# Jurnalul Oficial C 291/2012

| | ISSN 1977-1029
  doi:10.3000/19771029.C_2012.291.ron |
| --- | --- |
| Jurnalul Oficial
  al Uniunii Europene | C 291 |
| | |
| Ediţia în limba română | Comunicări şi informări | Anul 5527 septembrie 2012 |

ISSN 1977-1029

doi:10.3000/19771029.C_2012.291.ron

Jurnalul Oficial

al Uniunii Europene

C 291

Ediţia în limba română

Comunicări şi informări

Anul 5527 septembrie 2012

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| Informarea nr. | Cuprins | Pagina |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | IV   Informări |
| | INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2012/C 291/01 | Rata de schimb a monedei euro | 1 |
| | INFORMĂRI REFERITOARE LA SPAȚIUL ECONOMIC EUROPEAN |
| | Autoritatea AELS de Supraveghere |
| 2012/C 291/02 | Invitație de a prezenta observații, în temeiul articolului 1 alineatul (2) din partea I a Protocolului 3 la Acordul dintre statele AELS privind instituirea unei Autorități de Supraveghere și a unei Curți de Justiție, cu privire la ajutorul de stat pentru înființarea unui fond pentru zboruri charter pentru nordul Norvegiei | 2 |

Informarea nr.

Cuprins

Pagina

IV   Informări

INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

2012/C 291/01

Rata de schimb a monedei euro

1

INFORMĂRI REFERITOARE LA SPAȚIUL ECONOMIC EUROPEAN

Autoritatea AELS de Supraveghere

2012/C 291/02

Invitație de a prezenta observații, în temeiul articolului 1 alineatul (2) din partea I a Protocolului 3 la Acordul dintre statele AELS privind instituirea unei Autorități de Supraveghere și a unei Curți de Justiție, cu privire la ajutorul de stat pentru înființarea unui fond pentru zboruri charter pentru nordul Norvegiei

2

| | V   Anunțuri |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURI ADMINISTRATIVE |
| | Oficiul European pentru Selecția Personalului (EPSO) |
| 2012/C 291/03 | Anunț de concurs general | 12 |
| | PROCEDURI JURISDICȚIONALE |
| | Curtea de justiție a AELS |
| 2012/C 291/04 | Cerere pentru un aviz consultativ al Curții de Justiție a AELS, prezentată la 6 februarie 2012 de Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur, în cauza HOB-vín ehf./the State Alcohol and Tobacco Company of Iceland (ÁTVR) (Cauza E-2/12) | 13 |
| 2012/C 291/05 | Hotărârea Curții din 12 septembrie 2011 în cauza E-16/10 – Philip Morris Norway AS/Statul norvegian, reprezentat de Ministerul Sănătății și al Serviciilor de Îngrijire (Libera circulație a mărfurilor – Interdicția de a expune produse din tutun – Articolele 11 și 13 din Acordul privind SEE – Măsuri cu efect echivalent unor restricții cantitative – Modalități de vânzare – Protecția sănătății publice – Proporționalitate) | 14 |
| 2012/C 291/06 | Hotărârea Curții din 14 decembrie 2011 în cauza E-3/11 – Pálmi Sigmarsson/Banca Centrală a Islandei (Libera circulație a capitalurilor – Articolul 43 din Acordul privind SEE – Restricții naționale privind circulația capitalurilor – Jurisdicție – Proporționalitate – Securitate juridică) | 15 |
| 2012/C 291/07 | Hotărârea Curții din 14 decembrie 2011 în cauza E-8/11 – Autoritatea de Supraveghere a AELS/Islanda (Neîndeplinirea obligațiilor de către o parte contractantă – Directiva 2002/49/CE privind evaluarea și gestiunea zgomotului ambiental) | 16 |

V   Anunțuri

PROCEDURI ADMINISTRATIVE

Oficiul European pentru Selecția Personalului (EPSO)

2012/C 291/03

Anunț de concurs general

12

PROCEDURI JURISDICȚIONALE

Curtea de justiție a AELS

2012/C 291/04

Cerere pentru un aviz consultativ al Curții de Justiție a AELS, prezentată la 6 februarie 2012 de Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur, în cauza HOB-vín ehf./the State Alcohol and Tobacco Company of Iceland (ÁTVR) (Cauza E-2/12)

13

2012/C 291/05

Hotărârea Curții din 12 septembrie 2011 în cauza E-16/10 – Philip Morris Norway AS/Statul norvegian, reprezentat de Ministerul Sănătății și al Serviciilor de Îngrijire (Libera circulație a mărfurilor – Interdicția de a expune produse din tutun – Articolele 11 și 13 din Acordul privind SEE – Măsuri cu efect echivalent unor restricții cantitative – Modalități de vânzare – Protecția sănătății publice – Proporționalitate)

(Libera circulație a mărfurilor – Interdicția de a expune produse din tutun – Articolele 11 și 13 din Acordul privind SEE – Măsuri cu efect echivalent unor restricții cantitative – Modalități de vânzare – Protecția sănătății publice – Proporționalitate)

14

2012/C 291/06

Hotărârea Curții din 14 decembrie 2011 în cauza E-3/11 – Pálmi Sigmarsson/Banca Centrală a Islandei (Libera circulație a capitalurilor – Articolul 43 din Acordul privind SEE – Restricții naționale privind circulația capitalurilor – Jurisdicție – Proporționalitate – Securitate juridică)

(Libera circulație a capitalurilor – Articolul 43 din Acordul privind SEE – Restricții naționale privind circulația capitalurilor – Jurisdicție – Proporționalitate – Securitate juridică)

15

2012/C 291/07

Hotărârea Curții din 14 decembrie 2011 în cauza E-8/11 – Autoritatea de Supraveghere a AELS/Islanda (Neîndeplinirea obligațiilor de către o parte contractantă – Directiva 2002/49/CE privind evaluarea și gestiunea zgomotului ambiental)

(Neîndeplinirea obligațiilor de către o parte contractantă – Directiva 2002/49/CE privind evaluarea și gestiunea zgomotului ambiental)

16

| RO | |
| --- | --- |

RO

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IV Informări

INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

| 27.9.2012 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 291/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.9.2012

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 291/1

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Rata de schimb a monedei euro (1)

26 septembrie 2012

2012/C 291/01

1 euro =

| | Moneda | Rata de schimb |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dolar american | 1,2845 |
| JPY | yen japonez | 99,82 |
| DKK | coroana daneză | 7,4561 |
| GBP | lira sterlină | 0,79490 |
| SEK | coroana suedeză | 8,4998 |
| CHF | franc elvețian | 1,2088 |
| ISK | coroana islandeză | |
| NOK | coroana norvegiană | 7,4030 |
| BGN | leva bulgărească | 1,9558 |
| CZK | coroana cehă | 24,983 |
| HUF | forint maghiar | 285,78 |
| LTL | litas lituanian | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats leton | 0,6962 |
| PLN | zlot polonez | 4,1511 |
| RON | leu românesc nou | 4,5178 |
| TRY | lira turcească | 2,3053 |
| AUD | dolar australian | 1,2421 |
| CAD | dolar canadian | 1,2633 |
| HKD | dolar Hong Kong | 9,9600 |
| NZD | dolar neozeelandez | 1,5675 |
| SGD | dolar Singapore | 1,5844 |
| KRW | won sud-coreean | 1 438,77 |
| ZAR | rand sud-african | 10,5700 |
| CNY | yuan renminbi chinezesc | 8,0961 |
| HRK | kuna croată | 7,4515 |
| IDR | rupia indoneziană | 12 324,62 |
| MYR | ringgit Malaiezia | 3,9611 |
| PHP | peso Filipine | 53,910 |
| RUB | rubla rusească | 40,1730 |
| THB | baht thailandez | 39,807 |
| BRL | real brazilian | 2,6118 |
| MXN | peso mexican | 16,5957 |
| INR | rupie indiană | 68,7400 |

Moneda

Rata de schimb

USD

dolar american

1,2845

JPY

yen japonez

99,82

DKK

coroana daneză

7,4561

GBP

lira sterlină

0,79490

SEK

coroana suedeză

8,4998

CHF

franc elvețian

1,2088

ISK

coroana islandeză

NOK

coroana norvegiană

7,4030

BGN

leva bulgărească

1,9558

CZK

coroana cehă

24,983

HUF

forint maghiar

285,78

LTL

litas lituanian

3,4528

LVL

lats leton

0,6962

PLN

zlot polonez

4,1511

RON

leu românesc nou

4,5178

TRY

lira turcească

2,3053

AUD

dolar australian

1,2421

CAD

dolar canadian

1,2633

HKD

dolar Hong Kong

9,9600

NZD

dolar neozeelandez

1,5675

SGD

dolar Singapore

1,5844

KRW

won sud-coreean

1 438,77

ZAR

rand sud-african

10,5700

CNY

yuan renminbi chinezesc

8,0961

HRK

kuna croată

7,4515

IDR

rupia indoneziană

12 324,62

MYR

ringgit Malaiezia

3,9611

PHP

peso Filipine

53,910

RUB

rubla rusească

40,1730

THB

baht thailandez

39,807

BRL

real brazilian

2,6118

MXN

peso mexican

16,5957

INR

rupie indiană

68,7400

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(1)  Sursă: rata de schimb de referință publicată de către Banca Centrală Europeană.

