where other agencies have had more tense relationships perhaps, I think that we’ve been successful because we’ve 

worked, not through the government; we work directly with the 

communities themselves, and the communities have appreciated 

the respectful approach that we have in working with them and 

have welcomed the support. We don’t tell them what to do. We listen to what they think they should do and we work with them to 

fill the gaps so that they can do it. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

I have here the President’s order regarding Cuba from January 

14. It reads that: ‘‘In continuing efforts to reach out to the Cuban 

people in support of their desire to freely determine their country’s 

future,’’—which is the stated goal of policy toward Cuba; it says 

that—part of the things it expands is purposeful travel for the purpose of enhancing contact with the Cuban people and supporting 

civil society through purposeful travel. 

Are you familiar, Mr. Secretary, with the case of a United States 

citizen that traveled to Cuba to distribute communications technology on the island, particularly I believe to the Jewish community? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. Yes, I am, Mr. Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Would distributing technology to members of that 

community or to the Cuban people fall within the context of meaningful purposeful travel? I mean, would it fall within the guise of 

what we’re talking about here, to enhance contact with the Cuban 

people? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. With respect to Mr. Gross, Mr. Gross was in 

Cuba as a long-term development worker. He was working with 

elements of the Jewish community—— 

Senator RUBIO. To make contact with the Cuban—— 

Mr. VALENZUELA [continuing]. To make contact with the Cuban 

people. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, he’s facing 20 years in prison; is that correct? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. He might face 20 years in prison, that’s correct. 

Senator RUBIO. So are we going to issue an advisory to Americans that are looking at doing purposeful travel to make contact 

with people in Cuba, that they may also face 20 years if their contact is too purposeful? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. Anybody who travels to Cuba, I imagine that, 

including relatives of Cubans—and the numbers increased this 

year; there are about 300,000 Cuban Americans who traveled to 

Cuba—may take some risks in traveling. But it is our view that it’s 

very important for us to be able to have the capacity to have both— 

not only Cuban Americans, but also citizens across our country—— 

Senator RUBIO. Right, but is the State Department prepared to 

begin advising both Cuban Americans and non-Cuban Americans 

36 

traveling to Cuba what you’ve just said, that there are risks to 

traveling in Cuba? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. I think—I don’t know whether there’s some 

specific guidance on that, but I think that there is an awareness 

that there is a risk and that we—institutions that send—I was a 

professor at Georgetown and when our students would go down on 

a license to Cuba we always were mindful of the fact that they 

needed to be particularly careful. 

Senator RUBIO. So specifically, based on your testimony and 

what we’ve read about this particular case and others, isn’t it 

wise—or would it be unwise to advise people looking to travel to 

Cuba, be careful how much contact you make, because if you upset 

the Cuban Government you may be jailed and face 20 years, and 

by the way we may not be able to do much at all? 

In fact, what have we done with the case of the U.S. citizen? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. I think, at least from the experience that I’ve 

seen—we have one case right now. I can’t think of any other case 

recently of somebody who has been—of an American citizen who’s 

been arrested for this kind of activity. There are all kinds of people 

who’ve been going down to Cuba for a long period of time on the 

people-to-people program, and I can think of people, friends of mine 

from Tampa, for example, who go down with their church to Cuba 

all the time. 

Senator RUBIO. But the church visits are largely run through the 

ecumenical council, correct? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. Well, look. Let me clarify that these—again, 

the travel is going to be purposeful, regulated travel, where individuals and organizations and institutions will have to get licenses 

in order to go. So it’s under the framework of the same sorts of 

arrangements that we have now. 

Senator RUBIO. Now, in terms of—because I think there’s clearly 

a cost-benefit analysis that I hope the Department made or is making in this decision in the administration, between on the one hand 

the benefits of people-to-people contact, if you don’t go to jail, and 

the other of the revenues that it provides the Cuban Government, 

which is a repressive regime. 

In fact, in January alone we know of 260 political arrests. In fact, 

yesterday Sarah Fonseca was brutally beaten in the streets of 

Havana. So it continues to be a repressive regime, and it has to 

pay for its repression. One of the ways it does that, perhaps the 

single largest source of funding to the Cuban regime, is remittances and travel by Cuban Americans to the island. 

