POLICY ISSUE 

NOTATION VOTE 

June 27, 2014 SECY-14-0066

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: Mark A. Satorius

Executive Director for Operations 

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY DOMINION ENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC. FOR 

EXEMPTIONS FROM CERTAIN EMERGENCY PLANNING 

REQUIREMENTS 

PURPOSE: 

The purpose of this paper is to seek Commission approval for the staff to grant Dominion 

Energy Kewaunee, Inc.’s (DEK’s) request for exemptions from certain emergency planning (EP) 

requirements of Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” of Title 10 

of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). DEK’s proposed exemptions would result in 

elimination of the requirements for formal offsite radiological emergency plans at the Kewaunee 

Power Station (KPS) site, but would require the maintenance of certain onsite capabilities to 

communicate and coordinate with offsite response authorities. This paper does not address any 

new commitments or resource implications. 

SUMMARY: 

The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, “Emergency Plans,” and Appendix E, “Emergency 

Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,” to 10 CFR Part 50 

continue to apply to a nuclear power reactor after permanent cessation of operations and 

removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory provisions 

distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that has been shut down from those for an 

operating power reactor. 

CONTACTS: Michael Norris, NSIR/DPR 

 (301) 287-3754 

 Michael Wasem, NSIR/DPR 

 (301) 287-3793 
The Commissioners - 2 -

To modify their emergency plans to reflect the risk commensurate with power reactors that have 

been permanently shut down, power reactor licensees transitioning to decommissioning must 

seek exemptions from certain EP regulatory requirements before amending these plans. 

The staff has reviewed the technical basis for DEK’s requested exemptions and is 

recommending the Commission approve the staff’s proposal to grant the requested EP 

exemptions, as detailed in the enclosure. 

BACKGROUND: 

The regulations in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) provide that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) may, on application by a licensee or on its own initiative, grant exemptions from the 

requirements of the regulations in circumstances in which application of the regulation would not 

serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose 

of the rule1

. The risk of an offsite radiological release is significantly lower, and the types of 

possible accidents are significantly fewer, at a nuclear power reactor that has permanently 

ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel than at an operating power reactor. 

On this basis, the NRC has previously granted similar exemptions from EP requirements for 12 

permanently shut down and defueled power reactor licensees. The last approved exemptions 

that eliminated the requirements for formal offsite radiological emergency planning were in 1999 

for the Zion facility (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) 

Legacy Accession No. 9908260192). The underlying technical basis for the approval of the 

Zion facility exemptions was based on demonstrating that the radiological consequences of 

design-basis accidents (DBAs) would not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency’s (EPA) Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary and that 

the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) would not reach the zirconium ignition 

temperature in fewer than 10 hours based on analysis which assumes no water or air cooling of 

the fuel. The staff concluded that if 10 hours was available to initiate mitigative actions, or if 

needed, offsite protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan 2 

(CEMP), formal offsite radiological emergency plans are not necessary for permanently 

defueled nuclear power reactor licensees. In addition to KPS, Crystal River Nuclear Generating 

Plant, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station 

have also applied for exemptions from certain EP requirements. 

The NRC requires a level of licensee EP commensurate with the potential consequences to 

public health and safety and common defense and security at the licensee’s site. Under the 

current safety analysis in NUREG-1738, “Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 

 

1 Notwithstanding the special circumstances of the exemption request, 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1) requires that the 

exemption must be authorized by law, not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and be consistent 

with the common defense and security. 

2 A comprehensive emergency management plan in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan 

(EOP), is addressed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 

(CPG) 101, “Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans”. CPG 101 is the foundation for State, 

territorial, tribal, and local emergency planning in the United States. It promotes a common understanding of the 

fundamentals of risk-informed planning and decision making and helps planners at all levels of government in their 

efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use in 

all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying out 

specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and other resources available; and outlines 

how all actions will be coordinated. A comprehensive emergency management plan is often referred to as a 

synonym for “all hazards planning.” 
The Commissioners - 3 - 

Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants” (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), the event 

sequences important to risk at a decommissioning power reactor are limited to a large 

earthquake and cask-drop events. This is an important difference relative to an operating power 

reactor where typically a large number of different initiating events make significant contributions 

to risk. Additionally, physical security for special nuclear material at fixed sites, including 

decommissioning power reactors, is required by 10 CFR Part 73, “Physical Protection of Plants 

and Materials.” Decommissioning power reactor licensees are required by 10 CFR 73.55(f) to 

develop target sets for use in the development and implementation of security strategies that 

protect against spent fuel sabotage. While both operating and decommissioning power reactors 

are required to develop target sets, the number of target sets at a decommissioning reactor is 

significantly reduced. Implementation of the protective strategy at a decommissioning reactor 

takes into account this reduction in target sets. With the significant reduction in radiological risk 

for a power reactor undergoing decommissioning, the NRC has historically approved 

exemptions to EP and security requirements based on site specific evaluations and the 

objectives of the regulations. 

The NRC prepared NUREG-1738 to provide a technical basis for the 2000 integrated 

rulemaking for nuclear power reactors that were being decommissioned and had been 

permanently shut down. The rulemaking was later deferred in light of higher priority work after 

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, NUREG-1738 provides insights that 

the staff continues to find helpful for the evaluation of exemption requests regarding EP 

requirements. It identified a zirconium fire resulting from a substantial loss of water inventory in 

the SFP as the only postulated scenario at a decommissioning power reactor that, while highly 

unlikely, might result in a significant offsite release. Previously granted exemptions from EP 

regulations reduced EP requirements to those consistent with the standards of 

10 CFR 50.47(d), which states the requirements for a license authorizing fuel loading and low 

power testing only, and 10 CFR 72.32(a), which establishes the information required in an 

emergency plan for an independent spent fuel storage installation. Examples of the reduced EP 

requirements include: setting the highest emergency plan classification as an “Alert”; 

extending the timing requirements for notification of offsite authorities; requiring only onsite 

exercises with the opportunity for offsite response organization participation; and only 

maintaining arrangements for offsite response organizations (i.e., law enforcement, fire and 

medical services) that may respond to onsite emergencies. No formal offsite radiological 

emergency plans are required. 

While the staff considers the exemptions from certain EP requirements, as requested by DEK 

and described above, to be reasonable for a power reactor that has been permanently shut 

down and defueled, the resulting set of EP requirements could be viewed as a reduction in 

effectiveness when compared to the operating reactor emergency plan currently in effect at 

KPS. In the staff requirements memoranda (SRM) to SECY-08-0024, “Delegation of 

Commission Authority to Staff to Approve or Deny Emergency Plan Changes That Represent a 

Decrease in Effectiveness,” dated May 19, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081400510), the 

Commission directed that the staff should request Commission approval for any reduction in 

effectiveness of a licensee’s emergency plan that requires an exemption from the requirements 

of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. In a manner consistent with the SRM’s 

direction, this paper seeks Commission approval for the staff to process and grant, as 

appropriate, DEK’s requested exemptions from the EP requirements as detailed in the 

enclosure, which provides a summary of DEK’s exemption request and a brief description of the 

staff’s basis for recommending approval. 
The Commissioners - 4 - 

DISCUSSION: 

DEK is the holder of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-43, issued under the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR Part 50, which authorizes the licensee to 

possess and store spent nuclear fuel and greater-than-class C radioactive waste at the KPS 

facility, which has been permanently shut down and defueled. By letter dated February 25, 

