TC 7-100.3

Irregular

Opposing Forces

January 2014

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i 

TC 7-100.3 

Training Circular 

No. 7-100.3 

Headquarters 

Department of the Army 

Washington, DC, 17 January 2014 

Irregular Opposing Forces 

Contents 

Page 

 PREFACE.............................................................................................................. iv

 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... v

Irregular Forces ...................................................................................................... v

Irregular OPFOR and Hybrid Threat for Training .................................................. vi

Tailoring the OPFOR ............................................................................................ vii

Chapter 1 IRREGULAR OPPOSING FORCE FUNDAMENTALS ..................................... 1-1

Hybrid Threat ...................................................................................................... 1-1

Capabilities and Intent ........................................................................................ 1-1

Tactics ................................................................................................................ 1-4

Interactions of Operational Variables ................................................................. 1-4

Principles ............................................................................................................ 1-7

Motivations ....................................................................................................... 1-10

Support ............................................................................................................. 1-12

Blurring of Categories ....................................................................................... 1-14

Comparison and Contrast ................................................................................. 1-15

Chapter 2 INSURGENTS .................................................................................................... 2-1

General Characteristics ...................................................................................... 2-1

Insurgent Organizations ..................................................................................... 2-3

Chapter 3 GUERRILLAS .................................................................................................... 3-1

General Characteristics ...................................................................................... 3-1

Guerrilla Organizations ....................................................................................... 3-7

Guerrilla Brigade ................................................................................................. 3-8

Guerrilla Battalion ............................................................................................. 3-16

Guerrilla Company ............................................................................................ 3-23

Guerrilla Platoon ............................................................................................... 3-25

Guerrilla Hunter-Killer Company ...................................................................... 3-25

Hunter-Killer Group ........................................................................................... 3-27

Tactics and Techniques .................................................................................... 3-28

Chapter 4 CRIMINALS ........................................................................................................ 4-1

Characteristics .................................................................................................... 4-1

Motivations ......................................................................................................... 4-3

Criminal Organizations ....................................................................................... 4-4
Contents 

ii TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Command and Control ........................................................................................ 4-6

Criminal Activities ................................................................................................ 4-8

Chapter 5 NONCOMBATANTS ........................................................................................... 5-1

General Characteristics ...................................................................................... 5-1

Armed Noncombatants ....................................................................................... 5-3

Unarmed Noncombatants ................................................................................... 5-7

Unarmed Combatants ....................................................................................... 5-16

Chapter 6 TERRORISM ....................................................................................................... 6-1

Terrorism in Complex Operational Environments ............................................... 6-1

Motivations .......................................................................................................... 6-2

Terrorism Planning and Action Cycle .................................................................. 6-3

Terrorism Actions ................................................................................................ 6-7

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures ................................................................. 6-9

Terrorism Trends and Emergent Vectors.......................................................... 6-21

The Specter of Terrorism .................................................................................. 6-26

Chapter 7 FUNCTIONAL TACTICS .................................................................................... 7-1

Functional Organization of Forces and Elements ............................................... 7-1

Types of Offensive Action ................................................................................... 7-3

Types of Defensive Action ................................................................................ 7-24

Irregular OPFOR in Hybrid Threat Tactics ........................................................ 7-36

Appendix A INFORMATION WARFARE .............................................................................. A-1

General Characteristics ..................................................................................... A-1

INFOWAR Organizations ................................................................................... A-4

INFOWAR Support to Irregular OPFOR ............................................................ A-6

Figures 

Figure I-1. Irregular force actors ................................................................................................ v

Figure 1-1. Relation of irregular OPFOR principles to achieving the objective ..................... 1-8

Figure 2-1. Network types ...................................................................................................... 2-5

Figure 2-2. Typical levels of leadership, action, and support................................................. 2-6

Figure 2-3. Higher insurgent organization............................................................................ 2-10

Figure 2-4. Local insurgent organization .............................................................................. 2-13

Figure 2-5. Local and higher insurgent organizations network (example) ........................... 2-14

Figure 2-6. Insurgent direct action cell and team graphic symbols ..................................... 2-15

Figure 2-7. Insurgent supporting cell graphic symbols ........................................................ 2-20

Figure 3-1. Guerrilla organization symbols: brigade to team level ........................................ 3-7

Figure 3-2. Guerrilla brigade (example) ................................................................................. 3-8

Figure 3-3. Guerrilla battalion (example) ............................................................................. 3-17

Figure 3-4. Guerrilla company (example) ............................................................................ 3-24

Figure 3-5. Guerrilla platoon (example) ............................................................................... 3-25

Figure 3-6. Guerrilla hunter-killer company (example) ........................................................ 3-26
Contents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 iii 

Figure 5-1. Armed and unarmed noncombatants (examples) ................................................ 5-1

Figure 5-2. Noncombatant support to the irregular OPFOR (examples) ............................... 5-3

Figure 5-3. PSC organization by functions (example) ............................................................ 5-6

Figure 5-4. Media team organization (example) ..................................................................... 5-9

Figure 5-5. NGO field office functions (example) ................................................................. 5-12

Figure 6-1. Terrorism actors in complex operational environments ....................................... 6-1

Figure 6-2. Terrorism planning and action cycle .................................................................... 6-4

Figure 6-3. Bombing: insurgent affiliate (example) ............................................................... 6-11

Figure 6-4. Kidnapping: insurgent-criminal affiliation (example) .......................................... 6-13

Figure 6-5. Hostage-taking: guerrilla unit (example) ............................................................ 6-14

Figure 6-6. Raid: multiple insurgent suicide cell assaults (example) ................................... 6-15

Figure 6-7. Anthrax-laced letters: death-mayhem in targeted population (example) ........... 6-21

Figure 7-1. Insurgent ambush (example) ............................................................................... 7-4

Figure 7-2. Guerrilla ambush (example) ................................................................................. 7-5

Figure 7-3. Insurgent assault (example) ............................................................................... 7-10

Figure 7-4. Guerrilla assault (example) ................................................................................ 7-11

Figure 7-5. Insurgent raid (example) .................................................................................... 7-11

Figure 7-6. Guerrilla raid (example) ..................................................................................... 7-11

Figure 7-7. Guerrilla reconnaissance attack (example) ....................................................... 7-11

Figure 7-8. Simple and complex battle positions .................................................................. 7-25

Figure 7-9. Insurgent defense of a simple battle position (example) ................................... 7-28

Figure 7-10. Guerrilla defense of a simple battle position (example) ................................... 7-29

Figure 7-11. Insurgent defense of a complex battle position (example) .............................. 7-33

Figure 7-12. Guerrilla defense of a complex battle position (example) ................................ 7-34

Tables 

Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals ...................... 1-16

Table A-1. INFOWAR elements, objectives and targets ........................................................ A-3
iv TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Preface 

This training circular (TC) is one of a series that describes an opposing force (OPFOR) for training U.S. Army 

commanders, staffs, and units. See the References section for a list of other TCs in this series. (Other 

publications in the former Field Manual [FM] 7-100 series will be converted to TCs as well.) Together, these 

TCs outline OPFOR that can cover the entire spectrum capabilities of regular and/or irregular forces against 

which the Army must train to ensure success in any future conflict. 

Applications for this series of TCs include field training, training simulations, and classroom instruction 

throughout the Army. All Army training and red team venues should use an OPFOR based on these TCs, except 

when mission rehearsal or contingency training requires maximum fidelity to a specific country-based threat or 

enemy. Even in the latter case, trainers should use appropriate parts of the OPFOR TCs to fill information gaps 

in a manner consistent with what they do know about a specific threat or enemy. 

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG) /Army National Guard of the 

United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated. 

Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the proponent for this 

publication. The preparing agency is the Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate 

(CTID), TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)-Threats. Send comments and suggested 

improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to CTID 

at the following address: Director, CTID, TRISA-Threats, ATTN: ATIN-T (Bldg 467, Rm 15), 803 Harrison Blvd, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1323. 

This publication is available at on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library (RDL) at 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil. Also, see Army Training Network (ATN) https://atn.army.mil with Army 

Knowledge Online (AKO) access. Two locations on the ATN front-page access TRADOC G-2 products. Click 

the “Training for Operations” button and then click the “CTID Operational Environment Page” link. Click the 

“DA Training Environment” button and click the “OPFOR & Threat Doctrine” link. Both of these sites provide 

threat and opposing forces (OPFOR) resources and references for training, professional education, and leader 

development. Updates subject to the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) approval process will occur as 

required, and as a result of a normal review production cycle for an Army training circular. The date on the 

cover and title page of the electronic version will reflect the latest change update. 
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 v 

Introduction 

This training circular (TC), as part of the TC 7-100 series, addresses the irregular 

opposing force (OPFOR), which in Army training exercises represents a composite of 

actual threats and enemies that comprise irregular forces. The three primary 

categories of irregular forces portrayed by the OPFOR are insurgents, guerrillas, and 

criminals. These actors may operate separately or in conjunction with one another 

and/or combined with regular military forces as the Hybrid Threat (HT) for training. 

This TC also addresses other actors present in an operational environment (OE), who 

may be affiliated with the irregular OPFOR through willing support or coercion, 

and/or may be passive or unknowing supporters of the irregular OPFOR. 

IRREGULAR FORCES 

Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, 

or other internal security forces (JP 3-24). The distinction of being armed as an individual or group can 

include a wide range of people who can be categorized correctly or incorrectly as irregular forces. 

Excluding members of regular armed forces, police, or internal security forces from being considered 

irregular forces may appear to add some clarity. However, such exclusion is inappropriate when a soldier of 

a regular armed force, policeman, or internal security force member is concurrently operating in support of 

insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal activities. 

Irregular forces can be insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal organizations or any combination thereof. Any of 

those forces can be affiliated with mercenaries, corrupt governing authority officials, compromised 

commercial and public entities, active or covert supporters, and willing or coerced members of a populace. 

Independent actors can also act on agendas separate from those of irregular forces. Figure I-1 depicts 

various actors that may be part of or associated with irregular forces. 

C ?

? W

DRUG IED I G

Terrorists

Insurgents

Guerrillas Criminals

Active Supporters Independent Actors

Passive

Supporters

Figure I-1. Irregular force actors 

Closely related to the subject of irregular forces is irregular warfare. JP 1 defines irregular warfare as “a 

violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 

population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full 

range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” The 

definition spotlights a dilemma of conflict in and among a population. It also indicates that the non-state 

actors characterized as irregular forces may operate in other than military or even military-like 

(paramilitary) capacities. 
Introduction 

vi TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

IRREGULAR OPFOR AND HYBRID THREAT FOR TRAINING 

The function of the OPFOR is to portray a threat or enemy in training exercises. Army Regulation (AR) 

350-2 establishes policies and procedures for the Army’s Opposing Force Program. Since 2004, that AR 

has defined opposing force as “a plausible and flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a 

composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces used in lieu of a specific threat force, for 

training or developing U.S. forces.” AR 350-2 has defined threat as “any specific foreign nation or 

organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or 

challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies.” However, that definition of threat

was much narrower than the way ADRP 3-0 now defines it. 

 “A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm 

U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland. Threats may include individuals, groups of 

individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. 

When threats execute their capability to do harm to the United States, they become enemies.” (ADRP 3-0) 

A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist 

forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADRP 3-0). A hybrid 

threat can consist of any combination of two or more of those components. 

The preface of TC 7-100 says that TC outlines “the Hybrid Threat that represents a composite of actual 

threat forces as an opposing force (OPFOR) for training exercises.” After focusing on real-world hybrid 

threats in its first part, TC 7-100 states: “Part two of this TC focuses on the Hybrid Threat (HT) for U.S. 

Army training. The HT is a realistic and relevant composite of actual hybrid threats. This composite 

constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat...represented as an opposing force (OPFOR) in training 

exercises.” That means that, in the context of the HT for training, the OPFOR can also include nonmilitary 

actors (such as criminal elements), which are part of the threat faced by the training unit. Since the 

definition of hybrid threat includes other than military and paramilitary actors, it has broadened the 

application of the term OPFOR. 

The AR 350-2 definition of OPFOR used the term paramilitary forces, defined in JP 3-24 as “forces or 

groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, 

equipment, training, or mission.” However, the ADRP 3-0 (and TC 7-100) definition of hybrid threat uses 

the broader term irregular forces, defined in JP 3-24 as “armed individuals or groups who are not 

members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.” Thus, irregular forces would 

include paramilitary forces, but also other armed individuals or groups that do not resemble regular armed 

forces. Although the ADRP 3-0 definition of hybrid threat includes “terrorist forces, and/or criminal 

elements,” both criminals and actors who use terrorism as a tactic would actually fit under the JP 3-24 

definition of irregular forces. 

FM 7-100.4 lists criminal organizations under non-state paramilitary actors, but only because “Criminal 

organizations at the higher end of the scale can take on the characteristics of a paramilitary organization.” 

However, it notes that “individual drug dealers and criminals or small-scale criminal organizations (gangs)” 

do not have that type of capability. FM 7-100.4 also refers to “other armed combatants” as “nonmilitary 

personnel who are armed but not part of an organized paramilitary or military structure. Nevertheless, they 

may be disgruntled and hostile.” ARDP 3-0 defines “a party identified as hostile against which the use of 

force is authorized” as an enemy. In a training exercise, such an enemy would be portrayed as part of the 

OPFOR. 

FM 7-100.4 also recognizes the category of “unarmed combatants.” It says: “The local populace contains 

various types of unarmed nonmilitary personnel who, given the right conditions, may decide to purposely 

and materially support hostilities against the United States. ... Individual criminals or small gangs might be 

affiliated with a paramilitary organization and perform support functions that do not involve weapons. ... 

Even unarmed individuals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile actions and those who do 

so unwittingly can in some cases be categorized as combatants. Thus, various types of unarmed combatants 

can be part of the OPFOR.” 

Thus, a threat or enemy can be any individual or group—not necessarily military and/or paramilitary, or 

even armed. The same is true of the OPFOR that represents the threat or enemy in a training exercise. 
Introduction 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 vii 

TAILORING THE OPFOR 

The OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative adversary or enemy. It must be capable of stressing any 

or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. armed force being trained. This TC 

addresses the irregular OPFOR with a tactical focus on insurgents, guerrillas, and/or criminals. In exercise 

design (see TC 7-101), the type(s) of forces making up the OPFOR will depend upon the conditions 

determined to be appropriate for accomplishing training objectives. In some cases, the OPFOR may only 

need to reflect the nature and capabilities of a regular military force, an irregular force, or a criminal 

organization. However, in order to be representative of the types of threats the Army is likely to encounter 

in actual OEs, the OPFOR will often need to represent the capabilities of a hybrid threat. In that context, 

the force that constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat for an exercise is called the Hybrid Threat, with 

the acronym HT. Whenever the acronym is used, readers should understand that as referring to the Hybrid 

Threat. The HT is a realistic and representative composite of actual hybrid threats. 

Regular military forces of the OPFOR may have irregular forces and/or criminal elements acting in loose 

affiliation with them, or acting separately from them within the same training environment. These 

relationships depend on the scenario, which is crafted based on the training requirements and conditions of 

the Army unit being trained. The OPFOR tactics described in TC 7-100.2 are appropriate for use by an 

OPFOR that consists either entirely or partly of regular military forces. Some of those tactics, particularly 

those carried out by smaller organizations, can also be used by insurgents, guerrillas, or even criminals. 

Even those tactics carried out primarily by regular military forces may involve other components of the HT 

acting in some capacity. When either acting alone or in concert with other components of the HT, irregular 

forces and/or criminal elements can also use other tactics which are outlined in TC 7-100.3. 

Note. After this introduction, the chapters and appendixes of this TC address their topics from 

the OPFOR point of view. So, friendly refers to the irregular OPFOR and other parts of the 

Hybrid Threat. Likewise, enemy refers to the enemy of the irregular OPFOR, which may be an 

opponent within its own country or region or an extraregional opponent (normally the United 

States or a U.S.-led coalition). 
This page intentionally left blank. 
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-1 

Chapter 1 

Irregular Opposing Force Fundamentals 

This chapter describes the fundamental characteristics of the irregular opposing force 

(OPFOR). This TC portrays three main categories of irregular OPFOR: insurgents 

(chapter 2); guerrillas (chapter 3); and criminals (chapter 4). Other actors present in 

an operational environment (OE) can be willing, coerced, and/or unknowing 

participants in irregular OPFOR activities (chapter 5). The irregular OPFOR interacts 

with the eight operational variables that make up an OE. This interaction among 

variables adds to the complexity of an OE and creates multiple opportunities for the 

irregular OPFOR to optimize its capabilities against an enemy. The irregular OPFOR 

can use terrorism as a tactic (chapter 6) in addition to military-like functional 

techniques (chapter 7). A table in this chapter compares and contrasts the capabilities 

and limitations characteristic of a guerrilla force, an insurgent organization, and a 

criminal organization. The particular capabilities and limitations of the various types 

of irregular OPFOR are described in subsequent chapters of this TC. 

HYBRID THREAT 

1-1. The irregular OPFOR can be part of the Hybrid Threat (HT). (For more information of the HT, see 

TC 7-100.) The HT can be any combination of two or more of the following components: regular military 

forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements. The irregular OPFOR component of the HT can be 

insurgents, guerrillas, or criminals or any combination thereof. The irregular OPFOR can also include other 

armed individuals or groups who are not members of a governing authority’s domestic law enforcement 

organizations or other internal security forces. On occasion, situations may occur where unarmed 

individuals or groups may be part of the irregular OPFOR and the HT. An example of unarmed individuals 

aligned with the HT in an active support role is when segments of the population participate in public 

demonstrations against an enemy of the HT. Possible HT combinations include parts of the irregular 

OPFOR operating openly with regular military forces, being sponsored directly or indirectly by a state’s 

government, or being supported by non-state organizations. 

1-2. The irregular OPFOR can be part of the HT, but can also operate independently without any 

allegiance to or collaboration with other types of forces associated with the HT. Various state and non-state 

organizations, regular military forces, paramilitary forces, and/or criminal organizations might be operating 

in the same space and time as the irregular OPFOR but not be part of the irregular OPFOR or the HT. To be 

a hybrid threat, all these components would have to be “unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects” 

(ADRP 3-0 and TC 7-100). 

CAPABILITIES AND INTENT 

1-3. The irregular OPFOR is adaptive, flexible, and agile. It can quickly change its composition to 

optimize organizational capabilities and use those capabilities against known or perceived vulnerabilities of 

an enemy. The irregular OPFOR takes prudent risks when an expectation exists for successful attack on an 

enemy. However, it may also make significant practical sacrifices in individuals and materiel in order to 

achieve a major psychological impact on an enemy. An example of such deliberate sacrifice is a number of 

nearly simultaneous, small unit or direct action cell assaults on targets that result in the deaths of all 

attackers, but receive sensational media coverage to a global audience. 

1-4. The intent of the irregular OPFOR is to acquire a range of capabilities and use them at selected times 

and locations in order to achieve desired effects. It can use those capabilities against an enemy. However, 
Chapter 1 

1-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

the irregular OPFOR can also use functional tactics and/or terrorism to manipulate a population and 

dissuade support to an enemy’s military forces and/or other institutions. When necessary, it will use acts of 

violence to gain influence and develop willing or coerced cooperation. Concurrently, it will use indirect 

means to progressively degrade an enemy’s physical power and infrastructure, and to psychologically 

influence the political, social, economic, military, and information variables of an OE. The irregular 

OPFOR will attempt to exploit its familiarity with the physical environment and its ability to blend into the 

local populace. The time variable normally favors the irregular OPFOR. The activities of the irregular 

OPFOR are constant over a long period of time, but may change in pace, tempo, and speed. The timing of 

actions will sometimes appear random when the actual mode of the irregular OPFOR and its activities are 

deliberate decisions as part of a long-term campaign or strategy. 

1-5. One of the most significant capabilities of the irregular OPFOR is the ability to manipulate and/or 

ignore the restrictions and sanctions that apply to regulated military forces, law enforcement agencies, and 

internal security forces belonging to a sovereign state. International protocols and conventions, national 

statutes and law, and moral codes that guide behavioral norms and social interactions can limit the enemy’s 

use of weapon systems and other capabilities that overmatch irregular OPFOR capabilities. The irregular 

OPFOR can make exceptions by complying with these codes of conduct when that is advantageous for its 

information warfare campaign. However, it can easily abandon those standards when they no longer 

provide operational value. When regular military forces of a state incorporate clandestine use of the 

irregular OPFOR, the state can often plausibly deny responsibility for actions conducted by 

irregular forces. 

1-6. Although violent actions by any individual organization or combination intend to receive immediate 

notoriety, the irregular OPFOR complements violent actions with methodical, long-term psychological 

warfare. The overarching agenda of the irregular OPFOR can include but is not limited to the 

following issues: 

 Expand support and/or control within an area or region. 

 Deter opposition to its objectives within a relevant population. 

 Obtain popular recognition and support of its objectives by designated segments of a population. 

 Marginalize the governance and/or extraregional influence of an adversary. 

 Attract an international or global audience and/or external sources of influence to support irregular 

OPFOR aims. 

1-7. The irregular OPFOR seeks to gain the approval and support of at least certain elements of a relevant 

population in order to obtain active or passive assistance. The methods by which it acquires such influence 

are complex in any OE. Normally, it must communicate a compelling narrative of legitimacy that is 

accepted by the population. This credential of legitimacy may require a gradual process of convincing the 

relevant population that the irregular OPFOR is an acceptable means to achieve desired social, religious, or 

political effects. However, the irregular OPFOR may confer authority on itself without regard to the 

population’s goals. 

1-8. An enemy of the irregular OPFOR may maintain that the OPFOR concept of legitimacy is corrupt 

and illicit. The irregular OPFOR may declare that its actions are justifiable under existing conditions, and 

attempt to degrade the legitimacy of a governing authority. Over time, the irregular OPFOR seeks to obtain 

recognition of its legitimacy by a willing populace and official recognition from external states and/or 

organizations in order to accomplish its long-term goals. Once its authority is recognized, the irregular 

OPFOR seeks to maintain the legitimacy of its cause, its leadership role, and its actions. 

1-9. Sometimes external recognition and support is not as important to the irregular OPFOR as is 

establishing a geographic enclave from which to plan, prepare, and conduct its activities and influence. The 

irregular OPFOR conducts direct and indirect actions that are adaptive and persistent. This form of conflict 

incorporates irregular forces typically categorized as insurgents or guerrillas, and includes selective actions 

coordinated with criminal organizations. Particular actions can be purposely conducted as acts of terrorism, 

or can employ more military-like tactics. All of these actions are described in terms of the common 

functional framework described in the 7-100 series of FMs and TCs. 
Irregular OPFOR Fundamentals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-3 

COMPLEXITY AND COLLABORATION

1-10. The irregular OPFOR may be part of a complex array of irregular and regular OPFOR organizations, 

units, or individuals with various coordinated and/or disparate single-agenda aims. A particular geographic, 

political, cyberspace, or ideological environment may lead to alliances or affiliations that are dynamic and 

constantly changing. Discrete incidents may not seem to be part of an overall plan. However, detailed 

analysis of the irregular OPFOR actions and associated political, social, economic, information, and other 

events normally reveals a vision supporting a long-range aim. 

1-11. In particular conditions and circumstances, irregular OPFOR actions can include support from 

regular military forces and/or special-purpose forces (SPF) from a state or states. Internal security forces 

and/or law enforcement organizations that have been infiltrated by the irregular OPFOR can also support 

irregular OPFOR actions within an area or region. The collaboration among organizations, units, and/or 

individuals of a relevant population may be based on coercion, contractual agreement, and/or temporary or 

long-term common goals and objectives. 

1-12. Possible rationales for irregular OPFOR collaboration with other organizations or individuals in an 

OE can include— 

 Spotlight grievances for resolution. 

 Establish influence over a relevant segment of a population. 

 Develop acceptance and legitimacy of irregular OPFOR programs and actions. 

 Achieve OPFOR objectives without alienating critical segments of indigenous and/or 

extraregional populations. 

 Cultivate active or passive supporters. 

1-13. Irregular OPFOR objectives may promote solutions to grievances in the context of a particular 

population. The irregular OPFOR may prefer to use indirect approaches such as subterfuge, deception, and 

nonlethal action to achieve its objectives. However, it is committed to violent action, when necessary, in 

order to compel an enemy and/or an opposing form of governance to submit to its intentions. Some 

irregular OPFOR organizations such as affiliated criminal gangs exist for their own commercial profit and 

power, and are not interested in the quality of life and/or civil security of a relevant population that they 

influence or coerce. Other forms of the irregular OPFOR can be rogue individuals with single-issue 

agendas who are willing to use criminal activity and/or terrorism in order to achieve their objective. 

ADAPTABILITY

1-14. The irregular OPFOR is constantly adapting its capabilities in an agile and flexible manner to 

achieve its objectives. These capabilities include improvements in organization, equipment, and tactics. 

The irregular OPFOR can readily task-organize for a particular action. It tailors actions to support a 

compelling agenda that resonates with a relevant population for active and/or passive support. It makes 

adjustments when it gains or loses affiliated support or experiences degradation due to recent actions. 

1-15. Irregular OPFOR actions are conducted as a continuum. Any pause in its operations is part of a 

coherent campaign of persistent conflict. A long-term perspective guides near- and mid-term actions to 

marshal capabilities for future actions. While one form of action may appear stalled, another form of action 

is likely underway against an enemy weakness. Protracted actions can change quickly if the irregular 

OPFOR observes unexpected enemy vulnerabilities. 

1-16. The irregular OPFOR’s ability to quickly transition also gives it the agility and flexibility to— 

 Command, control, and/or influence various activities. 

 Task-organize its forces. 

 Deceive and surprise. 

 Disperse and concentrate. 

 Retain freedom of movement. 

 Apply physical and psychological techniques in order to create anxiety in an enemy. 
Chapter 1 

1-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

This agility and flexibility is critical to how effectively the irregular OPFOR adapts its patterns of 

operations to maintain the initiative over an enemy. The irregular OPFOR perseveres in adversity by its 

ability to adapt. 

1-17. FM 7-100.4 (to be converted to a TC) outlines the baseline organizations and equipment of 

insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals and provides general guidance on how these forces may task-organize 

for particular missions. This process of task-organizing and/or tailoring of forces is flexible to 

accommodate the particular mission and conditions in the OE. 

Note. In order to achieve a desired level of capabilities, the irregular OPFOR order of battle or 

task-organized structure may require adjustments in types and numbers of weapons systems, other 

equipment, and personnel. If a particular piece of equipment in the organizational directories of 

the OPFOR administrative force structure in FM 7-100.4 is not appropriate for a specific OE, 

possible substitutions are identified in the Worldwide Equipment Guide. 

TACTICS 

1-18. Insurgents and guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, may employ variants of the functional 

tactics outlined for smaller tactical units of the regular OPFOR in TC 7-100.2 (see chapter 7 of this TC). 

Criminal elements do not normally have the ability to execute these functional tactics. 

1-19. All three types of forces that make up the irregular OPFOR can employ terrorism as a tactic in order 

to achieve their aims. (For actions typical of criminals, see chapter 4. For more detail on terrorism, see 

chapter 6.) 

INTERACTIONS OF OPERATIONAL VARIABLES 

1-20. The irregular OPFOR is part of the military variable, which explores the military and/or paramilitary 

capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. However, irregular OPFOR 

actions can affect or be affected by all the operational variables: political, military, economic, social, 

information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) and their subvariables. The 

impacts may be robust, moderate, or relatively insignificant. The interaction of the operational variables 

and subvariables establishes conditions for various levels of irregular OPFOR capabilities and limitations. 

The dynamic interaction and effects by the irregular OPFOR on operational variables are a physical and 

psychological combat multiplier for the OPFOR. The following paragraphs discuss the impacts of the 

irregular OPFOR on each of the operational variables. They also provide examples of how the actions of 

one variable can directly or indirectly impact on other variables and affect the capabilities and influence of 

the irregular OPFOR. 

POLITICAL

1-21. The centers of responsibility and power at various levels of governance can be an objective for 

irregular OPFOR subversion or violent action. The irregular OPFOR may target for willing or coerced 

support of its aims— 

 Constituted authorities at local, provincial, and/or state levels. 

 Tribal leaders and/or clan chiefs. 

 Religious leaders and councils. 

 Influential political organizations. 

The irregular OPFOR may want to institute its own political goals for the perceived benefit of a relevant 

population, or to create chaos within a governing authority in order create a protected geographic enclave 

within a sovereign state. In either case, influence over a relevant population is essential. Given enough 

electoral support in a relevant population, the irregular OPFOR may be able to win formal political 

recognition at varied levels of a governing authority that it opposes. 

1-22. Conditions of the political variable would very likely interact with social and economic conditions of 

an OE. The political aim of the irregular OPFOR could have a genuine intent to provide a voice in politics 
Irregular OPFOR Fundamentals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-5 

to an under-represented relevant population, or be self-serving in order to obtain control of political 

institutions for its own commercial profit. It may start as the former and transition into the latter. An 

example of this transition could be if the irregular OPFOR emerged from an indigenous population of rural 

farmers and tenants with grievances against absentee landowners and corporate businesses. However, over 

time, the irregular OPFOR might shift its focus to commercial profit in racketeering and the production, 

and distribution of illegal drugs to a transnational market. 

MILITARY

1-23. The irregular OPFOR can infiltrate regular military and/or paramilitary forces of an enemy 

governing authority. It can collect intelligence on military unit strengths and weaknesses, unit leader 

preferences and biases, and/or readiness of weapons, support, and materiel. Covert actions by irregular 

OPFOR members can undermine the effectiveness of enemy units by— 

 Raising doubts about the validity of enemy unit missions. 

 Subverting leader and subordinate allegiances. 

 Questioning the general treatment of military and/or paramilitary members by the governing 

authority. 

1-24. With military training, weapons and equipment stolen or purchased by the irregular OPFOR can be 

used more effectively to improve its armed capabilities. In some cases, the irregular OPFOR may attempt 

to transition highly trained irregular forces into a more formalized paramilitary or security force in order to 

demonstrate its ability. 

1-25. An example of interaction of military and information variables could be a media campaign directed 

at a local, regional, and transnational audience, in which the irregular OPFOR uses the symbols and 

appearance commonly associated with military power and influence. The irregular OPFOR could use 

progressive success in establishing and protecting a geographic safe haven with a declaration of 

sovereignty. Announcements to a global information network could display senior irregular OPFOR leaders 

in military uniform and attire, speaking publicly with official banners or flags, and maps or images of 

territory declared as independent. A focused defense of the safe haven, assisted by an extensive and 

supportive diaspora could achieve irregular OPFOR objectives unless challenged by an enemy 

governing authority. 

ECONOMIC

1-26. The economic effectiveness and prosperity of a governing authority can be marginalized with black 

market activities coordinated by the irregular OPFOR. Criminal activities can include smuggling, theft, 

and/or piracy of marketable goods. Insurgent or guerrilla actions can include disrupting the flow of 

commerce throughout the economic chain of production, distribution, and consumption by the general 

populace. The irregular OPFOR, in some instances, can become the illicit commercial broker for what 

transactions occur in an economic sector. Front companies and/or organizations can launder resources and 

money into legitimate enterprises in support of irregular OPFOR objectives. 

1-27. An example of interaction between economic, infrastructure, and information variables could be 

when the irregular OPFOR can deliver a satisfactory level of livelihood, health care, and commercial 

advancement for a relevant population. The population may have been denied access to such expectations 

by transnational corporations and a governing authority that extract natural resources from the region for 

their own profit and exclusive use. The grievance of this economic poverty can result in irregular OPFOR 

actions such as sabotage of pipelines, disruption of refining facilities, kidnapping of corporate officials, 

and/or random acts of murder. The irregular OPFOR can use a media campaign aligned with the economic 

grievances of the relevant population to emphasize the validity of OPFOR offensive actions. For example, 

it could call attention to the presence of significant private security contractors of transnational corporations 

and regular military forces of a governing authority conducting business security actions and military 

operations for their own financial gain. 
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1-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

SOCIAL

1-28. Cultural, religious, and ethnic differences can be stress points within a population that the irregular 

OPFOR can incite with real or false claims to further fracture a society and its social institutions. Unsettled 

grievances based on traditional values and customs can range from dissatisfaction to violent demonstrations 

against issues such as human rights, educational opportunities, and/or social mobility. The irregular 

OPFOR can nurture the support of particular social and religious leaders of a community that align 

themselves with OPFOR initiatives. Civic improvement associations and social welfare projects 

administered by the irregular OPFOR focused on a relevant population can be part of a comprehensive 

social unity program. 

1-29. An example of interaction of the social and information variables could be the compelling influence 

that a cleric or advisory council of clerics can have on a relevant population. Religious leaders may have 

traditional authority in a culture that recognizes such an overarching authority, Based on that perceived 

authority, the directives and prohibitions of that cleric or council can direct popular support of the irregular 

OPFOR or civil disobedience to a governing political authority. 

INFORMATION

1-30. Public communications by the irregular OPFOR can promote its own message with perception 

management and also discredit programs of the enemy governing authority. Open source and human 

intelligence collection operations can improve the irregular OPFOR awareness of enemy weaknesses. 

Information warfare (INFOWAR) by the irregular OPFOR can deceive, destroy, or sabotage enemy 

communication infrastructure. Examples of irregular OPFOR INFOWAR activities include blogs on the 

Internet, publicizing incidents of alleged abuse by a governing authority in global news media, and/or 

recurring presentations by charismatic individuals in social, political, educational, and religious institutions. 

1-31. Another example of how the interaction of variables can cause significant impacts on irregular 

OPFOR operations is the way the physical environment can influence the transmission and flow of 

irregular OPFOR information and intelligence. In a rural setting, the irregular OPFOR may use normal 

commercial transportation means of porters and mule trains. In an urban setting, it may use vendors and 

daily routes of commercial goods. Thus, in either setting, sophisticated electronic monitoring capabilities 

by an enemy of the irregular OPFOR may become insignificant. The irregular OPFOR can manipulate the 

global information environment by using the Internet to encrypt and/or hide messages in innocent 

appearing electronic communications. Verbal or electronic communications of a relevant population can be 

stifled by irregular OPFOR threats and/or coercion when such information negatively affects its operations 

in an area. Public claims of responsibility for acts of terror by the irregular OPFOR can further reduce overt 

support of a relevant population to an enemy of the irregular OPFOR. 

Note. The information variable is discussed in more detail in appendix A, which describes the 

elements of the irregular OPFOR’s INFOWAR. 

INFRASTRUCTURE

1-32. The irregular OPFOR can cause immediate, progressive, and long-term effects on of basic facilities, 

services, and operational installations that provide the infrastructure for a community or society. Immediate 

impacts can be the disruption of a sole-source oil pipeline and/or the destruction of a main electrical power 

generation facility. Progressive acts to disrupt and cause long-term impacts can be the mining of regional 

motor transportation routes with improvised explosive devices and recurring ambushes of commercial and 

military convoys. From a more positive perspective, the irregular OPFOR could provide basic civil services 

not being provided by a governing authority such as potable water and/or basic medical care. 

1-33. Irregular OPFOR actions can include calculated disruption or destruction activities to limit enemy 

capabilities and/or convince a relevant population that the enemy is incapable of protecting them and 

providing adequate public or private services. The irregular OPFOR may choose to— 

 Attack public utilities or the civil servants who service such utilities. 

 Prevent delivery of commodities that sustain performance of public services. 
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17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-7 

 Interdict services such as motor transportation, urban construction and repair. 

 Disrupt implementation of farming initiatives hosted by an enemy governing authority. 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

1-34. The irregular OPFOR can optimize the geography and/or manmade structures of a physical 

environment by using restrictive rural terrain or dense urban communities to mask complex battle positions 

and safe havens. Terrain, weather, climate, and vegetation can support the concealment and/or cover of 

irregular OPFOR staging and conduct of operations. The growth of poor and underemployed populations in 

many large metropolitan areas, and the increase of some cities to a status of megalopolis are prime 

conditions to create grievances that can be manipulated by the irregular OPFOR. 

1-35. An example of interaction among variables could be the impact of a governing authority’s land 

reforms that adversely affect the immediate prosperity of a local or regional population. This could include 

a directed destruction of one type of farming crop on limited usable terrain, and a replacement crop that 

does not provide the same economic value to the farmer or local distributor. This situation can be part of 

INFOWAR, with the irregular OPFOR promoting a story of how the governing authority it to blame for 

these negative impacts. 

TIME

1-36. Time can be a combat multiplier for the irregular OPFOR when the cultural perception of time 

accepts a protracted conflict. During such a protracted conflict, the irregular OPFOR can use violent 

actions, INFOWAR, diplomatic discussions, economic pressures, and progressive representations of valueadded for a relevant population. Timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions, as well as how the 

timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the OE, can prevent or delay governing authority 

activities in favor of irregular OPFOR aims. 

1-37. The irregular OPFOR seeks to chose the time and place for engaging the enemy. Timing can be the 

most significant aspect of determining when to tactically execute a decision to delay, deceive, fix, and/or 

block. Timeliness of information and intelligence is another key aspect that the irregular OPFOR uses to its 

own advantage. In order to affect enemy pace, tempo, and/or speed of action and reaction, the irregular 

OPFOR may plant false information at a particular time and ensure that an enemy obtains it. The prudent 

use of time is often combined with characteristics of a physical environment to create opportunities in 

support of near-, mid-, and/or long-term objectives. 

PRINCIPLES 

1-38. The fundamental principles of the irregular OPFOR guide organizational and individual actions. 

Regardless of whether the organization is military-like in appearance and operations, or includes elements 

that are loosely affiliated with the irregular OPFOR in a political, social, or economic sector of a society, 

these principles provide a common framework of how the irregular OPFOR plans and conducts actions. 

Since the irregular OPFOR often resembles military forces in many ways, some of these principles are very 

similar to fundamental military principles in the regular OPFOR. In some cases, however, the principles are 

tailored in consideration of irregular OPFOR capabilities or limitations. Depending on the type of irregular 

OPFOR organization and its goals and motivations, the irregular OPFOR adapts the following principles to 

address particular situations. Figure 1-1 on page 1-8 shows how each of the principles interrelate and 

contribute toward achieving an irregular OPFOR objective. That objective typically relates to a particular 

grievance on the part of the irregular OPFOR or of a relevant population it seeks to influence. 

INITIATIVE

1-39. Initiative is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to retain a freedom of action in its plans and 

operations. Initiative enables the irregular OPFOR to force an enemy to react to its actions. Success often 

goes to the side that conducts itself more actively and resolutely. Irregular OPFOR leaders encourage 

initiative to make and implement bold decisions in order to establish or change the terms of the irregular 

conflict in favor of the irregular OPFOR. Subordinates are expected to take advantage of new 
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1-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

developments immediately. They seek to overcome a position of relative inferiority while operating within 

a senior OPFOR leader’s intentions. Initiative exploits an enemy’s restrictive rules of engagement or 

political restrictions. 

Ends Results

Means Actions

Ways Concept

Grievance

in order to achieve

focuses leader

that applies

with resolute

Deception

Objective

Adaptability Concentration Mobility

Surprise Protection

Initiative

Perseverance

Figure 1-1. Relation of irregular OPFOR principles to achieving the objective 

DECEPTION

1-40. Deception is the ability to deliberately convey a false and/or distorted picture of the situation to an 

enemy leader that is targeted for deception. Deceptive information causes an enemy leader to believe he has 

accurate situational awareness and understanding. Irregular OPFOR leaders plan and direct deception that 

helps them accomplish their objective, but does not hamper other concurrent OPFOR actions. Feints and 

demonstrations are examples of deception. Other elements of INFOWAR attempt to optimize the effects of 

deception in tactics and techniques. Various irregular OPFOR capabilities and actions can lead to a 

compelling yet inaccurate analysis by the enemy leader. These means of deception, not limited by domestic 

or international law and conventions, can include the following: 

 Physical activity or lack of activity. 

 Technical resources and employment techniques indicative of a particular tactic. 

 Administrative indicators such as visual, oral, or documentary evidence in order to manipulate and 

distort reality. 

SURPRISE

1-41. Surprise is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to take advantage of an enemy vulnerability in a 

manner for which an enemy is unprepared or unable to effectively counter. Irregular OPFOR action is 

normally swift and fleeting and may employ unexpected means. The irregular OPFOR attempts to shape a 

setting so that an enemy is not expecting the action or create conditions that an enemy is not prepared to 

confront. The irregular OPFOR achieves surprise through deception activities in conjunction with 

protection and security measures and/or other elements of INFOWAR. Surprise can be achieved by means 

such as the following: 

 Changing tactics, techniques, or the intensity of actions against an enemy. 

 Employing commercial or industrial materiel as a weapon in unexpected ways. 

 Presenting public indications of compromise or cessation of armed conflict. For example, the 

irregular OPFOR may agree to a truce and series of negotiations with an enemy, but use the time 

to prepare and stage for nearly simultaneous surprise attacks on military and civil government 

facilities. 
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17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-9 

PROTECTION

1-42. Protection is the ability to preserve irregular OPFOR effectiveness of its organizational assets and 

capabilities. These assets and capabilities include OPFOR personnel, equipment, weapon systems, 

operations, information, facilities, and/or infrastructure. Protection involves a continuous, integrated series 

and/or group of measures that sustain the ability for the irregular OPFOR to plan, prepare, and conduct 

successful actions. Protection and security measures are a key element in INFOWAR (see appendix A). 

The irregular OPFOR normally operates with a minimal or unidentifiable signature within a relevant 

population in order to avoid being a lucrative target. Protection complements the use of a safe haven, when 

required, to refit or reconstitute irregular OPFOR combat power. An example of protection is an irregular 

OPFOR guerrilla unit exfiltrating from a raid in hostile territory to a secure location in a neighboring state. 

This unofficial support by a state near the area of OPFOR actions provides security and protection to the 

guerrilla unit while it recruits and trains replacements due to casualties incurred in the raid. 

MOBILITY

1-43. Mobility is the ability to sustain irregular OPFOR freedom of movement within areas controlled or 

occupied by the enemy. The irregular OPFOR seeks to create an advantage over the enemy regarding 

knowledge and use of geographic terrain and populations in order to position, reposition, and/or prepare for 

and conduct effective actions. A high degree of mobility enables the irregular OPFOR to use available 

combat power with maximum effect at a decisive time and place. For example, the irregular OPFOR can 

blend into a population with similar clothing and daily habits in order to maintain anonymity while 

transiting an area or region. This type of mobility can allow the timely supply of weapons and materiel, 

fiscal resources, and/or manpower for designated actions in an area or region. 

ADAPTABILITY

1-44. Adaptability is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to use initiative and creative thinking in order to 

set particular conditions and take advantage of the resulting opportunities. Irregular OPFOR leaders 

recognize emergent developments that change existing conditions, and apply initiative that causes the 

enemy to react at a disadvantage to the actions of the irregular OPFOR. Simple tactics and techniques can 

be adapted for use against an enemy’s sophisticated technology and weapon systems. For example, a 

system of couriers can negate the intrusive ability of electronic monitoring devices to detect and locate the 

financial transaction networks of a local insurgent organization that were formerly conducted with cellular 

telephones. Conversely, the irregular OPFOR can adapt to sophisticated techniques such as encrypting and 

hiding information within harmless appearing communiqués such as electronic files, images, and 

documents transiting the Internet. 

CONCENTRATION

1-45. Concentration is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to mass the capabilities of combat power in time 

and space, in order to achieve a desired effect. Concentration of effort allows the irregular OPFOR to create 

and dominate a condition for a specific amount of time. When the irregular OPFOR concentrates rapidly or 

gradually from dispersed locations to conduct a particular action, a normal subsequent action is to quickly 

disperse in order to avoid an effective enemy response against the massed OPFOR. An example of 

concentration is the coordination to quickly mass irregular OPFOR insurgent cells, and use a swarming 

technique in a raid to overwhelm a designated target at an isolated combat outpost. Once insurgents have 

seized the objective and secured or destroyed designated weapons, equipment, and documents, the cells 

quickly disperse into the countryside or urban areas in order to avoid capture or death. 

PERSEVERANCE

1-46. Perseverance demonstrates the will of the irregular OPFOR to persist in long-term commitment to 

fight an enemy until it accomplishes its goals and objective. Protracted and persistent operations are the 

norm of the irregular OPFOR. Actions may be subtle and can be part of a gradual series of actions toward 

achieving a task. Dramatic individual actions are often used to establish or sustain notoriety for the 

irregular OPFOR, but rarely achieve a decisive effect. Periodic setbacks in irregular OPFOR missions are 
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1-10 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

anticipated and rationalized with effective INFOWAR announcements to sustain a moral dominance of the 

irregular OPFOR over an enemy. INFOWAR techniques can also convince a relevant population to sustain 

support of the irregular OPFOR even though its actions may require an extended period of time before the 

population eventually benefits. The irregular OPFOR may attempt to achieve its objectives within a 

specified timetable and announced milestones; however, the objectives may take decades or generations to 

achieve. 

MOTIVATIONS 

1-47. Insurgents and guerrillas are normally motivated by social, religious, or political issues or some 

combination of those. In most cases, criminals—whether they are part of the irregular OPFOR or not—

have other motivations. Although individual actors who conduct criminal activity may not be part of the 

irregular OPFOR, the individual’s personal motivation and/or ideology may be the deciding perspective of 

why he or she acts. 

Note. The local populace may provide active or passive support out of a different motivation 

than the insurgents or guerrillas they support. For example, the motivation of the populace might 

be financial (payment or beneficial effects on business profits) or security provided them. The 

populace might provide support, based on ethnic or religious issues, to an insurgent or guerrilla 

organization even if they do not share that organization’s political agenda. 

INSURGENTS OR GUERRILLAS

1-48. Certain types of motivation are common to insurgents and guerrillas, the two most likely components 

of the irregular OPFOR. However, insurgents and guerrillas that agree to collaborate against a common 

enemy may or may not share the same motivations or ideology. 

Note. If multiple insurgent and/or guerrilla organizations exist in a particular OE, they may share 

some motivations but differ in others. In order to form an affiliated relationship, the 

organizations just need to have one or more motivations that coincide with or complement each 

other. An example of a coinciding motivation could be that both organizations resent the 

presence of an extraregional force in their country. An example of a complementary relationship 

would be if one organization has financial resources, while the other needs financial support 

1-49. The motivation that incites violent as well as nonviolent actions by the irregular OPFOR is often 

framed in the context of ideology. The irregular OPFOR acts in a particular way based on underlying 

grievances, which are often linked to the ideals of an ideology. These unresolved grievances—perceived or 

factual—create conditions where armed and unarmed individuals believe they must act to obtain what they 

believe is a just solution. The rationale and the resulting actions may be perceived in a positive and 

negative light by a relevant population. The motivation and rationale typically are one or more of 

the following: 

 Personal or group social identity. 

 Devotion to a particular religious belief. 

 Commitment to a form of political governance. 

Combinations among these factors can further complicate how to describe the motivation and ideology of a 

particular person or group. Other motivations exist and may become a primary prompt for action, though 

only loosely associated with a social, religious, or political agenda. Aspects of ethnicity, geography, and 

history affect personal and group relationships as witnessed in social status and networks, religion, and 

politics. Combinations can occur among these factors to further complicate how to describe the motivation 

of a particular person or group. 

Social Identity 

1-50. Social identity, as an individual and/or as a member of a social group, is often a fundamental aspect 

of why people may be aligned with or alienated from the irregular OPFOR. They may be attracted by an 
Irregular OPFOR Fundamentals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-11 

ability to satisfy a perceived critical want or need in their lifestyle. Allegiance to a clan, tribe, or familial 

grouping is an example of social identity and accountability. These forms of social allegiance can indicate 

why change is desired or required in a social order. The same rationales can support why a set of ideals or 

practices must be sustained or expanded within a relevant population. Several common categories of social 

identity that can overlap with religious or political agendas are as follows: 

 Ethnocentric groups who understand race or ethnicity as the defining characteristic of a society 

and basis of cohesion. 

 Nationalistic groups who promote cultural-national consciousness and perhaps establishment of 

a separate nation-state. 

 Revolutionary groups who are dedicated to the overthrow of a governing authority and 

establishment of a new social order. 

 Separatist groups who demand independence from an existing governance that appears socially, 

theologically, or politically unjust to a relevant population. 

1-51. A variation on these identity categories is an independent actor who conceives, plans, and conducts 

violent or nonviolent actions without any direction from another person or irregular force. This type of 

individual may be sympathetic to the aims of a particular group, but have no contact with the group or 

affiliated members of the group. 

Religion 

1-52. Religion can be a compelling motivation. As a personal belief, religion can be interpreted as divine 

edict and infallible. Practice of a faith system is a personal interpretation and decision. However, 

fundamentalist clerics and/or religious mentors in some instances can interpret passages of religious 

doctrine in a particular way that supports the irregular OPFOR agenda. Some interpretations may be a 

purposeful misrepresentation never intended by an original religious author. Other clerics or radical splinter 

groups may honestly believe in a religious duty to pursue a fundamentalist approach to worship and 

lifestyle. In either case, religion can be used as a catalyst to instigate rivalry between and among ethnic 

and/or religious denominational groups. Confrontations can be provoked by faith system practices that are 

completely unacceptable to another faith group and/or can create an irreconcilable theological wedge 

between cultural-faith groups in a relevant population. 

1-53. The irregular OPFOR may attempt to link religion with declarations that governing political 

authorities who do not accept a particular understanding of a faith doctrine are a wicked secular presence 

that must be destroyed and replaced with a fundamentalist theocracy form of governance. Cults, although 

not a religion by normal definition, can adopt similar forms of violence, mass murder, and mayhem as part 

of a self-proclaimed apocalyptic vision and purpose. 

Politics 

1-54. The irregular OPFOR, especially the insurgent part, can have a political agenda. Prevalent political 

systems that can be promoted by the irregular OPFOR include forms of governance such as— 

 Single-party totalitarian state. 

 Nationalist-fascist authority. 

 Leadership appointed or democratically elected by popular vote. 

 Social self-management and equality aimed at reducing or eliminating political and economic 

hierarchies. 

 Social-political process that evolves toward a classless-stateless society with common ownership 

on means of production, communal access to commodities for livelihood, and general social 

programs for the benefit of community and human wellness. 

 Pseudo-social and political authority that protects a geographic sanctuary and/or safe haven for 

conduct of an illicit commercial enterprise. 

1-55. The irregular OPFOR can use motivations of a political ideology to attract the attention of a relevant 

population in order to develop influence with a particular community. This can lead to support and/or 

collaboration or actually joining the irregular OPFOR. Since politics are integral to the overarching 
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1-12 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

conditions that affect daily life, commerce, vocation, freedoms, and family, the irregular OPFOR can use 

political influence—along with social and/or religious appeal—to enhance its legitimacy. Visible actions, 

often localized in perspective, focus on demonstrating power and authority. 

CRIMINALS

1-56. Although actors who conduct criminal activities may not be insurgents or guerrillas, personal 

motivation and/or ideology may be a deciding factor in their decision to join the irregular OPFOR 

voluntarily or be coerced to participate. Criminals who become part of the irregular OPFOR may or may 

not share some of the same motivations as other parts of the OPFOR. Regardless of their social identity and 

religious or political preferences, criminals are motivated primarily by money. (See chapter 4 for more 

detail on the motivations of criminals and criminal organizations.) 

SUPPORT 

1-57. Support for irregular OPFOR activities includes capabilities provided by individuals and 

organizations internal and external to the geographic area. Multiple forms of support can be voluntary 

and/or coerced from individuals, selected segments of a population, or activities and organizations with 

particular capabilities. Affiliation with and/or among organizations indicates a common goal. However, 

affiliation is not a formal association and subordination among participants. Support relationships are 

often temporary and remain in effect only as long as the benefits of cooperation are mutual to the 

involved organizations. 

INTERNAL

1-58. Internal support includes the ideological and practical means to improve and/or sustain irregular 

OPFOR operations. Insurgents or guerrillas seek to ally and affiliate with activities and people that range 

from specific commodities and/or functional skills to networks of political, commercial, religious, and/or 

social groups with required capabilities. Internal support indicates the commitment of leaders, active 

supporters, and passive supporters to further the progress of the irregular OPFOR. As conditions change in 

geographic, political, cultural, cyberspace, and/or ideological environments, the coordination of internal 

support adjusts to accommodate emergent opportunities. 

EXTERNAL

1-59. External support is not always necessary for the irregular OPFOR to succeed. However, some form 

of external support is usually critical to sustain long-term operations. Activities and organizations often 

provide external support for ideological reasons, but other motivations can include political power, 

commercial enterprise, financial wealth, and/or some common grievance affecting a relevant population. 

The motivations that incite the irregular OPFOR affect how and why support is obtained. Whether support 

is voluntary or coerced, the rationale of why support is necessary reflects how discrete aspects of assistance 

improve a cumulative capability. 

1-60. Prominent categories of support are moral, money, and materiel. The morality of supporting the 

irregular OPFOR links an ideology to an outcome of desired conditions by a relevant population. Money 

enables the irregular OPFOR to acquire capabilities required in order to enhance its influence not only in a 

paramilitary sense, but also across a full spectrum of operational variables in an OE. Materiel support 

indicates the provision of equipment, supplies, and operating systems used by the irregular OPFOR and/or 

its supporters. Materiel requires training, maintenance, and recurring systems improvement. These 

capabilities suggest the need for trainers, advisors, and/or liaison personnel to support the irregular OPFOR. 

To accomplish these actions, a safe haven or sanctuary allows a freedom of action in planning, preparing, 

and staging for overt and covert operations. Three main types of external support are diaspora support, state 

support, and non-state support. 
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Diaspora 

1-61. A diaspora is a relevant population that has voluntarily moved or migrated, and/or been forcefully 

displaced from an established or ancestral homeland. However, they still have racial, national, tribal, 

religious, linguistic, and/or cultural affinities with inhabitants of that homeland. Motives for support from a 

diaspora can include ethnocentric, separatist, and/or nationalistic. A fundamental objective is to correct 

proven or perceived injustices to a group of people in a larger community and relevant population. This 

type of support is often linked to a common social, religious, and/or political identity. 

1-62. Voluntary support from a diaspora is a preferred method for assistance to the irregular OPFOR. 

However, compelling the support from segments of a diaspora may be required at times to ensure the 

amount of general or specialized support required to sustain operations. Compelling support from a 

diaspora is a calculated risk that is closely monitored by irregular OPFOR senior leaders in order to not 

alienate a significant portion of the relevant population. 

1-63. Beyond aspects such as financial and materiel contributions, the expansion of support through 

INFOWAR with and for a diaspora can sway public opinion and obtain continuing extraregional and 

international support for the struggle of the irregular OPFOR. In the spotlight of globalized media, a 

diaspora usually accents the moral correctness of resolving proven or perceived injustices to a group of 

people in a relevant population of the particular geographic region or state. 

External State 

1-64. Support from an external state for the irregular OPFOR can be covert and/or overt. A state acts 

primarily based on its political objectives. Political, economic, social, fiscal, moral, and/or logistics support 

can be provided while disavowing any direct connection to the irregular OPFOR. For example, a state may 

condemn an adversary state for repressing a relevant population while covertly providing arms, 

ammunition, sanctuary, training bases, and/or advise and other forms of assistance. 

1-65. A state might employ SPF and/or covert agents of the state to conduct direct actions in support of the 

irregular OPFOR. The state officially denies responsibility or state sponsorship for such activities, but can 

engage in unofficial INFOWAR releases that indicate support for specified actions within the insurgency. 

In other situations, a state may openly declare a legal or moral right to intervene in the affairs of another 

state and support designated insurgent organizations and their affiliates. States may form a coalition to 

condemn the acts of a governing authority and announce support for irregular OPFOR actions. 

1-66. A state can act overtly by providing supplies, training, and other forms of support to the irregular 

OPFOR. This support can be coordinated and provided without any specified control over an insurgent or 

guerrilla organization by the state. Other options can exist where stipulations are mutually agreed upon 

between representatives of the state and irregular OPFOR leaders in exchange for materiel and/or a safe 

haven or protected staging area for operations. Other means of support can include— 

 Access to training facilities and expertise not otherwise readily available to the irregular 

OPFOR. 

 Extension of diplomatic protections and services such as immunity from extradition. 

 Use of embassies and other protected grounds. 

 Use of diplomatic pouches to transport weapons or explosives. 

 False documentation for personal identification and movements throughout geographic regions 

and states. 

1-67. States in a coalition or as members of an international organization may decide to intervene directly 

in an insurgency with diplomatic envoys, observation teams, and/or military forces. A coalition may form 

to condemn the acts of a governing authority and announce support for irregular OPFOR actions. The 

irregular OPFOR insurgent organization leaders and coalition authorities can mutually agree to—

 Seek conditions for justice and respect arising from international treaties and other sources of 

international law. 

 Promote social progress, economic advancement of indigenous people. 

 Maintain international stability and security. 
Chapter 1 

1-14 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Non-State 

1-68. Forms of non-state support can range from non-state transnational networks with global reach 

capability to individuals with a special or unique capability. These forms of support can be overt and/or 

covert. Networks can be regional or international in their aims, and/or individuals committed to a singleissue agenda. Whether support involves a type of network, hierarchical organization, or loosely coordinated 

individuals, non-state support to an insurgency or independent guerrilla operations often includes 

sophisticated criminal activities in foreign and/or indigenous environments. 

1-69. Insurgencies may turn to transnational criminal organizations for funding. Other globalized 

capabilities can provide advanced knowledge and technology exchanges, mobile international 

transportation, and near-instantaneous cyber communication. Non-state support exchanges in capabilities 

can occur directly and indirectly. 

1-70. Transnational economic entities such as international business corporations may provide support to 

irregular OPFOR operations in order to further their corporate business interests. Other supervisory or 

workforce individuals in non-profit or private organizations may assist the irregular OPFOR based on 

personal beliefs and/or as the result of coercion or extortion. Individual financiers may provide support in 

order to advance personal agendas or cultural, ethnic, political, and/or religious causes. 

1-71. External support from other parts of the irregular OPFOR and/or in conjunction with regular military 

forces can include an exchange of personnel and equipment, as well as intelligence, training, recruitment, 

logistics, and finances. In addition to individual and contracted mercenaries, a significant body of other 

independent or loosely collaborative individuals may be available for hire to an irregular OPFOR 

organization. These personnel may have served previously in guerrilla units or regular military units. 

BLURRING OF CATEGORIES 

1-72. Although three basic types of forces can be part of the irregular OPFOR, the distinctions among 

insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals are sometimes blurred. That is because they may have more in 

common than they have that is different. From the viewpoint of the existing government authority, for 

instance, the activities of all three types are illegal, that is, criminal. Not just criminals but also insurgents 

and guerrillas can engage in criminal activities. Some insurgent organizations can include guerrilla units 

(developed from within or affiliated) and some guerrilla units may be part of an insurgency. In advanced 

phases of an insurgency, guerrilla units may begin to look and act more like regular military units. 

1-73. There are three general tactics available to the irregular OPFOR— 

 Military-like functional tactics. 

 Criminal activity. 

 Terrorism. 

1-74. At any given time, the irregular OPFOR could use any of these means. The differences among these 

three can become blurred, especially within an urban environment or where the governing authority exerts 

strong control. 

INSURGENTS AND GUERRILLAS

1-75. As an insurgent organization grows, its cellular structure or parts thereof may develop into a more 

hierarchical military-like structure. Within an insurgent organization, direct action cells may combine to 

form guerrilla squads and platoons. In some cases, a platoon or company may retain some direct action 

cells (possibly for terror tactics). Other specialized cells of an insurgent organization can evolve into 

parts of— 

 Supporting units of a guerrilla company, battalion, or brigade. 

 Staff elements of a guerrilla battalion or brigade. 

1-76. Guerrillas may engage in more military-like operations after an insurgency develops extensive 

popular and logistics support. When they feel the conditions are set, insurgents may generate a 

conventional military force that can directly confront regular forces of the existing governing authority. 
Irregular OPFOR Fundamentals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-15 

INSURGENTS AND CRIMINALS

1-77. There is often a nexus between insurgency and crime. Sustainment requirements, especially funding, 

often drive insurgents into relationships with organized crime or into criminal activity themselves. 

Insurgents may turn to local, regional, or transnational criminal elements for funding. Cooperating with 

criminals may not be ideologically consistent with the movement’s core beliefs, although that does not 

necessarily prevent such cooperation. 

1-78. An insurgent organization itself may engage in criminal activities as a source of funding. Income is 

essential not only for insurgents to purchase weapons but also to pay recruits and bribe corrupt officials. 

Reaping windfall profits and avoiding the costs and difficulties involved in securing external support makes 

illegal activity attractive to insurgents. Kidnapping, extortion, robbery, and trafficking (drug, human, black 

market goods, and so on)—four favorite insurgent activities—are very lucrative, although they can also 

alienate the population. 

1-79. Insurgents may use coercive force to gain power over the population. Examples of organizations 

providing such force are insurgent direct action cells, guerrilla units, gangs, and organized crime elements. 

Such groups may use their coercive means for a variety of purposes unrelated to the insurgency. Protecting 

their community members, carrying out vendettas, and engaging in criminal activities are examples. 

Insurgent organizations may also attract followers through criminal activities that provide income. 

1-80. Insurgencies attract criminals and mercenaries. Fighters who joined for money will probably become 

bandits once the fighting ends and may engage in criminal activity during the fighting. This category 

includes opportunists who exploit the absence of governing authority security and law enforcement to 

engage in economically lucrative criminal activity, such as kidnapping, smuggling, or theft. 

1-81. Some insurgencies can compartmentalize criminal activity, keeping it ancillary to the main effort and 

preventing it from affecting the organization and its unity. However, some insurgencies can become 

focused on criminal activity that once only served as a funding mechanism. Some insurgent cell leaders 

may become crime bosses. The insurgency as a whole may degenerate into criminality, particularly if the 

primary movement disintegrates and the remaining elements are cast adrift. Such disintegration replaces an 

ideologically inspired body of individuals with a more diverse body, normally of very uneven character. 

1-82. Even when criminal networks are not a part of an insurgency, their activities—for example, banditry, 

hijackings, kidnappings, and smuggling—can further undermine the governing authority. Insurgent 

organizations often link themselves to criminal networks to obtain funding and logistics support. In some 

cases, insurgent networks and criminal networks become indistinguishable. Most insurgent groups are more 

similar to organized crime in their organizational structure and relations with the populace than they are to 

military units. 

REGULAR AND IRREGULAR OPFOR 

1-83. There can also be some blurring between the irregular OPFOR and regular OPFOR military units. 

Both types of forces can use many of the same functional tactics (such as assault, ambush, and raid). 

1-84. The regular OPFOR, especially SPF, may use terror tactics similar to those of the irregular OPFOR. 

Since SPF may or may not be in uniform, they may be hard to distinguish from irregular OPFOR insurgents 

or guerrillas, for which they often serve as trainers or advisors and alongside which they may fight. 

COMPARISON AND CONTRAST 

1-85. Within the irregular OPFOR, guerrilla units, insurgent organizations, and criminal organizations have 

various capabilities and limitations. Table 1-1 on pages 1-16 through 1-18 compares and contrasts the basic 

characteristics of the three types of forces in order to highlight their similarities and their differences. 
Chapter 1 

1-16 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals 

Characteristic Insurgent Organization Guerrilla Unit Criminal Organization 

Leadership Network is typical, but can 

include hierarchical suborganizations; leaders may be 

located distant from the 

geographic area of conflict; 

political or ideological mentors 

or council advisors and/or 

counsel senior leaders. Title 

for personnel in command is 

usually “leader.” Some 

leaders may use a religious, 

historical, or honorific title. 

Hierarchical with military-like 

chain of command and control 

or support systems; leaders 

predominantly indigenous; 

political advisors may 

accompany guerrilla units in 

actions. Leader titles are 

military in nature such as 

battalion and/or company 

commander, platoon leader, 

section leader, team leader, 

hunter-killer group leader. 

Hierarchical structure or 

network dependent on origin 

of organization; even in small 

criminal organizations, 

leaders may be located 

distant from the geographic 

area of conflict; political or 

ideological mentors or council 

advise and/or counsel senior 

leaders. Leader titles can be 

traditional or historical terms, 

or simple authority terms. 

Motivation Insurgency movement with a 

political and/or ideological 

agenda. Can also be social 

identity or religion. 

Social identity, religion, or 

politics. Can be military 

component to an insurgency; 

or can be independent of an 

insurgency with a specified 

agenda. 

Intention to profit fiscally 

through control of a process, 

commodity, and/or area; 

social identity as a power 

broker in a designated 

geographic, economic, or 

social environment. 

Organization Cellular-network model; can 

be hierarchical for designated 

capabilities or functions; can 

include paramilitary capability 

for a primarily politicaloriented organization; can be 

affiliated with other irregular 

OPFOR and/or regular 

military forces. 

Military unit model with 

echelons of command and 

control; can include land, sea, 

and air capabilities; can be 

affiliated with other irregular 

OPFOR and/or regular 

military forces; more likely 

that other irregular OPFOR 

components to be closely 

integrated with regular military 

forces. 

Hierarchical structure or 

network dependent on origin 

of organization; general 

categories of gangs, largescale syndicates, and 

transnational organizations; 

organizations can be based 

on family, ethnic, commodity, 

or specialized purpose. Can 

infiltrate or become affiliated 

with insurgent, guerrilla, or 

regular military forces. 

Objectives Concessions from and/or 

defeat of a political opponent; 

ultimately, overthrow an 

enemy governing authority 

and replace governance with 

insurgent movement 

leadership; seek legitimacy as 

movement. 

Military mission success 

within a campaign in support 

of unit goals and desired end 

state; can be an independent 

and specified guerrilla unit 

agenda; can be the military 

capability in insurgent 

organization. 

Profit from activities and 

coercion; expand 

organizational influence within 

an area, regional, or 

transnational scope; preserve 

control of specified 

commodities, geographic 

areas, and/or services; avoid 

contact with governing 

authority. 

Internal 

Support 

Active and passive support in 

local and larger area 

population; can have 

legitimate social-economicpolitical activities to mobilize 

civil support. 

Active and passive support by 

segments of a local area 

population for military-type 

capabilities; can expand 

support to regional area 

population. 

Active and passive support in 

local and larger area 

population; can use coercion 

to influence legitimate socialeconomic-political activities or 

individual support. 

External 

Support 

Regional safe havens; 

Diaspora systems to promote 

insurgent movement in 

regional and/or international 

communities; can receive 

cooperation or assistance 

from regular forces, SPF, or 

state activities opposing the 

governing authority. 

Regional safe havens; can 

receive cooperation or 

assistance from regular 

military, SPF, or state 

activities opposing the 

governing authority in the 

area of guerrilla operations. 

Cooperative affiliations 

among gangs, large-scale 

syndicates, and/or 

transnational organizations 

can provide designated 

support and services; coopted governing authority 

offices may also assist. 

Activity 

Patterns 

Local, regional, provincial, 

and/or district activities with 

intention of obtaining support 

of relevant population; can be 

social, economic, diplomatic, 

political, and military activities. 

Military-like functional tactics 

as norm; can expand tactical 

actions into a military 

campaign focused in a 

geographic area. 

Local, regional, and/or 

transnational activities; 

random or systematic activity 

to sustain influence; 

specialized expertise can be 

part of functional business 

model of larger commercial 

enterprises. 
Irregular OPFOR Fundamentals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-17 

Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals (continued) 

Characteristic Insurgent Organization Guerrilla Unit Criminal Organization 

Composition Higher insurgent organization 

and local insurgent 

organization; functional 

structure with cellular base; 

can receive assistance or 

support from SPF and/or 

regular military forces. 

Brigade to squad-team 

guerrilla units; can be tailored 

for specialized missions; can 

be supported by SPF advisors 

and/or regular forces advisors 

or liaison. 

Transnational organization, 

large-scale syndicates, and/or 

gangs; can be groups 

affiliated in temporary or longterm specific business 

arrangements. 

Personnel Indigenous and/or 

transnational core; ideological 

mentor support network; rank 

and file members can be in a 

period of active service in the 

insurgent organization, or be 

authorized inactive status and 

return to familial-social 

responsibilities with their local 

population. 

Predominantly indigenous 

core; can include members 

outside of indigenous 

population; rank and file 

members typically remain in 

the same military unit with a 

long-term commitment of 

duty. 

Predominantly indigenous 

core, but can include 

members outside of 

indigenous population as 

organization expands in 

business connections; status 

may indicate familial or social 

lineage within organization; 

rank and file members may 

be specialized operators. 

Recruitment Local, regional, or 

extraregional population 

recruiting; often relates to an 

ideological or faith system 

commitment to serve; can be 

contract support; can use 

conscription for limited 

lengths of time or seasonal 

terms of service. 

Local or regional population 

recruiting base; informal 

induction process with 

expectation of long-term or 

open-ended term of service; 

can use conscription from 

local population; require 

compliance with strict 

standards and discipline. 