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INFORMĂRI REFERITOARE LA SPAȚIUL ECONOMIC EUROPEAN

Autoritatea AELS de Supraveghere

| 27.9.2012 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 291/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.9.2012

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 291/2

---

Invitație de a prezenta observații, în temeiul articolului 1 alineatul (2) din partea I a Protocolului 3 la Acordul dintre statele AELS privind instituirea unei Autorități de Supraveghere și a unei Curți de Justiție, cu privire la ajutorul de stat pentru înființarea unui fond pentru zboruri charter pentru nordul Norvegiei

2012/C 291/02

Prin Decizia nr. 246/12/COL din 27 iunie 2012, reprodusă în versiunea lingvistică autentică în paginile care urmează acestui rezumat, Autoritatea AELS de Supraveghere (Autoritatea) a inițiat procedura prevăzută la articolul 1 alineatul (2) din partea I a Protocolului 3 la Acordul dintre statele AELS privind instituirea unei Autorități de Supraveghere și a unei Curți de Justiție. Autoritățile norvegiene au fost informate prin intermediul unei copii a deciziei respective.

Prin prezenta, Autoritatea AELS de Supraveghere invită statele AELS, statele membre ale UE și părțile interesate să prezinte observații privind măsura în cauză, în termen de o lună de la data publicării prezentei comunicări, la adresa:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Observațiile vor fi comunicate autorităților norvegiene. Păstrarea confidențialității privind identitatea părții care prezintă observațiile poate fi solicitată în scris, precizându-se motivele care stau la baza solicitării.

REZUMAT

Procedură

În iunie 2011, autoritățile norvegiene au prezentat Autorității planul lor de instituire a unei scheme de fond pentru zboruri charter pentru nordul Norvegiei („schema”). Autoritatea a prezentat observații în cursul fazei de prenotificare.

Prin scrisoarea din 2 mai 2012, autoritățile norvegiene au notificat schema în mod oficial, în conformitate cu articolul 1 alineatul (3) din partea I a Protocolului 3.

Evaluarea măsurii

Schema implică instituirea unui fond pentru zboruri charter care va acorda ajutor agenților de turism care operează zboruri charter către trei districte din nordul Norvegiei: Nordland, Troms și Finnmark. Fondul va fi capitalizat cu fonduri publice acordate de aceste districte și va fi deținut de acestea.

Obiectivul schemei este acela de a spori gradul de utilizare a aeroporturilor din nordul Norvegiei și de a contribui astfel la dezvoltarea economică a regiunii. Districtele nordice sunt zone cu o densitate scăzută a populației: densitatea medie a populației este de 4,2 locuitori pe km2, acestea încadrându-se, prin urmare, în definiția regiunilor cel mai puțin populate, astfel cum sunt prevăzute în capitolul privind ajutoarele de stat regionale din Orientările Autorității în domeniul ajutoarelor de stat („Orientările privind ajutoarele de stat regionale”); acestea se confruntă cu depopularea.

În trecut, în nordul Norvegiei au fost operate câteva rute, dar fără succes. Potrivit industriei de profil, un motiv pentru această situație ar putea fi normele de anulare care se aplică zborurilor charter. Anularea într-o fază ulterioară este foarte costisitoare. Termenul-limită pentru a decide sau nu anularea este cu mai multe luni înainte de operarea seriei de zboruri charter. În cazul în care nu au fost vândute multe bilete, agenții de turism preferă mai degrabă să anuleze zborurile din cauza riscului de a avea locuri goale decât să aștepte și să spere că vânzările din ultima clipă vor face zborul profitabil.

Schema va acoperi zborurile charter către toate aeroporturile din nordul Norvegiei, indiferent de dimensiunea aeronavelor și a aeroporturilor.

Beneficiarii schemei se pot afla în nordul Norvegiei sau în afara acestei regiuni, precum și în interiorul sau în afara SEE.

Ajutorul va fi sub forma unei plăți de până la 25 % din totalul costurilor aferente unui zbor charter și se va limita la aceste costuri. Ajutorul va fi plătit agenților de turism din fondul pentru zboruri charter după efectuarea zborurilor către nordul Norvegiei. Agenților de turism li se va solicita să stabilească un prag de rentabilitate de 80 % din factorul de cabină (procentajul din numărul de locuri vândute), care este standardul de rentabilitate la nivelul industriei. Se va acorda sprijin maxim (25 %) pentru factorii de cabină de cel mult 60 %. Intensitatea ajutorului va scădea treptat la zero atunci când factorii de cabină ajung la o medie de 80 %.

Autoritatea are îndoieli dacă o schemă care prevede acordarea de ajutor de exploatare în cazul beneficiarilor care se pot afla în afara regiunilor cel mai puțin populate poate fi considerat compatibil cu Orientările privind ajutoarele de stat regionale.

Autoritatea înțelege că impactul economic indirect pe care îl poate avea schema asupra celor trei districte poate contribui la stabilizarea așezării populației în regiune. Cu toate acestea, nu este convinsă că acest obiectiv nu ar putea fi atins prin alte mijloace decât prin utilizarea ajutorului de exploatare, care este instrumentul cu cel mai mare potențial de denaturare a concurenței. Prin urmare, Autoritatea se întreabă dacă este adecvat să se acorde ajutoare directe agenților de turism care se vor afla, probabil, în afara regiunii care beneficiază de ajutor.

Concluzie

În lumina considerațiilor anterioare, Autoritatea a hotărât să deschidă procedura oficială de investigare în temeiul articolului 6 alineatul (1) din partea a II-a a Protocolului 3 la Acordul privind SEE. Părțile interesate sunt invitate să își prezinte observațiile în termen de o lună de la publicarea prezentei decizii în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 246/12/COL

of 27 June 2012

to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to a Charter Fund for Northern Norway

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I and Article 4(4) and Article 6 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | The Norwegian authorities approached the Authority in June 2011 regarding their plan to establish a Charter Fund Scheme for Northern Norway (‘the Scheme’). A pre-notification document setting out the main elements of the Scheme was communicated on 24 June 2011 (Event No 602898). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Norwegian authorities approached the Authority in June 2011 regarding their plan to establish a Charter Fund Scheme for Northern Norway (‘the Scheme’). A pre-notification document setting out the main elements of the Scheme was communicated on 24 June 2011 (Event No 602898).

| (2) | The Authority provided some initial feedback on 5 August 2011 (Event No 605972). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Authority provided some initial feedback on 5 August 2011 (Event No 605972).

| (3) | After several exchanges of e-mail, the Authority, by e-mail dated 16 January 2012 (Event No 621292), informed the Norwegian authorities that the pre-notification phase could be considered as complete. It furthermore identified some issues which the notification should address and alleviate. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

After several exchanges of e-mail, the Authority, by e-mail dated 16 January 2012 (Event No 621292), informed the Norwegian authorities that the pre-notification phase could be considered as complete. It furthermore identified some issues which the notification should address and alleviate.

| (4) | The Norwegian authorities notified the Scheme, pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, by letter of 2 May 2012 (Event Nos 632837 and 322824). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Norwegian authorities notified the Scheme, pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, by letter of 2 May 2012 (Event Nos 632837 and 322824).

