~ 

S. HRG. 100-159 

SPACE SHUTTLE OVERSIGHT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE I~ 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND 

SPACE 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

OVERSIGHT OF THE NATIONAL AEROKAUTICS AND SPACE 

ADMINISTRATION'S SPACE SHUTTLE REDESIGN ACTIVITIES 

JANUARY 22.1987 

7243 0 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Commerce, Science. and Transportation 

US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1987 

~~ 

For sale by the Supenntendent ot Documents Congressional Sales Office 

US. Government Pnnting Oftice. Washington. DC 20402 
COMMITEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE. Hawaii JOHN C. DANFORTH. Missouri 

WENDELL H. FORD, Kentucky BOB PACKWOOD, Oregon 

DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan 

J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska 

NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, Kansas 

LARRY PRESSLER. South Dakota 

ALBERT GORE, JR., Tennessee 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV. West Virginia 

LLOYD BENTSEN. Texas 

JOHN F. KERRY, Marsachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX. Louisiana 

BROCK ADAMS, Washington 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

ROBERT W. KASTEN. JR., Wisconsin 

PAUL S. TRIBLE. JR., Virginia 

PETE WILSON. California 

JOHN MCCAIN. Arizona 

RALPH B. EVERETT, Chief CoumelandSuffDirector 

W. ALLEN MOORE Minonry ChiejofSra// 

SUBCOMMIU ON SCIENCE. TECHNOLOGY. AND SPACE 

DONALD W. RIEGLE. JR.. Michigan, Chairman 

ALBERT GORE, JR., Tennessee 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV. West Virginia 

LLOYD BENTSEW. Texas 

LARRY PRESSLER. South Dakota 

NANCY LANDON KASSEBALW, Kansas 

PAUL S. TRIBLE. JR., Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Masachuserts 

BROCK ADAMS. Washington 

PRE WILSON. California 

(11) 
C ONTENTS 

Opening statement by Senator Riegle ................................................................................. Opening statement by the Chairman ....................................................... Opening statement by Senator Rockefeller ........................................................................ Opening statement by Senator Gore ................................................................................... Opening statement by Senator Heflin ......................................................... 

Opening statement by Senator Adams ................................................................................ Opening statement by Senator Pressler ...................................... 

LIST OF WITNESSES 

Brown, George G.. vice president for program development, Aero'et Strategic Propulsion Co.: Harry L. Crosby, vice president for business development, 

Chemical Systems Division. United Technologies Corp.: Ernest A. Mettenet, 

resident. Hercules Aerospace Products Group, Hercules Aerospace Co. : James g. Sides, senior vice president and general manager, Propulsion Division, 

Atlantic Research COT.: and Edward G. Dorsey. vice president and general 

manager, Wasatch Bvision, Morton Thiokol .... ........................................ Prepared statements: ............... 

............... 

Mr. Crosby ............................................................................................................. Letter of April 1, 19 ................................................................ Mr. Mettenet ............. Letter of March 2, 1 ................................................................ 

Mr. Dorsey .............................................................................................................. 

Fletcher, Hon. James C., Administrator, NASA: accompanied by Dale D. Myers. hard , H. Truly. Associate Administrator, Office, of 

Aldnch. Director. National Space Transpottauon 

Questions of Senator Pressler and the answers ........................................................ Thompson. J. R.. Director. Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA: accompanied b Arnie Aldrich, Director. National S ace Transportation System: Bob 

darshall. Shuttle Projects Director: and Jogn Thomas, Mana er. Solid Rocket 

Motor Design Team: U. E. Garrison, president, Morton Ttiokol Aerospace Group, Morton Tniokol; Edward G. Dorsey, vice president and eneral 

manager, Wasatch Division: and Alan J. McDonald. director, Solid Wocket 

Motor Verification Task Force ......................................................................................... 

Mr. Thompson ........................... ....................................... Mr. Garrison ............................................................................................................ 

............................................................................... 

............................................................................................... Prepared statement ......................................................... ......................................... 

Prepared statements: 

ADDITIONAL ARTICLES, LETTERS. AND STATEMENTS 

Stever, H. Guyford, chairman. Panel on Technical Evaluation of the Redesign of 

the Space Shuttle Rocket Booster, National Research Council, statement ............. 

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SPACE SHUTTLE OVERSIGHT 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 22, 1987 

US. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE, 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 

SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Donald W. Riegle, Jr., 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Staff members assigned to this hearing: Marty Kress, profession- al staff member, and Pete Perkins, minority professional staff 

member. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR RIEGLE 

Senator RIEGLE. The committee will come to order. This is the 

first hearing in the 100th Congress of the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, end Space, and we start on a day with adverse 

weather conditions here in Washington, and other committees 

meeting at the same time, so members will be arriving as we go 

along, but I thought we ought to start on time. 

I particularly want to welcome to our subcommittee the new 

members who will be serving. The subcommittee has been expanded because of the interest of members in the work of this subcommittee, and I want to particularly welcome this morning also the 

chairman of the full committee, Senator Hollings. This morning’s hearing begins a new chapter in the relationship 

between NASA and the Senate with new teams in place on both 

sides of the table. I hope and intend that this will be an era in 

which the Congress and NASA work together to reactivate the 

space shuttle and help restore the civilian space program to its 

former stature. 

This subcommittee will be properly independent and active in its 

oversight of NASA. We expect to be kept fully and promptly in- formed of all major issues and problems within NASA, as you and I 

have previously discussed, Dr. Fletcher. 

You in turn will find this committee to be dedicated as you are 

to making NASA the finest agency in our government. That is our 

common goal, and working together we will meet it. 

It was nearly one year ago that we experienced the tragedy of 

the Challenger explosion. A million tears have been shed over the 

loss of that mission and its crew. Our hearts are heavy whenever 

we think about it. 

With that sacrifice clearly in mind, we have renewed our efforts 

with painful new wisdom and with absolute American determina- 

(1) 

Washington, DC. 
2 

tion to return to space as soon as we are ready, and we are getting 

ready. 

Other astronauts have already been named for the next shuttle 

flight, and Commander Rick Hauck is here with us now, and I 

would just ask him, if he would, to please stand. We are delighted 

to have you, and we wish you and your crew the best, and we 

intend to give you the best. 

I know I express the commitment of our nation, Commander 

Hauck, in saying to you and your crew that we are determined to 

make that next launch the safest ever. We have the greatest confidence in you and in your crew and in the entire NASA community 

as you carry our flag and our hopes back into space. 

It is also NASA’s role to help restore and advance our technological leadership, and that requires the best human talent and facilities that can let us meek our future goals. 

This hearing will be the first in a series of oversight hearings 

that will examine the progress that NASA is making toward restoring the shuttle program to flight status. 

Seated before us today is NASA’s new management team. A year 

ago another team was in charge. Personnel changes were needed, 

and they have been made. It is important for America to see and to 

hear its new team. 

Today we will focus on the solid rocket boosters, which were the 

primary cause of the Challenger disaster. We will also hear later 

from the contracting community. We will take testimony from the 

National Research Council within the National Academy of Science, which has formed an advisory panel to monitor the solution 

of the solid rocket booster problems. 

We want to know where we are in the rebuilding process nearly 

one year after the accident. We want you to tell us where things 

stand in NASA today and what your time table looks like for fixing 

all known problems and resuming safe flight. 

I believe that I speak for the entire subcommittee when I say 

that we expect you to resist any pressures to launch until we have 

taken every necessary step to ensure the safety of the next launch. 

If the time table has to be stretched to accommodate further refinements or adjustments, we expect you to say so and to do so. 

Let me turn to the distinguished chairman of our full committee 

for his thoughts this morning, Senator Hollings. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

Dr. Fletcher and the NASA administration for what they have 

been doing. 

I commend you, Dr. Fletcher, in getting reorganized and I want 

to hear a little about it. I understand you have got a whole new 

team. I like what I see at the witness table here this morning, but I 

think it was a good opportunity for us to get some fresh new young 

blood. I would like to know about the reorganization. 

I am interested, of course, in the solid rocket booster, the Morton 

Thiokol redesign proposal and the observations or criticisms of the 

competitive contractors. 
3 

I am still a little nonplused when you try to correct the situation. 

It has been studied and studied and then you come in with heaters 

and everything else of that kind- It still has joints. I never have 

been able to understand why we never did go to the monolithic 

booster. 

And I am intrigued by the fact that United Technologies, who is 

making the Titan, has made the segmented kind of rocket booster, 

now suggests perhaps we ought to go to that monolith. 

I want to be absolutely safe. I don’t want to make the same mistake and say, well, we took care of the mastic by getting a different 

one, we took care of the heat by buying a heater, we took care of 

the O-ring by getting three O-rings instead of two O-rings. 

That doesn’t particularly appeal, and I want to see the testing of 

whatever changes have bzen done. I want to know that you have 

enough money, to do all of that testing. I also rather agree with the 

emergeccy launch systems-we have to play catchup ball in many 

areas. 

From the budget end, which I am as familiar with as anyone, 

there is no rhyme nor reason why we can’t pay for it. I don’t buy 

that at all. I want to make sure that the Congress supports the 

NASA and its reorganization and its rededication and its drive to 

catch up with the Soviets in space. 

And on that basis I also want to make sure that you have got 

some kind of plan. It has come to my attention over the last years 

that we never did have any plans and goals. We are hearing a lot 

of testimony here in other areas about the transfer of technology 

and how it has developed and where we can lead the world and 

where we should lead. If we do have a plan before the committee, 

then the Congress itself will be in lock step with NASA as to where 

they are headed, particularly from a financial basis and other support. 

So I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Senator Hollings. In the order of arrival next, Senator Rockefeller. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROCKEFELLER 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a 

year now since the disaster, as you indicated. I think we have seen 

this nation pull together first in a sense of common shock, but then 

also in a sense of common purpose and a rededication to make this 

a can-do effort to make our program the very best. 

I feel the report that was prepared by former Secretary of State 

Rogers was a good one, an excellent one, and his commission members provided us with a comprehensive and I feel fully credible account of the causes of the Challenger accident, as well as the set of 

nine recommendations for rectifying the causes of the disaster. 

Among the Rogers Commission recommendations was a revamping of the management structure at NASA. With Dr. Fletcher back 

at the helm at NASA and with the new team before us, we see that 

recommendation fully implemented. 

The openness with which NASA has addressed the problems 

posed by the Challenger disaster have helped I feel rebuild national 
4 

confidence. We have got a long ways to go, but I think the new 

team has done a good job. 

Dr. Fletcher indicated at his confirmation hearing in this room 

some time ago, he felt the shuttle would be back in operation in 

July of this year. Now that date was changed last summer to February of 1988. 

New questions have been raised by the National Research Council concerning the testing schedule that NASA has proposed to 

assess the adequacy of the redesigned solid rocket booster joint. I 

hope to hear more about this from Dr. Fletcher and his team in 

their testimony. 

We all want to see the shuttle back in service as soon as possible, 

but, as the Chairman indicated, not so soon that we risk any further trouble. 

In addition to the redesign of the flawed solid rocket booster 

joint, NASA has indicated its interest in evaluating a completely 

new design for the boosters, the so-called Block I1 design. 

The four major rocket contractors other than Morton Thiokol 

have all expressed interest in competing on this Block I1 booster, 

although some have expressed doubts as to whether a new booster 

will be procured if the redesigned booster proves to be adequate. 

I, too, have some questions as to this rationale for complete redesign of the booster, but I will reserve that until after I have heard 

some testimony from you folks. 

The final issue, Mr. Chairman, which I would like to touch on 

briefly has to do with the competition in NASA’s procurement of 

solid rocket boosters. Just before, I believe just, in fact, a week 

before the Challenger disaster last year, NASA announced its 

intent to accept bids for second source production of the solid 

rocket booster now produced solely by Morton Thiokol. 

Serious questions have been raised in the House by Congressman 

Jack Brooks’s government operations committee, by the General 

Accounting Office, and others, concerning NASA’s reluctance to 

invite true competition in the shuttle booster program. 

Given the cost and the safety advantages which a second source 

procurement might offer, I see no reason why NASA should not introduce competition now in the booster procurement and not wait 

around for the Block I1 issue to be resolved. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I think we also as a committee, an authorizing committee, have a vital responsibility to address the 

broader policy issues which we face in the space arena as a whole. 

With the immediate issues of the shuttle fixed behind us or at least 

before us, we must examine the policy and the budgetary choices 

that we have to participate in. 

That has to do with our civilian space program, our sense of national purpose, our morale at NASA, the pursuit of scientific understanding and scientific achievement on a civilian as well as a 

defense basis, all require that we get the shuttle back in service 

and get on with the job that we need to do. 

I thank the Chairman. 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator Gore? 
5 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GORE 

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend 

you and your staff on the prompt and thorough scheduling and 

preparation for this significant hearing so soon after assuming the 

chairmanship of this subcommittee. 

As the anniversary of the shuttle disaster approaches, I know 

that you agree that the American people are eager to learn exactly/ 

what is being done to put the shuttle program safely on track. 

Further, I believe there is increasing interest in America’s future 

in space along with increasing concern about our ability to set 

space policy and define the mission of NASA in implementing that 

policy. 

These and the hearings to follow represent an important part of 

a much needed process to ensure that the shuttle program will continue with proper emphasis on safety and reliability and, moreover, 

to begin to develop a consensus about the future of America in 

space. 

In these hearings, which deal with how NASA is resolving problems with the solid rocket booster, I intend to focus my questions 

on two areas of concern, which as we should have learned from the 

Challenger disaster are crucial to the redesign of a safe shuttle. 

Number 1, quality assurance, or SRQA, safety, reliability and 

quality assurance, and, second, NASA’s management structure. 

While many issues regarding the technical aspects of fixes to the 

solid rocket booster will be explored in depth by this committee, I 

agree with others that it is crucial for us as policymakers to also 

focus on the processes within NASA that should promote careful 

technical evaluation by the best minds within the agency. 

I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and join you in welcoming Dr. Fletcher and our other witnesses this morning. 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Senator Gore. 

Dr. Fletcher, it is very good to have you with us today with your,/ 

new management team and the new structure. And we look forward to having you shortly introduce to us this team and to give us 

an overview of the proposed shuttle solid rocket motor redesign 

program, which is the centerpiece of the mechanical work that is 

being done and the long term procurement issues that relate to 

that. 

So, if you would, let me ask you now to introduce the distinguished members of your new team. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES C. FLETCHER, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY DALE D. MYERS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR RICHARD H. TRULY, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SPACE 

FLIGHT; AND ARNIE ALDRICH, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SPACE 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, we don’t have all of the members 

of our new team, but we have at the table this morning several 

members, particularly of the shuttle organization. 

We have on my right Dale Myers, who is the Deputy Administrator, glad to have him aboard. On my left you already remember Admiral Truly, who is Associate Administrator for STS, the shuttle 
and other transportation. And on my far right is Arnie Aldrich, 

who is the Program Director, who is now at Headquarters running 

the shuttle program. 

We also have other members here, Mr. Chairman. As we move 

into it, I will introduce them as we go along. 

Senator RIEGLE. Fine. If you would, I think it is important that 

anyone who has assumed a major managerial responsibility within 

the last year be so identified so that we have a sense as to who has 

come into the team and new capacities and so we really understand the scope of the new management structure. 

Dr. FLETCHER. I will do that, Mr. Chairman. I should add that at 

the table this morning with me is an old-timer at NASA, and that 

is Tommy Newman, who is our controller, because there may be 

questions about budget. You were asking about is there enough 

money for this for fixing the anomaly and ELV’s and things of that 

sort, and Tommy is the expert at that, so he is also with us this 

morning. 

Mr. Chairman, if it is all right with you, I would like to submit 

my statement for the record and sort of summarize the highlights? 

Senator RIEGLE. Please do. I want to acknowledge as we pause 

here for a moment that Senator Heflin, who is a distinguished 

former member of this committee, is with us this morning. We are 

delighted to have him. 

Is there any comment that you wish to make at the outset here 

just before we hear from Dr. Fletcher? 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR HEFLIN 

Senator HEFLIN. I am delighted to see that we are moving forward in regards to the space shuttle. I have been long an advocate 

of space. I think I was the first senator that called for the building 

of the space station and I think there are many aspects of this that 

need to be thoroughly explored, and we need to move forward and 

move forward safely and as expeditiously as we can. With your per- mission I would like to make a brief statement. 

Mr. Chairman, let me begin by expressing my appreciation to 

you and the other members of the subcommittee for giving me the 

opportunity to participate in today’s oversight hearing to review 

the progress made toward the shuttle recovery and the redesign of 

the solid rocket booster joint. Although no longer a member of the 

subcommittee I nonetheless maintain a strong interest in the programs within its jurisdiction, particularly as they relate to NASA. 

I understand that this is the first of several oversight hearings on 

NASA’s space shuttle program since the Challenger accident. I congratulate the Subcommittee Chairman, Senator Riegle, on taking this initiative. 

I am particularly delighted to see Mr. J.R. Thompson, the new 

Director of Marshall Space Flight Center located in Huntsville, 

Alabama, here today. I have had the opportunity to meet and talk 

with Mr. Thompson and have been very impressed. I look forward 

to working closely with him in the future. 

On January 28, approximately a year ago, I and my colleagues in 

the Senate watched in total shock and deep sadness as the space 

shuttle Challenger exploded in mid-air, grounding the shuttle fleet 
7 

until the cause of the accident was found and a solution reached 

to get the system back to flight status. At that time, I and many 

others said that, in the aftermath of the tragedy, we must look to 

the future with new resolve that our efforts in space go forward. It 

is my hope that the US. space program moves forward quickly 

and, above all, safely. NASA has made our country the world leader in space and has 

helped increase the quality of life of all Americans. In fact, so SUCcessful had the agency been, we had all come to expect near perfec- tion. With the Challenger disaster, we were hit with the cruel re- ,/ ality that, like all human beings, NASA is far from being infallible. 

I am happy to see that NASA is going forward with the changes 

necessary to insure that we will never have a repeat of the shuttle 

accident and I look forward to hearing today about the progress of 

this effort. 

- 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Senator Heflin. 

Dr. FLETCHER. To begin with, I am glad to be back visiting with 

you in your new capacity, Mr. Chairman, as chairman of this Subcommittee, and also Senator Hollings, as chairman of the full Commerce Committee. 

am not able to indicate all of it, but we certainly are well along 

towards fixing the anomaly and towards putting the organization 

in place that will carry on the activities of NASA for years to 

come, but we are not there yet. We have got a ways to go and you 

will notice that as we go along. 

First, I would like to focus on three areas of my statement, the 

first having to do with the organizational management changes, as 

you indicated, the status of the shuttle recovery activities, and then 

the status of the solid rocket motor redesign activities, but I don’t 

plan to go into much detail on that because, as I understand it, the 

next panel will address that in as much detail as you like, although I would be glad to answer any questions that you have on that. 

First let me talk about the organization and management 

changes. We have done a lot partially in response to the Rogers , Commission recommendations and partially as a result of a task/ 

force that I set up when I first came back to NASA under General 

Sam Phillips. 

And the goal is not just to fix the shuttle, but to fix the entire 

NASA organization, I don’t mean fix, but strengthen it so that we 

have accountability and we have responsibility where it belongs. 

I think we have made a start in that. In fact, before you, I am 

sure you can’t read it, we have a kind of a, we call it a wiring diagram. It is an organization chart which indicates the boxes, and I 

will indicate some of the people that are already filling those 

boxes. 

In Headquarters we already mentioned Dale Myers who is here 

today, and we mentioned Admiral Truly. We also have here today George Rodney, who is Associate Administrator for SR&QA. 

George. 

We have the Associate Administrator for Space Station, Andy Stofan, who is probably not here today because this is primarily on 

We have made a lot of progress since we were here last, and I,,/ 
8 

the shuttle but, nevertheless, he has come back to Headquarters to 

run the space station. 

We have an Associate Administrator for External Relations, Rick 

Hauck, who has not yet gone back to being commander of his crew. 

He will go back around February 1 and he has been introduced to 

you already. 

We have a new Associate Administrator for Management, June 

Brown, and I suspect she is not here today. 

We have new Center Directors at the Johnson Space Center. We 

have Aaron Cohen as the Center Director and P.J. Weitz from the 

astronaut group agreed to leave that group and become Deputy. 

At the Marshall Space Flight Center we have J.R. Thompson, 

and he is here today. J.R. 

And we also have at the Kennedy Space Center a new Director, 

Forest McCartney. Forest is not here today. 

We have a new Acting Center Director at the Lewis Research 

Center and, generally speaking, we have filled most of the boxes on 

that chart, but we are still working on the remainder, and we 

expect to pretty well follow the Phillips recommendation with 

regard to our overall organization. The emphasis has been and was strongly urged by both the 

Rogers Commission and the Phillips Committee to bring back to 

Headquarters management of large programs like the space shuttle 

and like the space station and, also, in addition to that, to try to, as 

much as possible, with the smaller programs, to have a single 

center only involved in the programs because a lot of our difficulties had to do with intercenter communications and procedures. 

We think we have the beginnings of that strong Headquarters management in the people that I have mentioned, but we are continually adding people. For example, in the Shuttle Program Management Office we have moved Arnie Aldrich from Houston to 

Headquarters. We have a Deputy Program Director, Dick Kohrs, 

and I don’t know whether Dick is here this morning. Deputy Program Director for Operations, Bob Crippen, whom you have met 

before; and a Manager of the STS Projects Office, Bob Marshall. 

We have done similar things with the space station, but I won’t 

go into the detail except to mention that we have a Program Director, Tom Moser, in Headquarters, and he has a very able staff, and 

we have a Deputy Associate Administrator, Frank Martin, and a 

Deputy Program Director, Jim Sissen, who we brought up from the 

Marshall Space Flight Center. So we have strengthened both of those program offices and additional changes will be made in Headquarters as we go along. 

Senator RIEGLE. Let me just ask you one thing here, and I don’t 

want to interrupt your sequence to any length, but are you finding 

that you are able to get the talents that you want most, and are 

there open positions for which you are having difficulty finding or 

being able to persuade the people to come in and take these jobs that need doing? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, we have been very lucky to be able 

to bring in the people that we need in Headquarters at the top 

levels, and I am optimistic that we will be able to bring them in at 

the other levels, but I think your question is a very pertinent one 

because this is an unusual time. 
9 

Because of the accident there are a lot of people that are willing 

to make sacrifices to get the shuttle flying safely again, and we 

have got to look at the long range picture. We don’t want another 

accidentlike we had. 

So the long range picture is going to require some special efforts. 

When I say long range, over the next four or five years. So part of 

the recommendation of the Phillips Committee is that we set up a 

strong institutional manager, and that means somebody that worries about people, worries about the facilities that they have to 

work in, and the equipment, particularly at the centers, that they 

will have to work with and really push that hard. 

In addition, it is recommended that we bring in a strong person 

that worries about human resources. We have a good human resources program, but we want to strengthen that so that in the 

future, and I don’t know what inventions we will come up with, but 

we have got to make sure that we don’t have to have an accident 

every time we want to bring strong people into Headquarters, but 

the answer to your question is, yes, we have been able to get good 

people into Headquarters this year and last year. 

Two other boxes that the Phillips Committee recommended was 

two Associate Deputy Administrators, one for policy and one for institutions. Willis Shapley has come back in a consulting capacity to 

be the ADA, Associate Deputy Administrator for Policy, and he is 

supported by a policy and planning staff headed by Phil Culbertson, whom you have met before. 

We have not yet filled the box called ADA for institutions, but 

that is a key job and we plan to bring somebody in that can do that 

well. 

In addition to that, we have looked downstream because the 

space station is closely tied to the space transportation system. It is 

going to be hard to separate them when we start assembling the 

space station. They are both operations oriented. And we debated 

back and forth as to whether we should merge those two. 

We decided no, this is not the right time to merge those because 

it might jeopardize our ability to get the space shuttle flying again safely, but that was left as an open question. When I feel that we 

can merge those, we will do so, but in preparation for that it was 

recommended by the Phillips Committee that we set up an Office 

of Space Operations so that the operations of the shuttle and of the 

space station can be integrated. And that box is filled also, and Bob 

Aller is occupying that box. 

So we still have some ways to go, Mr. Chairman, but so far we 

have, and I don’t say we have done this without difficulty. There 

has been a lot of arm twisting going on and people being reminded 

of their patriotic duty and their commitment to NASA but, nevertheless, we are strengthening Headquarters and strengthening 

overall the program, not just of the space shuttle, but across the 

board in NASA. 

As far as the recovery program is concerned, we, as you know, 

have announced a flight manifest. This means that we have made 

a first guess at what mission should be on what shuttle flights, and 

we have also made a first guess, a second guess I should say, on when we are going to start flying, and that is February 1988. 
10 

Senator Rockefeller reminded me that we thought we could 

make the July date. That was really a broad guess, Senator, and 

the February 1988 is a tight schedule and we are still on that 

schedule, and we have been for several months, using that as a 

baseline and building up slowly, nothing like the 16 per year or the 

25 that we sometimes talked about, but maybe three or four or five 

the first year and then, as we get more experience, building up to 

something between 11 and 16 flights per year. 

The 11 is the low number suggested by one of our advisory committees. The 16 is the high number, which is something we thought 

we might, be able to someday achieve, but whatever is the case, we 

are not going to decide on the flight rate until we have had more 

experience with the shuttle. 

Having said that, though, in the outyeass, in the 199O’s, we have 

got to have some sort of a backup to the shuttle flights because we 

can’t launch all of our missions on the shuttle even with the 16 

flights per year, but certainly if we are down around the 13 or so 

that some of us at NASA feel might be mole realistic, we are going 

to need a mixed fleet. 

And a study is in the process to be finished sometime this month 

that will advise us on what kind of vehicles we should purchase as 

an ELV backup, not only in the out years, but in the immediate 

future because we have missions that have to be launched soon. 

In addition to the shuttle recovery, we have a list of what we call 

critical items that we have always kind of worried about but really 

didn’t have time to thoroughly scrub. We are doing that now. 

We have an external review of that critical items list, and that is 

going on, and we have quite a large number of changes that we 

plan to make to the first, to the Orbiter and to the SRB before the 

first flight, one of which, of course, as you remember, was an 

escape system which blew off the hatch, which I presume Admiral 

Truly will discuss sometime later. 

So we are looking at all of the potential failures of the shuttle. 

We are doing everything we can, as was suggested, to make the 

first flight and the follow-on flights as safe as we could possibly make them. 

We are also making progress on redesigning the solid rocket 

motor, and we have several review committees there. We have an 

internal review committee, and then Guy Stever is here, who is 

going to testify later, who chairs the NRC, National Research 

Council committee on the redesign of the solid rocket motor. 

He has an outstanding panel, and some of them I know to be outstanding engineers from my previous life, and we pay attention 

when they talk. So by and large we have accepted nearly all of their recommendations and are dealing with all of those that we haven’t yet accepted. 

We have lots of external and internal reviews of all aspects of 

the shuttle. We have people looking in the crack, so to speak, looking at areas that nobody has looked at before to make sure there 

aren’t additional changes that are necessary that ought to be implemented before resumption of flights. That is a lot of things that have been happening since we were 

here last, Mr. Chairman, but I think we are on the road to recov- 
11 

ery from the accident, but needless to say, we have a lot of work 

ahead of us. We have got to not only have people in place, but we 

have got to make sure they work together as a team, got to make 

sure that they communicate well, that we have the appropriate 

procedures and that we follow those procedures, that they are properly documented. 

I don’t mean that paperwork solves the safety but, nevertheless, 

you can’t just leave a message with somebody. You have got to 

make sure that it is in writing so there is a paper trail behind 

what you have decided to do. And, also, when you have anomalies, 

you want to make sure that actions are started to deal with those 

anomalies. 

All of those procedures and communications we will just have to 

tighten up as we go along. A lot af it remains ahead of us, although 

we have been doing that for some weeks. 

I guess one of our biggest problems is downstream and, that is, 

how we are going to accommodate all of the missions that were 

scheduled for the shuttle, particularly the science missions, and 

many of those were delayed anywhere from two to five years, the 

five years being much longer than the shuttle delay, and we hope 

to come up with a plan for dealing with that, but we are not quite 

there yet. 

Whatever it ta.kes in the way of expendable vehicles we will go 

ahead and purchase those with whatever money is available, and 

ws don’t anticipate difficulties in doing that in the out years. We 

may have to do some rejuggling in the near term. 

By and large that is a summary of my statement, Mr. Chairman, 

and I will be pleased to answer any questions you or other members of the committee might have. 

[The statement and questions follow:] 
Statement of 

Dr. James C. Fletcher 

Admi n is tra tor 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: 

It has been a number of months since I last appeared before this 

Subcommittee to discuss the activities of the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). At that time we 

were still putting together plans and estimating the costs 

necessary to restore the Space Shuttle to safe reliable flight. 

Much has been accomplished in this last year and although the 

schedule is still quite tight, we still are holding to a planned 

February 1988 launch of the Shuttle. 

Today, I would like to discuss three specific areas with you. 

First, the status of NASA's recovery efforts including the 

results and recommendations of the Phillips study: secondly, the 

specific efEorts of the Office of Space Flight (OSF) in this 

recovery; and thirdly, a more detailed description of the solid 

rocket motor redesign and alternative sourcing plans and status. 

General Sam Phillips has just completed a very comprehensive 

study on actions that are needed to improve the management of our programs, including relationships between various field centers 

and NASA headquarters, and a review of the Space Shuttle 

management struct!ire. The recornmendations from that study and 

the actions NASA is implementing resulting from the study were 

released on January 9, 1987. The thrust of General Phillip's 

recommendations is to strengthen NASA's program management 

through clear organizational responsibilities and to establish a process to identify, enunciate and achieve institutional goals. 

The major organizational changes being implemented are to set up 

two Assistant Deputy Administrators, one for Policy and one for 

Institutions; establish a new policy and planning staPf: and form a new Office of space Operations. TWO major reorganizations 

which preceded this announcement, but which are consistent with 

the recommendations of the Phillips Committee, are the 

reorganization of the Office of Space Station and the 

strengthening of the headquarters management of the National 

Space Transportation System (NSTS). 
13 

L 

We have announced a manifest based on realistic flight-rate 

goals, beginning with the targeted resumption of Shuttle flights 

in February 1988 and gradually building up to a saEe sustainable 

flight rate. Based on NASA and NRC studies, this rate will over 

the years build up to 11 to 16 €.lights per year with a four 

orbiter fleet. These flight-rate goals will be continually 

re-examined as we gain additional experience with Shuttle 

operations following the many changes which are being made. In 

addition to reviewing the Shuttle manifest, we have conducted an 

agency-wide mixed launch fleet study on the use of the mixed 

fleet concept and are examining priorities and options for 

incorporating this concept within the funding envelope proposed 

in our FY 1908 budget. 

Although much of our focus has been on fixing the solid rocket 

motor seals which caused the Challenger accident, we are reviewing all of the critical elements of the Shuttle program to 

ensure that safety is enforced and that the STS will be an 

operationally viable Space Transportation System. This approach 

is consistent with one of the Presidential Commission on the 

Space Shuttle Challenger Accident recommendations that NASA and 

the primary Shuttle contractors review all Criticality 1, lR, 2 

and 2R items and hazard analyses to reassess program risks. It 

was also recommended that an independent audit of the review be 

performed by the National Research Council (NRC), 

On March 13, 1986, NASA initiated a complete review of all Space 

Shuttle Program potential failures (Failure Modes Effects 

Analysis - FMEA's) and other critical items Critical Items List - 

CIL's). Each Space Shuttle project element and associated prime 

contractor as well as independent contractors are conducting 

comprehensive reviews. This review is extensive and is being 

conducted in a meticulous and in-depth manner. Because the 

formal process is lengthy and will not be complete until later 

this summer, we conducted a systems design review to assist in 

prioritizing the items for the formal FMEA/CIL process and to 

insure that all necessary modifications could be completed before 

the first flight. We are well into this process and I believe we have identified the major program requirements necessary to resume Shuttle €lights and have initiated fixes where they are necessary. 

An NSTS Crew Egress and Escape System study has been underway for 

several months and a preliminary report has been presented to the 

Office of Space Flight. The total mission profile, which includes 

pad activities, launch to orbit, and descent to landing, is being 

rev iewed. 
14 

3 

The Presidential Commission specifically concluded that a leaking 

solid rocket motor (SRM) case joint caused the Challenger 

failure. As a result, the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) 

established a redesign team, which included participation from 

NASA centers, as well as individuals from outside NASA, to 

evaluate alternatives to improve the SRM. An advisory panel 

consistina of experts from within and from outside of NASA was 

appointed to insure that the Einal designs are as safe as 

possible. In accordance with the Presidential Commission's 

recommendation, the National Research Council established an independent o v e r s i g h t group . The National Research Council Panel has a thorough understanding 

of the redesign activity. They are working conscientiously and 

actively in critically reviewing the design activity. The FJRc 

Panel has submitted three formal letter reports, the most recent 

of which was received on January 15, 1987. Members have 

participated in the Program Requirements Review (PRR), 

Preliminary Design Review (PDR), and mandatory first flight 

changes review. The Panel's next meeting is scheduled for 

January 28-29, 1987, at MSFC. 

The MSFC SRB redesign team has evaluated design aiternatives, and 

analysis and testing are in process to determine preferred 

approaches. Major emphasis is on the case field joints, case 

factory joints, nozzle to case joints, case insulation, and 

seals. Our redesign program includes extensive testing of both 

sub-scale test articles and the new transient pressure test 

articles. 

After an intensive study by the MSFC redesign team and 

independent studies by Morton-Thiokol, Inc., and USRI Booster 

Production Company, Inc., it has been determined that the full 

scale test and certification of the redesigned SRM will be 

conducted in the horizontal attitiide. We are in the process of 

building a second horizontal test stand, with the capability of 

simulating launch and flight loads on the motor during static 

test firings. This second stand will insure that the program 

test requirements can be fully satisfied while providing 

increased confidence in our return-to-flight schedule. 

I believe that this combination of testing will allow us to fully 

satisfy the Presidential Commission recommendations to conduct 

tests which duplicate the actual launch loads as closely as feasible and test over the full range of operating condicions, 

including temperature. The program requirements review and the 

preliminary design review have been completed. To better 

understand the dynamics of the case joints during the ignition 

transient, several tests have been conducted utilizing older case 
15 

4 

segments (STS 51-L configuration). On a test which was conditloned to 20 degrees Fahrenheit and had known leak paths the 

O-rings did not seal and leaked upon ignition as happened during 

the STS 51-L accident. On a subsequent test, which used an insulation configuration similar to the new baseline design where 

insulation of the segment joints is bonded, there was no leakage 

whatsoever. Tests on the nozzle-to-case joint utilizing existing 

hardware are also planned. Both the case and nozzle-to-case 

joints will be tested utilizing redesigned hardware as it becomes 

available. The first of several static test firings is planned 

to be completed in the first quarter of 1987. 

During the first filament wound case (FWC) 140 percent 

compressive structural load test, to simulate loads at SSME 

ignition, the aft skirt, which is the same skirt used on the 

steel case SRB, failed at approximately 130 percent. Inspection 

revealed a weld crack between a hold down post forging and the 

adjacent skin section of the skirt. The cause of the failure 

turned out to be a design weakness and had nothing to do with the 

fabrication or the fact that it was a filament wound case. A 

series of failure evaluation tasks are underway by NASA and 

contractors and an anomaly investigation team has been 

established. 

FWC production has been "mothballed" at this time because the Air 

Force decided that the Eirst Shuttle launch from Vandenberg will 

not be before 1992. The FWC development program will be 

completed this year, however. The program will include 

compressive loading of a composite segment to failure, ultimate 

pressure test, damage tolerance tests, material aging tests, and 

complete documentation. Any mandatory changes to the steel 

cases, such as seals, insulation, etc., will be incorporated in a re-qualified FWC. A minimum of two years lead time are required 

for re-qualification and production of FWC flight sets. 

On September 2, 1986, five "Block 11" SRM study contracts for 

about $500,000 each were awarded €or independent design analyses 

to support the SRM redesign team decisions and to support NASA's 

long term SRM procurement planning. The studies by the five 

sol id rocket product ion companies ( Aeroj e t S tra teg ic Pr opuls ion 

Company, Atlantic Research Corporation, Chemical Systems Division 

of United Technologies Corporation, Hercules Incorporated and 

Morton-Thiokol Incorporated) were completed by December 31, 1986. 

The ground rules for the studies allowed the contractors to 

utilize new concepts and approaches for the joint seals, 

elimination of asbestos in the insulation, and design for 

improved performance to accomplish a "heads-up" mission profile with greater payload. The contractors were constrained to 

maintaining current SRM envelope and interfaces. 
16 

5 

The five contractors have completed their studies on schedule and 

the reports have all been received by NASA. Results of these 

studies have been submitted to the Congress. NASA is conducting 

an assessment of the design, facilities, costs, and schedule 

estimates from each contractor. Specific joint and nozzle 

designs that are considered to have merit for incorporation as 

backup by the Redesign Team in support of their work will be 

utilized where feasible. The overall assessment of design 

performance, costs and schedules will provide the basis for the 

preparation of an SRM Acquisition Strategy and Plan. We plan to 

provide our SRM acquisition strategy and a recommendation on an 

upgraded SRM or a second source initiative by March 31, 1987 as requested by Congress. 

Internal and external reviews of all of the components of the 

Shuttle system are continuing and are expected to be completed 

soon. These reviews could identify addition81 changes which need 

to be implemented prior to resumption of flights. 

