### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d onBr ie fs N ove m be r 7, 200 6

MEL VIN CO FE R v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Hardem an Coun ty No. 6542 J. Weber M cCr aw, Ju dge

No. W2006-00631-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Septem ber 25, 2007

Th e pe tit ion e r, Me lvi n Co fe r, wa s c on vic te d o f a g g ra va te d v e hic ula

r h omi c ide and

ve hic ula r a ssa ult

. As a re sult, the petitioner rec eived c oncurr ent sentenc es of twe nty -one year s and three y ear s. The petitioner’s c onvictions and sentenc es we re a ffirme d on direc t appea l. See State v. Melvin Cofer, No. W2002-01984-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21729450, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Jul. 25, 2003), per

m. ap p

. denied, ( Tenn. Nov. 24, 2003) . Subsequently , the supreme court de nied permission to a p p ea l

. T h e petitioner filed a pro se pe tition for post-conviction relief alleg ing, on

numerous g rounds, ineffe ctive assistance of counsel. Counsel wa s appointed and se vera l amended pe tit ion s w e re fi le d. Th e pe tit ion wa s d e nie d b y

the po st- c on viction c ourt a ft e r a he ari ng . T his appea l followed. Be ca u s e the post-c onviction court prope rly denied the pe tition, we affir m the jud g me nt o f t

he po st- c on vic tio n c ourt

.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opin i o n o f t h e court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Gar y Antrica n, District Public Defe nder, Coving ton, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Melvin Cofer.

Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Pr e sto n S hi pp, A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Eliz a b e th Ri c e , D is tric t Attorney

Gene ral; and Joe Van Dy

ke, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral,for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

The fa cts underly

ing the petitioner’s conviction were prese nted on direc t appea l by this Court

a s f oll ow s:-2- At approximately

2:15 a. m

. o n Marc h 12, 2001, Trooper Tim Scott was dispatched to the sc ene of a singl e- v ehicle a ccide nt on Carlins Road in Harde man County . When he ar

rived some thirty -five minutes af t er t h e accident, he observe d that eme rge n cy

m ed i ca l p er s o n n el we re p re p ar i n g t o tra n s p o rt th e f em al e v i ct i m , later ide nti fi e d a s Ca

nd ic e Ma in, by

he lic op te r t o a

ho sp ita l in

Jac ks on . T he ma le vic tim , J eff Taylor, was be ing tr ansported by ambulance to J ackson Gener al Hospital. A g r e e n H o n d a la

y u p s id e d o w n o n th e e d g e o f th e r o a dw ay

. A c c o r d in g to Trooper S c o t t , t h e v e h i c l e h a d “ c r o s s e d o v e r th e c e n t e r l i n e , an d th e c e n t e r o f t h e r o a d w ay, and had r olled over into onc oming traff ic.” The defe ndant, who was the owner of the Honda, a cknowledg ed that he had bee n driving when the a ccide nt occur red. Tr ooper Scott described the defe ndant’s spee ch as slurr ed, his ey es as watery , and his g ait as unsteady , and obser

ved that one of hi s pupils was dilated. Tr ooper Scott also smelled alcohol on his brea

th. There was a

n unopened c an of b ee r beside the defe ndant’s vehicle.

After photogr aphingthe v e h ic le , T r o o p e r Sc o tt q u e s ti o n e d th e defe ndant, who admitted that he had be en drinkingear lier in the eve ning a nd had taken Xanax , and the n p la c e d h im und e r a rr e st f or DU I . T he of

fi cer tra ns po rt e d th e de fe nd ant t o Bolivar Ge n era l Hospital for a blood a lcohol test, which the de fenda nt refuse d. Be cause of injuries he suf fer ed in the ac cident, the def endant wa s hospitaliz ed and was late r take n to J ackson Gener al Hospi tal. Trooper Scott was not prese nt when the defe ndant’s blood was drawn. It was his opinion that the defe ndant was intoxi cate d when the a ccide nt occur

red.
Trooper S cott, who had only

three months’ experience at the time of the

acc ident, had previously investigated approx imately twenty acc idents. This was the first ac cident he ha d investigated which involved a fata lity . Trooper Scott concede d that he did not interview a ny of t he by standers who wer e at the sce ne that nig ht and acknow ledg ed that the de fenda nt’s slurred speech, w ater y ey es, dilated pupil, and

un ste a dy g a it c ou ld h ave be e n c a

us e d b y inj ur ie s h e re c e ive d in

the a c c ide nt.
Denise Walder, t h e victim Taylor’s fianc eé, te stified that she had la st seen him a t a pp rox imate ly

mid night o n th e night o f a c c ide nt a nd did no t se e him

a g a in until he was taken to the hospital. Upon her arr ival at the hospital, she lear ned that Taylor had be en in a c ar a ccide nt and had died.

Candice Ma in, who had attende d a cookout at a neig hbor’s house on the day be fo re the a c c ide nt, te sti fi e d th a t bo th t he de fe nd ant a

nd Ta ylor were t here . B oth

we re dr in k i n g

. D u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f th e e v e n i n g , M s

. M a i n an d T ayl o r d e c i d e d to persua de the de fenda

nt to leave the c ookout in order to avoid an alter cation. She

rec alled that when they

left in the def

endant’ s car , eac h of them wa s drinking be er. Acc ording to Ms. Main, Taylor drove initially but the defe ndant eve ntually took the whee l. When the defe ndant beg an driving at an excessive rate of spee d and-3-

sw e rv ing , s he “ be g g e d [th e de fe nd ant] t o s top or le t us out, o r l e t so me bo dy e lse drive.” Ms. Main testified that she wa s pinned underne ath the c ar wh en the defe ndant cr ashed. She r eca lled hear ing T aylor talking but could not se e him. The defe ndant ra

n for he lp. J ust after

a man a nd a woman pulled her fr o m t h e ca r, she los t c on sc iou sn e ss.

Ms. Ma in r emained in the hospital f or three wee ks with injuries to her colon, pa nc re a s and

kid ne y s. Al l of he r r ibs we re br ok e n. She te sti fi e d th a t “ [i]t’ s n ot a ll [t he def endant’ s] fault. He didn’t want me to g et in that car

. . . I believe the pain [the defe ndant has] been throug h is enoug h.”

