U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

35–790PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

THE FUTURE OF NATO: NEW 

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, 

AND THE ENVIRONMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 2019 

Serial No. 116–23 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

JASON STEINBAUM, Staff Director 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

GREGORY MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois Ranking Member 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GABRIELLE GOULD, Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Jones, James L., USMC, Retired, Jones Group International ............................. 6 

Farkas, Evelyn N., Resident Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the 

United States ........................................................................................................ 13 

Wilson, Damon, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council ............................... 22 

ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Materials submitted for the record from General Jones ...................................... 26 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 47 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 48 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 49 

(1) 

THE FUTURE OF NATO: NEW CHALLENGES 

AND OPPORTUNITIES 

TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE

ENVIRONMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William Keating (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. KEATING [presiding]. This hearing will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the future of NATO and our American commitment to it. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to 

the length limitation in the rules. 

Mr. KEATING. I will now make an opening statement, and then, 

turn it over to the ranking member for his opening statement. 

This Thursday marks the 70th anniversary of our NATO alliance. We recently reflected on the importance of NATO in a hearing last month held by the full committee. Today, I would like to 

follow on that by discussing and examining the future of NATO 

and America’s commitment to it over the next 70 years. 

We have watched NATO evolve in significant ways since its inception. And looking at the different threats we now face today, we 

must anticipate that it will again evolve in new ways to address 

this changing landscape. This evolution is important because 

NATO has long been, and will continue to be, a cornerstone of our 

security and defense policies. Our strategic advantage over our 

competitors is that we have a coalition. Russia and China cannot 

say the same. And that is something we cannot lose sight of nor 

ever take for granted. 

However, to maintain this advantage, we need strong American 

leadership along two fronts. The first is by making it clear that we 

are committed to NATO and that the alliance cannot be broken or 

undermined by our adversaries. The second, and the focus of this 

hearing today, is America’s role in leading NATO and its member 

States and partners through this unique period of change, as new 

members join and as we face new threats that challenge NATO’s 

readiness and ability to respond in an effective and a timely manner. 

NATO expansion has meant new and often smaller States are 

being integrated into the alliance, and this presents questions for 
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how best to coordinate this integration, their contributions, and the 

strengths and the vulnerabilities that they bring with them. 

Further, NATO must adapt in order to address new and emerging threats from China, Russia, cyber, hybrid warfare, terrorism, 

and climate change, among others. This means contemplating possible changes in NATO’s structure and thinking strategically, not 

only about how NATO should adapt to this landscape, but also how 

the U.S. and other member States must work together, now more 

closely than ever, to strengthen the alliance and their own capabilities. We addressed our shared values in our previous subcommittee 

hearing last week, and NATO is one example where our shared 

values really matter. 

There is no disagreement over commitment to reach the 2 percent benchmark that has been the case since at least 2014, and 

that was the continued understanding as recently as 4 weeks ago 

when I was in Brussels. And that is the understanding as NATO 

members gather this week in Washington. As more members meet 

the 2 percent and the 20 percent thresholds for defense spending, 

I would like to examine in this hearing how member States should 

prioritize their investments within the context of new threats 

NATO members are facing. 

As I take stock of the threats we are facing, it could not be clearer to me that this is what we need and this is the time we need 

to be standing shoulder to shoulder with no daylight between us. 

Our friends and allies must stand together, defending our shared 

values that are most sacred to our security and that are under attack, values of freedom and democracy. 

We need NATO allies who are equally committed to those values 

as we are and who we can trust completely, because our NATO alliance is about our security. Lives are on the line. We must hold 

new and aspiring members to the standard, but, perhaps more importantly, we must hold current members accountable to upholding 

these values that are at the very core of our NATO alliance. We 

should look at what our new member countries are ready to bring 

to the table as well as democratic backsliding among our current 

members, as well as possible action like Turkey’s purchase from 

Russia of S–400’s and working with China on FG networks in Europe. 

I, therefore, look forward to addressing these important issues 

today and hearing from our witnesses. We have incredible insight 

into how we should go planning in the next 70 years as a country, 

and we have that same insight as allies. And it is a pleasure to 

hear from our witnesses today with their opinions about which direction we should go. 

With that, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the panel for being here with us today. 

Look, NATO is not just an ally; they are our most important 

group of allies. We understand that strong alliances protect us from 

aggressors and guard our shared values. 

We appreciate you guys all being here. If you wonder why there 

may not be a huge turnout today, it is because this is the third 

hearing in 3 weeks that we have had on our friendship with NATO 

and Europe. We understand it is very important. 
3 

Tomorrow morning, we are going to have the NATO Secretary 

General Stoltenberg address our Congress in advance of the 70th 

anniversary of our security cooperation, 70 years of working together to face down oppression. It is sufficient to say that our alliance is strong. 

That being said, there are a lot of other issues we need to actually finally address on this committee has well. In the past week, 

we saw the first round of elections in Ukraine, Brexit’s status 

changing on a nearly hourly basis, and Russia landed soldiers in 

our own backyard to prop up the corrupt Maduro regime. 

And Ukraine exit polls show that the political newcomer and the 

comedian won about 30 percent of the vote, while current President 

Poroshenko won about 18 percent. These two candidates will now 

face off on April 21st. By all accounts, it is likely that both candidates will support Ukraine’s move toward NATO and EU accession. It is a good thing for our alliance and the United States. We 

also need to be having a hearing on what we saw in that first 

round of elections and what we can expect from the runoff. 

In the U.K., Prime Minister Theresa May has indicated that she 

will resign following a successful Brexit. However, we are now seeing a coalition formed to push for a soft Brexit where the U.K. retains its membership of the European economic area. We could be 

having a hearing on how this would affect transatlantic trade and 

security with Great Britain, with whom we have the most special 

bilateral relationships. 

Russia, the largest focus of this subcommittee, is not only responsible for the death of thousands of Syrians, but now has entrenched 

themselves to protect Venezuelan dictator Maduro as he starves his 

own people, a firsthand example of how socialism never works. 

There was once a time when this committee cared about Russia’s 

activity in our own backyard, and we need to continue to do that, 

instead of trying to handcuff the Trump administration from having a military option on the table during diplomatic negotiations. 

Had Congress threatened to block President Kennedy’s strategy to 

militarily quarantine Cuba from receiving Soviet ICBMs during the 

Cuban missile crisis and use military force, if necessary, to protect 

our Nation, I do not know if our negotiations would have gone as 

well as they did. 

I believe that some on this committee are being blinded by their 

opposition of the current administration, resulting in the same 

hearing 3 weeks running. The only reason, because the administration is telling our NATO allies the hard truth, that you can do 

more. And I would agree at the beginning. We can say it differently, but it is a message that needs to be said. 

So, I reiterate my support for NATO, this committee’s support, 

and the Congress’ support for NATO and Europe. I just think it is 

time to begin to move on to other pressing issues in this world as 

well. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. KEATING. I thank the ranking member. 

And I thank our witnesses for being here today. I realize that 

your schedules are greatly under strain, and we really appreciate 

your offering your thoughts here. 
4 

I will now introduce our witnesses. General James Jones served 

as Commander of the U.S.-European Command and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. He also served as President Obama’s 

National Security Advisor and the State Department’s Special 

Envoy for the Middle East Regional Security. He is currently the 

chairman of Snowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. 

Dr. Evelyn Farkas is a Resident Senior Fellow at the German 

Marshall Fund of the United States. Previously, she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, and as a Senior Advisor to the Supreme Allied Command of 

Europe and Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for the 

NATO summit. Welcome. 

Mr. Damon Wilson is the executive vice president of the Atlantic 

Council covering Europe and NATO. He previously served as Special Assistant to President George W. Bush and Senior Director for 

European Affairs at the National Security Council, and Deputy Director of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary. 

We appreciate hearing you today, and please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. And without objection, your prepared written 

statements will be made part of the record. 

I will now go to General Jones for his statement. Thank you very 

much, General, for being here. Thank you for your service. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES L. JONES, USMC, RETIRED, JONES 

GROUP INTERNATIONAL 

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Kinzinger. 

I am honored to be here, in part, to celebrate the 70th birthday 

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I was privileged to serve 

as the 14th Supreme Allied Commander from 2003 until 2006. I 

was honored to be in NATO when we went from 19 to 26 countries 

in 2004, and I am delighted to see that North Macedonia will be 

joining us, to bring the total membership of NATO to 30 members 

in the near future. 

One of the things that NATO has to deal with, and has dealt 

with I think and is doing quite well at, is understanding that there 

is a great difference between the 20th century and the 21st century 

in terms of what NATO does. Without going into too much detail, 

NATO is undergoing, in my view, a transformation that needs to 

continue from being a reactive defensive alliance to a more 

proactive, engaged alliance to actually prevent future conflict. 

Projecting influence in the face of new threats, in a way we are 

going back to the future to face the rise of autocrats, and intelligent autocrats that have the economic capability to cause us great 

harm. Dominant among those challenges is China’s quest for influence, not only total control inside its borders, but also the most 

control as it can gain outside of its borders, and it is moving into 

the European land mass with alarming speed. 

Russia, not too much needs to be said about that. Mr. Putin is 

very clear on what he thinks about NATO, and his most cherished 

ambition is to do anything he can to bring about disruption and, 

in fact, ultimately, the demise of NATO. 
5 

Iran continues to be the world’s greatest exporter of terror. Africa 

remains a challenge for the European land mass that NATO has 

to be involved in, non-State actors and hybrid warfare, just to 

name a few. 

Gentlemen and ladies, the defense of Europe has shifted from 

Germany to the Black Sea and to the Baltic States in the east, and 

certainly to the North African coastline to the south. And that fact 

brings with it a number of threats that our friends and allies are 

concerned with. 

NATO is relevant today I think in real terms. It is active outside 

of its borders in many ways that not many of our countrymen really understand. In Afghanistan, Operation Resolute Support is underway since January 2015. In Kosovo, 4,000 troops are deployed. 

In the Mediterranean, Active Endeavour has been replaced by Sea 

Guardian, again, a very important operation to counter terrorism. 

In Iraq, the NATO mission is underway since 2018 to help with 

training. And the African Union peacekeeping operations, going 

back to 2007 in Somalia, air policing in 2014 in the NATO land 

space where countries do not have adequate air forces to protect 

themselves. In short, this is a different world that we live in. It is 

a world that demands a very proactive and engaged NATO. And it 

also demands American leadership and participation. 

The financial picture is looking better. We have not arrived 

where we need to be, but we are getting there. NATO is buying the 

right type of equipment, in my view, and is partnering with the 

economic reality and the economic threats that countries like China 

and Russia, in particular, bring to the European land mass. 

In my view, peace and stability can only be maintained in the 

European land mass and elsewhere with American leadership, with 

involvement in three areas: security, economic development, and 

governance and rule of law. If you combine those three things, particularly I might bring to the attention of the committee the Three 

Seas Initiative, which was brought about by the Atlantic Council 

in 2014, which is to help the Central and Eastern Europeans with 

their own type of Marshall Plan, if you will, a north-south corridor 

from the Baltics to the Adriatic involving energy, telecommunications, and transportation renovation. Everything during the cold 

war was built east to west. Twelve countries are now involved in 

this project, and over 50 projects are underway. The U.S. Government has supported it very well. And this, combined with the military posture of NATO, which is encouraging, I think will contribute 

measurably to peace and stability in the European land mass. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:] 
6 

8 Atlantic Council 

Testimony before 

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment 

Hearing on the Future of NATO: New Challenges and Opportunities 

April 2, 2019 

General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.) 

Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council 

Views are those of my own 

Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger, and distinguished members of this Committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to testify before you today on the future of NATO. 

Thursday marks the seventieth anniversary of the NATO Alliance. While it is worth reflecting on what 

NATO has achieved over its history, it is also worth examining what the future holds for the Alliance. The 

most successful military alliance ever, NATO kept the peace in Europe and triumphed in the Cold War, 

essentially without without firing a shot. NATO's role adapted with the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, as it 

helped to end a humanitarian crisis and defeated fascism in the Balkans. After the United States was 

attacked on September 11, 2001, our Allies and partners rallied to our side and around the mission in 

Afghanistan. 

It's also worth noting that NATO's seventieth anniversary is not the only occasion we are celebrating this 

year. This November marks thirty years since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the end of 

communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe. Last month we celebrated twenty years of NATO 

membership for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the fifteenth anniversary of NATO's "big 

bang" expansion that brought seven other formerly communist states into the Alliance in 2004, and 

yesterday marked ten years since Albania and Croatia joined NATO. This year we can also look forward 

to the accession of the Alliance's thirtieth member, North Macedonia. 

And it is precisely to look forward that we are here today. I believe NATO today is as relevant to US 

security as ever. But to stay relevant for the next 70 years, NATO, as it did in the 20'h century, must 

proactively meet 21" century challenges rather than simply react to them. A proactive NATO will always 

be driven by US leadership. Without it, NATO will never be the fullest version of itself and could, 

conceivably, unravel entirely. We should not delude ourselves into believing that this is not President 

Vladimir Putin's most cherished strategic goal. 

As a Marine and former Supreme Allied Commander (2003-2007), I am of course concerned with the 

military dimension of NATO. In that sense, we have arrived at a "back to the future moment." US 

leadership and the European and global security architecture is again challenged by a Russia intent on 

changing the security environment to advance its power and place in the world. What is required again 

is a common US and Allied approach to strategically competing and defending ourselves with our allies 

against Putin's Russia intent on fracturing the Alliance and willing to threaten and damage the security 

of its neighbors. Make no mistake, Putin's ambitions would be emboldened by US and Allied weakness 

and division within the Alliance (and the EU) and the erosion of democratic values within some member 

states; we must remain vigilant on all fronts against Putin's aims, and proactively meet the challenge. 
7 

The Alliance has responded, and is responding, to Putin's challenge in effective ways. Decisions by the 

Alliance to forward station forces in the Baltics and Poland, to dramatically improve the readiness of its 

forces at tactical, operational, and strategic levels across all services, to step up efforts to counter hybrid 

threats and disinformation in peacetime, to ramp up training and exercising, and to call out Russia's INF 

violations, show a clear willingness of Allies to stand up with the US to Russian interference outside of its 

borders. Congress's decision to consistently and decisively fund the European Deterrence Initiative is 

critical- both in practical terms and as a clear signal of US leadership to Putin, and one that 

strengthened Allied resolve as well. 

However, the Alliance cannot stand still or ignore some of the real challenges it faces with respect to 

deterring Russia. As General Scaparrotti testified last month, more needs to be done to ensure adequate 

deterrence for the Alliance. Many nations in northeastern Europe and along the Black Sea have 

responded to this reality with investments in defense budgets and capabilities and are pursuing 

innovative collaboration. Indeed, as Secretary General Stoltenberg recently reported, progress has been 

made by our Canadian and European Allies to meet their spending commitments. We have had four 

consecutive years of real increases in defense spending among Canada and European NATO, including 

$41 billion to defense budgets. Allies have also made progress in meeting the pledge to spend 20% of 

defense budgets on major equipment; a majority of Allies are spending above the 20% mark now and 

twenty-four Allies are on track to meet or exceed that goal by 2024. We should recognize progress in 

these critical areas. 