2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13058A065), DEK submitted a certification to the NRC 

indicating its intention to permanently cease power operations at KPS, under 

10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i). On May 7, 2013, the KPS reactor permanently ceased power 

generation. After the reactor was shut down, all fuel assemblies were removed from the reactor 

vessel and placed in the SFP. On May 14, 2013, DEK submitted a certification of permanent 

removal of fuel from the KPS reactor vessel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii) (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13135A209). Upon docketing of these certifications, the 10 CFR Part 50 license for KPS 

no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor 

vessel, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). By letter dated July 31, 2013, “Request for 

Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E” (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13221A182), DEK requested exemptions from specific EP requirements of 10 CFR 

Part 50 for KPS. The staff made requests for additional information (RAIs) in an e-mail dated 

October 8, 2013. In a letter dated December 11, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A040), 

DEK provided responses to the RAIs. In a letter dated January 10, 2014, DEK provided a 

supplemental response to the RAIs (ADAMS Accession No. ML14016A078), which contains 

information applicable to the SFP inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the loss of water 

inventory. The information provided by DEK included justifications for each exemption 

requested. The staff found the application complete and the licensee’s associated technical 

justification provides a basis for the Commission’s consideration of the requested exemption. 

The KPS updated safety analysis report (USAR), dated November 2012 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML123390168), described the DBAs that were applicable to the KPS during power 

operation. Many of the USAR accident scenarios involved failures or malfunctions of systems 

that could affect the reactor core. DEK states that the USAR was revised to reflect the currently 

applicable DBAs that remain applicable based on the reactor being permanently shut down and 

defueled. DEK’s exemption request included radiological analyses to show that 90 days after 

shutdown, the radiological consequences of DBAs will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at 

the exclusion area boundary. Additionally, DEK performed analyses for loss of coolant 

inventory events for the SFP. These analyses show that after the spent fuel has decayed for 

17 months (which will occur on October 30, 2014) for events in which the SFP is drained, air 

cooling will prevent the fuel from reaching the lowest temperature at which incipient cladding 

failure may occur (565 degrees Celsius (C)). In the event that air cooling is not possible, 

10 hours is available from the time the fuel is uncovered until it reaches a temperature of 

900 degrees C to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, and if necessary, for 

offsite authorities to employ their CEMP to take protective actions. In addition to 10 hours for 

mitigative and protective actions, the significant decay of short-lived radionuclides that would 

occur over the 17 months since shutdown provides assurance in other ways. The results of 

research conducted for NUREG-1738 and more recently, SECY-13-0112, Enclosure 1, 

“Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a 

U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor” (ADAMS Accession No. ML13256A342), suggest that while 

other consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant decay time have 

little potential to cause offsite early fatalities regardless of the type of offsite response. 
The Commissioners - 5 - 

As noted above, DEK furnished information to supplement its exemption request concerning its 

SFP inventory makeup strategies. The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP 

include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; supplying water through hoses to a 

spool piece connection to the existing SFP piping; or using a diesel-driven portable pump to 

take suction from Lake Michigan and provide makeup or spray to the SFP. DEK has committed 

to maintaining the important mitigation strategies for the loss of large areas of the plant due to 

explosion or fire previously required under 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2). These strategies will continue 

to be required as a license condition. DEK further provides that the equipment needed to 

perform these actions will continue to be located onsite, and that the external makeup strategy 

(using a diesel driven portable pump) is capable of being deployed within 2 hours. DEK 

believes that, considering the very low-probability of beyond-design-basis events affecting the 

SFP, these diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth and time to provide makeup or spray to 

the SFP before the onset of zirconium cladding ignition. In addition, in the unlikely situation that 

a radiological release is expected, elements of the revised emergency plan would facilitate the 

ability of offsite authorities to take protective actions under a CEMP. The licensee staff uses the 

Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) as a communication system to notify the State and 

County agencies of a declared emergency. The NARS notification form contains information 

that identifies the station, emergency classification, meteorological data and emergency action 

level. Additionally, the licensee still must be able to determine if a radiological release is 

occurring. If a release is to occur, the licensee staff is in a position to promptly communicate 

that information to offsite authorities for their consideration. 

The staff reviewed DEK’s exemption request against the requirements included in 

10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 72.32, “Emergency Plans.” The 

review considered the status of the facility, which is permanently shut down and defueled and 

the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite 

protective measures. The staff based its evaluation of the DEK request for exemptions from EP 

requirements on site-specific analyses. The staff verified DEK’s analyses and its calculations. 

The analysis provides reasonable assurance that in granting the requested exemption to DEK: 

(1) an offsite radiological release will not exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary for a 

design-basis accident; and (2) in the unlikely event of a severe beyond design-basis accident 

resulting in a loss of air cooling, there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions 

and if a release is projected to occur, there is sufficient time for offsite agencies to take 

protective actions using a CEMP to protect the health and safety of the public. 

Consistent with the June 17, 1993, Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and 

FEMA, FEMA was provided this paper for its awareness and comment. The staff also met with 

FEMA staff and provided them the opportunity for questions and clarifications on the paper. 

FEMA provided the following comments: 

FEMA is not taking a position on the technical arguments presented by the licensee or 

the NRC's assessments. FEMA recognizes the NRC’s role to analyze the possibility of 

incidents that could result in offsite dose impacts. FEMA acknowledges that individual 

states and local governments have the primary authority and responsibility to protect 

their citizens and respond to disasters and emergencies. The exemption, if issued, 

could create a transitional environment for off-site emergency planners in how they 

consider radiological hazards. FEMA will continue to support offsite organizations as 

they adjust their plans, capabilities, and resources to the changing radiological threat. 

Among the resources available to support FEMA stakeholders during the transition 
The Commissioners - 6 - 

process include, but are not limited to, the National Preparedness System guidance 

materials, the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, and 

assistance from FEMA Headquarters and Regional Staff. 

The NRC staff considered FEMA’s comments and believes that the technical and safety basis 

for the exemption demonstrates reasonable assurance in the two areas mentioned above. The 

decommissioning facility, at the time the exemption is granted, would pose significantly less of a 

radiological risk to public health and safety than an operating power reactor, which should result 

in a straightforward transition to a more streamlined CEMP. Aspects of existing offsite 

radiological emergency preparedness plans may remain in place, at the State’s discretion, prior 

to completion of any adjustments to State and local CEMPs that are appropriate for the reduced 

radiological risk and can be adopted to minimize burden on the State and local governments. 

The licensee will still be required to maintain an onsite emergency plan, which would provide for 

the notification of and coordination with offsite organizations commensurate with the approved 

exemptions. Though not considered as part of the staff’s reasonable assurance determination, 

it is notable that the Kewaunee facility is located near the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, such that 

there is significant intersection of the two facilities’ emergency planning zones. 

The staff’s exemption recommendation, if approved by the Commission, would not affect the 

authority that FEMA has under its regulations in 44 CFR Chapter I for overall emergency 

management and assistance to State and local response organizations, nor would it affect the 

responsibilities of State and local governments to establish and maintain CEMPs. The NRC 

would base its finding of reasonable assurance on its review of licensee onsite emergency 

preparedness and would not require a finding from FEMA on the adequacy of State and local 

CEMPs. Under its role as described in the National Response Framework, the NRC remains 

ready to support FEMA by providing it and State and local governments technical advice related 

to the safety and security of operations at the plant. 