L aura Kitchen, a medical labor atory technicia n at B olivar Ge nera l Hospital at the time of the a ccide nt, testified that the def endant’ s b l o od was dra

wn at the dir e c tio n o f t he e me rg e nc y ro om p hy sic ian to te st f or blo od a lc oh ol c on te nt. Although she could not spe cifica lly rec all taking the def endant’ s blood, Ms. Kitchen testified that it is her prac tice to c lean the are a with w ater rathe r than a lcohol befor e draw ing the sample. Testing established that the defenda nt’s blood alcohol content was .217 milligra

ms per dec iliter.

Robert Marsha ll, a fore nsic scientist w i t h the Tenne ssee B urea u of I nvestig ation testified that the defenda nt’s medical r ecor ds established that a se rum b l o o d al co h o l t es t , ra t h er

t h an a w h o l e b l o o d al co h o l t es t , wa s p er fo rm ed

. Us i n g a standard f

ormula, Mar shall determined that the defe ndant’s wh o l e blood alcohol level would have been .177 perc ent. Marsha ll testified t hat whil e alc ohol in the body g ener ally dissipates at a rate of .01 to.02 grams perc ent per hour, the a lcohol content of blood kept in a sea led containe r would likely rema in the s ame. The de fenda nt’s

me d ic a l r e c o r d s in d ic a te d th a t h e h a d

ta k e nth e p r e s c r ip ti o n me d ic a ti o nX an a x, wh ic h, a c c or din g to M ars ha ll, sh ou ld n ot b e c omb ine d w itha lc oh ol. Mar sh all testified that the medica l r ecor ds established that the def endant r efuse d blood alcohol te sti ng by law e nf

or c e me nt and

that th e te sti ngwa s c on du c te d f or me dic a l pu

rp os e s.

B ill y I rv in, a vo lunte e r w iththe re sc ue sq ua d th a t re sp on de d to the a c c ide nt, test if ie d th a t wh il e h e is n o t a

c e rti f ie d e me r g e n c y

me d ic a l t e c h n ic ia

n , h e w as
cer tified to rende r medica l assistance at acc ident scene s with f ew limitations. I rvin, wh o a rr ive d at th e a c c ide nt s c e ne a t 2: 20 a .m. , te sti fi e d th a t i t to ok a pp ro ximate ly twenty minutes to extricate Tay lor, who wa s pinned betwe en the g round and the rea r window, with the full weig ht of the vehic le on his back.

Mecha nic Ro g e r Pr o v in c e , wh o examined the vehicle se vera l months after the

acc ident, deter

mined that “the rig ht r ear tire was flat. The rig ht r ear whee l is turned

un de r, and

. . . th e le ft

fr on t f e nd e r a nd the le ft fr on t w he e l ha s dama g e wh e re it h it the tree .” Province stated that he observe d asphalt inside the rim of the r ight r ear tire,-4-

ind ic a tin g tha

t it ha d d ugint o the ro a dw ay

. He fo un d th a t th e tir e ha d b ro ke n lo os e fr om t he ri m a nd the ri g ht r e ar s us pe ns ion of the c ar w a s b e nt.

J ohn Weaver , a par amedic w ith the Harde man County Ambulance Service , testified that when he arr i v ed at t h e scene of the acc ident, a number of by standers

wer e roc k i n g the ca

r in an attempt to li ft it off of Ta ylor. Acc ording to Weaver, Taylor was ly ing on his stomach and w as pinned unde r the c ar f rom his waist down. After direc ting the by standers to step a way from the vehicle, Weaver perf ormed a n assessment of Ta

ylor’s condition. Weaver noted that Taylor, who wa s conscious and able to spea

k, had a strongodor of a lcohol on his breath. Initially , he did not detec t any life-thre ateninginjuries. After Taylor was r emoved fro m t h e vehic le, Weaver ob se rv e d that “ [i]n the lum ba r are a ov e r the kid

ne y s[,] wh ic h wo uld

be jus t a bo ve his belt line, there wer e two indent [a]ti ons in the b ac k of the skin. They wer e approximately

half a n inch dee p, g uessing probably the size of a cig are tte, one over

eac h kidney .” Althoug h Taylor’s ski n was not broken, it was Weave r’s opinion that the injuries wer e of a

ty pe that “c ould cause a lot of dama g e to the interna l org ans.”
Although a helicopter

was c alled to transpor

t Taylor to J ackson G ener al Hospital or to T he Med in Me mphis, a major weather fr ont betwee n Har deman a nd Shelby Counties prevente d air travel so that only one helicopte r wa s available . When the helicopter

arr ived, Tay

lor was pinned under the vehicle and Ms. Main’s c ondition had wor sened so the de cision was made to tr ansport Ms. Main by air a nd Taylor by ambulance . Although t h e p i lot of the helicopter ag ree d to return a

nd meet the

ambu lanc e a ft e r d

ro pp ingof

f M s. Ma in, we a the r c on dit ion s wou ld no t pe rm it h im to do so. Ta

ylor ’s c on dit ion de te ri or a te d dur ing the tr ip t o Jac ks on Ge ne ra l H os pit a l, which took appr ox imately an hour.
Melvin Cofer, 2003 WL21729450, at *1-3 (f ootnote omitted).

