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4 March 1962 

OCI No. 1002/62 

Copy No. 

133 

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY 

NORTH VIETNAM AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 

(Reference Title: ESAU XVIII-62) 

Office of Current Intelligence 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

IAL CONTAINS INFORMATION 

ERSON IS PRO 
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the Department of Defense 

of the SSSGl 

NORTH VIETNAM AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 

I or to the coordinator 

This is a working paper, the third in a series of ESAU 

studies of components of the world Communist movement in the 

context of the Sino-Soviet relationship. ESAV-XV discussed 

North Korea, and ESAU-XVI discussed the Indian party. This 

paper was prepared by Philip L. Bridgham, a member of the SinoSoviet Studies Group in the period 1959-1961, before he joined 

the Department of Defense late in 1961. In preparing the first 

draft before he left the SSSG, and in preparing the final version of the paper in recent months, Mr. Bridgham had the benefit of counsel from I I 

the China and Asian 'satellites -' e - 

Bloc Area of OCI,I 

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NORTH VIETNAM AND S INO- SOV IET RELATIONS 

3~y ..................................................... 

I. NORTH VIETNAM AT WAR: 1949-1954.....................1 

I I. NORTH VIETNAM AND "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" : 

1955-1957 ............................................ A. Intrabloc Relations .............................. 3 

B. Domestic Policy .................................. 4 

C. Policy Toward South Vietnam and Laos....... ...... 6 

1. South Vietn =...........*....................7 

2. Laos .............'........................,....9 

111. NORTH VIETNAM AND THE CHINESE MODEL: 1958-1959 ..... 10 

A. Domestic Policy ................................. 11 

B. Foreign Policy ..................................l 4 

1. South Vietn am...............................15 

2. Laos ........................................18 

IV. NORTH VIETNAM AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: 

1960-1961 .......................................... 20 

A. Domestic Policy ................................. 21 

B. Foreign Policy .................................. 23 

1. South Vietnam ............................... 26 

2. Laos ........................................ 28 

C. North Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute. ..... .31 

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NORTH VIETNAM AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 

SUMMARY 

The North Vietnamese Communists have stood in several 

different relationships to the Soviets and the Chinese since 

the Communist triumph in China in 1949, but never in the 

relationship of a satellite of either. Chinese influence 

has always been the stronger, but at some periods, such as 

the present, not much stronger. 

clearly predominant with the Viet Minh. The North Vietnamese concurred in the Chinese claim to leadership of the 

revolution in Southeast Asia; they took "Mao's theory" together with Marxism-Leninism as their source of guidance; 

they adopted the Chinese revolutionary strategy (the broad 

"united front'' against imperialism, and the peasant armies 

operating from rural bases); they looked to the Chinese model 

for their party, military and mass organizations, and for 

legislation; they weredependent on Chinese aid for their 

military victories; and they permitted the Chinese to play 

the principal role for the Communist side at Geneva in 1954 

in negotiating a settlement of the war. The Soviets disapproved Chinese pretensions to leadership, but they apparently 

saw no alternative to predominant Chinese influence in this 

period. 

In the postwar years 1955-1957, the picture was less 

clear. After the USSR established an embassy in Hanoi in 

November 1954, the North Vietnamese leadership soon began 

to assign equal weight to the experience of the Soviets and 

the Chinese, and by 1956 were claiming that they themselves 

had "creatively applied" Marxism-Leninism to conditions in 

Vietnam. 

In the war years of 1946-1954, Chinese influence was 

With regard to world Communist strategy in the years 

1955-1957, North Vietnam became increasingly restive under 

the policy of "peaceful coexistence" to which both the Soviet 

Union and Communist China were committed in this period. 
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Moreover, the North Vietnamese reacted with ill-disguised distaste to destalinization and to Khrushchev's theoretical pronouncements at the 20th CPSU Congress on the non-inevitability 

of war and on peaceful accession to power by Communist parties. 

As for domestic policieg in this period, the North Vietnamese began to exercise the right (proclaimed by Ho Chi Minh 

following the 20th CPSU Congress) of finding their own methods 

and tempo of building socialism. After receiving grants of 

economic aid from both Peiping and Moscow, Hanoi introduced 

a ruthless land reform program in 1955 which clearly followed 

Chinese precedent. The consequences of attempting to transplant this Chinese program in Vietnam, however, were nearly 

disastrous. Faced with peasant uprisings which endangered the 

security of the regime, the Lao Dong party leadership in the 

fall of 1956 demoted the then secretary-general (the Stalinist 

and Sinophile Truong Chinh) and instituted an experiment with 

"democracy" and relaxat ion of controls. Veering sharply again, 

Hanoi reverted to a trhard" domestic policy line in the first 

half of 1957 at the very time Communist China was undergoing 

its own traumatic experience with "liberalization .'l 

As for policy toward South Vietnam, the Viet Minh exhibited increasing disillusionment over the strategy dictated 

by the Geneva accords of seeking ''national unification by 

peaceful means. I' In attempting to implement this strategy, 

the North Vietnamese received considerably more help from the 

Chinese than from the Soviets, who were content throughout 

the years 1955-1957 to accept the status quo in Vietnam. Although Hanoi had already decided bml-56 thaf it was 

necessary to prepare for "armed struggle" in South Vietnam, 

it was unable to secure Peiping's support in this endeavor until late in the period when Communist China began to shift 

away from "peaceful coexistence" toward a more militant strategic line in Asia. 

In contrast with the record of failure in Vietnam, the 

bloc strategy of "peaceful coexistence" appeared to win an 

important victory during this period in Laos. In late 1956 

the Chinese took the lead in seeking a negotiated settlement 

of the civil war in Laos despite initial objections by the 

DRV. Internally, the Laotian Communists won recognit ion as 

a legal political party and participation in a coalition government, and externally the Souvanna Phouma regime was persuaded 

to adopt a policy of nonalignment by a combination of threats 

and blandishments on the part of Peiping. 

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In sum, in the years 1955-1957 Chinese influence with the 

North Vietnamese continued to be stronger than Soviet influence, but not to the same degree as in 1949-1954. Throughout 

most of this period, the North Vietnamese were under the constraint of both the Soviets and the Chinese ip their policy 

toward the South, but with respect to matters of world Communist strategy and their domestic programs the North Vietnamese 

began to display greater independence and selectivity in reacting to policies originating in Moscow and Peiping. 

In the years 1958-1959, a period of Chinese radicalism 

with regard to both grand strategy and domestic policy, the 

North Vietnamese again looked to the Chinese model for guidance 

in f ormul at ing their domest ic and foreign pol icy programs 

and reasserted their dual allegiance to Marxism-Leninism and 

"the ideology of Mao Tse-tung." However, as the Sino-Soviet 

dispute intensified in late 1959, Hanoi apparently decided 

that it would be prudent to adopt a more nearly neutral stance 

in the impending conflict. 

As for matters of world Communist strategy in this period, 

the North Vietnamese agreed with Mao Tse-tung's new estimate 

\ of the balance of power and his position on the need for a 

militant revolutionary advance throughout the world, particltlarly in Asia. They continued to betray apprehension and resentment over Khrushchev's prescriptions for bloc strategy, 

clearly implying that the Soviet leader's theses on the-noninevitability of war and peaceful accession to power did not 

apply to Southeast Asia. 

As for domestic policies, the North Vietnamese enthusiastically endorsed China's "leap .forward" approach to economic 

development and declared their intent to follow the distinctive Chinese road to socialism. Although less extreme than 

the Chinese, they introduced a "leap forward" of their own in 

agriculture (revising their 1958-1960 plan to set highly unrealistic goals for food production) and attempted to emulate 

China's "mass line" of local industrial development. The 

North Vietnamese response to China's commune program was more 

ambiguous: they clearly rejected it for themselves for the 

immediate future, while they defended it against Soviet criticism and seemed to envisage the communes as a long-range possibility for Vietnam. Following the failure of these extremist programs in China in late 1959, however, North Vietnam began to turn away from the Chinese model and look to the Soviet 

Union for guidance in economic development. 

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As for policy toward Squth Vietnam during this period, 

L.JSCOW remained reluctant to get involved in a venture there, 

while the Chinese and North Vietnamese were in agreement on 

the need for a more aggressive policy. The DRV decided in 

May 1959 to initiate a new phase of violent revolution to 

overthrow the Diem government in the South. Despite Hanoi's 

claim of solid backing by the "socialist camp", North Vietnamese commentary throughout 1959 revealed a sense of grievance 

over Soviet non-support of this "liberation" movement. 

Laos during this period, but even here the Chinese were closer 

to North Vietnamese positions. In spring 1959, Communist 

China took the lead in a campaign of intimidation of the Laotian government. In fall 1959, when the resumption of guerrilla warfare in Laos coincided with Khrushchev's overtures 

to the United States, there began to be a signifidant divergence between Soviet policy on Laos and the more militant and 

uncompromis ing 1 ine of Pe ip ing and Hanoi . 

The DRV had less cause for criticizing Soviet policy in 

In sum, North Vietnam in the years 1958-1959 generally 

chose to follow Mao Tse-tung's lead and to support Peiping on 

significant issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute. By the end of 

the period, however, the North Vietnamese were openly skeptical 

of the efficacy of the Chinese model of ecoliomic and social 

development and were seeking a more neutral posture in the 

deepening Sino-Soviet conflict. 

national assertiveness in both domestic and foreign p o l i c y . 

By stressing the individuality and unique character of the Vietnamese revolution, the North Vietnamese sought to steer a 

neutral course between the conflicting policies advocated by 

the Soviets and the Chinese and at the same time to conciliate 

the worsening dispute between these two bloc powers. 

In the years 1960-1961, North Vietnam demonstrated a new 

With regard to world Communist strategy in this period, 

the North Vietnamese strongly favored Chinese positions in 

the first half of 1960. At a Warsaw Pact meeting in February, 

the Soviets and East Europeans reportedly advocated a ''soft'' 

strategic line, wh,ile the North Vietnamese supported the Chinese in advocating a "hard" strategic line toward the West. 