There are other ways in which European Allies are working innovatively to improve deterrence. The 

Three Seas Initiative is a gee-strategically critical effort by the nations situated between the Baltic, Black, 

and Adriatic Seas to accelerate the development of essential cross border transportation, energy and 

telecommunications infrastructure linking them and their region to wider Europe. The Three Seas 

nations have identified 48 transboundary projects core to regional and continental economic 

development. Collective prosperity, of course, is instrumental for assuring the transatlantic alliance's 

collective defense and sustaining the resilience of a Europe undivided, free, and secure. Strategically, full 

implementation will fortify the alliance's eastern periphery and blunt Put in's ability to wield energy as a 

weapon in the region. Operationally, modernized and integrated transportation corridors, energy 

linkages, and communications networks will directly benefit NATO's capabilities. The Three Seas 

Initiative enjoys the strong backing of the administration, and it merits Congress fullest endorsement 

and support. I would be happy to submit forthe record a fuller description of the Initiative, its status, 

and requirements. 

Yet, despite aggressive and innovative efforts by some countries in Europe, some nations, consumed by 

other priorities or feeling otherwise secure, have barely responded to Russian interventions and 

aggression. Unfortunately, the level of concern about the threat Russia poses to NATO is uneven across 

the Alliance. Part of this has to do with the fact that the defense of Europe has moved east to the Baltic 

States and Black Sea, where during the Cold War, defending Europe started further west. Complacency 

by nations who do not feel directly threatened has weakened our ability to deter further Russian action. 

In fact, some Allied leaders have appeared sympathetic to Moscow while others have simply been naive 

about Russian intentions. This plays into Putin's strategy and must be reversed for the good of all of 

Europe. It is especially important in the face of Russian military modernization and activities outside 

their border that are destabilizing for the Euro-Atlantic area. 

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8 

At the same time, the anti-access and area denial challenges posed by Russia in Europe's east- and by 

China elsewhere- require aggressive responses and combining new and old ways of thinking about 

deterrence. For instance, NATO should consider making an aggressive effort to preposition equipment 

forward, consider a permanent forward headquarters, and leave no doubt that we have an adequate 

number of rotational troops to counter the threat. Moreover, and let me blunt, withdrawing troops 

from contested areas, which parts of Europe are today, is a bad idea. Security vacuums will be filledand not by actors who share the same perspectives or values we do. Where forward presence is 

concerned, virtual presence is actual absence. 

And while I noted some progress on defense spending, I recognize the debate around burden-sharing is 

increasingly tense and politicized. Make no mistake, there is merit to the debate. When Allies make 

commitments -like the Defense Investment Pledge in Wales or in Prague in 2002- with no visible 

actions that follow-through on their commitments, the credibility of the Alliance suffers, the solidarity of 

the Alliance is strained, and ability of the Alliance to deter is weakened. Equally, when targets that were 

set to improve readiness or increase capabilities are not implemented, there are legitimate questions 

about the political willingness of Europe to take our collective security seriously. 

To that end, we should recognize the EU is an important security actor, even as our preference will 

always be to work through NATO in the first instance. Refusing to engage bilaterally with the EU, or 

prohibiting cooperation between NATO and the EU, is counterproductive and fails to recognize and 

empower genuine efforts to increase European capabilities. 

The United States is right in asking that Europe do more. But that imperative is not credible without a 

genuine conviction that United States is invested in NATO for the long run and willing to fulfill its Article 

5 obligations. Statements to the contrary are counterproductive to the leadership role the United States 

must play to move the Alliance forward. Such statements also damage the perception of NATO among 

the American public, something I know members of Congress must think about with respect to 

constituent opinions. 

I hope that all of you believe as I do that NATO is an indispensable strategic asset to the United States, 

that we have an economic imperative to ensure the peaceful integrity of the Euro-Atlanticfor 

fundamental economic reasons, and that we have a security imperative to meet threats forward and to 

protect the community of democratic nations in an increasingly unstable world drifting toward 

authoritarianism in some quarters. We recognize that having like-minded friends with common values, 

invested in the US-led global security architecture, makes us safer in general while also giving us more 

options when confronting a crisis. Institutions like NATO help normalize expectations around rule of law, 

collective security, and free and open economies in ways that promote enduring stability for the US- as 

the last 70 years have shown. NATO is a significant investment, but it is an investment in ourselves, and 

one that provides us with these practical advantages. We must all do our part to ensure the American 

people understand this- because the threats of the future will require NATO more than ever. 

I'd like to address two ways in which NATO must act to be prepared for the future. First, as has been 

well-documented, activities to Europe's south in the form of war, civil unrest, migration, terrorism, and 

trafficking have significant implications for European security. The Alliance is making progress in 

addressing such issues, but in relative terms, NATO's southern strategy remains hollow and underresourced. NATO must be active in addressing these threats, for instance, in terms oftraining and 

capacity building in Africa to shore up security and governance as a means of preventing crises that 

affect European security. The same might be said of NATO's role in the Middle East. Creating security 

3 
9 

conditions in neighboring regions as a means to enable better governance and increased commerce is a 

component of NATO's southern strategy that must be further developed. 

To that end, NATO's network of partnerships globally is a source of its vitality and something the 

Alliance must pursue with focus. Of course, NATO's door should remain open to any democracy willing 

to meet the requirements of membership and I am gratified by the agreement between Greece and 

North Macedonia that has the latter on the path to join the Alliance. NATO's foundational partnerships 

in Europe, as well as those in other regions of the globe, provide the Alliance with insights and options in 

an uncertain world. I find recent speculation about NATO partnerships in Latin America worth discussing 

and, in light of indicators signaling the centrality of the Indo-Pacific region to the global economy, 

NATO's partnerships in Asia are growing in importance. I believe that NATO could be of great assistance 

to our Arab friends as they consider ways to offset Iran's strategic ambitions in that region. 

This brings me to the second action NATO must take to effectively navigate the coming decades. Simply 

put, our European allies must come to grips the global ambition of China. While Europe is just 

awakening to the strategic implications of Chinese investments in everything from transportation 

infrastructure to digital technology, the approach to China across the region is uneven and muddled. 

Italy's recent decision to accept a significant Chinese investment in maritime infrastructure ignores the 

reality of Chinese ambitions. Skepticism across Europe about the dangers of Chinese technology for SG 

networks should be a wake-up call for those of us concerned about transatlantic security and the 

interoperability of the Alliance. Ceding access to China to key Italian ports is a mistake of strategic 

proportions, one that Italy will regret. 

Since divergent approaches to China across the Atlantic have the potential to unravel Alliance unity, 

NATO should start serious consultations about the short- and long-term security implications of Chinese 

investments and actions immediately. At a moment when the United States is demanding more 

resources from Allies, China is investing liberally across the continent. This is a dynamic that can 

exacerbate the existing divergence of views and shadow over the fact that China does not share the 

values that bind the community of free nations nor does it abide by global commercial norms and 

standards. Trying to appease our "competition" is a very flawed strategy. 

What should NATO do? It should deepen in its existing partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, including those 

with India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia and work an Asian presence mission into its 

repertoire of NATO exercises. While China does not present an immediate military threat to Europe, 

Beijing's challenges to the rules-based international order is a transatlantic concern. It stands among the 

more significant long-term challenges in a world that is increasingly globalized. 

Let me finish my underscoring that for NATO to be as relevant to the 21" century as it was to the 20'", 

US leadership remains the essential ingredient. If the US is not committed to NATO, if it does not invest 

in NATO, if does not set the agenda for what NATO should do, NATO will gradually fade into 

irrelevance ... full stop! Members of Congress have a heavy responsibility, to be sure, in ensuring that our 

commitments and investments are executed. We all have a critical role in explaining the value of NATO 

to the American public. If we do that effectively, NATO will remain active, adaptive, and indispensable to 

the advancement of American interests and security. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear today to offer my thoughts on the future essentiality of America's 

commitment to NATO, and NATO's essentiality to our national security. I look forward to your questions. 

4 
10 

James l. Jones 

General, US Marines (Ret) 

Executive Chairman Emeritus, The Atlantic Council 

### 

5 
11 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, General Jones. 

Dr. Farkas? 

STATEMENT OF EVELYN N. FARKAS, GERMAN MARSHALL 

FUND OF THE UNITED STATES 

Ms. FARKAS. Thank you. It has been a while since I have been 

on the House side, though I worked for 7 years on the Senate side. 

But I started here with this committee as a fellow in 1992, and 

they had me sitting in that anteroom there. So, it is nice to be 

back, but I do not have familiarity with the buttons. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, all of 

you members, for taking the time today, I know for now the third 

hearing on NATO. It is important because today our international 

system, NATO, and democracy around the world have never been 

in graver danger than they are today since the cold war. 

Today, Americans and our democratic allies in Europe, Asia, and 

elsewhere, are in a standoff against autocratic dictators working to 

destroy our democracy and to thwart our domestic and international objectives. 

First and foremost among these adversaries, as the ranking 

member mentioned, is the Russian government, led by Vladimir 

Putin. Russia is our greatest threat. The Kremlin is not satisfied 

solely by threatening our international interests, it seeks also a 

corrupt, weak, and undemocratic America. 

Russia, together with China, which seems to co-opt rather than 

destroy the international order, aims to return us to a 19th century 

sphere-of-influence system. Now we know from history that this alternative to the current global order leads to great power military 

competition, economic protectionism, and, ultimately, war. 

Russia would like nothing more than a United States uncoupled 

from the alliances that have brought us unprecedented success. 

NATO, our only operational collective security alliance, is in the 

sights of Putin’s Russia. Yet, in this moment of danger, NATO is 

strong. In the decades since 1991, NATO expanded in territory and 

mission, as the general mentioned, and the recent historic agreement between Greece and North Macedonia means the latter will 

become the 30th alliance member. Countries want to join, and 

when they qualify, we welcome them. 

NATO did not grow in size, however, solely to deter Russia, 

though that was a motivation. NATO primarily enlarged to 

strengthen democracy and free markets. Today, deterring Russia 

is, however, once again at the top of the NATO agenda. And I 

would prioritize that. Russia violated the sovereignty of Georgia 

and Ukraine with invasions and occupations and the sovereignty of 

almost all, if not all, NATO neighbors with cyber and information 

operations. 

Meanwhile, China hopes to develop 3G communications networks 

in Europe, which would leave NATO members more susceptible to 

Chinese espionage. This comes on top of Chinese Belt and Road 

Initiative infrastructure projects which have threatened to put European countries into debt traps, beholden to Chinese entities for 

decades. 

NATO must focus on countering autocracies like Russia and 

China. And again, that is where I would put the priority. First, 
12 

NATO must provide military support and advice to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. NATO should seek a way to bring Georgia into 

NATO, perhaps temporarily carving out the occupied areas, as we 

did with East Berlin during the cold war. And I am sort of stealing 

this idea from my colleague, Damon Wilson, who once set it forth 

in an Atlantic Council paper several years ago. Maybe it will catch 

on now. 

Second, NATO must prepare the two remaining Balkan aspirants, Bosnia and Kosovo, for membership and neutralize the 

threat posed by Russian influence and presence in the Balkan region. 

Third, NATO members must contribute more to building military 

conventional and asymmetric capabilities. Allies, of course, should 

meet their pledge to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense and 

to invest 20 percent on real capabilities by 2024, but NATO should 

also establish, among other things—and I have listed a bunch more 

in the written testimony—a fund to help Eastern European allies 

and partners who still have legacy Soviet and Russian equipment. 

This was something that we did not have money for under the 

Obama Administration, but I would have liked to have done it 

dearly. 

Fourth, NATO must protect its military cutting edge and competitiveness vis-a-vis China. 

Fifth, finally, and most importantly, NATO members must renew 

their vows to democracy. Democratic backsliding cannot be ignored, 

especially when Russia works every day to cripple NATO’s cohesion 

and resolve. The governments of Hungary, Poland, and Turkey 

must be held accountable. 

In the United States as well, we must heed the warning of the 

authors of How Democracies Die. Democracies die when leaders do 

four things. One, refuse to play by the democratic rules. Two, delegitimize their opponents. Three, tolerate or encourage violence. 

Four, prepare to curtail the civil rights of political opponents and 

the media. 

We must shore up our democracy and improve the processes and 

functionings of its institutions. We must ensure civility and democratic culture. We must fight corruption and improve our capitalist 

system to provide transparency, opportunity, and basic well-being 

for all Americans. Any alliance is only as good as the sum of its 

parts. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Farkas follows:] 
13 

Prepared Statement 

By 

Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas 

Resident Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States of America 

Before 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment of the Committee 

on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives 

Hearing on "The Future of NATO: New Challenges and Opportunities," April2, 

2019 

Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger, distinguished members of the Committee, thank 

you for holding this hearing and giving us the opportunity to consider with you the challenges, 

threats and opportunities facing NATO within the context of its Open Door policy. 

This year, 2019, is a milestone year. In two days we will celebrate the 70thanniversary of the 

founding of NATO with a meeting of foreign ministers here in Washington DC. And in October 

we will mark 30 years since the Berlin Wall-- the physical barrier dividing East and West Berlin, 

and the communist East Bloc from the democratic West- was breached by people eager for 

democracy and freedom. And yet, our international system, NATO, and democracy in America 

and around the world have never been in graver danger since the Cold War than they are 

today. 

Today, the United States, we Americans, and our democratic allies worldwide, are in a standoff 

against autocratic dictators working to destroy our democracy and to thwart our domestic and 

international objectives. First and foremost among these adversaries is the Russian 

government led by Vladimir Putin. Russia is our greatest threat; the Kremlin is not satisfied 

solely by threatening our international interests. It also seeks a corrupt, weak and 

undemocratic America. 

The Threat 

Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Kremlin have one main objective- to stay in power, to 

maintain the corrupt, autocratic, Kleptocracy running Russia today. To achieve this objective, 

Putin has determined he must demonstrate to the Russian people that he is making Russia 

great again; indeed, after Russia's economic growth tapered off in 2011, he has found it useful 

to distract Russians with military adventurism abroad. Putin seeks to re-establish a sphere of 

influence for Russia, which includes the territory that comprised the former Soviet Union, and if 
14 

2 

he can get away with it, the former East Bloc as well. He and his Kremlin cronies don't want an 

international order based on existing multilateral institutions which have served democracy, 

human rights and the United States so well. Instead, Moscow seeks the old 19'hcentury balance 

of power system, where nations live in a state of mistrust, arms races and cycles of 

protectionism and war. 

Meanwhile, Putin believes that the United States, the strongest diplomatic, economic and 

military power in the world, continues to seek to spread democracy, including to the Russian 

Federation. Therefore, Putin is determined to make America weak, unable and unwilling to 

support democracy for oppressed peoples. This incidentally, is a major component of what is at 

stake in Syria and Venezuela. (The other dimension, again, is Putin's strategic interest in global 

influence, an operational need for bases and ports for his military.) 