At the conc lusion of the jury t ri al, the petitioner w as convic ted of a g g ravated vehicula r homicide and ve hicular assault. The trial c ourt sentenc ed the pe titioner to twenty -one year s for the ag g ravated vehicular homicide conviction and three y ear s for the ve hicular a ssault conviction. The sentenc es we re or dere d to run concur rently

. On direc t a

ppeal, the petitioner a

rgued: (1) that the trial court e rre d by

ref using to suppre ss the results of the blood alc ohol test; (2) that the trial court e rre d by limit ing de fense counsel’s questioning of potential jurors; (3) that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to s up po rt the a g g ra vate d v e hic ula

r h omi c ide c on vic tio n; ( 4) that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y re fu sin g to qualify a def ense w itness as an e x pert; (5) that the state fa iled to establish a prope r cha in of custody prior to the admission of the re sults of the blood alcohol test; and (6 ) t h at the trial c ourt err ed by denying his reque st for spec ial jury instructions. This Court upheld both t he petitioner’ s convictions and sente nces. I d. The pe titioner’s application for per mission t o appea l was denied on November 24, 2003.-5- P o s t -C o n v i ct i o nP ro ce ed i n gs
The pe titioner filed a pr o se petition for post-c onviction relief o n J une 29, 2004. The petitioner ame nded the pr o se petition o nce to include more spec ific g rounds for post-c onviction relief

. Af ter c ounsel was a

ppointed, the petition was ag ain amende d, narr owing the g rounds on which the pe titioner sought r elief. The petitioner claimed that trial counsel was ineffe ctive for : (1) fa ili ngto pu rsue a

c ha ng e of ve nu e ; ( 2) fa ili ngto i nte rv ie w w itn e sse s; ( 3) fa ili ngto p ro pe rl y inv e sti g a te the c a se ; (4) fa ili ng to ar ra ng e fo r an e xpe rt wi tne ss co nc e rn ing the c a us e of the a c c ide nt; (5) f ailing to a dequate ly

investigate and pur sue issues re lating to the pe titioner’s blood sample; and (6) f ailing to zealously

repr esent the pe titioner during differ ent phase s of the trial.

Evidence at the Post-Conviction Hearing
At the post-conviction hea ring , the petitioner claimed that there was no testimony introduced at trial as to Mr. Ta

ylor’s ca use of de ath. The pe titioner stated that immediately afte r the wr eck, he ran to two houses to g et help and ha ve someone call for

emer g ency

assistance . The pe titioner te sti fi e d that he as ke d tri a l couns e l to me e t with and int e rv ie w the se pe op le a s p ote nti a l w itn e sse s. Acc ording to the petitioner, t rial counsel informed him that “they [t he witnesses] didn’t have nothing [sic ] g oo d to say a

bo ut [him]. ” F ur

the r, the pe tit ion e r c omp la ine d th a t tr ia l c ouns e l di d n ot o bta in an expert i n ac ci d en t rec onstruction or blood ana ly sis. The petitioner admitted that trial c ounsel

secur ed a wrec ker driver to te stify , but c omplained beca use the trial court would not per mit the driver to te stify as an expert in a ccide nt r econstruc tion. The petitioner was also unhappy becaus e t rial counsel did not obtain a c hang e of ve nue eve n afte r pre -trial publicity about the ca se.
The pe titioner further

testified that Troope r S cott was permitted to testify as an ex pert. The petitioner complained that trial counsel failed to obje ct to Trooper Scott’s categ orization as an expert and that the trial court did not proper ly deter mine that Trooper

Scott was an e x pert prior to allowing him to testi fy

. The pe titioner was also dissatisfied with trial counse l’s repr esen t at i o n in that trial counsel did not attempt to arg ue at tria l that the petitioner wa s not intox icated.

On cr oss-examination, the petitioner ag ree d and admitted that the State introduced e vidence of his intox ication at the time of t h e wr ec k

. Fur ther, the pe titioner admitted that trial counsel questioned Troope r Scott with reg ard to how the ty pical cha rac teristics of intox ication might mirror the ty pical cha rac teristics or a pe rson with a hea d injury . The pe titioner also ag ree d that there was
no te sti mony

that any of the tir e s w e re de fl a te d, a s th e pe tit ion e r s ug g e ste d to tr ia l c ouns e l.

Trial counse l took the stand to rebut the petiti oner’ s claims. Acc ording to trial counsel, she did not intend to have the wre cker driver testify as an e x pert re g ardinghow the ac cident occ urre d. Tr ia l c ouns e l se nt mate ri a ls to an a c c ide nt re c on str uc tio nis t, wh o re po rt e d that he wo uld no t be a ble-6-

to assist the petitioner beca use he b elieved that the Tenne ssee Hig hway Patrol had done a

n “excellent” job.

Tr ia l c ouns e l st a te d th a t sh e sp ok e wi th s e ve ra l pa ramedi cs and

me dic a l pe rs onne l in pr e pa ratio n f or tr ia l, wh o g ave “ a lte rn a tiv e the or ie s” of ho w M r. Ta

ylor su sta ine d h is f

a ta l in jur ie s. I n the end, tria l counsel re lied on the testimony of the paramedic s to support the theory that sever al of Mr. Ta ylor’s injuries re sulted from the re scue eff ort. By utiliz ing pa

rame dics, trial counse l hoped to have the pa

rame dics sug g est alterna

tive theories r eg ardingthe cause of death in the hope of ra ising

a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b ti nt h e m i n d s o f

t h e j ur y.

Trial counse l also testified that she conside red r equesting a chang e in venue, but chose not t o p u rs u e i t as she dete rmined that it would not be succe ssful. Acc ording to trial counsel, the petitioner ag ree d to this st rate g y

.
As to Trooper Scott’s testimony , trial counsel stated that she did not object to the testimony ab o u tt h e c au s e o f t h e acc i d en t b ec au s e th er e we re d et ai l s , s p ec i fi ca l l y th e t es t i m o n y ab o u tth e go u ge
mark s in the ro a d, that w e re he lpf ul t o th e de fense. Mo reov er, tr ia l c ouns e l r e me mbe re d c ro ssexamining Troope r Scott ext ensively on his observations and a ssessment of the sce ne. Tria l counsel did not feel that Trooper Scott a ctually g ave an opinion a s to the cause of the acc ident, but that he repor ted the cir cumstance s that he obser ved at the sc ene.

Trial counse l stated that she consulted a per son trained in blood testing and intox ication prior to trial. Trial counse l admitted that she did not consult directly with a ny one at the hospital wher e the pe tit ion e r’ s b loo d w a s d ra wn in pr e pa

ratio n fo r c ro ss- e xami natio n. Ho we ve r, tr ia l c ouns e l f e lt that the lab tec hnician who dr ew the petitioner’s bl ood testified clearly reg ardingthe exact protocol that she employ ed.

