UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4675

WALTER VANCE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Peter J. Messitte, District Judge.

(CR-97-0103-PJM)

Submitted: June 30, 1998

Decided: July 20, 1998

Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

James K. Bredar, Federal Public Defender, Susan M. Bauer, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne

A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Deborah A. Johnston, Assistant

United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Walter Vance pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, conditioned upon his right to appeal the district court's denial of

his motion to suppress. On appeal, Vance contends that the district

court erred by finding that the police officers had sufficient cause to

search him. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

At the suppression hearing the following facts were revealed. As

three police officers1 approached in a vehicle, they saw Vance and a

second man standing in a building entranceway. The officers exited

the vehicle and told the men to "clear the hallway."2 The other man

approached the officers with a pistol in his hand and an officer

retrieved the weapon.3 At approximately the same time, Vance was

walking behind the other two officers and placed his hands inside his

coat pocket. An officer stopped and frisked Vance finding a loaded

pistol in his coat pocket. The district court found that based upon the

totality of the circumstances the officers had a reasonable articulable

suspicion that Vance was armed relying on United States v. Poms,

484 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1973).

The reasonableness of a search and seizure is a legal conclusion

which we review de novo with the factual findings underlying the

legal conclusions reviewed for clear error. See United States v.

Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992). A brief investigative stop

is permissible whenever an officer has reasonable suspicion grounded

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1 The officers were employed by Bradley Hills Limited Partnership,

were commissioned by the state of Maryland, and granted with full arrest

powers at this property. (J.A. at 17).

2 (J.A. at 25). Also, loitering is prohibited in entranceways of the property. (J.A. at 20, 21, 111).

3 The gun was in fact a starter's pistol.

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in articulable and specific facts that a crime has been or is about to

be committed. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229

(1985). At trial, defense counsel contended that the officers could

have permissibly stopped Vance to question him but that the patdown search was impermissible. We have previously rejected this

argument. See United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir.

1987) ("`There is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly

confronting a person suspected of serious crime, should have to ask

one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.'")

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)). An officer making a lawful investigatory stop may protect

himself by conducting a search for weapons if he has reason to

believe the suspect is "armed and dangerous." Id. at 1107 (citing

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)). We do not find that

the district court erred in its order denying the motion to suppress.

The officers testified that because one man had a gun and because

Vance was moving away from and behind them as he placed his

hands in his pockets, they feared Vance, too, had a weapon. Accordingly, we affirm.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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