For example—many people may not know this. You have a 

Cuban American; you’ve got to get a Cuban passport. The funds all 

flow to the Cuban Government. Then you’ve got to go out and get 

a ticket through a charter company, which is basically—if this is 

an accurate assessment, basically a business partner of the Castro 

government, where a significant percentage of the money you pay 

for your travel to Cuba flows to the Cuban Government, correct? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. Yes. Our policy, Senator, is to have rules and 

regulations that will maximize the contact between the American 

people and the Cuban people—— 

Senator RUBIO. I understand, but I’m looking at the revenue 

side. What I’m trying to get at is you have to get a Cuban passport, 

37 

which is money directly to the Cuban Government, a source of revenue. Then you’ve got to get a ticket through a charter company, 

which is the business partner of the Castro government—revenue 

to the Cuban Government. Then when you land you get hit with 

an entry fee, which is direct revenue to the Cuban Government. 

Then they make you change your currency, which they take 20 percent of—revenue to the Cuban Government. 

Estimates are that about $4 billion a year flow directly to the 

Cuban Government from remittances and travel by Cuban Americans, which is the largest—perhaps the single largest source of revenue, to the most repressive government in the region. 

Mr. VALENZUELA. The remittances to Cuba are a large number, 

too. But let me just simply say this, that there may be some ancillary benefits to the Cuban Government, but it is our view that to 

be able to have direct contact with the Cuban people, that Americans have direct contact with the Cuban people, will provide them 

with the kind of space that will allow them to become much more 

independent of the regime. 

If we continue to isolate the Cuban people, we simply play into 

the hands of the Cuban regime. I think that we need to in that 

sense expand—— 

Senator RUBIO. But that goes back to the case of this American 

citizen, whose attempt was to create a technology or help people 

create a technology platform where there could be communication 

with the outside world. 

I guess my last question, and it kind of is redundant—I asked 

this earlier, but this is important, because a lot of people from my 

State are expressing an interest in traveling to Cuba, including 

people that are not Cuban Americans. Is the Department of State 

prepared to assure American citizens that if they go to Cuba they’ll 

be able to talk to whoever they want, do whatever they want within the civil laws—obviously, you can’t violate the civil law. But 

they’ll be able to talk to anybody they want, including somebody 

like Sarah Fonseca? They’ll be able to go there and actually tell 

people about the outside world, talk to dissidents, and that they 

will not get in trouble? 

Are we prepared to assure people if they travel to Cuba nothing 

bad will happen? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. Senator, I can’t give you that assurance. But 

I will also point to the fact that there’s been a lot of experience 

with travel to Cuba, including that of many, many Cuban Americans, and we still continue to think that that has a beneficial effect 

in promoting greater freedom in Cuba. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

Two last questions. Dr. Mora, technology transfer issues, particularly in relation to Brazil. Despite some of the United States and 

Brazil’s disagreements on foreign policy, we share a long tradition 

of cooperation in the area of national security, to include fighting 

shoulder to shoulder during the Second World War. 

With the beginning of Brazil’s new administration under President Rosef, it would seem we have the opportunity to reset our 

strategic relationship along the lines of our shared history. I am 

aware of Brazil’s recent interest in the United States—in the 

38 

United States offer to sell fighter aircraft, the Super Hornet, as 

part of a foreign military sales transaction between our two countries. In fact, the Congress approved the sale in 2009, underscoring 

that commitment. 

I know that there have been concerns raised by the Brazilians 

about our commitment to this sale. To what extend do you believe 

that such a sale promotes cooperation, interoperability, and shared 

security interests with the United States? 

Dr. MORA. Absolutely, Senator. As I said in my opening statement, this is a critical part of our defense cooperation with Brazil. 

It links us in ways that perhaps is an extension or continuation of 

the defense cooperation agreement that we signed last year. 

Now, we understand a final decision has not been made on 

whether—on the fighter competition. The United States I think, 

Senator, has made a robust proposal of the Super Hornet technology. In fact, I would argue the technology transfer that we are 

offering of this magnitude would put Brazil on par with our close 

partners. So it is a robust offer. It is significant tech transfer, and 

it is in par, as I say, with many of our close partners. And it demonstrates really our commitment, not only to the sale of this aircraft, but really a commitment to increasing, deepening, our 

defense-defense relationship. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So to the extent that Brazil is going to make 

a decision, is it fair to deduce from your answer that they should 

have no concern about our commitment to make that sale and to 

share the associated technology? 

Dr. MORA. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. All right. Thank you very much. 