By letter dated January 16, 2014, “Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency 

Action Level Scheme” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14029A076), DEK also requested a license 

amendment to approve its emergency plan implementing changes that reflect the permanently 

shutdown and defueled status of KPS. The revised emergency plan also includes changes 

consistent with the proposed exemptions discussed in this paper. The staff is awaiting a 

decision on this paper before issuing a decision on the amendment request. 

CONCLUSION: 

The NRC staff concludes that granting the exemption request, as provided in the enclosure, 

would provide: (1) an adequate basis for an acceptable state of emergency preparedness; and 

(2) in conjunction with arrangements made with offsite response agencies, reasonable 

assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 

radiological emergency at KPS. 

 

The NRC has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the exemptions described in the 

enclosure are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, 

and will be consistent with the common defense and security, and special circumstances are 

present. 
The Commissioners - 7 - 

RECOMMENDATION: 

The exemption request is consistent with previously granted exemptions and is commensurate 

with the risk associated with the facility. The changes in regulatory requirements are 

appropriate because the traditional accident sequences that dominate operating reactor risk are 

no longer applicable. Requiring the licensee to maintain its current level of EP imposes an 

unnecessary regulatory burden. Therefore, the staff recommends that the Commission: 

Approve: The staff’s proposal to grant DEK’s requested EP exemptions from 

certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 

consistent with the discussion above. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The Office 

of the Chief Financial Officer reviewed this paper for resource implications and has no objection. 

 /RA Darren B. Ash for/ 

Mark A. Satorius 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosure: 

Exemptions to Rule Language
The Commissioners - 7 - 

RECOMMENDATION: 

The exemption request is consistent with previously granted exemptions and is commensurate 

with the risk associated with the facility. The changes in regulatory requirements are 

appropriate because the traditional accident sequences that dominate operating reactor risk are 

no longer applicable. Requiring the licensee to maintain its current level of EP imposes an 

unnecessary regulatory burden. Therefore, the staff recommends that the Commission: 

Approve: The staff’s proposal to grant DEK’s requested EP exemptions from 

certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 

consistent with the discussion above. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The Office 

of the Chief Financial Officer reviewed this paper for resource implications and has no objection. 

 /RA Darren B. Ash for/ 

Mark A. Satorius 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosure: 

Exemptions to Rule Language 

ADAMS ACCESSION No.: ML14072A257 * via email 

OFFICE: NSIR/DPR BC:NSIR/DPR DD/NSIR/DPR RES* 

NAME: MNorris JAnderson RLewis KWest 

DATE: 2/27/14 2/28/14 3/13/14 4/4/14 

OFFICE: FSME* RIII* OCFO* Tech Editor* 

NAME: ZCruz GShear RAllwein CHsu 

DATE: 3/25/14 3/25/14 4/11/14 4/9/14 

OFFICE: NRR* OGC* NSIR/DPR EDO 

NAME: JUhle HBenowitz JWiggins MSatorius 

(DAsh for) 

DATE: 6/24/14 6/24/14 6/24/14 6/27/14 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Exemptions to Rule Language 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language.

Enclosure 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

(b) The onsite and, except as provided in 

paragraph (d) of this section, offsite

emergency response plans for nuclear 

power reactors must meet the following 

standards: 

In the Statement of Considerations for the Final 

Rule for emergency planning (EP) requirements 

for independent spent fuel storage installations 

(ISFSIs) and for monitor retrievable storage 

(MRS) facilities (60 FR 32430; June 22, 1995), the 

Commission responded to comments concerning 

offsite EP for ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded 

that, “the offsite consequences of potential 

accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS would not warrant 

establishing Emergency Planning Zones [EPZ].” 

In a nuclear power reactor’s permanently defueled 

state, the accident risks are more similar to an 

ISFSI or MRS than an operating nuclear power 

plant. The EP program would be similar to that 

required for an ISFSI under 10 CFR 72.32(a) 

when fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) has 

more than 5 years of decay time and would not 

change substantially when all the fuel is 

transferred from the SFP to an onsite ISFSI. 

Exemptions from offsite EP requirements have 

previously been approved when the site-specific 

analyses show that at least 10 hours is available 

from a partial drain-down event where cooling of 

the spent fuel is not effective until the hottest fuel 

assembly reaches 900°C. The technical basis 

that underlied the approval of the exemption 

request is based partly on the analysis of a time 

period that spent fuel stored in the SFP is unlikely 

to reach the zirconium ignition temperature in less 

than 10 hours. This time period is based on a 

heat-up calculation which uses several simplifying 

assumptions. Some of these assumptions are 

conservative (adiabatic conditions), while others 

are non-conservative (no oxidation below 900°C). 

Weighing the conservatisms and nonconservatisms, the staff judges that this 

calculation reasonably represents conditions 

which may occur in the event of an SFP accident. 

The staff concluded that if 10 hours was available 

to initiate mitigative actions, or if needed, offsite 

protective actions using CEMP, formal offsite 

radiological emergency plans are not necessary 

for these permanently defueled nuclear power 

reactor licensees. 
2

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

 As supported by the licensee’s SFP analysis, the 

staff believes an exemption to the requirements 

for formal offsite radiological emergency plans is 

justified for a zirconium fire scenario considering 

the low likelihood of this event together with time 

available to take mitigative or protective actions 

between the initiating event and before the onset 

of a postulated fire. 

The Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK) 

analysis has demonstrated that 90 days after 

shutdown, the radiological consequences of 

design-basis accidents will not exceed the limits 

of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 

(EPA) Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the 

exclusion area boundary. These analyses also 

show that after the spent fuel has decayed for 

17 months, for beyond-design-basis events 

where the SFP is drained, air cooling will prevent 

the fuel from reaching the lowest temperature 

where incipient cladding failure may occur 

(565°C). In the event that air cooling is not 

possible, 10 hours is available to take mitigative 

or, if needed, offsite protective actions using a 

CEMP from the time the fuel is uncovered until it 

reaches the auto-ignition temperature of 900°C. 

DEK has also furnished information on its SFP 

inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the 

loss of water inventory. The multiple strategies 

for providing makeup to the SPF include: using 

existing plant systems for inventory makeup; 

supplying water via hoses to a spool piece 

connection to the existing SFP piping; or using a 

diesel-driven portable pump to take suction from 

Lake Michigan and provide makeup or spray to 

the SFP. DEK also provided that the tools and 

equipment needed to perform these actions are 

located on site and that the external makeup 

strategy (using a diesel driven portable pump) 

was able to be deployed within 2 hours. DEK 

believes these diverse strategies provide 

defense-in-depth and ample time to provide 

makeup or spray to the SFP prior to the onset of 

zirconium cladding ignition when considering 

very low probability beyond design-basis events 

affecting the SFP. 
3

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

(1) Primary responsibilities for emergency 

response by the nuclear facility licensee 

and by State and local organizations 

within the Emergency Planning Zones

have been assigned, the emergency 

responsibilities of the various supporting 

organizations have been specifically 

established, and each principal response 

organization has staff to respond and to 

augment its initial response on a 

continuous basis. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(3) Arrangements for requesting and 

effectively using assistance resources 

have been made, arrangements to 

accommodate State and local staff at the 

licensee’s Emergency Operations Facility 

have been made, and other organizations 

capable of augmenting the planned 

response have been identified. 

