September 9, 2015 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer 

Ranking Member, Committee on Environment 

 and Public Works 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Senator Boxer: 

During our May meeting, I committed to provide you with a status of the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) actions based on the lessons learned from the March 2011 

accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan and the expected completion 

dates for these actions. 

As you know, the NRC’s Near-Term Task Force identified 12 overarching 

recommendations with 34 specific regulatory actions. An NRC steering committee 

recommended a subset of seven of the specific regulatory actions that should be initiated 

without delay. An eighth high priority action was later added. This prioritization represented 

those actions that would have the greatest potential for safety improvements in the near term, 

recognizing NRC’s limited resources. The NRC has completed five of the eight specific 

regulatory actions. With limited exceptions, staff and industry are on track to meet the goal of 

completing actions necessary for the other three items by the end of 2016. The only exceptions 

are containment venting capabilities for 13 units and a few plants that have flood hazard 

reevaluations that are dependent on information to be provided by the U.S. Army Corp of 

Engineers. 

Enclosure 1 contains the status of NRC Fukushima Lessons Learned Regulatory 

Actions. Please note that I have highlighted the eight high priority items. As you will see, some 

of eight high priority items are represented separately for different phases of implementation, for 

example, an order followed by rulemaking. We have also completed or started work on some of 

the items not on the high priority list. The NRC staff will be providing the Commission updated 

plans for addressing the other recommended regulatory actions later this year. The NRC staff’s 

most recent status report is included in Enclosure 2 and provides additional detail on all of the 

NRC’s Fukushima lessons-learned activities. Enclosure 3 is a Pacific Gas and Electric August 

2015 status report on Diablo Canyon’s implementation of the Commission Order for Mitigation 

Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events.
 - 2 - 

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter, please feel free to contact 

Eugene Dacus, Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs at (301) 415-1776. 

 Sincerely, 

 /RA/ 

 Stephen G. Burns 

Enclosures: 

As stated
 

Enclosure 1 

Status Summary of Japan Lessons Learned Regulatory Actions 

July 2015 

The NRC staff will be sending a paper to the Commission by October 31, 2015, providing the 

plans for addressing items designated with an asterisk (*) below.

 

1

 In this paper the staff provided for Commission review and approval an action plan, including a 

schedule, for closing NTTF Recommendation 2.1 Reevaluation of flooding hazards for operating nuclear 

power plants. 

ITEM 

Near-Term 

Task Force 

(NTTF), 

Tier 

Regulatory Action 

and Notes 

Licensee 

Actions 

Develop improved regulatory 

framework to better address 

beyond-design-basis events. 

NTTF 1 

Complete 

(incorporated into 

Risk Management 

Regulatory 

Framework 

activities) 

N/A 

Include ultimate heat sink (UHS) 

systems in hazard reevaluations and 

walkdowns, include loss of UHS as a 

design assumption in conjunction with 

strategies for dealing with prolonged 

station black out (SBO), and address 

loss of access to normal UHS in 

conjunction with measures taken to 

deal with beyond-design-basis 

external hazards. 

Related to 

NTTF 2.1, 2.3, 

4.1, and 4.2 

Complete Complete 

Reevaluate seismic and flooding 

hazards against current requirements 

and guidance and update the design 

basis. Take appropriate regulatory 

action to resolve issues associated 

with updated site-specific hazards. 

NTTF 2.1 

Tier 1

In processimplementing 

action plan in 

COMSECY-15-

0019 Closure Plan 

for the 

Reevaluation of 

Flooding Hazards 

For Operating 

Nuclear Power 

Plants 1

In processimplementing 

action plan in 

COMSECY-15-

0019 

Periodic confirmation of seismic and 

flooding hazards. 

NTTF 2.2 

Tier 3 TBD* TBD 
 2 

Perform seismic-and flood-protection 

walkdowns to verify compliance with 

existing seismic and flooding design 

bases. 

NTTF 2.3 

Tier 1 Complete Complete 

Potential enhancements to the 

capability to prevent or mitigate 

seismically-induced fires and floods. 

NTTF 3 

Tier 1/3 

Feasibility study of 

a Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment (PRA) 

tool in progress.* 

TBD 

Rulemaking to codify requirements for 

capability to maintain plant safety 

throughout a prolonged station 

blackout (SBO) through mitigating 

strategies implemented above. 

NTTF 4.1 

Tier 1

Mitigation of 

Beyond-DesignBasis Event 

(MBDBE) 

Proposed Rule will 

be published for 

public comment by 

December 2015 

2018-2019 

Provide a three-phase approach for 

mitigating beyond-design-basis 

external events. 

NTTF 4.2 

Tier 1 Complete 2016 

Provide a reliable hardened 

containment vent system for 

boiling-water reactor (BWR) Mark I 

and II containments. Was revised by 

SRM-SECY-12-0157 to address 

severe accident conditions. 

NTTF 5.1 

Tier 1 Complete 2018 (Phase 1)

2019 (Phase 2)

Containment Protection and Release 

Reduction Rulemaking. Incorporated 

assessment of filtration and additional 

severe-accident performance 

requirements for BWR Mark I 

and Mark II containments from SRMSECY-12-0157. 