Trial counse l remembe red me eting with and discussing the ca se with the p e ti ti oner nume rous times. During one of those me eting s, the petitioner told tria l c ounsel that he ha d taken Xa nax on the day of the a ccide nt. Trial counse l could not r emember what amount of the drugthe petitioner took. Trial counse l also believed that her investig ator spoke to a ll of the potential wit n es s es t h at wer e provided to her

by the petitioner. Tr ial counsel rec alled that all of the potential witnesses desc ribed the petitioner a s intox icated a nd sh e m ad e a d ecision not to call any of those witnesses on the petitioner’s be half. Tr ial counsel did not rec all the petitioner having a theory about an a lternative

cause of the a ccide nt, like o ne of the passeng er’ s leg s, causingthe steer ing wheel to stick and become the ultimate cause of the wr eck.

Trial counse l testified that she did not attack the indictment. After examining the indictment at the post-convic tion hearing , trial counsel a dmitted that it allege d only a viol ation of Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-213, the v eh icular homicide statute, but that the petitioner wa s convicted of

ag g ravated vehicula

r homicide unde r Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-218.-7-

To ny Mc Maha n, a lif e -l on g fr ie nd

of the pe tit ion e r, te sti fi e d th a t th e pe tit ion e r c ame to h is trailer a fter the wre ck to tell him about the acc ident and to g et help for the injured pa sseng ers. Mr. McMaha n claimed that he was the first witness on the sce ne. Ac cordingto Mr. McMaha n, no one
ever talked to him about his obse rvations at the scene , including trial counsel. Mr. Mc Mahan state d that, in his opini on, the petitioner did not appe ar intoxi cate d.

At the c on c lus ion

of the he ari ng , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt too k th e matte r u

nd e r a dv ise me nt. I n a wr itten order, the post-conviction cour t denied the pe tition for post- co n v iction relief, deter mining that trial c ounsel was not inef fec tive. In that order , the post-conviction cour t made the following finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law:

The pe titioner was indicted on DU IPer Se, Prior DUI , Ag g ravated Vehic ular homicide: I ntox ication and Ve hicular A ssault.

On J anuar

y 17, 2002, afte r a trial by

jury , the def

endant wa s found guilty

of DUI , Ag g ravated Vehicu lar Homicide as a r esult of intox ication and Ve hicular As sa ult

.
Th e fa c ts o f the c a se e sta

bli sh e d that the de fe nd ant wa s the dr ive r of a ve hic le involved in a sing l e v eh i cle accide nt which involved a f atality as we ll as critical injuries. Whil e drivingthe vehicle , the def endant wa s intox icated.
The pe titioner filed a petition f or post-conviction relief

, alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistance of counse l . . . .
Hearing: At the hea

ring on J anuar

y 24, 2006, the petitioner pre sented the testimony of the de fenda

nt/petitioner, . . . and [trial counsel].

Ine ffec ti ve As sis ta nc e of C ouns e l:

. . . . Petitioner’s main complaints appea rs [sic ] to be that his attorney did not pursue or secu re ex p er t witnesses, did not permit the def endant to testify , did not purs ue ve nu e c ha

ng e s a s w e ll as oth e r pr e tr ia l and tr ia l stra te g ie s. In p re se nti nghis testimony at th i s h ea ri ng , the Court did not find the defe ndant to be cr edible. The d e f e n d an t’ s r e c o ll e c ti o no f

th e f a c ts d if f e r e d f r o m th o s e p r e s e n te d b y [tr ia l c o un s e l] , and those e vidence d by

the re cord. With reg ard to se curing expert witnesses, [trial counsel] testified that an ac cident re constructionist was consulted, but a ft er investigation, the rec onstructionist found that his inves t i gat i ve re sults would not sup p o rt t h e th e o r y p r e s e n te d

b y th e d e f e n d an t; th e r e f

o r e , e xp e rt t e s ti mo n y

b y an
acc ident rec onstructionist was not presente d, and counse l determined that any te sti mony by su c h a n e xpe rt wo uld no t be he lpf

ul.-8- Wit h reg ard to the c hang e of ve nue complaint, the t estimony reve aled that the

a c c ide nt w a s c ov e re d b y

the loc a l me dia . H ow e ve r, the pr oo f d id n ot r e veal that a chang e of ve nue could be sustained. Reg ardle ss, the proof in d i ca tes that the defe ndant, af

ter c onsultation with counsel, ag ree d to proce ed to t ri al in Har deman C o u n t y.

L astly , the def

endant r aises the issue that the code se ction cited in the indictment w as err oneous, and c ounsel was inef fec tive for not addr essing this iss ue. Counsel for the de fenda nt in his arg ument on this post-convictio n prese nted statements as to the c urre nt codi fication of the vehicula r homicide a

nd ag g ravated vehicular homicide; y et no proof was pre sented a s to the codifica iton in 2001 which

wa s th e y e ar t

hat th e ind ic tme nt w a s p re se nte d. As sumin g arguendo fo r t his po stc on vic tio n he ari ng that the c od if ic a tio n co nta ine d in this ind ic tme nt w a s in c or re c t, this Court considers this iss ue. Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 9- 13-213, which is the

curr ent citation f

o r v ehicular

assault rather that [sic] for ag g ravated vehicle [si c] homicide, was c ited in the indictment. Although the indictment doe s g ive re fer ence to TCA 39-13-213, the indictment clea rly g ave a ppropriate and suff

icient cha rg ing

wo rd s to su

pp or t its c ha rg e of a g g ra vate d v e hic ula

r h omi c ide . T he de fe nd ant c la ims that failure to properly

identify the numeric al code section by the State should inure to his benef

it. All of the parties proce eded w ith the char g e of a g g ravated vehicula r ho mic ide , th e iss ue wa s n e ve r r a ise d b y the de fe nd ant, and th e re qu ir e me nts to sustain a conviction under ag g ravated vehicula

r homicide we re me t. This claim of the def endant f ails. I n this case ther e is no showing that the def endant wa s misled by this rec itation. Further

more, the a lleg ed def

ect wa s asce rtainable prior to trial, and the def endant did not raise any objection to the indictment. I n such ca se, the a lleg ed defe ct is waived. . . .