In order to achieve his objectives, Putin and his government have repeatedly violated 

international law and norms and human rights. They invaded neighboring Republic of Georgia 

in 2008, and continue to occupy 20 percent of its territory. In 2014 Russian invaded Ukraine, 

illegally annexing Crimea, and igniting a separatist war in another part of eastern Ukraine. The 

Kremlin has murdered a list of its enemies in other countries including the United Kingdom, 

France, Ukraine and likely the United States1 and has used chemical and nuClear materials to do 

so. Russian fighters shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine, killing 298 innocent 

persons. Russia has interfered in elections in Western and Eastern Europe and the United States 

and continues to conduct information operations aimed at sowing discord and division and 

eroding confidence in democracy. We learned last year, Russian cyber actors have infiltrated 

our energy and water grids and have inserted malware to facilitate potential future attacks. 

Russia has violated the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and several conventional arms 

control agreements. Its military continues to conduct unprofessional risky air operations, 

buzzing U.S. and allied ships and aircraft. Russian military jets have encroached upon U.S., 

European and Japanese airspace at levels not seen since the Cold War, necessitating defensive 

military maneuvers by our aircraft in response. And the Russian government and its forces have 

assisted the Syrian military in its deliberate bombing of hospitals, innocent civilians and a UN 

convoy. 

Russia is no longer a status quo power. Together with China, which seeks to co-opt rather than 

destroy the international order, Moscow aims to return to a 19'hcentury sphere of influence 

international disorder. We know from history that this alternative to the current global order 

leads to great power military competition, economic protectionism and ultimately, war. Russia 

would like nothing better than a United States uncoupled from the alliances that have brought 

us unprecedented economic, military and diplomatic success. NATO, our only operational 

collective security alliance is in the sights of Putin's Russia. 

1 "Fonner Putin Advisor had Neck Fracture at Time ofDeath in Washington Hotel," Associated Press, March 16, 

2019. 
15 

3 

Yet, in this moment of danger, NATO remains strong. 

In the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO expanded in territory and 

mission. In 1999, the first former East Bloc members- the Czech Republic, Hungary and 

Poland-- joined the Alliance and five years later, in 2004, seven other Eastern European states 

joined. In 2009, the enlargement took a southern turn, admitting Albania and Croatia and two 

years ago Montenegro became the 291hNATO member. With the historic and courageous 

agreement between Greece and North Macedonia regarding heritage and names, the 

301hmember will be the Balkan state previously known as Macedonia. I urge the administration 

and Congress to move expeditiously to approve North Macedonia's accession. 

At a time when NATO is being directly challenged by the Russian government, both politically 

and militarily, and its value is publicly questioned by the president of the United States, the 

accession of these two new Balkan members is a dramatic endorsement of NATO's enduring 

attractiveness and value. 

NATO's founding document the North Atlantic Treaty enshrined within its Article 10 the "Open 

Door" principle, declaring that NATO membership is open to any "European state in a position 

to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 

area." 2 NATO membership- if states can meet the political and military criteria- will earn them 

security, stability and greater economic prosperity. In exchange, because new members must 

have resolved border or other disputes with neighbors and internal ethnic conflicts NATO allies 

can expand the European territory that is "free and at peace." Expanded peace and democracy 

means more commerce within Europe and across the Atlantic. Individual states, the region and 

all NATO allies benefit. 

The threats have changed, but NATO has maintained its relevance because collective security is 

almost always better than going it alone, even for large politically, economically and militarily 

strong states like ours. As Secretary General Stoltenberg put it at a recent German Marshall 

Fund event, "Let us remember that alliances do not stand in the way of strong and independent 

nations ... NATO exists precisely to ensure the freedom and prosperity in which sovereign 

countries and peoples can thrive."3 

NATO did not grow in size solely to deter Russia, though for most initial members that was a 

motivation. NATO primarily enlarged to the East to strengthen democracy and free 

markets. New members demonstrated they were capable of managing domestic and regional 

ethnic and political tensions and committed to further democratic, economic and military 

reform. They accepted the responsibilities of Articles 3 (self-defense) and S (collective 

defense). They subsequently contributed to the NATO common budget and to deployments 

from Kosovo to Iraq, Afghanistan and to the Counter-ISIL effort focused in Iraq and Syria. And 

2 NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty, signed April 4, 1949, Article 10. 3 "NATO Alliance Marking 70 Years, looks to Counter Threats". US Department of Defense, March 18, 

2019,https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1788045/nato-alliance-marking-70-vears-looks-to-counterthreats/. 
16 

4 

all members endorsed and participated in the effort to forge a new relationship with the 

Russian Federation, as enshrined in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which included 

commitment to sovereign borders and a ban on "substantial and permanent" new deployments 

to NATO's new eastern members. 

The New NATO Agenda 

Today deterring Russia is, once again, at the top of the NATO agenda. Russia violated the 

Founding Act with its military invasions and occupations in Georgia and Ukraine and with its 

cyber and information operations against almost all, if not all, NATO members. NATO has 

responded with assistance to the aspirant countries on its periphery, and strong conventional 

deterrence on NATO territory. The U.S. contribution to this effort in the form of the European 

Deterrence Initiative (EDI) is invaluable. I commend the Trump administration for providing 

lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine and for increasing the amount of EDI. But I urge Congress 

to reconsider the proposed 2020 cut to that funding. Now- when Russian naval forces 

continue to violate Ukrainian freedom of navigation rights and to illegally hold 3 vessels and 23 

sailors seized in November- is not the time to ease up on support to our eastern allies and 

partners. 

Russia has consistently and aggressively worked to counter the efforts of Balkan countries to 

join NATO, including attempting to assassinate the Montenegrin prime minister and through 

disinformation operations in North Macedonia. Russia exerts influence in Serbia through 

energy and other business deals and its military intelligence presence at the south Serbian base 

in Nis. The Kremlin actively works to exacerbate ethnic division and encourage separatism in 

Bosnia and is encouraging the Serbian government to push for a dangerous, ill-considered land 

swap with Kosovo. 

Meanwhile, China is also working to extend its economic and political influence to Europe, 

actively working to develop SG communications networks in Europe, which would likely leave 

NATO members more susceptible to Chinese espionage, sabotage and blackmail. This comes 

on top of existing Chinese "Belt and Road Initiative" projects which have threatened to put 

European countries into "debt traps," where they are beholden to Chinese entities for 

decades. 

NATO, its new and old members. must focus on countering threats from 

autocracies like Russia. and China and other threats. in the following fashion: 

NATO as an institution must provide military support and advice to Ukraine, Georgia, and 

Moldova, partner nations located on Russia's periphery that are all subject to Russian military 

occupation. NATO exercises should continue in Georgia and Ukraine and these aspirant 

countries should continue to be invited to other exercises, including those with a hybrid or 

asymmetric warfare component. Military assistance should include lethal defensive ground, 

maritime and air systems; the prospect of potential losses is the best potential means to stop 

further Russian military aggression in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions. NATO assistance and 
17 

5 

that of member states should come with requirements for accountability and transparency in 

defense spending, military procurement and personnel management. 

NATO must work more actively to prepare the two remaining Balkan aspirants for 

membership: Bosnia and Kosovo, and to neutralize the threat posed by Russian influence and 

presence in the region. Bosnia has taken key steps to qualify for NATO membership, including 

registering some of its defense properties; the alliance has demonstrated flexibility by 

approving activation of a Membership Action Plan (MAP) of advice, assistance and targets for 

Bosnia to reach in order to quality for membership. Bosnia's political and ethnic fragmentation 

remains the obstacle to the state agreeing to the MAP. Resistance by the Bosnian Serb 

leadership is routinely strengthened by Moscow. NATO members must counteract those forces 

by supporting constitutional reform in Bosnia and providing assistance to combat corruption in 

the military and defense sector. 

The refusal of Spain, Romania and Slovakia to recognize Kosovo's statehood, because they fear 

the separatist precedent is a NATO failure. The reasons for their stance have nothing to do with 

Kosovo's unique history and its UN-mandated and approved independence process. All NATO 

members must recognize Kosovo as it is- a sovereign state under international law, with a seat 

at the United Nations. NATO must maintain security in Kosovo through its Kosovo Force (KFOR) 

deployment, but must work with the European Union to bring a durable resolution to the 

conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. Given the ethnic map in Kosovo and Serbia, a land swap is 

unlikely to be the solution. Moreover, in light of Russian (and Chinese) challenges to territorial 

borders any alterations in the south Balkans will serve to encourage separatism in Budapest 

and elsewhere. Let's not forget that the first European leader to express sympathy for Russia's 

military operations in Ukraine was Hungarian prime minister Victor Orban, whose nationalist 

agenda exploits the issue of Hungarian minorities in Hungary's neighboring states. Separatism is 

exactly what the non-recognizers of Kosovo fear; Russia knows this and seeks to further inflame 

intra-NATO disagreement and to perpetuate Kosovo's status outside NATO, denied even 

aspirant member status. 

Serbia is not a NATO aspirant, but it aims to join the European Union. Yet at the same time the 

Serbian government, plagued by nationalist politics. is an easy target for Russian 

manipulation. Serbia is beholden to Russia for energy and is a willing host to Russian 

intelligence operatives, allowing Kremlin influence in Serbia to increase. Belgrade continues to 

welcome European and American investment, but so long as the Kremlin targets the EU and its 

members Serbia's situation will remain untenable. Serbia must eventually chose democracy or 

go the route of autocracies like Belarus, firmly under the Kremlin's thumb. NATO and its 

members can encourage Serbia to pick democracy, by promoting military modernization; the 

Serbian armed forces know NATO is the military "gold standard." The U.S. should continue the 

robust exercise program it has with the Serbian military, but demand more publicity and 

acknowledgement of this work, at least to match the level of hoopla that accompanies the few 

bilateral engagements between Russia and Serbia. 
18 

6 

NATO members must all contribute more to building military conventional and asymmetric 

capabilities. This means that all allies, including new allies, should honor their Wales Defense 

Investment Pledge to spend 2 percent of their GOP on defense and to invest 20 percent of that 

in "major capacities" (as opposed to personnel or other base operating expenditures) by 

2024. All allies need to improve readiness by fully manning designated combat units, properly 

maintaining equipment and participating in more exercises. The Eastern European allies who 

still have legacy Soviet/Russian equipment in their inventory need to transition to NATOinteroperable platforms soonest. NATO should establish a fund to help the newest members 

achieve this objective. Continued reliance on Russian systems is a vulnerability Moscow is only 

too happy to continue to exploit. 

NATO must do more to counter bad cyber-actors such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.• 

The Alliance should define cyber-attacks or hybrid ("little green men") operations that would 

trigger Article S in order to dispel the current ambiguity Russia and other adversaries can and 

do exploit. The Supreme Allied Commander must be directed to develop more exercises for 

defensive cyber operations and contingency plans for hybrid operations. 

NATO must work more actively to protect its military cutting edge and competitiveness vis-avis China, in particular. The United States should devote more resources to the Committee on 

Foreign Investment in the United States {CFIUS) process, and help its allies establish similar 

procedures for vetting foreign investment for impact on national and collective security. Allies 

should increase coordination to prevent investments that could endanger national security and 

to prevent cyber-and other industrial espionage. 

NATO members must all be required to "renew their vows" to liberal democracy, a free and 

fair market economy, and the alliance must be prepared to call out governments working 

counter to the bedrock principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. Democratic backsliding cannot 

be ignored, especially in the current environment where Russia works every day to cripple 

NATO's cohesion and resolve. The governments of Hungary, Poland and Turkey must be held 

accountable. The United States and other allies should increase funding for civil society, 

independent media and organizations focused on anti-corruption in all eastern European 

member states. Secretary Pompeo recently signaled an interest in doing so in 

Hungary.5 Congress should ensure that the resources and resolve meet the challenge. 

In the United States as well, we would be wise to heed the warning of the authors of How 

Democracies Die.6 Democracies die when leaders: 1) refuse to play by the democratic rules; 2) 

delegitimize their opponents; 3) tolerate or encourage violence, and; 4) are prepared to curtail 

the civil rights of political opponents and the media. We must shore up our democracy, improve 

the processes and functioning of institutions and ensure civility and democratic culture. We 

4 Sophie Arts, "Offense as the New Defense: New life for NATO's Cyber Policy," German Marshall Fund of the 

United States, December 13, 2018. 5 "Press Availability with Hungarian Foreign Minister Szijarto," Secretary of State's Remarks, U.S. Department of 

State, February, 11, 2019. 6 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, (New York: Crown, 2018). 
19 

7 

must also fight corruption and improve our capitalist system to increase transparency, 

opportunity and provide for a common basic health and wellbeing for all Americans. 

Any alliance is only as good as the sum of the parts. So long as countries still want to join NATO 

we know we are doing something right, but we can't take the success of the Alliance for 

granted. 

Thank you. 
20 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Dr. Farkas. 

Mr. Wilson? 

STATEMENT OF DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. WILSON. Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger, 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the future of NATO, and thank you for your 

leadership on our alliance. 

NATO is the most successful alliance in history, in large part because of its ability to adapt. So, as ministers gather in Washington 

today, it is appropriate that this committee focuses not on the past, 

but on the future. As our Nation prepares for a long period of strategic geopolitical competition, we need to put our alliances in 

NATO, in particular, at the core of our strategy. And to make them 

effective, U.S. leadership is the key ingredient. 

The United States and its allies increasingly agree that the great 

challenge of the 21st century will be the competition between a free 

world and authoritarian, State-led capitalism, especially China and 

Russia. That means U.S. interests are best served when Washington and its allies act together. We need our allies as force multipliers of our interests and values when we face Moscow and Beijing. For NATO, this means responding to Russia’s aggression 

today while preparing for the challenge posed by China’s global 

reach. 

With regard to Russia, in my view, this requires a significant 

continuous U.S. military presence in the Baltic States, Poland, in 

the Black Sea, and Balkan regions, together with our allies. Today, 

our allies are forward positioned in the Baltic States; the United 

States is not and should be. 

The Russian challenge to us is likely to remain asymmetric. 

Therefore, we should double down on our support, working with 

the European Union to strengthen the resilience of democratic societies through efforts that range from diversifying energy routes 

and supplies to democratic defense of disinformation. 

At the same time, we need a common approach with our allies 

on how to handle China’s challenge, including by agreeing to common trade practices and approaches to set global standards, supporting our allies and establishing CFIUS-like review of foreign investment, and forging a concerted transatlantic effort to ensure the 

free world harnesses new technologies such as secure 5G before the 

authoritarians do. 

In an era of great power competition, our goals should be to keep 

and expand our alliances. This means that we should stand by 

NATO’s open-door policy, recognizing that welcoming new members 

is about expanding the zone of security and the community willing 

to defend freedom. Enlargement to those willing and able to accept 

the responsibility of membership should be seen as in our interest, 

not just in the interest of the aspirants. The Senate will have the 

next opportunity to act to welcome North Macedonia as NATO’s 

30th member, demonstrating that Russia’s effort to disrupt our interest in the Balkans is failing. 

