alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### KING et al., Appellants, v. HEIB et al., Respondents.

(136 N. W. 106.)

Appeal from Order — Time to Appeal — Power of Court.

Notice of appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer was served October 2nd; notice of entry of tbe order was served August 3rd; undertaking on appeal was served October 4ttu *219Held, the Supreme Court must sustain a motion to strike the case from the records of the court; otherwise the time for taking such appeal would, in effect, be extended, and this the court cannot do under Sec. 561, Code Civ. Proc.; following Aldrich v. Public Opinion Printing Co., 27 S. D. 589, 132 N. W. 278; this although appellant has moved to be relieved from default, presenting affidavits attempting to excuse delay in serving undertaking.

Haney and Corson, J. J., dissenting.

(Opinion filed, May 7, 1912.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lyman County. Hon. Frank B. Smith, Judge.

Action by Edward King and another against Jacob Heib and another. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiffs appeal. Cause stricken from records of the court.

*J. G. Maughan, B. R. Slifer,*and *H. B. Moses,*for Appellants.

*William Williamson, Jr.,*and *James Brozan,*for Respondent.

WHITING, J.

This cause is before the court upon a motion by respondents asking that it be stricken from the records of this court. It is an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to a complaint. It stands conceded that the notice of entry of such order was served on appellant August 3, 1911; that on October 2, 1911, appellant served on respondents’ attorney a notice of appeal; that the undertaking on appeal was not served until October 4, 1911. The above facts bring this motion directly under the ruling of this court in the case of Aldrich v. Public Opinion Printing Co., 132 N. W. 278, and the motion must prevail, unless a counter motion of appellant should be sustained. Appellant has moved this court to be relieved from his default and has presented affidavits attempting to excuse the delay in service of undertaking. To grant this relief would be an extending of the statutory time for appeal, and this' the court cannot do, either as an appellate court or as the tribunal to which an appellant may apply under section 461 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The effect of striking this cause from the records of this court will be to leave it as it would have been if there had been no attempt to appeal, and, if appellant is still desirous of review*220ing the decision of the trial court upon such demurrer, he may- do so upon an appeal from any judgment that has been or may be entered by such court.

It is directed that the cause be stricken from the records of this court.

HANEY, and CORSON, JJ., dissenting.
### §1397n. Purposes

The purposes of this division are the following:

(1) To improve the lives of families and individuals in need in the United States by funding social programs that achieve real results.

(2) To redirect funds away from programs that, based on objective data, are ineffective, and into programs that achieve demonstrable, measurable results.

(3) To ensure Federal funds are used effectively on social services to produce positive outcomes for both service recipients and taxpayers.

(4) To establish the use of social impact partnerships to address some of our Nation's most pressing problems.

(5) To facilitate the creation of public-private partnerships that bundle philanthropic or other private resources with existing public spending to scale up effective social interventions already being implemented by private organizations, nonprofits, charitable organizations, and State and local governments across the country.

(6) To bring pay-for-performance to the social sector, allowing the United States to improve the impact and effectiveness of vital social services programs while redirecting inefficient or duplicative spending.

(7) To incorporate outcomes measurement and randomized controlled trials or other rigorous methodologies for assessing program impact.

(Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, title XX, §2051, as added Pub. L. 115–123, div. E, title VIII, §50802(2), Feb. 9, 2018, 132 Stat. 269.)
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 23, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-20764

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

STERLING THOMAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-00-CR-540-1

--------------------

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Court-appointed counsel for Sterling Thomas has filed a

motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in accordance with

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Thomas has not

filed a response. Our independent review of the record and

counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly,

counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from

further responsibilities, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See

5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
#### § 768.10 Removal of controls on less sophisticated items.

Where the Secretary has removed national security controls on an item for foreign availability reasons, the Secretary will also remove controls on similar items that are controlled for national security reasons and whose functions, technological approach, performance thresholds, and other attributes that form the basis for national security export controls do not exceed the technical parameters of the item that BIS has decontrolled for foreign availability reasons.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-7676

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

DAMON BRIGHTMAN, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Solomon Blatt, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (2:03-cr-00627-SB-2) 