Decommissioning power reactors present a low 

likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a 

radiological release together with the time available 

to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP between the initiating event 

and before the onset of a postulated fire. As such, 

an emergency operations facility would not be 

required. The “nuclear island,” control room, or 

other onsite location can provide for the 

communication and coordination with offsite 

organizations for the level of support required. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(4) A standard emergency classification 

and action level scheme, the basis of 

which include facility system and effluent 

parameters, is in use by the nuclear 

facility licensee, and State and local 

response plans call for reliance on 

information provided by facility licensees 

for determinations of minimum initial 

offsite response measures. 

Decommissioning power reactors present a low 

likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a 

radiological release together with the time available 

to take mitigative or if needed, offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP between the initiating event 

and before the onset of a postulated fire. As such, 

formal offsite radiological emergency response 

plans are not required. 

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, “Development 

of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive 

Reactors” (Revision 6), was found to be an 

acceptable method for development of emergency 

action levels (EALs) and was endorsed by the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in a letter 

dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12346A463). NEI 99-01 provides EALs for nonpassive operating nuclear power reactors, 

permanently defueled reactors and ISFSIs. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 
4

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

(5) Procedures have been established for 

notification, by the licensee, of State and 

local response organizations and for 

notification of emergency personnel by all 

organizations; the content of initial and 

follow up messages to response 

organizations and the public has been 

established; and means to provide early 

notification and clear instruction to the 

populace within the plume exposure 

pathway Emergency Planning Zone have 

been established. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(6) Provisions exist for prompt 

communications among principal 

response organizations to emergency 

personnel and to the public. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(7) Information is made available to the 

public on a periodic basis on how they will 

be notified and what their initial actions 

should be in an emergency (e.g., listening 

to a local broadcast station and remaining 

indoors), [T]he principal points of contact 

with the news media for dissemination of 

information during an emergency 

(including the physical location or 

locations) are established in advance, and 

procedures for coordinated dissemination 

of information to the public are 

established. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(9) Adequate methods, systems, and 

equipment for assessing and monitoring 

actual or potential offsite consequences of 

a radiological emergency condition are in 

use. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(10) A range of protective actions has 

been developed for the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for emergency workers and 

the public. In developing this range of 

actions, consideration has been given to 

evacuation, sheltering, and, as a 

supplement to these, the prophylactic use 

of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. 

Evacuation time estimates have been 

developed by applicants and licensees. 

Licensees shall update the evacuation 

time estimates on a periodic basis. 

Guidelines for the choice of protective 

actions during an emergency, consistent 

with Federal guidance, are developed and 

In the unlikely event of an SFP accident, the iodine 

isotopes, which contribute to an off-site dose from 

an operating reactor accident, are not present, so 

potassium iodide (KI) distribution would no longer 

serve as an effective or necessary supplemental 

protective action. 

The Commission responded to comments in its 

Statement of Considerations for the Final Rule for 

emergency planning requirements for ISFSIs and 

MRS facilities (60 FR 32435), and concluded that, 

“the offsite consequences of potential accidents at 

an ISFSI or a MRS would not warrant establishing 

Emergency Planning Zones.” Additionally, in the 

Statement of Considerations for the Final Rule for 
5

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

in place, and protective actions for the 

ingestion exposure pathway EPZ 

appropriate to the locale have been 

developed.

EP requirements for ISFSIs and for MRS facilities 

(60 FR 32430), the Commission responded to 

comments concerning site-specific EP that includes 

evacuation of surrounding population for an ISFSI 

not at a reactor site, and concluded that, “The 

Commission does not agree that as a general 

matter emergency plans for an ISFSI must include 

evacuation planning.” 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(c)(2) Generally, the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants 

shall consist of an area about 10 miles 

(16 km) in radius and the ingestion 

pathway EPZ shall consist of an area 

about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The 

exact size and configuration of the EPZs 

surrounding a particular nuclear power 

reactor shall be determined in relation to 

local emergency response needs and 

capabilities as they are affected by such 

conditions as demography, topography, 

land characteristics, access routes, and 

jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the 

EPZs also may be determined on a caseby-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear 

reactors and for reactors with an 

authorized power level less than 250 MW 

thermal. The plans for the ingestion 

pathway shall focus on such actions as 

are appropriate to protect the food 

ingestion pathway.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 
6

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

1. The applicant's emergency plans shall 

contain, but not necessarily be limited to, 

information needed to demonstrate 

compliance with the elements set forth 

below, i.e., organization for coping with 

radiological emergencies, assessment 

actions, activation of emergency 

organization, notification procedures, 

emergency facilities and equipment, 

training, maintaining emergency 

preparedness, and recovery, and onsite 

protective actions during hostile action. In 

addition, the emergency response plans 

submitted by an applicant for a nuclear 

power reactor operating license under this 

Part, or for an early site permit (as 

applicable) or combined license under 

10 CFR Part 52, shall contain information 

needed to demonstrate compliance with 

the standards described in § 50.47(b), 

and they will be evaluated against those 

standards. 

The EP Rule published in the Federal Register 

(FR) (76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011) amended 

certain requirements in 10 CFR Part 50. Among 

the changes, the definition of “hostile action” was 

added as an act directed toward an NPP or its 

personnel. This definition is based on the definition 

of "hostile action" provided in NRC Bulletin 

2005-02, “Emergency Preparedness and 

Response Actions for Security-Based Events.” 

NRC Bulletin 2005-02 was not applicable to 

nuclear power reactors that have permanently 

ceased operations and have certified that fuel has 

been removed from the reactor vessel. 

The NRC excluded non-power reactors from the 

definition of "hostile action" at the time of the 

rulemaking because, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a 

non-power reactor is not considered a nuclear 

power reactor and a regulatory basis had not been 

developed to support the inclusion of non-power 

reactors in the definition of "hostile action." 

Similarly, a decommissioning power reactor or 

ISFSI is not a “nuclear reactor” as defined in the 

NRC’s regulations. A decommissioning power 

reactor also has a low likelihood of a credible 

accident resulting in radiological releases requiring 

offsite protective measures. For all of these 

reasons, the staff concludes that a 

decommissioning power reactor is not a facility that 

falls within the definition of “hostile action.” 

Similarly, for security, risk insights can be used to 

determine which targets are important to protect 

against sabotage. A level of security 

commensurate with the consequences of a 

sabotage event is required and is evaluated on a 

site-specific basis. The severity of the 

consequences declines as fuel ages and, thereby, 

removes over time the underlying concern that a 

sabotage attack could cause offsite radiological 

consequences. 

Although, this analysis provides a justification for 

exempting KPS from “hostile action” related 

requirements, some EP requirements for securitybased events are maintained. The classification of 

security-based events, notification of offsite 

authorities and coordination with offsite agencies 

under a CEMP concept are still required. 

2. This nuclear power reactor license Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 
7

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

applicant shall also provide an analysis of 

the time required to evacuate various 

sectors and distances within the plume 

exposure pathway EPZ for transient and 

permanent populations, using the most 

recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the 

date the applicant submits its application 

to the NRC.

 

3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

use NRC approved evacuation time 

estimates (ETEs) and updates to the 

ETEs in the formulation of protective 

action recommendations and shall provide 

the ETEs and ETE updates to State and 

local governmental authorities for use in 

developing offsite protective action 

strategies.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

4. Within 365 days of the later of the date 

of the availability of the most recent

decennial census data from the U.S. 