Is this something that Secretary Clinton will be raising in her 

upcoming consultation, do you know, with Minister Patriota? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. Yes, we always raise these issues. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Then last, Mr. Secretary, on a milder note, 

I want to ask about competitiveness in the hemisphere for U.S. 

companies and interests, which obviously means jobs here in the 

United States. I see the hemisphere opening up trade opportunities 

with regions such as China, Korea, Japan, to mention a few, as 

well as creating regional blocs. U.S. companies have had significant 

growth in the hemisphere and I wonder, as I have no doubt that 

some countries in the region want to limit U.S. influence and engagement, are there opportunities for the United States that we 

are missing out, for example as China takes a more prominent 

presence in terms of investment in trade in the region? 

What should we be doing? 

Mr. VALENZUELA. A couple points. One is, the region itself needs 

to become more competitive. There’s no question about it. It’s 

still—the growth rate for the last couple of years have been based 

on primarily exports of raw materials. Most countries in Latin 

America, including Chile and Brazil, that for example sell 60 percent of all exports to China, which are raw materials, realize that 

their future comes from value-added activity, and that requires in 

turn increasing levels of competitiveness, which in turn of course 

requires greater investment in such things as education, technology, and that kind of thing. 

39 

In fact, one of the advantages that U.S. firms already have in the 

region is that U.S. firms are much more likely to be involved in 

production chains with firms in Latin America than, say, the Chinese. But there’s no question that I think that we can do a better— 

and should do a better—job to try to promote the ability of American firms to do better in Latin America. 

The Western Hemisphere is today the source of 43 percent of all 

U.S. exports. It’s the area of the world where 37 percent of all U.S. 

direct investment is. There are 400 million people who are coming 

into the middle classes in Latin America. So the opportunities are 

great there. 

One area that we need to work on, though, and this is one of the 

things that fits in with what we discussed earlier, is that many 

U.S. firms are reluctant to move into Latin America because of 

issues of judicial insecurity and things like that. So strengthening 

the rules of the game, making them much more transparent—other 

competitors often don’t play by those rules—is an important part 

of the dialogue that we have with Latin America moving forward. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me thank you all for your testimony and 

answers to our questions. We’re going to keep the record open for 

5 days for anyone on the committee who may have additional questions. We urge you to answer them in a timely fashion. I appreciate 

the contribution you’ve made to this opening hearing on United 

States policy toward Latin America. Clearly we see our relationship 

as a partnership, and when the committee formally organizes it is 

my intention to pursue hearings on citizen security in the Americas, renewal and reform of the Peace Corps, poverty and inequality in Latin America, challenges and opportunities for democracy in 

the Western Hemisphere, and additional topics. 

We’ve laid a broad brush. We’ve only touched the surface. There 

are many topical issues that are cross-cutting as well as countryspecific issues that are opportunities for us to delve into. So we 

look forward to working with the chairman and with those interested in advancing in our partnership in Latin America to realize 

our joint dream of a safer, more prosperous, and democratic Western Hemisphere whose citizens can ultimately realize their dreams, 

hopes, and aspirations where dignity and freedom can become a 

reality. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:46 pm., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR MARK FEIERSTEIN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. Authoritarian governments the world over—and especially in Latin 

America—are taking aggressive measures to limit our support for democratic advocates in close or repressive societies. How is your agency responding to these autocratic challenges? 

Answer. Some autocratic governments are trying to make it more difficult for 

USAID and others to work in solidarity with citizens struggling to exercise basic 

human rights, like freedom of expression and freedom to assemble. But the United 

States will not yield in our support for those who want to enjoy universally recognized human rights. We support NGOs, independent media, and political parties 

committed to democratic principles. We and our implementing partners take our 

40 

lead from the advocates for democracy in a given country. They guide us about the 

most effective way to promote democracy. 

Question. Do you believe that the implementing community has the tools to continue to operate under the difficult environment they are facing in some of the countries in the region? 

Answer. Yes. Our implementing partners, and USAID, have years of experience 

promoting democracy and human rights in difficult environments throughout the 

world. They are experts in democratic development, are familiar with the countries 

they operate in, speak fluent Spanish, and have extensive in-country contacts. As 

organizations that in most cases work globally, they apply lessons learned from 

many other countries. They work closely with and take their lead from the democracy advocates they support in order to maximize their effectiveness and minimize 

the risks associated with advancing democracy and human rights in politically challenging settings. 

RESPONSES OF DR. FRANK MORA TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

SECURITY COOPERATION WITH HONDURAS

Question. As you know, our government has had a long standing and productive 

relationship with Honduras, including vital counternarcotic cooperation through the 

Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo).Have we restored—or increased—all security 

cooperation with Honduras to pre-June 2009 levels? 