Submitted: February 19, 2009 Decided: February 24, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Damon Brightman, Appellant Pro Se. Eric John Klumb, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Damon Brightman appeals the district court’s order 

denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2006) motion for a reduction of 

sentence pursuant to Amendment 706 of the U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible 

error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the 

district court. United States v. Brightman, No. 2:03-cr-00627-

SB-2 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2008). We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
#### Mary Ann Stevens et al., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants, v American Water Services, Inc., Formerly Known as American Anglian Environmental Technologies, L.P., et al., Respondents.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[820 NYS2d 824]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Joseph G. Makowski, J.), entered May 25, 2005. The order granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that said appeal be and the same hereby is unanimously dismissed without costs *(see Matter of Laborers Intl. Union of N. Am., Local 210, AFL-CIO v Shevlin-Manning, Inc.,*147 AD2d 977 [1989]). Present — Pigott, Jr., P.J., Hurlbutt, Martoche and Green, JJ.
#### § 1512.20 Separability.

If any section or portion thereof of this part 1512 or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the section(s) and its (their) application to other persons or circumstances is not thereby affected.
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Max Becker, Respondent.

Memorandum: On May 21, 1930, respondent was convicted of attempt to escape from State prison in violation of section 1695 of the Penal Law and was thereupon sentenced to a term of twelve years in State prison. Unless respondent was sentenced (1) as a prior felony offender under section 1941 of the Penal Law or (2) additional punishment was imposed for being armed in violation of section 1944 of the Penal Law, the sentence imposed was excessive. In view of the state of the record as to the factual situation at the time sentence was imposed, we feel that the order of the Special Term setting aside the sentence of May 21, 1930, of twelve years, was proper, but that the court erred in resentencing respondent to a term of three and one-half years and suspending execution thereof without first conducting a hearing and taking evidence as required by section 2188 of the Penal Law. The order vacating the sentence of May 21, 1930, is affirmed. The judgment of September 22, 1947, resentencing respondent to a term of three and one-half years and suspending the execution thereof is reversed and the sentence vacated. The proceeding is remitted to the Special Term to conduct a hearing and take evidence in accordance with section 2188 of the Penal Law, in effect in 1930, on the questions whether respondent was armed at the time of the commission of the felony of attempted prison escape and if so, to impose increased punishment as required by section 1944 of the Penal Law, in effect in 1930; whether an information as required by section 1943 of the Penal Law, in effect in 1930, was filed following respondent’s conviction of attempted prison escape charging him with being a second felony offender; and if so, to arraign respondent thereon and advise him of his right to be tried as to the truth of the allegations contained therein before imposition of sentence and to thereafter dispose of the proceeding in accordance with the evidence developed upon the hearing. All concur. (The order vacates a judgment of conviction and directs *893that defendant be resentenced; the judgment resentences defendant and suspends execution of the sentence during good behaviour.) Present — Taylor, P. J., Love, Vaughan, Kimball and Piper, JJ. [See *post,*pp. 997, 1019.]
EXHIBIT 5 TO
             FORM S-8 REGISTRATION STATEMENT
                      REGARDING
                 THE CLOROX COMPANY
          VALUE SHARING PLAN FOR PUERTO RICO



November 26, 1996


Ladies and Gentlemen:

This is with respect to the Registration Statement on 
Form S-8, to which this opinion is an exhibit, 
covering 20,000 shares of Clorox Common Stock which 
may be issued pursuant to exercise of options granted 
under The Clorox Company Value Sharing Plan for Puerto Rico.

It is my opinion that:

1.  All necessary corporate action has been duly taken 
to adopt said Plan and said Plan was duly approved by 
action of the stockholders of The Clorox Company.

2.  Said 20,000 shares of Clorox Common Stock have been 
reserved for purposes of said Plan and such shares, when 
issued on exercise of options granted in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of said Plan, will be legally 
issued, fully paid and non-assessable.

I hereby consent to the filing of this opinion with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the 
aforesaid registration statement.