Census Bureau or December 23, 2011, 

nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

develop an ETE analysis using this 

decennial data and submit it under § 50.4 

to the NRC. These licensees shall submit 

this ETE analysis to the NRC at least 

180 days before using it to form protective 

action recommendations and providing it 

to State and local governmental 

authorities for use in developing offsite 

protective action strategies

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

5. During the years between decennial 

censuses, nuclear power reactor 

licensees shall estimate EPZ permanent 

resident population changes once a year, 

but no later than 365 days from the date 

of the previous estimate, using the most 

recent U.S. Census Bureau annual 

resident population estimate and 

State/local government population data, if 

available. These licensees shall maintain 

these estimates so that they are available 

for NRC inspection during the period 

between decennial censuses and shall 

submit these estimates to the NRC with 

any updated ETE analysis.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

6. If at any time during the decennial 

period, the EPZ permanent resident 

population increases such that it causes 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 
8

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone 

or 5-mile zone, including all affected 

Emergency Response Planning Areas, or 

for the entire 10-mile EPZ to increase by 

25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is 

less, from the nuclear power reactor 

licensee's currently NRC approved or 

updated ETE, the licensee shall update 

the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of 

that population increase. The licensee 

shall submit the updated ETE analysis to 

the NRC under § 50.4 no later than 365 

days after the licensee's determination 

that the criteria for updating the ETE have 

been met and at least 180 days before 

using it to form protective action 

recommendations and providing it to State 

and local governmental authorities for use 

in developing offsite protective action 

strategies. 

A.1. A description of the normal plant 

operating organization. 

 

Based on the permanently shut down and defueled 

status of the reactor, a decommissioning reactor is 

not authorized to operate under 10 CFR 50.82(a). 

Because the licensee cannot operate the reactors, 

the licensee does not have a “plant operating 

organization.” 

A.3. A description, by position and 

function to be performed, of the licensee's 

headquarters personnel who will be sent 

to the plant site to augment the onsite 

emergency organization.

The number of staff at decommissioning sites is 

generally small but is commensurate with the need 

to safely store spent fuel at the facility in a manner 

that is protective of public health and safety. 

Decommissioning sites typically have a level of 

emergency response that does not require 

response by the licensee’s headquarters 

personnel. 

A. 4. Identification, by position and 

function to be performed, of persons 

within the licensee organization who will 

be responsible for making offsite dose 

projections, and a description of how 

these projections will be made and the 

results transmitted to State and local 

authorities, NRC, and other appropriate 

governmental entities. 

Although, the likelihood of events that would result 

in doses in excess of the EPA PAGs to the public 

beyond the owner controlled area boundary based 

on the permanently shut down and defueled status 

of the reactor is extremely low, the licensee still 

must be able to determine if a radiological release 

is occurring. If a release is occurring, then the 

licensee staff should promptly communicate that 

information to offsite authorities for their 

consideration. The offsite organizations are 

responsible for deciding what, if any, protective 

actions should be taken based on comprehensive 

emergency planning. 
9

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

A. 5. Identification, by position and 

function to be performed, of other 

employees of the licensee with special 

qualifications for coping with emergency 

conditions that may arise. Other persons 

with special qualifications, such as 

consultants, who are not employees of the 

licensee and who may be called upon for 

assistance for emergencies shall also be 

identified. The special qualifications of 

these persons shall be described.

The number of staff at decommissioning sites is 

generally small but should be commensurate with 

the need to operate the facility in a manner that is 

protective of public health and safety. 

A.7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, 

and a description of the assistance 

expected from, appropriate State, local, 

and Federal agencies with responsibilities 

for coping with emergencies, including 

hostile action at the site. For purposes of 

this appendix, “hostile action” is defined 

as an act directed toward a nuclear power 

plant or its personnel that include the use 

of violent force to destroy equipment, take 

hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to 

achieve an end. This includes attack by 

air, land, or water using guns, explosives, 

projectiles, vehicles, or other devices 

used to deliver destructive force. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.1. 

A.8. Identification of the State and/or local 

officials responsible for planning for, 

ordering and controlling appropriate 

protective actions, including evacuations 

when necessary.

Offsite emergency measures are limited to support 

provided by local police, fire departments, and 

ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate. 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, 

protective actions such as evacuation should not 

be required, but could be implemented at the 

discretion of offsite authorities using a CEMP. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

A.9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear 

power reactor licensees, a detailed 

analysis demonstrating that on-shift 

personnel assigned emergency plan 

implementation functions are not assigned 

responsibilities that would prevent the 

timely performance of their assigned 

functions as specified in the emergency 

plan.

Responsibilities should be well defined in the 

emergency plan and procedures, regularly tested 

through drills and exercises audited and inspected 

by the licensee and the NRC. The duties of the 

onshift personnel at a decommissioning reactor 

facility are not as complicated and diverse as those 

for an operating power reactor. 

The staff considered the similarity between the 

staffing levels at a permanently shut down and 

defueled reactor and staffing levels at an operating 

power reactor site. The minimal systems and 

equipment needed to maintain the spent nuclear 
10

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

fuel in the SFP or in a dry cask storage system in a 

safe condition requires minimal personnel and is 

governed by Technical Specifications. In the EP 

Final Rule published in the Federal Register 

(76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011), the NRC 

concluded that the staffing analysis requirement 

was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees 

due to the small staffing levels required to operate 

the facility. 

The staff also examined the actions required to 

mitigate the very low probability design-basis 

events for the SFP. Additionally, DEK also 

furnished information on its SFP inventory makeup 

strategies for mitigating the loss of water inventory. 

The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the 

SFP include: using existing plant systems for 

inventory makeup; supplying water via hoses to a 

spool piece connection to the existing SFP piping; 

or using a diesel-driven portable pump to take 

suction from Lake Michigan and provide makeup or 

spray to the SFP. DEK further provided that the 

tools and equipment needed to perform these 

actions are located on site and the external 

makeup strategy (using a diesel driven portable 

pump) was demonstrated to be capable of being 

deployed within 2 hours, significantly less time than 

the 10 hours that would be available for ad hoc 

response. DEK believes, and the staff agrees, that 

these diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth 

and ample time to provide makeup or spray to the 

SFP prior to the onset of zirconium cladding 

ignition when considering very low probability 

beyond design-basis events affecting the SFP. 

B.1. The means to be used for 

determining the magnitude of, and for 

continually assessing the impact of, the 

release of radioactive materials shall be 

described, including emergency action 

levels that are to be used as criteria for 

determining the need for notification and 

participation of local and State agencies, 

the Commission, and other Federal 

agencies, and the emergency action 

levels that are to be used for determining 

when and what type of protective 

measures should be considered within 

and outside the site boundary to protect 

health and safety. The emergency action 

levels shall be based on in-plant 

NEI 99-01, “Development of Emergency Action 

levels for Non-Passive Reactors” (Revision 6), was 

found to be an acceptable method for development 

of EALs and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter 

dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12346A463). No offsite protective actions are 

anticipated to be necessary, so classification above 

the Alert level is no longer required, which is 

consistent with ISFSI facilities. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV.1. 
11

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

conditions and instrumentation in addition 

to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 

20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor 

licensees, these action levels must 

include hostile action that may adversely 

affect the nuclear power plant. The initial 

emergency action levels shall be 

discussed and agreed on by the applicant 

or licensee and State and local 

governmental authorities, and approved 

by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency 

action levels shall be reviewed with the 

State and local governmental authorities 

on an annual basis. 