Familial or social affiliations 

may be membership 

requirement; rank and file 

members may be contracted 

for skill sets; initiation rites 

and tests may precede 

acceptance; code of conduct 

may demand absolute 

allegiance to the organization. 

Weapons and 

Other Equipment 

Tier 1-4 capabilities (see 

Worldwide Equipment Guide) 

dependent on support from 

insurgent region and 

diaspora; can receive 

clandestine support from 

states, private organizations, 

and/or criminal activities that 

oppose the governing 

authority in conflict with the 

insurgent organization. 

Tier 1-4 capabilities (see 

Worldwide Equipment Guide) 

dependent on access to local 

resources, or a higher and/or 

local insurgent organization if 

part of an insurgency; if 

independent, obtains 

weapons from raids, 

ambushes, and black market 

purchases; can include 

sophisticated systems and 

heavy weapon capabilities 

similar to regular military 

forces. 

Tier 1-4 capabilities (see 

Worldwide Equipment Guide) 

dependent on ability to 

purchase or procure weapons 

and/or materiel. 

Uniforms Local attire of populace as 

norm; can wear military-like 

pieces of clothing and loadbearing equipment for 

designated direct actions. 

Varied military-like clothing or 

pieces of clothing, loadbearing equipment, and 

insignia as norm; can wear 

local attire of populace to 

facilitate mission. 

Attire of local populace as 

norm; can use civilian or law 

enforcement or paramilitary 

pieces of clothing and 

equipment in order to 

deceive. 

Disposition Within political boundary of 

governing authority as norm; 

can be safe haven in or near 

contested territory; size and 

location of cells based on 

local conditions. 

Rural and/or urban areas on 

mission basis; often occupy 

safe havens in populace, can 

locate as dispersed cells, 

and/or in CBP; can use social, 

economic, or political 

organizations as public and 

visible presence in populace. 

Within enemy-held, hostile, or 

denied territory; can be safe 

haven in or near geographic 

area of contested territory; 

unit size, location, and 

command integrity based on 

local conditions. 

Rural and/or urban areas on 

mission basis; often occupy 

safe haven and complex 

battle position (CBP) away 

from populace; can locate 

units in proximity to other 

guerrilla units for mutual 

support. 

Within geographic area under 

organization control; can be 

safe haven in or near area 

involved in business 

transactions; size and location 

of organizational groupings 

based on local conditions. 

Rural and/or urban on mission 

basis; often use protected 

locations in populace, can 

locate as dispersed groups; 

co-opted social, economic, or 

political organizations can 

prevent interference by law 

enforcement or internal 

security organizations. 
Chapter 1 

1-18 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals (continued) 

Characteristic Insurgent Organization Guerrilla Unit Criminal Organization 

Training Functional skills in local or 

regional safe havens, or 

contract support for niche 

expertise; skills and services 

can include administrative, 

intelligence, direct actions, 

supply, transportation, 

communications, and/or 

special skill sets; can be 

augmented by SPF and/or 

regular military advisors. 

Basic and advanced military 

skills instructed in safe haven 

or CBP in or near geographic 

area of conflict. If part of 

insurgency, coordinates for 

special skills and support; can 

be augmented by SPF and/or 

regular military advisors. 

Basic and advanced skills 

learned in practice; special 

skills and support can be 

contracted; training can 

include administrative, 

intelligence, internal security, 

operational franchise 

management, supply and 

services, transportation, 

communications, and/or 

special skill sets. 

Internal Security Counterintelligence and 

internal security cells monitor 

insurgent loyalty. 

Counterintelligence elements 

monitor guerrilla loyalty. 

Internal security maintained 

through codes of conduct and 

monitoring activities and 

outside contacts; specialized 

groups monitor member 

loyalty. 

Logistics Self-sustaining with populace 

support; support from regional 

safe havens and diaspora; 

can receive regular military 

and SPF materiel support; 

can commandeer materiel 

from local area. 

Self-sustaining with populace 

support; can receive missionbased support from regular 

military forces and SPF; can 

barter and/or commandeer 

materiel from local area; can 

capture supplies and materiel 

from enemy forces. 

Self-sustaining with supply, 

services, and materiel 

purchased, stolen, or coerced 

from a local populace, or 

provided by a regional or 

transnational network; can be 

supported from regional safe 

havens. 

Communications Local, regional, and/or global; 

easy access to media; access 

to Internet and INFOWAR 

technologies; secure and 

encryption capable; common 

use of messenger or courier. 

Local and regional; tactical 

communications norm; secure 

and encryption capable; 

access to Internet and 

INFOWAR technologies; 

common use of messenger or 

courier. 

Local, regional, and/or global; 

easy access to media; access 

to Internet and INFOWAR 

technologies; secure and 

encryption capable; common 

use of messenger or courier. 

Finances Periodic reward in goods and 

services; may include 

contract-for-hire payment 

systems; can be obligation 

with no pay. 

Semiformal or formal pay 

system in local script and/or 

barter materiel; can be 

conscription with no pay. 

Payment to designated 

members based on 

performance and profit; 

payments may be cash, 

services, and or in-kind 

barter; investments and 

payments are often laundered 

to mask origin. 

Terrorism Use or restriction of terrorism 

can be due to insurgent 

proclamation; psychological 

weapon; actions are 

integrated as part of 

INFOWAR campaign; 

purpose ultimately supports a 

political objective can be 

focused or random for effects. 

Use or restriction of terrorism 

based on guerrilla 

commander directive; 

psychological weapon; 

actions are integrated as part 

of INFOWAR campaign; can 

be deliberate or random for 

intended effects. 

Use or restriction of terrorism 

can be due to senior or 

intermediate leader decision; 

field operators may use 

terrorism within the domain 

they control; psychological 

weapon; actions can be 

focused or random for effects. 
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-1 

Chapter 2 

Insurgents 

This chapter presents an overview of insurgent organizations and actions as part of 

the irregular OPFOR for U.S. Army training. The insurgent irregular OPFOR is 

representative of threats in a resistence movement and/or insurgency that can exist in 

various operational environments (OEs). Insurgents can be armed or unarmed. In 

addition to functional tactics (see chapter 7), insurgents can use acts of terrorism (see 

chapter 6) to intimidate or influence a governing authority or a relevant population. 

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 

2-1. Insurgents are armed and/or unarmed individuals or groups who promote an agenda of subversion and 

violence that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. They can transition between 

subversion and violence dependent on specific conditions. Both types of action intend to disrupt a 

governing authority. They gradually undermine the confidence of a relevant population in a governing 

authority’s ability to provide and justly administer civil law, order, and stability. Insurgents can achieve 

their aims without violence, but this is not the norm. 

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTORS

2-2. During an insurgency, the distinctions among insurgents, guerrillas, criminals, and other actors in an 

OE are often unclear. Insurgents may use deception to add to this confusion and sometimes deny 

responsibility for direct actions or acts of terrorism. Insurgent organizations can act separately from other 

groups, organizations, and/or activities in conflict with an enemy or in conjunction with them to achieve 

common goals. 

2-3. Insurgents may conduct operations in combination with regular military forces of a state in conflict 

with the governing authority that insurgents oppose. Advisors, liaison teams, and military forces—

especially from special-purpose forces (SPF)—can provide overt and covert support for insurgent actions. 

2-4. When present in the irregular OPFOR, guerrillas are normally incorporated into and subordinate to a 

higher insurgent organization. However, guerrilla forces can also be aligned with local insurgent 

organizations. In some cases, lower-level guerrilla units may be subordinate to a local insurgent 

organization. Guerrilla forces can also exist as an independent capability, completely independent of higher 

and local insurgent organizations. Evolving conditions may cause affiliations or task organizations that are 

particular to that context. The relationships between insurgents and guerrillas operating in an area may be 

temporary and remain in effect only as long as the both organizations mutually benefit. Guerrillas are 

described in detail in chapter 3. 

2-5. Insurgents may also act in conjunction with criminal elements. Criminals may exploit the instability 

caused by insurgency to further their own profit. Insurgents may consort with criminals or resort to criminal 

activities themselves, in order to finance and sustain their operations. 

Note. The Hybrid Threat (HT) used in training of U.S. Army forces can include all these types of 

actors and capabilities. The HT can be any combination of two or more of the following 

components: regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements. Possible HT 

combinations include insurgents and other parts of the irregular OPFOR operating openly with 

regular military forces, being sponsored directly or indirectly by another state’s governmental 

ministries and/or departments, or supported by non-state organizations. (See TC 7-100 for 

detailed discussion of the HT.) 
Chapter 2 

2-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

2-6. Insurgent organizations can form temporary affiliations with other commercial, social, or political 

entities. They can also solicit or coerce the active and/or passive support of civilians in and outside of the 

area of conflict. Such supporters can include— 

 Those merely sympathetic to the goals of the insurgents. 

 Those providing monetary support. 

 Those actively supporting and engaging in direct actions alongside the insurgents and/or 

guerrillas. 

Insurgents may have the overt and/or covert support of a government-in-exile when both organizations 

view a governing authority as a common enemy. 

SCOPE

2-7. Insurgent organizations normally conduct irregular conflict within or near the sovereign territory of a 

state in order to overthrow or force change in that state’s governing authority. Some insurgent activities—

such as influencing public opinion and acquiring resources—can occur outside of the geographic area that 

is the focus of the insurgency. 

2-8. An insurgent organization may begin or remain at the local level. A local insurgent organization may 

exist at small city, town, village, parish, community, or neighborhood level. It may expand and/or combine 

with other local organizations. Cities with a large population or covering a large area may be considered 

regions and may include several low-level insurgent organizations. A higher insurgent organization may 

exist at regional, provincial, district, national, or transnational level. Higher insurgent organizations usually 

contain a mix of local insurgent and guerrilla organizations. The higher insurgent organization can apply 

both types of forces with a wider scope of impact. The OE and the specific goals determine the size and 

composition of each insurgent organization and the scope of its activities. (See sections on Higher 

Insurgent Organizations and Lower Insurgent Organizations, below, for more detail.) 

LINES OF EFFORT

2-9. An insurgency is fundamentally a political movement. The expectation of a long-term conflict requires 

plans for and use of physical and psychological force. Civic actions develop, expand, and marshal the 

support of a relevant population for the insurgency’s agenda. A comprehensive plan of action typically 

incorporates three main lines of effort: 

 Political influence. 

 Direct action violence and terrorism. 

 Civic interaction and support. 

Political Influence 

2-10. The political element provides the overarching command and control (C2) of the insurgent 

organization. The political leadership plans and directs the strategy and actions to divide or weaken the 

governing authority they oppose. Information warfare (INFOWAR) activities foster dissatisfaction of the 

relevant population with the governing authority and show the insurgency as an opportunity for change. 

The insurgency degrades the confidence of the population in the governing authority. At the same time, the 

political element is preparing and/or implementing its own administrative and governance capabilities that 

provide solutions to the population’s grievances. 

Direct Action Violence and Terrorism 

2-11. Insurgent cellular organization provides an adaptable function-based capability. Direct action cells

reside primarily in local insurgent organizations and usually conduct small-scale and focused violent acts at 

the tactical level of conflict. (Direct action cells are described in detail later in this chapter.) Actions can 

range from one-person tasks to multiple cells tailored temporarily for specific operations. Subversion and 

selective or random violence are planned acts to incite frustration and overreaction by a governing 

authority. The government reaction can anger the relevant population and further undermine its allegiance 

or passive support to the governing authority. If an insurgency advances to the use of guerilla units, the 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-3 

guerrillas conduct operations against elements of the governing authority with functional tactics. (See 

chapter 3 for detail on guerrillas and chapter 7 on functional tactics.) Terrorism can be applied throughout 

these direct and supporting actions. (See chapter 6 on terrorism.) 

2-12. Targets are often the activities and organizations that provide civil law and order such as— 

 Police. 

 Civil administrators. 

 Internal security forces. 

 Regular military forces of the governing authority. 

2-13. Insurgent actions can range from simple threats and hoaxes to use of sophisticated technology and 

weapon systems. Insurgent organizations generally do not possess much of the heavier and more 

sophisticated equipment the guerrilla organizations possess. If the insurgents require these weapons or 

capabilities, they may either obtain them from guerrillas, or the guerrilla organization may provide its 

services depending on the relationship between the two organizations at the time. Some insurgent 

organizations profess the desire to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 

Civic Interaction and Support 

2-14. Civic interaction by insurgents with a relevant population establishes and maintains influence over 

the population. It allows the insurgency to successfully organize clandestine actions. Activities can— 

 Incite open demonstrations against the governing authority. 

 Improve recruitment efforts for the insurgency within the population. 

 Demonize the governing authority as a threat to the population rather than protector. 

2-15. If a relevant population believes that a governing authority is incapable of effective governance, 

insurgents can usually obtain increasing active and passive support from the population. Insurgents degrade 

the operational effectiveness of a governing authority in selected functions. They use a full range of 

INFOWAR capabilities to exhaust the resolve of a governing authority and increase the population’s will to 

support the overthrow of such governance. 

2-16. Insurgents conduct some civic initiatives in a manner that does not overtly link the services to it. 

Other actions often assist in providing basic social services that mitigate suffering of the population and 

provide support. The insurgents will want to take credit for these. Such support can be humanitarian 

programs for— 

 Food. 

 Potable water. 

 Basic medical services and preventive medicine. 

 Basic safe guarding of personal and commercial property. 

 Arbitrating civil and social disputes ignored by a governing authority. 

2-17. The insurgent organization can sometimes obtain enough public support its representatives can be 

legally elected to political positions within a governing authority. Ultimately, the insurgency must convince 

an increasing number of uncommitted citizens and passive supporters within the relevant population to 

accept its agenda for change or replacement of the current governing authority. 

INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS 

2-18. Insurgent organizations do not have a fixed structure. The mission, environment, geography, goal, 

and many other factors determine the configuration and composition of each insurgent organization. Their 

composition varies from— 

 Organization to organization. 

 Mission to mission. 

 OE to OE. 
Chapter 2 

2-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements. The 

size, specialty, number, and type of subordinates also depend on the size, number, and specialties required 

for specific missions in an OE. 

Note. Additional details of insurgent direct action and supporting cells are in FM 7-100.4. To find 

these details, use Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access to the Hybrid Threat Doctrine 

folder at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/30837459. Then, go to the “FM 7-

100.4 Org Guide” folder and click, in sequence, as follows: Administration Force Structure; Vol 

III Paramil Nonmil Orgs; 01 Combatants; 01 Armed Combatants; 01 Insurgent Orgs; 01 Local 

Insurgent Org. This FM will transition to a TC 7-100.4. 

The insurgent organization diagrams of FM 7-100.4 and the personnel and equipment lists that 

accompany them represent a composite of actual insurgent forces. They are a baseline that U.S. 

Army trainers can modify to provide the appropriate conditions required for a particular training 

exercise and/or training task. FM 7-100.4 provides detailed step-by-step instructions on how to 

construct a task organization based on the training requirements. FM 7-100.4 also describes how 

to select equipment options. See also TC 7-101 for guidance on creating the appropriate OPFOR 

order of battle during exercise design. 

CAPABILITIES

2-19. Insurgent organizations are flexible, agile, and adaptable. They can quickly change their composition 

to optimize capabilities and use these capabilities against known or perceived vulnerabilities of an enemy. 

These dynamic organizations are able to— 

 Adjust continually to changing conditions. 

 Shift organizational structures and alliances. 

 Influence and blend within a relevant population. 

 Simultaneously conduct covert and overt actions. 

 Use subversion and violence in innovative ways. 

 Shift between functional tactics and terrorism. 

 Employ a wide spectrum of lethality—from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to possible 

WMD. 

2-20. The irregular OPFOR can include insurgent organizations in two levels of capabilities: 

 Higher insurgent organization. 

 Local insurgent organization. 

2-21. A higher insurgent organization includes at least one local insurgent organization and can include 

guerrilla forces. The higher and local insurgent organizations include direct action cells and supporting 

cells. The direct action cells are primarily within local insurgent organizations. The differences in 

supporting cells of higher and local insurgent organizations relates to the scope of mission and 

responsibilities usually associated with the size of geographic areas within which they operate. Some direct 

action and supporting cells break down into teams. 

2-22. A higher insurgent organization can have subordinate guerilla units. In some cases lower-level 

guerrilla organizations may be subordinate to or affiliated with a local insurgent organization. In either 

case, guerilla units operate in conjunction with the activities of direct action cells and/or supporting cells. 

NETWORKS

2-23. The interactions between and/or among organizations, units, cells, and teams vary in complexity. 

They can be hierarchical but most often take the form of a network. Communication and coordination in a 

network can be linear and visualized as links in a chain, with each node connected to the next node in 

sequence. Another option is a hub, in which one node (a director or decisionmaker) is central to a number 

of other nodes that are not directly in contact with each other. A wheel is a variation on the hub in which 

each of the nodes is in contact with neighboring nodes, with the central node providing common source of 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-5 

information and/or guidance. An all-channel array provides contact among all nodes of a particular 

network. The network of an insurgent organization can include a combination of all these types (as shown 

in figure 2-1). (See figure 2-5 on page 2-14 for another example of such combinations.) 

Networked

Organization

Chain

Hub Wheel

All-Channel

Figure 2-1. Network types 

2-24. A network C2 structure adapts configurations to best use the capabilities of available organizations, 

units, cells, and teams. Adaptability and innovation are hallmarks of the insurgent organization. 

LEADERSHIP, ACTION, AND SUPPORT

2-25. Insurgents are flexible in how to organize C2. However, figure 2-2 shows six categories of 

leadership, action, and support that normally exist in an organizational structure in either a hierarchy or 

network: 

 Senior leaders. 

 Subordinate leaders. 

 Cadres. 

 Active supporters. 

 Passive supporters. 

2-26. The pyramid illustration in figure 2-2 indicates a relative number of people in each category. 

Underlying this pyramid is the relevant population that is critical to how these levels function for C2 and/or 

influence. Insurgents can use the population in various ways, such as a mass human shield or to assist in 

insurgent organization security. 

2-27. The insurgents can also solicit and/or coerce support from the population. Another consideration is 

the amount of support that is or is not provided by state and non-state sponsors for the insurgency. 
Chapter 2 

2-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Population

Active Supporters 

Passive Supporters

Senior Leaders

Cadres

Subordinate Leaders

Figure 2-2. Typical levels of leadership, action, and support 

Senior Leaders 

2-28. Senior leaders are the recognized authority of the insurgency. They conceive and state a 

philosophical or practical justification for actions by subordinate operational leaders and followers. These 

senior leaders— 

 Announce strategic direction and policy. 

 Approve goals and objectives. 

 Provide overarching guidance for operations and protracted conflict. 

2-29. The leadership of an insurgent organization may be one individual or a group of leaders, who may or 

may not consult formally with advisors. Leadership may informally use advisors or a council comprised of 

tribal, religious, political, secular, radical sectarian, other associations, and/or any combination thereof. A 

formal council of advisors is more common in a higher insurgent organization (see discussion of advisors 

under that heading, below). The insurgent leader may also be a tribal, cultural, political, or religious leader. 

The leader of a guerrilla unit may join the leader of a political element in an insurgency and form a 

collective leadership for the insurgent organization. 

2-30. Although leadership may be shared or apportioned among several individuals, one senior leader is 

often identified as the recognized authority and primary spokesperson for the objectives of the insurgent 

organization. The leader focuses on the strategic perspective and understands how to communicate the 

ideology and/or objectives that motivate the insurgents. A leader may have risen from the tactical ranks of 

the organization with calculated actions and political savvy, and/or may have achieved notoriety and/or 

demonstrated his influence through acts of terror. The leader usually is knowledgeable of world politics and 

complex socio-political environments. Individual leadership skills are often supplemented by personal 

charisma. 

2-31. Insurgent leaders can be located within or outside of the insurgent organization’s geographic area. 

These leaders provide strategic guidance that is implemented by subordinate leaders conducting operations 

within the geographic area. Leaders use the media to convince or coerce targeted segments of a population 

to act in a particular way. These leaders may solicit clandestine financing and other support for operations 

to attack high-priority targets. 

2-32. A situation may arise where the senior insurgent leadership is coordinating closely with a 

government-in-exile in order to reestablish authority over a state that has had its legitimate government 

ousted. Insurgent leaders can use multiple means to support a government-in-exile such as gradually 

providing civil and social services the existing governing authority is not providing to a relevant 

population. Another means is to gradually use political processes to obtain legitimate representation in 

local, regional, and national political parties and institutions. Leaders use these informal and formal 

processes to gain and sustain support of designated segments of a population and continually expand the 

positive influence of the insurgent organization’s agenda. 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-7 

Subordinate Leaders 

2-33. Subordinate leaders of the insurgent organization command or control organizational activities 

within geographic areas or functions. These leaders provide direction and guidance, approve goals and 

objectives, and provide overarching coordination in support of senior leader guidance. They may be leaders 

of cells and/or teams of specialized expertise or leaders of local insurgent organizations comprising several 

cells. The subordinate leaders may have responsibilities as special advisors to the senior leadership, media 

spokespersons, political leaders, or functional experts. If decentralized in structure, these leaders plan and 

act within general senior leader mission guidance. Other leaders, if structured in a more hierarchical 

military-type organization, plan and act within specified planning directives or guidance from senior 

leaders. 

2-34. For security and a division of labor, subordinate leaders may sometimes use intermediate leaders to 

communicate directives and guidance to subordinate cells and supporting activities. Clandestine 

communications can use sophisticated techniques such as electronic steganography to hide information 

within a message or email, or simple techniques such as human couriers and intermediaries to relay oral 

information and/or directives. 

2-35. Leaders can have varied effects on an organization’s effectiveness if they are eliminated. The 

insurgent organization develops redundancy among leaders and subordinate leaders in order to minimize 

significant disruption when a leader is killed or captured. 

Cadres 

2-36. In a general sense, a cadre is a nucleus of trained personnel capable of assuming control and of 

training others. In an insurgent organization, cadres include both the political or ideological cadre of an 

insurgency and the cadre of operators who direct and conduct direct action and supporting functions. 

2-37. One type of cadre is the political or ideological core of an insurgent organization. Movements based 

on religious extremism include religious and spiritual advisors among the cadre. Political advisors may 

have a special role in some organizations. The cadre can be openly active or mask their activities within a 

relevant population. Some cadre activities are violent enforcement of political and ideological discipline, 

subversion of opponents, and/or manipulation of social power to support an insurgent program. Cadre may 

perform key shadow-government or government-in-exile functions that are physically distant from a 

relevant population. 

2-38. Another type of cadre is the nucleus of experts in direct action or supporting cells of the insurgent 

organization that carry out specific functions and/or instruct other insurgents in functional capabilities. 

Some mid-level cadres are trainers and technicians such as bomb makers, financiers, and surveillance 

experts. Low-level cadres can be direct action operators but usually supervise and coordinate other 

insurgents rather than actually conducting direct action tasks. These actors can have functional, specialized, 

multifunctional, and/or supporting purposes based on knowledge and skill sets. 

2-39. Examples of activities conducted, coordinated, and led by cadre can include but are not limited to— 

 Intelligence and counterintelligence networks. 

 Political affiliations and alliances. 

 Recruiting programs. 

 Training programs. 

 Ideology education programs. 

 Weapon system and communications acquisition and maintenance. 

 Logistics sustainment. 

 Finances and fiscal resourcing programs. 

 Social and medical welfare support. 

 INFOWAR capabilities against the opposition government and adversaries in the relevant 

population and international community. 

 Operational missions. 

 Acts of selective and/or random terrorism. 
Chapter 2 

2-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

2-40. Some cadres use coercion and leverage to gain limited, periodic, or one-time cooperation from 

individuals in the relevant population. This forced cooperation can range from gaining specific information 

on a proposed target to supporting or conducting a suicide bombing attack. 

Active Supporters 

2-41. Active supporters are fully aware of their relationship to the insurgent organization but do not

normally commit violent acts. They can continue normal positions in society while providing functional 

expertise or general support to the insurgents. Depending on the type of organization, they may operate in 

functional capacities, such as politics, fund-raising, and/or INFOWAR activities of the insurgency. Acting 

as visible or tacit partners, active supporters may also— 

 Conduct or augment intelligence, surveillance, and counterintelligence activities. 

 Provide and administer safe houses and safe havens. 

 Promote dissatisfaction with the status quo in recurring media affairs information releases. 

 Support recruiting efforts for new members and affiliates. 

 Solicit and collect financial or other types of donation support. 

 Provide civilian transportation. 

 Conduct courier and communications services. 

 Produce forged documents. 

 Acquire commodities to assist insurgent direct action and supporting cells. 

 Store caches of supplies, weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other materiel. 

 Assist in the manufacture of weapons and IEDs. 

 Assist in subversive activities. 

 Assist in sabotage, assassination, or other direct and violent actions. 

 Provide medical treatment and related support. 

2-42. Supporters can improve insurgent initiatives to obtain the representation of legitimately elected 

political officials. Other supporters may assist the actions of a direct action cell or a guerrilla hunter-killer 

(HK) team. Active supporters may or may not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement in an 

insurgent agenda. They can conduct covert and overt operations. They can infiltrate organizations of the 

governing authority and conduct subversive activities against civil, social, and/or military programs. 

2-43. Insurgent leaders often broker associations for active support with civil, political, or other 

paramilitary organizations for selected purposes. Such associations may arise from specific mutual interests 

when cooperative efforts might not normally be expected. Public statements and/or secretive agreements 

that promote mutual support for a specific agenda of an insurgent organization can include the following 

themes: 

 Historical and recent perspectives to remedy grievances. 

 Familial, tribal, or clan allegiance. 

 Business and social productivity. 

 Faith system dogma. 

 Personal beliefs, motivations, and ideology. 

 Civil and political opposition to programs of a governing authority in a state or region. 

 Interference of an extraregional state in the domestic affairs of a state or region. 

 Potential future roles in society. 

Passive Supporters 

2-44. Passive supporters are typically individuals or groups that are sympathetic to the announced goals 

and intentions of an overarching insurgent agenda. However, they are not committed enough to take an 

active role in insurgent direct actions or acts of terrorism. Sometimes fear of reprisal by opponents of the 

insurgency leads to passive yet sympathetic support. 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-9 

2-45. Passive supporters may not be aware of their tacit relationship to the insurgent organization. They 

may intermingle with active supporters and be unaware of their actual relationship to the organization. 

Individuals may develop suspicions of activities that might be supporting insurgent actions, but decide to 

ignore indications and continue their daily lifestyle actions. 

2-46. The insurgent organization recognizes that a sympathetic base of passive support in a population is 

an ever-changing factor with multiple social, economic, religious, or political motives. The insurgency 

depends on a sympathetic segment of the population remaining passive. Nonetheless, passive supporters 

can be useful for political activities, fund raising, and/or unwitting assistance in intelligence gathering and 

other nonviolent activities. A primary value of passive support is minimal interference by the citizenry in 

ongoing overt actions of the insurgent organization. 

2-47. Passive support can undermine civil and social programs, and political and/or theological institutions, 

of the governing authority. Many functions of such programs and institutions must rely on voluntary 

cooperation by large segments of the population. 

HIGHER INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

2-48. The term higher insurgent organization includes any insurgent organization at regional, provincial, 

district, or national level, or at the transnational level. Cities with a large population or covering a large 

geographic area are considered regions. Higher insurgent organizations may control several local insurgent 

and/or guerrilla organizations. They can have transnational affiliations or other overt and/or covert support. 

2-49. The main capabilities of a higher insurgent organization that are not usually present in a local 

insurgent organization are as follows: 

 Subordinate local insurgent organizations in their network. (Local insurgent organizations 

usually do not have echeloned subordinate local insurgent organizations.) 

 Guerrilla units within their network and operating in the same geographic area. (Local insurgent 

organizations may have temporary affiliations with guerrilla units or may occasionally command 

and control them.) 

 Personal protection and security cell(s) for the organization’s senior leaders and designated 

advisors or special members. (A local insurgent organization does not normally have a personal 

protection and security cell.) 

 Associations and/or affiliations with criminal organizations directly and without coordination 

with subordinate local insurgent organizations. (The long-term vision in a higher insurgent 

organization may include cooperation with regional or transnational criminal organizations for 

specific capabilities or materiel available through criminal networks.) 

2-50. Higher insurgent organizations have no standard organizational structure. They are not necessarily 

subordinate to a regional, national, or transnational insurgent organization. However, higher and local 

insurgent organizations can be subordinate to and/or loosely affiliated with regional and national insurgent 

organizations. Any relationship of independent insurgent organizations to regional or national structures 

may be one of affiliation or dependent upon only a single shared or similar goal. 

2-51. Local insurgent organizations, guerrilla units, and other organizations (such as criminal gangs and 

networks) often operate in the same geographic area as a higher insurgent organization and can be 

subordinate, loosely affiliated, or independent of a higher insurgent organization. Any relationship of 

organizations and units to one another may be allegiance, affiliation, or temporary association based on 

shared aims and/or mutual support. 

2-52. A higher insurgent organization is normally cellular and comprises a network of functional 

capabilities. Figure 2-3 shows the types of organizations and cells that can comprise a higher insurgent 

organization. 
Chapter 2 

2-10 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Figure 2-3. Higher insurgent organization 

2-53. Some insurgent organizations may not have separate cells for all of the required functions. However, 

someone in the organization must be designated to perform all basic and critical functions. For example, 

the intelligence cell may also incorporate the counterintelligence and security functions, or the logistics cell 

may also perform the functions of the shelter and/or transportation cells. 

COMMS &

TRADECRAFT

CELL

TRAINING

CELL

TRANSPORT

CELL

CIVIL

AFFAIRS

CELL

LOGISTICS

CELL

PLANNING

CELL ADVISORS

LOCAL

INSURGENT

ORGANIZATION

INTELLIGENCE

CELL

INFORMATION

WARFARE

CELL

CI & INTERNAL

SECURITY

CELL

GUERRILLA

BDE/BN/CO/

PLT/HK Teams

PERSONAL

PROTECTION

& SEC CELL

TECHNICAL

SUPPORT

CELL

FINANCE

CELL

RECRUITING

CELL

MEDICAL

CELL

HIGHER

INSURGENT

ORGANIZATION

(Regional, National,

or Transnational)

SHELTER

CELL

Note. While this organization chart appears in a hierarchical format, that is only for convenience.

In actuality, a network structure is most likely in an insurgent organization. Also, the numbers of

each type of subordinate organization or cell can vary, and some may not be present at all in a

particular organization.
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-11 

2-54. Subordinates and supporting cells of a higher insurgent organization may or may not be colocated 

with each other or with the leadership of the higher insurgent organization. They may be located in separate 

villages, towns, cities, regions, or countries, as long as they can adequately and securely provide the 

required support in a timely fashion. The numbers and types of each, and their locations, may change 

frequently. 

2-55. A higher insurgent organization can have all the same types of supporting cells found in a local 

insurgent organization. (These types are described under Local Insurgent Organization.) Compared to their 

local counterparts, these cells may be larger and have expanded capabilities. However, the higher 

organization may also have advisors and one or more personal protection and security cells. 

Advisors 

2-56. The senior leader (or leaders) may or may not have a council of advisors. He can receive advice from 

others inside and outside the organization. However, he may rely heavily on his council of advisors to 

provide counsel, guidance, and/or expertise on a wide variety of areas. If present, advisors can include— 

 Political (international relations; shadow government). 

 Military (advice and liaison with affiliated nations or guerrillas; acquisition of military weapons 

and equipment, advisors, or fighters). 

 Religious (religious leaders or liaison with them). 

 Cultural (ethnic, tribal, minority populations). 

 Financial (international and money-raising). 

 Mass media (perception management). 

2-57. The number and types of advisors is situation dependent. Some insurgent leaders may have an 

advisor for every issue requiring specialized expertise, while other leaders may have advisors that can 

provide counsel on several functions. An example of a multifunctional advisor would be one that could 

provide counsel on political, religious, and tribal issues. Some functions may require specialized expertise. 

For example, in order to manipulate the media to achieve a specific goal in perception management, the 

leader of the INFOWAR cell may require expertise and/or advice from several advisors such as a cleric, a 

politician, and a tribal and/or ethic leader. 

2-58. The number of permanent advisors can be many but is often limited to a few individuals. One of 

these advisors generally rises to the position of primary advisor to the leader. In some insurgent 

organizations, in addition to providing counsel, the primary advisor also serves in a position comparable to 

that of a second-in-command, a deputy, or a chief of staff. The position of primary advisor is an extremely 

prestigious, influential, and powerful position in the insurgency. The primary advisor is usually the 

religious, political, or the military advisor. The choice of primary advisor typically reflects the insurgency’s 

goals and agenda. 

2-59. Advisors may consult with the leader on policies, tactics, and weapons to be used. They may use 

simple or information-age technology to exchange experience, practical observations, and lessons learned. 

Such advisors may coordinate activities among various supporting cells while also coordinating selective 

activities of direct action cells. 

2-60. Even if not part of a formal council of advisors, leaders of supporting cells directly assist a senior 

leader in planning and supervising the actions of the insurgent organization. For instance, the leaders of the 

INFOWAR, logistics, and finance cells may advise the leader on matters pertaining to their functional 

specialties. 

2-61. Advisors may or may not be armed. In most cases, advisors will possess firearms but may not choose 

to carry them on all occasions. There are typically security specialists (personal bodyguards) and drivers 

assigned to the advisors. The advisors’ association with the insurgency may be covert, with very few 

people aware of their connection. Most insurgent organizations have a mixture of overt and covert 

counselors. 
Chapter 2 

2-12 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Personal Protection and Security Cells 

2-62. A personal protection and security cell is responsible for the personal security and welfare of the 

senior leader(s) and other important persons. The cell’s armed security specialists provide around-the-clock 

protection for these personnel and vehicles for transporting them. The vehicle may or may not be armored. 

Even if armored, it is built to appear just like any other vehicle commonly used in the environment. Some 

weapons and/or equipment may be left in the vehicle until required or not carried on the mission at all. All 

cell members are cross-trained in the use of all weapons, equipment, and vehicles assigned to the cell. 

2-63. This cell works closely with both the counterintelligence and security cell(s) and the intelligence 

cell(s). When needed, it receives augmentation of trained personnel from direct action teams. 

LOCAL INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

2-64. The term local insurgent organization applies to any insurgent organization below regional, 

provincial, or district level. This includes small cities, towns, villages, parishes, communities, 

neighborhoods, and/or rural environments. (Large cities are equivalent to regions and may contain several 

local insurgent organizations.) Activities remain focused on a local relevant population. 

2-65. Differences between a local insurgent organization and a higher insurgent organization are as follows: 

 Direct actions cells are present within a local insurgent organization. Their multifunctional 

and/or specific functional capabilities may be enhanced or limited based on availability of 

resources and technical expertise in or transiting the local OE. These direct actions are planned for 

immediate and/or near-term effects related to the local insurgent organization’s area of influence. 

 Guerrilla units might not be subordinate to the local insurgent organization. However, 

temporary affiliations between local insurgents and guerrillas are possible for specified missions 

coordinated by a higher insurgent organization. Direct action personnel may use, fight alongside 

of, or assist affiliated forces, and guerrillas to achieve their common goals or for any other 

agenda. Guerrilla units may operate in a local insurgent organization’s area of influence and 

have no connection to the local insurgent organization or a higher insurgent organization. 

2-66. Criminals can affiliate with a local insurgent organization or a higher insurgent organization as a 

matter of convenience and remain cooperative only as long as criminal organization aims are being 

achieved. The local insurgent organization retains a long-term vision of its political agenda, whereas 

cooperation by a criminal organization is usually related to localized commercial profit and/or 

organizational influence in a local environment. This usually equates to criminals controlling or facilitating 

materiel and commodity exchanges. The criminal is not motivated by a political agenda. 

2-67. The local insurgent organization uses functional tactics (see chapter 7) and terrorism (see chapter 6) 

as the primary means to achieve its goals. Terrorism instills fear and anxiety that coerces and degrades the 

resolve of an enemy governing authority and selected people in a relevant population. 

Relation to Other Insurgent Organizations 

2-68. The local insurgent organization is the basic level of insurgent organization. Local insurgent 

organizations are not always subordinate to a regional, national, or transnational insurgent organization. 

They may be completely autonomous and independent of a larger insurgent movement and not be 

associated with it in any way. In other cases, they can be either subordinate to or loosely affiliated with 

such a larger organization. They may operate under the guidance of a larger insurgent organization even is 

no command relationship exists. In some cases a local insurgent organization may provide only financial 

support and general guidance to its direct action and supporting cells (see figure 2-4). 

2-69. Cells of a local insurgent organization may be forced to provide for themselves in several areas. A 

typical example of this is a smaller direct action cell separated from the parent insurgent organization by 

distance, population, or ability to communicate securely. They may not have access to the expertise or 

products such as IEDs provided by the technical support cell and must improvise IEDs by themselves. 

2-70. Any relationship to a higher organization or among independent local insurgent organizations may be 

dependent upon only a single shared or similar goal. These relationships are generally fluctuating and may 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-13 

be fleeting, mission dependent, event- or agenda-oriented, mutually coordinated, and/or coerced for a 

specific temporary purpose. There may be loose coordination of certain actions, after which the 

organizations revert back to their independent modes. 

Note. While this organization chart appears in a hierarchical format, that is only for convenience.

In actuality, a network structure is most likely in an insurgent organization. Also, the numbers of

each type of subordinate cell can vary, and some may not be present at all in a particular

organization.

TECHNICAL

SUPPORT

CELL

TRANSPORT

CELL

FINANCE

CELL

TRAINING

CELL

RECRUITING

CELL

MEDICAL

CELL

INFORMATION

WARFARE

CELL

DA CELL

(Information

Warfare)

DA CELL

(Kidnapping

& Extortion)

DA CELL

(MultiFunction)

PLANNING

CELL

CI & INTERNAL

SECURITY

CELL

DA CELL

(Mortar

& Rocket)

DA CELL 

(Assassin/

Sniper)

INTELLIGENCE

CELL

LOGISTICS

CELL

COMMS &

TRADECRAFT

CELL

SHELTER

CELL

(Safe Houses)

CIVIL

AFFAIRS

CELL

LOCAL

INSURGENT

ORGANIZATION

Figure 2-4. Local insurgent organization 

Dispersion 

2-71. Direct action cells and supporting cells disperse as a norm. They are not normally colocated with 

each other or with the leader(s) of the local insurgent organization. Although in some cases direct action cells 

may come together to provide mutual support, they usually carry out their mission independent of other cells. 

Dispersion enhances the security and survivability of the local insurgent organization and its individual cells. It 

also distributes the influence of the insurgency to a wider area and a larger segment of the population. 
Chapter 2 

2-14 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Leadership 

2-72. Leadership in a local insurgent organization may reside in one individual or more than one 

individual. Advisors or a small council may exist but are not always present in a local insurgent 

organization to assist the leader or leaders. (See Advisors under Higher Insurgent Organization, above.)In 

some cases, command directives can be very specific and focused. In other cases, the leadership may 

purposely issue only general guidance to allow initiative at the cellular level for specific actions. 

Insurgent Network Example 

The C2 structure of a local insurgent organization can be a network, hierarchy, and/or 

a combination of networked and hierarchical systems. However, a network is the 

most likely structure. An example of a network in figure 2-5 includes— 

• A higher insurgent organization. 

• A local insurgent organization (subordinate to the higher insurgent organization). 

▪ Direct action cells (some broken down into teams). 

▪ Supporting cells (some broken down into teams). 

• Guerrilla units (subordinate to the higher insurgent organization and affiliated with 

the local insurgent organization). 

• A criminal organization (affiliated with the local insurgent organization). 

Guerrilla

Company

Guerrilla

Platoons

Guerrilla

HK Teams

Guerrilla

HK Company

Guerrilla

HK Groups

Guerrilla

HK

Sections

Higher Insurgent Organization Local

Insurgent

Organization

Criminal

Organization

(Affiliated)

Guerrilla

Battalion

(Affiliated)

DA Cell

(Kidnapping

and Extortion)

Logistics

Cell

Finance

Cell

Training

Cell

Transportation

Cell

Civil Affairs

Cell

Recruiting

Cell

Shelter

Cell

DA Cell

(Multifunction)

Mortar

Team

Rocket

Team

Planning

Cell

DA Cell

(Assassin

and Sniper)

Medical

Cell

Intelligence

Cell

CI and Internal

Security Cell

Comms and 

Tradecraft

Cell

DA Cell

(INFOWAR)

INFOWAR

Cell

Technical

Support

Cell

Suicide IED Team

(Individual

and Vehicle)

Demolition, 

Sabotage

and IED Teams

WMD

Support

Team

DA Cell

(Mortar

and

Rocket)

Assassin

and Sniper

Team

Assassin and Sniper

Team

In this example, the local insurgent organization appears to be self-sufficient, relying 

on its own supporting cells for support. In some cases, supporting cells of the local 

insurgent organization would also have links to their counterpart cells in the higher 

insurgent organization. In other cases, the local insurgent organization may lack 

some supporting cells if it relies on the higher organization for this support. 

Figure 2-5. Local and higher insurgent organizations network (example) 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-15 

Cellular Structure 

2-73. As with a higher insurgent organization, local insurgent organizations have a cellular structure. 

However, there are several differences in functions and scope of operations. Figure 2-4 and 2-5 show the 

types of cells that may be present in a local insurgent organization. Local insurgent organizations are 

typically composed of anywhere from 3 to more than 30 direct action and supporting cells. However, a 

smaller insurgent organization may consist of as few as one direct action cell (see figure 2-6). 

2-74. Cellular structure in the local insurgent organization comprises two basic types of capability. These 

cells are— 

 Direct action cells. 

 Supporting cells. 

INFO

WAR I

I

K

I

A

I

S

I

I

S I

Assassination

Team

Kidnapping

Team

Mortar Team

(60-mm)

Direct Action Cell

Information Warfare

Sniper 

Team

Extortion

Team

Rocket Team

(107-mm) I

I

Direct Action Cell

Multifunction

Direct Action Cell

Kidnapping and Extortion

Direct Action Cell

Mortar and Rocket I

Note. If the I (for insurgent) does not fit in the diamond-shaped unit symbol, it is placed to the right of the

diamond. For multifunctional cells or teams and those with a specific function for which standard military

symbology has no functional symbol, it is necessary to either include an abbreviation for that function

inside the diamond or to identify the nature of the cell or team with a note outside the diamond. The

kidnapping and extortion cell can use different symbols for the currency of a particular state or region,

rather than the U.S. dollar sign. Subordinate teams of the mortar and rocket cell can be identified with a

specific mortar team or rocket team symbol when performing those functions separately. Using the symbol

for the mortar and rocket cell indicates that the cell is operating with both mortar and rocket capabilities.

I

Direct Action Cell

Assassination/Sniper

Figure 2-6. Insurgent direct action cell and team graphic symbols 
Chapter 2 

2-16 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Direct Action Cells 

2-75. Direct action cells are the backbone of the insurgency movement. They contain the actual fighters of 

the insurgency. Some direct action cells have a multifunction purpose, while others are organized to 

perform a specialty function. Specialties can include, but are not limited to, assassination, sniper, 

kidnapping, extortion, INFOWAR, or mortar and/or rocket attacks. Every direct action cell is capable of 

performing all the missions listed above, to some degree. All cells are capable of sabotage and IED 

emplacement and detonation. 

2-76. Typical types of direct action cells that may be present in a local insurgent organization are— 

 Multifunction. 

 INFOWAR. 

 Assassination and sniper. 

 Kidnapping and extortion. 

 Mortar and rocket. 

2-77. The types of direct action cells and numbers of each can vary greatly from one local insurgent 

organization to another. Some may have— 

 All multipurpose cells. 

 All specialized cells, each with a different focus. 

 All specialized cells with a single focus. 

 Any mixture of the above. 

Most insurgent organizations have a mix of separate specialty cells and multifunction cells. All these cells 

are designed to operate independently (if necessary) once they have started their mission. 

2-78. Direct action cells do not have a fixed structure. The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons 

mix all depend on specific mission requirements. The size, specialty, and number of cells employed also 

depend on the size, number, and specialties required for specific missions. A cell typically contains from 6 

to 10 personnel. However, a cell can be as small as 2 people or consist of over 20 people. Direct action 

cells easily lend themselves to be broken down into subordinate teams whenever necessary. 

2-79. All direct action cells record key events and successful results on digital video and/or still cameras. 

In some cases, the key event may be staged for the camera. Upon mission completion, the direct action 

cells turn the information over to the INFOWAR cell for manipulation and exploitation. The videographers 

or camera operators try to blend in with crowds and disassociate themselves from the operation. 

Sympathizers in the local population may also serve in this role. 

2-80. Direct action personnel may be a mixture of men, women, and children. Local women and children 

may be used as runners, messengers, scouts, guides, drivers, porters, snipers, lookouts, videographers, 

camera operators, or in other roles. They may also emplace and/or detonate IEDs, signal flares, and mines. 

Women (and possibly children) may be fighters and participate in assassinations, ambushes, or assaults. 

They may also serve (willingly or unwillingly) as suicide bombers. 

Multifunction Cell 

2-81. The direct action cell (multifunction) is the basic direct action cell structure. It can employ functional 

tactics or terrorism, as necessary. It possesses all the capabilities of specialized cells (such as assassination 

and sniper; kidnapping and extortion; INFOWAR; and mortar and rocket) but normally to a lesser degree. 

When not engaged in specialized activities the, specialized cells can serve as multifunction direct action 

cells. 

2-82. Bombs (especially IEDs) are the weapon of choice for multipurpose direct action cells. They can be 

used in support of assassination, maiming, sabotage, and producing mass casualties. The cells usually 

acquire IEDs from the technical support cell as unassembled, pre-manufactured components. The 

multifunction cell assembles them and adds fuzes and detonators. Within the multifunction cell, an IED 

team usually includes at least three people: a lookout, the IED emplacer, and a triggerman. In some cases, a 

small multifunction cell of three or four personnel may act as an IED cell. The team or cell emplaces the 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-17 

IEDs, and the triggerman detonates them at the appropriate time. If additional assistance or IED expertise is 

required, they receive it from the technical support cell. 

2-83. Insurgents often use IEDs as secondary devices, to detonate on the arrival of personnel responding to 

another attack or IED. IEDs can be detonated by a variety of means, including remote, command, electrical, 

trip wire, pressure, time, and others. 

Assassination and Sniper Cell 

2-84. The primary mission of the direct action cell (assassination and sniper) is to terrorize a relevant 

population and/or to assassinate preselected persons. (See chapter 6 on Terrorism.) In either the 

assassination or the sniper task, the cell creates a psychological impact to intimidate and demoralize the 

population. The cell may indiscriminately select individual targets in crowded marketplaces or religious 

and political gatherings with the sole intent to terrorize. 

2-85. An assassination is a deliberate action to kill political leaders or very important people rather than 

killing common people, which is considered murder. The insurgent assassinates or murders people it cannot 

intimidate, who have left the group, or who have some symbolic significance for the enemy or world 

community. Insurgent organizations may refer to these killings as “punishment.” 

2-86. Many targets of assassination are symbolic and often have a great psychological impact on the 

enemy. For example, assassinating an enemy negotiator or successful businessperson can demonstrate the 

enemy’s inability to protect its own people. 

2-87. The assassination and sniper cell consists of two teams. The cell leader serves as a team leader of 

one team, and another insurgent serves as the assistant cell leader and team leader of the other team. The 

structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements. Weapons 

appropriate to each mission are selected. The other equipment is left behind or cached. 

2-88. The cell could select its own targets based on opportunity, as long as hitting such targets supports (or 

does not conflict with) the overall goals of the insurgent organization. Assassination methods include 

remotely-detonated bombing, the use of firearms, and poisoning. The target’s vulnerabilities determine the 

method of assassination. The insurgent leadership and/or the planning cell can exercise centralized control 

as necessary in order to orchestrate concerted action or to achieve a specific goal in its area of influence. 

2-89. When not engaged in specialized activities, the assassination and sniper cell serves as a 

multifunction direct action cell. Depending on mission requirements, the assassination and sniper 

cell may also serve as a reconnaissance element, a stay-behind element, or provide security for 

other direct action cells. 

Kidnapping and Extortion Cell 

2-90. The primary mission of the direct action cell (kidnapping and extortion) is to conduct kidnapping, 

extortion, hijacking, and hostage-taking. These acts help to finance the insurgent organization and serve to 

influence and/or terrorize the population. (See chapter 6 on Terrorism.) Each action, particularly a 

kidnapping, requires detailed planning and support by a number of other cells. 

2-91. The kidnapping and extortion cell may be authorized to identify victims as targets of opportunity as 

long as hitting such targets supports (or does not conflict with) the overall goals of the insurgent 

organization. However, the insurgent leadership can exercise centralized control as necessary, in order to 

orchestrate concerted action, and might identify certain targets or types of targets in order to achieve a 

specific goal in its area of influence. For a mission directed by the leadership, this cell may receive 

augmentation of insurgents from other cells. 

2-92. The kidnapping and extortion cell leader coordinates with the intelligence cell for reconnaissance and 

surveillance of targets. The intelligence cell provides information on the target’s vulnerabilities, 

weaknesses, and routine behavior. Every member of the insurgent organization as well as sympathizers can 

help gather this target information. The intelligence cell must thoroughly analyze the target so that it can 

advise the insurgent leadership, the planning cell, and/or the kidnapping and extortion cell on selection of 

the target site and method of kidnapping. Human intelligence is vital when planning and conducting a 
Chapter 2 

2-18 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

kidnapping. The intelligence cell continuously conducts surveillance on the target to identify potential 

security flaws and identifies vulnerabilities that the direct action cell can exploit. 

2-93. The intelligence cell and/or the kidnapping and extortion cell conducts detailed 

reconnaissance/surveillance of potential kidnap sites to determine the best site, considering cover, 

concealment, and escape routes. Once the target and site are selected, the kidnapping and extortion cell 

(and/or the planning cell and intelligence cell) conducts detailed analysis to provide the kidnapping and 

extortion cell with the requisite data on the target. The information required depends on the location of the 

target and site, but typically includes— 

 The exact route the target uses. 

 The method of conveyance and its specific characteristics. 

 The number of security personnel, their location, disposition, and types of weapons used. 

 The target’s likes, dislikes, allergies, habits, and routines. 

2-94. After planning and reconnaissance, the kidnapping and extortion cell conducts the actual action. For 

a kidnapping, the cell leader designates a specific team to conduct the kidnapping. After receiving 

intelligence, the team rehearses specific kidnapping techniques, such as an ambush or abduction, and 

finalizes planning. The team plans the escape route in great detail because of the complexities of 

transporting the victim. It usually disables the victim to make the escape easier. The team determines the 

best method of disabling the victim (such as drugging, stunning, or binding him). 

2-95. The kidnapping and extortion cell coordinates with the shelter cell for a safe house when kidnapping 

and/or hostage-taking is the mission. The INFOWAR cell helps create and maintain the fear caused by 

kidnapping and extortion through its propaganda and media manipulation means. 

Information Warfare Cell 

2-96. The direct action cell (INFOWAR) supports the insurgent organization’s INFOWAR plan. It may or 

may not receive guidance and assistance from the local insurgent organization. INFOWAR cell or its 

counterpart in a higher insurgent organization. (See appendix A for more detail on INFOWAR.) 

2-97. There may be as few as one direct action cell (INFOWAR) to over 20 such cells depending on the 

mission, the targets within a relevant population and governing authority, and topics to be exploited. The 

cells can be broken down into teams when necessary. The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons 

mix, all depend on specific mission requirements. Personnel select weapons appropriate to the mission. 

Other weapons and equipment are added as required, such as computers, computer-rigged vehicles, 

specialized antennas, and communications. 

2-98. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the cell may be capable of 

several functions. Examples of functions performed by the INFOWAR cell are— 

 Selective sabotage actions. 

 Information management (internal methods, links, and security). 

 Media manipulation (misinformation and disinformation). 

 Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda and indoctrination videos; 

broadcast successes of the direct action teams). 

 Civic actions popular to a relevant population. 

 Cyber-mining for information and intelligence. 

Some of the functions may require specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation function 

may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, tribal, ethic, or cultural leader; or other 

subject matter experts. Some functions can also be performed by personnel outside of the INFOWAR cell. 

Several members of the cell may be hired INFOWAR specialists or “gun fighters.” 

Mortar and Rocket Cell 

2-99. The primary purpose of the direct action cell (mortar and rocket) is to either terrorize or influence 

the local populace and governing authorities. It may indiscriminately fire into crowded marketplaces 

and religious gatherings with the intent to terrorize and influence a relevant population. Targets may 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-19 

include religious or national icons and/or landmarks. These attacks are often used to support the 

overall INFOWAR plan. They may also be used in a manner to shift blame for the attack to the 

enemy. The cell can provide indirect fires in support of insurgent missions. When insurgents need 

additional mortar and rocket fires, they may look to affiliated guerrillas for support. 

2-100. The rocket and mortar cell typically consists of a mortar team and a rocket team. Each team may 

have approximately six personnel. The mortar team of the cell may have light and/or medium mortars. 

When it uses medium mortars, it may require additional ammunition bearers and possibly a light truck for 

transporting the weapon. The rocket team normally fires medium rockets, sometimes from improvised 

rocket launchers. The mortar team and rocket team can conduct missions as a cell or conduct mortar and 

rocket missions as separate teams. The normal plan is for the team(s) to execute a fire mission and quickly 

disperse from the firing point. 

2-101. When not engaged in specialized activities, the mortar and rocket direct action cell can serve 

as a multifunction direct action cell. The mortars, rockets, and associated equipment may be 

cached or left behind, in which case the cell members carry weapons and munitions similar to the 

multifunction cell. 

Supporting Cells 

2-102. Supporting cells support and assist operations of the direct action cells or the insurgent 

organization as a whole. At the local level, the supporting cells either support the roles of the direct action 

cells or exploit their successes. The same types of supporting cells may be present in a higher insurgent 

organization. Figure 2-7 shows the graphic symbols of supporting cells. 

2-103. Supporting cells that may be present in the insurgent organization are— 

 Intelligence. 

 Counterintelligence and internal security. 

 Planning. 

 INFOWAR. 

 Technical support. 

 Logistics. 

 Communications and tradecraft. 

 Finance. 

 Shelter. 

 Training. 

 Recruiting. 

 Transportation. 

 Civil affairs. 

 Medical. 

2-104. The local insurgent organization normally possesses the supporting capabilities listed here. 

However, some of these functions may be combined, rather than having separate cells. Also, supporting 

cells are not limited to these types. 

Intelligence Cell 

2-105. The intelligence cell plans, coordinates, and implements the insurgent intelligence collection plan 

and provides intelligence and information to support insurgent operations. The cell also conducts 

reconnaissance to obtain information about the activities, tactics, and resources of the enemy and potential 

supporters of the insurgency. Reconnaissance methods include surveillance, use of informants, and 

infiltration of organizations. Observation is the most common method used to conduct reconnaissance. 

2-106. The insurgent organization usually produces its own general intelligence and targeting 

information. Every member of the insurgent organization is an intelligence-gathering mechanism. 

Intelligence cell personnel may serve in any occupation (such as a taxi or delivery driver, or truck driver) 

that allows them to blend in with the population and still provides them the flexibility and mobility needed 
Chapter 2 

2-20 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

to gather information. Information in raw form may be freely provided by sympathizers conducting 

surveillance on behalf of the insurgent organization while living, traveling, or working near either a target 

area or the enemy. Raw information may also be purchased locally from affiliated insurgents, guerrillas, or 

criminal organizations. The intelligence cell analyzes all this information and turns it into intelligence. 

2-107. In addition to conducting intelligence analysis, typical activities of an intelligence cell may 

include— 

 Tracking enemy movements. 

 Determining enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

 Scouting potential targets. 

 Establishing enemy vulnerabilities. 

 Selecting attack locations. 

 Stalking potential assassination targets. 

I

IED

I

Intelligence

Counterintelligence

and Internal Security

Logistics

Cell 

INFO

WAR I

SAFE I

Transportation

Shelter

Medical

Finance

Civil Affairs

MI

I

Recruiting

I

Training

I

Planning

I

CI

Technical

Support

I

I

I

I INFO

WAR

I

I

Communications

and Tradecraft

Note. If the I (for insurgent) does not fit in the diamond-shaped unit symbol, it is placed to

the right of the diamond. For cells or teams with a specific function for which standard

military symbology has no functional symbol, it is necessary to either include an

abbreviation for that function inside the diamond or to identify the nature of the cell or team

with a note outside the diamond.

Figure 2-7. Insurgent supporting cell graphic symbols 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-21 

2-108. Collecting information is a continuous function performed by every insurgent organization. Overt 

activities include the open collection of information by individuals who circulate among the people. Other 

activities involve secret collection of information. This can include information collected through the use of 

extortion, bribery, or coercion. Insurgents also collect information using electronic devices and humanintelligence agents who may join or infiltrate popular organizations, government organizations, and 

nongovernmental organizations. The intelligence cell of a local insurgent organization may further 

disseminate the information to its counterpart intelligence cell in a higher insurgent organization. 

2-109. When planning any action, an intelligence cell analyzes information from all available sources. 

Sleeper agents, members of the insurgent organization, or active supporters and sympathizers who may 

have resided within the target area for years often have the specific mission of gathering information. This 

information may later serve to support direct action missions. 

2-110. The information gathered by the insurgent organization is used to plan future activities and 

determine the feasibility of planned actions. In the offense, efforts are concentrated on the enemy at his 

location and the area surrounding the target. In the defense, the reconnaissance effort is to determine when 

and where the enemy will conduct offensive actions against insurgent forces. 

2-111. The insurgent organization’s intelligence may be superior to the enemy’s. This is because 

insurgents may have— 

 More intimate first-hand knowledge of all aspects of the local environment. 

 Close relationships with the population. 

 Penetration of governmental structures. 

 Ability to maintain observation across the countryside or urban area. 

Counterintelligence and Internal Security Cell 

2-112. The counterintelligence (CI) and internal security cell conducts internal CI and operations security 

(OPSEC) activities. Members of this cell infiltrate other cells to identify security weaknesses or breaches, 

and enforce proper security measures. The cellular structure of the insurgent organization helps ensure 

against the compromise of the identity, location, or activities of leaders and members of other cells should 

there be a breach of internal security. 

2-113. The local insurgent organization must place great emphasis on the conduct of internal CI activities 

because of the criticality of maintaining cohesion within the hazardous environment in which it operates. It 

is susceptible to infiltration by enemy agents. If the local insurgent organization is infiltrated, it will not 

survive. 

2-114. It is within the CI and internal security cell that all OPSEC measures for the organization’s 

activities, as well as other security measures, are developed, disseminated, and enforced. In most insurgent 

organizations, violation of these security rules can result in immediate death to the violator and/or his 

family members. This cell is responsible for maiming or assassinating current or former insurgent members 

who commit breaches. Paranoia among the members actually increases security, since all members desire 

to remain free of suspicion. Individuals assigned to the CI and internal security cell are usually mature, 

experienced, or senior in the organization. 

Planning Cell 

2-115. The planning cell conducts near-, mid-, and long-term planning for missions of the insurgent 

organization. This cell plans current and future actions of direct action and other supporting cells that 

contribute to the goals of the overall organization. It coordinates cooperation among cells, when necessary. 

It works closely with the intelligence and training cells to coordinate capabilities and minimize the impact 

of organizational limitations on insurgent operations. 

2-116. The cellular structure of the insurgent organization helps ensure against the compromise of the 

plans and actions of direct action and/or supporting cells should there be a breach of internal security. 

Communication between and among cells may use intermediaries to provide additional security from 

infiltration and/or identification of key leaders and planners. 
Chapter 2 

2-22 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Information Warfare Cell 

2-117. The information warfare (INFOWAR) cell plans, coordinates, and implements the local insurgent 

organization’s INFOWAR activities. (See appendix A for more detail on INFOWAR.) This cell also 

provides guidance and assistance to the direct action cells (INFOWAR) whenever required. Portions of the 

cell may be dispersed. 

2-118. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the INFOWAR cell may be 

capable of several functions. Some example functions are— 

 Information management (internal methods, links, and security). 

 Media manipulation (misinformation and disinformation). 

 Public affairs designed to influence the population 

 Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda videos, broadcast successes of 

direct action teams, and printing). 

 Rumor control. 

 Sabotage actions. 

 Civic actions. 

 Fund-raising (including international). 

 Recruiting. 

 Indoctrination training. 

 Assistance in cyber-mining for intelligence. 

All these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals. Some of the functions may require 

specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation function may require expertise and/or advice 

from a cleric; a political, tribal, ethic, or cultural leader; or other subject matter experts. 

2-119. IED and other attacks are often used to support the overall INFOWAR plan. In all direct action 

cells, key events (especially successes) are recorded on digital video and still cameras. Upon mission 

completion, the recordings are turned over to the INFOWAR cell for manipulation and exploitation. 

Although the direct action cell has a video camcorder and digital camera capability within its cell, an 

INFOWAR cell may be tasked to provide video or digital collection of the event for rapid media 

distribution in the insurgent INFOWAR campaign. 

Technical Support Cell 

2-120. The technical support cell is responsible for all acquisition, manufacturing, and storage of bombs, 

mines, and other tactical demolitions and fuze materiel. It is the primary bomb factory for the insurgent 

organization. Bombs can include— 

 IEDs. 

 Signal flares (actually a subcategory of IEDs). 

 Bombs configured for individual and vehicular suicide tasks. 

 Even a WMD, when materiel and expertise is available in the insurgent organization. 

2-121. Bombs (specifically IEDs) are a preferred weapon of choice for the insurgent organization. This 

is because— 

 They are inexpensive. 

 The materials are readily available. 

 They are relatively easy to build. 

 They are extremely destructive. 

Bombs (IEDs) may be very sophisticated or extremely simple. They easily lend themselves to 

terrorizing the population. They are used in support of assassination, maiming, sabotage, mass 

casualties, and mass destruction. 

2-122. Although members of the technical support cell are very capable of emplacing and detonating 

IEDs and other demolitions, they normally do not do so. Their expertise is far too critical for them to 

routinely go on direct action missions. Direct action cells emplace and trigger the devices. On occasion, a 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-23 

representative from the technical support cell may be required to accompany the direct action cell to 

properly emplace and detonate the device, especially when dealing with WMD IEDs. Those insurgents 

requiring specific expertise in the fabrication, emplacement, and detonation of WMD such as radiation 

(dirty bombs) and biological weapons may acquire the expertise and material from outside the local 

insurgent organization. 

2-123. The number of teams subordinate to the technical support cell is not fixed and varies depending on 

the specific missions. Types of teams that may comprise the technical support cell are— 

 Demolition, sabotage, and IED team. 

 Suicide IED team (individual and vehicular). 

 WMD support team. 

2-124. Demolition, Sabotage, and IED Team. The demolition, sabotage, and IED team is the primary 

IED and tactical munitions factory for the technical support cell. This team is responsible for all 

acquisition, manufacturing, and storage of IEDs, suicide bombs, side-attack (antitank and anti-vehicle) 

mines, and other tactical demolitions and fuzing for munitions. The team prepares these devices for 

distribution to other elements of the insurgent organization or affiliated organizations and/or persons. Some 

demolition, sabotage, and IED teams may be located in factories in small villages (or other remote areas or 

local accommodations) where they build their IEDs and then smuggle them into cities, where suppliers may 

then distribute them (or sell them) to insurgent organizations or other customers. 

2-125. This team provides IEDs (usually unassembled, pre-manufactured components) to direct action 

cells. The direct action cell then assembles and adds a fuze or detonator to the IEDs. Some direct action 

cells may not have access to the expertise or products (IEDs) provided by the technical support cell. In 

these cases, the team trains, advises, and provides expertise to direct action cells. The team may also train 

direct action cells to manufacture limited qualities of IEDs for their own use. 

2-126. The demolition, sabotage, and IED team may train, advise, and provide expertise to direct action 

cells (especially the multifunction cells) on how, where, and when, to emplace and detonate munitions and 

on the proper assembly, fuzing, and detonation of the devices. The team also provides instruction on 

remotely detonated mines. 

2-127. Suicide IED Team. A suicide IED team (individual and vehicular) is responsible for acquisition, 

manufacturing, and storage of IEDs and/or vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) for 

suicide missions. The number of such teams in a technical support cell is not fixed and varies depending on 

specific missions. All suicide IED/VBIED team personnel are cross-trained to perform all functions 

necessary to fabricate IEDs and VBIEDs including automotive welding and fabrication. Members of the 

team are very capable of detonating IED/VBIEDs and other demolitions, but they normally do not do so—

even to detonate a device carried or driven by someone else. 

2-128. Direct action cells are responsible for the emplacement and detonation of the IED/VBIEDs. 

Suicide bombers/drivers are recruited by the recruiting cell, and turned over to direct action cells to 

properly emplace the individual-carried IEDs and VBIEDs. Once the direct action cell has ensured the 

proper emplacement of the IED/VBIED, they can either trigger the IED/VBIEDs remotely or use other 

detonation methods. On occasion, a representative from the suicide IED/VBIED team may be required to 

accompany the direct action cell to ensure proper emplacement and detonation of the device. 

2-129. WMD Support Team. The WMD support team has the primary purpose of creating weapons to 

either terrorize or influence a relevant population and governing authorities. Insurgent organizations use 

indiscriminate techniques to create mass casualties and mass disruption. Chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear (CBRN) weapons are the potential weapons of choice for organizations employing terror 

tactics. Insurgent organizations may obtain or use CBRN weapons for a variety of motives. They might 

threaten the use of these weapons as “saber rattlers” to raise the ante in response to political or military 

actions of the governing authority or foreign powers. They may actually use such weapons to achieve a 

specific objective or to terrorize. 

2-130. Use of a WMD such as a radiological (dirty bomb) and biological weapon can require specific 

expertise in fabrication, emplacement, and detonation or activation of the WMD. The WMD support team 
Chapter 2 

2-24 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

acquires necessary expertise and material from outside the local insurgent organization. Other types of 

WMD may be relatively simple to fabricate and use with devastating effects. 

2-131. Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and/or toxic industrial material (TIM) can be used as a WMD to 

cause mass casualties and psychological stress and anxiety. Most WMD support teams have easy access to 

TICs and TIM. TICs are highly toxic commercial chemical substances with acute toxicity that are produced 

in large quantities for industrial purposes. They can be solid, liquid, or gas. These are the normal weapons 

of choice for the WMD support team. TIM has similar toxicity and can be used as a complement to TICs or 

other mass effects on an enemy such as officials of a governing authority and/or a relevant population. Even 

though a mass release of TICs or TIM causing numerous noncombatant casualties was due to an IED explosion, 

the insurgent organization might be able to blame the casualties on the enemy as an intentional act. 

2-132. Once an insurgent organization acquires the ability to produce WMD IEDs, a WMD support team 

will normally have at least one such weapon fabricated and available at any given time. It may also have 

others in various stages of manufacture. 

2-133. All WMD support team personnel are cross-trained to perform all functions necessary to fabricate 

WMD IEDs. However, team members do not normally emplace and detonate WMD IEDs because their 

expertise is too critical to risk in direct action missions. Direct action cells emplace and trigger the WMD 

IEDs. On occasion, a representative from the WMD support team may need to accompany the direct action 

cell to ensure proper placement and detonation of the weapon. 

Logistics Cell 

2-134. The logistics cell is the resource planner for the insurgent organization. This cell is responsible for 

the planning, acquisition, and distribution of all resources ̶ human and materiel. Resources can come from 

sources outside of the insurgent area of interest, or can be obtained from within the geographic area. In 

addition to the direct purchase of materiel and/or support and services, the insurgent organization can 

obtain logistics in ways to include the following: 

 Theft from the governing authority. 

 Voluntary donations from a supportive relevant population. 

 Tax and/or levy on local and area populations. 

 Specified materiel from a relevant population in exchange for social services and/or health 

welfare support. 

 Self-manufacturing of designated materiel. 

Communiciations and Tradecraft Cell 

2-135. The communications and tradecraft cell is the communications planner for the insurgent 

organization. The cell advises insurgent organization leaders on the feasibility of all insurgent activities 

from a communications perspective. It also determines the internal communications equipment necessary 

for the success of direct action missions. 

2-136. This cell facilitates communications inside and outside of the organization with a courier service, 

dead-drop locations, and other tradecraft (clandestine) communications. It also provides multiple electronic 

means for digital and secure communications. It is equipped with computers, radios, small satellite 

communication antennas, and long-range cordless telephones. The cell is a source of communications, 

Internet, electronic tradecraft, and steganography expertise and provides training as required. It maintains 

close coordination with the INFOWAR cell for Internet communications. 

2-137. This cell provides courier service as s simple and secure means of communication among cells in 

the insurgent organization. Transportation for a courier may be a civilian model motorcycle, moped, motor 

scooter, bicycle, sedan, or even a taxi. The courier probably will not have an overt weapon or radio and will 

appear to be a noncombatant. Another insurgent may ride with the courier as a lookout or to provide 

security. Depending on the circumstances, some couriers may not use vehicles and will be used instead as 

foot messengers. Couriers may be male, female, or even children. Messages may be written, encrypted, or 

memorized and presented orally in person. 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-25 

Finance Cell 

2-138. The finance cell is the financial and economic planner and provider for the insurgent organization. 