In summary, we are well on the road to recovery from the 

Challenger accident but much work lies ahead before we can fly 

again, When we are further along the road to recovery, we still 

have the problem of determining how we accommodate all the 

missions originally planned for the Space Shuttle. Hopefully, in 

the next month or two we will have a plan for doing this, 

probably using both the Shuttle and expendable launch vehicles. 

Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions. 
17 

QUESTIW OF SEWCIDR PRESSIER AND 'ME ANSWERS 

Sol id Rocket Motor Redesign 

Que,stion 1: What does NASA's FY 1988 budget request provide 

for the continuation of the SRM redesign effort, and do you 

believe that this, coupled with the resources in the FY 1987 

Operating Plan, are sufficient to thoroughly address the SRM 

redesign? 

contingency design? 

Submit to Congress for the solid rocket motor redesign effort 

requested funding to support SRM redesign and analysis, 

full-scale development and certification tests, redesign of 

tooling and ground support equipment, additional testing 

facility/test structures, failure mode and effects analysis, and 

launch commit criteria and procedures evaluation. As with all 

major development efforts as the redesign has progressed there 

have been changes to the original plan. 

formulation of the operating plan, we have increased the redesign 

scope to include numerous nozzle changes (metal parts , ablatives 

and internal seals). Two additional static test firings have 

been added in addition to nozzle testing during burnout and 

reclamation of existing motors. The FY 1988 Budget request 

includes all the funds we requested. It appears at this time 

that sufficient funding is available to complete the redesign 

activities. Within our budget, we have included cost to conduct 

preliminary studies of an alternate SRM and limited engineering 

analyses. In no case, however, will the planned resources allow 

implementation of any major paral lel contingency design beyond 

the alternates currently in the program. 

Question 2: Do you believe that the baseline SRM redesign 

selected in October represents the best design possible? What 

limitations or constraints did NASA face in selecting this 

particular design? 

Answer 2: 

design, producibility, maintenance, or operation as the 

manufacturing and test phases progress that could be corrected. 

The consideration deals with flight safety and in this case, 

nothing has been found to date that compromises safety to any 

detectable degree. 

certification will drive out safety of flight issues, if any, 

that may not have been considered in the development phase. 

The limitations and constraints considered in selecting the 

October 1986, design focused primarily on the Roger's Commission 

Recommendation No. 1 and strict adherence to Level I and I1 

safety requirements. Secondarily, it was considered desirable to 

capitalize on the substantial investment in existing hardware and 

Are these resources sufficient to pursue a paral lel , 

Answer 1: The FY 1987 Operating Plan and the FY 1988 Rudget 

For example, since the 

There are always lessons learned regarding the 

The test program laid out for SRM 
18 

facilities, so long as flight safety was not compromised. 

there are trade-offs that must be made and that very rarely, if 

ever, are we able to reach a "perfect" solution. 

Question 3: I recognize that in all programs and activities, 

In the case of the SRM redesign, however, what assurances are 

there that the trade-offs are within an acceptable "margin of 

safety " ? 

Answer 3: 

on the substantial understanding of SRM functional performance-- 

particularly the field joint--gained during the CHALLENGER 

accident investigation, reassessment of motor difficulties , comprehensive analyses and tests conducted in the preliminary 

design phase, and expert consultation. The latter included not 

only the solid propulsion industry, but also others in the oil 

and gas industry that face similar sealing obstacles. In every 

trade-off decision, analytically derived positive margins above 

and beyond normal safety factors were mandatory and requisite to 

design selection. 

conclusions, a thorough test program i s i n place to demonstrate 

the prescribed safety factors and margins where practical over 

the SRM full environmental operating range. Where it is not 

practical or possible to demonstrate the full extent of margins, 

adequate tests will be conducted to verify the analytical models 

used to predict such margins. Specifically, full size, hot gas, 

and maximum pressure test articles like the Joint Environment, 

Simulators (JES) and Transient Pressure Test Articles (TPTA) for 

testing and field and case-to-nozzle joint; the structural test 

article that applies 140 percent of the design loads to the SRM; 

and five full scale static hot fire tests that all combined will 

subject the SRM to the limits of its environmental ranges. It 

is considered that successful accomplishment of this test series 

will demonstrate the SRM safe for flight. 

The trade-offs made in the SRM redesign were based 

In order to verify these analytical 

Question 4: I understand that one of the "ground rules" for 

the redesign of the solid rocket motor was to choose a redesign 

that would take advantage of the current booster casings, 72 of 

which NASA ordered in 1985. 

Do you have any reservations about any constraints to that these 

steel casings may have imposed on the redesign--are you convinced 

that safety and reliability have not been compromised by any 

constraint these casings may impose? 

Answer 4: Admiral Truly, in his direction to the program 

elements for implementing the Roger's Commission recommendation, 

was very explicit in placing the use of existing inventory as 

secondary to flight safety. 

Morton-Thiokol , Inc. specifically addressed each deficiency in 

the STS 51-L configuration field joints and evaluated various 

alternate designs prior to selecting the one that utilizes 

existing case segments. 

The SRM Design Team and 

These alternate designs were either 
inferior to the selected design or did not substantially improve 

performance. Based on full size redesigned segment pressure 

tests already conducted, the selected design continued to be the 

proper choice. 

expected motor operating pressure and they proved five to six 

times better than the STS 51-L design, essentially eliminating 

joint movement. 

new design joint safety and reliability and upon successful 

completion of the test program, will be fully convinced that this 

design is safe for flight. 

The Design Team would not have hesitated to recommend to Program 

Management that the existing case segment inventory be discarded 

if safety were an issue. This is supported by the fact that two 

major components were redesigned to meet stringent safety 

requirements and design margins to the extent that a substantial 

inventory of each was rendered unusable. 

These segments were pressurized to full maximum 

From these results, we are encouraged with the 

Question 5: How would you characterize the reliability 0 

this redesign, and prior to the CHALLENGER accident, what was 

generally-perceived reliability of the sol id rocket motor des 

in use? 

Answer 5: In the case field and nozzle joints, the gap 

opening, a measure o f j o i n t stability, has been improved by a 

factor of five to six. The 0-rims. even the STS 51-L tvoe. 

the 

gn 

ow 

have a 100 percent sealing margin; without t,he necessityto'be 

pressure actuated as was the case for the old design. The 

presence of pressure can only enhance sealing performance. The 

variable performing putty has been eliminated and insulation with 

an adhesive bond at the segment interface covers the metal joints 

similar in principal to the highly reliable factory joints. The 

temperature effects have been eliminated by the addition of 

heaters at the field joint and a warm purge at the nozzle joint 

to maintain the seals at a 75OF minimum temperature. 

the heater is a weather seal to remove any potential of water 

entering the joint area. 

Every other area in the SRM has been assessed relative to 

performance margin and past abnormal behavior. From this 

assessment has come changes in the igniter and case insulation to 

improve margins; modification of the nozzle to add redundant 

seals and improve Strength, dimensional stability, and ablative 

insulation erosion tolerance; and additional ground support 

equipment to minimize the potential for assembly damage. 

The redesigned SRM represents a substantially more reliable 

Shuttle system than before. 

comprehensive test program than had been in place in the past. 

review and hazard analysis has recommended that NASA devise some 

mechanism for and assign priorities to the Shuttle components and 

systems that are of the most critical nature -- Criticality 1 and 

Integral to 

This will be Verified by a much more 

Question 6: "The NRC panel overseeing NASA's criticality 
20 

1R items. How will NASA respond to this recommendation?" 

Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit at their November 

10, 1986 meeting, that NASA would take action to develop a 

process to prioritize Space shuttle criticality items. 

Subsequently, the NSTS Program Office formed a team to solicit, 

develop, and propose candidate prioritization schemes. 

is presently examining five techniques and plans to recommend one 

of them or a combination of several for evaluation in actual 

practice. From early indications, it is expected that the 

approach event-ually chosen by the program will 1en-d itself to 

being overlaid on the existing process with minimum perturbation 

to ongoing activities, yet provide an effective measure of 

relative risk to focus review emphasis and resources allocation. 

We believe this plan is responsive to the suggestion and that the 

NRC Committee will be satisfied with the resultant methodology. 

We are keeping them apprised of our progress. 

In NASA's Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and 

the Critical Items List Review, what are the two or three most 

difficult items that NASA is now addressing that are requiring 

the most attention and resources? 

Answer 6: Admiral Truly assured the NRC Committee on ShuttleThe team 

Question 7: 

To date, in this analysis and review, has NASA confronted any 

item whose correction or improvement may delay the scheduled 

launch of February 1988? 

costly items we are now addressing for first flight include the 

17-inch Orbiter/ET disconnect, RCS primary thruster and SSME 

blade crack modifications. While the decision to modify these 

items did not arise out of the ongoing FMEA/CIL reviews per se, 

they are Criticality 1 items requiring redesign for first flight. 

The 17-inch Orbiter/ET disconnects are being modified to 

include a positive stop mechanism to preclude the propellant 

valves from closing prematurely. 

thrusters are being modified to provide an automatic detection 

and shutoff capability in the event of thruster burnthrough. 

If so, what are they? 

Answer 7: Excluding the SRM redesign, the most difficult and 

The Orbiter RCS primary 

The most significant Criticality 1 item on the engine is the 

turbine blade cracking problem. 

that are being worked on: 

There are three crack problems 

1) 

2) 

3) 

HPOTP 1st stage blade surface crack 

HPFTP 1st stage fir tree crack 

HPFTP 2nd stage surface crack 

The HPOTP 1st stage blade redesign is the incorporation of 

two-pi ece damper. 

completed 5000 sec. of testing and no cracks were observed. 

HPFTP 1st stage blade redesign consists mainly of the 

The first development sample successful ly The 
21 

redistribution of loads on the fir tree and shot peening. 

Testing has been initiated on this redesign. 

blade redesign addresses the hydrogen sensitivity of blade 

cracking with gold plating. 

this redesign. 

anticipated due to these changes. 

The HPFTP 2nd stage 

Testing had also been initiated on 

No delay from the scheduled launch of February 1988, is 

Shuttle Crew Escape 

Question 8: NASA has announced its decision to implement a 

crew escape system that would utilize an escape hatch and 

parachutes. 

would be useful only when the Shuttle is in a glide. 

The announcement also indicated that the system 

What would it cost to implement this system, and how soon 

after flight is resumed would this system be ready for use? 

Could you be more specific as to what phases of a mission 

this system would be useful, and does this system enable a truly 

survivable escape? 

Answer 8: 

approximately 50 mi 11 ion do1 1 ars to imp1 ement. The development 

effort for the crew hatch escape system is underway; however, the 

schedule for incorporation of the system into the Orbiter fleet 

is under review. The goal is to provide the system as early as 

possihle in the flight schedule consistent with system 

development and qualification schedules. 

those mission phases which will allow the Orbiter to reach 

controlled gliding flight following a contingency abort. For 

contingency abort cases following SRB separation including two 

and three SSME's out, the percentage of time the escape system 

will be useful varies from, at a reasonable height without need 

for breathing equipment, 33 to 75 percent depending on the 

specific type of abort (TAL or RTLS). These percentages are 

based on prel iminary assessments conducted to date. 

The escape system is estimated to cost 

The crew escape system will be useful and survivable for 

Question 9: I understand that NASA is considering a "tractor 

rocket" system, which would utilize "rockets" to pull the crew 

from the Shuttle. 

Why was this system not selected? What risks did this 

"tractor rocket" system itself introduce, and over what phases 

would it provide a survivable means of escape? Are other systems 

still under consideration, and, if so, what are they? 

Answer 9: Development of the rocket personnel extraction 

system, which would provide velocity to enhance clearance from 

the orbiter during side hatch bailout, is continuing pending a 

decision as to its implementation. The risk versus added safety 
22 

factor for incorporation of this feature into the Orbiter is 

being assessed. 

other bailout aids to insure the safest and most rell'able overall 

system is utilized. Potential tractor rocket risks include the 

introduction of propellants and premature pyrotechnic ignition in 

the crew cabin environment. If approved, the rocket system would 

be an adjunct to the crew hatch escape system and be utilized 

during the same mission phases; i .e., contingency aborts 

following SRB separation. 

escape capabilities are underway. 

crew ejection and crew module separation. 

under study for possible implementation in the longer term (four 

- five years). 

In addition to development of a crew escape capability, an 

effort has been initiated to improve tbe chances of emergency 

landing of the Orbiter for multiple engine failures in the first 

20 seconds of ascent. Thss concept is referred to as the split-S 

maneuver. The software for this maneuver has been developed, and 

further analysis is underway to determine the structural 

acceptability of multiple engine out cases. 

The tractor rockets are being evaluated against 

Conceptual tradeoff studies on more complex first stage (SRB) 

These include crew extraction, 

These systems are 

Second Source of Solid Rocket Motors 

Question 10: I recognize that NASA's acquisition strategy 

for procurement of solid rocket motors will not be delivered to 

Congress u n t i ? t h e end of March, but could you tell us your 

present thinking on t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of establishing a second 

source for solid rocket motors? 

What are the most current and valid economic considerations in 

deciding to initiate a second source competition? 

considerations will be factored into this decision? How does the 

future development of a Block I1 solid rocket motor affect any 

decision to establish a second source for the redesigned solid 

rocket motor? 

the SRM Acquisition Plan to be submitted by the end of March 

1987. 

What other 

Answer 10: The answer to this question will be included in 

Question 11: A year ago, prior to the CHALLENGER accident, 

NASA had established as a ground rule for the consideration of a 

second source that the Agency could not provide funding for the 

necessary production qualification nor a firm guarantee of 

incurred for qualification. 

exist if NASA initiates a seGond source 

the FY 1988 budget request provide funds 

Is such a recovery of any costs 

ground rule likely to 

competition, and does 

for such a competiton 

Answer 11: The F 

provide for alternate 

1988 budget only includes funding to 

procurement studies. Further discussions 
of a second source competition will be included in the SRM 

acquisition plan to be submitted by the end of March 1987. 

Phillips Study 

One of the recommendations in the Phillips 

study was to place the Shuttle and Space Station programs under a 

single Associate Administrator when the Administrator is 

satisfied that the recovery will not thereby be compromised. 

Under what conditions would such an action be appropriate and 

advisable? 

What efficiencies and other gains would be realized from 

placing these two programs under one Associate Administrator? 

What conflicts or inefficiencies could arise from such an 

action? 

Answer 12: The Administrator has this recommendation under 

advisement. When we are satisfied that recovery of the Shuttle 

program will not be compromised, the proposal is to combine both 

the Shuttle and the Space Station programs under a single 

Associate Administrator. 

Question 12: 

The potential gains and benefits to be obtained from combining 

the Shuttle and Space Station programs include: 

clearer lines of communication both at Headquarters and at the 

Field Centers which are involved in both projects; 

o Efficiencies in the effective utilization of people and 

o More effective resolution of complex interface and 

Optimization of the use of STS/ELV elements in support 

manifesting issues between station and shuttle; 

o 

of Space Station buildup and routine support: 

o Efficient use of the scarce resources that are available 

to NASA for these two critical, high priority and closely related 

programs ; 

o Commonality in key areas of the programs through the use 

of common components where possible, minimizing the number of 

software languages and the use of common nomenclature and 

instructions. 

As time goes on, the STS and Space Station programs will become 

more and more interdependent, resulting in clear advantages to 

combining the programs under one manager. We will address these 

as we develop the comprehensive plan and integrate the program 

and operations activities. 

Question 13: The January 15, NRC report expresses concern 
24 

that valuable time could be lost if it became necessary to run to 

one of the alternative design as a consequence of something 

learned from the test program. The NRC goes on to recommend that 

NASA should strengthen its contingency plans for incorporating 

alternatives into the redesign program. 

will you respond to this recommendation? 

redesigned SRM successfully meeting all requirements and being 

certified, we also consider it prudent to take specific 

contingency steps in case of a problem during the test/ 

verification phase. 

formulate a contingency plan for specific features of the 

baseline SRM redesign. 

the redesign where there is the most concern for the success of 

the current baseline. Decision on implementation of specific 

contingency alternatives will be made following review of the 

plan and within the constraints of available resources. 

Question 14: The October 10, NRC report expresses concern 

about the fact that, at that time, the Shuttle Projects Office at 

Marshall was not only developing requirements, and reviewing and 

approving design, but also was deeply involved in the detailed 

design process. This situation, according to the NRC, created 

the potential for the design team to be able to waive certain 

requirements. 

resol ved? 

Do you agree with this assessment and recommendation, and how 

Answer 13: Although, NASA has high confidence in the 

The NSTS Program Director has taken steps to 

The plan will emphasize those areas of 

How and to what extent has this NRC concern been 

Answer 14: This concern expressed by the NRC was addressed 

in detail at the November 21, 1986, panel session held in 

Washington, D.C. Mr. John Thomas, SRM Design Team Manager, 

presented the waiver and configuration control discipline process 

whereby he showed that even though the SRM Project Manager has 

authority to approve proposed requirement changes to the SRM 

Contract End Item (CEI) Specification, he can impose 

requirements. 

I1 requirements are themselves reviewed by the Level 111 

Configuration Control Board composed, in part, of members who are 

not full time SRM staff. These type changes are also distributed 

widely for information. Should this process fail to screen 

inappropriate specification changes, the CEI Specification is 

reviewed at both the Critical Design Review (CDR) and the Design 

Certification Review (DCR), both of which have team and board 

members from senior management at JSC, KSC, MSFC, Level I1 

Program Office, and Level I Program Directors Staff. 

Additionally, each CEI Specification requirement must be 

addressed with evidence cited where such requirement has been 

verified by test, analysis, etc. 

deviations; but in addition, each waiver/deviation must be 

specifically addressed at the above referenced reviews. 

Those proposed changes which do not violate Level 

The process described above applies equally to waivers and 
25 

Inasmuch as the succeeding report from the Panel did not 

address this topic, it is presumed that the NASA response was 

suf f i ci ent . 

establishment of a second Joint Environment Simulator test stand, 

yet the January 15, NRC report infers that NASA has decided not 

to do so. Have you satisfactorily resolved this issue with the 

NRC committee? If so, how. If not, how do you intend to address 

the concerns of the NRC? 

Answer 15: The October 10, 1986, NRC report recommendation 

for a second Joint Environment Simulator (JES) test stand stemmed 

from excessive turnaround time between tests, i.e., five to six 

weeks were required to refurbish, reinstrument, and reassemble 

the simulator before another test could be accomplished. 

alleviate this excess down time, and thus increase the number of 

tests before return to flight, it was determined to be more 

expedient to add a second set of simulator hardware. With this 

approach, one set of hardware is in test while the other set is 

being refurbished and thus t h e t e s t frequency is substantially 

improved. To add another test stand without also adding a third 

or fourth simulator would not be materially superior to the 

adopted approach; and, there are not sufficient manufacturing 

facilities available to fabricate a third or fourth simulator 

while producing the development (DM-8, 9), Qualification (OM-6, 

7, 8), and flight motors in the next 10-12 months. 

The January 15, 1987, report suggests that the decision not 

to add another JES test stand be reconsidered. This topic will 

be readdressed with the Panel, particularly as it may be 

influenced by the approach finally agreed upon for the various 

contingency plans. 

The October 10, report states that in order to 

support an appropriate contingency action, NASA should test a 

case field joint that closes under pressurization. 

goes on to state that as of January 15, NASA had not ordered the 

appropriate steel case forgings to conduct these tests. Does 

NASA intend to order these forgings to conduct these case field 

joint tests? If so, when? If not, how will NASA adequately test 

a case f i e l d j o i n t that closes under pressurization? 

The overall contingency strategy is addressed in 

response to question 13; however, some discussion is warranted on 

this particular contingency dealing with a case field joint that 

closes under pressure. The SRM Design Team and MTI are carrying 

a backup design for a joint that closes under pressure and will 

be tested on the full scale hot static test of the Engineering 

Test Motor in March 1987. This design uses the newly designed 

joint in combination with a carbon epoxy composite band on either 

side of the joint. This has been demonstrated to close the joint 

sealing gap in a full size segment pressurized to full motor 

operating conditions. 

Question 15: The October 10, NRC report recommends the 

To 

Question 16: 

The report 

Answer 16: 

Although this concept adequately achieves 
26 

the closure objectives there are some undesirable systems 

implications such as increased weight and additional installation 

task complications for the stacking (assembly) process at KSC. 

Beside the composite bands, there were only two other 

practical concepts presented by the Design Team, MTI, or the 

solid rocket propulsion industry. One was proposed by MTI, 

called the Grayloc seal, but tests showed severe assembly 

complications and it has been set aside. 

one of the SRM Block I1 study reports, incorporates the two 

O-ring seals in a capture feature similar to that contained in 

the new joint design. It was evaluated in the Block I1 design 

assessment and was found to fall short of specification 

requirements and presents safety concerns during assembly. 

nearest competitor is a bolted flanged joint that is 

characterized as the Langley concept. It is considered practical 

to produce a forging from which the bolted joint can be machined 

within current processes and machinery bounds; and that the 

current new design joint can be machined from the larger forging 

if so desired. 

contingency plans, MTI has been instructed to prepare orders for 

a limited number of forgings for the eventual production of test 

hardware if the overall contingency strategy so dictates. 

It is my understanding that a decision to 

procure additional solid rocket boosters must be made by March, 

if NASA is to avoid any "gap" in future booster availability. 

This 'decision would come soon after only the first full-scale 

static firing test. 

If this is true, does this remove from the program the 

flexibility to make changes, should the redesign prove to be 

inadequate or require change? 

deemed necessary after these cases had been ordered? 

The other, presented in 

In the absence of a clearly superior joint that closes, the 

In order to comply with NRC desires for 

Question 17: 

What would be the consequences if significant changes were 

What other procurement options are there? 

Answer 17: The current contract with MTI provides for the 

future delivery of 13 flight sets of SRM's. This will provide 

the hardware for the flights through FY 1989 per the current 

mission model (87-1). Backing up from the last delivery in the 

current contract to provide the lead time required for the first 

fol low-on delivery and the procurement time required to provide a 

follow-on contract indicates need to release a RFP in September 

1987 and award a contract by June 1988 for follow-on deliveries. 

While it is true that the static test program will not be 

completed prior to release of the RFP, the confidence level in 

the redesign should be very high at this point in time. 

Additionally, changes could be incorporated, if required, during 

the procurement cycle prior to follow-on contract award in June 
27 

1988. In fact, if the condition postulated in your question of 

significant change being deemed necessary the current planning 

schedule would slip down stream and it would not be necessary to 

award a follow-on contract in June 1988 to avoid a gap. In any 

case postulated, we do not see the need for a contract award 

prior to complete confirmation of the redesign, therefore, nq 

loss of procurment flexibility due to need for follow-on 

deliveries. 

The August 1, NRC report states that some of 

the details concerning the dynamics of the performance of the 

Challenger's right solid rocket motor were uncertain and that his 

uncertainty was very important for the redesign. 

~ 

Question 18: 

How closely have you been able to duplicate the dynamics of 

the performance of the Challenger's right SRM? 

been unable to duplicate and how has this affected the redesign 

effort? What test have been conducted to assess alternate modes 

of failure? 

What have you 

Answer 18: The uncertainties stated in the August 1, 1986, 

NRC report concerned the ensuing events following the initial 

blow-by of the SRM a f t f i e l d j o i n t seals which ultimately 

resulted in the loss of the Shuttle. It is recognized that most 

likely the precise accident scenario will never be fully 

understood, particularly in the latter stages (40 to 60 seconds 

timeframe) ; however, NASA be1 ieves that the primary factors 

causing the accident are well understood. Specific design 

solutions to these deficiencies are being implemented and tested. 

The Referee and Joint Environmental Simulator tests (full scale 

SRM segments) have demonstrated the STS 51-L failure mode of 

joint rotation and blow-by for low temperatures with 

artifical ly-induced blow holes through the putty. NASA has 

continued to support NRC toward achieving a mutual understanding 

of the STS 51-L in-flight structural and dynamic loads through 

presentations and responses to specific action items. Additional 

analyses have been conducted for both the joint dynamics and 

external tank attachment strut loads which reconfirms the 

original STS 51-L investigation results. 

To assure that the lift-off and flight loads can be 

accommodated, all shuttle element loads are being reverified and 

will be applied to three different test articles during the tests 

prior to return to flight. These test articles will be 

dynamically and/or statically loaded to as much as 140 percent of 

design loads at the predicted temperature extremes and at the 

appropriate simulated flight phase. 

that the new Solid Rocket Motor test stand to be built at the 

Morton-Thiokol facility in Utah, may be limited in its capability 

to simulate launch loads, which could thereby limit NASA's 

understanding of these loads. 

Question 19: The January 15, NRC report expresses concern 
28 

I 

Will, in fact, this test stand be equipped to adequately 

address the issue of launch loads, as recommended by the NRC? 

Answer 19: This topic was readdressed with the Panel at the 

meeting held at MSFC on January 22, 1987. 

system load requirements were explained by JSC/RI, followed by a 

MSFC presentation on External Tank strut loads and new test stand 

requirements. MTI responded with the new test stand design and 

capabilities which were completely compatible with design load 

requirements. Based on recent comments by various Panel members, 

it is believed that the Panel will agree with the Design Team's 

and MTI's conclusions that the new test facility can adequately 

simulate lift-off and maximum dynamic pressure, flight phase 

loads, and predominate frequency. This will continue to be the 

subject of future briefings and reviews with the NRC Panel as the 

specific test plans for QM-7 and 8 are prepared. 

implicated in the Challenger accident, interim reports of the NRC 

state that the problems associated with the case-to-nozzle joint 

may be the most technologically demanding aspect of the redesign. 

What are your respective assessments of the relative difficulty 

of addressing the case-to-nozzle joint problems--are there any 

"show-stoppers" in the redesign of this joint? 

Answer 20: There were several design concepts pursued for 

the case-to-nozzle joint before arriving at the current so-called 

radial bolt design. This joint exhibited the same undesirable 

characteristics as the field joiht, i.e., gap opening, putty 

variability, lack of O-ring resiliency at low temperatures, and 

rapid movement referred to as skip. 

parameter values were more severe in the case-to-nozzl e joint 

than in the field joint. 

difficult task to acomplish. 

the seal gap opening and which also totally eliminate the skip 

factor. 

six. The variable putty has been eliminated in lieu of 

adhesively bonded insulation over the joint. 

environment surrounding the jgint in the aft skirt will be 

controlled to a minimum of 75 F. 

With the new design, all factors affecting joint performance 

have been accounted for and tests and analyses to date have not 

indicated any show stoppers. 

of whether the baseline design satisfies all design requirements. 

Does, in fact, the baseline design satisfy all design 

requirements, and, if not, could you explain any discrepancies? 

time of the SRM PDR and some design features had not been finally 

The updated shuttle 

Question 20: Although the case field joint was the joint 

The majority of these 

This made the nozzle joint a more 

The redesigned joint now contains 100 radial bolts to control 

The gap opening has been reduced by a factor of five to 

The temperature 

Question 21: The October 15, NRC report raises the question 

Answer 21: The October 15, NRC report was issued around the 
29 

identified at that juncture. 

for every area being assessed could have led to the Panel's 

apprehension about satisfying all requirements. Since the report 

issuance date, the Panel has been frequently appraised of the 

development progress and at this time all areas being redesigned 

meet the specified requirements. There are, however, two areas 

not being redesigned that do not fully adhere to generic 

requirements. 

The first area is the factory joint where insulation covers 

the joint completely throughout motor operation, thus rendering 

the O-ring seals non-essential. 

internal insulation suffice as the single pressure seal and that 

the O-ring seals be excluded from the stringent requirements 

levied on those sealing a true leak path such as the field joint. 

There are discussions still underway regarding the necessity for 

redundant seals at this location where over 400 joints have been 

tested OF flown without the slightest evidence of problems. 

Additionally, all composite motor cases, such as the SRM filament 

wound case, rely on insulation to seal the entire case surface. 

The other area relates to internal nozzle ablative 

insulation. At certain isolated areas, the virgin material 

remaining at the end of motor burn time does not quite meet the 

2.0 erosion safety factor requirement. This too is under way to 

confirm that enough material remains based on measure parameters 

derived from nozzles hot fired to date. 

The lack of a firm singular design 

It has been proposed that the 

The tests and analyses to date on redesign hardware have 

shown good margins and planned future tests should identify any 

def ici encies. 

Senator RIEGLE. We will move to that in just a moment. Let me 

acknowledge the other two members that have joined us since we 

began. And let me say again that we have a raging blizzard outside 

here in Washington today, so I am pleased that our panelists are 

here and that we have such a fine attendence here within the committee. 

Let me acknowledge Senator Pressler, who will be serving as the 

ranking member of this subcommittee. Senator Pressler and I have 

had a long personal association that predates our service here in 

the Congress together, and so I am delighted that he will be serving as the ranking member. 

Let me welcome you to the subcommittee today. I don't know if 

there is any opening comment that you want to make before we 

move on to the other members of the panel here or not. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR PRESSLER 

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much, and I 

I had a chance to have a very fruitful meeting yesterday with 

do have a statement for the record. 

Admiral Truly. 

72-663 o - a7 - 2 
30 

As the new ranking member of this subcommittee on science, 

technology and space, at this first hearing I certainly want to say 

that I look forward with working with you and the other members 

of the committee, and I congratulate you on your post. On this side 

of the aisle it is a little lonesome here this morning, and we have 

got to get used to serving as ranking members again instead of 

chairmen, so you can help me in my adjustment. 

Let me say that it has been encouraging to hear and read 

NASA’s public statements, particularly those of Dr. Fletcher and 

Admiral Truly, that NASA will not resume shuttle flights until it 

is unquestionably safe to do so. I think the worst thing we could do 

is to force ourselves to rush into a launch. 

Both this subcommittee and NASA are much more sensitive to 

the requirement that safety, reliability and quality assurance must 

and shall be integral elements of any program and must be given top priority. I am confident that this increased sensitivity will yield overwhelming positive results for our space program. I think that is 

true of us here in Congress, too. We should not be pushing unless 

we have all of the facts and unless it is a safe time to launch. 

The focus of the shuttle recovery effort has been appropriately 

the redesign of the solid rocket motor. Establishing a National Research Council Committee to oversee this activity was a significant 

action and should increase immeasurably public confidence in the 

results of the redesigned program. 

By all accounts the role of the National Research Council committee is proving to be constructive and valuable. Similarly, the 

five proposals submitted for the Block I1 solid rocket motor design 

have contributed significantly to this overall effort. 

I am hopeful and confident that this overall effort will yield a 

solid rocket motor that satisfies all safety and reliability concerns and supports effectively and efficiently our shuttle program. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that this solid rocket 

motor redesign program should also help crystallize and resolve an 

issue that has been dangling for some time, the desirability of establishing a second source for solid rocket motors and the timing of 

doing so. 

Both economic considerations and the strength of our nation’s industrial base for solid rocket motors should and will weigh heavily in the resolution of this issue. 

NASA’s review of the other critical shuttle components and systems has yielded and will continue to yield valuable information 

that will enhance and strengthen all elements of our shuttle program. We look forward to Dr. Fletcher’s continued efforts in this 

area. Similarly, the implementation of the recommendation of the 

Phillips study will prove invaluable and strengthen the NASA organization and institution. Today’s hearing will provide the subcommittee insight into NASA’s implementation of these recommendations. 

Senator RIEGLE. Let me now turn and acknowledge a new 

member of our subcommittee, and in our opening session we are 

delighted to have him joining both the committee and the subcommittee, and that is Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, and I am wondering if you have a comment you would like to make? 
31 

Senator KERRY. Iam delighted to be here and anxious to hear 

the testimony. 

Thank you. 

Senator RIEGLE. We are delighted to have you. We look forward 

to a major contribution from you as we go along here. 

Dr. Fletcher, are there others at the table who would want to 

make any comments at this point or would you rather that we 

direct our questions to you right now? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I think the best thing to do, Mr. Chairman, is to 

go ahead and direct them at me. If I can’t answer them, well, somebody else will. 

Senator RIEGLE. Very good. I am going to start by asking Senator 

Hollings if there are some matters that he would like to raise here 

with you at the outset? 

The CHAIRMAN. What is the one single thing you would ask of 

the Congress, Dr. Fletcher, right now? What do you really need? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Hollings, that takes a lot of thought. We 

need moral support, and you are giving us that, and I appreciate 

that. 

We may need additional funds, but we are not asking for it yet, 

when we go to purchase the expendable launch vehicles. 

The CHAIRMAN. You do need the funds, though? You can’t eat 

$600 million bucks. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Weare going to need the expendable launch vehicles, no question about that. How much they are going to cost and 

so forth, we are not ready to state yet. 

The CHAIRMAN. I like the answers that Mr. Dale Myers is giving. 

He is nodding his head, going up and down. I understand that. I 

mean, he answers the questions more clearly. 

You need $600 million, and that is one of the problems that you 

have that we can help with at this particular level. 

You have got a lot of bureaucracy. What about the people within 

the system itself? I have always had the view that the process 

wasn’t flowing. I never did agree with the Rogers Commission on 

that. I thought the process was violated. In fact, I think later on we 

will hear from a gentleman from Morton Thiokol who wouldn’t 

sign off on the launch. 

They tell me I have got an impediment in my speech and I can’t 

listen. Have you got some folks down there that can listen to the 

Alan McDonalds now and everybody else and not just have that 

kind of pressure wherever it came from to override common sense? 

In other words, in your process you had never launched over the 

objection of a contractor, this time it was two contractors’ objections, and we still launched. And that is the important point to this 

Senator, that we need some folks down the line in a system where 

you have some public checks and, thereby, some responsibility. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Hollings, what you just described is not 

going to happen again on my watch, and I suspect not for years to 

come. 

J.R. Thompson has come back. The first thing he did was look 

into that and said, hey, that is not going to happen when I am here 

either. I think we have got people working together a lot better, 

not only the relationship between the contractor and Marshall 
32 

Space Flight Center, but between Marshall Space Flight Center 

and the other centers as well as Headquarters. 

This new team that we have got together are bound and determined not to let that kind of thing get in our way. It is not going to 

happen again. 

The CHAIRMAN. And you have got a way to fix the responsibil- ities? 

Dr. FLETCHER. You bet. 

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, we got Mr. Aldrich here because he 

never was informed. I think he is thoroughly competent, and I go 

along with having him because he never did hear. 

Dr. FLETCHER. You are quite right, Senator Hollings, and that is 

not going to happen again. Not only Mr. Aldrich is going to make 

sure that doesn t happen again and, also, the two center directors 

that we have just appointed at Johnson and at Marshall, I haven’t 

asked them to swear on a stack of bibles, but they have told me in 

no uncertain terms that that will not happen again. The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have got to have fixed responsibilities. 

If we all can understand these responsibilities, we will know, if it 

does go wrong, where it went wrong. 

Dr. FLETCHER. That’s correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to the talent and the astronauts 

themselves, we have covered all of the other checks and balances 

in different offices. 

Are you getting the outstanding astronauts that we need now 

that will stick with the system? I notice a lot of them quiting because of delays and otherwise. They didn’t see too much of a future 

as they personally were concerned. 

Have we got a good feed-in now of young astronauts themselves? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I will ask Admiral Truly the answer to that, but 

let me just give you my observation. We took some of the best astronauts and ran them back to Headquarters. One of them is sitting at my left here. Bob Crippen is also back at Headquarters. 

And for a while we had Rick Hauck. I can just say those are absolutely outstanding astronauts. 

Now, for the younger ones, I will have to turn to Admiral Truly. 

Admiral TRULY. Thank you, sir. I think that the astronauts in 

NASA are one of our finest and most dependable group of people 

anywhere in the organization. 

There have been a number that have left in the last year but, 

frankly, if you will look at those that have left one by one, you will 

find that\some of them have been there for a long time and it was 

a good career move for them. 

There have been one or two who were asked to come back to the 

military and they saluted and did that. I cancelled last year’s astronaut selection because of the delay. It was underway at the time of 

the accident. There were just so many unknowns and the delay was 

not precise that we scrubbed that one. 

We have, however, with our new schedule and our new requirements started a new call for astronauts, and we will be making a 

small selection this year. I am confident with the number of people 

who apply and the quality of those individuals, that the people that 

we get in on the young end of the program will be just as capable 

as those that we are used to. 
33 

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to the plans for the future, the missions and goals now, we are trying our best to get back up sometime next year, hopefully in February, but once we are into space 

and we catch up on the defense demands, the communications demands, the health funds and everything else that we are testing in 

space, do we have an order, a mission, for NASA that we can look 

out over a period of five to ten years to know where we are 

headed? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Hollings, that is an awfully good question. 

I will respond the best I can. In the first place, we have the space 

station, as you know, that is going to be assembled out in the 1993- 

94 time period. That will last us for some years because that is a 

permanent base in space. 

We also have set internal goals for ourselves, broad general 

goals, not programs, but things that we think NASA ought to be 

doing in the long term. We ought to be involved in international 

cooperations. We ought to be the center of excellence of the whole 

world in aeronautics. 

We ought to be sure that we continue to have the best space science program in the world, which we do now, but it is in trouble 

because of the slip in the mission in the shuttle. 

We also plan to have a human presence in space permanently. 

And that space station is the first step in that, but we have extended that. We say we ought to move out beyond earth orbit with 

humans. And what that next stop for a base should be, we are still 

studying, but with these goals in mind we have put together a 

rather intensive effort internal to NASA and external and a 

number of groups are studying what we ought to be doing in 1995 

in addition to the space station, what comes next? What is our 

longer term goal? 

Not that we want to start spending money or anything of that 

sort, but what ought it be? And we have pulled together the various elements of NASA, and another outstanding astronaut is heading up that effort, Dr. Sally Ride, and she has got several committees going inside NASA studying the problem. 