C.1. The entire spectrum of emergency 

conditions that involve the alerting or 

activating of progressively larger 

segments of the total emergency 

organization shall be described. The 

communication steps to be taken to alert 

or activate emergency personnel under 

each class of emergency shall be 

described. Emergency action levels 

(based not only on onsite and offsite

radiation monitoring information but also 

on readings from a number of sensors 

that indicate a potential emergency, such 

as the pressure in containment and the 

response of the Emergency Core Cooling 

System) for notification of offsite agencies 

shall be described. The existence, but not 

the details, of a message authentication 

scheme shall be noted for such agencies. 

The emergency classes defined shall 

include: (1) notification of unusual events, 

(2) alert, (3) site area emergency, and 

(4) general emergency of 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix E, IV.C.1. These classes are 

further discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1. 

Containment parameters do not provide an 

indication of the conditions at a defueled facility 

and emergency core cooling systems are no longer 

required. Other indications, such as SFP level or 

temperature, can be used at sites where there is 

spent fuel in the SFPs. 

In the Statement of Considerations for the Final 

Rule for EP requirements for ISFSIs and for MRS 

facilities (60 FR 32430), the Commission 

responded to comments concerning a general 

emergency at an ISFSI and MRS, and concluded 

that, “...an essential element of a General 

Emergency is that a release can be reasonably 

expected to exceed EPA Protective Action 

Guidelines exposure levels off site for more than 

the immediate site area.” 

The probability of a condition reaching the level 

above an emergency classification of Alert is very 

low. In the event of an accident at a defueled 

facility that meets the conditions for relaxation of 

EP requirements, there will be available time for 

event mitigation, and if necessary, implementation 

of offsite protective actions using a CEMP. 

NEI 99-01, “Development of Emergency Action 

levels for Non-Passive Reactors,” (Revision 6) was 

found to be an acceptable method for development 

of EALs and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter 

dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12346A463). No offsite protective actions are 

anticipated to be necessary, so classification above 

the Alert level is no longer required. 
12

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

C.2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power 

reactor licensees shall establish and 

maintain the capability to assess, classify, 

and declare an emergency condition 

within 15 minutes after the availability of 

indications to plant operators that an 

emergency action level has been 

exceeded and shall promptly declare the 

emergency condition as soon as possible 

following identification of the appropriate 

emergency classification level. Licensees 

shall not construe these criteria as a 

grace period to attempt to restore plant 

conditions to avoid declaring an 

emergency action due to an emergency 

action level that has been exceeded. 

Licensees shall not construe these criteria 

as preventing implementation of response 

actions deemed by the licensee to be 

necessary to protect public health and 

safety provided that any delay in 

declaration does not deny the State and 

local authorities the opportunity to 

implement measures necessary to protect 

the public health and safety. 

In the EP rule published in the Federal Register 

(76 FR 72560), non-power reactor licensees were 

not required to assess, classify and declare an 

emergency condition within 15 minutes. An SFP 

and an ISFSI are also not nuclear power reactors as 

defined in the NRC’s regulations. A 

decommissioning power reactor has a low likelihood 

of a credible accident resulting in radiological 

releases requiring offsite protective measures. For 

these reasons, the staff concludes that a 

decommissioning power reactor should not be 

required to assess, classify and declare an 

emergency condition within 15 minutes. 

D.1. Administrative and physical means 

for notifying local, State, and Federal 

officials and agencies and agreements 

reached with these officials and agencies 

for the prompt notification of the public 

and for public evacuation or other 

protective measures, should they become 

necessary, shall be described. This 

description shall include identification of 

the appropriate officials, by title and 

agency, of the State and local government 

agencies within the EPZs.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

D.2. Provisions shall be described for 

yearly dissemination to the public within 

the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic 

emergency planning information, such as 

the methods and times required for public 

notification and the protective actions 

planned if an accident occurs, general 

information as to the nature and effects of 

radiation, and a listing of local broadcast 

stations that will be used for dissemination 

of information during an emergency. 

Signs or other measures shall also be 

used to disseminate to any transient 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.D.1. 
13

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

population within the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ appropriate information that 

would be helpful if an accident occurs.

D.3. A licensee shall have the capability to 

notify responsible State and local 

governmental agencies within 15 minutes 

after declaring an emergency. The 

licensee shall demonstrate that the 

appropriate governmental authorities have 

the capability to make a public alerting 

and notification decision promptly on 

being informed by the licensee of an 

emergency condition. Prior to initial 

operation greater than 5 percent of rated 

thermal power of the first reactor at the 

site, each nuclear power reactor licensee 

shall demonstrate that administrative and 

physical means have been established for 

alerting and providing prompt instructions 

to the public with the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ. The design objective of the 

prompt public alert and notification system 

shall be to have the capability to 

essentially complete the initial alerting and 

notification of the public within the plume 

exposure pathway EPZ within about 

15 minutes. The use of this alerting and 

notification capability will range from 

immediate alerting and notification of the 

public (within 15 minutes of the time that 

State and local officials are notified that a 

situation exists requiring urgent action) to 

the more likely events where there is 

substantial time available for the 

appropriate governmental authorities to 

make a judgment whether or not to 

activate the public alert and notification 

system. The alerting and notification 

capability shall additionally include 

administrative and physical means for a 

backup method of public alerting and 

notification capable of being used in the 

event the primary method of alerting and 

notification is unavailable during an 

emergency to alert or notify all or portions 

of the plume exposure pathway EPZ 

population. The backup method shall 

have the capability to alert and notify the 

public within the plume exposure pathway 

EPZ, but does not need to meet the 

While the capability needs to exist for the 

notification of offsite government agencies within a 

specified time period, previous exemptions have 

allowed for extending the State and local 

government agencies’ notification time up to 

60 minutes based on the site-specific justification 

provided. 

DEK’s exemption request provides that the KPS 

will make notifications to the State of Wisconsin, to 

the local county (Kewaunee) and the NRC within 

60 minutes of declaration of an event. In the 

permanently defueled condition of the reactor, the 

rapidly developing scenarios associated with 

events initiated during reactor power operation are 

no longer credible. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 
14

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

15 minute design objective for the primary 

prompt public alert and notification 

system. When there is a decision to 

activate the alert and notification system, 

the appropriate governmental authorities 

will determine whether to activate the 

entire alert and notification system 

simultaneously or in a graduated or 

staged manner. The responsibility for 

activating such a public alert and 

notification system shall remain with the 

appropriate governmental authorities.

D.4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear 

power reactor site's alert and notification 

design report, including the backup alert 

and notification capability, as of 

December 23, 2011, then the backup alert 

and notification capability requirements in 

Section IV.D.3 must be implemented by 

December 24, 2012. If the alert and 

notification design report does not include 

a backup alert and notification capability 

or needs revision to ensure adequate 

backup alert and notification capability, 

then a revision of the alert and notification 

design report must be submitted to FEMA 

for review by June 24, 2013, and the 

FEMA-approved backup alert and 

notification means must be implemented 

within 365 days after FEMA approval. 

However, the total time period to 

implement a FEMA-approved backup alert 

and notification means must not exceed 

June 22, 2015.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.D.3 regarding the alert and notification 

system requirements. 