Looking ahead, however, we should keep an open mind with regard to additional members, whether that be other Balkan nations, 
21 

Cyprus as part of a settlement, Ukraine and Georgia in a way that 

Article 5 would not apply to their occupied territories, or Sweden, 

Finland, or Malta, if their publics and governments opted for it. 

While geopolitics have returned to Europe, today’s competition is 

global. Russia is back in the Middle East and Latin America. Witness China’s global reach. 

Recognizing this reality, the United States should lead a more 

concerted effort to thicken the political bonds and operational ties 

between NATO and its global partners. Today, these partnerships 

are an under-invested asset at NATO Headquarters, and we should 

begin to change that. This means the United States could consider 

formalizing the links among U.S. treaty allies in Europe and those 

in Asia. And at the same time, we should begin fostering alliancelike links among our existing allies with strategic partners such as 

India and, in Latin America, Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, as we 

consider what unfolds in Venezuela. 

Beginning to build a network of alliances now with the United 

States at the center would provide a more capable and intentional 

global democratic response to the authoritarian challenge. It could 

also be a precursor to a more formal set of alliances among democracies who are committed to protecting their way of life and a 

democratic international order. 

So, as NATO leaders being arriving here today, there is no doubt 

a lot of attention will focus on which allies are making strides toward their defense investment pledges, and rightly so. While much 

more remains to be done, we can recognize that, since 2016, European allies have spent an additional $41 billion and have plans 

through 2020 of an additional $100 billion. 

That said, I am concerned about the current burden-sharing debate, that it can misplace the focus on what is strategically important inside the alliance. America’s friends and allies are the United 

States’ best competitive advantage. Indeed, Congress, the administration, and the American people can view our alliances as a national strategic asset. As such, each administration serves as a 

steward of these assets with a responsibility to defend, strengthen, 

and lead them. U.S. leadership, after all, is the decisive element in 

determining the success of NATO’s future. 

Thank you for the privilege to testify today. I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:] 
22 

• Atlantic Council 

Testimony before 

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment 

Hearing on The Future of NATO: New Challenges and Opportunities 

April2, 2019 

Damon M. Wilson 

Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council 

Views are those of my own. 

Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger, and distinguished members of this Committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to testify today on the future of NATO. 

This week, we will commemorate the 70th anniversary of NATO, the most successful alliance in history. 

The Alliance has succeeded in ensuring the peace and security of its members in large part because of its 

ability to adapt. So as leaders gather in Washington, it's appropriate that this Committee focuses not on 

the past, but on NATO's future. 

As our nation prepares for a long period of strategic geopolitical competition, we need to put our 

alliances, and NATO in particular, at the core, not the periphery, of our strategy. And to make them 

effective, US leadership remains the key ingredient. 

The United States and its allies increasingly agree that the great challenge of the 21st century will be the 

competition between the free world and authoritarian, corrupt state-led capitalism, especially China and 

Russia. If you accept this premise, US interests are best served when Washington and its allies act 

together. We need our allies as force multipliers for US interests and values when we face Moscow and 

Beijing. 

For NATO, this means responding to Russia's aggression today, while preparing for the challenge posed 

by China's growing global reach. 

With regard to Russia, we need to continue the Alliance's efforts to bolster its deterrence and defense in 

response to a revanchist Kremlin seeking to threaten its neighbors and our allies. In my view, this 

requires a significant and continuous US military presence in the Baltic states, Poland, and in the Black 

Sea and Balkan regions, supplemented by our NATO allies. Today, our allies are forward positioned in 

the Baltics states; the United States is not and should be. 

But the Russian challenge to us is likely to remain asymmetric. Therefore, we should double down on 

our support, working with the European Union, to strengthen the resilience of democratic societies 

through efforts that range from diversifying energy routes and supplies to democratic defense of 

disinformation. 

At the same time, we need a common approach with our allies on how to handle China's challenge, 

including by agreeing to common trade practices and approaches to set global standards, supporting our 

allies in establishing CFIUS-Iike review of foreign investments, and forging a concerted transatlantic 

1 
23 

effort to ensure the free world harnesses new technologies such as secure SG before the authoritarians 

do. 

In an era of great power competition, our goal should be to keep and expand our alliances. 

If our aim is to keep our allies as allies, we should avoid policies that ostracize allies whether Turkey or 

Hungary, even as we raise tough issues. We should work to keep our allies anchored in an alliance 

structure that provides the security necessary for democracies to face their own difficult political issues 

at home. 

Furthermore, this means that we should stand by NATO's open door policy, recognizing that welcoming 

new members is about expanding the zone of security and the community willing to defend freedom. 

Enlargement to those willing and able to accept the responsibility of membership should be seen as in 

our interests, not just in the interests of the aspirants. 

The Senate will have the next opportunity to act to welcome North Macedonia as NATO's 30'h member, 

demonstrating that Russia's effort to disrupt our interests in the Balkans is failing. looking ahead, 

however, we should keep an open mind with regard to additional members, whether that be other 

Balkan nations; Cyprus as part of a settlement; Ukraine and Georgia in such a way that Article 5 would 

not apply to their occupied territories; or Sweden, Finland, or Malta if their publics and governments 

opted for it. 

While geopolitics have returned to Europe, today's competition is global. Russia is back in the Middle 

East and latin America. Witness China's global reach. 

Recognizing this reality, the United States should lead a more concerted effort to thicken the political 

bonds and operational ties between NATO and its global partners. Today, these partnerships are an 

underinvested asset at NATO headquarters; we should begin to change that. Specifically, the United 

States should consider formalizing the links among US treaty allies in Europe and those in Asia, namely 

Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. At the same time, we should begin fostering alliancelike links among our existing allies with strategic partners such as India and, in Latin America, Colombia, 

Brazil, and Mexico. 

Beginning to build a network of alliances now with the United States at the center would provide a more 

capable and intentional global democratic response to the. authoritarian challenge. Doing so could also 

be a precursor to a more formal alliance among democracies who are committed to protecting their way 

of life and a democratic international order. 

As NATO leaders begin arriving in Washington today, no doubt much attention will focus on which allies 

are making strides toward their defense investment pledges. And rightly so. While much more remains 

to be done, since 2016, European allies have spent an additional $41 billion in defense; through 2020, 

they will spend an extra $100 billion; and their plans call for an additional $3SO billion through 2024. 

That said, I am concerned that the current burden-sharing debate misplaces the focus on what's 

strategically important and potentially undermines the Alliance's credibility. 

The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany account for 86 percent of total NATO 

defense spending. Given that the United States and United Kingdom spend over 2 percent of GDP on 

2 
24 

defense and France is close, we are having a debate about what amounts to 14 percent of NATO's total 

defense expenditure plus Germany. The current political debate is outsized relative to its strategic 

importance, in terms of delivering the capabilities the alliance needs to act. Furthermore, excessive 

focus on burden-sharing risks perpetuating questions about the Alliance's credibility and stoking doubts 

among the US public about NATO. The United States is right in expecting its allies to do more; but we 

need to remember that our own efforts are in our interests; they are not acts of charity. 

To conclude, in an era of geopolitical competition, America's friends and allies are the United States' 

best competitive advantage. Viewing our alliances that way would compel consistent policies to lead our 

alliances to ensure united fronts in standing up to Russian and Chinese aggression. Our defense strategy 

should inevitably drive Washington to bolster and expand its alliances. 

Indeed, Congress, the administration, and the American people should view our alliances as national 

strategic assets. As such, each administration serves as a steward of these assets with a responsibility to 

defend, strengthen, and lead them. 

US leadership after all is the decisive element in determining the success of NATO's future. 

Thank you for the privilege to testify today. I look forward to your questions. 

### 

3 
25 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

This week, we look back and celebrate NATO and look back at 

the history. But this hearing is about looking forward. 

General Jones, you hit, I think, the theme of that hearing, talking about a new way of viewing, a much more proactive way. We 

will look at the 2 percent, the 20 percent, but, really, what is 

NATO’s role in coordinating how that is going to be spent, how we 

are going to move in that direction, eliminating unnecessary 

redundancies and ensure improved deterrence and readiness in 

that regard? So, in that proactive sense that you spoke about, could 

you share some of your thoughts in that regard? 

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that this is really the moment for the alliance to really 

transform itself in its thinking philosophically in response to some 

very, very serious threats that are coming our way. NATO is included in all of these 5G discussions that are going on about China 

and the U.S. and Huawei, and the like. NATO can, and is showing 

signs of moving toward, buying the right type of equipment for the 

future. It is showing signs of moving into the countries that border 

the Black Sea and the Baltic States with expeditionary missions. 

There is even talk in Poland about encouraging the United States 

to establish fixed bases again in Poland. 

China and Russia are devoting a large part of their weapons acquisition to area and access denial in terms of reinforcing NATO, 

the European land mass, or in the Pacific. That will cause us to 

have to think about how we are able to react quickly in times of 

emergency. 

But I also really think that, as the example—and if you do not 

mind, Mr. Chairman, I would like to include this manual on the 

Three Seas Initiative as part of my testimony. 

Mr. KEATING. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
26 

COMPLETING EUROPE • 1 

CHAIRMEN'S 

INTRODUCTION 

One of the greatest successes of our new century 

has been the progress made in unifying Europe. 

The accession of Central Europe's countries to the 

European Union (EU)' has contributed to the end of 

division that wrought confrontations and conflicts. Yet 

this task is far from finished. Europe's economic woes, 

as well as new security challenges along the Union's 

eastern border add to the urgency of completing and 

consolidating the European integration project as part 

of our transatlantic vision of a Europe whole, free, and 

at peace. 

One of the biggest challenges that must be met to 

complete European integration is the development 

of infrastructure networks that will bind together 

the economies of Central Europe with the rest of 

the European Union. Toward that end, this report 

is intended to give renewed priority to plans for a 

North-South Corridor of energy, transportation, and 

telecommunication routes linking the Baltic, Adriatic, 

and Black Seas. Reanimating, accelerating, and 

resourcing this project would initiate the next phase of 

completing Europe. The North-South Corridor must be 

a top priority for the European Union and its Member 

States, as well as the transatlantic community. 

EUROPE'S INCOMPLETE 

INTEGRATION 

Since the turn of the millennium, the EU's ranks have 

expanded with three rounds of enlargement featuring 

Central European democracies. This enlarged EU has 

also made great progress toward the completion of a 

truly single market. Through various instruments. the 

EU has invested billions of euros to build and upgrade 

Central Europe's infrastructure. 

Yet, the integration of these Central European Member 

States remains unfinished, as the political and 

regulatory integration fostered by EU membership 

has yet to be fully complemented by infrastructural 

integration, both within Central Europe and of Central 

Europe into the broader European market space. 

Central European countries are still burdened by 

insufficient integration, unsatisfactory infrastructural 

connectivity with Western Europe, and weak NorthSouth links. This is a legacy from the Soviet era, 

when Moscow actively prevented intraregional 

1 Throughout the report we use Centra! Europe as a geographic are-a 

encompassing the EU Member States from Vise grad Four countries (Czech 

Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, 

Lithuania) and Slovenia and Croatia. Eastern Europe refers to the EU Eastern 

Partnership Member States (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, 

and Azerbaijan). 

infrastructural integration in order to maintain high 

levels of dependency on the Soviet Union. 

The detriments of this lack of integration are most 

evident in the energy sector. Central Europe remains a 

set of inadequately connected national energy markets, 

isolated from the rest of the EU and exposed to a 

supply monopoly. This dependence in Central Europe 

not only constitutes a supply-security risk; because of 

insufficiently diversified gas markets and monopoly 

pricing, it also increases prices in comparison with the 

Western European market, which is well diversified 

and more liquid. 

The disadvantages of missing links are also manifest in 

the transportation and telecommunications sectors, in 

which Central European countries generally lag behind 

their western peers in terms of connectivity. Moreover, 

Central European nations that remain outside of the 

EU-most notably, Moldova and Ukraine-are further 

disconnected from the EU, and now find themselves 

vulnerable to economic and political pressure from an 

increasingly assertive and aggressive Russia. 

In the past, Europe's leaders have emphasized 

development of the North-South Corridor. Real 

progress has been made in building the Baltic-Adriatic 

Corridor, a key road and railway network stretching 

from Poland's Baltic coast through Central Europe, 

south to the shores of Italy. In 2011, the European 

Commission identified the creation of the North-South 

Energy Corridor as a central priority in the effort to 

create a single European energy market. That year, 

the nations of the EU-10-with the active support 

of CEEP-signed a memorandum of understanding 

reaffirming the construction of that energy corridor as 

a shared objective. 

However, the momentum behind these elements of 

a comprehensive North-South Corridor has since 

waned. Europe's weak economy and budgetary 

constraints have impeded multilateral, governmental, 

and commercial investment in infrastructure. This has 

contributed to the dilution of Central Europe's unified 

resolve, and diminished attention and commitment on 

the EU level. The EU no longer gives the corridor the 

political and policy priority it once did. 

The need to reanimate the North·South Corridor has 

been given further urgency by the escalating tensions 

between Moscow and Europe-with special regard 

to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as well as the North 

American energy boom and its impact on global and 

European energy markets. Russia's use of energy price 
27 

2 • COMPLETING EUROPE 

hikes and cutoffs to cripple the Ukrainian economy 

and intimidate the rest of Europe bring back memories 

of previous energy cutoffs by Russia over the last 

decade. This further underscores the need to reinforce 

Europe's economic resilience, and strengthen its 

energy security by completing its internal energy 

market and diversifying its energy supplies. 

The North-South Corridor serves the following 

strategic objectives, which are central to the vision of a 

united Europe with a single market: 

Economic Integration: The North-South Corridor 

would establish a powerful set of economic arteries 

including energy pipelines and power lines, 

highways and railways, and telecommunication 

links extending from Poland's Baltic coast through 

the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, and to 

the coast of Croatia. Its spurs would span across 

the Baltic states and the Balkans, and reach into 

Moldova, Ukraine, and Turkey. This system would 

tie Central and Western Europe more tightly 

together by intersecting and complementing key 

existing and planned West-East infrastructure. It 

would increase the exchange of goods and services 

within Central Europe, and between Central and 

Western Europe. 

Energy Security: The North-South Corridor's 

liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and its 

networks of gas and oil lines and electricity grids 

would diversify the sources of energy for all 

Central European states. This is exemplified by 

the LNG terminal being completed in Swinoujscie, 

Poland, and the one proposed for Krk Island, 

Croatia, which would enable Central Europe to tap 

into an increasingly global LNG market, including 

prospective shipments from the United States 

under the right set of regulatory and market 

conditions. The corridor is crucial to the completion 

of an effective single European energy market, one 

that can receive inputs of oil, gas, and electricity 

from a variety of current and prospective European 

and non-European suppliers, and distribute them 

· throughout Europe on a competitive basis. 

Competitiveness and Economic Resilience in a 

Global Economy: Completion of the North-South 

Corridor represents an opportunity to increase 

competitiveness and resilience in Central and 

Eastern Europe, providing infrastructure of the 

type needed to ensure that Europe can compete 

effectively with economies elsewhere in the world. 