We have also our National Advisory Council that is dealing with 

the problem, and we have also brought in an outfit called Jason, 

which is a group of academic thinkers, mostly they have been 

doing work for the Defense Department, but we have asked them 

to take a look at what do we need to be to be leaders in space? 

What does this country need to be to be leaders in space? 

That means you have to look at what other countries are doing, And that will all come together in the spring of this year. We 

haven’t set an exact date, but sometime in the spring. 

We are not going to set those goals without extensive discussions 

with this committee and, of course, with the White House or other 

committees in Congress. It is going to be a consensus, whatever we 

decide to do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RIEGLE. Let me just say before moving ahead here, that 

we will be having hearings on precisely that issue, that is, what is 

our future in space and what are our goal choices, because I also 

feel strongly, that we need that national consensus, and that can 
34 

only come after we have examined our alternatives and discussed 

them openly and then made our selections. 

I want to acknowledge the presence of another new member of 

the full committee and of our subcommittee, Senator Adams, from 

the State of Washington. 

We are delighted to have you with us. I don’t know if you have 

any brief comments you would like to make at this point before we 

move along with the questioning. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR ADAMS 

Senator ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have just three 

brief comments. 

One, it is a pleasure to be on the committee with you. I was on 

the Manned Space Committee in the middle of the 1960s when we 

started both the original orbital flights and, of course, the manned 

flight to the moon. 

So it is a pleasure to be back involved with it. 

The second thing is, gentlemen, I share the Chairman’s concern 

that ow goals be realistic as we move back into space. I am concerned with the emphasis on the shuttle program at the expense of 

unmanned vehicles, particularly clustered vehicles that have put 

us into space prior to the time of the shuttle program. I think we 

have placed all of our eggs in one basket and that was a mistake. 

I hope that we will have a chance to examine the merits of additional shuttles as opposed to unmanned vehicles that will put us in 

space far sooner and not require us to rely on the Chinese or other 

sources. 

The third thing is I am very much in support of the space station. I am hopeful that unmanned vehicles along with those that 

are manned can be used in conjunction with one another in order 

to create the station, and that we are not waiting for a shuttle program to be reinstituted before moving ahead with the space station. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it and I am glad to be 

here. 

Senator RIEGLE. I want to just say one other thing. Having 

served with the Senator from Washington years ago in the House 

of Representatives, I am particularly delighted that he is joining us 

on our subcommittee. 

I think our subcommittee has the potential to be one of the 

strongest subcommittees in the Senate on any subject, just given 

the makeup of the group that we have here, and I am determined 

that if we approach our work properly, we can have that kind of 

effect and result as a subcommittee. 

I will proceed with the five minute time periods, and we will 

come right down through the list here based on order of arrival 

after the starting time of the meeting this morning. So having heard from Senator Hollings, I want to just raise two 

issues with you now myself, Dr. Fletcher. 

I want to raise with you rocket redesign. I am wondering if the 

proposed solid rocket motor that we have redesigned is really the 

best possible fix recognizing that what we are doing here is making 
35 

what I would think you could call a technical change or series of 

technical changes to what has been called a flawed design. The conclusion of the committee or rather the Rogers commission was that the design itself was fundamentally flawed. 

And I am wondering if making technical changes, however well 

done they are, is sufficient to make the field joint as structurally sound as a factory joint would be? 

I know shortly we will get into the mechanics of how you are 

doing this, but my basic question to you is-and I know there is 

debate about this in the scientific community-whether we ought 

to be working on a fundamentally different design even if it takes 

us longer to do it, or whether we take the design that we have been 

using with modifications and feel that that is sufficient? 

So I would like you to address that issue head on, if you would. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Yes. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that discussion might be better held later on. I can give you my own opinion of it. 

I think we have to go with at least a baseline design, one that we 

are pretty sure will work, and have sufficient testing and analysis 

so that we know it will work. 

On the other hand, it is also important to have backup programs, 

as you know. Dr. Stever’s committee has suggested several ways of 

doing that. Some of them are long range programs, like a complete 

new case which would take some years to complete. 

Others are different fixes that could be implemented if the current baseline configuration doesn’t work. 

Having said all that, though, we are pretty optimistic that the 

baseline configuration will work. We have got a JES, joint environmental simulator, I think that stands for, and that gives a pretty good indication already that the design that is called baseline is 

going to work. 

I don’t pretend to be an expert on the seal fix, but t’ liose are 

things that seem, I have been briefed a number of times, and seem 

like a good way to proceed. You ought to go with the bsrseline program. 

If you start looking at too many things all at once, you don’t get 

any of them done, but have sufficient backup so that, if that 

doesn’t work, you can go to the next possibility. 

Senator RIEGLE. For the record, how many successful launches 

were there with the original design, both the field joint and the 0- 

ring arrangements, that did not work in the last launch, how rcany had worked successfully prior to that time? 

Dr. FLETCHER. There were 24 flights, Mr. Chairman, that were 

flown, and there is two solid rocket motors on each flight, and how 

many field joints are there in each motor? Anyway, six times 24. 

Senator RIEGLE. So we had an unbroken record of thcse joints working properly in previous launch conditions prior to the one 

where it did not work properly, and, of course, we had other factors 

at work, the cold temperatures and so forth at that time. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, can I interrupt? If I may, I don’t 

think it is proper to say that those seals worked properly in the 

previous 24 flights. They did work, but we found a lot of anomalies. 

Senator RIEGLE. That is a very important point. They worked sufficiently to allow the flights to occur, but there were dangers that 
36 

were appearing, and YOU should have told us at the time that corrections were needed. In fact, certain corrective actions were underway, but they were not completed, 

And then we got into the situation of the launch period about a 

year ago with the low temperatures and we had this terrible accident that we are all too familiar with. 

What I am wondering is this now, so essentially the approach 

that you were taking is to say that that basic design was a pretty good one and it didn’t work properly, and you were finding that 

you were having some inadequate performance of those, and under 

some conditions just a failure to perform properly, so that you have 

taken essentially that same design and you have reworked it, but 

we are still intending, as things stand today, to go with a rocket 

system with joints, albeit redesigned, pretty much the way we had 

them before, with these technical changes and modifications, is 

that correct, or how would you state it? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, I would say it is a completely different design. 

Senator RIEGLE. That is what I want to understand. 

Dr. FLETCHER. It is brand new cases that allowed for a thickening 

to produce several different possible designs, and with a feature 

which does not allow the expansion that caused the seals not to, or 

the O-rings, not to function. 

The O-rings are new. I would say there is very little resemblance 

of the new design to the old design. The only thing that is similar, 

I would guess, is that there are probably still three field joints, and 

that is about it. 

Do you want to add to that, Arnie? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I would describe it that way. My description of that 

would be that the joint was flawed and, in fact, the testing during 

the past year and still ongoing is determining what the specific 

flaws were of the joint, and changes have been made that are 

strong technically in each area. 

So in that regard it really is a new joint. It is similar in that it is 

still a joint that is made in the field, therefore, it is called a field 

joint, but there are significant differences. 

Senator RIEGLE. We will pursue this. My time is up, but I gather 

you are saying that fundamentally it is different. You feel you 

have changed it enough that you now have something that is fundamentally different than what you had before, and I think we will 

need to probe that. 

We will also need to probe carefully the issue of the degree to 

which the new design, if it is that new, is sufficiently tested before 

it is actually used. And I am very concerned myself about that 

issue because I know there is great pressure to get going again. 

I want to make sure that all of the testing is done short of live 

conditions where you have got lives at stake, so that we are certain 

that we have got a design that works. 

With that, let me now turn to Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Dr. Fletcher, when you were here for a 

confirmation I raised my concern about the need even under these 

extraordinary circumstances to keep up the pressure on am~mercia1 scientific research. 
37 

You laid out several months ago a shuttle payload plan for the 

next several years. And in that the Pentagon will claim 11 of the 

26 flights scheduled for the first three years when all of this resumes. 

Now, that is the way it works around here. There is a line of 

prioritization, and military payloads get the first shot, as they 

should, and then you have this business of critical, as they say, scientific and communications payloads, and then commercial and 

foreign. 

The University of Alabama, represented by Senator Heflin, has 

been conducting research that could lead to the cure of cancer. The 

excitement of that and other prospects in science are enormous. 

In the aftermath of the tragedy, and also the general problem of 

putting up into the sky those things which we need for national security, I remain concerned about the importance of medical science, of science which will be put to commercial use which will 

help us in terms of our competitive position in this world. That is, 

new technologies, new ideas, that can be brought back down to 

earth, things that can be done on space but cannot be done on 

earth. 

So that is important to me. Now, prior to the accident last January NASA had planned 50 scientific payloads between 1986 and 

1992. Now we are talking about 17. 

What I want to get a sense of from you is the priority within constraints that are on you for scientific research that is going to help 

mankind in terms of disease and help industry and help this country compete in this enormous problem we have with our trade deficit? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Rockefeller, I think your concern is justified. It is not proper to say that the defense took over more of the 

payloads. What happened was t,hat we were asked to not fy any 

more communications satellites on the shuttle. 

So when they were moved off, both the scientific payloads and 

the military payloads increased, but there are actually fewer numbers of military payloads than there are scientific payloads in the 

period from 1988 to 1993 or 1995. 

Having said that, though, what you are focusing on is what we 

call space processing, which involves processing of biological materials and metals and things of that sort, and those were cut back 

severely in the manifest. 

And we are trying to deal with that problem the best we can. By 

the way, I think we are making progress and we are going to have 

to spend some more money in that area, but we do plan to offload 

some of those experiments that were planned on to the space station, which can do it a lot better because of the longer duration. 

Some of the earliest experiments in space processing for a long duration will be on the space station. I think about the seventh 

flight or something like that in the process of assembling the space 

station will be microgravity experiments. 

We think you are absolutely right. These are important commercial potential experiments. So does the rest of the world. So we are 

fighting for space on the shuttle and, of course, we have the priority. 
38 - 

We do think it is an important program. We do plan to put more 

money into it. We have got a study going on as to how we can put 

some of those payloads on the shuttle as secondary payloads. 

The Primary payloads are in the payload bay. The secondary payloads go into what we call GAS cans-what does GAS stand 

for-Get Away Special cans, that we can tuck in here and there, 

and conceivably some of them can even go in the cabin. These are 

all called secondary payloads. 

We have a study underway as to what secondary payloads ought to be established and how do we establish priorities on those. Ultimately, of course, when we have our ELV program sorted out, expendable launch vehicle program sorted out, we will know better 

how much they can be used for similar things. 

You are quite right. We have the same concern that you do. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I notice that the Pentagon is going to be 

spending over $4 and a half billion getting 48 ELVs. 

You feel secure now, I mentioned cancer, there are those who 

think that the cure for cancer is going to be found up there. Are 

there certain areas, cancer being one that I would focus on, that we 

can count on that you will be working on? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I wish I could answer you, Senator Rockefeller, 

more specifically. I can say that life science is one that you can 

count on. And I will go back and make sure that cancer, among the 

life sciences, is given a high priority. 

If there is somebody else that can answer that question better 

than I, but I think we would have to supply that for the record. 

Whatever is the case, now that you have raised the issue, we will 

make sure that that is given a high priority. 

[The following information was subsequently received for the 

record:] 

Under the auspices of the NASA Microgravity Science and Applications Program, we are conducting space experiments in the growth of protein crystals. Protein crystals are a critical element in the determination of the molecular structure and functional relationships of enzymes, nucleic acids, and other macromolecules. Understanding of the molecular structure allows the design of more efficient drugs. Protein crystals are, by their nature, very fragile, and difficult to grow; in some proteins, crystallization can take years. Dr. Charles Bugg, University of Alabama-Birmingham, is leading a large team of academic and industrial investigators in a series of experiments aimed at exploring the feasibility of protein crystal growth in 

space. It is our belief that elimination or reduction of gravity-driven phenomena, such as sedimentation and convection, will enable better quality, larger protein 

crystals to be grown in space, in much less time than methods currently used in 

ground laboratories. Dr. Bugg and his team feel that this area has enormous poten- tial in the science or drug design and subsequent treatment of diseases/illnesses 

such as cancer, diabetes, and arthritis. Interferon, which shows much promise in cancer treatment, is one such substance we hope to produce in crystal form in space. 

We are currently supporting a very active program in protein crystal growth, including preparation of advanced hardware to fly soon after the resumption of STS 

flights. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller. Before calling 

on Senator Gore, who is next in order, I want to acknowledge also 

the presence of Senator Bentsen, who has been chairing the Senate 

Finance Committee this morning, where I also serve. 

I want to say, Senator Bentsen, how pleased we are to have you 

both on the Commerce Committee and on this subcommittee, and 

we very much look forward to your thoughts and contributions on 
39 

these issues as they relate to NASA; especially since you represent 

a state that has such an important concentration of NASA activity 

and capability. 

So wz are delighted to have you, and I don’t know if you have 

any comment that you, perhaps, would like to make at this point? 

Senator BENTSEN. Only to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am very 

pleased to be a member of this very important committee and subcommittee, and my home City of Houston has not only a great economic interest, but a great emotional interest in the success of 

NASA. 

And hopefully we are about halfway between the tragedy of the 

past and the successes that we anticipate in the future. 

And I regret that chairing that other committee will limit my 

time here, but I appreciate your courtesy. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator RIEGLE. We are pleased to have you. 

Senator Gore? 

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Fletcher, I want to move to the two areas that I mentioned in 

my opening statement, but before doing so I want to touch briefly 

on a matter of old business from last month. I do not intend to 

pursue it in depth on this occasion, but, as you are aware, I requested a GAO review of matters that were the subject of an extensive public investigation by a newspaper, you were quoted at the 

time last month as saying that you would seriously consider disqualifying yourself from any new contract decisions on the shuttle 

booster. 

I am awaiting the results of the GAO review, which I am told 

will be available next month. I want to give you an opportunity to 

make any comment you wish to make at this time, and then I will 

move on to other subjects. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Well, with regard to your first point, I did have a 

long discussion with members of our staff on the business of should 

I recuse myself from future deliberations on a second source or 

anything having to do with the solid rocket motors, and also discussed this issue with several members of this committee, and it 

seemed quite clear to me that I could not do that. I couldn’t function as an administrator by recusing myself from such an important activity. 

On the matter of the GAO report, I am anxiously awaiting their 

results just as you are. 

Senator GORE. I was concerned by the disclosures, and it was for 

that reason I requested the review. I will return to this at some 

future time depending upon what that review indicates, but I 

would like to turn now to the subject of quality assurance. 

One of the management changes implemented by you since the 

accident has been the appointment of Associate Administrator 

George Rodney, a man with an excellent reputation in the quality 

assurance field, and from all appearances he seems to be off to an 

excellent start. 

I note in Dr. Thompson’s testimony that will be delivered on the 

next panel that considerable attention is paid to the enhanced role 

of what you call SR&QA at the Marshall Space Flight Center. 
40 

However, there is no indication in your statement, Dr. Fletcher, 

as to the role of the new Associate Administrator for SR&QA in 

the proposed baseline redesign program. 

Could you tell us about the role of SR&QA and Mr. Rodney in 

establishing and reviewing the proposed baseline redesign? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Yes, Senator Gore. George Rodney and his staff 

have been intimately involved in that, in fact, have signed off on 

all of 'the proposed redesigns. 

There are many details involved in that, and if you would like, 

we could ask George Rodney to respond to how many meetings he 

has been involved in and how many things he has signed off on. 

Senator GORE. Not at this time, if that is all right. Perhaps we 

can get to that later. 

Does he have the right to override any approved redesign? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Certainly he does. And if there is an argument about it, it comes to me because, as you know, Senator Gore, the 

Associate Administrator for SR&QA reports directly to me. So it is 

an independent route, if you like, to me. So if there is a difficulty, 

it is up to him to call it to my attention. 

We also have a statutory committee, which hasn't been discussed 

very much but, nevertheless, we have invigorated that committee 

with a new chairman. We call it the Safety Advisory Panel, I 

think. Anyway, it was set up by Congress, and they also have an 

independent channel into me, and they are working closely with 

George Rodney to make sure that whatever is being done in the 

line management, where the primary responsibility is, is correct. 

And, if it is not correct, it comes to my attention through George Rodney. 

Senator GORE. How many people have been added to quality control since the new office was created and what are your future 

staffing plans for this office? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Gore, it is more than just bodies. 

Senator GORE. I will accept your statement on that, but I want to 

know about the bodies. I want to know how many people have been 

added and how many people you plan to add because there was a 

71 percent cut in the bodies in the period of time leading up to the 

Challenger disaster, and how many people have been added? 

Dr. FLETCHER. An enormous number of people have been added, 

some civil servants and some what we call support contractors. 

As I recall, just off the top of my head, and George Rodney can 

help me if it is not right, but as I recall he has been able to recruit 

almost double the size of staff in Headquarters and a similar 

number of support contractors. I think the number of support contractors is up by about 150 by now, but that is still in the process, Senator Gore. 

Senator GORE. My time is up. I wonder if we could get Mr. 

Rodney to supply that number, Mr. Chairman, how many people 

have been added to that office? 

Senator RIEGLE. We will not only get that number, I think we 

can get it today because Mr. Rodney is here. I think whenever we 

can get information from people who are in the room rather than 

for the record, I think that is useful because I think if colleagues 

then want to take and pursue a line of questioning based on that 

information we can do it then rather than to lose the opportunity. 
41 

So, Mr. Rodney, do you have that information? 

Mr. RODNEY. I will provide it to the Senator. 

Senator RIEGLE. Today? 

Mr. RODNEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator Pressler? 

Senator PRESSLER. One thing I want to get some analysis on is 

how you are hiring engineers and your staff bureaucracy, so to 

speak, at the salary levels available. 

As I understand, about $70,000 is about as much as you can pay 

an engineer. And I noted with great interest these comparisons of 

the new field joints, and this has already been talked about, the 

field joint comparison, where we have the third O-ring added and 

the new interference fit capture latch added which, presumably, 

would have made the first rocket safe. 

Were the engineers who designed this new SRM joint from 

NASA or were they from Morton Thiokol or did they work together? Also, how much do you pay your engineers who work on a 

project of this nature and how much does Morton Thiokol pay its 

engineers who would have worked on this project? 

I ask these questions because I know there is a certain amount of 

dedication involved in government work. I know a lot of people work for that reason. 

I know in Sioux Falls, South Dakota at the Arrows Data Center 

we have A1 Watkins, who is a very dedicated guy, and he works at 

the salary that the government pays, although he could probably double it tomorrow by going out. 

There is some point that with all of the dedication in the world, 

if you have five kids in college, one wonders why a government en- gineer continues to work for $70,000 a year if he can make three 

times as much elsewhere? 

The basis of my question is, are you getting the right people, not 

just engineers; are you able to retain the right people, aside from 

the top management? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I think, Senator Pressler, I ought to ask J.R. 

Thompson to respond to that, but let me give you my support for 

your concern. We do have a problem of compensating engineers, and that is the purpose of the human resources activity that Sam 

Phillips’ Committee recommended. We have got to figure out better 

ways of compensating our people all up and down the line. 

We are not competitive in some regimes, but we need to fix that. 

That is a long-range plan. In response to the specific question you asked about who designed that particular joint, I will have to ask J.R. Thompson to 

respond. 

Senator PRESSLER, I don’t know if it is so important who designed this, but how much do your engineers make compared to the englneers at Morton Thiokol? I suspect they designed it together. If an engineer worked for you and was working side by side with 

one who was working for Morton Thiokol, how much would they 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you. 

\ 

probably make? 

question for Senator Pressler? 

- 

Senator RIEGLE. Is there someone here that can answer that 

Dr. FLETCHER. We will have to provide that for the record. 


44 

you would say at this point in time that YOU do fully understand it, 

and would you state for the record what the current assessment of 

the real cause is, is it the Same as was stated then or are there now 

additional things that you might say were part of it, and is there a 

full understanding of the nature of that joint at this point in time? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Kerry, I think I can say without equivocation that we do understand what caused the accident. It was the 

field joint. 

Having said that, though, we have interviewed and spent a considerable length of time with some of the folks that feel that it 

might have been a structural failure. 

Admiral Truly has been interviewing, he and his staff have been 

interviewing those folks and have had extensive discussions. Maybe 

you would like to comment on that. 

Admiral TRULY. Iwould echo Dr. Fietcher’s basic answer. In the 

broadest sense of the word we are absolutely confident that the 

cause of the accident was what was indicated then, and that was a 

failure in the field joint. 

We simply had a design that we did not understand. We have 

done, during the investigation and during this year, we have done 

many tests on that joint. We have duplicated the failure. And some 

of the later people can tell you more about that. And the proof of 

the pudding in the redesigned joint will be also testing. 

The other comment that I would make, though, is that during 

the investigation and even today we continually do get inputs from 

sources, citizens, who have made observations, technical people who believe that they have come up on something that we have 

missed, and we have treated every one of them seriously. 

I get some of them myself and I pass them all directly to the 

Marshall Space Flight Center redesign teams. And even during the 

accident we did not treat any of these inputs lightly, but I am absolutely confident that we know the cause of the accident. 

Senator KERRY. And you would dismiss any of those other assertions at this point in time? 

Admiral TRULY. Well, I treat them seriously. As a matter of fact, 

we are dealing with one now, that we met with the individual, and 

we didn’t dismiss it. We are going back and doing some analysis to explain to him what we think the facts were in the matter, and we 

are communicating with that individual. 

Senator KERRY. But notwithstanding, I see my time is up, but 

notwithstanding the ongoing conversations and dialogue with him, 

you are prepared to say that you do fully understand that there is 

no question then. Why do you still have the continuing dialogue? 

Has that been put to rest or is there still an issue as to whether or 

not there is some credibility to those assertions of that individual? 

Admiral TRULY. You said an important word, credibility. I think 

for us to be credible, we have to continue to treat seriously techni- cal opinions and advice that we get, and we do so. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, my time is up and I will stop 

now, but I do have some deep concerns about the testing schedule 

and the nature of the way in which it has been established, but for 

this moment thank you. Senator RIEGLE. Let me just say, Senator Kerry, that I do as 

well, and I think the subcommittee generally has the view that the 

+ 
45 

testing procedure is vital here because we have got to succeed the 

next time we launch. 

And so we will pursue that very carefully. And I think there will 

be other questions that people are going to want to submit for the 

record here as well. I would hope that in this area, that you have 

just been discussing, if there are other things that you would like 

to have responded to in detail, that you will provide us some questions, and we will see that the answers are gotten. 

Let me make an announcement before calling on Senator Adams, 

who is next in the order here, and that is we are making good 

progress in the room. Outside the room the storm is continuing, the 

blizzard that is taking place in Washington has worsened. 

The Federal Government has officially shut down for the day in 

other locales, but, I think those of us in this room can take some 

small measure of pride of the fact that we are here, we are at 

work, we are making some progress, and we will stay here and continue to work until we finish with our panels today. 

Senator KERRY. We can’t get anywhere if we wanted to. 

Senator RIEGLE. That’s right, we can’t escape if we wanted to. 

What we will do, we are going to change the order of things slightly, and I just want to tell everybody now, so that everybody can 

plan accordingly. 

When we finish this round, as we will do shortly after Senator 

Adams and Senator Heflin have been given an opportunity, I will 

suggest that, unless there is some totally compelling point that has 

to be raised, that we go to our next panel, which is the next level of 

technical know-how within NASA on these issues, hear from that 

panel, ask them to be brief in their summary comments at the 

outset, and then we will probe that, and then we are going to 

change the order. 

We are then going to call up the contractor group next. And I 

am anxious LO get to that group because I want to be able to juxtapose what they may have to say to what the NASA people are pre- senting this morning. 

And so they should be ready to come to the table after we have 

heard from Panel I1 and then, finally, Dr. Stever, I know that you 

are here in town. I don’t mean to put you last in any sense other 

than the fact that I think that is probably the better order to go with today. So then we will call on you at that time. 

So with an eye on the need to move as rapidly as we can so that 

we can cover all of the ground today, let me now call on you, Sena- - 

tor Adams. 

Senator ADAMS. Thank YOU, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. 

I am concerned about pressure being placed on you and”on the 

remaining shuttles to carry the entire load of the space program as 

I indicated in my opening statement. 

What do you have left in inventory of Delta, Atlas Centaur and 

the Titan? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I don’t have a precise picture, but I can give you a 

rough cut. We have parts of several Delta vehicles. 

Senator ADAMS. Less than ten? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Less than ten. 

Senator ADAMS. Atlas Centaur? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Atlas Centaur is a very small number. 
46 

Senator ADAMS. Less than ten? 

Dr. FLETCHER. They are all less than ten, Senator Adams. 

Senator ADAMS. So you have a total of less than probably 25 alternative vehicles? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Much less at the present time. We have not ordered any new ones. 

Senator ADAMS. In your testing procedure you were using a reusable rocket, correct, in terms of the solid motor vehicle? 

Dr. FLETCHER. The solid rocket motor will be recoverable, yes. 

Senator ADAMS. Are you in your testing taking into account that 

this is being retrieved and constantly reused with the problem of 

the weak joints, in other words, are you actually retrieving the vehicles and then testing or are you just doing lab testing? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Adams, that is a good question. My 

answer is yes, but I think I ought to turn to Admiral Truly. 

Senator ADAMS. Admiral? 

Admiral TRULY. Ye& sir. We have not totally defined the test 

program that I mentioned a few minutes ago. They will be continuing after the flights start, but that is precisely one of the things 

that we will be addressing. We do recover the motors. 

Senator ADAMS. And the casing and the O-rings, so that you are 

using a vehicle that has had basic flaw designs and a real problem 

with expansion, contraction of what is basically a rubberized-type O-ring, or whatever you want to call the new ring you are going to 

design, and you are placing that in the ocean, out of the ocean, and 

then under various temperatures, and then firing it with the vehicle, is that correct? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I just wanted to make sure. The O-ring would be a 

new O-ring. We don’t try to recover the O-ring itself. 

Senator ADAMS. You then replace the entire casing? 

Mr. MYERS. The experimental case is used again. 

Senator ADAMS. Well, the O-ring is in the external casing, isn’t 

it? 

Dr. FLETCHER. No, the O-ring is a big piece of spaghetti that goes 

in the groove in the casing. So the O-ring itself will probably not be 

used again, but the casing itself will be. 

Senator ADAMS. That is what I want to know, is each time that 

you are using your reusable boosters you are retrieving the casing, 

you are firing it again. Are you replacing all of the O-rings at that 

time? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Yes. 

Senator ADAMS. Did you replace the O-rings with the new 

design? 

.Adm.iral TRULY. We have always replaced the O-rings and all 

other parts of the recovered motor hardware with the exception of 

the steel case itself. 

Senator ADAMS. All right, then you had a new joint design, 

which I understand you were placing on the vehicles in a seriatim 

procedure, which was the one with the notch in it and the believedto-be-safer item. 

Why wasn’t that being replaced -~ as you brought these boosters 

back in. 

Admiral TRULY. At the time of the accident there was a design 

being discussed. 
47 

Senator ADAMS. You had put it on some, hadn’t you, Admiral? 

Had you not put any of these new features on any of your reusable rockets? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Arnie Aldrich is the institutional memory in this, 

Senator Adams. 

Senator ADAMS. Mr. Aldrich? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I think that the name for the feature you are discussing is the capture feature. 

Senator ADAMS. Precisely, the notch, whatever you wish to call 

it. 

Mr. ALDRICH. And that design, in fact, was in place on the units 

that were being tested for the filament wound case motor. 

Senator ADAMS. It was a 1982 design basically or in that neigh- borhood? I just know that that was being flowed into the system, as 

I understand it, from about 1982 on. 

Mr. ALDRICH. It was being tested as a baseline component of the 

filament wound case. 

Senator RIEGLE. Can you pull that a little closer? I want to make 

sure that the stenographer gets this. This is an important question 

and an important answer. 

Mr. ALDRICH. The capture feature was being tested as part of the 

development of the filament wound case solid rocket motor, which 

was to be used on the West Coast. 

There were designs being discussed for incorporating that into 

the steel cases for East Cowt launches, but, in fact, we had not 

moved to that point. 

Senator ADAMS. You had not moved any or flowed any into the 

system? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Nor had we built any for the steel cases at that 

time. 

Senator ADAMS. You had not built any of the capture features at 

the time of these launches? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Yes, sir. 

Senator ADAMS. A final question, Dr. Fletcher, are all people 

going on these shuttle missions in the future to be professional astronauts? 

Dr. FLETCHER. In the near term future that certainly will be the 

case. We are still discussing among ourselves if and when we 

should fly with civilians. 

Senator ADAMS. But everyone going up from now on in these 

original launches that are going to take place will be professionals? 

Dr. FLETCHER. The first five, probably the first 20 and maybe forever, but we really haven’t faced the issue of whether we fly some 

day so-called non-professional astronauts. 

That issue is not before us. We are not going to do it until we 

feel it is absolutely safe to do so, if we ever do it. 

Senator ADAMS. Thank you, doctor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Senator Adams. Several of us have 

that same concern, and so you will not be alone in expressing that 

view. 

Senator Heflin, did you have anything you wanted to raise at 

this point? 

Senator HEFIJN. I would like just briefly ask a few questions, but 

first let me say that I appreciate the fact that I, as an alumnus of 
48 

this committee, can return. I went off about two years ago, and I 

haven’t overused the privilege that has been granted to me, and I 

come back only occasionally. 

Secondly, let me say that, Dr. Fletcher, I want to congratulate 

you on doing an outstanding job, taking over NASA at the time. In 

my judgment you have restored confidence in the space program 

and you have restored the team spirit that I think is so important. 

I see a much more enhanced spirit among the people who work 

with NASA, and I think you should be complimented for your work. 

I also am considering, looking down the road, and in earlier testimony you indicated that there would be launch requirements for 

the space station, the shuttle system would certainly have plenty to 

do, and that there probably would be a need for a complementary 

launch vehicle in the future. 

We are faced with a number of problems. I see Senator Hollings 

here. Senator Hollings is a great supporter of the space program, 

but he is also one of the authors of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, and 

we have to look long range for reducing deficits. 

Space has been taken care of in the budget this last year real 

well, and I hope in the future will be. There are other programs 

that are going to be somewhat in competition that may well call 

for some long-range planning where they can dove-tail together. 

And there can be competition that can arise. We already know in 

regards to heavy lift vehicles that therc can be a problem. The Air 

Force, for example, wants to take over. 

There is no expertise in the Air Force relative to the matter of 

propulsion, heavy lift, that sort of thing, so I think these things 

have to be planned. There will certainly be requirements for heavy 

lift relative to the Star Wars or the Strategic Defense Initiative, 

and I am a supporter. Senator Hollings is a supporter of the Strategic Defense Initiative. 

I can’t say that zbout everybody here, but if I had to say that the 

space station and its needs to the future were to be on a gambling 

ratio, I would say that there is 95 percent surety that the space station and the space program will go on. 

I can’t give that high a percentage, and it would probably be 

much less than that, for maybe SDI in the long run. I intend to 

support it as long as the research shows that it is available. And 

the same is true in other matters. 

So I hope that as we move forward in planning in the long range 

that NASA and the nation as a whole look at it, and my hope is 

that we won’t get off into something that will cost a lot more 

money, that will have to require the development of expertise and 

other matters that could arise. 

So I realize at this stage it is early, but I did want to make that 

statement, and I think that we ought to be very much alerted to 

that. 

And I would say that the Hollings influence in the GrammRudman is just as strong as the Hollings influence in regards to 

space. That is all I have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Could I make just one comment? 

Senator RIEGLE. Yes, Senator Hollings. 
49 

The CHAIRMAN. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings provides for revenue, 

Senator. President Ronald Reagan signed that into law. It never 

would have been Gramm-Rudman-Hollings save for that and several other provisions that I inserted in there. 

As an old time governor, some of us here believe, we always 

must pay our bills. In fact, everybody is running around talking 

about competitiveness and getting new industry and more jobs, but 

the first requirement is to pay the bills. 

Industry is not going to come to a deficit-type state. The national 

government is no different. What we are really saying is we need 

this in space. We need SDI and certain things in defense. We need 

other things in education. 

And we have to show a willingness to pay for them. That is all it 

is. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings doesn’t say eliminate the government. 

It just says pay the bills. 

Thank you. 

Senator RIEGLE. We are always happy to get new insight on 

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, and most particularly from Senator Hollings. 

Senator HEFLIN. My remarks were largely just to show that he 

was a fiscal conservative. 

Senator RIEGLE. We all are. 

We have come through this round, and I think it is very important that we go to the next panel just as quickly as we can, which 

is the next level of technical know-how and application within 

NASA. 

Senator Pressler has asked to raise one more question which he 

feels he can do briefly. So I will call on him to do that. 

Is everybody else of a mind to, once that is completed, to move 

on to the next panel? Very good. 

Senator Pressler? 

Senator PRESSLER. I just wanted to ask Dr. Fletcher one final 

question about the February 1988 launch date. Is that a realistic 

date for the next launch? 

I know the NRC panel overseeing NASA’s critical review and 

hazard analysis report said there may not be enough time to incorporate any substantial design changes in time, that may be indicated by the outcome of the critical items review and hazard analysis, 

if NASA expects to meet its schedule of a February 1988 launch. 

Do you agree with this assessment and are you already aware of 

any critical design changes that could not be incorporated in time 

for a February 1988 launch? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Pressler, I am very glad you asked that 

question because it gives Admiral Truly a chance to say something 

he wanted to make clear at the close of this session, but let me just 

answer for myself. 

That February date is a target date. We have to have internal 

guidelines. We have no reason to believe that that date will slip. 

However, it will slip and we will fly when we are ready to fly, 

regardless of when that is. When it is safe, we will go. When it is 

not safe, we will delay, but, Admiral, you have your chance now. 

Admiral TRULY. I did want to, before the technical people come 

on after me, I wanted to have the opportunity to assure you public- 
50 

ly, and in doing so to say one more time out loud that February 18, 

1988 is not a magic date. 

We will not fly this system until we are safe and ready, but we 

do have thousands of people that are working on this problem nationally at contractors and at centers and in our oversight committees and in Washington, 

And these people need a target. And so we set a schedule. And 

when we have a disconnect in that schedule, a piece of hardware 

that needs to be at the Cape at the certain time, and the Cape needs it a month earlier, the way we work these problems is, is we 

identify those disconnects and we put money and people on those 

problems, and that is how we eventually get to the schedule. 

There are threats to it. We may not make it. However, we have 

had February 1988 as a target date now since last June. We have 

used this approach during this time. We hsve discussed it openly with all of the people that are looking at what we are doing. 

And today within the program, from Arnie throughout the other 

parts of the program, and also with the center directors whose responsibility it is for the technical excellence of the projects that are 

at their centers, as long as we can continue working these disconnects and keep to that schedule, it is good for the system to have it, 

but we are not going to fly this system until we are ready and until 

it is safe. 

Senator RIEGLE. We thank you for that response. Senator Danforth has come in. As I mentioned earlier, the 

Senate Finance Committee has been meeting at the same time. So 

several of us have had to be in two places at once. Senator Bentsen 

had that problem and Senator Danforth does as well. 

We are delighted to have you here. Do you have a comment that 

you would like to make at this time? 

Senator DANFORTH. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have a comment. I appreciate your holding the hearings. I think that you have shown 

your characteristic diligence in this issue where you have taken 

such a keen interest in for some time by scheduling this hearing 

early in the Congress, and I commend you for it. 

I am sorry I am late. 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you very much. We are delighted to have 

you. If there are any questions that you want to have us have answered for the record, please let us know. 

Senator Gore has asked to raise one other issue and then we will 

conclude and go to the next panel. 

Senator Gore? 

Senator GORE. One brief question, a follow-on to Senator Adams’ 

questions. 

You were talking about the reusable components of the shuttle 

system. I am wondering about your reaction to the National Research Council’s finding that the baseline redesign of the case joint 

does not allow for reworking or for inspection of the hidden surfaces of the case joint and that, as a result, this problem may prohibit the reuse of the casings which, of course, would dramatically change the economics of the shuttle. 

This is what the National Research Council has said in its January 15 report. And I am interested in your reaction. 

Dr. FLETCHER. That is a new one on me. Arnie? 
51 

Mr. ALDRICH. That is a concern with that particular feature of 

the redesign that the NASA team has addressed in the baselining 

of the design and, as Admiral Truly points out, we will be continuing to work each of these questions with the National Research 

Council in detail. 

We think we have plans in place that will allow us to understand 

the cleanliness and goodness for reflight of that area, but it is a 

complex area and does require additional study. 

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, let’s just pursue that for a second. Is that 

a new problem or was that a problem that we had previously in 

terms of the difficulty of the inspections in those areas? 

Mr. ALDRICH. It is a characteristic of the new design that will be 

described. It is shown on this sketch in front of you. 

Senator RIEGLE. I think it is very important that Mr. Thompson, 

who is about to come to the table, address that issue in detail as he 

goes through this design change. 

Let me thank all of you for coming. Let me ask now that this 

panel leave us, and we thank you for your testimony, and let us 

now have the next panel come forward, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Garrison, Mr. Dorsey, and Mr. McDonald. 

Senator RIEGLE. Can I ask that the people find seats and that we 

get whatever materials we need to have up front here for display 

purposes? 

Mr. McDonald, if you can’t find a seat up there we will give you 

one up here. 

Let me welcome this panel. Mr. Thompson, will you be the 

person who speaks for this panel? 

