This opinion was flied for record

# -~~ Ronald R. Carpenter Supr(ijme**Cgur~** CIEtriC


### INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OFWASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,


### v. RICKEY ARELIOUS BEAVER, Petitioner. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 

## _____________________________) No. 91112-6 ENBANC
Filed 

### SEP 1

## 72015

----------------
FAIRHURST, J.-Wemust determine whether due process requires the trial courtfind currentmental illnessto revoke an insanity acquittee's conditionalrelease. Chapter 10.27 RCW, the statutory scheme that governs insanity acquittals, requires the trial court find that a conditionally released insanity acquittee violated the conditions ofrelease or poses athreatto the publicto revoke an insanity acquittee's conditional release. Chapter 10.27 _RCW does not require the trial court make a finding regarding the acquittee's mental state at 

### a conditional release revocation hearing. We hold that the statute satisfies due process and affirm the Court of Appeals.State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6
I. 

### FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND In 2005, Rickey Arelious Beaver was found not guilty by reason ofinsanity
on a charge ofresidential burglary. The court found that Beaver suffered from a mental disease or defect and held that he posed a substantial danger to otherpersons and presented a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control by the court. The court committed Beaver to Western State Hospital (WSH) and to the custody of the secretary ofthe Department ofSocial and Health Services (secretary). The court granted Beaver's conditional release 1 

### in 2007. 2 

### Between 2007 and his final discharge in 2014, Beaver violated the terms of his conditional release several times. Because ofthese violations and because the trial court continued to

1"'Conditionalrelease' means modification ofa court-ordered commitment, which maybe revoked upon violation ofany ofits terms." RCW 10.77.010(3). 2The conditions and terms of Beaver's initial conditional release prohibited him from leaving the state without permission from his supervising community corrections officer (CCO) appointed by the Department ofCorrections; possessing explosive devices, firearms, or any other weapon; or using alcohol or controlled substances. In addition, the terms ofhis release required himto maintain good conductinthe community and notto violate any laws or ordinances. Beaver was also requiredto take his prescribedmedications and submitto random urinalysis and blood or breath testing whenever requested by his CCO. The conditions required him to enter into a state certified inpatient drug and alcohol program for at least 28 days, and upon discharge he was requiredto attend an outpatient drug and alcohol program. Afterrelease from the drug and alcohol program, Beaverwas required to reside at a location approved byhis CCO. Beaverwas to remain in prescribed geographic boundaries and notify his 

## ceo prior to making any changes in address or employment. Beaver was also required to report to his CCO as requested and cooperate with the CCO's monitoring activities. 2State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6
find that Beaver was a danger to society, the terms ofhis conditional release were modified or revoked several times. In 2011, Beaver petitioned for final discharge. WSH submitted a letter to the court recommending Beaver's final discharge because WSH found that Beaver did not show signs or symptoms of mental illness that could not be explained by substance abuse. The Public Safety Review Panel (PSRP? reviewed Beaver's treatmentrecord, evaluations, and letters from theprosecuting attorney andBeaver's defense counsel and opposed Beaver's discharge. The State and Beaver obtained independent mental health evaluations. Brian Judd, PhD, for the State, opined that Beaverremained mentally ill and athreatto the community. Brendon Scholtz, PhD, for Beaver, recommended Beaver's final discharge. InJuly 2011, ajurytrialbeganonBeaver'spetitionfor final discharge. Before resting, Beaver voluntarily withdrew his petition. Beaver agreed that he continued to suffer from a mental illness that made him a threat to public safety-the criteria for a defendant who is not guilty by reason ofinsanity under RCW 10.77.110-and stipulatedto an agreed order ofconditional release. On conditional release, Beaver violated the terms by usmg cocame, by drinking alcohol and driving a motor vehicle, and by being charged with the crime