It determines the internal financial requirements necessary for the success of direct action missions. This 

cell plans local fund-raising activities such as bribery, extortion, robbery, and operating front companies in 

order to finance and resource the insurgent organization’s activities. It also has links to regional, national, 

and international fund-raising activities. The cell also determines the roles of direct action cells and other 

cells in acquiring additional funds for the insurgent organization. 

2-139. Finance personnel establish and monitor internal and external funding and funds management 

mechanisms. Skilled operators appeal to the local and international community, possibly through the 

media, for political, monetary, and logistics support. They may do this in coordination with the INFOWAR 

cell and logistics cell. 

2-140. Voluntary or coerced contributions from the diaspora of a relevant population are a significant 

enterprise of regional, international, and transnational connections for the insurgency. Both governmental 

and nongovernmental donations and grants may wittingly or unwittingly finance an insurgency. 

Shelter Cell 

2-141. The shelter cell plans for and provides secure accommodations at safe houses for direct action and 

supporting cells. Safe houses may also accommodate visiting and high-ranking insurgents. These shelters 

are closely coordinated with the intelligence, planning, logistics, and transportation cells. Caches of 

materiel can be aligned with locations of safe houses and/or transit routes to and from insurgent areas of 

interest and territorial safe havens. 

2-142. Sympathizers in the relevant population may volunteer their homes, equipment, vehicles, and 

services. Maximum use is made of local assistance and facilities regardless of capability. 

Training Cell 

2-143. The training cell plans and coordinates training for the insurgent organization members. Training 

covers the basic organization, duties, and responsibilities of the insurgent organization, and advances to 

specialized training of insurgents for cell or team responsibilities. 

2-144. Basic instruction includes— 

 Basic marksmanship. 

 Surveillance and intelligence-collection methods. 

 Basic tactical instruction. 

 Communications techniques. 

2-145.Examples of specialized instruction may include advanced tactical instruction such as conduct of— 

 Ambushes. 

 Assaults. 

 Raids. 

 Assassination. 

 Bombing with IEDs. 

 Sniper activities. 

 Advanced surveillance and intelligence-collection methods. 

 Kidnapping. 

 Extortion. 

2-146. Training may be centralized or be conducted at the cell level depending on the structure and 

mission of the insurgent organization. Generally, training is a combination of both with the 

basics taught in a centralized location and specific mission and functional training conducted at 

the local cell level. Training may be distributed via the Internet. Training actions are coordinated 

closely with the planning and recruiting cells. 
Chapter 2 

2-26 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Recruiting Cell 

2-147. The recruiting cell provides the manpower resourcing and recruitment planning and for integrating 

recruits into the insurgent organization. Recruiting can promote radical religious, militant ethnic, 

nationalist, or social agendas that propose to remedy compelling grievances within a relevant population. 

Recruits might not be aware of the true nature of the organization they are joining. Recruiting may be 

wittingly or unwittingly financed from both governmental and nongovernmental donations and grants. 

2-148. Often, legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for insurgent organizations. The 

organizations from which individuals can be recruited need not necessarily be violent or illegal themselves, 

but simply contain populations that are sympathetic to the same goals as the insurgent organization. 

Recruiting may be for particular skills, training, and/or qualifications and may not be tied to ideological 

characteristics. Insurgent organizations may attempt to recruit current and former members of national 

armed forces, both as trained operatives and as agents in place. 

2-149. The recruiting cell uses many varied and different methods to persuade potential insurgents to join 

them. Some of these persuading factors may be monetary, religious, ethic, nationalistic, anger, promise of 

power, or fear. The Internet is a powerful recruitment tool. The recruiting cell maintains close coordination 

with the INFOWAR cell. 

2-150. Insurgents may also use coercion and leverage to gain limited or one-time cooperation from useful 

individuals. This cooperation can range anywhere from gaining information to conducting a suicide 

bombing. Blackmail and intimidation are common forms of coercion. Threats to family members are also 

employed. Coercion is often directed at personnel in government security and intelligence organizations. 

2-151. Internal security is the primary concern of the insurgent organization when recruiting. First, a 

potential recruit must pass an intense screening process. Once selected for recruitment, he/she is then 

closely monitored by the CI and internal security cell prior to full recruitment and integration into the 

insurgent organization. 

Transportation Cell 

2-152. The transportation cell plans and facilitates transportation for the insurgent organization. It 

responds to transportation requirements of other cells in the organization, especially the logistics and direct 

action cells. If sufficient or specific transportation is not available, the transportation cell either provides or 

arranges for it. 

2-153. Insurgents may have no vehicles or supplies at all and depend completely on caches, porters, or 

other transportation or supply means. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. 

Depending on the mission, the local insurgent organization may be augmented by any and every type of 

personnel and/or vehicle. Insurgents may requisition or confiscate local civilian transportation assets and 

materiel. This includes the use of civilian personnel for drivers, porters, lookouts, and security personnel. 

Draft animals may also be used as bearers and/or porters. 

2-154. The vehicles in the transportation cell are indistinguishable from civilian vehicles and are always 

kept as dispersed as possible, in order to prevent detection and destruction by the governing authority. 

Rarely, if ever, will all vehicles in the cell be colocated. Whenever possible, vehicles are dispersed for use 

by locals as commercial, delivery, agricultural, general cargo, construction, and general-purpose vehicles 

used in everyday life. When required, the transportation cell assembles the appropriate mix of vehicles to 

transport items and/or personnel to a specific location. After performing the necessary transportation tasks, 

the vehicles then melt back into the general population and environment. 

Civil Affairs Cell 

2-155. The civil affairs cell is responsible for the planning, preparation, and implementation of all civil 

affairs activities for the insurgent organization. It organizes a synchronized program of actions for the 

benefit of a relevant population. The cell may work openly and/or discretely with the INFOWAR cell for 

media manipulation to ensure the insurgent organization gets credit for providing those benefits. 
Insurgents 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-27 

2-156. Key civil affairs events are digitally recorded on digital video and still cameras in order to 

publicize results and successes intended to create a positive image in the relevant population. Some 

activities may be staged to enhances the prestige of the insurgent organization and/or present a negative 

image of the governing authority. The recordings are transferred to the INFOWAR cell for 

manipulation and exploitation and/or released to sympathetic media for local or worldwide 

distribution. 

Medical Cell 

2-157. Insurgent medics are combatants. When necessary, they fight. Insurgent medical personnel may be 

a mixture of men and women. Women may make up 50 percent or more of the medical cell strength. 

2-158. The insurgent organization has limited medical capability. However, insurgent medical care is 

coupled with local medical assets in the area whenever possible. Maximum use is made of local medical 

assistance and facilities regardless of medical capability. 

2-159. Insurgents will persuade and/or coerce local civilian medical support when needed. Sympathizers 

in the local populace may volunteer their homes, equipment, vehicles, and services for ad hoc medical care. 

Local medical personnel may volunteer to treat the ill and wounded. Sympathizers may also assist in the 

evacuation of wounded insurgents to civilian, militia, state, or even military facilities. Evacuation means 

can include general-purpose cargo vehicles, carts, or even taxis. 

2-160. When necessary, supported direct action cells receive litters from the medical cell to transport 

wounded. The supported cell provides its own litter bearers. Noncombatants may also be forced to serve as 

litter bearers. 

2-161. A medical aid station is usually set up in a fairly safe area, while other medics may accompany 

direct action cells or other insurgents. When necessary, medical functions are performed in tents, 

tunnels, caves, or local accommodations. In some cases, the medical cell may colocate with a 

village clinic. Insurgents may or may not have the services of a civilian medical officer (physician). If 

available, the physician can provide immediate trauma stabilization and minor surgical intervention. 

Meanwhile, the medics provide limited medical intervention, minor surgery, and treatment of most 

common illnesses and lesser wounds. 

2-162. Severe and long-term medical care relies on evacuation to civilian or other medical facilities. More 

routine and excess ill and wounded are transported to civilian medical facilities or may be cared for in 

insurgent safe havens. 

2-163. As the insurgent organization establishes gradual control in designated areas, medical care extends 

beyond the role of preserving capabilities of only the insurgent organization. Basic preventive medicine and 

medical care can be offered to a relevant population as a means to encourage and develop popular support. 
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17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-1 

Chapter 3 

Guerrillas 

This chapter presents an overview of guerrilla organizations and actions as part of the 

irregular OPFOR for training U.S. forces. Training conditions presented by this type 

of OPFOR are a composite of real-world guerrilla forces and indicate guerrilla 

capabilities and limitations that may be present in actual operational environments 

(OEs). Guerrilla combat power can be enhanced by possible affiliations with 

other combatants such as insurgents, criminal elements, special-purpose forces 

(SPF), or regular military forces. Passive or active civilian supporters can expand 

guerrilla capabilities. 

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 

3-1. A guerrilla force is a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along 

military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory (JP 

3-05). Thus, guerrilla units are an irregular force, but structured similar to regular military forces. They 

resemble military forces in their command and control (C2) and can use military-like tactics and 

techniques. Guerrillas normally operate in areas occupied by an enemy or where a hostile actor threatens 

their intended purpose and objectives. Therefore, guerrilla units adapt to circumstances and available 

resources in order to sustain or improve their combat power. Guerrillas do not necessarily comply with 

international law or conventions on the conduct of armed conflict between and among declared 

belligerents. 

SCOPE AND DURATION OF OPERATIONS

3-2. The area of operations (AOR) for guerrilla units may be quite large in relation to the size of the force. 

The reason for this is that a large number of small guerrilla units can be widely dispersed. Guerrilla 

operations may occur as independent squad or team actions. In other cases, operations could involve a 

guerrilla brigade and/or independent units at battalion, company, and platoon levels. A guerrilla unit can be 

an independent paramilitary organization and/or a military-like component of an insurgency. Guerrilla 

actions focus on the tactical level of conflict and its operational impacts. Guerrilla units can operate at 

various levels of local, regional, or international reach. In some cases, transnational affiliations can provide 

significant support to guerrilla operations. 

3-3. Guerrilla forces are adaptive, flexible, and agile in quickly changing their composition to optimize 

organizational capabilities against known or perceived vulnerabilities of an enemy. Guerrillas exploit 

familiarity with their physical environment and the ability to blend into the local populace. Small guerrilla 

units have great mobility and ability to move throughout enemy-occupied areas. 

3-4. Guerrillas seek to gain small psychological victories. These victories do not need to be significant in 

terms of material damage to the enemy. These tactical victories only need to show that a small guerrilla 

force can defeat [at least parts of] a much larger enemy force. 

3-5. Guerrilla forces take prudent risks when an expectation exists for successful attack on an enemy, but 

may also make significant practical sacrifices in individuals and materiel in order to achieve a major 

psychological impact on an enemy. Guerrillas also apply information warfare (INFOWAR) capabilities to 

weaken or exhaust enemy resolve. 
Chapter 3 

3-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

3-6. Ultimately, the resolve of guerrilla leaders and members of guerrilla organizations determines how 

long to continue guerrilla operations. Time is a key factor that guerrilla forces use as a combat multiplier in 

a long-term commitment to degrade and eventually defeat the will of an enemy. The goal is not necessarily 

to defeat enemy forces but to outlast them. This long-term struggle includes a full range of actions that 

range from espionage and media manipulation to more violent actions such as sabotage, assassination, 

bombing, ambushes, and raids. Guerrillas can use acts of terrorism to achieve either selective or random 

psychological stress and physical damage or destruction. Actions are typically quick and violent, followed 

by rapid dispersal of assembled guerrilla forces. 

3-7. Factors that affect the scope and duration of guerrilla operations include— 

 The level of sympathetic support from an indigenous relevant population. 

 Regional sociological demographics and ethnic-racial relationships and tensions. 

 Governance actions and support services to a relevant population by a civil or military authority 

in a contested region. 

 Economic stability and disproportionate distribution of benefits to a relevant population. 

 Physical and seasonal aspects of topography and climate. 

 The amount of covert or overt support from organizations or states with interests in a contested 

region. 

Note. TC 7-100.2 complements this publication in regard to tactics, and FM 7-100.4 provides 

details of organization, manning, weapons, and equipment. For weapons and equipment data, see 

the Worldwide Equipment Guide. 

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTORS

3-8. Guerrillas can act separately from other groups, organizations, and/or activities in conflict with the 

same enemy or act in conjunction with them to pursue common objectives. Depending on local or regional 

conditions, some guerrilla units may be affiliated with or subordinate to regular forces or an insurgent 

organization, or they may operate as independent of such organizations. Regular forces can provide overt 

and covert support for guerrilla operations, including the expertise of advisors, liaison teams, and SPF. 

Guerrilla units can be associated with regular forces on a temporary basis for particular missions, but would 

be incorporated into regular forces only when their capabilities are similar to those of the regular forces 

operating in the same geographic area. 

Note. Affiliated organizations are those operating in another organization’s AOR that the latter 

organization may be able to sufficiently influence to act in concert with it for a limited time. No 

command relationship exists between an affiliated organization and the organization in whose 

AOR it operates. 

3-9. Guerrillas are more likely to be incorporated in and subordinate to an insurgent organization when 

both are parts of the irregular OPFOR. A guerrilla organization that is affiliated with or subordinate to an 

insurgent organization may also be affiliated with SPF, other regular military forces, and/or criminal 

elements. Guerrillas will generally accept help from any other organization as long as it meets a need and is 

compatible with the guerrilla force’s interests and objectives. 

3-10. Guerrillas can be part of the Hybrid Threat (HT). The HT can be any combination of two or more of 

the following components: regular forces, irregular forces (such as guerrillas and/or insurgents), and/or 

criminal elements. Possible HT combinations include guerrillas operating openly with regular military 

forces or various forms of covert cooperation or support. (See TC 7-100 for detailed discussion on the HT.) 

3-11. Guerrilla associations with other actors in a contested region can vary, and relationships may change 

periodically during a long-term conflict. Guerrillas may have relationships with local or higher-level 

insurgent organizations or criminal organizations. If a standing relationship does exist among guerrillas and 

other irregular OPFOR or HT actors, any allegiance or affiliation may be focused on single-issue 

agreements or a mutual ideological commitment. Affiliation with criminal organizations is dependent upon 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-3 

the mutual needs of a criminal organization and a guerrilla unit or may be a contractual arrangement for 

specific tasks. Guerrilla activities often overlap with criminal activities. 

3-12. In addition to possible affiliations with insurgent, criminal, or regular military organizations, 

guerrilla units may also be affiliated with supportive civilians, perhaps covert informal support networks 

acting with a façade such as a charitable organization. The support provided by different categories of 

civilians can include— 

 Coerced support of guerrilla actions. 

 Passive support by people sympathetic to the goals of the guerrillas. 

 Actors actively supporting and engaging in combat support or sustainment of the guerrillas. 

Guerrillas may depend heavily on the active and passive support from the local population (see chapter 1). 

Note. Active sympathizers may provide important logistics services but not directly participate 

in combat operations. If they participate in guerrilla activities, they become guerrillas. 

AFFILIATION WITH SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES

3-13. When guerrilla organizations are affiliated with the military forces of an external nation-state, they 

are most likely to be associated with special-purpose forces (SPF). SPF carry out operations either 

independently or in coordination with regular and/or irregular forces (such as guerrillas). In some cases, 

SPF can provide funding for specific guerrilla activities or for the entire guerrilla organization. (See chapter 

15 of TC 7-100.2 for more information on SPF.) 

3-14. The nature of shared goals or interests determines the tenure and type of relationship and the degree 

of affiliation between SPF and guerrillas. For example, the affiliation of an SPF detachment with guerrilla 

organizations is dependent only on the needs of the guerrilla organization or on the needs of the SPF at a 

particular time. The relational dynamics of SPF units are very fluid and apt to change from one day to the 

next. For example, if an SPF mission requires close cooperation with guerrilla forces, those guerrilla units 

can be included in the SPF task organization with the appropriate command and support relationships. 

3-15. SPF can recruit, organize, train, advise, and support guerrillas and conduct (or lead) operations in 

conjunction with them. SPF personnel may fight alongside such affiliates or assist them to prepare for 

offensive actions, diversionary measures, or other missions. In some cases, the SPF will not only advise 

and assist but actually control (command) the guerrilla units as a surrogate force. When guerrilla forces 

support SPF teams, the SPF teams can serve as the planning and command element for these forces. 

3-16. SPF sappers can accompany and/or augment guerrilla units. SPF sappers can train affiliated 

guerrillas as sappers. SPF battalions using sappers in an assault and/or demolition role may need to form 

several sapper platoons. In that case, the additional sapper platoons may be manned by affiliated guerrillas 

or may be a mixture of SPF and guerrillas. SPF sappers can guide guerrillas through enemy lines and 

obstacles to perform their missions (or guerrilla sappers can do the same for SPF teams). An SPF sapper 

team may serve with and train guerrillas on how to infiltrate, set demolitions, and assault enemy 

installations. In some cases, the SPF sappers may train guerillas in the manufacture and employment of 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and signal flares. In other cases, an SPF sapper team may 

manufacture the IEDs and signal flares and then give them to guerrillas to emplace and/or detonate. 

3-17. The deep attack and reconnaissance platoon of an SPF battalion typically operates in enemy-held 

territory. Its missions can include assisting guerrillas in offensive actions or providing communications, 

liaison, and support to stay-behind guerrillas and guerrilla activities in the defense. Almost any type of SPF 

unit can do the same. 

3-18. The long-range signal platoon of an SPF battalion or a signal team from an SPF company can assist 

in training affiliated guerrillas on how to set up, operate, maintain, and transport communications 

equipment. SPF signal teams may accompany and/or augment guerrilla units and support guerrilla 

operations. A single small SPF signal team can provide long-range communications support for guerrilla 

units up to battalion size. A full SPF signal team can do the same for a brigade-size unit. This team may 

also serve in a signals reconnaissance collection role. 
Chapter 3 

3-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

3-19. Various other types of SPF teams may accompany and/or augment guerrilla units and provide them 

with support whenever necessary. Such teams include the following: 

 SPF sniper teams, who may serve as part of a stay-behind element or a hunter-killer (HK) team. 

SPF snipers can also train guerrillas to serve as snipers or marksmen. 

 SPF mortar teams, who may provide mortar support to guerrilla forces. They can also provide 

mortars to the guerillas and train them in the proper use and maintenance of mortars. 

 SPF air defense teams, who may provide air defense support to guerrilla forces. They can also 

provide air defense weapons to the guerillas and train them in the proper use and maintenance of 

those weapons. 

 SPF medical teams, who may provide medical supplies and medical support to guerrilla forces. 

Each SPF medical team is designed to provide medical support for guerrilla units up to brigade 

size. A small medical team can support a battalion-size force. These teams can also train 

guerrilla forces on how to perform emergency medicine, battlefield medical procedures, and 

evacuation. 

 SPF unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) teams, who may provide UAV support to guerrilla forces, 

including the acquisition of reconnaissance information on targets or facilities. 

 SPF diver teams, who may provide diving support to guerrilla forces, including water 

infiltration, reconnaissance, and demolition. These teams can also provide diving equipment to 

guerrilla forces and train them in its use. 

Note. In some instances, SPF can provide guerrilla units with new or high-technology niche 

weapons and equipment and train them to use it. 

3-20. When SPF are to be air-dropped into an area known to contain a guerrilla force of sufficient size and 

nature to warrant cultivating as an affiliated force, the guerrilla force, in all probability, will be receptive to 

outside support. Other SPF or regular military forces may have trained the guerrilla force as drop zone 

reception personnel. Once on the ground, the SPF team or detachment attempts to make contact with the 

guerrilla forces. 

LOGISTICS

3-21. Because guerrillas typically operate in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory, they must acquire a 

self-sustaining capability. Although they typically rely on some support from the local population, they 

need to avoid enemy retribution on the population and/or dissatisfaction of the population with the demands 

of supporting a guerrilla force. One example of self-sustainment is to acquire weapons, ammunition, 

supplies, transportation assets, and other commodities by raiding or ambushing enemy forces, locations, 

and installations. In another example of self-sustainment, civilian medical facilities may be used to treat 

guerrillas on a case-by-case clandestine basis, but a preferred capability is to develop medical treatment 

stations and convalescence sites integral to guerrilla safe havens or complex battle positions. 

3-22. Guerrilla units normally have sufficient assets to transport munitions and materiel for the immediate 

short-term fight. Organic transportation and use of available resources of the local area provide the 

guerrillas a degree of autonomy and freedom of action. For a sustained fight, however, guerrillas normally 

require additional support and sources to transport or stage materiel. Such sources can include transport 

assets from higher guerrilla organizations to transport materiel or preposition items in caches for resupply. 

For example, a guerrilla battalion might depend on support from the brigade’s transport company, or a 

guerrilla company might receive support from the battalion’s transport platoon. Other external sources may 

include civilian augmentation. 

3-23. A guerrilla brigade or its subordinates may be augmented by military or civilian vehicles 

(motorcycles, trucks, cars, bicycles, carts, or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles) or personnel depending on 

the mission. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. The guerrilla commander 

may requisition or confiscate local civilian transportation assets and materiel. This includes the use of 

civilian personnel for porters. Vehicles are a mix of military and civilian. The guerrillas may have no 

vehicles at all and depend completely on caches, porters, or other transportation or supply means. 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-5 

3-24. Requirements for obtaining supplies and services from a local population are evaluated in 

conjunction with the sustainment needs of the population. Support to guerrillas from communities is 

coordinated with a willing population, but is sometimes coerced due to tactical needs of the guerrilla force. 

Guerrillas recognize that recurring requisition or confiscation of materiel may alienate the population. 

Therefore, the guerrillas may institute a system for receipts and eventual compensation of the citizenry. 

3-25. Sustained combat and/or participation in a fight by guerrilla units may require significant operational, 

administrative, and logistics support from regular military forces operating in the same geographic area. 

This type of regular forces support complements the significant sustainment that guerrillas require from 

a local or regional populace. As a basic level of logistics support, guerrillas subsist primarily from 

locally available resources. This limitation influences the size of a guerrilla unit and its proximity to 

other guerrilla units. 

PERSONNEL

3-26. Guerrillas often come from impoverished backgrounds and are used to hardships. Typically, they are 

young and in good physical condition. They can make do with less by both design and background. 

3-27. The military-like organizational structure and intent of a guerrilla unit is often accompanied by a 

military style of clothing or uniform, equipment and weapons, and distinctive badges or insignia. However, 

a guerrilla may not always wear a military-like uniform. They may wear civilian clothing and be 

indistinguishable from the local population (other than weaponry, which they may conceal or discard). 

Although most guerrillas are armed, they may seek to avoid being identified as guerrillas by giving the 

appearance that their weapons are part of their normal civilian occupation or activities. Weapons and other 

materiel may be concealed until they are needed for a guerrilla action. 

3-28. Some, or all, guerrillas may be part-time fighters and melt back into the civilian population when not 

assembled to conduct operations. Guerrillas may continue their normal positions in society and lead 

clandestine lives as members of a guerrilla organization. They may be a local resident one moment and a 

guerrilla the next. 

3-29. Guerrillas may be a mixture of men, women, and children. Women and children may be used as 

runners, messengers, scouts, guides, suicide bombers, drivers, porters, snipers, lookouts, or in other roles. 

They may also emplace and/or detonate IEDs, signal flares, and mines. Women (and possibly children) 

may be fighters and participate in drive-by shootings, assassinations, and/or assaults. 

3-30. Since most guerrillas are indigenous to the area in which they are fighting, their knowledge of the 

local population, customs, issues, language, and terrain are first hand. They use this understanding to 

develop working relationships with the populace. They can apply this knowledge to win support, develop 

intelligence networks, gain new recruits, and/or develop effective propaganda. If the guerrillas are not able 

to persuade the local populace to provide support, they have the force to coerce them. 

Note. Members of a guerilla force are predominantly indigenous to the region but may include 

personnel who are not indigenous to a particular guerrilla unit’s AOR and may have 

characteristics significantly different from most of the guerrilla force or the local population. 

BASE CAMPS AND TRAINING CAMPS

3-31. Like any other armed force, guerrillas have requirements for C2, rest, resupply, refit, and training. 

The larger the guerrilla force and the more active they are, the more they will need established bases, both 

semipermanent and temporary. 

3-32. Guerrillas who are part-time fighters may prefer to continue to live in their own homes. They would 

assemble into guerrilla units only for the time necessary to carry out a mission and then return to their 

homes. They would establish and occupy base camps only if security does not permit them to live at home 

or in order to prepare for actions involving more than just a few squads or HK teams. Platoon and larger 

organizations typically operate out of a base camp. 
Chapter 3 

3-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

3-33. Guerrilla forces may need to avoid large concentrations of troops in camps. Even though logistics 

conditions may permit large troop concentrations, commands normally are broken up into small camps and 

widely dispersed. Dispersion facilitates concealment, mobility, and security. Large forces may be 

concentrated to perform specific operations. On completing the operation, the force is dispersed quickly 

into small units. 

3-34. Base camps must be relatively safe and secure in areas where guerrillas can rest, eat, and plan. More 

sophisticated guerrilla base camps have command posts, training areas, communications facilities, medical 

stations, and logistics centers. These base camps, however, are not the same as bases of regular military 

forces. They are usually small in overall scope, spread out, and sometimes underground. Guerrillas try to 

locate base camps within guerrilla-controlled areas where cover and concealment provide security against 

detection. In rural areas, base camps tend to be in areas where the guerrillas have popular support. Urban 

guerrillas may rent or confiscate houses for use as temporary bases for small guerrilla forces, such as HK 

teams. Guerrillas will normally avoid battling over their base camp. If the site is discovered, the guerrillas 

will abandon it and move to another location. Routes into a base camp will be constantly observed for 

security. Mines, signal flares, IEDs, and ambushes are used as standard security enhancements. If surprised 

or cornered, guerrillas will vigorously defend themselves with a delaying action while evacuating key 

personnel and equipment. 

3-35. Common characteristics of guerrilla base camps are— 

 Covered and concealed. 

 Located on remote, rough, and inaccessible terrain. 

 Suitable for bivouac. 

 Well defined and defended perimeter. 

 Planned escape routes. 

3-36. Guerrilla base camps are temporary or semipermanent and depend on secrecy for their existence. 

These bases are kept small, and usually there is more than one base in the guerrilla unit’s AOR. Guerrillas 

typically use four types of base camps: 

 The main camp. 

 Reserve camps that are in a preselected location and would be occupied if the main camp must 

be permanently evacuated. 

 Temporary camps located close to current combat operations and occupied only during those 

operations. 

 False camps located away from main and reserve camps to deceive enemy forces. 

3-37. Guerrillas favor level, well-drained campsites with good water supply, natural fuel, cover, and 

adequate vegetation to provide concealment from visual observation. The preferred camps are also chosen 

with a view toward easy access to the target population, access to a friendly or neutral border, good escape 

routes, and good observation of approach routes for enemy forces. When enemy operations force the 

guerrillas out of their preferred base camps, they tend to establish camps in rugged, inhospitable areas not 

easily penetrated by enemy forces. 

Base Camp Security 

3-38. To provide security against detection, guerrillas attempt to locate base camps in areas with cover and 

concealment. Usually, the rougher the terrain, the less likely is the chance of being surprised by enemy 

forces. While guerrillas avoid defensive combat, they emphasize short-term defensive action in the base 

camp vicinity to aid evacuation, if necessary. 

3-39. Base camps are usually in relatively remote areas for security. To preclude accidental discovery, base 

camps are not usually near inhabited areas. However, because the guerrillas must be able to fulfill their 

logistics needs, their base camp usually will not be more than a day’s march from a village or town. 

3-40. Guerrilla camps are normally located away from roads, main trails, and civilian communities. The 

surrounding terrain should obstruct rapid enemy approach into the area. The site of the camp should 

provide concealed evacuation routes. The camp is surrounded by guard and warning systems. Prepared 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-7 

positions are organized to delay or destroy enemy forces when this action becomes necessary or desirable. 

Almost every base camp is surrounded by observation posts, preferably located on hilltops. From these 

posts, an early alert is passed enabling timely evacuation of the area. 

Training Camps 

3-41. Guerrilla training camps may be established in both urban and rural environments. While some 

training is accomplished in urban safe houses or rural guerrilla base camps, most training is accomplished 

at locations focused on training. This may be a special urban safe house, a remote guerilla base camp, or a 

training center in another country. 

GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS 

3-42. Guerrillas use a military-like organizational structure for C2 and conduct of operations. For example, 

the basic building block of a guerrilla organization may be a squad consisting of two fire teams. Such 

squads are the basis for building guerrilla platoons, companies, battalions, and brigades. However, guerrilla 

commanders can task-organize these units for specific actions. Even prior to specific actions, whole 

guerrilla companies may already be restructured (task-organized) as hunter-killer (HK) companies, made 

up HK groups, HK sections and HK teams. When a guerrilla battalion consists predominantly of HK 

companies, it may be called a guerrilla HK battalion. When a guerrilla brigade consists predominantly 

of HK battalions (or conceivably of multiple separate HK companies), it may be called a guerrilla 

HK brigade. 

Note. Although this chapter and FM 7-100.4 present typical structures of guerrilla units, these 

forces are also irregular in the sense that individual units can vary in manning, weapons, 

and materiel. 

3-43. Guerrilla organizations may be as large as several brigades or as small as a platoon and/or 

independent HK teams. Often a brigade-size guerrilla force may not be appropriate for a particular mission 

or area AOR. It may be too large, and a task-organized guerrilla battalion may be sufficient. An example 

task-organized battalion might have four or five HK companies, organic battalion units, a weapons battery 

(with a composite of mortar, rocket launcher, and antitank platoons) from brigade, and possibly intelligence 

and INFOWAR augmentations. 

3-44. The hierarchy of military-like terms for guerrilla units (from the bottom up) is as follows: 

 Team or HK team. 

 Squad or HK section. 

 Platoon or HK group. 

 Company or HK company. 

 Battalion (or HK battalion). 

 Brigade (or HK brigade). 

G G G G G G G

Brigade Battalion Company Platoon Group Section Squad Team

X II I

G

Figure 3-1. Guerrilla organization symbols: brigade to team level 
Chapter 3 

3-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Note. Some guerrilla organizations may have honorific titles that do not reflect their true nature 

or size. For example, a guerrilla force that is actually of no more than battalion size may call 

itself a “brigade,” a “corps,” or an “army.” A guerrilla organization may also refer to itself as a 

“militia.” This is a loose usage of the term militia, which generally refers to citizens trained as 

soldiers (as opposed to professional soldiers), but applies more specifically to a state-sponsored 

militia that is part of the state’s armed forces but subject to call only in emergency. To avoid 

confusion, the TC 7-100 series uses militia only in the latter sense. 

3-45. Guerrilla units can be independent units or can be associated with insurgent organizations at local, 

regional, provincial, national, or transnational levels. Organizational relationships between guerrillas and 

insurgents can fluctuate and be mission dependent, event-oriented, mutually coordinated, and/or coerced 

for a specific temporary purpose. The relationship may be one of loose affiliation or involve a more formal 

command relationship. When an insurgency includes guerrilla units, the units may be under the C2 of a 

local insurgent organization or of a higher insurgent organization. The relationships may be temporary and 

remain in effect only as long as the both insurgent organization and guerrilla unit mutually benefit. 

Note. The guerrilla organization diagrams of FM 7-100.4 (on which examples in this chapter are 

based) and the personnel and equipment lists that accompany them are a baseline that U.S. Army 

trainers can modify to provide the appropriate level of combat power as part of the conditions 

required for a particular training exercise and/or training task. The organizational directories of 

FM 7-100.4 provide detailed information on manning, weapons, and equipment for a typical 

guerrilla brigade and its subordinate units, which represent a composite of actual guerrilla forces. 

FM 7-100.4 provides detailed step-by-step instructions on how to construct a task organization 

based on the training requirements. FM 7-100.4 also describes how to select equipment options. 

See also, TC 7-101 for guidance on creating the appropriate OPFOR order of battle during 

exercise design. 

GUERRILLA BRIGADE 

The composition of a guerrilla brigade may vary. The structure depends on several factors, including the 

physical environment, sociological demographics and relationships, economics, and support available from 

external organizations and/or countries. A guerrilla brigade may have over 4,000 guerrillas or may have 

specified units significantly reduced in strength. Figure 3-2 shows an example of such a brigade. 

BRIGADE

HQ

WEAPONS

BATTALION

GUERRILLA

BRIGADE

RECON

COMPANY

SAPPER

COMPANY

SIGNAL

PLATOON

TRANSPORT

COMPANY

MEDICAL

PLATOON

GUERRILLA

BATTALION

Figure 3-2. Guerrilla brigade (example) 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-9 

3-46. The typical composition of a full-strength guerrilla brigade may be as follows: 

 Brigade headquarters. 

 Three or more guerrilla battalions. 

 Weapons battalion. 

 Reconnaissance company. 

 Sapper company. 

 Transport company. 

 Signal platoon. 

 Medical platoon. 

3-47. Guerrilla units are tailored organizational structures based on the conditions of a particular OE and 

available manning, weapons, and equipment. The following are some examples of such tailoring: 

 In a particular OE, a guerrilla brigade could be a multi-battalion combat force operating in 

several AORs, with a full range of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units 

(as in figure 3-2) and possibly affiliated with regular military forces. 

 In mountainous or forested areas with no major population centers, a guerrilla brigade might 

have only one or two battalions (or five or six separate companies) with little or no additional CS 

or CSS. Options could include widely dispersed companies depending on sustainment from local 

resources in a rural context or materiel obtained from defeated enemy forces and isolated enemy 

installations. 

 A guerrilla brigade based in a major urban-industrial center or a megalopolis would probably 

have a distinctly different structure of combat, CS, and CSS capabilities, tailored to readily 

available resources within a densely packed population and urban terrain. 

GUERRILLA BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

3-48. The guerrilla brigade headquarters consists of the brigade command group, brigade staff, and a 

headquarters and service section. The personnel and functions of these organizations are described below. 

Brigade Command Group 

3-49. The brigade command group includes the brigade commander and deputy commander (DC). 

Guerrilla commanders have complete authority over their subordinates and overall responsibility for those 

subordinates’ actions. In the event the commander is killed or incapacitated, the DC assumes command. 

The brigade chief of staff (COS) is considered part of the command group but actually heads the 

brigade staff. 

Brigade Staff 

3-50. The brigade COS exercises direct control over the brigade staff and is in charge of the main 

command post (CP) in the absence of the brigade commander. His role is to direct staff planning and 

coordinate all staff inputs that assist the commander’s decisionmaking. He is the commander’s and DC’s 

focal point for knowledge about the friendly and enemy situation. 

3-51. The brigade staff has three primary staff officers: operations officer, intelligence officer, and officer. 

Each of these heads one the following staff sections: 

 Operations section. 

 Intelligence and information section. 

 Resources section. 

Operations Section 

3-52. The brigade operations section is the basis of the main CP. The brigade COS normally resides with 

this section. Operational signature is small. Whenever possible, staff functions are performed in tents, 

tunnels, caves, or local accommodations. When mounted, the main CP usually operates from command and 

staff vehicles. The brigade commander determines how to organize C2 of the brigade and how many CPs 
Chapter 3 

3-10 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

will be activated. The operations section is structured to simultaneously support a main CP and an auxiliary 

CP. A forward CP may also be required. 

Note. Guerrilla brigades and battalions may not have all the types of CPs discussed here. 

However, specific situations may require various types. 

3-53. The brigade operations section includes the operations officer (who also serves as the deputy COS), 

the chief of current operations (who also serves as assistant operations officer), and the chief of future 

operations. The latter two officers each head subsections. 

3-54. Current Operations Subsection. The chief of current operations serves as the representative of the 

commander, COS, or operations officer in their absence and has the authority to control forces in 

accordance with the commander’s intent. 

3-55. Future Operations Subsection. The chief of future operations monitors the friendly and enemy 

situations and their implications for future actions. He advised the commander on how to make adjustments 

to the battle plan during the fight. 

3-56. Functional Staff. Functional staff elements may augment the brigade operations section when 

required. These experts in particular functions (such as fire support) advise the brigade command group and 

staff on issues pertaining to their individual areas of expertise. 

3-57. Liaison Teams. The operations section may also receive liaison teams from subordinate and 

affiliated units that perform tasks in support of those. Liaison teams are not a permanent part of the brigade 

staff structure. They support the brigade staff with detailed expertise in particular functional areas and 

provide direct communications to their parent organizations. SPF advisors and liaison personnel from 

regular military forces may operate from the brigade headquarters or may be located at lower echelons. The 

brigade staff may also receive liaison and advisory teams from organizations covertly or overtly supporting 

guerrilla operations. Their purpose may be based on functional military expertise for guerrilla unit 

operations or may support selected political, economic, social, or INFOWAR tasks. If the guerrilla brigade 

is affiliated with or subordinate to an insurgent organization, a political advisor may also be present. 

Intelligence and Information Section 

3-58. The intelligence and information section provides intelligence on the current and future OE. It also 

provides insights on opportunities for ongoing and future operations and windows of opportunity. At least 

one representative from the intelligence and information section is part of, and accompanies, each auxiliary 

or forward CP. This section has three subsections: reconnaissance, INFOWAR, and communications. 

3-59. Reconnaissance Subsection. The chief of reconnaissance, who heads this subsection, develops 

reconnaissance plans, gathers information, and evaluates data on the OE. He supervises the efforts of 

subordinate reconnaissance units. 

3-60. INFOWAR Subsection. The chief of INFOWAR, who heads this subsection, coordinates the 

employment of INFOWAR assets, both at brigade level and in subordinate units. This subsection oversees 

the planning and execution of all elements of INFOWAR (see appendix A). 

3-61. Communications Subsection. The chief of communications and his subsection plan the use of all 

forms of communication and communications security. The subsection may be augmented by personnel 

from the brigade’s signal platoon when necessary. 

Resources Section 

3-62. The resources officer is responsible for the acquisition, distribution, and care of all the brigade’s 

resources, both human and materiel. He is also in charge of the brigade’s sustainment CP and may establish 

multiple sustainment CPs. The resources section may be augmented from the brigade’s transport company 

when necessary. The section is also structured to accommodate augmentation from the functional staff and 

liaison teams. It consists of two subsections: logistics and administration. 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-11 

3-63. Logistics Subsection. The chief of logistics heads the brigade logistics system. He supervises 

transportation support. He is responsible for the acquisition and distribution of supplies to sustain the 

brigade. He is also responsible for the all armament accountability, readiness, supply, utilization, repair, 

and evacuation. 

3-64. Administration Subsection. The chief of administration supervises all personnel actions and 

transactions. This subsection assigns personnel and records losses. 

Headquarters and Service Section 

3-65. The headquarters and service section provides supply and transportation support to the brigade 

headquarters. It includes a command team, a support team, and a supply and transport team. 

WEAPONS BATTALION

3-66. The weapons battalion of a guerrilla brigade typically consists of the following units: 

 Battalion headquarters. 

 Towed mortar battery. 

 Rocket launcher battery. 

 Antitank battery. 

 Signal section. 

 Transport section. 

This battalion provides fire support to any other subordinate units of the guerrilla brigade as necessary. In 

some instances, due to the dispersed nature of guerrilla operations, a battery or parts thereof may be 

allocated to a particular guerrilla battalion. 

Battalion Headquarters 

3-67. The battalion headquarters consists of a command section and a staff section. The weapons battalion 

commander locates where he can best support the brigade operations and is often positioned in the vicinity 

of the brigade commander. The command section also includes the battalion’s deputy commander, who 

would be in charge of a forward or auxiliary CP, if necessary. The chief of staff (COS) is part of the 

command group and staff. However, he is usually located with the staff on the battlefield, because he 

exercises direct control over the battalion staff. He is also in direct charge of the battalion’s main CP in the 

absence of the commander. 

3-68. The battalion staff consists of the operations officer (who also serves as the deputy COS), the 

assistant operations officer (battalion fire direction officer), the intelligence officer, and the resources 

officer. The COS also serves as the chief of fire support. The signal section leader also serves as the 

battalion communications officer. The transport section leader serves as the battalion logistics officer. The 

staff section operates the main CP. During static operations, staff functions are performed in tents, tunnels, 

caves, or local accommodations. The command and staff vehicles are then dispersed and camouflaged. 

Towed Mortar Battery 

3-69. The towed mortar battery normally consists of— 

 Headquarters and service section. 

 Fire coordination platoon. 

 Two towed mortar platoons. 

 Supply and transportation section. 

3-70. The headquarters and service section consists of a command team, a support team, and a supply and 

transport team. The battery deputy commander (in the support team) normally is also the battery fire 

direction officer. The fire direction chief (in the fire control section of the fire coordination platoon) 

assumes the duties of the fire direction officer in the battery deputy commanders’ absence. Depending on 

mission requirements, either the battery commander or deputy commander remains with the weapons 

battalion commander to facilitate fire support. 
Chapter 3 

3-12 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

3-71. When required, an observation team (from the observation section of the fire coordination platoon) 

accompanies a guerrilla unit. In this case, the observation section vehicle drops the team off and returns to 

the section headquarters. Supported units also provide additional observers. 

3-72. The towed mortar battery normally has six 120-mm mortars—two platoons of three mortar sections 

each. However, some batteries may have six 100-mm mortars. For normal travel, the light truck (prime 

mover) of each mortar section carries the mortar crew and ammunition for the immediate fire support 

mission. For movement over short distances, the 100- or 120-mm mortar can be dismantled into three parts: 

barrel, bipod, and baseplate. Animals or carts can pack the mortar in its three parts. Additional ammunition 

bearers may be used when required. Civilians or draft animals may also be used as bearers or porters. The 

guerrillas may have no vehicles at all and depend on caches, porters, draft animals, or other transportation 

or resupply means. 

Note. Another alternative is for the battery to have nine 81- or 82-mm mortars (not towed), by 

adding a third mortar platoon. 

Rocket Launcher Battery 

3-73. The rocket launcher battery of the weapons battalion typically consists of— 

 Headquarters and service section. 

 Fire coordination platoon. 

 One multiple rocket launcher (MRL) platoon. 

 One rocket launcher platoon. 

3-74. The headquarters and service section and the fire coordination platoon have the same structure and 

functions as in the towed mortar battery (see above). The MRL and rocket launcher platoons may 

receive additional transportation support from the weapons battalion headquarters or the brigade 

transport company. 

Multiple Rocket Launcher Platoon 

3-75. The MRL platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters and three MRL sections with one 107-

mm launcher each. The platoon can be employed as a platoon or broken into separate sections to support 

guerrilla or HK companies. The 107-mm MRL on a wheeled carriage can be towed by almost any vehicle 

or pulled by personnel or a yoked animal. Several versions can be broken down into man-packable loads. 

When moving dismounted for any distance, an MRL section may require augmentation of other guerrillas 

or civilian personnel to serve as additional ammunition bearers and to move the MRLs. 

3-76. Single-tube, man-portable, tripod-mounted launchers are also available. Twelve single-tube 107-mm 

rocket launchers may replace each 12-tube MRL. When using single-tube rocket launchers, a vehicle is not 

required. However, extra porters and ammunition bearers are then required. Improvised 107-mm rocket 

firing pads can be constructed using materials such as dirt, bamboo frames, pipes, or crossed stakes. 

Rocket Launcher Platoon 

3-77. The rocket launcher platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters and six rocket launcher 

sections. Each section operates two 122-mm single-tube rocket launchers. This provides a total of 12 

single-tube rocket launchers in the platoon. When moving dismounted for any distance, a rocket launcher 

section requires augmentation of other guerrillas or civilian personnel to serve as bearers to transport the 

launchers and additional rockets. 

3-78. Typically, each rocket launcher section has one light truck. The truck can carry one or both launchers 

close to the firing point. The firing team dismounts, transports the launcher to the firing position and 

prepares it to fire. The team then fires several rockets, probably no more than five, before detection 

probability is high. Each launcher can fire on individual targets or it can fire preplanned volley fires with 

other launchers against a single target. The truck (whenever possible) will return and pick up the firing 

team and launcher. If the truck cannot retrieve the team and launcher, they either join up with another 

guerrilla unit or exfiltrate to another possible pickup point. 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-13 

3-79. The 122-mm launcher can be broken into two-one man loads for transport. The 122-mm rocket can 

also be broken into two-one man loads. Improvised 122-mm. rocket firing pads can be constructed 

using materials such as dirt, bamboo frames, pipes, or crossed stakes. Caches of rockets may be used 

for resupply. 

Antitank Battery 

3-80. The antitank (AT) battery of the weapons battalion typically consists of a headquarters and service 

section, three antitank platoons, and one antitank hunter-killer (AT HK) platoon. These platoons can be 

broken down to support guerrilla or HK companies or their subordinates. The headquarters and service 

section has the same structure and functions as in the towed mortar battery and rocket launcher battery 

(see above). 

Antitank Platoon 

3-81. Each AT platoon typically has a platoon headquarters, an antitank guided missile (ATGM) section, 

and a recoilless gun section. The AT platoon receives transportation support from the battery headquarters 

and service section or the battalion transport section. Some ATGM and recoilless gun sections may have 

additional ammunition bearers. Civilians, draft animals, carts, bicycles, and bearers/porters may also be 

used to assist in transporting the weapons and munitions. 

3-82. ATGM Section. The ATGM section of the AT platoon typically consists of a section headquarters 

and four ATGM teams. It may be employed as a section or allocated by team to guerrilla or HK companies. 

They may also be integrated into AT HK teams at company level. Each ATGM team has one ATGM 

launcher and carries four ATGMs for its launcher. These and/or additional ATGM launchers may also be 

dispersed among guerrilla HK teams. 

3-83. Each ATGM team of the AT battery’s AT platoon typically has four members. This organization is 

different from an ATGM team in the guerrilla battalion’s weapons company, which has three members. 

The difference is the addition of one grenadier and his ATGL to the team, and the team may be 

reconfigured based on the available ATGM system. 

3-84. Recoilless Gun Section. The recoilless gun section of the AT platoon typically consists of a section 

headquarters and three recoilless gun teams, each with one recoilless gun. It may be employed as a section 

or allocated by team to guerrilla or HK companies. When towed, a recoilless gun requires a crew of three. 

When transported solely by the crew, it requires a crew of at least four. Some recoilless gun sections may 

have additional ammunition bearers. 

Antitank Hunter-Killer Platoon 

3-85. The AT HK platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters and three AT HK sections. It may be 

employed as a platoon or by sections. It may also be broken up into teams and allocated to support separate 

guerrilla or guerrilla HK units. The platoon’s primary weaponry is 18 84-mm recoilless rifles. 

3-86. Each AT HK section typically consists of a section headquarters and three AT HK teams. The senior 

team leader also serves as the assistant section leader. The AT HK section may be employed as a section of 

six recoilless rifles or allocated by team to guerrilla or HK companies. Teams may also be integrated into 

AT HK teams at company level. 

3-87. Each team of six guerrillas operates two recoilless rifles, which typically are used together for 

maximum effectiveness. Each AT recoilless rifle gunner carries three rounds (one round in the weapon and 

two carried on load bearing equipment). The team leader, assistant gunner, and ammunition bearer all carry 

at least six rounds each and may carry more depending on the type of ammunition. Additional ammunition 

bearers may be used when required. 

Signal Section 

3-88. The signal section of the weapons battalion typically consists of a section headquarters, a courier 

squad, a voice squad, a digital team, and a wire team. The structure and capabilities of this section are 
Chapter 3 

3-14 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

likely to be quite similar to those of the signal section in a guerrilla battalion (see below). The signal 

section leader also serves as the battalion signal officer. 

Transport Section 

3-89. The transport section of the weapons battalion is likely to be quite similar to one of the transport 

sections in the transport platoon of a guerrilla battalion. (See below.) 

RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY

3-90. The reconnaissance company of a guerrilla brigade typically has a company headquarters and service 

section, three reconnaissance platoons, and one intelligence and electronic warfare (EW) platoon. This 

company may be augmented by other guerrilla units, HK teams, or local sympathizers. Members of this 

company (and augmentees) may be in civilian clothes, in which case they may not have a weapon or radio 

and would appear to be noncombatants. 

Reconnaissance Platoon 

3-91. The reconnaissance platoon typically has a platoon headquarters and three reconnaissance squads. A 

reconnaissance squad can break down into three or four teams. The platoon may be mounted in light trucks 

or on motorcycles, or may be dismounted based on the tactical situation. Since there are typically not 

enough vehicles to transport all the teams simultaneously, a squad or team may be dropped off at a point at 

least part way to the location for its reconnaissance mission and perhaps picked up later at a designated 

location. Motorcycles can be used to support their individual squad, or they can be grouped together to 

serve as a high-mobility reconnaissance squad. Squads may be augmented by military or civilian vehicles 

(motorcycles, trucks, cars, bicycles, carts, or high-mobility all-terrain vehicles) or personnel depending on 

the mission. Local sympathizers may provide assistance and information. 

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Platoon 

3-92. The intelligence and EW platoon typically has a platoon headquarters, a signals reconnaissance 

section, a global positioning system (GPS) jamming section, an EW squad, and an integration squad. 

Whenever possible, the intelligence and EW platoon operates out of tents, tunnels, caves, or local 

accommodations. Its activities are always covered, camouflaged, and concealed. 

Signals Reconnaissance Section 

3-93. The signals reconnaissance section conducts radio intercept or direction finding (DF) tasks. The 

section typically consists of a section headquarters, a signal intercept and exploitation squad, and a radio 

DF squad. Each of the squads consists of an (intercept or DF) base vehicle, a mobile (intercept or DF) 

position, and three or more dismounted (intercept or DF) teams. The dismounted teams generally 

accompany guerrilla units and report back to their squad leader. 

3-94. The signal intercept and exploitation squad coordinates all intercept and DF operations based on 

guidance received from the platoon’s integration squad, which receives its guidance from the intelligence 

and EW platoon leader. The platoon leader, in turn, receives his guidance from the reconnaissance 

company operations officer. The signal intercept and exploitation squad tasks the DF squad by providing 

target technical data and priority of location. The effectiveness of intercept (HF/VHF/digital) capabilities 

and/or radio DF depends on how the enemy uses his electronic systems. 

Global Positioning System Jamming Section 

3-95. The GPS jamming section disrupts enemy GPS receivers. The section typically has two GPS 

jamming squads. Each squad has a mobile, trailer-mounted GPS jammer. The trailer-mounted jammers are 

employed separately. Due to their high level of vulnerability, one may be held back for later use. Manportable GPS jammers are dispersed via two-man teams in civilian clothes and using motorcycles, bicycles, 

or other civilian vehicles. These teams either transmit while on the move or emplace and operate the 

jammers. In order to survive when dismounted, however, they must make frequent moves when 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-15 

transmitting (jamming). Another way to increase survivability is to employ the jammers in areas of high 

civilian density. Additional man-portable jammers can be distributed to other guerrilla units with 

instructions on how, where, and when to use them. Sappers can infiltrate enemy compounds and 

surreptitiously emplace man-portable jammers. 

Integration Squad 

3-96. The integration squad performs signals intelligence (SIGINT) analysis, collection management, and 

reporting for the intelligence and EW platoon. It receives guidance from the reconnaissance company 

operations officer through the platoon leader. This squad also disseminates intelligence information based 

on the analysis of intercepted data and emitter locations. 

SAPPER COMPANY

3-97. Sappers are guerrillas trained to perform some functions typically associated with raiders, engineers, 

or rangers. Sappers are not engineers. The sapper company of a guerrilla brigade typically consists of— 

 A headquarters and service section. 

 Three sapper platoons. 

 A transport section. 

A guerrilla brigade can form more than one sapper company. 

3-98. The structure and capabilities of the sapper platoons are likely to be quite similar to those of the 

sapper platoon in a guerrilla battalion. (See Sapper Platoon under Guerrilla Battalion, below, for more 

detail on the nature of sappers and the types of functions they can perform.) The main difference may be in 

the scope of sapper activities. Sapper platoons, particularly those of a guerrilla brigade, can serve as an 

independent combat force making deep thrusts from different directions simultaneously. However, a sapper 

platoon or individual squads may also be allocated to accompany and support a guerrilla battalion, guerrilla 

company, or HK company. The sappers may also augment other sapper squads, HK teams, and other 

guerrilla units as necessary. 

3-99. Sappers can perform the following functions: 

 Infiltrate enemy installations and areas. 

 Scout (making accurate diagrams for future attacks). 

 Guide other sappers or guerrillas (or affiliated SPF) through enemy lines and obstacles to 

perform their missions. 

 Conduct route reconnaissance. 

 Conduct mine warfare. 

 Breach obstacles. 

 Emplace mines (especially nuisance minefield, IEDs and signal flares). 

 Conduct general demolition. 

 Emplace field expedient fortifications and obstacles (such as cratering). 

 Set side-attack mines. 

 Support antitank and countermobility operations. 

 Conduct and/or assist in ambushes. 

 Employ limited smoke or expedient obscurants. 

 Provide general engineer-like support. 

See Sapper Platoon under Guerrilla Battalion, below, for more detail on which squad(s) within a sapper 

platoon typically perform each of these functions. However, all squad members are cross-trained to 

perform all sapper functions. 

3-100. The transport section of a sapper company transports equipment and a basic load of mines and 

demolition materiel. It includes support personnel armed with light machineguns, who are dispersed among 

the trucks while moving. 
Chapter 3 

3-16 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

TRANSPORT COMPANY

3-101. The transport company of the guerrilla brigade typically consists of a headquarters and service 

section and three transport platoons. The structure and capabilities of these platoons are likely to be quite 

similar to those of the transport platoon of a guerrilla battalion (see below). Some guerrilla brigades may 

not require a full transport company. Only one or two platoons may suffice. 

SIGNAL PLATOON

3-102. The signal platoon of a guerrilla brigade typically consists of a platoon headquarters and two signal 

sections. Each signal section typically has a section headquarters, a courier squad, voice squad, digital 

team, and wire team. The structure and capabilities of these sections are likely to be quite similar to those 

of the signal section of a guerrilla battalion (see below for details). A designated signal platoon truck 

primarily supports operations conducted in a main CP. It is equipped with a small satellite communications 

(SATCOM) antenna, digital, and secure communications. Depending on mission requirements, other light 

trucks and trailers provide the mobility for the platoon and its squads or teams. 

MEDICAL PLATOON

3-103. The medical platoon of a guerrilla brigade typically consists of a platoon headquarters and two 

medical sections. These sections have the same structure and capabilities as the medical section of a 

guerrilla battalion (see below). The platoon provides immediate medical care, trauma stabilization, and 

minor surgical actions. An officer (physician) or medical assistant (physician’s assistant) and senior 

noncommissioned officers provide limited medical intervention, minor surgery, and treatment. Guerrilla 

commanders may mobilize local medical personnel from the population to treat their ill and wounded. The 

guerrilla force has a limited inpatient capability. Whenever possible, medical functions are performed in 

tents, tunnels, caves, or local accommodations. Severe and longer-term care relies on evacuation to civilian, 

military, or other medical facilities. More routine and excess ill and wounded are backhauled in generalpurpose cargo vehicles. 

3-104. Guerrilla medical support is coupled with local medical assets in the area when available. 

Maximum use is made of local medical assistance and facilities regardless of capability. In some instances, 

the brigade medical platoon may attempt to operate in conjunction with the assets of a village clinic. Local 

sympathizers may volunteer their homes, equipment, vehicles, and services. They may also assist in the 

evacuation of wounded guerrillas to civilian facilities. 

3-105. Medical vehicles may be a mix of military and civilian, or all civilian. Carts may also be used to 

transport wounded. Cargo trailers transport medical equipment and supplies, and in emergencies may 

transport wounded. Supported guerrilla units receive liters from the medical section to transport wounded. 

The guerrilla unit provides its own liter bearers. 

3-106. Guerrilla medics are combatants, trained to fight as guerrillas. They fight when necessary to 

support the guerrilla mission. A medical aid station is usually set up at battalion level while other medics 

accompany guerrillas in the fight. Medical platoon personnel may be a mixture of men and women. 

Women may comprise at least 50 percent or more of the medical platoon strength. 

GUERRILLA BATTALION 

3-107. The composition of a typical guerrilla battalion is as follows: 

 Battalion headquarters. 

 Guerrilla companies or guerrilla HK companies. 

 Weapons company. 

 Reconnaissance platoon. 

 Sapper platoon. 

 Transport platoon. 

 Signal section. 

 Medical section. 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-17 

Figure 3-3 shows an example of a guerrilla battalion with two task-organized HK companies. 

BATTALION

HQ

GUERRILLA

COMPANY

GUERRILLA

BATTALION

GUERRILLA

HUNTER-KILLER

COMPANY

WEAPONS

COMPANY

RECON

PLATOON

TRANSPORT

PLATOON

SAPPER

PLATOON

SIGNAL

SECTION

MEDICAL

SECTION

Figure 3-3. Guerrilla battalion (example) 

Note. HK company organizations configured from subordinate units of a guerrilla battalion are 

discussed later in this chapter. 

3-108. A guerrilla battalion may have as many as 1,000 guerrillas, but could be considerably smaller. 

Each guerrilla battalion differs in capability, but all battalions have a similar structure of a battalion 

headquarters and combat, CS, and CSS units. Depending on the number of guerrilla and/or HK companies, 

the size and strengths of support units can also vary. 

3-109. Often a battalion-size guerrilla unit will be tailored for a particular OE or mission. If taskorganized, capabilities may include four or five guerrilla or guerrilla HK companies, some organic battalion 

units, a task-organized, composite weapons battery from a guerrilla brigade, and possibly intelligence and 

EW support. A composite weapons battery could have a mix of mortar, rocket launcher, and antitank 

platoons. Guerrillas can also coordinate and act in concert with local insurgent and/or higher insurgent 

organizations. 

3-110. A guerrilla battalion may be any combination of guerrilla companies or guerrilla HK companies. 

When a battalion consists predominantly of guerrilla HK companies, its designation is a guerrilla HK 

battalion. The HK company is especially effective in close environments such as urban, forest, or swamp 

terrain that offers opportunities to canalize the enemy into preplanned kill zones. The HK company fights 

as HK groups, sections, and teams. The guerrilla company fights as platoons, squads, and fire teams. With 

sufficient equipment and resources, it can conduct sustained company-level actions. 

GUERRILLA BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

3-111. The guerrilla battalion headquarters consists of a command section and a staff section. During 

static operations, command and staff functions may be performed in tents, tunnels, caves, or temporary 

and/or permanent local accommodations. 
Chapter 3 

3-18 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Command Section 

3-112. The command section comprises the battalion commander, deputy commander, and the immediate 

support personnel. The deputy commander’s light truck may be used as a CP. 

Staff Section, Guerrilla 

3-113. The battalion chief of staff (COS) is part of the command group and staff, but is normally located 

with the staff section in order to exercise direct control over the staff. He also controls the main CP in the 

absence of the commander. The battalion staff consists of the operations officer (who also serves as the 

deputy COS), the assistant operations officer, the intelligence officer, and the resources officer. Each 

of these primary staff members heads a small staff section consisting of himself and one or two other 

staff personnel. 

3-114. The commander of the weapons company also serves as the chief of fire support. The signal 

section leader also serves as the battalion communications officer. The platoon leader of the reconnaissance 

platoon serves as the battalion chief of reconnaissance. The platoon leader of the transport platoon serves as 

the battalion logistics officer. When the guerrilla battalion is affiliated with or subordinate to an insurgent 

organization, the staff section may also have a political advisor. 

3-115. Any liaison teams attached to the battalion would be under the operations officer. Liaison may 

include SPF personnel for particular missions or training. Liaison may also be present from regular force 

units operating in coordination with the guerrilla force. 

WEAPONS COMPANY

3-116. The weapons company of a typical guerrilla battalion consists of the following: 

 Headquarters and service section. 

 Fire coordination platoon. 

 Mortar platoon. 

 Multiple rocket launcher (MRL) platoon. 

 Antitank platoon. 

 Man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) squad. 

Headquarters and Service Section 

3-117. The headquarters and service section of the weapons company is very similar to that of the 

guerrilla company, but with some additional transport and communications equipment. It typically consists 

of a command team, a support team, and a supply and transport team. The weapons company commander 

locates where he can best assist the battalion commander, which may often mean being colocated with the 

battalion commander. The deputy commander of the weapons company (in the support team) normally is 

the fire direction officer. 

Fire Control Coordination Platoon 

3-118. The fire coordination platoon typically consists of the platoon headquarters, a fire control section, 

and an observation section. The fire control section serves as the company fire direction center. The fire 

direction chief (in the fire control section) assumes the duties of the fire direction officer in the absence of 

the company deputy commander. The fire control section may have a laptop-based automated fire control 

system (AFCS). When available, the AFCS provides fast and accurate ballistic computations of artillery 

and rocket launcher weapons, fire support coordination, message transfer in digital format and ammunition 

accounting at the weapons company level. When required, an observation team accompanies a guerrilla 

unit. Supported units also provide additional observers. 

Mortar Platoon 

3-119. The mortar platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters and three mortar sections. The 

sections normally consist of a section headquarters and two mortar squads, each with one 82-mm (or 81-
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-19 

mm) mortar. A mortar squad normally consists of a squad leader, a gunner, an assistant gunner, and four 

ammunition bearers. When moving dismounted, the section may require augmentation to serve as 

additional ammunition bearers. The mortar section may be augmented with high-mobility all-terrain 

vehicles, depending on the mission. 82-mm mortars can fire 82-mm and 81-mm ammunition including 

extended-range munitions. However, this platoon may substitute 100- or 120-mm mortars for the 81- or 82-

mm mortars. As with its 81- and 82-mm counterparts, the 100-mm mortar, when broken down in three 

parts, can be man-packed or animal-carried, or the complete weapon can be carried on a light vehicle. The 

120-mm mortars may also be substituted; however, this heavy mortar requires a tactical vehicle or light 

truck to transport each mortar. 

3-120. Some mortar platoons may have only four mortars, consisting of two mortar sections of two 

mortars each. The mortar platoon receives transportation support from the either the headquarters and 

service company or the battalion transport platoon. Additional ammunition bearers may be used 

when required. 

Multiple Rocket Launcher Platoon 

3-121. The MRL platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters and three MRL sections, with one 

MRL per section. It can be employed as a platoon or broken down into separate sections to support 

subordinate companies or HK groups. The platoon receives transportation support from the either the 

battery’s headquarters and service company or the battalion transport platoon. The wheeled MRL carriage 

can be towed by almost any vehicle or pulled by personnel or a yoked animal. In some cases, the MRL 

can be mounted on a vehicle. When moving dismounted for any distance, an MRL section may require 

augmentation of personnel to serve as additional ammunition bearers or to move the MRL. Some 

versions of the 107-mm MRL can be broken down into man-packable loads. Light trucks that serve as 

prime movers for the towed MRLs may also transport other assets of the weapons company, such as 

mortars or recoilless guns. 

3-122. In lieu of MRLs, some platoons may have single-tube rocket launchers. In that case, 12 single-tube 

launchers replace each 12-tube MRL, and extra porters or ammunition bearers are required. Improvised 

107-mm rocket firing pads can be constructed using dirt, bamboo frames, or crossed stakes. 

Antitank Platoon 

3-123. The AT platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters, an antitank guided missile (ATGM) 

section, and a recoilless gun section. The AT platoon normally has no vehicles. The ATGM section and 

recoilless gun section may receive transportation support from the weapons company’s headquarters and 

service section or the battalion transport platoon. They may also be transported on the vehicles belonging to 

the MRL platoon. 

3-124. The ATGM section typically consists of a section headquarters and three ATGM teams. It may be 

employed as a section or allocated by team to guerrilla or HK companies. These teams may also be 

integrated into HK teams throughout the battalion. One person can fire the man-portable ATGM; however, 

the crew normally consists of an ATGM gunner (team leader) and assistant gunner. The team may also 

include one or more riflemen to provide security and/or carry additional missiles. 

3-125. The recoilless gun section typically consists of a section headquarters and three recoilless gun 

teams. It may be employed as a section or allocated by team to guerrilla or HK companies. A team 

normally consists of a gunner (team leader), an assistant gunner, and a varying number of ammunition 

bearers. A 73-mm recoilless gun is man-portable, but is usually carried in a vehicle or cart. Some versions 

may have removable wheels; when towed, it requires a crew of three. When transported only by the crew, 

the weapon requires a crew of at least four, including an additional ammunition bearer. Some recoilless gun 

teams may use civilian personnel and vehicles from the local population to assist in transporting the 

weapon and ammunition. 

MANPADS Squad 

3-126. The MANPADS squad typically has two MANPADS launchers and one heavy machinegun. The 

entire MANPADS squad may be employed together, or it can be broken down into three teams. In the latter 
Chapter 3 

3-20 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

option, two teams with a single MANPADS launcher each and one team with the heavy machinegun can be 

deployed with guerrilla or HK companies. 

3-127. If the squad has a light truck, the vehicle can carry up to five missiles for each MANPADS 

launcher. When dismounted, each MANPADS gunner carries a gripstock launcher and one missile. The 

MANPADS assistant gunner carries one additional missile; he also carries the electronic plotting board and 

enters location and direction data of approaching targets. Local civilian personnel and vehicles may 

transport additional missiles. The senior MANPADS gunner is the assistant squad leader. 

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON

3-128. The reconnaissance platoon of a guerrilla battalion typically consists of a platoon headquarters and 

three reconnaissance squads. Each squad can break down into two or three teams. One scout per squad is 

designated as the sniper (or marksman) and uses a sniper rifle. 

3-129. Based on the situation, the platoon may be dismounted or mounted in light trucks or on 

motorcycles. Surveillance and communications equipment is man-portable, but some equipment may 

require vehicle support. Some scouts may be assigned additional duty as a motorcycle or light truck drivers. 

The reconnaissance squads may not be able to lift all their personnel and equipment at one time without 

augmentation. The squads may be carried part way on a patrol and dismounted. They are then picked up on 

the way back. Depending on the mission, the platoon may also be augmented with military or civilian 

vehicles (trucks, cars, motorcycles, bicycles, carts, or high-mobility all-terrain vehicles) or with additional 

personnel and equipment from guerrilla companies. 

3-130. Each reconnaissance squad normally has a motorcycle, which extends the range of the squad. 

Motorcycles can be used to support their individual squad, or they can be grouped together to serve as a 

high-mobility reconnaissance squad. For longer patrols, the motorcycles can be loaded into a light truck. 

3-131. Each reconnaissance squad is equipped with long-range cordless telephones (LRCTs). The LRCT 

base station remains with the squad vehicle and serves as a retransmission station for the patrols. Digital 

cameras, camcorders, or computers may be linked to the LRCTs for transmittal to the platoon headquarters 

or battalion via the squad base station. The LRCT base station vehicle must remain within range of the 

LRCTs used by the squad or by teams within the squad. 

3-132. Reconnaissance personnel may wear civilian clothes and use common civilian model trucks, cars, 

motorcycles, mopeds, motor scooters, or bicycles. In this case, the guerrilla would probably not have an 

overt weapon or radio and would appear to be a noncombatant. Local sympathizers may provide assistance 

and information. 

SAPPER PLATOON

3-133. Sappers are guerrillas trained to perform some functions typically associated with raiders, 

engineers, or rangers. Sappers are not engineers. Guerrilla battalions may use sappers in an assault and/or 

demolition role. In a raider role, sappers are the lead or primary (assault) element in an assault on fixed 

installations or military field positions. Armed primarily with explosives charges, sappers breach the 

defensive perimeter and neutralize designated positions in advance of the attacking main body. The sapper 

unit can serve as an independent combat force making deep thrusts from different directions in the enemyheld region. At other times, they can accompany and support guerrilla and HK missions throughout an 

AOR. The sappers also augment other sapper squads, HK teams, and other guerrilla units as necessary. 

Sappers may also serve as a stay-behind or independent unit to conduct disruption operations. The sapper 

platoon also coordinates suicide bombings. 

3-134. Guerrilla sappers (or their SPF advisors from a regular military force) can also train local civilians 

to be sappers. The sappers may be a mix of men, women, and children. Women and children may be used 

as runners, messengers, scouts, guides, drivers, porters, fighters, suicide bombers, lookouts, or in several 

other roles. 

3-135. A guerrilla battalion may form more than one sapper platoon. A sapper platoon typically is 

organized as— 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-21 

 A platoon headquarters. 

 An infiltration and scout squad. 

 A mine warfare and demolition squad. 

 An improvised explosives and signal flares squad. 

 A general support squad. 

Text below outlines the functions normally associated with each of these squads. However, all squad 

members are trained to perform all sapper functions. Each squad normally carries a mix of mines and 

demolitions. The mix varies according to the mission. A trailer may transport equipment and a basic load of 

mines and demolitions and may be dropped off to be recovered later. 

Infiltration and Scout Squad 

3-136. The infiltration and scout squad serves as a sapper/raider element and may— 

 Infiltrate enemy installations and areas. 