In spring 1960, the North Vietnamese endorsed in general the 

systematic Chinese attacks on Soviet strategy in the Lenin 

Anniversary pronouncements. In June 1960 the North Vietnamese 
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again supported Chinese positions at the WFTU meeting in Peiping. However, after the Bucharest Conference revealed $he 

fundamental character of the Sino-Soviet dispute and after an 

apparent pledge of Soviet support for a new offensive in. Southeast Asia, the North Vietnamese became more evasive and circumspect in their pronouncements on bloc strategy. 

As for domestic policies throughout this period, North 

Vietnam abandoned its former reliance on the Chinese model 

and displayed a marked tendency to look to the Soviet Union 

for guidance in economic development. Endorsements of "Lenin's 

theory of agricultural cooperatives" provided a good indication that the DRV was shying away from China's heretical communes. Other indications of a closer adherence to Soviet 

policies were a new emphasis on heavy industrial development, 

instructions to North Vietnam's planners to learn "especially 

from the USSR" and renewed support for Khrushchev's concept 

(opposed by the Chinese) of an integrated bloc-wide economicsystem. North Vietnam was rewarded for adopting this new 

course by grants of sizable Soviet credits in June and December 

1960 to help finance agricultural and industrial development 

in North Vietnam's first long-term economic plan. 

As for policy toward South Vietnam throughout this period, 

the North Vietnamese in early 1960 inaugurated a new phase of 

stepped-up terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the South. Acting in accordance with its mil it ant strategic pronouncements, 

Communist China took the lead throughout 1960 in extendihg 

public support and encouragement to this campaign of violence. 

The North Vietnamese, encouraged by the pledges of greater 

bloc support to "national liberation movements" in the Moscow 

Declaration of early December 1960 and by the vigorous bloc 

response to the Laotian crisis in the same month, appealed to 

both Moscow and Peiping in mid-1961 for further aid. There 

were indications at this time that Communist China once again 

favored a more militant and aggressive policy in South Vietnam than the Soviet Union was prepared to support. 

As for bloc policy toward Laos in 1960-1961, the Soviet 1 

decision to lead the bloc offensive there in the fall of 1960 I 

appeared to be influenced in part by the concurrent crisis in 

Sino-Soviet relat ioss . By taking forceful act ion in Laos, 

Moscow was able to refute Peiping's charges that the Soviet 

Union had failed to support adequately any war or liberation 

struggle since the Moscow Conference of November 1957. Even 

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in Laos, however, there was evidence throughout 1961 that 

the Soviets on the one hand and the Chinese and North Vietnamese on the other continued to hold divergent views on 

questions of timing and tactics in seeking a negotiated settlement of the Laotian war. 

North Vietnam's enhanced stature within the bloc in 1960- 

1961 was graphically illustrated by its key role ' at the Moscow Conference of Communist parties in November 1960 and subsequently in seeking to mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute. 

Numberous reports have indicated that Ho Chi Yinh was instrumental in conciliating the bitter disagreements between Khrushchev and the Chinese delegation at the Moscow Conference, 

making it possible for the Soviets and the Chinese to reach 

nominal agreement in the conference declaration. Advocating 

the concept of bloc solidarity based on "voluntary" allegiance, 

the North Vietnamese delegation supported Communist China in 

resisting the principle of majority rule in the international 

Communist movement which Khrushchev sought to impose at this 

conclave. Acting in accordance with their concept of "voluntary" allegiance , the North Vietnamese asserted their determination following the conference "to strengthen unity and 

friendship" with both'the USSR and Communist China. Also actting in accordance with this concept, the DRV generally supported Albania throughout 1961 in resisting Soviet coercion. 

In sum, North Vietnam in the years 1960-1961 achieved a 

new status of independence and influence within the Communist 

bloc. As a major beneficiary of the Sino-Soviet dispute in 

the form of vastly augmented economic and military assistance 

from both Moscow and Peiping during this period, the North 

Vietnamese party leadership have every reason to persist--if 

they can--in their chosen role of mediator and neutral in the 

deepening conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China 

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NORTH VIETNAM AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1949i1961 

This study reviews the record of North Vietnam's relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China since the 

appearance of the latter as a second great power center within the Communist bloc. Perhaps the dominant theme of this 

historical review has been the continuing struggle of North 

Vietnam to maintain its independence in the face of er'iorts 

by both Moscow and Peiping to influence the policies of this 

small Asian Communist state. Events of the past two years, 

principally the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations ,and in the 

East-West struggle in Southeast Asia, have enhanced North 

Vietnam's status within the bloc to a point where it now proclaims the unique-character of its own revolutionary experience as a model for Communist "liberation" movements in underdeveloped areas of the world. ' 

I. NORTH VIETNAM AT WAR: 1949-1954 

Founded in 1930, the Indo-China Communist Party under 

Bo Chi Minh had achieved firm control over the Viqtnamese 

nationalist revolution by the end of World War I1 and, immediately following.the surrender of the Japanese, had established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 

of fruitless negotiations for independence, Ho initiated a 

full-scale war against France in December 1946. The appearance of a powerful Communist China in 1949, the meeting of 

Sino-Vietnamese forces along a common border the following 

year, and massive Chinese military, economic and technical 

aid were indispensable to North Vietnam's final victory in 

the field at Dien Bien Phu. 

After a period 

The Chinese Communists, on coming to power in 1949, were 

in a mood of supreme self-confidence and assertiveness. In 

1948, at an important regional conference in Calcutta of Communist parties convened to disseminate the new line of armed 

insurrect ion in Asia, the Chinese Communist representative 

had staked a claim to .leadership over the national liberation 

movement in Southeast Asia. Within weeks after the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, Liu Shao-chi elaborated 

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this claim in a speech before a Conference of Asian and Australasiqn Trade Unions in Peiping in which for the first time 

the "road of Mao Tse-tung" was proclaimed to be the revolutionary model for other Asian Communists to follow. Two years 

later, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Chinese 

Communist Party, this claim was reiterated in speeches hailing the Chinese revolution as "the classic type of revolution 

in colonial and semi-colonial countries ." 

The Soviet reaction to this early Chinese bid for hegemony over the Asian revolutionary movement was mixed. Moscow 

appeared to favor the substance of the Maoist revolutionary 

prescription (formation of a broad "united f r o n t r 1 d i r e c t e d 

against imperialism and organization of Communist-led peasant 

armies operating from rural bases), but Moscow apparently disapproved of the Chinese Communist undertaking to 'establish 

Peiping as the regional center for Asian Communism and."the 

theory of Mao Tse-tung" as the fountainhead of Asian revolutionary doctrine. Soviet propaganda throughout this period 

consistently minimized Mao's ideological innovations and 

theoretical eminence. In November 1951 Soviet spokesmen took 

the offensive by warning that "it would be risky to regard 

the Chinese revolution as some kind of 'stereotype' for people's democratic revolution in other countries of Asia, 'I and , 

nearl-y a decade later, during the bitter exchanges at the 

height of the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1960, the Soviets were 

to cite this episode as an example of "sectarianism" in the 

international Communist movement. 

By contrast, North Vietnam in the period 1951-1954 actively propagated the concept of Peiping's leadership over 

the Asian revolution and enthusiastically endorsed ''Mao Tsetung's theory" as the source of guidance in its revolutionary 

struggle. Throughout the crucial war years of 1951-1954, 

North Vietnamese party leaders and organs consistently coupled 

Ydao Tse-tung's theory" with Marxism-Leninism as twin sources 

of ideological authority (most notably in the Lao Dong Party 

statutes of 1952) ; directed party, military and mass organizations to pattern themselves on their Chinese counterparts; and 

drafted legislation in accordance with Chinese prototypes. 

The extent of Chinese Communist influence was demonstrated 

graphically in December 1952 when Ho Chi Minh delivered an 

important policy speech in Hanoi large parts of which had been 

drafted in Peiping, apparently either by the Chinese or by 

one of Ho's writers with Chinese guidance. 

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Communist China's influence with the North Vietnamese 

leadership was also evident in the final months of the IndoChina War. Although the Soviet. Union and Communist China appeared to share responsibility for the initial -deciSion, Chou 

En-lai took the lead at Geneva in negotiating a territorial 

division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel and in persuading 

Ho Chi Minh to substitute political methods for armed struggle 

in seeking the unification of his homeland. The subsequent 

failure of their f'peaceful unification" strategy would largely 

determine North Vietnam's views on the bitter Sino-Soviet 

dispute over international Communist strategy in 1960. 

I I. NORTH VIETNAM AND "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" : 1955-1957 

In terms of the Communist dialectic, the Geneva Conference of 1954 ushered in,a "new era" of peace in which a 

series of "new tasks" confmnted the North Vietnam regime. 

Although all were closely interrelated, these tasks in the 

ensuing three-year period will be discussed below under the 

headings of intrabloc relations, domestic policy and policy 

toward Southeast Asia . 

A. Intrabloc Relations 

Establishment of a Soviet embassy in Hanoi in November 

1964 afforded the North Vietnamese leadership an opportunity 

to introduce Soviet authority as a counterweight to the influence previously exercized by Peiping. Whereas previously 

the Lao Dong Party had stressed the paramount importance to 

North Vietnam of the Chinese revolution and '!the ideology of 

Ma0 Tse-tung," the consistent pattern following the Geneva 

Conference was to assign equal weight to the contributions 

and experiences of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's 

Republic, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet and Chinese armies and the 

Soviet and Chinese revolutions. Implicit in this new assessment was the right to choose between alternative policies and 

programs advocated by the two leading bloc powers. And in 

fact this right was to be asserted forcefully by Ho Chi Winh 

following the Soviet 20th Party Congress in early 1956. After 

claiming for the first time that "our party has already achieved 

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considerable results in the way of creative application of 

Marxism-Leninism to conditions in Vietnam, " he emphasized 

the importance to the Vietnamese people of finding their 

own path, methods and tempo in fighting American imperialism 

and struggling for socialism. 