Furthermore, raising infrastructure-investment 

rates along the axis of the corridor provides an 

effective stimulus to economic growth. Thus, the 

process of corridor development represents an 

important contribution to solving Europe's current 

macroeconomic, fiscal, and monetary challenges, 

which include issues of competitiveness, the risk 

of deflation, high unemployment, and increasingly 

sensitive intra-EU migration trends. The NorthSouth Corridor would foster smart, sustainable, 

and inclusive economic growth, and would drive 

the reindustrialization of Europe through lower 

energy prices, faster transportation links, and 

modern digital infrastructure. 

Significant Contribution to Europe's Climate 

Goals: The creation of a single market-featuring 

integrated and efficient infrastructure-is crucial 

to Europe's climate goals and in building a lowemission economy. The North-South Corridor 

would contribute significantly to the attainment of 

these goals by increasing the efficiency of Europe's 

transportation system and enabling greater use of 

natural gas. 

THE NORTH-SOUTH CORRIDOR 

AND THE TRANSATLANTIC 

RELATIONSHIP 

Of course, the vision of a Europe that is whole, free, and 

secure is not solely a European concern. The United 

States has a vested interest in a strong, integrated, and 

competitive Europe, and thus should fully support the 

completion of the North-South Corridor. 

Promoting the corridor is an important way for 

Washington to demonstrate continued commitment 

to peace and prosperity in Europe, particularly Central 

Europe. The corridor will also provide critical nodes 

to maximize benefits flowing from prospective energy 

trade liberalization in the context of the Transatlantic 

Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) treaty 

currently being negotiated by Brussels and Washington. 

For these reasons, it is absolutely essential to phase out 

outdated US restrictions on exports of crude oil and 

natural gas, in order to increase liquidity and enhance 

Europe's energy security. 

Supporting the corridor is also a direct way for 

Washington to help strengthen Central Europe's 

resilience against Russian intimidation and aggression. 

It would lay the foundation for a more normalized 

and vibrant economic relationship between Europe 

and Russia. Indeed, a prosperous and secure Central 

Europe fully integrated into a single European market 

will no doubt be a more important and more valuable 

trade partner with Russia too, 

The preconditions are there for a more active US role 

in the North-South Corridor. Energy security has long 

been a top priority of the US-EU relationship, and.the 

US-EU Energy Council has been one of its most active 

intergovernmental bodies. A central priority of the 

Council has been to assist the EU in diversifying its 

energy sources away from an overdependence upon 

Russian oil and gas. This priority has been vigorously 

pursued by the US special envoy on Eurasian energy 

affairs, then by the special envoy and coordinator on 

international energy affairs and the Energy Bureau 

at State Department, as well as the US Department of 

Energy. 
28 

WITH A NEW EUROPEAN 

LEADERSHIP, A NEW 

OPPORTUNITY 

The new European Parliament, European Commission, 

and European Council leadership presents an 

opportunity to give the North-South Corridor renewed 

priority in the European Union and the transatlantic 

community. This study is intended to provide the 

conceptual framework that will enable policymakers 

on both sides of the Atlantic to generate and focus the 

political and financial capital necessary to revitalize 

and complete this strategic project. 

The research and findings of these chapters 

have reinforced our strong conviction that the 

implementation of the corridor can and should 

be accelerated. This requires renewed political 

momentum, sustained governmental and regulatory 

focus, and a stronger coordination of national and 

EU resources. With regional resolve, EU support, and 

American political commitment, the North-South 

Corridor can become a reality in the near future, 

preferably within the next five years. 

Toward these ends, we submit the following strategic 

recommendations. Detailed recommendations can be 

found at the end of each chapter. 

1. We welcome the European Council Conclusions 

on October 24, 2014, declaring the NorthSouth Corridor a critical infrastructure project. 

Consequently, the European Commission should 

embed this priority into its key policy and budgetary 

directives and initiatives: 

The European Commission should highlight the 

corridor as a critical element of the €300 billion 

plan being developed to leverage public and private 

investment to strengthen Europe's infrastructure, 

drive forward economic growth and enhance 

energy security. 

The corridor should be reflected in the mandates 

of relevant European commissioners, including, 

among others: the vice president for jobs, growth, 

and investment; the vice president for the digital 

single market; the vice president for energy union; 

the commissioner for transport and space; and the 

commissioner for climate action and energy. 

2. The North-South Corridor should be approached 

holistically, guided by a vision that integrates gas 

and oil pipelines and infrastructure, electricity 

interconnections, rail and road networks, and 

telecommunications Investments. As a key artery 

in Europe's economy, the North-South Corridor will 

have greater impact if it leverages the synergies that 

can flow from the intersection and overlap of pipelines, 

power lines, railroads, highways, telecommunication 

links, and other communication networks. 

COMPLETING EUROPE • 3 

3. The North-South Corridor should be prioritized in 

available public funding for infrastructure investment. 

The European Commission in 2011 found preliminary 

estimates for total infrastructure-investment needs up 

to 2020 in the range of €1.5-2 trillion, or an average 

of €150-200 billion annually. In the energy sector the 

Commission noted that "public and private entities in 

the Member States will need to spend around €400 

billion on distribution networks and smart grids, 

another €200 billion on transmission networks and 

storage as well as €500 billion to upgrade and build 

new generation capacity between now and 2020."2 Five 

hundred billion euros is estimated to be needed for 

the implementation of the Trans-European Transport 

Network (TEN-T) program. Last, but not least, between 

€38-58 billion and €181-268billion capital investment 

is required to achieve the Commission's broadband 

targets. More recently, the European Commission' put 

"overall investment needs for transport, energy and 

telecom infrastructure networks of EU importance 

amount to EUR 1 trillion fortheperiod up to 2020:· For 

the European Union, the historical figure of 2.6 percent 

of GOP implies annual-investment amounts of nearly 

€500 billion for economic infrastructure until2030. 

Our report focuses specifically on critical infrastructure 

components that are needed to create the backbone 

of interconnected Central European energy. 

transportation and telecommunications markets along 

the North-South Corridor from the Baltic to the Adriatic 

and Black Seas. We found that the total costs of the 

the projects identified in this report as strategically 

important and critical to the completion of the 

corridor amount to an estimated €50.5 billion 

(€Z7 billion for energy, €20 billion for transport 

and €3.5 billion for telecommunications as as 

detailed in the respective chapters of this report)-

-a small portion of the enormous infrastructure 

investment needs outlined above especially in light 

of the strategic significance of the corridor. 

In these times of austerity, raising new public funds 

to invest in infrastructure is an unlikely prospect 

The European Union should reprogram and 

dedicate existing funds to promote and cofund 

the infrastructure projects most critical to the 

timely completion of the North-South Corridor as 

identified and outlined in this report, through the 

following actions: 

Reprioritizing available funds in the Connecting 

Europe Facility-Energy (CEF-E) by tweaking the 

selection criteria for projects of common interest 

(PC!) to ensure that the top priorities-the twentyseven projects in gas and six in electricity that 

2 European Commission, press release, "The Europe 2020 Bond Initiative," 

February 28. 2011, http:/ jeuropa.euf rapidfpress-re!ease_MEM0-11-121_ 

en.htm?locale=en 

3 European Commission, "Long-Term Finandng of the European 

Economy,H Green Paper, March 23,2013, http:/ jeur-lex.europa.eujresource. 

html?uri,.cellar:9df9914f-6c89-48da -9c53-d9d6be 7099fb,0009.03/ 

DOC_l&format<=PDF. 
29 

4 • COMPLETING EUROPE 

the European Commission's proposed European 

Energy Security Strategy identified as critical for 

the EU's energy security in the short and medium 

terms-enjoy priority access to CEF-E funding. 

Prioritizing infrastructure investments in the 

national development plans of the Member States 

in the framework of the EU's Multiannual Financial 

Framework for the period of 2014-2020. Member 

States in Central Europe should closely coordinate 

their cross-border infrastructure-development 

plans, to maximize the availability and efficiency 

of European funding. 

Earmarking €3.5 billion to a North-South 

Backbone Gas Pipeline from Lw6wek to Sisak from 

combined sources from CEF-E, the Cohesion Fund 

and a regional infrastructure investment fund (see 

point 5 below). 

Streamlining access to the €11.305 billion of the 

Connecting Europe Facility-Transport (CEF-T) 

ringfenced for related transport-infrastructure 

investments in the Member States eligible under 

the Cohesion Fund to facilitate absorption capacity 

of Member States along the North-South Corridor. 

Doubling the percentage of Connecting Europe 

Facility funds allocated to telecommunications 

infrastructure and leveraging those funds for 

regional and national projects as opposed to solely 

pan-European projects. Today, only 3 percent 

of CEF funds, or some €1.14 billion are directed 

toward the telecommunications sector. Giving 

priority for CEF telecommunications funding to 

those Central European states lagging in digital 

literacy with the aim to foster public-private 

partnerships to further develop digital services 

infrastructure. Leverage the rails, roads, and 

pipelines of the North-South Corridor as venues 

through which to build an efficient access network 

of Central European broadband infrastructure. 

Focusing EU resources on key corridor connectors 

would demonstrate the viability of the North-South 

Corridor as a whole, and thereby generate additional 

funding from national governments and commercial 

entities. In addition, national governments of Central 

Europe should consider creating a €1 billion 

regional Investment fund that pools resources to 

complement the funding provided by the European 

Union as outlined below. European funding alone 

cannot provide for all public investment needs, and 

Central Europe is the most direct beneficiary of the 

North-South Corridor and the economic growth 

and resilience it promises to yield, along with the 

rest of the EU. A unified posture, backed by financial 

commitments by the concerned Member States, will be 

necessary to generate and sustain renewed support for 

the corridor in the European Commission and among 

Western European governments. 

4. As outlined above, Infrastructure connectors 

whose acceleration and completion are most 

critical to completing the North-South Corridor and 

the integration of Central Europe with the rest of the 

EU should be prioritized. Focusing on the corridor's 

most urgent missing links and bottienecks is the best 

way to accelerate the project and to demonstrate the 

corridor's commercial viability. 

Top priorities for the North-South Corridor in the 

energy sector: 

Development of a 15-billion-cubic-meters-peryear (bcmjy), bidirectional gas pipeline-the 

Backbone Pipeline-between Lwowek in from 

Swinoujscie, Poland and Sisak in from Krk Island 

Croatia, through the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 

and Hungary, together with 6 bcm/y connections 

to Poland's new LNG regasification plant at 

Swinoujscie and Croatia's planned LNG regas 

facility at OmiSalj or Krk Island. 

Additional key elements include: 

o development of linkages to Lithuania, Latvia, 

and Estonia, to strengthen open-market 

infrastructure in Northeastern Europe and 

end the isolation of the Baltics; 

o development of the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline 

and bidirectional interconnectors with 

Romania and Bulgaria, as a means to tap into 

the Southern Gas Corridor currently under 

development and to further integrate the 

Balkans into the European energy market; and 

o implementation of large-capacity flows to 

Ukraine to diversify energy supplies and 

enable Europe to leverage the country's 

extensive storage facilities. 

Physical reverse flow enabled on the 

interconnectors between Hungary and Romania, 

as well as Hungary and Croatia (the latter one 

being a prerequisite for the Adria Corridor that 

would provide an alternative suplly route into 

Ukraine from the Mediterranean); 

Strengthening the connection between the NorthSouth Corridor and Western Europe (e.g., a new 

Polish-Germany bidirectional pipeline) in order to 

increase the potential number of gas sources for 

the corridor and its supply elasticity. 

Completing Europe's strategic oil infrastructure 

by building the Pan-European Oil Pipeline and 

the extension of the Odessa·Brody oil pipeline. 

New electricity connections between Nordic 

and continental European markets to adapt to 

changing generation portfolios in Central Europe 

and the Baltic region, as well as accommodating 
30 

Germany's nuclear phase out plan, as an important 

alternative route between Nordic and continental 

Europe, supporting the more efficient use of hydro 

potential in the North with the thermal and wind 

dominated RES in the Southern region. A more 

resilient~ interconnected transmission facility will 

improve security of supply and the distribution of 

RES generation to meet Europe's 20-20-20 targets 

with an increasing focus on long-term ]X'Ojects 

looking toward 2030. 

Top priorities for the North-South Corridor in the 

transportation sector: 

Accelerated completion of the Baltic-Adriatic 

Transportation Corridor, the North Sea-Baltic 

Corridor, and the Orient-East Med Corridor with 

special regard to: 

Upgrading and improving multi-modal port 

interconnections in the Baltic region that 

integrate rail and road routes the Baltics 

with Central Europe, and accelerating the 

implementation of high capacity railway 

connections along the axis ("green transports"). 

A high-performance rail connection from West 

to East and North to South is a necessary 

precondition for sustainable economic 

development and cohesion in the regions along 

the North-South Corridor that has positive 

economic spill-over impacts over further 

regions along the interconnection stretches as 

well. The Rail Baltica Project, linking HelsinkiTallinn-Riga-Kaunas-Warsawwill enable major 

regional freight transport to be shifted from 

road to rail. 

Upgrading key intermodal transport 

connections linking the nations of Central 

Europe and the region to transportation 

routes through Austria. Completion of the 

Central European intersections of the NorthSouth Corridor running from Vienna-GrazKiagenfurt (including the Koralm line) to 

Udine-Venice-Ravenna, along with linkages 

connecting the landlocked "Visegrad capitals" 

along the North-South Corridor to multimodal 

ports of Romania and Bulgaria along the 

OstravajPrerov-Zilina-Kosice-UA border, 

Vienna-Bratislava/Vienna-Budapest-AradBrasov-Bucuresti- Constanta routes. 

Establishing and modernizing routes 

connecting the Baltic-Adriatic Transportation 

corridor to multi-modal ports in Romania and 

Bulgaria and beyond; 

Modernizaton of the five North-Adriatic ports. 

These provide the cheapest naval route from 

the Far East via Suez to Central Europe with 

a distance that is about 2,000 nautical miles 

shorter than the route to Northern European 

COMPLETING EUROPE • 5 

ports. These ports form a perfect multimodal 

gateway to the key European markets. They 

will form a European logistics platform. 

Top priorities for the North-South Corridor in the 

telecommunications sector: 

Creation of a backbone infrastructure along the 

corridor the cost of the necessary investments 

to efficiently upgrade the region's capacities and 

provide for the development of digital literacy and 

skills. 

Doubling the percentage of Connecting Europe 

Facility funds allocated to telecommunications 

infrastructure and leveraging those funds for 

regional and national projects as opposed to 

solely pan-European projects. Prioritizing CEF 

telecommunications funding to those Central 

European states lagging in digital literacy with the 

aim to foster public-private partnerships to further 

develop digital services infrastructure. 

Leveraging the rail, road and pipelines of the 

North-South corridor as venues through which 

to build an efficient access network of Central 

European broadband infrastructure. 

5. The European Central Bank (ECB) should permit 

limited exceptions to national budget restrictions 

when funds are to be spent on cross-border 

projects involving two or more Member States. This 

would help fund projects whose commercial rationale 

may depend as much on their benefit to the consumer 

as to any commercial entity; it would help the ECB to 

ease spending restrictions by national governments 

without 'driving a coach and horses' through its 

current policy; and at a time of! ow growth and reduced 

employment prospects, it would help to allocate funds 

for construction projects that are relatively labour 

intensive. 