 Serve as the lead or primary (assault) element in an assault on a fixed installation or a military 

field position. 

 Set demolitions and side-attack mines. 

 Serve as scouts (making accurate diagrams for future attacks). 

 Conduct route reconnaissance. 

 Guide other sappers or guerrillas (or affiliated SPF) through enemy lines and obstacles to 

perform their missions. 

 Conduct and/or assist in ambushes. 

A truck may transport squad personnel to an appropriate dismount point and return to the platoon. 

Mine Warfare and Demolition Squad 

3-137. The mine warfare and demolition squad may— 

 Conduct mine warfare. 

 Breach obstacles. 

 Emplace mines (especially nuisance minefield, IEDs and signal flares). 

 Support antitank and countermobility operations. 

 Scatter mines using a man-portable mine-scattering system. 

 Lay controlled minefields. 

 Serve as the lead or primary (assault) element in an assault on a fixed installation or a military 

field position. 

 Infiltrate enemy installations and areas. 

A trailer typically transports equipment and a basic load of mines and demolitions. It may be dropped to be 

recovered later. Minelaying operations may require a truck on-site to off-load the mines. 

Improvised Explosives and Signal flares Squad 

3-138. The improvised explosives and signal flares squad may— 

 Manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and signal flares. (Signal flares are actually a 

subcategory of IEDs.) 

 Emplace and/or detonate the IEDs. (Signal flares are triggered by the unsuspecting.) 

 Provide IEDs (or signal flares) to other trained sappers or guerrillas to emplace and/or detonate. 

 Serve as the lead or primary (assault) element in an assault on a fixed installation or a military 

field position. 

 Infiltrate enemy installations and areas. 

 Augment other sapper squads and HK teams as necessary. 

 Coordinate suicide bombings. 
Chapter 3 

3-22 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Note. Guerrillas (and other irregular OPFOR) commonly use IEDs as secondary devices to 

detonate on the arrival of responding personnel. IEDs can be detonated by a variety of means, 

including remote, command, electrical trip wire, pressure, time, and others. 

General Support Squad 

3-139. The general support squad may— 

 Provide general engineer-like support to the sapper platoon or the guerrilla battalion. 

 Employ limited smoke or expedient obscurants. 

 Provide water purification and minor construction. 

 Emplace field expedient fortifications and obstacles (such as cratering). 

 Conduct general demolition. 

 Conduct assault breaching. 

 Emplace anti-vehicle wire obstacles. 

 Augment other sapper squads and HK teams as necessary. 

 Serve as the lead or primary (assault) element in an assault on a fixed installation or a military 

field position. 

 Infiltrate enemy installations and areas. 

TRANSPORT PLATOON

3-140. The transport platoon of a guerrilla battalion typically has a platoon headquarters and two transport 

sections. The platoon leader serves as the battalion logistics officer. 

3-141. Each transport section operates with three light trucks and five medium trucks. Single- and twoaxle trailers provide additional cargo capacity. Water and POL trailers are augmented with flexible storage 

bladders for both water and fuel. The transport platoon assists in transporting assets of the battalion’s 

weapons company (mortars, rocket launchers, antitank weapons, and munitions) whenever necessary. 

Whenever possible, corner-mounted mechanical hoists are used to load and unload the vehicles. 

3-142. Vehicles are generally a mix of older civilianized military and civilian models, or all civilian 

models. They will not appear to be or look like military vehicles and are intended to be indistinguishable 

from civilian vehicles. The vehicles are kept as dispersed as possible, in order to prevent detection and 

destruction by enemy forces. Rarely, if ever, will all vehicles in the transport platoon be colocated. 

Vehicles may be dispersed for use by locals as commercial, delivery, agricultural, general cargo, 

construction, militia, or general-purpose vehicles in everyday life. When required, the transport platoon 

leader (battalion logistics officer) or the battalion resources officer will assemble the appropriate mix of 

vehicles to transport specific items to a specific location. The vehicles can then melt back into the civilian 

population when not assembled to support guerrilla operations. Guerrillas do not use static truck parks or 

assembly areas for vehicles. 

3-143. The cargo trucks normally carry materiel to meet only the immediate combat needs of the guerrilla 

battalion. At other times, they may transport materiel for caches and prepositioning. When necessary, 

additional transportation support may be received from higher headquarters or external sources. 

Transportation can be augmented with vehicles, draft animals, or bearers/porters requisitioned or 

confiscated from the local citizenry. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. Local 

civilian mechanics service and/or repair the vehicles when required. 

SIGNAL SECTION

3-144. The signal section of a guerrilla battalion typically consists of a section headquarters, a courier 

squad, a voice squad, a digital team, and a wire team. The signal section leader also serves as the battalion 

communications officer. 

3-145. The courier squad typically uses motorcycles, mopeds, motor scooters, or bicycles of the same 

types commonly used by the local population. High-mobility or all terrain vehicles may be substituted for 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-23 

motorcycles. The courier may be a male or female in civilian clothes. In this case, the courier probably will 

not have an overt weapon or radio and will appear to be a noncombatant. Another guerrilla may ride with 

the courier as a lookout or to provide security. (In the latter case, the additional rider could have a rifle or 

light machinegun.) Depending on the circumstances, some couriers may not use vehicles at all. Message 

transmission can be written, digital, or memorized and presented orally to a designated recipient. The 

courier squad can also conduct drive-by shootings or attacks. 

3-146. The voice squad supports operations conducted in the battalion headquarters. A signal truck 

primarily supports the battalion main CP. It is equipped with a small SATCOM antenna and can provide 

digital and secure communications. Depending on mission requirements, organization, and terrain, two 

light trucks may be substituted for the signal truck. Some staff communications are remoted back to the 

signal section. 

3-147. The digital team is responsible for all digital communications between the battalion command 

section and staff, to other battalion subordinates, and to higher headquarters. It also provides a remote 

communications capability. The team is equipped with a small SATCOM antenna and long-range cordless 

telephones, and provides secure communications. 

3-148. The wire team is responsible for all wire (landline) communications between the battalion 

command section and staff and the subordinate units. It also provides a remote communications capability. 

Landline communications are used whenever possible. 

MEDICAL SECTION

3-149. The medical section of a guerrilla battalion is responsible for temporary medical treatment. A 

medical aid station is usually established at battalion level with a number of medics directly supporting 

guerrillas in the fight. Supported guerrilla units receive liters from the medical section to transport 

wounded. The guerrilla unit provides its own liter bearers. Cargo trailers transport medical equipment and 

supplies. In emergencies, the trailers may transport wounded. These trailers may be dropped at the aid 

station when light trucks serve as ambulances. Evacuation and transportation may be a mix of military and 

civilian vehicles, wagons, or carts. Whenever possible, medical functions are performed in tents, tunnels, 

caves, or local accommodations. Local medical support may be available. Civilian sympathizers may 

volunteer use of their facilities, vehicles, and services, or may be coerced into providing temporary medical 

assistance. (For additional information on medical support, see the Medical Platoon under Guerrilla 

Brigade, above.) 

Note. Guerrilla medics are combatants, trained to fight as guerrillas. They fight when necessary 

to support the guerrilla mission. 

GUERRILLA COMPANY 

3-150. A typical guerrilla company consists of— 

 Headquarters and service section. 

 Three guerrilla platoons. 

 Weapons platoon. 

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE SECTION

3-151. The headquarters and service section of the company has a command team, support team, and 

supply and transport team. The command team consists of the company commander, a radio telephone 

operator (RTO) and a messenger-runner. The support team is the deputy commander, first sergeant, an 

RTO, and a medic. The supply and transport team consists of the supply sergeant, drivers, and trucks that 

provide the company a degree of autonomy from the guerrilla battalion. 

3-152. Figure 3-4 shows an example of such a company. A guerrilla company fights as platoons, squads, 

and fire teams (see Guerrilla Company, below). 
Chapter 3 

3-24 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

HQ & SVC

SECTION

WEAPONS

PLATOON

GUERRILLA

COMPANY

GUERRILLA

PLATOON

Figure 3-4. Guerrilla company (example) 

WEAPONS PLATOON

3-153. The weapons platoon of a guerrilla company typically consists of a platoon headquarters, a mortar 

section, a recoilless gun section, a machinegun section, and a sniper section. Weapons of this platoon 

provide a heavy volume of fires and extend the range of weapons effects beyond the range of guerrilla 

platoon weapons. The platoon receives additional transportation support from the supply and transport team 

of the company’s headquarters and service section. Unless vehicles are available, ammunition for the 

platoon’s mortars and recoilless guns may require additional ammunition bearers and may be distributed 

among members of the company. This platoon may also allocate weapons to individual guerrilla platoons. 

When a guerrilla company is task-organized into an HK company, the weapons platoon typically ceases to 

exist as a separate unit. Its weapons are then redistributed among various parts of the HK company. 

Mortar Section 

3-154. The mortar section typically consists of three mortar squads. The mortar section leader serves as 

the squad leader of one of the three motor squads. The mortar section may be employed as a section or 

allocated by squad to guerrilla platoons. 

Recoilless Gun Section 

3-155. The recoilless gun section typically consists of a section headquarters and three recoilless gun 

teams. It may be employed as a section or allocated by team to guerrilla platoons. 

Machinegun Section 

3-156. The machinegun section typically consists of a section headquarters and three machinegun teams. 

It may be employed as a section, or it may be allocated to support separate guerrilla platoons, in addition to 

their own machinegun sections. Depending on the tactical circumstances, some machinegun sections may 

have additional ammunition bearers. 

Sniper Section 

3-157. The sniper section typically consists of two sniper teams. The section leader serves as the team 

leader of one sniper team. Each sniper team consists of a team leader/observer (spotter), a sniper (shooter)/ 

target designator, and an assistant sniper. The assistant sniper provides additional security, transports 

equipment, and may serve as a backup for the sniper or observer. See chapter 16 of TC 7-100.2 for the 

differences between snipers and marksmen and between snipers (or marksmen) in guerrilla forces and those 

found in regular military forces. 

3-158. The primary mission of the sniper section is to serve in a sniper-countersniper role. Depending on 

mission requirements, a sniper team may also serve as a reconnaissance element, stay-behind element, or 

part of an HK team. 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-25 

Note. When a guerilla company is restructured into an HK company, the whole sniper section 

typically becomes part of the HK company’s headquarters and command section (a section 

within a section). However, the section may allocate some or all of its snipers to be part of 

HK teams. 

GUERRILLA PLATOON 

3-159. A guerrilla platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters, three guerrilla squads, and a 

machinegun section. Figure 3-5 shows an example of such a platoon. The size of the guerrilla platoon can 

vary, and its weapons, equipment, and manning can be tailored for specific missions. One guerrilla in each 

platoon is typically cross-trained as a medic in addition to primary duty as a rifleman. 

GUERRILLA

PLATOON

PLATOON

HQ

GUERRILLA

SQUAD

MACHINEGUN

SECTION

Figure 3-5. Guerrilla platoon (example) 

GUERRILLA SQUAD

3-160. The guerrilla squad consists of at least two maneuver fire teams (or HK teams). The squad leader 

normally commands one fire team while the assistant squad leader commands a second fire team. Each 

team typically consists of the leader, a machinegunner, a grenadier, an assistant grenadier, and either two 

rifleman or one rifleman and a guerrilla designated as a sniper or marksman. (See chapter 16 of TC 7-100.2 

for the differences between snipers and marksmen and between snipers [or marksmen] in guerrilla forces 

and those found in regular military forces.) The squad may be augmented by elements from the 

machinegun section to create three or possibly four maneuver fire teams or HK teams. 

3-161. Fire teams structure around one machinegun with remaining team members normally equipped 

with assault rifles. The riflemen support squad members with other weapons, including the machinegunner, 

the grenadier, a sniper or marksman, or augmentation from the guerrilla platoon’s machinegun section or 

the company’s weapons platoon. 

MACHINEGUN SECTION

3-162. The machinegun section, consisting of three teams. It may be employed as a section, or it may be 

allocated to support separate guerrilla squads. This tailoring of capability enables a guerrilla squad to 

operate with three or possibly four maneuver fire teams or HK teams. When a guerrilla platoon is 

restructured as an HK group, the personnel and equipment of the machinegun section typically are 

dispersed among HK sections and teams. 

GUERRILLA HUNTER-KILLER COMPANY 

3-163. The guerrilla company can be augmented and restructured into a guerrilla hunter-killer (HK) 

company made up of numerous small HK teams. Those teams are typically organized into HK sections and 
Chapter 3 

3-26 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

the sections into HK groups. The HK team structure is ideal for dispersed combat such as fighting in urban 

areas and can provide similar capabilities in rural terrain when cover and concealment and channelized 

avenues favor the guerrilla. Tailored HK units are usually a company-level configuration; however, 

complete battalions and brigades can be organized for combat as HK units. 

3-164. An HK company is based on the personnel and equipment originally found in a guerrilla company. 

However, the HK company may have additional equipment due to the dispersed nature of HK team 

employment. For example, it typically would have additional antitank disposable launchers and flame 

weapons. It may also have three additional 60-mm mortars, possibly dispersed to one team in each HK 

group. These additional weapons do not necessarily require additional personnel. 

3-165. The guerrilla company task-organized as an HK company typically consists of a headquarters and 

command section and three HK groups. Typically, each HK group has four HK sections, and each HK 

section has three HK teams. Figure 3-6 shows an example of such a company. 

GUERRILLA

HUNTER-KILLER

COMPANY

HQ & CMD

SECTION

COMMAND

TEAM

COMPANY

TRAINS

SNIPER

SECTION

COMPANY

SCOUTS

HUNTERKILLER

SECTION

HUNTERKILLER

TEAM

HUNTERKILLER

GROUP

Figure 3-6. Guerrilla hunter-killer company (example) 

3-166. An HK company structured as in figure 3-6 can contain a total of 36 HK teams. If the two sniper 

teams and the company scouts in the headquarters and command section are counted, the HK company can 

have a total of 39 HK teams. 

Note. When a guerrilla platoon is task-organized into an HK group, its machinegun section 

ceases to exist as a separate unit. Its personnel and equipment are distributed among HK sections 

and teams. Likewise, when a guerrilla company is restructured into an HK company, the 

weapons platoon typically ceases to exist as a separate unit. Its weapons are then redistributed 

among various parts of the HK company. 

HEADQUARTERS AND COMMAND SECTION

3-167. The headquarters and command section of an HK company typically comprises the command 

team, company trains, a sniper section, and company scouts. The company commander and the rest of the 

command team locate with HK fighting elements. The deputy commander remains in charge of the 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-27 

company trains. The former weapons platoon sergeant now serves as the senior sergeant in the trains. The 

former weapons platoon leader now performs as a “deputy commander for tactics,” as part of the command 

team. When required, the sniper section and company scouts provide flexible capabilities for additional 

HK teams. 

Sniper Section 

3-168. The primary mission of the sniper section is to serve in a sniper-countersniper role. The sniper 

section consists of two sniper teams. Each sniper team has three members. The section leader serves as the 

team leader of one sniper team, and each team leader also acts as the observer/spotter. Other team members 

are a sniper (shooter)/target designator and an assistant sniper. The assistant sniper provides additional 

security, transports equipment, and may serve as backup for other team members. A sniper team may also 

serve as a reconnaissance element, a stay-behind element, or as part of an HK team. 

Note. When a guerrilla company is restructured into an HK company, the sniper section of the 

former weapons platoon typically becomes part of the HK company’s headquarters and 

command section (therefore a section within a section). 

Company Scouts 

3-169. The company scouts typically comprise one team of four members, three of whom normally come 

from the former weapons platoon of a guerrilla company. The scout team leader and senior scout is the 

former recoilless gun section leader. The assistant team leader is the former machinegun section leader. The 

scout who acts as radio telephone operator (RTO) is the former RTO for the weapons platoon. The remaining 

scout is a former supply specialist with the headquarters and services section of the guerrilla company. 

HUNTER-KILLER GROUP 

3-170. An HK group is basically a task-organized guerrilla platoon. The HK group typically has a group 

headquarters and four HK sections, each with three HK teams. (See figure 3-6 on page 3-26.) HK teams in 

each HK section may vary in their manning, weapons, and equipment. Equipment may be transferred 

among HK sections and teams. As in the guerrilla platoon, one of the guerrillas in the group is cross-trained 

as a medic. 

SECTIONS ONE, TWO, AND THREE

3-171. Sections one, two, and three are typically formed by augmenting the three squads of a guerrilla 

platoon with personnel and equipment from that platoon’s machinegun section. Each of these three sections 

has three teams, designated as HK teams one, two, and three. Each of the subordinate teams may differ, as 

in the following examples: 

 The section leader also serves as team leader of team one. 

 Team one has a designated sniper or marksman. 

 Teams one and two each have a grenadier and assistant grenadier. 

 All three teams have a machinegunner, and team three, based on a machinegun team from the 

machinegun section, also has an assistant machinegunner for its crew-served weapon. 

 Teams two and three have other riflemen who also have duties as ammunition bearers or 

operators of antitank disposable launchers or flame weapons. 

SECTION FOUR

3-172. Section four has a different task-organized HK structure because it comes from the guerrilla 

company’s weapons platoon. The weapons platoon had three machineguns, three mortars, and three 

recoilless guns. One of each of these weapons goes to the section four of each of the three HK groups in the 

HK company. In section four, these weapons form the basis for team one (machinegun), team two (mortar), 

and team three (recoilless gun). The teams may receive additional transportation support from the company 

trains in the headquarters and command section of the HK company. 
Chapter 3 

3-28 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 

3-173. Functional tactics (see chapter 7) are characteristic of a guerrilla force. However, guerrillas may 

also use terrorism tactics and techniques (see chapter 6). Functional tactics and terrorism are not mutually 

exclusive. Guerrillas can use both forms of violent action simultaneously. Guerrillas also apply a full range 

of information warfare (INFOWAR) capabilities to exhaust enemy resolve (see appendix A). 

FLEXIBILITY

3-174. Depending on conditions, guerrilla actions can include a wide spectrum of offensive and defensive 

actions. Guerrilla organizations are capable of independent actions or may be affiliated with regular 

military forces and/or insurgent organizations. Actions may be conducted in close coordination with regular 

military forces when such support is available. In a long-term conflict, this close association with regular 

military forces can lead to integration of highly trained guerrilla forces into the regular military forces. 

Specific weapons, equipment, manning, and materiel provide the level of combat power or sophistication 

required for a particular situation. Guerrilla actions are characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and brief, 

violent action. Guerrillas can use a broad range of tactics, from terrorism and sabotage through functional 

tactics similar to those used by regular military forces. This enables them to escalate or deescalate activity 

almost at will. They apply whatever tactics and techniques best fit the specific situation. 

3-175. Guerrilla unit actions may be as large as several brigade-level operations or be as small as a 

platoon raid or independent HK team ambush. Guerrilla organizations and capabilities can be tailored for 

brigade, battalion, company, platoon, and squad or team levels of action. The objective of guerrilla actions 

by small independent forces is often to harass, delay, or disrupt enemy operations. The objective of small 

forces may be to inflict casualties and damage on the enemy rather than to seize and defend terrain. In the 

latter case, operations are characterized by the extensive use of surprise. 

FUNCTIONAL TACTICS

3-176. Guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, use variants of the same functional tactics described in 

TC 7-100.2 for smaller regular military units or SPF. (See chapter 7 for more detail on these functional 

tactics and examples of how guerrillas can use them.) 

3-177. When guerrilla forces first become operational, they usually engage in limited or small-scale 

activities and operations. If they reach more sophisticated levels of organization, equipment, and training, 

then they may conduct larger operations using more complex forms of functional tactics, perhaps in 

conjunction with regular military forces. 

Offensive Action 

3-178. Guerrillas typically use hit-and-run attacks by lightly armed, small forces. Their tactics emphasize 

ambushes, raids, snipers, rocket and mortar attacks, and the use of explosive devices. Guerrilla actions are 

generally offensive, not defensive, and are often harassing in nature. Guerrillas seldom attempt to seize and 

defend physical objectives and, in general, avoid decisive engagement, unless they know they can win. 

Their overall aim is often to cause confusion, to destroy infrastructure or security forces, and to lower 

enemy morale. Guerrilla harassment attempts to keep enemy forces on the defensive and weaken them, 

which can include destroying resources and disrupting lines of communication (LOCs). One advantage of 

harassment is that it may create the perception that the guerrillas can strike anywhere and that the enemy 

cannot prevent it. In rural areas, guerrillas may seize a remote area or conduct raids and small-scale attacks 

on remote targets and LOCs. 

3-179. Even when small guerrilla units are under the command of a guerrilla battalion or brigade, this 

does not necessarily mean a mass concentration of personnel. On the contrary, small units remain dispersed 

throughout the area. When enemy forces outnumber the guerrillas, the guerrillas seek to attain local 

numerical superiority. If guerrillas can successfully concentrate, they can attain victory over small elements 

of enemy forces. Guerrillas often use simple techniques of speed, surprise, maneuver, and especially 

infiltration. (See Infiltration, below.) 
Guerrillas 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-29 

3-180. Guerrillas use dispersion during their movements. However, near the target area, small guerrilla 

units mass and then conduct offensive actions. (See Swarming, below.) While the guerrillas are 

outnumbered by enemy forces, they seek to attain local numerical superiority. In this way, they can attain 

victory over small elements of enemy forces. The most common techniques employed by guerrillas are the 

ambush, raid, and small-scale assaults or reconnaissance attacks. These techniques usually target security 

posts, small forces, facilities, and LOCs. These tactics, if successful, may compel enemy forces to commit 

larger elements to defensive tasks. Guerrillas can employ some of the types of offensive action also used by 

smaller tactical units of the regular OPFOR. (See chapter 7 for basic discussion of these offensive actions.) 

Such actions can include— 

 Ambush. 

 Assault. 

 Raid. 

 Reconnaissance attack. 

Defensive Action 

3-181. Guerrilla strength, equipment, and training is almost always inferior to that of the enemy. 

Therefore, unless forced to do otherwise by the enemy, guerrilla forces hold defensive positions only for 

brief periods in support of other actions by guerrilla or affiliated regular forces. Guerrilla forces usually 

defend themselves by flight or dispersion, by withdrawals, or by creating diversions. Whenever possible, 

defensive actions are accomplished by offensive raids and ambushes against the enemy’s flanks and rear. 

Guerrillas may also try to ambush the initial enemy attack force to inflict maximum casualties. 

3-182. When faced with a large-scale enemy offensive action, a guerrilla commander may chose to— 

 Defend the area against attack. 

 Disperse units or individuals until the enemy offensive is over. 

 Conduct diversionary activities in other areas. 

 Withdraw into another area not likely to be included in the enemy offensive. 

 Withdraw in a wide, circling movement and then attack against the enemy’s rear and base 

installations. 

3-183. The object of the defense may be to make the attack so expensive for the enemy that he will soon 

abandon it and will not wish to try it again. The guerrilla force seeks to avoid being pinned down so that it 

can be encircled and destroyed. As the enemy overcomes various defensive positions, the defenders 

withdraw to subsequent defensive positions or break up and infiltrate through the enemy’s lines and attack 

his rear, flanks, and supply installations. The principles of guerrilla defense of fixed positions are the same 

as those applicable to regular forces, except that there are fewer supporting fires and that counterattacks are 

not practicable. Maximum use is made of complex terrain, defensive works, and mines. 

Guerrillas can employ some of the types of defensive action also used by smaller tactical units of the 

regular OPFOR. (See chapter 7 for basic discussion of these defensive actions.) Such actions can include 

defense of a simple battle position and/or defense of a complex battle position. 

TERRORISM

3-184. Guerrillas can also use terrorism achieve psychological impact. See chapter 6 for terrorism tactics 

and techniques that guerrillas can use. 

INFILTRATION

3-185. Land infiltration involves the use of various modes of transportation or techniques such as 

commercial vehicles, railway trains, or infiltration on foot, possibly along with refugees. Before the 

mission, the guerrilla unit is briefed on the known locations of selected individuals who will furnish 

assistance and on the established means of contacting them. These individuals may be used as local guides 

and sources of information, food, and shelter. Since there are local sources for survival items, the unit can 

restrict the equipment and supplies to be carried to mission-essential items (individual arms, equipment, 

and communications gear). 
Chapter 3 

3-30 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

3-186. A very successful infiltration method used by guerrillas (and/or affiliated SPF) is to infiltrate under 

the guise of reconnaissance probes. This is especially successful when the SPF are either guiding or using 

affiliated guerrilla forces, from a team of three to four men to a squad, or a platoon, or even a company. 

The guerrilla forces and/or SPF conduct small probes along the enemy defensive positions. If the enemy 

does not respond to these probes, the guerrilla forces and/or SPF infiltrate in small numbers and spread out. 

This permits larger numbers to penetrate. Once behind enemy lines, one team may cut off the escape route 

of the enemy, while the other units conduct a coordinated assault on both the front and flanks. The attacks 

will continue on all sides until the defenders are destroyed or forced to withdraw. The guerrilla forces 

and/or SPF will then move stealthily forward to the open flank of the next enemy position and repeat 

the tactics. 

3-187. The OPFOR also conducts another very successful variation of this infiltration and subsequent 

action. Another very successful variant is that the guerrilla forces and/or SPF do not immediately attack as 

soon as they are successfully behind enemy lines. Once behind the enemy, they may wait a few hours or up 

to 3 days or more and may number as much as a full guerrilla company or even a battalion, depending on 

the circumstances. Once emplaced either behind the enemy or more likely behind and on both flanks of the 

enemy, the infiltrated force then waits for the main attack. If the main attack is successful, the enemy will 

either retreat or fall back. At that time, the infiltrated guerrilla forces and/or SPF will ambush and destroy 

the remaining enemy forces. If the main attack is faltering or appears as if it may fail, the infiltrated 

guerrilla forces and/or SPF simultaneously attack from both the rear and flanks, ensuring victory. 

SWARMING

3-188. Swarming is a tactic that results in the convergent attack(s), from multiple directions, and possibly 

multiple dimensions, by numerous elements on a single target(s). Guerrillas can use this type of attack, 

especially when accompanied by affiliated SPF. SPF teams can plan or otherwise facilitate the attack and 

may or may not accompany their surrogate forces conducting the swarming attack. 

3-189. There are two basic types of swarming: the massed swarm and the dispersed swarm. In the massed 

swarm, the elements begin as a massed (assembled) unit. On command, the elements then disassemble and 

conduct a convergent attack(s) to swarm the enemy from numerous directions. In the dispersed swarm, the 

elements are geographically dispersed from the beginning. On command, the elements infiltrate. Once 

prepared, they attack (from their respective directions), converging on the enemy without forming a single 

massed unit. Swarms are equally effective in both the offense and the defense. 

3-190. Of the two types of swarming, the dispersed swarm is the most difficult to defend against because 

the attacking elements never present a massed target. Guerrillas prefer to use the dispersed swarm attack 

where the attackers are initially dispersed, then converge on the target(s). It is more appropriate to the 

dispersed fight that guerrillas, and affiliated SPF, prefer. Once the attack is complete, the attacking 

elements can either dissipate into the local population, exfiltrate back to where they came from, or move to 

hide positions or sanctuary (possibly cross-border). 

STAY-BEHIND

3-191. Guerrilla forces, usually HK teams, may remain in areas formerly under guerrilla (or other Hybrid 

Threat component) control, or areas not previously occupied by the enemy. If SPF teams are also present in 

such areas, they can help organize the guerrilla force to conduct surveillance or direct action. Stringent 

precautions are taken to preserve security, particularly that of the refuge areas or other safe sites to be used 

during the initial period of enemy occupation. Information concerning locations and identities within the 

indigenous guerrilla organization is kept on a need-to-know basis. Contacts among various elements use 

clandestine communications. Dispersed caches, to include radio equipment, are pre-positioned when 

possible. SPF can provide communications, liaison, and support to guerrilla stay-behind activities. 

3-192. Guerrillas (and associated SPF personnel) have a better chance of survival in small towns, villages, 

and rural areas. However, when stay-behind operations are attempted in heavily populated urban areas, the 

SPF teams may be completely dependent upon the indigenous guerrilla organization for security, the 

contacts required for expansion, and the buildup effort. 
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-1 

Chapter 4 

Criminals 

Criminal elements exist at every level of society and in every operational 

environment (OE). Their presence, whatever their level of capabilities, adds to the 

complexity of any OE. They may be intertwined with irregular forces and possibly 

with regular military and/or paramilitary forces of a nation-state. However, they may 

also pursue their criminal activities independent of such other actors. 

CHARACTERISTICS 

4-1. Some individuals, groups, and activities are criminal or illegal only because they violate laws 

established by a recognized governing authority. Others may violate moral or ethical standards of a given 

society or of the international community. 

Note. In some OEs, the threat is more criminal than military or paramilitary in nature. 

Insurgents, guerrillas, or other armed groups often use or mimic established criminal enterprises 

and practices to move contraband, raise funds, or otherwise further their goals and objectives. 

4-2. Criminal activity is a category of violence that is enmeshed in the daily life of most people in both 

urban and rural areas. However, criminal activity thrives in areas where there is instability and lack of 

government control or law enforcement. The actions of insurgents and guerrillas further erode stability and 

effective governance, creating more opportunities for criminal pursuits. Sometimes, given those 

opportunities, insurgent or guerrillas themselves turn to crime—either to sustain themselves or for personal 

profit. It may be difficult to distinguish crime from ethnic feuds, ideological and theological extremism, or 

other elements of a culture that incite insurgency or guerrilla warfare. 

4-3. Governing authorities often characterize insurgents and guerrillas as “bandits.” The reason for this is 

that their activities in opposing the governing authority and sustaining themselves are illegal (from the 

government perspective). Acts of subversion may be against the law (that is, criminal) even if not violent. 

SCOPE OF OPERATIONS

4-4. Criminal organizations are normally independent of nation-state control. Large-scale organizations 

often extend beyond national boundaries to operate regionally or worldwide. Large-scale organizations may 

have the capability to adversely affect legitimate political, military, and judicial organizations. However, 

individual criminals or small-scale criminal organizations (gangs) typically do not. Still, any criminal 

organization can affect such government organizations and/or military operations by becoming affiliated 

with the irregular OPFOR or with military forces of another nation-state. 

4-5. Unless a criminal organization is in league with government officials, it must operate in ungoverned 

or poorly governed areas. Otherwise, the governing authority would interfere with the criminal activity. In 

today’s world, the ungoverned area may be virtual—in the Internet and cyberspace. Criminal organizations 

can draw on virtual sanctuaries such as websites, chat rooms, and blogs. 

4-6. Criminal organizations desire a space where they can conduct their activities unconstrained by a 

government. They may seek to create or maintain a region where there is no governmental control or only 

governmental control that they can co-opt. Such an area allows them sufficient latitude to operate and 

discourage rival criminal enterprises. From this base area, they can generate more and more violence and 

instability over wider sections of the political map. 
Chapter 4 

4-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

4-7. Some criminal organizations can generate instability and insecurity within a state or across borders. 

They can become partners with insurgents in order to further their criminal ends. A criminal organization 

takes on the characteristics of an insurgency when it uses subversion and violence to negate law 

enforcement efforts. Some criminal organizations may seek to co-opt political power through corruption 

and intimidation. The more they seek freedom of action, the more they inhibit state sovereignty. A criminal 

organization may create its own form of “government” by providing protection and enforcing its will on the 

populace. If it can challenge the governing authority’s control beyond the local level of government, it in 

effect becomes an insurgency unto itself, although its ends are materially focused rather than ideological. 

RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTORS

4-8. Criminal organizations may have some type of relationship with guerrilla and/or insurgent 

organizations or other actors, based on similar or shared goals and/or interests. The nature of the shared 

goal or interest determines the tenure and type of relationship and the degree of affiliation. Any affiliation 

depends on the needs of the criminal organization at a particular time. To criminals, any cooperation with 

other actors is viewed through the lens of profitability. They may actually oppose other actors whose 

activities degrade their criminal enterprises. 

Note. Criminals and criminal organizations, both armed and unarmed, may be considered 

noncombatants as long as they are neutral. However, they may be considered as combatants if 

they become affiliated with regular military or irregular forces. In the latter case, they can be 

considered part of the irregular OPFOR. 

Irregular Forces 

4-9. By mutual agreement, or when their interests coincide, criminal organizations may become affiliated 

with insurgents and/or guerrillas controlling and operating in the same area. Such allies can provide 

security and protection against government forces or other common enemies. They can also provide 

support to the criminal organization’s activities. In exchange, the criminal organization may provide 

financial assistance, advanced technologies, or weapons. 

4-10. Mutual interests of criminals, insurgents, and/or guerrillas can include preventing extraregional or 

local government forces from interfering in their respective spheres. The amount of mutual protection 

depends on the size and sophistication of each organization and its level of influence on the government or 

the local population. 

4-11. On behalf of a criminal organization, insurgents or guerrillas can conduct— 

 Diversionary actions. 

 Reconnaissance and early warning. 

 Money laundering. 

 Smuggling. 

 Transportation. 

 Civic actions. 

4-12. Criminal organizations may not be part of an insurgency. However, their activities—such as theft, 

hijackings, kidnappings, and smuggling—can further undermine the governing authority. Insurgent 

organizations often link themselves to criminal networks to obtain funding and logistics support. In some 

cases, insurgent networks and criminal networks become indistinguishable. Many insurgent organizations 

are more similar to organized crime in their organizational structure and relations with the populace than 

they are to military units. 

Note. If an insurgent organization creates a shadow government, criminals may co-opt elements 

of that government for their own benefit or reach agreements for mutual benefit. 
Criminals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-3 

Nation-State Military or Paramilitary Forces 

4-13. At times, criminal organizations might also be affiliated with nation-state military and/or 

paramilitary actors. In time of war, a state may encourage and materially support criminal actions that 

contribute to the breakdown of civil control in a neighboring country. Regular, reserve, and militia forces of 

a state can maintain various relationships with criminal organizations. Special-purpose forces (SPF) can 

support criminal organizations and possibly conduct operations in conjunction with them. 

Local Populace 

4-14. Criminal organizations may conduct civic actions to gain and maintain support of the populace. A 

grateful public can provide valuable security and support functions. The local citizenry may willingly 

provide ample intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and security support. Such support can also be 

the result of bribery, extortion, or coercion. For example, a criminal organization might use bribery or 

extortion to induce members of the local populace to act as couriers or otherwise support its activities. It 

might also coerce a businessperson into running a front company on its behalf. 

Private Security Companies 

4-15. Large criminal organizations may hire private security contractors (PSCs) to guard key facilities. 

PSCs can also provide bodyguards for a criminal leader or conduct surveillance or a search at a site prior to 

his arrival. 

PERSONNEL

4-16. In most countries and cultures, criminals fall into the lower orders of social groups. However, there 

are some cases in which the criminals are well known and receive a degree of respect for their adherence to 

traditional social values and their public social works (civic actions). 

4-17. Criminals may or may not be armed. For instance, individuals who perform money laundering or 

operate front companies might not be armed. Individual criminals or gangs might be affiliated with 

insurgents or guerrillas and still perform support functions that do not involve weapons. Conversely, some 

criminals are armed noncombatants who are not part of or affiliated with any military or paramilitary 

organization. Some minor criminals may use their weapons for activities such as extortion and theft. They 

might even steal from local government or extraregional forces, to make a profit. Opportunists may decide 

to hijack a vehicle or a convoy by force of arms. 

4-18. Individual criminals may be completely neutral or have leanings for either side, or several sides. At 

least at the outset, they may not be members of or directly affiliated with the irregular OPFOR. However, 

since some of them are already armed, they could easily become combatants, if their situation charges. 

While some noncombatants are normally unarmed, there is always the potential for them to take up arms in 

reaction to developments in the OE and their perception of the actions of local governing authorities or an 

extraregional force. 

Note. Most criminals (especially noncombatants) are not irregular forces or part of the irregular 

OPFOR. However, they are included in this TC because of their relationships and interactions 

with the irregular OPFOR. Their criminal acts can add to the general instability caused by the 

irregular OPFOR. 

MOTIVATIONS 

4-19. Criminals, unlike insurgents or guerrillas, are seldom driven by any political or religious ideology. 

They exist to make money or to wield power. However, some criminal organizations may align themselves 

with insurgents or guerrillas if their interests are mutually supportable. Criminal organizations may even 

become affiliated with military or paramilitary forces of a nation-state if their interests coincide. 
Chapter 4 

4-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Note. Insurgents, guerrillas, or nation-states may espouse a rigid religious or political ideology. 

However, they may set aside those principles when using the drug trade or other criminal 

activities to finance their operations. 

PROFIT

4-20. The primary motivation of criminals is making as much money as possible with as little risk as 

possible. To make a profit, they may fill a need or want with otherwise unavailable products or provide 

services that are illegal. To mitigate risk, they may buy influence with politicians and police officials. 

Failing that, they may eliminate those law enforcement and legal system personnel who interfere with their 

activities, as well as criminal competitors. 

4-21. The enemies of criminal organizations are any political, military, legal, or judicial institutions that 

impede their actions and interfere with their ability to make a profit. However, there are other groups that 

conduct drug-trafficking or other illegal actions as a means to purchase weapons and finance other 

paramilitary activities. Criminals may tolerate or cooperate with such groups as long as they do not appear 

to be competitors or infringe on their own ability to make a profit. A criminal organization may sell or trade 

information to a military or paramilitary organization, for profit or mutual benefit. 

POWER

4-22. Individual criminals and criminal organizations commit crimes not only for money, but also to gain 

power and prestige. Actions such as assassination, murder, and maiming are intended to demonstrate the 

criminal organization’s power and control. That power may be over public officials, persons it cannot 

otherwise control or intimidate, criminal competitors, or people disloyal to the organization. 

4-23. Larger criminal networks and transnational criminal organizations conduct criminal activities on a 

scale that can threaten whole societies and/or the international community. They can render governments 

corrupt and ineffective. They often begin to control ungoverned territory within a nation-state, acquire 

political power in poorly governed regions, and eventually vie with the governing authority for influence in 

government-controlled space. They also look for ways to exert power and influence internationally. 

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS 

4-24. Very few crimes can be carried out by an individual criminal. Therefore, some form of organization 

is normally required. It may be a group of two or three individuals or a larger, more sophisticated 

organization. The higher the level of organization, the greater the potential for profit and power. Criminal 

organizations may not change their structure in wartime, unless wartime conditions favor or dictate 

different types of criminal action or support activities. 

4-25. Weapons and equipment vary based on type and scale of criminal activity. Criminal organizations at 

the higher end of the scale can take on the characteristics of a paramilitary organization—either for selfprotection or as a private army for hire. Criminals may have the best technology, equipment, and weapons 

available, simply because they have the money to buy them. 

4-26. Criminal organizations generally fall into three types: gangs, large-scale criminal networks, and 

transnational criminal organizations. Some gangs and criminal networks develop into larger criminal 

networks and possibly into transnational criminal organizations. Thus, the lines of separation are not 

always clear-cut. However, there are some basic differences in how these three types are structured and 

how they operate. 

GANGS

4-27. Some criminals may form loosely associated organizations with no true formal structure. These small 

gangs are a concern to local law enforcement, but normally are not a threat to legitimate institutions. 

Nevertheless, their often unpredictable acts of violence can destabilize the social and political environment. 

Smaller gangs tend to have loose, unsophisticated leadership focused on turf protection, gang loyalty, and 
Criminals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-5 

local, petty crime (such as theft or small-scale drug sales). Even when many gangs with various leaders 

operate in the same areas, they may or may not interrelate with each other. 

4-28. These smaller gangs are not irregular forces, but their impact on the local populace can be significant 

and may actually assist irregular forces. Even small gangs may become affiliated with insurgents or 

guerrillas if they stand to gain profit or power. 

4-29. Some smaller gangs may develop into larger gangs or into large-scale criminal networks. This can 

happen in two ways. A small gang may grow into a larger organization, or several gangs may (willingly or 

forcibly) be joined to form a larger organization. 

LARGE-SCALE CRIMINAL NETWORKS

4-30. Gangs may develop into large-scale criminal networks. At this level, they expand illicit business, 

increase profits, and typically focus on trafficking and market protection. These networks and the gangs 

that comprise them also continue with the traditional sources of illegal income. However, they are much 

more versatile, flexible, and able to adapt to various opportunities. The large number of criminal 

organizations loosely associated with one another is able to exploit more opportunities with a variety of 

means. Large-scale criminal networks can include any or all of the actions listed under “Criminal 

Activities” later in this chapter. 

Note. The term criminal network more closely captures the loose structure of many large 

criminal groups that do have an enduring association but are more fluid and adaptable than the 

more specific terms syndicate or cartel imply. 

4-31. Most criminal networks are loosely structured and function primarily because each participant is 

pursuing his own interests. Such a network is not necessarily a formally structured, hierarchical 

organization with one individual controlling and running the operation. Rather, it may be a loose-knit, 

intricate web of individuals or groups selected for their particular skills. However, they frequently continue 

to operate independently until the network needs their skills. The network can quickly assemble the 

appropriate resources to take advantage of opportunities for specific illegal activities and then release these 

assets between jobs. This reduces exposure to detection and keeps individuals from having too much 

information about the overall operation. 

4-32. Even when there are strong vertical links, there can still be a great deal of autonomy among the 

numerous small gangs that make up the network. The hierarchy may receive payments from those lower in 

the organization, but each gang is free to pursue its own criminal enterprises when the larger organization 

does not require its services. The small gangs may still operate relatively independently (and perhaps 

competitively). They do not necessarily share key information with the larger structure. Even the highestlevel leadership may not be aware of all operations. 

4-33. These criminal networks use violence as a means to create and protect their market as well as 

marginalize and control their competition. They seek to control or weaken state security institutions. They 

often begin to dominate community life within large areas of a nation-state. Criminal groups at this level 

may begin to develop overtly political agendas to improve their market share. They may overtly challenge 

state security and sovereignty. They may use subversion and violence as political interference to negate law 

enforcement efforts directed against them. 

4-34. Criminal networks that control local or regional markets may have ties to and frequently do business 

with criminal organizations in other regions or other countries. They do so when they need wider networks 

of customers, fences, money-laundering expertise, access to technologies, and other essentials for an 

effective criminal venture. 

4-35. Some criminal networks may develop into larger criminal networks or into transnational criminal 

organizations. In some cases, a smaller network may simply grow into a larger organization. In other cases, 

several networks may willingly join to form a larger organization. In still other cases, smaller organizations 

may be forced (by coercion or by circumstances) to become part of a larger organization. 
Chapter 4 

4-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

4-36. Some criminal organizations develop into sophisticated transnational criminal organizations. These 

organizations may have ambitious economic and political agendas. They often begin to fill the power 

vacuum in ungoverned or poorly governed regions within a nation-state and to challenge government 

control of other regions. This provides the transnational organization with security and freedom of 

movement to pursue its criminal enterprises. In some cases, the organization becomes a de facto insurgency 

with ends focused on the material rather than ideological goals. Actions can include any or all of the items 

listed under “Criminal Activities” later in this chapter—such as drug and arms trafficking, money 

laundering, and terrorism. Transnational criminal organizations develop their own transit routes for illegal 

shipments and develop their own access to contraband. 

4-37. Transnational criminal organizations take advantage of increased opportunities for profit and power 

that are found internationally. Globalization is not limited to legal trade and commerce. Criminals in 

various countries can cooperate in criminal ventures that take place across several countries. The increasing 

ease and effectiveness of global communications plays a significant role in arranging criminal ventures and 

in laundering the proceeds. 

4-38. For example, smuggling is a big business that requires international organization. Illegal substances 

or legal goods less expensive elsewhere are smuggled across state boundaries. (Drugs are the most lucrative 

of smuggled items.) A significant part of the profits may go to suppliers and associates in other countries, 

and profits may be laundered using international financial systems. 

4-39. Also contributing to the international nature of crime is the increased movement of people across 

borders. Businesses, both legitimate and illegitimate, benefit from expanding global travel. Another aspect 

is movement of people forced from their homes by war or political persecution. Others move in order to 

seek the opportunity to build a better life for themselves and their families. The vast majority of these 

people are not criminals. However, the size of the movement provides perfect cover for those who are 

connected to transnational criminal organizations. Some migrants avoid formal channels and pay smugglers 

to get them into another country. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

4-40. Criminal organizations (especially gangs and criminal networks) tend to have a lose structure. 

However, there is always some vertical link between lower-level subordinates and the organization’s 

leadership. When smaller organizations develop into larger criminal organizations by growth or by forcible 

joining, the vertical links are more likely to take the form of a relatively strong hierarchical leadership 

structure. However, when smaller organizations willingly become part of a larger organization, there is 

more likely to be a rather loose leadership structure. The following paragraphs describe some of the levels 

that may exist even in a loose hierarchical structure. 

SENIOR LEADERS

4-41. As a general rule, transnational criminal organizations tend to be highly centralized with senior 

leaders exerting control through a rigid chain of command. Gangs and criminal networks vary much 

more in their leadership structure. Some are highly organized, while others may be near anarchic with 

no central leadership. 

4-42. Compared to gangs, the leadership of large-scale criminal networks tends to be more centralized, but 

with a loose hierarchical structure. However, there are exceptions. For example, some networks (such as 

drug cartels or crime syndicates) may be tightly organized with a rigid hierarchy. Some networks may 

resemble a business enterprise with specially qualified individuals on the operational side, while others 

supply the support services. 

4-43. Different groups have varying titles for their leaders. Such titles may include boss, number one, 

chief, father, or simply leader (in various languages). 
Criminals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-7 

INTERMEDIATE LEADERS

4-44. Intermediate leaders are the “middle management” of criminal organizations. Each of these is the 

ranking member of his particular part of a larger organization. Again, titles vary from organization to 

organization. Examples are sub-boss, underboss, street boss, or franchise leader. Those intermediate leaders 

who, in the view of their organization, lead a crew of “soldiers,” may have military-like titles (such as 

sergeant, lieutenant, captain, or brigadier). Regardless of the title, the mission is the same: 

 Turn orders into reality and make money. 

 Ensure loyalty and punish those who get out of line. 

 Avoid arrest and prosecution. 

 Eliminate or intimidate the competition. 

SPECIALIZED AND TECHNICAL SUPPORTERS

4-45. All organizations have specialists. These are people who maintain a very high level of expertise in 

one or two areas necessary for the success of the organization. In criminal organizations, this traditionally 

includes such persons as— 

 Accountants. 

 Defense attorneys. 

 Counselors. 

 Professional assassins. 

 Explosives experts. 

 Counterfeiters. 

 Smugglers. 

 Pilots. 

 Drivers. 

In today’s strategic and operational environments, it also includes— 

 Hackers. 

 Computer programmers. 

 Telecommunications specialists. 

 Weapons experts. 

 Human traffickers. 

FIELD OPERATIVES

4-46. At the lowest level of the criminal organization is the field operative. That is the man on the street, 

willing to commit crimes for money, power, and prestige. These people may be full members (made men), 

aspiring members (prospects), or those who want to be seen with the organization (hang-around, 

associates). The titles for field operatives may include soldier, warrior, legman, or simply member. 

Whatever their title, they are still criminals within a larger organization and will be the face of the 

organization that most of the populace see. 

PASSIVE SUPPORTERS

4-47. In many cases, there are individuals or groups who provide passive support to criminal organizations 

for any number of reasons. Some see the organization as a defense against another group or corrupt 

government officials. Some have familial connections. Some see neighborhood, community, or country 

loyalty embodied in the criminal organization. Some are merely concerned about their own financial 

security or material gain. 
Chapter 4 

4-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 

4-48. Criminals use many and varied tactics and techniques. Some of these methods overlap with one 

another. The activities typically include an objective to make fiscal profit and/or achieve influence. 

SECURITY

4-49. Security is crucial for criminal organizations. They may use the highest degree of sophistication 

available to conduct intelligence collection and counterintelligence activities. These activities are a priority 

and can be well funded. Intelligence sources may extend to high levels within government and lawenforcement agencies. The local populace may willingly provide ample intelligence collection, 

counterintelligence, and security support. Intelligence and security can also be the result of bribery, 

extortion, or coercion. 

4-50. Most members of criminal organizations are capable of protecting themselves and their assets. 

Typically, they carry small-caliber weapons, such as handguns, pistols, rifles, and shotguns. They are 

lightly armed out of necessity or convenience, not for lack of resources. When greater force of arms is 

necessary to control people, protect vital resources, or obtain information, these organizations typically 

have members who can use heavier arms, such as machineguns and assault weapons. Large criminal 

organizations may hire PSCs to conduct surveillance, provide personal security for leaders, or guard 

key facilities. 

THEFT

4-51. Theft is the taking of another person’s property without that person’s permission or consent with the 

intent to deprive the rightful owner of it. Thus, theft is an overarching term that covers various crimes 

against property such as burglary, embezzlement, larceny, looting, robbery, and fraud. (See also identity 

theft and intellectual property theft, both under Cyber Crime.) 

FRAUD

4-52. A fraud is an intentional deception made for personal gain and/or to damage another individual 

or entity. Defrauding people or entities of money or valuables is a common purpose of fraud. Fraud 

can include— 

 Ponzi schemes. 

 Insider trading. 

 Embezzlement. 

 Insurance scams. 

 Money laundering. 

 Forgery. 

Fraud can also include cyber crimes such as— 

 Identity theft. 

 Copyright infringement. 

RACKETEERING

4-53. A racket is a fraudulent scheme, enterprise, or activity. It is usually an illegitimate business made 

workable by bribery or intimidation. A racketeer is one who extorts money or advantages by threats of 

violence, by blackmail, or by unlawful interference with business or employment. Therefore, racketeering 

overlaps with bribery, intimidation, and extortion. 

4-54. In racketeering, a criminal organization typically creates or perpetuates a problem or the perception 

of a problem for which it then offers a solution, for a fee. The intent is to engender continual patronage. In 

the traditional example of a protection racket, the racketeer informs a store owner that a substantial monthly 

fee will be required in exchange for protection. The “protection” provided takes the form of the absence of 

damage inflicted upon the store or its employees by the racket itself. Another example is malicious 
Criminals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-9 

software (malware) that pretends to be detecting spyware or other infections on a computer and offers to 

download a cleaning utility for a fee. In actuality, the distributor of the malware is also the maker of the 

cleaning utility. (This aspect of racketeering overlaps with the category of cyber crime, discussed below.) 

In addition to protection rackets, racketeering can also involve numbers rackets or illegal lottery. 

4-55. Racketeering can also include seemingly legitimate businesses that provide a front for illegal activity 

such as buying and selling illegal merchandise. Loan sharking is another form of racketeering in which a 

criminal offers loans at extremely high interest rates to borrowers who cannot qualify for loans from 

legitimate sources. The debtor faces violence or other criminal means to cause harm if the debt is not paid. 

4-56. Black markets fall under racketeering as illegal businesses. These can include traded goods and 

services such as biological organs, transportation providers, illegal drugs, prostitution, weaponry, alcohol, 

tobacco, currency, and fuel. Black markets tend to flourish in most countries during wartime, due to 

rationing, and impact commodities such as food, fuel, rubber, and metal. 

GAMBLING

4-57. In most societies, the act of gambling is in itself not illegal. What becomes illegal is an illicit 

business based on gambling (also called gaming). It is illegal because either— 

 It is conducted in a fraudulent manner. 

 The governing authority has outlawed it. 

 The gambling enterprise fails to share all its profits with the governing authority. 

Gambling in the form of a numbers racket or illegal lottery is a form of racketeering. Internet gambling is a 

form of cyber crime. 

4-58. Many types of gambling have been, or still are, illegal in some places. Hence, criminals may be the 

only operators of some games. Even when a governing authority legalizes some gambling ventures, it may 

be difficult to keep criminals from becoming involved, due to the huge potential for profits. Besides 

gaming operations recognized and (sometimes poorly) regulated by the state, there are many other 

gambling opportunities in which criminals may be involved. 

4-59. Gambling is often associated with other types of crime. Operators of legal gambling establishments 

may receive kickbacks for allowing money laundering. Gambling operations earn large amounts of cash 

and present particular opportunities for skimming and money laundering. Aside from skimming profits 

from a legalized gambling enterprise, skimming can also occur with the granting of credit, which can lead 

into loan sharking. In particular, problem gamblers who need money for gambling may easily fall prey to 

loan sharks. Compulsive gambling can also lead to crimes such as embezzlement, robbery, check forgery, 

and fraud. 

PROSTITUTION

4-60. Prostitution is the practice of indulging in sexual relations for money. As a criminal enterprise, it also 

involves a criminal or criminal organization that profits from the commercial sex act. Prostitutes may also 

profit from the venture, although the criminal organization gets its cut. However, prostitution may be linked 

to human trafficking, in which case the criminals get all the profits. 

EXTORTION

4-61. Extortion is the act of obtaining money, materiel, information, or support by force or intimidation. 

Criminal organizations use extortion to obtain information or cooperation or to protect members. Examples 

of extortion include— 

 Intimidating politicians to vote in a manner favorable to the criminal organization. 

 Intimidating judges to free an organization member. 

 Forcing a farmer to grow drug-producing crops. 

 Extorting money from local businesses in exchange for protection, which means not harming the 

business or its members. 
Chapter 4 

4-10 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

 Using death threats against an individual or his family to cause him to provide information or 

resources. 

 Intimidating other people not to take action against the criminal organization. 

 Using information warfare (INFOWAR) methods to create and maintain fear caused by 

extortion. 

BRIBERY

4-62. Bribery is giving money or other favors to influence someone. Criminals give money to people in 

power who make or influence decisions. For example, bribes to law-enforcement officials can cause them 

to have their patrols avoid a criminal organization’s transit routes. If the organization is unable to bribe 

someone, it employs harsher methods, such as extortion, assassination, or murder, to gain cooperation. 

ARSON

4-63. Arson is maliciously burning another person’s dwelling, structures, or property. This may be done to 

as punishment for noncompliance with internal rules of criminal organizations. It may be the result of not 

paying the criminal organization for “protection.” It may also be done on a for-hire basis or as a means to 

inflict terror on a targeted person or group. 

HIJACKING

4-64. Hijacking is stealing or commandeering a conveyance. Criminals may conduct a hijacking to produce 

a spectacular hostage situation. Sometimes criminals may hijack a conveyance as a means of escape; in that 

case, the criminals may eliminate any unneeded people and materiel, such as hostages or baggage. 

KIDNAPPING

4-65. Kidnapping is an abduction or transportation of a person or group by force. The person is kept in 

false imprisonment (confinement without legal authority). This may be done for ransom or in furtherance 

of another crime (such as human trafficking or hostage taking). This type of crime has become very popular 

with criminal organizations, and the methods vary by region. Kidnapping flourishes particularly in fragile 

or failed states and regions in conflict, as drug traffickers and other criminal organizations fill the vacuum 

left by governing authority. 

4-66. The risk in kidnapping is relatively lower than in hostage taking. This is primarily because the 

criminals take the kidnapped victim to a location controlled by the criminal organization. The criminals 

then make demands and are willing to hold a victim for a long time, if necessary. 

HOSTAGE TAKING

4-67. Hostage taking is typically an overt seizure of a person or persons to gain publicity, concessions, or 

ransom. Unlike kidnapping, where usually a prominent individual is taken, the hostages are usually not 

well known figures. Criminals attempt to hold hostages in a neutral or friendly area. The planning and 

execution of a hostage taking are similar to those of a kidnapping or hijacking. However, criminals may 

also take hostages as an expedient measure when they have difficulty exiting a crime scene. 

MURDER

4-68. Murder is the unlawful killing of another human being without justification or excuse. Murder is 

perhaps the single most serious criminal offense. Criminal organizations use murder as an enforcement tool 

and as a method of generating revenue in murder-for-hire schemes. 

ASSASSINATION

4-69. An assassination is the murder (usually of a prominent person) by a sudden and/or secret attack. It is 

usually prompted by religious, ideological, political, or military motives, but may be done for payment. 

Criminals and criminal organizations may use an assassination— 
Criminals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-11 

 For monetary gain. 

 To exert terror. 

 To display power. 

 To exact revenge on a public official. 

 To eliminate people they cannot intimidate. 

 To punish people who have left the criminal organization. 

MAIMING

4-70. Maiming is a deliberate act to mutilate, disfigure, or severely wound a person so as to cause lasting 

damage. Maiming can involve assault and battery on a person with intent to inflict serious injury. Other 

methods include— 

 Male castration. 

 Female genital mutilation. 

 Burning or branding. 

 Forcible tattooing. 

 Cutting off limbs. 

 Removal of tongue, eyes, or ears. 

 Throwing a corrosive acid or alkali to cause blindness or scarring. 

4-71. The person maimed is an outward sign of the criminal organization’s power and control. A criminal 

organization often uses or threatens maiming— 

 To enforce order within the organization. 

 To collect debts. 

 For extortion. 

 As a for-hire operation to generate revenue. 

SMUGGLING

4-72. Smuggling is the clandestine transportation of illegal goods or persons. It usually involves illegal 

movement across an international border. There are various motivations to smuggle. These include 

participation in illegal trade, illegal immigration or emigration, and tax evasion. Smuggling is often related 

to trafficking in persons, drugs, or arms. 

TRAFFICKING 

4-73. Trafficking is the transportation of goods or persons for the purpose of making a profit. Criminals 

conduct illegal trafficking. Human trafficking (trafficking in persons) is the second largest criminal activity 

in the world—followed by drug trafficking and arms trafficking. 

Humans 

4-74. Human trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons 

(including children) for the purpose of exploitation. It involves the threat or use of force, coercion, 

abduction, fraud, deception, and/or abuse. Human trafficking may take two forms: 

 Sex trafficking in which a person is induced to perform a commercial sex act. 

 The recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or 

services, for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, debt bondage, or slavery. 

Criminals choose to traffic human beings because, unlike other commodities, people can be used repeatedly 

and because human trafficking requires little in terms of capital investment. 

4-75. Human trafficking is not the same as people smuggling. A smuggler may facilitate illegal entry into a 

country for a fee, but on arrival at their destination, the smuggled person is free. The trafficking victim is 

coerced in some way and is further exploited after arrival, in order to derive profits. Victims do not agree to 
Chapter 4 

4-12 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

be trafficked; they are tricked, lured by false promises, or forced into it. Traffickers control their victims by 

coercive tactics including deception, fraud, intimidation, isolation, physical threats and use of force, debt 

bondage, or even force-feeding drugs. 

Drugs 

4-76. The illegal drug trade is a black market consisting of production, distribution, packaging, and sale of 

illegal psychoactive substances. The legality or illegality of the black markets purveying the drug trade is 

relative to geographic location. The drug-producing countries may be inclined to tolerate the drug 

traffickers because of bribery or the effect on the country’s economy. Drugs often cross international 

borders in order to reach the best paying customers. The massive profits inherent to the drug trade serve to 

extend its reach. The social consequences of drug trade include crime, violence, and social unrest. 

Arms 

4-77. Arms trafficking involves illicit transfers of arms, ammunition, and associated materials. Criminal 

organizations may be involved in two types of arms trafficking: 

 Small-scale transactions by individuals or small firms that deliberately transfer arms to illicit 

recipients. 

 Higher-value or more difficult illicit shipments of arms involving corrupt officials, brokers, or 

middle men motivated mainly by profit. 

4-78. Arms trafficking is driven by a variety of clients, which include— 

 Embargoed governments. 

 Armed groups involved in war, banditry, terrorism, or insurgency. 

 Criminals and criminal organizations. 

 Citizens who cannot obtain guns legally. 

4-79. Some arms and ammunition may come from illicit arms manufacturers. However, the source of a 

large proportion of illicit conventional arms is government disposals of surplus arms or thefts from insecure 

government stockpiles. Governments themselves may deliberately facilitate covert flows of arms to their 

proxies or allies, or to embargoed or suspect destinations for profit. 

4-80. Arms trafficking is widespread in regions of political turmoil. However, it is not limited to such 

areas. Most arms trafficking occurs at the regional or local level. Among the most common forms are 

numerous shipments of small numbers of weapons that, over time, result in the accumulation of large 

numbers of illicit weapons. While individual transactions occur on a small scale and do not draw attention, 

the sum total of weapons trafficked is large. 

CYBER CRIME

4-81. Cyber crimes are offenses targeting or using information technology. This includes computers, 

computer networks, and other telecommunication networks such as the Internet (chat rooms, emails, notice 

boards, and groups) and mobile phones. Such crimes may threaten not only individuals and groups but also 

a nation’s security and financial health. Cyber crimes can facilitate a variety of other criminal activities, 

including money laundering, extortion, fraud, racketeering, gambling, smuggling, and trafficking. 

4-82. Criminals exploit the speed, convenience, and anonymity that modern technologies offer in order to 

commit a diverse range of criminal activities. The global nature of the Internet allows criminals to commit 

almost any online illegal activity anywhere in the world. In the past, cyber crime has been committed by 

individuals or small groups of individuals. However, an emerging trend is for criminal networks and 

criminally minded technology professionals to work together and pool their resources and expertise. 

4-83. Cyber crimes include network intrusions, hacking attacks, malicious software, and account takeovers 

leading to significant data breaches affecting every sector of the world economy. Advances in computer 

and telecommunications technology and greater access to personal information via the Internet have created 

a virtual marketplace for transnational cyber criminals to share stolen information and criminal 

methodologies. The increasing level of collaboration among cyber criminals raises the level of potential 
Criminals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-13 

harm to individuals, companies, and governments. Members of online forums discuss cyber crime topics of 

interest. Criminal purveyors buy, sell, and trade— 

 Malicious software. 

 Hacking services. 

 Spamming devices. 

 Personal identification information. 

 Credit and debit card data. 

 Bank account information. 

 Brokerage account information. 

 Counterfeit identity documents. 

 Other forms of contraband. 

4-84. Cyber crime falls into two broad categories: 

 Computer crimes. 

 Intellectual property crimes. 

Computer Crimes 

4-85. Computer crime refers to any crime that involves a computer or computer network. The computer or 

network may be the target, or it may be used in the commission of a crime, the primary target of which is 

independent of the computer network or device. 

Crimes Targeting Computers 

4-86. Criminals can cause damage to computers in many ways. For example, an unauthorized intruder can 

send commands that delete files or shut the computer down. Intruders can initiate a denial-of-service attack 

that floods the victim computer with useless information and prevents legitimate users from accessing it. A 

virus or worm can use up all of the available communications bandwidth on an agency or corporate 

network, making it unavailable to employees. When a virus or worm penetrates a computer’s security, it 

can delete files, crash the computer, install malicious software, or do other things that impair the 

computer’s integrity. 

4-87. Extortion threats involving damage to a computer are a high-technology variation of old-fashioned 

extortion. Intruders may threaten, unless their demands are met, to— 

 Penetrate a system and encrypt or delete a database (erasing or corrupting data or programs). 

 Distribute denial-of-service attacks that would shut down (or slow down) the victim’s 

computers. 

 Steal confidential data. 

The threat need not be sent electronically. 

4-88. Crimes may involve intercepting or interfering with communications through the use of electronic, 

mechanical, or other devices. This applies to electronic communications as well as oral and wire 

communications via common carrier transmissions. This may involve— 

 Spyware or intruders using packet sniffers. 

 Persons improperly cloning email accounts. 

 Other surreptitious collection of communications from a victim’s computer. 

The crime may extend to the unauthorized disclosure of the contents of an illegally intercepted 

communication or using such information for other criminal purposes. Such crimes may also injure or 

destroy various types of communication operated or controlled by a government or used for a state’s 

military or paramilitary functions. 

Crimes Using Computers 

4-89. Crimes using computers or facilitated by computers include— 

 Unauthorized access to computers (even government computers and perhaps law enforcement). 
Chapter 4 

4-14 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

 Unauthorized access to stored communications (including email, social networking data, and 

voicemail). 

Two of the most common uses are for— 

 Fraud (computer fraud and wire fraud). 

 Identity theft. 

4-90. Fraud. Computer fraud is the use of information technology to commit fraud. Criminals may devise 

various schemes or artifices to obtain money, property, goods, or services of measurable value. These 

include— 

 Accessing a computer without authorization to obtain— 

 Commercial data. 

 Information contained in a financial record of a financial institution. 

 Information contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a customer. 

 Information from any government department or agency. 

 Information from a protected computer. 

 Accessing without authorization a government, commercial, or personal computer and affecting 

the use of the owner’s operation of the computer. 

 Accessing a protected computer with the intent to defraud and thereby obtain anything of value. 

 Causing the transmission of a program, information, code, or command that causes damage to a 

computer system, personal injury, or a threat to public health or safety. 

 Trafficking in passwords or similar information through which a computer may be accessed 

without authorization. 

 Manipulating market data for criminal purposes. 

 Data or information or even the use of a computer can be regarded as a thing of value. 

4-91. Computer fraud can also fall under the more general category of wire fraud. In what is considered 

wire fraud, criminals may use fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises transmitted by various 

means of telecommunication, including— 

 Wire. 

 Radio. 

 Television. 

 Mobile phone. 

 Facsimile. 

 Telex. 

 Modem. 

 Internet. 

4-92. Money mule schemes could be categorized as computer or wire fraud. In such schemes, criminals 

trick people into moving money for them. Through Internet phishing, criminals can steal money from 

unsuspecting people by accessing their accounts. The phishers then face the problem of moving the large 

sums of money acquired from the victims to their own accounts, often in other countries, without attracting 

suspicion. Traditionally, drug smugglers have used people (referred to as mules) willing to carry small 

amounts of drugs across borders for them for a price. In a variant of this scheme, phishers recruit innocent 

people in the countries where their victims reside by offering them a lucrative job using their home 

computers. Those recruited are usually unaware that these are not legitimate business opportunities. Thus, 

phishers can dupe a large number of individuals (called money mules) into accepting relatively small 

amounts of money stolen from people’s accounts and transferring the funds to the phishers in return 

for a commission. 

4-93. Identity Theft. Identity theft is almost always committed to facilitate other crimes. It involves 

unauthorized transfer, possession, or use of a means of identification of another person with the intent to 

commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any unlawful activity. Most commonly, it involves the 

misuse of another individual’s personal identifying information for fraudulent purposes. With relatively 

little effort, an identity thief can use this information to take over existing credit accounts, create new 
Criminals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-15 

accounts in the victim’s name, or even evade law enforcement after the commission of a violent crime. 

Identity thieves also sell personal information online to the highest bidder, often resulting in the stolen 

information being used by a number of different perpetrators. Personal information can also be obtained for 

the purpose of blackmail or other forms of extortion. 

4-94. Criminals can obtain credit and debit card numbers by hacking into the wireless computer networks 

of major retailers. Network intrusions can compromise the privacy of individuals if data about them or their 

transactions resides on the victim network. Once inside the networks, criminals install “sniffer” programs 

that capture card numbers, as well as passwords and account information. After collecting the data, they 

conceal it in encrypted computer servers that they control. Then they sell the credit and debit card numbers 

through online transactions to other criminals. In addition to these “carders,” there are “phishers,” who 

obtain the same type of information via fraudulent emails. 

4-95. The unlawful use of identification information can involve access device fraud. Such fraud can 

include any device, number, or other means of account access that can be used to obtain money, goods, 

services, or other things of value. It can also involve unlawful access to buildings or facilities. 

Intellectual Property Crimes 

4-96. Intellectual property crimes involve theft of material protected by copyright, trademark, patent, or 

trade-secret designation. Such intellectual property is vital to local, national, and international economies. 

4-97. The interconnected global economy creates unprecedented business opportunities to market and sell 

intellectual property worldwide. Geographic borders present no impediment to international distribution 

channels. If the product cannot be immediately downloaded to a computer, it can be shipped and arrive by 

next day air. However, the same technology that benefits rights-holders and consumers also benefits 

intellectual property thieves seeking to make a fast, low-risk profit. In addition, trafficking in counterfeit 

merchandise also generates large profits. 

4-98. The most egregious violators are large-scale criminal networks and transnational criminal 

organizations whose conduct threatens not only intellectual property owners but also the economy of 

nation-states. Because many violations of intellectual property rights involve no loss of tangible property 

and do not require direct contact with the rights-holder, the owner often does not even know that it is a 

victim for some time. 

4-99. Intellectual property crimes can overlap with computer crimes, especially in the following areas: 

 Unauthorized access of a computer to obtain information. 

 Mail or wire fraud (can include the Internet). 

 Devices to intercept communications. 

4-100. Unauthorized obtainment of information or electronic media covered by copyright, trademark, 

patent, or trade-secret designation robs the rights-holders of their ideas, inventions, and creative 

expressions. Such theft is facilitated by digital technologies and Internet file sharing networks. 

4-101. Although fraud schemes can involve copyrighted works, it is not mail or wire fraud unless there is 

evidence of any misrepresentation or scheme to defraud. Mail and wire fraud may exist, even if the 

perpetrator tells his direct purchasers that his goods were counterfeit, as long as he and his direct purchasers 

intended to defraud the direct purchaser’s customers. Wire fraud can include the Internet. 