E.8.a.(i) A licensee onsite technical 

support center and an emergency 

operations facility from which effective 

direction can be given and effective 

control can be exercised during an 

emergency; 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs 

at the site boundary, the available time for event 

mitigation at a decommissioning reactor and, if 

needed, to implement offsite protective actions 

using a CEMP, an emergency operations facility 

(EOF) would not be required to support offsite 

agency response. Onsite actions may be directed 

from the control room or other location, without the 

requirements imposed on a technical support 

center (TSC). 
15

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

E.8.a. (ii) For nuclear power reactor 

licensees, a licensee onsite operational 

support center;

NUREG-0696, “Functional Criteria for Emergency 

Response Facilities,” provides that the operational 

support center (OSC) is an onsite area separate 

from the control room and the TSC where licensee 

operations support personnel will assemble in an 

emergency. For a decommissioning power 

reactor, an OSC is no longer required to meet its 

original purpose of an assembly area for plant 

logistical support during an emergency. The OSC 

function can be incorporated into another facility. 

E.8.b. For a nuclear power reactor 

licensee's emergency operations facility 

required by paragraph 8.a of this section, 

either a facility located between 10 miles 

and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor 

site(s), or a primary facility located less 

than 10 miles from the nuclear power 

reactor site(s) and a backup facility 

located between 10 miles and 25 miles of 

the nuclear power reactor site(s). An 

emergency operations facility may serve 

more than one nuclear power reactor site. 

A licensee desiring to locate an 

emergency operations facility more than 

25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site 

shall request prior Commission approval 

by submitting an application for an 

amendment to its license. For an 

emergency operations facility located 

more than 25 miles from a nuclear power 

reactor site, provisions must be made for 

locating NRC and offsite responders 

closer to the nuclear power reactor site so 

that NRC and offsite responders can 

interact face-to-face with emergency 

response personnel entering and leaving 

the nuclear power reactor site. Provisions 

for locating NRC and offsite responders 

closer to a nuclear power reactor site that 

is more than 25 miles from the emergency 

operations facility must include the 

following:

(1) Space for members of an NRC site 

team and Federal, State, and local 

responders;

(2) Additional space for conducting 

briefings with emergency response 

personnel;

(3) Communication with other licensee 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 
16

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

and offsite emergency response facilities;

(4) Access to plant data and radiological 

information; and

(5) Access to copying equipment and 

office supplies;

E.8.c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear 

power reactor licensee's emergency 

operations facility required by paragraph 

8.a of this section, a facility having the 

following capabilities:

(1) The capability for obtaining and 

displaying plant data and radiological 

information for each reactor at a nuclear 

power reactor site and for each nuclear 

power reactor site that the facility serves;

(2) The capability to analyze plant 

technical information and provide 

technical briefings on event conditions 

and prognosis to licensee and offsite 

response organizations for each reactor at 

a nuclear power reactor site and for each 

nuclear power reactor site that the facility 

serves; and

(3) The capability to support response to 

events occurring simultaneously at more 

than one nuclear power reactor site if the 

emergency operations facility serves more 

than one site; and

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

E.8.d. For nuclear power reactor 

licensees, an alternative facility (or 

facilities) that would be accessible even if 

the site is under threat of or experiencing 

hostile action, to function as a staging 

area for augmentation of emergency 

response staff and collectively having the 

following characteristics: the capability for 

communication with the emergency 

operations facility, control room, and plant 

security; the capability to perform offsite 

notifications; and the capability for 

engineering assessment activities, 

including damage control team planning 

and preparation, for use when onsite 

emergency facilities cannot be safely 

accessed during hostile action. The 

requirements in this paragraph 8.d must 

be implemented no later than December 

23, 2014, with the exception of the 

capability for staging emergency response 

organization personnel at the alternative 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. 
17

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

facility (or facilities) and the capability for 

communications with the emergency 

operations facility, control room, and plant 

security, which must be implemented no 

later than June 20, 2012.

E.8.e. A licensee shall not be subject to 

the requirements of paragraph 8.b of this 

section for an existing emergency 

operations facility approved as of 

December 23, 2011;

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

E.9.a. Provisions for communications with 

contiguous State/local governments within 

the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such 

communication shall be tested monthly. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

The State and the local governments in which the 

nuclear facility is located need to be informed of 

events and emergencies, so lines of 

communication must be maintained. 

E.9.c. Provision for communications 

among the nuclear power reactor control 

room, the onsite technical support center, 

and the emergency operations facility; 

and among the nuclear facility, the 

principal State and local emergency 

operations centers, and the field 

assessment teams. Such 

communications systems shall be tested 

annually.

Because of the low probability of design-basis 

accidents or other credible events that would be 

expected to exceed the EPA PAGs and the 

available time for event mitigation and if needed, 

implementation of offsite protective actions using a 

CEMP, there is no need for the TSC, EOF, or 

offsite field assessment teams. 

Also refer to justification for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

Communication with State and local EOCs is 

maintained to coordinate assistance on site if 

required. 

E.9.d. Provisions for communications by 

the licensee with NRC Headquarters and 

the appropriate NRC Regional Office 

Operations Center from the nuclear power 

reactor control room, the onsite technical 

support center, and the emergency 

operations facility. Such communications 

shall be tested monthly. 

The functions of the control room, EOF, TSC, and 

OSC may be combined into one or more locations 

due to the smaller facility staff and the greatly 

reduced required interaction with State and local 

emergency response facilities. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 
18

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

F.1. The program to provide for: (a) The 

training of employees and exercising, by 

periodic drills, of radiation emergency 

plans to ensure that employees of the 

licensee are familiar with their specific 

emergency response duties, and (b) The 

participation in the training and drills by 

other persons whose assistance may be 

needed in the event of a radiation 

emergency shall be described. This shall 

include a description of specialized initial 

training and periodic retraining programs 

to be provided to each of the following 

categories of emergency personnel: 

i. Directors and/or coordinators of the 

plant emergency organization; 

ii. Personnel responsible for accident 

assessment, including control room shift 

personnel; 

iii. Radiological monitoring teams; 

iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades); 

v. Repair and damage control teams; 

vi. First aid and rescue teams; 

vii. Medical support personnel; 

viii. Licensee’s headquarters support 

personnel;

ix. Security personnel. 

In addition, a radiological orientation 

training program shall be made available 

to local services personnel; e.g., local 

emergency services/Civil Defense, local 

law enforcement personnel, local news 

media persons. 

Decommissioning power reactor sites typically 

have a level of emergency response that does not 

require additional response by the licensee’s 

headquarters personnel. Therefore, the staff 

considers exempting licensee’s headquarters 

personnel from training requirements to be 

sufficient to provide reasonable assurance. 
19

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

F.2. The plan shall describe provisions for 

the conduct of emergency preparedness 

exercises as follows: Exercises shall test 

the adequacy of timing and content of 

implementing procedures and methods, 

test emergency equipment and 

communications networks, test the public 

alert and notification system, and ensure 

that emergency organization personnel 

are familiar with their duties. 

Because of the low probability of design-basis 

accidents or other credible events that would be 

expected to exceed the limits of EPA PAGs and 

the available time for event mitigation and offsite 

protective actions from a CEMP, the public alert 

and notification system will not be used and, 

therefore, requires no testing. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

F.2.a. A full participation exercise which 

tests as much of the licensee, State, and 

local emergency plans as is reasonably 

achievable without mandatory public 

participation shall be conducted for each 

site at which a power reactor is located. 

Nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at 

least 60 days before use in a full 

participation exercise required by this 

paragraph 2.a.

F.2.a.(i), (ii), and (iii) are not applicable. 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events that would be expected to 

exceed the limits of EPA PAGs, the available time 

for event mitigation, and if necessary, 

implementation of offsite protective actions using a 

CEMP, no formal offsite radiological emergency 

plans are required. 