6. The North-South Corridor should be a key 

element of the US-EU agenda. A Europe that is 

economically prosperous and integrated, and whose 

energy security is resilient, is a Europe that will be a 

more capable partner in an age of increasing global 

turmoil. 

As has been the case in the Southern Corridor, the 

United States can leverage both its newfound energy 

prowess and its influence to help bring focus and 

unity to the complex, and often politically charged and 

controversial, resource decisions that are an inevitable 

part of vast and complex multinational projects, 

and create the preconditions for real energy supply 

diversification. 

The North-South Corridor should be regarded as a 

critical piece of a "transatlantic energy alliance;' and 

thus should become a priority of the US-EU relationship. 
31 

6 • COMPLETING EUROPE 

The first meetings between Washington and the 

new European Commission-whether through 

the EU-US Energy Council, the initial engagement 

of the new EU high representative and the US 

secretary of state, or the next EU-US Summitshould be used to proclaim the North-South 

Corridor a shared priority. 

As part of its strategy to help drive forward the 

North-South Corridor, the United States should 

liberalize its energy markets to allow for the 

unfettered export of crude oil and LNG, particularly 

to Europe. The prospect of direct US energy sales 

to Europe, and the fact that expanded US exports 

to other regions of the world often push other 

LNG and crude oil to Europe, will enhance the 

commercial viability of the North-South Corridor. 

7. A North-South Corridor Forum should be 

established to foster regular consultations and 

to generate awareness, interest, funding, and 

political and commercial support. Operating as an 

independent platform chaired by countries along the 

corridor on a rotating basis, convened regularly at 

senior (ministerial and ambassadorial) and working 

General James jones 

Co-Chairman 

President, jones Group International 

Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

Former US National Security Advisor to President 

Barack Obama 

Chairman, Brent Scowcroft Center on International 

Security, Atlantic Council 

levels, the forum would facilitate intergovernmental 

coordination and collaboration among the countries 

along and adjacent to the corridor, as well as 

representatives from the EU and the United States. It 

should feature the robust engagement of the business 

community for advice and innovation, and serve as a 

platform to further improve the investment climate 

in the region. The forum should be used to exchange 

experience in the development oflarge-scale interstate 

infrastructure projects, with special regard to the 

United States, and foster private sector interest and 

public-private partnerships that should be key drivers 

in catalyzing essential elements of the North-South 

Corridor. 

Completing the North-South Corridor offers a unique 

opportunity to further Europe's integration, enhance 

its energy security, increase its competitiveness in 

the global marketplace, and strengthen its economic 

resilience-all while furthering its climate change 

objectives. Accelerating the corridor is a critical step 

to initiating the next phase of completing Europeand that should make the North-South Corridor both a 

European and a transatlantic priority. 

Pawet Olechnowicz 

Co-Chairman 

Chairman of the Board of Directors, CEEP 

President of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, 

Grupa LOTOS S.A. 

Member, Windsor Energy Group's International 

Advisory Panel 

Former Vice-President for Central and Eastern Europe, 

ABB Ltd in Zurich 
32 

1. 

THE 

ENERGY 

DIMENSION 

This chapter attempts to furnish an overview of the 

requirements to create the critical interconnections 

that would constitute a North-South Energy Corridor, 

along with the various new or expanded connections 

that would provide access to the gas, electricity, and 

oil supplies required to diversify supply sources to 

improve Europe's energy security and competitiveness. 

The chapter focuses on the strategic rationale behind 

such a corridor; the potential supply anchors with 

special regard to the transatlantic dimensions; the 

missing links in the wider region; and concludes with a 

set of recommendations to speed up the development 

of the corridor. 

THE NEED FOR A NORTH-SOUTH 

ENERGY CORRIDOR AND ITS 

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND 

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR 

ENERGY MARKETS There are two main reasons for developing a North· 

South Energy Corridor. The most immediate is the role 

it would play in enhancing Europe's energy security 

by eliminating "energy islands" in the regions of the 

European Union that are currently not connected to 

mainstream European pipelines and grids, and which 

therefore remain vulnerable to potential single-source 

supply disruptions. This is particularly important in 

the case of the Baltic states, given their reliance on 

energy imported from Russia. However, it also applies 

to Bulgaria-which is wholly dependent on Russia 

for gas supplies-and to various countries in the 

Balkans that are members of the EU's energy affiliate, 

the European Energy Community (EEC). However, it 

should be noted that the term "North-South Corridor" 

is commonly used to refer to connections between 

the Baltic countries and Poland and countries with 

coastlines on the Adriatic and Black Seas, notably 

Croatia and Romania. 

COMPLETING EUROPE • 7 

The second reason for developing the corridor is its 

potential role in helping to create an effective, single 

energy market for the EU-one that can receive oil, 

gas, and electricity from a variety of current and 

prospective suppliers and distribute them throughout 

the EU on a competitive, market basis. 

The European Commission has drawn up a list of 

248 projects of common interest (PCI)1 intended to 

create the necessary connectivity between Member 

States. Moreover, in order to support projects that 

may not have an immediate commercial justification, 

the Commission has allocated €5.85 billion to the 

Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)-in effect, a fund to 

ensure the development of infrastructure that might 

otherwise be considered noncompetitive in the short 

term, but is critical for long-term energy security. In 

this context, "noncompetitive infrastructure" generally 

refers to projects with a strategic significance in 

terms of their ability to assure supply in the event of a 

failure along existing pipelines or electricity networks. 

It might, however, be worth considering whether 

some projects-notably national grids-should be 

considered noncompetitive, simply because no private 

company would voluntarily take them on without 

securing monopoly control. This is because grids 

prompt competition of a kind that reduces the profit 

levels available in areas where there are no effective 

grids. 

The creation of a single energy market that is integrated, 

efficient, and flexible is considered crucial if the EU 

is to transform itself into a low-emission economy 

while maintaining secure supplies at the lowest cost. 

It is also considered vital if the EU is to maintain the 

competitiveness of its fully integrated energy markeL 

Although the European Council in February 2011 

1 European Commission, ~Energy Infrastructure: Projects of Common 

Interest,~ http;J/ec.europa.eufenergy/infrastructure/pci/pci_en.htm. 
33 

8 • COMPLETING EUROPE 

committed the EU to completing the single energy 

market by 2014, and eliminating energy islands after 

2015, these goals have not yet been fulfilled-and it'is 

not clear when they will be achieved. The North-South 

Corridor is essential for completing the single energy 

market. 

In May 2014, then-European Commission President 

jose Manuel Duriio Barroso, summarized the European 

Commission's immediate energy goals, which related 

more to energy security than to the completion of • 

the single market. Barroso said that by the winter of 

2014-15, the European Commission would coordinate 

First, as a provider of energy, making LNG and 

crude oil available for commercial export to 

European customers. There is an increasing 

prospect of large-scale US LNG exports, as a byproduct of the shale-gas boom in North America 

and the availability of gas at prices that are much 

lower than those in such key markets as Eastern 

Asia and the European Union. This issue is 

addressed below. 

Secondly, as a key provider of hard security for the 

protection of energy infrastructure. It is intensely 

relevant to European energy security-not least in 

the context of NATO policy, in the wake of Russian 

intervention in Ukraine-but that is beyond the 

scope of this paper. 

an increase in gas-storage capacity with EU Member 

States, develop reverse-flow capacity, expand the 

potential for liquefied natural gas (LNG), and create 

plans for security of supply at both the regional and EU 

levels. 

Three years earlier, after meeting with the thenPolish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Barroso said that 

a common energy policy should be the next great 

European integration project. "We need a safe, secure, 

sustainable, and affordable energy supply," Barroso 

declared.' At this stage, the Barroso described this 

approach in largely commercial terms, as being "key to 

our economic interests, not only at the internal market 

level, but also for the European Union as a global 

player."' 

Barroso then added: "This new policy has to ensure 

that no Member State is isolated from the rest of 

Europe. This is why we need to accelerate the pace 

of implementation of the internal market on energy:·• 

He stressed the need for the European Council-the 

grouping of the EU's heads of government-to agree 

on key missing infrastructure links, and on how to 

remove all barriers to a truly European energy market. 

Barroso singled out one key element needed for this 

market to succeed-the creation of a North-South 

energy corridor.' Donald Tusk, then prime minister 

of Poland, advocated for a "European Energy Union" 

in an article in the Financial Times on April 21, 2014.' 

emphasizing that "whether in coal, steel, uranium, 

credit or gas, the principal idea of the EU has always 

been to bring Europe together, deepening our security 

and establishing fair rules where the free market 

is lacking. An energy union, too, would be based on 

solidarity and common economic interests." 

Although this paper is essentially about Europe. there 

are key elements that involve major external players. In 

particular, the United States has four main roles to play: 

2 Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, "Statement by President Barroso following his 

Following His Meeting with Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of Poland," speech 

delivered at the European Commission, January 31, 2011, http;/ feuropa,euj 

rapid /press~release_SPEECH-11-55 _en.htm. 

3 Ibid. 

4 Ibid. 

5 Ibid. 

6 Donald Tusk, ·~United Europe Can End Russia's Energy Stranglehold," 

Financial Times, April 21, 2014, http://www.ft.comjintl/cms/s/0/91508464· 

c661·11 e 3~ba0e-00 144feabdcO.html#axzz3H MunsOVX. 

Thirdly, the United States .can, and should, lend 

political and diplomatic support to pushing for 

the realization of the North-South Corridor. The 

United States should also assist these countries 

in developing their indigenous resources, and 

provide expertise on resolving inter-state 

challenges and disputes with transboundary 

energy infrastructure. 

Fourthly. US private investment could play a major 

role in the realization of the corridor, provided that 

the right investment climate can be created and 

sustained. 

This paper largely focuses on gas. The reason is that, 

whereas oil is a fungible commodity that is traded 

globally. gas is still primarily marketed locally and 

regionally. Gas customers are not only linked to their 

supplier by pipe, but in many cases have no ability to 

secure an alternative supply in the event of a cutoff, 

which would impact heating and cooking as well as 

electricity. Moreover, Europe is particularly dependent 

on Russian gas.lt typically relies on Russia for some 30 

percent of actual consumption, and for a much higher 

proportion of imports. In 2013, EU consumption stood 

at 438.1 billion cubic meters (bern), while Russian gas 

deliveries to Europe (excluding Turkey, but including 

non-EU nation Switzerland) amounted to 136.2 bern 

(31 percent of total supplies ).7 1n2014, EU consumption 

is expected to fall to around 420 bern. 

THE EU'S VISION FOR GAS 

INTERCONNECTIONS FROM THE 

BALTIC TO THE MEDITERRANEAN 

The European Commission set out its vision of energy 

interconnections within Europe on October 14, 2013. 

In a list updated january 9, 2014, it itemized 248 

energy-related PCis that are intended to benefit from 

faster and more efficient permit-granting procedures 

and regulatory treatment. Most strikingly. these are 

7 BP, Statistical ReviewofWorld Energy (June 2014), http:/ fwww.bp.comjenj 

globalfcorporate/about-bp/energy-economicsjstatistical-review-of-wor!denergy.html. 
34 

General JONES. Thank you. 

Because it is the combination, I think—the future of NATO is not 

just a military future. It is about economic strength. It is about 

governance and rule of law, as Dr. Farkas pointed out. And it is 

about ways in which we can and must be successful against the 

rise of these new autocracies that are actually quite smart in terms 

of using—— 

Mr. KEATING. If I could, General, I would like to use that comment you just gave as a point to include our other witnesses on 

this question. 

General JONES. Sure. 

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Wilson mentioned a misplaced focus on just 

the percentages. It does not mean it is not important. It just means 

that it seems to be too much of a focus. 

And going back to Dr. Farkas’ comments in that regard, I was 

troubled when I was in the Munich Security Conference just about 

4 weeks ago—there was a poll in Germany that said the view of 

the German people is 85 percent unfavorable to the United States. 

Dr. Farkas, you were mentioning the role of the U.S. in NATO, 

particularly in terms of trying to stop democratic backsliding. And 

if you look at areas like civil rights and issues of autocracy in Hungary and Poland and Turkey, how can the U.S. do a better job assuming that mantle that we should have in this regard, given the 

current way the U.S. is being viewed? What can we do to perhaps 

resume being the mantle of all these civil rights, rule-of-law, democracy issues that you mentioned? 

Your microphone. There you go. You are in the House again. All 

right. 

Ms. FARKAS. So, first, Mr. Chairman, I would say, looking internationally, which is where most of my expertise is, we need to do 

more helping put pressure, helping the opposition, frankly speaking, in Hungary, in Poland, in Turkey, to put pressure on the government to do better, so to be more of a liberal democracy, if you 

will. If you recall the famous statement by Viktor Orban, the Prime 

Minister of Hungary, he very proudly said, we are not a liberal democracy, but without the liberal you are not really much of a democracy. 

So, there needs to be more pressure put on these countries. But 

what we have found—and here we saw different types of approaches taken to Hungary under the administration. I worked for 

the Obama Administration and now the Trump administration. 

And I think we need kind of a mix of the two, where we speak 

frankly and directly to the Hungarians and to our allies, to the 

leadership, and we appreciate them for their military contributions, 

because those three countries are actually very strong contributors, 

with Turkey and Poland making the 2 percent cut and, also, having 

the highest—Turkey certainly has one of the highest numbers of 

people under arms. So, we recognize that, but at the same time we 

know that their democracies are weak; we know that they need 

help. We need to put more money into that through our foreign assistance programs to help the opposition, to help their democracy 

and their civil society. 

Here at home. I would say the polls—and I think Damon is probably also familiar with these polls—the polls, I believe that they 
35 

tend to ask about our President and how the German public views 

our President, and then, America. But these two things obviously 

become intertwined. And President Trump is not popular in Europe 

because of how he has spoken out with regard to the German 

Chancellor and the Prime Minister of the U.K., so Prime Minister 

May, and other leaders. He is seen as not being respectful, and I 

think the push for increased assistance to NATO, while it is very 

consistent with all of the other Presidents who have come before 

our current President, he does it in a way that, obviously, is irritating not just to the leadership, but to the people. 

With regard to what we have to do about shoring up our democracy—— 

Mr. KEATING. Appreciate that. 

Ms. FARKAS. Yes, sorry. Obviously, more needs to be done there. 

And I would really just urge Congress to do what you do best. I 

love Congress, and Congress just needs to have a robust role in our 

democracy. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Dr. Farkas. 

I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And just respectfully, on the polling front, as you were asking 

that, I looked up an old poll from 1983. And in Britain, Great Britain, in England, Ronald Reagan’s popularity was 21 percent in 

1983 in England. And I would argue that he was actually a pretty 

good President in hindsight. 

Typically, I think if we look at Eastern Europe, there would 

probably be a much more popular, as we have always seen, view 

of the United States because they remember what it was like to 

live under oppression. And this is why I think this is so important 

to keep NATO together. 