4-102. Intellectual property crimes may involve intercepting and acquiring the contents of 

communications through the use of electronic, mechanical, or other devices. Criminals may then market the 

contents of an illegally intercepted communication, including intellectual property. 

MONEY LAUNDERING

4-103. A criminal organization conducts money-laundering activities to transfer funds into the legitimate 

international financial system. Because of the legal restrictions levied by a governing authority, the 

organization must have a way of transferring “dirty” (illegally earned) money into “clean” money. The 

organization smuggles some currency back to its country of origin. However, large sums of foreign 

currency are not feasible for the organization because it must use the legal currency of its country to make 
Chapter 4 

4-16 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

transactions. For example, a farmer cannot receive payment for his drug crops in the foreign currency 

because he would be unable to use it. 

4-104. A more productive way to transfer funds into the legitimate financial system is to operate through 

front companies. Front companies are legitimate businesses that provide a means to launder money. The 

criminal organization establishes its own front companies or approaches legal companies to act as 

intermediaries. Some front companies, such as an import or export business, may operate for the sole 

purpose of laundering money. Other companies (possibly targets of extortion) operate as profit-making 

activities and launder money as a service to the organization. Criminal organizations operate front 

companies in their own country, as well as in other countries. 

4-105. Personnel involved in money laundering can include accountants, bankers, tellers, and couriers. 

Some are willing participants in the money-laundering process and accept bribes for their services. 

Extortion and intimidation keep unwilling members active in the process. Members of money-laundering 

organizations also establish and operate front companies. 

4-106. Some members, such as accountants and bankers, perform their normal functions as in a legal 

business. However, they may conduct illegal acts on behalf of the organization. Because of banking 

regulations, members must conduct activities that do not draw attention to themselves. As an example, 

couriers deposit in bank accounts a level of funds small enough to avoid banking regulations. However, not 

all countries have such regulations, making it easier to launder large sums of money. 

4-107. Couriers conduct many transactions with financial institutions. They travel from bank to bank 

making deposits or converting money into checks and money orders to prepare for smuggling activities. 

Money-laundering personnel may also use electronic fund transfers, which make tracking of illegal 

transactions much more difficult, especially when the country has lax banking laws. 

CIVIC ACTIONS

4-108. Criminal organizations conduct programs of patronage under the guise of civic actions. These 

programs are only indirectly intended to benefit the general populace. Rather, the main intent of the 

criminal organizations is to gain and maintain support, reward their supporters, and facilitate their 

continued activities. They may build a school, improve a road, or supply food and medicine. These projects 

benefit the local population because they improve the people’s quality of life and may improve their 

standard of living. For example, road building makes it easier to transport goods to market and creates jobs. 

Some of the jobs may be temporary, such as those in construction, while others may be permanent, such as 

those in education and clinics. Through its propaganda efforts, the criminal organization ensures that the 

population knows who is making the improvements. 

4-109. Sometimes the criminal organization cooperates with an insurgent force to conduct civic actions. 

They do not cooperate for ideological reasons. Their sole purpose is to inhibit the governing authority’s 

ability to affect their activities by gaining the inherent security a grateful public can provide. 

INFORMATION WARFARE

4-110. Criminal organizations may have the resources to conduct a variety of information warfare 

(INFOWAR) activities (see appendix A). However, their focus is often on a well-orchestrated perception 

management (propaganda) effort. This can be a powerful tool for intimidating enemies (governing 

authority and criminal competitors) and encouraging support of the organization’s money-making efforts. 

The use of perception management techniques can ensure that the population knows who is making 

improvements in the local environment and allow the organization to take credit for other benefits it 

provides to the local population. 

4-111. The criminal organization can also use counterpropaganda to spin events against the governing 

authority. For example, the government may burn a farmer’s drug-producing crop and then broadcast 

announcements that the action is a direct result of the farmer’s involvement with an illegal activity. 

However, the criminal organization can counter this by instilling the idea that the governing authority does 

not have programs to help the farmer make profits legally and reminding the populace of the new medical 

clinic it built. 
Criminals 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-17 

4-112. Various elements of INFOWAR can also be instrumental in other criminal activities. For instance, 

perception management and deception are related to fraud, including computer fraud. Information attack 

and computer warfare are parts of cyber crime. 

TERRORISM

4-113. Terrorism is always illegal, whether conducted by insurgents, guerrillas, or criminals. When 

conducted by regular military forces or other agencies of a nation-state (perhaps in the form of ethnic 

cleansing or confiscation of private property), other states can consider it illegal by international standards. 

For criminal organizations, terrorism becomes an action against an adverse governing authority, a criminal 

competitor, or an innocent populace. (See chapter 6 for more information on terrorism.) 

Note. Many of the tactics and techniques used by criminals and criminal organizations are the 

same as addressed for terrorism in chapter 6. The only difference is that criminals may use these 

as means to obtain profits rather than just to instill fear or coerce governments and societies. 

 
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17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-1 

Chapter 5 

Noncombatants 

A host of noncombatants add complexity to any operational environment (OE). The 

irregular OPFOR attempts to manipulate these noncombatants in ways that support 

its goals and objectives. Many noncombatants are completely innocent of any 

involvement with the irregular OPFOR. However, the irregular OPFOR will seek the 

advantage of operating within a relevant population of noncombatants whose 

allegiance and/or support it can sway in its favor. This can include clandestine yet 

willing active support (as combatants), as well as coerced support, support through 

passive or sympathetic measures, and/or unknowing or unwitting support by 

noncombatants. 

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 

5-1. Noncombatants are persons not actively participating in combat or actively supporting of any of the 

forces involved in combat. They can be either armed or unarmed. Figure 5-1 shows examples of these two 

basic types of noncombatants that can be manipulated by the irregular OPFOR. These examples are not allinclusive, and some of the example entities can be either armed or unarmed. (See Armed Combatants and 

Unarmed Combatants later in this chapter for more detail on various subcategories.) 

Note. From a U.S. viewpoint, the status of noncombatants is typically friendly, neutral, or 

unknown. Conversely, the noncombatants would view U.S. and/or local governing authority 

forces as friendly or neutral in regard to themselves. For the sake of consistency throughout the 

chapters of this TC, however, this chapter occasionally refers to the governing authority and 

associated U.S. or coalition forces as “enemy,” referring to the enemy of the irregular OPFOR. 

Armed Noncombatants Unarmed Noncombatants

Nongovernmental Organizations

Transnational Corporations

Media

Private Citizens and Groups

Private Security Contractors

Business Owners and Employees

Criminals and Criminal Organizations

Private Citizens and Groups

Noncombatants

Figure 5-1. Armed and unarmed noncombatants (examples) 

5-2. Aside from military and paramilitary forces, the civilian population of a nation or region is often the 

single most important aspect of an OE. This situation can be further complicated by the presence of other 

noncombatants who are not indigenous to the country or region. 
Chapter 5 

5-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

RELATION TO THE IRREGULAR OPFOR 

5-3. The irregular OPFOR recognizes that noncombatants living and/or working in an area of conflict can 

be a significant source of— 

 Intelligence collection. 

 Reconnaissance and surveillance. 

 Technical skills. 

 General logistics support. 

Therefore, the irregular OPFOR actively uses noncombatants within a relevant population to support its 

goals and objectives. It sees them as a potential multiplier of irregular OPFOR effectiveness. It will also 

attempt to use the presence of noncombatants to limit the effectiveness of its enemies. The irregular 

OPFOR can marshal and conceal its combatant capabilities while hiding among armed and unarmed 

noncombatants in a geographic or cyber location. 

5-4. Changes in an OE and persuasion by the irregular OPFOR’s information warfare (INFOWAR) 

activities can cause rapid or gradual shifts in allegiance by noncombatants. Any noncombatant is a potential 

recruit to become a combatant in support of irregular OPFOR goals and objectives. However, the irregular 

OPFOR will also attempt to use those who remain noncombatants to its advantage. It purposely exploits 

noncombatants to cause doubt or hesitation in an enemy’s decision to act. It takes advantage of the 

difficulties its enemies may have in distinguishing combatants from noncombatants. This uncertainty exists 

because both may or may not be armed and may appear to not be participating in or supporting irregular 

OPFOR actions. The irregular OPFOR may use noncombatants for shielding its operations close to and/or 

within a relevant population, where enemy reaction may cause harm to noncombatants. Incidents such as 

noncombatant detention and/or casualties can alienate a relevant population from enemy forces. 

Note. The Geneva Conventions state criteria for combatants as individuals who operate under the 

recognized command and control of an organization, are clearly armed, and do not attempt to 

disguise their intended actions when deploying for and conducting military-like actions. The 

irregular OPFOR is not bound by such conventions. The U.S. Army and regulated military 

forces of other nations consider chaplains, medical doctors, and medics as noncombatants. 

However, the irregular OPFOR does not necessarily recognize such functional distinctions. In 

guerrilla units, for example, medics are combatants, trained to fight alongside other guerrillas. 

MOTIVATIONS

5-5. The irregular OPFOR uses several forms of persuasion to motivate and obtain support from 

noncombatants in a relevant population. Means of persuasion can include— 

 INFOWAR activities. 

 Social welfare programs. 

 Political activism and mobilization. 

 Coercion. 

5-6. When co-opted directly or indirectly by the irregular OPFOR, noncombatants are a means to weaken 

control and legitimacy of a governing authority over its population. The irregular OPFOR attempts to 

communicate a compelling narrative of its own legitimacy that is accepted by the relevant population. Its 

visible actions, often localized in perspective, focus on demonstrating its power and authority. 

5-7. The irregular OPFOR may appeal to noncombatants based on unresolved grievances of a relevant 

population. These unresolved grievances, perceived or factual, create conditions where individuals believe 

they must act to obtain a just solution. The irregular OPFOR can also appeal to aspects of ethnicity, 

geography, and regional history that affect personal and group relationships. These are reflected in social 

status and networks, lifestyle, employment, religion, and politics. The irregular OPFOR can manipulate at 

least three areas of grievance by to obtain noncombatant support: 

 Personal or social identity and/or social mobility or advancement. 

 Religious beliefs and/or persecution. 
Noncombatants 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-3 

 Unjust political representation and/or governance. 

5-8. Motivations to support the irregular OPFOR may vary from religious extremism to pure criminality 

for personal or organizational profit. Often, the deciding factor may be the desire for local freedom from 

control by the governing authority and its international supporters. 

TYPES OF SUPPORT

5-9. The relevant population can willingly provide active or passive support to the irregular OPFOR. If 

necessary, however, noncombatants can be coerced by the irregular OPFOR. Some noncombatants may be 

aware of irregular OPFOR activities and choose to remain passive and not report information to the 

governing authority. Noncombatants may be sympathetic to the irregular OPFOR but remain uninvolved in 

any activity. Other noncombatants may unknowingly support irregular OPFOR initiatives such as money 

donations to charities or apparent humanitarian relief organizations that are actually front organizations for 

irregular OPFOR financing and/or materiel support. Those members of the local populace who elect to 

participate in or actively support the irregular OPFOR become combatants, even if they do not bear arms. (See 

Unarmed Combatants at the end of this chapter.) Figure 5-2 shows various types of support to the irregular 

OPFOR. 

Population

Active Supporters 

Passive Supporters

Senior Leaders

Cadres

Subordinate Leaders

Support

to the irregular OPFOR

can be—

Active-Willing

Coerced-Knowing

Passive-Sympathizing

Unknowing-Unwitting Noncombatants within Relevant Population

Irregular OPFOR Organization

Figure 5-2. Noncombatant support to the irregular OPFOR (examples) 

ARMED NONCOMBATANTS 

5-10. In any OE, there are likely to be nonmilitary personnel who are armed but are not part of an 

organized paramilitary or military structure. Nonetheless, such people may be disgruntled and hostile to the 

governing authority or forces that support it. Armed noncombatants may represent a large portion of the 

undecided citizens in a population. Some of these nonaffiliated people may possess small arms legally to 

protect their families, homes, and/or businesses. Some may use weapons as part of their occupation (such 

as hunters, security guards, or local police). Some may be minor criminals who use their weapons for 

activities such as theft or extortion. Given the fact that they are already armed, it would be easy for such 

noncombatants to become combatants. Any number of reasons, including prejudices and grievances, can 

cause them to choose sides or change sides. They may switch allegiances repeatedly as circumstances 

evolve. 

5-11. Some armed noncombatant entities can be completely legitimate enterprises. However, some 

activities can be criminal under the guise of legitimate business. The irregular OPFOR can embed 

operatives in legitimate commercial enterprises or criminal activities to obtain information and/or 

capabilities not otherwise available to it. Actions of such operatives can include sabotage of selected 

commodities and/or services. They may also co-opt capabilities of a governing authority infrastructure and 

civil enterprises to support irregular OPFOR operations. 
Chapter 5 

5-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

5-12. Examples of armed noncombatants commonly operating in an OE are— 

 Private security contractor (PSC) organizations. 

 Local business owners and employees. 

 Private citizens and private groups authorized to carry and use weapons. 

 Criminals and/or organizations with labels such as cartels, gangs. 

 Ad hoc local “militia” or neighborhood watch programs. 

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

5-13. Private security contractors (PSCs) are commercial business enterprises that provide security and 

related services on a contractual basis. PSCs are employed to prevent, detect, and counter intrusions or 

theft; protect property and people; enforce rules and regulations; and conduct investigations. They may also 

be used to neutralize any real or perceived threat. PSCs can act as an adjunct to other security measures and 

provide advisors, instructors, and support and services personnel for a state’s military, paramilitary, and 

police forces. They may also be employed by private individuals and businesses (including transnational 

corporations). 

5-14. PSCs may be legitimate, well-respected corporations providing contract advisors and employees as 

part of a military nation-building program funded by a foreign government. A PSC that provides services 

on a contract basis outside its country of origin also falls into the category of a transnational corporation. 

Other PSCs may be domestic firms that supply contract guard forces. In its simplest form, a PSC might be a 

local citizen organization that performs actions on a short-term contractual basis. 

Relation to the Irregular OPFOR 

5-15. The irregular OPFOR can identify required or desired capabilities in a PSC and either overtly or 

covertly obtain the capabilities. It can also infiltrate a PSC with its own operatives, to covertly pursue its 

own objectives. A PSC’s use of local hires can make it relatively easy to infiltrate with actual or forged 

documentation. Infiltration can allow the irregular OPFOR to observe actions and procedures, collect 

information and intelligence for future sabotage, and/or incite dissatisfaction within and among foreign and 

local contractors. 

5-16. The irregular OPFOR might actually be a customer of a PSC. For example, the leader of an insurgent 

or criminal organization may employ a PSC to provide bodyguards or conduct surveillance or a search and 

assessment prior to his arrival. Another group, such as a drug organization, may contract a PSC to guard its 

facilities. (A drug organization can afford to pay more than many small countries.) The PSC may erect a 

fence or employ roving, armed guards to protect facilities. 

5-17. PSCs use both active and passive measures that may be rudimentary or employ advanced technology 

such as sophisticated surveillance, identification devices, and alarms. During the conduct of their duties, 

members of a PSC can take offensive actions. For example, a security, guard, or patrol team might conduct 

an ambush to counter an intrusion by a governing authority on an irregular OPFOR operation. 

5-18. The irregular OPFOR’s INFOWAR activities can spotlight known or alleged abuses by PSCs in 

order to build negative sentiments against governing authority and/or coalition actions. Incidents can 

include PSCs— 

 Shooting civilians misidentified as combatants. 

 Using excessive force. 

 Being insensitive to local customs and beliefs. 

 Other inappropriate actions. 

The irregular OPFOR can exploit such incidents to damage international and coalition relationships and 

trust. Additional public dissent might limit use of PSCs or restrict where and how they can be used. 

Prohibition on use of PSCs in certain circumstances could further constrain governing authority and 

coalition programs. It could also place additional operational requirements on enemy military forces. 
Noncombatants 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-5 

Functions 

5-19. Most functions of a PSC involve protecting personnel, facilities, or activities. Such security functions 

normally require armed contractors. However, PSCs can also perform other, security-related functions that 

do not require armed personnel. 

Armed Functions 

5-20. Functions typically requiring armed personnel can include— 

 Personal security details to protect a person or group of people. 

 Guard protection of static sites (such as housing areas, building sites, government complexes, 

and businesses—both legal and illegal). 

 Transport security support to convoys and special materiel shipments. 

 Security escorts. 

 Cash transport. 

 Covert operations. 

 Surveillance. 

 Intelligence services. 

 Advising and/or training of indigenous or extraregional security forces. 

 Operations and administration within governing authority prisons and/or detention facilities. 

Unarmed Functions 

5-21. Functions typically not requiring armed personnel include— 

 Unarmed security functions when presence is deemed an appropriate deterrent. 

 Air surveillance. 

 Psychological warfare. 

 Intelligence support (including information collection and threat analysis). 

 Operational coordination (such as command and control, management, and communications). 

 Personnel and budget vetting. 

 Hostage negotiation services. 

 Risk advisory services. 

 Weapons procurement. 

 Weapons destruction. 

 Transportation support. 

Advantages and Disadvantages 

5-22. PSCs provide key capabilities and can often be hired quickly and deployed faster than a military 

force with similar skill sets. This flexibility allows governmental or commercial organizations to adapt 

quickly to a rapidly changing OE. Employing a PSC can keep military forces available to conduct 

traditional or specialized military missions. 

5-23. Evolution of private sector military-like services by corporations can be a very influential factor in 

international and regional diplomacy. Although coalition operations may appear in need of services from 

PSC, governmental authorities and private citizen groups can be concerned on the level of PSC 

transparency and accountability when high-profile incidents occur that involve PSCs. 

5-24. PSCs often hire large numbers of indigenous people from the local area. The vetting procedures may 

not screen out some undesirable elements of the population. A legitimate PSC may be susceptible to insider 

threats that infiltrate elements of the organization and subvert legitimate practices into forms of corruption. 

PSC security for the governing authority or commercial enterprises can be a conduit for corruption that 

disrupts support to a governing authority and/or coalition forces. The irregular OPFOR can cooperate with 

or coordinate corruption and extortion by local or regional warlords and criminal organizations. Private 

security subcontractors can be warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders who compete with the 
Chapter 5 

5-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

governing authority for power and authority. Providing “protection” services empowers PSC leaders with 

money and legitimacy. In some cases, PSCs can become private armies. Irregular OPFOR operations under 

the guise of a PSC can thrive in areas that appear to be devoid of government authority. 

Organization 

5-25. A PSC can be fairly small in scale or a large corporate organization. Figure 5-3 shows an example of 

possible functions in a PSC organization. The board of directors acts much like a headquarters staff of a 

military organization. Support services provide administrative, financial, and logistics support. Information 

and investigative services collect, analyze, and disseminate all types of information and intelligence, 

including economic intelligence. They also perform personnel security investigations and 

counterintelligence functions. Security services provide active and passive security measures that may be 

either rudimentary or use advanced technology. Guard services provide bodyguards, personal security 

details, stationary guard teams, and surveillance teams. Patrol services conduct patrols and tactical may 

conduct actions such as an ambush (to counter an intrusion). Security, guard and patrol service members 

receive weapons training. 

Board of Directors

Teams Teams Teams

Guard 

Services

Support 

Services

Security 

Services

Information & 

Investigative 

Services

Teams Teams

Patrol 

Services

Figure 5-3. PSC organization by functions (example) 

5-26. A PSC organization is tailored to serve its customer’s needs. However, its organizational structure 

and level of capability are often directly related to a client’s ability to pay. The capabilities of PSC 

employees vary from highly trained former military members to uneducated, poorly trained recruits. The 

level of competence and the sophistication equipment depends on what the client can afford. 

5-27. The weapons and equipment mix is based on team specialization and role. Equipment might 

include— 

 Listening and monitoring equipment. 

 Cellular phones. 

 Cameras. 

 Facsimile machines. 

 Computers. 

 Motorcycles. 

 Helicopters. 

 All-terrain vehicles. 

 Light armored vehicles. 

 Assault rifles. 

 Machineguns. 

 Submachineguns. 

 Antitank grenade launchers. 

 Antitank disposable launchers. 

 Silenced weapons. 
Noncombatants 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-7 

LOCAL BUSINESS OWNERS AND EMPLOYEES

5-28. Local commercial enterprises often have authorization to own personal firearms to protect their 

workplace from theft or robbery. Authorization may be for either concealed or open carry. A business 

owner or employee with a weapon is not necessarily a threat to the governing authority or coalition forces. 

However, the mere presence of many weapons in public places adds to the uncertainty whether those forces 

should consider such armed noncombatants as friend or foe. The irregular OPFOR can use this type of 

uncertainty to slow the actions and reactions of the governing authority and/or coalition forces. 

5-29. A local business may hire a PSC to protect its assets and interests. The irregular OPFOR or criminal 

organizations may coerce a businessperson into running a front company on their behalf. 

CRIMINALS AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

5-30. Criminals and the irregular OPFOR in an OE can be associated and/or affiliated with each other. For 

example, some insurgents and criminals can form temporary coalitions when it serves their mutual 

interests. Crime is a lucrative means to— 

 Fund operations. 

 Coerce and control key leaders and/or a relevant population. 

 Erode governmental authority. 

5-31. Some criminals may oppose the irregular OPFOR when its actions jeopardize criminal operations 

and profits. Criminal organizations may hire PSCs to provide additional security. Larger criminal 

organizations can employ paramilitary elements and tactics. Some may expand from traditional criminal 

activities into a pseudo-insurgency and establish de facto governance in areas, regions, and enclaves within 

an otherwise sovereign territory of the governing authority. (See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of 

criminal organizations and their possible roles in support of and/or cooperation with the irregular OPFOR.) 

PRIVATE CITIZENS AND GROUPS

5-32. Local citizens often have authorization to own personal firearms for the personal security. Some may 

carry weapons as part of their occupation (such as hunters, security guards, or local police). Some are 

members of legitimate private clubs for shooting competitions or hunting. In some societies, carrying a 

weapon is simply part of the local culture. Many armed noncombatants openly carry weapons. This 

generally includes the individuals mentioned above, as well as members of public law enforcement 

agencies and various types of internal security forces. Other organizations and individuals may be 

authorized to carry concealed personal weapons. 

5-33. Ad hoc local militia or neighborhood watch programs may provide some of the same functions as a 

PSC. However, they do so without some of the more sophisticated means and without the profit motive. 

These ad hoc local citizen organizations perform such actions on a volunteer basis to protect their families, 

homes, and businesses. (A local citizen organization that performs these functions on a contractual basis is 

a PSC.) 

5-34. Such a large number of armed noncombatants in public places makes it harder to distinguish them 

from combatants. Members of the irregular OPFOR also try to blend in with the local populace when they 

are not conducting operations. The irregular OPFOR can use this type of uncertainty to slow the actions 

and reactions of the governing authority and/or coalition forces. 

Note. In a broad sense, all individuals and groups not part of a formal, regulated military force 

are civilians. That includes insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals. 

UNARMED NONCOMBATANTS 

5-35. Other actors in an OE include unarmed noncombatants. These nonmilitary actors may be neutral or 

potential side-changers in a conflict involving the irregular OPFOR. Their choice to take sides depends on 

their perception of who is causing a grievance for them. It also depends on whether they think their 

interests are best served by supporting the governing authority. Given the right conditions, they may decide 
Chapter 5 

5-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

to purposely support hostilities against a governing authority that is the enemy of the irregular OPFOR. 

Even if they do not take up arms, such active support or participation moves them into the category of 

unarmed combatants. (See the section on Unarmed Combatants at the end of this chapter.) 

5-36. Some of the more prominent types of unarmed noncombatants are— 

 Media personnel. 

 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 

 Transnational corporations and their employees. 

 Private citizens and groups. 

However, unarmed noncombatants may also include internally displaced persons, refugees, and transients. 

They can also include foreign government and diplomatic personnel present in the area of conflict. 

MEDIA PERSONNEL

5-37. An area of conflict attracts a multitude of media personnel. This includes local, national, and 

international journalists, reporters, and associated support personnel. They may be independent actors or 

affiliated with a particular news organization. 

Capabilities and Vulnerabilities 

5-38. The media can be a credible source of current information for multiple actors in an OE. News cycles 

demand timely information and near-simultaneous reporting on current events. The irregular OPFOR 

recognizes the value of media coverage of significant incidents. This coverage can draw attention to 

irregular OPFOR successes or highlight failures or missteps by its enemies. The irregular OPFOR can 

exploit media coverage to attack the will and resolve of— 

 Its enemies’ regular military and internal security forces. 

 The governing authority. 

 A relevant population. 

Media coverage of operations can dramatically affect international relations and strategic interaction. 

5-39. The irregular OPFOR may closely observe media personnel. This surveillance can identify character 

flaws or weaknesses of personnel the irregular OPFOR can co-opt to the advantage of its INFOWAR 

activities. Although media personnel may seek to remain objective and report accurately, they can be 

coerced or persuaded to promote an irregular OPFOR perspective. The irregular OPFOR uses threats, 

extortion, and/or physical violence to minimize media coverage that is counter to its interests. Some media 

representatives who support irregular OPFOR motives may purposely distort information to support 

irregular OPFOR objectives. 

5-40. The balancing effect of multiple reporting sources tends to reduce the impact of any one source with 

overt bias. The irregular OPFOR recognizes that democracies with freedom of the press and widespread 

access to media and other information systems can be less susceptible to INFOWAR. However, the 

international public and foreign governments are still susceptible to how the irregular OPFOR presents its 

agenda to a global audience. 

Exploiting Media Access 

5-41. The pervasive presence of the media provides access to information that might not otherwise be 

available to the irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR can use the physical access allowed to media 

representatives to enhance its intelligence collection, information analysis, and consequent actions. Some 

members of the irregular OPFOR or individuals who support them may be able to pass themselves off as 

independent reporters or embed themselves in a media team under the guise of functional media expertise. 

Media credentials can be easily counterfeited. The embedding may take place with or without the 

knowledge of a sponsoring media organization. This may enable them to access plans and monitor 

operations of the governing authority or regular military forces with which the irregular OPFOR is 

in conflict. 
Noncombatants 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-9 

Media Organization Structure 

5-42. A media entity can be as small as an independent reporter or videographer operating as a free-lance 

entrepreneur or as large as a sophisticated media team with the credentials of a major news corporation or 

international sponsor. Well resourced reporters or media teams may have— 

 Cellular telephones. 

 Cameras. 

 Video cameras. 

 Tape recorders. 

 Notebook or laptop computers. 

 General office equipment. 

They may have an all-terrain vehicle equipped with the latest video manipulation technology and satellite 

communication links. 

5-43. Figure 5-4 shows an example of possible functions and individuals in a media team organization. 

While most media teams carry out most of these functions, they do not necessarily have all these specific 

coordinators and teams. 

Media Team

Leader

Liaison

Team

Security 

Team

Videographer

Team

Cameraman

Team

Graphics

Designer

Admin & Logistics 

Coordinator

Press Release

Coordinator

Documentation 

Coordinator

Figure 5-4. Media team organization (example) 

Media Team Leader 

5-44. The media team leader is responsible for the overall media coverage and news release program. This 

individual supervises the development of products that the media team presents. He promotes the value of 

its media resources and products and continually seeks to expand business investment in the team products. 

Press Release Coordinator 

5-45. The press release coordinator is the promotional “face” with the general relevant population and its 

influential leaders. He develops the persona of a trusted member to relevant population. 

Documentation Coordinator 

5-46. The documentation coordinator transforms raw audio or video coverage and produces a final package 

for release to the media-at-large via multiple means. Production coordination includes adding music, verbal 

announcements, graphics, and other sound and visual elements to enhance a compelling message. This 

coordinator is also responsible for crafting the long-term and recurring reinforcement of a particular 

message in conjunction with the press release coordinator. 

Administration and Logistics Coordinator 

5-47. The operational administration and logistics of the media team is the responsibility of the 

administration and logistics coordinator. Functions include— 
Chapter 5 

5-10 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

 Personnel management. 

 Transportation. 

 Lodging. 

 Technical support. 

 Repair services. 

 Communications connectivity. 

 Transmission security. 

The administration and logistics coordinator coordinates with the security team in planning, occupying, and 

departing designated media coverage areas. 

Videographer Team 

5-48. The videographer team uses video camera equipment to record an assigned project. It then edits and 

assembles an audio-visual production. The documentation coordinator and videographer team review the 

product to ensure consistency and relevancy in support of an intended message. Each team member is 

responsible for the operation and maintenance of the equipment used in shooting and editing. A 

videographer may also be responsible for lighting and sound at a particular event. Depending on the 

assigned task, videographers can use diskette, videotape, and/or live broadcast capabilities. 

Cameraman Team 

5-49. The cameraman team is responsible for physically operating a camera and maintaining composition 

and camera angles throughout a given mission or task. Still-shot images are the norm for a cameraman. 

Duties are similar to that of a videographer. 

Graphics Designer 

5-50. The graphics designer has expertise in emphasizing visual impact to using graphics or other special 

effects such as animation. This individual also coordinates with media points of contact on how to best 

promote the news message and image of materials including electronic and other media venues. Much of 

the graphics design is focused on what effectively communicates with the targeted audience. This audience 

is usually influential individuals of a relevant population in an irregular OPFOR area of responsibility 

(AOR) as well as governing authority officials that are in conflict with the irregular OPFOR. 

Liaison Team 

5-51. The liaison team works closely with community members and leaders to ensure access to areas and 

information that supports the media mission or task. However, other teams may conduct their own liaison. 

Security Team 

5-52. The security team is responsible for the physical security and protection of media team members in 

the conduct of their duties. Security includes the actual mission sites, movement from and to the media 

team’s operating base and/or logistics support areas. 

Relationship to OPFOR Public Relations 

5-53. Like media affairs, OPFOR public relations involve focused efforts to understand and engage key 

audiences of a relevant population. Their purpose is to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable 

for the advancement of OPFOR interests, policies, and objectives. They accomplish this through the use of 

coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with all regular OPFOR and 

irregular OPFOR actions. 

5-54. Public relations are part of the perception management element of INFOWAR. In an expanding 

INFOWAR campaign, the irregular OPFOR seeks partners within the specific OPFOR AOR and regional 

and/or global supporters. When external states provide overt and/or covert support, the irregular OPFOR 

provides appropriate public relations guidance on how to portray or hide such support. 
Noncombatants 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-11 

5-55. A significant audience external to an irregular OPFOR AOR can be the diaspora of a relevant 

population. INFOWAR and public opinion are critical to obtaining diaspora support and keeping the 

struggle of guerrillas and/or insurgents in the spotlight of globalized media. 

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

5-56. A nongovernmental organization (NGO) is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization 

dedicated to alleviating human suffering; promoting education, health care, economic development, 

environmental protection, human rights; supporting conflict resolution; and/or encouraging establishment of 

democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). NGOs are likely to be present in any OE. 

Variety of Types 

5-57. The global community of NGOs includes a wide variety of organizations that are independent, 

diverse, and flexible. They differ greatly in size, resources, capabilities, expertise, experience, and missions. 

An NGO may be local, national, or transnational. It may employ thousands of individuals or just a handful. 

It may have a large management structure or no formal structure at all. It may be a large organization with a 

huge budget and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief or a newly created 

small organization dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. NGOs are involved in such diverse 

activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, development 

programs, human rights, and conflict resolution. 

5-58. Some NGOs represent members of a particular religious faith. In most of these cases, humanitarian 

aid originates in faith-based principles, but promoting a particular religion is not part of the aid provided. 

However, some missionary aid groups use humanitarian aid as a means of access for religious awareness 

and conversion of a relevant population. 

5-59. Within a particular OE, there may be local NGOs as well as an international support presence of 

larger NGOs. International NGOs may use localized staffs in building capabilities in and for a region. 

Sometimes larger NGOs from outside a geographic region may not be openly visible while operating 

through these local organizations. This cooperation can provide resources unavailable at the local and 

regional levels during a crisis while incorporating localized capacity and knowledge of conditions, 

interpersonal relationships, and informal operations. 

NGO Organizational Structure 

5-60. A board of directors (sometimes called executive committee) is normally part of the large-scale 

decisionmaking process and working issues of the organization. The board serves as the trustee body of the 

NGO. Board members are valuable in that they extend the organization’s resources into various 

communities and include personalities that are not specifically significant in daily operations but provide 

credibility to the organization as a whole. Many NGO boards have celebrities, former government officials, 

experts, academics, and community leaders with the intention of attaining recognition or publicity. During 

emergency appeals, NGOs will often send board members out to make public statements, write newspaper 

or journal editorials, make speeches, or give interviews to spark focus on the organization’s work and needs 

in responding to the emergency. 

5-61. NGO boards vary widely in style. Some are very active, often establishing close relationships with 

NGO officers and staff and involving themselves in planning processes and fundraising programs. Other 

boards are largely fundraising entities, lending their names to give credibility to an organization’s 

fundraising practices. Boards can be primarily symbolic and fulfill the legal requirements of meeting a 

specific number of times each year and certifying financial obligations. The actual authority may reside in 

leaders who purposely remain discrete or unpublicized donors of an NGO. 

Note. The irregular OPFOR may seek to co-opt board representatives and/or influential 

celebrities and donors to overtly or covertly support its goals and objectives. 

5-62. Figure 5-5 shows an example of the possible functions of an NGO field office. A smaller, local NGO 

may not have all these functions. 
Chapter 5 

5-12 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Director NGO Coordinating Group

Field Office

Functions

Administration

Transportation

Operations Logistics

Communications Special Projects

Services Distribution

Liaison

Procurement

Plans

Finance International Law Security

Media Affairs

Board of Directors

Figure 5-5. NGO field office functions (example) 

5-63. Internal coordination, though not always formal, is the most common way civilian sectors organize in 

humanitarian emergencies. NGOs coordinate extensively within the local NGO community to manage 

information. They can act as advocacy bodies to international donors or local and regional governments. 

There is also external coordination between NGOs, regular military forces, governments, and donor 

agencies involved in a geographic region and/or international setting. 

Capabilities and Vulnerabilities 

5-64. Some internationally active NGOs may employ indigenous groups as local implementing partners. 

Extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make NGOs valuable 

sources of information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes. 

5-65. Many NGOs are outfitted with very little, if any, equipment for communications and personal 

security. They prefer instead to rely on the good will of the local populace for their safety. However, many 

larger NGOs have very capable communications capabilities. Some NGOs provide considerable support 

and assistance in the security area. 

5-66. Communications provide some special challenges to NGOs. NGOs strive to provide assistance based 

on need rather than race, religion, political affiliation, or ability to pay. To avoid the perception of 

favoritism and operate in a neutral manner, NGOs normally do not use any encryption devices. They 

operate with the understanding that the local governing authority will likely be monitoring all their 

communications. They often have access to sensitive information that could assist political or military 

objectives of either side. This requires that information be recorded and transmitted in a way that reduces 

rather than incites conflict. 

5-67. Modern communications equipment is essential for the NGO headquarters to remain in contact with 

field offices or mobile teams. However, such equipment might make NGO personnel a target of crime in 

areas where the technology is not commonly available. A satellite phone, which provides an NGO team 

global coverage, might represent a significant capability if acquired by the irregular OPFOR or criminals. 

The same might apply to a vehicle outfitted with a communication suite of sophisticated radios. In some 

areas, simply carrying a cellular phone or radio could be viewed as a threat by actors who would like to 

keep their activities concealed. 
Noncombatants 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-13 

5-68. Security planning by an NGO is an ongoing process that continually reassesses threats. In some 

cases, NGOs operate in violent environments without developing a strong organizational culture of safety 

and security. Aid personnel often rely on the apparent immunity provided by a perceived humanitarian 

space and do not view themselves as party to the conflict. Various factors, including programs connecting 

an NGO and a governing authority, can cause specific targeting of NGO staff for kidnapping or murder by 

violent groups. NGOs often have formal safety and security systems to meet these threats. Some NGOs use 

professional security officers and/or PSCs with former military, police, or intelligence experience. 

5-69. Reliable transportation is essential for NGO operations. However, this also poses the risk of 

accidents, assault, injury, and death for aid workers. The NGO must balance the need for a completely 

reliable vehicle against the risk of becoming a target of carjacking in areas of conflict or crime. NGOs may 

hire local drivers who have knowledge of which routes to use and how to negotiate check points. Such 

drivers may eventually gain trust as representatives of the organization. A driver from a group 

disenfranchised due to religious, ethnic, racial, or caste, may cause prejudice against the NGO. A driver 

might also be part of a criminal gang or the irregular OPFOR with the intent on stealing the vehicle or 

committing a crime against the NGO. 

NGO Cooperation with a Governing Authority or Colaition Forces 

5-70. The mission of an NGO is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting a military 

force in accomplishing its objectives. International guidelines on NGOs emphasize the principle of 

“humanitarian space” (humanitarianism, neutrality, and impartiality). 

5-71. The preferred external coordination for NGOs is a United Nations (UN)-coordinated effort rather 

than a military-administered effort unless the UN is unable to do so. In cases where civil government is 

incapable or not present to coordinate NGO response, NGOs and militaries can interface with each other in 

operations centers administered by regular military forces. 

5-72. Large NGOs often employ specialists or retired military personnel to assist in managing relations and 

activities that require interface with military entities. NGOs and military units have many incentives to 

coordinate and collaborate. NGOs often need many things from the military: logistics assistance, 

communications, intelligence, and protection. Military forces often find value in coordinating with NGOs 

for understanding ground-level activity, and to manage population movements, assistance projects, and 

general humanitarian activities. Both groups find that coordination is essential. 

5-73. Military personnel often contact a NGO coordination group, which can— 

 Provide contact information for liaison with member NGOs. 

 Indicate what NGOs are doing in the region or area. 

 Identify which NGOs are active in specific areas. 

5-74. The UN often sets up humanitarian information centers (HICs) as central coordination points. NGOs 

are either required or voluntarily register with an HIC to keep updated on information and regional 

developments. A civil-military operations center or humanitarian operations center can be established 

for official coordinating between NGOs, the UN, governments, intergovernmental organizations, and 

the military. 

5-75. NGOs and military forces can operate together, but challenges exist. Sometimes, in a region 

receiving NGO support and despite coordination efforts and extensive collaboration, NGOs can become 

frustrated with the apparent idle capacity that military commanders have in reserve for emergency or 

contingency actions. NGO managers may question why large numbers of military personnel, expertise, and 

supply stores remain unused while NGOs are short-staffed and significant support requirements exist for 

displaced persons and other elements of a relevant population. NGOs often want to ensure a distinct 

separation between military operations and NGO relief activities. 

5-76. Coordinating and cooperating among NGOs and regular military forces does not necessarily mean 

sacrificing NGO impartiality or transparency. The benefits of working with military forces can enhance 

more effective and efficient NGO operations. Some factors for and against cooperation are— 

 NGOs are generally capable organizations but may lack robust communication and logistics 

capacities. 
Chapter 5 

5-14 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

 NGOs are civilian organizations that do not fall into a military-style command structure. 

 NGOs prefer to keep their programs, activities, and image as independent as possible. 

 NGOs can work effectively and efficiently during an emergency, often with a comparative 

advantage, in specific areas or regions. 

 Routine and informal meetings between the NGO community, UN agencies, and the military can 

reduce much of collective tension and misunderstanding. 

Motivations 

5-77. NGOs are generally motivated by charity. They are trying to help the local population deal with 

manmade and natural disaster and disease, hunger, and poverty. NGOs are not affiliated with a government, 

but may be influenced by governing authority policies of their home nation. 

5-78. NGO leaders and operators may have both stated and hidden interests and objectives. Some 

organizations and individual participants may have motivations that differ from the NGO’s public mission 

statements. These motivations can be— 

 Political. 

 Economic. 

 Ideological. 

 Religious or theological. 

 Social or cultural. 

 Private and/or personal agenda. 

The irregular OPFOR may play on these motivations to induce NGO personnel to act in ways that favor its 

own objectives. 

Relation to Irregular OPFOR 

5-79. Individuals participating in or in conjunction with an NGO may willingly support or be coerced to 

support the irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR seeks to embed its supporters and/or covert operatives 

in NGOs operating its AOR. This could allow it to access plans and monitor operations of the governing 

authority or regular military forces with which it is in conflict. 

5-80. Perceptions can easily be interpreted as reality by a relevant population when INFOWAR presents a 

compelling irregular OPFOR message and story of unresolved grievances. The irregular OPFOR can 

manipulate NGO actions to knowingly or unknowingly serve its goals and objectives. 

5-81. The irregular OPFOR can use visible cooperation by an NGO with regular military or internal 

security forces of a governing authority to its advantage in INFOWAR. Media exploitation by the irregular 

OPFOR can depict NGO presence as biased in favor of a governing authority that is unjust and corrupt. 

Reducing NGO presence or causing NGOs to depart particular geographic regions may increase the civil 

turmoil the irregular OPFOR desires in its actions against the governing authority. 

5-82. NGOs can be inundated with large numbers of civilians seeking medical care in refugee camps and 

NGO facilities. It may be difficult for an NGO to distinguish sick or wounded members of the irregular 

OPFOR from others requesting care. 

5-83. NGOs provide essential services, comfort, and hope to those in need. Unfortunately, the irregular 

OPFOR may exploit the charitable sector to support its organizations and activities. This abuse can take 

many forms, including: 

 Establishing front organizations or using charities to raise funds in support of irregular OPFOR 

organizations. 

 Establishing or using charities to transfer funds, other resources, and operatives across 

geographical boundaries. 

 Defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to divert funds to support irregular 

OPFOR organizations. 
Noncombatants 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-15 

 Leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to recruit members and foster support for 

irregular OPFOR organizations. 

TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

5-84. A transnational corporation is a business that conducts commerce beyond national boundaries. 

Corporate activities may be regional or global. The term transnational, as opposed to international, 

accentuates the fact that these organizations and activities are not created or governed national 

governments. Instead, they arise under private enterprise for profit. 

5-85. Transnational corporations may enter into partnerships with countries that are trying to increase their 

world economic position. Emerging states may invite such corporations to establish research and 

manufacturing facilities in their countries as a means of building infrastructure. The presence of these 

corporations can also enhance a country’s security. However, the motivations of transnational corporation 

leaders are business oriented and not usually charitable. The corporations may try to influence regional 

affairs or assist their host country in actions that promote their own economic gain. 

Note. In pursuit of its own financial gain, a transnational corporation may provide overt or 

covert support to the irregular OPFOR. This may include support in obtaining weapons and 

equipment, fiscal funding, transshipment of materiel to irregular OPFOR sanctuaries, and/or 

placing economic pressure on governing authorities. 

5-86. When external forces become involved in a particular country or region, they must take into account 

transnational corporations conducting business in the region. The presence of these outside business 

interests can put additional pressure on the intervening external forces to avoid collateral damage to civilian 

life and property. 

Note. Some transnational corporations may have their own armed security forces, or hire PSCs, 

to protect their business interests or perhaps also those of the host country and governing 

authority. Such security forces become armed noncombatants. However, if they participate in 

armed conflict on behalf of the host country, they become combatants. 

5-87. A host country must also take into account transnational corporations conducting business within its 

borders or region, and their international connections. If the host country’s actions adversely affect foreign 

commercial enterprises or regional security, conditions may encourage local, regional, or international 

support for irregular OPFOR goals and objectives. 

PRIVATE CITIZENS AND GROUPS 

5-88. The various types of civilians in an OE can include— 

 Government officials. 

 Business people. 

 Farmers. 

 Lawyers. 

 Doctors. 

 Clergy. 

 Tradesmen. 

 Shopkeepers. 

 Other groups of the local relevant population. 

 Transients. 

 Internally displaced civilians. 

 Refugees. 

These individuals and activities include offices, bureaus, and agencies of a governing authority, 

intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, civil organizations, and independent or transnational corporations. 
Chapter 5 

5-16 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

They provide a wide range of services, support, and other activities that can be susceptible to the influence 

of the irregular OPFOR. 

Note. The irregular OPFOR can attempt to embed operatives in low-level jobs in order to 

infiltrate government, commercial, and military activities. Such an insider threat can reap 

significant information and intelligence for the irregular OPFOR. It can also increase the 

restrictions placed on a relevant population and/or incite additional dissatisfaction with policies 

and practices of the governing authority. 

5-89. Some government officials, such as police and emergency service personnel, have specialized 

equipment and standard uniforms. Other officials, such as mayors and town council members, wear 

clothing appropriate to the local customs. These officials are generally linked to a geographical area and/or 

functional responsibility and authority. Each actor has varied concerns and agendas. In some instances, the 

irregular OPFOR can masquerade as officials and act in a manner to discredit the governing authority. 

5-90. Various political, religious, or social groups may be affiliated with the irregular OPFOR. Even if 

unarmed, this can affect their status as noncombatant actors. Criminal organizations or elements of a 

criminal organization can— 

 Be unarmed noncombatants who violate civil law. 

 Be armed noncombatants. 

 Be involved in armed combatant acts. 

Note. The irregular OPFOR identifies weaknesses in the social structure and/or individuals of a 

relevant population and seeks to co-opt or manipulate particular individuals and/or groups to 

enhance its agenda. It may also acquire organizational capabilities, skill sets, and/or materiel in 

the population within which it operates. When possible, it gains this support voluntarily. 

However, it uses extortion and violence to attain its objectives if required. 

5-91. Support from the civilian population is a key to irregular OPFOR operations. The irregular OPFOR 

recruits its manpower, gains intelligence, and receives safe haven and materiel support from the relevant 

population. Even if it also has external support, the irregular OPFOR cannot exist for an extended period 

without significant support from the civilian population. 

UNARMED COMBATANTS 

5-92. The local populace contains various types of unarmed nonmilitary personnel who, given the right 

conditions, may decide to purposely support hostilities against the enemy of the irregular OPFOR. Such 

active support or participation may take many forms, not all of which involve possessing weapons. 

5-93. In an insurgent organization or guerrilla unit, unarmed personnel might conduct recruiting, financing, 

intelligence-gathering, supply-brokering, transportation, courier, or INFOWAR functions (including 

videographers and camera operators). Technicians and workers who fabricate improvised explosive devices 

might not be armed. The same is true for people who provide sanctuary for combatants. 

5-94. Unarmed religious, political, tribal, or cultural leaders might participate in or actively support the 

irregular OPFOR. Unarmed media or medical personnel may become affiliated with a military or 

paramilitary organization. Even unarmed individuals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile 

actions and those who do so unwittingly can in some cases be categorized as combatants. 

Note. From the viewpoint of some governing authorities, any armed or unarmed person who 

engages in hostilities, and/or purposely and materially supports hostilities against the governing 

authority or its partners is a combatant. 

5-95. Individuals who perform money-laundering or operate front companies for large criminal 

organizations might not be armed. Individual criminals or small gangs might be affiliated with a 

paramilitary organization and perform support functions that do not involve weapons. 
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-1 

Chapter 6 

Terrorism 

Terrorism is a tactic. This chapter presents an overview of conditions that are a composite of 

real-world capabilities and limitations that may be present in a complex operational 

environment that includes terrorism. Acts of terrorism demonstrate an intention to cause 

significant psychological and/or physical effects on a relevant population through the use or 

threat of violence. Terrorism strategies are typically a long-term commitment to degrade the 

resilience of an enemy in order to obtain concessions from an enemy with whom terrorists are 

in conflict. International conventions and/or law of war protocols on armed conflict are often 

not a constraint on terrorists. Whether acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently random, 

and/or purposely haphazard, the physical, symbolic, and/or psychological effects can diminish 

the confidence of a relevant population for its key leaders and governing institutions. Social 

and political pressure, internal and/or external to a relevant population and governing authority, 

is frequently exploited by terrorists with near real-time media coverage in the global 

information environment. The local, regional, international, and/or transnational attention on 

acts of terrorism by state and/or non-state actors can often isolate an enemy from its relevant 

population and foster support of organizations, units, or individuals who feel compelled to 

use terror to achieve their objectives. The themes and messages promoted by terrorists can 

accent anxiety, demoralize the resolve of a relevant population and its leaders, and eventually 

defeat an enemy. 

TERRORISM IN COMPLEX OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 

6-1. Terrorism can be defined as the use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce 

governments or societies. Often motivated by philosophical or other ideological beliefs, objectives are 

typically political in nature. The pursuit of goals and conduct labeled as terrorism by some actors in 

complex operational environments (OE) can be considered fully justifiable by other actors. The spectrum of 

actors in an OE can range political, public, and/or commercial institutions, other institutions appearing 

legitimate but disguising an illicit agenda, and/or organizations and individuals who openly declare intent 

to use terror as a matter of policy and practice. Irregular forces typically use terrorism (see figure 6-1). 

Insurgents Guerrillas Criminal Organizations

Irregular Force Adherents Independent Actors 

Figure 6-1. Terrorism actors in complex operational environments 

6-2. The geographical perspectives of local, national, regional, international, and/or transnational terrorist 

acts can indicate why terrorism is used but a more effective measure of understanding terrorism must relate 
Chapter 6 

6-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

directly to the actors involved in a particular OE. Ultimately, terrorism is about people and the 

psychological effectiveness of convincing or compelling a relevant population to act in a desired manner. 

6-3. Multiple actors in an OE can use terrorism to enhance the conditions that favor their agenda and 

overarching purpose. Terrorism in irregular actions favors indirect and asymmetric approaches. However, 

terrorism can be employed within a full range of military and other explicit or subtle capabilities in order to 

erode an enemy’s power, influence, and will. Irregular forces are generally categorized as armed 

individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security 

forces of a governing authority. Similarly, a hybrid threat can be visualized as the diverse and dynamic 

combination of regular armed forces, irregular forces such as insurgent organizations and/or guerrilla units, 

and/or affiliated and associated criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Other 

irregular forces can include mercenaries, corrupt officials of a governing authority, compromised 

commercial enterprises, public entities, active or covert supporters, and/or coerced and passive citizens 

of a populace. 

6-4. Independent actors using terrorism can also exist in an OE distinct and separate from the agendas 

from other irregular forces. Adherents may have no direct connection with an irregular force but apply 

terror in support of an irregular force’s agenda. Threats can be as small as one individual or expand in size 

from a small and discrete band, cell, or unit to the noticeable presence as a large group of rogue actors that 

are affiliated or united in purpose. 

6-5. Irregular forces adapt their capabilities in an agile and flexible manner to achieve organizational 

objectives. Terrorism is a means of conducting violent conflict that typically provides significant 

psychological impact on an intended target. Acts of terror may be actually intended for an audience other 

than the victims of an attack. Conducting terrorism typically emerges from a deliberate decisionmaking 

process. Terrorists usually compare and contrast advantages and disadvantages to evaluate probable costbenefits of a particular act or acts of terror. When an irregular force terrorist self-justifies the legitimacy of 

using terrorism against an enemy, the terrorism often affects enemy combatants and noncombatants in a 

relevant population. The analysis and decision to use terror is often a simple cost-efficient and effective 

results-oriented means to pursue violent conflict in order to achieve a purpose. 

Note. For the purpose of this TC, the term enemy refers to an enemy of the irregular force. 

MOTIVATIONS 

6-6. Motivations often include a wide range of reasons that an individual, cell, unit, or other type of 

irregular force organization may feel compelled to use terrorism. Encouragement from outside an 

organization to use terrorism can be part of the conditions and circumstances that influence an irregular 

force to act. Support to use terrorism may be from regular military forces and/or special-purpose forces 

(SPF) from a state or states. Internal security forces and/or law enforcement organizations that have been 

infiltrated by an irregular force can also support irregular force actions within a local or regional area of 

responsibility. The collaboration among organizations, units, cells, and/or individuals may be based on 

coercion, contractual agreement, and/or temporary or long-term common goals and objectives. 

6-7. Motivations for initiating and/or continuing acts of terrorism can include— 

 Spotlight attention on unresolved grievances with an enemy. 

 Disrupt an enemy’s ability to continue actions against an irregular force. 

 Champion causes of a suppressed and/or disenfranchised segment of a relevant population. 

 Demonstrate irregular force capabilities. 

 Obtain active and/or passive support from a relevant population. 

 Receive overt and/or covert support from a state or non-state actor. 

 Deter continued enemy military operations in a particular geographic area. 

 Dissuade enemy governmental influence over a relevant population. 

 Develop acceptance and legitimacy of an irregular force agenda and programs. 

 Cause an enemy to overreact to acts of terror and correspondingly alienate a relevant population. 
Terrorism 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-3 

 Defeat enemy military and/or internal security forces and/or its governing institutions. 

 Achieve irregular force objectives. 

6-8. Irregular force objectives promote solutions to grievances in the context of a particular relevant 

population. An irregular force may prefer to use indirect approaches such as subterfuge, deception, and 

non-lethal action to achieve its objectives, but is committed to violent action when necessary to compel an 

adversary, enemy, and/or other opposing form of governance to submit to the irregular force demands. In 

most cases, irregular force operations include politically oriented plans of action. Some irregular force 

organizations, such as affiliated criminal gangs, exist for their own commercial profit and power and are 

not interested in improving aspects such as quality of life and civil security of a relevant population that 

they affect. 

6-9. Transforming a grievance into a concept and plan for action develops typically along a pattern that 

evolves from generalized ideas to tactical options and a heightened sense of needing resolution to a 

grievance. Continuous information and intelligence collection refines options for the likelihood of success 

and a decision to act. Motivation provides a momentum of commitment to actually conduct the terrorism. A 

way to visualize this human dimension sequence is a terrorism planning cycle. 

TERRORISM PLANNING AND ACTION CYCLE 

6-10. A generic sequence and timing of irregular force terrorism depends on organizational capabilities and 

limitations, operational constraints, and the level of commitment of an irregular force actor or organization. 

To effectively understand this commitment, knowing the underlying motivation is fundamental to 

appreciating the resolve to plan and act. The irregular force sets conditions to optimize its awareness, 

training, and mission readiness to achieve objectives that counter enemy forces. When advantageous to 

irregular force operations, coordination and cooperation can combine the capabilities of conventional 

military, paramilitary, criminal activities, and/or terrorism. 

6-11. Tactics, techniques, and procedures include creating conditions of instability in a particular OE, 

alienating the population from the governing authority of the region, and improving the irregular force 

influence on a designated populace and key leaders in that relevant population. In complex conditions, an 

irregular force may be able to employ a range of organizational options from small loosely affiliated cells 

to global networks in order to promote psychological effect and mission success. Such networks can be 

local, regional, international or transnational affiliations; host simple or sophisticated media affairs 

programs; as well as acquire covert and/or overt financial, political, military, or social support. 

6-12. A terrorism planning cycle is actually a continuum. Irregular forces plan, prepare, act, and apply 

experience and skill in order to achieve objectives. The concept of a spiral effect may be an effective way 

to visualize and understand a planning cycle of terrorism. Even with periodic setbacks in acts of terror 

capabilities and execution, the resolve of terrorists to a compelling agenda is often progressive, adaptive, 

and long-term in order to achieve objectives. 

BROAD TARGET SELECTION

6-13. Irregular force terrorism operations are typically prepared to minimize risk and achieve the highest 

probability of success by avoiding an enemy’s strengths and concentrating attack on an enemy’s 

weaknesses. Emphasis is often placed on maximizing irregular force security and terrorism effects. Security 

measures usually include planning and operating with small numbers of irregular force members to more 

effectively compartment knowledge of a pending terrorism mission. 

6-14. Collection against potential targets may continue for years before an operation is decided upon. 

Detailed planning is a norm but can be deliberately shortened when an opportunity arises. While some 

targets may be vulnerable enough with shorter periods of observation, the information gathering and 

analysis for intelligence will be intense. Operations planned or underway may be altered, delayed, or 

cancelled due to changes at the target or in local conditions. Tactical missions conducted by and/or for 

larger irregular forces complement operational objectives and strategic goals of the irregular force. The 

psychological impact on a targeted population is the overarching objective of any terrorist operation. 
Chapter 6 

6-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

6-15. There is no universal model for planning, but irregular forces use their experience and expertise to 

effectively apply traditional principles for plans and operations. Irregular forces often exchange expertise in 

particular skill sets such as recruitment, media affairs, and training on various forms of direct action in 

terrorism. Tactical methods and analysis of successful missions are often shared via the Internet and 

websites hosted by an irregular force. Adaptability, innovation, improvisation, and risk assessment are key 

components of plans and actions toward mission success (see figure 6-2). 

Exploit

Conduct broad target analysis and general intentions.

Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.

Select specific target and resources.

Refine target surveillance and intelligence.

Rehearse plan and contingencies.

Attack.

Exploit effects.

Target Recon Select Refine Ready Act

Continuum of planning -- execution -- reapplication -- lessons learned – evaluation

Figure 6-2. Terrorism planning and action cycle 

6-16. Tactical and operational planning can be analyzed according to common requirements. A plans and 

operation cycle provides a baseline in assessing particular organizational requirements to conduct an act of 

terror. The significant differences among irregular forces often center on factors of intent and capability 

and the organizational, key leader, and individual commitment to a philosophical, ideological, or otherwise 

practical motivation and compulsion. 

6-17. Irregular forces often pride themselves on being a learning organization. Combined with motivation 

and a compelling agenda, irregular forces gather information and intelligence, analyze their own and enemy 

strengths and weaknesses, determine enemy patterns, trends, and emerging actions susceptible to attack, 

and identify key vulnerabilities in an enemy’s systems, functions, and actions. 

6-18. Consideration in selecting potential targets focuses directly to counter enemy governing authority or 

supporting force programs that demonstrate security, safety, and assurance to the relevant population that 

the irregular force needs to influence. Tactical operations that might counter an enemy through irregular 

force subversive or direct actions can include— 

 Secure a critical segment of a relevant population. 

 Declare the control and/or sovereignty of geographic areas that support the irregular force. 

 Disrupt military and/or internal security forces of an enemy. 

 Diminish the credibility of civil police and law enforcement activities. 

 Degrade a public sense of safety and stability from the enemy governing authority. 

 Discredit the political agenda of the enemy governing authority. 

 Demonize key leader actions of the enemy governing authority and civil administration. 

 Provide basic social services not being adequately provided by the enemy governing authority. 

INITIAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SURVEILLANCE

6-19. Targets displaying significant vulnerabilities may receive additional attention and priority of effort 

for intelligence gathering and surveillance. This potential for successfully attack establishes a requirement 

to gather additional information on a target’s patterns over time. This phase may be very short or can span 

months and even years. The type of surveillance employed depends on the type of target and its location. 

Elements of information typically gathered include— 
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17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-5 

 Assessing the practices, procedures, and/or routines of an organization and/or facility. Items of 

interest include scheduled product deliveries, work shift changes, identification procedures 

and other observable security routines. Examples are as simple as recording when regularly 

scheduled supply deliveries arrive or commodity pickup occurs, or where key leaders park 

personal vehicles. 

 Observing the physical layout and individual activities at residences and business offices of key 

leaders. Actions include knowing how the power grid services the location and critical points of 

failure if electrical power is to be interrupted during an attack. 

 Monitoring transportation routes of travel for targeted individuals for common routes, choke 

points, and limited visibility areas along routes that may be conducive for an attack. Personal 

patterns can include routes among a personal residence, temporary lodging, commercial site, gym, 

and/or school or university. Attention at facilities may include access and exit points, types of 

vehicles allowed on the facility property, and/or physical security barriers that must be bypassed 

or breached to enter a location. 

 Probing security measures to determine the complexity of security at a target and/or reaction time 

of security response units. Other items of interest can include any hardening of structures, barriers, 

or sensors; personnel, package, and vehicle screening procedures; and the type and frequency of 

emergency reaction drills at a facility. 

SPECIFIC TARGET SELECTION

6-20. Selection of a target for actual tactical planning typically considers some of the following issues: 

 Does success affect a larger audience than the immediate victim(s)? 

 Will the target attract immediate high profile media attention beyond the immediate region? 

 Does attack success emphasize the desired grievance to the appropriate audience that can resolve 

the grievance? 

 Is the attack effect consistent with overarching objectives of the irregular force? 

 Does the target and mission success provide an advantage to the irregular force by demonstrating 

its organization’s capabilities? 

 What are the near-, mid- and long-term costs versus benefits of conducting the operation? 

6-21. A decision to proceed requires continued intelligence collection against the selected target. Targets 

that do not receive immediate primary consideration may still be collected on for future opportunities. 

PRE-ATTACK SURVEILLANCE AND PLANNING

6-22. Members of the unit or cell that will conduct the attack begin to appear during this phase. Trained 

intelligence and surveillance personnel or members supportive of the irregular force may be organized to 

prepare logistics and/or locations for the operation. Operatives gather detailed information on the target’s 

current patterns in recent days to weeks. The irregular force assesses and confirms information gathered 

from previous surveillance and reconnaissance activities. 

6-23. The type of surveillance employed depends on the target’s activities. Current information is used to— 

 Conduct security studies. 

 Conduct detailed preparatory plans and operations. 

 Recruit specialized operatives and/or active supporters. 

 Procure a base of operations in the target area such as safe houses and caches. 

 Design and test escape routes. 

 Decide on types of weapons and other means of attack. 

REHEARSAL

6-24. Rehearsals improve the probability of success, confirm planning assumptions, and assess 

contingencies. Rehearsals test security reactions to particular attack profiles in primary and alternate plans of 

attack. Irregular forces use their own operatives and/or unsuspecting people to test target reactions. 
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6-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

6-25. Typical rehearsals include— 

 Equipment and weapons operational checks. 

 Communications and signals to be used in the mission. 

 Skills performance of all and/or particular specialists. 

 Final preparatory checks. 

 Pre-operations inspection drills. 

 Deployment sequence of movements and maneuver into the target area. 

 Actions near and/or on the objective. 

 Primary and alternate escape routes. 

 Initial safe haven, hide sites, and/or rally point actions. 

 Transfer plans from initial to subsequent safe havens or hide sites. 

6-26. Confirmation checks in the target area can include— 

 Target information gathered to date. 

 Target patterns of activities. 

 Physical layout of target area for changes in routes and/or manmade features. 

 Time-distance factors from the assault position to the attack point. 

 Security force presence during varied states of alert. 

 Reaction response timing by security forces to a demonstration, feint, and/or threat. 

 Ability to preposition and/or retrieve equipment or vehicles near the objective. 

 Ease of blocking and/or restricting an escape route at critical choke points. 

ATTACK AND ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE

6-27. The irregular force executes its tactical plan but remains flexible to changing conditions and adapts 

accordingly. The plans and rehearsals have considered primary and contingency actions that possess the 

advantages of initiative and deception. Actions provide for— 

 Use of Surprise. 

 Choice of time, place, and conditions of attack. 

 Employment of diversions and supplemental attacks. 

 Support of security and related positions and/or forces to neutralize target reaction forces and 

security measures. 

6-28. Simultaneous actions may include an assault element, security element, and support element. Some 

missions may require a breach element. Actions on the objective will sequence through several main tasks: 

 Isolate the objective site. 

 Gain access to the individual, individuals, and/or asset. 

 Control the target site. 

 Seize and/or destroy the individual, individuals, and/or asset at the objective. 

 Achieve the mission task. 

ESCAPE AND EXPLOITATION 

6-29. Escape plans are well rehearsed and executed. Rapid withdrawal and dispersal from the target site 

can involve multiple withdrawal routes and temporary safe houses. Even in the case of a suicide attack, a 

handler or observer-recorder requires a plan to evade identification and capture. Similar expectation to evade 

capture occurs with an attack by fire element or support by fire element. 

6-30. Media exploitation to a global audience will usually include video coverage, sometimes with audio 

commentary by observers with a videographer. Mass casualties or major disruption of economic and social 

services typically gain prime international media coverage. Extending the duration of an act of terrorism may 

promote awareness of an irregular force agenda and assist the irregular force in winning the “battle of the 

narrative” with a relevant population. 
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17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-7 

6-31. The irregular force attack must be actively publicized to achieve an intended effect of exploiting a 

successful attack. Media outlets influenced or coerced to support an irregular force agenda with prepared 

public statements are examples of preparation to effectively exploit irregular force operations. Release of 

warnings and/or announcements are timed to take advantage of media cycles for selected target audiences at 

the local, regional, and global levels of information warfare. 

6-32. Unsuccessful operations are often disavowed by the irregular force when possible. The perception 

that an irregular force has failed can damage its prestige and indicate vulnerability. 

6-33. In addition to the negative impact on the enemy, successful attacks can bring favorable attention, 

notoriety, and encourage support such as funding and recruiting to the irregular force. The proof that an 

attacker can attack and evade may sway potential recruits to join and/or convince recruits that have been 

coerced to approach assigned tasks with an expectation of success and survival. 

6-34. The general concept of planning and action by irregular forces is adaptable. The seven concept 

phases are generally descriptive of tactics and techniques but are not prescriptive. Operations retain a flexible 

expectation based on evolving conditions. Knowing the underlying motivations for terrorism is fundamental to 

appreciating the resolve of irregular forces to plan and act. 

6-35. When advantageous to irregular force operations, capabilities can include combinations of regular 

military forces, paramilitary units, insurgent organizations and guerrilla units, and criminal networks. Any 

and/or all of these groups can use terrorism. Regardless of an irregular force network as local, regional, 

international or transnational in capability, media exploitation using simple or sophisticated systems is critical 

to create the desired influence within a targeted population. 

TERRORISM ACTIONS 

6-36. Irregular forces apply terrorism for offensive and defensive purposes. Common tactical principles of 

armed conflict and INFOWAR apply capabilities with the intent to cause psychological anxiety and fear in an 

enemy in addition to physical effects. Adding aspects of surprise and deception to acts of terrorism often 

weakens resolve of a targeted relevant population. Nonetheless, each situation in an OE can present tactical 

variations and techniques to conduct a successful irregular force mission. 

6-37. In applying a definition of tactics as an ordered arrangement and maneuver of forces in relation to an 

enemy to achieve a mission objective, an irregular force has a wide range of technique options in traditional or 

irregular conflict. Techniques describe methods used to conduct a tactic in order to accomplish required 

functions or tasks. Techniques evolve through the analysis of an intended mission and observations and/or 

lessons learned from successes and failures of previous missions. Procedures are standardized steps, 

performed deliberately and consistently, that prescribe how to perform specific tactical functions and tasks. 

The “how-to” of understanding terrorism is a composite of knowing TTP and the motivations that provoke 

and compel their use by irregular forces. 

6-38. Incidents of terrorism can range the rogue action of a lone individual or the sanctioned activities of 

large organizations acting on the overt or covert policies of a state. Terrorism can also be sponsored or 

conducted by non-state actors. The following descriptions focus primarily on individual and small unit, cell, or 

group actions experienced as a sudden, violent engagement among friendly and enemy forces. These tactical 

engagements usually orient on offensive actions and terrorism but may also require irregular forces to 

transition temporarily to defensive forms of conflict. 

6-39. The irregular force uses a flexible array of terrorism means and materiel to accomplish assigned 

missions. The irregular force makes decisions under conditions of uncertainty but continually seeks to 

minimize its risk and identify vulnerabilities in an enemy that can be attacked. Deception and surprise 

compound the effects of massing an attack against a point of weakness in order to achieve physical effects and 

create anxiety or fear. Understanding and applying these debilitating effects of coercion, anxiety, and/or fear is 

central to the intended physical and psychological effects of terrorism. 

6-40. The irregular force is adaptive and learns from tactical success and failure and will adjust techniques 

to particular conditions in order to achieve an objective. TTP examples underscore the fact that the science of 

tactics is only as effective as the leadership, training, and experience of an irregular force unit, cell, or related 

organization. Elements such as demonstrated capabilities, weapon systems, location, restrictions and 
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6-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

constraints, logistic support, and time-distance and weather and terrain factors are important to planning and 

conducting an irregular force action. However, the essential aspect of executing an irregular force act is the 

motivation and commitment of an irregular force in the individual and collective execution of tasks to achieve 

a mission objective. 

DEFENSIVE ACTIONS 

6-41. Irregular force tactics can augment defensive actions with terrorism in order to— 

 Defeat an enemy attack. 

 Gain time. 

 Economize irregular force capabilities. 

 Develop conditions favorable for subsequent offensive operations. 

6-42. Other objectives for conducting defensive actions related to terrorism include denying access to an 

area, causing extensive commitment of enemy forces and materiel, and/or fixing enemy forces for a specific 

time. Since acts of terrorism are typically sudden, violent acts similar to an assault, ambush, or raid, defensive 

actions often involve the delay or disruption of enemy response to the act of terrorism. An irregular force may 

attempt to deny access to designated terrain or a resource for a specific time, limit the freedom of maneuver to 

an enemy pursuit, or channel enemy forces into a killing zone for a subsequent assault or ambush. Defensive 

actions remain closely linked to offensive actions and terrorism. 

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS 

6-43. An irregular force plans and acts decisively with deception and surprise as tactical enablers for 

terrorism. Creating overwhelming combat power against a specified objective requires an irregular force to 

have keen situational awareness and understanding of its AOR. 

6-44. The shock effect of terrorism depends heavily on effective reconnaissance and surveillance in 

information gathering and intelligence analysis. The resulting awareness and understanding improves the 

ability to combine irregular force effects at a time and place for the optimum application of surprise and 

deception with available resources for an expectation of mission success. 