Although both the Soviet Union and Communist China were 

committed to a strategy of "peaceful coexistence" in this 

period, Moscow appeared even more reluctant to support North 

Vietnamese aspirations for an early Communist takeover in 

South Vietnam and what is now known as Laos. When Ho greeted 

the first Soviet ambassador with expectations of "constant 

support'' and "great assistance" from the USSR, the Russian 

diplomat countered by offering the "deep sympathy and understanding" of the Sotiret people for Vietnam's struggle. And 

when Ho visited Moscow seeking aid for his struggling regime 

in July 1955, the formal communique referred pointedly to 

Sino-Vietnamese friendship as "the main factor" preserving 

peace in Southeast Asia. 

Furthermore, the Soviet 20th Party Congress in February ' 

1956 issued a number of theoretical pronouncemen$s which were 

patently unsuited to Vietnamese needs. The Lao Dong Party 

resolution commenting on these innovations revealed ill-disguised distaste for Khrushchev's dicta on the preventability 

of war (noting instead the need for struggle and vigilance 

against imperialist war plotting) and on peaceful accession -r 

to power. In a country like Vietnam, the Lao Dong resolution 

clearly implied, it was necessary "to prepare the proletariat 

well in advance. . .for the inevitable armed struggle for power. I' 

Khrushchev's slashing attack on Stalin and the "cult of Dersonality" was greeted coolly at the outset by the DRV, a& by 

the Chinese, and by the end of 1957 Soviet destalinization was 

being publicly blamed for much of the "pessimism and skegticism" which had infected the Lao Dong Party. 

B. Domestic Policv 

The new bloc strategy of "peaceful coexistence" and the 

local variant in Vietnam of "reunification through peaceful 

means" (the Geneva settlement prqvided for nation-wide elections to be held in 1956) called for a "soft" tactical line, 

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one which stressed national and democratic goals appealing 

to a broadly-based "united front" in both North and South. 

On the other hand, the "national-democratic" phase of the 

revolution had already been completed in the North and it 

was necessary to move ahead with the pressing tasks of building the economy and remoulding society along socialist lines. 

Conflict over the relative importance of the reunification 

struggle through 'vpolitical" means and the rapid buildup of 

a Communist regime in the North has probably accounted for 

much of the controversy within the Lao Dong Party from 1954 

to the present. 

For more than a year following the Geneva Conference, 

Hanoi consciously soft-pedaled its Marxist goals out of def- . 

erence to the reunification struggle in the South. Then, as 

it became painfully clear that the new Diem government in 

South Vietnam would neither succumb to Communist subversion 

nor consent to the holding of nation-wide elections, the 

decision was taken at a key party plenum in August 1955 "to 

consolidate the North and take it to socialism." In anticipation of this decision, Ho Chi Minh had already visited 

Moscow and Peiping to secure badly needed assistance to rebuild his country's war-torn economy. At this time Peiping, 

contributed three times the amount of aid proferred by the 

Soviet Union. In quick succession, in t he closing months of 

1955, North Vietnam proclaimed its status as "the first people's 

democracy in 'southeast Asia, revealed that its land reform 

program was merely a prelude to agricultural collectivization, 

and characterized its first annual state plan for 1956 as a 

step "leading to socialism. *' 

For nearly a year, Hanoi executed a ruthless agrarian 

"reform" policy which clearly followed Chinese precedent. 

Employing the well-known Chinese Communist techniques of 

mobilizing the peasants in "struggle" meetings, Communist 

cadres reportedly executed between 50,000 and 100,000 landlords to consolidate the regime's control over the countryside. Inspired by Mao's call for rapid collectivization of 

agriculture and lltransition to socialism" in China, the Viet 

Minh continued throughout most of 1956 to look to Peiping for 

domestic policy guidance. It is perhaps significant that Soviet representatives at this time began to express dissatisfaction with the manner in which their own aid program was 

being implemented, complaining to Western diplomats of the 

"obstinacy - and stupidity" of Vietnamese officials. 

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The consequences of this headlong pursuit of Communist 

revolutionary goals were nearly disastrous. Widespread discontent and disaffection erupted in popular uprisings which 

precipitated a crisis in party leadership. This resulted in 

the demotion of the Secretary-General of the Lao Dong Party, 

the Stalinist and Sinophile Truong Chinh, and in the abject 

admisgioh (perhaps unprecedented in the history of the international Communist movement) that the party central committee itself had been llresponsible for serious errors" in the 

agrarian reform program of 1956. Further admissions that 

"general confusion existed among all classes, that cadres 

had lost confidence in the party leadership, and that peasant 

ubrisings had endangered the security of the regime, testified 

to the gravity of the situation. 

Responding- to this crisis, the Lao Dong party initiated 

an overall program of "mistakes correction" in the fall of 

1956 aimed at mollifying the recalcitrant population. In addition to remedying the errors committed in land reform, the 

program also called for a greater degree of and 

freedom of expression and promised to relax the pace of economic development in order to improve living conditions. In 

brief, the time had come once again to stress national "democratic" gbals and the "liberal" character of the revolution 

in a period of economic retrenchment. 

The transitory nature of this . "liberalf1 phase in the 

evolution of North Vietnamese domestic policy soon became 

apparent. In February 1957, the experiment wit'h relaxation 

of controls was largely discarded; in September, the decision 

to move ahead with agricultural collectivization was announced; 

and by the end of the year, it was clear that the pendulum 

had swung again to a new "hard" line in socialist revolution 

and construction. 

C. Policy Toward South Vietnam and Laos 

The frustrations experienced by North Vietnam during and 

after the Geneva Conference of 1954 were to shape its views 

on the bitter Sino-Soviet dispute over international Communist 

strategy in 1960. Having expected to gain control over all 

Vietnam through military conquest, the Viet Minh were persuaded to accept partition and to substitute peaceful, political 

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methods for armed struggle in seeking the unification of their 

homeland. Furthermore, although the Soviet Union and Communist appeared to share responsibilty for the initial decisioc 

at Geneva, it soon became apparent that Moscow was much less 

interested than Peiping in attempting to implement the provisions of the Geneva settlement affecting Indochina. Following the issuance of a Soviet-Vietnamese communique in July " 

1955 which termed Sino-Vietnamese friendship the %@in factor'' 

in preserving peace in the Far East, Communist China took the 

lead in championing DRV policies toward both South Vietnam and 

Laos. 

1. South Vietnam 

As noted earlier, it had become painfully clear by mid1955 that the authorities in South Vietnam would neither succumb to Communist subversion nor consent to the holding of 

nation-wide elect ions in the absence of effective and impartial 

supervision of the proposed balloting. (Moreover, the Government in South Vietnam had not signed the Geneva accords and 

was not bound by their provisions). Constrained by the overall bloc strategy of "peaceful coexistence" from resorting to 

military force, the Lao Dong party leaderbhip then laid down 

the new tactical line in August 1955 of forming a "broad nat ional united front. . .to strive for national unification by 

peaceful means." Posing internally as a strong and dynamic 

government capable of outstripping the South in "peaceful 

competition," North Vietnam's strategy externally was to pose 

as a peaceful and loyal adherent to the Geneva Agreements and 

to seek international support in order to press Diem into 

negotiations for a national election. 

Serving.with Great Britain as a permapent co-chairman 

of the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union acknowledged in 

the joint Nehru-Bulganin declaration of June 1955 that it 

had "undertaken special responsibilities" in overseeing implementation of the Geneva settlement. Nevertheless, its 

condGct throughout the ensuing three-year period was to belie 

this statement. In April 1956, the visit of Mikoyan to Hanoi 

proved such a disappointment to North Vietnam that not even 

the customary joint communique was forthcoming. In a meeting 

of the Geneva co-chairmen in London the following month, the 

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Soviet representative appeared tacitly to accept the status 

quo in Vietnam for an indefinite period. Even more galling 

was the Soviet proposal in January 1957 that both North and 

South Vietnam be admitted to the United Nations as "separate 

states," thus placing the stamp of approval on the territoral 

division of Vietnam to the obvious dismay of the DRV. 

By contrast, Communist China on several occasions throughout this period supported the Viet Minh in efforts to enforce 

the provisions of the Geneva Settlement. For example, Chou 

En-lai in January 1956 formally proposed that the Geneva Conference be reconvened to deal with alleged violations of the 

accords by the Diem regime. It was presumably in recognition 

of these services that the Lao Dong party organ Nhan Dan on 

1 October 1956 singled ' out the "loyal attitude"oftheChinese People's Repubiic as having greatly encouraged the DRV 

in its struggle to unify Vietnam under the terms of the Geneva 

Agreements . 

Disillusionment over the efficacy of political forms of 

struggle to achieve national reunification was becoming more 

and more apparent within the ranks of the Vietnamese party. 

At an important central committee plenum in April 1956, the 

then Secretary-General Truong Chinh publicly acknowledged 

that "some people" regarded the policy of "peaceful reunif ication" as "illusory and reformist ." The party resolution 

emerging from this session clearly implied that it was necessary to make long-term preparations in Vietnam for "armed 

struggle." In commenting on the failure of nation-wide elections to take place in July 1956, Nhan Dan referred to widespread "pessimism, disappointment and lack of confidence in 

future struggle for national unification." In an August 1956 

article, €Io Chi Minh appeared to be rebuking militants within 

the party when he stressed that North Vietnam was bound to 

the "general struggle" of the bloc and rejected the notion that 

the Viet Minh's problems were a "personal affair which no 

longer concern the international proletariat .IT 

It was shortly thereafter that Chou En-lai reportedly was 

approached by the North Vietnamese, to provide greater assistance in the struggle against the South. Although reportedly 

he replied that nothing could be done at the time, Communist 

China within six months in June 1957 fired the opening shots 

in a new propaganda campaign assailing United States military 

"control" of South Vietnam as a "grave threat to peace in 

-- 

-8- 

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.. 'I 

. . : . .. 

.. 

Indochina and the whole of Southeast Asia" and insisting that 

"United States aggressive forces must be withdrawn from South 

Vietnam in the interest of Vietnam's peaceful unification. '' 

This campaign anticipated a significant shift in Communist 

China's strategic line in Asia following the Moscow Conference of November 1957, a shift away from "peaceful coexistence" to a militant pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. 