I am going to go 2 degrees of separation from NATO for a second 

and just say one of the challenges I think we face as a country is 

people think they are tired. I think they feel exhausted, even 

though they really are not. And we are fighting on an economic 

front in many cases, I think primarily China. 

And so, I think this is part of the reason I came out and said 

that I think cutting off aid, for instance, to El Salvador, Honduras, 

and Guatemala was not smart, because as we back away from it, 

right now I think Central and South America are on the verge of, 

frankly, democratic governance, a major change. But every time we 

pull away, the Chinese will show up and they are going to ask how 

much money we were giving El Salvador, for instance, get that 

number and double it. 

We saw, in fact, a few months ago El Salvador de-recognized Taiwan. And you wonder why that happened? Well, it was because 

they got money from China to do it. So, this is the battle we are 

in. 

So, I think when we talk about, whether it is in Europe and 

NATO, and things like that, we have to keep in mind the importance of the economic side of what we do. And so, with that, I want 

to talk, because obviously Putin being a prime, I guess, adversary 

of the United States, I want to talk about his movement into Venezuela, even though this is not, again, specifically NATO. 
36 

Maduro has lost trust in his own armed forces. So, Putin has to 

come in and protect him. That is what is going on. We have seen 

this play out before when Russian forces entered Syria to protect 

Bashar al-Assad. And I remember Russia said they are just here 

for maintenance; they are here to take care of a base we have. The 

next thing we knew, there were thousands of them. Now they illegally occupied Georgia, Ukranian territory, and now they are in 

Venezuela. 

So, Mr. Wilson, should we be concerned with Russia’s strategy of 

illegally occupying land as well as propping up despot regimes 

around the world? And what would you recommend to this administration to do to counter Russia in that? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, thank you for that question. 

I think the reality is we are facing a declining Russia which is 

seeking to disrupt our interests, and doing so pretty effectively. 

When your goal is disruption rather than building, it is actually an 

easier threshold to achieve. We have seen that close to their neighborhood. We are seeing it play out globally. 

So, I think the twofold issue of an alliance that is transforming, 

to be focused more on defense and deterrence, is quite important. 

And I think the alliance has begun that process. I think it is still 

begun and playing out on the home front in Europe. 

But I think we need to be a little bit more strategic about how 

we think of disrupting Russia’s interests on a more global platform. 

We should have a strategy that thinks about how Beijing and Moscow do not become allied in their efforts, but that we drive that 

wedge. We should be paying attention to what Russian forces are 

doing in the Central African Republic and in Venezuela. It is pretty 

astonishing. So, I think thinking through a strategy of not just deterrence in Europe, but disruption of Russian interests on the global playing field is overdue. 

We look at Venezuela, where Cuban intelligence, Russian military, and Chinese money, debt, is fueling this crisis. It is why I 

have suggested that we should not just support what is happening 

on the part of the Venezuelan people, but think about how we work 

with Colombia, Brazil, and back the regional countries, and bring 

our European allies into this kind of conversation, so that we can 

actually have a more intentional effort of disrupting this effort here 

in Venezuela. 

A quick word on what you said at the beginning, the Chinese 

strategy. The economic piece is fundamental. We are never going 

to outspend the Belt and Road Initiative, and we should not. It is 

not how we play. We do need to recognize that U.S. capital markets, private sector investments, private equity dwarf what the 

Chinese government can do in BRI over time. 

Part of it is that it is difficult. We do not want our government 

telling our private sector what to do. But how do we think of harnessing in a geo-economic term American capital markets to advance American interests and values in these places? At the end 

of the day, whether you are in Serbia or other countries, they will 

accept and take Chinese money, but usually a mother wants her 

child to study in the United States or Europe. And if a young person is competing for a job, they want the opportunity to work for 

a U.S. company, where they know there will be a meritocracy. 
37 

We can win this because we see individual decisions recognize 

the difference between their strategy and ours, but we need a 

stronger approach to a geo-economic—— 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

And I think Eximbank is a prime example. That is still languishing right now. And that is, I think, a very effective thing for 

our economy. 

I had more questions for you, General, but I am out of time. So, 

I yield back. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Costa of California. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank 

my colleague for yielding. 

General, we appreciate your commitment and service to our 

country. 

And you made a number of comments. I think we are all in 

agreement that the 2 percent goal for commitments by NATO countries is something that has been determined necessary. We need to 

continue to press them, especially some of our allies who have been 

backsliding. We know who they are. How we do that is critical. 

You talked about their making the right choices on equipment. 

In terms of procurement, what do you mean by that? 

General JONES. I am sorry, in terms of equipment? 

Mr. COSTA. Procurement of equipment. You say they are making 

the right decisions. 

General JONES. I am really talking about investing in real warfighting capability and upgrading the systems that they have in 

terms of airplanes, ships, and war-fighting equipment, as opposed 

to—— 

Mr. COSTA. What about the notion that the European Union is 

talking about putting its own defensive capabilities? Do you think 

that is compatible? I know that is still being sorted out among the 

EU. 

General JONES. Well, I think that whatever the alliance can do 

in the regard of organizing itself in such a way that they buy the 

right things and they do not all try to do the same thing—— 

Mr. COSTA. I think that is very important. 

General JONES. It is very important. 

Mr. COSTA. They do not all need—some of them have certain talents in certain areas. 

General JONES. Exactly. 

Mr. COSTA. And we should encourage them to pursue that instead of areas that are less effective. 

General JONES. Exactly. You will find that some of the smaller 

countries in NATO are actually specializing in quite impressive 

special operations capability, abilities to make significant contributions in electronic warfare, and the like. So, there is some specialization going on. 

And if you look at the graph that shows the equipment expenditure as a share of defense expenditures, well over half of the countries in NATO are approaching the NATO guideline of 20 percent 

of their purchasing power being spent on relevant equipment. And 

so, that is very encouraging. 
38 

Mr. COSTA. Because of my time situation, I do not know—I think 

General Gerasimov, who is, I guess, equivalent to the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, talked about their asymmetrical potential. And, Mr. Wilson, you made reference to Russia playing a disruptive hand, but 

smartly—those are my words, not yours—but using democratic 

elections as a means to undermine not only NATO as a deterrent 

to peace, but also undermine the European Union as an economic 

force. 

And frankly, if you look back to 2013–14, he gave that speech. 

They have done a fairly effective job. I mean, they have been undermining European elections even before 2016 with ours. 

And so, I guess my question to you is, what is the best way, Mr. 

Wilson and Dr. Farkas, to combat this, this real threat? Because 

while this may be the third hearing on NATO, I think it is important, when we tomorrow hold the Joint Session of Congress, realize 

that not only has this been the safeguard of our common values 

and rule of law, but it is the longest peacetime period in Europe 

for the last 70 years in over 1,000 years. And that gets overlooked. 

Mr. KEATING. And if you could—we are up against a roll call— 

if you could just keep that combined under a minute, that would 

be great. 

Ms. FARKAS. I can be very quick. 

I did cover this in my written testimony. I would just say one 

part is resilience, so strengthening our democracy and transparency. The second part is deterrence. 

And then, I would say a little bit, based on the comments and 

question from the ranking member. We need to communicate very 

clearly to Russia what our expectations are, and if they cross a 

line, we need to be willing to take action. That was critical in Syria 

when the Russians attacked us, when their contract workers attacked us. And I think if we keep a firm line against Russia, keep 

the dialog open, hopefully, we will have a new regime at some 

point in the not-foreseeable future. 

Mr. KEATING. General? 

General JONES. If I could just add to that, to the ranking member’s statement, there is a difference, I think, in Europe—and I noticed at the Munich Security Conference as well—between how 

Western Europeans feel about the United States and how Eastern 

Europeans feel about the United States. So, that is something that 

it is real and it has to be dealt with. 

But what I have noticed in Western Europe is more of a trend 

toward appeasement against these autocrats in Russia and China. 

And that is a very dangerous thing. But the further east you go, 

the more you have solidarity with the U.S. philosophy, U.S. fears, 

U.S. identification of the threats that are coming toward us, be 

they military or economic or political. 

So, we really need to shore up the Western Europeans, I think, 

more so than we have. And that is why I think these initiatives, 

like I mentioned the Three Seas Initiative, are important in righting the balance in Europe, where the Eastern Europeans’ economies can rise and make Europe a more powerful entity to combat 

these—— 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. Thank you, General. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. 
39 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank all of you for being here today. 

But, General Jones, your colleagues have already addressed this, 

and that is the admission of Georgia into NATO. I would be interested, because Georgia was promised in 2008 at the Bucharest 

summit that they would have the opportunity to join. Since then, 

the alliance has recognized Georgia already possesses all the practical tools for NATO membership. Georgia spends more than 2 percent of its GDP on defense, has committed the largest number of 

soldiers per capita of any allied nation in Afghanistan. How would 

you assess the potential for Georgia’s admission to NATO? 

General JONES. Speaking as a personal opinion, I think Georgia 

has demonstrated fight way beyond its weight in terms of its contribution to Afghanistan and the quality of their soldiers and their 

commitment. Of course, admission to NATO and accession to 

NATO is largely a political question, but on the basis of performance, I would say that Georgia deserves our admiration, our support, and our encouragement for whatever it is they want to do 

with their own future. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. And I agree. Thank you to all 

three of you. It is amazing. 

Mr. Wilson, Poland, which appreciates very much the temporary 

placement of troops, currently U.S. troops, in the country, has announced that they would support stationing a permanent U.S. brigade in the country and finance the infrastructure and basing. 

What would be your view of putting a permanent U.S.-NATO presence in Poland? 

Mr. WILSON. I think we need to recognize that the challenge we 

are facing from the Kremlin today is not temporary and we should 

not plan as such. This is a long-term challenge. We need to have 

a continuous presence and be permanent as long as we face a 

Kremlin that is intimidating and threatening our allies. 

Two other small things I would say is that we need to be comfortable with an uncomfortable relationship with Russia. And in response to some of the conversation, we should not be going through 

a political cycle that would consider any reset approach with Russia, for example. 

And finally, to consider enlargement as a stabilizing force rather 

than a provocative one. And that is a way to reconceptualize how 

we think about Georgia’s role. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. And I an really grateful to 

serve as the co-chair of the Bulgaria Caucus. March the 29th 

marked the 15th year of Bulgaria being part of NATO. How would 

you assess, Mr. Wilson, the benefits of Bulgaria as a part of the 

NATO alliance? 

Mr. WILSON. I think Bulgaria has been the fundamental story of 

how you create a Europe whole and free, where former adversaries 

become allies. That is the story from France-Germany to former 

Warsaw Pact countries, to Bulgaria itself. It has been an important 

ally, helping to anchor the southeast flank. 

It also is where I have some concerns about Russian 

disinformation and penetration, where I think some of the Russian 

efforts are the most active and sometimes the most effective. I 
40 

think Bulgaria is underappreciated in terms of our ability to push 

back on those influences. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. And, Dr. Farkas, you have already addressed this, but, again, Russia has described further 

NATO enlargement as provocation in a variety of efforts to intimidate. Again, what can we do to push back on the infringement by 

the Russian Federation? 

Ms. FARKAS. Well, first, of course, the Russians themselves have 

been provocative, not us. And our enlargement, as Damon said, and 

as I said in the opening statement, was aimed at spreading stability, not at provoking Russia. However, we found out we really 

do need to deter Russia. We need to keep having a dialog with Russia. Unfortunately, it is not going to happen within the normal context that NATO used to have the dialog because of Russia’s infringements, because of the things that they have done, first and 

foremost, of course, occupying and illegally annexing territory. 

But I would argue that we have to hold the firm line on deterrence. For too long, we were hoping—and this spans multiple administrations and really the whole NATO alliance—there was a 

hope that somehow the Russians would realize that this was a bad 

policy. Unfortunately, this Kremlin, this leader of Russia is not 

going to realize that. So, we have to hold a firm line. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you. 

And a final question for the general. In regard to Turkey purchasing S–400’s, should the United States still be providing, 

through NATO, F–35s? 

General JONES. Yes, I believe that that topic is being discussed 

almost as we speak between Turkey and the United States. I also 

serve as the chairman of the American-Turkish Council, a venerable institution for over 40 years. We just returned from a big trip 

to Turkey where we were received by the President, the Vice President, and every cabinet minister we wanted to speak. They are 

very active and very desirous to rebalance the relationship with the 

United States, working on these difficult problems, but also some 

resurgence in the trade relationships between our two countries. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Well, thank you for your personal efforts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

The chair recognizes the vice chairman of the committee, Ms. 

Spanberger from Virginia. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you to our witnesses today. 

So much of our national security relies on global telecommunications infrastructure, including military systems, diplomatic channels, intelligence reporting, not to mention the critical infrastructure for day-to-day uses across this country and the world. Several 

countries, in addition to the U.S., have barred the Chinese company Huawei from supplying components for 5G networks, citing 

national security concerns, including Australia, New Zealand, and 

Japan. Yet, European allies have not. As recently as February of 

this year, the head of Britain’s cybersecurity agency, GCHQ, said 

they needed to better understand the opportunities and threats 

from China’s technology. My question for you all today is, how 
41 

great of a risk do Chinese 5G network providers pose to NATO’s 

security in your estimation? 

General JONES. Thank you for that question. 

5G represents to me one of the big challenges that the United 

States faces with its competition with China. It is up there with 

John F. Kennedy’s man-on-the-moon project. It is up there with the 

Manhattan Project for the 1940’s. When I was a teenager in Europe in 1957, I witnessed the Sputnik moment where the headlines 

of the newspapers around the world said, ‘‘Russia Beats the United 

States to Space’’. I do not want to see a headline where it says, 

‘‘China Beats the United States in Technology of 5G’’. 

5G is the most disruptive technology that is going to come our 

way. It is absolutely critical to our national security and economic 

future that the United States not cede control over the infrastructure required for 5G and, more importantly, secure 5G. NATO’s 

interoperability will be affected if there are countries in NATO who 

are showing signs of forgiving China and believing the theology 

that they advocate, which is cheaper, more reliable, no strings attached, and, you know, back doors to Beijing. This is a very, very 

serious threat. 

We are behind. And our private sector is going a pretty good job 

of developing the technology we need to ensure our security, but we 

need more government oversight and participation because this is 

really a moonshot for us. This is as important as anything we have 

ever done. If we lose this, we will lose a substantial portion of our 

ability to influence the world. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. And in your assessment, is there a way for 

NATO to mitigate the risks from Chinese 5G technology or do you 

believe that the United States should continue to pressure our European allies to avoid any agreements with China altogether? 

General JONES. So, there is 5G and there is secure 5G. By far 

the most important one is the secure 5G. On that score, I can tell 

you that our private sector is coming up with some very exciting 

technologies that would give us hope that we can prevail at least 

in the secure 5G world, technologies that are impenetrable, technologies that cannot be reverse-engineered. 

You cannot have a smart city without a secure network. That is 

obvious. And the United States I think can prevail. There will be 

countries that will buy Huawei equipment. And by the way, a lot 

of them are thinking twice about that right now, and that is a good 

thing. But if they do not care about it, if they just want cheap 

equipment and they do not care about the back door or the ability 

of China to eavesdrop on what they are doing, then more power to 

them. 

