lUl 

I1! n ~ la 

LtL',Iq] S"':IS,,,,, 

REDEFINING THE 

U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

Tokyo's National 

Defense Program 

PATRICK M. CRONIN 

and 

MICHAEL J. GREEN 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

McNair Paper 31 
A popular Government, 

without popular information or the means of 

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or 

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 

And a people who mean to be their own 

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power which 

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W, T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
REDEFINING THE 

U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE: 

Tokyo's National 

Defense Program 

PATRICK M. CRONIN 

and 

MICHAEL J. GREEN 

McNair Paper 31 

November 1994 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Washington, DC 
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

[] President: Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 

[] Director: Hans A. Binnendijk 

Publications Directorate & NDU Press [] Fort Lesley J'. McNair 

[] Washington, D.C. 20319-6000 [] Phone: (202) 475-1913 [] Fax: (202) 

475-1012 

[] Director: Frederick T. Kiley [] Chief, Publications Branch: George C. Maerz 

[] Editors: Jonathan W. Pierce, Mary A. Sommerville 

[] Editor for this issue: Mary A. SommerviUe 

[] Secretary: Laura Hall [] Circulation Manager: Myma Morgan 

Patrick Cronin is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

Nalional Defense University. Dr. Cronin, who holds his doctorate from O.£ford 

University, is also a professorial lecturer of imernational relations at the Paul 

H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Johns Hopkins 

University. 

Michael Green is Washington Research Associate for the MIT-Japan Program 

and a consultant for the Department of Defense. Dr. Green spem more than 

5 years in Japan as a special assistant for foreign policy and defense affairs to 

a member of the National Diet, a Fulbright Fellow at Tokyo University, a 

reporter for Defense News and the Iwate Nippo, and Tokyo Representative of 

the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies. He is also a 

professorial lecturer at SAIS, the John Hopkins University. 

From time to time, INSS publishes short papers to provoke thought and inform discussion 

on issues of U.S. national security in the post---Cold War era. These monographs present 

current topics related to national security strategy and policy, defense resource management, intemational affairs, civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, combined, and coalition operations. 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, are those 

of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 

University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. 

Cleared for publ& release; distribution unlimited. 

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without further permission, with 

credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC. A courtesy copy 

of reviews and tearsheets would be appreciated. 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP. Washington, DC 20402-9328 

ISSN 1071-7552 
CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ........................... 1 

A NEW SITUATION ......................... 4 

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE 

REVIEW ............................... 7 

KEY ISSUES .............................. 11 

Host Nation Support ...................... 11 

Theater Missile Defense ................... 12 

Technology, Procurement, and Arms Exports .... 13 

RECOMMENDATIONS ....................... 14 

APPENDIX A: THE MODALITY OF THE SECURITY 

AND DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF JAPAN: The 

Outlook for the 21st Century ................ 21 

Foreword .................................. 22 

CHAPTER 1. THE WORLD AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC 

AFTER THE COLD WAR ................... 23 

The End of the Cold War and Qualitative Changes in the 

Security Environment ...................... 23 

Multilateral Cooperation Centering on the United States 24 

Roles of the United Nations and Other Regimes for 

Cooperative Security ................... 25 

Four Types of Likely Danger ................... 26 

Characteristics of the Security Environment in the AsiaPacific Region ........................... 27 

CHAPTER 2. BASIC THINKING ON JAPAN'S SECURITY 

POLICY AND DEFENSE CAPABILITY ......... 29 

Active and Constructive Security Policy ........... 29 

Multilateral Security Cooperation ................ 31 

Enhancing the Functions of the Japan-U.S. Security 

Cooperation Relationship ................... 34 
Maintenance and Operation of Highly Reliable and Efficient 

Defense Capability ....................... 35 

CHAPTER 3. THE MODALITY OF DEFENSE CAPABILITY 

IN THE NEW AGE ....................... 36 

From the Cold War Defense Strategy to the Multilateral 

Security Strategy ......................... 36 

The Role of Defense Capability for Multilateral Security 

Cooperation ............................ 37 

The Enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Security 

Cooperation38 Relationship ................. 42 

Maintenance and Qualitative Improvement of Self-Defense 

Capability .............................. 44 

Other Items Pertaining to Defense ............... 55 

Conclusion ................................ 59 

APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS ................. 61 
REDEFINING THE 

U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE: 

Tokyo's National 

Defense Program 

INTRODUCTION 

Japan is starting to emerge as a major player in the international 

security affairs of the post-Cold War era. 1 With the approach of 

the half-century mark since the conclusion of the Second World 

War, Japan's postwar generation of leaders appears more 

confident than their predecessors about their country's potential 

contribution to global peace and stability. Evidence that Japan 

may be finding its footing as a great market democracy is extant 

in the recent report of a distinguished advisory commission 

reviewing Japan's National Defense Program Outline: "Japan 

should extricate itself from its security policy of the past that 

was, if anything, passive, and henceforth play an active role in 

shaping a new order. ''2 

The search for Japan's intemational security role, however, 

is not without consequences for the U.S.-Japan alliance. 

Ironically, the United States is trying to establish a special new 

relationship with Japan at the same time that a torrent of 

intellectual debate in Tokyo is questioning the longevity and 

vitality of the bilateral alliance. To be sure, as the United States 

and Japan enter the fourth decade of their postwar defense 

relationship, they have achieved unprecedented levels of bilateral 

cooperation. Japan pays more for U.S. forces, transfers more 

technology to the United States, engages in more joint training, 

and assumes more roles and missions within the alliance than at 

any other point in its history. 

However, in many ways this close relationship is only a 

superficial continuation of policy trajectories established during 
2 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

the Cold War. The reality is that today the U.S.-Japan alliance 

is on shakier ground than most will admit. One should not be 

misled by the fact that the Social Democratic Party (SDP) has 

ended its longstanding objection to the constitutionality of the 

alliance, and that U.S. trade negotiators are now careful to 

reassure everyone that economic friction with Japan is not 

intended to hurt the bilateral security relationship. 3 The problem 

is that all this is too reassuring. These boilerplate endorsements 

of the alliance may in fact insulate senior policy makers from the 

reality that the internal workings of the defense relationship are 

in need of more care and top-down leadership. 

There should be no mistaking the commitment of Japan's 

elites in government, business, and politics to the alliance with 

the United States as the centerpiece for Japan's future security. 

However, there are growing signs in Japan's policy planning of 

renewed attention to the United Nations, to regional multilateral 

mechanisms, and to stronger independent capabilities as means of 

hedging against possible U.S. withdrawal or fatigue. 4 All things 

being equal, the U.S.-Japan alliance is Japan's first choice, but 

there is a growing question about whether it should be the only 

choice. 5 Some in Japan appear to be questioning old taboos 

regarding force projection, arms exports and even nuclear 

weapons. 6 Bureaucrats in the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs are increasingly distracted from 

alliance concerns by other matters. In the 1980s, the best and the 

brightest worked on the alliance; now they work on 

peacekeeping, Asian relations, or planning a "well balanced" 

Japanese force structure. Momentum and energy in Japanese 

policy planning are flowing away from the alliance. 

In many cases the Japanese Govemment's apparent hedging 

strategy is based on miscalculations about U.S. intentions. The 

Department of Defense (DoD) focus on the Bottom-up Review, 

host nation support, the so-called Technology for Technology 

(TFI') initiative which seeks to increase the flow of Japanese 

dual-use technology back to the United States--and joint 

cooperation on theater missile defense (TMD) all strike Japanese 
PATRICK M. CRONIN and MICHAEL J. GREEN 3 

observers as examples of a superpower in decline, rather than a 

nation recalculating its security policy for a post-Cold War 

world. 7 Although by no means typical of contemporary Japanese 

opinion, one critic of U.S. military presence in Japan portrays the 

situation starkly: "Americans should realize this is not a period 

of ascent for America. It is a period of descent. ''8 

The irony in this situation is that the United States now wants 

Japan to play an active role as a security parmer in the 

intemational arena. U.S. bases in Japan form the linchpin of 

America's forward military presence in Asia. The bilateral 

security ties are watched closely by other East Asian nations for 

evidence of U.S. malaise or Japanese resurgence. Diplomatically, 

the United States wants Japan to help implement the accord 

aimed at dismantling North Korea's nuclear program and to bring 

China into the burgeoning Pacific community as a peaceful 

economic partner. The United States also needs to work with 

Japan to ensure access to dual-use technologies critical to their 

common defense. 

Decisive action is now necessary to redefine the alliance. 

Lingering uncertainties about the Korean peninsula demand the 

establishment of clear rules for operational cooperation--- 

including acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA), 

base access, and host nation support. Future bilateral cooperation 

in theater missile defense will depend on agreement on joint 

operational requirements reached in the near term. The 

commitment of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to the 

development of redundant (possibly destabilizing) systems for 

long-range airlift, maritime support, and perhaps satellite 

surveillance will be determined in large measure by forwardlooking U.S. policies to improve interoperability and intelligence 

sharing for Japan's peacekeeping operation (PKO) missions. 

Indeed, U.S. actions and initiatives to redefine the overall security 

parmership with Japan must be carefully considered during this 

time of comprehensive reassessment in Japan. 
4 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

A NEW SITUATION 

In the past, the pressure of bipolar competition gave the U.S.- 

Japan security relationship a linear simplicity. Each decision to 

expand defense capabilities or burden sharing drew Japan further 

into the Westem Alliance. New roles and missions for the Japan 

Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)--such as the 1981 pledge to assume 

responsibility for sea-lane defense out to 1,000 nautical 

miles--were legitimized by U.S. strategies to contain the Soviet 

Union. 9 For Japan's internationalists and defense hawks alike, 

U.S. pressure was critical for developing domestic support for an 

expanded Japanese security role. The last decade of the Cold 

War saw rapid public acceptance in Japan of expanded bilateral 

security relations---reinforced by tight-knit professional ties 

between the two countries' military and policy communities. 

This close defense relationship was not just the natural 

byproduct of a common external threat; the alliance was nurtured 

from within. On the U.S. side, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the U.S. Department of State, the National Security 

Council, the U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Forces Japan had 

a comprehensive vision for the role Japan was to play within the 

alliance. That vision was launched with the Carter 

Administration's 1978 agreement on U.S.-Japan Guidelines for 

Defense Cooperation and reinforced by the Reagan 

Administration's 1982 articulation of the "Roles and Missions" 

approach to defense relationships with Japan. Key members of 

Congress and the academic community added their political and 

intellectual weight to the interagency planning on Japan. This 

community was interconnected with an expanded defense 

constituency within Tokyo, including the Foreign Ministry's 

North American Affairs Bureau, the JDA, the JSDF and key 

members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who 

oversaw alliance relations as part of the defense zoku (caucus). 

This network of interagency and intergovemmental alliances 

helped the United States win Japanese commitments to the 

Strategic Defense Initiative, expanded host nation support, sea 

lane defense, the advanced fighter aircraft (FSX), joint military 
PATRICK M. CRONIN and MICHAEL J. GREEN 5 

technology transfers, and myriad other issues critical to U.S. 

strategy in Asia. The relationship worked because both sides had 

invested considerable time and effort into developing a common 

security agenda. 

The critical factor in developing this relationship on the 

Japanese side was, however, never the Soviet threat. If anything, 

constitutional sensitivities made Japanese policy makers hesitant 

to cite the Soviet military as an explicit justification for assuming 

new roles within the alliance (although the implicit justification 

was always there for military planners). Expanded Japanese 

defense cooperation with the United States had its own merits: 

It counterbalanced growing trade friction with the United States, 

and it brought pressure on Japan's more passive bureaucrats and 

politicians to accept a larger responsibility in global affairs. 

The end of the Cold War had the greatest impact on U.S. 

policy toward the alliance. A growing preoccupation with 

economic a_flairs broke apart the interagency coordination on the 

defense relationship with Japan. Japanese policy makers, 

formerly accustomed to working with DoD to develop strategies 

for quick domestic acceptance of new Japanese commitments to 

the alliance, have been accosted with what at times seem to them 

to be uncoordinated demands for two-way technology flows, 

TMD, and host nation support. Once managing alliance relations 

would have been an opportunity for Japanese officials or 

politicians to contribute directly to their nation's new 

international agenda. Now they wonder whether it is not more 

akin to trade negotiations. 

On the Japanese side, the alliance network survived waning 

U.S. interest for a short time, but since the Gulf War it has 

eroded rapidly. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) defense 

caucus, once a crucial actor in building interfactional support in 

the political world for new alliance initiatives, is now scattered. 1° 

Those politicians who are still concerned with defense issues are 

focused on preserving the JDA budget. Within the Foreign 

Ministry, the silver ring is now membership on the U.N. Security 

Council. Some of the strategic thinkers are moving from the 
6 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

North American Affairs Bureau's Security Division into the Asia 

Bureau and the newly created Policy Planning Bureau (once the 

U.N. Bureau). The critical human bonds of the alliance seem 

somewhat diminished from the recent past. JDA and JSDF 

strategists have built their current force structure on the premise 

of U.S.-Japan interoperability, but long-range planning papers are 

focusing on the need for achieving more balanced capabilities. 

These shifting patterns at the working level of Japanese 

alliance management are taking place against the backdrop of 

profound shifts in Japan's political world. The LDP and 

Socialists, once bitter foes (particularly over security policy), 

have joined forces with the smaller Sakigake "Harbinger" Party 

to seize power back from the reform coalition launched by 

Morihiro Hosokawa and inherited by Tsutomu Hata. Prime 

Minister Tomiichi Murayama frequently attacked Japan's 

commilment to the alliance, so in order to join the govemment, 

he and his party were forced to renounce their previous 

ideologies. Anti-U.S. pacifism in the SDP has been replaced 

with studied disinterest in security ties to the United States. In 

the LDP, meanwhile, defense is viewed as an unnecessary irritant 

in coalition relations, something to be managed with as little 

exposure to daylight as possible. Under the surface, however, the 

LDP leadership holds a variety of views regarding Japan's future 

security policy. Some, like Foreign Minister Yohei Kono, would 

put more emphasis on Japan's multilateral dialogue in Asia. 

Others, like MITI Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto or Transport 

Minister Shizuka Kamei, would strengthen Japan's autonomous 

defense capabilities. There are still many, like former Prime 

Minister Noboru Takeshita who know from direct experience the 

importance of strengthening U.S.-Japan security ties. These 

views should resurface when the Socialists are merged into new 

parties or eliminated by elections. 

It seems increasingly likely that Prime Minister Murayama's 

diverse coalition could survive into late 1995, on the ironic 

grounds that a divisive security debate over North Korea has 

been averted by apparently successful U.S. negotiations with 
PATRICK M. CRONIN and MICHAEL J. GREEN 7 

Pyongyang. The Govemment of Japan will now focus on tax 

reform and budget distribution, two important elements in 

winning electoral support for the future. It will be a difficult 

environment in which to push new initiatives for the alliance. 