STATEMENT OF J.R. THOMPSON, DIRECTOR, MARSHALL SPACE 

FLIGHT CENTER, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY ARNIE ALDRICH, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM; BOB MARSHALL, 

SHUTTLE PROJECTS DIRECTOR, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT 

CENTER JOHN THOMAS, MANAGER, SOLID ROCKET MOTOR 

DESIGN TEAM; U.E. GARRISON, PRESIDENT, MORTON THIOKOL 

AEROSPACE GROUP, MORTON THIOKOL; EDWARD G. DORSEY, 

SION; AND ALAN J. McDONALD, DIRECTOR, SOLID ROCKET 

MOTOR VERIFICATION TASK FORCE 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator RIEGLE. Would you take a moment and introduce the 

members of this part of the team? Just go across the table and indicate who they are. 

If I am not mistaken, almost everybody on this list is new to the 

assignments that they hold, am I correct in that? 

Mr. THOMPSON. On my right is Arnie Aldrich, who was here just 

a few moments ago as the Director of the shuttle program and reporting directly to Dick Truly. 

To my extreme right is John Thomas, who heads the redesign 

team at the Marshall Space Flight Center. 

VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, WASATCH DIVI- 
52 

On my immediate left is Bob Marshall, who heads up the shuttle 

propulsion work at Marshall, but reports to Level 11, Dick Kohrs, 

within the shuttle program. 

Ed Garrison, the President of Morton Thiokol, of the Aerospace 

Group, is to Bob’s left. And then Ed Dorsey the Vice President and 

General Manager out at Thiokol, and then Alan McDonald, down 

at the end of the table, heads up the Engineering and Verification 

Task Force at Thiokol as we get back into the redesign. 

Senator RIEGLE. I will have you go ahead and make whatever 

summary comment that you wish to make on behalf of the grcruF 

that you were speaking for, and then we will move on into questions. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Very good. Mr. Chairman and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, I and my colleagues welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss actions that are 

being taken by the Marshall Space Flight Center and our contractors to return the shuttle to flight and do it in a safe way. 

I have submitted a prepared statement, and I would like to summarize several of the key points at this time and give you also a 

brief status an where we stand as we prepare our propulsion systems for flight. 

Next week marks one year since our tragic accident. I can assure 

you that all of the men and women of the Marshall Space Flight 

Center and our total contractor work force are rededicating themselves and have made a commitment to getting the space program 

back on the right track and, also, to keep it there once we become 

flying again. 

We are following the leadership here at NASA Headquarters, 

and we are aggressively implementing the recommendations of the 

Rogers Commission. And, I might add, that we totally support their 

report. 

At Marshall we have made several significant organizational 

changes that I think I have highlighted in my statement. I would 

like to touch on a few of the key. 

Our SR&QA organization is now headed by Alex McCool, and he 

reports directly to me. 

We have consolidated our propulsion work in one laboratory 

under very strong and effective leadership, and that is under John 

McCarty. 

We have assigned a chief engineer for all of our propulsion activity at the Marshall Space Flight Center, and that individual is 

Jildd Lovingood. 

The manager of our Shuttle Projects Office, Bob Marshall, now 

reports directly to Dick Kohrs at Level I1 located at JSC. 

We have also had a number of personnel changes. I believe that 

we have got the right people in the right jobs. They are very experienced and very dedicated. 

I would mention one, Jim Odom, who heads up our science and 

engineering directorate. He is an excellent engineer and has a 

track record as being one of the best managers throughout all of 

NASA. 

And I am personally committed to addressing the communication 

issues that were brought up in the Rogers Commission report, not 
53 

only within the Marshall Space Flight Center, but as we look outward. 

To me that is my number 1 priority. When I fix that, I think 

other good things will follow. 

Let me make a few comments now about our overall recovery 

status in the shuttle and specifically in propulsion. 

In general I think it is going quite well. The propulsion systems 

are our most critical systems. We are making a large number of 

changes. They are all mandatory before we return to flight. 

That primarily is focused in two areas, our solid rocket motor, of 

course, where we had the failure on 51-L, and our space shuttle 

main engine. 

I would like to make a few general comments on the progress in 

our main engine, and then more detailed comments on our solid 

rocket motor, and then we can certainly entertain any questions 

that you have in even more detail. 

In the space shuttle main engine our primary thrust is improving our margins of safety and specifically knowing where these 

margins are and are not. We certainly have a very rigorous analysis and always have had, but now we are embarking on a very aggressive ground test program which will be the proof of the pudding. 

Certain areas we are interested in are turbine blades, our turbo 

pump bearings, and where we have life-limited components that 

are caused by fatigue stresses, both mechanical and thermal. 

Our progress has been excellent. I can only report to you that 

over the last six weeks we have conducted the equivalent of some 

six plus missions’ worth of main engine firings. We have done this 

with no new safety issues, no old safety issues. Our data looks excellent, and the inspections of the hardware are coming along quite 

well. 

We have got a long way to go, and over the next several quarters 

we are going to be pushing the engines in these propulsion systems 

to the limit, to the point of failure. 

I only mention this because I believe it sets the pace for the same 

kind of testing that we are going to conduct and be embarking on 

in our solid rocket motor program. 

Let me turn now to that. The redesign activity, I believe, is progressing about as I expected. We are making good progress. It is 

taking longer than I would like to see in getting to our first all up 

flight motor, which is DM-8. 

That is being paced by tooling for our internal motor insulation. 

I conducted a very extensive review at Thiokol over this past weekend with senior managers and engineers from the Marshall Space 

Flight Center as well as our management of our SR&QA organization, and Thiokol was equally well represented. 

Our primary focus was on DM-8, our first all up flight motor. 

That will drive the design, the tooling, the manufacturing, all of 

the processes we used as well as our quality control and inspections. 

The reason I want to focus there, and we are driving that schedule, we won’t make the back end of the schedule, meaning the 

flight end, unless we can show progress on the front end, and I am 
54 

very interested in getting away from the charts and the design 

drawings, and the design drawings, and getting into the test area. 

Testing again will be very extensive. It started not now, but back 

during the middle of the summer in the investigation. We have 

conducted a large number of laboratory tests. We are now to the 

point, as Dr. Fletcher mentioned, of testing our joint environmental simulator of the redesigned joint. 

We will be doing that very extensively over the next several 

months. Before we get to our redesigned motor, the all up firings, 

we will test the field joint that failed individually some 20 times in 

the redesigned configuration. 

We will be testing the case-to-nozzle joint, which is very similar, 

over and above the all up flight motor some 11 times. Again, the 

real proof of the pudding is going to start at mid-summer, toward 

the tail-end of July, with DM-8. That will be followed by DM-9, 

QM-6 and QM-7 and QM-8. 

Those are all all up motors to the redesign configuration. We 

have as a requirement that we successfully conduct DM-8, DM-9, 

QM-6 and QM-7 before we fly again. That means no hitches in 

four all up motors. We will follow that, as Dick Truly indicated 

earlier, with the hot motor case test condition, which is QM-8. 

We feel that if the prior four motors are successful across the 

board in all respects, then we can fire QM-8 after the first launch. 

That is our current opinion. 

A lot is going to depend on our test program. I believe it has got 

to be very aggressive. It is going to be very aggressive and we have 

a lot of eyes looking at it. 

I personally believe the launch date is going to fall out, and it is 

going to be dictated as a result of the progress we make in our test 

program, and that is why I am putting a lot of priority-- 

Senator RIEGLE. Excuse me. When say fall out, do you mean get 

pushed further out ii1 time? 

Mr. THOMPSON. No, sir. I believe right now we are on a track to 

make it, but it is going to fall out of the results of our test program. 

If our test program is as successful as I believe it will be, because 

of all of the eyes we have got inside of Marshall, within NASA and 

outside of NASA looking at this joint, and other areas, I can think 

we have got a good shot at making it. 

Senator RIEGLE. You said four firings without any hitches? 

Mr. THOMPSON. That’s correct. 

Senator RIEGLE. If there are any hitches, or if you have any unsettled questions in your own mind about this thing, and anybody 

pushes you to go ahead, how would you respond to that? 

Mr. THOMPSON. We will stop and fix it. Any problem, that is 

going to be our reaction, we will stop and fix it. 

Senator RIEGLE. And if somebody tries to push YOU past that 

point? 

Mr. THOMPSON. We will stop. 

Senator RIEGLE. You will just stop? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, sir, we will stop. Senator RIEGLE. Iwould hope as well that YOU would let us know 

if that happens because we can’t have that situation arise. 
55 

Mr. THOMPSON. I certainly agree with your point, and we will 

proceed ic a way I think that is consistent with the thrust of the 

committee. 

I know very deeply within NASA we feel that way now. 

Senator RIEGLE. Please continue. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I would like to make a few other points. Our 

project managers at Marshall will be making recommendations to 

Dick Kohrs and to Arnie, on up to Dick Truly, and I will be 

making them into Dick Truly, that we add to our program about 

two ground test motors per year to parallel our flight program to 

continue to push these motors to the limit so we know where the 

margins are and are not, as well as through ground test resolve 

any anomalies we see that come up in the flight program. 

We have a number of key people now at Thiokol from our redesign team headed by John Thomas, numbers about 25, and over the 

next several weeks I believe we will be adding to that, specifically 

John personally, to again put more attention on DM-8, which I 

think is going to be the proof of all of the work that we have done 

now over the last half year in this redesign activity. 

Let me just make two other points. These aren’t the only problems we have got in the solid rocket booster. We had an aft skirt 

failure as we were testing the filament wound case. 

We are going to be redesigning that. We are in the process of 

reanalyzing it now, but that is a mandatory fix before the next 

launch. 

We also are relooking at some fasteners that have failed on our 

ET attach ring. In no way did these contribute to the 51-L accident. We are absolutely convinced of that, but it is a weakness now 

that we see in our analysis and through test, and we will be addressing those issues before we return to flight. 

That concludes my comments, except I would like to add one 

thing, sir, and that deals with people. I primarily addressed hardware and schedules. 

I see throughout NASA since my return they are highly motivated, not only within NASA, not only at Marshall, but throughout 

our contractor work force. I believe that they are totally dedicated 

to retarning to flight getting back on a track and doing it in a safe 

way and, once we get there, keeping it on that track. 

With that, sir, I would like to stop and entertain with my colleagues your questions. 

[The statements follow:] 
Statement 

Of 

Mr . James R. Thompson, Jr . Director, Marshall Space Flight Center 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the actions 

being taken by the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in support 

of the NASA program to return the Shuttle safely to flight. I 

want to assure the Subcommittee that each and every person in the 

work force of the Marshall Center is deeDly committed to the 

success of that effort. 

Next Wednesday, January 28, marks the first anniversary of the 

tragic Challenger accident. We shall always remember the 

sacrifice made by the Challenger Crew and their families, and 

upon that memory have rededicated our efforts to minimize the 

risks that are inherent in space exploration. 

I want to thank the Subcommittee for its confidence in, and 

support of, the Nation's space program, and I want you to know 

that we at the Marshall Space Flight Center are pledged to do our very best to be deserving df that support and confidence. 

Ddring the brief time I have served as Director of the Marshall 

Center, it has been evident to me that the team spirit, which has 

always been characteristic of the Marshall Center, is alive and 

well. That spirit has been manifested in the diligent efforts of 

our people as the Center has responded to the leadership of 

Dr. Fletcher, Mr. Myers and Admiral Truly in implementing the 

recommendations outlined in the report of the Presidential 

Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. It is our plan, in following the Administration's lead, to implement not 

only the substance of that report, but also the spirit, in all 

the actions we are taking in support of the Shuttle Program 

recovery efforts. 
2. 

The specific actions that I will discuss with you today include 

organizational changes and management pol icy changes implemented 

at the Marshall Center: the activities underway to redesign the 

Solid Rocket Motor (SRM); and a brief update on the actions being 

taken to assess alternate SRM designs and the actions being taken 

relative to the other propulsion elements of the Shuttle under 

the management responsibility of MSFC. 

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT POLICY CHANGES 

A number of organizational changes have been implemented at the 

Marshall Center to improve our operational effectiveness and 

strengthen our ability to meet the challenge of safely returning 

the Shuttle to flight status. All MSFC safety, reliability and 

quality assurance (SR&QA) activities have been consolidated, 

strengthened, and placed under a single organization. This new 

organization, the Safety, Re1 iabil ity and Qua1 ity Assurance 

Office, reports directly to the Center Director. The office 

represents a consolidation of the MSFC Safety Office, and two 

SR&QA elements of the Science and Engineering Directorate--the 

Reliability and Quality Assurance Office, and an organizational 

element of the Systems Analysis and Integration Laboratory. The 

capability of the new SR&QA Office has also been strengthened by 

the addition of more civil service personnel, some with 

experienced leadership in SR&QA functions and others with 

significant journeyman experience in various elements of SR&QA. 

In addition Col. Charles Bolden has been assigned by the 

Astronact Office to the MSFC SR&QA Office to assist with flight 

safety and serve as a liaison for the two organizations. 

This increased staffing level will provide for enhanced 

leadership, management and performance of all SR&QA functions, 

including the acquisition, processing, and analysis of 

performance, anomaly and trend data. 

In addition to increasing the number of civil service personnel, 

an experienced SR&QA contractor is being utilized to provide 

additional SR&QA support to the Center. As an interim measure, 

this support is being provided through the existing Johnson Space 

Center (JSC) SRhQA contract. This effort is being applied in the 

areas of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Critical 

Items Lists (CIL’s), and Hazard Analyses for the Space Shuttle. 

The Marshall Center has also initiated procurement action which 

will result in the competitive selection of an SR&QA contractor 

for all MSFC projects in Calendar Year 1988. 

Significant organizational changes have been made in the Science 

and Engineering Directorate which is the technical backbone of 

the Marshall Space Flight Center. These changes were implemented 

to place greater focus and emphasis on our propulsion system 

efforts. The previous Office of the Associate Director for 

Engineering has been divided into two separate elements, the 

Associate Director for Space Systems and the Associate Director 

for Propulsion Systems. Also, propulsion systems functions which 

were previously assigned within several of the Science and 

Engineering Laboratories have been consolidated under the newly 

established Propulsion Laboratory. 
58 

3. 

In order to place special emphasis on the SRM redesign activity, 

a dedicated SRM Design Team was established in March 1986. This 

team, headed by a highly respected senior manager, Mr. John Thomas, 

is staffed by experienced design, analytical, manufacturing, and 

test personnel, not only from Marshall but from several other 

NASA Centers. Other key team staff members include systems 

safety personnel and flight crew members. The team also is being 

supported by contractor engineers and scientists drawn from a 

wide spectrum of recognized industrial firms, ranging from large 

aerospace organizations to oil field sealing experts to small 

specialized analytical groups. This team has utilized the full 

resources of the Center to conceive designs, manufacture 

hardware, and test the features of many design concepts and 

materials. They have conducted literally hundreds of tests in 

support of the evaluation of design alternatives. The design 

team has worked independently, but in concert with Morton 

Thiokol, Inc. (MTI), to redesign the SRM field joint and certain 

other assemblies deemed appropriate to correct difficulties 

encountered in Shuttle flights and to enhance reliability. The 

design team and MTI have planned a thorough and comprehensive 

test program, and substantial testing has already been 

accomplished. John Thomas' team, accompanied by MTI, interacts 

directly and frequently with the National Research 

Council (NRC) Panel which is overviewing the SRM design activity. 

Some adjustments have also been made in the MSFC Shuttle Projects 

Off ice to place increased emphasis on the reassessment activity, 

analysis, test, production, and operational aspects of the 

Shuttle Program. The Flight Engine and the Development Engine 

Project Offices were consolidated into the Space Shuttle Main 

Engine Projects Office. Additional responsibility was assigned 

to this office for the alternate turbopump development and main 

propulsion testing, The Solid Rocket Rooster Project' Office was 

expanded to include a sub-element for the management of the Solid 

Rocket Motor alternate source study. The business management, 

project control, and integration functions were consolidated into 

the Systems Management and Integration Office. 

The Marshall Center has also participated in the development of 

and is fully supporting the restructure of the agency Shuttle 

Program management structure. This recent change in the agency's Shuttle management retained the Shuttle Projects Manacjer's Off ice 

at the Marshall Space Flight Center with MSFC responsible for the 

~xternal Tank, Space Shuttle Main Engine, and the Solid Rocket 

Booster. This office has a clear line of responsibility to the 

Level I1 Manager who is the Deputy Director of the NSTS Program. 

The Manager's responsibilities are to manage the three MSFC 

Shuttle elements for the Shuttle Program and make the 

decisions/recommendations that are necessary for hardware and 

operational flight, and to provide the appropriate MSFC interface 

with the Level I1 Manager. 
59 

4. 

The budget function at the Center continues to report directly to 

the NSTS Program Director in the Office of Space Flight at NASA 

Headquarters. rhe MSFC Shuttle Projects Manager will, for the 

Center, define the project requirements and the Center will 

include these in the Center budget submission to Headquarters. 

These budget requirements will also be addressed in parallel with 

the center management through the Level I1 and Level I Shuttle 

management structure. I believe this line of management for the 

program and path for submission of the program budget is 

acceptable and will help to improve the execution of the program 

decisions. 

In addition to the organizational changes which I have mefltioned, a number of changes in management policy and practices have been 

put in place based on a review of the Presidential Commission 

Report and as a part of an overall effort to provide the oest 

possible management to the Marshall Space Flight Center arld the 

agency as a whole. In many cases, specific steps have been taken 

to improve communications both within and external to the Center. 

Management policy and practice changes include: initiation of more frequent meetings with major project managers; expanded 

attendance at staff meetings; increased impromptu visits to 

Center elements by the Director; encouragement of more open 

communications at all levels; initiation of more 

employee-oriented events; facilitating improved access to Center 

representatives by the press; increased acceptance by the Center 

Director oE press requests for interviews and speaking 

engagements; increased interchange with universities; encouraging 

the assignment of MSFC employees to NASA Headquarters for 

extended TDY; participation in routine intercenter coordination 

meetings with other center directors; initiating exchange visits 

with other centers; involvement of MSFC support contractor 

personnel in functions in which they had not nreviously been 

involved; initiating a Marshall "Management Council" composed 

of Center managers to provide for discussion of and resolution of 

key issues facing the Center; and enhanced communications with 

employee unions. 
60 

5. 

SOLID ROCKET MOTOR REDESIGN 

The Presidential Commission's first recommendation concerned the 

design of the SRM. The Commission recommended that the SRM joint 

and seal be redesigned to eliminate the inadequacies of the 

original design, or that a new design be developed to eliminate 

the joints. In keeping with 'that recommendation and the agency's 

objectives, changes are being made in the design of the case 

joints, the nozzle joints, nozzle parts, the igniter, the 

propellant configuration, and the ground support equipinent. 

Various NASA Centers (LaRC, LeRC, JPL, 3SC and KSC) along with 

the USAF Rocket Propulsion Laboratory and the U.S. Army Yissile 

Command are participating with MSFC in the redesign effort. The 

progress made to date in these areas is very encouraging. The 

requirements, design changes, and recertification plans have been 

thoroughly reviewed within the agency by the SRM &sign Review 

Committee and by the NRC Panel for the Technical Evaluation oE 

the Redesign of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster. 

The criteria for redesigning the SRM was solidified by a formal 

Project Requiremencs Review in August 1986. The primary 

redesigned configuration was confirmed by a formal Preliminary 

Design Review in October 1986. Seven review sessions have been 

held with the NRC panel. Four review sessions were held with the 

SRM Design Review Committee. After very thorough consideration 

and study of verticai static test, the determination has been 

made that testing in a horizontal mode is the superior test 

orientation. A second test stand has been initiated to assure 

schedule accomplishment for the program and to introduce external 

ioads dynamically to the motor during static test. The 

csmprehensive test program includes use of these and other new 

subscale and full size test stands located at both MTI and 

Marshall. At MTI, a new test stand, the Joint Environment 

Simulator (JES!, has been constructed and is in operation. Three 

Cull size case segments, which include two fie1.d joints, arc 

placed in the JES for extensive short duration hot fire 

environmental and functional testing. The JES can accurately 

simulate actual motor pressure conditions during iqqition. 

Another new test stand, the Nozzle Joint Environmental Simulator, 

is operating to perform similar type testing op. the 

case-to-nozzle joint. Construction is just heginninq at Marshal!. 

on the Ransient Pressure Test Article test stand for first use 

~n the late spring. This stand will test the motor joints under 

environmental and dynamic load conditions. The total test plan 

calls for these major tests along with five full-scale static 

tests and a thorough full scale static load test to 140 percent 

of the design limit loads. The static load test will be 

conducted in an existing test stand at Marshall. Many other 

smaller tests are planned and underway along with extensive 

analyses--all oE which go toward overall motor certification. 
61 

6. 

Other significant activities and accomplishments include the 

continued monitoring of the Titan Failure Analyses Program 

progress for implications into the SRM design--special attention 

being devoted to process verification and nondestructive test 

methods for which the Associate Administrator for SRhQA has 

formed a special panel to assure that technological advancement 

is considered; involving the solid rocket propulsion industry in 

the redesign program through soliciting critiques of the primary 

joint design, development of backup joint design proposals, and 

development of new and original joint proposals: and fabricating 

test hardware of the newly designed joint configuration. 

Figure 1 is an illustration depicting both the old and new 

configurations of the field joint. The new design eliminates all 

the factors contributing to the Challenger accident. A capture 

feature is added to essentially remove seal gapping. A heater is 

incorporated to eliminate environmental influence. O-rings and 

their grooves are larger to more closely adhere to industry 

standards. A third O-ring is included in the capture feature to 

permit proper O-ring positioning. The variable putty has been 

discarded in favor of a fully sealed insulation that is 

principally like the factory joint. Also, we are working 

diligently to obtain a more resilient O-ring material. 

Substantial subscale and full size tests on this joint 

configuration are very encouraging. These tests have shown that 

assembly can be repeatedly accomplished without any 

deterioration, that the insulation does not leak hot gas even if 

not bonded, and that gapping is so small that any candidate 

O-ring material, even the old fluorocarbon material, can remain 

sealed with a 200 percent factor even with two of the three 

0-r ings missing . We are confident that the new joint will resolve the Challenger 

problem, and a comprehensive test and analysis program is 

underway that will fully reinforce or dispel our cone idence. 

STATUS OF SOLID ROCKET MOTOR ALTERNATE DESIGNS 

The Center is assessing alternate designs for the Solid Rocket 

Motor. Activity is underway to evaluate the five solid rocket 

motor conceptual design proposals for Block 11 to support the 

Administrator's commitment to assess the merits of an alternate 

design by March 31, 1987. 

The objective, which is to identify an SRM design concept that 

may offer performance and/or reliability and safety margin 

improvements over the Redesign Team baseline configuration, also 

involves the definition of corresponding development and 

verification testing, cost and schedule requirements for 

implementation. 

72-663 0 - 87 - 3 
62 

7. 

A formal plan is in effect for the evaluations which will 

encompass conceptual SRM design evaluations, contractor 

capability assessments, and cost and schedule projections. A 

full review of concepts for compliance with the Contract End Item 

Specification and assessment of potential performance and/or 

reliability and safety margin improvements will be accomplished. 

Design concepts to be evaluated were submitted by Aerojet 

Strategic Propulsion Company; Morton Thiokol, Incorporated; Atlantic Research Corporation; United Technology CorporatiDn; and 

Hercules, Incorporated. 

REVIEW OF PROPULSION SYSTEM ELEMENTS 

During the down time for the redesign of the SRM, the Center is 

undertaking an extensive review of the design and veriEication of 

all Shuttle elements for which it is responsible, and is 

accomplishing substantial testing of the Space Shuttle Main 

Engine (SSME). This testing is addressing certification of 

changes incorporated for the resumption of flight. In addition, 

tests are exploring the life limits of hardware and operational 

limits of defined redlines. It is the intent of the margin tests 

to explore the failure point of the "weak link" in the engine 

system. The reviews are addressing the measured flight 

environment and comparing this environment to the design 

requirements for each Shuttle element. A Design Certification 

Review (DCR) will be accomplished for all items to assure that 

the design complies with the requirements and that an adequate 

qualification test program has verified the hardware for flight. 

Failure Mode and Effects Analyses for each element is being 

redone utilizing in-house resources, prime contractors, and 

independent contractors to assure that all failure modes and 

critical items are identified and that retention rationale is 

developed. Parallel to the FMEA/CIL activities, the Center and 

the prime contractors are re-evaluating the hazard analysis for 

each of the flight elements. The MSFC Safety, Reliability and 

Quality Assurance Office, supported by its SR&QA contractor, is 

participating in the hazard analysis assessment. 

With the reviews mentioned, new criticality items and 

requirements will be identified and are required to be 

incorporated in the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch processing 

documentation. This documentation, the Operations Maintenance 

Requirements Specification Documents (OMRSD) and Operation 

Maintenance Instructions (OMI), are being reviewed with KSC to assure that these new requirerents are incorporated. These 

review activities are substantial for all the Shuttle elements 

and I believe they will add to the assurance that requirements 

are clearly defined and understood €or the systems. 
a. 

One additional area to be addressed is a concern that has been 

expressed by some that existing contract incentives used by NASA 

do not adequately address or promote safety and quality concerns -- with most emphasis being placed on meeting cost and schedule 

requirements. All of our contracts are being re-examined to ensure that we have the correct form OE contract and that proper 

emphasis is being placed on the SRCQA functions. Membership of 

the Performance Evaluation Board is being amended to evaluate a representative from the SR&QA organ i za t ion. 

In summary, our eeforts to date in strengthening our management 

structure, improving our management practices, redesigning the 

SRM, investigating new designs, and reviewing other propulsion 

system components for safety and design adequacy are progressing 

satisfactorily. Our schedule is tight, but with continued hard 

work by our NASA and contractor team, we believe that it is 

achievable. 

That completes my prepared statement, I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

####### 

FIELD JOINT METAL AND INSULATION 

,- 

ORIGINAL DESIGN NEW DESIGN 
64 

STATEMENT OF u. EDWIN GARRISON, PRESIDENT, AEROSPACE GROUP, MORTON 

THIOKOL, INC. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, I am Ed Garrison, 

President of the Aerospace Group of Morton Thiokol, Inc. located in Ogden, Utah. I am pleased to appear before this Committee to offer testimony regarding the solid 

rocket motor redesign, development and test program to return the Space Shuttle 

safely to flight. With me today are Mr. Edward G. Dorsey, Vice President and General Manager of our Space Division, and Mr. Allan J. McDonald, Director, Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor Development. 

Speaking personally, for our Space Division-indeed, for all Morton Thiokol em- ployees-I want to assure this Committee that we are totally committed to those 

efforts required for a safe resumption of Space Shuttle flights. We are keenly aware of the tragic events of approximately one year ago. We are determined to accom- plish successfully a redesign and test program which fully supports the objectives 

and requirements of this distinguished committee and of NASA, and one which fulfills the national interests of an active and productive space flight program. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, today I will discuss organizational and man- agement changes which I have directed within the Morton Thiokol Aerospace 

Group. Also, I would like to summarize the detailed report which we have submitted 

to the Committee for the record, which discusses the solid rocket motor redesign 

and test work now underway; the parallel and alternate design activities; and program accomplishments. 

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 

Shortly after the Challenger accident I completed a thorough review of our Space Shuttle organization and management structure. In March 1986, I directed a series 

of organizational changes. The objective of this reorganization was to bring together all necessary resources under Mr. Dorsey to accomplish the important work ahead. 

The Space Division now has these resources, which include a full range of technical, 

management, and manufacturing capabilities. It also consolidates all Space Division 

safety, reliability and quality assurance functions to assure a strong role for these 

disciplines in the redesign effort. Mr. Dorsey reports directly to me, and we are in 

daily communication on the program status. 

THE REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTOR 

A1 McDonald is the Program Manager for the redesign. Under his direction the 

SRM field joint and its seals have been thoroughly analyzed and redesigned. The 

work has received numerous reviews by the Marshall Design Review Committee and 

by the National Research Council Panel. In the redesign, a capture feature has been 

added to the metal case joint to negate joint opening. A sealed insulation design has 

been introduced as well as a third O-ring which is followed by a metal-to-metal fit of 

the capture featnre. 

The redesign has a high degree of redundancy. Hot gas cannot reach the final seal 

unless it penetrates four separate barriers. The joint is designed to be safe even if it 

opened several times as much as we could anticipate under a worst case scenario. 

The joint redesign also includes heaters and a water barrier. I am confident that the 

on-going test program will prove this field joint redesign to be completely satisfactory. 

In accordance with NASA’s redesign objectives, we also completed a thorough assessment of all other aspects of the SRM design. This assessment has caused significant design changes in the nozzle and minor changes to the igniter and propellant configuration. 

TEST PROGRAM 

A comprehensive test program, including work from laboratory benches to full 

scale, full duration rocket motor static firings has been defined, coordinated with 

NASA, reviewed by the NRC, and it is well underway. Laboratory tests, material 

tests, and subscale motor firings are being used to verify that our design is sound. 

The major efforts now in progress will continue into six full scale, full duration 

static firings to test and verify the SRM redesign. Specialized new test stands are complete and in use at our facility for full scale, short duration static firings to test 

the field and nozzle joints. 

Full scale, short duration tests and structural tests are being conducted at Marshall to supplement the program. We are also constructing a second test bay to 
65 

assure schedule integrity and to provide capability for applying external dynamic loads on qualification motor firing. 

PARALLEL AND CONTINGENCY DESIGNS 

Parallel designs for the critical case joint areas are being carried along in development with the primary design so that the backup can be incorporated in the motor 

program if desired. There are also contingency designs which are pursued through 

concept definition in parallel with the primary and backup designs. Parallel and 

contingency designs are active for the most significant design areas-the field joint and case-to-nozzle joint. 

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS 

Mr. Chairman, I can report that significant progress is being made on the Space 

Shuttle solid rocket motor redesign and test program. The preliminary Design Review for the baseline design was completed with NASA on October 10, 1986 and 

the information communicated to the NRC panel. Substantial testing has been conducted ranging from laboratory to subscale to full scale. To date, test results are verifying our design approach. Our efforts are being conducted to support a Space Shuttle flight in February 1988, but it is a tight schedule. Our basic and overriding 

goal is the safe return of the Shuttle to flight. 

Thank you for the opportunity to make this statement, Mr. Chairman. We would 

be pleased to answer any questions you or the other members the Committee may 

have. 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you very much. We all have some ques- tions. 

Before I pose the first one, and I will tell you what that is so you 

can start thinking about it, I want you to walk us through this 

technical change so that we can understand how the new system is 

designed to work. 

I gather that that is what is before us on this table. So I want to 

go to that in my first question. 

Before I do, in terms of the team that you have introduced to us 

across the table here, and this will have a meaning to Senator Hollings as it does to me, I am particularly pleased to see Alan 

McDonald in this group. 

I say that because those of us, and it includes most of us in the 

room that went through the events of a year ago, and unraveling that situation and finding out what the truth was, and looking at it 

squarely and deciding what we needed to do as a result of that, his 

help was critical in that effort, and his efforts to try to stop that 

launch for all of the reasons we now know were a very key part of 

what happened at that time. 

And sometimes there is a tendency to kill the messenger when 

the messenger brings news that isn’t happy, and that might even 

have happened, but it didn’t happen here, and so Mr. McDonald is 

still part of this operation as he properly should be. 

And I for one am very pleased that he is, and I know Senator 

Hollings feels the same way. So we are happy to see all of you at 

this table and have that particular feeling with respect to Mr. 

McDonald. 

So, if I may now, let me ask you, Mr. Thompson, would you walk 

us through this new design approach and how and why you feel 

that this will solve this problem that we have had before? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, sir. What I would like to do is ask John 

Thomas, who heads up our redesign team, to do that for us, and 

then I will add to that. 

Senator RIEGLE. Fine. Mr. Thomas? 
66 

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, as you may recall, there were five 

potential problems or five potential factors contributing to the 51-L 

accident in the defective joint, defectively-designed joint. This represents the new design joint, and I have a small model 

laying right here-this is the old one-that I can use, I think, to 

switch from one to the other to explain not only the problem, but 

what has been done to alleviate the problem. 

The first condition or first factor contributing to the accident was 

the amount of gap opening that was caused by the so-called joint 

rotation, and that was the gap at this location between the two 0- 

rings opening to such an extent that the cold O-rings could not 

track the gap and, therefore, opened the seal. 

The second one of those contributing factors was then temperature. And the temperature affected the O-ring as I just described 

and, secondly, the temperature was a factor with respect to the potential of having ice in the joint, the ice having froze as a result of 

the lower temperature, and possibly, possibly I say, affecting the 

function of the O-ring to seal and do its job. 

The third item was the squeeze that was put into these O-rings during the initial assembly and, that is, if this joint was very tight, 

that is, almost metal to metal, the O-rings were squeezed into the 

grooves, and by virtue of being cold they could not pop out as the 

joint rotated, nor, because they were pressed into the joint, could 

pressure get beneath them and actuate them in order to seal. 

The remaining factor dealing with the accident was the so-called 

putty. And the putty was, it is not shown here, but the insulation, 

as you recall, is in this side of the joint. It must be separated at 

this point to allow the assembly and disassembly of the field joint, 

and that opening in the putty was filled with putty which per- formed in a variable manner. 

And that variability was that we could not always tell if the 

putty was completely consistent or if there were holes caused by 

assembly blowing pressure back through that, which we refer to as 

back blowholes, or the leak check procedure. 

Now, taking those in the order that I just listed them, I would 

like to tell you what we have done to the joint that leads us to believe that we have resolved those critical deficiencies. 

The first is the gap rotation. In order to remove that gap rotation 

we have added the capture feature that is on the upper part of the 

cylinder. It has a slight interference fit in the assembly process that sets the distance between the tang and the O-rings at this 

point assuring that that opening is always known and that, with 

the application of pressure, it does not significantly change. 

And in the new design the change is minute with respect to what 

it was during 51-L based on testing of actual hardware at a thousand PSI. 

The next factor was the temperature. We have taken two courses 

to resolve the temperature conditions. The one is to add a heater, 

which will keep the O-rings at a comfortable 75 to 120 degree temperature, and we also set about in parallel to understand and 

define a new O-ring material that would be not so affected by low 

temperature. 

Now, we have found three O-rings that are better than the 0- 

rings that we flew on 51-L from a resiliency standpoint, but, as is 
67 

typical, not all of that comes free. There is some detrimental effects of, for example, grease, on a couple of those different O-rings. 

We think we know how to overcome that, but we have not 

reached that point yet. We have not reached the point that we 

must make a decision on the O-ring material to be put into DM-8. 

However, we are confident that with the heaters even the old 0- 

ring material will meet the stringent design requirements that we 

have on the joint and, that is, it must track this joint if the opening is twice as much as we think it is. 

The next factor, subfactor within the temperature, was the ice. 

And by adding the heater we have incorporated in that subassembly a weather seal that will prevent the possibility of rain water 

entering the joint from the outside in this location as long as the 

joints are assembled and exposed to the environment. 

Lastly, the variability of the putty was questioned and, therefore, 

the putty has been eliminated. And instead the two insulation 

halves have been moved to be adjacent, and there is a seal, an adhesive, located at this point in order that O-rings will not be exposed to the hot gases of the motor unless there is i? leak through 

this particular joint in the insulation. 

Now, what we have set as a goal for ourself, and we thick it is 

quite obtainable, is that we m*xd demonstrate that even if the insulation seal leaks arid leaks hot gas down to this point, that there 

will be no detrimental effects to the joint. 

Now, we have tested a version of this under hot fire conditions in 

the joint environment simulator, which is full scale, full diameter, 

and it did not leak. And we have many more tests in the program 

that are going to verify thaL and, in fact, we will introduce known 

defects in not only this, but the O-rings, and test to be sure that we 

understand their performmce. 

Senator RIEGLE. When you say it didn’t leak, you mean it didn’t 

leak at all? 

Mr. THOMAS. Did not leak at 811. It did not allow pressure to 

reach t5e O-rings. 

SO those are fundamentally the design changes that we have 

added to the joint. 

Senator RIEGLE. Let ae just pause right there and ask you to 

remain there, and I will ask my colleagues if they have any spesific 

questions that they would like to raise at this point with respect to 

this design or any aspect of it? 

MY. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, could I add cne thing? 

Senator RIEGLE. Please. 

Mr. THOMAS. I forgot to mention the third O-ring in the capture 

feature, which wzs added in order to allow us to apply pressure through this port, seal this cavity, and put this primary O-ring in 

its proper sealing position. 

And that is the extent of the changes. 

Senator RIEGLE. Senator Gore? 

Senator GORE. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

wanted to pursue the last question I asked Dr. Fletcher, and get 

you to point out on your diagram there the area of concern identified by the National Research Council that could lead to a prohibition on reuse of the casing. 

Mr. THOMAS. Certainly. 
68 

Senator GORE. It is that bottom lip there? 

Mr. THOMAS. You see this third O-ring groove right here? The apprehension is that with this moved, of course, in a disassembled 

fashion, that one can get the proper inspection equipment into this 

area to detect small corrosive pits or potential cracks that might 

reside here. 

Now, I would like to add to that. You will notice that there is a 

slight shallowing of the O-ring groove in the front. We did that for 

a purpose, and that was to provide better visibility and better 

access back into this joint. 

We believe that we need to further discuss this with the panel 

and show them precisely what we have in mind in terms of procedures and equipment, and see if then they still think that there 

might be some possibility that we will lose a case or two later on. 

This is not, I would like to point out, is not a flight safety issue, 

but a reuse issue. 

Senator GORE. Well, in other words, you believe that the National Research Council is wrong on that point, but you wish to engage them in discussions in order to resolve the difference of opinion 

about the point, is that what you are saying? 