2.   The Scheme

2.1.   
  The objective and the scope of the Scheme

| (5) | The Scheme entails the establishment of a Charter Fund (‘the Charter Fund’) which will grant aid to tour operators flying air charter (1) to three counties in Northern Norway, Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The Scheme entails the establishment of a Charter Fund (‘the Charter Fund’) which will grant aid to tour operators flying air charter (1) to three counties in Northern Norway, Nordland, Troms and Finnmark.

| (6) | The objective of the Scheme is to increase the use of the airports in Northern Norway and thereby to contribute to the economic development in the region. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The objective of the Scheme is to increase the use of the airports in Northern Norway and thereby to contribute to the economic development in the region.

| (7) | The northern counties are low density population areas with an average population density of 4,2 inhabitants per km2 thereby falling within the definition of least populated regions as set out by the chapter of the Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on national regional aid (‘the Regional Aid Guidelines’) (2). Moreover, they face depopulation (3). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The northern counties are low density population areas with an average population density of 4,2 inhabitants per km2 thereby falling within the definition of least populated regions as set out by the chapter of the Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on national regional aid (‘the Regional Aid Guidelines’) (2). Moreover, they face depopulation (3).

| (8) | The Charter Fund will be a non-profit company acting as a vehicle for granting aid. The fund will be capitalised with public money granted by the counties of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark and will be owned by the counties. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The Charter Fund will be a non-profit company acting as a vehicle for granting aid. The fund will be capitalised with public money granted by the counties of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark and will be owned by the counties.

| (9) | The Scheme will cover charter flights to all airports in Northern Norway regardless of the size of the airplanes and the airports. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that they expect only large airplanes to be concerned as they are the only ones suitable for charter flights. The following airports can currently handle large planes: Tromsø, Bodø, Harstad Narvik/Evenes, Alta, Kirkenes, Høybuktmoen, Bardufoss, Svalbard (4), Banak, Andøya (‘the Northern lights airports’). All these airports have excess capacity. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Scheme will cover charter flights to all airports in Northern Norway regardless of the size of the airplanes and the airports. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that they expect only large airplanes to be concerned as they are the only ones suitable for charter flights. The following airports can currently handle large planes: Tromsø, Bodø, Harstad Narvik/Evenes, Alta, Kirkenes, Høybuktmoen, Bardufoss, Svalbard (4), Banak, Andøya (‘the Northern lights airports’). All these airports have excess capacity.

| (10) | A few routes have been operated to Northern Norway in the past but without success (5). According to the industry, a reason for this could be the cancellation rules applying to air charters. Cancellation at a late stage is very expensive. The deadline for deciding whether to cancel or not is several months before the operation of the air charter series. If the sale of tickets until that date is limited, the series is often cancelled. The tour operator would otherwise risk having to pay a cancellation fee or bear the loss corresponding to the empty seats. Several charter series have been cancelled due to limited sales up until the cancellation deadline. The industry believes that if the risk is reduced, many of the flights would go ahead. Such flights could even be profitable. However, tour operators seem to prefer to cancel flights due to the risk of empty seats rather than to wait and hope that late sales will make the flight profitable. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

A few routes have been operated to Northern Norway in the past but without success (5). According to the industry, a reason for this could be the cancellation rules applying to air charters. Cancellation at a late stage is very expensive. The deadline for deciding whether to cancel or not is several months before the operation of the air charter series. If the sale of tickets until that date is limited, the series is often cancelled. The tour operator would otherwise risk having to pay a cancellation fee or bear the loss corresponding to the empty seats. Several charter series have been cancelled due to limited sales up until the cancellation deadline. The industry believes that if the risk is reduced, many of the flights would go ahead. Such flights could even be profitable. However, tour operators seem to prefer to cancel flights due to the risk of empty seats rather than to wait and hope that late sales will make the flight profitable.

2.2.   
  The beneficiaries of the Scheme

| (11) | The beneficiaries of the Scheme may be located inside or outside Northern Norway and inside or outside the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The beneficiaries of the Scheme may be located inside or outside Northern Norway and inside or outside the EEA.

| (12) | The aid applicant is the tour operator, i.e. the charterer and signature partner of the airline contract. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that all applications must be supported by three parties:






  — | the tour operator who is the direct aid recipient, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(12)

The aid applicant is the tour operator, i.e. the charterer and signature partner of the airline contract. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that all applications must be supported by three parties:

—

the tour operator who is the direct aid recipient,

| — | the destination provider which could be a destination management company, a hotel, a tourist office, or any other service provider. Aid from the Charter Fund will not be granted to ‘air only packages’. It must be demonstrated that the tour package includes a so-called ‘land arrangement’ in the target area with a value of at least NOK 800 (approx. EUR 106) per tourist, |
| --- | --- |

—

the destination provider which could be a destination management company, a hotel, a tourist office, or any other service provider. Aid from the Charter Fund will not be granted to ‘air only packages’. It must be demonstrated that the tour package includes a so-called ‘land arrangement’ in the target area with a value of at least NOK 800 (approx. EUR 106) per tourist,

| — | the airline outlining all costs, deadlines, penalties, obligations and responsibilities applicable to the charter series. |
| --- | --- |

—

the airline outlining all costs, deadlines, penalties, obligations and responsibilities applicable to the charter series.

| (13) | The panel in charge of selecting projects may reject an application if:






  — | fund limitations set by the board of directors of the Charter Fund for the period in question have been reached, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(13)

The panel in charge of selecting projects may reject an application if:

—

fund limitations set by the board of directors of the Charter Fund for the period in question have been reached,

| — | any of the supporting partners are believed to be unable to meet the expected commercial performance described in the application, |
| --- | --- |

—

any of the supporting partners are believed to be unable to meet the expected commercial performance described in the application,

| — | the application is incomplete or does not comply with published guidelines of the Charter Fund. |
| --- | --- |

—

the application is incomplete or does not comply with published guidelines of the Charter Fund.

| (14) | The Norwegian authorities anticipate that the Scheme will trigger 16 charter series with 7 flight rotations per charter series the first year. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The Norwegian authorities anticipate that the Scheme will trigger 16 charter series with 7 flight rotations per charter series the first year.

2.3.   
  Form of the aid

| (15) | The aid will take the form of a payment of up to 25 % of the total charter costs and will be limited to the charter costs only (financial obligations under the contact with the airlines). Other costs borne by tour operators are not eligible costs. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The aid will take the form of a payment of up to 25 % of the total charter costs and will be limited to the charter costs only (financial obligations under the contact with the airlines). Other costs borne by tour operators are not eligible costs.

| (16) | The aid will be paid out from the Charter Fund to the tour operators after the flights to Northern Norway have been conducted. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The aid will be paid out from the Charter Fund to the tour operators after the flights to Northern Norway have been conducted.

| (17) | The aid will be calculated with reference to the average cabin factor of the operated flights under the charter series excluding empty legs (6). The cabin factor is the percentage of sold seats. The cabin factor will be determined according to the actual number of departing passengers divided by the maximum seat capacity of the aircraft. Passenger data will be based on the official numbers recorded by the Norwegian airport authorities. Empty legs will not be taken into account when calculating the average cabin factor but will be included when the total eligible costs for the charter series are calculated. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The aid will be calculated with reference to the average cabin factor of the operated flights under the charter series excluding empty legs (6). The cabin factor is the percentage of sold seats. The cabin factor will be determined according to the actual number of departing passengers divided by the maximum seat capacity of the aircraft. Passenger data will be based on the official numbers recorded by the Norwegian airport authorities. Empty legs will not be taken into account when calculating the average cabin factor but will be included when the total eligible costs for the charter series are calculated.

| (18) | The tour operators will be required to set a break-even point at 80 % cabin factor which is the industrial break-even standard. Maximum support (25 %) will be given for cabin factors of 60 % or less. The aid intensity will gradually decrease to zero when cabin factors reach an average of 80 %. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The tour operators will be required to set a break-even point at 80 % cabin factor which is the industrial break-even standard. Maximum support (25 %) will be given for cabin factors of 60 % or less. The aid intensity will gradually decrease to zero when cabin factors reach an average of 80 %.

| (19) | If the planes operated under a charter series reach between 60 % and 80 % cabin factor, the contribution paid by the Charter Fund will cover the tour operator’s losses connected to the charter series. The following figure illustrates how the Scheme will work: |
| --- | --- |

(19)

If the planes operated under a charter series reach between 60 % and 80 % cabin factor, the contribution paid by the Charter Fund will cover the tour operator’s losses connected to the charter series. The following figure illustrates how the Scheme will work:

Image

| (20) | As shown in the table above, if flights are operated with a cabin factor of less than 60 %, the tour operator will lose money, as the combination of sales revenues and an aid intensity of 25 % will not be enough to reach the break-even point. The Charter Fund will actually cover the tour operator’s losses only when the cabin factor lies between 60 % and 80 %. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

As shown in the table above, if flights are operated with a cabin factor of less than 60 %, the tour operator will lose money, as the combination of sales revenues and an aid intensity of 25 % will not be enough to reach the break-even point. The Charter Fund will actually cover the tour operator’s losses only when the cabin factor lies between 60 % and 80 %.