But it is absolutely incompatible, since we are talking about 

NATO, with the 30-nation alliance, that they would have a combination of Chinese technology and Western technology. That is 

just simply not going to happen. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. OK. Thank you, General Jones. 

I yield bak. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

We have Mr. Pence, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. Guest. Having called the 

roll call, those members can choose to cut their questions, if they 

so choose, to 3 minutes, so we can get them all in there. 
42 

The chair recognizes Mr. Pence from Indiana. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Chairman Keating, Ranking Member 

Kinzinger. 

Thank you all for being here today. 

Mr. Wilson, in your prepared testimony, you stated the following, 

and I quote: ‘‘But the Russian challenge to us is likely to remain 

asymmetric. Therefore, we should double down on our support, 

working with the European Union to strengthen resilience of democratic societies through efforts that range from diversifying energy 

routes and supplies to democratic defense of disinformation.’’ 

I am glad you mentioned energy security. In our hearing last 

week that Congressman Kinzinger mentioned, I brought up this 

very topic and would be interested in your thoughts. This is my 

question to you all: is NATO doing enough to enhance energy security in the alliance, and how might we encourage NATO to engage 

with the EU to address their collective energy security challenges? 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much for that question. 

I will sort of refer to, as General Jones noted, this Three Seas 

Initiative. I do not think NATO is doing enough, and I think the 

key is an integrated strategy between NATO and the European 

Union. If Russia uses energy and weaponizes it against our allies, 

we need to work with our allies in a common strategy to defend 

against that. That, obviously, requires work with the European 

Union. So, part of this effort is how can the European Union, with 

the United States, help diversify those energy routes and supplies, 

particularly into Central and Eastern Europe, so that they are not 

found in a vulnerable position. 

And I think that is where the effort of the Three Seas Initiative 

is, how to build a cross-border infrastructure that is required, that 

is often not attractive to some private investment, but is quite necessary to give options to some of our more vulnerable allies. We 

have made progress on this agenda, but it has been too slow. We 

have not treated it as a first-order strategic priority of alignment 

between NATO and the EU on a common strategy, and I think it 

is an imperative one to add to that. 

Ms. FARKAS. Yes, I would basically agree with all of the points 

that Damon made. NATO needs to get more actively involved, at 

a minimum, in a consultative fashion. But NATO members rely, 

their militaries rely on energy; they rely on fuel, and maybe to 

some extent on natural gas. So, there is a role for the defense ministries of these countries as well in putting pressure on their governments. But the EU largely has the lead on the issue. They took 

a while to become activated again, to become sufficiently alarmed 

to coordinate this, and they are doing a better job. 

General JONES. Thank you for that question. 

Philosophically, President Putin of Russia has shown that he is 

more than capable and willing of using energy as a weapon, and 

he has done so. The U.S., having catapulted itself into a position 

of global leadership on energy, has adopted a much more benevolent strategy. We care about military security, economic security, 

political security, and energy security. 

And with the Three Seas Initiative, and what it does, it reduces 

the dependency of about 20 different countries in Central and Eastern Europe off of the Russian ability to manipulate the political 
43 

spectrum through threats to cutoff energy. It will effect better 

prices. It will effect the whole stability of the continent. And I 

think that arrival of the United States as a great power on energy 

should go beyond Europe. We should also compete with China aggressively in Africa on energy security as well, because energy is 

not the commodity that China can export. We can. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 

Mr. KEATING. The chair recognizes Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to our witnesses. 

As you have all said, NATO is, obviously, rooted in a bedrock of 

shared democratic values. And I think, like many, you have expressed concern about democratic backsliding, particularly in Hungary and Poland, and, of course, Turkey is hardly democratic today. 

And I am just curious, maybe starting with you, Mr. Wilson, what 

can Congress do to kind of shore up these democracies in Europe 

and within the alliance? Some have suggested NATO should begin 

an annual report or review of democracy within the alliance. I wonder what you think of that and what Congress might do to support 

that. 

And, Dr. Farkas, if you could follow? I know you said that these 

countries must be accountable. I think we all agree, but it is unclear exactly how we do that under the current kind of structure 

of NATO. How do we actually hold these countries accountable? 

So, maybe start with you, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you for that question. 

My approach is a little bit different perhaps than as Dr. Farkas 

outlined. I think our premise should be to keep our allies as our 

allies. And if we look 10–20 years out, the last thing we want to 

see is an alliance in which Turkey is not aligned with us, but perhaps someone else. I think the openings there of the cleavages 

within our alliance are a strategic vulnerability that a country like 

Russia can exploit. 

It does not mean that we do not have concerns about what is developing. But if you look at local elections in Poland, local elections 

in Turkey, there is a vibrancy to these civil societies, to these opposition parties, to their political class. And I think that, through engagement rather than isolation, rather than ostracizing our allies, 

being engaged, and I think that helps with the congressional body, 

with other parliaments, meeting cross-party—you know, as you are 

doing meetings, doing cross-party parliamentary meetings with 

your counterparts. Because my view of the alliance is to provide an 

architecture, an infrastructure, which provides a bedrock sense of 

security that our democracies, whether it is our own or others, can 

be self-correcting and help nurture this. 

So, I am reluctant to go down the path of a NATO passing judgment on democracies within that club while trying to set the standards that we want to uphold, but understand that this isolating, 

calling out, or not meeting with, going 20 years without a head-ofState meeting with the Hungarian leadership, is not the best way 

to pursue democracy, in my view. I think it opens up opportunities 

for the Russians to play games and to potentially cause danger of 

peeling back our alliance. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Dr. Farkas? 
44 

Ms. FARKAS. Yes, in my written testimony I also wrote a little 

bit more extensively on this. And I noted that, when Secretary 

Pompeo was recently in Budapest, he talked about a new fund, new 

funding to help boost the civil society, to boost the—he did not say 

the opposition, but the civil society in Hungary. 

So, I think I would agree with Damon’s approach, which is we 

do not need to set, certainly not another public litmus test like 2 

percent, because I do not think it helps. And as he said, our adversaries will exploit it. But, behind closed doors, I think we have to 

speak frankly with the heads of State and the ministers, but, then, 

engage, as Damon said, not just in the meetings we hold, but our 

government needs to put more money back into those programs 

that we used to fund to help bolster civil society in Eastern Europe 

and elsewhere. So, I think those are very important, and media 

outreach programs, and Fulbrights, and all of these people-to-people things, so that, hopefully, we can help their societies evolve either back to where they were before or to a better place. 

General JONES. Thank you for that question. 

I would strongly encourage more congressional engagement with 

NATO. When I was over in SACEUR, the congressional visits were 

always well-received by our European partners. I would double 

down on those missions. I think they are very important. 

I would recommend that our country reaffirm, without any question, our commitment to Article 5 and NATO. I think that has got 

to be—we should not ever dangle that as a negotiating tool because 

it makes everybody nervous. And by the way, Russia needs to hear 

that as well. 

We should praise what the alliance has done. We criticize it quite 

a bit, but I do not see enough praise coming from this side of the 

Atlantic to what they are doing. 

I think, frankly, I would champion a revamping of the partnership program and the membership program, which I think should 

be divided. There are countries like Brazil and countries all over 

the world that would like to have an interoperable mission with 

NATO, and I think we should encourage that. The membership 

side should be completely distinct. There should be a very rigid, 

step-by-step process where countries can become members. But, 

right now, the two are kind of in the same building, if you will, and 

it is unclear. The distinction between the two is unclear. 

So, I think there is a lot more we can do. I just think we need 

to praise NATO when they deserve to be praised because we do not 

hesitate to criticize them. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, General. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Guest from Mississippi. 

Mr. GUEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

NBC News reported earlier today that the United States has 

blocked turkey from receiving equipment related to the F–35 fighter jet until its NATO ally cancels an order of the Russian missile 

defense system, which we know to be the S–400. Assuming that 

that information is correct, General, do you agree with us canceling 

their receiving the F–35s? 

General JONES. Before the hearing started, I saw another newsclip that said that Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan said that 
45 

he believes that the S–400 issue will be resolved and that the F– 

35 will be included in Turkey’s architecture. So, I am on the private sector. I cannot—— 

Mr. GUEST. Well, let me ask, as a former general and as a private citizen, would you agree with canceling the F–35 if Turkey 

does not agree to cancel the S–400 missile system? Do you think 

that is a prudent decision by the United States Government? 

General JONES. My military friends tell me that the compatibility 

of the F–35 operating in the same vicinity as the S–400 gives away 

some of the technology of the F–35 that the S–400 system could not 

otherwise acquire. I am very hopeful that this is going to be resolved because this is really important for the alliance. It is important for the bilateral relationships. 

I would like to remind the committee that years ago Greece 

bought the S–300 from Russia, and the alliance put so much pressure on Greece that they bought the system, but they never deployed it, and it averted a crisis. 

I know from my Turkish friends that there is some willingness 

to consider the deployment options available to them. And so, I 

hope this thing is working out. I was very encouraged to see this 

clip before I appeared before you. 

Mr. GUEST. And, Dr. Farkas, the same question to you. If Turkey 

refuses to cancel that order, do you agree that we should not sell 

them the F–35s? 

Ms. FARKAS. Congressman, I am not sure whether I would link 

the two, just because I have not studied the issue. So, the kind of 

political scientist, policymaker, geek in me says I need to study it. 

But I will tell you that it is deeply disturbing that Turkey is dangling this in front of us. I do not know how serious it is. And the 

reason I say that is because, when I was in the Pentagon, they also 

were toying with buying a Chinese system. And some of this plays 

into Turkey’s desire to show that they are somehow independent of 

the United States, of our pressure. It is not helpful at this time in 

history. 

It may also be part of their overall effort to put pressure on our 

government vis-a-vis Syria and what is happening there. So, I 

think I would look very closely at the macro picture. I am not sure 

I would, again, tie the F–35 directly to this S–400 deal, but the S– 

400 deal, I would say it cannot stand. 

Mr. GUEST. And, Mr. Wilson, I will give you an opportunity to 

answer the question as well. 

Mr. WILSON. I think, strategically, we want Turkey in the F–35 

program. We need to recognize that we are in the Turkish bazaar 

negotiating right now. And I think even today’s statements are 

playing out. There is a high-stakes negotiation. 

Now that we are through Turkish elections, I hope they can be 

serious. We understand that the Russians put real pressure on 

Erdogan after the shootdown of a Russian jet over Syria in Turkish 

airspace to go through with this. I think we need to see it either 

canceled or deployed in such a way that it is actually deployed/ 

mothballed at the same time, so that it does not provide a cleavage 

place, a vulnerability for the F–35, which has to be our No. 1 priority to protect that program’s integrity. 
46 

Mr. GUEST. And would you agree, Mr. Wilson, as the general 

spoke of a few moments ago, that if the S–400 was deployed in 

Turkey at the same time our fighter jets were, that it would be 

able to give the Russians or our adversaries information about capabilities that they do not currently have? 

Mr. WILSON. That is what I understand from people who have 

more technical expertise than I do. That is where this either comes 

in, do we either come out of a negotiation that leads to a cancellation or is there a saving-face option where the Turks end up paying 

for this and it is not deployed and used in such a way that it would 

cause that concern for us? 

Mr. GUEST. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Guest. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for being here and the subcommittee members as well, working around roll calls and hearings. 

It is critical to have a strategy for NATO to grow and evolve and 

address the new and emerging threats. And I look forward to working with my colleagues on the committee this Congress to address 

it. 

We appreciate the comments you have made about the role of 

Congress going forward. I think it is a very important role. 

Members of the committee may have an additional time to ask 

questions of our witnesses in writing, and we ask our witnesses to 

please respond to those questions in writing as well. The record 

will be open for 10 more business days to receive those responses. 

Mr. KEATING. Again, we thank all of you for being here and an 

important discussion about the future of NATO and where we are 

going, certainly an evolving one. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
47 

APPENDIX 

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment 

William R. Keating (D-MA), Chairman 

April 2, 2019 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment in Room 

2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

https:/ /foreignaffairs.house.gov /): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

Tuesday, April2, 2019 

3:00pm 

The Future ofNA TO: New Challenges and Opportunities 

General James L. Jones (USMC, ret.) 

Jones Group International 

(Former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States, 

Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Combatant Commander 

USEUCOM) 

Evelyn N. Farkas, Ph.D. 

Resident Senior Fellow 

German Marshall Fund of the United States 

(Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia) 

Mr. Damon Wilson 

Executive Vice President 

Atlantic Council 

By Direction of the Chairman 

The Commiuee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities, If you are in need of special accommodations, 

please call 2{)2/225~5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special 

accommodations in general {including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed 

to the Committee. 
48 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMIITEE ON ___ Ei_•_-.:...:...•E_,_I'IIIhi_..:..,_Erwv_:::.:.•_•114_14_•E_,._r~nm_,._ 111 ___ HEARING 

Day_-=.T.:::ues=da=-!)':.__Date. ___ ...:412/.=..:'1:..:9 ___ ,Room __ -=2::cJ.:.;72:..· __ _ 

Starting Time _.......:3...,;(J()p=---·Endlng Time __ 4:.:.:0"'9p""--

Recesses __ L__to___) L_to ___)L_to___)L_to___)L_to ___) L_to___) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Cltlllrm4n Ketllhfg 

Check oil oflltefoUowillfllltllt 11J1ply: 

Open Session IZI 

Executive (£!_osed) Session D 

Televised IZI 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Recordm_(taped) IZI 

Stenographle Record I.LI 

The Future of NATO: New Challenges and Opportunltes 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Keating, Spanberger, Costa, Clclllllle, Gonzalezs, Kin'l)nger, WUson, Pence, Guest 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with on •if they are not members of full commlnee.) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attaebed? Yes fZI No 0 

(If "no", please Iilli below and Include title, agency, department, or orgonization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements suhmilledfor the record.) 

General JilllfU L. J011es' statement 

General Jones' addition "Completing Europe" Report (page 25 of the transcript) 

Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas' slfltement 

Mr. Damon WUson's statt!llfent 

Mr. Wilson's additions to truth In testimony -Atlantic Council Projects funded by NATO 

or 

TIMESCHEDULEDTORECONVENE____ 

TIME ADJOURNED 4:09p 

~ 

- ~ 

~ 

su ~~tlliuuoclllte=-
49 

Æ 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

PRESENT MEMBER PRESENT MEMBER 

X William Keating, MA X Adam Kinzinger,!L 

X Abigail Spanberger, VA X Joe Wilson, SC 

Gregory W. Meeks, NY Ann Wagner, MO 

Albio Sires, NJ James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr., WI 

Theodore E. Deutch, FL Francis Rooney, FL 

David Cicilline, Rl Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA 

Joaquin Castro, TX X Greg Pence, IN 

Dina Titus, NV Ron Wright, TX 

Susan Wild, PA X Michael Guest, MS 

David Trone, MD Tim Burchett, TN 

X Jim Costa. CA 

X Vicente Gonzalez, TX