 Attack Threat on Land 

6-45. Attacks using terrorism are often considered most likely during the normal conduct of lifestyles in 

familial, social, or commercial settings. Attacks often occur in the context of a local setting. Political 

perspectives can affect each of these daily domains and the willingness of people to be an active or passive 

supporter to an irregular force agenda. 

6-46. An irregular force evaluates the situational context of its operational environment in order to 

determine the most effective ways to advance its objectives. The variables of a particular setting and the 

capabilities that exist for improvised or innovative actions by an irregular force can include physical domains 

beyond conflict on land or its sub-surface. Two other domains can be maritime and aerial environments in 

which to conduct irregular conflict. 

Maritime Attack Threat 

6-47. A maritime attack has the potential for significant disruption and/or damage on the economy of a 

governing authority and other international actors with which the irregular force is in conflict. An attack at a 

major port facility or a choke point on a main maritime route would cause significant regional disruption and 

negative impacts on a global economy. 

6-48. If a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) was detonated at any of these locations, the immediate 

damage would be great to shipping and port facilities. However, a potentially even greater damage would be 

the economic repercussions on regional and global markets and commerce. 
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17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-9 

Aerial Attack Threat 

6-49. An aerial terrorism threat can use multiple means to attack. Traditional forms include hijacking 

aircraft and hostage-taking, sabotage of aircraft and facilities, and/or using a manned civil or military aircraft 

as a suicide bomb against a designated target. 

6-50. Another variation is use of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with an explosive payload to attack a 

target. Techniques can range from small hobby craft model airplanes with small ad hoc explosive packages to 

the acquisition and use of sophisticated cruise-type missiles with significantly larger warhead capabilities. 

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES 

6-51. Irregular forces use a wide array of tactics and techniques to apply terrorism. The TTP are intended to 

be flexible and adaptive approaches. Surprise, secrecy, and indirect methods of attack are fundamental to acts 

of terror. The tactical options are as broad and diverse as the resolve of the irregular force leader to improvise 

and/or innovate with available resources. 

6-52. The irregular force leader uses tactics, forces, and weapon systems tailored to a particular mission. 

Operations are planned for a specific target and effect and use reconnaissance and surveillance to plan, 

counter, and overmatch an enemy. If changes or unexpected conditions render success unlikely, the irregular 

force leader may cancel or postpone an operation and return at a more opportune time. He may choose a 

different target and continue his planning and attack process. 

6-53. Extensive use of the Internet encourages exchange of practical information, training, and 

observations among terrorists. Training material, training videos, and on-line dialogues develop and sustain 

initiatives and encouragement among irregular forces. Shared information and intelligence continue to 

improve irregular force techniques as field experiences demonstrate degrees of effectiveness in employing acts 

of terror. 

6-54. Tactics, techniques, and procedures typical of irregular force actions and terrorism include— 

 Threat-Hoax. 

 Arson. 

 Sabotage. 

 Bombing. 

 Hijack-Seizure. 

 Kidnapping. 

 Hostage-taking. 

 Raid or ambush. 

 Assassination. 

 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 

THREAT OR HOAX

6-55. Irregular forces can use threats to coerce or preclude actions by a targeted individual or population. 

Threats and hoaxes can degrade the effectiveness of preventive or countermeasures when a targeted individual 

or population loses situational awareness of an actual terrorist threat or disperses finite assets against many 

possible threats. At the less lethal end of the conflict spectrum, hoaxes can simply be methods to annoy and/or 

degrade the alertness of security forces and keep the population constantly agitated. Bomb threats, leaving 

suspicious items in public places, and other ploys consume time, resources, and effort from an enemy and its 

security operations and contribute to general uncertainty and anxiety. 

6-56. Extortion is an example of a threat that can obtain money, materiel, information, or support by force. 

For example, numerous reports from a region could indicate that warlords and militias are in contractual 

agreements with a governing authority to protect government and coalition supply convoys. However, these 

same warlords and/or militia in many cases are corrupt and extort large sums of money from the regional 

trucking contractors. Corrupt government officials or an activity that require bribes to retain business 

permits or easy route access further complicates actual or alleged threats and extortion. Another example 
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6-10 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

of extortion can occur in the opium trade of a region with “taxes” levied on farmers, traffickers, and 

competing trafficking networks. 

6-57. Intimidation is another form of extortion. An irregular force individual, intelligence cell or 

specialized team can intimidate people to obtain information on a target location or to provide resources. 

Death threats against an individual or his family may cause the individual to provide information or resources 

to a cell, unit, or organization with which he has no interest or allegiance. Intimidation can also be used as a 

means to convince individuals not to take an action. For example, security personnel may be intimidated to not 

implement required security measures during a specified period of time at a critical infrastructure facility. 

6-58. The effects of coercing individuals can be significant while appearing irrational to some people. 

Nonetheless, irregular forces have successfully used these simple techniques to coerce individuals to 

participate in an attack that could include an individual suicide or vehicular borne suicide mission. 

ARSON 

6-59. Arson is most often used for symbolic attacks and economic effects. Examples of attack by irregular 

forces can include— 

 Assaulting and setting fire to a temporary staging area for fuel tanker trucks. 

 Burning transportation infrastructure in order to disrupt the flow of logistics along a main supply 

route and a resulting requirement for reallocation of security forces to reinforce route protection. 

 Damaging communications nodes to disrupt cable or digital relay transmissions. 

6-60. A number of arson attacks by small groups of armed extremists can hamper other ongoing governing 

authority operations and/or regional law enforcement responsibilities. Arson can be combined, directly or 

indirectly, with other forms of terror. An arson attack on residential areas or public facilities could injure or 

kill noncombatants and incite civil unrest. 

SABOTAGE 

6-61. Sabotage is the planned destruction of the enemy’s equipment or infrastructure. The purpose of 

sabotage is to inflict both psychological and physical damage. Sabotage can be an incident creating a large 

number of casualties or cause a severe disruption of services for a relevant population. 

6-62. Destroying or disrupting key services or facilities displays irregular force capabilities on the public 

consciousness and either increases a target population’s frustration with the ineffectiveness of its governing 

authority or may inspire others in the population to resist along with the irregular force. Oil pipelines, water 

purification plants, sewage treatment facilities, air traffic control hubs, and/or medical treatment or research 

facilities are examples of potential sabotage targets. Sabotage and terrorism can also be demonstrated as a 

combination of techniques such as bombing, arson, cyber, or use of industrial materials and contaminates. 

BOMBING 

6-63. Bombs are commonly used by irregular forces to conduct acts of terrorism. Bombs can be highly 

destructive and easily tailored to a mission, do not require the operator to be present, and have a significant 

physical and psychological impact (see figure 6-3). 

6-64. The type of terrorism can employ varied explosive device — 

 Military-grade type-classified mines. 

 Military-grade or civilian engineer/construction explosives. 

 Commercial-industrial products adapted to create explosive components and/or devices as 

improvised explosive devices (IED). 

6-65. Car bombs, commonly referred to as vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), are used 

regularly in terrorism. Suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) are a norm of some 

terrorists. In a contemporary tally of attack methods used by irregular forces, only armed attacks surpass the 

use of bombing. 
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17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-11 

Bombing: Insurgent Affiliate (Example) 

An insurgent organization affiliate operating within a sovereign state selected an urban 

compound that housed coalition forces as the target for a vehicle borne explosive device 

(VBIED) attack. The governing authority had been successful in suppressing any public 

demonstrations by the insurgent organization as coalition forces arrived in the state to 

assist in stabilizing the expanding insurgency of the region. A small cell of six insurgents 

conducted reconnaissance and detailed surveillance of the compound and identified that 

breaching an entry into the compound was not likely to succeed. The plan evolved to 

detonate a large VBIED close to a perimeter wall near high-rise apartments inside the 

compound. The fabricated bomb was sure to cause significant death and injuries to the 

multinational military members and civilian contractors operating from the compound. 

Insurgents placed several thousand pounds of explosive inside the bulk fuel tank of a 

commercial tractor-trailer truck. Training and other logistical support was provided by the 

insurgent organization in a neighboring state of the region. An insider threat identified that 

the governing authority would not allow any expansion of stand-off distance along a 

particular section of compound wall. Insurgent observers confirmed that physical security 

checks by local police were infrequent and the area next to the wall was easy to access. 

At an early morning hour with visibility limited due to a heavy rain, three insurgents waited 

near the compound wall in a sedan. Other insurgents drove the tractor-trailer fuel truck up 

to the compound wall, set the timing device on the bomb, and quickly departed the area 

with the other insurgents in the sedan. An insurgent observer remained to observe 

security force and first responder reactions to the bombing. 

Guards inside the compound noticed the suspicious activity but were unable to warn 

many of the residents in the apartments before the VBIED detonated. Structure damage 

was significant to several apartment buildings. The bombing caused 35 deaths and over 

100 other people were injured in the attack. 

The public outcry from several coalition states caused the compound to be evacuated 

within days. The insurgent organization claimed a major victory in forcing the removal of 

coalition forces from the area as the insurgency increased its active and passive support 

of the relevant population. 

 

IED

Figure 6-3. Bombing: insurgent affiliate (example) 

6-66. A technique used often by terrorists is an initial bomb detonation followed by secondary bomb 

detonations as first responders or other people arrive at the attack site. In recent years, bombs and in particular 

IEDs increased in lethality and adaptation of techniques used by terrorists. Some IEDs are bulky devices often 

made from artillery shells and detonated with simple electric triggers using garage door openers or doorbells. 

However, irregular forces also produce and use smaller lethal devices that can be planted quickly and can be 

detonated from longer distances with more sophisticated devices. 

6-67. Another IED innovation is to use a device called an explosively formed projectile (EFP). The 

penetrating principle is common to shaped-charge munitions in order to outmatch armor protection. Although 

some technical skill and machining is required to obtain an optimum effect, a simple EFP is a section of pipe 

filled with explosives and capped by a shaped copper disk. When the explosive detonates, the EFP liner folds 

into a slug-like shape to penetrate armor plating of a vehicle. Emplacement of the EFP is factored to hit a most 

likely weak point for penetration. The angle of an EFP attack can be from below a target, along a side of a 

target, and can even be from above or at an extended height from a road or trail surface to attack wheeled or 

tracked vehicles. 
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6-12 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

6-68. A prevalent suicide tactic involves an individual wearing or carrying an explosive device to a target 

and then detonating the bomb or driving an explosive-laden vehicle to or into a target and then detonating the 

bomb. Suicide attacks differ in concept and execution from other high risk operations. In other high-risk 

missions, mission success does not require that the participant die. The plan allows for possible escape or 

survival of the terrorist or terrorists. 

6-69. Some terrorists have used people who are unknowingly part of a suicide attack. An example is an 

individual associated with a terrorist cell who believes he is only a courier of information and materiel but is 

unknowingly transporting an IED in a vehicle that is command- detonated by an observer-handler against a 

selected target. 

6-70. Another way of describing a suicide bomber is a highly effective precision-guided munition. 

Psychological impact increases when confronted by a person who plans to intentionally commit suicide in 

order to kill other people. Although a suicide bomber can be a lone terrorist working independently, the use of 

suicide terrorism as a tactic is normally the result of a conscious decision on the part of the leaders of an 

irregular force to engage in this form of attack. 

HIJACK-SEIZURE

6-71. Hijacking involves the forceful commandeering of a means of transportation such as an airplane, 

ship, train, or bus. Purposes for hijacking and terrorism can include— 

 Hostage-taking activities. 

 Obtaining a means of escape from a tactical area of responsibility. 

 Obtaining a means to conduct a suicide attack with a weapon of mass destruction. 

6-72. While hijacking of aircraft for hostage taking has declined in frequency in recent times, the use of 

hijacked aircraft for escape or as a weapon continues to be a dangerous threat. The attacks on the World Trade 

Center and the Pentagon in September 2001 are tragic examples of hijacking commercial jet planes that are 

used for terrorism in a deliberate and multiple suicide attacks. 

6-73. The use of hijacked vehicles for destructive devices is not restricted to aircraft. Trucks carrying 

explosive or flammable materials have been seized for use as weapon delivery devices. The possibility of such 

a technique could also apply to commercial transport ships carrying petroleum products such as liquefied 

natural gas (LNG). The damage or environmental contamination caused by an explosion of such carriers or 

other explosive commodities would be devastating. Accidental explosions of this nature are evidence of the 

catastrophic infrastructure damage that would be caused to ports and people. 

6-74. Seizure of a critical element of infrastructure, similar to hostage-taking, can be a physical site such as 

a facility of critical importance to a relevant population or a cyber node that disrupts and/or prevents use of 

selected cyber functions. The terrorism threat of disruption or destruction of seized infrastructure can be a 

bargaining issue for an irregular force or could be the intentional seizure and use of infrastructure to 

contaminate and/or damage a geographic area. 

KIDNAPPING

6-75. Kidnapping is usually an action taken against a prominent individual for a specific reason. However, 

kidnapping can be an indiscriminate act to cause anxiety in a relevant population. The most common reasons 

for kidnapping include— 

 Ransom. 

 Barter for release of a fellow irregular force member. 

 Desire to publicize a demand or issue with terrorism. 

6-76. Success of kidnapping often relies on correctly assessing the impact to the governing authority in 

maintaining their prestige with a relevant population. A contrast is the possible reactions of the governing 

authority to demonstrate their resolve. Detailed planning considers contingencies of how to release the kidnap 

victim and/or how often to move the kidnap victim among safe houses. The irregular force typically states 

specific demands with a timeline for a response. Kidnapping can also be used as a means of financing the 

organization. Ransom from seized individuals or groups is often a significant income for irregular forces in 
Terrorism 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-13 

several regions of the world. Irregular forces are often willing to hold a victim for significant time in order to 

have its demands satisfied (see figure 6-4). 

 Kidnapping: Insurgent-Criminal Affiliation (Example) 

A criminal organization was contracted by an insurgent leader to kidnap a prominent 

member of the regional governing authority. This appointed government official was a 

leading advocate to disrupt the cross-border smuggling operations of the criminal 

organization and had recently sponsored the arrest and detention of several criminal 

leaders. Members of the criminal organization observed the daily routine of the official 

and determined that seizing him at his residence provided the best opportunity for 

success. No personal security existed once the driver and guard delivered the official to 

his apartment. The criminals posed as city water engineers inspecting a reported water 

leak in the apartment complex. 

When the official allowed the engineers to enter his apartment, they gagged and bound 

him before placing him in a work chest on rollers. The official’s spouse and children were 

gagged, blindfolded, and tied to a room radiator but were otherwise physically unharmed. 

The kidnap victim was casually rolled out of the apartment complex to a waiting van and 

brought to a safe house in a nearby town. The official was delivered to an insurgent cell 

and brought to a separate safe house. 

 

The insurgent organization sent photographs of the official and a manifesto to media 

outlets and on the Internet that unless the criminal leaders were released from detention 

by the governing authority, the official would be killed. Negotiations continued for two 

weeks before the governing authority agreed to release the criminal leaders in exchange 

for the official. Although the official was released unharmed, the kidnapping embarrassed 

the governing authority in its apparent inability to curtail the criminal organization in its 

illicit international smuggling operations. Concurrently, the insurgency gained more active 

and passive support from the relevant population in the region’s urban areas and 

sections along the inter-border smuggling routes. 

 

Figure 6-4. Kidnapping: insurgent-criminal affiliation (example) 

6-77. Some kidnapping operations are actually assassinations with killing the victim as a planned outcome. 

Actions include obtaining intermediate concessions and publicity during the negotiation process that the 

irregular force would not receive from a simple assassination. Irregular forces may distribute videotapes 

and/or photographs to the media and post similar exploitation means on Internet websites. 

HOSTAGE-TAKING 

6-78. Hostage taking is typically an overt seizure of people to— 

 Gain publicity for a grievance. 

 Seek political attention and/or concessions. 

 Obtain safe passage for irregular forces contained by enemy forces during a mission. 

 Demand release of irregular force prisoners held by an enemy governing authority. 

 Ransom. 

6-79. Unlike kidnapping where a prominent individual is normally taken and moved to an unknown 

location, the hostages can be individuals not well known in the enemy’s society. Hostage situations are 

frequently risky for irregular forces especially when conducted in enemy territory. This location exposes the 
Chapter 6 

6-14 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

irregular forces to hostile military or police operations and carries the possibility of mission failure and 

capture. Therefore, hostages may be held in a neutral or friendly area rather than in enemy territory. Irregular 

forces will sometimes take often hostages with the intent to kill them after they believe they have fully 

exploited the immediate tactical advantage and/or media coverage from the situation. However, some hostage 

situations are conducted to cause a direct confrontation with enemy forces and the resulting global media 

attention while negotiations are in progress (see figure 6-5). 

Hostage-taking: Guerrilla Unit (Example) 

A guerrilla unit was directed by its higher insurgent organization to seize hostages and 

demand several political concessions from the governing authority with whom the 

insurgency was in conflict. The raid by approximately 15 guerrillas approached the 

opening day ceremonies of a middle school in a medium size industrial city. Guerrillas 

jumped from trucks firing weapons into the air as they entered the large school courtyard 

and quickly forced students, parents, and other relatives into the main school building. 

Local police had been deceived earlier by a hoax and were in a different part of the city. 

Government response to the hostage-taking was slow and ineffective. 

Guerrillas barricaded the school building and after separating young male adults from the 

main group of hostages, murdered the 20 male adults and dumped their bodies out of a 

second floor window into a main street. Internal security police had arrived at the scene 

along with regular military forces but were unable to prevent the murder and mayhem. 

International news media arrived on the scene based on insurgent announcements 

posted to the Internet. The governing authority’s response to the terrorism received public 

criticism by the local citizenry and mass media as confused and sluggish. The guerrillas 

allowed selected negotiators and news representatives inside the school to record the 

tension and suffering of the hostages. Guerrillas stated their willingness to fight to the 

death if attacked or if their demands were not satisfied. 

The stalemate ended abruptly when a guerrilla improvised explosive device detonated 

under suspicious circumstances. Both guerrillas and government forces started firing at 

each other and many hostages were killed or wounded in the firefight. Beyond the tragic 

loss of life and injuries, the governing authority was embarrassed in front of a global 

audience. All guerrillas died in final room-by-room assaults by government forces inside 

the school but the insurgent leader achieved his objective of spotlighting the plight of the 

relevant population in the region being suppressed by an unjust governing authority. 

 

G

Figure 6-5. Hostage-taking: guerrilla unit (example) 

RAID OR AMBUSH 

6-80. A raid or ambush is similar in concept and can be used to accent anxiety in an enemy with its sudden 

and violent actions. A raid permits control of the target for the execution of some other action. The kidnapping 

or assassination of a target may require a raid to gain access and control a particular person or area for a brief 

period of time. 

6-81. Some raids may not expect irregular force members to survive. Other raids may use raiders that 

volunteer to attack with the expectation of committing suicide as integral to the assault and/or to fight until 

killed in order cause the maximum amount of destruction and mayhem (see figure 6-6). 
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17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-15 

 Raid: Multiple Insurgent Suicide Cell Assaults (Example) 

An insurgent organization conducted nearly simultaneous assaults with a cell of two and 

three-person teams at multiple locations in a major metropolitan city. The choice of target 

areas ranged business centers, famous entertainment sites, mass transit hubs, and 

cultural landmarks for the purpose of indiscriminate killing as well as focused hostagetaking and murder of citizens and foreign visitors based on their nationality or religious 

faith. Terrorism was to exploit psychological trauma on a major urban population and 

undermine the confidence of citizens on the ability of their governing authority to protect 

its people and foreigners, as well as spotlight the insurgent organization’s ideological 

extremism and agenda to global attention. 

 

A ten-person direct action cell was thoroughly trained and indoctrinated in the safe haven 

of a neighboring state. None of the terrorists in the cell expected to survive the raid. The 

insurgent organization prepared for more than one year with refined surveillance and 

reconnaissance. The terrorist cell used a fishing trawler to infiltrate past coastal security 

patrols and arrive at the city’s harbor area. The cell unloaded their weapons, explosives, 

and equipment and split into five two-person teams. Dressed as normal citizens with 

travel bags, they moved to their separate objectives by walking, taxi cab, or a small 

inflatable boat for travel further into the city’s port. 

Confirming via cellular telephone that all assault teams were in position, the terrorists 

used semiautomatic rifle fire and hand grenades to assault people in a rail station, 

hospital, urban streets, café, hotels, and religious cultural center. Improvised explosive 

devices (IEDs) had been hidden in taxis and were timed to explode well after the 

simultaneous attacks were underway. These taxi explosions caused additional confusion 

and mayhem in the first hours of the incident. After attacking a café, one team quickly 

joined a team assaulting an internationally famous hotel complex. Random killing 

continued as they started fires in the hotel and seized hostages. Hostages at a cultural 

center were tortured and murdered. Another team killed or wounded people randomly in 

a train station and a hospital. As these terrorists attempted to link up with other insurgent 

cell members they were intercepted and killed by internal security forces in a city street. 

Several IEDs were emplaced with timers or tripwires at various sites in or near a hotel. 

The terrorists barricaded in the hotel were in regular communication with senior insurgent 

leaders in a neighboring state via satellite telephone, personal digital assistant (PDA) 

devices, and cellular telephones. The insurgent leaders and cell handlers provided 

ideological encouragement and tactical advice to the insurgents as the hostage crisis 

continued for several days with live-feed media coverage to a global audience. 

Regular military forces and special purpose forces eventually killed nine terrorists and 

captured one terrorist but the insurgents had already achieved their information warfare 

objectives. The murder or injury of hundreds of noncombatants and days of mayhem in a 

metropolis embarrassed the governing authority in front of international partners and its 

citizens and demonstrated the insurgent’s commitment to its extremist agenda. 

 

Figure 6-6. Raid: multiple insurgent suicide cell assaults (example) 

6-82. An ambush is another form of surprise attack characterized by terror, violent execution, and speed of 

action. The intended objective may be to cause mass casualties, assassinate an individual, or disrupt enemy 

security and stability operations. Explosives, such as bombs and directional mines, are a common weapon 

used in ambushes as well as antitank rockets, automatic weapons, and/or other small arms fires. 
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6-16 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

ASSASSINATION

6-83. An assassination is a deliberate action to kill specific individuals. Targets for assassination are often 

individuals that have notoriety in a relevant population such as political leaders, well-known citizens, and/or 

public spokespersons. This form of terrorism can also target individuals with no public or governing authority 

importance and appear indiscriminate. This type of targeting for assassination can intimidate and cause 

anxiety and fear and coerce the passive support of a relevant population to an irregular force and preclude the 

active support to a governing authority with whom the irregular force is in conflict. Extensive target 

surveillance and reconnaissance of engagement areas is critical to planning and conducting an assassination. 

Although many factors play into the decision, the target’s vulnerabilities often determine the method 

of assassination. 

6-84. Many targets of assassination are symbolic and are intended to have significant negative 

psychological impact on the enemy and the relevant population that it controls. For example, assassinating an 

enemy senior government official, a successful corporate leader, or a prominent cleric can demonstrate the 

inability of an enemy governing authority to protect its own people. Assassinating local representatives and/or 

leaders of a society can contribute to civil disorder while demoralizing members of a local governing authority 

and/or law enforcement organizations. 

TECHNIQUE ENABLERS 

6-85. Techniques that take advantage of restrictions and constraints on an enemy operating within a 

relevant noncombatant population are a norm of irregular force actions. Limitations on an enemy can include 

social traditions, moral codes, and/or legal policies of a governing authority and its forces. Irregular forces can 

remain discrete and secretive within a population or can choose to be open in their operations when operating 

in or from a safe haven. In either case, irregular forces seek to create an environment of authority and relative 

protection in and from which to operate. Examples of these enablers include dispersion of the irregular force 

organization within a relevant population and/or the use of noncombatants of the population as human shields 

when confronting an enemy. 

6-86. Actions by irregular forces demonstrate a tempo and/or pace based on the capabilities of the irregular 

force as it attempts to gradually or dramatically impact on its enemy. Attacks preferably employ surprise and 

deception with irregular force units, cells, or other organizations and also plan for the infiltration of insider 

threats to enemy activities and infrastructure. Several offensive action techniques that can easily compound a 

sense of anxiety, fear, and/or terror are use of suicide attacks, cyber attacks, and attacks with a weapon of 

mass destruction. 

Disperse 

6-87. Dispersion in complex rural and urban environments can degrade situational awareness and 

complicate enemy intelligence and targeting efforts. Urban areas offer excellent cover and concealment from 

enemy ground forces and airpower because building interiors and subterranean areas are hidden from airborne 

observation, and vertical obstructions hinder the line of sight to ground targets. Irregular force individuals, 

cells, units, or other organizations are often decentralized and purposely dispersed in locations. Similar cover 

and concealment in rural areas may be available in villages or natural terrain such as caves, tunnels, and/or 

every restrictive physical terrain. 

6-88. Safe houses or sites facilitate irregular force ability to discreetly transit from one location to another 

by providing a place to rest, acquire resources, plan, prepare, and stage for acts. Active supporters in a relevant 

population and/or criminal organizations can facilitate such networks and trafficking from location to location 

in a local community and/or across regional and/or international borders. 

Shield 

6-89. Irregular forces can deliberately use noncombatants as human shields that limit enemy forces in using 

their weapons systems when noncombatants may be injured or killed. Noncombatants are sometimes 

prevented from evacuating likely engagement areas to ensure that irregular forces have human shields present 

in their immediate vicinity. These groupings can conceal movements and/or be a means of escape for an 
Terrorism 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-17 

irregular force after executing an attack. Some irregular forces purposely use the elderly, women, and/or 

children as human shields. Activities to create selective areas of human shields can include— 

 Orchestrating work strikes. 

 Fomenting mass rallies. 

 Coordinating peaceful-appearing demonstrations. 

 Coercing civilians to gather with and around an irregular force action, security, and/or support 

element. 

6-90. Types of withdrawal actions or repositioning through human shields causes terror for the 

noncombatants involved and may allow an irregular force to regain a tactical initiative and renew offensive 

actions. Asymmetric techniques take advantage of typical restrictions on enemy rules of engagement and often 

reduce enemy capabilities to apply their full suite of weapon systems against an irregular force. Some 

defensive tactics are to— 

 Disperse within a relevant population of noncombatants. 

 Use noncombatants as a human shield during armed conflict with an enemy. 

 Exploit positioning in close proximity to infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, or places of 

religious worship. 

 Conduct INFOWAR manipulation of actions when enemy forces cause noncombatant casualties in 

combating the irregular force. 

Women and Children Combatants 

6-91. Women and children cover a broad range of irregular force capabilities. Women and children can be 

involved in the direct actions of an assault, raid, or ambush and/or be critical to the security and/or logistics 

support to an irregular force. 

6-92. Media reporting often spotlights the contributions of women in irregular force operations. In some 

instances irregular forces may encourage their front organizations to promote the visible presence of women 

and children in their public awareness efforts. In other instances, irregular forces will co-opt women and 

children to be suicide bombers in sensational incidents that receive much attention in media affairs. 

6-93. Less obvious but often just as dangerous are other forms of direct combative and support activities. 

Women and children can serve a valuable role as couriers when cultural custom or civil restrictions in a region 

allow them easier ability to transit public areas without the level of detailed personal searches that a man 

would normally experience at checkpoints of a governing authority and/or its internal security forces and law 

enforcement organizations. 

6-94. From other support perspectives, women can be key operators in the logistical systems of irregular 

forces. Personnel operations can involve the recruitment of new members with a maternal image and be an 

example of how a woman can obtain status within a social-cultural setting. Recruitment of women and 

children can range from selective invitation of individuals perceived to be receptive to an irregular force 

agenda to overt coercion and forceful levy for manning irregular forces in a local community. Alcoholic 

beverages and/or drugs can be used at times to dull the ability of children to resist assisting irregular force 

activities. Child fighters may be indoctrinated or coerced to conduct specific tasks and can be forced to act in 

irregular force operations with little or no training. 

6-95. However, training of particular skills such a bomb making or other functional capabilities can support 

the transition of recruits to be fully integrated members in an irregular force. Women and men may be 

responsible for establishing and maintaining safe houses for irregular forces that may require a periodic 

sanctuary on short notice. Women and men may also be the overt presence in a facility used for maintaining 

kidnapped people, cached supplies, or medical treatment sites. Similarly, fund raising and the informal 

connections within a community can use women and children as a significant symbol of family value and 

need. When public expression of an irregular force agenda is allowable in a locale or region with recognition 

as a legitimate political party, women can be a spotlight for media affairs coordination and publicity. In some 

cases, women are elected political spokespersons for an irregular force agenda. 
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6-18 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

6-96. Women and children can be fighters with a weapon, couriers of money or munitions, shields to male 

fighters who engage an enemy with small arms fire, and/or other forms of support operations for an irregular 

force. Women and children in irregular conflict are a significant combat multiplier for an irregular force. 

Safe Haven 

6-97. Safe havens are typically located in ungoverned or physical areas where irregular forces are able to 

organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of 

inadequate governance capacity by a governing authority with whom an irregular force is in conflict. In some 

cases, safe havens are located in semi-autonomous areas within a sovereign state while in other cases an 

enclave across international borders. Distant locations from an irregular force AOR may be more acceptable to 

sustaining irregular force operations. 

6-98. A safe haven is often used to train regional and/or foreign recruits and integrate them into the tactical 

and/or logistical support operations of an irregular force. An extension of some safe havens is use of cyber 

connectivity and the ability to mask or distort Internet irregular force cyber points of origin. Recruitment, 

training, and encouragement can be particularly effective with recurring communications and encouragement 

to irregular force members, affiliates, and/or adherents. 

Insider Threat 

6-99. An insider threat and intent to conduct acts of terror involve the infiltration by an irregular force 

member or members into an area and/or facility. The insider threat is a practical and psychological perspective 

that consumes significant enemy resources to counter such invasive actions. 

6-100. The “insider” is an individual who is authorized access to open or secure systems of an enemy or 

supporting organization that can include physical facilities and infrastructure as well as information systems. 

In the context of irregular forces and terrorism, an insider can be a member of an irregular force and/or an 

adherent of an irregular force agenda. In either instance in context of command and control and/or information 

system operations and infrastructure, the insider threat can— 

 Disrupt general and/or specific operations of an enemy. 

 Deny enemy use of particular systems and data. 

 Corrupt or destroy selected information. 

 Cause malicious damage or destruction to a facility and/or other infrastructure. 

6-101. An insider threat mission can be planned as a one-time breach of enemy security measures or be 

planned as a recurring, long-term covert investment to gather information and intelligence. An insider threat 

can be a willing participant with an irregular force or be coerced into supporting actions that support irregular 

forces. In addition to tasks on gathering specific information and/or intelligence on enemy operations and 

procedures, a complementary task may be to identify weaknesses in a particular enemy capability or function. 

6-102. Irregular force accomplices may already exist within an objective area and be able to assist the entry 

and acceptance of additional irregular force members as an insider threat. Uniforms, security badges and/or 

identification cards, and/or purposeful lapses in physical security measures are examples of insider accomplice 

support. Once an insider threat is established in an assigned objective area, it may be directed to perform a 

number of tasks or be focused with a specific function. Tasks can include— 

 Remain discrete and report on current operations and personal observations in the objective area. 

 Plan for acts of sabotage on designated systems and/or equipment. 

 Attempt to subvert other actors in the objective area to support the irregular force. 

 Conduct sabotage as critical opportunities arise. 

 Support the actions of other insider threats of the irregular force. 

 Commit, on order, violent acts on a designated target. 

 Conduct a suicide attack on a designated target. 

6-103. An insider threat or an irregular force observer in the objective area can sometimes capitalize on 

witnessing an incident that identifies individuals with a personal and/or ideological grievance and who has 

already been vetted for security clearance into an enemy’s organization and/or facility area. This type of 
Terrorism 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-19 

individual may be gradually co-opted by an irregular force observer and recruited as an insider threat. On 

other occasions, a personal grievance may incite an individual to act violently even though there is no direct 

connection to an irregular force. The INFOWAR campaign of the irregular force will manipulate such 

incidents to support its agenda and often claim responsibility for the violent and/or terrorism actions. 

Information Warfare 

6-104. Irregular force information warfare can disrupt popular support for a governing authority and its 

allies and/or coalition partners. Irregular forces can spread rumors or misinformation as a means to offset the 

official information from a governing authority and its military and/or internal security forces. 

6-105. Irregular forces can use the Internet to disseminate their message as quickly as events occur. An 

immediate press release from a Website offers irregular force control of initial message content and media 

reporting. Irregular forces manipulate images and create special effects or deception that enhances the anxiety 

and/or fear of terrorism. Audiovisual coverage of irregular force successes are incorporated in irregular force 

recruitment efforts and sustain morale. Multimedia sites can display manufactured evidence of governing 

authority atrocities and war crimes to turn domestic and international opinion against the governing authority. 

Irregular forces use sympathetic media to reinforce their INFOWAR campaign (see Appendix A). 

Suicide Attack 

6-106. Suicide attack can be the act of an individual or a tactic planned and conducted by an irregular force 

to spotlight a grievance with an intentional self-destruction and incidence of mass casualties, death, and 

mayhem. Mass media attention is often focused on an organization’s grievance when such a sensational action 

occurs. As a tactic, suicide attack seeks to degrade the resolve of a relevant population and obtain concessions 

from an enemy to an irregular force agenda. Organizational aims and ideological support to commit suicide in 

attacking an enemy is often complicated in motivations but is typically an action used when other more 

conventional means of combating an enemy are overmatched and produce nil results. A tactic of suicide attack 

can also be evaluated for an operational intent and/or strategy to obtain support for an irregular force agenda 

from state and non-state actors who might be otherwise unwilling to get involved in a social or political 

conflict of an irregular force. 

6-107. In whatever means a suicide attacker uses, an irregular force member conducting such an act of 

terrorism has the ability to adjust actions until the moment of attack. This adaptive behavior makes a suicide 

attacker particularly dangerous. When the weapon is a suicide bomb, the moment to detonate a suicide vest or 

a vehicle borne improvised explosive device can be adjusted given conditions as they exist at a time and 

place of a planned attack. An attacker can estimate the degree of mayhem that will be caused by the 

explosion and change who and where to assault. In other instances, a handler of the suicide attack can 

command-detonate a bomb on a willing and/or unknowing individual carrying a bomb. The attack can 

be a deliberate assault on a specified target or can be intentionally an indiscriminate act to kill and/or 

main combatants and noncombatants. Suicide attack is primarily a psychological assault on an enemy 

and its supporters. 

Cyber Attack 

6-108. A cyber attack can be obvious or purposely masked to prevent an enemy from knowing a system has 

been or is about to be attacked. Cyberspace use can be a key enabler to commit espionage, subversion, and/or 

sabotage. From a terrorism perspective, cyber attack can create anxiety and fear in a targeted population or 

group of key leaders. An intrusion into a cyber system can be embedded with a time delay feature and/or be 

programmed to execute an action on order of a specific signal. Whether a cyber intrusion is from an external 

source or has been emplaced by an insider threat, the reasons for conducting terrorism with a cyber attack on 

an enemy can include―

 Sabotage cyber networks. 

 Extort concession from an enemy. 

 Damage enemy or supporting activities and infrastructure. 

 Endanger people within a relevant population as part of an irregular force objective. 

 Support other threat capabilities with a greater probability of success in mission conduct. 
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6-20 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

 Identify vulnerabilities in cyber systems and facilities. 

 Evaluate enemy TTP for the ability to limit or prevent particular cyber attacks. 

6-109. Irregular forces can employ a broad range of technology to support cyber attacks. Cyber technology 

is readily available from commercial or illicit markets in order to conduct terrorism. The ability to exploit 

advanced or low-cost technology and integrate with basic TTP is limited only by the fiscal means and 

application skills of a terrorist. TTP can use a range of capabilities simultaneously to gather critical 

information for planning and conducting a future while a cyber attack is in progress. TTP of a very simple 

nature include―

 Exploiting social media to collect information through false representation 

 Gathering open source information from Internet or intranet electronic postings. 

 Exploiting people through techniques such as phishing, spearphishing, or whaling expeditions. 

 Infiltrating malware to disrupt, damage, or destroy cyber systems. 

 Exfiltrating critical information from cyber systems that enables sabotage and other types 

of attack. 

6-110. A model for planning and conducting cyber attack can be very sophisticated in attempt to breach 

layers of detection and protection. Other models can be quite simple in concept. A cyber attack model 

can include― 

 Reconnaissance to identify and select potential targets. 

 Weaponization of a computer operating system or software application. 

 Delivery of malware by remote or physical access to a targeted computer. 

 Exploitation by triggering a malware code in a targeted computer. 

 Installation that creates an access point on a victimized computer and allows unauthorized entry 

and exit on a victimized computer and network. 

 Command and control to send instructions to targeted computers previously installed with payload 

malware and provides the means to conduct a cyber attack. 

 Actions to accomplish the intended cyber attack objectives. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

6-111. Listing a category of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) acknowledges a broad range of 

capabilities that specific terrorist organizations, units, cells, and/or groups would like to acquire. WMD for an 

irregular force can be as simple in concept as several tons of improvised explosive from fertilizer and 

chemicals to acquisition of a sophisticated nuclear device from a rogue state and/or contract technicians. 

Fundamental information on using materials to construct types of WMD is available on the open-source 

Internet. Once skills are acquired and precursor or selected material and equipment are obtained by terrorists, 

the possibility exists to threaten use and/or actually employ WMD for catastrophic results. 

6-112. The types of WMD are categorized generally as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

(CBRN) materials. Sometimes WMD is described as nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry. However, 

this is a limiting viewpoint on what can be used as a WMD. 

6-113. Materials that are weaponized as WMD can include toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) and toxic 

industrial materials (TIM), biological agents, and/or radiological materiel. Low-yield and high-yield common 

explosives can also be configured to cause results considered a WMD. Although difficult to acquire by 

irregular forces, a nuclear demolition and/or bomb-like device is by its nature a weapon of mass destruction. 

Any of these weaponized materials can be a significant irregular force and/or terrorism capability. 

6-114. WMD can be employed through numerous types of delivery systems. Once a dangerous biological 

agent is acquired, a simple means of employing the WMD can be letters contaminated with a biological agent 

being sent through a postal service to cause death and/or severe injury to those individuals who are 

contaminated. Additional impacts of such an attack are contamination and/or the potential contamination of 

facilities that the letters transited during the delivery process. Extensive decontamination requirements would 

disrupt or temporarily halt private and or commercial mail systems. The psychological impact on a relevant 
Terrorism 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-21 

larger population would accent anxiety, fear, and frustration of how to prevent other similar attacks with a 

WMD (see figure 6-7). 

Figure 6-7. Anthrax-laced letters: death-mayhem in targeted population (example) 

6-115. The expertise to acquire and use WMD remains a significant terrorist threat based on some irregular 

forces intent to―

 Acquire materials to construct or develop WMD. 

 Threaten to attack with WMD 

 Attack combatants and noncombatants indiscriminately with WMD. 

 Create mass injury, death, mayhem, and damage with WMD. 

TERRORISM TRENDS AND EMERGENT VECTORS 

6-116. Trends of terrorism can be considered emergent variations and adaptation to age-old truths of conflict 

when at least two forces are unequally matched in military power. Terrorism is often indicative of a weaker 

force seeking vulnerabilities in a more powerful force and attacking those weaknesses with an expectation of 

persistent conflict. No accurate prediction exists on the character, location, or duration of any specific future 

terrorism; however, irregular force will continue to improvise, innovate, and adapt TTP to achieve success 

through acts of terror. 

6-117. Situational accelerators can spotlight probable vectors of terrorism adaptation by irregular forces in 

near-term years. Uncertainties include the pace and/or tempo an irregular force can demonstrate in its 

tactical or operational reach, effects an irregular force can display throughout the strategic depth of an 

enemy, and how successful the “battle of the narrative” will be in influencing a targeted population. The 

resilience of motives and ideological commitment of an irregular force and its leaders remain primary 

strengths in an irregular force campaign of terror. Terrorism trends and emergent vectors that irregular 

forces consider include— 

 Improved situational awareness and understanding of the enemy. 

 Radicalized philosophy and/or ideology as a compelling motivation. 

 Adaptive organizational tactics and techniques. 

 Versatile organizational affiliations. 

 Expanded transnational affiliates. 

 Emergent independent adherents. 

 Devastating full spectrum weaponry. 

 Targeted economic disruption. 

 Globalized media affairs. 
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6-22 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

IMPROVED AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING

6-118. Understanding situational context approaches the issue of irregular emergent vectors along an avenue 

of action used by irregulars, paramilitary, guerrillas, terrorists, insurgents, or criminals. Intent has a premise 

of adapting constantly to optimize knowledge, training, logistical support, and readiness to conduct irregular 

operations. Terrorism will be used when this type of action accomplishes the desired psychological and 

physical effects. Irregular forces can be patient. Irregular forces plan while waiting for critical opportunities 

to strike. 

6-119. Irregular force vectors consider the nature of irregular forces and the capabilities and limitations of 

specific irregular forces in an evolving contemporary operational environment. As the regions of the world 

advance in technological areas, expand the mobility opportunities of people, and exploit the Internet and 

other media, extremists concurrently fuel grievances and alienate segments of populations to foster support 

for their agendas. 

6-120. Irregular forces assess and plan for conducting operations in an area of responsibility and also 

consider how to attack forces and/or states that may exist in regions that are distant from a primary area of 

land, air, and/or maritime conflict. Cooperation and collaboration among extremist affiliates and/or 

adherents will plan for and attempt to attacks the homelands of those states that may be supporting a 

governing authority with whom the irregular force is in conflict. Irregular forces also assess and plan 

for attacking intermediate staging locations that would disrupt the flow or prevent significant support 

from these states. 

RADICALIZED MOTIVATIONS

6-121. Core grievances are real or perceived issues of segments in a targeted population. The importance of 

the core grievances or even their existence can change over time. Irregular forces can manipulate core 

grievances to create conditions for developing the willing support within a population. The perception of 

foreign exploitation or a governing authority that appears to be excessively influenced by foreigners can be a 

core grievance. For example, if foreign businesses dominate critical portions of the local economy, some of 

the population may feel that they or their country are being exploited by outsiders. A foreign military 

presence or military treaty may offend national sentiment as well. The mere presence or specific actions of 

foreigners may offend local religious or cultural sensibilities. A state or regional governance in an area can 

be a core grievance. 

6-122. Extremists that are very conservative can be as revolutionary in intent as other groups that are 

considered very liberal. Intents may include replacing forms of legitimate government with varied types of 

authoritarian rule. Socialism or variants of communism and/or other forms of totalitarianism can exist in 

many forms. However, ideology can range the political variable from fascist or other totalitarian intentions 

to an opposite political perspective of anarchism. As regimes fail to demonstrate its value to a subjected 

population, a population may gradually and secretly plan and act for change. Religious fundamentalism or 

extremist viewpoints can become a core grievance. Pervasive and desperate poverty often fosters and fuels 

widespread public dissatisfaction in a relevant population. Young people without jobs or hope are ripe for 

recruitment into an irregular force. Lack of essential services in a population complicates an OE and its 

effective governance. Examples of these essential needs are availability of food and potable water, credible 

law enforcement, emergency services, electricity, shelter, health care, schools, transportation, and sanitation 

programs for trash and sewage. Stabilizing a relevant population requires meeting these basic social and 

civil needs. Frustration and a feeling of disenfranchised existence can sway a relevant population to support 

an irregular force that promises change and improved living conditions. 

ADAPTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

6-123. In an era of sophisticated weapon systems and rapid international deployment of military forces, 

incidents demonstrate the effectiveness of simple tactics conducted efficiently by small irregular forces. 

Devastating attacks can be conducted by a small unit or cell of irregular force terrorists. Operating in two- or 

three-person teams, they could simultaneously attack separate locations. The terrorists would be armed 

primarily with small arms, hand grenades, and improvised explosive devices. The attacks and eventual 

destruction of the terrorists could extend to hours or days of horrifying murder and mayhem. A methodical 
Terrorism 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-23 

containment and room-by-room clearance of historic and multi-story buildings in a large metropolitan 

complex would be covered by global media outlets throughout the incident. An irregular force conducts 

operations with the expectation of such publicity to spotlight its irregular force agenda and embarrass the 

governing authority that it defies. 

VERSATILE ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

6-124. Irregular forces will normally start as small entities with modest operational capabilities. As 

capabilities develop, plans may focus on acquiring improved capabilities across the functions of intelligence, 

logistics, communications, media affairs, and direct action. Building capacity in order to demonstrate 

commitment and capability is progressive. Temporary setbacks in plans and actions require flexibility to 

adjust timelines and adapt support networks. These networks can be as local as a neighborhood informationintelligence collection effort to a disciplined outreach for assistance from sources external to the immediate 

community or region. 

6-125. Organizational versatility can include units or cells focused on acts of terrorism or other actions and 

organizations which are difficult to distinguish from civil crime. The increasing role of criminal activity in 

financing an agenda, either in partnership or competition with traditional criminal activities, can be a 

condition used by irregular forces. These enterprises include drug trafficking and human smuggling, fraud, 

tax evasion, counterfeiting, money laundering, and theft. Some activities are associated with terrorist’s 

evolving capabilities for false documents production and concealment of money transactions for their 

operational purposes. 

6-126. Irregular forces and criminal organizations can be closely related for mutual benefits. Mega-cities are 

expanding in countries with poor services and weak governance. Bases and operations in rural and urban 

environments will increase where law enforcement is often ineffective and/or corrupt. Rampant 

unemployment and dissatisfaction creates a productive recruiting ground and operating environment for 

irregular forces promoting grievances acknowledged by large segments of the population. Many of these city 

areas have materiel, communication, and transport capacities for irregular forces to use, and a potentially 

huge base of sympathizers and recruits. 

6-127. A development related to this is the emergence of regions where governments exercise marginal 

control of geographic areas within their sovereign territory. Control is imposed by sub-state actors that can 

span criminal organizations, militias, guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists. Government forces confront 

violent and capable irregular forces that often resort to open coercion and terrorism of officials, police 

officers, military forces, their families, and the general citizenry. In addition to overt intimidation of a 

populace, irregular forces exploit the vulnerabilities of new technologies to attack and have a great deal of 

flexibility in their use of new technology. They have the advantage of only needing to attack or neutralize 

specific systems or capabilities, and can concentrate fiscal expenditures on specialized counter-technology to 

protect their criminal systems. Nonetheless, irregular forces can often neutralize advanced systems or 

capabilities through the use of simple and unconventional techniques such as a suicide bomber. 

EXPANDED TRANSNATIONAL AFFILIATES

6-128. Transnational actions and terrorism presents a global challenge. Some irregular forces seek to 

conduct major operations that cause large scale, maximum casualty impact. Globalization removes the 

perceived security that national borders and geographic distance from adversaries and enemies once 

indicated. Commerce and finance is international, travel is international, and society in general is a much 

more international community. Operating beyond the organizational reach of an opponent can provide the 

physical space or fiscal and media affairs support to enhance an irregular force purpose. 

6-129. Irregular forces can operate in and among this international reach and develop transnational 

capabilities through a loose affiliation of clandestine networks, inserted sleeper or active cells within 

geographic regions, and adaptability to constantly shift and change in organizational form. When extremist 

ideology is the primary motivation, the commitment is often absolutist with no allowance for compromise 

and seeks no negotiation. Violence signals a committed path to conditions with no restrictions by social 

norms, laws, or values. Actions such as terrorism are often becoming more networks based. Irregular forces 

can encourage loosely organized, self-financed organizational structures. The motivation of terrorists 
Chapter 6 

6-24 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

appears to be based increasingly on theological extremes and ideological absolutes. International or 

transnational cooperation among some terrorists provides an improved ability to recruit members, develop 

fiscal support and resources, gain skills training and expertise, transfer technology, and when desired, 

political advice. 

EMERGENT INDEPENDENT ADHERENTS 

6-130. The presence of varied irregular forces and/or possible independent actors that separate from an 

originating organization can easily blur in organizations claiming responsibility for terrorism incidents. 

These actors can be at the individual level or small cells acting on a specified agenda that may be similar but 

distinct from more well known irregular force organizations. Independent actors may purposely minimize or 

preclude public announcement of their plans and action in order to improve their cell security. 

6-131. Independent adherents are adjusting their financial operations to be self-sustaining in their activities. 

This independence from any external control is a value to an irregular force as it gains the impact of diverse 

and separate adherent actions at no real cost to his own organizational base. The facility with which groups 

can obtain and move funds, procure secure bases, and obtain and transport weaponry determines their own 

operational abilities and the level of threat that they pose to a common enemy. The international nature of 

finance, the integration of global economies, and the presence of terrorist adherents in the illegal economies 

of slaves, drugs, smuggling, human trafficking, counterfeiting, identity theft, and fraud have aided an 

independence from traditional sources of state-linked sponsorship and other interconnected support. 

DEVASTATING FULL SPECTRUM WEAPONRY

6-132. Weapon lethality can be assessed in many ways but efficiency and effectiveness are two general 

means to determine intent. Some weapons are quite simple and very deadly in effect. Lethality and overall 

effects are key considerations when assessed with types of action to obtain attention and reaction. The 

trauma of violent deaths as well as mass injuries and damage on a targeted population can be critical to the 

psychological effect and consequent actions or inaction by the affected population. Terrorism will continue 

to seek forms of indiscriminate violence. Acts of terror can also be targeted to specific people, groups, or 

capabilities. Terrorism is merging and combining with various other state and sub-state actors, further 

blurring the difference between criminals, rogue governments, and terrorists. 

6-133. Ongoing conflicts display that terrorism attacks account for only a small fraction of civil violence but 

the high-profile nature of many terrorist operations can have a disproportionate negative impact. Conditions 

and changing dynamics in conflict can create a perception in a relevant population of unchecked violence 

and fear. Such perception can harden differing opinions, empower militias and vigilante groups, increase a 

middle-class exodus from a region, and disrupt confidence in a governing authority and its security forces. 

Terrorism plays a key role in much of this physical and psychological violence. 

6-134. The means to cause mass casualties can be a highly sophisticated weapon system such as a 

weaponized military-grade nuclear device. However, mass destruction can also be caused by an improvised 

low-yield explosive weapon such as the 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and the 

Pentagon. While purposeful mass casualty incidents may have appeared to be extraordinary events several 

decades ago, contemporary acts of terror surpass these former acts and demonstrate a profound impact on 

populations at the local, regional, national, and international levels. Emergent actions indicate that terrorism 

previously centralized and controlled by formal networks and organizations, is being conducted increasingly 

by loosely affiliated terrorists or groups that may generally identify themselves with an ideology or special 

purpose agenda. The threat can be foreign and domestic. 

6-135. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a particularly alarming issue. The projected effects 

amplify the danger and fear of a catastrophic attack. Some of these materials that could be used to construct 

some form of WMD are easily accessible in the public domain. Other potential capabilities are quite 

problematic to weaponizing materiel. The knowledge and technological means of specialists to produce 

WMD is a shadowy area of science, crime, and intrigue available to some terrorists. 

6-136. The trend to exploit available simple and sophisticated technologies and the desire to cause mass 

casualties could be demonstrated in irregular force attacks that employ WMD such as— 
Terrorism 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-25 

 Chemical [sarin nerve agent] attacks in a metropolitan subway system. 

 Biological [anthrax] attacks using contaminated letters in postal system. 

 Low-yield explosive aerial bomb as in nearly simultaneous suicide attacks with large commercial 

jet aircraft into critical infrastructure. 

 Low-yield explosive vehicular bomb as in a vehicle borne improvised explosive device attack on a 

Federal governing authority building and commercial business locale. 

 Radioactive material placed in a public location for area contamination. 

 Nuclear weapon detonation in a controlled environment as a demonstration of capability. 

TARGETED ECONOMIC DISRUPTION

6-137. Modern, high-technology societies are susceptible to a concept of complex terrorism. Dependence 

on electronic networks in modern infrastructure, sometimes with questionable redundancy in systems, and 

concentrating critical assets in small geographic locales can present lucrative targets for the irregular force. 

Some emerging irregular forces wield effective power in failing states and view terrorism as an effective 

mode of conflict. 

6-138. Critical infrastructure and support systems provide terrorists with a wide array of potential targets in 

land, maritime, cyber, and space environments that would directly affect economies on a regional and global 

scale. Common vulnerabilities may focus on oil refinery operations and overland and/or maritime 

shipment of oil products. Infrastructure for oil production has critical aspects in key areas of the world. 

Single points of failure in the infrastructure or denying critical services for a period of time could severely 

disrupt world economies. 

GLOBALIZED MEDIA AFFAIRS

6-139. Exploiting mass media considers the value of effectively marketing an irregular force message 

through a nearly simultaneous global information environment. An overarching principle is to create and 

maintain international attention and impact. To gain international awareness and attention to grievances and 

issues, incidents must often be spectacular to attract mass media coverage. Effectiveness of INFOWAR will 

be measured by its ability to cause a dramatic impact of fear and uncertainty in a target population. Surprise 

and sustained violence may be normal against specified people representing elements of civil or military 

control and order of a governing authority with whom irregular forces are in conflict. Common citizens may 

also be targets in a culture of violence. Damage or destruction of community, regional, or national 

infrastructure and governance will be used to gain attention, provoke excessive reaction by host nation or 

coalition military forces, and attempt to alienate general population support of a governing authority. 

6-140. Irregular force operations consider a desired media effect and plan for verbal or visual reporting 

coverage. Supporting events and interviews reinforce the desired message. These messages may present 

disinformation and false perspectives. Frequently, military reluctance to comment on ongoing operations in 

the media for operational security reasons can assist the irregular force. If no balanced information comes 

from official sources in a timely manner, the media may use the information readily available from the 

irregular force or a terrorist cell as a primary source for reporting an incident. 

6-141. Future armed conflicts are more likely to be fought “among the people” rather than “around the 

people.” Conflict in urban areas and populated locales is inevitable. Much of the world’s population is 

already located in urban terrain. In the next two decades, estimates pose five billion of the world’s eight 

billion people will live in cities. Many of the population hubs will be along coastlines throughout the world’s 

regions. Irregular forces will attempt to blend into concentrated populations in order to marginalize 

detection of their recruiting, training, and staging initiatives; obtain support within a coerced or passive 

populace, and act at times and locations of their own selection. Media attention to a major incident will be 

immediate in coverage. 

6-142.Rural areas and their inhabitants, depending on conditions in particular regions, will complement 

operations in urban centers. Irregular forces will evolve hybrid capacity of selective conventional military, 

paramilitary, and criminal organization capabilities. Rural irregular forces will operate in regions providing 

cover and concealment such as heavily forested or mountainous areas that hinder some forms of detection 
Chapter 6 

6-26 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

and interdiction. Notwithstanding, a rural orientation must lead back to urban centers as a presence and 

connection to the main population masses and the political infrastructure of governing authorities with 

whom irregular forces are in conflict.

THE SPECTER OF TERRORISM 

6-143. The specter of irregular forces using terrorism on a society illustrates the value that such acts can 

provide to an irregular force that is often incapable of directly confronting an enemy with overwhelming 

combat power. The key factors of a successful campaign of irregular force terrorism will continue to be the 

long-term resolve and resilience of terrorists to continue the conflict until their aims are achieved. 

6-144. The dedicated irregular force using terrorism must be adaptive and flexible to the periodic success of 

an enemy. When terrorism is disrupted with key irregular force leaders killed or captured, and functional 

capabilities are degraded or destroyed, other irregular force members, affiliates, and/or adherents are 

prepared to continue the struggle against a declared enemy. 

6-145. A relevant population is a critical qualifying environment of nearly all irregular conflict. Irregular 

forces decentralize, network, and operate among a relevant population to overcome technological advantages 

of an enemy. The resilience of an irregular force and the expected debilitating effects of terrorism on an 

enemy require a determined long-term commitment from irregular force leaders to defeat an enemy. The 

massing of effects over time often requires a patient and decentralized approach to irregular conflict. The 

irregular force maintains a keen sense of cultural awareness and social understanding to establish a rationale 

for terror that is tolerated to a relevant population. The irregular force must obtain and sustain the passive 

and/or active support of the relevant population within which it operates. 

6-146. An INFOWAR campaign must promote a resilient irregular force message of purpose and 

commitment to a relevant population. The objective of terrorism in support of an irregular force agenda must 

be recognized by a relevant population as a compelling outcome worth the amount of suffering and social 

disruption that terrorism and other acts by an irregular force may cause. Whether the ultimate aims of an 

irregular force are ideological, philosophical, and/or practical, terrorism will continue to be a vexing 

factor in future conflicts among and between state and non-state actors throughout the world.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-1 

Chapter 7 

Functional Tactics 

Insurgents and guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, may employ adaptive 

functional tactics. When planning a tactical action, an irregular OPFOR commander 

or leader determines what functions must be performed to accomplish the mission. 

Then he allocates functional responsibilities to his subordinates and synchronizes 

the effort. 

Note. Since criminal elements do not normally have the ability to execute these functional 

tactics, the term irregular OPFOR in this chapter refers to insurgents and/or guerrillas. 

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF FORCES AND ELEMENTS 

7-1. An irregular OPFOR commander or leader specifies the initial organization of forces or elements 

within his level of command, according to the specific functions he intends his various subordinates to 

perform. At brigade level (when that exists in guerrilla units), the subordinate units performing these 

functions are referred to as forces. At lower levels they are called elements. 

Note. This functional organization provides a common language and a clear understanding of 

how the commander or leader intends his subordinates to fight functionally. Thus, subordinates 

that perform common tactical tasks such as disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation, security, 

deception, or main defense are logically designated as disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation, 

security, deception, or main defense forces or elements. Irregular OPFOR commanders and 

leaders prefer using the clearest and most descriptive term to avoid any confusion. When the 

irregular OPFOR operates in conjunction with an affiliated regular military force, there is the 

advantage that regular OPFOR commanders also use this common language. 

7-2. The commander or leader organizes and designates various forces and elements according to their 

function in the planned offensive or defensive action. A number of different functions must be executed 

each time the irregular OPFOR attempts to accomplish a mission. The functions do not change, regardless 

of where the force or element might happen to be located. However, the function (and hence the functional 

designation) of a particular force or element may change during the course of a tactical action. The use of 

precise functional designations for every force or element involved in a particular tactical action allows for 

a clearer understanding by subordinates of the distinctive functions their commander or leader expects them 

to perform. It also allows each force or element to know exactly what all of the others are doing at any 

time. This knowledge facilitates the ability to make quick adjustments and to adapt very rapidly to shifting 

tactical situations. This practice also assists in a more comprehensive planning process by eliminating the 

likelihood of some confusion (especially on graphics) of who is responsible for what. 

Note. A subordinate designated as a particular functional force or element may also be called 

upon to perform other, more specific functions. Therefore, the function of that force or element, 

or part(s) of it, may be more accurately described by a more specific functional designation. For 

example, a disruption force generally “disrupts,” but also may need to “fix” a part of the enemy 

forces. In that case, the entire disruption force could become the fixing force, or parts of that 

force could become fixing elements. 
Chapter 7 

7-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

7-3. The various functions required to accomplish any given mission can be quite diverse. However, they 

can be broken down into two very broad categories: action and enabling. 

ACTION FORCES AND ELEMENTS

7-4. One part of the organization conducting a particular offensive or defensive action is normally 

responsible for performing the primary function or task that accomplishes the overall mission goal or 

objective of that action. In most general terms, therefore, that part can be called the action force or action 

element. In most cases, however, the higher unit commander will give the action force or element a more 

specific designation that identifies the specific function or task it is intended to perform, which equates to 

achieving the objective of the higher command’s mission. 

7-5. For example, if the objective of the action of a guerrilla company or a grouping of insurgent direct 

action cells is to conduct a raid, the element designated to complete that action may be called the raiding 

element. In a brigade-level offensive, a force that completes the primary offensive mission by exploiting a 

window of opportunity created by another force is called the exploitation force. In defensive actions, 

the grouping that performs the main defensive mission is called the main defense force or main 

defense element. 

ENABLING FORCES AND ELEMENTS

7-6. In relation to the action force or element, all other parts of the organization conducting an offensive 

or defensive action provide enabling functions of various kinds. In most general terms, therefore, each of 

these parts can be called an enabling force or enabling element. However, each subordinate force or 

element with an enabling function can be more clearly identified by the specific function or task it 

performs. For example, an element that clears obstacles to permit an action element to accomplish a 

battalion’s tactical task is a clearing element. 

7-7. In most cases, irregular OPFOR tactical actions would involve one or more types of enabling forces 

or elements designated by their specific function. The most common types include— 

 Disruption force or element. Disrupts enemy preparations or actions; destroys or deceives enemy 

reconnaissance; begins reducing the effectiveness of key enemy elements. 

 Fixing force or element. Fixes the enemy by preventing a part of his force from moving from a 

specific location for a specific period of time, so it cannot interfere with the primary 

OPFOR action. 

 Security force or element. Provides security for other parts of a larger organization, protecting 

them from observation, destruction, or becoming fixed. 

 Deception force or element. Conducts a deceptive action (such as a demonstration or feint) that 

leads the enemy to act in ways prejudicial to enemy interests or favoring the success of an 

OPFOR action force or element. 

 Support force or element. Provides support by fire; other combat or combat service support; or 

command and control (C2) functions for other parts of a larger organization. 

 Reconnaissance force or element. Conducts specific reconnaissance task(s) tailored to 

the mission. 

Note. In a defensive situation, there may be a particular unit or grouping that the irregular 

OPFOR commander or leader wants to be protected from enemy observation and fire, to 

ensure that it will still be available for further actions. This may be designated as the protected 

force or element. 

FLEXIBILITY

7-8. The function of a particular force or element may change in the course of a tactical action. For 

example, a grouping originally designated as a reconnaissance element may locate an enemy unit that it has 

the combat power to engage. In that case, the element in question could become an assault element, ambush 

element, or raiding element. 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-3 

TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION 

7-9. Insurgents and guerrillas can employ some of the types of offensive action also used by smaller 

tactical units of the regular OPFOR. Such actions can include— 

 Ambush. 

 Assault. 

 Raid. 

 Reconnaissance attack (guerrillas only). 

Insurgent cells typically do not have sufficient combat power to conduct a reconnaissance attack. (See TC 

7-100.2 for basic discussion of these offensive actions, as they are also conducted by the regular OPFOR.) 

7-10. Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders select the offensive action best suited to accomplishing 

their mission. Insurgent cells and small guerrilla units typically execute one combat mission at a time. 

Therefore, it would be rare for such a cell or unit to employ more than one type of offensive action 

simultaneously. However, irregular OPFOR organizations are dynamic and adapt very quickly to the 

situation. An offensive action may have to make use of whatever cell(s) or unit(s) can take advantage of a 

window of opportunity. 

AMBUSH

7-11. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position against a moving or temporarily halted 

target. In an ambush, the actions of the enemy determine the time, and the irregular OPFOR leader decides 

on the location. Similar to purposes used by regular military OPFOR, the irregular OPFOR can conduct 

ambushes to— 

 Destroy or capture enemy elements, personnel, and/or designated very important persons. 

 Secure supplies. 

 Demoralize enemy military forces and officials of a governing authority. 

 Delay introduction of international and/or enemy coalition assistance to a governing authority. 

 Block enemy movements and/or logistics support. 

 Canalize or restrict enemy movement. 

7-12. The irregular OPFOR can use an ambush as a primary psychological tool in its information warfare 

(INFOWAR) activities. The psychological effects of ambushes can be enhanced by— 

 Conducting recurring ambushes at known areas and/or points where enemy forces must travel. 

 Changing the tempo or the number of ambushes to appear unpredictable. 

 Attacking targets that were previously considered safe or had not been attacked. 

 Using weapons with range capabilities previously not used in an area of conflict. 

 Increasing weapons and/or demolitions effects against particular targets. 

7-13. A common tactic is to conduct an ambush as a means to set up ambush(es) of enemy forces that 

respond to the original ambush. Multiple and nearly simultaneous ambushes can be conducted along likely 

avenues of approach to the area of the initial ambush. Ambushes may also target enemy medical treatment 

and evacuation assets, when irregular OPFOR commanders or leaders decide to not comply with 

international conventions and law of war norms that regular military forces use. The destruction of means 

to evacuate and treat wounded can instill a sense of tentativeness in enemy soldiers because they realize 

that, should they become wounded or injured, medical help may not be forthcoming. 

7-14. Attacking known points of enemy weakness is a fundamental planning consideration for the irregular 

OPFOR. Correspondingly, the irregular OPFOR avoids enemy strength. 

7-15. Surprise and overwhelming massed firepower at a specific place and time provides an expectation 

of tactical success for the irregular OPFOR. Factors that complement tactical surprise and massed 

firepower are— 

 Detailed plans and rehearsals. 

 Selection of ambush positions. 
Chapter 7 

7-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

 Rapid and violent conduct of the ambush. 

 Disciplined withdrawal of irregular OPFOR elements from the ambush site. 

Functional Organization for an Ambush 

7-16. An ambush force is typically organized into three types of elements: the ambush element, security 

element, and support element. There may be more than one of each element (see figure 7-1). 

IED

Support

Element

Security

Element

Ambush

Element

IED

Security

Element

Exfiltrate Exfiltrate Exfiltrate

IED

(w/ Video

Camera)

Figure 7-1. Insurgent ambush (example) 

Ambush Element(s) 

7-17. The ambush element has the mission of attacking and destroying enemy elements in kill zone(s). 

Other tasks may include capturing personnel and/or recovering supplies and equipment. 

Security Element(s) 

7-18. The security element has a mission to provide early warning to irregular OPFOR elements of any 

enemy presence that might disrupt the ambush. Another task can be to protect the ambush element from 

becoming decisively engaged by enemy forces before, during, or after the ambush. 

Support Element(s) 

7-19. The support element can include direct and/or indirect fires and provides general support to improve 

success of the ambush. The insurgent leader or guerrilla commander typically commands and controls the 

ambush from the support element. However, he will position himself where he can best command and control. 

Executing an Ambush 

7-20. There are three types of ambushes based on the desired mission effects⎯annihilation, harassment, or 

containment. The irregular OPFOR conduct ambushes with a particular purpose that often supports a larger 

tactical action. 

Annihilation Ambush 

7-21. The purpose of an annihilation ambush is to destroy an enemy force within a designated kill zone. In 

addition to massed direct fires, the irregular OPFOR often increases the lethality of a kill zone with indirect 

fires, manmade obstacles, mines, and/or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to halt, contain, and kill the 

enemy force in the kill zone (see figure 7-2). 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-5 

Note. For guerrilla forces, annihilation ambushes in complex terrain, including urban 

environments, often involve task-organized hunter-killer (HK) teams. 

G

G

G

G

G

Ambush 

Element

Ambush 

Element

Ambush 

Element

Security 

Element

Support 

Element

Support 

Element

Security 

Element

IED

G

KILL

ZONE

IED

IED

G

Figure 7-2. Guerrilla ambush (example) 

7-22. Irregular OPFOR commanders and leaders may be willing to accept decisive engagement with the 

enemy in this type of ambush. An annihilation ambush typically emphasizes tactical tasks to— 

 Block. 

 Contain. 

 Destroy. 

7-23. The ambush and support elements normally remain in their fighting positions until the enemy in the 

kill zone is rendered combat ineffective. The intent is to destroy enemy personnel and equipment within the 

kill zone with concentrated firepower. 

7-24. Once the enemy is destroyed, the ambush element can secure the kill zone and eliminate any 

remaining enemy in the kill zone. The support element provides overwatch protection to the ambush 

element when the ambush element is directed to search the destroyed enemy force and equipment for 

information and/or intelligence. Weapons and materiel can be seized by the ambush element for future 

irregular OPFOR tactical actions. 

7-25. The security element remains in fighting positions to ensure early warning, isolate a kill zone, and 

prevent any enemy from escaping the kill zone. Once the ambush element clears the kill zone, the ambush 

force withdraws from the ambush area. The ambush element withdraws first and is followed by the support 

element. The security element is the last element to depart the kill zone area and delays or blocks any rapid 

response of enemy forces that attempt to pursue irregular OPFOR elements as they depart the kill zone 
Chapter 7 

7-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

area. Depending on the size of the ambush force, the elements typically reassemble at a predetermined 

location and time at a safe house or safe haven. 

Note. An irregular OPFOR ambush could employ security elements to provide early warning 

and/or isolate a series of kill zones on a known convoy route of the enemy. Restrictive natural 

terrain and manmade features are reinforced with IEDs to disrupt and contain an enemy force in 

the kill zones. A simple ambush technique is to employ a decoy IED that is observable on an 

enemy force route. Once enemy forces halt to investigate the potential of an IED detonation, the 

ambush force initiates the actual ambush with the simultaneous detonation of IEDs directed into 

the kill zone where enemy soldiers and vehicles are expected to halt. Lead and trail vehicles are 

initially the primary targets for massed direct fires and destruction. When they are destroyed, the 

ambush and support elements shift direct and indirect fires from both ends of the enemy column 

toward the center of the contained enemy forces. The enemy convoy is destroyed with massed 

overlapping direct and indirect fires. Ambush elements and designated support elements 

exfiltrate from the area while security elements provide rear security and an all-arms air defense 

capability against any enemy response forces. On order, security elements also exfiltrate from 

the ambush site and rendezvous with other guerilla elements at a safe haven. 