Nevertheless, 1995 will be a critical juncture for engaging 

Japan's political leadership in a new security dialogue. The 

process of introducing electoral reform in the Diet has already 

split the LDP and led to the recent series of coalitions. The 

process of implementing this electoral reform package will shake 

the political parties apart even more. New election rules (from 

multi- to single-seat districts) will spark the emergence of new 

political leaders and new political alliances (and eventually 

parties). Security policy issues will be important determinants in 

this restructuring, just as they were in the formation of the LDP 

back in 1955. The good news is that the Socialists' acceptance 

of the constitutionality of the JSDF and the alliance has removed 

the possibility that any major new party will be created on an 

anti-U.S.-Japan alliance platform. The bad news is that U.S. 

neglect of the alliance could tempt ambitious conservative 

politicians to call for more independent Japanese security roles in 

their political platforms, or to advocate a shifting of Japanese 

budget resources away from alliance themes such as host nation 

support and TMD towards domestic priorities. It is therefore 

crucial that the interests of the United States in the Japanese 

defense policy debate be felt soon. 

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM 

OUTLINE REVIEW 

Of all the issues affecting the future course and management of 

the alliance, none is as critical as the outcome of Japan's review 

of its National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). The Japanese 

Govemment's defense planning is based on parameters set in the 

1976 NDPO. Early in 1994 Morihiro Hosokawa as Prime 

Minister established a special advisory panel to begin 

deliberations on restructuring the NDPO to reflect current 

strategic trends. The panel presented its report, The Mod~lity of 
8 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for 

the 21st Century, to Prime Minister Murayama on August 12, 

1994 (see appendix A). The next step was supposed to be a 

cabinet level, interagency review of the document, but it is not 

clear whether Murayama had sufficient interest in the NDPO 

issue to proceed with his predecessor's original schedule. Even 

if it never receives a quick response from the cabinet, the 

advisory panel's report will stand as a powerful guide for security 

policy planners in Japan. The report was prepared with only 

limited input from the United States. While it is important not 

to over-react to what is officially an advisory panel's conceptual 

framework, elements of the report do have troubling implications 

for Japan's alliance policy and require clarification. 

The report's main recommendation is that Japan formulate a 

new comprehensive security strategy for the post-Cold War world 

resting on three pillars: multilateral cooperation, alliance with the 

United States, and a modem and efficient military. Japan's 

primary security priority, according to the report, is to empower 

the Government of Japan to respond more effectively to crises, 

from the Cabinet level on down. The report emphasizes 

enhancing intelligence and early-warning capabilities, revamping 

bureaucratic and legal mechanisms for decisionmaking, and 

introducing greater mobility and autonomy to the JSDF. 

The report does contain positive statements regarding U.S.- 

Japan defense cooperation. For instance, it boasts of a new 

"alliance for peace" between Washington and Tokyo. Noting the 

"essentiality" of the U.S.-Japan security system, it urges both 

sides to reaffirm the alliance's rationale while making "systemic 

improvements" that clarify bilateral roles and missions. The 

report makes specific reference to the need for "introducing a 

missile defense system in collaboration with the United States," 

providing host nation support, and improving combined 

operational planning. It also calls for a NATO-style acquisition 

and cross-servicing agreement and the establishment of joint 

research, development, and production with the United States. 
PATRICK M. CRONIN and MICHAEL J. GREEN 9 

The report's attention to strengthening the bilateral defense 

relationship with the United States is overshadowed, however, by 

the emphasis given to multilateralism and autonomous 

capabilities. The multilateral agenda fbcuses on expanded 

participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and regional 

forums such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia 

Pacific and the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 

Regional Forum. Although the report calls for U.S.-centered 

multilateralism, it does not explain how the alliance roles and 

missions will be related to the JSDF's new multilateral agenda. 

As it now stands, the report's recommendations suggest that 

multilateralism is a hedge against waning U.S. commitments to 

the alliance, and possibly even a distraction (in terms of political 

and financial resources) from bilateral defense cooperation. 

After the essential mission of the defense of Japan, the report 

contends that peacekeeping is the major mission of the 

Self-Defense Forces. Almost all recommendations for 

restructuring or redirecting the future of the JSDF at least 

implicitly revolve around the mission of peacekeeping operations: 

• Restructuring ground units for operations other than war 

and noncombat humanitarian operations 

• Shifting the GSDF away from large, slow-moving 

platforms to more mobile systems 

• Emphasizing greater joinlness among the three services 

• Upgrading intelligence, especially imagery intelligence 

• Building long-range transport aircraft, studying a midair 

refueling capability, and acquiring more maritime support ships 

to provide greater sustainability at sea 

• Bolstering research and education, including foreign 

language and international relations experts. 

Reflecting in part concerns raised about Japan's ability to respond 

during the Gulf War or a potential conflict on the Korean 

peninsula, the report also recommends that Japan reorganize, 

augment, and streamline its national security apparatus to allow 

swift and material responses to future crises. But, at least under 

current constitutional interpretations, such responses would have 
10 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

to be part of limited U.N. peace operations. 

Lacking a proximate threat, the report consistently refers to 

the opaque and uncertain security environment of the post-Cold 

War era. To the extent that it details any specific dangers to 

Japan, the report refers to the following: "interference in the 

safety of maritime traffic, violation of territory air space, limited 

missile attack, illegal occupation of a part of the country, terrorist 

acts, and influence of armed refugees." Along with the uncertain 

nature of these dangers, doubts about U.S. willingness and 

capability to defend Japan against them, and a clear desire on the 

part of the report's authors for Japan to contribute more directly 

to its own national defense, the report emphasizes that "the 

ultimate foundation of security lies in the determination of a 

people to defend themselves and in holding the appropriate 

means of doing so." 

Because the report's emphasis on new multilateral security 

roles and autonomous capabilities is not necessarily in 

contradiction with the alliance, the U.S. Government should seek 

to work in tandem with Japan on multilateral security issues. 

Without a more explicit articulation of how these new roles and 

missions will be coordinated with the United States, however, the 

report could have the perverse effect of undermining bilateral 

security cooperation in the long run. 

The National Defense Program Outline advisory report's 

great weakness as a bilateral document is also the source of its 

domestic influence: ambiguity. The hedging strategy suggested 

in its pages is a reflection of uncertainty about U.S. intentions 

and Japanese domestic political developments. The multilateral 

agenda, for example, could alternately be used as legitimization 

for scaling back Japanese defense spending, or for expanding 

defense spending, since multilateraiism rests on "individual 

nations possessing their own capability of managing or dealing 

with crises." Similarly, the report's recommendations for greater 

autonomous capabilities in satellite surveillance and airlift could 

be met indigenously----or by greater access to U.S. capabilities. 

The choice will be determined largely by U.S. actions. 
PATRICK M. CRONIN and MICHAEL J. GREEN 11 

KEY ISSUES 

The United States and Japan will face a number of key issues 

over the next year that provide a first opportunity for 

reinvigorating and redefining the management of the alliance. 

Host Nation Support 

Although host nation support has always been politically 

controversial in Japan, the Foreign Ministry and leadership in the 

LDP have never failed to deliver. Under the current process of 

political restructuring, however, the LDP's ability to contain 

opposition to host nation support is under challenge. The 

Ministry of Finance has threatened major reductions in the JDA 

budget, and many in Japan feel that equity requires the United 

States to take a fair share of the funding cuts. Meanwhile, some 

politicians see advantages in leading a movement against host 

nation support. For decades, U.S. bases were located in multiseat 

districts where the LDP worked hard to guarantee the election of 

at least one pro-base candidate. These candidates, in turn, 

restrained local opposition with generous distribution of base 

countermeasure funds. Under the new single-seat system, this 

firebreak against local resentment of bases will vanish. 

Moreover, given the pressure on the higher levels of political 

leadership to build new constituencies, U.S. bases will become 

attractive targets for the creation of new public works projects 

such as international airports and public housing. The head of the 

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Minister 

Ryutaro Hashimoto, and nationalist Shintaro Ishihara have 

already submitted a paper to the LDP leadership calling for 

eventual removal of U.S. bases. In short, the political situation 

surrounding host nation support will get worse before it gets 

better. 

Already the JDA has suggested that increases in host nation 

support will be difficult to meet. 1~ Foreign Minister Kono has 

declared that Japan will meet its "international obligation" this 

year, however, Japan's commitment to outyears, is arnbiguous. 
12 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

The Defense Department cannot pressure Japan for host nation 

support in isolation from the rest of the alliance relationship. The 

NDPO advisory report suggests that the United States and Japan 

should improve the combined operational use of the bases, which 

requires greater attention to interoperability across the board. 

The caretakers of the alliance in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

(MOFA), JDA, and the political parties all recognize the 

symbolic and substantive importance of host nation support, but 

they need political support from DoD to reaffirm the advantages 

to the rest of the Japanese Government. 

Theater Missile Defense 

Japanese industry, conservative politicians within and outside the 

ruling coalition, the JSDF, and the leadership of the DA are 

generally convinced of the strategic, technological and political 

importance of entering into a missile defense system with the 

United States. But there remain some strongly discordant chords 

within Japan, particularly those concemed with the costeffectiveness of missile defenses. 12 

The reasons for the JDA cold feet are unclear, but they might 

stem from any combination of the following four issues: First, 

because the Socialists have come out in opposition to TMD at 

their party plenum, JDA officials may be reluctant to pursue 

officially a policy attacked by their prime minister's party. 

Second, the Japanese Government is still skeptical about the U.S. 

ability to deploy TMD. (There is no precedent for Japan making 

a commitment to participate in a system that the United States 

has not yet successfully deployed.) Third, the Japanese 

Govemment and industry want to establish their own track record 

on TMD before joining the United States in an architecture study 

that might relegate them to the role of third-tier suppliers of dualuse technology, rather than full partners in systems development. 

Finally, the JDA may be unable to convince the Ministry of 

Finance to provide sufficient funding for participation in an 

architecture study this year. 
PATRICK M. CRONIN and MICHAEL J. GREEN 13 

The long-term prospects for Japanese participation in TMD 

are good. Nevertheless, for the short term, that participation will 

have to be limited to studies that discourage a divergence in 

Japanese planning and educate the broader Japanese policy 

audience to the U.S. commitment and capacity to deploy 

TMD---with or without--Japanese participation. 

Technology, Procurement, and Arms Exports 

The Japanese Govemment recognizes that achieving some degree 

of success on the TFT initiative is important to the future 

viability of the alliance. JDA is responding to the initiative by 

expanding the joint development of subsystems under the 

Systems and Technology Forum. DoD would like access to 

Japanese dual-use technology, particularly in the areas of 

composite materials, microelectronics, fuzzy logic, and fiat panel 

displays. These are all areas dominated by private industry 

outside the usual defense contracting community. JDA, and even 

MITI, will be of only marginal assistance unless DoD is willing 

to increase political pressure on Japan--an action that would have 

an extremely detrimental impact on other areas of the alliance 

relationship. Ultimately, reciprocity in dual-use technology can 

be achieved only by expanded industry-to-industry contact. U.S. 

industry would be motivated first by the prospect of receiving 

research and development funding and only secondly by access 

to Japanese technology. In short, TFT will depend on DoD's 

willingness to create financial incentives for cross-national 

industry teaming on research and development projects that then 

lead to transfer of Japanese dual-use technology to the United 

States. 

Japanese industry and MITI see in the TFT an opportunity to 

relax the Three Arms Export Principles (essentially a ban on 

defense exports). 13 Such a relaxation, or "clarification" of policy, 

would be necessary for TFT to succeed at all. Japanese 

industry's immediate goal is greater interaction with U.S. industry 

in order to increase domestic offsets (and avoid forced off-theshelf purchases like the Multiple Launch Rocket System and 
14 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

AWACS). In the short term, that situation would enhance U.S. 

efforts to integrate Japanese technology into U.S. systems, and it 

would enhance interoperability; in the longer term, it could open 

the way for Japanese exports to third countries. For that reason, 

the DoD must be careful to push for more "clarification" than 

"relaxation" in discussions with the Government of Japan 

regarding arms export policies. 

Finally, it is important to recall that Japanese industry has 

pursued indigenization of defense production ("kokusanka") 

throughout the postwar period. The increasing complexity of 

defense systems has raised the costs of autonomous development 

for Japan in terms of the impact on military efficiency. U.S. 

tolerance for Japanese indigenization has also declined since 

FSX. Nevertheless, Japanese industry believes it has the 

capability to pursue indigenous development of fighters, surfaceto-air missiles, reconnaissance satellites, and other systems. 

Industry and advocates of autonomy in the government will seize 

upon any DoD efforts to restrict Japanese access to U.S. 

technologies in these areas. To the extent DoD can provide 

interoperable support for Japanese forces in areas such as lift, 

recounaissance satellites, radar and refueling, that contribution 

would restrain the drive for indigenous capabilities that might be 

redundant or provocative. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

The United States has three major objectives in its security 

relationship with Japan. 

• We need the alliance to maintain our forward presence 

and preserve the balance of power in Asia. 

• We want Japan to play a more active role in partnership 

with the United States to address new threats to the security of 

the region--such as increased bilateral coordination on nonproliferation, PKO, sea lane defense, and TMD. 

• We want Japan to refrain from developing new unilateral 

missions or capabilities that are distractions from the alliance or 

provocations to other powers in the region. 
PATRICK M. CRONIN and MICHAEL J. GREEN 15 

It is imperative to focus on all three objectives 

simultaneously with Japan. Improved access to Japanese bases 

and host nation support can be built only on a trusting 

relationship in which senior Japanese defense officials and 

political figures are engaged in a bilateral process of defining 

new roles and missions. For the same reasons, Washington 

cannot attempt to discourage Japanese departures into new 

unilateral defense roles or capabilities without offering 

comparable roles within the alliance framework. What is 

required is a comprehensive dialogue with Japan on new bilateral 

roles and missions. 

The political situation in Japan creates a difficult environment 

for engaging in this bilateral process, but the dialogue should 

begin now so that Japanese defense planners are not working in 

a vacuum. The groundwork can be laid for political decisions in 

12 to 18 months hence (after elections have realigned Japan's 

political parties). 

The model for DoD action should be the 1978 U.S.-Japan 

Defense Guidelines. The original 1976 National Defense 

Program Outline reaffirmed the alliance as the basis for Japanese 

defense planning, and the 1978 Guidelines followed as a 

necessary articulation of how expanded defense cooperation 

would be implemented. The current NDPO review process 

should also be accompanied by a specific plan for bilateral 

defense cooperation that ensures that Japan's exploration of new 

security modalities serves U.S. interests. 