Answer. We have restored the level of security cooperation with Honduras to preJune 2009 levels, with the following caveats. 

Per U.S. Government policy, our reengagement and security cooperation with 

Honduras is to focus on military professionalization, countering illicit trafficking 

(CIT), combating terrorism, and capacity-building for humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief. For example, we have resumed all International Military Education 

and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) activities that reinforce 

these principles and/or improve nonlethal technical skills. 

Security assistance for lethal weapons aid was restricted in 2009. However, it is 

increasingly evident that we need to initiate a staged approach to bolstering our assistance to units directly involved in CIT operations, which are facing formidable opposition, including high-caliber weapons, from drug trafficking organizations. U.S. 

Embassy Tegucigalpa is currently pursuing authorization to resume lethal weapons 

assistance (initially for select, vetted units directly supporting CIT operations), with 

the goal of subsequently normalizing lethal weapons aid to pre-June 2009 levels 

during 2011. The Defense Department supports the Embassy’s request to resume 

lethal weapons aid, and the Department of State notified Congress of its desire to 

provide equipment, including weapons, for a unit assigned to the violent La 

Mosquitia region of Honduras. 

DISRUPTING TRAFFICKING NETWORKS

Question. Have we seen an improvement in our success rate in disrupting illicit 

trafficking on the Mosquito Coast since the Lobo government has been in power? 

Answer. We have seen an improvement, although it is too early in the Lobo administration to make an accurate judgment. It is clear, however, that the government of President Porfirio Lobo shares our concerns about the difficult situation in 

La Mosquitia. Using the policy and resource framework provided under the Central 

America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), President Lobo is supportive of, and 

cooperating on, a bilateral, integrated strategy to strengthen the operational capabilities of Honduran security forces and law enforcement officials, as well as to spur 

increased development, jobs, and growth opportunities in La Mosquitia. 

The strategy for La Mosquitia is a whole-of-government approach and is focused 

on prevention, interdiction, and law enforcement. USAID, for example, is working 

on the prevention side by partnering with Honduran agencies (e.g., the Ministries 

of Health, Education, and Social Investment) and the private sector to bolster 

health, education, and economic opportunity. The U.S. Military Group in Honduras 

has established partnerships with U.S. agencies, the Armed Forces of Honduras, 

and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations to support interdiction 

efforts, provide mobility, and build capacity to counter illicit trafficking in La 

Mosquitia. 

Finally, the support of the Lobo administration has been instrumental in ensuring 

the effectiveness of Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF–B) efforts in La Mosquitia. In 

41 

2010, for example, JTF–B, in coordination with their Honduran counterparts, 

launched more than a dozen helicopter rapid response and deliberate missions in 

support of the Drug Enforcement Agency and has executed four forward deployments in La Mosquitia. 

THE BALLOON EFFECT

Question. Transnational criminal organizations have responded to security successes in Colombia and the sustained efforts in Mexico by increasing their activities 

in Central American countries, thus threatening to overwhelm the capacity of these 

countries’ security forces to protect their innocent populations. What is the status 

our Nation’s efforts to more closely partner with Central American security forces? 

Have you identified any U.S. mandates limiting the potential expansion of these cooperative efforts? 

Answer. DOD supports U.S. Government efforts to build the capacity of the nations of Central America to fight illicit trafficking. Led by the Department of State, 

the Central America Security Initiative (CARSI) is the principal vehicle currently 

employed to partner with Central American countries. DOD support to CARSI 

includes funding for equipment, training, and technical assistance to counter the 

corrosive impact of gangs, transnational criminal organizations, and arms and narcotics trafficking. 

DOD also administers the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and funding from 

the Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account (CN CTA). FMF and CN CTA funding for fiscal year 2010 included funding for counterterrorism and counternarcotics 

trafficking training for Belize, interdiction boat refurbishment for the Guatemalan 

Naval Special Forces, maritime mobility and communications equipment for El Salvador, vehicles and aviation spare parts for Honduras, aviation and maritime modernization for Nicaragua, helicopter maintenance and crew safety equipment for 

Costa Rica, and training of border security units for Panama. 

Additionally, Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF–S), a USSOUTHCOM 

subcommand led by the U.S. Coast Guard, is the keystone of regional maritime detection, monitoring, and interdiction efforts for the United States and our partner 

nations. JIATF–S coordinates information from multiple sources, including U.S. and 

partner nation law enforcement; and DOD assets such as Maritime Patrol Aircraft 

(MPA) and radar, and U.S. Coast Guard and Navy ship patrols. JIATF–S detects 

and monitors suspect aircraft and maritime vessels, and then provides this information to international and interagency partners who have the authority to interdict 

illicit shipments and arrest members of transnational criminal organizations 

(TCOs). In 2010, JIATF–S and our international and interagency partners were directly responsible for interdicting 142 metric tons of cocaine and denying TCOs $2.8 

billion in revenue. 