Harassment Ambush 

7-26. The purpose of a harassment ambush is to disrupt routine enemy activities, impede the enemy’s 

freedom of movement, and/or create a negative psychological impact on enemy personnel. The irregular 

OPFOR may choose to conduct a harassment ambush when the enemy has superior combat power and 

destruction of an enemy force is not feasible as in an annihilation ambush. This type of ambush does not 

require the use of obstacles to keep the enemy in the kill zone but can include terrain reinforced into a kill 

zone with manmade obstacles, mines, and/or IEDs to halt and/or contain the enemy force for a limited 

period of time. Compared to an annihilation ambush, the irregular OPFOR typically conducts a harassment 

ambush at a greater distance from the enemy in a kill zone. A harassment ambush often considers the 

maximum effective range of its weapons when massing firepower. 

7-27. The irregular OPFOR does not normally accept decisive engagement with the enemy in this type of 

ambush. A harassment ambush typically emphasizes tactical tasks that can include— 

 Disrupt. 

 Delay. 

 Defeat. 

7-28. The ambush and support elements are often combined to provide more effective control of fires 

throughout the kill zone. This combination is especially useful when the kill zone is quite wide and/or 

extends for a long distance. The security element provides early warning of any enemy forces conducting 

reconnaissance prior to the ambush and/or enemy forces attempting to respond to the ambush. 

7-29. Once the irregular OPFOR commander or leader determines that the ambush has achieved the 

desired effects, he directs the ambush and support elements to withdraw along designated routes. The 

security element continues to report on enemy activity in the kill zone area and any attempt of enemy 

forces to pursue. The irregular OPFOR will not become decisively engaged by enemy forces and often 

emplace mines and/or IEDs to delay enemy pursuit. 

7-30. Repeated harassment ambushes against the enemy can⎯

 Cause the enemy to allocate a disproportionate amount of forces to security tasks which affect 

other enemy force missions and potentially create enemy vulnerabilities. 

 Create a negative psychological effect upon enemy soldiers and leaders, and officials of a 

governing authority with which the irregular OPFOR is in conflict.
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-7 

Containment Ambush 

7-31. A containment ambush is a security task that is usually part of a larger tactical action. This type of 

ambush can prevent the enemy from using an avenue of approach or interdicting another tactical action 

such as a raid or another ambush. 

7-32. The ambush element can be directed to secure a kill zone, but this task is not necessarily required for 

mission success. The support and security elements perform the same functions as those described in an 

annihilation ambush. Obstacles are an integral part of a successful containment ambush. The commander or 

leader determines if his relative combat power compared to enemy forces is adequate to conduct a 

containment ambush. The fact that containment may require the irregular OPFOR elements to remain in an 

ambush site for an extended period places those elements in danger of being fixed and defeated by enemy 

reinforcements. 

7-33. The ambush force will normally not accept decisive engagement with the enemy in this type of 

ambush. However, it can be directed to accept decisive engagement in support of a larger irregular OPFOR 

action. A containment ambush typically emphasizes related tactical tasks that can include— 

 Contain. 

 Fix. 

 Delay. 

 Defeat. 

Command and Control of an Ambush 

7-34. The commander or leader of the ambush force normally positions himself with the support element 

and designates a subordinate leader to move and maneuver with the ambush element. However, the ambush 

force commander or leader locates himself where he can best command and control the ambush. 

7-35. Urban and rural complex terrain provides several tactical advantages to irregular OPFOR ambush, 

security, and support elements. Operating among indigenous citizens in an urban area or other complex 

terrain can be used to— 

 Observe enemy forces along known canalized routes or areas of reconnaissance and/or avenues 

of approach or directions of attack. 

 Provide for easily camouflaged irregular OPFOR reconnaissance and surveillance activities. 

 Provide covered and/or concealed irregular OPFOR routes into and out of the ambush kill zone 

area. 

 Improve irregular OPFOR ambush, security, and support positions with cover, concealment, and 

camouflage of the natural and manmade tactical environment. 

 Encourage deception activities in a relevant civilian population against enemy forces and a 

governing authority. 

 Encourage techniques that employ overlapping direct fires from multiple directions into a 

designated kill zone. 

Support of an Ambush 

7-36. An ambush typically requires several types of support. These can include reconnaissance, fire 

support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR. Covert or overt assistance may 

also be provided from external sources such as special-purpose forces (SPF) of another state. 

Reconnaissance 

7-37. Reconnaissance is critical to a successful ambush and is continuous in the objective area in order to 

confirm and/or adjust information collection and intelligence previously collected and analyzed. The 

irregular OPFOR uses active supporters in the relevant population to observe and report on enemy activities 

at the planned objective area in order to select the best terrain on which to locate irregular OPFOR 

positions. 
Chapter 7 

7-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

7-38. The irregular OPFOR often has sufficient time in a local community and in vicinity of the objective 

to observe and interact with the relevant population. Posing as innocent civilians or coercing local civilians 

and/or civic leaders, irregular OPFOR reconnaissance and surveillance reports combine with the reports 

from active supporters. Assessing and analyzing these reports assist the commander or leader in finalizing 

his ambush plan. Once infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned, the irregular OPFOR maintain these 

routes under constant surveillance prior to and during the ambush. Secrecy of irregular OPFOR locations 

and activities is essential to tactical survival. 

7-39. The irregular OPFOR will closely monitor— 

 Routines of enemy forces selected as the target. 

 Enemy use of weapons and equipment, crew duties, and teamwork. 

 Lapses in local security measures among groupings of enemy soldiers and vehicles. 

 Routes and response time of enemy quick reaction forces during prior ambushes or irregular 

OPFOR ruses. 

 Cooperation of governing authority law enforcement and paramilitary units with enemy forces. 

 Medical treatment and evacuation norms of enemy forces. 

Fire Support 

7-40. Fire support is typically in the support element. In most ambushes, support elements in proximity to 

ambush elements provide supporting direct fires from light, medium, or heavy machineguns and/or antitank 

grenade launchers (ATGLs). However, some support elements may also provide indirect fires from mortars 

and rockets. Fires can also support security elements, if necessary. The irregular OPFOR emplaces fire 

support systems with the intention of quickly withdrawing them at the conclusion of the ambush. 

7-41. Artillery from an affiliated regular military force can augment fires organic to the irregular OPFOR 

ambush force. Such artillery support can provide additional fires into the kill zone, illumination over it, or 

smoke to permit withdrawal. 

Air Defense 

7-42. Capabilities for air defense during an ambush may be limited to an all-arms air defense concept, 

using the small arms and direct fire weapons with the ambush force. However, guerrilla battalions typically 

have a limited man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) capability in their weapons company. If 

allocated to an ambush force, these MANPADS would likely be located in security element(s). 

Note. Air defense in the irregular OPFOR can also be improved by state and non-state sponsors 

providing sophisticated air defense weapons, technologies, training, and logistics support. Other 

opportunities may arise when insurgents or guerrillas in armed conflict capture or acquire 

sophisticated air defense weapons. In either case, clandestine state or non-state agents and/or 

technicians can provide technical support to ensure the effective use of the weapon systems. 

Examples of state-of-the-art air defense systems include shoulder-fired MANPADS and/or other 

air defense missiles with detection and tracking systems mounted on wheeled or tracked 

vehicles. 

Engineer-Like Capabilities 

7-43. Mobility and countermobility support often depends on insurgents or guerrillas with specialized 

skills and expertise from their civilian occupations or previous military experience. Guerrilla units include 

sappers, who are not engineers but can perform some engineer-like functions. Covert or overt assistance 

may also be provided from external sources such as SPF of another state. 

Logistics 

7-44. Logistics are prepared as caches or supported from safe houses and havens as part of detailed 

planning and rehearsals. The ambush force typically moves from a secured location with everything it 

needs to complete the mission. In those rare situations that require a multi-day hide prior to executing the 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-9 

ambush, the ambush force will have to move with its own extra life support. Resupply of the ambush force 

would significantly increase the chances of its detection and defeat its purpose. 

INFOWAR 

7-45. INFOWAR activities can support ambushes by concealing the intended action through deception and 

information protection. An INFOWAR campaign may use successful ambushes to demonstrate the 

progressive failure of an enemy force and/or governing authority. INFOWAR support of an ambush can 

temporarily and psychologically isolate the enemy force. (See appendix A for additional information on 

irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.) 

ASSAULT

7-46. An assault is an attack that destroys an enemy force through firepower and the physical occupation 

and/or destruction of his position. An assault is a basic form of irregular OPFOR tactical offensive combat. 

Therefore, other types of offensive action may include an element that conducts an assault to complete the 

mission. However, that element will typically be given a designation that corresponds to the specific 

mission accomplished. For example, an element that conducts an assault in the completion of an ambush 

would be called the ambush element. 

Functional Organization for an Assault 

7-47. The insurgent cell(s) or guerrilla unit(s) conducting an assault constitute an assault force. The assault 

force typically is organized into three types of elements: 

 Assault element. 

 Security element. 

 Support element. 

There may be more than one of each of these types of element. 

Assault Element 

7-48. The assault element is the action element. It maneuvers to and seizes the enemy position, destroying 

any forces there. 

Security Element 

7-49. The security element provides early warning of approaching enemy forces and prevents them from 

reinforcing the assaulted enemy unit. Security elements often make use of terrain choke points, obstacles, 

ambushes, and other techniques to resist larger forces for the duration of the assault. The commander or 

leader may (or may be forced to) accept risk and employ a security element that can only provide early 

warning that is not strong enough to block or delay enemy reinforcements. This decision is based on the 

specific situation. 

Support Element 

7-50. The support element provides the assault element with one or more of the following: 

 C2. 

 Combat service support (CSS). 

 Supporting direct fire (such as small arms, grenade launchers, or ATGLs). 

 Supporting indirect fire (such as mortars or rockets). 

 Mobility support. 

7-51. The assault force commander or leader typically commands and controls the assault from the support 

element. However, he will position himself where he can best exercise C2. 
Chapter 7 

7-10 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Executing an Assault 

7-52. An assault is a rapid and violent action that can have significant and even decisive effects. However, 

a simple direct assault has a very low chance of success without some significant mitigating factors. 

Decisive assaults are characterized by— 

 Isolation of the objective (enemy position) so that it cannot be reinforced during the assault. 

 Early warning of any approaching enemy reinforcements and/or other security measures by the 

security element. 

 Effective suppression of the enemy by the support element prior to the assault element 

maneuvering on the enemy position. 

 Violent fire and maneuver into and through the enemy position. 

7-53. The assault element maneuvers from its assault position to the objective and destroys the enemy 

located at the objective. It can conduct attack by fire, but this is often not an optimal method and should be 

used only when necessary. Typical tactical tasks of the assault element are— 

 Clear. 

 Destroy. 

 Seize. 

7-54. The irregular OPFOR normally does not assault to secure, since this task indicates an intention to 

prevent the loss of an objective to subsequent enemy reaction. Any occupation of an objective is typically 

temporary to minimize the ability of an enemy force to mass overwhelming combat power against the 

irregular OPFOR. Speed of execution and surprise are critical to an assault. (See figures 7-3 and 7-4 for 

examples of assaults.). 

KILL

ZONE

I

Security

Element

Security

Element

I INFOWAR

Assault

Element

Support

Element

I

I

Coalition

TCP

Coalition

QRF

Figure 7-3. Insurgent assault (example) 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-11 

G

G

G

Support

Element

60-mm

IED

G

Support

Element

G

Security

Element

Security

Element

Assault

Element

KILL

ZONE

Support Element

2ea 7.62-mm PKM

G

IED IED

G

Figure 7-4. Guerrilla assault (example) 

7-55. The security element is equipped and organized to detect enemy forces that may be able to react to an 

assault on an objective. While the assault is in progress, security tasks may include the requirement to 

isolate the objective from any reinforcement by enemy forces, with tasks such as block, contain, or delay. 

The security element may be directed to conduct similar tasks that allow the assault and support elements to 

exfiltrate. 

Note. A simple, effective, and successful assault technique employed often by the irregular 

OPFOR is to surprise the enemy by focusing enemy attention in one direction and then 

assaulting from a different direction in a nearly simultaneous action with massed firepower and 

maneuver on the objective. Support element(s) shift and/or lift initial small arms fire across the 

objective as the assault element assaults through the objective. Security element(s) prepare to 

ambush any enemy response forces and provide early warning to other elements. The assault 

element is already exfiltrating from the objective when the assault force commander or leader 

gives the order to support and security element(s) to exfiltrate from the area. A security element 

with an INFOWAR team can record the successful assault and relay the video and audio 

coverage to an intermediary for delivery to local media outlets. The INFOWAR team can 

publish its videotape with added narrative from a higher headquarters spokesperson on an 

Internet website often within hours of the assault. 

7-56. The commander or leader of the assault force typically exercises C2 from within the support element. 

He can also lead the assault element when he determines that his personal presence in the assault is critical 

to mission success. 
Chapter 7 

7-12 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

7-57. The support element controls all combat support (CS) and CSS functions as well as any supporting 

fires. Tasks expected of support elements in the assault are normally attack by fire and/or support by fire. 

These direct and/or indirect fires are often intended to divert the enemy’s attention during the maneuver by 

the assault element. 

Command and Control of an Assault 

7-58. Command and control of the assault masses irregular OPFOR capabilities in time and space for rapid 

and violent attack on a selected objective. The irregular OPFOR normally plans an assault in detail to 

improve tactical execution with surprise and deception and in order to achieve temporary superior combat 

power against an enemy force. However, the irregular OPFOR will often take advantage of an unexpected 

opportunity as it occurs in order to assault an enemy force. 

7-59. Fighting in complex terrain can be a significant tactical advantage for the irregular OPFOR. In urban 

areas the irregular OPFOR can use the civilian community and its infrastructure for shielding and obstacles 

against enemy forces. The irregular OPFOR may decide to not comply with international conventions and 

law of war restrictions that apply to regular military forces and governing authorities. 

Note. Complex terrain is a topographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village 

and/or of two or more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the 

same space. (Restrictive terrain or environmental conditions include but are not limited to slope, 

high altitude, forestation, severe weather, and urbanization.) 

7-60. Channelized corridors of urban traffic networks and the vantage points of multi-story buildings 

and/or surface or subsurface infrastructure can be demoralizing to an enemy force attempting to counter the 

irregular OPFOR. People and facilities in urban areas provide cover and concealment to the irregular 

OPFOR. Beyond that, enemy forces often operate within a relevant population that they do not want to 

alienate due to excessive civilian casualties, restrictions, and/or damage to their facilities and livelihoods. In 

comparison, rural complex terrain may have fewer people within designated areas but can provide similar 

cover and concealment advantages to the irregular OPFOR. The civilians that reside in such rural areas can 

be influenced to support the irregular OPFOR involuntarily or voluntarily through an effective INFOWAR 

campaign. 

Support of an Assault 

7-61. Support of an assault normally includes reconnaissance, logistics, and INFOWAR. When required 

for a particular mission, capabilities such as fire support and air defense can be added to the elements 

conducting an assault. 

Reconnaissance 

7-62. Reconnaissance effort for an assault is continuous in the objective area in order to confirm and/or 

adjust information collection and intelligence previously collected and analyzed. The irregular OPFOR uses 

active supporters in the relevant population to observe and report on enemy activities at the planned 

objective area. Insurgents or guerrillas are often positioned in the local community and in vicinity of the 

objective posing as innocent civilians conducting normal commercial or social actions. These 

reconnaissance and surveillance reports, combined with the reports from active supporters, assist the 

commander or leader of the assault force in finalizing his assault plan to shape, assault, and exfiltrate. Once 

infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned, the irregular OPFOR maintains these routes under constant 

surveillance prior to and during the assault. Secrecy of irregular OPFOR locations and activities is essential 

to tactical survival. Locations of keen interest for reconnaissance and surveillance include— 

 Caches. 

 Infiltration routes. 

 Assault position. 

 Support position. 

 Objective. 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-13 

 Exfiltration routes. 

 Safe houses. 

Fire Support 

7-63. The primary mission of fire support in an assault is to suppress the objective and protect the advance 

of the assault element. Fire support assets are typically part of the support element(s). In most ambushes, 

support elements in proximity to ambush elements provide supporting direct fires from machineguns and/or 

ATGLs. However, the support element(s) can also include indirect fire weapons such as mortars and 

rockets allocated to the assault force. 

Air Defense 

7-64. The typical purpose of air defense support to an assault is to prevent enemy air power from 

influencing the action of the assault element. All three elements of an assault typically employ the concept 

of all-arms air defense. If specialized air defense weapons (such as MANPADS) are available, they could 

be used in any of the elements, but are least likely to be found in the assault element. The security element 

provides early warning of enemy aerial response to the assault and may try to destroy the enemy aircraft. 

The support element provides overwatch of the assault element and the objective. (See note under Air 

Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding additional air defense assets that may be available.) 

Logistics 

7-65. Logistics support for an ambush is similar to that for an ambush (see above). The support element is 

responsible for CSS. 

INFOWAR 

7-66. INFOWAR support of an assault considers the rapid and violent nature of an assault and the intention 

to temporarily and psychologically isolate the enemy force. Isolation of the enemy may also use physical 

means such as simultaneous assaults on multiple objectives to overload the enemy’s ability to respond 

and/or effectively reinforce an enemy force at a particular irregular OPFOR objective. (See appendix A for 

additional information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.) 

RAID

7-67. A raid is an attack against a stationary target for the purposes of its capture or destruction that 

culminates in the withdrawal of the raiding force to safe territory. Raids are usually small-scale attacks that 

use surprise and combat power to successfully accomplish the purpose of the mission. Sudden violence 

characterizes most raids and may be conducted to secure information, materiel, or individuals and can also 

be used to confuse or deceive an enemy. A raid concludes with a planned withdrawal upon completion of 

the assigned mission. 

7-68. Raids can be used to⎯

 Destroy or damaging key systems or facilities (such as command posts, communication 

facilities, supply depots, radar sites) 

 Seize hostages and/or prisoners. 

 Rescue insurgents, guerrillas, and /or active supporters being detained and/or imprisoned. 

 Destroy, damage, or capture supplies or lines of communication. 

 Obtain or denying critical information to the enemy. 

 Support INFOWAR actions that distract attention from other irregular OPFOR actions, keep the 

enemy off balance, and/or to cause the enemy to deploy additional units to protect critical sites. 
Chapter 7 

7-14 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Functional Organization for a Raid 

7-69. The size and configuration of a raiding force depends upon its mission, the nature and location of the 

target, and the enemy situation in the objective area. Examples various raiding forces and their missions 

could include— 

 A small insurgent cell or guerrilla HK team attacking an isolated voting station or a portion of 

unprotected railroad track. 

 A larger raiding force attacking an enemy checkpoint, convoy route, or a large supply depot. 

 A larger insurgent cell, group of cells, or task-organized guerrilla unit attacking an enemy 

combat outpost that is attempting to interdict irregular OPFOR movements and control in a 

geographic area. 

7-70. Regardless of size and specific capabilities, a raiding force typically consists of three elements: 

raiding, security, and support. However, a raiding force may employ other functional elements such as a 

fixing element or breaching element. It may also obtain advice and direct assistance from SPF teams and or 

regular military forces that are in conflict with the same enemy force or governing authority. 

Raiding Element(s) 

7-71. The raiding element executes the primary task of the raid. That is to destroy or seize the objective of 

the raid. In some situations, the raiding element moves physically into the objective, and in other cases it is 

able to accomplish the raiding task from a distance. Other elements of a raid support and/or protect the 

raiding element while it approaches, enters, and departs the objective. 

Security Element(s) 

7-72. The security element in a raid is primarily focused on enemy containing enemy security forces, 

blocking enemy response forces, and/or fixing enemy escape from the objective area. Any of these tasks 

are usually conducted for a limited time period in support of the raid objective. The security element is 

often equipped and organized to detect enemy forces in the vicinity of the objective and prevent them from 

alerting enemy forces at the objective. Insurgents or guerrillas may infiltrate into the objective area and 

position themselves posing as civilians until the time of mission execution. 

7-73. The task of a security element is to occupy enemy security and response forces and fix these enemy 

forces so that they cannot react to the raiding element. Security elements deploy to locations where they 

can deny the enemy freedom of movement along any ground or air avenues of approach that can reinforce 

the objective or interfere with the raid mission. Insurgents and guerrillas employ an all-arms air defense 

concept that uses all available weapons to disrupt and/or defeat enemy aircraft. Any additional air defense 

assets are most likely found in the security element(s). 

7-74. Covering the withdrawal of the raiding element with a designated level of rear security, the security 

element typically does not allow itself to become decisively engaged. The size of the security element 

depends upon the size of the enemy’s estimated capability to intervene and disrupt the raid. 

Support Element(s) 

7-75. The support element in a raid serves several enabling functions that assist in setting the conditions for 

success of the raid. This support may take several forms. The support element provides fire support, 

logistics, mobility and countermobility actions, and INFOWAR support to the raiding and security 

elements. 

7-76. The commander or leader of the raiding force normally commands and controls the raid from within 

the support element. However, he will position himself where he can best command and control the raid. 

7-77. Critical support element tasks are often executed immediately prior to conduct of the raid and/or 

facilitate its execution. Tasks that assist the raiding element(s) to achieve their objective can include— 

 Breaching and removing obstacles to the objective. 

 Conducting diversionary actions. 

 Providing fire support. 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-15 

Executing a Raid 

7-78. Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders plan for a rapid and violent execution of a raid. They do 

not intend to be decisively engaged with the enemy. The security and support elements normally remain in 

their fighting positions unless a task requires an element to accompany the raiding element into the 

objective. A breaching element may be required to clear a lane or lanes in enemy defenses and pass the 

raiding element(s) through to the objective. 

7-79. When the intent is to destroy enemy personnel and equipment within the kill zone, concentrated 

firepower may be able to accomplish the task without physically entering the objective. For example, a 

guerrilla unit could use indirect fire weapons to raid an enemy site as an attack by fire with no intention of 

entering the objective site (see the examples in figure 7-5 and 7-6 at pages 7-16 to 7-17). 

7-80. If the raiding task includes seizing individuals and/or equipment, the raiding element temporarily 

secures the objective and seizes designated equipment, individuals, and/or other materiel. The support 

element provides protection to the raiding element when the raiding element searches the objective for 

information and/or intelligence. The raiding element can seize weapons and other materiel for future 

irregular OPFOR tactical actions. 

Command and Control of a Raid 

7-81. A raid is conducted by elements that are often autonomous from other irregular OPFOR or regular 

OPFOR cells or units but can be coordinated in actions to support a common purpose. A raid is not 

necessarily associated with actions being conducted concurrently by larger OPFOR organizations in the 

same area. Irregular OPFOR raids are typically conducted by small insurgent cells or guerrilla units at the 

tactical level of conflict. 

7-82. The commander or leader of the raiding force normally positions himself with the support element 

and designates a subordinate leader to move and maneuver with the raiding element. However, the raiding 

force commander or leader locates himself where he can best command and control the raid and may 

maneuver with the raiding element into the objective when appropriate. 

Support of a Raid 

7-83. A raid typically requires several types of support. These types of support can typically include 

reconnaissance, fire support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR. 

Reconnaissance 

7-84. The primary task of reconnaissance and surveillance in a raid is to collect information and 

intelligence on the target of the raid and monitor all activities in and near the objective. Reconnaissance 

also identifies the locations of response forces and their expected response routes to the objective 

during a raid. 

7-85. Reconnaissance elements confirm and/or adjust information collection collected previously in order 

to determine current intelligence. Insurgents and guerillas are often members of a local community and 

easily interact with the relevant population. The irregular OPFOR uses active supporters in the relevant 

population to observe and report on enemy activities at the objective area in order to select the best terrain 

in which to locate irregular OPFOR positions. Infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned and rehearsed, 

and security elements maintain these routes under constant surveillance prior to and during the assault. 

7-86. In preparation for a raid, the irregular OPFOR will closely monitor— 

 Patterns of enemy force activities selected as the target. 

 Lack of discipline in enemy soldier use of weapons and equipment, crew duties, and teamwork. 

 Lapses in enemy local security measures in the objective area. 

 Availability of enemy quick reaction forces. 
Chapter 7 

7-16 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Raid Examples 

Insurgent Raid 

Insurgents could use a raid to rescue an insurgent leader who is being held in a 

governing authority detention facility. A suicide vehicle-borne IED detonates at the 

main gate to breach barriers and kill, wound, or daze internal security force (ISF) 

guards in the immediate vicinity. Concurrently, support elements use small arms and 

ATGL fire to kill and/or contain other guard forces at a separate gate and small 

barracks. Security elements detect and ambush enemy reaction forces coming to the 

aid of the detention facility. 

I

I

I

Security

Element

I

Security

Element

Security

Element

I

I

Support

Element

Support

Element

IED

I

Security

Element

MP

I

Security

Element

ISF

ISF

Vehicle Borne

IED IED

I

I

Raiding Element

4ea (Motorcycle)

I

IED

I

Raiding Element

4ea(Motorcycle)

Raiding Element

4ea (Motorcycle)

with Detainee

Leader

I

I

ISF

Detainee

Leader

(Linkup)

ISF

I

IED

IED

Support

Element

IED

Figure 7-5. Insurgent raid (example) 

A raiding element of four motorcycles moves through the breach at the main gate to a 

designated linkup point inside the facility that had been coordinated within a covert 

operative of the insurgency. The covert operative kills guards inside the holding cells 

area and releases the insurgent leader. Once the raiding element secures the 

insurgent leader, the element exits the facility through a side gate and quickly departs 

the area on motorcycles to a safe house. 

During the raid, security elements positioned along likely avenues for enemy 

response forces ambush and delay law enforcement and quick reaction forces as 

they approach the detention facility. The local insurgent leader in command of the 

raid determines that the insurgent leader secured from the facility is now safe and 

directs support and security elements to exfiltrate from the area. 

An INFOWAR cell video and audio records the raid from several vantage points. It 

releases an account of the successful raid on the Internet and to regional media 

outlets within hours of the raid. 

 (continued) 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-17 

An INFOWAR cell video and audio records the raid from several vantage points. It 

releases an account of the successful raid on the Internet and to regional media 

outlets within hours of the raid. 

Guerrilla Raid 

A guerrilla battalion could employ a raid to demonstrate the inability of the enemy to 

effectively defend critical infrastructure. However, the battalion in this example has 

suffered significant losses, now having only one of its original three guerrilla 

companies. Therefore, it is reluctant to attempt a raid against an enemy POL 

installation by physically entering the objective, which has an enemy motorized infantry 

company and two combat outposts in the vicinity. However, the guerrilla battalion still 

has two of the original three 107-mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) of its weapons 

company, although it has lost the crews trained to operate them. So the battalion 

commander has one guerrilla platoon from his remaining company task-organized as 

an MRL platoon and moved to a designated site for specialized training in MRL tactical 

operations. SPF advisors from a neighboring state deploy into the area to train the 

task-organized platoon and continue plans and rehearsals for the MRL raid. Insurgent 

leaders and senior guerrilla commanders position themselves to observe the raid. An 

INFOWAR cell of the local insurgent organization positions to record the raid. 

I

(-)

G

G

CIV

COP

COP

G

MRL

G 107-mm

SPF

I INFOWAR

Videographer

Support

Element

Security

Element Raiding

Element

MRL 107-mm

Security

Element

Security

Element &

Observer

Security

Element &

Observer

Support

Element

Figure 7-6. Guerrilla raid (example) 

(continued) 
Chapter 7 

7-18 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

In this example, the raiding element is one MRL section from the task-organized MRL 

platoon, with one MRL (broken down into man-packable loads), the mortar crew, and 

additional riflemen (from the original guerrilla platoon). It infiltrates to a firing point 

near the maximum range of the rockets and establishes observations posts and 

security teams. With their weapon reassembled and ammunition ready for firing, the 

section leader orders the firing to commence. Significant damage is accomplished 

with three volleys of rockets from the MRL. The guerrillas quickly disassemble the 

weapon and move to hide positions along multiple exfiltration routes. The INFOWAR 

cell video and audio records the raid from several vantage points and releases an 

account of the successful raid on the Internet and to regional media outlets with a 

message from the local insurgent organization leader. On order, the guerrillas split 

into small teams and continue to exfiltrate to safe havens in the neighboring 

mountain range. 

Fire Support 

7-87. Most raids may use support elements in proximity to raiding elements with supporting direct fires 

from light, medium, or heavy machineguns and/or ATGLs. In some cases, support element(s) can also 

provide indirect fires from mortars or rockets allocated to the raiding force. 

7-88. Fire support for a raid can assist in— 

 Isolating a point of penetration in the enemy defenses at the objective. 

 Fixing enemy forces in the objective and protecting the breach of enemy defenses. 

 Suppressing effective direct and indirect fires from enemy forces. 

 Disrupting enemy response forces. 

 Obscuring the vision and sensors of the enemy as the raiding force withdrawals. 

Air Defense 

7-89. The irregular OPFOR recognizes that air defense is an all-arms effort that uses all weapon systems 

and resources available to the raid. (See TC 7-100.2, chapter 11 for more information on the OPFOR allarms air defense concept.) The irregular OPFOR seeks new and adaptive ways to employ systems not 

traditionally associated with air defense. However, guerrilla battalions typically have a limited MANPADS 

capability in their weapons company. If allocated to a raiding force, these MANPADS would likely be 

located in security element(s). Security elements provide early warning and fires against enemy aerial 

response forces. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding additional air defense 

assets that may be available.) 

Engineer-Like Capabilities 

7-90. Irregular OPFOR cells and units do not have organic mobility and/or countermobility capabilities. 

Breaching and/or removing obstacles before and during a raid on an objective may require insurgents or 

guerrillas with specialized skills and expertise from their civilian professions or previous military 

experience. Guerrilla sappers are not engineers but can perform some engineer-like functions. The irregular 

OPFOR may also rely on assistance from affiliated SPF or regular military forces in support of a raid. 

Tasks in either situation involve ensuring freedom of movement and maneuver to the objective, within the 

objective and to the target, and timely withdrawal from the objective. Insurgents, guerillas, and/or SPF 

soldiers with these skills may be located with the raiding, support, and/or security element depending on 

the assigned tasks. 

Logistics 

7-91. Raids are typically brief in duration. The raiding force will move from a secured location such as a 

safe house or safe haven to the objective area with all materiel required for the raid. Caches can be used in 

the vicinity of the objective when this technique improves tactical security and/or when irregular OPFOR 

materiel needs to be located close to the objective. Caches can also be mobile in transportation masked 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-19 

within a relevant civilian population in urban or rural environments. Examples of mobile caches are as 

simple as a wheel barrow covered with a tarpaulin to a modern truck with hidden compartments as part of a 

commercial convoy. 

INFOWAR 

7-92. INFOWAR primarily supports a raid by concealing the action through deception and information 

protection. Successful raids can be used in INFOWAR to demonstrate the inability of enemy forces to do 

one or more of the following: 

 Defend civilian, government, and military facilities. 

 Safeguard key representatives of the governing authority. 

 Protect civilian and military infrastructure critical to a governing authority’s counterinsurgency 

or counter-guerrilla campaign. 

(See appendix A for more information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.) 

7-93. Recurring irregular OPFOR raids can be conducted to— 

 Isolate psychologically the enemy force and governing authority from each other and the 

relevant civilian population. 

 Degrade the resolve of the enemy force and governing authority to continue counterinsurgency 

or counter-guerrilla operations. 

 Obtain needed materiel to continue the irregular OPFOR. 

RECONNAISSANCE ATTACK (GUERILLAS) 

7-94. A reconnaissance attack is a tactical offensive action that locates moving, dispersed, or concealed 

enemy elements and either fixes or destroys them. A guerrilla commander may also use it to gain 

information about the enemy’s location, dispositions, military capabilities, and possibly his intentions. 

(Insurgent cells typically do not have sufficient combat power to conduct a reconnaissance attack.) 

7-95. The guerrillas recognize that an enemy will conduct significant measures to prevent them from 

gaining critical intelligence. Therefore, quite often they will have to fight for information, using an 

offensive action to penetrate or circumvent the enemy’s security forces to determine who and/or what is 

located where or doing what. 

7-96. The reconnaissance attack is the most ambitious method to collect information and is ordered by a 

guerrilla commander only after prudent consideration of other tactical alternatives. Key factors in 

reconnaissance attack considerations are— 

 Accurate situational assessment of an area of responsibility (AOR) within which the guerrillas 

operate. 

 Contact conditions: having maintained contact with the enemy or the requirement to reestablish 

contact. 

 Current capabilities to simultaneously support the movement and/or maneuver of multiple 

reconnaissance, security, and action elements in the guerrilla AOR. 

 Level of active support from the local relevant population. 

Functional Organization for a Reconnaissance Attack 

7-97. Depending on the situation, a guerrilla commander organizing a reconnaissance attack may designate 

reconnaissance, security, and/or action elements. There may be more than one of each type. The 

commander may also form various types of support elements. 

Reconnaissance Element(s) 

7-98. If the purpose of the reconnaissance attack is merely to gain information, a guerrilla commander may 

organize several reconnaissance elements. Their role is to locate enemy elements operating in the unit’s 

AOR. If the purpose is to also have the capability to fix and/or destroy located enemy elements, the 

reconnaissance elements provide reconnaissance and surveillance support to the elements that carry out 
Chapter 7 

7-20 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

those functions. A tactical option is for security elements to perform this role if reconnaissance 

elements are not formed. Once a reconnaissance element locates an enemy element, it may become a 

security element. 

Security Element(s) 

7-99. If the guerrilla commander believes he has sufficient combat power to engage enemy elements that 

may be located, he may also organize one or more security elements. Size and task organization of security 

elements are dependent on the assigned mission and the expectation of how long a security element will 

conduct its functional tasks before arrival of action elements or other elements. (When performing some of 

these functional tasks, the unit originally designated as a security element may receive a designation that 

describes that specific function.) 

7-100. Security elements can either work in conjunction with reconnaissance elements or perform the 

reconnaissance role for the guerrilla unit. Upon locating an enemy element, a security element may be 

directed to conduct one of several tactical tasks. It may— 

 Report on conditions in the AOR. 

 Observe and monitor the enemy in the AOR. 

 Locate enemy direct-fire weapons concentrations such as enemy antitank ambush sites. 

 Locate enemy countermobility obstacles along friendly axes. 

 Identify bypasses to enemy countermobility obstacles. 

 Prepare infiltration lanes through enemy countermobility obstacles that cannot be bypassed. 

 Fix enemy forces (as a fixing element). 

 Block probable enemy avenues of withdrawal or reinforcement (as a blocking element). 

 Attack a smaller enemy element (as an ambush element or raiding element). 

Action Element(s) 

7-101. A guerrilla commander task-organizes one or more action elements to conduct designated tasks 

against enemy element(s). These action elements may receive a functional designation that more 

specifically describes the action they are to accomplish, such as raiding element. Once an enemy element is 

located and/or fixed, the action element(s) attack to defeat or destroy the enemy. The number of action 

elements for a mission is based on the anticipated tasks to engage enemy elements located by 

reconnaissance and/or security elements. Action elements may be directed to plan for operations in 

conjunction with one or more security elements in an AOR. Each security element may not necessarily 

have an action element dedicated to follow and assume an offensive task. 

Support Element(s) 

7-102. One or more support elements can perform various supporting tasks. Typical CS and/or CSS tasks 

are discussed in subsequent paragraphs under Support of a Reconnaissance Attack. 

Executing a Reconnaissance Attack 

7-103. Multiple attack axes often characterize reconnaissance attacks. Control measures may include start 

times, check points, orientation objectives, and objective rally points designated for each axis. Multiple 

axes of advance provide more tactical flexibility to guerrilla elements in accomplishing their respective 

missions and tasks (see figure 7-7 on page 7-21). 

7-104. Guerrilla elements normally infiltrate within or into an AOR. The norm is reconnaissance and/or 

security elements maneuvering separately to find the enemy and/or report on activity and/or conditions 

along designated routes or axes. When the enemy is located, the guerrilla commander decides on 

subsequent tasks for his unit. A typical task is to fix the enemy with security forces and attack with action 

elements to defeat or destroy the enemy. Success often relies on the ability of reconnaissance and/or 

security elements to operate independently. Action elements are positioned within an AOR to quickly 

respond to intelligence confirmed by reconnaissance and/or security elements. (See figure 5-7 for an 

example of a reconnaissance attack.) 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-21 

Reconnaissance Attack Example 

Recent combat actions have severely reduced a guerrilla battalion two guerrilla 

companies and limited organic fire support. The guerrilla brigade allocates mortar 

and rocket launcher support as the guerrilla battalion prepares for a reconnaissance 

attack. The battalion commander uses remnants of his third company to create two 

dummy companies as deception elements. SPF INFOWAR teams support guerrilla 

deception activities. Avoiding enemy screening elements, several reconnaissance 

elements infiltrate to reestablish contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance elements 

report on activities and conditions within the AOR, identify enemy force locations, and 

guide security elements into positions to fix enemy forces. Other reconnaissance 

elements reach their orientation objectives without enemy contact and transition to 

security tasks. The guerrilla battalion conducts simultaneous attacks on enemy forces 

using massed direct and indirect fires. 

G

G SPF

120-mm

Support

Element

Cache

G

INFO

WAR

INFO

WAR IED

MRL

107-mm

Support

Element

G

IED

IED

IED

RL 122-mm

Support

Element 82-mm

Support

Element

Cache

G Recon

Element

G

Action

Element

Cache

G

G

Action

Element

G

Recon

Element

Security

Element

G

Security

Element

Raid

Element

?

G

G

G

Raid

Element

KILL

ZONE

G Recon

Element

G

Raid

Element

Recon

Element Recon

Element

Figure 7-7. Guerrilla reconnaissance attack (example) 

Guerrilla forces quickly withdraw to safe havens while security elements and on-call 

indirect fires prevent any enemy pursuit. The surprise attack by guerrillas disrupts 

enemy logistics and stalls enemy offensive operations. 

Command and Control of a Reconnaisance Attack 

7-105. A reconnaissance attack requires planning and coordination typically more detailed than in other 

offensive actions for a guerrilla unit. The commander or leader must plan for multiple reconnaissance 

and/or security elements operating across a broad area is one consideration. He must also position one or 

more action elements to respond quickly to tactical opportunities identified by reconnaissance and/or 
Chapter 7 

7-22 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

security elements. The organization and positioning of functional elements is further complicated as 

guerrillas plan to deceive the enemy as to their presence and tactical intentions. 

Support of a Reconnaissance Attack 

7-106. A reconnaissance attack typically requires several types of support. These can include 

reconnaissance, fire support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR. 

7-107. Special situations may exist when guerrilla units have levels of capability more expected of regular 

forces. These capabilities can include armored fighting vehicles, aviation, and additional air defense or fire 

support. Weapons and equipment can be— 

 Provided by state and/or non-state sponsors. 

 Acquired from indigenous resources. 

 Captured from the enemy. 

 Purchased from criminal organizations and/or other commercial enterprise intermediaries. 

7-108. Sustained intelligence activities, logistics, and training support are critical aspects of long-term 

guerrilla unit effectiveness. These types of functional capabilities of a guerrilla unit can be supported by— 

 SPF from a state overtly or covertly affiliated with the guerrilla unit. 

 Regular military force or intelligence activity liaison teams that operate with the guerrilla unit. 

 Criminal organizations with expertise and assets available on a contractual basis to the guerrilla 

unit. 

 Adherents in the relevant population who actively support guerrilla actions but will not be 

visibly involved in the direct actions and combat of the guerrilla unit. 

 Higher-level or SPF-supported INFOWAR activities. 

Reconnaissance 

7-109. Reconnaissance in a reconnaissance attack can be conducted in two primary ways. A 

reconnaissance element can be formed with a mission to find the enemy forces and guide security elements 

to locations that allow the security elements to fix the enemy forces. When no reconnaissance element is 

formed, each security element performs its own reconnaissance tasks with the responsibility to both find 

and fix an enemy force. 

Armored Fighting Vehicles 

7-110. Some guerrilla units may have armored vehicles present in their organization and can use them for 

particular tasks. When a guerrilla commander believes he has a level of near parity with local enemy forces 

and is confident in his air defense capabilities for limited periods of time, he can use armored vehicles in 

his various functional element(s). With effective camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D), he 

may decide to introduce wheeled and/or tracked armored vehicles from safe havens or local hide positions 

to augment reconnaissance and/or security elements. The thermal imagers and other electro-optical aids on 

armored vehicles can be of great value in detecting enemy forces. Armored vehicles can also increase 

mobility, firepower, and protection for reconnaissance and/or security elements, significantly enhancing 

their ability to fix and possibly destroy the enemy. The mobility and speed of these vehicles permit them to 

serve in the action element(s), rapidly orienting on located and/or fixed enemy forces and moving to a 

position of advantage to destroy them. Especially when the enemy was previously unaware of their 

presence in the AOR, these armored vehicles can provide a significant advantage in firepower and 

shock effect. 

Fire Support 

7-111. Fire support is positioned in an AOR to provide responsive fires throughout the reconnaissance 

phase, security element movement and occupation of fixing and/or blocking positions, and the maneuver 

and combat of action of elements. Various wheeled, towed, or tracked fire support systems may be 

available to cover the withdrawal of reconnaissance, security, action, or other support elements after 

completing the reconnaissance attack mission. 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-23 

7-112. Guerrilla units may include medium and heavy mortars, artillery, and/or rocket systems as a varied 

collection of antiquated and contemporary capabilities. Mobility of systems can vary also. Guerrilla units 

may have to improvise transportation, using captured military trucks, local commercial vehicles that 

conceal a weapon system, or other expedient means. In some cases, pack animals, bicycles with reinforced 

frames, and/or porters can be used to transport disassembled fire support systems for reassembly at 

locations unexpected by the enemy. 

Aviation 

7-113. Aviation is not typically anticipated in a guerrilla unit order of battle. However, a guerrilla 

commander can acquire small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with relative ease through normal means 

on the commercial market and/or illicit purchases from criminal organizations or other sources. State 

sponsors can provide technical expertise with clandestine agents and/or technicians or provide training and 

advice through SPF teams. A guerrilla commander could acquire systems and technical expertise on a 

contractual basis from disenfranchised experts or rogue non-state enterprises. UAVs in a guerrilla unit can 

be used to enhance real-time reconnaissance and surveillance in conjunction with reconnaissance elements 

maneuvering on the ground in an AOR. A number of small UAVs could be armed with IEDs to create an 

aerial attack capability. Used with a swarm technique on a point or area target, a mass of low-flying UAVs 

could conduct a disruptive or devastating attack on critical enemy assets. 

7-114. Aviation in guerrilla units can also include rotary- and/or fixed-wing capabilities. Although these 

capabilities may be considered exceptional for most guerrilla forces, state and non-state sponsors can 

covertly introduce limited aviation capabilities into an advanced insurgency and/or highly trained guerrilla 

units. Operating from a guerrilla enclave or safe haven, even one or two helicopters or fixed-wing 

commercial aircraft could be converted into an attack system with military-grade rockets or bombs. 

Capability for aviation attack against a governing authority or its military forces could create a significant 

psychological impact in a guerrilla INFOWAR campaign. 

Air Defense 

7-115. Guerrilla air defense can be developed to a level of protection that limits enemy aerial response 

forces and reinforcements from influencing a particular guerrilla mission in the AOR. Any guerrilla unit 

conducts all-arms air defense as a norm to damage and/or destroy tactical enemy aircraft within the range 

of their available small arms weapons systems. (For more information on the all-arms air defense concept, 

see chapter 11 of TC 7-100.2.) However, guerrilla battalions also typically have a limited MANPADS 

capability in their weapons company. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding 

additional air defense assets that may be available.) 

Engineer-Like Capabilities 

7-116. Mobility and countermobility support to a reconnaissance attack focuses on freedom of movement 

and/or maneuver of reconnaissance, security, and action elements. Mobility and countermobility tasks are 

performed by guerrillas with specialized skills. For example, guerrillas with expertise from civilian 

engineering occupations and/or previous training by SPF teams may be assigned tasks that concentrate on 

emplacing rudimentary obstacles and IEDs along planned withdrawal routes to disrupt any pursuit by the 

enemy after a successful reconnaissance attack. Guerrillas from sapper units can be task-organized to assist 

various elements in infiltrating through enemy security elements, breaching enemy obstacles, as well as 

support attacks on located enemy forces or installations. 

7-117. Additional mobility and countermobility support, training, and assistance can be obtained from 

sappers in SPF teams that accompany and/or augment a guerrilla unit. SPF and/or guerrilla sappers can also 

train active supporters in the relevant local population to assist the reconnaissance attack in specified 

supporting roles. Guerrilla units can use to their advantage the blurred distinctions of what constitutes the 

role of active support versus being considered a guerrilla. Regardless of who is providing mobility and 

countermobility support, this guerrilla capability is essential to offensive action in fixing, blocking, and/or 

attacking enemy forces. 
Chapter 7 

7-24 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Note. Guerrilla sappers are not combat engineers. However, sappers are trained to perform 

several tasks that are typical of raider and combat engineer-like functions. 

Logistics 

7-118. A reconnaissance attack can be conducted by widely dispersed guerrilla elements operating over 

extended time periods and distances. Elements typically carry sufficient logistics with them during their 

movements. Guerrillas can create and stock caches and/or preposition designated logistics elements in an 

AOR for multiple reconnaissance advances toward orientation objectives and during guerrilla unit 

withdrawals to safe havens after a reconnaissance attack. 

7-119. Guerrillas are self-sufficient as a goal but must often subsist on the local economy without 

offending a local relevant population. Use of civilian facilities and support of the population to guerrilla 

units may result in reaction by enemy forces and the governing authority on the civilian population and its 

institutions. Guerrilla INFOWAR activities amplify enemy repression to increase and sustain tactical and 

logistics support by a relevant population for guerrilla actions. 

INFOWAR 

7-120. With the support of INFOWAR deception, the guerrilla commander attempts to deceive the enemy 

concerning the strength and composition of his forces, their current deployment and orientation, and the 

intended manner of employment. False intelligence provided to enemy forces by active supporters of 

the guerrillas disrupts enemy information collection. When successfully conducted, deception 

activities support tactical surprise by the guerrilla force and improve the likelihood of achieving the 

reconnaissance attack objective. 

7-121. INFOWAR activities in a reconnaissance attack are primarily executed to— 

 Deceive the enemy force regarding guerrilla actions and intentions. 

 Protect elements of the guerrilla force from being detected. 

 Create a false sense of security in the enemy. 

 Encourage the active and passive support of the guerrilla operations by a relevant population. 

 Demoralize enemy forces and the governing authority they support. 

TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTION 

7-122. Insurgents and guerrillas can employ some of the types of defensive action also used by smaller 

tactical units of the regular OPFOR. Such actions can include— 

 Defense of a simple battle position. 

 Defense of a complex battle position. 

(See TC 7-100.2 for basic discussion of these types of defensive actions, as they are also conducted by the 

regular OPFOR.) 

7-123. Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders select the defensive action best suited to accomplishing 

their mission, given the conditions under which they assume a defensive posture. Some parts of an 

insurgent or guerrilla organization may conduct defensive actions while other parts of the same 

organization are on the offense. 

BATTLE POSITIONS

7-124. A battle position (BP) normally is a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of 

approach. However, the irregular OPFOR may select defensive locations to avoid contact with an enemy 

but provide for defense if discovered. When irregular OPFOR leaders determine that they will operate in a 

defensive posture, defensive positions will be either a simple battle position (SBP) or complex battle 

position (CBP). The mission and specific circumstances will influence the type of BP to establish and 

occupy. Figure 5-8 shows examples of symbols for SBPs and CBPs (see figure 7-8 o page 7-25. 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-25 

SBP perimeter and

platoon-size defense

CBP perimeter and

guerrilla company occupation 

G

Cache I

I

DA Cell

INFOWAR

Demolitions,

Sabotage & IED

Team

I

G

Enemy

SBP perimeter and

squad-size defense

CBP perimeter and

insurgent cells occupation 

I

DA Cell

G

Figure 7-8. Simple and complex battle positions 

Note. Sometimes graphics show a relatively large unit, such as a guerrilla battalion or brigade, 

inside a symbol for a CBP. This actually means that such a unit’s subordinates occupy a series of 

CBPs within that area. 

Simple Battle Position 

7-125. A simple battle position (SBP) is a defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of 

approach. SBPs are not necessarily tied to complex terrain. However, they often employ as much 

fortification and C3D measures as time allows. Defenses are improved upon continuously until the 

SBP is abandoned. 

Complex Battle Position 

7-126. A complex battle position (CBP) is a defensive location designed to employ a combination of 

complex terrain, C3D, and engineer-like capabilities to protect the cells or units within them from detection 

and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. CBPs typically have the following 

characteristics that distinguish them from SBPs: 

 Not on or along an enemy avenue of approach. 

 Limited avenues of approach toward and/or in vicinity of a CBP. 

 Observation of any existing avenues of approach. 

 Defensive posture with an integrated 360-degree perimeter. 

 Countermobility and mobility efforts prioritizing C3D measures of the CBP location. 

 Substantial logistics caches. 

 Sanctuary. 

DEFENSE OF A SIMPLE BATTLE POSITION

7-127. Construction of an SBP places special attention on the camouflage, concealment, and cover of 

fighting positions in urban and rural terrain. The irregular OPFOR normally expects significant enemy 
Chapter 7 

7-26 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities and recognizes that 

sophisticated RISTA capabilities may be supporting the enemy. An effective counter to such levels of 

sophisticated technology and systems may be to embed the SBP within a relevant population in an urban 

and/or rural environment, or physically use rural and/or urban terrain to mask the presence of SBPs. 

Examples include the use manmade underground shelters, tunnels, natural shelters such as caves, 

and/or village or city dwellings. An SBP or group of SBPs establishes kill zone(s) on likely enemy 

avenues of approach. 

7-128. Deceptive techniques can include the façade of being commercial or private equipment, vehicles, 

work places, and/or public institutions and public gathering places such as houses of worship, hospitals, 

and civic centers with regular intermingling of the relevant population. Insurgents usually wear the clothing 

of the local population and often keep weapons, munitions, and materiel in caches that are easily retrievable 

in the vicinity of the SBP. The same may be true of guerrillas. However, guerrillas may transition to 

recognizable paramilitary uniforms. 

7-129. The irregular OPFOR commander or leader makes prudent risk assessments when establishing 

SBPs. He evaluates the desirability and/or requirement to invest substantial time, effort, and materiel on an 

SBP. He weighs this against the expectation that he must defeat an enemy that can typically mass combat 

power quickly against an SBP. 

7-130. Once the commander or leader decides to defend an SBP, he focuses his available combat power 

on one or more kill zones. The irregular OPFOR plans and rehearses all actions necessary to prevent enemy 

penetration of an SBP and/or what an SBP or group of SBPs is protecting, and also considers measures to 

defeat an enemy penetration of an SBP if it occurs. 

7-131. The commander or leader considers what criteria he will use to direct a withdrawal and/or 

withdrawal under pressure from an SBP or group of SBPs. Unless directed to retain a specific SBP by a 

higher level, the commander or leader responsible for an SBP recognizes that he is committed to a longterm struggle and that preserving combat power for a future engagement may be the appropriate decision. 

However, some insurgents or guerrillas may have a self-determined commitment or directed mission to 

fight until killed or captured in a particular SBP. 

Functional Organization for Defending an SBP 

7-132. The commander or leader defends an SBP with cells or units that are organized as functional 

elements. Typical functional designations are— 

 Disruption element. 

 Main defense element. 

 Reserve element. 

 Support element. 

 Deception element. 

7-133. There may be more than one of each type. The name of an element describes its function within 

the defensive action. 

Disruption Element(s) 

7-134. Insurgents or guerrillas assigned to a disruption element have a mission of identifying enemy 

reconnaissance efforts and reporting the location, disposition, and composition of approaching enemy 

forces. When disruption elements have the capability to target and attack designated subsystems of an 

enemy force, they conduct disruption actions as part of a comprehensive defense plan of the higher 

commander or leader. 

7-135. Disruption activities may include direct and indirect fires, remote-controlled or commanddetonated IEDs and/or other execution of obstacles to slow, channel, contain, or block an enemy force. The 

normal intention of a disruption element is to not become decisively engaged by the enemy. However, a 

commander or leader can direct decisive engagement if the action is necessary to preserve the combat 

power of other critical capabilities in the irregular OPFOR organization. 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-27 

7-136. Tactical tasks typical of a disruption element include— 

 Ambush. 

 Attack by fire. 

 Delay. 

 Disrupt. 

7-137. The irregular OPFOR will typically not assign a small cell or unit a fixing task when an 

expectation of “fix” is to deny movement of any part of an enemy force. A more probable task for the 

irregular OPFOR in an SBP is “delay” with an expectation to slow the momentum of an enemy advance 

and cause significant damage to the enemy force without becoming decisively engaged. 

7-138. A disruption element for an SBP can be as small as one or two insurgents or guerrillas with assault 

rifles, light and/or medium machineguns, grenade launchers, IEDs, and/or ATGLs. Typically, it is no larger 

than 8 to12 such personnel. 

Main Defense Element(s) 

7-139. The main defense element of an SBP is responsible for defeating an attacking force. Insurgents or 

guerrillas in a main defense element are prepared to use fires and maneuver to defeat the penetration or 

seizure of their SBP or other SBPs. Main defense elements focus the combat power of available weapon 

systems into designated kill zones to defeat or destroy an enemy force. 

Reserve Element(s) 

7-140. The reserve element of an SBP exists to provide the irregular OPFOR commander or leader with 

tactical flexibility. The commander or leader will normally assign priorities of effort to the reserve element 

for contingency planning and rehearsals. Although a reserve element may not have specified tasks to 

perform initially, tactical tasks it can later receive include— 

 Counterattack. 

 Block. 

 Contain. 

 Delay. 

 Defend. 

Support Element(s) 

7-141. The support element of an SBP can include— 

 CSS. 

 C2. 

 Direct fires such as heavy machineguns, ATGLs, antitank guided missiles, recoilless rifles, or 

automatic grenade launchers. 

 Indirect fires such as mortars or rockets. 

 Nonlethal actions such as smoke obscurants. 

 INFOWAR activities. 

 Engineer-like capabilities with specialized talents of individual insurgents or guerrillas. 

Deception Element(s) 

7-142. To keep the enemy from discovering the nature of the defenses and to draw fire away from actual 

elements, the defending force may establish dummy firing positions and battle positions. In addition to 

enhancing force protection, the irregular OPFOR may use these deception elements as an economy-of-force 

measure to portray strength where none exists. 
Chapter 7 

7-28 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Organizing the Battlefield for an SBP 

7-143. When establishing an SBP, the commander or leader of the defending force specifies the 

organization of the battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. This normally includes a battle 

zone and often a support zone. It may also include a disruption zone. (See figures 7-9 and 7-10 for 

examples of SBP defense.) 

Battle Zone 

7-144. The battle zone is the area where the defending commander or leader commits the preponderance 

of his force to the task of defeating attacking enemy forces. Generally, an SBP will have its battle zone fires 

integrated with those of any adjacent SBPs. Fires will orient to form kill zones where the defenders plan to 

destroy key enemy targets. 

BG-15

40-mm

AKM with

7.62-mm

Mosin/

Nagant

PKM

7.62-mm

Support

Element

60-mm

IED

IED

AKMS

7.62-mm

AKMS

7.62-mm

AKMS

7.62-mm

RPK

7.62-mm RPG-7V AKMS

7.62-mm

Main Defense

Element

Main Defense

Element

Security

Element

I

I

KILL

ZONE

IED

IED

I

Figure 7-9. Insurgent defense of a simple battle position (example) 

Disruption Zone 

7-145. The disruption zone is the area outside the battle zone where the defenders may seek to— 

 Report on the enemy situation. 

 Defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts. 

 Detect attacking forces. 

 Disrupt and delay an attacker’s approach. 

 Engage and destroy key attacking elements prior to engagement in the battle zone. 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-29 

7-146. Engagement (such as ambush or attack by fire) in the disruption zone may be beyond the 

capabilities of a small disruption element. However, it may be able to delay or disrupt the enemy advance 

or channel it away from the SBP(s). In any case, some level of reconnaissance and/or security will be 

placed outside of an SBP for early warning of enemy approach. 

Support Zone 

7-147. Depending on the mission and size of the defensive positions, support capabilities may be 

incorporated into the battle zone of an SBP, or there may be a support zone inside or outside the battle 

zone. Aside from the support element(s), the support zone may contain a reserve element. 

Executing Defense of an SBP 

7-148. Aggressive security measures throughout the development and occupation of an SBP provide early 

warning of enemy activities. Once enemy forces are detected, the irregular OPFOR commander or leader 

decides when to engage the enemy. He may direct that disruption elements engage with direct and 

indirect fires, or he can continue to observe movements and maneuver of the enemy as it approaches 

SBP kill zones. 

G

G

Support Element

PKM 7.62mm

G

G

G

G

G

Disruption

Security

Element

Disruption

Security

Element

Support

Element

60-mm

Main

Defense 

Element

Main

Defense 

Element

Main

Defense 

Element

Support

Element

PKM 7.62mm

Reserve 

Element

G

Figure 7-10. Guerrilla defense of a simple battle position (example) 

7-149. On order of the commander or leader, the irregular OPFOR engages the enemy to defeat and/or 

destroy the enemy in designated kill zones. Given the norm of an enemy quickly responding to contact 

with additional forces, the commander or leader may decide to withdraw or reposition from initial 

defensive positions. 

7-150. The irregular OPFOR can initiate deception activities to confuse an enemy when it is displacing 

from its initial SBP or SBPs. Deception can include small stay-behind direct action cells or guerrilla teams 
Chapter 7 

7-30 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

to indicate a continued defense of an SBP or SBPs. Other actions that can slow the reaction of enemy 

forces to irregular OPFOR maneuver are keeping insurgents or guerrillas close to or within a relevant 

civilian population as a shield. Multiple IEDs along withdrawal routes can be both active and inert 

munitions. Both types of IED-appearing obstacles cause enemy responses to assess and disarm or bypass 

the munitions. 

Note. The commander or leader of an SBP can position main defense elements to mass 

overlapping small arms fire (SAF) and ATGL fires in to a kill zone or kill zones. He selects the 

kill zone(s) to best use restrictions in terrain, such as difficult fords across a river. He reinforces 

the terrain with antipersonnel mines to further channel, separate, or contain the enemy force as it 

enters the kill zone(s). Security elements are located where they can observe any approaching 

enemy along ground and aerial avenues of approach to the SBP. The security elements may be 

directed to continue reporting on enemy activity and to not engage the enemy. Support elements 

such as mortars are ordered to commence indirect fires in support of machinegun and automatic 

rifle SAF that coincide with detonation of antipersonnel mines and/or IEDs in and near the kill 

zone. All SAF orient on identified enemy in their kill zone(s). 

When the commander or leader determines that he has achieved the intended effects on the 

enemy, he directs exfiltration of his elements and rendezvous at a designated location. Main 

defense elements disengage while support elements continue to suppress enemy forces. Security 

elements may add their SAF to the suppression. Security and support elements disengage but 

may leave observers in the area to continue reporting on actions of the enemy. 

Command and Control of an SBP Defense 

7-151. The irregular OPFOR commander or leader will position himself where he can best command and 

control the defensive fight. Security during defensive preparations includes communications such as 

couriers, landline or wire intercommunication systems, visual signals, and limited use of cellular 

telephones. Once the irregular OPFOR initiates the defense with direct and indirect fires, communications 

make full use of handheld radios and cellular telephone technology. 

Support of an SBP Defense 

7-152. Support of an SBP defense is typically provided from local resources in the geographic area and 

may include CS and/or CSS. While some of this support resides in irregular OPFOR cells or units, a 

higher-level organization may temporarily allocated some support or assign it to a particular subordinate 

cell or unit. 

Reconnaissance 

7-153. SBP defenders will perform aggressive counterreconnaissance activities to prevent the enemy from 

remaining in reconnaissance contact with the SBP. The irregular OPFOR will observe avenues of approach 

to provide early warning; determine location, composition, and disposition of attackers; and direct fires 

against key enemy capabilities. 

Armored Fighting Vehicles 

7-154. The irregular OPFOR may occasionally capture armored fighting vehicles or acquire them from 

other sources operating in the region. When possessed by the irregular OPFOR, armored fighting vehicles 

are normally concealed and covered in hide positions until the commander or leader directs them into the 

engagement. Their visible and other signatures are masked to preclude identification by enemy RISTA 

systems. Once armored fighting vehicles are employed in defensive actions, they move frequently to 

alternate and supplemental fighting positions to improve their survivability. 

Fire Support 

7-155. Fire support to an SBP or SBPs is usually under the command and control of the commander or 

leader responsible for the defensive actions. When additional fire support assets are required in a defensive 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-31 

mission, a higher-level organization may allocate assets to a subordinate for a particular mission or on a 

temporary basis. 

Air Defense 

7-156. The irregular OPFOR in an SBP can employ active and passive air defense measures to protect the 

defender from air threats within an all-arms air defense concept. Medium or heavy machineguns and 

shoulder-fired MANPADS may be found in or near an SBP. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an 

Ambush regarding additional air defense assets that may be available.) 

Engineer-Like Capabilities 

7-157. The irregular OPFOR commander or leader is responsible to countermobility and mobility tasks. 

He uses the specialized talents that exist among insurgents or guerrillas in a cell or unit but does not have 

cells or units structured for only engineer-like tasks. 

Logistics 

7-158. When present, logistics capabilities will normally be found with the support element, within the 

SBP. However, they can also be located in caches and safe houses in or near an SBP. Weapons, munitions, 

and materiel will normally be hidden from open surveillance until just prior to a defensive action. Items are 

brought from concealment and emplaced in fighting positions on order of the irregular OPFOR commander 

or leader. 

INFOWAR 

7-159. The SBP obtains support from INFOWAR activities that deceive the enemy as to the defenders’ 

presence, actual locations, and/or intentions. A successful INFOWAR campaign can promote the 

impression that the enemy to failing to effectively protect its population. Other INFOWAR messages 

portray the enemy force and governing authority as a corrupt regime and further isolate them from a 

relevant population the irregular OPFOR claims to protect. (See appendix A for additional information on 

irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.) 

DEFENSE OF A COMPLEX BATTLE POSITION

7-160. C3D measures are critical to the success of a CBP, since the defenders generally want to avoid 

enemy contact. Additionally, cells or units in a CBP will remain dispersed to negate the effects of precision 

ordnance strikes. Generally, once the defense is established, non-combat vehicles will be moved away from 

concentrations of personnel to reduce their signature on the battlefield. 

7-161. Units defending in CBPs will use restrictive terrain and countermobility efforts to deny the enemy 

the ability to easily approach the position. Construction of a CBP places special attention on the 

camouflage, concealment, and cover of fighting positions in urban and rural terrain. The irregular OPFOR 

normally expects enemy RISTA capabilities to be significant and recognizes that sophisticated RISTA 

capabilities may be supporting the enemy. An effective counter to such levels of sophisticated technology 

and systems may be to embed a CBP within a relevant population in an urban and/or rural environment. 

Examples include the use manmade underground shelters, tunnels, natural shelters such as caves, and/or 

village or city dwellings. 

7-162. Cultural shielding is a tactical consideration to deny the enemy the ability to detect and attack a 

CBP. Examples of cultural shielding in order to create tactical standoff are using a religious location, 

school, community center, or medical facility as a base of fire or firing from within a crowd of 

noncombatants. 

7-163. If a CBP is identified and attacked, the commander or leader will engage only as long as he 

perceives an ability to defeat the enemy. Prior to becoming decisively overmatched, he will withdraw in 

order to preserve his combat power. A guerrilla commander or leader can be directed by a higher guerrilla 

headquarters to accept decisive engagement in order to support a larger mission. 
Chapter 7 

7-32 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Functional Organization of a CBP Defense 

7-164. The commander or leader of the defending force organizes his subordinates as functional elements. 

Typical functional designations are─

 Disruption element. 

 Main defense element. 

 Reserve element. 

 Support element. 

 Deception element. 

7-165. These functional elements conduct tactical actions very similar to those used in defending an SBP. 

That is because the names of these elements identify their basic functions. However, the following 

paragraphs highlight some differences. There may be more than one of each type of element. 

Disruption Element(s) 

7-166. The disruption element of a CBP is primarily concerned detecting attackers and providing 

early warning to the defending force. The disruption elements may be directed to only observe and 

report enemy movements and maneuver but can also be directed to attack enemy forces once they pass 

the disruption elements. 

Main Defense Element(s) 

7-167. The main defense element of a CBP is responsible for defeating an attacking force. This element 

can be directed to delay an enemy while other cells or units withdraw from direct contact with the enemy. 

Reserve Element(s) 

7-168. The reserve element of a CBP exists to provide the commander or leader with tactical flexibility. 

Tasks for a reserve element can include— 

 Counterattack. 

 Block. 

 Delay. 

 Defend. 

Support Element(s) 

7-169. The support element of a CBP has tasks that include C2, CS, and CSS for the defending force. 

Other support functions can include direct and direct fires; countermobility or mobility capabilities; and/or 

INFOWAR activities. Support elements typically are located within the CBP but can be outside and in the 

vicinity of a CBP. 

Deception Element(s) 

7-170. To keep the enemy from discovering the nature of the defenses and to draw fire away from actual 

elements, the defending force may establish dummy firing positions and battle positions. In addition to 

enhancing force protection, the irregular OPFOR may use these deception elements as an economy-of-force 

measure to portray strength where none exists. 

Organizing the Battlefield for a CBP 

7-171. When establishing a CBP, the commander or leader of the defending force specifies the 

organization of the battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. He will determine if he 

designates a battle zone supported by a disruption zone and support zone. (See figures 7-11 on page 7-33 

and 7-12 on page 7-34 for examples of a CBP defense.) 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-33 

Battle Zone 

7-172. The battle zone is the area where the defending commander commits the preponderance of his 

force to the task of defeating attacking enemy forces or delaying them while the defenders withdraw. In the 

defense of a CBP, the battle zone is typically the area in and surrounding the CBP that the defending force 

can influence with its direct fires. It may be larger depending on the availability of indirect fires. 

Disruption Zone 

7-173. The disruption zone is the area outside the battle zone where the defenders may seek to— 

 Report on the enemy situation. 

 Defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts. 

 Detect attacking forces. 

 Disrupt and delay an attacker’s approach. 

 Destroy key attacking elements prior to engagement in the battle zone. 

Support Zone 

7-174. The support zone contains C2, CSS, fire support, and other supporting assets. A reserve element 

may also be located there. The support zone is normally located within the CBP. 

I

I

DA Cell

Disruption

Element

I

DA Cell

Disruption

Element

I

DA Cell

Disruption

Element

I

DA Cell

Main Defense

Element

Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

CACHE I

SAFE

I

SAFE

I

DA Cell

Support

Mortar

60-mm

I

DA Cell

Logistics

I

SAFE

Suicide

I IED TM

DA Cell

Comms &

I Tradecraft

CACHE I

DA Cell

Technical

I Support

I

DA Cell

INFOWAR

DA Cell

Multi-Function

Reserve

I

I

DA Cell

Extortion

I

DA Cell

Finance

Demolitions,

abotage& IED I TM

I

DA Cell

Intell

I

DA Cell

Transport

I

DA Cell

Planning

Observer

ENY

LZ ?

KILL

ZONE

I

DA Cell

Disruption

Element

IED

IED

IED

IED

IED

DA Cell

Main Defense

Element I

IED

IED

DA Cell

Main Defense

Element I

Figure 7-11. Insurgent defense of a complex battle position (example) 

Executing Defense of a CBP 

7-175. The commander or leader will determine whether or not to organize a disruption force in a 

disruption zone. He may determine that the manning and capabilities of his organization are more 

effectively used with security elements close to the defensive perimeter of the CBP. Whether near or distant 
Chapter 7 

7-34 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

from the CBP main defenses, security actions are disruption, active reconnaissance, and 

counterreconnaissance. However, contact with the enemy is on order of the commander or leader. The 

normal intention is to keep a CBP undiscovered by enemy forces. Working in close coordination with main 

defense elements, support capabilities are often incorporated into the CBP. 

7-176. A disruption element in the disruption zone can engage enemy forces in tactical depth as they 

approach the CBP or CBPs. Direct and indirect fires coordinated by a disruption element can delay and 

attrit enemy forces and cause them to enter the attack on a CBP in a piecemeal manner. 