Like the 1978 agreement, the new guidelines ought to 

emanate from a year-long, bilateral planning process. That 

process ought to begin with the establishment of a strong 

working relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and their colleagues in the 

Japanese Govemment. It must have the clear endorsement of the 

Secretary of Defense and go beyond regular bilateral meetings. 

Finally, it should include an intra- and inter-agency debate on 
16 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

how to harness Japan's economic, technological and political 

assets to our common security agenda. 

The new Guidelines for Comprehensive Security Cooperation 

should reflect the specific policy objectives of DoD Acquisition, 

DoD Policy, U.S Forces Japan, the Department of State, NSC, 

and, of course, their counterparts in the Japanese Govemment. 

Critical items in that agenda will include: 

• Improving Japanese operational support for U.S. forces 

(including ACSA) 

• Improving U.S. operational support for new Japanese 

missions such as PKO (including joint training, air and sealift, 

and logistical support) 

• Improving intelligence sharing 

• Coordinating regional multilateral security initiatives (at 

the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), etc.) before presenting them 

to the rest of the region 

• Cooperating on TMD 

• Increasing the joint operation of bases in Japan 

• Clarifying the long-term commitment to host nation 

support 

• Establishing industry working groups on TFr 

• Clarifying the Three Arms Export Principles 

• Increasing informational exchanges on procurement and 

defense industrial base planning (to seek out redundancies on the 

Japanese side and potential new areas for armaments 

cooperation). 

To conclude, the U.S-Japaal alliance is not on the verge of 

expiration, but it does need a boost, especially during this critical 

time in Japan. The 1993 Aspen Strategy Group report, Harness 

the Rising Sun, ~4 made the brief for a new U.S.-Japan strategy 

incorporating four critical elements: 

• A clear conception of U.S. national objectives 

implemented in ways that capitalize on the mutual interests of the 

two countries 

• Integration of economic and security interests, which the 

United States decoupled during the Cold War 
PATRICK M. CRONIN and MICHAEL J. GREEN 17 

• Institutional expression, both domestically and 

internationally 

• A broad strategic vision that places the U.S.-Japan 

relationship in the context of America's global strategy. 

This fourfold strategy remains sound. It is also squarely in 

Japan's strategic interest. As one noted Japanese security expert 

put it, "From the moment that the Japan-U.S. alliance breaks 

down, Japan will start having enormous difficulties in its 

relationship with other Asian countries. Nor will these 

difficulties be limited to Asia. ''15 Now all that remains is for U.S. 

and Japanese political leaders to implement it with a clear sense 

of the long-term mutual benefits that will accrue. In the year 

ahead, as we approach the 50th anniversary of the end of World 

War II, officials in both countries should make it a high priority 

to redefine the alliance in terms of new global realities, deepen 

the level of trust and understanding between our two 

govemments, and strengthen our mutual interdependence and 

military interoperability. 

Notes 

1. For instance, as few as 5 years ago it would have been 

unthinkable for a major Southeast Asian leader to admonish Japan to 

stop apologizing for World War II and start conducting more 

peacekeeping operations as a member of the United Nations Security 

Council. Yet that is precisely what Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 

Mohamad told Japanese Prime Minister Murayama in August 1994. 

See "Mahathir to Japan: 'Drop War Apologies, Join UNSC, Become 

Peacekeeper'," The Daily Japan Digest, 29 August 1994. 

2. The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: 

The Outlook for the 21st Century, Advisory Group on Defense Issues 

(Tokyo, August 12, 1994). 

3. The Social Democratic Party of Japan announced in July 1994 

that it was recognizing the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces 

and abandoning the goal of unarmed neutrality--reversing a position 

held for more than three decades. See, inter alia, "Socialists Recognize 

SDF," The Japan Times, 29 July 1994. 
18 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

4. The August 1994 advisory report on defense issues to the 

Prime Minister elevates multilateral and unilateral security initiatives 

relative to the bilateral alliance with the U.S. In so doing, this highlevel advisory report followed Japanese economic trends toward greater 

emphasis on "Asianizationo" For instance, the 1994 white paper on 

economic cooperation, released in June 1994 by the Ministry of 

International Trade and Industry (MITI), calls on Japan to activate the 

world economy by supporting efforts among Asian economies to 

maintain and expand their "growth dynamism." The MITI white paper 

described the newly industrializing economies in Asia and the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations as "the growth center for world 

economic development." See "White Paper on Cooperation with Asian 

Nations," Kyodo News Service, 3 June 1994, reprinted in FBIS-EAS-94- 

107, 3 June 1994. 

5. A discernible shift in Japanese public opinion is perhaps one 

symptom of this phenomenon. For example, one poll conducted in 

early 1994 by Yomiuri and Gallup revealed that the percentage of 

Japanese who consider the U.S. their most trustworthy ally slipped 6 

percent from 1992 to a record low 45 percent. Cited in The Daily 

Japan Digest, 8 May 1994. Similarly, Japanese public opinion is 

increasingly agreeable to an expansion of Japan's leadership role. 

According to an Asahi Shimbun poll taken in March 1994, well over 

half (55 percent) of the Japanese public think Japan should become a 

permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. That percentage is 

likely to grow as political leaders in Japan make the case for Japanese 

leadership. See USIA Opinion Research Memorandum, "Japanese 

Support for More Active Role in World Affairs," 27 June 1994. 

6. The August 1994 "Higuchi Commission" advisory report to the 

Prime Minister (printed as appendix A of this document) contains a 

number of quotations that appear to raise questions about taboos being 

broken, whittled away, or reconsidered. For instance, the report asserts, 

"It is vitally important to maintain autonomy and independence in 

equipment procurement and defense-related technology." Furthermore, 

in addition to calling for building long-range airlift and studying midnir 

refueling capabilities, the report recommends that the Ground SelfDefense Force (GSDF) "be restructured into multifunctional units with 

emphasis on the capability to fulFtll diverse duties . .. at home and 

abroad." Finally, the report supports "the use of reconnaissance 

satellites" and recommends that "Japan itself should hold the capability 
PATRICK M. CRONIN and MICHAEL J. GREEN 19 

of dealing with and defending against ballistic missiles." Concerns of 

a Japanese nuclear capability are fueled mostly by a combination of 

Japanese technological and scientific prowess and worst-case projections 

about likely Japanese responses to nuclear proliferation in Northeast 

Asia. Japanese officials are quick to denounce any interest in abjuring 

their country's anti-nuclear posture, which is why Tokyo tried to control 

the media fallout after then-Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata acknowledged 

that Japan had the capability to produce nuclear weapons. See, inter 

alia, David E. Sanger, "In Face-Saving Turn, Japan Denies Nuclear 

Know-How," The New York Times, 22 June 1994. 

7. The character of this misreading of American power and its 

commitment to Japan have been set out in Patrick Cronin, "Japan 

Rethinks the Alliance," PACNET No. 24, 21 July 1994. 

8. The comment is from Yoshikazu Nakasone, General-Secretary 

of the Okinawa Center for Peace Activity, an alliance of labor and 

antiwar groups, quoted in Charges A. Radin, Boston Globe, 3 October 

1994. 

9. The commitment was announced at a summit meeting in June 

1981 between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Zenko 

Suzuki. At the time, few understood the implications of that 

declaration. Now it is obvious that the policy shift--undertaken at the 

request of the Reagan Administration in order to increase Japanese 

weapons procurement from the U.S.--provided the rationale for 

concrete additions to Japan's military platforms, from additional P-3C 

antisubmarine patrol aircraft, to Airbome Warning and Control System 

(AWACS) aircraft and state-of-the-art Aegis ships. See Joseph P. 

Keddell, Jr., The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and 

External Pressures (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp, 1993), 112-113. 

10. This diminution of political support for the alliance can be 

inferred from recent comments made by LDP members. For instance, 

the Deputy Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party's Foreign Affairs 

Research Council, Kousuke Ito, recently announced that "The time has 

come for us to review the existence of all these [U.S.] bases." 

Similarly, Taro Nakayama, a former Foreign Minister and chairman of 

the Foreign Affairs Research Council, added that "We need to consider 

these questions from the perspective of the Asia-Pacific region as a 

whole, not from the narrow perspective of the bilateral relationship." 

See James Sterngold, "Some Leaders in Japan Begin to question U.S. 

Bases," The New York Times, 28 August 1994. 
20 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

11. For instance, see "Japanese Budget Lacks $125M for U.S. 

Bases," Pacific Stars & Stripes, 1 September 1994; "'Limitless Growth' 

of USFJ Costs Reviewed," Mainichi Shimbun, 19 August 1994, in 

FBIS-EAS-94-162, 22 August 1994; and "DA to H',dve Extra Spending 

for U.S. Bases," Kyodo News Service, 24 August 1994 in FBIS-EAS94-164. 

12. For example, "Reconsider TMD," Mainichi Daily News, 29 

September 1994, and Sadao Sakai, "Improbable Missile Defense," The 

Japan Times, 29 September 1994. 

13. Japan's Three Principles on Arms Export, declared in 1967 by 

the Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, provide that arms exports to the 

following countries shall not be permitted: Communist Bloc countries; 

countries to which the export of arms is prohibited under United 

Nations resolution; and countries involved or likely to become involved 

in international conflicts. 

14. Harness the Rising Sun: An American Strategy for Managing 

Japan's Rise as a Global Power (Lanham, MD: University Press of 

America, Inc., 1993). 

15. Takeshi Kondo, "Security Ties Unaffected by Trade Friction," 

Securitarian, 1 July 1994, 12-15, in FBIS-EAS-94-199, 14 October 

1994. 
APPENDIX A: 

THE MODALITY OF THE SECURITY AND 

DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF JAPAN: 

The Outlook for the 21 st Century 

On August 12, 1994, after 5 months of intensive deliberations, the 

advisory panel created by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa to review 

Japan's basic defense posture released its final report, "The Modality 

of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 

21st Century." 

The advisory group was chaired by a senior representative from the 

business worM: Mr. Hirotaro Higuchi, Chairman of the Board, Asahi 

Breweries, Ltd. Two members of the nine-member panel possessed 

extensive defense experience: Mr. Seiki Nishihiro, the venerable former 

Administrative Vice Minister of the Japan Defense Agency, and Admiral 

Makoto Sakuma, the recently retired Chairman of the Joint Defense 

Council. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was indirectly represented by 

Yoshio Okawara,former Ambassador to the United States, and currently 

Executive Adviser to Keidanren. Academe was ably represented by 

Professors Akio Watanabe of Aoyama Gakuin University and Kuniko 

lnoguchi of Sophia University. The panel's other members were Ken 

Moroi, Chairman, Chichibu Cement Co., Ltd., Toyoo Gyoten, Chairman 

of the Board of Directors, the Bank of Tokyo, Ltd., and Shinji 

Fukukawa, Vice Chairman of the Board, Kobe Steel, Ltd. 

The panel convened for its first session on 28 February 1994, with 

an address by Prime Minister Hosokawa. The panel then conducted 

some 15 meetings over the subsequent 4 months to listen to briefings 

and discuss myriad issues, ranging from the regional security situation, 

to personnel resources and readiness, to the U.S.-Japan alliance, to 

peacekeeping, arms control, and intelligence issues. In mid-July the 

panel convened to listen to an address from the new Prime Minister, 

Torniichi Murayama. The report was then drafted in July and delivered 

to Prime Minister Murayama on 12 August. The advisory report has 

been translated and reprinted here in order to make it accessible to a 

much wider audience than the Japanese version alone. 

21 
22 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

AUGUST 12, 1994 

ADVISORY GROUP ON DEFENSE ISSUES 

FOREWORD 

Nearly half a century has passed since the Japanese people recovered 

from the physical and spiritual ruin caused by World War II and, 

bearing a deep sense of self-reproach, started building a new Japan. At 

the same time, the world, having overcome the long ordeals of the Cold 

War, is seeking to create a new era half with hope, half with anxiety. 

Japan, too, faces an urgent need to reconsider its future course with a 

view to the 21st century. From this standpoint, the modality of the 

security and defense capability of Japan has reached the stage where a 

fundamental review must be done. 

When postwar Japan made a new start, we were given a new 

framework of basic national policies, externally by the United Nations 

Charter and internally by the Constitution. However, the ideal of 

collective security upheld by a United Nations still in its infancy rapidly 

lost its basis for realization as it was exposed to the stern realities of 

international politics. Governments realized anew that self-defense 

capability was the best assurance of national security. Furthermore, the 

major nations were in a state of confrontation centering on the two 

superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and realized they 

had no alternative but to ensure national security through an alliance of 

nations sharing common interests and values. Thus the Japan-U.S. 

Security Treaty was chosen as the realistic basis of postwar Japan's 

security policy. 

Japan returned to the postwar international community in April 

1952 with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, making that choice after 

serious discussions. Since then, while cooperating with the United 

States (which assumed the largest share of the responsibility of 

maintaining international order), Japan has achieved an economic 

recovery, and contributed to transforming the Asia-Pacific region, which 

was half a century ago plagued by war and poverty, into a region of 

peace and prosperity. Looking back, it can be said that Japan's path 

was, on the whole, correct. 

Now that the Cold War has ended, the world is searching for a new 

order. In these circumstances, there is a mood in Japan to reconsider 

the modality of its security and defense capability as a central question 
APPENDIX A 23 

of national politics. The Japanese people, who lived in an "unstable 

peace" during the Cold War, are beginning to deal seriously with the 

questions of world peace and national security in the future by returning 

to the starting point with a fresh mind. 

This forum, created five months ago as a nonstatutory advisory 

group for the Prime Minister, has since continued discussions with a 

view to reviewing the National Defense Program Outline, which has 

served as the guideline for the modality of the nation's defense 

capability, and presented ideas that would form the basis of an 

alternative guideline. The task of this advisory group is to define a 

direction of security policy appropriate to the new era and, on that basis, 

propose a new modality of defense capability while taking into account 

changes in the post-Cold War international situation and also various 

changes facing Japanese society itself. 

CHAPTER 1. THE WORLD AND THE ASIAPACIFIC AFTER THE COLD WAR 

THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND QUALITATIVE 

CHANGES IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 

The pattern of East-West confrontation, which formed the basic 

framework of international politics for nearly half a century following 

the end of World War II, collapsed with the Berlin Wall. As Western 

nations centering on the United States fLrmly maintained freedom and 

democracy and achieved steady economic development in the process, 

the Soviet Union and other socialist nations found themselves left far 

behind in the economic and technological race. The reforms undertaken 

by the Soviet Union to reverse the setback and rebuild itself as a great 

power produced unintended results in the form of the collapse of the 

socialist system in one East European nation after another and, finally, 

the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself. The demise of the Warsaw 

Pact was a stark testimony to the end of the Cold War. 