Very truly,


/s/ EDWARD A. CUTTER
Edward A. Cutter
Senior Vice President - 
General Counsel and
Secretary
### SUBCHAPTER VI—FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
**EPA ICR No. 2195.04 OMB Control No. 2070**
**- 0169** 

**ATTACHMENT C Sections**  **408(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 408(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic**  **Act FFDCA Section**  **408(b)(2)(A)(ii) (b)**  **A UTHORITY AND**  **S TANDARD FOR**  **T OLERANCE**  **. —**  * * * * **(2) S**  **TANDARD .**  **— (A)**  **G ENERAL**  **R ULE**  **. —**  * * * * **(ii) D**  **ETERMINATION OF S**  **AFETY .**  — As used in this section, the term “safe”, with respect to a tolerance for a pesticide chemical residue, means that the Administrator has determined that there i s a reasonable certaint y that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for which there is reliable information. **FFDCA Section 408(e)(1)(C)**  **(e) A**  **CTION ON A**  **DMINISTRATOR ’**  **S O**  **WN I**  **NITIATIVE .**  **— (1)**  **G ENERAL**  **R ULE**  **. —** The Administrator may issue a regulation

— * * * * **(C)** establishing general procedures and requirements to implement this section.
#### §§ 6.153-6.159 [Reserved]
Exhibit 32

Certification pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Donald Mindiak, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer and Thomas M. Coughlin, Principal Accounting Officer and Chief Operating
Officer of BCB Bancorp, Inc. (the Company) each certify in his capacity as an officer of the Company that he has reviewed the quarterly report of the Company on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended June 30, 2009 and that to the best of
his knowledge:

(1) the report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

The purpose of this statement is solely to comply with Title 18,
Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, as amended by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.





|              |  |  |  |                                                               
|------------- |  |  |  | --------------------------------------------------------------
|July 30, 2010 |  |  |  | /s/ Donald Mindiak                                            
|              |  |  |  | President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
|              |  |  |  |                                                               
|              |  | 
|July 30, 2010 |  |  |  | /s/ Thomas M. Coughlin                                        
|              |  |  |  | Principal Accounting Officer and Chief Operating Officer
#### Henry E. Suarez et al., Respondents, v Gallo Wine Distributors, L.L.C., et al., Appellants.

[820 NYS2d 794]

*738Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mark Friedlander, J.), entered March 18, 2005, inter alia, denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (2), unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The amended complaint alleges simply that defendants, in violation of City and State Human Rights Laws, have denied plaintiffs’ employment by reason of their race and nationality. Contrary to defendants’ arguments, the adjudication of these claims will not involve state court intrusion upon areas federally preempted under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). No issue is posed respecting plaintiffs’ right to organize or to union representation, much less is an issue posed as to the frustration of any such right by an unfair labor practice redressable pursuant to the NLRA by the National Labor Relations Board *(cf. Chaulk Servs., Inc. v Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 70*F3d 1361 [1995]; *Lemerich v International Union of Operating Engrs., Locals 877 & 4,*2002 WL 655333, 2002 US Dist LEXIS 7102 [D Me 2002]). Nor is this a dispute between a labor organization representing employees and an employer over the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, committed pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA (29 USC § 185) to the federal courts *(see Livadas v Bradshaw,*512 US 107 [1994]). Indeed, plaintiffs are members of a labor organization and, as noted, seek relief exclusively under State and City Human Rights Laws. While perhaps this litigation will require consultation of the union contract, and perhaps defendants’ defenses may be based upon its existence, the agreement is only tangentially relevant to the claims as pleaded *(see id.*at 123). Moreover, even if this litigation did touch upon conduct protected or prohibited by the NLRA, the exceptions to preemption enunciated in *San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon*(359 US 236, 243-244 [1959]), would be applicable. The allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint would, at most, be of only peripheral concern to the NLRB, but, by contrast, New York State and City have a compelling and “deeply rooted” interest in eradicating employment discrimination based on ethnicity and national origin. Concur— Mazzarelli, J.P., Sweeny, Catterson, McGuire and Malone, JJ.
FEB 1 7 2000

EMPLOYER STATUS DETERMINATION

Rail Equipment & Transportation, Inc. d/b/a Nobles Rock Railroad Co. (RETT)

This is the determination of the Railroad Retirement Board concerning the

continued status of Rail Equipment & Transportation, Inc. d/b/a Nobles Rock

Railroad Co. (RETI), BA. No. 9623, as an employer under the Railroad

Retirement Act (45 U.S.C. §231 et $££.) (RRA) and the Railroad Unemployment

Insurance Act (45 U.S.C. §351 elsea.) (RUIA).

Information from the coverage file for Nobles Rock Railroad, Inc. (NRRR) (BA

No. 2650) shows that NRRR was incorporated in the State of Nevada on

August 13, 1998 . On December 21,1998, NRRR and its parent company,

Cascade Railcorp, Inc. (Cascade), entered into a sublease/purchase agreement

(Agreement), which stated that it became effective retroactively on April 1,

1998, with RETI and RETTs sole shareholders, Dirk Lenthe and William G.