Mr. THOMAS. I think the Research Council, based on the information that we have presented to them thus far, has reason to be concerned with that. 

I think with further dialogue that we can allay that concern. 

Senator RIEGLE. We will have the chance to ask that question. 

Senator Hollings? 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomas, I am worried about being locked in 

by a contract with Morton Thiokol to a continuation of a faulty 

design. 

I am only posing that question. We do this politically when we 

lost in 1984. Democrats all got together and said we had too many 

special interests and caucuses. So we immediately instituted another caucus and called ourselves a leadership caucus. 

So we have some O-ring problems, and I know how you have 

been frustrated and even had gone to the automobile engineering show in November of 1985 to see whether automotive engineers 

had any ideas how to solve it. 

So instead of two O-rings we get three, and then we put a heater 

on it and it sounds like the M-1, that we have got a good tank, but 

it can only go three miles to one gallon and then we have to chase 

it through the desert looking for a filling station. 

My question, is, and maybe, Mr. Thompson, you can answer this 

question of contract renewal because our friend Mr. McDonald was 

there at Huntsville Wednesday and Thursday before this tragedy, 

and necessarily there was some interest no doubt that the contract 

be renewed, and maybe that is why they overturned Mr. McDonald 

at the Cape. 

Now, are we just locked into this thing, because we have had 

good witnesses testify that it ought to be a monolith? You can put 

on another O-ring. Instead of having two, have three. Instead of 

calling it plastic or mastic, now you call it adhesive and, more particularly, now they say with the heater that the adhesive becomes 

detached as a result of the heater. So the heater, while it may solve 

one problem, creates another. 
69 

Let me begin at the beginning, Mr. Thompson. Are we locked in 

by a contract? Is Morton Thiokol going to make this thing regardless of the next three or four years or do you have alternative 

sources or not? 

Mr. THOMPSON. What we are doing, we are carrying this as our 

baseline for the next flight. We do have several variations of that, 

but they are really quite minor in concept that we are carrying 

along as contingency. 

We are in the process, as you are aware, of evaluating inputs for 

additional contractors as well as Thiokol as to what we really want 

to do over the longer haul. That is a very aggressive look within 

Marshall. We will be reporting back to Dr. Fletcher here within 

the month and then on up to the Congress shortly after that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in brief, is this design-you know we have 

been talking about the process flaw-is this design also fundamentally flawed? I am not an engineer, but I understand you run the 

best tests in the whole business and we are delighted to get you 

back in NASA. We appreciate your sacrifice because you do come 

at a sacrifice. 

Am I to honor them because contractually I am locked in, you 

have to work with the contractors, so you go ahead and work with 

the contractor’s design? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Let me tell you how I feel about it. Obviously, 

the joint that we were flying and had designed has shortcomings. 

Clearly, looking back, we see that now in spades. 

Having all of that data and going to school on that, I am quite 

confident that the design modifications in this joint are going to 

end up quite reliable. And I believe that we have got a test program structured to demonstrate that in spade. And if it is not, if 

that doesn’t end up being the case, we will just have to stop and 

take further corrective action. 

Now, the NRC has encouraged us to start thinking ahead now 

and develop even more contingencies to what what we are talking 

about. And I support that and I think we are going to be looking at 

that quite hard. 

They are also very supportive of us taking a much broader look 

for the country and seeing where we want to go with these socalled Block I1 designs. We at Marshall are very much into that 

right now. And we have just got to develop our own thinking so we 

can go up and report it to Dr. Fletcher. 

I am confident from what I see now on paper, on the design and 

from the simulator tests that we have run, I believe that we can 

lick this problem. It is a mechanical problem. I know we have got 

to address the cold. The heaters do sound like a kludge, I don’t disagree with that, but I believe they are going to make it work if we 

can come up with the material that gives us the performance we 

want at the colder conditions and don’t need the heaters. 

I want to do that. I just want to make sure that we don’t back 

into another problem associated with the grease, but I am confident in the path we are on but with everything we have got on the 

table, we need to be looking even further. I certainly support that. 

I think that is the general thrust of the NRC report. We will be 

working with them on that. 
70 

The CHAIRMAN. Where and when did you make that test when 

they had no leakage? 

Mr. THOMAS. This was made, I believe it was back in November. 

It was made at Morton Thiokol on the so-called joint environment 

simulator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Up in Utah? 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Under what temperature condition? 

Mr. THOMAS. 20 degrees. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. 

Senator RIEGLE. Could you describe that test to us? That was a 

stationary test? 

Mr. THOMAS. The test is on a test facility that has the real flight 

motor aft dome. It has a segment, three segments in fact, that produces two field joints. And then it has a forward dome. 

And in this dome is mounted an igniter and a small amount of 

propellent is spread throughout the motor. The joints are cooled 

down. The igniter is initiated. And the propellent produces the 

same pressure profile that one gets within the real solid rocket 

motor. 

And it was, in fact, then a simulation of the first second of flight 

environment for that joint from an internal motor pressure viewpoint. 

Senator RIEGLE. Ithink Senator Hollings has asked the key issue 

here in terms of whether or not we are just trying to fix something 

that, while we keep making repairs to it, the basic design is wrong. 

And there are people who argue that it is. 

What I hear you saying, Mr. Thompson, is that you are just as 

interested in looking at whole new options and that that is going 

down a parallel track here and that your mind is open to a completely different design at some point. If our exploration of that 

option proves that that is what we ought to do, at some point we 

would bridge over into a brand new design; is that correct? 

Mr. THOMPSON. That is correct, sir. 

Senator RIEGLE. Now I want to understand the question that 

Senator Hollings raised with respect to the contractual relationship 

with Morton Thiokol. Are we locked in with the contract side of 

this thing and the money commitments in such a way that even if 

at some point we wanted to bridge over, there would be such a financial barrier to doing that that we might be dissuaded from 

doing it just for financial reasons. 

Mr. THOMPSON. No, sir, we are not. As a part of the ongoing discussions we have got with Thiokol right now associated with the 

restructuring of the contract, it takes us out no longer than the 

early 199Os, which would be consistent with when we could bring, 

if indeed we chose to do that, some other design or some other contractor, phase them into the program. So we are not locked in with our current contractor, nor with 

that design. 

Senator RIEGLE. You used one other word, maybe you can recall 

what he said, but when he was describing in response to your question about reliability, will this work, the word you chose to use was 

not the fact that you are absolutely convinced or it will have to be 
71 

that it is going to work, period. You used a somewhat more conditional word than that. 

But in terms of taking the test results from this approach and 

deciding whether or not we are ready to go and put lives at risk on 

the strength of this thing working, what kind of safety parameter, what kind of degree of confidence do you feel that you have to have 

as the person in the end that is ready to say this is sufficient and 

we are ready to go? 

Mr. THOMPSON, Ifin conducting these four all up motor tests, the 

last one of which will be under inflight load conditions that we are 

building into our new test stand, and that test will be conducted at 

the cold conditions, and all of that has been preceded by a simulator test where we build in flaws in our bonded joint, and basically 

those motor firings and the scale motor firings come out highly 

successful, then I will have great confidence in that joint, but I 

have been in engineering long enough to know that you have got to 

send these designs through a solid test program and I might be 

wrong. Right now I have a lot of confidence in that joint from everything I have seen on paper, but now it has to go through the test 

wicket. 

Senator RIEGLE. Senator Hollings, did you finish? 

Senator GORE. Could I follow on the contract questions briefly? Is 

that appropriate? 

Senator RIEGLE. Yes, and then we will go to Senator Kerry. Senator GORE. If that is all right. The company made, the way I 

see it, the company made some mistakes in building this booster. 

Under the terms of the contract, is NASA going to pay them extra 

money to correct the mistakes they made? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Let me answer that, but let me preface it by 

saying I am in the middle of discussions on this very issue now 

with some of the gentlemen seated at this table. Just in general, to 

correct the problem, Thiokol will receive no fee from my standpoint, no profit. 

Senator GORE. I do not .want to get into any area that will compromise contract negotiations, but I do want to express the concern 

that I think others share, because I have information that looks 

like they could be paid as much as $350 million for anomaly resolution and actions in response to the Rogers Commission identifying serious problems with the work, as it was originally done. 

Is the work that the company is now performing for anomaly resolution being done under the existing contract and, thus, treated as 

old work or is the anomaly resolution new work and, hence, under 

a new contract? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I think the basic difference there is under the 

terms of the contract, the costs we pay, profit and fee is a totally 

separate issue. 

Senator GORE. Is it a new contract or an old contract? 

Mr. THOMPSON. We are in the process now of restructuring that 

contract. We have no new contract in force now since the accident. 

Senator GORE. But it is on a cost plus basis? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Itis a cost plus basis, that is correct. 

Senator GORE. Any costs that they incur to correct mistakes that 

they made on the original work, you are obligated to pay? 
72 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, sir. Now, there are penalty provisions associated with the accident that I am sure you are aware of. And we are 

discussing these conditions with the contractor. 

Senator GORE. Well, that is the kind of contract, I mean the 

nature of that contract should itself be an issue as you consider 

whether or not to compete, whether or not to open it up to others 

who would like a chance to offer better terms. 

I am concerned, if they are going to end up making a great deal 

of money out of this entire thing by having a cost plus arrangement to do 300-well, I have here $290 million worth of anomaly 

resolution and corrective actions going to the company, out of a 

total of $798 million in the account, and $50 to $75 million for actions in response to the Rogers Commission out of $580 million in 

that account, so $350 to $365 million, under this contract, the way it is structured, for correcting what many believe were mistakes 

that never should have been made. So I hope you will take that 

into account. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Certainly we will. As we go forward, we will certainly be mindful of your points. 

Senator GORE. Thank you. 

Senator RIEGLE. Senator Kerry. 

Senator KERRY. The Rogers Commission specifically directed that 

the faulty motor rocket seal be changed, had to be changed. And 

they specifically set out two options for you. 

Option Number 1, you can eliminate the joint, develop a design 

that is new. Option Number 2 is redesign the current joint. You 

have proceeded with Option Number 2. I would like to ask you, I 

sit here and I hear Senator Hollings, and I am just a lay person 

with this stuff too and not as versed as he is and some of the others 

on the committee, but I see us going from two rings to three and a 

little new putty here, redesign, whatever you want to call it. 

What was the decision process that put you on the track of redesign rather than the alternative? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I believe that we have taken both paths. We have 

embarked on this redesign. John has described that. That is the 

near term. 

We have also solicited and now have received the input from five 

contractors, Thiokol plus four, that are quite innovative. And we 

are committed to exploring that. 

Senator KERRY. Irealize that. And that is precisely what concerns me. What you are basically saying to me is that you are willing to go along with this for the moment and place some astronauts on top of a rocket with something that may be less than 

what you are looking at that is out there that you haven’t yet decided on. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Only if the redesign-with our flight experience 

and looking backward-if that redesign passes the very rigorous 

test program, I believe we will be in a very safe position to fly. I 

contrast that with almost any new redesign. It hasn’t failed yet because it hasn’t been in the test stand. I worry about that. I don’t 

want to jump from what we have got to something else. 

I am very interested in some of the alternate proposals that have 

come forward. I am not in love with this redesign. It has got to 
73 

pass a very rigorous test program before we fly it or we will just wait. 

Senator KERRY. The one that went before it passed a very rigorous test program, did it not? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Obviously not vigorous enough. That is looking back, and you are right. That got away from us. I believe there 

were signals during the flight program that, to be perfectly honest, 

we just missed. 

We are very much attuned throughout NASA, certainly at the 

Marshall Space Flight Center, to that. And we know the criticality 

and the sensitivity of these propulsion systems. Senator KERRY. Should we be thinking about and are you thinking about whether or not the standard here is to fly with something that is deemed to be safe according to the standards that you 

set up by which you make that judgment or should we be thinking about flying what is the safest possible design? 

Mr. THOMPSON. The safest. 

Senator KERRY. Are you convinced then that this is the safest 

design measured against the alternatives? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Measured against what I know of the alternatives to date. I don’t have a design on the alternative. I have got 

some ideas. They have got to go through a design. If, indeed, we 

embark on that track, a very vigorous test program. 

We are well along on that with this design, here with this redesign, but we are not there yet. We still have got a lot to do. If we 

come up short, we are going to stop. If it goes through all of the 

wickets, with all of the eyes that we have got and others that are 

going to be looking at this thing, then I believe collectively we will 

be very confident in having a very safe flight program. Whether that is the best rocket motor over the long haul from 

an economic standpoint or having too many eggs in one basket, is 

something we will be discussing with Dick Truly and Dr. Fletcher. 

Senator KERRY. You haven’t done the horizontal test of this yet; is that correct? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Not of the new design. The all up motor will be 

DM-8, occurring in July of this year, to be followed by, on about two 

month centers, with these other all up certification motors. 

Senator KERRY. How many of those tests under the current plan will there be? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Five planned, all of the same configuration and 

design, four before the first flight. And we have got to have outstanding results. As I mentioned, over and above that we plan to 

introduce into the program two flight-configured ground test 

motors per year to parallel our flight program. That would address one of the earlier comments that was 

brought up; that is, are we going to be testing on the ground 

motors that have been reused to make sure that we are appropri- ately addressing the reuse issue? 

And on this concurrent parallel ground test program, we will be 

doing just that. 

Senator KERRY. Will those tests be tested to a specific percentage 

or will they be tested until point of failure? 

Mr. THOMPSON. They will be tested, it will be a nominal burn, 

but I suspect, and we have not designed these tests yet, but consist- 
74 

ent with the kind of thing we are doing in our space shuttle main 

engine program, we will induce limiting loads to thermal extremes, 

probably with the most reused hardware to try to flush out any 

weaknesses that we have got either in the design or in our reuse 

program. That would be the intent of that parallel ground test program. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RIEGLE. Senator Pressler. 

Senator PRESSLER. I guess I would address this to Mr. Garrison of 

the Morton Thiokol Company. As I questioned earlier, wasn’t the 

new SRM joint designed by engineers from Morton Thiokol? 

Mr. GARRISON. I think it was designed-it was a combination of 

effort between Morton Thiokol and NASA. 

Senator PRESSLER. I am trying to get to some facts relating to the 

retention of engineers within NASA. What do you pay your engineers who worked on this, roughly speaking? 

Mr. GARRISON. Senator, I don’t have the exact data with me. I 

am not prepared to answer specifically, but I would say that the 

technical people working in the area would range from recent college graduates to people that are paid up to probably $50,000 or 

$60,000 a year. 

Senator PRESSLER. $50,000 or $60,000 a year? 

Mr. GARRISON. That is the top end. And they would have supervisory responsibilities and they would have longterm service or experience. 

Senator PRESSLER. So you are paying about the same level of salaries to engineers as the government is paying? 

Mr. GARRISON. I cannot answer that question. I do not know 

what the government is paying. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Sir, let me take a shot at trying to put it on an 

apples-to-apples basis and then we can give you some detailed facts. 

It would be my judgment that at the nonsupervisory level but very 

senior design engineers working the details of that joint, that 0- 

ring and that kind of thing, you are probably looking at a differential between any contractor, not just Morton Thiokol, aerospace 

and NASA of about 25 percent. That would be my guess, NASA 

being on the low end. 

As you get up in management and supervision, then I think perhaps that starts to take it further apart. That would be my guess. 

Senator PRESSLER. You people are very senior experienced businessmen, and one is the head of the company. As one approaches 

the upper management positions, how much is the difference? 

Mr. THOMPSON. You know what I make. It is about $70,000. 

Senator PRESSLER. What does your counterpart at Morton Thiokol make? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I don’t know. 

Senator PRESSLER. I am trying to get a feel for what engineers 

make in the private sector, compared to their government counterparts. 

Mr. GARRISON. I think you should not address that to Morton 

Thiokol, sir. I think you need to look at the aerospace industry as a 

whole. And that is what we do. We pay in accordance with what 

the competition pays and the going rates. We have to do that. 
75 

Senator PRESSLER. I am not criticizing you. You are the head of 

Mr. GARRISON. I gave you a range. 

Senator PRESSLER. $50,000 to $60,000 a year? 

Mi-. GARRISON. I think that I would say engineering people are 

paid that much, yes. 

Senator PRESSLER. So the people that design this, the very top 

people are paid $50,000 to $60,000 a year? 

Mr. GARRISON. No, I said some of the top engineering people who 

are working on it are paid that. It depends on the other responsibilities. You have to take a composite. 

We also have people, engineers on the drafting board running 

analyses, running computer programs that are very low paid. So it 

is not an easy question to answer, sir. 

Senator PRESSLER. I am just trying to get a feel for a range of 

salaries. 

Mr. GARRISON. I really do not know what the difference is. I 

don’t have the advantage of knowing what NA§A pays. And I have 

never looked at a composite in our company in that manner. We 

will try to supply that to you. 

Senator PRESSLER. I am not criticizing. I am trying to get a feel 

for what our people are paid in government as opposed to in the 

private sector. Would you. please submit the best information you 

have available. I am not interested in individuals’ salaries by 

name, but categories. 

I would like both of you to submit that for the resord side by side. 

Mr. GARRISON. We would be happy to do that. 

[The following information was subsequently received for the 

the company. How much do you pay your top engineers? 

record:] 

Upon examination of the information provided by Morton-Thiokol, Inc., we firid 

that only limited comparisons can be made between NASA Marshall Space Flight 

Center (MSFC) and Morton-Thiokol engineering pcsitions. There are such significant differences in the organizational structure, scope of mission, and size of the two 

organizations that it is virtually impossible to make reliable comparisons. This is especially true for supervisory. and managerial levels. For example, we have compared the job responsibilities of the Director of the MSFC Science and Engineering Directorate, Mr. Jim Odom, to the Vice President, Space Engineering at 

Morton-Thiokol. Mr. Odom manages the work of 1,600 engineers involved in 20 to 25 

projects including the solid rocket motor. The Morton-Thiokol Vice President man- ages less than 300 engineers cn a smaller number of projects. Mr. Odom’s job is 

shown in Table 1 with salary of $75,500. The Morton-Thiokol Vice President’s job is 

shown on Table 2 with a salary of $82,314. 

Tables 1 and 2 show the types and average salaries of engineering positions at 

Warshall Spa.ce Flight Center and Morton-Thiokol, respectively. Table 3 is a side-by side comparison of some nonsupervisory poeiitions which appear reasonably comparable in terms of level of responsibility, complexity and experience. 

TABLE 1.-NASA MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER: ENGINEERING POSITIONS 

Title Grade Average salary 

Enineer trainee I .............................................. ...................................... 1 $23,866 

Engineer trainee II ................................................................................................................ 9 28,518 

Engineer junior ..................................................................................................................... 11 31,370 

Engineer ............................................................................................................................... 12 35,121 

Engineer expert ................................................................................................................... 13 44,407 

Engineer team leader .......................................................................................................... 14 50,338 
76 

TABLE 1.-NASA MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER: ENGINEERING POSITIONS-Continued 

Title 

~ ~~ ~~ ~ 

Grade Average salary 

Branch chief ........................................................................................................................ 14 56,125 

Division chief ............................ ......................................................... 15 65,971 

Laboratory dir ............................ ......................................................... SES-4 73,400 

Director, science & engineering ........................................................................................... SES-5 75,500 

Solid rocket motor joint design: 

B. Powers (MSFC) 48,876 ..................................................................................................................................................... 

R. Boisjoly (MTI) 61,506 .................................................................. ......................................................................... 

TABLE 2.-MORTON-THlOKOL ENGINEERING POSITIONS 

Title 

Engineer associate ............................................................................................................... 

Engineer associate senior .............................................. 

Engineer ....................................................................... 

Engineer senior ................................................................................................................... 

Project engineer .................................................................................................................. 

Project engineer seniar ....................................................................................................... 

Section supervisor/manager ................................................................................................ 

Engineering manager ............................................................................................................ 

Engineering manager ............................................................................................................ 

Engineering design manager ................................................................................................ 

Vice president engineering .................................................................................................. 

Grade Average salary 

10 $29,732 

11 32,931 

12 34,528 

14 38,792 

15 44,325 

16 52,624 

16 51,501 

17 57,805 

18 65,487 

19 78,437 

20 78,000 

21 82,014 

TABLE 3.-MSFC-MTI COMPARISON 

Title MSFC (Brade) Average salary 

Engineer trainee (I) ............................................................ 7 

Engineer trainee (11) ........................................................................................................... 9 

Engineer (junior) ................................................................................................................ 11 

.................................................................................. 12 

Engineer (expert) ............................................................................................................... 13 

Engineer associate ................................................................................................................ 10 

Engineer associate senior ............... .......................................... 11 

Engineer ......................................... .......... 12 

Engineer senior .............................. .......... 14 

Project engineer ................................................................................................................... 15 

$23.866 

28,518 

31,370 

35,727 

44,407 

29,732 

32,931 

34.528 

38,792 

44,325 

In response to Senator Pressler’s initial questioning about the salaries of the engi- neers working on the design of the solid rocket motor joints, we are providing specific salaries for two people, Roger Biosjoly of Morton-Thiokol and Ben Powers of Marshall, who were counterparts for the joint design. 

The wide pay disparity at the entry level is compatible with the findings of cur- rent nationwide pay comparability studies, and NASA’s own experience. In recent 

years, it has become increasingly difficult to hire and retain the best personnel be- cause of the heightened marketplace competition for top talent. The Challenger ac- cident has escalated these pressures. As a whole, the aerospace industry has much 

more flexibility to attract and retain top talent. NASA needs similar flexibilities to 

maintain the quality of leadership that is expected and required. 

Senator PRESSLER. The January 15th NRC report expressed concern that valuable time could lie lost if it became necessary to turn 

to one of the alternative designs as a consequence of something 

learned from the test program. 
77 

The NRC panel goes on to recommend that NASA should 

strengthen its contingency plans for incorporating alternatives into 

the redesign program. Do you agree with this assessement and recommendation and how will you respond to this recommendation? I 

address that to Mr. Garrison and Mr. Thompson. Mr. Garrison 

probably should go first. 

Mr. GARRISON. Yes, I do agree with it. I think we are complying 

within the activities that we are authorized to proceed with to respond to that. We have a number of both parallel and contingency 

designs and a major effort on them underway. 

I believe we have something like three or four for both the case 

joint and the nozzle-to-case joint. I think we are complying and we 

do agree with that, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, sir, I believe we will be doing more of it. I 

think the point or the issue that we have with the NRC, and it is 

not a basic issue, its one of priorities, is they want us to do even 

more. 

My only concern is I want to know how many balls we get in the 

air. I want to be able to do what we do and do it well. 

Senator RIEGLE. Ido want each member to have the chance to 

pursue it, but I want to make sure we hit everybody. I am concerned about the safety of people leaving later in the day and getting out of here. I am talking about our witnesses particularly. 

Senator Hollings, I know you have one thing you wanted to raise. 

The CHAIRMAN. I do thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Quickly, Mr. Thompson, I tried to approach it from the standpoint of 

contract restriction or of pressure. Let’s do it from the standpoint 

of common sense and then you correct me, maybe I am oversimplifying. 

In other words, I never have merged a rocket motor with a booster rocket itself. I have always found that the rocket motor worked, 

propellent and everything else, never a defect there, but since this 

was designed and manufactured 2,000 miles away, it had to be 

brought in segments down to Florida and all joined together. 

So we asked over a year ago almost, we said: Why not get the 

monolithic or single motor so that would forgo any kind of field 

joints and another O-ring and bringing heaters and doing all of 

that stuff? It just couldn’t leak. And we had responsible contractors 

saying that is the way it should go. I think that is what we are 

going to hear again. 

I want to hear one more time before we hear from them, is there 

some drawback or defect, in the monolithic booster itself-at that 

time we heard you didn’t have barges to get them and bring them 

around to the Cape. I have barges coming out of my ears down in 

Charleston, South Carolina. The Navy has them backed up in 

creeks and I can get you all the barges to move the thing. 

I am not worried about that, but that is the excuse. They said it 

was a good idea, Senator, but we didn’t have barges. That is why I 

come back to a test engineer and a design engineer, your expert 

judgment on the fundamental design of this thing. Is there a drawback to having a monolithic one? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Certainly it is not the transportation of any significance. I am intrigued by the idea. You are pouring a lot of pro- 
78 

pellent and curing it in one shot. The people that do that have a 

lot of confidence in it. 

If we embark on that road, we have also got to develop that confidence. And that is kind of the process we are going through now. 

You always have to end up with at least one joint. However we go, 

we have got to have a reliable joint design, but the monolithic concept is attractive to some of us in NASA. We are looking at it very hard. 

I personally want to hear more about it. That is what I have got 

the people doing now. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have another question, but 

before the witness leaves, I just want to say that listening to him, I 

feel a good deal of confidence in the way you have taken charge at 

Marshall in this aspect of the program. 

I am very impressed and look forward to visiting at Marshall. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think we ought to get him a job at the National 

Security Council so the President can hear what is going on. I can 

hear you. 

Senator RIEGLE. Let me say that we appreciate the testimony 

today. And the more we see of the new team, speaking for myself, 

the more I see of the new team, the better I feel. 

And we are here to work with you. So the intensity of interest 

that you see today to have this many Senators here and as involved as we are, we are not trying to do anybody else’s job. We are 

trying to do our job, and that is to understand what is happening 

here and to be sure that what is being done is right 2nd conforms 

with the Rogers Commission recommendations and that we are get- ting the job done. 

So we will have the closest kind of working relationship but it 

will be a constructive one and a positive one and an independent 

one, as it properly should be. 

So let me thank you now. Let me now invite the contractor 

group to come to the table, if they would. 

Let me ask, if I can, if we can have others in the room be seated 

so that we can proceed. Let me say to the contractor group which 

is at the table that we are pleased to haw you with us today. We 

thank you for braving the elements and the blizzard to come here. 

Those of us that come from more northern climates are used to 

snowstorms and Zizzards of this kind, but they are relatively uncommon here. So to get through the traffic and to gat here is a 

major achievement. And I thank all of you for doing so. 

I will start with asking a couple of things, posing a couple of 

questions and then I will call on you, Mr. Brown, to kick this off. I 

think we will go in ths order of Mr. Brown, Mr. Crosby, Mr. Mettenet, Mr. Sides and Mr. Dorsey, ia that order. I want to get your 

opinions on what we have just been discussing; namely, your professional judgment about this solid rocket motor redesign program 

that has just been described. 

I want to hear your thoughts on both your feeling about the way 

that seems to be proceeding and also the question of an upgrade to 

a solid rocket motor of a different kind. 

I think it is very important that you all be involved actively in 

searching for these answers. I think out of the competition and the 
79 

alternatives that can be developed by different engineering teams, 

can lead us to the best possible result. And it may very well be a 

different design for the future. 

I think we have just heard from Mr. Thompson that he is very interested in looking at other designs as are others in NASA, as we 

are, because we want to make sure we are using the best approach 

that we can find. So you folks are really vital to the process of 

helping us determine whether or not there is an alternative out 

there that would be better and that we ought to move towards. 

So, Mr. Brown, let me start with you and then we will go down 

through this group. I will ask, in the interest of time, including 

your own time, that you condense your thoughts as best you can. 

And if you have a lengthy prepared statement, we will put it in the 

record and review it carefully, but if you can summarize it, that 

would be helpful to us. 

STATEMENTS OF GEORGE G. BROWN, VICE PRESIDENT FOR PROHARRY L. CROSBY, VICE PRESIDENT FOR BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT FOR CHEMICAL SYSTEMS DIVISION, UNITED TECHNOLGRAM DEVELOPMENT, AEROJET STRATEGIC PROPULSION CO.; 

OGIES CORP.; ERNEST A. METTENET, PRESIDENT, HERCULES 

AEROSPACE PRODUCTS GROUP, HERCULES AEROSPACE CO.; 

AGER, PROPULSION DIVISION, ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.; 

AND EDWARD G. DORSEY, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, WASATCH DIVISION, MORTON THIOKOL 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to 

have the opportunity to appear. The testimony that I submitted 

covers the shuttle rocket redesign activities. I am going to address 

my remarks to a parallel or an alternative motor program that I 

feel NASA should embark upon. 

We have proposed an alternate to NASA which would be conducted in parallel to the current redesign activity. This is a timely 

program. It is cost effective. It costs much less than the $350 million that Senator Gore referred to for the ongoing activity. 

The Aerojet proposal actually would completely eliminate the 

field joint problem. This would be done by preassembling rocket 

motor segments as received from Thiokol and then insulating over 

the joints that are caused by that assembly, so that you wind up with complete continuous insulation over all the joints in the 

motor, except for the end joints, that is the igniter and the nozzle 

joints, which will exist in any event, and then inserting a core in 

the motor, in the cast pit, and then completing casting a single pro- pellent grain. 

You wind up then with continuous insulation over all of the 

joints plus the thickness of the propellent itself, which protects the 

joint from the hot gas in the motor. The joints never see the hot 

gas in that case. 

So to me it is a complete and wholly reliable kind of a solution to 

the field joint problem. This design has been examined in detail by us, checked out with structural analysts at NASA, and has essentially the same structural margins that the segmented grain design has. 

JAMES R. SIDES, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MAN- 
80 

We are able to do this with a very strong sense of confidence because the flights that have been flown have flown with so-called 

factory joints that are built in this same way. They have complete 

insulation over them. They have propellent cast over the joint. 

And they have had complete success in all of the flights to date 

with no anomalies or no indicater of trouble in any of the flight 

records that have been received by NASA to date. 

So we really convert then a faulty field joint into a reliable factory joint. If you do a statistical reliability assessment of the design 

using the Morton Thiokol report as submitted to NASA, comparing 

the reliability of the so-called factory joints to field joints, you can 

actually get a 67 percent reduction in potential motor case failure 

causes. And that significantly improves flight safety, which is the 

objective that we started out with, with our design. 

We can do this by assembling the solid rocket in an existing 

rocket facility in Dade County, Florida that has access to water 

through a canal. This facility was specifically designed and operated for a previous NASA program, a 260-inch rocket program. We 

developed and tested three 260-inch rockets there and a 120-inch 

rocket. 

The facility was operating in the middle '60s. It is capable of 

being quickly reactivated in a timely manner so that we could conduct a program in parallel to, with a slightly longer time schedule, 

the current redesign program. 

The question has been brought up in this regard, as Senator Hollings has referred to, of transportation. You have to barge a completely assembled rocket motor that weighs in excess of a million 

pounds. 

Now, we have looked at the equipment that is required to do 

that, the cranes that are needed to lift it, the transport equipment 

that is needed to move it onto a barge and so on, and the equipment exists. It is off the shelf from various contractors throughout 

the United States to do this. 

We don't consider that to be a major problem. It is something 

that has to be worked out in concert with NASA, particularly because the motors received at the Kennedy Space Center, have to be 

handled in the same way. 

Senator RIEGLE. Let me just ask you a question there. In that research are you aware of anything else that we move around the 

country that would, in one unit, that would weigh as much as a 

million pounds? Is this something where there are other kinds of 

things? I know this is more delicate, perhaps, than other things. 

Mr. BROWN. Yes, let me cite you one example. In the nuclear industry, where you have these nuclear reactors, pressure vessels and 

so on, they weigh well in excess of a million pounds. They are 

larger than the solid rocket motor that we are talking about here 

and they are being moved every day into remote locations, essentially, not a well-developed location like our plant or like Kennedy 

Space Center. 

So equipment exists to do that, to do it safely and to do it reliably. 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you. 

Mr. BROWN. The facility that we had, as I mentioned, was put 

there for the 260-inch rocket motor program. And this facility is ca- 
81 

pable of being reactivated and then producing the amount of propellent and casting that propellent in a large cast pit that still 

exists on the facility and doing it at the rate, essentially, that is 

required for the shuttle program. 

The quality verification testing we have recommended to NASA 

be done at Kennedy Space Center. So there would have to be the 

addition of some quality facilities, including x-ray equipment and 

quality verification tests, just before it goes into the vertical assembly building. 

Transporting the booster there in one piece has an advantage in 

that it takes all of the rocket segment assembly operations out of 

the vertical assembly building. There is quite a bit of time now 

that is involved in putting the rocket motor together in the vertical 

assembly building. 

That would be done offsite at our plant, and we would transport 

a completely assembled motor in there, thus saving NASA that 

time lag in the vertical assembly building. 

We feel that our large motor experience in the unique facility 

that we have at Dade County can provide fc.r the production of 

what we refer to as a single grain solid rocket motor, recognizing 

that we still build up the motor hardware, the steel hardware segment by segment and use the existing hardware in the program, 

the existing O-rings and all of that, plus all of the existing process 

experience. 

So the only thing that we are really changing is the propellent 

casting operation itself. And that is the thing I think that NASA 

has to look at in detail with us and satisfy themselves that it can 

be done safely and reliably. 

We feel that NASA should really start this parallel program 

now. They have already embarked on a joint redesign. They have 

looked at many, many different designs for the joint. They have selected the one or the two or three that they are proceeding with 

and that they should now embark on something that is significantly different, a different approach, an approach that affords NASA 

the opportunity to significantly improve the flight safety of the 

shuttle system. 

We feel this particular approach would do that. We think they 

should proceed now. Thank you. 

[The statement follows:] 
STATEMENT BY GEORGE G. BROWN, 

AEROJET STRATEGIC PROPULSION COMPANY 

SUMMARY 

Investigation of the Challenger accident 

revealed that the solid rocket motor (SRM) 

segmented design with O-ring joint seals 

must be modified to eliminate any possible 

hot gas leakage. Future Space Shuttle 

flights must be both safe and reliable for 

launching national payloads in support of 

the United States Space program. 

Aerojet has recommended a recovery 

program that would be both timely and cost 

efficient when conducted in parallel with 

other candidate design modifications to 

reduce program risk for the NASA Space 

program. Aerojet would completely eliminate the O-ring seal failure problem and hot 

gas leakage path at the field joints while 

using all the existing solid rocket motor 

chambers and other components. Use of the 

existing qualified hardware and processes 

are possible by preassembling the existing 

Morton Thiokol Inc. (MTI) chamber segments without propellant, using the same 

seaW and pins. The internal segmented 

chamber joint interfaces of the completely 

stacked motor case would then be completely insulated and the propellant cast; 

thus creating a motor with continuous 

insulation and single-grain that would 

prevent any possible hot gas leakage paths 

to the O-rings. 

This single insulation and propellant 

grain design reduces the possible hot gas 

leakage paths from the five current seal 

failure points to only the two required at 

the igniter and the nozzle. Also this design 

reduces the debond failure point of the 

propellant/insulation to hot gas pressure, 

1 

from the eight current interfaces to only the 

two required at the forward and aft ends 

of the solid motor. Reduction of these hot 

gas seals and potential debond interfaces 

reduces potential failure modes to improve 

flight reliability. Also, previous Shuttle 

flights have verified that this single 

insulator and grain assembly method used 

with MTI factory segments prevents any 

damage to the segmented joints. The joint 

seals are not pressure actuated and have 

the integrity of the casewall since they are 

sealed and thermally protected by not only 

the insulation, but also the propellant itself. 

Aerojet would assemble the solid motor near a waterway for transportation to 

either the Eastern or Western Test Range. 

Such capability exists at the Aerojet Dade 

County Facility. This large rocket motor 

installation in Florida was originally 

designed and used for the successful NASA 

Large 260-in. Diameter Motor Program. 

One 120-in. diameter subscale and then 

three 260-in. diameter by 80 feet long, solid 

motors were successfully cast and tested 

using the single insulator and grain design. 

After Shuttle motor assembly and casting, 

the Solid Rocket Motor would be barged to 

the launch site as is currently done with 

all the Shuttle external tanks. The Aerojet 

Dade County Facility was originally capable of producing up to 14,000 pounds of 

propellant per hour using one continuous 

mixer and two vertical batch mixers. This 

facility still has the large cast pit, vertical 

propellant batch mixer and continuous 

mixer buildings, one continuous mixer, 

infrastructure and other facilities. Thus, the 
83 

existing facility could be activated and 

qualified for producing over two NASA 

Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motors per 

month in not only the least time, but for 

the minimum amount of funding. 

Currently all large solid motors in the 

United States use a single (monolithic) 

grain design, except for the Titan 120-in. 

diameter, and the Space Shuttle 146-in. 

diameter motors. These large motors were 

segmented to allow ground transportation 

from the manufacturer to the launch site. 

Both motor designs have recently experienced flight failure due to thermal daniage 

to the segmented field joint O-rings or propellant debonds at the segmented 

interfaces. Industrial experience is available for the design and production of single 

grain motors to provide NASA an alternate 

low-risk and highly-reliable solid rocket 

motor program for future reliable Space 

Shuttle flights. 

Any design or manufacturing process 

change will require requalification of the 

Solid Rocket Motors. X-ray inspection of the 

transported motor and qualification testing 

could be efficiently accomplished at the 

Cape. Use of existing qualified procedures 

and contractor and NASA personnel prior 

to providing hardware for single grain 

propellant casting and after single grain 

motor delivery to the launch site minimizes 

proven solid motor process changes and 

thus program risks. 

This proposed Solid Rocket Motor 

manufacturing approach provides NASA 

and the United States a candidate solution 

to the Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor O-ring 

design problem. Thus, this program should 

be conducted in parallel with other current 

design approaches, to assure NASA that 

a reliable Solid Rocket Motor design is 

obtained for future Space Shuttle flights. 

The approach that NASA has taken since 

the Challenger accident has concentrated on redesign of the field joint to incorporate 

additional O-ring seals and a capture 

feature in the clevis joint. They have 

explored a multitude of different designs to 

improve the reliability of the field joints and 

have selected the best design to develop and 

test in a very extensive program. It is 

appropriate that NASA should initiate an 

alternative approach that provides for an 

improvement to Space Shuttle Solid Rocket 

Motor reliability. The single grain Solid 

Rocket Motor provides that alternative 

approach. 