SECY-12-

0025, 

Consideration 

of Additional 

Requirements 

for 

Containment 

Venting 

Systems for 

Boiling Water 

Reactors with 

Complete- Closed 

by Commission in 

August 2015 (SRM 

for SECY-15-0085 

Evaluation of The 

Containment 

Protection and 

Release Reduction 

For Mark I and 

Mark II Boiling 

Water Reactors 

N/A 
 3 

 

2

 In SRM SECY-12-0025 the Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with development of 

technical bases and rulemaking for filtering strategies with drywell filtration and severe accident 

management of BWR Mark I and II containments. 

3

 In SRM SECY-15-0085 the Commission disapproved the staff's plan to issue a Federal Register notice 

requesting public comments on the draft regulatory basis for the Containment Protection and Release 

Reduction rulemaking. The Commission direction staff to proceed with Order EA-13-109 implementation 

without additional regulatory actions. Order EA-13-109 requires all BWRs with Mark I or Mark II 

containments to have a reliable, hardened, severe-accident capable containment venting system. 

Mark I and 

Mark II 

Containments 

Enc. 2, Tier 12

Rulemaking 

Activities3

Reliable hardened vents for other 

containment designs. 

NTTF 5.2 

Tier 3 TBD* TBD 

Hydrogen control and mitigation inside 

containment or in other buildings. 

NTTF 6 

Tier 3 TBD* TBD 

Provide a reliable indication of water 

level in spent fuel storage pools. 

NTTF 7.1 

Tier 1 Complete 2016 

Require licensees to provide reliable 

spent fuel pool makeup capabilities. 

NTTF 7.2 

through 7.5 

Tier 2 

Complete 

Incorporated in 

mitigating 

strategies 

Require integration of onsite 

emergency response processes, 

procedures, training, and exercises. 

NTTF 8 

Tier 1

MBDBE Proposed 

Rule will be 

published for public 

comment by 

December 2015 

2018-2019 

Perform a staffing study for 

responding to multiunit events, 

evaluate enhancements that would be 

needed to power communications 

equipment throughout a prolonged 

SBO, and inform the NRC of the 

results. 

NTTF 9.3 

(partial) 

Tier 1

Complete 

Incorporated in 

mitigating 

strategies 

Require a revision to the emergency 

plan to address multiunit dose 

assessment, periodic training and 

exercises for multiunit and prolonged 

SBO scenarios, and drills on 

identification and acquisition of offsite 

resources, as well as to ensure 

sufficient emergency preparedness 

(EP) resources for multiunit and 

prolonged SBO scenarios. 

NTTF 9.3 

(partial) 

Tier 2 

Complete 

These items 

were either 

accomplished 

separately 

(e.g., multi-unit 

dose 

assessment) or 

incorporated in 

mitigating 

strategies 
 4 

Certain Tier 1, 2, and 3 EP activities 

(9.1, 9.2, 9.3 (with the exception of 

maintenance of Emergency Response 

Data System (ERDS) capability 

throughout an accident), 9.4, 10.2, 

and 11.1). 

NTTF 9.1, 9.2, 

9.3 (partial), 

9.4, 10.2, 11.1 

MBDBE Proposed 

Rule will be 

published for public 

comment by 

December 2015 

2018-2019 

EP enhancements for prolonged SBO 

and multiunit events. 

NTTF 9–11 

Tier 3 TBD* TBD 

ERDS capability. NTTF 9–11 

Tier 3 TBD* TBD 

Additional EP topics for prolonged 

SBO and multiunit events. 

NTTF 9–11 

Tier 3 TBD* TBD 

EP topics for decision-making, 

radiation monitoring, and public 

education. 

NTTF 9–11 

Tier 3 TBD* TBD 

Complete the ERDS modernization 

initiative by June 2012 to ensure 

multiunit site monitoring capability. 

NTTF 9.4 

Tier 1 Complete Complete 

Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) 

modifications to reflect the 

recommended defense-in-depth 

framework. 

NTTF 12.1 

Tier 3 

The NRC staff is 

identifying and 

evaluating 

improvements to 

the ROP based on 

insights from 

implementing the 

other 

recommendations.* 

N/A 

Staff training on severe accidents and 

resident inspector training on 

severe-accident management 

guidelines. 

NTTF 12.2 

Tier 3 

Under 

development/ 

partially 

implemented.* 

N/A 

Reevaluate natural external hazards, 

other than flooding and seismic, 

against current requirements and 

guidance and update the design basis. 

Take appropriate regulatory action to 

resolve issues associated with 

updated site-specific hazards. 

Tier 2 TBD* TBD 

Reactor and containment 

instrumentation capable of 

withstanding beyond-design-basis 

Advisory 

Committee on 

Reactor 

NRC staff 

continues to work 

with the standards 

TBD 
 5 

conditions. Safeguards 

item 

Tier 3* 

development 

organizations to 

develop criteria for 

severe accident 

instrumentation.* 

Basis of emergency planning zone 

size. 

Staff item 

Tier 3 TBD* TBD 

Pre-staging of potassium iodide 

beyond 10 miles. 

Staff item 

Tier 3* TBD* TBD 

Expedited transfer of spent fuel to dry 

cask storage. 

Additional 

issue Complete N/A 

Determine applicability of lessons 

learned to regulated facilities other 

than power reactors. 

Additional 

issue Complete N/A