The intent of submitting exercise scenarios at an 

operating power reactor site is to check that 

licensees utilize different scenarios in order to 

prevent the preconditioning of responders at power 

reactors. For decommissioning power reactor 

sites, there are limited events that could occur, and 

as such, the previously routine progression to 

General Emergency in an operating power reactor 

site scenario is not applicable. 

The licensee would be exempt from 10 CFR 

Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.(i)-(iii) 

because the licensee would be exempt from the 

umbrella provision of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2.a. 

F.2.b. Each licensee at each site shall 

conduct a subsequent exercise of its 

onsite emergency plan every 2 years. 

Nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at 

least 60 days before use in an exercise 

required by this paragraph 2.b. The 

exercise may be included in the full 

participation biennial exercise required by 

paragraph 2.c. of this section. In addition, 

the licensee shall take actions necessary 

to ensure that adequate emergency 

response capabilities are maintained 

during the interval between biennial 

exercises by conducting drills, including at 

least one drill involving a combination of 

some of the principal functional areas of 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2.a. 

The low probability of design-basis accidents or 

other credible events that would exceed the EPA 

PAGs, the available time for event mitigation and if 

necessary, implementation of offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP, render a TSC, OSC and 

EOF unnecessary. The principal functions 

required by regulation can be performed at an 

onsite location that does not meet the requirements 

of the TSC, OSC or EOF. 
20

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

the licensee's onsite emergency response 

capabilities. The principal functional 

areas of emergency response include 

activities such as management and 

coordination of emergency response, 

accident assessment, event classification, 

notification of offsite authorities, and 

assessment of the onsite and offsite

impact of radiological releases, protective 

action recommendation development, 

protective action decision making, plant 

system repair and mitigative action 

implementation. During these drills, 

activation of all of the licensee's 

emergency response facilities (Technical 

Support Center (TSC), Operations 

Support Center (OSC), and the 

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) 

would not be necessary, licensees would 

have the opportunity to consider accident 

management strategies, supervised 

instruction would be permitted, operating 

staff in all participating facilities would 

have the opportunity to resolve problems 

(success paths) rather than have 

controllers intervene, and the drills may 

focus on the onsite exercise training 

objectives. 

F.2.c. Offsite plans for each site shall be 

exercised biennially with full participation 

by each offsite authority having a role 

under the radiological response plan. 

Where the offsite authority has a role 

under a radiological response plan for 

more than one site, it shall fully participate 

in one exercise every two years and shall, 

at least, partially participate in other offsite 

plan exercises in this period. If two 

different licensees each have licensed 

facilities located either on the same site or 

on adjacent, contiguous sites, and share 

most of the elements defining co-located 

licensees, then each licensee shall:

(1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its 

onsite emergency plan;

(2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite 

biennial full or partial participation 

exercise;

(3) Conduct emergency preparedness 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2.a. 
21

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

activities and interactions in the years 

between its participation in the offsite full 

or partial participation exercise with offsite 

authorities, to test and maintain interface 

among the affected State and local 

authorities and the licensee. Co-located 

licensees shall also participate in 

emergency preparedness activities and 

interaction with offsite authorities for the 

period between exercises;

(4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its 

onsite emergency plan in each exercise 

cycle; and

(5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or 

partial participation hostile action exercise 

in alternating exercise cycles.

F.2.d. Each State with responsibility for 

nuclear power reactor emergency 

preparedness should fully participate in 

the ingestion pathway portion of exercises 

at least once every exercise cycle. In 

States with more than one nuclear power 

reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ, the 

State should rotate this participation from 

site to site. Each State with responsibility 

for nuclear power reactor emergency 

preparedness should fully participate in a 

hostile action exercise at least once every 

cycle and should fully participate in one 

hostile action exercise by 

December 31, 2015. States with more 

than one nuclear power reactor plume 

exposure pathway EPZ should rotate this 

participation from site to site.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

F.2.e. Licensees shall enable any State or 

local Government located within the 

plume exposure pathway EPZ to 

participate in the licensee’s drills when 

requested by such State or local 

Government. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 
22

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

F.2.f. Remedial exercises will be required 

if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily 

tested during the biennial exercise, such 

that NRC, in consultation with FEMA,

cannot (1) find reasonable assurance that 

adequate protective measures can and 

will be taken in the event of a radiological 

emergency or (2) determine that the 

Emergency Response Organization 

(ERO) has maintained key skills specific 

to emergency response. The extent of 

State and local participation in remedial 

exercises must be sufficient to show that 

appropriate corrective measures have 

been taken regarding the elements of the 

plan not properly tested in the previous 

exercises.

The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) is responsible for evaluating the adequacy 

of offsite response during an exercise. No action is 

expected from State or local government 

organizations in response to an event at a 

decommissioning power reactor site other than 

onsite firefighting, law enforcement and 

ambulance/medical services support. A 

Memoranda of Understanding should be in place 

for those services. Offsite response organizations 

will continue to take actions on a comprehensive 

emergency planning basis to protect the health and 

safety of the public as they would at any other 

industrial site. 

F.2.i. Licensees shall use drill and 

exercise scenarios that provide 

reasonable assurance that anticipatory 

responses will not result from 

preconditioning of participants. Such 

scenarios for nuclear power reactor 

licensees must include a wide spectrum of 

radiological releases and events, 

including hostile action. Exercise and drill 

scenarios as appropriate must emphasize 

coordination among onsite and offsite 

response organizations. 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, 

the available time for event mitigation and, if 

needed, implementation of offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP, the previously routine 

progression to General Emergency in power 

reactor site scenarios is not applicable to a 

decommissioning site. Therefore the licensee is 

not expected to demonstrate response to a wide 

spectrum of events. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. 

F.2.j. The exercises conducted under 

paragraph 2 of this section by nuclear 

power reactor licensees must provide the 

opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate 

proficiency in the key skills necessary to 

implement the principal functional areas of 

emergency response identified in 

paragraph 2.b of this section. Each 

exercise must provide the opportunity for 

the ERO to demonstrate key skills specific 

to emergency response duties in the 

control room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint 

information center. Additionally, in each 

eight calendar year exercise cycle, 

nuclear power reactor licensees shall vary 

the content of scenarios during exercises 

conducted under paragraph 2 of this 

section to provide the opportunity for the 

ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2. 
23

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

skills necessary to respond to the 

following scenario elements: hostile action 

directed at the plant site, no radiological 

release or an unplanned minimal 

radiological release that does not require 

public protective actions, an initial 

classification of or rapid escalation to a 

Site Area Emergency or General 

Emergency, implementation of strategies, 

procedures, and guidance developed 

under § 50.54(hh)(2), and integration of 

offsite resources with onsite justification. 

The licensee shall maintain a record of 

exercises conducted during each eight 

year exercise cycle that documents the 

content of scenarios used to comply with 

the requirements of this paragraph. Each 

licensee shall conduct a hostile action 

exercise for each of its sites no later than 

December 31, 2015. The first eight-year 

exercise cycle for a site will begin in the 

calendar year in which the first hostile 

action exercise is conducted. For a site 

licensed under Part 52, the first eight-year 

exercise cycle begins in the calendar year 

of the initial exercise required by Section 

IV.F.2.a.

I. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power 

reactor licensees, a range of protective 

actions to protect onsite personnel during 

hostile action must be developed to 

ensure the continued ability of the 

licensee to safely shut down the reactor 

and perform the functions of the 

licensee’s emergency plan.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.E.8.d.