Not all regions experienced the effects of U.S.-Soviet confrontation 

in the same manner during the Cold War, and in turn the end of the 

Cold War produced different effects in various regions and countries. 

However, as for the security question, there is no denying that the Cold 

War impacted every comer of the globe. The security environment also 

changed significantly with the termination of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. 

While clearly visible threats have disappeared and moves toward arms 
24 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

control and disarmament have made some progress centering on the 

United States, Russia and Europe, we find ourselves in an opaque and 

uncertain situation. In other words, there exist dangers of various 

qualities difficult to identify, and it is hard to predict in what forms 

such dangers would threaten our security. The sense of security has 

increased in that we have been freed from the "balance of terror" that 

might have collapsed at any moment. At the same time, however, it 

can be said that we confront a more difficult security environment 

because that we must prepare for unpredictable dangers and maintain a 

stance of responding quickly to such dangers. We cannot remain 

insensitive to the new security problems that presented themselves with 

the ending of the Cold War. 

MULTILATERAL COOPERATION CENTERING ON THE 

UNITED STATES 

The realistic basis of the security environment consists of two 

factors--modes of military power and international regimes for keeping 

peace. The U.S. supremacy in military power has become even more 

strengthened with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The network of 

U.S.-centered alliances built during the Cold War is likely to be 

maintained as a stabilizing factor in international relations. The most 

typical examples of these alliances are the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 

and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There is little 

possibility that any major nation with both the intention and the capacity 

to challenge U.S. military power head on will emerge in the near future. 

However, the United States no longer holds an overwhelming 

advantage in terms of overall national strength. Particularly in the 

economic field, competition between the United States and other 

industrialized countries-~and the newly industrializing economies as 

weUmis intensifying. Consequently, there is a possibility that 

competitive relations will intensify over economic issues---but it seems 

unlikely that this will trigger an arms race in the classic sense of the 

tenn. All nations want to avoid such an eventuality. It is expected, 

therefore, that in spite of somewhat intensified conflicts of economic 

interest, the U.S.-centered cooperative relationships in the military and 

security field will continue. 

The question is whether the United States, its preeminent military 

power notwithstanding, will be able to demonstrate leadership in 

multilateral cooperation, and the answer to the question will depend to 
APPENDIX A 25 

a certain extent on actions by nations in a position to cooperate with the 

United States. The mechanism of resolving security problems through 

international cooperation is still imperfect, but it is showing signs of 

developing little by little, both at the level of the United Nations and at 

the regional level. 

ROLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER REGIMES 

FOR COOPERATIVE SECURITY 

For the United Nations security mechanism to work it is essential that 

multilateral cooperation be maintained under U.S. leadership. During 

the period of serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation the United Nations was 

unable to function fully. In recent years, however, it has actively 

deployed peacekeeping operations, thus expanding the scope of activity 

both geographically and qualitatively. Whether the United Nations will 

be able to continue such operations in the future depends largely on 

how cooperation can be maintained not only among the five permanent 

members of the Security Council but also among all major nations, such 

as the Group of Seven, including Japan and Germany, both of which are 

making large financial contributions to the world body. 

The possibility of an all-out military showdown between major 

powers has decreased. On the other hand, particularly in areas where 

the social infrastructure is so fragile that the unity of a nation-state is 

nearly absent, conflicts among various forces have intensified across or 

inside borders and, in many cases, have developed into armed clashes. 

How to deal effectively with such relatively small-scale regional 

conflicts is now a major task for international peace. 

Meanwhile, as the fruits of economic development begin to spread 

to benefit many nations and regions beyond the boundary of a handful 

of industrialized nations, adjustment of economic interests has become 

more complex than ever before. For the moment, however, there are 

no indications that such economic problems will develop into military 

clashes. But if mishandled, such problems could develop into new 

problems that would threaten regional and even global security. In the 

Asia-Pacific region, which includes many nations whose state building 

has just gotten under way and are in the process of achieving dynamic 

economic development, it is especially necessary to pay close attention 

to tiffs kind of "danger. Lest the fruits of economic development 

increase political distrust because of conflicts of interest over such 

achievements, efforts to build a political relationship of trust on a 
26 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

regional scale must be emphasized from the viewpoint of security. 

FOUR TYPES OF LIKELY DANGER 

In the security environment that has these features, what types of danger 

are likely to occur in the future? 

First, direct military confrontation between major nations, such as 

developed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 

Cold War, is unlikely for the moment. Consequently, the possibility of 

a global military conflict is far smaller than before, if not nonexistent. 

For the time being, all major nations of the world will pay attention to 

domestic economic and social problems. Russia, which is experiencing 

a difficult transition from tile socialist system, and China, which is 

grappling with the task of transforming itself into a market economy, 

are no exceptions. The question is whether the five permanent members 

of the United Nations Security Council, including Russia and China, 

will continue to have the will and ability to play a constructive role in 

the international community in ways commensurate with their 

responsibilities. If cooperation among major nations centering on the 

United States is lost, the global security environment could deteriorate 

rapidly. 

Second, it is likely that localized military clashes will occur 

frequently and become more complex in nature. Such regional conflicts 

also occurred during the Cold War, but now there is a less of a 

relationship of regional conflicts to big-power interests, and it is easier 

for the international community to deal with such flareups. On the 

other hand, there is the danger that the situation will worsen in the 

absence of effective solutions, now that the coordinative capacity of big 

powers is less likely to work than it did during the Cold War era. 

Third, there is the increasing danger that weapons and arms-related 

technologies will proliferate. This would be both the cause and result 

of localized military clashes. In particular, if the proliferation of 

nuclear and chemical/biological weapons and missile technologies--not 

to mention conventional weapons---is left unchecked, the security of the 

entire international community will be threatened. Particularly grave is 

the danger that nuclear technologies and materials will flow out of the 

former Soviet Union and come into possession of those who do not 

abide by international rules. 

Fourth, regional military clashes of the kind described above would 

be induced by economic poverty and social discontent and by the 
APPENDIX A 27 

related loss of the ability to govern. For example, regions containing 

many of the poorest nations rich in resources but very low in stability 

require special attention. It seems that the solution of security 

problems will increasingly require not only responses by military means 

but also by multidimensional means, including economic and technical 

assistance. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN 

THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 

For the moment, any large-scale danger that would threaten the security 

of the international community is distant. But, with nations of the 

world becoming increasingly interdependent because of the economic 

and technological conditions of the modern society, even localized 

conflicts are likely to affect the entire international community. In 

particular, the Japanese economy is built on close relations with various 

parts of the world, including heavy dependence on Middle East oil. 

Therefore, the nation's security concerns are truly worldwide, but Japan 

cannot help having special concerns for the security of the Asia-Pacific 

region. What we have described with respect to the qualitative changes 

in global security problems in the post-Cold War world applies to the 

Asia-Pacific region as well. At the same time, this region, which is 

undergoing dynamic changes, as already stated, has a number of 

characteristics demanding special attention from the security standpoint. 

First, unlike the European nations that over the years have built 

advanced defenses to meet the strong military threat of the Soviet 

Union, the Asia-Pacific region did not experience such a dramatic 

change in its security environment with the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. On the contrary, there is no evidence that the level of military 

tension in this part of the world has rapidly declined, and nations of this 

region are generally more concerned about security problems than they 

have been and are devoting a considerable portion of their resources to 

the improvement of military power. 

For most Asians, the 50 years following the end of World War II 

was the creative period in which they built their nations and began to 

assert themselves as sovereign states in the international community. 

Nation building and national unification were major characteristics of 

Asian history in the Cold War period. Peoples of this region had an 

abundance of energy for social construction, causing Asia to become a 

convenient stage for the fierce leadership struggle on which the East and 
28 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

West staked their respective systems. 

Now that the Cold War is over and the influence of the two 

superpowers is relatively diminished, it is no wonder that Asian nations 

lull of youthful vitality are beginning to pursue their own security 

policies. At the root of their efforts to deal more seriously with security 

problems is the fact that power relationships in Asia are becoming fluid 

as a result of the end of the Cold War. Thus many nations in Asia, 

including China, now have political motives and economic foundations 

for improving their military power. This is the first characteristic of the 

security environment in this region. 

Second, the security system in the Asia-Pacific region is still in the 

immature, formative stages. The tensions across the Demilitarized Zone 

in the Korean peninsula are continuing amid the latent danger of nuclear 

proliferation. It will be no easy task to resolve the division of the 

peninsula between the northern and southern parts and achieve a 

sustainable political reconciliation. At this moment it is difficult to 

make predictions concerning the timing and mode of national 

unification, the character of a resultant unified state and the direction of 

its foreign policy. 

China, blessed with a stable international environment almost 

unprecedented in recent history, has devoted its maximum energy to 

modernization. However, there are various problems that remain 

unresolved, such as those that exist across Taiwan Stlait, the status of 

Hong Kong, and the widening economic disparity between the inland 

and coastal regions. In Indochina, the war in Cambodia has finally 

ended, and Vietnam and other nations are about to enter a period of 

economic construction. In Cambodia, however, there is still the danger 

of a recurrent military clash. There is also the possibility of a military 

clash among the interested nations over territorial claims to islands 

scattered off the coast of the Chinese mainland. All this shows that a 

fully stabilized political and military situation does not yet exist in this 

region. 

Third, importance must be attached to the geopolitical fact that the 

interests of some of the world's major military powers, namely the 

United States, Russia, and China, are concentrated in the Asia-Pacific 

region, particularly in the Northwest Pacific. Russia and China are 

continental states that traditionally have their foundations in the 

Eurasian continent. With their economic activities expanding, however, 

both nations are beginning to acquire the character of an oceanic state 
APPENDIX A 29 

with an eye to the Pacific. Moreover, all three nations are nuclear 

armed. In particular, Russia, as the nuclear-weapons state that faces the 

United States across the Arctic Zone, has strong concerns in the 

Northwest Pacific as well. The United States, meanwhile, will continue 

to have interest in this region, not only from the security viewpoint but 

also in light of its growing trade interests. Japan, situated as it is in 

Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific where the interests of these 

world military powers interact, cannot help but be sensitive to security 

problems in this region. 

Considering all these characteristics--the dynamism and energy of 

Asian nations, the immaturity of the security cooperation system, the 

interacting interests of major military powers, there are both positive 

and negative possibilities in the security environment of the Asia-Pacific 

region. The period in which Asia was merely the stage for the pursuit 

of interests by major powers is already over. It is unlikely that Asian 

nations that attained sovereignty in the second half of the 20th century 

will repeat a history of endless wars in the rest of this century and 

beyond, as European nations did in those centuries in which they 

devoted themselves to nation building through riv',dry in a narrow 

continent. Asia today is markedly different from Europe of those 

centuries not only geopolitically but also in terms of the historical 

circumstance. At any rate, there is little doubt that future developments 

in Asia will be an important determining factor in the future of global 

security, not only because the Asia-Pacific region abounds in 

opportunity but also because major nations are deeply involved in this 

part of the world. Concerned nations, including Japan, have great 

responsibilities. 

CHAPTER 2. BASIC THINKING ON JAPAN'S 

SECURITY POLICY AND DEFENSE CAPABILITY 

ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE SECURITY POLICY 

During the Cold War period international security problems were 

discussed with the focus on the development of bipolar tensions 

between the United States and the Soviet Union. In today's security 

problems that focus no longer exists. The cause of our sense of 

insecurity is the very opaqueness of the present international order in 

which the dangers that exist are dispersed and difficult to predict. On 

the other hand, however, there are emerging signs that a collective 
30 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

capacity to deal with conflicts will be developed through the 

cooperation of the United States and other major nations under the 

United Nations and other international regimes. These signs indicate a 

new direction. Various dangers exist in the present security 

environment, but the international community will be able, through 

cooperation, to prevent the development of conflicts, to contain the 

expansion of conflicts that have developed, and to take the initiative to 

remove the causes of conflict development. Thus there exist 

opportunities to create a more secure world, provided nations of the 

world take active and constructive moves to create a sustainable 

"structure of peace" in the spirit of cooperation. Under the present 

circumstances, however, nations must possess their own defense 

capabilities. Also we must not forget that our security is ensured by 

maintaining ties with our allies because we cannot defend ourselves 

alone. 

Japan should extricate itself from its security policy of the past that 

was, if anything, passive, and henceforth play an active role in shaping 

a new order. Indeed, Japan has the responsibility of playing such a 

role. Preventing the use of force as a means of settling international 

disputes is the intent of the United Nations Charter. That the 

international community will develop along these lines is extremely 

desirable for Japan in light of its national interests, since the nation is 

engaged in economic activities around the globe and yet resolved not to 

tread the path to a major military power. Consequently, pursuing an 

active and constructive security policy and making efforts in this 

direction is not only Japan's contribution to the international community 

but also its responsibility to the Japanese people now and in the future. 

In order to fulfill such responsibility Japan must make efforts to 

that end by making full use of all policy means, such as diplomacy, 

economy and defense. That is to say, it is necessary to build a coherent 

and comprehensive security policy. This consists of the following: 

First, promotion of multilateral security cooperation on a global and 

regional scale; second, enhancement of the functions of the Japan-U.S. 

security relationship; and third, possession of a highly reliable and 

efficient defense capability based on a strengthened information 

capability and a prompt crisis-management capability. 
APPENDIX A 31 

MULTILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION 

The United Nations, which was created 50 years ago as the organization 

for collective security, is now awakening to its primary function. 

The "threat or use of force," prohibited under Paragraph 4, Article 

2 of the U.N. Charter, refers to actions that individual states take 

independently as means of settling international disputes. In this 

respect, the 1928 Treaty of Paris (the general treaty for renunciation of 

war as an instrument of national policy), from which the U.N. Charter 

originates, provides essentially the same. In other words, as stated in 

the preamble to the U.N. Charter, the primary intent is that no state 

shall use force "save in the common interest" of the international 

community. 

In fact, the U.N. Charter, in Paragraph 3, Article 2, calls on all 

members to settle "their international disputes by peaceful means" and, 

in Paragraph 4, states, "All members shall refrain in their international 

relations fi'om the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 

or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 

inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Thus all U.N. 

members have pledged to the entire international community that they 

shall refrain from "the threat or use of force." The provision of Article 

9 of the Japanese Constitution agrees in its spirit to that pledge. 

However, if any major nation that supposedly bears special 

responsibilities for supporting U.N. peace activities should become a 

party to a conflict, this function of the United Nations unavoidably 

would be lost for all practical purposes. As this indicates, for the 

collective security mechanism of the United Nations to demonstrate its 

primary function, stability in the international environment is necessary. 

At the present time, when no serious military confrontations exist 

between major nations now that the Cold War has ended, this condition 

is minimally satisfied. How much nations can achieve in terms of 

cooperative security by availing themselves of this favorable 

opportunity, and whether they can acquire such a habit, will determine 

the fate of the United Nations in the 21st century. Japan, which is 

deeply committed to peace, must make positive use of this historic 

opportunity, not for altruistic purposes but primarily from the standpoint 

of its national interest. 

It seems, however, that it will be a long time before the U.N. 

collective security organization is established in a complete form. At 

its present stage, the United Nations is required not so much to deal 
32 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

with military clashes by regular U.N. forces stipulated in Chapter 7 of 

the U.N. Charter as to respond to various modes of crisis by such 

means as preventing armed conflicts that may develop inside unstable 

nations where it is unclear who holds the ability to govern; containing 

their expansion; and supporting the reconstruction of order following the 

cessation of conflicts. The U.N. peacekeeping operations are becoming 

more and more multifarious. Japan should actively participate in these 

operations and needs to make efforts to improve its system and 

capabilities for that purpose. 

Incidentally we would like to emphasize that the civilian sector of 

peacekeeping operations and the construction of peace tbllowing the 

settlement of conflicts are important fields of international cooperation 

for security. In these fields Japan should be able to make particularly 

significant contributions. At the government level, official development 

assistance (ODA) policy, for example, should be positively utilized. In 

addition, considering that voluntary participation at the private level is 

particularly significm~t in this respect, the entire society should make 

serious efforts to enable nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to step 

up their activities. 

On the other hand, there still exists the danger that conflicts of 

interest between nations will lead to armed conflicts. Nations are 

allowed to possess self-defense capability as a measure of last resort, 

provided it is limited within the bounds of the exercise of the right of 

self-defense. However, if those nations rush to build arms while 

harboring an extreme sense of mutual distrust, the danger of military 

conflicts will increase. Consequently, it is first necessary to reduce the 

level of mutual distrust and to increase the sense of security and 

approximate a condition of mutual trust. To this end efforts should be 

exerted to make the arms control system effective on a global and 

regional scale. The registration system for the transfer of conventional 

weapons, established at the United Nations at the proposal of Japan and 

other countries, is already in practice. In addition, since preventing the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, 

such as nuclear and biological/chemical weapons and missile 

technologies, is a grave concern of mankind, Japan should make further 

efforts toward the strengthening of the international management and 

supervision regimes for such weapons and technologies. 

The cooperative security policy must be pursued not only at the 

United Nations but also at the regional level. Security dialogue among 
APPENDIX A 33 

the participating nations is under way already at the ARF. Japan, which 

has involved itself positively in the establishment of this forum from the 

beginning, should continue to make further efforts for its development. 

We believe this forum should take up questions such as creating a 

regional system for increasing transparency in the mutual disclosure of 

information pertaining to the transfer and acquisition of weapons, the 

deployment of military forces and military exercises, etc., as well as 

building a framework of cooperation concerning the prevention of 

marine accidents, maritime traffic safety, and peacekeeping operations. 

As a private-level body to complement regional dialogue at the 

government level the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia 

Pacific (CSCAP) was established recently. If, through such forums, 

dialogue is promoted with nations from which it is difficult to obtain 

information on military policies, such as China, Russia, Indochinese 

states, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), then 

transparency in the security environment in Asia and the Pacific will 

increase, and as a result the sense of security among nations of the 

region will also increase. 

There are some emerging signs of multilateral security dialogue in 

Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific, such as an attempt to create 

a five-nation forum at the semi-private level among Japan, the United 

States, China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Russia. But 

pa~licipation of the DPRK has not yet materialized. At the government 

level, efforts to increase transparency on a mutual basis should, for the 

time being, be made by promoting bilateral military exchanges, such as 

those with the ROK, China, and Russia. 

It will be a long time before nations of the Asia-Pacific region 

cooperate and thereby establish a standing regional system for engaging 

in U.N. peacekeeping operations. But a number of nations in the region 

have accumulated experience in this field through participation in the 

U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Japan can leam 

much about regional cooperation by promoting exchanges with nations 

that have rich experience in U.N. peacekeeping operations, such as 

Australia and Canada. In addition, Japan should make efforts to 

broaden the basis of cooperation for regional security by acquiring as 

much experience as possible through exchanges of visits by military 

personnel, research exchanges, exchange student programs and joint 

training with the United States and other nations. 
34 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

ENHANCING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JAPAN-U.S. 

SECURITY COOPERATION RELATIONSHIP 

In order to further ensure the security of Japan and make multilateral 

security cooperation effective, close and broad cooperation and joint 

work between Japan and the United States are essential. The 

institutional framework for this is provided by the Japan-U.S. Security 

Treaty. Henceforth the two nations should make efforts to make greater 

use of this framework and strengthen their cooperative relations so that 

they can act more positively in response to new security needs. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 

Europe against the background of East-West confrontation in the Cold 

War era. In Asia, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was concluded against 

the same backdrop, particularly the outbreak of the Korean War. 

Considering, that international cooperation centering on the United 

States provides a realistic basis of the post-Cold War's security system 

as well, it stands to reason that these treaties should be maintained as 

a valuable asset for the formation of a new security system. 

In relation to the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, 

cooperation between Japan and the United States is an essential factor. 

In view of the continuing need to ensure that U.S. commitment of this 

region is maintained as desired by many Asian nations, it is highly 

significant that Japan and the United States should renew their 

determination to maintain their security relations. The U.S. posture in 

Asia might undergo some changes depending on its fiscal considerations 

and assessments of the military situation. In addition, as shown by the 

withdrawal of the U.S. bases from the Philippines and the conclusion 

of an agreement with Singapore on the use of military facilities, some 

changes have already occurred regarding U.S. presence. Nevertheless, 

it is of great significance to the security of this region as a whole that 

the United States should continue its existing frameworks of security 

cooperation with nations of this region, such as Japan, the ROK, 

Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand. Consequently, it is 

desirable that the nations concerned should cooperate in this direction. 

From these international and regional viewpoints, the Japan-U.S. 

Security Treaty will assume a greater significance than ever before. In 

addition, it is necessary to reaffirm the significance of this treaty in the 

sense that it forms an essential framework for the active and 

constructive security policy Japan should pursue. Consequently, in 

order to further ensure the continuation of this treaty and further 
APPENDIX A 35 

facilitate its smooth operation, various policy considerations and 

institutional improvements must be made. 

MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF HIGHLY RELIABLE 

AND EFFICIENT DEFENSE CAPABILITY 

The ultimate foundation of security lies in the determination of a people 

to defend themselves and in holding the appropriate means of doing so. 

This truth remains unchanged. Serf-defense capability is a concrete 

expression of a nation's capability of self-management and of crisis 

management, ha light of the fact that one armed conflict after another 

is developing in regions that contain many nations without such 

capability, it is self-evident that international security begins with the 

building of states that have a stable capability of crisis management. 

Japan itself must have a reliable defense posture in order to 

enhance the reliability of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and to 

participate actively and constructively in multilateral security 

cooperation. For that purpose it is necessary for the SDF to improve 

its intelligence capability and crisis-prediction capability, maintain a 

preparedness to deal assuringly with crises, and develop a policymaking mechanism that would make it possible to act in this manner. 

It is also true that such self-defense capability must be one that is 

harmonious with the international security environment. It is not an 

easy task to determine the quality and quantity of defense capability that 

is appropriate in this sense. However, on the basis of the security 

environment surrounding this country and the duties of the SDF therein 

and taking into account such factors as relations with allies, geographic 

features of the land, the level of military technology, the size and 

composition of the population, and economic and fiscal conditions, it 

will be possible to determine the quality and quantity of the defense 

capability to be maintained by this country in peacetime. Heretofore 

such defense capability has been expressed by the concept of basic and 

standard defense capability. The concept itself remains valid even in 

the present age of cooperative security. 

Henceforth, while making use of the concept of basic defense and 

standard capability but at the same time responding to the needs of the 

new security environment and taking into account the appropriate 

allocation of financial and human resources, it will be important to 

achieve further organization rationalization by identifying the functions 

that should be strengthened or improved and those that should be 
36 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

reduced or consolidated. The desirable defense capability will be 

described in specific terms in Chapter 3. Suffice here to mention the 

importance of (1) intelligence functions to improve the danger 

prediction capability, (2) the capability of responding promptly in the 

early stages of manifest danger, and (3) the flexibility to prepare for the 

possible expansion of danger. 

CHAPTER 3. THE MODALITY OF DEFENSE 

CAPABILITY IN THE NEW AGE 

FROM THE COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY TO THE 

MULTILATERAL SECURITY STRATEGY 

The defense capability of Japan in the Cold War period was built up 

and maintained for the primary purpose of preparing for attacks on 

Japanese territory by hostile forces and, at the same time, with a view 

to securing the safety of maritime traffic of vital importance to the 

maintenance of national livelihood, on the premise that U.S. forces 

would be stationed in Japan and come to its aid under the bilateral 

security treaty. Japan's mission was to defend the country based strictly 

on the right of self-defense. In light of its geographical position, 

however, Japan naturally played an important role in the anti-Soviet 

strategy of the Western bloc. 

Even in the Cold War era, regional armed conflicts that occurred 

against a backdrop of U.S.-Soviet confrontation short of a direct 

military showdown were a principal type of international conflict. 

During such conflicts, including the Vietnam War, to say nothing of the 

Korean War that broke out when Japan was under Allied occupation, 

the nation played a role as a logistical support base for U.S. forces. 

With the end of the Cold War, the security environment surrounding 

Japan changed markedly. However, the primary role of defending the 

country remains unchanged regardless of the changes of the times. In 

addition, Japan-U.S. cooperation remains unchanged as a major pillar 

of Japan's security policy. The question for the future is how such 

defense capability and security policy should be positioned from the 

viewpoint of cooperative security. 
APPENDIX A 37 

THE ROLE OF DEFENSE CAPABILITY FOR MULTILATERAL 

SECURITY COOPERATION 

As described in the foregoing, the primary task for international security 

in the new age is to respond appropriately to diverse dangers in various 

parts of the world and, by so doing, to prevent the deterioration of the 

security environment and make positive efforts to improve it. To this 

end, it is important that, acting on their relationships of alliance, nations 

make active efforts from the constructive viewpoint to promote global 

and regional security through cooperation at the United Nations and 

other organizations. Japan, whose hwolvement with the international 

community has vastly increased, is in a position to bear proportionately 

larger responsibilities in this respect. Japan's defense capability has a 

role to play in such multilateral cooperation for international security. 

The Strengthening of U.N. Peacekeeplng Operations and 

the Role of the SDF 

Japan enacted the international Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, thus 

making its stand clear in favor of full-scale involvement in U.N. 

peacekeeping operations, including participation of the SDF. As noted 

in light of the issues raised in "An Agenda for Peace" by U.N. 

Secretary-General Bou~os Boutros-Ghali and by a number of peace 

operations now under way, the fact is that the content and concept of 

U.N. peacekeeping operations are being forced to adapt to the new 

environment and undergo repeated experiences. There is no doubt that 

the United Nations is beginning to move in the direction of a United 

Nations as it should be. 

Seen in this light, it should be emphasized anew that one of the 

major pillars of Japan's security policy is to contribute positively to 

strengthening the U.N. functions for international peace, including 

further improvement of peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, such 

contribution is important in the sense that Japan's firm commitment to 

such an international trend regarding security problems will strengthen 

its role befitting its international position. The closer the world moves 

to the realization of the ideal held up in the U.N. Charter of a world 

without wars, the better it will become for nations such as Japan, which 

aspires for a true peace in the original sense of the word. Therefore it 

is extremely important to Japan's national interest to make the utmost 

efforts toward this goal. The SDF, whose most important mission is to 

ensure the security of Japan, cannot be exempt from this duty. From 
38 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

this viewpoint, a number of improvements are needed in such areas as 

statutes governing the operation of the SDF, SDF organization, 

equipment and training. 

Missions of the SDF and Peacekeeping Operations. First, it is 

important to consider it a major duty of the SDF, along with the 

primary duty of national defense, to participate as positively as possible 

in various forms of multilateral cooperation that are conducted within 

the framework of the United Nations for the purposes of international 

security, including peacekeeping operations. 

In this sense, it is necessary to take such measures as improvements 

of the legal system, including revision of the SDF Law to add 

participation in peacekeeping operations to the primary duties of the 

SDF, and organizational improvement of the SDF with a view to 

international cooperation. In addition, use of SDF facilities for such 

purposes as Waining centers and advance depots for materials and 

equipment for peacekeeping operations, and supply by Japan of 

equipment necessary for peacekeeping operations conducted by other 

nations also merit positive consideration. Such measures mean 

providing international public goods for peace. 

Peacekeeping operations, which are currently attracting the 

particular attention as a role of the United Nations, require in some 

cases that weapons be used to a certain extent. In view of the purposes 

of the United Nations already described, however, it is natural that such 

use of arms should be permitted. From this viewpoint, we believe the 

government should make efforts to obtain public understanding at home 

and abroad with regard to the mode of SDF participation. As for the 

mode and limits of SDF in peacekeeping operations, it should be 

decided in a comprehensive manner taking into consideration a number 

of aspects including whatever means available for Japan to make a 

meaningful contribution. 

There is a view in some quarters that organizations other than the 

SDF should be dispatched to engage in peacekeeping operations. If this 

view is intended to evade constitutional questions, it is meaningless. 

Organizations that participate in the military sector of peacekeeping 

operations, regardless of their names, are internationally regarded as 

military organizations. Under status-of-forces agreements, for example, 

they are t/eated as "foreign military units." In addition, when the 

United Nations requests nations to contribute personnel, branches of 

service, ranks, and so forth as mentioned. Thus even non-SDF 
APPENDIX A 39 

organizations would be treated as military organizations. Furthermore, 

if an organization such as a peacekeeping unit for the exclusive purpose 

of international cooperation were to be created separately from the SDF, 

such a move might cause suspicion abroad that it might, for all intents 

and purposes, lead to substantial arms buildup. On the other hand, 

giving the SDF opportunities to participate in U.N. peacekeeping 

operations and other international activities will greatly help, internaUy, 

to broaden the international perspective of the SDF and defense 

authorities and enhance the public understanding of the SDF and, 

externally, to increase transparency in the real image of the SDF and 

eventually build confidence in Japan. 

Organizational Improvement of the SDF. In line with the purposes 

stated above, it is necessary to make a series of improvements in the 

organization of the SDF. Heretofore the SDF has maintained a system 

of organizations, formations and equipment on the assumption that it 

deal with "limited and small-scale aggression." It also has conducted 

education and training on that assumption. The recent participation of 

the SDF in several cases of peacekeeping operations was limited in 

scope, so that the SDF could afford to respond within the framework of 

its existing organizations, equipment and training. Fortunately, as 

shown by the example of Cambodia, education and training and its past 

experience in disaster relief proved highly useful, thus enabling the SDF 

to receive a high international rating for its performance. 

However, requests for participation of the SDF in this type of 

activity are likely to increase hereafter, making it necessary to make 

more systemic efforts to prepare for such requests. This is because, 

first, peacekeeping operations involve, more than anything else, 

activities that are exceedingly different from those in the domestic 

environment, culturally, geographically and politically. Secondly, such 

operations represent international joint actions with similar organizations 

from other countries. Thirdly, these activities are different in nature 

from conventional military actions. Consequently, if makeshift 

responses are made as the situation demands, it may become impossible 

to fulfill the duties and responsibilities that are called for. Moreover, 

since it is expected that peacekeeping operations will require quick 

responses, it is even more necessary to make preparations on a routine 

basis. 

Specifically, we believe the following improvements should be 

made mainly in the areas of organization/system and equipment. First, 
40 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

in the area of organization/system, it is necessary to create a special 

organization in charge of collecting and classifying a wide range of 

information pertaining to international peacekeeping operations and 

other types of international cooperation, to conducting the specialized 

training of personnel, and to having function to formulate and 

coordinate prog~ns of implementation. In this connection, it is 

desirable to dispatch SDF officers to the Permanent Mission of Japan 

to the United Nations so that they can accumulate experience in various 

fields. As for implementing units, it is not practical for the time being 

to create a special unit to engage exclusively in peacekeeping 

operations. Such a step should be avoided. It is better, instead, to 

deploy existing units and personnel to carry out duties as required. In 

the area of equipment, it is necessary to acquire equipment required in 

conjunction with participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations (for 

example, equipment necessary for outdoor life and ensuring the safety 

of personnel in overseas areas). As for the questions of when it is 

appropriate for the SDF to participate in peacekeeping operations and 

what type of unit should preferably be dispatched, we advise that the 

government establish certain criteria while learning from past 

experience. 

Points to be Revised in the International Peace Cooperation Law. 

Regarding the mode of SDF participation in peacekeeping operations, 

it is desirable that discussions should be continued with a view to 

removing as soon as possible the provision in the International Peace 

Cooperation Law calling for a freeze on participation of the SDF in the 

field of peacekeeping activities mainly conducted by infantry units. In 

this connection, Japan should study the common understanding that is 

recognized by the United Nations with regard to the use of arms. 

Furthermore, as we believe that the functions of the United Nations 

concerning security, including peacekeeping operations, will be 

improved and strengthened through experience to better meet the new 

needs, Japan should continue its quest for the ideal mode of 

participation while learning from past experience. 

Other Forms of International Cooperation for Security 

In addition to U.N. peacekeeping operations, the United Nations, its 

specialized agencies, and NGOs are conducting international cooperative 

activities in a widening range of fields. Of these activities, those to 

which tile SDF c~m contribute include, for example, various types of 
APPENDIX A 41 

international rescue activities for humanitarian purposes, which are 

provided for in the existing International Peace Cooperation Law. In 

addition, we believe that the SDF will be able, for example, to provide 

support for refugee rescue operations conducted within the framework 

of international cooperation. 

International Cooperation for Arms Control. As for arms control, 

various efforts are being made, regionally and globally, in conjunction 

with confidence-building measures. In this regard, Japan "has been 

making no small contribution. In order to ensure that the uncertain and 

opaque security environment in the post-Cold War period does not 

move in a dangerous direction, it is increasingly necessary to promote 

international cooperation in this area. In the case of the SDF, examples 

of cooperation so far include participation in various disarmamentrelated conferences at the United Nations and other organizations and 

the dispatch of personnel to monitor the disposal of chemical weapons 

in Iraq. Regarding questions for the near future, it is desirable, for 

example, to dispatch SDF personnel versed in chemical weapons to the 

secretariats of treaty organizations as monitoring personnel in order to 

ensure the effectiveness of the treaty banning chemical weapons, which 

is expected to take effect in 1995. The challenges for the future include 

the disposal of weapons accumulated in the past and chemical weapons 

and mines left in the battlefield. In carrying out these duties, it must be 

kept in mind that large-scale efforts involving an SDF unit will be 

required. 

Thus it is expected that SDF personnel will increasingly become 

involved in areas where personnel with military expertise and 

experience are needed. Participation in such international activities 

should reasonably be regarded as duties of SDF personnel, and we 

believe that participating personnel should be accorded appropriate 

status treamaent. 

Promotion of Security Dialogue. As stated in Chapter 2, dialogue 

aimed at building confidence is starting to take place at various levels 

in the Asia-Pacific region. It is important that military and defense 

personnel from the nations concerned participate positively in these 

security dialogues. 

In addition, reciprocal goodwill visits by training fleets and joint 

training with units of neighboring countries are some of the measures 

that can be recommended, in the sense that they will help increase 

mutual transparency. In the same vein and also with a view to 
42 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

developing defense personnel capable of international activity, 

exchanges between officials in charge of policy affairs and researchers 

and exchanges of defense academy students should be implemented 

more positively than before. For this purpose, we urge the government 

to take the necessary measures, including those related to funding and 

personnel. 

THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY 

COOPERATION RELATIONSHIP 

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty remains an indispensable precondition 

for the defense of Japan even in the post-Cold War security 

environment. What is more, the range of fields in which Japan and the 

United States can cooperate for the security of Asia is expected to 

widen. In other words, the Japan-U.S. relationship of cooperation in the 

area of security must be considered not only from the bilateral 

viewpoint but, at the same time, also from the broader perspective of 

security in the entire Asia-Pacific region. 

For example, the use of bases and related facilities by U.S. forces 

stationed in Japan and the support of such facilities through financial 

measures required for their maintenance and other means should be 

favorably evaluated in the sense described above. In addition, it is 

necessary to build a more flexible and positive relationship of 

cooperation in practical terms. Such cooperation between Japan and the 

United States will provide a foundation for further ensuring the security 

of this region and the whole world. The importance of the Japan-U.S. 

security cooperation should be recognized from the standpoint of such 

a positive "alliance for peace." 

We cannot ignore, of course, the fact that the security of Japan 

itself depends heavily on Japan-U.S. cooperation in the military area. 

In particular, the United States' nuclear deterrent is indispensable to the 

security of Japan as long as some nations possessing nuclear weapons 

continue to exist. In the United States, a nongovernment movement 

seeking abolition of nuclear weapons as a long-term goal, starting with 

nuclear disarmament by the five major nuclear nations, including the 

United States, is under way. The U.S. Government is making efforts 

for nuclear disarmament while calling on Russia and other nations to 

make similar efforts. At the same time, it has as its major policy goal 

for the present the prevention of the emergence of new nuclear weapons 

states. Both goals agree perfectly with the interests of Japan, which is 
APPENDIX A 43 

determined to ftrmly maintain its nonnuclear policy. At the same time, 

until these two goals are actually achieved, it is of decisive importance 

that the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent be fa'mly maintained. 

The long-term slrategy for peace of creating a world free from nuclear 

weapons and the policy of maintaining and strengthening Japan-U.S. 

security cooperation are, in this respect, inseparably related. 

In order to promote the Japan-U.S. friendship of security 

cooperation on a more routine basis, efforts should be made to establish 

a greater interoperability in a broad range of fields, including operations, 

intelligence/command communications, logistic support, and equipment 

procurement. Specifically, improvement should be promoted in the 

following respects: 

• Enhancement of Policy Consultations and Information 

Exchange: Japan-U.S. policy consultations and information exchange 

for this purpose should be further promoted, and the relationship of 

mutual trust should be enhanced. 

• Promotion of Operational Cooperation Setup: It is necessary 

to promote joint formation and studies of unit operation plans as well 

as joint training on the assumption of various circumstances. 

• Improvement of Mutual Cooperation Setup in Logistic Support: 

The United States maintains ACSA with NATO member states and 

other allies for the purpose of facilitating mutual logistic support and 

provision of supplies and services. Japan should conclude a similar 

agreement (ACSA) at the earliest possible time. 

• Promotion of Mutual Cooperation in Equipment: In order to 

facilitate joint actions with U.S. forces it is necessary to emphasize the 

joint usability of equipment systems including C3I (command, control, 

communication and intelligence). Moreover, it is expected that weapons 

and equipment to be required in the future will consist mainly of those 

types that are advanced in quality but limited in quantity. In order to 

meet these demands, joint research, development, and production with 

the United States and other industrialized nations would be a rational 

choice. Tlfis problem involves technologies developed by private 

corporations. Consequently, lest the interests of the corporations 

involved should be impaired, it is important that the Japanese 

government request the governments of nations concerned to take the 

necessary protective measures. 

• Improvement of the Support Setup for U.S. Forces Stationed 

in Japan: The Japanese government has over the years borne part of the 
44 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

expenses relating to the U.S. forces in Japan under the status-of-forces 

agreement. In more recent years it concluded a special agreement to 

increase the Japanese share of such payments. Henceforth, too, it will 

be necessary to cover such expenses, even though there seems to be 

room for technical improvement, such as ensuring a more flexible 

management of expenses. In addition, it is desirable that the joint use 

of facilities be further streamlined. Efforts should continue to be made 

for consolidation and realignment of these facilities as necessary. 

MAINTENANCE AND QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF 

SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITY 

The general trend for international security in the post-Cold War world 

is shifting from the confrontational to the cooperative pattern, but this 

does not mean that the roots of various military dangers have 

disappeared completely. As stated in Chapter 1, the security 

environment in the Asia-Pacific region is in a state of flux for various 

reasons. In light of this situation, the fact remains that the basis of 

security lies in individual nations possessing their own capability of 

managing or dealing with crises. Furthermore, we must not ignore the 

reality that only when at least major nations of the world possess such 

capability can the mechanism of multilateral security through the United 

Nations and other organizations demonstrate their effectiveness. In this 

sense, the possession of a reliable self-defense capability is the ultimate 

assurance of maintaining national independence; it is also desirable from 

the viewpoint of international security. 

Likely Military Dangers 

During the Cold War period when the whole world was overshadowed 

by a military standoff between the Eastern and Western blocs, the 

defense of Japan was positioned in this overall picture of East-West 

confrontation. For example, it was hardly likely that the Soviet Union 

would target only Japan for a full-scale attack in disregard of its 

relations with the West as a whole. The National Defense Program 

Outline of 1976, which defined the level of defense capability to be 

maintained by Japan as being capable of dealing with "limited and 

small-scale aggression," assumed that the U.S. forces had the ability to 

deter aggression against Japan and in the event of such aggression 

actually taking place, to repel it. In other words, the assumption was 

that the military forces of Japan and the United States, which stood in 
APPENDIX A 45 

a complementary relationship, would deal with Soviet aggression in a 

coordinated manner. On the basis of this slrategic concept and, 

moreover, as a result of constitutional constraints and political 

considerations, Japan's defense capability was limited to one of modest 

scale and quality even during the Cold War period. Thus Japan 

maintained the so-called basic and standard defense capability. 

Now military dangers have changed both in form and nature, but 

the thinking that Japan should maintain the minimum necessary level of 

basic defense capability as an independent state remains basically valid. 

The possibility that the kind of military incursion that has been 

anticipated in the past will be mounted directly against Japan has 

markedly diminished. We should not completely rule out a case in 

which the possibility of a military attack from a certain country 

increases as a result of an extreme deterioration in political relations 

with that country. It is unlikely, however, that a state comparable to the 

former Soviet Union---one that is prepared to confront the U.S. 

militarily and politically--will emerge in the near future. At any rate, 

it should be possible to predict lhe emergence of such a threat 

considerably in advance. Consequently, Japan, too, should be able to 

have a reasonable period of time in which to prepare for the kind of 

threat mentioned above. The modality of defense capability in such a 

case should be considered anew in light of the prevailing situation. 

For the moment, attention should be paid to the various dangers 

that lurk in the unstable and hardly predictable situation. In case such 

dangers become manifest, it is necessary to maintain a certain level of 

management capability so as to deal correctly and quickly to prevent 

them from developing into large-scale conflicts. We believe importance 

should be attached particularly to the capability of dealing with the 

following situations: interference in the safety of maritime traffic, 

violation of territorial air space, limited missile attack, illegal occupation 

of a part of the country, terrorist acts, and influx of armed refugees. 

Factors to be Considered In Defense Buildup 

The primary factor to be considered in determining the future buildup 

of defense capability is, needless to say, the perception of the situation 

as stated above. On the other hand, there are factors to be considered 

in light of the developments of recent years in military technology and 

from the viewpoint of the optimal allocation of national resources. 
46 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

Developments in Military Science and Technology. The 

performance of weapons has improved markedly as a result of the 

progress that has been made in science and technology in recent years. 

There has been a major shift in emphasis from conventional weapons 

of the heavy, large types to high-performance weapons of the precisionguidance type. In parallel to these changes, progress has also been 

made in saving the labor required of weapons. In addition, the 

advancement of information and command/communication systems 

including the use of satellites have also made marked progress, and C3I 

systems such as various information networks have come to occupy a 

highly important position. In particular, software is expected to gain in 

importance since the quality of software affects equipment capability. 

The sophistication of equipment will likely add to the complexity of 

weapons systems and drive up the prices of weapons. Since the 

research, development and manufacture of such high-performance 

weapons and the training of operating personnel cannot be achieved in 

a short period of time, it is necessary to formulate plans from the longterm viewpoint. 

Long-term Downward Trend of the Young Population. Another 

long-term factor is the long-term trend of the decline of the young 

population. As a result, conditions for securing SDF personnel will 

deteriorate. In fact, this problem is already mentioned in the Mid-term 

Defense Program (FY 1991-1995). In light of the future prospects for 

population changes, the male population eligible for enlistment as 

Private, Seaman Apprentice, or Airman 2nd Class, who comprise the 

main part of the recruitment of short-term SDF personnel (said 

population consisting of those aged 18-27), is projected to peak at about 

9 million in 1994 and decrease sharply beginning in 1995. In particular, 

18 year olds, who form the core of the eligible population, is expected 

to drop about 40 percent 15 years from now. Assuming these 

population changes, we believe it is necessary to consider a defense 

buildup in a direction leading to the conservation of human resources. 

Severe Fiscal Constraints. The aging of the population will bring 

pressure to bear on the f'mances. This is because the social security 

budget is expected to increase substantially as the aging of society 

continues, and consequently, it is hardly likely that fiscal constraints 

surrounding the defense buildup will improve in the long term. 

Japan's defense spending has for many years been limited to less 

than 1 percent of the GNP. Such spending as a percentage of the 
APPENDIX A 47 

general-account budget has stayed at the level of about 6 percent. Thus, 

when compared with other nations, the allocation of resources to the 

area of defense is never too large. Moreover, personnel expenses per 

SDF member and equipment prices tend inevitably to rise, as compared 

with nations that maintain a conscription system or follow a policy of 

keeping equipment prices lower through overseas weapons markets. In 

addition, a considerably large portion of defense spending (about 11 

percent of the 1994 budget) is earmarked for base countermeasure 

expenses and expenses for the support of U.S. forces stationed in Japan. 

Thus real defense spending is not as large as it appears. Defense 

buildup in the future demands, even more than before, that efforts be 

exerted to make the best possible use of the limited budget and prevent 

any decline in the actual level of defense capability. 

Incidentally, it may be pointed out that defense spending consists 

mostly of obligatory expenses such as personnel expenses and payments 

for equipment on which contracts have been concluded in the past. In 

view of this characteristic, it is difficult to increase or decrease such 

spending on an annual basis. It is desirable that spending changes be 

managed from the medium- and long-term viewpoints. 

New Thinking on Defense Capability 

Considering the above, namely, the perception of the situation, the 

developments in military technology and the constraints on human and 

fiscal resources, we believe it is reasonable to adopt the following 

thinking on the basic morality of future defense capability: while 

making use of the concept of basic and standard defense capability 

Japan should make the necessary revisions to that concept by adapting 

it to the new strategic environment. Specifically, first, the intelligence 

function should be improved so as to deal with the opaque security 

environment. At the same time operational preparedness should be 

maintained so as to deal correctly with manitbld dangers. Secondly, 

combat units should be reorganized into more efficient ones while their 

functions and quality should be improved by such methods as promoting 

the use of high technology and the modernization of equipment. On the 

other hand, the overall scale of such units should be reduced. Thirdly, 

consideration should be given to the question of flexibility so that, in 

the event that a more serious situation has developed, the SDF can deal 

with it. We hope that reform and reorganization of defense capability 
48 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

based on such thinking will be carded out in stages, preferably within 

about 10 years. 

Specific Measures of Reform 

Improvement of dl Systems. Generally, the need for the CaI 

systems of defense organizations has increased in order to meet dangers, 

now that highly mobile military technologies are increasingly used. In 

particular, in order to meet manifold dangers by defense capability of 

a restrained scale, it is necessary to attach importance to the capability 

of dealing quickly and flexibly with such dangers. Only by speedily 

and properly grasping the situation and deploying the necessary units at 

the necessary time at the necessary locations is it possible to defend 

against a quantitatively superior attack capability. For that, it is 

essential to possess well-organized C3I systems. In addition, it is 

necessary to make use of various types of sensors, including the use of 

reconnaissance satellites. 

The need to improve the information-gathering and analysis 

capability and various warning and surveillance capabilities has been 

pointed out in the past, as in the National Defense Program Outline. 

Given the tendency toward the dispersion and proliferation of dangers 

in the opaque post-Cold War international situation, however, it is 

necessary to attach greater importance to this particular need in order 

to quickly discern changes in the situation and help make decisions 

expeditiously. 

Strengthening of Joint Operational Posture. In order to effectively 

perform new duties including U.N. peacekeeping operations and to 

improve the capability of dealing promptly with various types of danger 

stemming from the opaque international situation it is urgently necessary 

to strengthen the joint operational posture of the Ground, Maritime and 

Air Self-Defense Forces. This is also necessary because in many cases 

collaboration between Japan and the United States is essential. In 

particular, the strategic information function and the 

command/communication functions must be strengthened from the 

viewpoint of integration. In this connection, it is especially necessary 

to broaden the areas of coordination by the Joint Staff Council and its 

Chairman with necessary personnel. 

Improvement of Maneuverability and Combat-ready Capability. In 

order to ensure effective operation of our defense capability of a 

restrained scale it is essential that such capability be deployed at the 
APPENDIX A 49 

necessary locations and at the necessary time. From this viewpoint it 

is necessary to improve maneuverability and combat-ready capability. 

Scale of Human Resources. Considering the constraints stemming 

from the anticipated demographic trend, we believe it is necessary to 

devise ways to make more effective use of a limited number of 

personnel to the extent that does not impair the combat capability 

required in an emergency. Consequently, the authorized number of 

regular SDF personnel, including even those who will be required 

correspondingly to the functions to be strengthened, should be reduced 

from the present level of approximately 274,000 to the neighborhood of 

240,000. Henceforth, the necessary personnel must be secured to carry 

out the duties within this numerical limit. On the other hand, in order 

to promptly make up for any shortage in an emergency it is necessary 

to consider introducing a new system of SDF reservists. This question 

will be described further later in this report. 

Ground Defense Capability. No matter how the security 

environment surrounding this country may change, the fact remains that 

ground defense capability has the mission of national defense and 

contributes to the stability of national life. Hitherto, in preparation for 

possible aggression against Japan proper by hostile forces, the GSDF 

has had its uniformly-organized divisions deployed across the country 

with emphasis on the concentrated operation of almost all of its existing 

force. Henceforth, the GSDF should be restructured into 

multifunctional units with emphasis on the capability to fulfill diverse 

duties such as dealing with dangers which may not be full-scale 

aggression but which seem highly likely to occur, U.N. peacekeeping 

operations and disaster relief/emergency rescue at home and a broad. 

In other words, the GSDF should be reorganized into divisions and 

brigades of diverse formations with regional characteristics taken into 

account, and its units should be deployed accordingly. At the same 

time, the numbers of sizes of units should be reduced. 

There is a wide disparity between the authorized number and the 

actual number of SDF personnel, creating difficulties in the maintenance 

and management of units. For example, education and training and 

management of unit activities have been considerably hampered. In 

order to solve these problems it is necessary to reduce the scale of units 

and reorganize them into qualitatively improved units. Regarding, in 

particular, those sections of the GSDF that have many opportunities to 

perform duties in peacetime and positions that require an ability to make 
50 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

prompt responses, it is highly important to secure the necessary 

personnel and maintain high levels of proficiency. At the same time, 

in order to respond quickly in an emergency, a study should be made 

on introducing a new system of SDF reservists. Specifically, such a 

system should be aimed at creating a highly proficient force capable of 

serving in front-line units in an emergency. For this purpose reservists 

would be recruited from retired SDF personnel and receive training for 

a considerable number of days each year. For such a system to be 

marketable, it would also be necessary to create through cooperation 

between the government and the private sector, an arrangement for 

aUowing the reservists to participate in training. For example, such 

supportive measures as improving treatment for the reservists and 

financial incentives for businesses that employ them would be 

necessary. 

Along with the reduction of the overall number of personnel, efforts 

should be made to expedite the shift in emphasis in weaponry from 

heavy equipment such as tanks and artillery to more sophisticated 

equipment with increased mobility and high-tech applications. At the 

same time, by improving the professional proficiency of personnel who 

operate such equipment, the GSDF should be restructured so as to 

further improve its ground-defense capability. 

Maritime Defense Capability. For Japan, surrounded by seas, the 

defense of adjacent seas and securing the safety of maritime traffic are 

essential in order to secure the foundations of national survival in an 

emergency, the combat-sustaining capability and the foundations of U.S. 

military deployment. Furthermore, securing the safety of the maritime 

traffic in peacetime is a matter of life and death to Japan which has an 

extremely high degree of overseas dependence, as in energy supply and 

manufactured-goods trade. In addition, the MSDF has duties to 

perform, in collaboration with the Maritime Safety Agency, in such 

areas as sea rescue, crackdown on pirates and control of drug 

trafficking. 

In the foreseeable future the naval force of the United States, which 

prides itself on its overwhelming superiority at sea, will, we believe, 

remain the basic factor in maintaining security on the world's oceans 

including the Pacific. Japan's maritime defense capability is to perform 

duties such as described above while maintaining cooperative relations 

with the U.S. Navy. 
APPENDIX A 51 

The possibility of full-scale attacks on sea lanes by Soviet [sic] 

submarines, for example.---the kind of attacks that have been anticipated 

in the past--has declined. Consequently, the number of ships and 

aircraft for antisubmarine and anti-mine warfare, which was previously 

emphasized, should be reduced. On the other hand, efforts should be 

made to build up a more balanced maritune defense capability. For 

example, the surveillance and patrol functions as well as anti-surface 

and anti-aircraft battle capabilities should be further improved. In 

addition, considering participation in UaN. peacekeeping operations and 

other international activities, we believe it is also necessary to somewhat 

strengthen support functions such as maritime transport and seaborne 

supply. 

Moreover in order to improve the level of proficiency and combat 

readiness, it is essential to resolve the situation where some of the 

manning requirements for ship crew are left unfulfdled. For this 

purpose we believe measures such as reassigning surplus personnel 

resulting from the gradual reduction of ships, etc. described above 

should be taken. 

Air Defense Capability. Considering the development of aircraft 

and missile technologies, the role of air defense capability in national 

defense will increase rather than decrease. The introduction of the 

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), for example, has 

given a further impetus to the modernization of Japan's airborne 

warning and control capability. Since technology in this field is 

expected to make considerable progress, airborne warning and control 

organizations such as radar sites should be reviewed substantially, in 

part from the viewpoint of increasing their efficiency. Moreover, in 

view of the reduced possibility of a full-scale air attack of the kind that 

was previously anticipated, such as one by the Soviet Union, the 

number of fighter units or fighters should be reduced (ballistic missile 

defense will be discussed later since it includes something that 

transcends the conventional concept of air defense). 

On the other hand, we believe it is worth studying the inlroduction 

of midair refueling from the standpoint that it helps to increase the 

efficiency and strength of the air-defense system, this will make it 

possible to increase the efficiency of flight training as well. Since the 

training of pilots takes a long period of time, however, further expenses 

and energies should be applied to improving their education and 

training. 
52 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

In addition, from the viewpoint of participating in U.N. 

peacekeeping operations and other international activities, we believe it 

will be necessary to build a certain degree of long-haul transport 

capability. 

Systems for Dealing with Ballistic Missiles. In order to deal with 

the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 

means of delivery, regulatory efforts are being made under various 

regimes, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the 

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Missile Technology 

Control Regime (MTCR). Needless to say it is desirable from the 

standpoint of Japan's interest in terms of its security that these 

international efforts from the long-term viewpoint should succeed. 

Accordingly, Japan is playing a positive role in building such 

international control regimes. On the other hand, the possession of 

effective means of defending against attacks or threats by nuclear 

missiles and other weapons during the transitional period up to the time 

when this goal is attained is an essential condition for the success of the 

long-term nonproliferation regimes described above. For. as long as 

there exist states haunted by unrest, motives for proliferation will not 

disappear. From this viewpoint it is absolutely essential for Japan, 

which adheres to a nonnuclear policy, that the credibility of the U.S. 

deterrent be maintained. In addition, Japan itself should hold the 

capability of dealing with and defending against ballistic missiles. To 

that end, Japan should make positive efforts toward possessing such 

capability in collaboration with the United States where research in this 

area is most advanced. Furthermore, it should be especially noted that 

such a system makes collaboration with U.S. forces essential and 

requires a system of integrated operation among three services. 

In introducing such a system it is necessary, we believe, to conduct 

studies on an efficient air defense system, including a review of roles 

and missions among the three services of the SDF. 

Maintaining a Flexible Defense Capability. It may be said that 

there are no imminent threats today, yet no one knows what kind of 

situation would develop from dangers now lurking in the opaque and 

uncertain security environment. In preparation for such an emergency 

it is necessary to maintain some leeway with respect to specialists who 

take a long time to train (such as commanders and pilots) and 

equipment that takes a long period to acquire (such as aircraft and 

ships). This should be done by, for example, assigning certain numbers 
APPENDIX A 53 

of such personnel and equipment to the education and training divisions 

so that they can contribute to the improvement of education and training 

at the same time. Relating to this, introduction of a new reserve system 

should be studied, as mentioned before. 

Measures in the Personnel Area. 

• Improvement of the Treatment of the SDF Personnel: As in 

the case with every organization, the basis of the defense 

organization lies ultimately in people. In particularly, in order to 

maintain the efficiency of the entire organization while reducing the 

number of personnel it is essential that duties be performed by 

personnel of high morale and skill. From this viewpoint it is 

necessary to provide well-thought measures to improve the 

treatment of personnel, from entry to retirement, their living 

environment and other aspects of life in the SDF. 

• Improving the Recruitment Method: The diminishing trend of 

the young population makes it unlikely that the recruitment of SDF 

personnel will become easier in the future. In view of this, it is 

desirable to improve the recruitment method as follows: First, the 

current method should be revised so that a method similar to that 

used for general civil service personnel and private company 

employees can be adopted as far as possible. By this method 

applicants would be recruited through local public organizations 

and schools in cooperation with the latter. Secondly, introduction 

of a new recruitment method that would make it possible to 

manage the numbers of personnel to be recruited over several years 

should be considered. Such a multi-year method would take into 

account annuai increases or decreases in the number of applicants 

due to changes in the business cycle and other factors, instead of 

limiting itself to the fixed number for a single year. 

• Development of Human Resources and Qualitative 

Improvement of the Education and Training Progrmn: In view of 

the tendency toward the globalization and diversification of the role 

of defense capability in the new age, the education and training for 

cultivating the necessary personnel must be qualitatively improved. 

This begins with securing personnel who have aptitude at the 

recruitment stage, but the education and training following their 

entry also has a very large role to play. What should be 

particularly emphasized henceforth is the viewpoint of cultivating 

personnel who have knowledge and sensibilities regarding such 
54 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

matters as foreign languages and international relations, namely, 

those who are fully capable of responding to calls for international 

cooperation, such as participation in U.S. peacekeeping operations. 

For that purpose the necessary measures should be taken so that the 

opportunity to study abroad may be offered as widely as possible 

to many SDF personnel. In addition, considering that the 

proportion of simple work has decreased and more complex 

abilities are required as a result of the modernization of weapons 

systems, the education and training should be improved with 

emphasis on the acquisition of special knowledge and skill. On the 

other hand, greater efforts need to be made toward the cultivation 

of personnel who have an ability to perform as many 

multifunctional duties as possible. 

• Consolidation of Stations and Posts: The stations that exist 

now were located not only from the viewpoints of defense and 

internal security, but also by taking the following fact into account: 

the dispatch of SDF troops to disaster-stricken areas in the country 

was emphasized immediately after the creation of the SDF. This 

is because major natural disasters, represented by the Ise Bay 

Typhoon of 1959 and the heavy snowfall that hit the Hokuriku area 

in 1963, occurred during the early years of the SDF. Thus, 

responding to the needs of local communities was a major 

contributing factor. 