3The PSRP was created in 2010 and convenes to make independent assessments ofthe public safety risk involved in the secretary's recommendations to the court. RCW 10.77270. 3State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6
of driving under the influence ofalcohol. In January 2013, the State successfully moved to revoke Beaver's conditional release. During the conditional release revocation hearing, Beaver did not request a mental health examinationpursuantto RCW 10.77.190(2). In fact, the first and only timethatthere was any discussionatthe conditionalreleaserevocationhearing about Beaver's mental disease or defect was when the trial judge, after stating that he wouldrevoke, expressedconcern aboutrecommittingBeaverwhenWSHhadearlier indicatedBeaverno longer continuedto suffer from amental illness.4 However, the trialjudgerecognizedthere were contradictory opinions andhis comments were not incorporated into the trial court's findings. Beaver appealed the trial court's order revoking his conditional release, arguing that due process required a finding ofcurrentmental illness before the court could revoke his conditional release and recommit him to WSH. While this appeal
was pending, Beaver filed a petition for final discharge under RCW 10.77.200(3). Based on agreement of the parties, Beaver was granted conditional release in

4"I am satisfied that Mr. Beaver is in violation ofhis conditional release. Now, I am going to revoke the conditional release
....The other concern that I had
... [is] apparently the treating doctors at Western State at least at the last examination were ofthe opinion that there was no mental health disease. That was reviewed and
...the public safetyboard thought he was arisk to public safety." Verbatim Report ofProceedings (VRP) at 30. "I am satisfied he is a risk to the public." VRP at 32. 4State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6
October 2013. Then in May 2014, again based on agreement ofthe parties, Beaver
was granted final discharge. 5 Although the Court ofAppeals found that the case was moot, it reviewed the merits and heldthat substantive andprocedural due process do notrequire ajudicial finding of current mental illness before the court can revoke conditional release. 

### State v. Beaver, 184 Wn. App. 235, 239, 336 P.3d 654 (2014). We grantedBeaver's petition for review. 

### State v. Beaver, 182 Wn.2d 1020, 345 P.3d 783 (2015). II. ISSUES A. Whether Beaver's claim, though moot, is ofcontinuing and substantial public interestthatthis court should consider its merits. B. Whetherrevoking an insanity acquittee's conditional release without a judicial finding that the acquittee currently suffers from a mental illness violates procedural or substantive due process. III. ANALYSIS A defendant charged with a crime may plead and prove insanity as an affirmative defense. 

### State v. Platt, 143 Wn.2d 242, 246, 19 P.3d 412 (2001). The defendantmust showby a "preponderance ofthe evidence thathe or she was insane

5In May 2014, both WSH and the PSRP were in agreement that Beaver was no longer suffering from amental defect. 

### 5State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6

at the time of the offense or offenses with which he or she is charged."6 RCW 10.77.080. A defendant acquitted by reason of insanity may be committed to a hospital, conditionally released, or released without condition. RCW 10.77.110. Conditional release may be revoked if the acquittee poses a threat to society or violates the conditions ofhis or her release. RCW 10.77.190(4). Beaver contends that the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution7 and article I, section 3 ofthe Washington State Constitution8 require the court additionally to find that the acquittee is mentally ill at the time the court revokes conditional release. Because Beaverwas finally discharged from WSH and the custody ofthe secretary in 2014, we must first determine whether to decide the merits of Beaver's moot claim. If so, we must decide if due process requires a judicial finding ofcurrent mental illness to revoke conditional release.