Fur ther, whe n words of a cha rg ing instrument show the offe nse for which a person is cha

rg ed, the errone ous rec itation of a statute is mere surplusag e and is not fata l to the char g ing instrument. St at e v . Bow ers, 673 S.W.2d 887. Further , since there was no indication that the defendant was misled by the re citation of the wr ong statute in the indictment which contained sufficie nt a nd appropr iate char g ing w ords to alleg e ag g ravated vehicula r homicide, such c onviction should not be set aside.
Unless substantial rig hts of the def endant a re a ffe cte d b y t he var iance betwee n the indictment and the pr oof, the de fenda nt suf fers no harm, and va

rianc e do e s n ot p re

jud ic e defend ant’s su

bs tanti a l r ig hts if

[the ] ind ic tme nt s uf

fi c ie ntl y informs him of the cha

rg es so that he may prepa re [a] defe nse and not be misled or surprised at trial. State v. Moss, 662 S.W .2d 590 (Tenn. 1984)

.

. . . .
T h e Co u rt a c c r e d it s th e te s ti mo n y o f [tr ia l c o un s e l]

.-9- The Cour t finds that [t rial counse l] provided a dequate assistance ; she met wi th t he pe tit ion e r a

nd dis c us se d th e c a se , in c lud ingpo ssi ble tr ia l stra te g ie s.

Pe tit ion e r f

a ile d to sh owany

m a t e r ia l de fi c ie nt p e rf

or manc e by [tr ia l c ouns e l] or that he w as pre

judiced by

his repre sentation.

The Court finds that petitioner has failed to establish the fa ctual alleg ations contained in his petition by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e.

Post-Convi ction Standard of Re view
To sustain a petition for post-c onviction relief, a defe ndant must prove h i s o r h er factua l alleg ations by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e at a n evidentiar

y hear ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 3 0 -1 1 0 (f ); M o m o n v

. S t at e, 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d 1 5 2 , 1 5 6 (T en n

. 1 9 9 9 ). T h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nco urt ’ s fi n d i n gs of fa c t are c on c lus ive on a

pp e a l unle ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e ra te s o the rw ise . Se e State v. B ur ns , 6 S. W.3 d 4 53 , 4 61 (T e nn . 1 99 9) . D ur ingour r e vie w o f the is su e rai se d, we wi ll a ff or d th os e finding s of fact t he weight of a jury verdic t, and thi s court is bound by the cour t’s finding s unless the evidenc e in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst those finding s. See He nley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997); Alley v. State, 958 S.W .2d 138, 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . This Court may

no t re we ig h or re -e va luate the e vid e nc e , no r su bs tit ute its inf e re nc e s fo r tho se dr awn by th e postconviction cour

t. See State v. Hone y cu t t , 54 S.W .3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2001) . All questions

conce rning the cr edibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht and value to be g iven their testimony , and the fa c tua l is su e s r a ise d b y

the e vide nc e are to b e re so lve d b y the tr ia l ju dg e , n ot t

he a pp e llate c ourt s. See M o mo n , 1 8 S. W. 3 d

a t 1 5 6 ; H e n le y , 9 6 0 S. W. 2 d a t 5 7 8

- 7 9

. H o w e v e r , th e p o s t- conviction court’s c onclus i ons of law a re r eviewe d under a

purely de novo standa

rd with no presumption of

corr ectne ss. See Fie lds v. St ate, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

I neff ective A ssistance of Counsel

Wh e n a p e ti ti o n e r s e e k s p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f o n th e b a s is o f in e f f e c ti v e a s s is ta

nce of counsel, the petitioner bear s the burden of showing that (a) the servic es re ndere d by trial counsel

wer e def icient and ( b) that the de ficient pe rfor mance was pre

judicial. See Powe rs v

. S t at e, 942 S.W .2d 551, 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996 ). I n order to demonstrate de ficient pe rfor mance , the petitioner must show that the service s rende red or the advice g iven was be low “the r ang e of competenc e dema

nded of attorney s in criminal case s.” Bax ter v. Ros e, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 19 75 )

. I no r d e r

t o d e m o n s t r a t e p r e

j u d i c e , t h e p e t i t i o n e r

m u s ts h o w t h a tth e r e i s a r e a s o n able probability

that, but for counse l’s defic ient perf ormanc e, the r esult of th e p ro ce ed i ng would have be e n d if fe re nt. Se e Str ic kla

nd v. Was hin g ton , 46 6 U. S. 66 8, 69 4 ( 19 84 ). “ B e c a us e a pe tit ion e r m

us t

e sta bli shbo th p ro ng s o f t

he te st t o p re va il o n a

c la im o f ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, f

a ilure to prove e ither def

i ci en t perf

ormanc e or r esulting pr ejudice pr ovides a suff icient basis to deny

relief on the claim.” H enley , 960 S.W .2d at 580.-10-

As no te d a

bo ve , th is Co urt w ill a ff or d th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s a presumption of cor

rec tness, rende ring them conclusive on a ppeal unless the r ecor d p re p o nderates ag ainst the court’s finding s. See id. a t 578. Howeve r, our supreme court has “de termined that issues of def icient per formanc e by

counsel a nd possible prejudice to the defe nse ar e mix ed questions of law and fa ct . . . ; thus, [ appellate ] review of [these issues] is de novo” wit h n o p re s u m p t ion of

corr ectne ss. State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999).

F ur the rm or e , o n c la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, the pe tit ion e r i s n ot e nti tle d to the be ne fi t of

hin ds ig ht. Se e Ad

kin s v. State , 91 1 S.W. 2d 33 4, 34 7 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). Th is Court may

not second-guess a rea sonably -base d trial strateg y , and we cannot g rant re lief base d on a sound, but unsucce ssful, tactica l decision made dur ing the course of the p ro ce ed i n gs . See id. How ever , su c h d e fe re nc e to t he ta c tic a l de c isi on s o f c ouns e l a pp lie s o nly

if c ouns e l make s th os e decisions af

ter a dequate prepa

ration for the ca se. See Cooper v. State, 847 S.W .2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
On app ea l, the petitioner ar g ues that the post-c onviction court improper ly deter mined that he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel at trial. Specif ically , the petitioner a

rgues t h at t rial counsel’s pe rfor

mance “not only

fell below the n o rm ex p ec ted of c riminal defe nse lawyers, but

a c tua lly re su lte d in

a c on vic tio n of an of

fe ns e fo r wh ic h a

pp e lla nt w a s n e ve r i nd ic te d. ” Th e State

c on te nd s th a t be c a

us e tr ia l c ouns e l’ s p e rf

or manc e wa s n ot d e fi c ie nt a nd the pe titio ner fai led t o demonstrate pr ejudice, the judgme nt of the post-convic tion court should be af firmed.