2.4.   
  Cumulation, monitoring and advertising

| (21) | Aid under the Scheme may be cumulated with other forms of aid. Funding of the same eligible costs under other schemes will be coordinated with the Scheme and the aid ceilings in the applicable guidelines will not be exceeded. Operating aid under the Scheme shall not be cumulated with de minimis support in respect of the same eligible expenses in order to circumvent the maximum aid intensities laid down in the Regional Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Aid under the Scheme may be cumulated with other forms of aid. Funding of the same eligible costs under other schemes will be coordinated with the Scheme and the aid ceilings in the applicable guidelines will not be exceeded. Operating aid under the Scheme shall not be cumulated with de minimis support in respect of the same eligible expenses in order to circumvent the maximum aid intensities laid down in the Regional Aid Guidelines.

| (22) | The Scheme will be published under a new subpage on Avinor’s homepage (7) and on http://www.visitnorthnorway.com. It will furthermore be advertised in international conferences. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Scheme will be published under a new subpage on Avinor’s homepage (7) and on http://www.visitnorthnorway.com. It will furthermore be advertised in international conferences.

| (23) | The Charter Fund undertakes to ensure that a list of tour operators receiving aid is published annually, in each instance indicating the source of public funding, the recipient company, the amount of aid paid out and the number of passengers concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The Charter Fund undertakes to ensure that a list of tour operators receiving aid is published annually, in each instance indicating the source of public funding, the recipient company, the amount of aid paid out and the number of passengers concerned.

| (24) | In the event that a tour operator fails to comply with the criteria set by the Charter Fund when the aid was granted, penalty mechanisms will be implemented. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In the event that a tour operator fails to comply with the criteria set by the Charter Fund when the aid was granted, penalty mechanisms will be implemented.

2.5.   
  Duration and budget

| (25) | The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Scheme will be in place for 10 years but will be re-notified if required by the revision of the Regional Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Scheme will be in place for 10 years but will be re-notified if required by the revision of the Regional Aid Guidelines.

| (26) | The Norwegian authorities have said that the budget for the three first years will be of NOK 30 million. Thereinafter, capital will be injected only when necessary. However, the Charter Fund will never be capitalised with more than NOK 30 million. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The Norwegian authorities have said that the budget for the three first years will be of NOK 30 million. Thereinafter, capital will be injected only when necessary. However, the Charter Fund will never be capitalised with more than NOK 30 million.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

| (27) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

1.1.   
  Presence of State resources

| (28) | The aid measure must be granted by the State or through State resources. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The aid measure must be granted by the State or through State resources.

| (29) | The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Charter Fund will most likely be financed directly from the three northern counties’ budgets (it cannot be excluded that it may also at some stage be financed directly by the Norwegian State). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Charter Fund will most likely be financed directly from the three northern counties’ budgets (it cannot be excluded that it may also at some stage be financed directly by the Norwegian State).

| (30) | The Authority considers that the condition regarding use of State resources is met as the Scheme will be financed either by the counties or the State’s budgets (8). |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The Authority considers that the condition regarding use of State resources is met as the Scheme will be financed either by the counties or the State’s budgets (8).

1.2.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (31) | Firstly, the aid measure must confer on the beneficiaries advantages that relieve them of charges that are normally borne from their budget. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Firstly, the aid measure must confer on the beneficiaries advantages that relieve them of charges that are normally borne from their budget.

| (32) | The tour operators benefiting from the Scheme will receive a direct grant which will reduce the amount they have lost on a given charter series. Similarly, the service providers located in the three northern counties gaining from an increase in the tourist population will also benefit indirectly from the Scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The tour operators benefiting from the Scheme will receive a direct grant which will reduce the amount they have lost on a given charter series. Similarly, the service providers located in the three northern counties gaining from an increase in the tourist population will also benefit indirectly from the Scheme.

| (33) | Secondly, the aid measure must be selective in that it favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Secondly, the aid measure must be selective in that it favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’.

| (34) | Only those tours operators that operate charter flights to Northern Norway will benefit directly from the Scheme. Similarly, only those operators that are located in the three northern counties will indirectly benefit from the Scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Only those tours operators that operate charter flights to Northern Norway will benefit directly from the Scheme. Similarly, only those operators that are located in the three northern counties will indirectly benefit from the Scheme.

| (35) | The Authority therefore considers that the measure is indeed selective. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Authority therefore considers that the measure is indeed selective.

1.3.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between contracting parties

| (36) | The aid measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The aid measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement.

| (37) | Aid is regarded as distorting competition if it is granted to an undertaking which carries out activities in competition with others. The aid beneficiaries of the Scheme are tour operators. Tour operators are active in a sector characterised by strong competition. Therefore, any aid granted under the Scheme may be regarded as distorting competition. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Aid is regarded as distorting competition if it is granted to an undertaking which carries out activities in competition with others. The aid beneficiaries of the Scheme are tour operators. Tour operators are active in a sector characterised by strong competition. Therefore, any aid granted under the Scheme may be regarded as distorting competition.

| (38) | Furthermore, State aid to specific undertakings is regarded as affecting trade between the contracting parties if the recipient firm carries out an economic activity involving trade between the contracting parties. The State funding affects trade between contracting parties as it will be granted to operators offering holiday packages in different countries, which by definition is a cross-border activity. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Furthermore, State aid to specific undertakings is regarded as affecting trade between the contracting parties if the recipient firm carries out an economic activity involving trade between the contracting parties. The State funding affects trade between contracting parties as it will be granted to operators offering holiday packages in different countries, which by definition is a cross-border activity.

| (39) | The Authority therefore considers that all the conditions set out in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are met and that consequently the notified Scheme entails State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Authority therefore considers that all the conditions set out in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are met and that consequently the notified Scheme entails State aid.

2.   Procedural requirements

| (40) | The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 81) provide that ‘operating aid schemes are not covered by the regional aid maps, and are assessed on a case-by-case basis on the basis of a notification by the EFTA State concerned pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement’. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 81) provide that ‘operating aid schemes are not covered by the regional aid maps, and are assessed on a case-by-case basis on the basis of a notification by the EFTA State concerned pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement’.

| (41) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. (...) The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. (...) The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (42) | By submitting a notification of the Scheme on 2 May 2012 (Event No 632837), the Norwegian authorities complied with the requirement to do so set out in Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

By submitting a notification of the Scheme on 2 May 2012 (Event No 632837), the Norwegian authorities complied with the requirement to do so set out in Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.

| (43) | By not implementing the notified Scheme, the Norwegian authorities have complied with the standstill obligation provided for under Article 3 of Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

By not implementing the notified Scheme, the Norwegian authorities have complied with the standstill obligation provided for under Article 3 of Part I of Protocol 3.