6To establishthe defense ofinsanity, it must be shownthat: (1) At the time of the commission of the offense, as a result of mental disease or defect, the mind ofthe actor was affected to such an extentthat: (a) He was unable to perceive the nature and quality ofthe act with which he is charged; or (b) He was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the particular act charged. Former RCW 9A.12.010 (1975). 7"[N]or shall any state deprive any person oflife, liberty or property, without due process oflaw." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 8"No person shall be deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 3. 6State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6
A. Beaver's claim, though moot, is ofcontinuing and substantial public interest, and we should decide the merits As a general rule, we do not consider cases that are moot or present only abstract questions. State v. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 907, 287 P.3d 584 (2012); see also Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972). "A
case is technically moot ifthe court can no longer provide effective relief." Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 907. Beaver's case is mootbecause he was finally discharged inMay 2014 while this appeal was pending. Even ifa case becomes moot, the court has the discretion to decide an appeal ifthe question is one of continuing and substantial public interest. Sorenson, 80 Wn.2d at 558. Mootness is ajurisdictional concern. State v. Deskins, 180 Wn.2d 68, 80, 322 P.3d 780 (2014). As a threshold matter, we must determine whether Beaver's claim is ofcontinuing and substantial public interest. To determ,ine whether a case presents an issue ofcontinuing and substantial public interest, we consider three factors: "'[(1)] the public or private nature ofthe · question presented, [(2)] the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future guidance ofpublic officers, and [(3)] the likelihood offuture recurrence ofthe question.'" Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 907 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingIn re Pers. Restraint of Mattson, 166 Wn.2d 730, 736, 214 P.3d 141 (2009)). As a fourth factor, the court may also consider the level of 

### 7State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6 adversitybetweentheparties. Hartv. Dep 't of Soc. &Health Servs., 111 Wn.2d445, 448, 759 P.2d 1206 (1988). The continuing and substantial public interest exception has been used in cases dealing with constitutional interpretation, the validity of statutes or regulations, and matters that are sufficiently important to the appellate court. Id. at 449. This exception is not used in cases that are limited to their specific facts. Id. All factors weigh in favor of deciding whether, as Beaver contends, due process requires a finding ofcurrent mental illness before the conditional release of
an insanity acquittee may be revoked pursuant to RCW 10.77.190. Cases involving interpretation ofthe constitution or interpretation ofstatutes are public in nature and provide guidance to future public officials. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 907. This issue is likelyto reoccur because other insanity acquittees are subjectto conditional release revocation proceedings. See id. Additionally, both parties sufficiently briefed the legal issue. Hart, 111 Wn.2d at 448. Deciding the merits ofBeaver's moot claim is ofcontinuing and substantialpublic interest. B. Revoking an insanity acquittee'sconditionalrelease without ajudicialfinding that the acquittee currently suffers from a mental illness does not violate substantive or procedural due process We review constitutional challenges de novo. State v. Baa Dinh Dang, 178 Wn.2d 868, 874, 312 P.3d 30 (2013). Freedom from bodilyrestraint is at the core of the liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 8State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6

U.S. 71, 80, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1992). "The commitment of a criminally insane person is a deprivation ofliberty and subjectto this constitutional guaranty ofdue process." State v. Wilcox, 92 Wn.2d 610, 612, 600 P.2d 561 (1979). The due process clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment provides that the State shall not "deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause confers both substantive and procedural protections. Amunrudv. Ed. of Appeals, 158 Wn.2d 208, 216, 143 P.3d 571 (2006). The substantive component ofthe due process clausebars wrongful and arbitrary government conduct, notwithstanding the fairness of the implementing procedures. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. Even if government qonduct satisfies substantivedueprocess,theproceduralcomponentofthe dueprocessclauserequires that government action be implemented in a fundamentally fair manner. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987). 9 1. Substantive due process In the context ofinvoluntary commitment, substantive due process requires thatthe nature ofcommitment bear some reasonable relationship to the purpose for

9Neither party asserted that the state due process clause provides greater protections than the federal due process clause. We therefore presume the provisions are coextensive in this case. In re Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 143 Wn.2d 384, 394, 20 P.3d 907 (2001) ("[I]n the absence ofthe petitioner's [State v.] Gunwall, [106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986)] analysis, we presume a coextensive provision."). 9State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6


### which the individual is committed. Foucha, 

### 504 U.S. at 79. An involuntary commitment scheme satisfies substantive due process when there is a periodic review ofthepatient's suitability forrelease. See State v. Klein, 