More than one-half of the cocaine destined for the United States makes its initial 

landfall in Honduras and Guatemala; nearly all of that crosses the Guatemala-Mexico border. Focusing specifically on this vulnerable Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border 

area, we are engaged in planning with our U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Southern 

Command, U.S. interagency, and partner nation colleagues to develop a subregional 

operations capability among these three countries. 

U.S. law currently prohibits provision of FMF and International Military Education and Training (IMET) to the Guatemalan Army (Consolidated Appropriations 

Act, 2010, Public Law 111–117). Assistance to the Guatemalan Air Force, Navy, and 

Army Corps of Engineers (for disaster preparedness and peacekeeping) is not affected, provided the U.S. Secretary of State certifies that they are respecting internationally recognized human rights and cooperating with civilian judicial investigations and prosecutions. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARTURO VALENZUELA TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. I am concerned about the persistent delays in the delivery of equipment 

and I want to work with the administration and the committee to resolve the 

situation. 

• Has the administration identified the specific obstacles slowing the delivery of 

badly needed equipment? 

Answer. We have identified the significant hurdles to managing and moving 

Merida Initiative assistance and we are working to address them. Although it has 

taken longer than we would have wanted to move assistance under the Merida Initiative, the pace of delivery continues to accelerate. Furthermore, key pieces of large 

42 

equipment have been delivered, while more is well along in the procurement 

process. 

To date, approximately $295 million in equipment has been delivered to Mexico. 

Examples of equipment delivered include 3 UH–60M helicopters ($76 million), 8 Bell 

412 helicopters ($88 million), 318 polygraph machines ($2.3 million), various pieces 

border security and of nonintrusive inspection equipment (NIIE) ($25 million), and 

IT equipment ($28 million). We are committed to delivering $460 million in equipment this calendar year alone, as part of the Secretary’s goal to deliver $500 million 

in total assistance to Mexico this calendar year. 

As mentioned, the greatest obstacles to delivering assistance have been identified 

and are being addressed. For example, staffing in Washington and at Embassy 

Mexico City’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) needed to grow, and it has—from 21 

to 107 full time staff supporting the Merida Initiative. To address office space concerns, we opened the first ever Bilateral Implementation Office (BIO)—a shared 

United States-Mexico office space outside of the Embassy that allows for daily exchanges among the staff of both countries. We expect this to facilitate improved 

planning for and delivery of assistance. In addition to hiring staff, working level 

bilateral relations and trust had to be established. Now that staffing is in place, 

working-level relations are strong, and contracting processes are better understood 

by Government of Mexico counterparts, we are seeing an acceleration of deliveries 

to Mexico. 

Certain delays to providing assistance were unforeseen, or simply unavoidable. 

For example, the contract award for NIIE was protested by a losing vendor, delaying delivery of $100 million in assistance for much of last year. We have overcome 

the protest delays, which will allow us to move most of this NIIE this year. Another 

delay in assistance was caused by advanced aviation modifications required by Mexico. For the UH–60Ms, for example, the GOM-requested modifications pushed back 

the delivery date by approximately 10 months. To minimize these delays, relevant 

offices in the State Department, as well as at the Department of Defense, are collaborating very closely. 

Other steps taken to streamline Merida assistance include: 

1. We recently brought on an experienced INL Senior Advisor to conduct a full 

review of INCLE-funded Merida Initiative programs, identify possible bottlenecks, 

and engage in efforts to implement programmatic changes. 

2. We are working more closely with Mexican counterparts to help them provide 

clear program requirements, which are required for our contracting and procurement processes. We are also exploring ways to build training in strategic planning 

into the Merida programs themselves. 

3. We are exploring new contracting mechanisms for large training programs, that 

could move large sums of assistance as quickly as needs demand. 

4. We are moving funds away from slow-moving projects, toward high impact programs that can be executed faster. 

Question. Have you identified the need of legislative fixes to address these bottlenecks, especially as we look into increasing security cooperation in Central America 

and the Caribbean? 