3.   Compatibility of the aid

| (44) | The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 1) provide: ‘on the basis of Article 61(3)(a) and Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, State aid granted to promote the economic development of certain disadvantaged areas within the EEA may be considered to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. This kind of State aid is known as national regional aid. National regional aid consists of aid for investment granted to large companies, or in certain limited circumstances, operating aid, which in both cases are targeted on specific regions in order to redress regional disparities’. (Emphasis added.) |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 1) provide: ‘on the basis of Article 61(3)(a) and Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, State aid granted to promote the economic development of certain disadvantaged areas within the EEA may be considered to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. This kind of State aid is known as national regional aid. National regional aid consists of aid for investment granted to large companies, or in certain limited circumstances, operating aid, which in both cases are targeted on specific regions in order to redress regional disparities’. (Emphasis added.)

| (45) | In the case at hand, the aid granted is operating aid, i.e. aid which releases an undertaking from costs which it would normally have to bear in its day-to-day management or normal activities (9). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

In the case at hand, the aid granted is operating aid, i.e. aid which releases an undertaking from costs which it would normally have to bear in its day-to-day management or normal activities (9).

| (46) | The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 69) furthermore provide:
  ‘(in derogation from the previous paragraph,) operating aid which is not both progressively reduced and limited in time may only be authorised in the least populated regions, in so far as it is intended to prevent or reduce the continuing depopulation of these regions (10). The least populated regions represent or belong to regions at NUTS-II level for Norway and NUTS IV level for Iceland with a population density of 8 inhabitants per km2 or less and extend to adjacent and contiguous smaller areas meeting the same population density criterion’. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 69) furthermore provide:

‘(in derogation from the previous paragraph,) operating aid which is not both progressively reduced and limited in time may only be authorised in the least populated regions, in so far as it is intended to prevent or reduce the continuing depopulation of these regions (10). The least populated regions represent or belong to regions at NUTS-II level for Norway and NUTS IV level for Iceland with a population density of 8 inhabitants per km2 or less and extend to adjacent and contiguous smaller areas meeting the same population density criterion’.

3.1.   
  The aid may only be authorised in the least populated regions

3.1.1.   The three northern counties belong to the least populated regions

| (47) | As provided by paragraph 69 of the Regional Aid Guidelines, the operating aid measure which is not progressively reduced and limited in time may only be granted in the least populated regions. The least populated regions are those regions with less than 8 inhabitants per km2
   (11). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

As provided by paragraph 69 of the Regional Aid Guidelines, the operating aid measure which is not progressively reduced and limited in time may only be granted in the least populated regions. The least populated regions are those regions with less than 8 inhabitants per km2
   (11).

| (48) | The three northern counties have a population density of 4,2 inhabitants per km2. They consequently meet the conditions set by the Regional Aid Guidelines to benefit from the more flexible compatibility assessment. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The three northern counties have a population density of 4,2 inhabitants per km2. They consequently meet the conditions set by the Regional Aid Guidelines to benefit from the more flexible compatibility assessment.

3.1.2.   The direct beneficiaries of the Scheme are not necessarily located in the least populated regions

| (49) | However, the aid as such will be paid to tour operators which may be situated anywhere in the world. The direct beneficiary of the aid will therefore not necessarily be located in the least populated region. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

However, the aid as such will be paid to tour operators which may be situated anywhere in the world. The direct beneficiary of the aid will therefore not necessarily be located in the least populated region.

| (50) | During the pre-notification phase, the Authority expressed some concerns regarding the fact that the aid beneficiaries would not necessarily be located in the least populated regions. The companies located in the northern counties involved in the package sold by the tour operator would benefit from the increase in the tourist population but only in an indirect manner. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

During the pre-notification phase, the Authority expressed some concerns regarding the fact that the aid beneficiaries would not necessarily be located in the least populated regions. The companies located in the northern counties involved in the package sold by the tour operator would benefit from the increase in the tourist population but only in an indirect manner.

| (51) | The Norwegian authorities have argued that the link between the aid to the tour operator and the regional development was sufficient for the following reasons:






  — | the Scheme will apply to charter flights to Northern Norway exclusively, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(51)

The Norwegian authorities have argued that the link between the aid to the tour operator and the regional development was sufficient for the following reasons:

—

the Scheme will apply to charter flights to Northern Norway exclusively,

| — | only those packages including a ‘land arrangement’ would be eligible, and |
| --- | --- |

—

only those packages including a ‘land arrangement’ would be eligible, and

| — | the aid will be paid out from the Charter Fund to the tour operator after the flights to the target area have been conducted. |
| --- | --- |

—

the aid will be paid out from the Charter Fund to the tour operator after the flights to the target area have been conducted.

| (52) | The Norwegian authorities have argued that if indeed the direct beneficiaries of the aid will be tour operators who may be located outside the three northern counties, there will be many indirect beneficiaries of the Scheme in the region. They therefore consider that as the link between the direct beneficiaries of the aid — the tour operators — and the indirect beneficiaries — hotels, restaurants, etc. — is sufficiently strong, the Scheme may be held to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Norwegian authorities have argued that if indeed the direct beneficiaries of the aid will be tour operators who may be located outside the three northern counties, there will be many indirect beneficiaries of the Scheme in the region. They therefore consider that as the link between the direct beneficiaries of the aid — the tour operators — and the indirect beneficiaries — hotels, restaurants, etc. — is sufficiently strong, the Scheme may be held to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (53) | The Authority, however, considers that the Regional Aid Guidelines were meant to encourage the granting of aid in the regions to be developed. Paragraph 1 of the Regional Aid Guidelines provides that ‘national regional aid consists of aid for investment granted to large companies, or in certain limited circumstances, operating aid, which in both cases are targeted on specific regions in order to redress regional disparities’. (Emphasis added.) |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Authority, however, considers that the Regional Aid Guidelines were meant to encourage the granting of aid in the regions to be developed. Paragraph 1 of the Regional Aid Guidelines provides that ‘national regional aid consists of aid for investment granted to large companies, or in certain limited circumstances, operating aid, which in both cases are targeted on specific regions in order to redress regional disparities’. (Emphasis added.)

| (54) | Furthermore, paragraph 72 of the Regional Aid Guidelines states that ‘in order to verify the effects on trade and competition of operating aid schemes, EFTA States will be required to provide each year a single report in respect of each NUTS II region in which operating aid is granted which provides a breakdown of total expenditure, or estimated income forgone, for each operating aid scheme approved in the region concerned and identifies the ten largest beneficiaries of operating aid in the region concerned’. (Emphasis added.) |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Furthermore, paragraph 72 of the Regional Aid Guidelines states that ‘in order to verify the effects on trade and competition of operating aid schemes, EFTA States will be required to provide each year a single report in respect of each NUTS II region in which operating aid is granted which provides a breakdown of total expenditure, or estimated income forgone, for each operating aid scheme approved in the region concerned and identifies the ten largest beneficiaries of operating aid in the region concerned’. (Emphasis added.)

| (55) | The Authority therefore considers that the way the Regional Aid Guidelines were drafted indicates that the intention was that operating aid could only be granted in the regions concerned, here in the three northern counties. The Authority questions whether the fact that the undertakings in the regions concerned are only indirectly targeted by the Scheme constitutes a sufficiently strong link for the regional development of the area. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Authority therefore considers that the way the Regional Aid Guidelines were drafted indicates that the intention was that operating aid could only be granted in the regions concerned, here in the three northern counties. The Authority questions whether the fact that the undertakings in the regions concerned are only indirectly targeted by the Scheme constitutes a sufficiently strong link for the regional development of the area.

| (56) | Despite the supporting data put forward by the notifying party, the Authority still questions whether a scheme providing for the grant of operating aid to beneficiaries that may be situated outside the least populated regions may be held to be compatible with the Regional Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Despite the supporting data put forward by the notifying party, the Authority still questions whether a scheme providing for the grant of operating aid to beneficiaries that may be situated outside the least populated regions may be held to be compatible with the Regional Aid Guidelines.