7-177. Main defense elements mass direct and indirect fires to defeat an enemy attack. The commander or 

leader of the defending force may retain a reserve element and commit it only when necessary to prevent 

defeat by enemy forces. Support elements in the support zone provide support to defenders in the disruption 

zone and battle zone as required. In the event the commander or leader orders of a withdrawal from the 

CBP, some support elements will exfiltrate quickly while other elements such as indirect fires 

continue support to the main defense elements until directed to disengage by the commander or leader 

and also exfiltrate. 

G

G

60-mm

G

82-mm

PKM

7.62-mm

IED

G

G

IED

KILL

ZONE

KILL

ZONE IED

G

CSOP

G

G

G

Figure 7-12. Guerrilla defense of a complex battle position (example) 

Command and Control of a CBP Defense 

7-178. The irregular OPFOR leader will position himself where he can best command and control the 

defensive fight. C2 of a CBP is generally more difficult than that of an SBP because the defenders may be 

more dispersed. Insurgents or guerrillas operating in and from the CBP use secure communications such as 

couriers and wire. 
Functional Tactics 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-35 

Support of a CBP Defense 

7-179. Support of a CBP can be provided from within the local insurgent or guerrilla organization and/or 

local resources in the relevant population. Some support may be allocated higher-level irregular OPFOR 

organizations or from a state or non-state sponsor. Specialized support such as SPF can be temporarily 

associated with insurgents or guerrillas in a CBP in order to provide training, materiel, and/or tactical and 

technical advice. 

Reconnaissance 

7-180. Reconnaissance assets observe avenues of approach key to providing early warning and allow the 

commander or leader time to defend or to exfiltrate personnel and resources from the CBP. Insurgents, 

guerrillas, and/or their active supporters embed themselves within local populations. The irregular OPFOR 

is less likely to engage in counterreconnaissance activities if these actions would reveal CBP location. 

Armored Fighting Vehicles 

7-181. Armored vehicles are not the norm in a CBP. When possessed by the irregular OPFOR, armored 

fighting vehicles and ad hoc fighting vehicles mounting heavy weapons are normally concealed and 

covered in hide positions. The commander or leader may retain armored vehicles as part of his reserve for 

quick response to contingencies in defense of his CBP. 

Fire Support 

7-182. CBPs are typically self-supporting in their defense. Fire support assets normally locate within the 

CBP but may also locate outside of the CBP perimeter to best employ specific fires. Defenders employ 

these fires to— 

 Defeat enemy forces in the battle zone. 

 Attrit enemy forces along avenues of approach near a CBP. 

 Disrupt enemy use of landing zones in the vicinity of a CBP. 

 Delay enemy forces to support withdrawal of the irregular OPFOR from the CBP. 

Air Defense 

7-183. Passive air defense is the norm for a CBP. Active air defense generally involves systems that do 

not emit an electromagnetic signature. Insurgents or guerrillas engage aerial targets on order of the 

commander or leader. An all-arms air defense concept involves using weapons of all personnel of a CBP to 

protect against fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft threats. However, guerrilla battalions typically have a limited 

MANPADS capability in their weapons company. When available, shoulder-fired MANPADS would likely 

be located in disruption or security element(s) that occupy fighting positions near a CBP oriented on 

probable enemy air avenues of approach. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding 

additional air defense assets that may be available.) 

Engineer-Like Capabilities 

7-184. The irregular OPFOR conceals fighting and survivability positions using C3D techniques with 

locally available resources. Military-manufactured antipersonnel and/or antitank mines and/or IEDs are 

emplaced on or near likely enemy avenues of approach. Particular mines and/or IEDs are emplaced 

and secured with a cell or unit designated to arm and/or detonate the munition on order of the 

commander or leader. 

7-185. The irregular OPFOR reinforces urban and/or rural terrain to channel enemy forces into kill zones 

on approaches to a CBP. Obstacles are generally more protective in nature than obstacles used near an SBP. 

Insurgents or guerrillas may have specialized talents for engineer-like countermobility and mobility tasks. 

When supported overtly or covertly by a state sponsor, SPF or regular forces may be associated with an 

insurgent or guerrilla organization in order to provide training, materiel, and advice. 
Chapter 7 

7-36 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Logistics 

7-186. Logistics operations of a CBP are generally self-sustaining and blend into the local commerce and 

daily operations of a relevant population in the vicinity of the CBP. Provisioning a CBP with regular 

resupply is facilitated by active supporters of the insurgent or guerrilla organization. The commander or 

leader typically does not coerce local citizens to provide logistics support but can use such extortion when 

critical commodities are required to sustain the CBP defense. 

7-187. Supply caches and safe houses are distributed throughout the urban or rural area near the CBP. 

Other supply caches and safe houses are located within the CBP perimeter. 

INFOWAR 

7-188. Elements from the CBP may attempt to integrate within any local communities for the purpose of 

gathering information, collecting intelligence, and disseminating INFOWAR themes to the local relevant 

population. Active supporters of the irregular OPFOR assist the commander or leader in keeping a low 

profile. INFOWAR activities may focus on downplaying the existence or significance of the CBP. 

Generally, the CBP will not conduct easily detectable INFOWAR activities that would call the enemy’s attention 

to it. (See appendix A for additional information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.) 

7-189. If the presence of a CBP cannot be hidden, INFOWAR may attempt to convince enemy forces that 

the defenders are friendly to them. It may attempt to convince leaders of the governing authority that the 

insurgents or guerillas are willing to affiliate and/or associate with them in levels of reconciliation. Other 

INFOWAR techniques can portray the enemy force and governing authority as a corrupt regime to further 

isolate them from the relevant population. The insurgents or guerrillas can claim and demonstrate 

themselves to be the population’s protector. In some cases, senior irregular OPFOR leaders may conduct 

INFOWAR from a CBP to convince followers in other locations that they are still alive and leading their 

organizations in the struggle against the enemy. INFOWAR can include support to provide basic social and 

civic services to the relevant population that is not being provided by the governing authority. 

7-190. Other INFOWAR techniques can result in the gradual acceptance by the relevant population to the 

point that members of the insurgent or guerrilla organization become informal or legitimate representatives 

in civil governance. This recognition can lead to election in a state’s formal voting processes and/or 

establishing self-proclaimed semi-autonomous enclaves within a state with which the irregular OPFOR is 

in conflict. In either case, the irregular OPFOR ensures a significant INFOWAR campaign to weaken 

enemy support and strengthen its own support from a relevant population. 

IRREGULAR OPFOR IN HYBRID THREAT TACTICS 

7-191. The above section of this chapter shows examples of functional tactics in which insurgents and/or 

guerrillas employ some of the same types of offensive and defensive actions used by smaller tactical units 

of the irregular OPFOR (see TC 7-100.2). However, insurgents and/or guerrillas may also participate in 

larger-scale functional tactics when acting as part of the Hybrid Threat (HT). (See TC 7-100 for examples 

of such involvement.) They often work closely with SPF units in such roles. 

7-192. One would expect the irregular OPFOR to play a relatively minor role in HT tactics, perhaps used 

as an economy-of-force measure when regular OPFOR units are not available. However, as examples in TC 

7-100 show, insurgents and guerrillas can sometimes do things that regular military units cannot. For 

example, they are well suited to dispersed actions as part of a disruption force in a disruption zone (in 

offense or defense). However, their small size and ability to blend in with the local population also make it 

easier for irregular OPFOR units or cells to infiltrate into enemy-held positions. There, they may serve as 

enabling forces or elements, paving the way for exploitation by larger, regular military units, or they may 

play key roles as part of an exploitation force or other action force or element that accomplishes the overall 

mission of the HT action. 

Note. Insurgents, guerrillas, or even criminals can perform acts of terrorism that complement 

functional tactics actions separate from or in conjunction with a larger HT force. (See chapter 6 

for more details on terrorism.) 
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 A-1 

Appendix A 

Information Warfare 

The irregular OPFOR (including insurgents, guerrillas, and criminal elements) is trained to 

use adaptive techniques to defeat a superior opponent. Naturally it uses information warfare 

(INFOWAR) to obtain asymmetrical effects. These tactics are constantly evolving thanks to 

the exponential growth of networking and information technology. Increased accessibility to 

the Internet, commoditization of information, and unprecedented global awareness provide 

the irregular OPFOR with the ability to focus its INFOWAR activities on one of the 

enemies greatest weaknesses—his dependence on information communication 

technology in every aspect of his operations. 

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 

A-1. The irregular OPFOR, along with the regular OPFOR, defines information warfare as specifically 

planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. 

Conducted in conjunction with offensive or defensive actions, INFOWAR is designed to exploit the 

weaknesses of the opponent’s information systems. 

GOALS

A-2. The primary goals of INFOWAR are to— 

 Influence the enemy’s decisionmaking through his collected and available information, 

information systems, and information-based processes. 

 Retain the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems. 

TACTICAL TASKS

A-3. The effects of INFOWAR can be multidimensional and at times hard to pinpoint. However, the 

irregular OPFOR highlights the following tasks and associated effects as critical to the application of 

INFOWAR at the tactical level: 

 Destroy. Destruction tasks physically render the enemy’s information systems ineffective. 

Destruction is most effective when timed to occur before the enemy executes a command and 

control (C2) function or when focused on a resource-intensive target that is hard to reconstitute. 

Neutralizing or destroying the opponent’s information capability can be brought about by 

physical destruction of critical communications nodes and links. 

 Degrade. Degradation attempts to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s information 

infrastructure, information systems, and information collection means. 

 Disrupt. Disruption activities focus on disrupting enemy observation and sensor capabilities at 

critical times and locations. Disruption impedes the enemy’s ability to observe and collect 

information and obtain or maintain information dominance. 

 Deny. Denial activities attempt to limit the enemy’s ability to collect or disseminate information 

on the irregular OPFOR or deny his collection efforts. 

 Deceive. Deception activities strive to mislead the enemy’s decisionmakers and manipulate his 

overall understanding of OPFOR activities. Deception manipulates perception and causes 

disorientation among decisionmakers within their decision cycle. 

 Exploit. Exploitation activities attempt to use the enemy’s C2 or reconnaissance intelligence, 

surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities to the advantage of the irregular 

OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR also uses its various INFOWAR capabilities to exploit any 

enemy vulnerability. 
Appendix A 

A-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

 Influence. Influencing information affects an enemy’s beliefs, motives, perspectives, and 

reasoning capabilities, in order to support irregular OPFOR objectives. This may be done 

through misinformation or by manipulating or “spinning” information. 

INFOWAR ELEMENTS

A-4. Across the spectrum of competition, conflict, and war, the following elements are integrated when 

developing and implementing INFOWAR: 

 Electronic warfare (EW). Activity conducted to control or deny the enemy’s use of the 

electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the irregular OPFOR. 

 Deception. Measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification 

of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. 

 Physical destruction. Use of all types of weapons and explosives to destroy critical components 

of the enemy force, focusing on C2 nodes and RISTA sensors. 

 Protection and security measures. A wide range of activities (including the elements of 

deception and EW) to enhance survivability and preserve combat power. 

 Perception management. Measures aimed at creating a perception of truth that best suits 

irregular OPFOR objectives. 

 Information attack (IA). Intentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that 

supports accomplishment of the irregular OPFOR mission. 

 Computer warfare. Attacks focused specifically on computer systems, networks, and nodes. 

A-5. The seven elements of INFOWAR do not exist in isolation from one another and are not mutually 

exclusive. The overlapping of functions, means, and targets requires that they all be integrated into a single, 

integrated INFOWAR plan. However, effective execution of INFOWAR does not necessarily involve the 

use of all elements concurrently. In some cases, one element may be all that is required to successfully 

execute a tactical INFOWAR action. Nevertheless, using one element or subelement, such as camouflage, 

does not by itself necessarily constitute an application of INFOWAR. 

A-6. The use of each element or a combination of elements is determined by the tactical situation and 

support to the overall objective. The size and sophistication of an enemy force also determines the extent to 

which the irregular OPFOR employs the various elements of INFOWAR. The commander or leader has the 

freedom to mix and match elements to best suit his tactical needs, within the bounds of guidance from 

higher authority. The resources and capabilities of the irregular OPFOR, and the appropriateness of the 

INFOWAR medium to the target, determine the choices and the extent to which the various INFOWAR 

elements are employed and integrated. 

TOOLS

A-7. Tools for waging INFOWAR can include, but are not limited to— 

 Conventional physical and electronic destruction means. 

 Malicious software. 

 Denial-of-service attacks. 

 The Internet. 

 The media. 

 International public opinion. 

 Communication networks. 

 Various types of reconnaissance, espionage, and eavesdropping technologies. 

The irregular OPFOR can employ INFOWAR tools from both civilian and military sources and from assets 

of third-party actors. 

A-8. In some cases, the irregular OPFOR will conduct INFOWAR activities that are criminal in nature. 

For example, it may— 

 Use known computer exploitation tactics such as identity theft and industrial espionage. 

 Sell its computer warfare capabilities to create additional funding for its operations. 
Information Warfare 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 A-3 

TARGETS

A-9. The OPFOR sees the targets of INFOWAR as an opponent’s— 

 Decisionmakers. 

 Weapons and hardware. 

 Critical information infrastructure. 

 C2 system. 

 Information and telecommunications systems. 

 C2 centers and nodes. 

Information links, such as transmitters, communication devices, and protocols, will be targeted. The 

irregular OPFOR is extremely adaptive and will employ the best option available to degrade, manipulate, 

influence, use, or destroy an information link. See table A-1 for typical examples of INFOWAR objectives 

and targets. 

Table A-1. INFOWAR elements, objectives and targets 

Elements Objectives Targets 

Electronic Warfare (EW) Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the 

enemy’s use of the electromagnetic 

spectrum. 

C2 and RISTA assets and 

networks. 

Deception Mislead enemy decisionmakers. 

Cause confusion and delays in the 

decisionmaking process. 

Persuade the local population and/or 

international community to support 

irregular OPFOR objectives. 

Key military decisionmakers. 

General population and 

international media sources and 

Internet sites. 

Physical Destruction Destroy the enemy’s information 

infrastructures. 

C2 nodes and links, RISTA 

assets, telecommunications, and 

power sources. 

Protection and Security 

Measures

Protect critical assets. Enemy RISTA assets. 

Perception Management Distort reality or manipulate information to 

support irregular OPFOR goals. 

Enemy RISTA assets. 

Local populace and leaders. 

Media sources (international and 

domestic). 

Information Attack (IA) Alter or deny key information. Decisionmakers and other users 

of information. 

Systems reliant on accurate 

information. 

Computer Warfare Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemy’s 

computer networks and information flow. 

C2 and RISTA assets and 

networks. 

WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY

A-10. To conduct successful action against a more powerful enemy force likely enjoying a technological 

overmatch, the irregular OPFOR must exploit windows of opportunity. Sometimes these windows occur 

naturally, as a result of favorable conditions in the operational environment (OE). Most often, however, the 
Appendix A 

A-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

irregular OPFOR will have to create its own opportunities. INFOWAR can help create the necessary 

windows of opportunity for any type of offensive or defensive action, by executing deception techniques, 

EW, perception management, and/or physical destruction. 

A-11. Specific INFOWAR activities that can limit enemy force effectiveness can include— 

 Deceiving enemy forces with recurring social and political activities by active supporters of the 

irregular OPFOR that appear non-threatening in the vicinity of the targeted objective. 

 Exploiting enemy information collection with false intelligence provided by active supporters of 

the irregular OPFOR and/or insider threats. 

 Disrupting enemy information collection through coercion and extortion of the relevant 

population to not cooperate with enemy forces. 

 Influencing enemy forces with misinformation and/or manipulated claims against the governing 

authority to which the enemy forces belong. 

 Demonstrating the inability of enemy forces to protect civilians, effectively defend civil and/or 

military facilities, and/or safeguard key representatives of the governing authority. 

 Psychologically isolating the enemy force and governing authority from each other as well as 

from a relevant civilian population. 

 Creating a positive impression of irregular OPFOR actions and objectives among local, regional, 

and/or global audiences. 

 Influencing a local, regional, and/or global audience with near real-time media coverage of 

successful irregular OPFOR actions against enemy forces and the governing authority. 

 Using media releases to indicate the increasing discontent in a relevant population due to the 

governing authority’s actions and reactions affecting daily civil commerce and lifestyles. 

 Using progressive INFOWAR activities to degrade the resolve of the enemy force and governing 

authority to continue counterinsurgent, counter-guerrilla, or anti-crime operations. 

INFOWAR ORGANIZATIONS 

A-12. Various types on non-state actors might be part of the irregular OPFOR, affiliated with it, or support 

it in some manner. Even those organizations that do not belong to the irregular OPFOR or support it 

directly or willingly could be exploited or manipulated to support its objectives. Irregular INFOWAR 

organizations can be semiformal in the case of insurgent organization or ad hoc in informal organizations 

such as guerrillas or criminal gangs. In most case, the irregular forces are organized to perform a specific 

mission. Their number and size will increase or decrease based on the tactical situation. 

A-13. INFOWAR organizations conduct actions either in support of or independent of established irregular 

OPFOR units. The determining factors are base on those means that achieve their goals expeditiously. 

Note. Special-purpose forces (SPF) can organize, train, and support parts of the irregular 

OPFOR (insurgents or guerrillas and possibly even criminal organizations) and conduct 

operations in conjunction with them. SPF missions can also include the use of INFOWAR. 

A-14. Criminal elements will engage in INFOWAR activities to protect their operations. However, some 

criminal organization specialize in INFOWAR and use technology to illegally produce profits either by 

acquiring sensitive financial information or by selling hacking services and malware toolkits. (See chapter 

4 for more information.) INFOWAR organizations will provide a variety of products and technical 

assistance to aligned irregular forces through direct action cells or through specialized INFOWAR cells. 

INFOWAR CELLS

A-15. In a local or higher insurgent organization, an INFOWAR cell plans, coordinates, and implements 

the organization’s INFOWAR plan and provides guidance and assistance to the INFOWAR direct action 

cells whenever required. The INFOWAR cell may use a variety of lethal and nonlethal methods to 

influence the enemy and the population. Examples of such activities include but are not limited to— 

 Propaganda such as night letters and disinformation campaigns. 
Information Warfare 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 A-5 

 Incentivizing of destabilization activities such as criminal activities. 

 Assassinations and sabotage. 

IED and other terrorist attacks are often used to support the overall INFOWAR plan. These attacks may 

also be used in a manner to deceive the enemy and confuse the source of the attacks. The ultimate goal of 

the INFOWAR cell is to create and maintain the perception that the enemy cannot provide security and 

stability to the population. 

A-16. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the INFOWAR cell may be 

capable of several functions. Multiple functions and activities are necessary if the enemy has mounted his 

own INFOWAR campaign. Some example functions performed by the INFOWAR cell are— 

 Information management (internal methods, links, and security). 

 Media manipulation, psychological warfare (PSYWAR), and public affairs designed to influence 

the population. 

 Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda videos, broadcast successes of 

direct action teams, or printing). 

 Rumor control (misinformation and disinformation). 

 Sabotage actions. 

 Civic actions. 

 Indoctrination training. 

 Fund-raising (including international). 

 Recruiting. 

 Assistance in cyber-mining for intelligence. 

All these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals. 

INFOWAR DIRECT ACTION CELLS

A-17. An INFOWAR direct action cell supports the insurgent organization’s INFOWAR plan and may or 

may not receive guidance from the INFOWAR cell. Direct action as the title indicates is the nature of its 

objective, purpose, and role. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other terror attacks are often used to 

support the overall INFOWAR plan. These attacks may also be used in a manner to shift blame for the 

attack to their enemy. 

A-18. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, an INFOWAR direct action 

cell may be capable of several functions. Some example functions performed by this cell are— 

 Selective sabotage actions. 

 Information management 

 Media manipulation (misinformation and disinformation—PSYWAR). 

 Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda and indoctrination videos, 

broadcast successes of other direct action teams). 

 Civic actions. 

 Assistance in the cyber-mining for intelligence. 

All of these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals. 

A-19. Some of the functions may require specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation 

function (PSYWAR) may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, a tribal, ethic, or 

cultural leader; or other experts. Portions of the INFOWAR direct action cell may be dispersed and are 

assigned as the mission dictates. When countering the enemy’s INFOWAR campaign, specific knowledge 

of stabilizing factors and systems is required. For example, if the enemy engages in reconstruction efforts 

the direct action cell may require specific knowledge to sabotage the operation. 

A-20. The mission, combat conditions, and many other variables determine the configuration and 

composition of each direct action cell. Direct action cells do not have a fixed structure. Cell composition is 

not fixed and varies from cell to cell, mission to mission, and OE to OE. The structure, personnel, 

equipment, and weapons mix, all depend on specific mission requirements. Personnel select weapons 
Appendix A 

A-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

appropriate to the mission. Other equipment is added as required, such as computers, computer rigged 

vehicles, specialized antennas, and communications. Several members of the direct action cell may be hired 

INFOWAR specialists. Some functions can also be performed by personnel outside of the cell. There may 

be as few as one INFOWAR direct action cell to over 20 INFOWAR direct action cells, depending on the 

mission and other factors. Portions of the INFOWAR direct action cell are probably dispersed. 

SUPPORT TO INFOWAR Cells 

A-21. Irregular OPFOR organizations at times will compete for limited resources either from their higher 

headquarters or from an external supporting state or non-state actors. This competition appears to the 

outside observer as disjointed or lacking the discipline needed for unity of effort. However, individual 

leaders of the irregular OPFOR are allowed to develop lines of operation as it sees fit given the unique set 

of circumstances of its area of responsibility and the means at its disposal. When a particular tactic is 

proven to be effective, it will be replicated as necessary in order to exploit success, increase the perception 

of legitimacy for the irregular OPFOR cause, and to give the impression of progress. This sort of “groping 

in the dark” for a successful strategy means that the irregular OPFOR is able to experiment to find what 

works and to capitalize on effective tactics. The key is to open as many inroads as possible and to increase 

the likelihood for windows of opportunity for the irregular OPFOR to exploit the political, economic or 

social situation. 

A-22. The operational variables will determine whether or not a local area will require all of the elements of 

tradecraft for a complete perception management campaign. Important issues such as regional conflicts, 

underprivileged and underrepresented populations, and the location of political, commercial or economic 

power centers, all have the potential to be targets of an INFOWAR campaign plan. Support may come in 

many forms from the general population. Online chat rooms, radio and television opinion shows and 

politically motivated groups may all provide support to the INFOWAR mission. As the irregular OPFOR 

assess the local environment and the enemy’s center of gravity is determined, INFOWAR planners will 

target select groups, organizations, and individuals for a variety of activities. 

A-23. Some INFOWAR missions may require cultural insights, organizational intelligence, and specialized 

expertise for use in an INFOWAR campaign. For example, the media manipulation function (PSYWAR) 

may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, a tribal, ethnic, or cultural leader; or other 

experts. Other functions could be used to obtain specific technical expertise such as the configuration of 

important infrastructure, industrial, economic, and financial systems to develop targets for cyber attack. 

INFOWAR activities will leverage the knowledge of individuals employed by these sectors of the 

operational environment. 

INFOWAR SUPPORT TO IRREGULAR OPFOR 

A-24. INFOWAR activities support all of the categories of irregular OPFOR—insurgents, guerrillas, and 

criminal elements. INFOWAR Cells provide the ways and means to conduct all elements of INFOWAR 

activities. INFOWAR actions in the form of perception management or propaganda are designed to garner 

support of the population for the irregular OPFOR. By establishing seemingly innocuous activities such as 

web logs (blogs) and news outlets, INFOWAR cells can establish inroads for C2 functions, targeting and 

other support functions. By targeting an information system’s weakest link, (the user), INFOWAR cells can 

obtain information that provides inroads for further attacks by the irregular OPFOR or to by components of 

the Hybrid Threat. If the current governing authority has control over information technology, INFOWAR 

cells can conduct their operations from the sanctuary of a sympathetic nation. 

A-25. INFOWAR activities provide support to the irregular OPFOR covertly in both times of peace and 

times of war. OPFOR INFOWAR organizations can provide a variety of products and technical assistance 

to aligned irregular organizations. INFOWAR cells also provide information technology resources such as 

servers and networks to the irregular OPFOR in order to protect INFOWAR activities and disassociate it 

from INFOWAR operations. 

A-26. Some examples of INFOWAR support— 

 Locations of media outlets and personalities both friendly and enemy. 
Information Warfare 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 A-7 

 Accepted customs and norms and practices used to foster support for the irregular OPFOR. 

 Inside access to government, commercial, and financial leaders and institutions that support the 

enemy. 

 Locations of civilian and government communications infrastructure. 

 Distracting of enemy forces through instantaneous civil disobedience such as flash mobs. 

 Economic data vital to projecting required resources necessary to establish local rapport. 

 Established networks for recruiting and mobilization of combatants and noncombatants. 

 Enemy forces mission command tactics techniques and procedures, and command and control 

structure. 

A-27. INFOWAR cells provide advisors and technological resources to the irregular OPFOR in either a 

covert or clandestine manner depending on the objective. Examples of such support could include either 

all or some of the elements of INFOWAR and range from hosting servers and managing networks for 

an insurgency or criminal element to supplying software and/or EW equipment to guerrillas for 

INFOWAR operations. 

A-28. INFOWAR cells may or may not have the necessary resources to conduct research and development 

of INFOWAR technologies and to develop mature INFOWAR training and doctrine. In some cases, 

commercial-off-the-shelf technology satisfies the requirement for the irregular OPFOR. The INFOWAR 

cell may provide funds or equipment such as computers and network equipment, low-power GPS jammers, 

or software for use by other insurgents or by affiliated guerrillas or criminals. The benefit of using 

commercial information technology is that it is dual purpose and has less chance of raising suspicion when 

transporting it. 

Perception Management Activities 

A-29. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a perception of truth or stability that 

best suits the irregular OPFOR objectives. Perception management integrates a number of widely differing 

activities that use a combination of true, false, misleading, or manipulated information. Targeted audiences 

range from enemy forces, to the local populace, to world popular opinion. At the tactical level, the irregular 

OPFOR seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through PSYWAR and other 

perception management activities aimed at deterring, inhibiting, and demoralizing the enemy and 

influencing civilian populations. 

A-30. The various perception management activities include efforts conducted as part of—

 PSYWAR. 

 Direct action. 

 Public affairs. 

 Media manipulation and censorship. 

 Regional or international recruitment and/or fundraising for affiliated irregular forces. 

A-31. Information communications technology and global dissemination of the 24-hour news cycle has 

empowered the irregular OPFOR to implement complex perception management activities public affairs to 

affect change, garner global support, and generally shape the OE to its purposes. INFOWAR activities 

engage in public affairs to involve interest groups and media outlets to gain influence and to obtain their 

objectives. The irregular OPFOR can enable political and civic leaders at all levels to engage the population 

to accept its ideology and support the irregular OPFOR. 

A-32. Although the irregular OPFOR maintains that perception management activities conducted at the 

tactical level must be consistent with, and contribute to, the goals of the highest levels of organization, 

subordinates are allowed much discretion on the ways and means of achieving their perception 

management objectives. For example, forming a partnership with a charitable organization or a local 

business leader in order to obtain secure lines of communications, and a recruiting pool would be a natural 

extension of the strategy necessary to influence the local populace. If there is a religious or other 

ideological approach available, the irregular OPFOR will leverage this to establish drivers of social 

mobility such as educational organizations or business alliances. These organizations also provide the 
Appendix A 

A-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

irregular OPFOR a conduit for recruiting, indoctrination, and long-term influence within the target group. 

Additionally, the irregular OPFOR has the freedom to provide immediate assistance and disperse funds 

without delay during times of crisis or whenever there is an opportunity to meet a particular objective. This 

gives the irregular OPFOR the opportunity to be the so called “first with the most” in the struggle for hearts 

and minds. 

Psychological Warfare 

A-33. PSYWAR is a major contributor to perception management. Targeting the forces of the enemy, 

PSYWAR attempts to influence the attitudes, emotions, motivations, aggressiveness, tenacity, and 

reasoning of enemy personnel. In addition to the enemy’s military forces, PSYWAR specialists also 

concentrate on manipulating the local population and international media in favor of the irregular OPFOR, 

turning opinion against the enemy’s objectives. Planners focus special emphasis on highlighting enemy 

casualties and lack of success. They also highlight enemy mistakes, especially those that cause civilian 

casualties or damage civil infrastructure. 

A-34. The irregular OPFOR skillfully employs media and other neutral players, such as nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), to further influence public and private perceptions. However, if the irregular 

OPFOR perceives the presence of NGOs to be detrimental to its objectives, it can be extremely effective in 

hindering their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, thus discrediting them. 

Public Affairs 

A-35. Local partnerships and projects are regarded as enhancing the strategic and operational goals of the 

irregular OPFOR but are not necessarily prescribed by the higher command. The objective is to provide a 

working solution that is culturally acceptable to the target population and does not compromise the core the 

irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR seeks to integrate its activities into the target society and does this 

by providing the essential services for everyday life. Through cultural acceptance and shared goals, 

INFOWAR operators are able to develop trust and loyalty among the society and create opportunity for 

future projects and the perception of social mobility. Other examples of grassroots assistance given to a 

disenfranchised segment of the population by the irregular OPFOR could include— 

 Establishment or purchase of a local business or industry in order to buy influence, generate 

funds for irregular OPFOR activities, and provide access to lines of communications. 

 Cash payments to victims of both natural and manmade disasters. 

 Support to religious, educational, or charitable institutions for public relations purposes, and 

recruitment. 

 Provision of public services such as welfare, disaster response, or law and order services in order 

to delegitimize the existing government. 

 Monetary support to religious, political, academic, or business leaders who are willing to support 

the irregular OPFOR cause. 

 Establishing a parallel legal process where the population can obtain a just resolution for 

disputes without unwanted corruption by external values. 

A-36. If properly employed, the results of perception management activities become ingrained into 

everyday life and can be viewed as a positive force to the targeted population. The targeted population gets 

the services denied to them by the current governmental structure, while the irregular OPFOR is able to 

move freely among the population and establish a support structure for future operations. Perception 

management activities are regarded by the enemy as propaganda, despite the fact that the irregular OPFOR 

enjoys more influence over the population than the existing government does. The irregular OPFOR is able 

to maintain contact with the target population in an overt way that further legitimizes its presence. By 

providing opportunities for education, work and charity, the irregular OPFOR receives in return loyalty and 

support for its cause. The irregular OPFOR may adopt a long-term strategy that allows it to fully integrate 

into all aspects of society. The fact that it administers resources and services that are unavailable to the 

targeted population increases its influence and makes affiliation with its cause a desirable goal for the 

target population. 
Information Warfare 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 A-9 

A-37. Providing footage of perceived abuses of power by the enemy to the public helps INFOWAR 

activities make a case for allowing the irregular OPFOR to establish an ideological foothold within the state 

and provides the moral support needed to increase the resistance to the government. 

Disaster Response 

A-38. Response to disaster, whether natural or manmade, is viewed by the irregular OPFOR as another 

opportunity to gain influence and support in a region. Human suffering on a large scale sets the conditions 

for chaos and an overextension of the state’s resources. In many regions, disaster-relief services may be 

inadequate, and there is usually an inordinate amount of suffering before any assistance becomes available. 

Because of its access to resources and support systems that are outside the government’s bureaucratic 

structure, the irregular OPFOR can enable a more comprehensive response to natural disasters in certain 

targeted areas. In some cases, it will augment the current regime’s disaster-relief efforts and attempt to 

integrate and legitimize its role in assisting the population. In other situations, it will supplant the existing 

structure and outperform the competition. The goal is to be the first with the most in terms of aid and 

assistance. Disaster response efforts may include— 

 Evacuation of personnel from threatened areas. 

 Provision of humanitarian relief such as food and temporary shelter. 

 Long-term plans to rebuild structures destroyed by the disaster. 

 Cash payments to victims to pay for immediate needs or to compensate a loss. 

A-39. The irregular OPFOR can couple these services—including grassroots activism, social services and 

disaster response—with a political message and an intimidating presence. These combined methods allow 

the irregular OPFOR to establish its legitimacy, separate its enemies from its friends, and build support 

among the population while establishing inroads for future operations. 

Media Activities 

A-40. Irregular OPFOR will use all available means to exploit the media. These include both traditional 

forms such as television and newspaper outlets and as “new” media such as social networks and other 

computerized outlets. Benefits to the irregular OPFOR include the ability to connect with sympathizers for 

recruiting and resourcing, channeling responses through emotive themes, and promulgating a narrative of 

events that is more conducive to its objective. 

A-41. The barriers to obtaining and using the media have diminished significantly with the ubiquitous 

expansion of the Internet. Media resources are no longer restricted to a limited number of corporations or 

individuals. Individuals with the technical knowledge can leverage a variety of commercially available 

technologies and reach a large audience. In some cases video releases or newscasts produced exclusively 

within the new media are used by traditional media outlets and are given more attention than the official 

account of events. Unburdened by a multi-step approval process, irregular OPFOR can manipulate the 

media to their political and military advantage. Oftentimes it is not the most accurate or properly vetted 

message that attracts attention, but rather the first to hit the media. 

A-42. Having the ability to appeal or relate to the broadest possible audience within the cultural context of 

the OE, means that the irregular OPFOR has an intimate understanding of the target audience including 

social and cultural factors such as race issues, economic status and education levels. 

A-43. The irregular OPFOR uses its knowledge of technology and culture to craft a message that is both 

targeted and suggestive. It also uses media operations as a front for reconnaissance and intelligence 

operations. Some of the techniques available to the irregular OPFOR are — 

 Producing pamphlets, signs, and banners to spread their message usually through the use of 

images for illustration. 

 Using radio television and other media in a fashion that exploits freedom of speech laws in order 

to operate on the fringe of social norms without being illegal. 
Appendix A 

A-10 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

Computer Warfare Information Attack 

A-44. OPFOR information warfare (INFOWAR) units engage in a combination of computer warfare, 

information attack and perception management to establish and maintain information dominance in 

cyberspace by using both direct and indirect attacks on their adversary’s computer networks, information 

systems and online media. Computer warfare and information attack targets both the networks and the 

information enemy elements of national power need to function daily basis and conduct warfare. 

INFOWAR brings to bear the information oriented elements of national power to decisively defeat 

the enemy. 

A-45. The complex nature of the information environment provides the conditions for both direct and 

indirect INFOWAR attacks and presents an opportunity for INFOWAR tactics and techniques to augment 

traditional military operations at all levels of command from tactical to the strategic. Modern militaries 

rely on information systems and automation as well as worldwide connectivity to project power on a global 

scale. These information systems are used in command and control; logistics support; surveillance and 

reconnaissance; and for global positioning and navigation satellites which provide both navigation and 

precision targeting data. 

A-46. The direct approach to INFOWAR is a concerted operation designed to attack a specific target 

whether it is key infrastructure, a civil institution’s databases or critical command and control nodes. While 

the indirect approach could involve the constant probing of the adversary’s weaknesses and multiple 

limited engagements designed to wear down electronic defenses, win decisively in the propaganda 

campaign, or to identify vulnerabilities for future operations. 

Providing Computer Warfare Tools and Services 

A-47. Hosting services are the key to supporting INFOWAR activities in cyberspace. The INFOWAR unit 

provides access for a variety of services and is a clearing house for exchanging successful techniques and 

data on potential targets in chat rooms and on blogs. The irregular OPFOR can use these services to email 

or embed links to servers outside the area of operations that can be used for recruiting, exchanging 

intelligence and propaganda, and launching attacks. 

A-48. Propaganda is still a key component of the INFOWAR campaign. Redirecting Internet users to 

OPFOR themed websites will have the effect of not only spreading the irregular OPFOR’s message but 

giving the enemy and his supporters the impression that the irregular OPFOR has compromised every 

aspect of his society. 

Developing Paralell Networks 

A-49. Providing to the irregular OPFOR a C2 network is an effective way for the INFOWAR activity to 

maintain situational awareness and gather intelligence on the state’s infrastructure and elements of power. 

A dedicated communications network can also be used to recruit and mobilize large groups for specific 

actions such as rallies, protests, riots, or attacks. 

A-50. The irregular OPFOR posing as commercial or humanitarian venture, such as an NGO, a legitimate 

business, or another noncombatant entity, can establish network connectivity in a contested area of interest. 

This can be accomplished at another level by providing telecommunications infrastructure and switching 

equipment to the state’s telecommunications company with embedded backdoor access to the input-output 

systems of the equipment. 

A-51. This will give the INFOWAR activity free access to important elements of the nation’s 

telecommunications network. In other cases, after hostilities have begun, telecommunications equipment 

can be replaced or reconfigured after a key node is physically seized and repurposed for manipulation and 

use by the irregular OPFOR. 

A-52. The irregular OPFOR has the ability to seize enemy civil telecommunications infrastructure and use 

it for their purposes. Existing switching equipment can be integrated with that of their own and used with 

existing lines and wireless towers to extend the range and services for the irregular OPFOR C2 network. 

Once implemented the irregular OPFOR can commercialize its services. As more subscribers are added, the 
Information Warfare 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 A-11 

network becomes a source of intelligence by logging calls made and received by persons of interest. It can 

also be a source of revenue to fund future actions. 

SPF and INFOWAR 

A-53. INFOWAR capabilities provide clear advantages for SPF missions, due to the fact that SPF will 

always conduct missions in small teams or detachments and will use INFOWAR capabilities and 

techniques to maximize the effectiveness of their small numbers. INFOWAR capabilities have the potential 

to increase situational awareness, facilitate deception, and disrupt the enemy’s decision making process. 

A-54. SPF conducts an array of operations in support of the INFOWAR plan. Examples include— 

 Perception Management. 

 Diversionary Measures. 

 Sniper. 

 Indirect Fire. 

 Air Defense (denial of airspace and enemy claims of air supremacy and/or superiority). 

 Electronic Warfare. 

Note. SPF can recruit, organize, train, advise, and support local insurgents or guerrillas and 

possibly even criminal organizations and conduct (or lead) operations in conjunction with them. 

SPF personnel may fight alongside such affiliates or assist them to prepare for offensive actions, 

diversionary measures, INFOWAR activities or other missions. In some cases, the SPF will not 

only advise and assist but actually control (command) the irregular forces as a surrogate force. 

SPF missions (and those of their affiliates or surrogates) can include the use of terror tactics. See 

TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 7 INFOWAR, and Chapter 15Special Purpose 

Forces for more information. 

A-55. The nature of the shared goal or interest determines the tenure and type of relationship and the degree 

of affiliation. For example, the affiliation of an SPF detachment with criminal (or guerrilla) organizations is 

dependent only on the needs of the criminal (or guerrilla) organization or on the needs of the SPF at a 

particular time. The relational dynamics of SPF units are very fluid and apt to change from one day to 

the next. Shifts in affiliations may in turn cause adjustments in the SPF task organization to 

accommodate these changes. 

Direct Action Team 

A-56. A Direct Action Team is embedded in most INFOWAR units to provide support to the PSYWAR 

company. The teams specialize in infantry antiarmor style attacks; antiarmor ambushes; hit-and-run attacks 

against armored and/or hardened or rear area targets. Usually one Direct Action Teams, each broken into 

three attack elements of 4 persons each. The teams will probably be supported or augmented by different 

types of SPF specialty teams such as Sniper Teams or Sapper Teams. The SPF Teams (UAV) may be used 

to acquire reconnaissance information on targets or facilities. 

A-57. SPF team members are cross-trained in the use of all equipment, weapons, and vehicles assigned to 

the company. The equipment and weapons mix is determined by the mission. SPF Soldiers speak several 

languages and are able to interact with the local populace for perception management and or PSYWAR missions. 

All SPF teams may be augmented by other SPF personnel, weapons, and/or equipment. The team serves as a 

standard SPF Team when not required for INFOWAR. 

A-58. The SPF team leader coordinates all combat activities as well as reconnaissance and jamming 

activities, operations, employment, monitoring, direction finding, collection, and reporting. This includes 

GSR, sensor sets, remote sensor monitoring, and observation. 

Signal Team 

A-59. A single small SPF signal team can provide long-range communications support for guerrilla units up 

to battalion size. A full SPF signal team can do the same for a brigade-size unit. Teams can also support 
Appendix A 

A-12 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

insurgent operations. This team may also serve in a signals reconnaissance collection role. In the collection 

role, the signal equipment is exchanged one-for-one with communications intercept and direction finding 

equipment. Each team then becomes a communications intercept and direction finding unit. 

Sniper Team 

A-60. The snipers (7.62-mm or .50 cal) in each attack element provide covering fires. The 35-mm AGL-L 

and the 7.62-mm GP MG engage personnel when they exit the armored vehicles, pin down the supporting 

infantry allowing the ATGM/ATGL gunner to engage the armored vehicle. and provide covering fires for 

the ATGM and ATGL gunners. Sniper operations are useful to create hesitancy among enemy forces and to 

disrupt the enemy decision making process by forcing enemy commanders to account for sniper counter 

sniper operations. 
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 Glossary-1 

Glossary 

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

AKO Army Knowledge Online 

AOR 

AP 

area of responsibility 

antipersonal 

AR 

AT 

Army regulation 

antitank 

ATGL 

ATGM 

AUTL 

antitank grenade launcher 

anitiank guided missile 

Army Universal Task List 

BP battle position 

C2 command and control 

C3D camouflage, cover, concealment, and deception 

CBP 

CBRN 

CI 

CP 

CR 

complex battle position 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 

counterintelligence 

comand post 

counterreconnaissance 

CS combat support 

CSS combat service support 

DA 

DODD 

EFP 

EW 

direct action 

Department of Defense Directive 

explosive formed projectile 

electronic warfare 

FM 

G 

GANG 

GPS 

HEAT 

field manual 

guerrilla [in guerrilla unit symbol] 

criminal (generic) [in crimainal organization symbol] 

global positioning system 

high explosive antitank 

HK 

HRO 

 hunter-killer 

humantarian relif organization 

HT 

HUMINT 

HVT 

I 

IA 

Hybrid Threat 

human intelligence 

high-value target 

insurgent [in insurgent organization symbol] 

information attack 

IED improvised explosive device 

INFOWAR 

INS 

information warfare 

internal security 

ISF internal security forces 

JP joint publication 

km 

LNG 

kilometer(s) 

liquefied natural gas 
Glossary 

Glossary-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

LOC 

LVCG 

line of communications 

live, virtual, constructive, and gaming 

LZ landing zone 

MANPADS 

m 

man-portable air defense system 

meter(s) 

mm millimeter(s) 

MRL 

NGO 

multiple rocket launcher 

nongovernmental organization 

OE 

OP 

operational environment 

observation post 

OPFOR 

OPSEC 

PSC 

opposing force (AR 350-2) 

operational security 

private security contractor 

PMESII-PT 

PSYWAR 

political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical 

environment, and time 

psychologcial warfare 

POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants 

RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition 

SAF 

SAM 

SATCOM 

small arms fire 

surface-to-air missile 

satellitte communications 

SBP 

SIGINT 

simple battle position 

signals intelligence 

SPF 

SSM 

SVIED 

SVBIED 

special-purpose forces 

surface-to-surface missile 

suicide vest improvised explosive device 

suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device 

TC 

TCP 

TIC 

TIM 

training circular 

traffic control post 

toxic industrial chemical 

toxic idustrial material 

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command [US Army] 

TRISA 

TTP 

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity [US Army] 

tactics, techniques, and procedures 

US United States 

UAV 

UJTL 

UN 

VBIED 

WMD 

unmanned aerial vehicle 

Universal Joint Task List 

United Nations 

vehicle borne improvised explosive device 

weapon of mass destruction 
Glossary 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 Glossary-3 

SECTION II – TERMS 

adherent 

An individual or one or more unit, organization, or cell that forms collaborative relationships with, acts 

on behalf of, or is otherwise inspired, without any requirement of allegiance to another organization, to 

take action in support of the goals and objectives of another irregular force [such as al-Qa‘ida—the 

organization and the ideology—including support and/or acts of violence]. (As adapted for TC 7-100.3 

from U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism) 

affilitate 

An individual or one or more unit, organization, or cell that aligns with another individual, unit, 

organization, or cell to influence, support, and/or act in concert with for mutual benefit. No command 

relationship exists necessarily between an affiliate and the unit, organization, or cell in whose area of 

responsibility it operates; however, localized operations of the affiliate may support the area, regional, 

or global agenda of an organization [such as al-Qa’ida]. Affiliates are typically nonmilitary or 

paramilitary individuals or groups. In some cases, affiliated forces may receive support from regular 

military forces as part of an agreement under which they cooperate. (As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from 

U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism) 

antiterrorism 

Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to 

include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 3-07.2) 

ambush 

A surprise attack from a concealed position used against moving or temporarily halted targets in order to 

destroy or capture personnel and/or supplies; harrass and demoralize the enemy; delay or block movement 

of personnel and supplies; and/or canalize enemy movements. (TC 7-100.2) 

area defense 

A defensive operation designed to achieve tactcial decision by forcing the enemy’s offensive 

operations to culminate before the enemy can achieve his objective, and/or by denying the enemy his 

objectives while preserving combat power until decision can be achieved through strategic operations 

and operational mission accomplishment. (TC 7-100.2) 

area of reposnibility 

The geographical area and associated airspace, as defined by the Opposing Force (OPFOR), within 

which a commander has the authority to plan and conduct combat operations. An AOR is bounded by a 

limit of responsibility (LOR) beyond which the organization may not operate or fire without 

coordination through the next-higher headquarters. AORs may be linear or nonlinear in nature. Linear 

AORs may contain subordinate nonlinear AORs and vice versa. (TC 7-100.2) 

assault 

An attack that destroys an enemy force through firepower and the physical occupation and/or 

destruction of the enemy position. (TC 7-100.2) 

attack 

An offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both 

destroys or defeats enemy forces and seizes and secures terrain. (TC 7-100.2) 

battle 

A battle consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an 

engagement. (ADRP 3-90) 

battle positon 

A defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach. (TC 7-100.2) 
Glossary 

Glossary-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

combating terrorism 

Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and 

counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to 

oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. See antiterrorism and 

counterterrorism. (See also JP 3-26) 

complex battle position 

A defensive location designed to employ a combination of complex terrain, C3D, and engineer effort 

to protect the unit(s) within it from detection and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by 

the enemy. (TC 7-100.2) 

condition 

Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is 

expected to operate and may affect performance. See also joint mission-essential tasks. (JP 1-02) 

counterterrroism 

Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to 

terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 3-26) 

deception 

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence 

to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (JP 1-02; JP 3-13.4) 

enemy 

A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADRP 3-0) [The enemy in 

the context of TC 7-100.3 is any hostile party to the irregular opposing force (TC 7-100.3)] 

enemy combatant 

In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an 

armed conflict. The term “enemy combatant” includes both “lawful enemy combatants” and “unlawful 

enemy combatants.” (U.S. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.01E, The Department of 

Defense Detainee Program, September 5, 2006) 

engagement 

A tactical conflict, usually between opposing, lower echelon maneuver forces. (ADP 3-0) 

guerrilla 

A typically indigenous individual within a irregular unit structure organized along military lines in 

order to conduct military and paramilitray operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. TC 7-

100.3 typically identifies guerrillas within the context of guerrilla units. [As adapted to TC 7-100.3 

from JP 1-02/No approved JP 1-02 definition] 

guerrilla force 

A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct 

military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05) 

hybrid threat 

The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all 

unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects. (ADRP 3-0; see also TC 7-100) 

improvised explosive device 

A weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, 

noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny 

mobility, or distract. Also called IED. (JP 1-02) 

information operations 

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network 

operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with 

specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human 

and automated decision making while protecting the irregular opposing force human and automated 

decision making. Also called IO. [As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from JP 3-13] 
Glossary 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 Glossary-5 

intergovernmental organization 

An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or 

functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. (ADRP 3-0) 

irregular forces 

Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal 

security forces. (JP 1-02; JP 3-24) 

irregular warfare 

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant 

population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full 

range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (JP 1-02) 

insurgent 

An individual organized within an irregular insurgent organization structure that uses subversion 

and/or violence in order to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. TC 7-100.3 typically 

identifies insurgents within the context of cells. [As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from JP 1-02 and 

JP 3-24/no approved JP 1-02 defintion.] 

kill zone 

A designated area on the battlefield where the opposing force (OPFOR) plans to destroy an enemy 

using obstacles and massed fires of direct and indirect weapon systems. (TC 7-100.2) [As adapted for 

TC 7-100.3 from FM 3-21.8, ATTP 3-06.11, ATTP 3-21.9.] 

lawful enemy combatant 

Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions, include 

members of the regular armed forces of a State party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and 

organized resistance movements belonging to a State party to the conflict, which are under responsible 

command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide 

by the laws of war; and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an 

authority not recognized by the detaining power. (Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 

2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program, 5 September, 2006) 

maneuver defense 

A defensive operation designed to achieve tactcial decision by skillfully using fires and manuever to 

destroy key enemy elements of the enemy’s combat system and deny enemy forces their objective, 

while preserving the friendly force. (TC 7-100.2) 

militia 

An organization which generally refers to citizens trained as soldiers (as opposed to professional 

soldiers), but applies more specifically to a state-sponsored militia that is part of the state’s armed 

forces but subject to activation only in an emergency. To avoid confusion, the TC 7-100 series uses 

militia typically in the latter sense. Irregular forces might be referred to or declare itself as a “militia;” 

however, the term militia is not typically used to describe gurrilas, insurgents, or criminals associated 

with opposing forces. (TC 7-100.2; TC 7-100; TC 7-100.3) 

mercenary 

An individual who acts individually or acts a member of a formed group and volunteers from 

recruitment locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; is operating directly in the 

hostilities; is motivated by the desire for private gain, are promised, by or on behalf of a party to the 

conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to the combatants of 

similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party; is neither a national of a party to the 

conflict nor residents of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; is not a member of the armed 

forces of a party of the conflict; and, is not on official military duty representing a country that is not 

involved in the conflict such as a legitimate loan service or training appointment between. (Geneva 

Conventions IV) 

nongovernmental organization 

A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or 

promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and 
Glossary 

Glossary-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. 

NGO. (JP 3-08) 

objective 

The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. A location 

on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide 

for unity of effort. (ADRP 1-02) 

operational area security 

A form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces. Forces engaged in area security 

operations focus on the force, installation, route, area, or asset to be protected. (ADRP 3-37) 

operational environment 

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of 

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0) 

operational variables 

Those interrelated aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that differ 

from one operational environment to another and define the nature of a particular operational 

environment. The eight operational variables are political, military, economic, social, information, 

infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) (ADRP 3-0) 

opposing force 

A plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities 

of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing US forces 

(AR 350-2). 

paramilitary 

An irregular individual belonging to forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any 

country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. [As adapted for TC 7-

100.3 from JP 1-02 and JP 3-24] 

paramilitary forces 

Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in 

organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02; JP 3-24) 

procedure 

Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. See also tactics; techniques. 

(JP 1-02) 

propaganda 

Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to 

influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, 

either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02) 

protection 

The preservation of the effectiveness of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, 

equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the 

boundaries of a given operational area. (ADRP 3-37) 

raid 

An attack against a stationary target for the purpose of its capture or destruction that culminates in the 

wihdrawal of the raiding dorce to safe territory. (TC 7-100.2) 

reconnaissance attack 

A tactical offensive action that locates moving, dispersed, or concealed enemy elements and either 

fixes or destroys them; and/or gain information about the enemy’s location, dispositons, military 

capabilities, and/or intentions. (TC 7-100.2) 
Glossary 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 Glossary-7 

red team 

An organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent 

capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational 

environment and from the perspective of adversaries and others. (JP 1-02) 

resistance movement 

An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established 

government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05) 

risk management 

The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making 

decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 1-02) 

rules of engagement 

Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations 

under which [United States] forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 

encountered. Also called ROE (JP 1-04; ADRP 3-0) 

simple battle position 

A defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach. (TC 7-100.2) 

standard 

A satisfactory level of performance for a task and condition for each individual and collective task to 

ensure that the individual or organization meets mission requirements. When no standard exists, the 

commander or organizational leader establishes a standard and the next higher commander or leader 

approves it. All training conducted by the unit, organization, or cell is assessed against the 

commander’s or leader’s intent for the training event, mission, and/or published doctrinal standards. 

See also TC 7-101, Appendix A. [As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from ADP 7-0]

tactics 

The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. See also procedures; 

techniques. (JP 1-02) 

task-organizing 

The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and 

composition to meet a unique task or mission. (ADRP 3-0) 

techniques 

Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. See also procedures; 

tactics. (JP 1-02 ) 

terrorist 

An individual who commits unlawful acts of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce 

governments and societies in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. TC 7-100.3 

typically identifies terrorists in the context of cells. [As adapted to TC 7-100.3 from JP 1-02/no 

approved JP 1-02 defintion.] 

terrorism 

The use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to 

intimidate governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other 

ideological beliefs and committed to the pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2) 

threat 

Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm the United 

States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADRP 3-0) Note. Irregular opposing 

forces can apply this definition to actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm 

irregular opposing force goals and objectives. 

threat analysis 

In antiterrorism, a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning 

potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups which could target a facility. A threat analysis will 
Glossary 

Glossary-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

review the factors of a terrorist group's existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well 

as the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in 

identifying probability of terrorist attack and results in a threat assessment. See also antiterrorism. 

(JP 1-02) Note. Irregular opposing forces can apply this definition to actors, entities, or forces that 

have the capability and intent to harm irregular opposing force goals and objectives. 

traditional warfare 

A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the 

objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or 

seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. (DOD 

Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), December 1, 2008) 

transnational threat 

Any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular country or region that operates across 

international boundaries and threatens [United States] national security interests. (JP 3-26) Note. 

Irregular opposing forces can apply this definition to actors, entities, or forces that have the capability 

and intent to harm irregular opposing force goals and objectives. 

unconventional warfare 

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly 

conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, 

supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source, and includes but is not limited 

to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted 

recovery. (JP 1-02) 

unlawful enemy combatant 

Persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its 

coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict. For purposes of 

the war on terrorism, the term unlawful enemy combatant is defined to include, but is not limited to, an 

individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are 

engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. (Department of Defense 

Directive (DODD) 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program, September 5, 2006) 

weapon of mass destruction 

Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or 

causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such 

means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 3-40) Note. WMD 

effects can be caused by other means such as high-yield or low-yield explosives. 
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 References-1 

References 

DOCUMENTS NEEDED 

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. 

ADP 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 24 September 2013. 

ADP 7-0. Training Units and Developing Leaders, 23 August 2013. 

ADRP 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 24 September 2013. 

AR 350-2. Opposing Force Program. 9 April 2004. 

DOD MIL-STD-2525-C. Common Warfighting Symbology. 17 November 2008. 

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Available online at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/. 

TC 7-100. Hybrid Threat. 26 November 2010. 

TC 7-100.2. Opposing Force Tactics. 9 December 2011. 

TC 7-101. Exercise Design. 26 November 2010. 

READINGS RECOMMENDED 

These sources contain relevant supplemental information. 

ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012. 

ADRP 3-05. Special Operations. 31 August 2012. 

ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012. 

ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012. 

ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012. 

ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012. 

ADRP 6-22. Army Leadership. 1 August 2012. 

AR 11-33. Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP). 17 October 2006. 

AR 381-11. Intelligence Support to Capability Development. 26 January 2007. 

ATTP 3-06.11. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 10 June 2011. 

ATTP 3-21.9. SBCT Infantry Platoon and Squad. 8 December 2010. 

DODD 2310.01E. The Department of Defense Detainee Program. 5 September 2006. 

DODD 3000.07. Irregular Warfare. 1 December 2008. 

FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 28 March 2007. 

FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013. 

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 15 December 2006. 

FM 3-24.2. Tactics in Counterinsurgency. 21 April 2009 

FM 3-37.2. Antiterrorism. 18 February 2011. 

FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009. 

FM 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations. 27 December 2004. 

FM 7-100.4, Opposing Force Organization Guide. 3 May 2007. 

Geneva Conventions. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Geneva_conventions-1949.html

JP 3-05. Special Operations. 18 April 2011 

JP 3-07.2. Antiterrorism. 24 November 2010. 

JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011. 

JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012. 

JP 3-13.4. Military Deception, 26 January 2012. 
References 

References-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

JP 3-24. Counterinsurgency Operations. 5 October 2009. 

JP 3-26. Counterterrorism. 13 November 2009. 

JP 3-40. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 10 June 2009. 

Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) [Database with Conditions Version 7.1.] 17 July 2012. 

U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-national-strategy-counterterrorism

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY FORMS 

DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil). 

DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 Index-1 

Index 

Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. After a 

page reference, the subsequent use of paragraph reference is indicated by the 

paragraph symbol (¶). 

A

action element, 7-4 

action force, 7-4 

action function, 7-1 ¶ 1 

actions on objective, 6-27 

active supporter, 1-57, 2-41 

adaptive, 2-19 

adherent, 6-4, 6-130

adversary, 1-6, 1-64, 6-8 

advisor, 2-29 

affiliation, 1-10, 1-57, 2-48, 3-2. 

 3-13, 4-8, 5-66, 6-124 

air defense, 7-42 

all-arms air defense, 7-89 

allegiance, 1-56, 2-43, 5-10 

ambush, 6-80, 7-11

annihilation ambush, 7-11, 

 7-21 

containment ambush, 7-11, 

 7-31 

harrassment ambush, 7-11, 

 7-26

antitank battery, 3-80 

antitank platoon, 3-123 

anxiety, 6-39, 6-55, 6-75 

area of operations (AOR), 3-2

armed combatant, 5-1, 5-10, 

 5-90 

armor, 2-62, 7-110, 7-181

arms trafficking, 4-73 

arson, 4-63, 6-59 

assassination, 4-69, 6-83 

assault, 7-46 

assault element, 7-48 

association, 1-57, 2-43, 2-49, 

 2-61, 3-11, 3-174, 4-30 

attack, aerial, 6-49 

attack maritime, 6-47 

attack on land, 6-45 

B 

base camp, 3-31–3-37 

battle position, 7-124 

battle zone, 7-144 

bombing, 6-63

breach, 7-77, 7-90 

bribery, 4-62 

C 

cache, 7-91 

cadre, 2-36 

camera operator, 2-119, 5-93 

CBRN, 6-112

cellular structure, 2-72, 2-73 

child combatant, 6-91 

civil affairs cell, 2-155

clan, 1-21, 2-43 

clandestine, 2-34, 3-28, 6-129 

clearing element, 7-6 

coalition, 1-67 

combat service support, 7-50 

combat support, 7-57 

command and control, 2-10, 

 3-1, 4-40 

compare and contrast table: 

 communications, p.1-17 

 composition, p.1-16 

 disposition, p. 1-16 

 equipment, p.1-16 

 finances, p.1-17 

 interal security, p. 1-17 

 organization-structure, 

 p. 1-16 

 personnel, p. 1-16 

 recruitment, p. 1-16 

 terrorism, p. 1-17 

 training, p. 1-17 

 uniforms, p. 1-16 

 weapons, p. 1-16 

complex battle position, 

 7-122, 7-124, 7-126 

complex terrain, 7-59 

computer crime, 4-85 

computer fraud, 4-90 

computer warfare, A-44

corporate organization, 5-25 

counterintelligence, 2-41, 2-53, 

 2-112, 

counterreconnaissance, 7-153, 

 7-175, 7-180 

courier, 3-88, 3-145, 4-14, 5-93 

criminal activity, 1-73, 4-2 

criminal network, 4-30 

criminal organization, 4-4, 

 4-30 

 transnational organization, 

 4-36 

criminal, 1-56, 2-73, 

 4-1

 field operatives, 4-46 

 immediate leaders, 4-44 

 passive supporter, 4-47 

 senior leaders, 4-41 

cult, 1-53 

cyber attack, 6-108 

cyber crime, 4-81 

D 

deception elment, 7-170 

deception force, 7-7 

deception, 1-40, 6-39, 

defensive action, 3-181, 6-41, 

 7-122

demolition, sabotage, and IED 

 team, 2-124 

diaspora, 1-25, 1-60–1-63

direct action cell, 2-11, 2-64, 

2-70, 2-71, 2-75 2-81, 

 assassination cell, 2-84 

 extortion cell, 2-90 

 INFOWAR cell, 2-117, A-15 

 kidnapping cell, 2-90 

 mortar cell, 2-99 

 multifunction cell, 2-81 

 rocket cell, 2-99 

 sniper cell, 2-84 

dispersion, 6-87 

disruption element, 7-134 

disruption force, 7-2, 7-7 

disruption zone, 7-145 

drug trade, 4-76 

E

economic disruption, 6-137 

element, 7-1 

enabling element, 7-6 

enabling force, 7-6 

enabling function, 7-6, 7-75 

enemy, 6-5 

engineer, 3-97, 7-43 

escape and exploitation, 6-29 

exploitation force, 7-192 

exploitation, 6-29 

explosively formed projectile, 

 6-67 

external state, 1-8, 1-64, 5-54 

external support, 1-71 

extortion, 2-90 

F 

faith system, 1-52, 2-43 
Index

Index-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014 

finance, 2-39, 2-90 

finance cell, 2-138 

fire support, 7-40 

fixing element, 7-7 

fixing force, 7-7 

flexibility 7-8 

forces, 7-1 

fraud, 4-52 

functional tactics, 1-18, 1-72, 

 p.7-1 ¶ 1 

fundamentalist, 1-52 

G 

gambling, 4-57 

gang, 4-4, 4-27 

Geneva Conventions, 5-4 

governing authority, 1-21 

government-in-exile, 2-6, 2-32, 

 2-37 

guerrilla, 1-47–1-48, 3-1

guerrilla battalion, 3-107 

guerrilla brigade, 3-23, 3-46

guerilla company, 3-150 

guerrilla company, hunter- killer, 

 3-163 

guerrilla force, 2-2–2-3, 3-1 

guerrilla hunter-killer group, 

 3-170 

guerrilla platoon, 3-159 

guerrilla scouts, 3-169 

guerrilla squad, 3-160 

guerrilla unit, 2-65, 2-72, 3-1 

 

H 

hierarchical organization, 1-68 

hijacking, 2-90, 4-64, 6-71

hoax, 6-55 

hostage taking, 4-67, 6-78 

higher insurgent organization, 

 2-48 

human shield, 6-89 

human trafficking, 4-74 

humanitarian, 2-16, 5-9 

hunter-killer, 3-42 

Hybrid Threat tactics, 5-188 

Hybrid Threat, 1-1, 2-5, 

 3-10, 6-3, 7-191 

I

independent, 1-51, 2-4, 3-2 

independent actor, 1-51, 6-4, 

 6-130 

infiltrate, 3-185, 6-6, 7-192 

information warfare cell, 2-96, 

 2-117 

information, 1-30 

 elements, A-4 

 objectives, A-9 

 tactical tasks, A-3 

 targets, A-9 

 tools, A-7 

INFOWAR, 1-30, 2-117, 

 6-104, 7-45, 7-66, 7-92, 

 7-120, 7-159, 7-188, 

 A-1 

insider threat, 5-88, 6-99, A-11

insurgents, 1-48, 2-1

insurgent irregular OPFOR, 

 2-1 

insurgent organization, 2-1 

 higher insurgent 

 organization, 2-48 

 local insurgent organization, 

 2-13, 2-64

insurgents-criminals,1-77, 6-76 

intelligence cell, 2-105 

internal security forces, 1-11, 

 2-12, 5-32, 6-3 

irregular forces, p. viii-ix 

irregular OPFOR, 1-1,1-9, 

 p.7-1 ¶ 2 

irregular warfare, p. vii ¶ 4, 

J 

K 

kidnapping, 4-65, 6-75

L 

law enforcement agencies, 1-5 

legitimacy, 1-7, 5-6, 6-5 

local insurgent organization 

 2-64 

logistics, 1-71, 3-21 

logistics cell, 2-134 

M

main defense element,, 

 7-132, 7-167 

main defense force, 7-5 

MANPADS squad, 3-126 

media activities, 6-136, A-40 

media manipulation, 2-96, 

 2-117, 5-41,6-30 

media organization, 5-42

media personnel, 5-37 

medical cell, 2-157

medical section, 3-103 

mercenaries, 1-71, 6-3 

militia, 3-44, 4-13, 5-31 

mortar battery, 3-69 

mortar platoon, 3-119 

motivations, 1-47, 4-19, 5-5, 

5-77–5-78, 6-6, 6-121, A-33 

multile rocket launcher 

 platoon, 3-75, 3-121 

N 

nationalistic, 1-50, 1-61, 2-149 

network organization,2-49,4-12 

noncombatant, 5-1

nongovernmental organization, 

 5-56 

non-state, 1-68–1-71 

O 

objectives, irregular OPFOR 

 1-12, 1-39 

offensive action, 2-180, 

 3-178, 6-43, 7-9

OPFOR, p. vii ¶ 1, p. vi ¶ 1 

opposing forces, p. vii ¶ 1 

P 

paramilitary, p. vii ¶ 4 , 1-2, 

 1-23, 2-43, 3-1, 4-1, 5-2 

passive supporter, 2-27, 2-44 

perception management, 

 1-30, 2-37, 4-110, A-29 

planning cell, 2-115

PMESII-PT, 1-20 

political, 1-21 

military, 1-23 

economic, 1-26 

social, 1-28 

information, 1-30 

infrastructure, 1-32 

physical environment, 1-33– 

 1-34 

time, 1-36 

political advisor, 2-33, 2-37, 

 2-56, 3-57, 3-114, 

principles [OPFOR], 1-38 

adaptability, 1-44 

concentration, 1-45 

deception, 1-40 

initiative, 1-39 

mobility, 1-43 

perseverance, 1-46 

protection, 1-42 

surprise, 1-41 

private security company, 4-15 

private security contractor, 

 5-13 

protected element, 7-7 

protected force, 7-7 

psychologcial techniques, 1-16 

psychologcial warfare, 1-6, 

 5-21, A-16, A-33

public affairs, A-35

Q 

R 

raid, 1-83, 6-80, 7-67 

raiding element, 7-5, 

 7-70 

reconnaissance, 2-205, 3-58, 

 3-90, 7-37, 7-62, 7-84, 

 7-108

reconnaissance attack, 7-94 

reconnaissance company, 3-90 

reconaissance element, 7-7 

reconnaissance force, 7-7 

reconnaissance platoon, 3-128 
Index 

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 Index-3 

recruiting cell, 2-147 

recruitment, 2-14, 6-94 

regular forces, 1-22 

regular OPFOR, 1-10 

regulated military forces, 1-5, 

 5-4 

rehearsal, 6-24 

relevant population, 1-6, 1-21 

 6-145 

reserve element, 7-140 

rocket launcher battery, 3-73 

S 

sabotage, 6-61 

safe haven, 1-25, 1-34, 1-54, 

 1-66, 3-21, 6-25, 6-97 

safe house, 2-41, 2-141, 3-41, 

 6-23, 6-29, 7-44 

sapper, 3-16, A-12 

sapper company, 3-97 

security element, 7-7, 7-18, 

 7-25 

security force, 7-7 

separtist, 1-50 

shelter cell, 2-141 

simple battle position, 2-272, 

 3-183, 7-125

sniper section, 3-157 

special purpose forces, 1-11, 

 2-3, 3-13, 4-13, 6-6, A-53 

stay-behind forces, 3-191 

subversion, 1-21, 2-1, 4-3 

suicide attack, 6-106 

support element, 7-19, 7-50 

support force, 7-7 

support zone, 7-143, 7-147 

supporting cell, 2-18, 2-73 

surprise, 1-41, 6-39 

surveillance, 2-41, 3-129, 

 4-50, 5-3, 6-22

surveillance, pre-attack, 6-22 

swarming, 1-45, 3-188 

T 

tactics and techniques, 7-1

tailor, vii 

target selection, 6-13, 6-20 

technical support cell, 2-120 

terror tactics, 6-36

terrorism, 1-72, 6-1 

terrorism techniques, 6-37 

terrorist, p. viii ¶ 3, 6-1

threat, p. viii ¶ 2

totalitarian, 1-54 

toxic industrial chemicals, 

 2-131, 6-113 

toxic industrial material, 2-131, 

 6-113

trafficking, 4-73 

training, 1-60, 2-45, 6-10, A-16 

training camp, 3-31–3-37, 3-41 

training cell, 2-143 

training facilities, 1-66 

transnational affiliate, 6-128 

transnational corporation, 5-84 

transnational network, 1-68 

transportation cell, 2-152

tribe, 1-50

U 

unarmed combatant, 5-1, 5-92

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

3-19, 6-50, 7-113, A-56 

V 

videographer, 2-79, 5-42, 5-93, 

6-30 

W 

weapons battalion, 3-66 

weapons company, 3-116 

weapons of mass destruction, 

 6-54, 6-111, 6-135

WMD support team, 2-129 

woman combatant, 6-91 

Y 

Z 
This page intentionally left blank. 
TC 7-100.3 

17 January 2014 

By order of the Secretary of the Army: 

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

 GERALD B. O’KEEFE 

 Administrative Assistant to the 

 Secretary of the Army 

 1402301 

DISTRIBUTION: 

Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Not to be distributed; electronic 

media only. 
PIN: 103548-000