Dahlin. The Agreement provided that Cascade and NRRR would acquire stock

ownership of RETT and secure a sublease for the operation of the Nobles Rock

Railroad from RETT pending completion of the stock acquisition. RETT

formerly operated the railroad and was found to be an employer covered under

the RRA and RUIA. See B.C.D. No. 95-104. In Board Coverage Decision 99-41,

NRRR was determined to have become an employer under the Acts effective

December 21,1998. Additionally, NRRR was determined to be the successor

employer to RETT effective the same date.

Information regarding RETT was furnished by Shane B. Gebeke, Corporation

Office Manager for M-BAR-D Railcar Tech., Inc. (MBARD). According to

Mr. Gebeke, NRRR purchased all outstanding stock and assets of RETT. The

information obtained regarding RETT suggests that all railroad trackage has

been transferred from RETI to NRRR.

Section 202.11 (20 CFR 202.11) of the Board’s regulations states that:

The employer status of any company or person shall terminate

whenever such company or person loses any of the characteristics

essential to the existence of an employer status.

The information summarized above indicates that RETT no longer possesses

the characteristics of an operating railroad company. The Board therefore

finds that effective with the close of business on December 21, 1998, the date on

which NRRR entered into the sublease/purchase agreement with RETT, Rail

Equipment & Transportation, Inc. d/b/a Nobles Rock Railroad Co. ceased being

a covered employer under the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad

Unemployment Insurance Act. As noted above, the Board previously

BCD 2000-08

BA# 9623
Rail Equipment & Transportation, Inc. d/b/a Nobles Rock Railroad Co. (RETI)

determined in B.C.D. 99-41 that NRRR is the successor employer of RETI for

purposes of experience rating under the ROTA. See 20 CFR §345.204.

CherrylT. Thomas

V. M. Speakman, Jr.

■C'L'xe

erome F. Kever
§ 802.35 Acquisitions by employee trusts. An acquisition of voting securities shall be exempt from the notification requirements of the act if: ( a ) The securities are acquired by a trust that meets the qualifications of section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code;
( b ) The trust is controlled by a person that employs the beneficiaries and,
( c ) The voting securities acquired are those of that person or an entity within that person.
Examples: 1. Company A establishes a trust for its employees that meets the qualifications of section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. Company A has the power to designate the trustee of the trust. That trust then acquires 30% of the voting securities of Company A for in excess of $50 million (as adjusted). Later, the trust acquires 20% of the stock of Company B, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Company A, for in excess of $50 million (as adjusted). Neither acquisition is reportable. 2. Assume that in the example above, “A” has total assets of $100 million (as adjusted). “C” also has total assets of $100 million (as adjusted) and is not controlled by Company A. The trust controlled by Company A plans to acquire 40 percent of the voting securities of Company C for in excess of $50 million (as adjusted). Since Company C is not included within “A,” “A” must observe the requirements of the act before the trust makes the acquisition of Company C's shares.
[52 FR 7082, Mar. 6, 1987, as amended at 66 FR 8694, Feb. 1, 2001; 70 FR 4995, Jan. 31, 2005]
#### § 10.113 Right to challenge distribution of funds to customers.

Any order of an Administrative Law Judge directing or authorizing the distribution of funds paid as restitution to individual customers shall be considered a final order for appeal purposes to be subject to Commission review pursuant to § 10.102.
Home > NRC Library > ADAMS Public Documents

# FSME-11-106, Notification of Issuance of the Safety Culture Policy Statement Brochure.

Accession Number: ML113490093

Date Released: Friday, December 16, 2011

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    - ML113490096 - FSME-11-106, Notification of Issuance of the Safety Culture Policy Statement Brochure. (3 page(s), 12/16/2011)
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### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

CAROLYN DUTRIZ

, Appellant,

v.

NICOLA NAZY and RITA NAZY

, Appellee s

.

No. 4D 21

- 1646

[ March 31, 2022 ]

Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth

Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; John S. Kastrenakes , Judge; L.T.

Case No. 502021CA002690

.

Enrique Nieves III of Enrique Nieves, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for

appellant.

David Steinfeld of Law Office of David Steinfeld, Palm Beach Gardens,

for appellees.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

W ARNER

, G ERBER and K LINGENSMITH

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.