Answer. As discussed above, the major bottlenecks to providing Merida Initiative 

assistance have been identified and are being addressed. In many cases, they related to having insufficient staff; in others, they related to the procurement processes that are part of an open competitive process. Our GOM counterparts are now 

much more familiar with our processes and better able to provide the specifications 

for equipment requirements that are needed for contract proposals; and we anticipate a rapid acceleration in the pace of delivery this year. We are also looking to 

increase staff in support of new Central America and Caribbean programs, including 

expanding our procurement and administrative support, where necessary. 

Question. When can we expect the next round of Cuba policy changes by the administration and what will be their nature? 

Answer. The administration is working to advance U.S. national interests through 

policies that support the Cuban people’s desire to freely determine their future. 

Over the past 2 years, we have taken a number of important steps in support of 

this objective. On January 14, the President directed changes to regulations and 

policies governing purposeful travel, nonfamily remittances, and airports supporting 

licensed charter flights to and from Cuba. These new measures will increase peopleto-people contact, support for civil society in Cuba, and enhance the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people. The changes also build upon the 

President’s April 2009 actions to help reunite divided Cuban families, facilitate 

43 

greater telecommunications links with the Cuban people, and increase humanitarian flows to the island. 

The administration believes that these actions are important steps in reaching the 

widely shared goal of a Cuba that respects the basic rights of all its citizens. We 

want to ensure that the United States is doing all we can to support the Cuban people in fulfilling their desire to live in freedom. There are no additional policy 

changes contemplated at this time, although policy can be adjusted to advance U.S. 

national interests. 

Question. As you know, the Government of Colombia is considering extraditing notorious drug trafficker Walid Makled to Venezuela instead of the United States. U.S. 

prosecutors have identified Mr. Makled as ‘‘a king among kingpins,’’ and his arrest 

is testimony to our excellent security cooperation with Colombia. Considering the 

control exerted by President Chavez over the Venezuelan judiciary, and Mr. 

Makled’s implication of senior Venezuelan officials in the illicit drug trade: 

• How is the administration working to make sure that this notorious drug kingpin is extradited to the United States instead of Venezuela? 

• How confident is the administration of the Venezuelan Government’s intentions 

and capacity to fully investigate and punish all individuals implicated by Mr. 

Makled? 

• Is the administration aware of any connections between Mr. Makled’s drug trafficking activities and terrorist activities and organizations? 

Answer. The President designated Makled as a significant narcotics trafficker 

under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act in May 2009. Colombian authorities arrested him in 2010 on the basis of information and a provisional arrest 

warrant from the United States. We have formally requested Makled’s extradition 

to the United States, and have separately made clear, publicly and privately, to the 

highest levels of the Colombian Government, our intense interest in Makled’s extradition to the United States, given the seriousness of the offenses he is charged with 

and the quality and volume of evidence to support the charges. 

The decision on extradition rests with the Colombian Government, and we respect 

their processes and internal deliberations. As you may know, we have a particularly 

healthy extradition relationship with Colombia; between 2002 and 2010, the Colombian Government has extradited 1,149 individuals to the United States. 

While it is impossible to predict how Venezuela will react in this case, we have 

repeatedly expressed our concern about Venezuela’s counternarcotics efforts generally; since 2005, we have found that Venezuela has ‘‘demonstrably failed’’ to meet 

its international counternarcotics obligations. We are also concerned about the independence and capabilities of the judiciary in Venezuela. As reported in the 2009 

Human Rights Report, ‘‘judicial independence and competence is compromised due 

to corruption and political influence, particularly from the Prosecutor General’s 

Office.’’ 

Finally, regarding the possibility of connections between Mr. Makled’s drug trafficking activities and terrorist activities and organizations, the Department of State 

does not have any specific information in this regard. However, the fact that the 

FARC, a terrorist organization, is known to be involved in narcotics trafficking in 

the region makes this a legitimate cause for concern and one which we are tracking. 

Question. As you know, Venezuela is building deep and troubling ties with Iran— 

the world’s most active state sponsor of terrorism. I believe these ties are—or will 

soon begin—to undermine the multilateral sanctions against the Iranian regime’s 

pursuit of an illicit nuclear weapons program. You have recently said that the administration is ‘‘looking into’’ whether Venezuela is in violation of sanctions against 

Iran. 

• How long would this process last? 

• Will the administration’s findings be publicly available? 

Answer. We have seen the recent press and other reports, including the purported 

PDVSA documents made public February 23, suggesting that Venezuela has sent 

refined petroleum to Iran. If true and accurate, these shipments may render the 

companies involved eligible for sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), as 

amended by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, 

and the administration will comply fully with the law. We are reviewing the possibility that Venezuelan companies may have engaged in sanctionable activity under 

ISA, as amended, and will provide Congress with the basis of any determination. 