2. Laos 

From the standpoint of international Communism, Laos 

must be regarded as an extension of North Vietnam. As an 

integral component of the old Indo-China Communist party, 

the Laotian Communists in 1951 formally recognized the right 

of the Lao Dong party to "supervise" its activities. Military invasion of Laos by the Viet Minh in 1953 enabled the 

Pathet Lao to develop strong guerrilla forces, establish a 

"resistance government," and gain control over the two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua adjoining the borders of both North Vietnam and Communist China. The acquisition of an effective military force and of a fixed territorial 

base adjacent to North Vietnam (serving both as a sanctuary 

in times of retreat and as a base of operations in times of 

advance) has shaped the entire course of Laotian history from 

that time to the present. The additional factor of a powerful Communist China as a "close neighbor," as Peiping is 

fond of stressing, was to make "peaceful coexistence" a much 

more formidable strategy in Laos than in South Vietnam. 

The Geneva agreements also facilitated the Communist 

cause in Laos, permitting the Pathet Lao to occupy "regroupment areas" in the two northern provinces until an internal 

political settlement had been reached. Confronted internally 

by a Viet Minh-directed armed insurrection and externally by 

strong pressures exerted by both Peiping and Hanoi, the Laot ian government under Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma decided 

in the spring of 1956 to seek a negotiated settlement with 

the Pathet Lao. 

Peiping took the lead in proposing a negotiated settlement in Laos despite initial objections by the DRV, which in 

turn had to overcome similar opposition by the Pathet Lao. 

During the protracted negotiations leading up to the November 

-9- 
1957 Vientiane agreement, the bloc negotiating strategy was 

remarkably successful in wringing unilateral concessions from 

the Phouma government. Internally, the Pathet Lao won recognition as a legal political party, participation in a coalition 

government, and the opportunity to implant its functionaries 

within the government administrat ion. Although -Pathet Lao 

agreement to permit integration of their troops into the national army and to surrender control over the two northern 

provinces appeared to be a substantial quid pro quo, there 

is good evidence that the Laotian Communistshadno 

tion of abiding by these provisions of the agreement. 

intenExternally, the Phouma regime was persuaded to adopt a 

policy of non-alignment by a combination of threats and blandishments on the part of Peiping. Symbolizing the leading 

role of Communist China in this effort was Souvanna Phouma's 

trip to Peipigg in August 1956. On this occasion, the Laotian 

premier publicly disavowed any interest in SEATO and pledged 

to follow thereafter a "policy of peace and neutrality." This 

pledge, supplemented by promises to develop economic, cultural 

and diplomatic relations with the Communist bloc was reaffirmed in the negotiated settlement a year later. In contrast with 

the record of failure in Vietnam througnout this period, the 

Vientiane agreement of November 1957 constituted an important 

victory for the bloc strategy of "peaceful coexistence" in 

Laos. .. 

111. NORTH VIETNAM AND THE CHINESE MODEL, 1958-1959 

The Lao Dong party's annual review of major developments 

at the close of 1957 revealed a picture of almost unmitigated 

gloom. For whatever reason (the ostensible cause was "revisionism" which had sprung up following destalinizat ion, the 

Hungarian uprising and policy errors in North Vietnam), authoritative pronouncements alluded to the existence of widespread "confusion and skepticism" and decried the loss of 

"revolutionary optimism" within the ranks of the party. It 

was time for a bold new program on both the domestic and foreign policy fronts, one which would restore revolutionary 

elan and badly needed momentum in the drive for a socialist, 

unified Vietnam. As this program unfolded throughout the 

ensuing two-year period, it became clear that the Viet ifiinh 

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,.. . .. I' 

in a number of important respects was once again emulating 

the Chinese Communist model in pursuit of its domest.ic and 

fore ign pol icy objectives . 

A. Domestic Policy 

The campaign of emulation of Communist China extended 

into most spheres of North Vietnam's domestic policy throughout 1958 and 1959. Attracted by Peiping's claim to have <iscovered a special road enabling the underdeveloped nations 

of Asia.to achieve rapid economic and social progress, the 

North V& tnamese leadership enthusiastically endorsed China's 

"general 1 ine of socialist construction" and "leap forward" 

programs and appeared to regard the even more radical commune 

program as a logical step to be taken at some future stage 

of higher llsocialistff development within Ndrth Vietnah. * 

In May 1958 €Io Chi Minh, a onetime member of the Chinese 

Communist party, issued the first of a series of appeals to 

all classes of Vietnamese society to learn from the "example" 

and "experience" of their Chinese counterparts in building 

socialism. The Vietnamese leader noted in August that "our 

country being near to China and having conditions similar to 

hers must learn first from China and then advance further to 

learn from the Soviet Union." 

The second in command of the Lao Dong party, Le Duan, 

presented a more comprehensive rationale for the DRV decision in 1958 to follow China's distinctive road to socialism. 

encountered by underdeveloped nations seeking industrialization and modernization, Le Duan declared in September that 

After quoting Mao Tse-tung on the special problems 

*However, North Vietnam never became as intoxicated with 

these innovations as did the North Korean regime. For a 

discussion of the even more enthusiastic response of the 

North Korean leadership to these radical innovations, see 

ESAU XV-61: "Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea." 

.. . 

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"the problem is the same with us" and added that "the infinitely 

rich experience of China in this connection has taught us a 

brand new concept of the road to socialist construction." In 

brief, this concept held that in the conditions of overpopulation, land scarcity and shortage of capital peculiar to backward Asian countries, the key to economic development lay Jin. 

mobilizing and exhorting the peas'ant masses in a forced-draft 

labor-intensive program conducted at "leap forward" speed. ,< 

In this new approach to economic development in North 

Vietnam, a "leap forward" in agricultural production was the 

first step. Following the Chinese pattern, party enthusiasts 

were sent to the countryside to wage a "sharp ideological 

struggle against conservatism in the fixing and fulfillment 

of production norms." Taking the lead in this endeavor, Bo 

Chi Minh called for doubling the spring 1959 production target, asserting that new techniques perfected in Communist 

China (principally deep plowing, close planting and abundant 

fertilization) enabled a technological break-through in agriculture. Under the influence sf * this "leap forward" psychology, North Vietnam's Three Year Plan was revised in December 

1958 to include hopelessly unrealistic food product ion goals 

for 1959 and 1960. 

The next step was a "leap forward" in industrial development to be achieved by following Communist China's "mass line" 

of local industrialization. The DRV Minister of Industry conf idently asserted that Vietnamese workers and peasants, "provided they are led by the Party and enlightened ideologically," 

could grasp industrial techniques and build a network of small 

industrial installations throughout the countryside. The 

extravagant Chinese claims for this audacious undertaking-- 

that i$ constituted a short-cut to industrialization, promoted 

agricultural mechanization and helped eliminate differences i 

between urban and rural areas--were all faithfully reproduced I 

in Vietnamese commentary. When all industrial enterprises in 

early 1959 were ordered to build small-scale iron and steel 

plants "employing simple methods and using only local materials,'; 

North Vietnam appeared firmly committed to Peiping's unorthodox 

program of "leaping' agricultural and industrial development. 

Applauding this fidelity in a message of greetings in May 1959, 

Liu Shao-chi lauded "the great achievements of the Vietnamese 

people'' who were "displaying the highest labor enthusiasm in 

order to achieve great leap forwards in all fields of construct ion. 'I 

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&RET 
By contrast, Hanoi's reaction to the third of the trilogy 

of programs which dominated the Chinese scene in 1958-1959-?the 

formation of people's communes--was more ambiguous and.circumspect. The fact that the DRV was still in the preliminary 

phase of organizing low-level agricultural cooperatives. ruled 

out the establishment of communes in North Vietnam within the 

foreseeable future,and probably for this reason Hanoi originated little independent comment on China's commune program in 

the fall of 1958. This presumption was confirmed by Ho Chi 

Minh in January 1959 when he utilized the medium of a Western 

press query to stress that his country had no intention of 

organizing communes in the "immediate future. 

On the other hand, there were indications at this time 

that the Lao Dong party may have been attracted by a number 

of commune features and may have looked favorably on this 

organization as a logical future step once North Vietnam had 

achieved a higher level of "socialist" development. In a 19 

December 1958 editorial, the-off icial party organ hailed "the 

movements to establish people's communes and develop the national economy at a leap forward rate" as "of great significance not only for the Chinese People's Republic $ut also for 

the Communist and Workers Movement and peace movement through 

the world." A May 1959 report by the Sinophile Truong Chinh 

on agricultural cooperatization revealed the future goal of 

establishing "large cooperatives" encompassing "all party organizat ions; administrative services, organs for mobilizing 

the people; all economic, cultural and educational activities; 

and the building of militia... ." The basic identity between 

this comprehensive organization and Mao Tse-tung's concept of 

the commune, combining "industry, agriculture, commerce, education and the militia" plus township government, was unmistakable. 

North Vietnam's praise of the Chinese Communist model 

reached a peak at the time of the 10th anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic in October 1959, an occasion honored 

in Hanoi, according to a Western observer, as if "a colony 

were celebrating the centenary of its mother country." A 

significant feature of Vietnamese commentary on this occasion 

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I 

I 

I 

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was the theme of dual allegiance of the Viet Minh revolution 

to "Marxist-Leninism and the ideology of Mao Tse-tung. I** 

Elaborating this theme, the official organ of the People's 

Army of Vietnam paid striking tribute to "the military ideology of Mao Tse-tung" as exercising "profound influence on our 

armed struggle in general and in building our armed forces in 

particular. '' 

Of particular interest was the defense, appearing in severa1 authoritative discussions at this time, of China's communes against the mounting campaign of criticism by the Soviet 

Union. In a late August - Nhan Dan editorial the Lao Dong party 

asserted that "only the imperialists and their followers. . . attacked the great successes of the Chinese people in their movement to build people's communes.'' A major article in late 

September appraising the 10-year record of the Chinese People's 

Republic, sought to justify the commune by stressing China's 

"special conditions," declaring that "certain things may be 

true in a certain friendly country /The USSR7 but not in China." 