3.2.   
  The aid must be necessary and appropriate to prevent or reduce continuing depopulation

| (57) | The Regional Aid Guidelines provide that it is up to the EFTA State to demonstrate that the Scheme is necessary and appropriate (paragraph 69). |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The Regional Aid Guidelines provide that it is up to the EFTA State to demonstrate that the Scheme is necessary and appropriate (paragraph 69).

| (58) | According to the Regional Aid Guidelines, the Norwegian authorities must demonstrate that the Scheme is necessary to prevent depopulation: that to reach the objective of preventing or reducing continuing depopulation, there is a need for a State intervention. The Norwegian authorities have explained that Northern Norway — which is one of Europe’s least populated areas — has always been extremely sparsely populated and has suffered from depopulation for decades. The Norwegian authorities therefore consider that it is necessary to take further measures to stabilise the settlement and to prevent further depopulation. They recognise that the establishment of the Charter Fund on its own will not solve the issue of depopulation but as a part of a general policy will increase the economic activity in the region and maintain and create new jobs. Employment opportunities and expected income are the most decisive factors influencing a person’s choice of residence. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

According to the Regional Aid Guidelines, the Norwegian authorities must demonstrate that the Scheme is necessary to prevent depopulation: that to reach the objective of preventing or reducing continuing depopulation, there is a need for a State intervention. The Norwegian authorities have explained that Northern Norway — which is one of Europe’s least populated areas — has always been extremely sparsely populated and has suffered from depopulation for decades. The Norwegian authorities therefore consider that it is necessary to take further measures to stabilise the settlement and to prevent further depopulation. They recognise that the establishment of the Charter Fund on its own will not solve the issue of depopulation but as a part of a general policy will increase the economic activity in the region and maintain and create new jobs. Employment opportunities and expected income are the most decisive factors influencing a person’s choice of residence.

| (59) | For the notified measure to be appropriate, the Norwegian authorities must demonstrate that to reach the objective of preventing or reducing continuing depopulation, the establishment of the Scheme is the best instrument as it is the one with the most chances of success and the least distortive effects. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

For the notified measure to be appropriate, the Norwegian authorities must demonstrate that to reach the objective of preventing or reducing continuing depopulation, the establishment of the Scheme is the best instrument as it is the one with the most chances of success and the least distortive effects.

| (60) | The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 10) also provide that:
  ‘where, exceptionally, it is envisaged to grant individual ad hoc aid to a single firm or aid confined to one area of activity, it is the responsibility of the Member State to demonstrate that the project contributes towards a coherent regional development strategy’. (Emphasis added.) |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 10) also provide that:

‘where, exceptionally, it is envisaged to grant individual ad hoc aid to a single firm or aid confined to one area of activity, it is the responsibility of the Member State to demonstrate that the project contributes towards a coherent regional development strategy’. (Emphasis added.)

| (61) | The notified Scheme will concern tour operators directly and the tourism industry and the local economy as a whole more indirectly. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that the notified measure is part of a more general regional development policy. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The notified Scheme will concern tour operators directly and the tourism industry and the local economy as a whole more indirectly. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that the notified measure is part of a more general regional development policy.

| (62) | Thus, the High North is considered as a priority in terms of regional development. It is the government’s ambition to prevent depopulation and to encourage settlement in this region. Support for the tourism industry is seen as a key to the development of the region (12). To that effect, they have argued that the creation of employment possibilities is of particular interest to achieve the aim of preventing or reducing depopulation in the region. They have indicated that the High North has always been extremely sparsely populated and has suffered from depopulation for decades. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Thus, the High North is considered as a priority in terms of regional development. It is the government’s ambition to prevent depopulation and to encourage settlement in this region. Support for the tourism industry is seen as a key to the development of the region (12). To that effect, they have argued that the creation of employment possibilities is of particular interest to achieve the aim of preventing or reducing depopulation in the region. They have indicated that the High North has always been extremely sparsely populated and has suffered from depopulation for decades.

| (63) | The Institute of Transport Economics estimated that in 2007, foreign air bound tourists used NOK 7 480 (approx. EUR 992) on prepaid purchases and NOK 6 730 (approx. EUR 892) on local purchases. It is estimated that travellers to Northern Norway will spend NOK 9 000 (approx. EUR 1 193) per person in 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Institute of Transport Economics estimated that in 2007, foreign air bound tourists used NOK 7 480 (approx. EUR 992) on prepaid purchases and NOK 6 730 (approx. EUR 892) on local purchases. It is estimated that travellers to Northern Norway will spend NOK 9 000 (approx. EUR 1 193) per person in 2012.

| (64) | The Authority understands that the indirect economic impact the Scheme may have on the three northern counties may contribute to stabilising the settlement of population in the region. It is, however, not convinced that this objective could not be reached by another means than by using operating aid which is the most distortive instrument. Moreover, the Authority questions whether the objective of reducing depopulation could not be reached by an instrument that directly benefits the undertakings located in the target area. The Authority thus questions whether it is appropriate to grant direct aid to tour operators located outside the region to be aided. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Authority understands that the indirect economic impact the Scheme may have on the three northern counties may contribute to stabilising the settlement of population in the region. It is, however, not convinced that this objective could not be reached by another means than by using operating aid which is the most distortive instrument. Moreover, the Authority questions whether the objective of reducing depopulation could not be reached by an instrument that directly benefits the undertakings located in the target area. The Authority thus questions whether it is appropriate to grant direct aid to tour operators located outside the region to be aided.

3.3.   
  The aid must be proportionate to the objective of the Scheme

| (65) | According to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, aid granted in order to facilitate the development of certain economic areas may be considered to be compatible with the functioning of the Agreement ‘where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’. In order to be compatible with the common market, the Scheme must be proportionate to the objective of the Scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

According to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, aid granted in order to facilitate the development of certain economic areas may be considered to be compatible with the functioning of the Agreement ‘where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’. In order to be compatible with the common market, the Scheme must be proportionate to the objective of the Scheme.

| (66) | The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Scheme has been designed so that only the necessary level of aid is granted. The aid will take the form of a payment of up to 25 % of the total charter costs which must be specified in accordance with generally accepted project accounting principles. If the planes operated under a charter series have somewhere between 60 % and 80 % cabin factor, the Charter Fund will reimburse the tour operator’s losses connected to the charter series. Maximum support (25 %) from the Charter Fund will be given at cabin factors of 60 % or less. The aid intensity will gradually decrease to zero when cabin factors reach an average of 80 %. At 80 % cabin factor, the tour operator has passed the break-even point and will therefore generate a profit (see above, Part I, Section 2.3). |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Scheme has been designed so that only the necessary level of aid is granted. The aid will take the form of a payment of up to 25 % of the total charter costs which must be specified in accordance with generally accepted project accounting principles. If the planes operated under a charter series have somewhere between 60 % and 80 % cabin factor, the Charter Fund will reimburse the tour operator’s losses connected to the charter series. Maximum support (25 %) from the Charter Fund will be given at cabin factors of 60 % or less. The aid intensity will gradually decrease to zero when cabin factors reach an average of 80 %. At 80 % cabin factor, the tour operator has passed the break-even point and will therefore generate a profit (see above, Part I, Section 2.3).

| (67) | The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the risk reducing aspect of the Scheme will most likely lead to a cabin factor exceeding 60 % and that therefore it is unlikely that the aid intensity will correspond to 25 % of the charter costs. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the risk reducing aspect of the Scheme will most likely lead to a cabin factor exceeding 60 % and that therefore it is unlikely that the aid intensity will correspond to 25 % of the charter costs.

| (68) | They have furthermore argued that the tourist industry being a major industry in the EEA, it is unlikely that the relatively small amounts of aid likely to be granted under the Scheme are liable to affect trade in a particularly negative way. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

They have furthermore argued that the tourist industry being a major industry in the EEA, it is unlikely that the relatively small amounts of aid likely to be granted under the Scheme are liable to affect trade in a particularly negative way.

| (69) | The Norwegian authorities have furthermore indicated that the Scheme will expire after 10 years of operation but that the Scheme will be re-notified if necessary due to the adoption by the Authority of new guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

The Norwegian authorities have furthermore indicated that the Scheme will expire after 10 years of operation but that the Scheme will be re-notified if necessary due to the adoption by the Authority of new guidelines.

| (70) | The Authority refers to paragraph 71 of the currently applicable Regional Aid Guidelines which provide: ‘In all cases, the need for and level of operating aid should be regularly re-examined to ensure its long-term relevance to the region concerned. The Authority will therefore only approve aid schemes for the duration of these guidelines’. (Emphasis added.) The Regional Aid Guidelines are applicable until 31 December 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Authority refers to paragraph 71 of the currently applicable Regional Aid Guidelines which provide: ‘In all cases, the need for and level of operating aid should be regularly re-examined to ensure its long-term relevance to the region concerned. The Authority will therefore only approve aid schemes for the duration of these guidelines’. (Emphasis added.) The Regional Aid Guidelines are applicable until 31 December 2012.

| (71) | The Authority doubts that, should it consider that the Scheme is compatible with the EEA Agreement at the end of the formal investigation phase, it will be able to approve the Scheme beyond 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The Authority doubts that, should it consider that the Scheme is compatible with the EEA Agreement at the end of the formal investigation phase, it will be able to approve the Scheme beyond 31 December 2013.