F a ilure to H ir e Expe rt s
The pe titioner argues t hat t rial counsel should have hire d an expert, rather than r ely on the testimony of the pa rame dic, t o testify as t o the cause of Mr. Tay lor’s death and should have c alled

an a c c ide nt r e c on str

uc tio nis t to te sti fy

a s to the c a

us e of the wr e c k. F ur

the r, th e pe tit ion e r c la ims that trial counsel should have hired a blood expert to testify

reg ardingthe amount of Xa nax he had in his sy stem, as well as how the amount of alcohol in his sy stem would have phy sically af fec ted him. The petitioner sugg ests that Mr. Tay lor’s injuries we re sustaine d duringthe re scue e ffor t rather tha n d ur ingthe wr e c k. Ho we ve r, the pe tit io ner did no t pr ov ide the po st- c on vic tio n c ourt wi th evidenc e t h at h e d i d not cause the ac cident, or that the cra sh was not the proximate cause of Mr. Taylor’s death. Furthe r, the pe titioner failed to prove that even if Mr. Tay lo r’ s i n j u ri es we re sustained duringth e re s cu e ef fo rt , as opposed to the wr eck, the jury would have f

ound him not g uilty . Neither did the petit ioner produce a blood expert at the post-convic tion hearing . There was te sti mony a t the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ngthat tr ia l c ouns e l sp ok e wi th a n a c c ide nt r e c on str

uc tio nis t, who was una

ble to conclude any

thing f avora ble to the defe nse. Consequently , there is no indication that any potential experts would have be nefitted the pe titioner’s defe nse at trial. See Bla ck v. State, 794 S.W .2d 752, 758-59 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1990) (dete rmining that wher e a pe titioner contends that his or her tria l counsel fa iled to present fa v o ra b l e wi tnesses in support of their de fense , such wi tne sse s mu st b e pr e se nte d at an e viden ti ary hea ri ng , o the rw ise the pe tit ion e r i s n ot e nti tle d to relief ). The r ecor d supports the post-conviction cour t ’s co n cl usion that trial counsel wa s not-11-

defic ient in this re g ard. Fur ther, the petitioner has pr esente d no proof that he was pre judiced by

trial

c ouns e l’ s p e rf

or manc e . T his iss ue is w ith out me ri t.

Fa ilure to Call Wi tnesses

Ne xt, th e pe tit ion e r c la ims that tr ia l c ouns e l wa s ine ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto i nte rv ie w o r c a ll

cer tain witnesses. In particula r, the pe titioner complains that trial counsel did n o t call Tony McMaha n, one of the first people to a rrive on the scene , as a witness. The pe titioner sugg ests that Mr. McMaha

n could have testified t h at M r. Tay lor rec eived his injuries as a result of the r escue eff ort. The petiti oner also argues that Mr. McMa han would have testified that the petitioner w as not drunk at the time of the acc ident. Ms. McMahan te stified at the post-conviction hea ring , but made no mention of how he thoug ht the victim rece ived his injuries. Furthe r, w h i l e M r. McMahan testified at the post-c onviction hear ing that the petitioner “didn’t se em drunk” in his opinion, the jury was pre sented wit h o v er wh elm ing e vidence of the pe titioner’s intox ication at trial, includingthe

re su lts of blo od a lc oh ol t e sts that sh ow e d th e pe tit ion e r’ s b loo d a lc oh ol l e ve l to be .1 77 pe rc e nt.
The pe titioner also complains that trial counse l failed to ca ll a witness to test i fy as t o the proper proce dure f

or dra wing blood. Trial counsel testified that she consulted a pe rson as to prope r proce dure in pre paration for cr oss-examination of the State’s wit ness at trial. The petiti oner did not pr e se nt a ny wi tne sse s at th e po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ngthat sh ow e d ho w su c h te sti mony a t tr ia l w ou ld have been benef

icial. Ag ain, the rec ord supports the post-conviction court’s conclusion th at t ri al counsel wa s not deficient in this reg ard. F urther, the petitioner has pr esente d no proof that he was pr e jud ic e d b y

tr ia l c ouns e l’ s p e rf

or manc e . T his iss ue is w ith out me ri t.

Fa ilure to Expl ore A lternate Theory as to Cause of Wre ck

Th e petitioner alleg es that trial counse l’s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt beca use she did not

e xplor e an a lte rn a te the or y a s to the c a

us e of the fata l w re c k. Th e pe tit ion e r s ug g e ste d at the po stconviction hea

ring that the wre ck could have been cause d by one of the passeng er’ s leg s hitting the

s t e e r i n g w h e e l

. T r i a l c o u n s e l t e s t i f i e d th a tth e p e t i t i o n e r

n e v e r m a d e h e r aw ar e o f th i s th e o r

y

. In de nying the pe tit ion , the tr ia l c ourt g ave c re dib ili ty

to t he te sti mony

of tr ia l c ouns e l and

sp e c if ic a lly dis c re dit e d th e pe tit ion e r’ s te sti mony . A s st a te d a bo ve , “ qu e sti on s o f c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, the weig ht and value of

the evidenc e, and r esolution of conflicts in the evide nce are matters entr usted to the trial judg e as the trier of fac t” and the post-c onviction court’s c redibility deter minations are conclusive on appea l unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18 , 2 3 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 6 )