### 156 Wn.2d 102, 110, 124 P.3d 644 (2005). We have held that "in order to confine an insanity acquittee to institutionalization against his or her will, the trial court must make two determinations: first, thatthe acquittee suffers from amental illness and second, that the acquittee is a danger to others." BaaDinh Dang, 

### 178 Wn.2d at 876. The United States Supreme Court observed that a verdict of guilty by reason of insanity establishes that the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense and that he committedthis actbecause ofmental illness. Jones v. UnitedStates, 

### 463 U.S. 354, 363, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1983). The commitment can continue until the individual is either no longer dangerous or no longer mentally ill. Foucha, 

### 504 U.S. at 77-78. 10 

### Under chapter 10.77 RCW, ifa defendant is acquitted ofa crime by reason of insanity and it is found that "such defendant is a substantial danger to other persons, orpresents asubstantial likelihood ofcommittingcriminal actsjeopardizing

10Chapter 10.77 RCW provides an acquittee with opportunities to seek final discharge basedonrecovery ofhis orhermentalhealth. An acquitteemustbe dischargedifitis demonstrated that he or she no longer suffers from a mental disease or defect, notwithstanding any potential danger to the community. Klein, 156 Wn.2d at 114. 

### 10State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6 public safety or security, unless kept under further control by the court or other persons or institutions, the court shall order his or her hospitalization." RCW 10.77.110(1 ). Each insanity acquittee committed to a hospital or other facility or conditionally released "shall have a current examination of his or her mental condition made by one or more experts or professional persons at least once every six months." RCW 10.77.140. In addition to periodic examinations, an acquittee may apply for his or her final discharge by demonstrating that he or she no longer suffers from a mental illness. "Upon application by the committed or conditionally released person, the secretary shall determine whetherornotreasonable grounds existfor release." RCW 1

0.77.200(1). Ifthe secretary approves ofthe release, he or she shall authorize the acquittee to petition the court. I

### d. Ifthe acquittee has not applied for his or her own releasebutthe secretaryreasonablybelievesthatrelease is appropriate, the secretary may petition the court. RCW 10.77.200(2). Before petitioning the court or authorizing a petition, the secretary must submit his or her recommendation to the PSRP. RCW 10.77.270(3). The PSRP completes an independent assessment ofthe public safety risk associated with the secretary's recommendation and may indicate whether it is in agreement. The PSRP's assessment is submittedto the court and the acquittee's counsel. 

### Id. Once the petition is served, the court must set a hearing within 45 days. RCW 10.77.200(3). Atthe hearing, 11State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6

I

### d. [t]he burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner to show by a preponderance ofthe evidence thatthe person who is the subject ofthe petition no longer presents, as a result ofmental disease or defect, a substantial danger to other persons, or a substantial likelihood of committing criminal actsjeopardizingpublic safety or security, unless kept under further control bythe court or other persons or institutions.

An acquittee who hasreceived amental examinationmaymake an application to the secretary for conditional release. RCW 10.77.150(1). The secretary may also recommend an acquittee for conditional release. RCW 10.77.150(2). "Conditional release is a mechanism whereby mentally ill persons of varying degrees of dangerousness can be conditionallyreintroduced into society where it is determined the conditions willreasonablymitigatethe dangerousness." State v. Reid, 

### 144Wn.2d 621, 630, 30 P.3d 465 (2001). Conditional release is subject to periodic review to determine ifthe acquittee should remain conditionally released. RCW 10.77.180. If the prosecuting attorney, the secretary, the secretary of the Department of Corrections, orthe court "reasonablybelieves that a conditionallyreleasedpersonis failing to adhere to the terms and conditions ofhis or her conditional release," they may apprehend the acquittee and seek revocation of the acquittee's conditional release. RCW 10.77.190(2). Before conditional release can be revoked, the statute requires the court to hold a hearing where the issues are limited to whether the conditionally released 12State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6