4.   Conclusion

| (72) | Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority considers that all the conditions set out in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are met and that consequently the notified Scheme entails State aid. The Authority has doubts that the Scheme complies with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, read in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Chapter of the State Aid Guidelines on national regional aid. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority considers that all the conditions set out in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are met and that consequently the notified Scheme entails State aid. The Authority has doubts that the Scheme complies with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, read in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Chapter of the State Aid Guidelines on national regional aid. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (73) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (74) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (75) | In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure, |
| --- | --- |

(75)

In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the Charter Fund Scheme for Northern Norway notified by the Norwegian authorities.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 27 June 2012.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

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(1)  A charter flight is defined as a non-scheduled flight. A charter series is charter flights between two destinations repeated over a limited period of time (for example, weekly flights between Bodø and London from February to April).

1

(2)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

2

(3)  The three northernmost counties are NUTS II regions. The lowest population density can be found in Finnmark: 1,6 inhabitants per km2.

3

2

(4)  See Protocol 40 to the EEA Agreement.

4

(5)  In 2009, the Authority approved an aid scheme for route development from the second largest city in Northern Norway, Bodø, see Decision No 179/09/COL. The Route Development Fund Bodø has not yet granted any aid under the scheme.

5

(6)  Empty legs are flights operated in order to position an aircraft at the start and at the end of a charter series. The return flight on the first departure will be empty and the flight to pick up the last passengers will also be empty. Empty legs represent a considerable cost for short charter series.

6

(7)  Avinor AS is the State-owned company that operates most of the civil airports in Norway.

7

(8)  The Norwegian authorities have also mentioned the fact that the Charter Fund may, at some stage in the future, be co-financed by private undertakings. The assessment carried out by the Authority will not examine this possibility as this option seems to be relatively uncertain.

8

(9)  See Case T-384/04 SIDE v Commission [2008], ECR I-nyr, paragraph 99, Case T-162/06 Kronoply GmbH v Commission [2009], ECR II-nyr, paragraph 75.

9

SIDE

Commission

Kronoply GmbH

Commission

(10)  ‘It is the task of the EFTA State to demonstrate that the aid proposed is necessary and appropriate to prevent or reduce continuing depopulation’. (Emphasis added.)

10

(11)  See paragraph 22(a) of the Regional Aid Guidelines.

11

(12)  See The High North. Vision and policy instruments, the Government’s political platform for the period 2009 until 2013 and The Governments’ tourism strategy.

12

The High North. Vision and policy instruments, the Government’s political platform for the period 2009 until 2013

The Governments’ tourism strategy

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V Anunțuri

PROCEDURI ADMINISTRATIVE

Oficiul European pentru Selecția Personalului (EPSO)

| 27.9.2012 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 291/12 |
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27.9.2012

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 291/12

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ANUNȚ DE CONCURS GENERAL

2012/C 291/03

Oficiul European pentru Selecția Personalului (EPSO) organizează concursul general:

EPSO/AST/121/12 – Tehnicieni de conferință (AST 3)

Anunțul de concurs se publică în 23 de limbi în Jurnalul Oficial C 291 A din 27 septembrie 2012.

Puteți obține informații suplimentare pe site-ul EPSO: http://www.eu-careers.info

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PROCEDURI JURISDICȚIONALE

Curtea de justiție a AELS

| 27.9.2012 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 291/13 |
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27.9.2012

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 291/13

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Cerere pentru un aviz consultativ al Curții de Justiție a AELS, prezentată la 6 februarie 2012 de Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur, în cauza HOB-vín ehf./the State Alcohol and Tobacco Company of Iceland (ÁTVR)

(Cauza E-2/12)

2012/C 291/04

S-a înaintat o cerere Curții de Justiție a AELS de către Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (instanța districtuală din Reykjavik) prin scrisoarea din 6 februarie 2012, înregistrată la grefa Curții la data de 13 februarie 2012, vizând emiterea unui aviz consultativ în cauza HOB-vín ehf./the State Alcohol and Tobacco Company of Iceland (ÁTVR), cu privire la următoarele întrebări:

| 1. | este incompatibil cu articolul 11 din Acordul privind SEE ca unei întreprinderi de stat, care deține monopol asupra vânzării cu amănuntul a alcoolului pe teritoriul unui stat SEE, să i se permită, în conformitate cu legislația sau normele administrative, să refuze acceptarea spre vânzare a băuturilor alcoolice fabricate legal și comercializate într-un alt stat membru SEE, pe motiv că ambalajele și etichetele produselor conțin informații tendențioase sau care nu au legătură cu produsul sau sugerează că alcoolul sporește condiția fizică, mentală, socială sau sexuală, fără a se referi exclusiv la produs, la metoda de producție sau la caracteristicile sale; |
| --- | --- |

1.

este incompatibil cu articolul 11 din Acordul privind SEE ca unei întreprinderi de stat, care deține monopol asupra vânzării cu amănuntul a alcoolului pe teritoriul unui stat SEE, să i se permită, în conformitate cu legislația sau normele administrative, să refuze acceptarea spre vânzare a băuturilor alcoolice fabricate legal și comercializate într-un alt stat membru SEE, pe motiv că ambalajele și etichetele produselor conțin informații tendențioase sau care nu au legătură cu produsul sau sugerează că alcoolul sporește condiția fizică, mentală, socială sau sexuală, fără a se referi exclusiv la produs, la metoda de producție sau la caracteristicile sale;

| 2. | este incompatibil cu articolul 11 din Acordul privind SEE ca un stat membru SEE să includă în legislația sau normele sale administrative, legi care să solicite să fie specificat clar pe ambalajul băuturilor alcoolice că au conținut alcoolic și ca un monopol de stat să poată refuza să accepte spre vânzare astfel de produse dacă ambalajul nu îndeplinește această cerință; |
| --- | --- |

2.

este incompatibil cu articolul 11 din Acordul privind SEE ca un stat membru SEE să includă în legislația sau normele sale administrative, legi care să solicite să fie specificat clar pe ambalajul băuturilor alcoolice că au conținut alcoolic și ca un monopol de stat să poată refuza să accepte spre vânzare astfel de produse dacă ambalajul nu îndeplinește această cerință;

| 3. | în răspunsurile la prima și a doua întrebare de mai sus, contează faptul că legislația sau normele administrative se aplică în mod egal produselor naționale și străine; |
| --- | --- |

3.

în răspunsurile la prima și a doua întrebare de mai sus, contează faptul că legislația sau normele administrative se aplică în mod egal produselor naționale și străine;

| 4. | dacă se consideră că o dispoziție precum cea descrisă în prima și/sau a doua întrebare de mai sus reprezintă o restricție cantitativă sau o măsură ce are efecte echivalente, în conformitate cu articolul 11 din Acordul privind SEE, se solicită Curții de Justiție a AELS să decidă dacă o astfel de dispoziție poate fi totuși considerată cu toate acestea justificată în conformitate cu articolul 13 din Acordul privind SEE; |
| --- | --- |

4.

dacă se consideră că o dispoziție precum cea descrisă în prima și/sau a doua întrebare de mai sus reprezintă o restricție cantitativă sau o măsură ce are efecte echivalente, în conformitate cu articolul 11 din Acordul privind SEE, se solicită Curții de Justiție a AELS să decidă dacă o astfel de dispoziție poate fi totuși considerată cu toate acestea justificată în conformitate cu articolul 13 din Acordul privind SEE;

| 5. | dacă se consideră că o dispoziție precum cea descrisă în prima și/sau a doua întrebare de mai sus, care se întemeiază pe lege sau norme administrative, este în conformitate cu articolul 11 din Acordul privind SEE, atunci se solicită Curții de Justiție a AELS să decidă dacă aceasta consideră că sunt îndeplinite condițiile pentru răspunderea statului, în măsura în care Curtea de Justiție a AELS evaluează acest subiect. |
| --- | --- |

5.

dacă se consideră că o dispoziție precum cea descrisă în prima și/sau a doua întrebare de mai sus, care se întemeiază pe lege sau norme administrative, este în conformitate cu articolul 11 din Acordul privind SEE, atunci se solicită Curții de Justiție a AELS să decidă dacă aceasta consideră că sunt îndeplinite condițiile pentru răspunderea statului, în măsura în care Curtea de Justiție a AELS evaluează acest subiect.