. T h e e v id e n c e d o e s n o t p r e p o n d e r a te a g a in s t t h e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o nc o u rt’s

cre dibilit y

deter mination herein. The petitioner has f ailed to prove by clea

r and convincing evidenc e that tr ia l couns e l wa s ine ff e c tiv e in fa ili ng to expl or e a the or y that w a s n e ve r d isc los e d to he r. Th is issue is without m erit.-12- Fa ilure to Objec t to Trooper Scott’s Te stimony
The pe titioner com p l ai n s t hat trial counse l failed to objec t to Trooper Scott’s testimony reg ardinghow the ac cident occ urre d beca use he w as not qualified as a n expert in acc ident

re con stru c tio n. Tr ia l c ouns e l te sti fi e d at th e po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ngthat sh e did no t ob je c t to Trooper Scott’s testimony

beca use t here wer e details, such as the goug e marks in the road, that were he lpf ul t o th e de fe ns e the or

y . F ur the r, tr ia l c ou

ns e l te sti fi e d th a t sh e c ho se to v ig or ou sly c ro ssexamine Trooper

Scott rather tha

n object to his testimony in its entire ty . Trial counse l actually stated that she did not believe Tr ooper Scott g ave a ny opinions at all reg arding how t he ac cident occ urre d, but that he mere ly

repor ted t h e circ umstances that he observe d at the sce ne. Thus, trial c ounsel testified that her

decision wa s a tac tical one. It is not t his Court’s function to “‘sec ond g uess’ tac tical and strate g ic choices perta ining to defe nse matters or to measure a def

ense attorney ’s re prese ntation by ‘20-20 hindsig ht.’” He nley , 960 S.W .2d at 579 (quoting Hellar d v. State, 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)). The petitioner ag ain failed to prove ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. This issue is without merit.

Fa ilure to Objec t During Voir Dire

I n his brief, the petitioner claims that trial counsel should ha ve objected when the prosec utor alleg edly rea d a list of Har deman County DUI victims to potential jurors during voir dire. While the trial rec ord indicate s that the prosecutor named sever al DUI victims during voir dire , it also indicates that the prosecutor l isted the names in order to establish if any of t he potential jurors knew anyone inj ur e d a s a

re su lt o f D UI . H ow e ve r, the pe tit ion e r f a ile d to ra ise th is all eg a tio n in any of his petitions for post-conviction re lief and f ailed to ra ise this issue at the post-conviction hea ring

.
I neff ective a ssistanc e o f counsel is a single c laim for re lief under the Post-Conviction Procedur e Act even though the violation may be proved by multipl e acts or omissions on t h e p art

o f c o u n s el. E r ik a

L o u is e B u n k le y

Patr ic k v

. St a te , N o

. W2 0 0 4

- 0 2 2 1 7

- CC A

- R3

- PC , 2 0 0 6 WL 211824, at *10 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, J an. 24, 2006) (citing Thompson v. State, 958 S.W .2d 1 56, 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ; Cone v. State, 927 S.W .2d 579, 581-82 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1995)). Thus, a ll factua l alleg ations must be presented in one claim. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106( d). A petitioner may not relitigate a c laim of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel “by p r e s e n ti n g n e w an d d if

f e r e n t f a c tu a l a ll e g a ti o n s ” o n a

p p e a l. E r ik a

L o u is e B un k le y

Patr ic k , 2 0 0 6 WL 2118 2 4, at *10 (c iting Thompson, 958 S.W.2d at 161; R og er Clay ton Davis v. State, No. 03 C01 -9 90 2- CR- 00 07 6, 20 00 WL21 30 7 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. , at Kno x vi ll e, Jan . 1 4, 20 00 ), pe rm

. app. denie d, (Tenn. Sept. 5 , 2 000)). It appea rs that the petitioner’ s additional fac tual alleg ation supporting his c laim of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel was not ra ised in his petition for post-conviction re lief and w as not in response to testimony develope d at th e ev i d entiary hear ing. Fur thermore , the pos t-conviction court did not make any finding s of fact on the fa ctual alleg ations the pe tit ion e r now ra ise s. Er ika L ou ise B un kle y Patr ic k, 20 06 WL21 18 24 , at *1 0 ( c iti ngTe nn . R. App. P. 36(a) (holding that no “re lief may be g rante d in contrave ntion of the province of the trier of fac t.”)). Conseque ntly , this iss ue has be en wa ived. See Cone, 747 S.W.2d at 357.T he Stat e argues t hat t he p et i t i o ner wai ved t he i ss ue f o r f ai l ure t o prep are an ade q uat e reco rd b y not i ncl ud i ng 1 copi es of t he i ndi ct ment

. W e h ave t ake n j udi ci al not i ce of t he t ech ni cal r ecor d as pre s ent ed on di r ect appeal i n or der to re v ie w the ind ic tm e n t.

-13- Fa ilure to Objec t to I ndictment

F ina lly , th e pe tit ion e r c omp la ins th at tr ial co un se l f a ile d to ob

je c t to the ind ic tme nt. Specifica lly , the petitioner alleg es that acc ording to the statue sections cited in the indictment, the ind i ct m ent charg ed the pe titioner with “DUI Per Se, Prior DUI , . . . Vehicula r Homicide, a

nd . . . Ve h i cu l ar As s au l t

. ” In o t h er

wo rd s , t h e p et i t i o n er

ar gu es th at t h e i n d i ct m en td i d n o tac tu al l y

ch ar ge the petitioner with a g g ravated vehicular homicide, for which he wa s ultim ately convicted, a

nd that trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive for failing to object to the indictment prior to trial.

At the outse t, w e no te that th is i ssu e wa s n ot r a ise d in th e pe tit ion e r’ s p e tit ion fo r p os tc on vic tio n r e lie f. Ho we ve r, the iss ue wa s a dd re ssed at th e po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ngand the po stc on vic tio n c ourt

ma de fi nd ing s o f fa c t and c on c lus ion s of law i n r e g ard s to the iss ue , f ind ingit t o be without merit.

We have r eviewe d the indictment as i t appea rs i n the t echnic al record from the petitioner’s dir e c t a pp e a l. Count t

hr e e of the ind ic tme nt a lle g e s th a t th e pe tit ion e r “ did un lawf ull y , f e lon iou sly 1 and rec klessly kill Jeffre y Taylor by operation of an automobile, the killing of J eff rey Taylor being the proxim ate r esult of [t he petitioner’ s] i ntox ication as ope rator of said automobile, in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-213, . . . .” Ag g ravated vehicula r homicide is found at Tennesse e Code Annotated section 39-13- 2 1 8 ra t h er tha n -213. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-218 states that ag g ravated vehicula

r homicide is vehicula

r homicide a s defined in Te nnessee Code Ann o tated section 39-13- 213 wher e a defe ndant has two or m ore convictions for DUI

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-218(a )(1) (A). V ehicular homicide is define d as the “re ckless killing of anothe r by the oper ation of an a utomobile . .