Question. I commend the administration and our Ambassador in Haiti for speaking out early and clearly against attempts to manipulate the results of the November 2010 Presidential elections. 

44 

• What is the current status of recovery and reconstruction efforts in Haiti? 

Answer. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the U.S. Government deployed assets from across the government in the largest U.S. humanitarian response 

on record. We provided rescue, food, water, shelter, medical treatment, and other 

essential items and services to help Haitians immediately begin rebuilding their 

lives. 

Since the earthquake, the U.S. Government, working with partners, provided food 

for more than 4 million people—the largest emergency urban food distribution in 

history—and continues to target 1.9 million with food assistance. The United States 

and international partners provided basic shelter materials to 1.5 million people before the start of the rainy season in May 2010. We supported the immunization of 

more than 1 million Haitians against highly communicable disease including polio 

and diphtheria. With partners, we provided safe drinking water for up to 1.3 million 

people daily following the earthquake. 

The Government of Haiti estimates that 80 percent of schoolchildren were able 

to return to school last year with the help of the United States and the international 

community. The U.S. Government and the international community have assessed 

damage to nearly 400,000 buildings and homes, enabling hundreds of thousands of 

people to return home. Short-term employment projects have cumulatively employed 

more than 350,000 people. We have supported the rebuilding of the Haitian 

Government, including temporary offices for government officials. We continue to 

strengthen capacity in Haitian institutions. 

We have helped the Government of Haiti respond to the cholera outbreak, providing technical expertise and nearly $45 million in assistance. This money has 

funded the establishment of more than 30 cholera treatment facilities with more 

than 1,100 beds. 

In the first year alone, the U.S. Government helped clear more than 1.3 million 

cubic meters of rubble from areas prioritized by the Haitian Government. We have 

completed more than 15,000 temporary shelters sufficient to house more than 

75,000 displaced Haitians, and about 31 percent of the international total of more 

than 48,000. We are working with partners to promote an industrial park in Haiti’s 

North, providing employment for tens of thousands of Haitians and harnessing the 

region’s untapped economic potential. 

We are pleased that the elected authorities in Haiti followed the recommendations 

of the Organization of the American States electoral mission and look forward to 

working with Haiti’s new authorities after the second electoral round. 

Though much remains to be done, the U.S. commitment is long term. 

Question. To what extent has Haiti’s precarious political situation—with runoff 

Presidential elections scheduled for March—affected the pace of recovery and reconstruction? 

Answer. For all intents and purposes, the Haitian Government has been without 

a functioning legislature since May 10, 2010, when the terms of all members of the 

Chamber of Deputies and one-third of the Senate expired. President Rene Preval 

has been making decisions via executive order since that time. 

This has had an impact on the Preval administration’s ability to make long-term 

decisions and Haiti’s ability to enact through Parliament critical reform legislation, 

such as fiscal, judicial, and constitutional reforms key to long-term assistance 

objectives. 

In addition, rioting in Port-au-Prince and other urban areas sparked by the 

announcement of preliminary results of the November 28 elections hindered local 

reconstruction and international efforts to respond to the cholera crisis. For these 

reasons, peaceful and timely transfer of power, based upon an electoral process that 

reflects the will of the Haitian people, is critical to the consolidation of Haiti’s democracy and the reconstruction effort. 

Question. What is the administration doing to ensure a fair and transparent process during the second round of elections in March? 

Answer. For the second round of elections, the U.S. Government has determined 

to focus its on-the-ground capacity on the following: minimizing voter disenfranchisement by supporting activities which focus on helping voters to locate their 

names on voter lists, find their polling stations, and retrieve their voter ID cards; 

helping to improve organization and transparency at the polling station level with 

the aim of increasing the credibility of the electoral results; and increasing the 

transparency and credibility of the tabulation process. 

The United States will continue to provide technical and financial assistance in 

other areas we are supporting, but rely on the work of our partners to use their 

on-the-ground capacity to achieve outcomes associated with those areas. 

45 

We have committed an additional $1 million for the second round to support initiatives such as the provision of technical assistance to the Provisional Electoral 

Council (CEP) call center, training to domestic observer groups and capacity building for the Vote Tabulation Center (CTV). In addition, we are providing an additional $500,000 to support the Organization of American States observation mission, 

funds which will be used to deploy 200 observers nationwide to observe the elections 

and conduct a quick count following the vote count on March 20. 