A reliability assessment of the Aerojet 

design shows significant improvement over the segmented design. The SRM Failure 

Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA) 

Report (TRW-10168) was the baseline for 

comparing potential failure modes against 

those identified for the current design. The 

results of this study indicate a possible 67% 

reduction in potential failure causes, and 

is summarized below. This study concluded 

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Summary 

FME A-Identified 

Failure Causes 

Component Segmented SRM 

Case 53 

Insulation 106 

Propellant/Liner 

Overall 

Percent Reduction (Single GrainbSegmented Grain) 

54 

213 

Comparison 

Analysis 

Single Grain SRM 

34 

13 

24 

71 

67 

2 
84 

that SRM reliability (and therefore, flight 

safety) is significantly improved by the 

Aerojet Single Grain and Insulation SRM 

design. 

This concept negates the importance of 

devoting significant resources to design 

studies leading to improved case segment 

joints, as sealing integrity is maintained 

by the internal insulation and propellant 

at each factory joint, and the current joint 

design, as well as the three O-ring modification, is acceptable. 

When compared with the conventional 

segmented SRM, the added safety and 

reliability of the single-grain design were 

the most obvious and important features 

supporting this approach. However, other 

benefits and potential deficiencies, in any 

comparison between a single grain SRM 

and the segmented version, needed examination. Therefore, trade studies were 

conducted on performance, mass properties, reliability, processing, transportation, 

and handling. Summary information concerning these aspects is presented later in 

this statement. We have verified that other 

positive benefits can accrue in the area of 

performance and mass properties and that 

issues concerning processing, transportation, and handling can be dealt with in a 

routine, straightforward manner. 

Therefore, it is recommended that NASA 

should immediately proceed with this 

alternative single grain solid rocket motor 

approach in parallel with the current 

redesign program to significantly improve 

reliability and flight safety in a timely and 

cost-effective manner. 

The fold-out page that follows presents 

a sequential illustrated program approach 

for this alternative program recommended 

to NASA for implementation. The availability of appropriate facilities represented 

by Aerojet's Dade Division is a vital factor 

underlying the viability of this alternative 

SRM program. These facilities permit a 

timely schedule, i.e., delivery of flight 

motors to Kennedy Space Center in 20 

months. The buildings, roads, utilities and 

plant infrastructure at the Dade Division 

leads to an alternative program that is very 

cost-effective. This alternative program can 

be accomplished for significantly less funds 

than now being expended on the joint 

redesign activities. 

At the initiation of the alternative 

program, Aerojet would conduct all design, 

analysis, laboratory and subscale testing 

operations and ignitor fabrication at the 

Aerojet Sacramento facility. At the Dade 

County facility, the chamber segments 

would 'be assembled, fully insulated and 

lined, the propellant mixed, cast, and cured 

and the nozzle, ignitor and tunnel assem- blies installed. 

The pages that follow present a program/ 

facility description of the Dade Division 

activity. 

3 
SINGLE INSULATOWGRAIN REDUCES SOLID ROCKET MOTOR (SRM) PROGRAM RISK 

0 Uses Existing Hardware Already Built for the 0 Flight-Proven Factory Joints 

- SRM 0 Qualified by Both Ground Test and Flight 

Existing Segmented Case Hardware 

0 Reduces Cost and Time 

0 Conventional Single Propellant Grain and Single 

lnsulatom 

0 Grain Stresses Are Lower Than Segmented 

to Reduce Risk 

0 Allows Use of Existing Tooling, Procedures 

and Experience 

0 Eliminates Hot Gas Exposure to Case Walls and 

Segmented Joints 

Protects Case Material and Segmented Joints 

From Hot Gases 

Prevents Propellant Debonds at Segmented 

Joints 

Design 

Grains 

0 Removes Pressure Loads on Segmented 

0 Removes Tangential Instability 

wlII Be BargeTransported Likeshuttle 

Tank 

INSULATIOWGRAIN FAILURE mim 

-- SEGMENTED SINGLE 

- CASE 53 34 

* INSULATION 106 13 - PROPELLANT/LINER 54 - 24 

TOTAL FAILURE POINTS 71 

4 
86 

EXISTING DADE COUNTY FACILITY 

0 Located Near KSC, Homestead AFB and Miami 

Facility Has a Benign Temperature Environment 

0 Accessible to Navigable Waterways for Safe 

Transportation to KSC and WTR 

0 Facility Was Constructed to Build Laige NASA 

0 Existing Facility Can Be Reactivated to Produce 

0 Facility Has Growth Potential to Meet All NASA 

Solid Rocket Motors 

at Least Two Solid Rockets Per 'Month 

Shuttle Flight Requirements 
SRM PROGRAM SCHEDULE 

0 Production Motors Can Be Delivered Within 20 Months After 

Contract GeAhead 

0 Use of Single Insulator and Grain With Existing Hardware Would 

Pmvide NASA a Low Cost Backup SRM Program 

0 Program Costs Are Low Due to Use of Existing HardwarWFacilities 

SRM Manufacturing Approach - KSC 

0 Aerojet Dade Division Minimizes Change to Current NASA Solid 

Rocket Motor Procesing 

COUHTY FACILITY t 

LAUNCH 

MLP TO VAB 

TEST EVALUATION 
88 

USE OF EXISTING SRM HARDWARUPROCEDURES PROVIDES 

RECEIVE EXISTING CHAMBER HARDWARE 

0 Receive Case Segments at Dade County on Existing Standard Rail Cars 

inspect and Transport to Assembly Area 

STACK CASE SEGMENTS AND INSULATE 

Use Existing Procedures, Seals 

and Pins 

0 Insulate Segments and Vulcanize 

Using Qualified Material and 

Procedures to Provide Motor 

Insulator to Protect Chamber 

Walls and Joints 
89 

NASA A LOW RISK ALTERNATE PROGRAM 

CAST AND CURE PROPELLANT 

Lift Motor Into Cast Pit and Install 

Core to Produca the Required 

SRM ThNSflime Perfonnanca 

Vacuum Cast Single Motor Propellant 

Grain to Eliminate Hot Gas Leakage 

Path to the Single Liner, Insulator, 

Chamber Well, and Segmented Joints 

Cure Propellant and Remove Core 

All Resulting Segmented Field 

Joints Haw Same Flight and 

Ground Test Charactenstiff as 

Proven Factory Joints 

Assemble and Transport 

install Assembled Solid Rocket Motor 

on Transporter After Installing 

Short Nozzle and Igniter 

Move Motor to Barge 

CI 

Ziq 

BEU(1 OF 3) 
90 

MOVE TO KSCMR BY BARGE 

Place on Barge at Dade County a Remove From Barge at Launch Slte 

a Transwrt to Launch Site Assemble into Space Shuttle Launch 

Configuration. Conduct Inspections and 

Load on MLP (KSC) 

THE MROJET PROGRAM PROVIDES NASA WlTn A PROVEN ALTERNATE DESIGN I THAT PREVENTS ANY FUTURE KlGM FAILURES DUE TO THE FIELD JOINTS 1 
91 

1.0 INTRODUCTION ment, Aerojet will conduct its operations in 

a manner consistent with all current 

In order to Provide NASA with an regulations and other environmentally 

alternate source for a safe, highly reliable sound considerations. Particular attention 

large solid rocket motor (SRM) for the Space will be given to the Everglades and Bis. 

Shuttle Booster and other uses, Aerojet is cayne Bay and protection of such endanProPosing that the motors be filled With gered species as the manatee and crocodile, 

propellant(1oaded) at its Dade County Plant and their habitats. It may be noted that 

site. This facility provides the only current at Aerojet’s Sacramento, California facility 

capability within the free world for loading Over 100 bird species are indigenous to the 

such large solid rocket motors as a single site, among them 12 protected species 

unit - a feature which drastically reduces including the perigrine ~~l~~~ and Bald 

the potential for booster motor failure ~~~l~. Other wildlife, including deer, 

during flight. skunks, opossums, rabbits, wild turkeys, 

Current plans provide for using existing and bobcats also inhabit the site with no 

prepared booster motor case segments. adverse impact from operations Performed 

These will be shipped from Morton Thiokol there. At Dade County, Aerojet will likewise 

in Utah by rail to Florida City and trans- avoid significant impact on the habitat of 

ferred to truck for shipment to the Aerojet all wildlife indigenous to the area with fully 

plant site (preparation of the segments is appropriate consideration for all endannot planned for this facility, although if gered species. 

requested by NASA, Aerojet would provide The following sections contain more such a case segment preparation facility in detailed discussions of the activities pro- an area like Florida City). All chemicals posed for the existing manufacturing 

and other materials will be brought by rail facility. ~~~~ri~ti~~~ of the modifications 

or truck to Florida City and trucked to the and additions necessary for the manufacThe case segments will be assembled into Booster motors are also included, Addi. a rocket motor case which will be filled with 

Propellant and shipped as a complete unit 

by barge to the launch site(s). 

B~~~~~ will travel from the site by canal 

to open water and will then follow the same 

route used by current bargelship traffic in 

Barnes Sound, Card Sound, Biscayne Bay, 

Biscayne Channel, and the Florida Intersite, or brought to the site directly by truck. ture and assembly of the Solid Rocket 

tional project components described are 

water use, work force location and population, noise events, hazardous materials 

generation, site restrictions, and economic 

impact. 

2.0 FACILITY OPERATIONS 

2.1 Proposed Phasing 

Aerojet’s Dade County facility was constructed during the 1960s and used to 

provide exactly this type of capability for 

loading large solid rocket booster motors as a single unit. However, contrary to 

preceeding operations, no rocket motor test 

firings will be conducted at this site. 

Recognizing the concern for the environmodifications and aciditions to accommo- date manufacture of increased quantities of 

the Solid Rocket Booster motors. 

2.2 Proposed Operations 

SRM fabrication and assembly operations will be performed at the Aerojet Dade 

County plant site. No rocket motor testing 

6 
92 

is planned at this site. This activity, 

although performed during the original use 

of the facility, is currently under consideration at locations where such testing is 

routinely conducted. It is thus expected that 

there will be no adverse noise events from 

the reactivated facility. 

2.3 Manufacturing Process 

The manufacturing and assembling of 

SRMs, independent of size, can be described 

as a four step process: (1) preparation of 

a propellant, (2) preparation of rocket motor 

inert parts to contain the propellant, (3) 

loading of the propellant into the inert 

subassembly, and (4) final assembly of 

completed motors. These four processes are 

planned to be conducted at the Dade County 

facility. 

2.3.1 Propellant Manufacture 

The composite propellant process flow 

shown in Figure 2.1 indicates the five basic 

steps in the process of manufacturing 

propellant. 

Figure 2.1 Solid Rocket Motors Composite 

Propellant - Process Flow 

Oxidizer Storage - Ammonium Perchlorate oxidizer is received at the facility via 

railroad transport to Florida City and truck 

transport to the Aerojet plant site. The 

material is stored in above ground containers in a separate area from other chemicals 

as shown in Figure 2.1.1. It is estimated 

that approximately 12,000,000 lb of oxidizer 

will be in storage to properly support the 

propellant mixing activities. All oxidizer 

will be stored in above ground containers 

with fully adequate spill protection features 

and procedures provided. 

Figure 2.1.1 Oxidizer Storage - Aerojet 

Dade Plant NASA-SRM 

Program, 1964-1966 

Chemical Storage - All other propellant 

chemicals are received at the facility via 

railroad transport to Florida City (Figure 

2.1.2) and truck transport to the Aerojet 

plant site. The materials are stored in one 

or more buildings reserved strictly for 

storage of chemicals. These chemicals 

consist primarily of innocuous non-toxic 

materials and will amount to approximately 500,000 lb. All chemicals will be 

stored in above ground containers with 

' I' 

I 1 

Figure 2.1.2 Chemical Receiving - Aerojet 

Florida City NASA-SRM 

Program, 1964-1966 

7 
93 

fully adequate spill protection features and an enclosed system (Figures 2.1.5 and 2.1.6) 

procedures provided. under tightly controlled conditions to 

Oxidizer Grind - The Ammonium Perchlorate oxidizer is handled in closed containers as shown in Figure 2.1 3. The oxidizer 

is ground to a specific particle blend in a 

fully enclosed system within the enclosed 

facility (Figure 2.1.4). An extensive dust 

control collection system is provided to 

preclude any emission of particulate material outside the building. Approximately 

150,000 lb of oxidizer are present in the 

facility during processing. 

Figure 2.1.3 Oxidizer Handling - Aerojet 

Dade Plant NASA-SRM 

Program, 1964-1966 

Figure 2.1.4 Oxidizer Blending - Aerojet 

Dade Plant NASA-SRM 

program, 1964-1966 

Fuel Preparation - Specific chemicals 

are weighed and mixed into a slurry called 

a submix. A separate group of chemicals 

is weighed and mixed to form a catalyst 

called the final fuel. All mixing is done in 

8 

achieve process specifications as well as to 

control all potential emissions. Chemicals 

are dispensed into closed containers with 

adequate spill protection features and 

procedures provided. Approximately 

150,000 lb of chemicals are present in the 

building during processing. 

Figure 2.1.5 Fuel Liquids Addition - Aezet 

Dade Plant NASA-SRM 

Proeram. 1964-1966 

Figure 2.1.6 Fuel Solids Addition - Aerojet 

Dade Plant NASA-SRM 

Program, 1964-1966 
P6 
95 

propellant. Tooling is removed from the 

subassembly (Figure 2.2.4), and any excess 

propellant is cut away (Figure 2.2.5) to 

provide a final solid propellant shape. 

Figure 2.2.1 Receive Case Segments - 

Aerojet Dade Plant NASA-SRM 

Program, 1964-1966 

Figure 2.2.2 Case Preparation for Loading - Aerojet Dade Plant NASASRM Program, 1964-1966 

Figure 2.2.4 Casting Form Removal - Aerojet Dade Plant NASA-SRM 

Program, 1964-1966 

Figure 2.2.3 &opellant Casting Into Case - Figure 2.2.5 Solid Propellant Finishing - Aerojet Dade Plant NASA-SRM 

Program, 1964-1966 Program, 1964-1966 

Aerojet Dade Plant NASA-SRM 

10 
96 

The casting of the propellant is done The completed rocket motor is then ready 

within an evacuated (vacuum) cannister for shipment. 

At the Dade County facility, the com- inside the enclosed facility to assure 

adherence to process specifications. No pleted SRM assembly will be lifted vertigaseous products evolve from the process. cally from the casting,assembly pit with 

Any waste propellant and other chemical during these operations is a crane, as shown in Figure 2.2.8, and 

collected and disposed of in a prescribed lowered to a horizontal position. It will then 

be placed on a diesel powered crawler environmentally approved manner. transporter (Figure 2.2.9) for the short trip 

Final Assembly - All remaining compo- to the loading dock and subsequent barge 

nents and subassemblies consisting prim- loading for delivery to NASA. 

arily of a nozzle and an ignition system are assembled (Figures 2.2.6 and 2.2.7) to form Of the Operations described above were 

a completed solid rocket motor assembly. ~~uv~~~s~c~o~~~~i~?~l,D$~ 

waste 

Figure 2.2.7 Rocket Motor Assembly - Figure 2.2.8 Rocket Motor Lifting - Aerojet 

Aerojet Dade Plant NASA-SRM Dade Plant NASA-SRM 

program, 1964-1966 Program, 1964-1966 

11 
97 

Figure 2.2.9 Loaded Rocket Motor Move - 

Aerojet Dade Plant SASA-SRM 

Program, Future 

2.4 Land Use/Infrastructure 

2.4.1 Access/Transportation 

Current access to the Aerojet facility is 

from State Highway 27. No change in this 

access route is contemplated. Access to the 

facility will continue to be restricted and 

patrolled by security personnel. 

Although access to the facility will be 

restricted, limited access will be provided 

to state and federal agency personnel and 

private parties that require access in order 

to exercise specific duties or functions. No 

firearms, hunting, or off-road vehicle use 

will be allowed on the facility. 

Shipment of completed rocket motor 

boosters will be by barge through existing 

canals to Barnes Sound, Card Sound, 

Biscayne Bay, and out Biscayne Channel 

to deep water as shown in Figure 2.2.10. 

This barge traffic will follow established 

traffic routes in these areas. The minimal 

additional traffic generated by the Aerojet 

activity (approximately one barge every 10 

days) is expected to have little effect upon 

existing conditions in this area. Barge 

designs which result in very shallow draft 

at the weights incurred during large solid 

rocket booster transport appear to preclude 

any need to increase depth of existing 

routes in Barnes Sound, Card Sound, 

Biscayne Bay, Biscayne Channel, or the 

Florida Intercoastal Waterway by dredging. In addition, barge designs will include 

features such as propeller guards, intake 

screens, etc. effective in protection of 

endangered water species. 

The existing canal now has an earthen 

plug installed to control fresh water discharge and salinity intrusion. This plug will 

need to be removed and a gate or gates used 

to allow barge movement and control water 

flow. Aerojet is studying three alternative 

methods for controlling salinity intrusion 

or fresh water discharge and allowing 

barge traffic to pass. The three systems 

under study are a mechanical lock system, 

a hydraulically inflatable plug, and a single 

or double lock system. The final system will 

be constructed and operated in a manner 

which will strictly control water flow in an 

environmentally acceptable way. 

2.4.2 Land Disturbance 

The proposed reactivation and modification of the Aerojet Dade County facility will 

have minimal effect on the surrounding 

landscape. Any areas disturbed during 

construction will be rehabilitated through 

revegetation with native species. The 

existing access road to the canal will be 

graded to an approximate width of 30 fer; 

to accommodate the diesel powered crawler 

type transporter depicted in Figure 2.2.9. 

This access road will not be surfaced. 

To provide adequate loading and turning 

facilities for the barge traffic, it will be 

necessary to provide a turning basin and 

loading dock at the head of the existing 

canal. All work in this regard will be 

conducted under permit from the Corps of 

Engineers with disposal of all dredged 

material as directed by the permit(s). 

As an alternative, it has been proposed 

that the C-lllcanal be extended to a point 

adjacent to the final assembly area, thereby 

negating the need to transport the large 

12 
98 

Atlantic 

Ocean 

Figure 2.2.10 Barge Route - Aerojet Dade 

Division to Kennedy Space 

Center 
booster motor over land. This has obvious 

operational advantages and will be considered if it can be shown to have a significant environmental benefit for example by 

enhancing the sheetflow of water in the 

Everglades Park area. This alternative 

would include the needed turning basin and 

loading dock mentioned above. 

2.4.3 Facilities Infrastructure 

The following is a list of the various 

services Aerojet has provided or will provide 

for the proposed operations. The services 

discussed below are water supply, roads, 

electrical power, and waste disposal. 

Water Supply - The project will be 

supplied with domestic water from existing 

wells on the site. No new wells are contemplated at this time. 

Roads - The existing road network will 

be utilized and maintained without major 

alteration except where necessary in the 

motor manufacturing area and the access 

road to the barge canal. Here, the modifications will be kept to an absolute 

minimum. 

Electrical Power - The existing power 

supply to the facility will be adequate for 

all contemplated operations. Refurbishment with minimal modifications is 

required. 

Waste Disposal - All waste generated 

(other than domestic wastewater) will be 

collected and transported off-site to an 

approved disposal site. Disposal of waste 

propellant will be accomplished by collection, packaging in durable corrosion proof 

containers, and shipment as DOT Class B 

explosive to an approved thermal treatment 

site. Thermal treatment of propellant waste 

will be prohibited at the Dade County 

facility unless accomplished within an 

enclosed system utilizing air scrubbers and 

liquid/solid separators which prevent 

emissions to the atmosphere and fully 

comply with EPA and other regulatory 

requirements. Existing facilities for the 

treatment of domestic wastewater will be 

refurbished and brought up to current 

standards. 

2.5 Environmental Audit Committee 

Aerojet will establish an internal Environmental Audit Committee to review 

proposed Aerojet construction activities to 

ensure environmentally sensitive issues are 

being addressed. As part of the project, 

Aerojet environmental staff will oversee 

permit compliance and ensure that proposed activities, including construction, are 

conducted in an environmentally sound 

manner. 

2.6 Work Force Population 

The Aerojet Dade County facility will 

employ approximately 150 to 200 full time 

people when utilized at maximum capacity 

for SRM production. It is expected that 70 

percent of this workforce would be hired 

locally with the balance of technical 

personnel being transferred from other 

Aerojet facilities. 

2.7 Economic Influence 

The estimated cost of each Solid Rocket 

Booster motor is in excess of $5.0 million 

or greater than $10.0 million per Space 

Shuttle flight. Total value of the proposed 

project is therefore in excess of $150 million 

per year at the projected launch rate of 15 

flights per year. Of this cost, it is estimated 

that approximately 25 percent or $36 

million per year will be expended in the 

immediate Dade County area with significant positive impact on the local economy. 

In addition, during the plant reactivation 

and addition phases, a significant local 

work force will be required with additional 

economic benefit to the area of $20 to $30 

million. 

2.8 Supplemental Project Motivation 

Other potential work similar to that 

described herein for NASA is under both 

14 
government and commercial consideration. 

This potential work would either supplant 

or supplement the specific Space Shuttle 

Booster motor work. Impact of this other 

work, although specifically indeterminate 

at this time, would appear to fall totally 

within the descriptions provided in this 

document, and could provide benefits of 

additional employment and positive economic effects in the area. 

3.0 FACILITIES DESCRIPTION 

A plot plan and location map of the 

Aerojet Dade County Florida facility is 

provided as Figure 3.1. The following is a 

listing and general description of each 

facility component to be reactivated 

together with the modifications which may 

be required for this project. The information 

includes general data on the building type, 

purpose, building description, waste generated, and methods for disposal. 

3.1 Administration and Inert Area 01 

Activities located in this area include: 

Administration and engineering offices 

Maintenance and support activities 

Receiving, storage, and shipment of inert 

Fabrication, assembly, and preparation 

materials and components 

of inert components. 

Refurbishment with minimal modifications of the existing facilities is required. 

Only domestic wastewater and nonhazardous solid waste will be generated in 

this area. 

3.2 Magazine Storage Area 10 

This area will be used for the receiving 

and bulk storage of hazardous materials 

including: 

Oxidizers 

Fuel ingredients 

Assembled igniterb). 

Refurbishment with minimal modifica 

tions of the existing facilities is required. 

Only domestic wastewater will be gener. 

100 

15 

ated in this area. 

3.3 Chemical Processing Area 11 

This area, shown in part as Figures 3.1.1 

through 3.1.4, will be used for the preparation and mixing of solid propellant. 

Laboratory facilities for analytical control 

of raw material and material in process are located here. 

Figure 3.1.1 Process Area 11 

I I 

Figure 3.1.2 Oxidizer Preparation Building 

Figure 3.1.3 Fuel Preparation Building 
101 
102 

Figure 3.1.4 Propellant Mixing Buildings Figure 3.1.5 SRM Case Assembly and 

Preparation Building 

Preparation and mixing of all chemical 

components is done under tightly controlled 

conditions. Virtually all operations are 

conducted within closed systems with 

substantial safeguards to prevent emission 

of fumes to the atmosphere. All chemicals 

will be stored in above ground containers 

with fully adequate spill protection features 

and procedures provided. 

Solid waste generated in this area will 

consist primarily of chemically contaminated rags, and spent solvents. All waste 

(other than domestic wastewater) will be 

collected, packaged, and transported offsite to an approved disposal site. Domestic 

wastewater will also be generated in this 

area. 

Refurbishment with minimal modifica- 3.5 Motor Process Area 21 

tions to this area is contemplated. Solid 

waste generated in this area will consist This area, shown in part as Figures 3.1.6 

primarily of off.specification chemical and 3.1.7, will be used for the manufacture 

material, chemically contaminated rags, of large solid rocket motors. Modifications 

and spent solvents. All waste (other than 

domestic wastewater) will be captured and 

packaged and transported off-site to an 

approved disposal site. Domestic wastewater will also be generated in this area. 

3.4 Motor Process Area 11 

This area, shown in part as Figure 3.1.5, 

will be used for assembly and preparation 

of the large metal casing of the SRM for 

subsequent loading with propellant. Refurbishment with minimal modifications to 

this area will be made to accommodate 

improved manufacturing methods and the 

special requirements of the SRM Booster. 

Figure 3.1.6 SRM Propellant Loading 

Building 

17 
103 

to this area will be made to accommodate 4.0 DESIGN SUMMARY 

improved manufacturing methods and the 

special requirements of the SRM. Roads will I1 

be widened to accommo~ate the crawler study activities, we conducted a design 

transporters needed to the motors, analysis of the SRM and identified design Modifications to the area will consist of improvements that could be accomplished 

During Aerojet’s recent SRM 

ing a crane capable of lifting the mo-tor. 

Waste generated in this area will be 

similar to that generated in area 11 with 

the addition of scrap propellant. All nonpropellant waste generated (other than 

domestic wastewater) will be collected, 

packaged, and transported off-site to an 

approved disposal site. Domestic wastewater will also be generated at this site. 

Hazardous propellant waste will be collected, packaged in durable corrosion proof 

containers, and shipped as DOT Class B 

explosive to an approved thermal treatment 

site. 

Figure 3.1.7 52 ft Dia by 150 ft Deep 

Propellant Loading Pit 

form as follows. 

The primary objective of the four month 

Block I1 SRM study was to create a design 

that would be significantly more reliable 

than the current design and also highly 

producible at an acceptable life cycle cost, 

To this end, Aerojet elected to employ the 

existing qualified steel SRM chamber 

segments, assemble them completely in the 

factory, insulate the full length assembled 

chamber, and cast the existing PBAN 

propellant formulation to form a single 

unsegmented SRM. Thus, field joints, with 

the potential for leakage under operational 

conditions, are eliminated. 

SRM Assembly - The single grain SRM 

design is characterized by the single-piece 

propellant grain and the completely single 

continuous insulation system. 

There are no “field-joints”, thus, the 

concern over leakage past joint O-ring seals 

under pressure and at low temperatures is overcome. There are also no grain-end 

restrictors, another area of potential failure 

initiation. 

Performance requirements stipulated for 

the SRM are readily achieved by the 

monolithic grain design. Likewise, SRM 

mass property values and CG shift during 

propellant burning are within established 

limits. 

Case - The well qualified D6aC steel 

segmented case will require only minor 

modification to meet desired nozzle and 

igniter sealing reliability improvements. 

The forward dome igniter boss face will be 

retrofitted with O-ring grooves to accommodate redundant O-ring seals. These seals 

18 
104 

will replace the gaskets now used at this 

interface. The nozzle boss on the aft dome 

segment will require a more extensive 

modification. A capture feature is proposed 

addition, a cmdidate liner system (SD-850- 

2), has been shown to produce excellent 

bonding between the propellant and the 

insulation. 

for the nozzle-to-case joint, with O-ring 

grooves machined on the case aft boss. The 

cylindrical case segments employing either 

the old, or the modified-joint configuration 

design, can be used with the Aerojet single 

grain approach. 

Insulation - An insulation material to 

replace the currentlyused asbestos-filled 

NBR has been selected and incorporated 

into the SRM design. 

This material, designated A-380, is a 

Kevlar-filled EPDM rubber having better 

insulating and erosion-resisting properties 

than the NBR system. It is also about nine 

percent lighter in weight. This characteristic, plus the absence of heavy field-joint 

insulators and grain restrictors, results in 

an insulation system weighing approximately 7000 lbs less than the current 

design. In the high material loss regions 

near the nozzle, the carbon-filled EPDM 

system now used is retained to assure that 

a low-risk and well-proven material is used 

in this critical area. 

The simplicity and effectiveness of the 

insulation at the process joints has been 

demonstrated. This approach, whereby 

uncured insulation is applied and vulcanized to previously cured insulation material 

to provide a continuous insulation, is well 

proven and used extensively within the 

industry. Laboratory tests conducted during the study showed rubber-to-rubber bond 

strength at joints processed in this manner 

exceeded that of the unbonded parent 

material. 

Propellant and Grain Design - No 

change to the current propellant formulation is necessary. Aerojet has established 

through laboratory testing that the desired 

burning rate. mechanical and processing 

The grain design essentially duplicates 

the MTI design -the major exception being 

the single-piece versus segmented configuration. The absence of grain-end restrictors 

adds reliability to the design; the absence 

of unrestricted free to (burn) grain-ends is 

compensated for by use of slightly longer 

fins in the forward dome and the addition 

of two small radial slots in the cylindrical 

section. 

Grain stresses and strains resulting from 

worst case storage, transportation and 

flight conditions were analyzed and found 

to be generally equal or less than those 

induced in a segmented SRM. 

Nozzle Assembly - As noted previously, 

the most significant design change in the 

nozzle results from the need to improve 

sealing reliability at the nozzle-case interface. It was Aerojet’s position that the 

present redesign of this area, whereby 100 

radial bolts are being added to assure joint 

closure under pressure, is not the preferred 

approach as 100 additional potential leak 

paths (at each bolt gasket) are introduced. 

The igniter propellant configuration is 

unchanged. As with the SRM case, all 

asbestos-filled insulators have been 

replaced by Kevlar-filled EPDM material. 

The design selected, after several options 

were defined, incorporated a capture lip on the nozzle fixed housing. This feature 

assures no joint opening at the primary 0- 

ring seal location. Both primary and 

secondary O-rings are verifiable in the 

proper direction. The aft dome-nozzle 

housing insulation interface is modified to 

preclude direct heat radiation or circumferential flow in the joint area. 

Igniter Seals - Although there has been 

properties may be readily dupiicated. In less concern expressed regarding the 

19 
105 

reliability of the seals at the various igniter 

interfaces, the multiple potential leak paths 

in this area pose a design shortcoming in 

Aerojet’s opinion. Therefore, all gaskets 

(Gask-0-Seals and Stat-0-Seals) have been 

replaced by more reliable face-sealing 0- 

rings. The igniter adapter (cover plate) has 

been strengthened to accommodate attachment to the igniter chamber from within, 

thereby eliminating all leak paths at this 

location and to assure that the joint 

remains closed under pressure at the 

primary seal. 

Other Components - Aerojet does not plan 

any changes to other SRM components or 

systems as a result of this four-month study. 

The Committee has requested that we 

include in our testimony comments on the 

proposed joint redesigns. Our comments are 

based on concept drawings and summaries 

of the extensive analysis performed by 

NASA in support of the design studies 

conducted. Obviously no attempt to check 

these analysis results was feasible within a short time; however, based on ASPC 

experience with both large boosters and 

strategic missile propulsion systems, the 

data provided is reasonable and within the 

range we would expect based on experience 

only. 

The approach of our evaluation and 

critique was to compare the presented 

design approach results to the Presidential 

Commission recommendations and to 

determine the degree of compliance with 

each recommendation and to identify those areas in which full compliance was apparently not attained. A comparison was also 

made of the joint design against the design 

criteria utilized by ASPC in the design and 

use of O-ring seals. It was noted that the 

original SRM joint which failed during the 

Challenger’s accident violated many of the 

most critical of our in-house design criteria. 

Of importance and concern to us in O-ring 

sealed joint designs are (I) compliance with 

manufacturers’ and military standard 

2 

design requirements, (2) maintenance of 0- 

ring squeeze under all applicable loads and 

environmental conditions both static and 

dynamic, and (3) utilization of the seal and 

joint only under temperature conditions for 

which it was designed and qualified. 

In the area of the redesigned field joints, we provided the following comments to 

NASA in a briefing at MSFC on 22 August 

1986 relative to compliance with the commission recommendations: 

(1) The integrity of the field joints should 

not be less than the case walls. The 

presented redesign represents a significant 

improvement in reliability of a field joint; 

however, the integrity and reliability was 

judged to be still less than the factory joint 

or case walls. One of the redesign concepts 

included a field joint to preclude the 

exposure of the joint (and O-ring) to motor 

pressure. Our evaluation leads us to believe 

that attainment of a reliable perfect bond 

during assembly operations when the bond 

surface is both blind and subject to tolerance and air entrapment problems is 

doubtful and therefore the O-ring seals at 

the field joints could be exposed to motor 

gases which does not occur at the factory 

joints. 

(2) Integrity of the field joints should be 

insensitive to: dimensional tolerances; 

transportation and handling; assembly, 

inspection and test procedures; environmental effects, operating pressure; recovery 

and reuse effects and flight and water 

impact loads. The design and analyses 

presented support tolerance insensitivity of 

joint at least during its first use; however, 

changes which might occur in the joint, 

especially the interference fit of the capture 

feature during flight, impact, recovery and 

reuse, were not addressed in the design 

analyses and are of sufficient concern that 

determination of joint conformance after 

each use should be performed and the 

suitability of the design for the planned 

number (or any number) of recesses is not 

!O 
106 

assured until the data is available. 

Insensitivity of the case/insulator/ 

propellant/inhibitors bonds at the forward 

joints to transportation and handling (and 

other effects such as aging) were not 

addressed. These areas are of concern 

because the highest bond stresses in the 

motor occur at the field joints and because 

these bonds in the field joint region were 

identified as the cause of the Titan SRB 

failure at Vandenberg Air Force Base. We 

would suggqt .that the integrity of these 

bonds and their insensitivity to transportation, handling and other environmental 

effects must be demonstrated in qualifying 

the redesigned motors for flight. 

Insensitivity to assembly, inspection and 

test procedures must finally be addressed 

in the development of these procedures; 

however, some of the areas which should 

receive special attention to insure insensitivity are in the rounding and mating of 

the capture feature interference fit; and in 

inspection of hardware for dimensional 

changes especially of the rubber materials 

and loads at the field joints. 

Insensitivity of the joint to temperature 

effects over the operating range is sup 

ported by the analyses performed and the 

failure potential of the joint over the entire 

operating range has been significantly 

reduced by the redesign. The redesign also 

improved substantially the joint integrity 

under the internal operating pressure of the 

motor for both dynamic (ignition transient) 

field joint redesign indicates at least partial 

compliance with the Presidential Commission recommendations and the probability 

of failure of the joints will be reduced by 

this action. The redesigned SRM does, 

however, still retain five O-ring joints which 

may be exposed to motor pressure and gases 

during the entire action time of booster. Two 

of these joints at the igniter and the nozzle 

are required features in an SRM and have 

both an extensive design data base and an 

excellent reliability record. The additional 

three O-ring sealed joints are the field joints 

which are non-required features for either 

motor manufacture or operation. They are required only so that the booster can be 

broken down into segments which can be 

shipped from Utah or other inland locations 

to Kennedy Space Center or Vandenberg 

Air Force Base. We feel that inclusion of 

non-required design features which degrade 

reliability is a poor design practice and 

should be done only if no viable options 

exist. 

An area of concern not addressed in the 

SRM reevaluation effort at the time of our evaluation involves the case to insulator, 

insulator to propellant, and propellant to 

inhibitor bonds at the field joints. The 

bonds which terminate at the joints 

experience the highest bond stresses of any 

location in the motor and failure of these 

bonds can lead to a catastrophic failure of 

the booster as demonstrated by the failure 

of a Titan 34D SRB shortly after launch 

at Vandenberg. 

and static pressure conditions. It also 

with our in-house practice for 0.ring originally and currently trades reliability 

seal design and with standard industry and in operation for ability to ship cross country 

government standard practice recommen- by land, even though the Option existed 

dations. B~~~~~~ it appears difficult to both times to eliminate the field joint and 

an absolute seal of the motor gases 

bond terminations. That option Utilizes 

from the field joint and its O-ring seals we water transportation and planning for 

would still evaluate the redesign as being Of a completely and 

loaded SRB. This can be easily done using 

equipment and procedures well within less reliable than the factory joints. 

In summary, our evaluation of the SRM industry experience. 

appears that the redesigned joint does The approach selected for the SRM both 

21 
107 

5.0 CONCLUSION 

Over the past several years we have made 

Aerojet experience and resources readily 

available to NASA in support of the Shuttle 

SRM program. During this time, for example, Aerojet has expended its own resources 

in developing and testing a nonasbestos 

insulation and liner system for the SRM. 

In addition, Aerojet has expended its own 

resources in support of the Shuttle SRM 

Block I1 study program with a preliminary 

engineering design for the reactivation of 

the Aerojet large solid rocket manufacturing facility in Dade County, Florida as a 

backup approach to the Challenger redesign activity. 

The Aerojet approach focuses on 

increased SRM reliability through the 

elimination of the field joints as failure 

potentials by continuously insulating the 

assembled motor segments and casting a one-piece solid propellant grain. This 

approach is made readily possible by the 

existence of our large solid rocket manufacturing facility in Florida. This facility 

is currently idle, but it can be activated to 

deliver flight SRMs in 20 months. This 

unique facility is available to be totally 

dedicated to the Space Shuttle Program. 

This alternative program would provide 

needed competition for Space Shuttle SRM 

procurement and provide NASA with 

opportunity for cost reduction and assured 

access to space. 

We are prepared to discuss our support 

of a production effort with additional 

capital resources if NASA determines that 

it is in the best interests of the Government 

to proceed with contractor funding as 

opposed to NASA facilitization. Aerojet is 

further prepared to establish a price for the 

Dade County Large Solid Rocket Facilities 

and sell the facilities to NASA after the first 

production buy. The facilities could then be 

operated on a GOCO contract basis for each 

production buy, similar to the launch 

support operations presently performed at 

the Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberg 

Air Force Base, thereby ensuring a competitive market for SRM production. 