person did or did not adhere to the terms and conditions ofhis or her release, or whetherthepersonpresents athreatto public safety. RCW 10.77.190(4). Ifthe court determinesthe acquittee didnotadhereto theterms and conditions ofthe conditional release, the court can continue or modify the conditions ofrelease or the court may revoke the conditional release. Id. Beaver argues that substantive due process requires a judicial finding of current mental illness to revoke an acquittee's conditional release. Ajudicial finding ofcurrentmental illness at a conditional release revocation hearing is not constitutionally required. We presume that an acquittee's insanity continues until the acquittee or the secretary proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee no longer suffers from a mental disease or defect. Klein, 156 Wn.2d at 114 ('"Washingtonlaw since 1905 has presumedthe mental condition ofa person acquitted by reason ofinsanity continues and the burden rests with that individual to prove otherwise."' (quoting Platt, 143 Wn.2d at 251 n.4)); see RCW 10.77.200(3). Thepresumptionofinsanityis consistentwith substantive dueprocess principles. It is logical for the legislature to assume that an acquittee continues to have amental illness thatmakes him orher dangerous. Platt, 143 Wn.2d at252. The presumption ofinsanity continues during conditional release. See id. During conditional release, as well as while committed to a hospital, an acquittee's mental health is periodically reviewed. The statute provides that the 13State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6 acquittee or the secretary may petition for the acquittee's release at any time during conditional release or commitment. Revocation of conditional release and recommitment does not limit the acquittee's opportunity to seek final discharge on the basis that he or she is no longer mentally ill. The revocation of Beaver's conditional release satisfied substantive due process and was supportedby sufficient factual findings. WhenBeaverwas initially committed in 2005, the court found thathe suffered from a mental illness and posed
a substantial danger to the community. Beaver's mental illness was established by the original findings in 2005 and was presumed to continue. In 2011, as part of Beaver's stipulated conditional release, he agreed thathe continued to suffer from a mental disease or condition. At the conditional release revocation hearing in 2013, Beaver did not attempt to prove that he regained his mental health. At that hearing, the court found that Beaver violated the terms and conditions of his release. In addition, the court found that Beaverposed a substantial threatto public safety. We hold that substantive due process does not require the trial court make a finding ofcurrent mental illness to revoke conditional release. It is presumed that the acquittee's insanity continues throughout conditional release until proved otherwise. Moreover, the statutory scheme provides for periodic reviews of the acquittee's mental health and the acquittee has opportunities to prove that he or she
no longer suffers from a mental defect and to petition for final discharge. 14State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6
2. Procedural due process Procedural due process requires thatwhen the State seeks to deprive aperson of a protected interest, the State provides the individual adequate notice of the deprivation and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 216. Due process is a flexible concept and calls for different procedural protections depending on the interests at stake. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). Beaver asserts thatprocedural due process requires
ajudicial finding ofmental illness at a conditional release revocationhearing. To determine whether the procedures provided by a statutory scheme are constitutionally sufficient, we must analyze the governmental and private interests affected. 

### !d. We consider three factors: the private interest that will be affected by the state action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used andtheprobablevalue, ifany, ofadditional or substituteprocedural safeguards; and the State's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional procedures might entail. 

### !d. at 335. As to the first factor, the private interest in liberty or freedom from state constraint is substantial. SeeAddington

### v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979) ("[C]ivil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation ofliberty that requires due process protection."). However, the court's revocation of an insanity acquittee's conditional release implicates a 15State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6

conditional liberty interest dependent on the observance ofterms and conditions. 

### Bao Dinh Dang, 178 Wn.2d at 883. Although the Fourteenth Amendment due process guaranties apply to the revocation of a limited liberty interest, the due process analysis is limited. 