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| 27.9.2012 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 291/14 |
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27.9.2012

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 291/14

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HOTĂRÂREA CURȚII

din 12 septembrie 2011

în cauza E-16/10

Philip Morris Norway AS/Statul norvegian, reprezentat de Ministerul Sănătății și al Serviciilor de Îngrijire

(Libera circulație a mărfurilor – Interdicția de a expune produse din tutun – Articolele 11 și 13 din Acordul privind SEE – Măsuri cu efect echivalent unor restricții cantitative – Modalități de vânzare – Protecția sănătății publice – Proporționalitate)

2012/C 291/05

În cauza E-16/10, Philip Morris Norway AS/Statul norvegian, reprezentat de Ministerul Sănătății și al Serviciilor de Îngrijire – CERERE adresată Curții, în temeiul articolului 34 din Acordul între statele AELS privind instituirea unei Autorități de Supraveghere și a unei Curți de Justiție, de către instanța teritorială Oslo (Oslo tingrett), cu privire la interpretarea articolelor 11 și 13 din Acordul privind Spațiul Economic European (SEE), în special pentru a stabili dacă o normă privind interdicția de a expune produse din tutun în punctele de vânzare cu amănuntul, cum este cea prevăzută de legislația norvegiană, constituie o restricționare ilegală în temeiul articolului 11 din Acordul privind SEE și, în cazul în care se dovedește că există o astfel de restricționare, care sunt criteriile decisive pentru a determina dacă respectiva interdicție de expunere este proporțională cu scopurile articolului 13 din Acordul privind SEE, Curtea, alcătuită din Carl Baudenbacher, președinte, Thorgeir Örlygsson (judecător-raportor) și Per Christiansen, judecători, a pronunțat, la 12 septembrie 2011, o hotărâre al cărei dispozitiv prevede următoarele:

| 1. | o interdicție de a expune produse din tutun, impusă de legislația internă a unui stat membru al SEE, precum cea discutată în cauza de față, constituie o măsură cu efect echivalent unei restricții cantitative asupra importurilor în sensul articolului 11 din Acordul privind SEE dacă, în fapt, interdicția afectează comercializarea produselor importate din alte state membre ale SEE într-o măsură mai mare decât comercializarea produselor importate, care au fost, până de curând, produse în Norvegia; |
| --- | --- |

1.

o interdicție de a expune produse din tutun, impusă de legislația internă a unui stat membru al SEE, precum cea discutată în cauza de față, constituie o măsură cu efect echivalent unei restricții cantitative asupra importurilor în sensul articolului 11 din Acordul privind SEE dacă, în fapt, interdicția afectează comercializarea produselor importate din alte state membre ale SEE într-o măsură mai mare decât comercializarea produselor importate, care au fost, până de curând, produse în Norvegia;

| 2. | este de competența instanței naționale să identifice obiectivele reale pe care legislația în cauză le urmărește și să decidă dacă obiectivul privind sănătatea publică în materie de reducere a consumului de tutun, în general, poate fi îndeplinit cu ajutorul unor măsuri mai puțin restrictive decât interdicția de a expune produse din tutun. |
| --- | --- |

2.

este de competența instanței naționale să identifice obiectivele reale pe care legislația în cauză le urmărește și să decidă dacă obiectivul privind sănătatea publică în materie de reducere a consumului de tutun, în general, poate fi îndeplinit cu ajutorul unor măsuri mai puțin restrictive decât interdicția de a expune produse din tutun.

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| 27.9.2012 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 291/15 |
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27.9.2012

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 291/15

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HOTĂRÂREA CURȚII

din 14 decembrie 2011

în cauza E-3/11

Pálmi Sigmarsson/Banca Centrală a Islandei

(Libera circulație a capitalurilor – Articolul 43 din Acordul privind SEE – Restricții naționale privind circulația capitalurilor – Jurisdicție – Proporționalitate – Securitate juridică)

2012/C 291/06

În cauza E-3/11, Pálmi Sigmarsson/Banca Centrală a Islandei – CERERE adresată Curții, în temeiul articolului 34 din Acordul între statele AELS privind instituirea unei Autorități de Supraveghere și a unei Curți de Justiție, de către Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (instanța teritorială Reykjavik), cu privire la interpretarea articolului 43 din Acordul privind SEE, Curtea, alcătuită din Carl Baudenbacher, președinte, Per Christiansen (judecător-raportor) și Benedikt Bogason (ad hoc), judecători, a pronunțat, la 14 decembrie 2011, o hotărâre al cărei dispozitiv prevede următoarele:

O măsură națională care împiedică transferul în Islanda a coroanelor islandeze achiziționate pe piața offshore este compatibilă cu articolul 43 alineatele (2) și (4) din Acordul privind SEE în circumstanțe precum cele specificate în cauza aflată pe rolul instanței de trimitere.

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| 27.9.2012 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 291/16 |
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27.9.2012

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 291/16

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HOTĂRÂREA CURȚII

din 14 decembrie 2011

în cauza E-8/11

Autoritatea de Supraveghere a AELS/Islanda

(Neîndeplinirea obligațiilor de către o parte contractantă – Directiva 2002/49/CE privind evaluarea și gestiunea zgomotului ambiental)

2012/C 291/07

În cauza E-8/11, Autoritatea de Supraveghere a AELS/Islanda – CERERE vizând constatarea potrivit căreia, prin negarantarea faptului că autoritățile sale competente au întocmit și, după caz, aprobat hărți acustice strategice și au elaborat planuri de acțiune privind zgomotul pentru toate drumurile principale de pe teritoriul său cu un trafic mai mare de șase milioane de treceri ale vehiculelor anual, precum și a faptului că informațiile din hărțile acustice strategice și din rezumatele planurilor de acțiune prevăzute în anexa VI la directivă sunt transmise Autorității de Supraveghere a AELS, Islanda nu a respectat obligațiile care îi revin în temeiul articolului 7 alineatul (1), al articolului 8 alineatul (1) și al articolului 10 din actul menționat la punctul 32g din anexa XX la Acordul privind SEE (Directiva 2002/49/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 25 iunie 2002 privind evaluarea și gestiunea zgomotului ambiental), astfel cum a fost adaptat la Acordul privind SEE prin Protocolul 1 la acesta, Curtea, alcătuită din Carl Baudenbacher, președinte și judecător-raportor, Per Christiansen și Páll Hreinsson, judecători, a pronunțat, la 14 decembrie 2011, o hotărâre al cărei dispozitiv prevede următoarele:

Curtea:

| 1. | declară că, prin negarantarea faptului că, în termenele prevăzute, autoritățile sale competente au întocmit și, după caz, aprobat hărți acustice strategice și au elaborat planuri de acțiune privind zgomotul pentru toate drumurile principale de pe teritoriul său cu un trafic mai mare de șase milioane de treceri ale vehiculelor anual, precum și a faptului că informațiile din hărțile acustice strategice și din rezumatele planurilor de acțiune prevăzute în anexa VI la directivă sunt transmise Autorității de Supraveghere a AELS, Islanda nu a respectat obligațiile care îi revin în temeiul articolului 7 alineatul (1), al articolului 8 alineatul (1) și al articolului 10 din actul menționat la punctul 32g din anexa XX la Acordul privind SEE (Directiva 2002/49/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 25 iunie 2002 privind evaluarea și gestiunea zgomotului ambiental), astfel cum a fost adaptat la Acordul privind SEE prin Protocolul 1 la acesta; |
| --- | --- |

1.

declară că, prin negarantarea faptului că, în termenele prevăzute, autoritățile sale competente au întocmit și, după caz, aprobat hărți acustice strategice și au elaborat planuri de acțiune privind zgomotul pentru toate drumurile principale de pe teritoriul său cu un trafic mai mare de șase milioane de treceri ale vehiculelor anual, precum și a faptului că informațiile din hărțile acustice strategice și din rezumatele planurilor de acțiune prevăzute în anexa VI la directivă sunt transmise Autorității de Supraveghere a AELS, Islanda nu a respectat obligațiile care îi revin în temeiul articolului 7 alineatul (1), al articolului 8 alineatul (1) și al articolului 10 din actul menționat la punctul 32g din anexa XX la Acordul privind SEE (Directiva 2002/49/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 25 iunie 2002 privind evaluarea și gestiunea zgomotului ambiental), astfel cum a fost adaptat la Acordul privind SEE prin Protocolul 1 la acesta;

| 2. | obligă Islanda la plata cheltuielilor de judecată. |
| --- | --- |

2.

obligă Islanda la plata cheltuielilor de judecată.

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