Aerojet has a long history of commitment 

to NASA space programs ranging from the 

original 260-in. Booster Program, for which 

the Dade County Facility was originally 

constructed, to Gemini, Apollo, the OMS 

engine, and support of SSME Turbopump 

manufacturing and design. We are ready 

to offer our unique facility and our resources 

and experience toward the Shuttle Block I1 

SRM which is of critical importance to our 

National Space Program. 
108 

Aerojet Strategic Propulsion Company 

George G Brown 

Vice President 

Program Develoarert 

20 February 1987 

The Honorable Donald W. Riegle, Jr. Senator From Michigan 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space 

SD-105 Dieksen Senate Office Building 

United States Senate Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Senator Riegle: 

In response to your letter dated February 2, 1987, I am submitting 

the attached answers to your written questions for the record. 

I appreciated the opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee 

and share your view that our common objective is a strong national 

space program conducted in the safest environment possible for users of the Space Transportation System. 

The Aerojet proposal for a single grain solid rocket motor which 

eliminates the field joints is offered to satisfy that safety 

objective. 

On Friday, February 6, 1987, I was pleased to host a visit to our Dade Division in Florida by J. R. Thompson and his staff from 

Marshall Space Flight Center. I was encouraged that they made 

this visit and are giving serious consideration to the single 

grain concept. 

I wish to offer my compliments to you and members of your commit- tee for your conduct of the SRM hearing and, more specifically, 

for your knowledge of the issues involved. This resulted in a penetrating series of questions to the witnesses that brought 

needed information into the discussions. Having been raised and 

schooled in Michigan I would like to say that Michigan is 

fortunate to be represented in the Senate by a gentleman with your 

capabilities. 

Sincerely, 

P 0 Box 156996 Sacramento Caiilorn~a 95852 9 6 355-5860 
QUESTIONS AND AASWERS FOR THE RECORD 

1. On March 31st, Dr. Fletcher wtll provide this Subconunittee with a Long-Term Procurement Plan for solid rocket boosters. At that time, NASA will indicate whether or not a Block I1 solid rocket motor will 

be procured. 

Q. If NASA decides to pro:eed with a competitive Block I1 procurement, is there a cmsensus on this Panel that any Second 

Sourcing decision should be delayed until the Block I1 motor is designed, developed, tested and flown? 

A. Aerojet believe; that a single grain SFN should be 

qualified in pa:allel to the NASA Redesign Program. 

This should be Looked on as a competitive alternate 

program that ca.1 be used as a potential second source. This approach wsluld provide, at the earliest possible 

date, a back-up for the existing redesign and a viable 

second source. 

Q. If a Second Source wer,? pursued, would each of you bid if it were a fixed price con:ract? 

A. We at Aerojet h,we sufficient confidence in the single 

grain program t<i bid it fixed price assuming satisfactory contrac: provisions. 

2. There has been much discussion today concerning the scope, timing, 

and schedule of the proposed solid rocket booster test program. 

Q. Based on your experien<:e, how many full-scale, qualification motor tests should be run prior to the first flight? 

A. we do not have ;sufficient information about Thiokol's test program to offer a considered opinion. However, 

for the single grain, which utilizes existing hardware 

and has no join: dynamics consideration, we feel that 

four qualificat.on tests are sufficient prior to 

flight. 

0. Do you feel the new ho:izontal test stand at Morton Thiokol can duplicate the load!; and conditions associated with the 

actual flight experience? 

A. We dc, nut have enough informatior. on tl;e test stand or confiqiration to permit intelligent coment. 
110 

-2- 

Q. Based on your experiences with solid rocket motors, are there 

any nondestructive examination techniques that can be used to verify the structural integrity of the redesigned solid 

rocket motors and the bands between the case and the insulation? 

A. Examination of the redesigned solid rocket motor 

configuration in the field joint region, shows the 

areas of interest with respect to the O-rings and 

bonds are now more complex than before the redesign, 

The number and geometries of the interfaces and 

materials involved have increased in size and 

complexity making the measurement task more difficult. 

In our experience a great deal of time and money have 

been spent in establishing NDE techniques for the 

verification of bonds. Bond verification is a 

difficult technical problem. The redesign, with the 

addition of the J-Seal deflection relief flap, makes 

the measurement task more difficult than before the 

redesign. Before the redesign the measurement techniques that had any chance of success were based on x-ray sampling plans and would be very difficult to 

develop and would require a research program. What can be said without a research or technique develop ment program is that even with an assumed success, the 

results of the applied measurement would yield the 

probability of hnd detection over the entire 360 

degree surface of much less than 1. A reasonable 

scenario can be calculated and yields a 20 percent 

chance of finding an unbond should one exist. It is 

also OUK estimate that developing a potential technique for the redesigned configuration has less than a 

50% chance of success. 

We are aware that even verification at a few pints is 

sometimes considered better than no information, in 

this case we feel from a practical point of view such a bond verification scheme would lead to self illusion 

of integrity. 

3. There has been and continues to be much discussion about the technical merit of monolithic solid rocket motors versus segmented solid 

rocket booster motors. 

Q. Have you done trade studies of the technical merit of mono- lithic motors versus segmented motors? What are the tradeOffS? 
111 

-3- 

Q. Do either offer the reliability required to support a manned 

program? 

A. Table 1-2 summarizes some of the significant technical 

features in a comparison between a segmented and a single grain SRM design which was conducted by Aerojet 

during the NASA Block I1 SRM study. 

TABLE 1.2. Technical Considerations; Monolithic and Segmented Grain Study 

- Item Monolithic Segmented 

Case Field Joints (Potential Leak Paths) 0 3 

All Case Joint Seals Verifiable Before Yes cast NO 

All C-Rings Leak-Tested in Proper 

Direction Yes NO 

Joint Seal Gap Tracking Ability Critical NO Yes 

C-Ring Long-Term, Low Temperature, 

Compression Critical NO Yes 

Heaters Required at Field Joints NO Yes 

Current or 3 C-Ring Mod Case Segments Yes Acceptable NO 

Meets Ballistic Requirements Yes Yes 

Significant Insulation Weight Savings Yes NO 

System Meets All Flight and Ground 

Structural Requirements Yes Yes 

Propellant Grain System Stresses/Strains Yes Meet Established Safety Factors Yes 

Fully Compatible with Filament Wound Yes Yes Case 

Potential Case/Insulation/Propllant 

Unbonds at Field Joint Locations 0 6 
112 

-4- 

Q. Based on the Challenger and Titan investigations, has 

industry's understanding of solid rocket motors been dramatically increased to where more reliable motors can be 

manufactured? Will there ever be a solid rocket motor that 

is "fail safe" for the two minutes it burns during space 

shuttle flight? 

A. With a single grain motor the failure modes can be 

reduced by 67%. dramatically increasing reliability 

and flight safety, however, there are still other 

failure modes that remain. 

motors can be made completely fail safe. on single grain motors for past solid rocket programs 

demonstrates 0.997 reliability. 

Neither liquid nor solid 

The record 

4. You are familiar with the National Research Council Panel's technical assessment of the proposed redesign and coments on the need 

for contingency planning and a better defined and more thorough test 

program. 

Q. Would you please comment on the NRC recommendations, 

especially those recommendations concerning the need for a better defined and more thorough test program and the 

establishment of a priority criteria by which to evaluate the 

tests? 

A. NRC Recommendation: Page 2, third para: "...NASA 

strengthen contingency plans for incorporating alternatives into the (test) program." 

In response to this recommendation, and to others 

discussed below, Aerojet is handicapped by the fact 

that the content and details of the subject test 

programs, and the results to date, have not been 

made available nor discussed with the Company. 

regard to the specific recommendation above, incorporating alternaives into the test program repre- sents a sound philosophy and one that too often is 

omitted because of the pressures of schedule and 

budget limitations. In particular, the consideration and testing of the best alternatives proposed 

by the other solid rocket propoulsion companies 

should be included in contingency planning. 

NRC Recommendation: Page 3, First Para: "...alternatives be established and special emphasis be placed on early meaningful tests of the (case-nozzle joint) 

design . " 

In 
113 

-5- 

Aerojet strongly agrees with this recommendation. 

AS pointed out in the recently-completed Block I1 

Design Concept Study Report (AGSRM-001, Vol. I), 

the proposed design with its 100 radial bolts is 

not the design solution favored by Aerojet. The 

Aerojet design incorporates a positive sealing 

feature which is not dependent upon the radial 

bolts, but instead closes at the primary O-ring 

seal upon pressurization. The current mcdification must be considered as strictly an interim 

fix, and must be well verified in both full scale 

static test firings and bench-level load simulation tests. 

NRC Recommendation: Page 4, Second Para: "...NASA 

establish and maintain a directed program for continued evaluation and improvement in reliability.. . and preplaMed block changes to the flight hardware to 

provide opportunities for incorporating desired 

improvements." 

This is an important recommendation and one which 

is strongly supported by Aerojet. The Aerojet 

design approach to safety and reliability in large 

boosters for manned space flights features the 

single-piece propellant grain, whereby all case joints are sealed by a protective insulation system 

without joints and further covered by the prcpellant itself. 

within the context of the MIC recornendation which 

goes on to state that "...completely new designs, 

possibly radically different from the current one, may be preferred;" and that ..." (the) program cannot 

afford to continue to rely on older technology 

indefinitely into the future...we (NRC), believe 

that NASA should vigorously pursue a program to 

develop the next and future generations of motors. ..." Aerojet feels that funding and direction for 

developing and verifying the technologies proposed 

for boosters having substantially improved reliability must begin now if we are to achieve the 

goals envisioned by MtC. 

This approach fits perfectly 

The several M(C recommendations on technical issues, 

pages 5 through 7, deal with issues upon which, as 

stated earlier, Aerojet has not been adequately 

briefed as to plans, results, etc. All NRC recom- mendations are based upon sound engineering and technical assessment. Therefore the comments below will 

only highlight areas, or concerns, where Aerojet 

departs from, or strongly supports the NRC position. 
114 

Reqarding the Case Joint - We strongly share the NRC concern regarding problems associated with 

refurbishment, inspection, and re-use of the new case joiiit. 

Regarding Nozzle Ablative Materials - Aerojet's 

understanding of the proposed changes to the nozzle 

ablative liner(s) design concludes that the re- design will result in the desired improvements and 

the correct approach is being followed. 

materials involved are all well characterized and 

proven and little would be gained from a series of 

subscale tests. 

The 

Regarding Analytical Predictions and Success Criteria Establishment Before Each Major Test - This is a critical element of the NRC report and 

one whlch shoud be vigorously enforced. 

Programs of aerospace components and systems 

routinely incorporate these requirements. 

Test 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. I know Aerojet has been working on this and it sounds like that is a very interesting approach that you are suggesting to us. 

Mr. Crosby, you are with United Technologies. Let us here from 

you now. 

Mr. CROSBY. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the 

committee, I have submitted a fairly lengthy response to the four 

primary issues that you asked us to address, so I will summarize 

each one of those in my response. 

Before I address those four issues in turn, I would like to have it 

clearly understood that with regard to the planned redesign activity on the booster, we have not had any formal involvement in that 

redesign activity. And so the opinions and the perceptions and the 

views that I am going to offer here today are really based on the 

informal exchange of data that we have had with the NASA redesign team, on a rather frequent basis, but it nevertheless has been 

an informal involvement. 

On the basis of those general understandings, though, we feel 

that the redesign concepts that are being-- 

Senator RIEGLE. Let me stop you there. That is an important 

point. Ought we to be moving beyond the informal stage? 

In other words, for you folks to really be in a position to do the 

kinds of serious work to develop an alternative opportunity here, 

do you need something more than an informal contact and should 

we have something in place that is different than that? 

Mr. CROSBY. Let me answer that this way: Shortly, very shortly 

following the Challenger, my company, and I suspect the rest of us 

here at this table, all offered our services to NASA, offering to 

come in in whatever capacity was reasonable to participate in the 

recovery activity. 

The decisions were made that this sort of involvement should be 

handled, apparently, on an informal basis. In other words, there 

was no follow-up on the offers to be formally involved to my knowledge. 

Senator RIEGLE. Is that true for the rest of you at the table? 

Mr. BROWN. Yes. We actually have participated twice in a review 

of the design here that was gone over earlier, but we did come in 
115 

even before the opportunity to do that and actually gave NASA 

lists of our specialist people in specific technical areas and said: 

These people are available to help you. If you want them to help 

you, please let us know. We were never asked specifically for any 

one of those individuals. 

Senator RIEGLE. Let me just on that point, Mr. Thompson, you 

are still here in the room. We have all conferred among ourselves 

and we are a little concerned about that because, it seems to me, 

that if we are going to let ourselves move down this alternative 

track, even if we are for the time being going to work with.a modified existing design, that these people have to be involved in a far 

more direct workman-like way. 

Can you throw some light on that as to why these relationships 

have been “informal”? Should we be thinking about crafting something that creates a more formal relationship so that we can really 

harness this creative thinking in a way that, if there is a better 

design out there, we really can find it? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Certainly, sir, we want to get that. Of course, the 

studies were formal. They were contracted by us. I personally have 

been involved with discussions with, say, Hercules management in 

getting them actively involved with Thiokol. 

I think there are some 30 or 40 engineering people that are assisting us in that task and have had UTC down to brief me on the 

NDE, the nondestructive evaluation, as a part of their Titan work, 

to make sure we fold that in. 

Any formal contractual arrangement beyond that, to me in the 

short term should be folded in with the contractor-we’ve got, Thiokol, I believe, and Atlantic Research and Hercules. We have 

done that and it is not trivial. It is a substantial number of engineering people. 

Over and above that, this Block I1 has to be a very aggressive 

activity if, indeed, we pursue that. And that will become very formal. 

Senator RIEGLE. That is really what I am addressing. I am addressing Block 11. I am not surprised that you have had the other 

sort of interim relationships, particularly with Hercules. 

I am really raising the question with respect to Block 11. We 

ought to be moving an Block I1 now. What are we waiting for? 

Mr. THOMPSON. We have gotten, I think, five excellent reports. 

We need within NASA in a very short period of time to digest this 

so we can come up with a plan that makes sense to Jim Fletcher 

and then back to you. 

Senator RIEGLE. Why shouldn’t there be at NASA somebody who 

is a take-charge person like yourself who isn’t distracted by a lot of 

other things but whose job it is to take and drive this Block I1 process and to work with these folks and make sure that they are able 

to move at top speed so that we can find a superior design, that we 

can have it and start to move to bring it on line? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I have elements within my organization to do 

that. We are on a very fast track to get our recommendations back 

into Dr. Fletcher. Within our project office, separate individuals, 

and within the John Thomas Redesign Engineering Team, people 

now that are dedicated to evaluate the merits of these proposals, 

now taking off and going to school on what we now know of our 

current joint. 

’ 

’ 

1 

1 
116 

Senator RIEGLE. Am I wrong in concluding that the Block I1 activities, though, are still in the informal stage rather than beyond 

that? 

Mr. THOMPSON. The alternate study stopped. They furnished 

their reports at the end of December. We are in a hold period now 

for us to digest that and get back to you with a recommendation. 

We plan to do that by the end of March. 

Senator GORE. Could I pursue this point while you are still at the 

microphone? Going back to the baseline redesign aspect of it for a 

moment, I am given to believe that the companies represented on 

this panel are, indeed, deeply involved in the Block I1 part of it. 

This contract promises to be the biggest contract in the world. It 

is a source of a great deal of interest and they have been deeply 

involved. But on the baseline redesign, what Mr. Crosby just said 

and the others have agreed with, is that there was a kind of an 

informal and low intensity participation or review by these other 

companies of the baseline redesign. 

Now, that strikes me as curious because normally if you have an 

event like this, there is an industry-wide redesign. In this case 

there was none. 

Now, first of all, do you think that that is wrong? Second of all, 

is it because the keen interest in the biggest contract the world has 

ever known produces a desire on the part of all of the competitors 

to acquiesce in this sort of informal paper review of the baseline 

redesign and not aggressively push for an industry-wide redesign? 

Mr. THOMPSON. What I have seen from the industry, they have 

come to me and ask how can they help. So we stay coherent on 

this, I have gotten Thiokol and their top management together. There are areas that they can help and are doing that. 

I have talked to UTC, for example, to make sure I have got the 

continuity of the Titan information. I believe we are doing everything that is productive now on the baseline. 

Senator GORE. Do you believe there has not been the kind of industry-wide effort that would be expected after the event of the 

kind we had? 

Mr. THOMPSON. We have a good bit going. It is not industry-wide. 

One big team on the redesign, that is true. Thiokol is taking a lead 

on that. They are drawing on several of the other companies. We 

in NASA are pushing that, very much encouraging that. 

Senator GORE. Did you provide them access to the subscale test 

data? You never got to that level of detail, did you? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I don’t believe so. 

Senator GORE. Isn’t that unusual? 

Mr. THOMPSON. We have got a lot of folks looking at that. 

Senator GORE. Isn’t it unusual for there not to be industry-wide 

attention to that level of detail during a redesign of this magnitude? 

Mr. THOMPSON, You know, it is hard to say when you say of “this 

magnitude” because this has been a very tragic. It has been a big 

failure. In other failures, say in propulsion systems, let me speak there, we have our liquid systems, Rocketdyne where we have Problems. We bring in Pratt & Whitney for isolated problems and they 

have been very helpful. And now we have even expanded that and 

involved them in our alternate turbo pumps. 
117 

We haven’t done it in the solid rocket motor to that degree. We 

have gotten them involved more for the bigger job long haul and 

not so much a big new team for just a short term. We have more 

here tried to pick in certain areas. 

I don’t want to play down the paperwork the FEMA/CIL part 

and all that, where independent eyes can go back and look at it 

later. 

Senator GORE. They are playing it down. From what I know 

about it, it seems appropriate. I think the subcommittee ought, as a 

result, take with a big grain of salt the uniform endorsement of the 

redesign by all of the industry participants who acknowledge that 

they have only had an informal paper review, but I am using too 

much time at this juncture. I appreciate the Chairman’s indulgence. 

Senator RIEGLE. It is important that we pursue these things and 

that we do it where we can cross connect these observations between the contractor community and NASA. We are going to do 

more of that as we go along. 

I want to make one observation that hasn’t been made along the 

line today. That is, as I have attempted to understand the strategic 

implications of NASA’s whole effort in the accident since the time 

that all of this took place, it has become clear to me that if we 

were to have another accident of this scale and to lose one of the 

remaining three shuttles, that for all practical reasons we are out 

of the space business for a very long period of time. 

In fact, our capacity now is so low, until we can replace the orbiter that we have lost, that we have had to stretch out our program. 

There are all kinds of things that we are not able to do and so 

forth. 

Should we lose another one, I think apart from the loss of life, as 

tragic as that would be, the strategic damage to this country in 

terms of our ability to function effectively in space is almost 

beyond description and calculation. 

So the issue of solving this problem right in the short run, so 

that it works and that we don’t, due to a repeat of the same reasons or other reasons, lose a shuttle at this point, is something of 

the highest urgency for this country. So we cannot miss this next time around. And that is why I 

think all of us are saying that if the schedule has to slip, you let 

the schedule slip because when we go, it has to work. And because 

the front-end test here is so critical in terms of that next launch 

working successfully, which is why you have come back into the 

government to lend yourself to it, this is such that I really think 

we have to find a way to incorporate the industry-wide know-how 

to the maximum possible extent. 

And that is not easy. It is a lot easier to say it than to do it. 

There is a lot of internal momentum, the contract relationships 

and what have you, but that was part of the problem in the past. I 

mean, that is one of the reasons that an avoidable accident happened. 

So I feel very strongly that we have got to realize that this capability, which is, the national program, and national interest, is on 

the line. The strategic interests of every citizen of this country is at 

stake in our ability to perform. 
118 

And I want to see to it that every last key element of what we 

have as a nation to apply to this problem is applied. I am not too 

sensitive about people’s feelings or momentum or for that matter 

even long-term contractual relationships because I think when you 

have got as much riding on it as we do, we have to have the amalgam of every last bit of talent coming to bear on this thing, both 

the redesign of this joint, if we are going to use this again, and the 

design of the possible new alternatives in Block 11. 

So it is just my personal feeling. And I think my colleagues probably share that view from what they have said. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very definitely. 

Senator RIEGLE. Mr. Crosby, we have interrupted you, so why 

don’t you continue. 

Mr. CROSBY. I see my time is up. However, I would like to make a 

couple of points. First of all, the intent of my comment there was 

not to criticize but to point out, as obviously has been substantiated 

by Mr. Thompson, that we have all participated, but on an informal (as opposed to contractual) basis. 

My intent really was to make it clear that we do not have detailed information in some areas. So when I make an observation 

relative to an aspect of the current redesign activity, we are 

making that observation without having participated in the detailed analysis. That was really my purpose. 

Again, on that basis, I would like to say that our position, the 

position of the people who have spent a good deal of time with J.R. 

Thompson and his people is that this redesign has corrected the 

problems that we know existed in that joint. 

The issues of mechanical rotation, the temperature sensitivity, 

those issues we believe are in hand. And we think that this current 

joint will-let me put it this way-work as well as any joint will 

ever work in a solid rocket motor. 

We, however, do believe that it is possible to design a motor that 

perhaps offers a high reliability and might be safer for the type of 

operation that the space shuttle is intended for, and that is to 

hopefully some day return to the time when we don’t have to 

depend upon professional test pilot military crews to fly these, so 

we can really go back to the nonprofessional man in space type of 

operations. 

On that basis, we suggested in our Block I1 study that an alternate design should be considered. And I will say just a few more 

words about that, but I would like to comment on a couple of other 

issues here that you have referred to that we will get into in the 

full testimony. 

With regard to the test program, and I would like to sum up our 

feelings about the test program by saying that perhaps as an illustration of the fact that we are not as close as we might like to be in 

the program, we were under the impression that we were dealing 

with three motors in the test program. I learned today that we now 

have five, perhaps six before we fly again. I am much encouraged 

by that number of tests. 

As a matter of fact, we feel that the test program is entirely adequate with the qualification that the motors be subjected to the 
119 

real environment that they will see in flight. That means structural, temperature, all of the loads that they will see. And with those 

qualifications, we think that it is a realistic test program. 

We are concerned with the planned installation of a second test 

facility at Morton Thiokol. I would just like to comment that I 

think that facility should be viewed as a national asset, and perhaps in that sense might be better located at a government installation much as is being done by the Air Force on the Titan program that we are currently working on. 

Let me move on very quickly, in the interat of time. I would like 

to say that there are some aspects of a Block I1 motor that we believe should be seriously considered that have to do with increasing 

the potential for safety. These are systems that, while they might 

be serious technical challenges, we think should be very diligently 

examined, systems that would permit termination of the solid 

rocket motors in the event of a malfunction during the boost phase 

of flight. 

Back in the late 1960s when the manned orbiting laboratory program was being considered by the Air Force, we designed such 

thrust termination systems into the Titan boosters that would have 

been used on that program. We believe that they should be reconsidered and every effort should be made to try to incorporate a 

system of that type on these boosters as soon as possible, not necessarily before we resume initial flights, but before we get into operations with nonprofessional personnel again. 

On the issue of the Block I1 design motor itself, we find ourselves 

in the situation of agreeing that a monolithic rocket motor today, 

we believe, makes more sense for this type of operation. The approach that we would take to this type of a motor uses exactly the 

same hardware that is in the inventory today. We would install a 

continuous seamless layer of insulation on the interior surface of 

that motor and cast a propellent grain in one piece, transporting the motor with existing equipment, as you have heard Mr. Brown 

describe. 

We believe all of those things are entirely practical and possible 

today. We believe it would contribute to lower cost in the program, for many of the same reasons that Mr. Brown mentioned, such as 

reduced turnaround time during the solid motor build-up phase of 

operations. 

We think it is an approach that needs to be very seriously exam- ined. We personally believe it is a good way to go in combination 

with a system that would permit turning off the rocket motor in 

the event of a problem. 

And I think I would like to just close my summary comments at 

that point. 

[The statement follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HARRY L. CROSBY, VICE PRESIDENT OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT FOR 

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION’S CHEMICAL SYSTEMS DIVISION 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Science, Technology and Space Subcommittee; thank you for this opportunity to express our views on the on-going 

space shuttle solid rocket booster recovery activities, and on the current planning 

for alternative solid booster development and second sourcing. My testimony will 

begin with a brief description of my company’s qualifications, then continue with 

comments on each of the four topics identified in your invitation. 
120 

Chemical Systems Division (CSD) has designed, developed, and manufactured solid 

propellant rocket motors since the late 1950’s. We have extensive experience, unique to ourselves and Morton Thiokol, with large segmented rocket motors. CSD 

is responsible for the entire Titan segmented solid motor booster stage and has pro- duced well over 150 of the Titan Boosters under fixed price contracts at CSD since 

1965. Because of our background in large segmented solid booster technology, we have participated by NASA request in a series of meetings and reviews with the 

shuttle booster redesign team, exchanging information on segmented motor design 

and performance. These meetings have provided us with a general knowledge of the 

current redesign concept and some aspects of the anomaly investigation and redesign validation test program. My testimony today is based on both CSD’s background in segmented solid rocket technology, and on our current general understanding of the shuttle booster redesign effort. 

I will first offer some general comments on the on-going effort to redesign the segment field joints and nozzle attach flange joint. It must be understood that CSD is 

not directly involved in the redesign effort. Therefore, our understanding of the 

planned design improvements is based entirely on data exchanged during meetings 

and conferences with the booster redesign team. On the basis of our understanding, we feel that the selected concepts adequately address the previous joint sealing and 

associated mechanical rotation (displacement) problems. The previous segment field 

joint and nozzle joint designs were susceptible to leaking and potential burn-through 

when subjected to the combined effects of excessive displacement of sealing surfaces 

due to motor operating pressure, unusual (narrow) O-ring gland design, and limited 

resilience of O-ring material with cold temperatures. The redesign effort has addressed and appears to have significantly improved the joints in these previously 

deficient areas. In addition to addressing known problem areas, the redesigned joints incorporate redundant features to further protect against mechanical displacement and leakage. 

We believe that the current redesign activity should result in solid rocket boosters 

that will permit a resumption of flights to support National Priority missions in the 

1988 to 1992 time period. At the same time we are concerned that the redesigned 

boosters will present cost and assembly problems as a result of the complexity of the 

redesigned joints. We are convinced that a Block I1 booster can be developed to support flights in the early 1990’s that will have higher inherent reliability and will 

cost much less in terms of both basic manufacturing cost and the costs incurred 

during shuttle vehicle assembly at the launch site. I will expand on this thought 

later in my testimony. 

Our comments on the proposed testing program for the current booster redesign 

effort fall into three categories, First, we feel the materials and component tests 

currently in progress will provide important information and will help establish 

necessary final design details. We believe that this program is adequate as presently 

planned. 

In the second test category, that of full scale motor firings, we feel that three (3) 

full scale tests are sufficient to confirm the adequacy of the design improvements if 

the motors are subjected to loads and conditions that are realistic and fully representative of preflight and flight environments. We consider truly representative 

motor test structural load and environmental conditions to be the key element in 

successfully confirming the adequacy of the redesigned motors to support a renewal 

of flight operations. We will continue to monitor the planned test program and will 

offer suggestions and recommendations based on our experience where and when we believe it is appropriate. Third, with regard to the planned installation of a new motor test facility at the 

Morton Thiokol plant in Utah, we feel that such a facility should be viewed as a national asset. Therefore, it is more appropriate that this test stand should be located on an existing government (NASA or Air Force) facility as has been done at the 

Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory in support of the Titan program. The new 
121 

test facility would then be available to other organizations to support an alternate 

(Block 11) shuttle booster, second source qualification, or other future booster development program. 

Having addressed the current booster redesign effort and the associated test program, I would now like to comment on alternative shuttle booster design concepts 

and activities. CSD, supported by other UTC divisions with relevant capabilities, initiated company funded improved shuttle booster studies immediately after the Challenger tragedy. These studies have continued through the NASA funded Block I1 

Shuttle SRM Conceptual Design Studies, and have convinced us that improvements 

in reliability, safety, and cost are available from a second generation solid motor 

design. The design that we have recommended to NASA in our final report for the 

“Space Shuttle SRM Block I1 Conceptual Design Study” under NASAIMSFC contract No. NAS8-37300, dated 2 September 1986, provides the above mentioned improvements while utilizing most of the existing and planned inventory of motor case 

hardware and booster subsystems. 

The recommended CSD design will solve the field joint leakage problem by con- verting all field joints to factory joints as now exist in the current booster. The factory joints are protected by a continuous layer of vulcanized rubber insulation that 

precludes any possibility of joint leakage. In this design the current segmented propellant grain is replaced by a “monolithic” or one piece propellant grain that is cast 

into the existing motor case segments after they have been joined together and insulated with a seamless insulator which has been vulcanized to the interior surface of 

the entire motor case. 

Additional design improvements will provide higher performance for a “heads-up” 

flight trajectory and for increased payload. CSD studies have also included detailed 

investigations of one piece motor processing, shipping, and handling. The results indicate that the monolithic motor concept is practical and that the required handling 

and logistic equipment and techniques are available. The initial investment in the 

monolithic motor design will pay off not only in improved reliability and safety, but 

also in overall cost savings that result from greater payload capacity, reduced vehicle assembly time at the launch site, and lower manufacturing cost. 

We strongly recommend that a Block I1 booster development program be started 

with FY’88 funding, with the firm objective of introducing a more reliable, higher 

performing, and lower cost monolithic solid booster motor in 1992. This schedule 

will support projected requirements for Space Station deployment and provide a significant improvement in critical aspects of space shuttle operations. 

Finally, I would like to comment on the issue of second sourcing. CSD has been 

vitally interested in the space shuttle solid rocket booster program since the original 

competition in 1973. We have supported all of the studies to date on second sourcing 

and will continue to do so. However, it is our view that any decisions relative to 

second sourcing should be delayed until the current booster redesign effort has been 

completed, the shuttle is flying, and an improved Block I1 booster design has been 

selected and has progressed far enough in its development cycle to provide confidence that major design changes will not subsequently be required. Even then, the 

real economies of a competitive second source should be compared to the cost of a single source under a fixed price contract. As stated earlier in my testimony, CSD 

has produced Titan solid rocket motors that are very comparable to the shuttle solid 

motors under fixed price contracts for over 25 years. We believe that cost reimbursement type contracts are inappropriate for programs of either the current or Block I1 

SRM type and that lower overall program costs will result from fixed price contracting for economic production quantities. In the final analysis, any decision to proceed 

with second sourcing should be based on comparison of the real costs of establishing 

and maintaining multiple sources compared to the cost of fixed price contracting for 

larger and more economic production quantities. 

This concludes my prepared testimony. I will be happy to answer any additional 

questions that I can. 
122 

UNITED 

TECHNOLOGIES 

CHEMtCAL 

SYSTEMS 

1 April 1987 

HLC-055-87-BD 

P 0 Box 5W15 

San Jose CA 951500015 

40817784371 

Harry L Crosby 

Vice President 

Business Development 

Honorable Donald W. Riegle, Jr. 

United States Senate 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space 

Committee on Commerce, Science and 

Transportation 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Senator Riegle: 

Please accept my apologies for the delay in answering the subcommittee's questions which were addressed to me in early February 

regarding the space shuttle Bloc I1 booster program. The attached 

answers to those questions represent the current position and recommendations of Chemical Systems Division on these important subjects. 

We at CSD agree wholeheartedly with your opinion that the solid 

rocket motor industry as a whole must be involved if the space 

shuttle is to resume safe flights in a reasonable period of time. 

In that regard, we have eagerly accepted a request from Marshall 

Space Flight Center Director James R. Thompson and have appointed a very senior and highly experienced solid motor technical expert 

to support NASA's reviews of the shuttle booster redesign and 

test/verification program. 

I would like to thank you and the other members of your subcommittee for the opportunity to express our views and recommendations for the future of the shuttle SRM program. I also want to assure you of our willingness and desire to continue to work 

closely with you and the NASA team in the future. 

Sincerely, 

United Technologies Corporation 

CHEMICP~, SYSTEMS DIVISION 

rl 
CSD ANSWERS TO 

"QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD" 

Answers to "Questions for the Record" addressed to Harry L. Crosby, 

vice President, Business Development for United Technologies Corporation, Chemical Systems Division resulting from January 22, 1987 

shuttle solid rocket motor redesign and Bloc I1 hearings before 

the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology in Washington, D.C. 

1. On March 31st, Dr. Fletcher will provide this Subcommittee with a Long-Term Procurement Plan for solid rocket boosters. At 

that time, NASA will indicate whether or not a Bloc I1 solid 

rocket motor will be procured. 

Question : 

If NASA decides to proceed with a competitive Bloc I1 procurement, is there a consensus on this Panel that any Second Sourcing decision should be delayed until the Bloc I1 

motor is designed, developed, tested and flown? 

CSD Answer: 

The Bloc I1 solid motor program will require a major com- mitment of resources to development, equipment, and launch 

facilities. While it might be possible to reduce the cost 

of qualification of a second source by integrating second 

sourcing activities during the Bloc I1 development phase, 

it may be more cost effective in terms of available annual 

funding to delay the introduction of a second source until 

after the Bloc I1 motor has been qualified for flight. 

This may be particularly true in the case of a monolithic 

configuration for the Bloc I1 motor wherein a major investment in production facilities and handling equipment will 

be required of either NASA or the selected Bloc I1 contractor. 

If, as CSD has recommended in its Bloc I1 study, a mono- lithic motor configuration is selected, an option which we 

believe the NASA should seriously consider is that of a - Government Owned-Contractor-gperated (GO-CO) manufacturing 

facility t-o-produce the solid motors. 

the selected motor development contractor would be responsible for the design and construction of a cost effective 

manufacturing plant as well as for the design and qualification of the Bloc I1 monolithic solid motor. Since the 

production plant and the solid motor design would be owned 

by the Government, a competition could be conducted on a bi- or tri-annual basis to select the lowest priced operating contractor to produce a given quantity of motors once 

the new motor has entered production. 

In this approach, 
Such future operating contractor competitions would occur 

only after the Bloc I1 motor was fully developed and qualified for flight. 

Question : 

If a Second Source were pursued, would each of you bid if 

it were a fixed price contract? 

CSD Answer: 

If a Second Source for the existing Shuttle SRB is pursued, 

Chemical Systems/United Technologies would have to care- fully evaluate the future potential of the program relative 

to any required investment in facilities. Our decision to 

bid would be based on our assessment of the economic 

potential for reasonable return on investment. A fixed 

price contract would be the usual and expected contract 

type for a production second source contract of this type. 

2. There has been rruch discussion today concerning the scope, 

timing, and schedule of the proposed solid rocket booster test 

program. 

Question : 

Based on your experience, how many full-scale, qualification motor tests should be run prior to the first flight? 

CSD Answer: 

Full scale testing should include a sufficient number of 

tests conducted at a sufficient number of conditions to 

demonstrate the ability of the motors to perform at conditions which exceed the operational environment of the system - that is assure that "demonstrated margins of safety" 

exist. The quantity of tests for qualification (assuming no development tests are required - new nozzles, insulation 

systems or propellants) would be predicated on the following : 

1. Test at high temperature - demonstrate operation at 

maximum pressure. 

2. Test at low temperature - demonstrate insulation and 

nozzle survival at maximum duration. 

3. Sufficient replicate tests at ambient to demonstrate 

These tests would total about 4 to 6. However, superimpose'd would have to be load simulation tests and the evaluation of potential failure modes in the critical field 

reproducibility. 
125 

joint interfaces. These additional test requirements might 

add 1 to 2 full scale tests. A critical failure modes 

analysis would help define the various potential probldns 

that need to be addressed. 

Question : 

Do you feel the new horizontal test stand at Morton Thiokol 

can duplicate the loads and conditions associated with the 

actual flight experience? 

CSD Answer: 

The horizontal test stand at Morton Thiokol should be 

capable of duplicating or bounding many of the loads associated with launch and flight. A thorough loads analysis 

and test stand evaluation is needed to determine if all 

critical loads are imparted to the test motors. 

Since the motors will be assembled in a horizontal orientation normal flight build-up is not duplicated. Also, the 

motor will sag prior to motor ignition - again a condition 

that does not exist at launch. 

Question : 

Based on your experience with solid rocket motors, are there any non-destructive examination techniques that can 

be used to verify the structural integrity of the redesigned solid rocket motors and the bonds between the case and the insulation? 

CSD Answer: 

The Titan 34D recovery program has developed a number of 

automated and semi-automated NDT methods of 100% inspection 

of the loaded propellant segments - most of these could be 

applied to Shuttle SRM's. 

A critical part of Shuttle's integrity is the assembly of 

the field joints and the bonding of the interfacing segment 

insulators - this is a blind operation with no post assembly inspection possible. Leak tests can be conducted on O-rings but this will not identify potential failure modes 

existing in the insulation interface. Tight controls will 

be needed on assembly procedures to minimize the chance of a problem developing. This again is why the full scale 

testing must address potential non-detectable assembly 

problems. 
3. There has been and continues to be much discussion about the 

technical merit of monolithic solid rocket motors versus segmented solid rocket booster motors. 

Question: 

Have you done trade studies of the technical merit of monolithic motors versus segmented motors? What are the tradeoffs? 

Do either offer the reliability required to support a 

manned program? 

CSD Answer: 

We have completed trade studies of monolithic motors versus 

segmented motors and have presented the results of these 

studies to NASA in our Bloc I1 booster study final report. 

Our results show that the monolithic motor offers higher 

potential reliability and lower cost, along with an increase 

in performance for the STS application. Our studies indicate that while either a segmented or a monolithic solid 

booster can provide the reliability needed to support a 

manned program, the monolithic approach offers significantly higher potential reliability and should therefore be 

seriously considered for manned programs. 