### Id. at 883-84. As to the second factor, the procedures to revoke an acquittee's conditional release in chapter 10.77 RCW provide protection against erroneous deprivation of liberty. The acquittee is entitled to counsel at any and all stages ofthe proceedings. RCW 10.77.020(1). Conditional release may be revoked or modified only if the secretary, the prosecuting attorney, the secretary ofthe Department ofCorrections,
or the court reasonably believes that the acquittee is failing to adhere to the terms and conditions ofhis or her conditional release, or ifa hospital or another facility determines that the acquittee presents a threat to public safety. RCW 10.77.190(2), (3). Ifthe secretary determines that the acquittee is violating the terms ofhis or her release, the secretarymay orderthatthe acquitteebeimmediatelytakeninto custody. Id. The courtmustbe notifiedthatthe acquittee was apprehendedwithinonejudicial day, and the court must set a hearing within 30 days to determine whether the acquittee's conditionalrelease shouldbe modifiedorrevoked. Id. Atthehearing, the acquittee or acquittee's counsel can confront and cross-examine witnesses unless there is good cause for disallowing confrontation. 

### See Bao Dinh Dang, 178 Wn.2d at 883-84. In addition, the prosecuting attorney and the acquittee have the right to 16State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6


### request an immediate mental examination of the acquittee. 11 

### RCW 10.77.190(2). After the hearing, the court is not required to revoke conditional release. The court has the discretionto modify the conditions ofrelease. RCW 10.77.190(4). The statutory scheme as a whole provides significant procedural protections against erroneous deprivation ofliberty. Platt, 

### 143 Wn.2d at 246 n.3; see also State
v. Derenojf, 

### 182 Wn. App. 458, 467, 332 P.3d 1001 (2014) ("[A]lthough risk ofan
erroneous deprivation ofliberty is a real concern, the procedures currently in place under chapter 10.77 RCW provide significant procedural safeguards for insanity acquittees."). The statutory scheme provides the acquittee with sufficient opportunities to rebutthe presumptionthathe or she is insane. The mental health of the acquittee is periodically reviewed every six months, RCW 10.77.140, and the acquittee can apply to be finally discharged or released from confinement, RCW 10.77.200(1), (5). The acquittee may be committed to a facility only for as long as the statutorymaximum sentence ofthe crime charged. RCW 10.77.025(1). Although the risk oferroneous deprivation is high, the statute provides adequate procedural protections.

11Interestingly, Beaver did notrequest an immediate mental examination. In fact, the first time any questionofhis mental disease or defect arose was whenthetrial courtraised it sua sponte after revoking Beaver's conditional release. 

### 17State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6

As to thethird factor, the governmenthas a strong interest intheprotection of public safety by detaining mentally unstable individuals who present a threat to society. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748. The conditional release revocation hearing is designedto efficientlydetermine whether a conditionallyreleasedinsanityacquittee is in violation ofthe terms ofhis or her release and presents a danger to society. Derenoff, 182 Wn. App. at 468. A full review ofthe acquittee's mental condition is not appropriate at a conditional release hearing, andthe State has a strong interest in avoiding such a review. SeeJones, 463 U.S. at 366. After examining and balancing the three Mathews factors, the current statutory scheme provides sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that the State willnot erroneouslydeprive a conditionallyreleased acquittee's limitedliberty. The statutory scheme satisfiesprocedural due process. IV. CONCLUSION The statutorymechanismto revoke an acquittee's conditionalrelease satisfies substantive and procedural due process. The trial court is not required to make a finding of current mental illness at a conditional release hearing because during conditional release the acquittee is presumed insane. The presumption ofinsanity begins whenthe defendant is found not guiltybyreason ofinsanity, and it continues until the acquittee orthe secretaryproves otherwise. Ifthe acquittee's mental health recovers, the statute provides for periodic examinations ofthe acquittee's mental 18State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6


### health, as well as mechanisms by 

### which the acquittee can petition for a final discharge. Moreover, the statute provides sufficient procedural protections for acquittees. We affirm the Court ofAppeals.

19State v. Beaver, No. 91112-6



### WE CONCUR:

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