And Ho Chi Minh speaking in Peiping-lauded communist China's 

"general line, great leap forward and people's communes" as, 

by implication, "proof of the wisdom of the leadership of the 

Chinese Communist party headed DY Comrade Mao Tse-tung" and 

as a "creative application of the universal truths of MarxismLeninism to the actual practice of the Chinese revolution." 

,. 

B. Foreign Policy 

The first Soviet sputnik launching and ICBM test in the 

fall of 1957 marked an important turning point in the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute over world Communist strategy. 

Assuming that this breakthrough in weapons technology const ituted a decisive shift in the world balance of power, Mao Tsetung returned from the Moscow Conference of Communist and 

Workers Parties in November 1957 apparently convinced that the 

*This formulation, which implicitly acknowledges Peiping's 

leading role in the Asian Communist movement and which accordingly is anathema to Moscow, had not appeared in Vietnamese 

commentary since the Geneva Conference of 1954. 

I 

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correct strategic line for the international Communist movement was no longer one of passive "peaceful coexistence" but 

one of active revolutionary advance. Coming at a time of 

frustration and sagging hopes in North VietnamP s undertaking 

to achieve national unification by "peaceful means, this 

strategic estimate must have struck a responsive chord in Ho 

Chi Minh, who tarried a month in Peiping before returning home 

from the Moscow Conference. As the events of the ensuing two 

years were to demonstrate, Communist China and North Vietnam 

would act in c-oncert on the implications of this assessment 

by adopting a more aggressive policy in pursuit of revolutionary goals in South Vietnam and Laos. As these events would 

also demonstrate, Idoscow's differing Strategic estimate and its 

reluctance to become involved in Southeast Asia would align 

the North Vietnamese regime behind Peiping on a number of issues in the worsening Sino-Soviet,dispute in the latter months 

of 1959. 

1. South Vietnam 

Le Duan, who had become Ho Chi Minh's second in command 

in early 1958, expressed the party's new "hard" line toward 

South Vietnam. Reputedly the leader of a "Southern" faction 

who had been in charge of party operations in the South from 

1947 to 1956, this previously obscure revolutionary figure 

criticized Khrushchev's doctrine of "peaceful transition to 

socialism" in early 1958 in a series of speeches and articles 

directed ostensibly at the Tito-brand of "revisionism." Denying the applicability of this doctrine to Vietnam, Le Duan 

underlined the. "arduous and complicated" nature of the struggle in South Vietnam and invoked the authority of Lenin to 

emphasize that "both peaceful and non-peacef ul forms of struggle" were essential to the success of any revolutionary undertaking. Developments throughout the remainder of 1958 indicated a Viet Minh decision to intensify sharply the political 

struggle in preparation for a new phase of armed struggle in 

South Vietnam the following year. 

The first indication of an impending shift in revolutionary tactics appeared in July during the fourth anniversary of 

the Geneva Conference* In contrast with previous anniversaries 

which had emphasized the DRV's faithful adherence to the Geneva 

Agreement, this observance was devoted to a campaign of rabid 

1 

- 15 - 
, -, . . .. . .. .. . 

ant i-Americanism. In propaganda tones approaching hysteria, 

Hanoi's press and radio launched a massive "anti-American 

movement" in which it was claimed that a million Vietnamese 

had participated in rallies demanding the withdrawal of United 

States imperialists from South Vietnam. Criticism of the 

o p e r a t i o n s of the International Control Commission in Vietnam 

appeared for the first time, especially after it had rejected 

DRV complaints against US military operations in the South. 

Continuing these pressure tactics, Foreign Minister Pham Van 

Dong cabled the United Nations demanding steps "to compel the 

complete withdrawal of U. S. military personnel fmm South 

Vietnam." 

Next was the decision in December to stage an all-out 

propaganda attack against the government of South Vietnam. 

Whereas previous appeals to the Diem regime to enter into 

negotiations had been temperate in tone, Pham Van Dong's 22 

December note was characterized by abusive and insulting 

language, asserting in arrogant tones that negotiations were 

feasible only if Diem agreed to accept Communist terms. Following closely on the announcement of this new hard line on 

reunification, the DRV initiated a virulent propaganda attack, 

charging that the Southern authorities, acting on US instructions, had poisoned 6,000 inmates of a "concentration camp" 

in the Southern zone. 

Developments in Communist China at this time encouraged 

North Vietnam in its decision, based primarily on other considerations, to inaugurate a new phase of armed struggle in 

South Vietnam. First was the adoption of a more radical 

strategic line by Mao Tse-tung, one which stressed the "paper 

tiger" character of American power and which advocated a more 

militant revolutionary struggle. Next was a series of reports 

that Mao Tse-tung was determined to win MOSCOW~S recognition 

of a special role for China in guiding Asian Communist parties 

and assisting them to power. The militant character of Peiping's new policy was revealed in Premier Chou En-lai's address 

to the National People's Congress in April 1959 when he pledged 

"support and assistance to the full extent of our capabilities 

to all national independence movements in Asia, Africa and 

Latin America. 'I 

The Lao Dong central committee decided in early May 1959 

to initiate a new phase of violent revolution in the South 

with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the Diem regime. 

.. ,. 

I 

I .. ' . I 

, 

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=ET 
Although couched in the usual Aesopian language of such occasions, the message contained in a 14 May Nhan Dan editorial 

on this party conference was clear. Utilizingthe "advantageous)) shift in the world balance of forces and supported by 

"an unprecedently firm North Vietnam and socialist camp," the 

party's compatriots in the South were exhorted "to struggle.. . in the tradition of the 1941 and 1945 uprisings.. .and by all 

necessary forms and measures to achieve the goal of revolution.t1 

This decision was implemented in the fall of 1959 and the win-- 

ter of 1959-1960 by sharply stepping up sabotage and terrorist + operations in the South and*.by sharply increasing the flow of 

cadres and arms to newly activated guerrilla battalions in 

South Vietnam. 

Despite the claim of solid backing by the "socialist camp," 

this new revolutionary drive was to receive much more support 

from Peiping than from Moscow throughout 1959. Khrushchev's 

decision at this time to press for a rapprochement with the 

West under the guise of "peaceful coexistence" and "relaxation 

of international tensions" was clearly incompatible with the 

launching of a frontal assault on American imperialism in Vietnam, and indeed the Chinese were soon to accuse Khrushchev of 

being unwilling to give adequate support to "liberation" wars. 

The Soviet leader's failure to mention Vietnam in a global review of "main problems" in East-West relations in October 1959 

(despite lenghty remarks on Korea) appeared to confirm Soviet 

caution with regard to Vietnam's national liberation struggle. 

In a speech delivered in Peiping on 30 September, North Vietnam politburo member Hoang Van Hoan appeared to air publicly 

his party's grievances over Soviet non-support when he pointedly confined the scope of Soviet assistance to economic aid 

and efforts to restore peace in Vietnam and then paid glowing 

tribute to Communist China's "persistent support of the Vietnamese people's resistance war" in the past and "active support of Vietnam in her struggle for national reunification" 

in the present. 

Authoritaive party editorials in the remaining months 

of 1959 continued to betray apprehension and resentment over 

Khrushchev's prescriptions for bloc strategy. A recurring 

theme in these discussions was the need to differentiate between the general world situation (where some relaxation of 

international tension had occurred) with the situation in Laos 

and South Vietnam (where American imperialists were plotting 

war and aggression.) Of particular interest was the veiled 

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i . r; '. . :, .. .Y 

I.. . . 
warning to the Soviet Union that it would be a ''mistakeV1 to 

detach the "socialist camp" from "the national liberation 

movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." Thus increasingly overt criticism of Soviet policy characterized the position of North Vietnam as the Sino-Soviet dispute over international Communist strategy neared a climax in 1960. 

2. Laos .. .. 

1- 

The DRV had less grounds for criticizing Soviet policy 

in Laos throughout 1958 and 1959. After a strong showing in 

supplementary elections held in early 1958, the Laotian Communists were in a good position to demonstrate the efficacy 

of Khrushchev's doctrine of "peaceful transition to socialism." 

When a strongly anti-Communist Lao Government emerged in 

August 1958, it was clearly in the interests of the Soviet 

leader, as prime advocate of this doctrine of revolution via 

the ballot box, and of the Soviet Union as leader of the bloc, 

' to participate in a common effort to preserve the powerful 

Communist assets in that country. Even here, however, the 

Soviet Union appeared to favor a more conciliatory policy than 

that advocated by Communist China and North Vietnam. 

The developments leading up to and including the Laotian 

crisis in mid-1959 fall into several well-defined stages. The 

first Stage, in summer 1958, saw the formation of an anti-Communist coalition government vested with emergency powers and 

intent on aligning Laos more closely with the West. In order 

to deal more effectively with internal Communist subversion 

and prepare the way for more active American assistance, the 

Lao Government succeeded in July 1958 in bringing about an 

indefinite, adjournment of the International Control Commission, 

This action was strongly protested by Hanoi and Peiping, 

the latter underlining its right to be heard with the reminder 

that it was "a close neighbor of Laos." Probably more decisive in indicating to Hanoi that a resumption of Communist 

military act ion was necessary was Premier Phoui's Civic Act ion 

program, started in August 1958, to wipe out Communist influence in the countryside. In ominous response, North Vietnam 

charged Laotian .violat ion of its borders in December and sent 

troops into the disputed border areas. 
... .. . . 

The second stage, from February through April 1959, was 

initiated by the Lao Prime Minister's repudiation of the Geneva 

Agreements of 1954, a prerequisite for introducing an American 

military training mission and for increasing American military 

aid. During this period, Communist China took the lead in a 

campaign of intimidat ion against the Lao Government, charging 

"unscrupulous violat ion" of the Geneva Agreements and "military 

incursions" of its southern border. For the first time, the 

Soviet Union added its voice to the chorus demanding reactivation of the ICC, declaring that it "fully shared" the concern 

of its Far Eastern partners over the "serious situation" in 

Laos. 

i- ., 

The third stage, immediately preceding the outbreak of 

armed hostilities in May 1959, was inaugurated by efforts to 

integrate two Pathet Lao battalions into the national army 

(as stipulated in the Vientiane agreement of 1957). With 

the escape of one of these battalions to the North Vietnam 

border and the ensuing arrest of several top-ranking Communist 

leaders, developments accelerated rapidly. Reacting uiolentay, 

both Hanoi and Peiping accused the Royal Laotian Government 

of "launching a civil war" and laid the groundwork for possible military intervention by alleging threats to their national 

security. Following representations by these Asian bloc members, the Soviet foreign minister pressed for reactivation of 

the ICC in high-level talks with the British. .. 

The final stage, in fall 1959 and the winter of 1959-1960, 

was marked by the resumption of full-scale Communist guerilla 

warfare. It was in this stage of armed insurrection, begun 

on the eve of Khrushchev's visit to the United States, that 

Soviet policy on Laos began to diverge from the more militant 

and uncompromising line of Peiping and Hanoi. - 

Throughout August and September of 1959, Communist China 

and North Vietnam made mare explicit their threats to intervene 

by warning that any foreign involvement in Laos would be a 

direct threat to their national security, On 12 August Communist China demanded the complete withdrawal of US advisers, 

equipment and bases as a precondition for peace in Laos. It 

was also at this time that Peiping brought up the Laos situation in connection with Khrushchev's impending visit to the 

United States, citing it as further proof of the inherently 

aggressive nature of American policy despite peaceful protest at ions, 

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._. 

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1 ., ':. 

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.I .. 

By contrast, a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement in midAugust was notably conciliatory in tone. 

of a United Nations fact-finding mission in Laos in September 

prompted a stronger Soviet stand calling for a new Geneva Conference to uphold the legality of the 1954 agreements. This 

action, promptly endorsed by Hanoi and Peiping, succeeded 

bloc partners. Two developments in the following month, however, suggested a continuing dispute over the tactical line 

to be pursued in Laos. 

Then the dispatch 

temporarily in reconciling the divergent views of the three .. 

The first indication appeared in Khrushchev's obvious 

effort to minamize the gravity of the Laotian situation in a 

major foreign policy address of 31 October. In a formulation 

remarkably neutral in tone, the Soviet leader urged Ifthe great 

powers" to refrain from intervention in Laos and argued that 

a "sensible approach'' predicated on adherence to "internirt ional 

agreements" could "1 iquidate the clashes" in that troubled 

area. And in a final observation which appeared to be directed in part at the incendiary and bellicose position of Communist China throughout the precedingmonths, Khrushchev asserted 

that "more than a necessary amount of noise has been raised 

in the world" about the Laotian cirsis. , 

I 

The second development concerned a Soviet approach to the I, 

British 1 in behalf of the imprisoned Communist leaders about 

to go on trial in Laos. During the course of conversations I 

in London, Soviet Ambassador Malik referred twice to Communist 

China's position as expressed in a 31 October note which warned 

that the trials would "inevitably block the way to a peaceful 

solution" of the Laotian problem. By this device the Soviet , 

representative appeared to convey a warning that the Chinese 

would cause trouble in Laos if the trials were held. Moreover, 

the timing of this demarche, which followed almost immediately 

Khrushchev's thinly-veiled warning in Peiping against "test- l 

ing the stability of the capitalist system by force," suggested I 

the possibility of Soviet apprehension over Communist China*s 

aggressive intentions in Southeast Asia. 

I 

I 

IV. NORTH VIETNAM AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: 1960-1961 

A number of developments in the fall of 1959 intensified 

the Sino-Soviet dispute over methods of building Communism and 

international Communist strategy. Following his abortive 

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c 

.. . ; . 

.. '. .. .. 

conference with Mao Tse-tung in Peiping, Khrushchev apparently 

decided to resort to more forceful measures designed to press 

Communist China and its bloc supporters back into line. The 

Soviet leader publicly attacked China's foreign and domestic 

policies on four separate occasions in the closing months of 

1959. On 31 October he implicitly rebuked Peiping for its 

bellicose posture toward the West by alluding to Trotsky's 

''notorious slogan of 'neither peace nor war'." On 1 December 

Khrushchev launched a polemical, if oblique, attack on China's 

commune and "leap forward" programs, characterizing them as 

a "distortion: of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism on the building of socialism and Communism1' resulting from "conceit.. . and 

mistakes in leadership." Reacting to these developments, North 

Vietnam.apparently decided in late 1959 to adopt a more ne&,ly 

neutral 'position :in the Sino-Soviet dispute, a policy which 

it has maintained up to the present time. Implementation of 

this policy during 1960-1961 would be characterized by a new 

national assertiveness manifested internally by stressing the 

unique character of the Vietnamese revolution and externally 

by proclaiming (for the first time) the revolutionary experience of North Vietnam as a model for Communist "liberation" 

movements in other underdeveloped areas of the world. 

.. 

.. 

'. , I. 

,,. . 

,.. . 

.. 

.. 

.. I 

A. Domestic Policy 

North Vietnam's determination to seek a neutral course 

in domestic policy was revealed by two significant developments in the winter of 1959-1960. 

ticism over the applicability to Vietnam of the Chinese model 

of economic and social development. In September Premier 

Pham Van Dong had publicly exposed this skepticism when he 

enumerated various defects in the 1959 economic plan, singled 

out for special criticism the excessive agricultural production goals which had been forced on the peasants, and pointedly 

asserted that "socialist ideology and enthusiasm cannot automatically make us skillful." Further admission of failure in 

North Vietnam's "leap forward" program appeared at- this time 

in the progressive reduct ion of the highly unrealistic goals 

of the Three Year Program (1958 to 1960). Most striking was 

the drastic scaling-down of the 1960'food target from the plan 

figure of 7.6 million tons to 5.5 million tons. 

First was the growing skep- 

- 21 - I. , .. . '. 
Even more revealing was the decision taken in late 1959 

to stress the individuality and unique character of the Vietnamese revolution. In place of previous encomiums to the Chinese model and the "ideology of Mao Tse-tung," Hanoi utilized 

the anniversary celebrations of Indo-China Communist party in 

January-and Lenin's birthday in April to introduce a new rationale ascribing all of its revolutionary victories to Lenin and 

Ho Chi Minh, described as Lenin's "most outstanding disciple 

in Vietnam" who had "creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to 

the concrete conditions of Vietnam." This new national assertiveness, no doubt calculated, reflected North Vietnam's decision to steer a neutral course between the conflicting SinoSoviet doctrinal pronouncements on correct methods of building socialism and Communism. 

The new exaltation of Lenin as the ideological mentor of 

the Vietnamese revolution was carried to extremes. In an 

April Hoc Tap editorial, it was asserted that 'fever since 

restoraoof peace in 1954, we have taken Lenin's theory on 

the transition to socialism as a compass in socialist transformation and the building of socialism in North Vietnam," 

and in the August-September issue of this party organ Premier 

Pham Van Dong cited Lenin 13 times as the ideological guide 

to North Vietnam's revolution. Of particular interest in this 

voluminous discussion were the increasing references to "Lenin 's 

theory of agricultural cooperatives, It a good indication that 

the DRV was shying away from the ideologically suspect "people's communes" of Communist China. On this point, Hanoi's 

position was virtually identical with Moscow's. 

There were other indications of a growing tendency to look 

to the Soviet Union for guidance in economic development programs. First was Le Duan's announcement in January 1960 that 

North Vietnam would shift from agricultural to heavy industrial 

development as the main task of the First Five Year Plan (1961- 

1965) and his instruction to learn "especially from the USSR" 

in carrying out this task. A Soviet scientific and technical 

mission arrived in spring 1960, charged with "drawing up a 

long-term, comprehensive construction plan." Equally important was Le Dtian's reiteration at the Third National Party Congress in September that North Vietnam fully accepted Khrushchev's 

concept of an integrated bloc-wide economic system in which 

each country acknowledged "socialist principles of international 

division of labor and cooperat ion'' and ''coordinated its longterm national economic plans.. .as an integral part of the world 

- 22 - 

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. -. ..~ . ... ... . .. - . .... 

socialist economic system. 'I (Peiping has consistently opposed 

this principle of a coordinated bloc-wide approach to ecormmic 

development). The North Vietnamese were rewarded by grants 

of sizable Soviet credits in June and December 1960 to help 

finance agricultural and industrial development in North Vietnam's first long-term economic plan. 

Another instance of North Vietnam's increasing susceptibility to Soviet positions on building socialism occurred at 

the now famous Bucharest Conference of world Communist parties 

in June. According to reliable accounts of the proceedings 

of this conference, the Soviet leader attacked China's communes 

as a fake, the mass iron and steel campaign as a mistake, and 

the "great leap forward" policy as indefensible ip both theory 

and practice. Voicing an even more serious objection, Khrushchev accused the Chinese of "wanting to impose their concepts 

on others .I1 Apparently reacting to the6e polemical attacks, 

North Vietnam suddenly terminated its support for Peiping's 

heretical program. Although Premier Pham Van Dong had praised 

these programs only a momth earlier during Chou En-lai's visit 

to Hanoi, this was the last such reference to appear in North 

Vietnamese commentary throughout 1960. 

The extension of sizeable economic credits by both Moscow and Peiping in the winter of 1960-1961 testified to the 

effectiveness of North Vietnam's efforts to steer a middle 

course in domestic policy through the preceding months of crisis 

in Sino-Soviet relations. Whether designed by Ho Chi Minh or 

not, neutrality was paying off in the form of an apparent SinoSoviet economic competition for influence in the domestic affairs of the DRV. It remains now to turn to the even more important benefits accruing to North Vietnam in the pursuit of 

its foreign policy objectives in Laos and South Vietnam. 

B. Foreign Policy 

As noted earlier in this paper, Khrushchev's venture in 

summit diplomacy during the winter of 1959-1960 could not have 

occurred at a worse time for North Vietnam. Having decided 

by May 1959 ta prepare for a new phase of violent revolution, , 

the DRV was poise'din December ready to launch a frontal attack 

on "US imperialism" in South Vietnam. This obvious incompatibility between Soviet and North Vietnamese foreign policy objectives came to a head at the Warsaw Pact meeting of February I 

- 23 - ,. 
. : -. . 

1960. According to accounts of this conference, the Soviet 

Union, backed by East European regimes, argued the necessity 

of a "soft" approach to the West in order to solve the uppermost problem confronting the bloc, that of Germany. On the 

other hand, Communist China, supported by North Vietnam and 

North Korea, maintained that a "hardq1 uncompromising line was 

throughout the world. 

essential in resisting American imperialism, the "main enemy, .. 

Confirmation of these reports appeared in a surprisingly 

candid Hoc Tap party editorial on the results of the Warsaw 

Conference.Parroting the Chinese Communist line so closely 

that it was reproduced in Peiping's party newspaper, the editorial attacked the false belief "that the imperialist wolf 

has become a lamb;" warned that US imperialism would "continue 

to initiate local wars;" and, in a thinly-veiled criticism 

of Khrushchev's strategic assumptions, called for ''correctly 

estimating the new advantages of the world situation ... and 

forging ahead to obtain new advantages which are profitable 

to peace and socialism." 

- 

In April Peiping launched a public attack on the theoretical rationale of Khrushchev's foreign policy by reviving Leninist dicta on the inevitability of war, the intrinsically 

aggressive nature of imperialism and the need for direct revolutionary action to promote international Communism. When Premier 

Chou En-lai visited Hanoi the following month, the DRV enthusiastically endorsed this militant strategic prescription. 

After the publication of a commundque stressing the two governments' "completely identical views.. .on all current major international questions, '' the Chinese leader hailed the agreement as of "great significance in further strengthening mutual 

aid and cooperation between our two countries and close coordination between them in international affairs. Close coordination was in fact evidenced in early June at the World Federation of Trade Unions Conference in Peiping when the North Vietnamese delegate strongly supported the dissident faction 

headed by Communist China and called for a resolution which 

would "mahe clear" that the "working class" did "not harbor 

any illusions about the nature of imperialism. 

However, two developments in mid-1960 were to persuade 

North Vietnam of the wisdom of a more neutral course in the 

Sino-Soviet dispute on international Communist strategy. The 

first was the Bucharest Conference in late June which revealed 

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I. 
to other bloc-parties for the first time the fundamental 

character and disruptive effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict. 

According to reliable reports, Iolrushchev utilized this 

occasion to accuse the Chinese party of "disloyalty and insincerity, of employing "Trotskyite methods, l1 and of pursuing 

a "bellicose foreign policy." The Chinese countercharges were 

equally bitter, including the allegation that Khrushchev had 

been guilty of "revisionism and right opportunism" and had 

Created-the Chinese "an enemies. '' In a response revealing 

grave apprehension over the growing rift in Sino-Soviet rela- . 

tions and a consequent desire to remain neutral, North Vietnam issued a studiously noncommittal editorial on the Bucharest 

meeting and took the unprecedented step of reprinting without 

comment the widely-divergent Russian and Chinese party editorials 

on the conference. 

The second development vas Ho Chi Minh's visit to Moscow 

in early August. 

act as a conciliator in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Ho very likely 

also discussed the explosive Laotian situation and his party's 

determination to accelerate the pace and expand the scope of 

violent revolution in South Vietnam. Moreover, a significant 

shift in DRV commentary on the Soviet Union immediately thereafter suggests that Ho's mission to Moscow was successful in 

eliciting pledges of greater Soviet support in mounting a Dew 

offensive drive in Southeast Asia. 

Continuing his efforts after Bucharest to 

This new line was expressed most forcefully by Premier 

Pham Van Dong in a foreign policy address to the Third National' 

Party Congress in September 1960. For the first time since 

the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet dispute on bloc strategy, a 

North Vietnam leader paid glowing tribute to the Soviet Union 

as Ira staunch and successful supporter of the struggle of oppressed peoples to liberate themselves and strengthen their 

national independence." And in the same context, the North 

Vietnamese premier went on to declare that "the great Soviet 

Union deserves its position as the country leading the socialist camp." With the revelation of vastly augmented economic 

and military assistance to North Vietnam in the following 

months, the Soviet Union would undertake a much more active 

role in supporting "liberation" movements in Southeast Asia. 

- 25 - - 
1. South Vietnam 

After two and a half years of a steady but low-key campaign 

of propaganda, subversion and terrorism, Hanoi inaugurated in 

early 1960 a new phase of sharply stepped-up terrorism and guerrilla warfare extending throughout wide areas of South Vietnam. 

Reflecting this decision, top-ranking Worth Vietnamese leaders in 

January and February began to issue overt appeals inciting the 

people of South Vietnam to engage in "revolution" to overthrow 

the Diem regime and "drive out" their US imperialist "enemies." 

Echoing Peiping's call for armed struggle during the Lenin anniversary in April, Lao Dong party 1st secretary Le Duan applied this Leninist dictum directly to South Vietnam when he 

asserted : 

The way for the South Vietnamese people to 

liberate themselves can by no means differ 

from that which Lenin has mapped out for the 

national liberation revolution of colonial 

peoples. 

Acting in accordance with its mil itant strategic pronouncements, Communist China took the lead throughout 1960 in extend- . ing public support and encouragement to the revolutionary drive 

in South Vietnam. Spelling out their "completely identical 

views on all current major international questions," Chou Enlai and Pham Van Dong in May 1960 characterized their two countriej as "the closest comrades-in-arms of the peoples of Asia, 

Africa, and Latin America.. .firmly supporting the struggles 

in these areas for national independence and democratic freedoms." The Chinese premier was more specific in a 2 September 

speech when he singled out the revolution in South Vietnam as 

"an important part of the stormy struggle of people of the 

whole world against the U. S. imperialists" and declared: "The 

Chinese people have supported in the past, do support at present, and will support in the future the struggle of the Vietnamese people. It 

A second more violent phase of guerrilla warfare was 

initiated in South Vietnam in the latter half of 1960. This 

new phase was clearly indicated in keynote speeches at the 

Third Party Congress in September which pointed to Ita new 

balance of forces favoring revolution" in the South and which 

openly proclaimed the intent of North Vietnam "to promote the 

I 

I 

I .. 

, 

:. . . .,I ', 1 

,* . .. 

I. 

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I 

revolutionary struggle in the South." The next step, as North 

Vietnamese commentary was to reveal more and more candidly in 

the ensuing months, was to call upon "the powerful and resolute 

help of socialist countries, especially the USSR and China" 

to assist in South Vietnam's liberation struggle. 

The nominal resolution of Sino-Soviet differences on international Communist strategy as expressed in the Moscow Declaration, and in particular the vigorous bloc response to the 

Laotian crisis in December 1960, facilitated this task. The 

Declaration cited Vietnam, along with Laos, as a country struggling for national liberation and proclaimed the "duty" of 

"socialist countries ... to render every moral and material support to peoples struggling for their liberation against imperialism and colonial oppression." The arrival in North Vietnam 

of massive shipments of arms, together with military advisers, 

from both Russia and China provided the wherewithal not only 

for waging a "liberationii war in Laos but also for supporting 

the armed revolt in South Vietnam.* 

There were several indications in the spring and summer 

of 1961, however, that Communist China was once again outbidding the Soviet Union in declarations of support for the war 

in South Vietnam. On 13 April the CPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a forceful protest against the stepped-up. American 

military aid program in South Vietnam, a protest eliciting expressions of profound gratitude in a Nhan Dan editorial. Foreign 

Minister Chen Yi's harsh attacks at theeea Conference on 

American policy in South Vietnam also won DRV plaudits, suggesting a common intent on the part of Peiping and Hanoi to raise 

the issue of Vietnam at future sessions of this conference. 

More significant, however, was the reception accorded Premier 

Pham Van Dong during his June-July 1961 mission to Peiping 

and Moscow for the obvious purpose of countering Vice President 

Johnson's offer of aid to the Diem government with a demonstration of equal or greater bloc support for the North. 

The results achieved in Peiping were gratifying. Premier 

Chou En-lai, in addition to reiterating previous pledges of 

*It should be noted, however, that arms of bloc manufacture 

have not. yet been found in South Vietnam. 

 ET 
.. 

.. 

.. . .. ._ 

"resolute support for the Vietnamese people's just and patriotic 

struggle against US imperialist aggression," injected a new 

tone of menace when he asserted "the Chinese Government and 

people cannot be indifferent to the increasingly grave situation created by US imperialism in South Vietnam..*' Politburo 

member Peng Chen pointed to "stepped up military intervention 

in Laos and South Vietnam" as proof of Mao Tse-tung's dictum 

that !'the Kennedy administration is even worse, even more 

sinister and insidious, than the Eisenhower administrat ion, 

and he demanded that "US imperialism must get out of South Vietnam." 

The North Vietnamese emissary r e c e i v e d n o t i c e a b l y less 

from Khrushchev in the way of a public display of support for 

the war in South Vietnam. Perhaps already preoccupied with 

Berlin, the Soviet leader tended to blur the issue with generalities about the need to "welcome and show sympathy for" 

the, liberation struggles of colonial peoples. And in the formal communique, Khrushchev carefully distinguished between "the 

Vietnamese pe,ople's legitimate demands for an end to foreign 

interference in South Vietnam" (which the Soviet Government 

"fully supports") and "the Vietnamese people's just struggle 

for national reunification" (which the Soviet Government "firmly 

believes'' will succeed). Despite Premier Phamls assertion on 

this tour that his country@en'S.- struggle was receiving "the 

enthusiastic support of the Soviet Union, China and other 

fraternal countries," Peiping appeared once again to favor a 

more mil itant and aggressive pol icy in support of "national 

liberation" in South Vietnam. 

.. . 