. as the proxi mate result of the driver’ s intox ication.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 21 3. I n ord e r to b e c on vic te d o f a g g ra vate d v e hic ula

r h omi c ide , “ the ind ic tme nt, in a se pa rate c ount, shall specify , char g e and g ive not ice of the required prior conviction or convictions.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-218( c). Count two of the indictment listed two prior DUI offe nses committed by

the petitioner.
As a g ener al matter, “ [t ]he indictment must state the fa cts constituting the of fense in ordinary and conc ise languag e, without prolix ity or re petition, in s u ch a ma nner a s to enable a

person of

c omm on un de rs tand ing to kn ow wh a t is int e nd e d, and wi th that de g re e of c e rt a int y wh ic h w ill e na

ble the cour t, on conviction, to pronounce the proper j udg ment . . . .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-13- 202. I t is well-settled that an indictment must provide sufficie nt inf ormation: “(1) to e nable the a ccuse d to know the accusation t o which answer is require d, (2) to fur nish the court ade quate ba sis for the entry of a pr oper judg ment, and (3) to protec t the accused from double j eopar dy .” State v. Hill, 954 S.W .2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997)

.-14-

Although the issue of whe ther counsel’s failure to r aise on objection to the sufficie ncy of the indictment is not allege d in the post-conv i ct i o n p et ition, it was discussed by the post-conviction court in its determination of the issue of t he effec tiveness of counsel. The e ntire evide ntiary rec ord

conce rning this iss ue consists of t he followingcolloquy at the post-convic tion hearingbetwee n pe tit ion e r’ s p os t- c on vic tio n atto rn e y and his tr ia l c ouns e l:
Q. 39-13-213, what offense does that def ine? A. Vehicula

r homicide. Q. Now, turn to the pa g es over here to 39-13-218, what does that alleg e? A. Ag g ravated vehicula r homicide. Q. Any

wh e re on Cou nt T hr e e of

the ind ic tme nt d oe s it

sp e c if ica lly mention ag g ravated vehicula r homicide or 39- 13-218? A. No, but this book is t he most curr ent and I don’t know– Q. Iunderstand. A. – in 2001 – it would have bee n 2001, Idon’t know if the Codes are the same. Q. Of c ourse, we don’t have the notes so we don’ t know the y e ar t hat – A. Rig ht. Q. I f the codes are the same, then it’s t wo d i ffe rent of fe ns e s; i s th a t c or

re c t: A. I f the Codes a

re the same. Q

. O k ay. A. Any

I ’d have to look in my

book to see – Q. And y ou ag ree acc ording to what we ha ve her e today that the indictment is for 39-13-213, vehicula r homicide, not for 39- 13-218, ag g ravated homicide. A. Ye s. Q. On e oth e r thi ngI ’l l a sk y ou . Y ou

re a d it . D oe s th is ind ic tme nt a lle g e tha

t he ha d p ri or

DU I s, a s a

se pa ra te

– A. Ye s. Ithi nk

in C ount T wo , d oe sn ’t

it? Q. No , I ’m

no t ta lki nga

bo ut t hat. I ’l l a sk

y ou wh e n you

loo k at it

. A

. O k ay.

Ba sed on t his extremely

limit ed discussion of counse l’s understandingof the indictment, the re asons for he r ac tion o r inaction with respe ct to it, and the abse nce of any rec ord bef

ore us a s to what transpire d at the bifurc ated por tion of the proce eding s where in the status o f t h e i n d i ctm ent mightT h e br i ef s of t h e par t i es r ef

er en ce a bi f

u r ca t ed por t i on of t h e pr oce edi n g s wh er ei n appa r en t l y t h e qu es t i on of 2
wh et h er t h e pet i t i o ner’ s v eh i cu l ar h omi ci de con v i ct i on s h ou l d be e l ev at ed t o a g g r av at ed s t at u s w as de t er mi n ed. H owe v er , t h er e i s n o t ec h n i ca l r ec or d or t r an s cr i pt of t h at por t i on of t h e pr oce edi n g i n e i t h er t h e di r ec t a ppea l r ec or d or
t h e pos t

- con v i ct i on r ec or d.

-15- have c hang ed, we find t h at the petitioner ha s failed to ca rry his burden of pr oof that counse l was ine ff e c tiv e in n ot o bje c tin g to t he su ff ic ie nc y of the ind ic tme nt. 2

I t does appe ar that the i ndictment in this case , as i t appea rs in the re cord of

the direc t appea l p re s en t l y b ef o re t h i s co u rt , d o es n o tc o n t ai na c o un tal l egi n g aggravated vehicular

homicide. A valid indictment is an essential jurisdict i o nal eleme nt to the procure ment of a va lid conviction. W y att v . S tate , 24 S.W .3d 319, 323 (Tenn. 2000)

. I n t h e ab sence of a c omplete re cord of what transpire d at trial we are unable to dete rmine whe ther the indictment wa s ever amende d either expli citly or implicitly

befor e proc eedingto the portion of the procee ding where in the conviction for aggravated

vehicular homicide occ urre d. See State v . Y orick, 133 S.W .3d 606, 613 (Tenn. 2004) ; (holding in the absenc e of tra nscripts of all re levant portions of the r ecor d , plain err or re view of validity of indictments was e rror

beca use re cord unclear ). Of course, the petitioner may be entitled to relief on this issue in a proper ly pleade d and filed habea s corpus proce eding wher ein the question of the suff iciency of the indictment ca

n be fully litigated. Id. Such a proc eedingshould be institut ed pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-21-101, et seq ., and should be pled in a ccor dance with the provisions of that title and chapte r, including attachme nts demonstrating that the petitioner’s c onviction is void. See Su mm e rs v . S

tate , 212 S.W .3d 251, 261 (Tenn. 2007)

.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE