```

                                                                 
Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not	 
Reflected in Readiness Reporting (30-APR-02, GAO-02-525).	 
                                                                 
Rigorous, realistic training is key to military readiness. All	 
U.S. military forces  conduct frequent training exercises to hone
and maintain their war-fighting skills. Combat units stationed	 
outside the continental United States are able to meet many of	 
their training requirements but face constraints in such areas as
(1) maneuver operations, (2) live ordnance practice, and (3)	 
night and low altitude flying. Training constraints cause adverse
effects, including (1) requiring workarounds that can breed bad  
habits affecting combat performance; (2) requiring military	 
personnel to be away from home more often; and (3) preventing	 
training from being accomplished. To address these concerns,	 
military commands and services are negotiating with host	 
governments to lessen restrictions on existing training areas,	 
but such actions are often done at an individual-service level	 
and sometimes create unforeseen problems for other services and  
for existing training capabilities.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-525 					        
    ACCNO:   A02921						        
  TITLE:     Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not
Reflected in Readiness Reporting				 
     DATE:   04/30/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     International relations				 
	     Military facilities				 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Military training					 
	     Armed forces abroad				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Air Force Europe Rangeless Interim 		 
	     Training System					 
                                                                 
	     Bradley Fighting Vehicle				 
	     DOD Global Status of Resources and 		 
	     Training System					 
                                                                 
	     F-15C Aircraft					 
	     F-15E Aircraft					 
	     F-16 Aircraft					 
	     MK-19 Grenade Launcher				 
	     Multiple Launch Rocket System			 
	     P-3 Aircraft					 
	     Stinger Missile					 
	     Orion Aircraft					 
	     High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 		 
	     Vehicle						 
                                                                 
	     Eagle Aircraft					 
	     Rolling Airframe Missile				 
	     TOW Missile					 
	     F-15 Aircraft					 

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GAO-02-525
     
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

April 2002 MILITARY TRAINING Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not
Reflected in Readiness Reporting

GAO- 02- 525

Page i GAO- 02- 525 Military Training Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Forces Face Increasing Training Limitations
5 Constraints Adversely Affect Training, but the Effects Are Not

Captured in Readiness Reporting 16 Service and Command Coordination Is
Insufficient When Pursuing

Training Alternatives 28 Conclusions 34 Recommendations for Executive Action
35 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35

Appendix I Location of Major Units and Bases in Europe and the Pacific 37

Appendix II Maps of Individual Countries 41

Appendix III Scope and Methodology 48

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 51

Tables

Table 1: Army Capability Table 20 Table 2: Marine Corps Capability Table 21
Table 3: Navy Capability Table 23 Table 4: Air Force Capability Table 25
Table 5: Units and Locations Visited on This Assignment 49

Figures

Figure 1: A Steel Mill Constructed in the Safety Easement Area of the Koon-
ni Range 9 Figure 2: A Korean Woman Harvesting Rice on Field Inside the

Story Range Complex 10 Contents

Page ii GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Figure 3: A Machine Gun Firing Point on Range 7 in Okinawa 12 Figure 4: A
Tank Tunnel Firing Point on Range 10 in Okinawa 13 Figure 5: Major Combat
Units and Bases in Europe 38 Figure 6: Major Combat Units and Bases in Japan
and Korea 40 Figure 7: Map of Germany Identifying the Locations of Major

Combat Units and Major Training Facilities 41 Figure 8: Map of Italy
Identifying the Locations of Major Combat

Units and Major Training Facilities 42 Figure 9: Map of United Kingdom
Identifying the Location of Major

Combat Units and Major Training Facilities 43 Figure 10: Map of Korea
Identifying the Location of Major Combat

Units and Major Training Facilities 44 Figure 11: Map of Japan, Including
Okinawa, Identifying the

Location of Major Combat Units and Major Training Facilities 45 Figure 12:
Map of Alaska Identifying the Location of Major Combat

Units and Major Training Facilities 46 Figure 13: Map of Hawaii Identifying
the Location of Major Combat

Units and Major Training Facilities 47

Page 1 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

April 30, 2002 The Honorable Daniel Akaka Chairman, Subcommittee on
Readiness

and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman: Rigorous, realistic training is one of the keys to
military readiness. All United States military forces, including the
approximately 240, 000 military personnel stationed outside the continental
United States (CONUS), conduct frequent training exercises to hone and
maintain their warfighting skills. About 110,000 U. S. military personnel
are stationed in Europe and 130,000 in the Pacific, including the states of
Hawaii and Alaska. (See app. I for maps showing the two theaters and what
units are stationed there and app. II for a map of each location and its
major training areas.) Concerned that growing restrictions by host
governments are limiting the training opportunities available to U. S.
military forces, you requested that we examine a number of issues related to
the ability of nonCONUS- based forces to train. Accordingly, our objectives
in this report were to assess (1) the types of training constraints that
non- CONUS forces face and whether they are likely to increase in the
future, (2) the impact these constraints have had on the ability of military
units to meet their training requirements and on their reported readiness,
and (3) alternatives that exist to increase training opportunities for these
forces. As agreed with your office, we included all U. S. forces based
outside the 48 contiguous states in our examination, which includes those
based in Hawaii and Alaska. A more detailed description of our scope and
methodology is included in appendix III.

This is the first of two assessments we have recently made of training
limitations facing U. S. forces. We are also nearing completion of a study
of environmental and commercial development issues affecting military
training ranges in the continental United States. That report is being
conducted at the request of the House Committee on Government Reform and is
expected to be completed shortly.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Non- CONUS combat units are able to meet many of their training requirements
but face a variety of training constraints that have grown over the past
decade and are likely to increase further. Units have the most difficulty
meeting their training requirements for (1) maneuver operations, (2) live
ordnance practice, and (3) night and low altitude flying. These difficulties
arise because both the European and Pacific units? homestation training
locations are not large enough to conduct specific ground maneuvers on a
regular basis; are limited in the types of munitions or use of live fire or
both; and are restricted in terms of flight hours, altitudes, and electronic
frequencies allowed. While some restrictions are long standing, the increase
in restrictions facing U. S. forces in many cases is the result of the
growing commercial and residential development on or near previously
established training areas and ranges. The construction itself, including
residential and agricultural development within training ranges, has forced
some ranges to close, reduced the training capability at others, and often
delayed training on those that remain. Continued growth in land use and
competing demands for air space near training ranges is likely to result in
further training constraints in the future.

Training constraints have a variety of adverse effects, including (1)
requiring workarounds- or adjustments to the training event- that sometimes
breed bad habits that could affect performance in combat; (2) requiring
military personnel to be away from home more often; and (3) in some
instances preventing training from being accomplished. One potential problem
with workarounds is that that they lack realism, and the procedures used
during the workaround could lead to individuals practicing tactics that may
be contrary to what would be used in combat. For example, in actual combat,
weapons are armed well before pilots make a final approach to a target;
however, in Korea, pilots are not able to arm their weapons until the final
approach on its training ranges because of terrain limitations. This causes
these pilots to learn inappropriate combat tactics. While all units have to
deploy to major training centers, like the Army?s Combat Maneuver Training
Center in Hohenfels, Germany, to obtain some of their higher- level
combined- arms training skills, we found that all non- CONUS units had to
deploy to complete training that normally is performed at home station by
CONUS units. These units deploy to other locations within the country in
which they are stationed (or in the case of Alaska and Hawaii to other
locations in the state); to other locations within their theaters; or back
to the United States to complete training. While deployments allow the units
to complete a great deal more of their training, they result in increased
costs and more time away from home. Even with these actions, there are times
when the units are not able to accomplish required training or accomplish
the training to Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

such a limited extent that it just minimally satisfies the requirement.
However, the adverse effects of training constraints are often not being
captured in readiness reporting. Our review of unit readiness assessments
for almost all combat units in Europe and the Pacific for the last two
fiscal years showed that the impact of limitations and restrictions on
training were rarely reflected in unit readiness reports.

U. S. military commands and services are taking a variety of actions to
address constraints, such as negotiating with host governments to lessen
restrictions on existing training areas, but such actions are often done at
an individual- service level and sometimes create unforeseen problems for
other services and for existing training capabilities. For example, Air
Force pilots at Misawa Air Base in northern Japan are allowed to use a
nearby Japanese air base to land their F- 16s during inclement weather but
are not able to practice for this maneuver because of an agreement reached
by local Japanese military officials and a local U. S. Navy official when
Misawa was a U. S. Navy installation. Under the agreement, Navy P- 3
aircraft were allowed to practice such landings, but U. S. fighter aircraft
could not. At the time, the Navy had no fighter aircraft at Misawa, and the
limitation did not seem significant. The regional military commands do not
have a strategy for coordinating efforts to improve training that could
prevent the individual services from pursuing solutions to their training
shortfalls that are unintentionally detrimental to other services or that
unintentionally sacrifice some training capabilities to improve others.

GAO is making recommendations to improve the quality of readiness reporting
to reflect training constraints and to provide for a more holistic approach
to addressing training constraints. In written comments on a draft of this
report, the Department of Defense stated that it substantially concurred
with the contents of the report and its recommendations. A detailed
discussion of the department?s comments is contained in the body of this
report.

Armed forces must be trained and ready in peacetime to deter wars, to fight
and control wars that do start, and to terminate wars on terms favorable to
the U. S. and allied interest. Historical experiences indicate that there is
a correlation between realistic training and success in combat. Hence,
training should be as realistic as possible to prepare troops for combat.
Service training guidance emphasizes the importance of live fire training to
create a realistic combat scenario and to prepare individuals and units for
operating their weapons systems. Background

Page 4 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

U. S. forces are required to train for a variety of missions and skills.
This training includes basic qualification skills such as gunnery and
higher- level unit operational combat skills. Service training requirements
typically require the use of air ranges for air- to- air and air- to- ground
combat, drop zones, and electronic warfare; live- fire ranges for artillery,
armor, small arms, and munitions training; ground maneuver ranges to conduct
realistic force- on- force training at various unit echelons; and sea ranges
to conduct ship maneuvers for training. To achieve required training, non-
CONUS forces use a variety of training areas and ranges that are generally
owned by host governments.

Ideally, forces conduct the majority of their required training at home
station using local training areas or operating areas. However, non- CONUS
forces have historically relied on a combination of instrumented training
ranges away from home station, major training centers, CONUS training
exercises, and multilateral training exercises with countries within their
theater to obtain their required training. This includes the Navy and the
Marine Corps, which have no permanently stationed combat forces in Europe
and no fixed access to training ranges in the European theater. 1

We have previously reported that the size of home station training areas
available to units varies greatly, particularly between units stationed
overseas and those in the United States. 2 For example, we reported that
local training areas for units stationed in Germany have historically varied
in size from 3 acres to 8,000 acres, with divisional units not always housed
at the same location. In the United States, we reported that individual
installations vary, but far more land is available and typical installations
may vary in size from just under 100,000 acres up to more than one million
acres.

While this report?s focus is exclusively on training constraints outside
CONUS, both we and the Department of Defense (DOD) are examining constraints
on CONUS training. At the request of the House Committee on Government
Reform, we are reviewing the effects of environmental and

1 The Navy and Marine Corps deploy forces into the European theater fully
trained at their highest state of readiness. Therefore, their objective is
to provide ?maintenance? or ?proficiency? training during their six- month
deployment in theater.

2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: War Offers
Important Insights Into Army and Marine Corps Training Needs (GAO /NSIAD-
92- 240, Washington, D. C.: Aug. 25, 1992).

Page 5 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

commercial development restrictions on key training areas within the 48
contiguous states and whether DOD is effectively working to address these
issues. In addition, DOD is in the process of determining the extent of the
training problems at CONUS facilities. DOD?s Senior Readiness Oversight
Council initiated a sustainable range initiative spearheaded by the Defense
Test and Training Steering Group. The initiative?s purpose is to develop and
recommend a comprehensive plan of action to ensure that the department
maintains range and airspace capabilities that support DOD?s future training
needs. In November 2000, the steering group submitted a sustainable range
report to the Oversight Council followed by the publication of nine action
plans that addressed eight training- related issues 3 confronting CONUS
training and an outreach plan. Currently, DOD?s efforts have focused almost
exclusively on CONUS training. There is no consolidated DOD- wide listing of
non- CONUS training ranges and their associated limitations. Some services
have started collecting this information, but a complete inventory is not
yet available.

Unlike CONUS- based forces, which conduct their company level and below
training at home- station, none of the permanently stationed nonCONUS combat
units are able to meet all their company- level and below training
requirements at home station. According to service doctrine, home- station
training should support company- level and below training requirements. Non-
CONUS combat units have the most difficulty meeting their training
requirements for (1) maneuver operations, (2) live ordnance practice, and
(3) night and low altitude flying. These difficulties arise because both the
European and Pacific units? home- station training locations are not large
enough to conduct specific ground maneuvers on a regular basis; are limited
in the types of munitions or use of live fire or both; and are restricted in
terms of flight hours, altitudes, and electronic frequencies allowed. Some
restrictions are long- standing, while others are more recent. In many
cases, the increase in restrictions facing U. S. forces is the result of the
growing commercial and residential development on or near previously
established training areas and ranges. The construction itself, including
residential and agricultural development within training ranges, has forced
some ranges to close, reduced the training capability at

3 The report addressed endangered species, unexploded ordnance, frequency
encroachment, maritime sustainability, national airspace redesign, air
quality, airborne noise, and urban- growth encroachment. Forces Face

Increasing Training Limitations

Page 6 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

others, and often delayed training on those that remain. Continued growth
and host nation concerns may result in further restrictions in the future.

In many instances non- CONUS- based units? home- station local training
areas are not large enough or are inappropriate for certain operations. To
make training as realistic as possible, many exercises require specific
terrain or large maneuver areas. However, in both Europe and the Pacific U.
S. ground forces lack enough space and/ or the appropriate terrain to train
at their home stations. Following are several examples of such limitations.

 The Army in Germany has historically had limited local training areas
available for units to engage in home- station training. The Army recognizes
only 7 of the 61 identified local training areas as having all the
characteristics of a local training area. Over the past decade, as part of
the Army?s practice of being a good neighbor, there has been a shift toward
using designated areas as opposed to large open areas on private land, which
has further lessened the amount of land available for training. Although,
the Army has limited local training areas, it has been able to conduct all
its required training using a combination of training areas within Germany.
Figure 7 in appendix II is a map showing the locations of major units and
training facilities in Germany.

 Army units in Italy also have a limited number of local training areas to
conduct home- station training, and for some types of mission training the
terrain there is inappropriate for the desired training. Army officials
based in Italy said that there were only a few instances where training was
constrained at some local training areas. One local training area does not
allow the soldiers to train on their High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles. A second local training area is coming under pressure from
increased recreational use by the local population. Specifically, during
summer 2001, a portion of this training area was completely closed because
the area abutting it is becoming increasingly popular for hikers. Army
officials expressed concern that they may lose more of the training area in
the future. Regarding having the right terrain, while Army units in Italy
are expected to operate in wooded areas, soldiers told us that during some
exercises they pretended to be moving through a wooded area hiding behind
trees when in actuality they were moving through an open field at their
local training areas. Figure 8 in appendix II is a map showing the locations
of major units and training facilities in Italy. Ground Maneuver

Restrictions

Page 7 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

 In Korea, the Army?s local maneuver areas are inadequate in size to
support platoon and company training events, which has been a longstanding
problem. While the local training areas have always been inadequate to
support training events to Army standards, the areas available for training
are shrinking as the population in or around the training areas increases.
Figure 10 in appendix II is a map showing the locations of major units and
training facilities in Korea.

 In Japan, local training areas on Okinawa are too small to support the
Marine Corps? maneuver- training requirements. Only small- unit elements can
maneuver together. Large force elements that would normally be in close
proximity to each other and maneuver together must break into small groups,
disperse among the island?s training areas, and maneuver independently.
Further, maneuver training that ideally would be conducted in a continuous,
uninterrupted manner must be started and stopped as units move from one non-
contiguous training area to another. Training constraints have further
increased as a result of the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa
agreement 4 , which returned the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield- the site
previously used to conduct parachute drop training- to Japan and terminated
nearly all artillery training on the island. Most battalion exercises and
parachute drops, which require troops to conduct maneuver exercises after
being dropped, have been relocated off Okinawa. Marine Corps officials told
us that it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain maneuver training on
Okinawa. Figure 11 in appendix II is a map showing the locations of major
units and training facilities in Japan.

Many local training areas in both Europe and the Pacific prohibit the use of
live munitions or specific weapon systems. DOD officials have repeatedly
expressed the need for live- fire to make training realistic preparation for
combat. Many live- fire restrictions were implemented because development
and population growth near the training ranges reduced the areas available
for safety zones and led to noise complaints from nearby residents.
Following are examples of such restrictions.

4 The United States and Japan launched the Special Action Committee process
to reduce the training burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby
strengthen the Japan- U. S. alliance. The committee was to develop
recommendations to realign, consolidate, and reduce U. S. facilities and
adjust operational procedures of U. S. forces on Okinawa. Live- Ordnance
Restrictions

Page 8 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

 In Germany, for decades Army unit- level personnel have had difficulty in
conducting live fire training at home station except for small arms because
of the prohibitions on live fire in those areas. Army units have
historically gone to the Grafenwoehr Training Area- the Army in Europe?s
principal live- fire training area- to conduct live fire training on their
major weapons such as tanks and artillery. Regarding Grafenwoehr?s
sufficiency for future advance munitions, Army officials told us that they
plan to upgrade the training area to accommodate all munitions that will be
used by Army in Europe units.

 Both the Army and the Air Force in Italy have restrictions on live fire
training. There are such restrictions at nine of the Army?s ten local
training areas and firing ranges. The Air Force?s fighter wing in Italy does
not have a local air- to- ground range for bombing training although bombing
is one of its primary missions. The lack of an air- to- ground range is a
longstanding problem and prevents the wing from conducting surface attack
training in Italy.

 The two F- 15E squadrons in the United Kingdom cannot employ laserguided
bombs on any of their local ranges. Laser- guided bombs are the primary
munitions used for air- to- ground attacks by these squadrons. Although
these squadrons have regular access to air- to- ground ranges for non-
laser- guided bombing, the ranges are not considered quality tactical
training ranges that allow pilots to train for identifying and engaging
targets. Figure 9 in appendix II is a map showing the locations of the
fighter wing and training facilities in the United Kingdom.

 When in Europe, Navy units have limited access to training for live fire
combined arms, supporting- arms coordination, and naval gunfire support- all
of which are capabilities that the Navy tries to maintain at a certain level
while deployed in theater. As a result, they rely on bilateral exercises,
use of other country?s ranges or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
exercises to attain training.

 Both the Air Force and the Army in Korea face restrictions on live fire
training. The capabilities at Koon- ni, the Air Force?s only exclusive- use
range, have steadily diminished over time. Prior to 1978, live bombs were
dropped on the target island, practice bombs were dropped on the mainland,
and strafing was conducted on a scored 5 land target. In 1978,

5 Scoring is the process of quantitatively measuring training performance.

Page 9 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

live bombing was discontinued. Over the years, commercial development has
moved within the range?s safety easement zone. By 1989, practice bombing was
restricted to the target island and in 2000 the scored strafing pits were
closed. Figure 1 is a photo of a steel mill constructed within the zone
during the time that strafing was still allowed. As of April 2002 only
training ordnance is allowed and can only be used over water. For the Army,
its live- fire Story Range Complex does not have a safety easement zone
sufficient for some of its longer- range weapons, such as the MultipleLaunch
Rocket System and the Palladin. In addition, farming and structures- such as
houses, a greenhouse, and power lines- lie within the range?s boundaries.
Army officials said they frequently find farmers on the range, but they are
working with the Korean government to fence this range to keep farmers out
of those areas. Figure 2 shows a picture of a local farmer harvesting rice
inside the impact area at the Story Range. These farmers have to be removed
for obvious safety reasons before the Army can use the range, which causes
delays in training.

Figure 1: A Steel Mill Constructed in the Safety Easement Area of the Koon-
ni Range

Source: GAO.

Page 10 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Figure 2: A Korean Woman Harvesting Rice on Field Inside the Story Range
Complex

Source: GAO.

 In Japan, the Navy?s ships and aircraft face live- fire restrictions at
their local training facilities. The Navy is unable to conduct two of its
surface anti- air warfare exercises due to inadequate target support
facilities. These exercises are for the Rolling Airframe Missile against a
subsonic cruise missile target and for the standard missile against the
Supersonic Sea Skimming Target. The Navy ships typically use Farallon de
Medinilla, a range about 1,400 miles from Tokyo, to train aircraft in their
air to ground deliveries and for surface ship naval gunfire support. Pacific
Command officials said that in March 2002, a Federal judge held that the
incidental killing of migratory birds at this range violated the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act and that a hearing is scheduled for April 30, 2002, to
determine if operations at this range will be enjoined. Furthermore, the
Pacific Command said that if the Navy loses use of this range, serious
degradations in readiness will be expected within six months unless an
alternative range is found. In addition, the Navy?s carrier air wing faces
constraints on its ability to conduct live fire training. Because of the
close proximity of the wing?s home base at Atsugi (a suburb of Tokyo) to the
local population, live munitions are not allowed to be stored at Atsugi or
to be carried by aircraft departing the runway. Consequently, the wing?s
aircraft have to take off from Atsugi, land at another base in Japan to load
munitions, and then continue on to other ranges to conduct their live fire
training.

Page 11 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

 In addition to training constraints on mainland Japan, on Okinawa the
Marines have limited live- fire range capabilities at their local training
areas. For the Marines, the ranges throughout the island have fixed firing
points that do not allow tactical firing. Figures 3 and 4 show examples of
the fixed firing points at two of the ranges. As a result, Marines can train
to fire in only one direction as opposed to firing in any direction, which
would be the most likely situation in combat. While these ranges can help a
new Marine become familiar with his weapon, they cannot provide realistic or
qualification training. In addition, since the early 1990s, the Marines?
ability to conduct artillery firing on Okinawa has steadily diminished and
as previously noted was discontinued altogether in 1996. The government of
Japan now pays for the Marines to conduct their artillery firing training on
the Japanese mainland four times a year. However, Marine Corps officials
told us that one of the artillery ranges used on the mainland, Camp Fuji- a
co- use training area in northern Japan- is restricted and that artillery is
not being trained as robustly as it was on Okinawa.

Page 12 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Figure 3: A Machine Gun Firing Point on Range 7 in Okinawa

Source: GAO.

Page 13 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Figure 4: A Tank Tunnel Firing Point on Range 10 in Okinawa

Source: GAO.

 Land limitations and environmental concerns restrict live fire training in
Alaska and Hawaii. In Alaska, the artillery, mortar, and Tube- Launched,
Optically- Tracked, Wire Command- Link Guided missile (TOW) firing area at
Fort Richardson is unavailable to units 6 months a year (during the warmer
months). In addition, the local training areas are insufficient to support
cavalry gunnery, air- defense artillery- platoon ?Stinger? missile ground-
to- air gunnery, TOW, and the MK- 19, an automatic grenade launcher. In
Hawaii, the Makua live fire range complex on Oahu was closed from September
1998 to October 2001 because of environmental concerns raised by the local
population. Consequently, during this time the Army and Marines were unable
to conduct company live fire exercises at home station. According to Army in
the Pacific officials, the Makua range complex is now open for limited use
under the terms of a lawsuit settlement. According to these officials, it is
unlikely that the Marines will be able to use this range for the next 3
years because the settlement agreement limits the number of annual training
events.

Page 14 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Forces in both Europe and the Pacific are not able to conduct all their
aviation training events using their local training areas due to a variety
of airspace restrictions. For aviators in both theaters, air space
restrictions limit the ability to accomplish required training; thus
limiting pilots and aircrews? proficiency in some areas. Although some
restrictions are longstanding, Air Force personnel told us that airspace
throughout Europe and the Pacific is becoming increasingly congested, adding
to the difficulty in completing training. Following are examples of airspace
restrictions.

 The Air Force units stationed in Germany have limited local air space
available, and altitude restrictions prohibit flying below 1,000 feet.
Airspace is routinely available between 1,000 and 10, 000 feet and the Air
Force can obtain access to temporary reserved airspace above 10, 000 feet, 6
which is allocated to military training flights. The ability to train below
1,000 feet and above 10, 000 feet is important because pilots are likely to
engage in combat at both low and high altitudes. In addition, flying is
limited to the hours between 7 a. m. and 11 p. m. 7 Pilots are also
prohibited from flying at supersonic speeds and employing chaffs and flares.
The tactical ranges in Germany are limited in that only eight aircraft at a
time can use them; this does not allow the pilots to train in a realistic
formation.

 Air space restrictions in Italy are a major challenge for the Air Force
wing located in Aviano. The wing does not have permanent air space for air-
toair training in Italy. Currently, the wing uses a number of small air
spaces over the base and airspace over the Adriatic Sea; however, there is
no binding agreement for continued use of this space. Since 1993, the
Italian government has limited U. S. military aviation forces in Italy,
including both the Air Force and the Army, to 44 sorties 8 per day.
According to wing personnel, it is impossible for the Air Force to meet all
annual training events within the 44 sorties per day restriction. In
addition to sortie limitations, the Air Force is faced with additional
restrictions, such as restricted flying hours, which make it difficult to
complete night training requirements; hot pit refueling, that is, refueling
while the pilot is in the cockpit and the engine is running; employing
chaffs and flares; and flying at low altitudes.

6 Generally, temporary reserved airspace is capped at 24,000 feet; however,
on rare occasions it can be extended up to 31, 000 feet. 7 Although the
flying hours are usually 7 a. m. to 11 p. m., they may be adjusted for NATO
exercises or other events when requests are made to appropriate German
authorities. 8 A sortie is an individual flight by one aircraft. Airspace
Restrictions

Page 15 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

 For the Air Force, airspace in the United Kingdom is very congested and
has restrictions on high altitude and supersonic training, both of which are
necessary for pilots to accomplish prescribed air- to- air attacks. Limited
night flying hours restrict pilots? ability to accomplish night vision
training events. Pilots have limited radio frequencies in which they can
operate their electronic equipment. The only air space dedicated for
unrestricted air- to- air training- including the ability to fly supersonic,
employ chaff/ flares, and fly at unlimited altitudes- is at an Air- Combat
Maneuvering- Instrumentation (ACMI) range over the North Sea operated by a
private contractor. See appendix II figure 9 for the location of the North
Sea ACMI range. To gain access to this range, the United States must have a
contract that allows it to buy training slots; however, this contract lapsed
after fiscal year 2001 because of a lack of funding. Electronic warfare
training is also a challenge for the Air Force wing. It does not have access
to electronic warfare ranges where it can fly against threat emitters and
regularly be exposed to reacting to aircraft system alerts. Lastly, the lack
of radio frequencies for uses such as communicating while training and
transmitting training telemetry to ground stations is an issue in the United
Kingdom and throughout Europe. However, the United Kingdom and Italy have
now approved frequencies for the Air Force in Europe?s rangeless training
technology although there is still a lack of radio frequencies for
communicating while training

 In Korea, the ranges used by the Air Force at Koon- ni and Pilsung have
several restrictions. Both ranges do not allow flying after 10 p. m. This
makes it extremely difficult for pilots to meet night- flying requirements
during the summer months. In addition, the physical locations of the ranges
restrict the approaches that aircraft can use to enter the ranges and the
angles of attack used to engage targets. In both these locations, the
airspace has become increasingly congested over time. The construction of
the Inchon commercial airport near Seoul and its expected traffic growth
will have a negative impact on airspace availability for training at Koon-
ni Range in the future.

 In Japan, Air Force and Naval aviators are unable to successfully complete
training at home station. The size and capabilities of the Ripsaw Range in
northern Japan do not support training for the Air Force wing?s mission, 9

9 In 1995, the wing?s primary mission changed from attacking general targets
to suppression of enemy air defenses. The new mission requires extensive
training against electronic warfare emitters.

Page 16 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

which is suppression of enemy air defenses. The range has only two emitters,
and the physical size of the range and airspace will not permit additional
emitters. Further, frequency bands are extremely restricted in Japan and
additional frequency approval would be very difficult even if the available
range space would accommodate adding more emitters. Consequently, while the
size and capability of this range has not changed, the wing?s mission
changed, rendering this range ineffective for current training requirements.
For the Navy, prior to 1992, night landing practice was conducted at Atsugi
Naval Air Field. However, due to noise complaints generated by the increased
population from residential development that abuts the Air Field fence, in
1992 routine landing practice was discontinued at Atsugi. The interim
solution has been to have the pilots use Iwo Jima, 674 nautical miles away.
The base commander can get approval for night landing practice at Atsugi
only if weather prohibits the use of Iwo Jima or if an emergency arises that
requires the wing to deploy quickly. Furthermore, because the airspace
around Atsugi has become extremely congested, landing patterns cannot be
practiced to standard.

 In addition to constraints on mainland Japan, airspace on Okinawa is
restricted, creating difficulties for Air Force and Marine Corps pilots.
According to Air Force personnel, there is no electronic warfare training
capability on the island. The closest range with electronic emitters is the
previously discussed Ripsaw Range in northern Japan. Low altitude flying
(below 1,000 feet) is prohibited over Okinawa. Good neighbor policies limit
flying to between 6 a. m. and 10 p. m. Restrictions imposed to accommodate
civilian air traffic have dramatically increased, and Marine Corps officials
told us that as a result they cannot fly low altitude air defense missions
effectively.

Training constraints have a variety of adverse effects. These include (1)
requiring workarounds- adjustments to the training events- that sometimes
breed bad habits that could affect performance in combat, (2) requiring
military personnel to be away from home more often, and (3) in some
instances preventing training from being accomplished. Sometimes workarounds
lack realism, and the procedures used during the workaround could lead to
individuals practicing tactics that may be contrary to what would be used in
combat. While all units have to deploy to obtain some of their higher- level
combined arms training skills, we found that all non- CONUS units had to
deploy to complete training that normally is performed at home station by
CONUS units. While deployments allow the units to complete a great deal more
of their Constraints Adversely

Affect Training, but the Effects Are Not Captured in Readiness Reporting

Page 17 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

training, they result in increased costs and more time away from home. Even
with these actions, units are not always able to accomplish required
training or accomplish the training to such a limited extent that it just
minimally satisfies the requirement. However, the adverse effects of
training constraints are often not being captured in readiness reporting.

Units employ workarounds to mitigate home- station training limitations.
Although workarounds are preferable to forgoing the training, they often
result in training that is of lower quality or that creates ?negative?
training. Negative training is practicing procedures in a manner
inconsistent with how an action would be performed in combat, which results
in developing bad habits. In Europe, in some instances the Army adapts
maneuver training to fit the land available and the Air Force flies
unrealistic air- toground attack training missions. In the Pacific, the Air
Force must perform workarounds in Korea and Japan. These workarounds include
delaying weapons arming when approaching the training ranges and using
substitute signals to replicate threat emitters. Following are examples of
such workarounds.

 In Italy, one of the Army?s local training areas is not large enough or
wooded enough to accomplish its required training. For the unit to perform
its required flanking maneuver, it does so in pieces so that the land will
accommodate the event. To train on what to do after making contact with the
enemy, soldiers told us that a member of the unit would hide behind a pile
of sandbags in an open field. The other members move through the open field
and at some point the hidden solider playing the role of the enemy initiates
contact for the unit to react. This workaround does not provide realistic
training, because there is only one possible place the ?enemy? can be. Army
officials based in Italy said that this local training area is not the
preferred place for units to conduct the type of training described and that
other training areas are available and used between 150 and 220 times per
year.

 Air Force pilots in the United Kingdom have to both simulate air- to-
ground attacks using training lasers instead of real lasers and train at
different altitudes than they would likely operate at in combat. According
to personnel at the fighter wing, training lasers create bad habits,
especially for younger, less- experienced pilots, because the training laser
has a shorter range, which does not allow for training on the longer range
targeting likely in combat. In addition, flying at altitudes that are
different than the altitudes likely to be used in combat affects pilots?
timing, habit patterns, situational awareness, and engagement times. For
example, Workarounds May Provide

Unrealistic Training

Page 18 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

because air- to- air missiles have twice the range at high altitude than at
low altitude, the inability to train at high altitudes does not allow pilots
to practice firing missiles in a realistic combat scenario.

 In Korea, at the Koon- ni range pilots have to delay arming their weapons
until final approach. According to Air Force personnel this is negative
training because, in actual combat, weapons are armed well before the final
approach.

 In Japan, to get practice against more than the two threat emitters at
Ripsaw Range, pilots from the fighter wing must employ a ?trick file? to
fool their aircrafts? on board electronic warfare systems to make the
systems think that weather and other civilian radars are threat emitters.
While this workaround enables the aircraft?s sensors to pick up the radar
signals as if they were threat systems, the training is not realistic. The
commercial radars are always turned on, making them easy to find. In combat
situations, adversaries keep their air defense radars off as much as
possible, making them much more difficult to locate.

When units are unable to mitigate their training constraints with a
workaround, the next course of action taken is to deploy to complete
training requirements. While all units have to deploy to major training
centers like the Army?s Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels,
Germany to obtain some of their higher- level collective training skills, we
found that all non- CONUS units had to deploy to complete training that
CONUS units normally conduct at home station. Non- CONUS units deploy to
other locations within the country in which they are stationed; in Alaska
and Hawaii to training facilities elsewhere in those states; to other
countries within their theaters; or back to the United States to complete
training. While deployments allow the units to complete a great deal more of
their training, they result in increased costs and more time away from home,
although both DOD and the Congress are trying to reduce time away from home.

Data we collected from each of the military services? commands in Europe and
the Pacific show that in many cases when an entire country?s training
facilities (including both U. S. and host- country- operated facilities) are
considered, or in the case of Alaska and Hawaii all facilities in those
states, units are able to meet many of their training requirements. Since
some facilities are not located near where units are stationed, Army and
Marine Corps ground maneuver units and some Navy aviation units and ships
must deploy to training facilities elsewhere in the country or state in
Deployments Allow Units

to Meet Some, but Not All, Training Needs

Page 19 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

which the unit is based and sometimes to other locations in their theater of
operations. Air Force wings, except those in Korea, must deploy outside the
country or state in which they are based to complete their training.

The following is a discussion by service of overall training capabilities.
Tables 1- 4 show each service?s training capabilities and how well the
Commands believe their training facilities in that country or state satisfy
their training needs. At our request, the service commands graded their
locations on a high, medium, or low scale. High (H) denotes that units can
fully satisfy or satisfy a vast majority of the capability; moderate (M)
denotes that most of the capability can be satisfied; and low (L) denotes
that very few to none of the training requirements can be satisfied in
country or within the state. Because each service has different training
requirements, the capabilities being rated vary.

 As shown in table 1, Army units can meet most training needs in country or
state. Army units mainly deploy within country or state to obtain maneuver,
major gunnery, and combined arms live fire training at the company level or
higher. Army units in Germany deploy to Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels training
areas on an average of 28 days per year to accomplish this training. Army
units in Italy deploy to Grafenwoehr twice a year for about one month and to
Hohenfels once a year for about 25 days to accomplish this training. In
Korea, Army forces do not deploy away from Korea for training because of
their mission. However, units have always had to deploy to larger training
areas within country to complete necessary maneuver training. For example,
each of the five armor and mechanized battalions in Korea deploy on average
about 7 weeks each calendar year for maneuver training and, in total, the
division?s four aviation battalions deploy for training on average about 2-
1/ 2 weeks each calendar year. Army units in both Hawaii and Alaska deploy
within their respective states to accomplish their training requirements.
This is particularly true for live- fire combined- arms training. There are
no Army combat units permanently stationed in Japan.

Page 20 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Table 1: Army Capability Table Army Capability Germany Italy Korea Hawaii
Alaska

Armor qualification gunnery H a H a a Mechanized qualification gunnery H a H
a a Infantry w eapons q ualification H H H H H Attack helicopter
qualification gunnery H a M M a Lift helicopter qualification gunnery H M M
H H Artillery qualification H H M H H Air defense artillery systems
qualification H M H H H Engineer qualification H L H H H Military Police
Qualification H M H H H Squad/ platoon live- fire exercises H H H H H
Platoon Exercise Evaluation/ Army Training Evaluation Program H H M H H
Company/ Battalion Field Training Exercise H M M H H Nonstandard urban
operations training H H H HL Mission- Essential Training List training H M H
H M Joint training H H H a H

Legend: H = All or a vast majority of training needs can be satisfied. M =
Most of the training needs can be satisfied.

L = Very few of the training needs can be satisfied. a Not applicable.

Source: U. S. Army Europe and Pacific Commands? Analysis.

 As shown in table 2, Marine Corps units? ability to meet training
requirements are more limited than the Army?s. Units must deploy to achieve
most of their combined- arms live- fire training requirements. In Japan, on
the island of Okinawa, Marine Corps training is largely limited to small
arms live- fire and maneuver training at company level and below. Units must
deploy off Okinawa to maintain basic skill training. Since 1996, to conduct
artillery live fire training, four times a year 150 to 700 Marines stationed
on Okinawa deploy to the Japanese mainland for 30 days. Livefire and
maneuver training above the platoon and squad level and any integrated
combined- arms live- fire training involving coordinated air and ground
assault, also must be conducted away from Okinawa. For each of these
training exercises, about 1,000 sailors and marines deploy for 40 days. In
Hawaii, Marine Corps forces on Oahu must deploy to the Army?s Pohakuloa
Training Area on the island of Hawaii, about 200 miles from Oahu, to conduct
combined air and ground task- force training. Each deployment lasts between
25 and 30 days and involves a maximum of 2,100 Marines. Prior to September
1998, the Marines would have conducted most of this training at the Army?s
Makua military training area

Page 21 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

on Oahu, lessening both deployment days and cost. Principally because of
transportation costs, the Marines estimate it costs $500,000 more per year
to train at Pohakuloa than it does to train at Makua. There are no Marine
Corps combat units permanently stationed in Europe.

Table 2: Marine Corps Capability Table Marine Corps in the Pacific
Capability Japan Okinawa Hawaii Marine air

Electronic warfare L L M Inert ordnance M M H Live ordnance M M H Stand- off
weapons L L L

Air combat maneuvers M M M Night operations M M M Supporting arms
coordination exercise M M H Troop lifts H H H Reconnaissance M M M Command
and control M M H Chaff and flare expenditure M M H

Marine ground

Reconnaissance M M H Ground maneuver M M L

Combined arms and supporting arms employment M L M Night operations M M L

Command and control M M H Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special operations
capable with Naval Special Warfare) M M M

Amphibious warfare

Surface assault L L L

Helicopter assault M M L

Amphibious reconnaissance L M M Live- fire support M L L

Live Close Air Support M L H Simulated Close Air Support M L L

Live demolitions M L M Legend: H = All or a vast majority of training needs
can be satisfied. M = Most of the training needs can be satisfied.

L = Very few of the training needs can be satisfied. Source: U. S. Marine
Corps Pacific Command?s analysis.

Page 22 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

 As shown in table 3, Navy units have limited ability to meet training
requirements in Japan, including Okinawa. Deployments are often needed to
drop live ordnance, obtain proper electronic warfare training, fly at low
altitudes, or to participate in combined air and ground forces training. For
example, in Japan the carrier wing stationed at Atsugi Naval Air Field in
the Tokyo suburbs deploys to maintain certification and qualification for
aircraft carrier landings. Since 1992, aircrews have had to deploy to Iwo
Jima, about 674 nautical miles from Atsugi, 2 to 3 times per year for this
training. It requires between 350 and 500 personnel for a 10- day period to
accomplish this training, which must be done prior to each carrier
deployment. Because of its remote location and lack of an alternate
emergency airfield, practicing carrier landings at Iwo Jima requires a
safety waiver. In addition, these aircrews must also deploy to complete
airto- ground warfare training by either going to a target island near
Okinawa, nearly 950 nautical miles away, or to Farallon de Medinilla, which
is nearly 1,400 miles from Atsugi. For electronic warfare training, Navy
aircrews stationed in Japan usually deploy to Pilsung Range in Korea, nearly
650 miles from Atsugi. During our visit to Japan, naval aviators said that
it was not uncommon for them to deploy in excess of 200 days per year. There
are no ships or carrier air wings permanently stationed in Europe.

Page 23 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Table 3: Navy Capability Table Navy in the Pacific Warfare area capability
Japan Okinawa Hawaii Anti- air

Air L LM

Surface L M H Submarine a aa

Anti- surface

Air L M H Surface L M H Submarine L M H

Undersea

Air L LH

Surface L LH

Submarine L LH Mine

Air L LH

Surface L LH

Submarine L LH Strike

Air L LM

Surface L LL

Submarine L LL Electronic

Air L LM

Surface L LH

Submarine L LH

Legend: H = All or a vast majority of training needs can be satisfied. M =
Most of the training needs can be satisfied.

L = Very few of the training needs can be satisfied. a Not applicable.

Source: U. S. Navy Pacific Command?s analysis.

 As shown in table 4, other than in Korea and Alaska, Air Force units have
limited ability to train in the locations in which they are stationed. Many
units must deploy to the United States to fulfill their live ordnance,
electronic warfare, and low altitude flying requirements. For example, they
deploy to the United States to participate in combined air and ground

Page 24 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

forces training such as Red Flag 10 exercises and to participate in weapons
testing exercises. The Air Force wing in Italy relies on deployments to Red
Flag and weapons testing and delivery exercises to accomplish required
training such as air- to- ground attacks, munitions employment, and low
altitude flying because they do not have access to an air- to- ground range.
In contrast, for CONUS- based units Red Flag is the culmination of training,
not an opportunity to obtain training not available at home station. The Air
Force wing in the United Kingdom also deploys to the United States for live
fire training using laser- guided bombs and to engage in air- to- ground
training on tactical ranges. Additionally, United Kingdom based units rely
on deployments to Red Flag exercises or weapons system evaluation programs
to complete their electronic warfare training. The Air Force in Europe
discontinued use of a joint British and U. S. electronic warfare training
range, Spadeadam, in October 2000, and the range is currently available on a
pay- as- you- use basis. As a result of the cost, the fighter wing did not
utilize this range during fiscal year 2001. Furthermore, a second option,
the electronic warfare training range available in Germany, is not utilized
on a routine basis because the distance from the United Kingdom to the range
requires tanker support to train there, which increases training cost. In
Japan, the wing stationed at Okinawa, as in the United Kingdom, doesn?t have
access to an electronic warfare range. This wing deploys to Ripsaw Range in
northern Japan or to Pilsung Range in Korea to perform electronic warfare
training. There are no active duty Air Force combat units stationed in
Hawaii.

10 Red Flag is one of the Air Force?s premier training events. It provides
realistic combat training in an air, ground, and electronic threat
environment. It also allows participating units to operate with multiple
weapon systems and U. S. allies.

Page 25 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Table 4: Air Force Capability Table Air Force Capability Germany Italy
United

Kingdom Korea Japan Okinawa Alaska

Conventional M L M M H a H Tactical L L LH MHH Laser- guided bomb L L L L L
a H Chaff L L LH MHH Flare L L LH MHH Night flying L M M M M HH Low & medium
altitude L LH MML H Heavy weight L LM M M a H Strafe M L M M H a H Live fire
L L LM L a H Scorable M L M HH a H Electronic warfare H L LM L LH

Legend: H = All or a vast majority of training needs can be satisfied. M =
Most of the training needs can be satisfied.

L = Very few of the training needs can be satisfied. a Not applicable.

Source: U. S. Air Force Europe and Pacific Commands? analyses.

In some instances certain types of training cannot be completed
notwithstanding service efforts. Specifically, the Air Force in both Europe
and the Pacific and the Navy in the Pacific are unable to complete all their
required training events. Following are examples of training that cannot be
completed.

 For the Air Force, individual units report to their command what types of
training they were unable to accomplish in an internal document called their
?End of Fiscal Year Training Shortfalls Report.? The fighter wing in Italy
reported that it could not complete its basic surface attack or night close-
air- support training and the fighter wing in the United Kingdom reported
that it could not accomplish all of its required night flying or electronic
combat air- to- ground deliveries in fiscal year 2001. In Korea, fighter
squadrons reported that they could not satisfy their night- flying
requirements because aircraft are not allowed to fly with their wing lights
off. This lowers combat capability because during training it is impossible
for pilots to avoid looking at anti- collision or navigation lights, which
would not be available during combat. In Japan, the wing stationed on
Okinawa is unable to complete its electronic warfare or low altitude
training requirements because there is no electronic warfare range near
Notwithstanding

Workarounds and Deployments, Some Training Cannot Be Completed

Page 26 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Okinawa and because low altitude overland flights are not permitted on
Okinawa.

 In Japan, five U. S. surface ships stationed in Japan are unable to
complete their training requirements because they cannot fire the rolling
airframe missile. This adversely affects their readiness. The targets used
to qualify this missile cannot be launched and controlled from sites on
Okinawa or elsewhere in Japan. According to Pacific Fleet officials, they
arranged for alternate targets and the ships needing to fire the Rolling
Airframe Missile did so at Farallon de Medinilla and Okinawa in March 2002.
Now that this is done, Pacific Fleet officials expect these ships? readiness
to increase. The ships are to maintain their currency through simulation.

Our review of unit readiness assessments for almost all non- CONUS combat
units in Europe and the Pacific for the last 2 fiscal years showed that most
units consistently reported high levels of training readiness. The impact of
limitations and restrictions on training readiness were rarely reflected in
unit- readiness reports. However, individual services may report these
limitations in other ways.

Each month, or whenever a change in readiness occurs, units report their
readiness status through DOD?s primary readiness reporting system, the
Global Status of Resources and Training System. Units report their status in
four resource areas, one of which is training. A unit?s training readiness
status is determined by the present level of training of assigned personnel
as compared to the standards for a fully trained unit as defined by joint
and service directives. 11

We analyzed monthly Global Status of Resources and Training System data for
fiscal years 2000 and 2001 to see how often non- CONUS combat units were
reporting training readiness at high levels and lower levels. Our analysis
included units from the Army divisions and Air Force fighter squadrons in
Europe and the Pacific, and selected non- CONUS Navy and Marine Corps units
in the Pacific. For the units that reported low training

11 Commanders can assign a training status rating ranging from T- 1, meaning
most ready, to T- 4, meaning least ready. Specifically, a T- 1 rating
assessment means the unit requires 0 to 14 days to train to proficiency in
its wartime mission; a T- 2 unit requires 15 to 28 days; a T- 3 unit
requires 29 to 42 days; and a T- 4 unit requires 43 or more days to train to
proficiency in its wartime mission. A T- 5 rating assessment means that a
unit?s training proficiency cannot be determined due to special
circumstances, such as an inactivation. Readiness Reporting

Page 27 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

readiness, we examined the specific reasons cited for the lowered training
readiness and also reviewed the commanders? comments to ascertain whether
they attributed any of their training readiness shortfalls to training range
or host country restrictions. Anytime a unit is not at level one, it must
identify the reason why, and the readiness reporting instruction provides a
list of reasons for commanders to choose. There is a reason in the
instructions for identifying problems caused by inadequate training areas.
In addition, commanders may submit their own remarks on any subject.

Our analysis of unit- readiness reports of combat forces stationed in Europe
and for most combat forces stationed in the Pacific showed that during
fiscal years 2000 and 2001 these forces rarely reported low combat
readiness. In the Pacific, with the exception of U. S. naval forces
stationed in Japan, forces rarely reported low training- readiness. Units
from both theaters that did report low training- readiness rarely attributed
the degradation to inadequate training areas. Rather, other factors were
cited such as personnel shortages or operational commitments. Further, in
those instances in which Air Force units reported low training- readiness,
Air Force commanders? never cited training area limitations or host country
restrictions as contributing factors to their low training- readiness. Army
and Marine Corps commanders did cite training area limitations or host
country restrictions as contributing factors, but only infrequently.

Naval forces stationed in Japan reported low training readiness more often
than other forces, but still only a small proportion of the time. Inadequate
training areas or ranges were the third most frequently cited reason for the
degraded training readiness. Further, when commenting on their units? low
training status, commanders of these units often cited the inadequacy of the
ranges available to them and other restrictions that limited their ability
to train. For example, one unit commander commented that the inability of
his fighters to carry live munitions out of Atsugi Naval Air Field was a
contributing factor to his lowered training readiness.

The limitations of the Global Status of Resources and Training System are
well known in DOD. For the most part, military officials in both theaters
and office of the secretary of defense officials told us that the unit
readiness report is subjective and is not a vehicle to report training
shortfalls and the associated limitations or restrictions. Officials within
the office of the secretary of defense also noted that the reporting system
does not function as a detailed management information system objectively
counting all conceivable variables regarding personnel, training, and
logistics. Rather, we were told that it asks commanders to report on

Page 28 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

whether or not their units are combat ready or could be combat ready in a
comparatively short period of time. However, as noted earlier, the readiness
reporting system contains what are called reason codes to indicate the cause
of lower reported readiness. These reason codes include inadequate training
areas.

There is no overall training shortfalls report that would inform senior DOD
leadership of a units? inability to obtain required training. However,
individual Air Force units report to their command what types of training
they were unable to accomplish and why they were limited in what is called
their End of Fiscal Year Training Shortfalls Report. The Army has recently
revised its training readiness reporting instructions to make the reporting
more objective and the Marine Corps has an initiative underway to improve
the accuracy, objectivity, and uniformity of its training readiness
reporting, but there are no DOD- wide initiatives to make such improvements.

U. S. military commands and services are taking a variety of actions to
address constraints, including (1) negotiating with host governments to
lessen restrictions on existing training areas; (2) seeking to work with
other countries to create additional training opportunities, such as
expanding bilateral exercises to include training that can no longer be
conducted at home station; and (3) using technology to create, among other
things, transportable training systems designed for training outside the
usual training areas. The regional military commands do not have a unified,
coordinated strategy for coordinating efforts to improve training that could
prevent the individual services from pursuing solutions to their training
shortfalls that are unintentionally detrimental to other services or that
unintentionally sacrifice some training capabilities to improve others.

In most cases, individual services or unit commanders are working with host
countries to lessen restrictions. This results in individual solutions
rather than a set of coordinated actions that sometimes adversely affect
other services or training capabilities. The following are examples of
various alternatives and their effects.

 Both Army and Air Force officials in Italy have a very positive working
relationship with their Italian counterparts and the U. S. Embassy?s Office
of Defense Cooperation. The Air Force is currently working with them to
relax the restriction on the number of sorties allowed per day. The Air
Service and

Command Coordination Is Insufficient When Pursuing Training Alternatives

Working with Host Governments

Page 29 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Force is restricted to 44 sorties- per- day, which makes it very difficult
to accomplish training especially after aircraft were added to the wing. The
Air Force is negotiating to increase sorties to 63 per day. U. S. Army
helicopters stationed in Italy are restricted to 12 sorties per day and on a
weekly basis only 15 of these sorties can be low altitude. The Army needs
several helicopters to take- off and land multiple times to execute a
training mission, which it views as a single sortie, while under the
agreement the Italian government counts each helicopter on the mission as a
single sortie. This restriction as currently defined by the Italian
government may limit Army helicopters to no more than 1 day of effective
training per week. Army personnel said that there was a miscommunication
between the Air Force and the Army about the definition of sortie during the
initial negotiations.

 In other European countries with long- standing training constraints,
actions have been taken to resolve issues. In these cases, the services
worked closely with the governments and militaries to address new issues as
they surfaced, such as the impact of the foot and mouth disease in the
United Kingdom in 2001. In some instances, certain restrictions are the
result of political agreements and cannot be opposed. An example of this is
the low- altitude training restriction of 1,000 feet above ground level that
Chancellor Kohl of Germany and President George H. W. Bush agreed upon.

 Air Force pilots at Misawa Air Base in northern Japan are allowed to use a
nearby air base operated by the Japanese Air Self Defense Force when they
have to divert their F- 16s because of inclement weather. Ideally, the
pilots should practice such landings at the air base before they need to use
it in an emergency. However, they are unable to practice because of an
agreement reached prior to 1985 by local Japanese military officials and a
local U. S. Navy official when Misawa was a U. S. Navy installation. Under
the agreement, Navy P- 3 aircraft were allowed to practice such landings at
the air base, but U. S. fighter aircraft could land there only in an
emergency. At the time, the Navy had no fighter aircraft at Misawa, and the
limitation did not seem significant.

 In Korea, U. S. military officials and American embassy personnel are
working with their host government counterparts in a coordinated effort to,
among other things, lessen training restrictions and remove residential and
commercial development from critical training areas. According to

Page 30 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

U. S. military officials in Korea, the resulting Land Partnership Plan 12
was designed to consider the needs of all the services because previously
some local commanders had made agreements that met their short- term needs
but ultimately sacrificed broader, more long- term U. S. military interests.
Under the plan, the United States is to return about 33,000 acres of land it
currently uses and reduce its major installations from 41 to 26. In
exchange, Korean civilian housing, farming, and commercial buildings are to
be removed from the remaining U. S. installations and training areas. The
United States is also to receive greater access to Korean- owned-
andoperated training areas and ranges. The plan is to be phased in over a
10- year period. The plan has been completed and is awaiting final United
States and Korean government approval. If implementation does not begin
soon, U. S. Forces Korea estimates that its forces will face
trainingreadiness shortfalls by 2003.

 Army officials in Hawaii recently negotiated with local groups the
reopening of the Makua training area on the island of Oahu. The agreement
provides training opportunities that satisfy some of the Army?s
requirements. However, the Army did not include the Marine Corps in the
negotiation. According to Army officials in the Pacific, the Army did
attempt to include provisions for Marine Corps training requirements in
negotiating with the lawsuit plaintiffs, but were unable to reach an
agreement that would provide specific training opportunities for the Marine
Corps. These Marine units are heavily dependent on Army operated training
ranges to meet a sizable portion of their training needs, most notably
training for company- level and higher exercises that involve live- fire and
combined- arms. Thus, for at least the next three years, Marine units must
continue deploying to another training area. This increases time away from
home and cost.

The theater commands and their service components are working with countries
throughout their theaters to develop additional training opportunities. The
following are examples of these successful efforts and the problems and
drawbacks that they sometimes create.

12 The Land Partnership Plan is a cooperative U. S.- Korean effort to
improve combat readiness, consolidate U. S. installations and training
areas, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U. S.- South Korean
alliance. Developing New Training

Opportunities with Foreign Governments

Page 31 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

 The Army in Europe is working with eastern European countries to develop
training opportunities. For example, in 2000 and 2001, the Army conducted a
live- fire and combined- arms exercise in Poland called Victory Strike.
According to Army in Europe officials, the exercise allowed them to practice
against real world systems and meet training standards by taking advantage
of the location, opportunity, time, and space of the Poland ranges. This
exercise also allowed the Army to accomplish training that it would not have
been able to perform in Germany.

 The Air Force in Europe is working with countries throughout the European
theater- including countries in north Africa, such as Tunisia, and new NATO
nations, such as Slovakia and Bulgaria- to negotiate developing training
ranges or opportunities. It is also coordinating with the Navy in Europe to
develop possible joint- use and jointly funded trainingrange opportunities
in Croatia and Slovenia. Further, the services are trying to gain access to
training ranges in countries where U. S. forces do not train now, such as
the Czech Republic and Croatia.

 According to personnel in some units we visited, units have little input
into the design of joint training exercises. While a joint exercise may
provide great training for one U. S. service, it may provide little value
for another. For example, Air Force personnel stated that the Victory Strike
exercise in Poland was not adequately coordinated to maximize their
involvement. During the first part, they were not able to communicate with
other participants, and they never performed the close air support role that
they thought they were there to perform.

 The U. S. Pacific Command supports a number of training exercises with
allied and friendly countries in the region. The exercises include Tandem
Thrust, a bi- annual bilateral exercise with Australia; Cobra Gold, an
annual bilateral exercise with Thailand; and Balikatan, a joint exercise
with the Philippines. They provide U. S. forces with access to training
areas that (1) permit integrated and combined- arms training that would be
difficult to accomplish using only existing U. S.- controlled ranges and
training areas and (2) are less restricted than the areas used at their home
station.

Relying on such exercises does have drawbacks. When foreign ranges are used,
in deference to host governments and other participants, U. S. forces may
not be able to conduct the training in a manner that would provide the
quality of training U. S. forces would conduct on their own ranges.
According to U. S. Pacific Command and Marine Forces Pacific officials, a
few of the exercises had little value because they were basically having to
train their foreign hosts on U. S. tactics and were unable to train at a
level

Page 32 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

needed to accomplish their desired goals. In addition, if U. S. forces must
devote time during exercises for training they would typically conduct at
home station, they may not conduct as much of the higher- level training
needed or conduct it as effectively.

Eliminating certain training restrictions is impossible; and the services
are looking to technology, such as simulation training, to possibly provide
training that non- CONUS units cannot obtain. Technologies currently exist
in the European theater to provide training for individual weapons systems
and equipment, such as F- 15s, tanks, and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. In the
Pacific theater, the use of technology, including simulation, is essential
to ensure that U. S. military forces are able to maintain their combat
readiness. Training simulators for Europe- based units are available at
major training facilities, such as Grafenwoehr, and some home stations. With
these additional home- station training options, the units do not have to
deploy as frequently. However, the use of technology for training has caused
other problems, inadvertent and agerelated. Following are examples of the
non- CONUS use of technology for training and its effect.

 The Air Force in Europe acquired a rangeless training system called U. S.
Air Force Europe Rangeless Interim Training System to allow flexibility in
how it uses available airspace for training. Before the system was acquired,
aircrews had to train on an instrumented range in order to receive feedback
from their training. With the system, aircrews can train in available air
space and receive feedback from devices installed in their aircraft. In
theory, the new system should make quality air- to- air training easier to
accomplish despite the increasing restrictions on available air space.
However, this is not the case for the F- 15C squadron in the United Kingdom.
The Air Force in Europe acquired the system for the F- 15Cs in the United
Kingdom and terminated the contract for the existing range, which was the
best air space available for air- to- air training. Now, actual air- to- air
training is more difficult for that squadron to accomplish because of the
lack of quality air space. Air Force in Europe officials said that they were
unaware that quality air space would be more difficult to schedule when they
terminated the existing range contract.

 In Germany, many local training areas are not sufficient for tank
maneuvering. The simulator provides an opportunity for solders to become
familiar with the procedures while they are at home station. However, units
we spoke with said that the simulation available at home station is old and
rarely operating. According to Army in Europe officials, Using Technology

Page 33 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

they plan on having these replaced. A mobile trainer is to be fielded in
fiscal year 2005.

 In Korea, the Army will be highly dependent upon technology in the form of
simulators, such as for tank gunnery; instrumentation systems; and a variety
of other systems that are being fielded Army- wide. Using such technology,
Army officials will be able to improve their training capabilities for
large- unit maneuvers. Additionally, the Army uses portable target systems
on Korean ranges to achieve training to U. S. standards. The portable
systems will become even more important as the Army forces in Korea expand
their previously discussed use of Korean- controlled training areas and
ranges.

 In Japan, on Okinawa, an example of technology- based systems includes a
portable air- combat maneuvering system known as the Kadena Interim Training
System. The system- a pod fitted to the aircraft?s wing- is designed to
improve the quality of fighter air- to- air training and is ?rangeless.? It
does not need ground- based instrumentation to function and is not dependent
on having a fixed range. The system was first deployed at Kadena Air Base on
Okinawa, but the Air Force has started deploying additional systems to Osan
Air Base in Korea, and it expects to deploy the system to Misawa Air Base in
Japan later in 2002. According to officials from Headquarters, U. S. Pacific
Fleet in Honolulu, the Navy is also developing a portable air combat
maneuvering system for its fighter aircraft and plans to fund the system in
2004. On Okinawa, the Marine Corps currently use marksmanship trainers. The
Marines said that they are scheduled to receive three additional training
simulators: staff trainers to train Marines in the use of command and
control systems; gunnery and tactical trainers for light armored vehicles;
and supporting arms call- forfire trainers. In Japan, the Navy also wants to
fund the use of portable antisubmarine warfare ranges and use simulators to
maintain currency for the Rolling Airframe Missile as was mentioned earlier.

 In Hawaii, the Pacific Missile Range Facility has developed a
computersimulated target ?island? to enable surface ships to do naval
surface fire support training.

With the exception of Korea, the regional commands do not have a coordinated
strategy for pursuing actions to mitigate training limitations. The norm is
for individual services to negotiate solutions for their individual training
constraints. In the case of Japan, U. S. Embassy officials in Japan told us
that individual service efforts were the recommended Lack of a Coordinated

Strategy

Page 34 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

course of action because local service representatives were the most
knowledgeable about their issues and should be the ones to resolve them.
However, as discussed earlier, a lack of coordination has at times
unintentionally been detrimental to another service. For example, we
previously described an instance in Japan where a local Navy official
negotiated practicing landings at a Japanese airfield that resolved a Navy
constraint but did not consider future needs. In the case of Korea, U. S.
Forces Korea officials told us that the previously described Land
Partnership Plan was designed to consider the needs of all the services
because arrangements made in the past by local commanders sometimes
sacrificed broader, more long- term military interests. In addition, when
the regional commands or an individual service arrange bilateral and
multilateral training exercises, they do not always allow all the other
military service participants input into the design of the exercise. This
lack of coordination has at times not maximized all the services?
involvement. As we discussed earlier, this was the case for the Air Force in
its participation in an Army exercise in Poland called Victory Strike.

Even though units we visited told us about numerous constraints on their
ability to complete required training, units have rarely reported degraded
training readiness. This practice undermines the usefulness of readiness
reporting. Also, at present, there is no consolidated listing of training
constraints for non- CONUS locations. Therefore, senior DOD leadership, such
as the Senior Readiness Oversight Council, which monitors the readiness of
U. S. military forces, as well as service leadership above the affected
commands in Europe and the Pacific, cannot be aware of the extent of
training constraints faced by non- CONUS units.

Military services and regional commands are taking a variety of steps to
mitigate constraints and increase training opportunities without a
coordinated strategy that assures that actions taken by one party do not
adversely affect another. Our work shows that actions taken by one part of
DOD can in fact adversely affect other parts of DOD. First, individual
services, and not regional commands, are pursuing solutions to their
training shortfalls with host governments- solutions that may inadvertently
be detrimental to other services. Second, commands do not always allow the
services much, if any, input into structuring bilateral and multilateral
training events. Without their input, training exercises may not focus on
obtaining some required training and can unnecessarily favor one service
over another. Third, when DOD acquires new technology to improve training
capabilities, it is not considering all factors of the training Conclusions

Page 35 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

environment and is thus sacrificing some training capabilities to improve
others.

We recommend that the secretary of defense direct the chiefs of the military
services in conjunction with the undersecretary of defense, Personnel and
Readiness, to develop a report that will accurately capture training
shortfalls for senior DOD leadership. This document should objectively
report a unit?s ability to achieve its training requirements. It should
include

 all instances in which training cannot occur as scheduled due to
constraints imposed by entities outside DOD as well as all instances when
training substitutes are not sufficient to meet training requirements,  a
discussion of how training constraints affect the ability of units to meet

training requirements and how the inability to meet those requirements is
affecting readiness, and  a description of efforts to capture training
shortfalls in existing as well as

developmental readiness reporting systems. We further recommend that the
secretary of defense direct that the war fighting commands, in concert with
their service component commands, develop an overarching strategy that will
detail the initiatives the command and each service plan to pursue to
improve training, such as access to additional host government facilities,
participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises, and acquisition of
new technology. This strategy needs to be vetted throughout the services to
ensure that all factors are taken into consideration and that actions taken
to improve training opportunities for one service are not made to the
detriment of another service?s ability to train or that training
capabilities are not lost unintentionally.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it concurred
with the content of the report and its recommendations. DOD suggested that
our recommendation on reporting training shortfalls be expanded (1) to
include both active and reserve training shortfalls and (2) to specify in
greater detail what the recommended report should address. Regarding the
inclusion of both active and reserve training shortfalls in our
recommendation, we agree that conceptually this has merit, but because we
did not examine reserve forces? training shortfalls, we are not in a
position to include them in our recommendation. We have, however, expanded
this recommendation to identify some topics that reporting on
Recommendations for

Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 36 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

training shortfalls should include. These topics are not meant to be
allinclusive because DOD is in a better position than we to determine
exactly what to report. In responding to our recommendation that an
overarching strategy be developed to detail initiatives being pursued to
improve training, DOD stated that such an effort should help generate a
variety of options to ameliorate the current training deficiencies. DOD?s
comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV.

We are sending copies of this report to the secretary of defense; the
secretary of the army, the secretary of the air force, the secretary of the
navy, the commandant of the Marine Corps, and the director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon
request.

If you have any questions, please call me on (757) 552- 8100. Key
contributors to this report were Steve Sternlieb, Laura Durland, Frank
Smith, and Lori Adams.

Sincerely yours, Neal P. Curtin Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management

Appendix I: Location of Major Units and Bases in Europe and the Pacific

Page 37 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

In Europe, as shown in figure 5, Army and Air Force units are primarily
stationed in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The Army in Europe has
two divisions, the First Infantry Division headquartered at Wuerzburg,
Germany, and the First Armored Division headquartered at Wiesbaden, Germany.
In addition, the Army?s Southern European Task Force is stationed at
Vicenza, Italy. The Air Force has three fighter wings in Europe. The 48th
Fighter Wing at Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom is comprised of F- 15Cs
and F- 15Es; the 52nd Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany is
comprised of A- 10s and F- 16s, and the 31st Fighter Wing located at Aviano,
Italy, has F- 16s. Appendix I: Location of Major Units and

Bases in Europe and the Pacific

Appendix I: Location of Major Units and Bases in Europe and the Pacific

Page 38 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Figure 5: Major Combat Units and Bases in Europe

Source: GAO.

Appendix I: Location of Major Units and Bases in Europe and the Pacific

Page 39 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

In the Pacific, as shown in figure 6, the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps have combat units stationed in Japan and Korea. The Army?s 2nd
Infantry Division is stationed at Uijongbu, Korea. The Air Force has the
18th Wing at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, whose fighter aircraft is the F-
15Cs. The 35th Fighter Wing at Misawa Air Base in Japan has F- 16CJs. In
Korea, the 51st Fighter Wing at Osan Air Base has A- 10s and F- 16s, and the
8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan Air Base has F- 16s. In Japan, the 7th Fleet is
headquartered at Yokosuka Naval Base; however, there are ships at both
Yokosuka and Sasebo Naval Bases. In addition, the Navy has Carrier Air Wing
5 located at Atsugi Naval Air Field, Japan. The Marine Corps? III Marine
Expeditionary Force, comprised of the Headquarters, 3 rd Marine Division, 1
st Marine Aircraft Wing, and 3 rd Force Service Support Group is stationed
on Okinawa.

Appendix I: Location of Major Units and Bases in Europe and the Pacific

Page 40 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Figure 6: Major Combat Units and Bases in Japan and Korea

Source: GAO.

Appendix II: Maps of Individual Countries Page 41 GAO- 02- 525 Military
Training

Figure 7: Map of Germany Identifying the Locations of Major Combat Units and
Major Training Facilities

Source: GAO.

Appendix II: Maps of Individual Countries

Appendix II: Maps of Individual Countries Page 42 GAO- 02- 525 Military
Training

Figure 8: Map of Italy Identifying the Locations of Major Combat Units and
Major Training Facilities

Source: GAO.

Appendix II: Maps of Individual Countries Page 43 GAO- 02- 525 Military
Training

Figure 9: Map of United Kingdom Identifying the Location of Major Combat
Units and Major Training Facilities

Source: GAO.

Appendix II: Maps of Individual Countries Page 44 GAO- 02- 525 Military
Training

Figure 10: Map of Korea Identifying the Location of Major Combat Units and
Major Training Facilities

Source: GAO.

Appendix II: Maps of Individual Countries Page 45 GAO- 02- 525 Military
Training

Figure 11: Map of Japan, Including Okinawa, Identifying the Location of
Major Combat Units and Major Training Facilities

Source: GAO.

Appendix II: Maps of Individual Countries Page 46 GAO- 02- 525 Military
Training

Figure 12: Map of Alaska Identifying the Location of Major Combat Units and
Major Training Facilities

Source: GAO.

Appendix II: Maps of Individual Countries Page 47 GAO- 02- 525 Military
Training

Figure 13: Map of Hawaii Identifying the Location of Major Combat Units and
Major Training Facilities

Source: GAO.

Appendix III: Scope and Methodology Page 48 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

To determine the types of training constraints faced by non- CONUS- based
units and whether they are likely to increase in the future, we interviewed
officials at all levels in DOD from the office of secretary of defense,
Personnel and Readiness, to unit- level service representatives from all
services in both the European and Pacific theaters. We obtained
documentation detailing training shortfalls where available. We conducted
interviews with component command representatives from each of the services
in both the European and Pacific theaters and headquarters personnel within
each service responsible for training range programs. To aid us in
systematically collecting country- wide training range capabilities for each
service, we developed a training- capabilities data collection table that we
asked each of the services? subordinate commands to fill out on how well
they were able to meet their training requirements. We included these tables
on pages 20- 25. We conducted our work in the five major countries in which
U. S. forces are stationed- Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the United
Kingdom, and the state of Hawaii. We visited a variety of training areas in
each location. We did not conduct work involving Vieques, Puerto Rico,
because our focus was Europe and the Pacific and the training constraints
involving Vieques are well known. Table 5 depicts all the major units and
training locations we visited. Appendix III: Scope and Methodology

Appendix III: Scope and Methodology Page 49 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Table 5: Units and Locations Visited on This Assignment Germany U. S.
European Command

U. S. Army Europe U. S. Air Force Europe Grafenwoehr Training Area Hohenfels
Training Area Polygone Electronic Warfare Range

Italy U. S. Army Southern European Task Force Aviano Air Base (31st Fighter
Wing and Army Helicopter B Company) U. S. Navy 6th Fleet

United Kingdom Lakenheath Air Base (48th Fighter Wing) Holbeach Training
Range U. S. Navy Europe

Hawaii U. S. Pacific Command U. S. Army Pacific U. S. Air Force Pacific U.
S. Marine Corp Pacific U. S. Navy Pacific 25th Infantry Division (Light)
Army Scofield Barracks Training Area 3rd Regiment of 3rd Marine Division at
Kaneohe The Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai The Makua Military
Reservation Training Area on Oahu Pohakuloa Training Area on Hawaii

South Korea U. S. Forces Korea 8th Army Korea 2nd Infantry Division Army
Osan Air Base Story Training Range Complex Dagmar Maneuver Area Koon- ni
Training Range

Japan U. S. Forces Japan - Yokota Air Base Misawa Air Base (35th Fighter
Wing) Atsugi Naval Air Field Mt. Fugi Training Center Ripsaw Training Range

Okinawa Kadena Air Base (18th Wing) 3rd Marine Division - Camp Schwab 3rd
Marine Division - Camp Hansen The Marine Corps Central Training Area Ie Jima
Training Area

Appendix III: Scope and Methodology Page 50 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

To determine the impact that training constraints are having on the units?
ability to meet their requirements, we obtained information on such impacts
from unit level service representatives from all services in both the
European and Pacific theaters. In doing so, where training was not
accomplished, we discussed if these shortfalls translated into readiness
reporting. To independently assess the impact of training constraints on
reported readiness, we obtained and analyzed reported readiness data for the
European and Pacific theaters for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 to determine if
units had reported any diminished readiness as a result of training
limitations.

To determine what alternatives were being pursued by the services to
overcome their training shortfalls, we interviewed unit- level and
component- command representatives from all services in both the European
and Pacific theaters. They provided us data and documentation on what
initiatives they are pursuing to alleviate training limitations. We also
interviewed embassy representatives from the defense attach�s? offices in
each of the previously mentioned countries that we visited except Korea to
determine what role they play in addressing training limitations.

We conducted our review from June 2001 through February 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 51 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 52 GAO- 02- 525 Military Training

Now on p. 35. Now on p. 35.

(350081)

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