.. I 

i .. I 

i' .' I 

2. Laos 

It is not within the scope of this 

tortuous course of events preceding and 

paper to trace the 

encompassing the- Lao- - tian civil war in the winter of 1960-1961. Rather, bloc 

policy in Laos throughout this period will be discussed within the larger context of the Sino-Soviet dispute on international Communist strategy. Although solid evidence is hard 

to come by, the record does suggest a close relationship between the development of these two crises in intrabloc and 

East-West relations in the final months of 1960. 

- 28 - .. , 

.. .. 

! i .I , ,. 

I. 

.. 
, ... .... .. <' 

Following the sending of a United Nations fact-finding 

mission in the fall of 1959, Laos entered a period of relative 

quiescence in which the Pathet Lao prepared for future largescale guerrilla activities. This period was punctuated by 

occasional appeals by Peiping and Hanoi urging the Laotian 

people to "persist in their revolutionary struggle" and by increaslngly frequent reminders from Peiping that no settlement 

of the Laotian problem was possible without its participation. 

The Kong Le coup in %gust 1960 set the stage for the 

resumption of civil war in Laos. Moscow's reaction in the 

initial stages of this crisis was cautious in comparison with 

that of Peiping, merely expressing for the Laotian 

people as opposed to China's declaration of "resolute support .'I By late October, however, the Soviet Union had shifted 

to a position of "full support'' for the Souvanna regime, committing its prestige and revealing a belated determination to 

lead the bloc offensive in Laos. 

A factor of undoubted importance in this Soviet decision 

was the opportunity afforded by Souvanna Phouma's diplomatic 

recognition of Moscow in early October 1960. This opportunity, 

then denied Peiping (which was not recognized until April 1961), 

was quickly exploited by the arrival of a Soviet emissary with 

offers of ecqnomic aid. Another considerat ion, probably, was 

the conviction that Laos constituted a soft spot in the US-protected perimeter in Southeast Asia, which promised substantial 

gains in return for a limited investment. The timing of the 

Soviet decision, however, suggests still another factor of 

equal or greater importance--the need to take vigorous action 

in Laos to counter Peiping's polemical accusations throughout 

the preceding months that the Soviet Union had failed to support adequately any war or national liberation struggle after I 

the Moscow Conference of November 1957. This charge had been 

aired publicly, in oblique if unmistakable terms, just weeks I 

before the Soviet decision to intervene in the Laotian civil 

war--on the occasion of the publication of the fourth volume 

of Mao Tse-tung's collected works, timed to coincide with the 

celebration of the 11th anniversary of the Chinese People's 

Republic on 1 October 1960. 

This event, greeted with much fanfare in Chinese propaganda, provided a convenient medium for reiterating Peiping's 

militant line on the desirability and inevitability of armed 

I 

struggle and violent revolution in promoting international I. 

.. 

.. , T. ' 

.. .,. . . ,. 

'- 29 __ - 
I 

Communism. Surrounding commentary stressed that Mao had always insisted on taking a "revolutionary" line as opposed to 

an 'lopportunist" line (i.e. Khrushchev's) . Furthermore, it 

characterized this volume as a "great Marxist-Leninist work" 

and asserted its "great significance for the broad people's 

revolutionary movements in those parts of the world. still under oppression and exploitation." It was clear that the Chinese Communists were once again advancing Mao's revolutionary 

theories as a general guide for revolutionary movements.Ln the 

underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. 

The immediate and forceful bloc response to General Phoumi's 

recapture of the Laotian capital in mid-December is a matter 

of record. Initiated by a large-scale Soviet airlift 'delivering arms and ammunition, the Communist powers made quite clear 

their determination to take all measures necessary to support 

the gong Le-Pathet Lao forces. Although the concerted program 

of diplomatic, propaganda, and military action suggested clos.: 

coordination and consultat ion between Moscow and Peiping at 

the outset, there were several indications in 1961 that the 

Soviet Union and Communist China continued to hold divergent 

views on questions of timing and, tactics in seeking a negotiated 

settlement of the Laotian crisis. 

Beginning in January, Peiping and Hanoi appeared on a 

number of occasions to favor the continuation of armed struggle rather than to accept MOSCOW'S proposal to negotiate an 

international political settlement. This was evident first 

of all in Communist China's obvious reluctance to permit reactivation of the International Control Commission in Laos, 

stipulating as a prior condition that a new Geneva Conference 

be reconvened. Reports of North Vietnamese resistance to a 11 cease-:Ai-e" appeared confirmed by a 4 April Soviet broadcast to Vietnam urging in defensive tones the desirability 

of a truce. Peiping's insistence in late April that all American military personnel and equipment be withdrawn before 

a "real cease-fire" could be achieved in Laos indicated a 

desire for continued military operations in preference to a 

political settlement. Finally, there was evidence of divergent 

approaches to negotiations, either as to tactics or to substance, between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets after 

tile Geneva Conference on Laos convened in May. 

Animated by the desire to achieve quick gains in both 

South Vietnam and Laos; North Vietnam displayed a marked 
" 

preference for Peiping's more militant position on world Communist strategy throughout 1960 and 1961. It remains now to 

examine North Vietnam's role in the overall Sino-Soviet conflict throughout this period, a role which Ho Chi Minh performed with notable effect at the Moscow Conference of November 1960.and which Hanoi has continued to play up the present. 

C; North Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute 

LJ reporting 

with information available in the public reco is possible 

to reconstruct with a fair amount of accuracy the performance 

of the NDrth Vietnamese party delegation at the Moscow Conference oft November 1960. Numerous reports have indicated the 

key role played by Ho Chi Minh in conciliating the bitter disagrcainent u!5ich persisted between Khrushchev and Liu Shao-chi 

into ths final days of the conference. From an intensive review of North Vietnamese materials bearing on this conference, 

it would appear that the essence of the recocciliation formula 

advanced by Ho Chi Minh at this time was the principle of bloc 

solidarity based on "voluntary" allegiance, a concept advanced 

by Peipirig during the troubles in Eastern Europe in 1956. 

By a judicious combination of scattered 

Far and away the most revealing single published source 

detailing North Vietnam's role at this conference was the report of Lao Dong party 1st Secretary Le Duan appearing in the 

January 1961 issue of Hoc Tap. It was here that the principle 

of "voluntary" allegiance was discussed at some length in the 

section defining the nature of relations between Communist 

parties within the bloc. After repeating the ritualistic formula 

appearing in the Moscow Declaration that '?all Communist and 

Workers Parties are independent and equal,'' Le Duan went on 

to add a significant formulation which did not appear in the 

Declaration--"and 'have the duty to support and help each other 

-- 

so that they will voluntarily respect the views and conclusion 

they have unanimously passed after democratic debates in delegatesP conferences ." (Underlining supplied) . This statement 

would appear to confirm the number of reports indicating that 

North Vietnam at the Moscow Conference , while generally evasive 

and conciliatory, supported Communist China on the key issue 

of authority and discipline within the international Communist 

movement, rejecting the principle of majority rule which Khrushchev sought to impose on the movement. 

., 

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I IAL _Y I 
Moreover, the stress on "voluntary respect'' and "unanimous 

views" would appear to reject coercive tactics (e.g. the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from Communist China in 1960 and 

economic sanctions applied to Albania since that time) as a 

means of extracting obedience to Moscow. Corroborative evidence for this conclusion would be provided by North Vietnam's 

1961. Whereas the Russian representative attacked the Albanian 

party leaders (obliquely of course) as "renegades. . .foaming 

at the mouth in fits of hatred and hostility against our party", 

tile North Vietnamese delegate praised the Albanian leaders for ' 

"profound faithfulness to Marxism-Leninism" and "their correct 

leadership. I' 

conduct at the Albanian Workers Party Congress in February .* 

Another manifestation of this principle of "voluntary" 

allegiance was Le Duan's clear implication that the Lao Dong 

party would look to both the "Communist Party of the Soviet 

Union and the Chinese Communist Party" (the "two largest parties") for guidance in charting its own revolutionary course. 

This implication was made first of all by omitting the tribute 

paid the CPSU in the Moscow Declaration--"the universally 

recognized vanguard ... whose experience is of fundamental signif icance"--and by substituting the neutral statement that the 

DRV "would study the collective experience of brother countries. '' 

The principle was also to be evident in North Vietnam's resumption in 1961, after a six months' hiatus following the Bucharect 

Conference, of laudatory appraisals of Communist China's "leap 

forward" and commune programs and reassertion of "the great 

significance of the Chinese revolution to the revolution of 

Vietnam." 

The intent of Hanoi to follow a neutral course in the 

Sino-Soviet dispute was also demonstrated in Le Duan's discussion of the nature of relations between bloc countries. After 

referring to the ''USSR and China" as '*the two largest counkxies 

bearing heaviest responsibility for maintaining unity within 

the socialist camp," the party leader indicated that North Vietnam's policy thereafter would be to "strengthen unity and friendship between our country and the USSR and China" and "between 

our party and the CPSU and the CCP." 

As events throughout the remainder of 1961 would demonstrate , it 4ould become increasingly difficult to implement 

this neutral strategy. The requirements of impartiality were 

illustrated in somewhat ludicrous fashion by Premier Pham Van 

Dong in mid-year when he lauded Communist China in Peiping as 

- 32 - 

IAL Cm 4ammlw 
.. . *. ... . 1 ,. 

"the closest friend of the DRV" and then hailed Khrushche.; in 

Moscow as "the closest friend of the Vietnamese people." And 

Khrushchev's bid at the 22nd Party Congress to establish supremacy over the Communist bloc and world Communist movement 

would aggravate Sino-Soviet tensions and further complicate 

Hanoi's effort to maintain a neutral stance. 

On balance, however, it is clear that North Vietnam has 

been a major beneficiary of the Sino-Soviet dispute as the two 

bloc powers have intensified competition for influence o.;zr 

"national liberation movements" in Southeast Asia. The rscipient of vastly augmented economic and military assistance 

from both Moscow and Peiping during the past two years, the 

North Vietnamese party leaders have every reason to persist 

in their chosen role of moderator and neutral in the deepening conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China.