Today, in light of the need for a more rational and efficient 

defense capability, and considering that the anti-disaster capability 

of local public entities has dramatically improved over the past 20- 

30 years, it is high time that the siting of SDF units was reviewed. 

For example, some of the small GSDF stations may be consolidated 

to the extent that the social needs of the communities in which they 

are located are not seriously affected. However, in the case of 

those locations which in an emergency are highly likely to become 

necessary for national defense, it is necessary to maintain such 

measures as will make their restoration possible in such an event. 

From the viewpoint of increasing the overall efficiency of 

defense capability, it is desirable that the consolidation of stations 

and posts be promoted in such a way that funds generated by the 

disposition of some stations and posts are applied to the 

improvement of the stations and posts to be integrated. In order to 

facilitate such consolidation it is necessary, we believe, to work out 
APPENDIX A 55 

special devices in the fiscal area. 

However, even if a certain degree of efficiency is achieved 

through consolidation, a considerable number of personnel and a 

considerable amount of expenses will continue to be required to 

maintain stations and posts. In order to ease the pressure on 

resource allocation and personnel assignment to other deparmaents, 

we believe that, generally speaking, operations of such stations and 

posts should be entrusted to private entities as far as practicable. 

OTHER ITEMS PERTAINING TO DEFENSE 

The main question addressed by this report is what improvements 

should be made in defense capability in order to adapt to the new 

international situation and security environment. However, as 

emphasized earlier, defense can play its role only when it is correctly 

positioned in the regime of comprehensive security policy. In that sense 

improvement of defense is part of the question of giving new direction 

to overall security policy. Consequently, we would like to take up in 

this final section questions that the government as a whole or Japanese 

society as a whole should address--questions that are closely related to 

the desired restructuring of defense capability. (We would like to add 

that some of the questions described in three previous sections, such as 

the proposed introduction of a new system of SDF reservists, also 

involve many difficult problems which cannot be solved unless national 

efforts are exerted beyond the level of the Defense Agency.) 

Improvement of Research and Education on Security 

In Japan thus far there has been a tendency to show little concern for 

research and education on security. The international environment 

surrounding us requires the government and the people to take serious 

interest in peace. This must be reflected in research and education on 

security problems. 

Education on security as it stands is extremely inadequate. It is 

important to the future security of Japan that appropriate security 

education be provided in all stages of education, from elementary school 

all the way to college and university. Security is a public good whose 

benefits are equally enjoyed by the entire people. If the whole society 

forgets to pay due respect to those who are engaged in the defense of 

the country, the spiritual foundation of national defense and security 

will be lost. History shows that such states did not enjoy lasting 
56 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

prosperity. Consequently, we believe that the necessary consideration 

should be given so that SDF personnel may devote themselves to their 

duties with pride and in the spirit of challenges. 

Defense Industry 

Total output of Japan's defense industry today accounts for about 0.6 

percent of domestic industrial production. From the viewpoint of the 

national economy, this represents a paltry amount. From the viewpoint 

of security, however, we would like to emphasize that it is extremely 

important to have a domestic defense industry capable of developing 

and producing technologically advanced and high-quality equipment. 

The roles played by state-owned munitions factories before the end of 

World War II, such as army ordnance and naval arsenals, have been 

taken over completely by the private defense industry since the war's 

end. What is notable about today's defense industry is that it consists 

of numerous enterprises that cut across a broad spectrum of h~dustrial 

sectors and, moreover, includes a large number of small- and mediumsized enterprises and highly specialized enterprises. Furthermore, as 

Japan maintains a policy of imposing strict voluntary restraints on arms 

exports under the three principles of arms exports, weapons-related 

divisions of component enterprises have no alternative but to formulate 

production plans based entirely on orders from the Defense Agency. As 

a result, a wide variety of products tend to be produced on a limited 

scale, which leads to prices higher than the average price abroad. As 

for mainline equipment, it is notable that a major part of such 

equipment is either imported from the United States or manufactured 

domestically under license from U.S. defense contractors. 

In spite of these limitations the Japanese defense industry has 

managed to maintain its manufacturing base because the nation's 

defense capability has until recently been in the stages of build-up and 

improvement. During the past few years, however, the equipment 

procurement budget has leveled off or begun to decrease, making the 

future prospects uncertain. As overall business earnings are shrinking 

because of the current economic slump, it is becoming increasingly 

difficult for related enterprises to maintain their defense divisions. 

Henceforth, as already described, it will be necessary to promote 

the modernization of defense capability and, at the same time, reduce 

the overall scale of defense capability, with emphasis on combat units, 

and improve its overall efficiency. Moreover, considering that the 
APPENDIX A 57 

service life of equipment is tending to lengthen markedly, it is expected 

that procurement volume of equipment, particularly front-line 

equipment, will be considerably reduced. As a result, unless appropriate 

measures are taken, a number of enterprises may find it difficult to 

maintaining their production basis and, if worse comes to worst, may 

be forced to withdraw from the defense industry. 

For the reasons described above, Japan's defense production is 

placed at a disadvantage in terms of cost. But because of the nature of 

the defense industry economic efficiency should not be the only 

criterion for judgment. It is vitally important to maintain autonomy and 

independence in equipment procurement and defense-related technology, 

partly with a view to facilitating technological exchanges with the 

United States. Consequently, it is necessary to give policy consideration 

so that maximum possible support may be provided to help maintain the 

existence of enterprises involved in the defense industry. For example, 

it is desirable that the government should announce medium-term 

procurement estimates as far in advance as possible so that related 

enterprises will find it easier to draw up production plans. In particular, 

with a view to easing as much as possible the adverse effects of 

decreases in the procurement volume of front-line equipment, continued 

consideration should be given to domestic production and to the 

promotion of restructuring at the level of individual enterprises. At the 

same time the following points should be noted: First, regarding areas 

were advanced technology is required, consideration should be given to 

the maintenance of the foundations of research and development and 

manufacturing technology. Secondly, in order to avoid difficulties in 

the routine operation of equipment on the spot it is absolutely necessary 

for related enterprises to maintain the capacity for equipment repairs. 

Thirdly, regarding small- and medium-sized enterprises that depend 

heavily on defense demand, we believe it is necessary to consider 

measures from the viewpoint of industriul policy or social policy. 

Fourthly, we believe that promotion of appropriate joint research and 

development with the United States and other nations is another 

measure that merits consideration. 

Technological Foundation 

It is expected that military technology will make for steady progress. 

Furthermore, since it is impossible to make up for laggard in quality 

through expansion of quantity, it is extremely important to security that 
58 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

defense technology be maintained at the advanced level. On the other 

hand, as already stated, the procurement volume of front-line equipment 

is expected to decrease in the future, so that even if research and 

development work on equipment should succeed, the actual volume of 

orders for such equipment may not reach the level desired by the 

producers. It is possible that the uncertain prospects for future contracts 

will reduce the desire of private enterprises to invest in research and 

development. 

In view of these points, it is essential for the government to make 

greater efforts for research and development, promoted Governmentfunded research of technological prototypes not predicated on mass 

production, and seek to strengthen the basis of most advanced 

technologies. In addition, it is important to make greater efforts to 

accumulate software and build data bases. 

Modality of Future Defense Program 

Implementation of the restructuring of defense capability and 

organizational reform along the lines of thinking proposed by this report 

will have considerable effects not only on SDF personnel and those 

concerned with the Defense Agency but also on general society such as 

local public organizations and private enterprises concerned. 

Consequently, in order to avoid unnecessary confusion it will be 

necessary to implement our proposals in stages over a considerably long 

period of time (for example, about 10 years). It should also be noted 

that the nature of the reforms proposed herein is such that they present 

targets to be attained during the process of reforms to be carded out 

over an appropriate period of time. As such, they do not indicate 

targets to be maintained in the long term or upper limits of defense 

capability, such as those indicated in the appendix to the "National 

Defense Program Outline" of 1976. We must part with the "National 

Defense Program Outline," but whether an alternative document should 

be prepared is a question to be considered by the government. In 

addition, whether the "Basic Policy for National Defense" of 1957 

should be rewritten as to express the new basic thought on defense is 

a question to be studied in the future. 

As for specific defense buildup, we believe that mid-term plans 

should be prepared and that efforts should be made on a flexible yet 

programmed basis. 
APPENDIX A 59 

Establishment of Crisis Management System and 

Integration of Intelligence 

Regarding C3I systems, it is pointed out that, generally, links between 

a plurality of organizations are the weakest spots and that defects are 

liable to present themselves in these areas. This seems to be the case 

with the present conditions of Japan's intelligence system and crisis 

management system. Efforts are being made to strengthen these links, 

such as by holding joint intelligence conferences at the Cabinet, but it 

is necessary to make further efforts so that the intelligence and crisis 

management systems of the entire government may function more 

effectively. Henceforth it will be necessary to make full-scale efforts 

to strengthen and improve the crisis management and intelligence 

analysis functions at the Cabinet level. This is a task of vital 

importance that covers a broad range of endeavor from the training of 

intelligence specialists and improvement of their treatment to the 

strengthening of the intelligence functions at the levels of government 

organizations and the SDF and finally to the integration of intelligence 

at the Cabinet level and the maintenance of the policy-making 

machinery suited to crisis management type and the domestic legal 

system designed to prepare for emergencies. Consequently we hope 

that sufficient discussions will be conducted on these matters. 

CONCLUSION 

The nature of security problems has undergone certain changes with the 

ending of the Cold War. In these circumstances peoples of the world 

are beginning to make their respective efforts in search of a new 

international order. We, too, should deal squarely with our security 

policy with a fresh mind. 

It goes without saying that the security policy of each state lies 

basically in its capacity for self-management and crisis management. 

It also remains true that the sharing of common interests and values is 

the most reliable of ties in relations between nations. In this sense, the 

ties between Japan and the United States, which have a common goal 

concerning the formation of a new international order, are expected to 

become even more important. This is because peoples of the world, 

working together to prevent armed conflicts and bring about their early 

settlements and to resolve social problems contributing to conflict, such 

as poverty, will likely have increasing opportunities to act positively and 

constructively to that end. Through steady accumulation of productive 
60 REDEFINING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 

results in such cooperative security mankind will be able to come closer 

to the United Nations' goal of collective security. As a result, an 

international order in which the prohibition of "the threat or use of force 

as means of settling international disputes" is the basic rule will become 

a greater certainty. We should make maximum efforts toward that goal 

because that will also be in the interest of the Japanese people. 

From this viewpoint this report has discussed the modality of 

security policy and defense capability Japan should henceforth pursue. 

Such security policy and defense capability consist of three pillars-- 

promotion of multilateral cooperation, improvement and strengthening 

of Japan-U.S. security relations, and maintenance of a highly reliable 

and efficient defense capability. 

In order to ensure that the new security policy described here is 

smoothly implemented and that defense plays a significant role in the 

process, it is essential that the entire nation make efforts accordingly 

from the comprehensive viewpoint and that policy be implemented in 

a coherent manner. To that end the building of a crisis management 

system that makes effective policy making and execution possible is 

indispensable. At the same time, we would like to emphasize that broad 

public understanding, support and participation lie at the heart of 

security policy. It is our sincere hope that this report will help to 

deepen the public understanding of security issues. 
APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS 

ACSA 

ARF 

ASDF 

ASEAN 

AWACS 

C3I 

CSCAP 

CWC 

DoD 

DPRK 

FSX 

GSDF 

JDA 

JSDF 

LDP 

MITI 

MOFA 

MSDF 

MTCR 

NATO 

NDPO 

NGOs 

NPT 

NSC 

ODA 

PKO 

ROK 

SDP 

TFT 

TMD 

U.N. 

UNTAC 

acquisition and cross-servicing agreements 

ASEAN Regional Forum 

Air Self-Defense Force 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

Airborne Warning and Control System 

command, control, communications, and intelligence 

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 

Chemical Weapons Convention 

Department of Defense 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea 

fighter support experimental 

Ground Self-Defense Force 

Japan Defense Agency 

Japan Self-Defense Force (also SDF) 

Liberal Democratic Party 

Ministry of International Trade and Industry 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Maritime Self-Defense Force 

Missile Technology Control Regime 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

National Defense Program Review 

nongovernmental organization 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

National Security Council 

official development assistance 

peacekeeping operation 

Republic of Korea 

Social Democratic Party 

technology for technology 

theater missile defense 

United Nations 

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 

61 
McNair Papers 

The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, 

home of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the 

National Defense University. An Army post since 1794, the fort 

was given its present name in 1948 in honor of Lieutenant 

General Lesley James McNair. General McNair, known as 

"Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three million troops, 

was about to take command of Allied ground forces in Europe 

under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy, 

25 July 1944. 

The following is a complete listing of published McNair Papers. 

For information on the availability of specific titles, contact the 

Circulation Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, 

Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 30219-6000 (telephone: 

commercial 202/475-1913; DSN 335-1913). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 

1989. 

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May 

1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional 

Monarch?, October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SD! and Arms Control, November 1989. 

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, November 1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third 

World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign 

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in 

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of 

lnsurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The 

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, lran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1990. 

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand, May 

1991. 
13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: 

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare, 

March 1992. 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military 

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria' s Quest for Security After the Cold 

War, February 1993. 

16. William C. Bodie, Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy in 

Post-Soviet Europe, June 1993. 

17. William H. Lewis (ed.), Military Implications of United Nations 

Peacekeeping Operations, June 1993. 

18. Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, lnteroperability: A Desert 

Storm Case Study, July 1993. 

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the United Nations 

Charter Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jeffrey Simon; 

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy, European 

Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technologies in the 

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic 

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegrad 

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 1993. 

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Brian 

Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? November 1993. 

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failing States, 

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Security 

Structure, February 1994. 

28, Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: ,Speculations on Armed 

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, 

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a 

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S.-Japan 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 1994. 
JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly is a professional military 

journal published under the auspices of the Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, National Defense University, to 

promote understanding of the integrated employment 

of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. 

JFQ focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, 

contingency planning, operations conducted by the 

unified commands, and joint force development. 

The journal is a forum for examining joint and 

combined warfare and exchanging ideas of importance 

to all services. JFQ appeals to a wide audience across 

the defense community with an interest in the nature 

and history of joint warfighting. 

TO ORDER A SUBSCRIPTION, cite Joint Force 

Quarterly (JFQ) and send your check for $22.00 

($27.50 foreign), or provide your VISA or MasterCard 

number and expiration date, to Superintendent of 

Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15220- 

7954. You may also place orders by FAX: (202) 512- 

2233.