In focusing its capacity in these areas, we are looking to see measurable improvements in these areas from the first round. 

Question. Since its default on more than $81 billion in sovereign debt in 2001, 

Argentina has repeatedly refused to negotiate in good faith with its creditors and 

ignored rulings by U.S. courts to pay its obligations. Despite now having the capacity to pay its debts, Argentina still owes U.S. bondholders over $3 billion and the 

costs of Argentina’s default and debt restructuring to the United States is estimated 

to be billions more. 

• What has the administration done to address this unfair treatment of American 

creditors and American taxpayers, who have been forced to shoulder the costs 

of Argentina’s irresponsible conduct? 

Answer. Prompt payment of debts is a hallmark of wise economic stewardship. I 

have repeatedly urged the Government of Argentina to resolve all of the outstanding 

claims against it. 

The Government of Argentina has stated publicly its interest in a resolution of 

its outstanding debts, and completed a second debt swap with bondholders in 2010. 

Argentina is currently subject to Brooke amendment sanctions under the Foreign 

Operations Appropriations Act and Section 620(q) sanctions under the Foreign 

Assistance Act for its arrears to the U.S. Government. These sanctions prevent most 

U.S. assistance and official creditor agency lending to Argentina. The U.S. Government and other Paris Club creditors continue to encourage the Government of 

Argentina to normalize relations with all creditors, including the United States. We 

also urge the Government of Argentina to pay all outstanding arbitral awards held 

by U.S. investors. 

Question. The Organization of American States (OAS) has served as the primary 

organization to build hemispheric consensus on regional matters. Yet, over the last 

decade or so, the OAS has performed dismally at responding to nearly every challenge to democracy in the region. You have spoken about implementing the InterAmerican Democratic Charter ‘‘more effectively.’’ 

• Can you give us specifics on how the administration plans to do this? 

Answer. Together with other democracies in the hemisphere, we need to continue 

to strive to improve adherence to the principles set forth in the Inter-American 

Democratic Charter and other inter-American instruments that deal with democracy 

and human rights. The Organization of American States (OAS) is not a perfect institution, but it is the best forum available in the Western Hemisphere for strengthening the collective promotion and defense of democracy. 

One of the underlying premises of multilateral diplomacy and the OAS is that collective action can be more effective than a single country acting alone. That means 

working with the often widely divergent views of the active Member States to seek 

consensus where that is possible. 

The Inter-American Democratic Charter serves as a benchmark for assessing the 

state of democracy in the hemisphere, but the provisions of the Democratic Charter 

do not have the force of a legally binding instrument. As we seek full adherence to 

democratic norms we must persuade other governments that protecting democratic 

values throughout the hemisphere is an obligation of OAS membership. 

While challenges exist in the OAS, there are success stories big and small, the 

most recent being elections in Haiti and the quiet role it exercised in peacefully resolving the hunger strike by opponents of the Chavez government in Venezuela. We 

also note the success of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). 

The recent ability of opposition elements to petition the court for redress is something we support and continue to encourage. 

Countries are changing their practices and even their laws based on the findings 

of the Commission and the work of Special Rapporteurs who note publicly when governments fail to support the principles of human rights and rule of law that support 

democracy. These are important steps and the work being done is effective and 

unique to the region. The United States, together with other countries has renewed 

its support for the Commission, including its work in monitoring challenges to the 

civil rights of citizens, including press freedom, freedom of assembly, and the freedom to run for elected office. 

46 

The United States contributes $3 million annually to enable the OAS to reinforce 

democratic institutions through the OAS Democracy Fund, which supports not only 

the important work of the IACHR, but also mobilizes hemispheric efforts in electoral 

observation missions and technical assistance to electoral bodies, conflict resolution, 

and the strengthening of institutions and political parties. Most of this funding is 

used to ensure the credibility of electoral processes in OAS Member States, which 

is fundamental to democratic systems. But the OAS can only do this where Member 

States agree. 

Much more needs to be done to make the OAS an effective institution in support 

of democracy. We must, therefore, continue our work to increase OAS action in support of democratic values, but must not overlook the real impact it is already having 

in support of democracy and human rights, both in the Western Hemisphere and 

in Africa, where active collaboration with the African Union is beginning. Conscious 

of the challenges to the OAS, we are undertaking a concerted diplomatic strategy 

to engage with individual government to highlight the importance of strengthening 

democratic institutions and bolstering an effective OAS response to interruptions in 

the democratic order. 

Æ