Question : 

Based on the Challenger and Titan investigations, has 

industry's understanding of solid rocket motors been dramatically increased to where more reliable motors can be 

manufactured? Will there ever be a solid rocket motor that 

is "fail safe" for the two minutes it burns during space 

shuttle flight? 

CSD Answer: 

The Challenger and Titan investigations have produced 

information and inspection techniques that can be applied 

to improve the reliability of solid rocket motors in the 

future. We believe that the application of this information and the use of the new NDT techniques in combination 

with new safety systems will provide solid rocket boosters 

that can approach the goal of being "fail safe." A mono- lithic booster will inherently be closer to this goal 

than will a segmented booster. 

4. You are familiar with the National Research Council Panel's 

technical assessment of the proposed redesign and comments on the need for contingency planning and a better defined and more thorough test program. 
127 

Question : 

Would you please comment on the NRC recommendations, especially those recommendations concerning the need for a better defined and more thorough test program and the establishment of a priori criteria by which to evaluate the 

tests? 

CSD Answer: 

The NRC recommendations can be grouped into the fOllOWing 

general categories: 

1. Increase and strengthen contingency planning for 

incorporation of alternative designs and materials 

if required. 

2. Establishment of a priori test criteria based on the 

most current data and analysis available against 

which each subsequent test will be evaluated and any 

deviations or discrepancies fully and completely 

explained. 

3. Increased subscale testing of all critical design areas and materials. 

4. Provision for a second test stand fully capable of 

simulating all predicted flight loads and conditions. 

5. Additional full scale tests prior to first flight. 

CSD agrees in principle with these recommendations and 

suggests only that each recommendation should be reevaluated as the re-design effort proceeds to prevent 

unnecessary effort where it can be shown that such effort 

is unlikely to provide any real advantage vs the selected 

baseline approach. 

We are in complete agreement with the recommendations 

calling f0.r additional subscale testing and for reevaluation and updating of all models and analytical techniques on the basis of test data as it is developed. We 

concur with the recommendations that a new test stand, 

fully capable of simulating all flight conditions be provided. However, we urge that this new test stand be 

constructed on a government facility as opposed to MortonThiokol property. 

Finally, we are also in agreement with the recommendations 

that qualifications tests number 7 and 8 should be com- pletei prior to the first flight with the re-designed 

boosters. 
128 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you. Mr. Mettenet. 

Mr. METTENET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am Ernest Mettenet, president of Hercules Aerospace 

Products Group. Hercules is the largest manufacturer of solid 

rocket motors for the Department of Defense. 

As a natural extension of this, we have for the past five years 

been aggressively promoting the introduction of competition for 

SRMs. Specifically, we have been preparing to compete for the 

shuttle rocket motors as a second source contractor. 

This preparation has included technical design, schedule and cost 

analysis and, more importantly, a commitment by Hercules Incorporated to build and have in place a $150 million dollar solid 

rocket motor plant, the most modern in the free world. 

It was designed and built for three or four principal directions. 

One, safety of operations. Two, built-in low costs, and reliability 

and quality. We feel with this rocket motor plant, we can build the 

lowest cost production motor today. 

Now, our specific involvement with NASA and the shuttle, we 

were selected to develop the filament wound case for the SRM program. During this program, we developed the so-called capture feature for the SRM field joints. A modification of the capture feature 

has been talked about today. We also were awarded one of five 

SRM Block I1 design study contracts, which were recently completed. 

On this contract we reported on a number of alternate design 

configurations that offer improvements in performance, reliability 

and safety. In addition, like the others, we have supported the Marshall Space Flight Center on several occasions to assist in the investigation of space shuttle motor variations and anomalies. 

I, too, have got to qualify my remarks by stating that we have 

not been under contract for direct participation in formulating the 

SRM joint redesign nor the test flight. Our understanding of the 

technical problems, solutions and results are derived from the 

above participation. 

Lacking the details of the test results, we cannot provide a complete technical evaluation of the proposed redesign. We believe that 

the NASA redesign joint configuration can support recovery to a 

reliable operational status. Test plans and results must confirm 

that design adequacy. 

We believe the proposed NASA joint redesign can meet the 

manned space flight criteria and the reduced movement expected 

in the redesigned seal elements and use of the captive feature are 

very positive steps. 

The adhesive method for joining the insulating material between 

segments will do the job, assuming the assembly operation is error 

free. However, it will be difficult to ensure a perfect bond each and 

every time. And there are proven design techniques that do not require this critical assembly and inspection operations with the adhesive bonding approach. 

A new nozzle joint should be eventually incorporated with a closing feature to avoid the radial bolts. The incorporation of these features could be either through second sourcing now Or through 

Block I1 competitions. 
129 

Again, we lack the require detailed information to fully evaluate 

the test program. It does appear that a thorough subscale component level test program has been conducted. Lacking sufficient 

data on the full scale test plan, we can only make the recommendation that the final redesigned flight configuration be incorporated 

in every full scale test used to certify motors for flight and that 

test be conducted at the temperature extremes. 

Relative to the second source issue, we believe that a second 

source should be under contract during the development and qualification for the redesign Block I motors. We also believe that this 

timely contractor selection would provide the greatest benefits to 

the system in terms of schedule, cost savings and the availability of 

technical resources to support an improved recovery program. 

We are convinced that simpler and lighter weight nozzles, cases 

and other components can be designed based on information from 

existing STS flight history and the strategic missile database. In 

addition, improvement in the propellent charge would improve mission capability. 

As I mentioned earlier, Hercules has invested in facilities for this 

competitive production. These facilities are operational and ready 

to go. 

Finally, we believe that the segmented motors and monolithic 

case remain the correct choice for the shuttle system. Safely handling and transporting over one million pounds of propellent in one 

unit presents some very, very special problems. The unit is basically propulsive in that state and you have a million pounds of it. You 

also have the problems associated with inland waterways, high traffic level and this propulsion unit in the waterways or the 

Panama Canal. 

The monolithic rocket motor would require extensive and expensive on-site modifications which would induce schedule delays with 

no net systems benefit. In addition, the monolithic case would still 

require two major field joints which must undergo the same scrutiny required of any joint seal. 

O-rings in our industry are not a big problem. Cold flying rocket 

motors in our industry are not a big problem. Every strategic 

motor has O-rings. Properly designed with an closure-type capture 

feature at a field joint, it is technically within our technical capabilities. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement follows:] 

STATEMENT OF ERNEST A. METTENET, PRESIDENT, AEROSPACE PRODUCTS GROUP, 

HERCULES, INC. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. I am Ernie Mettenet, President of the Hercules Aerospace Products Group. By 

way of background, Hercules is the largest manufacturer of solid-rocket motors for 

the Department of Defense. As a natural extension of our DoD rocket motor involvement we have, for the past five years, been aggressively promoting the introduction 

of competition for solid propulsion space launch motors. Specifically, we have been 

preparing to compete for the shuttle booster motors as a second source contractor. 

This preparation has included technical design, schedule and cost analyses and the 

construction of a new automated facility capable of competitively manufacturing shuttle SRM boosters. This state-of-the-art facility, built with $150 Million dollars in 

corporate funds, is the largest, most modern complex of its type in the free world 
130 

and was designed to optimize safety and provide the highest quality and most reliable product at the lowest possible cost. 

Our specific involvement with NASA and the Shuttle program includes our selection to design and develop the Filament Wound Composite Case for the shuttle 

booster motor. During this program we developed the so-called capture feature for 

the SRM field joints to reduce the movement of field joints that occurred at SRM 

ignition. A modification of this feature is being developed for incorporation on the 

redesigned case that is the subject of this hearing. We were also awarded one of the 

five NASA SRM Block I1 Design Study contracts which were recently completed. On 

this contract, we explored and reported on a number of alternate design configurations that offer improvements in performance, reliability and safety for the shuttle 

SRM. In addition, we have supported the Marshall Space Flight Center on several 

occasions with technology and technical expertise to assist in the investigation of 

space shuttle motor variations and anomalies. However, I must qualify my following remarks and comments by stating that we have not been under contract for direct 

participation in formulating the SRM joint redesign nor the test plan. As a result, our understanding of the technical problems and solutions is derived from our prior 

participation in the Filament Wound Case Program, the Block I1 study, our activities in preparing for a Second Source competition and the limited data released by Marshall Space Flight Center on the subject of redesign. 

I would now like to direct my comments toward the specific topics outlined in 

your invitation for testimony. 

NASA REDESIGNED BOOSTER 

Lacking details of test results, we cannot provide a complete technical evaluation of the proposed redesign, but do have some recommendations based on our experi- ence and understanding of the SRM. Based on this understanding we believe that 

the NASA redesigned joint configurations can support recovery to a reliable oper- ational status provided the test results confirm design adequacy. Hercules recognizes that the designed options incorporated in the proposed boost- er redesign have been constrained by schedule. The principal constraints have been 

the need to avoid the long lead times associated with significant changes in the 

major forgings required tffi manufacture the case and construction of the necessary structural testing facilities as well as the time needed to conduct full scale verification testing. 

The proposed redesigned joint solution, as we understand it, has taken steps to 

reduce the movement between sealing elements through the incorporation of the 

capture feature. Reducing movement of the seal is a step in the right direction; in 

fact, elimination of this movement is desirable and achievable through design op- tions. 

The proposed adhesive method to be used in joining the insulator material between segments at the field joints is an approach to provide an additional sealing element upstream of the primary joint seals, designed for that purpose. This approach, if accomplished in a stacking process 100% of the time, will certainly do the 

job. However, the difficult task will be to insure that a perfect seal is accomplished each and every time. From our point of view, inspection and certification of the 

bonded insulation joint represents a difficult task that deserve6 maximum attention 

by the NASA redesign team. Additionally, destacking of an assembled motor, as sometimes occurs, also presents challenges when separating the adhesive joint, as bonds must be broken in the process which subjects the segment insulators to 

damage. 

Finally, the redesigned nozzle joint incorporates an approach to reduce seal move- ment through the inclusion of a number of radially oriented attachment bolts in a 

location between the two nozzle joint sealing elements. As a result, each bolt must 

also be individually sealed to provide for redundancy. We would encourage the 

NASA redesign team to thoroughly evaluate or reevaluate other concepts for the 

seal which don’t rely on individually sealed bolts, and we recommend critical attention to the precise definition of and adherence to assembly procedures, since the as- sembly of such a joint is critical to its proper function. We further recommend a 

broad testing program to evaluate the nozzle joint/seal under various loading and 

assembly variables if such plans are not a part of the existing recovery program. 

TEST PROGRAM 

We lack the required detailed information on the test program to fully evaluate. 

However, based on our limited knowledge, it appears that a thorough subscale com- ponent level test program has been conducted on the selected redesign configura- 
131 

tion. It is reported that the tests have successfully reproduced the failure mode for 

the Challenger anomoly and have demonstrated that the redesigned case joints have 

performed successfully within the same test condition parameters. 

The structural testing of full scale components is constrained by facility capabilities and schedule. We believe the stated design objective to provide equivalency of 

the joint sealing and strength to the case wall is proper, and that a demonstration 

of that equivalency along with the statistical variations on margins of safety is an important test objective that should be part of the plan. 

We believe that horizontal testing is technically equivalent to vertical testing and can provide all the required loading extremes and, at the same time, avoid damage 

to a number of components which would result from prolonged acoustic exposure 

that does not occur under normal flight conditions. Our recommendation would be 

to ensure that the final redesign flight comfiguration be incorporated in every full 

scale test used to certify the motors for flight, and that these tests be conducted at 

temperature extremes. 

SECOND SOURCING 

We strongly believe that a second source for the SRM is not only desirable, but 

necessary if the space shuttle is to remain the mainstay of the US. space launch 

capability. Program exposures resulting from a single source of supply for a major 

component like the SRM presents unacceptable risks for program disruption from a natural disaster or some manufacturing process caused catastrophe. This industrial base capability protection alone is sufficient in our minds to justify second sourcing the SRM. The additional benefits are cost savings, technical synergism and improved product quality. 

We believe that a second source should be under contract during the development 

and quaiification for redesigned Block I motors. We also believe that this timely 

contractor selection would provide the greatest benefits to the system in terms of 

schedule, cost savings and the availability of technical resources to support an improved recovery program. 

Multiple contractor participation at an early date will also improve management flexibility for the government and provide accessibility to a broader range of industrial resources during restart and recovery to full operational status. The second source contractor can be a part of the redesign team and participate in the qualifi- cation and verification testing, support initial development flights, provide an independent point of view and, in the process, acquire the necessary program familiarization. 

We further believe that competition elevates system effectiveness by ensuring the 

industry’s best technologies are made visible and available to the system during the 

competitive phases. This provides the Government the opportunity to identify and 

select the best solutions to satisfy both the recovery program and future operational requirements. 

Finally, we note that only through credible competitive opportunity can the Government provide the incentive necessary for industry investment in new and more efficient capabilities. It is this investment which is the foundation for advancement 

in both technical and manufacturing capability which are needed to drive down 

costs and still maintain adequate profits for the investors. While there are many examples of the immediate benefits in cost reduction resulting from even the threat 

of competition, the underlying force which maintains the momentum for improved 

contractor performance is this investment in improved capability. 

ALTERNATE BOOSTER DEVELOPMENT 

If, in NASA’s opinion, higher performance is required of the SRM then we believe 

that an alternate booster development program should be initiated with specific per- formance objectives and improvements. Hercules Block I1 studies identified a 

number of design and material improvements that would maintain system reliabil- ity and provide significantly higher performance. 

We are convinced that simpler and lighter weight nozzles, cases and other components can be designed based on information from existing STS flight history and the 

strategic missile data base. In addition, improvement in the propellant charge would 

significantly improve mission capability. 

Our schedule and economic studies have shown that any alternative booster development should be accomplished in parallel with Buy I11 of the redesigned (Block 

I) motors. Designs for alternative boosters are already underway as a result of the 

NASA initiative for Block I1 Design Study programs. As I mentioned earlier, Hercules has invested in facilities for the competitive production of shuttle solid rocket 
132 

motors. These facilities are operational and ready for either second sourcing the re- designed Block I motors or for an alternative booster development and qualification 

program. 

I believe it is worth a brief moment to note the role that the filament wound composite case could play in meeting increased performance requirements for defense 

and space station needs. As it is currently configured, this case provides nearly 

5,000 pounds of additional payload capability for the shuttle system. While the 

design has passed all the current verification and qualification tests, testing has 

been terminated as a result of difficulties with non-FWC test assembly components 

and the need to support structural testing of the redesigned steel case. There are some minor modifications to the current filament wound case that would be re- quired to bring it into compliance with the new joint design criteria and to maintain 

compatibility with new steel case components. If the opportunity to optimize the 

design of the composite case were provided as part of a Block I1 program, a dramatic increase in performance could be achieved. 

We believe that segmented motors remain the correct choice for the shuttle 

system. Segmented motors enable the transportation of motor segments from any of 

the established and existing manufacturing sites to both coasts without the risks of 

open sea transport or the security risk of transport through the Panama Canal. 

Safely handling and transportation of over 1 million pounds of propellant in a single 

unit presents some special problems. In particular, under the current proposals, the 

monolithic case motor would be propulsive during shipment and would develop a high thrust if ignited. Inland waterways, with their high traffic level and population 

centers, could be threatened under these conditions. 

The monolithic rocket motor would require extensive launch site modifications 

which would enduce significant schedule delays. In addition, successful resolution of new environmental impact issues that would be raised by a manufacturing facility 

and the case motor transportation problems must occur. Also, monolithic case motors will require two major field joints which must undergo the same scrutiny 

required of any joint and seal and are no less critical than a segment seal. Any perceived advantage of a monolithic case would be negated by these impacts. 

Highly reliable joint seal design utilizing existing and proven technologies are available and commonplace in the solid rocket motors produced in this country. The 

temperature extremes required for shuttle operations are not a technology challenge to solid rocket motor sealing. Hercules has a wide variety of existing solid 

rocket motors that successfully operate at higher pressures with more stringent 

sealing requirements over temperature ranges from - 65°F through + 350°F. 

It must be also recognized that all solid rocket motors require at least two major 

joints in their manufacture; one at the forward closure and one at the aft nozzle 

attachment. Design of all joints for a large space booster application must include 

adequate reliability and safety margins for manned space flight and provision for 

system safety in the manufacture, transportation and assembly. The motors must be 

capable of disassembly into a more manageable segment size and made non-propulsive for transportation and launch site handling. These criteria can be met by maintaining the current four segment configuration which would avoid front end system 

cost and schedule penalties which could delay the recovery program. 

C 0 N C L U S I0 N 

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to summarize what I consider our four most 

important points, First, it is our belief that the NASA redesigned configuration for 

the field joints can support a recovery to safe operational status and that proper 

testing will verify the adequacy of this redesign; second, early selection of a second source provides the Government with a number of short and long-term program 

benefits as well as providing the competitive framework that will reduce costs; 

third, we believe that the initiation of an improved performance (Block 11) design 

and development effort for the Solid Rocket Motor represents the greatest opportunity for a maximum payback on the national investment in the spce shuttle program; and fourth, the segmented motor remains the only logical choice for solid 

rocket motor configuration. Let me thank you once again for giving me the opportunity to lace our views 

any questions. 

before the Government in a direct and open forum. I would be pl t ased to answer 
@ HERCULES Hercules Aerospace Company 

Aerospace Products Group P. 0 Box 30181 

Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0181 

(801 1 262-9393 

2 March 1987 

The Honorable Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Chairman 

Subcommittee on Science Technology and Space 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 

The United States Senate 

Washington DC 20510 

Dear Senator Riegle: 

Please accept my thanks for again offering us the opportunity to present 

our viewpoint on matters regarding the procurement of shuttle rocket motors 

for the space shuttle system. We have carefully considered the questions you have submitted to us and have attached our answers to this letter. 

We have for several years been vigorously promoting a more open 

participation of the solid propulsion industry in the perfection and 

production of the solid rocket motors for the shuttle system. However, we have been continually frustrated in these attempts. This has substantially 

limited the accessibility by NASA to the background and experience of our firm 

regarding a wide variety of nozzle, joint, casing, and propellant design and 

development issues. 

As an example of the benefit of wider industry participation of which I speak, we can point to the introduction and development by Hercules of the 

capture latch feature on the joint of the Shuttle filament wound case. This 

was accomplished after Hercules' insistence that this feature was required to 

control the rotation and concentricity effects on the O-ring extrusion gap. 

The redesigned joint currently under evaluation for the steel solid rocket 

motor case now includes the basic features of this capture latch. 

I review this history with you to point out and emphasize again that the 

risk of isolating the Shuttle SRM program should not be continued, and that 

one objective of any procurement strategy should be abatement of this risk. 

The clock is running. 

Once again, I wish to thank you for the opportunity of participating in 

the deliberations of the Senate, as we together seek rapid, safe recovery of 

our nation to a premiere position in space. You may be assured that Hercules 

will cooperate in every reasonable way to expexite and support the policies 

and programs that result from these deliberaJtons. 

%yi&\ €:-A. Mettenet Presiden 

Hercules Aerospace Products Group 

A Hercules I~CO~C ' ,I.. , 'nsany Wilminglon. OE 19894 
134 

Hercules Aerospace Company 

Aerospace Products Group 

Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0181 

@ P. 0. Box 30181 HERCULES 

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD (801) 262-9393 

REQUESTED FEBRUARY 2, 1987 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE 

DONALD W. RIEGLE JR., CHAIRMAN 

ITEM 1: BLOCK I1 PROCUREMENT 

guestion: 

If NASA decides to proceed with a competitive Block I1 procurement, is there a consensus on this panel that any second sourcing decision should be 

delayed until the Block I1 motor is designed, developed, tested, and flown? 

Answer: 

We believe there are real and substantial benefits from having additional 

knowledgable industrial contractors involved in the final steps of the current 

recovery process provided they are engaged at the earliest possible time. 

This involvement is the only mechanism by which the experience of the rocket 

propulsion industry can be brought to bear on the final design review and 

evaluation process. With all due respect to the skills and experience of 

those members of the academic community and leaders in the related industries 

of aircraft and spacecraft, there is no substitute for the direct experience and knowledge of those within the solid propulsion industry who have been 

responsible for the successful development of this technology over the past 40 

years. However valuable this service might be, it nevertheless does not alone 

constitute a suitable basis for competition at this time. 

An immediate second sourcing competition would provide the benefits that 

always have been attributed to the second source concept, that is, protection 

of schedule, national security, safety, and cost reduction. Under the current 

circumstances, however, it does lock the incumbent into a long time continuing 

position as one of the contractors, and would tend to inhibit the 

incorporation of improvements that can be achieved as a result of relaxation 

of the specific constraints that were imposed on the redesign program. While 

it must be clearly understood that flights will not be resumed until the 

solutions that are currently undergoing evaluation are thoroughly proven to 

have met the requirements for flight safety, it is equally clear that these 

solutions are in some instances cumbersome, inelegant, costly, and heavy 

compared to what could be accomplished in a less constrained and more patient 

environment. 

Furthermore, the cumulative result of safety improvements throughout the 

shuttle system has inevitably resulted in a substantial reduction in launch 

A Hercules Incorporated Company Wilmington, DE 19894 
capability. This capability can be recovered by applying the lessons learned 

in the years since the existing shuttle motors were first conceived, but only 

through the medium of a Block I1 competition and development program. This 

then becomes a rational basis upon which to conduct a competition, in which 

both the future needs of the shuttle, and possibly a heavy lift unmanned 

launch vehicle, could be considered together such that the investment and 

assets of the country in a system of this capability can be most effectively 

utilized. With this understanding, one can now address the question of timing 

and sequencing of selecting one or more contractors for the Block I1 

development and production. 

In recent procurement by the Department of Defense, in which dual sourcing 

was understood to be an objective from the very beginning, a combined 

procurement was conceived such that both contractors were selected at the 

beginning in open competition. Under this approach, both contractors participate in the early development and evaluation activity on the basis of a 

leader, who is the competition winner, and a follower who is judged next best 

in capability. While the leader bears full responsibility for the design and 

development of the product, the follower is concurrently aware of the design 

issues, and available to the government for supplementary functions. It then 

becomes a relatively minor matter to complete the qualification of the 

follower contractor at such time as the national interest or production 

requirements suggest, generally prior to the first production buy. We believe 

this procurement strategy is appropriate for the solid rocket motor Block I1 

Program and recommend it be considered for adoption. A prompt procurement in 

this regard can provide nearly the entire resources of the solid propulsion 

industry to apply not only to the conception the design and development of a 

Block I1 motor , but perhaps as well, to the completion of the evaluation and 

verification of the Block I Redesign. 

Ouestion: 

If a Second Source were pursued, would each of you bid if it were a fixed 

price contract? 

-: 

Yes. Hercules has worked to fixed price constraints in the past and has 

made similar offers to NASA for qualification of SRM production. 

ITEM 2: SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER RECOVERY TEST PROGRAM 

Ouestion: 

Based on your experience, how many full-scale qualification motor tests 

should be run prior to the first flight? 

Answer: 

In our experience, the number of motor tests that should be run varies 

widely, depending on the type of motor that is being qualified and the range 

of variables and conditions under which it must function. For smaller motors 

used on tactical weapon systems, the number often exceeds twenty in order to 
provide a suitable statistical confidence that the motors will perform under 

widely ranging temperatures which are as low as -65'F and as high as 165°F. 

In addition, these motors must have been subjected to a wide variety of 

storage temperatures,aeroheat conditions, shock, vibration, and cycling 

associated with their exposure to air or land operating environments. 

For larger motors such as are used on strategic weapons system which are 

subject to a much narrower range of environmental conditions and are better 

protected during handling, transportation, and installation, the number may be 

far fewer, typically about ten depending on the number of prior development 

tests that have been run. 

In the case of large space boosters, the problem becomes more difficult as 

these tests typically cost of the order $20 million each. For this reason the 

qualification strategy is changed in order to provide confidence of the safe 

function of many major components and subcomponents by prior testing in 

subscale and special fullscale tests. In addition, much more time is spent to 

develop a complete and thorough analytical model describing the behavior of 

the rocket motor system so that the variabilities associated with changing 

environments and loads can be explored by means of these models rather than a 

fullscale test for each variable combination. The function of development and 

qualification test firings then becomes directed as much to validate and 

verify these models as it is to generate a statistical validation of 

performance under a given set of conditions. This procedure is not unique to 

the rocket motor industry, but is based on a long standing and successful 

approach used by the aircraft and spacecraft industries as well. Therefore, 

the answer to the question of how many test firings should be conducted is 

related to an evaluation of the competency of the modeling and the range of 

test variables that can be accommodated in a single test. 

In the case of temperatures, loads and resulting mechanical stresses, 

there are adequate tools to precisely model and analyze the mechanical 

behavior of rocket motor components and systems. These tools must be applied 

with intelligence to plan, design, and manage a fullscale test program in 

order to achieve the required objectives at a reasonable cost. 

In particular, the models may be used to design special fullscale tests 

that simulate the critical conditions of a motor firing in a simpler and less 

expensive configuration. The test apparatus called "The Joint Evaluation 

Simulator" at Morton Thiokol and the "Transient Pressure Test Motor" at 

Marshall Space Flight Center are capable of such tests. With this type of 

testing, many additional tests which explore the extremes in environment and 

loading can be conducted at reasonable cost, and therefore reduce the number 

of fullscale firings that are required. 

In addition to model validation, the principal objectives of a fullscale 

firing are the evaluation of ballistic performance, insulator performance, and 

nozzle performance. Issues of structural integrity and sealing must have been 

completely settled prior to a fullscale firing, since the failure of a 

fullscale static firing is an event so serious as to have a similar 

devastating effect on the development program as the failure of a flight. 
137 

and military applications, then the supply of segments must be made available 

to both coasts. There is clearly no location in the continental U.S. where a 

manufacturing plant could be located that could supply both coasts with single 

segment rocket motors without a long passage through open water or through the 

Panama Canal, or both. 

Risks are incurred during transportation both to the product and to the 

environment through which the product is transported. In the case of the 

current four segment motors, the risks are minimized by the fact that the 

motors are open at both ends and therefore are non-propulsive. That is, 

should there be an ignition incident, although a fire would occur, the fire 

could be contained to the point of initiation and would threaten a relatively 

small adjacent area. 

However, an incident with a single segment motor if shipped with nozzle 

installed would generate the same thrust as the motor during launch, 

approximately 3 million pounds. Such a thrust could not be contained at the 

point of incident if it occurred on a barge or ship. If the motors were 

shipped without nozzle or igniter, a thrust exceeding 0.1 million pounds is 

developed due to the mass of propellant present in relationship to the size of 

the openings in the case. The extent of the threat is significantly increased 

by the mass of propellant that would be involved and the probability of 

transition from a fire to explosion is also much higher. 

The water routes that are usually identified during the discussions of 

plant site locations at this time generally involve the inland waterway or 

rivers on the east coast and therefore threaten a sizable area of dense 

population from such an event. 

The third phase of system safety begins with the unloading operation at 

the launch site and continues until launch. In this phase, there appears to 

be little significant difference between single segment and multiple segment 

motors. Since the assembly of multiple segments into a single segment occurs 

within this phase and creates the same level of threat as would be associated 

with a single segment motor. 

The fourth phase of the system safety study involves the actual launch and 

flight. During this phase, the risk of human injury includes the flight crew, 

which may in fact be substantially lower than the human risk in earlier phases 

of the production and operation of the shuttle. However, the risk to national 

security and property becomes extremely high due to the value of the shuttle 

system that depends on the rocket boosters. 

In this phase, the issue of safety is focused on the design and function 

of all the joints in the rocket motor, including the forward joint and the 

nozzle joint, which are unavoidable even in a single segment motor. It must 

be recognized that these joints have not been a source of failure in the 

thousands of solid fuel rockets that have been tested and flown in previous 

years for the Department of Defense as weapons systems. The effects of 
Hercules has conducted trade studies of single piece case versus segmented 

case rocket motors on the basis of performance, safety, and cost. The 

question of performance is easily answered and can be dealt with first. Based 

on our studies, we have found there would be no significant difference in 

performance between motors with single piece cases or segmented cases. 

Propellant charged designs can be conceived which will provide the same 

ballistics for any of these configurations although monolith is more difficult 

to manufacture, and the weight differences would be very minor. 

not a discriminator. 

This issue is 

The issue of system safety needs to be subdivided into several 

components. First, there is manufacturing safety. This includes the 

likelihood of an incident during the manufacturing process in which the 

property or lives are at risk. There is a well established relationship 

between the size and quantity of explosive materials in a given location and the risk of damage to property and lives. many years to identify the minimum location distances between operating 

buildings and the type of protection required for containment of fire and 

explosive events. Using this relationship, there is clearly a higher 

manufacturing risk associated with the manufacture of a one piece case rocket 

motor compared to the manufacture of four segments. 

This relationship has been used for 

Another issue associated with manufacturing safety is the risk of product 

loss due to damage or error during the manufacturing process. The effect of 

error is generally directly related to the size of the item, hence, if an 

error occurs, the consequences of the error are much more costly in the case 

of a single piece motor casting than if the error affects only one segment, 

Therefore, segmentation tends to minimize loss of product risk, 

Both loss of product and threat to life are incurred as a result of 

incidental damage which can be experienced during the manufacturing process. 

While our review of the capabilities of industry to lift, move, and handle 

large products has shown that there is capability to handle a one piece case 

and casting, the threat of damage can be related to the mass and energy of the 

item being handled. Furthermore, the solid rocket motor industry is not 

accustomed to manufacturing and handling products of this dimension, and our 

experience would indicate that a very significant time must pass before the 

introduction of such a significant increase in scale in the fundamental 

operations can be managed with the required assurance that handling incidents 

and damage would not occur. The record clearly shows that such incidence were 

occurring with the handling of the four piece segments, and it is unreasonable 

to expect they would not occur with the handling of a single piece segment. 

Therefore, one must associate a higher level Of threat to a single segment 

motor. 

The next phase of system safety is the transportation of the finished 

segments from the point of manufacture to the assembly point at the launch 

site. Our studies have shown that it is feasible to transport segments of the 

current dimension and up to twice as large as the current dimension, using 

rail overland techniques that are currently available. Segments larger than 

two times the current segment would have to be transported by barge or boat on 

water routes. If one accepts that the very large booster motor is a national 

asset that would be utilized on launch systems on both coasts for both civil 
structural integrity of the redesigned solid rocket motors and the bonds 

between the case and the insulation? 

Answer: 

Hercules has been working at the leading edge of nondestructive 

technologies for large rocket motors for many years. In this regard, we have 

installed the largest computer aided tomography X-ray system for examining the 

integrity of solid rocket propellant and case bonds currently in the free 

world. We also operate 100% scanning ultrasonic inspection of the filament wound case, and have always performed 100% radiographic (X-ray) inspection of 

all motors we produce. 

As a part of our contribution to the Block I1 Design Study recently 

conducted by the Marshall Space Flight Center, we convened a panel of experts 

to explore a broad range of new and emerging technologies which might be 

useful in nondestructive evaluation of large rocket motors. The result of 

this exploration was the identification of a number of very promising 

approaches which could detect case unbonds and evaluate specific structural 

integrity issues. These included radiography, thermography, and ultrasonic 

technologies. We note that a number of these are being explored currently as 

a result of the Titan failure and as a part of the Titan recovery program. 

This is an area of special need with regard to the support of both technology 

development and technology implementation. The application of a number of 

these technologies is now limited by the size of available apparatus, and 

support is needed to provide the incentive for designing and building the size 

of apparatus that is needed for shuttle booster motors. 

ITEM 3: MONOLITHIC CASE ROCKET MOTORS 

Oues tion: 

Have you done trade studies of the technical merit of monolithic motors 

versus segmented motors? What are the tradeoffs? 

-: 

First, it must be understood that there are no monolithic motors. There 

are monolithic or one-piece cases, but every motor must have at least three 

major components which are assembled with two major joints between them. All 

solid motor cases have openings at the forward end and at the aft end which 

are required to cast the motor and to insert afterwards an igniter on one end 

and a nozzle on the other. It must be remembered that in the case of the 

shuttle rocket motor the aft joint between the nozzle and the motor case was 

the first joint to show distress, and the joint which continually showed the 

worst distress prior to the failure. This is the joint that on one flight was 

completely destroyed in the primary seal and nearly failed in the secondary 

seal. The conclusion one must reach is that a totally reliable joint is a 

prerequisite for a successful solid rocket motor. And this prerequisite is 

not relaxed if the motor has a one piece case. Therefore it is essential that 

the joint design issue be resolved first, and then the number of joints that 

are required is a matter of logistics, system safety, and cost. 
In demonstrating the achievement of these objectives, we feel that at 

least two firings are required to validate the ballistic performance and in 

particular, the reproducibility of ballistics between one motor and another 

within the required tolerance for balance of a shuttle pair. The effect of temperature should primarily be directed toward the sensitivity of the 

ballistics to temperature since motor performance, internal pressures, and 

other functional parameters are a function of temperature, and it is for this 

reason that low temperature and high temperature firings are desired. 

Within this group of four firings, it is normally possible to accommodate 

all of the final verification tests of nozzle function and insulator 

performance. The term final verification is key to this philosophy. It 

implies that no changes have been made in this series of tests and that all 

design and processing features have been demonstrated during the development program in at least one fullscale firing. This may require from three to four 

prior development firings depending on the degree of change that has been 

incorporated into the new design and the techniques used to increase the level 

of confidence and margins of safety for the initial firings. 

Ouestion: 

Do you feel the new horizontal test stand at Morton Thiokol can duplicate 

the loads and conditions associated with the actual flight experience? 

a: 

Although Hercules attempted to open the design, development, and 

installation of the second test stand to competition, this eventuality did not 

occur, and we have not been briefed with regard to the design of the test 

stand currently planned. However, as a result of our participation in the 

filament wound case program and information received informally through 

channels at NASA, we understand the nature of the horizontal vs vertical test 

configuration question, and have explored to some extent, the fidelity of the 

simulation of peak loads developed in the horizontal configuration to the 

loads experienced in flight. On this basis, we believe that the peak loads 

imposed on the case during a horizontal firing are at least as severe as those 

experienced in flight. 

While the addition of special loading apparatus to modify the loads 

normally experienced in the horizontal position has been the matter of some 

controversy, it does not appear to us that the addition of this apparatus 

makes a significant contribution to the fidelity of the test or the objectives of a static firing program. We believe that such structural behavior should 

be explored prior to a fullscale static firing through the use of fullscale simulated firing apparatus such as the joint environmental simulator. This 

approach can evaluate all of the temperature and loading variables at a much 

lower cost and at a much greater speed than can be done in fullscale firings. 

Ouestion: 

Based on your experience with solid rocket motors, are there any 

nondestructive examination techniques that can be used to verify the 
141 

temperature, joint rotation, and case bond were identified and resolved in the 

mid-sixties to mid-seventies period for these systems and subsequently, have not failed on a wide variety of rocket applications which operate from -65OF to 165'1. The tragedy of Challenger was not that the design was flawed, 

though it was, but that the flaw was known and was permitted as "acceptable 

risk". One should not indict the concept under this circumstance, and 

recognize that this was not a technical failure of unforeseen events, but a 

failure of management to correct a known technical error. 

Let us now explore for a moment the sensitivity of the reliability of a 

flight system to the number of joints in a motor case. If one accepts that 

there are at least two major joints in every motor and therefore four in every 

flight, the acceptable reliability of a joint can be established. 

Reliabilities may be quoted in terms of the probability of a single 

failure in a specified number of operational events. Thus, one might say that an acceptable reliability be no more than one flight failure in one thousand 

launches. According to the rules of combining the effects of multiple failure sources, this would mean that a single joint could not fail more than one time 

in four thousand operations if there were four joints on every flight. 

Given that the previous plan was to fly 24 shuttles each year and the 

current plan is to fly perhaps twelve, but considering also the commonality of 

what might be shuttle and heavy lift launch vehicles, and with future Titan 

launchers, one could expect the launch rate of large solid rocket boosters to 

be at least 24 and perhaps more each year. Hence, there could be as many as five-hundred flights associated with a joint design technology over the 

lifetime of a heavy-launch/shuttle type motors. 

The probability of one flight failure in one thousand flights does not provide much comfort due to the randomness of this occurence. We thereby see 

the reliability of a single joint must be increased from one in four thousand to probably one in ten thousand before one will feel comfortable about the 

acceptable safety of flight, even with single segment motors. 

Two questions now arise, first what is the effect of having more joints in a motor once the reliability of a joint is of the order one in ten thousand, 

and second, can a joint with such a reliability be designed and built? 

The answer to the first question is easily calculated according to the 

rules of combining the risk of multiple failure sources. If a single joint 

has a probability of failure of one in ten thousand, then the probability of 

flight failures from this cause in a flight motor set which includes four 

joints is four in ten thousand. If the motor sets were built as today with 

four segments in each motor, there are five joints in each motor, or ten joints in a motor set, and the probability of a flight failure using such 

joints is approximately ten in ten thousand. Therefore, the increased risk 

due to a four segment design as compared to a single segment design is 

approximately six events in ten thousand flights. 

The implication of this thought process is very clear, and it is that the 

primary requirement of the technology we need is to design and build a totally 
reliable joint, since such joints cannot be avoided. However, having done so, 

the difference in reliability between a motor set with one segment vs four 

segments is not significant, and the number of segments can be selected on the 

basis of other system requirements, particularly system safety during other 

phases of manufacture and operation. 

The final phase of operations is the recovery and refurbishment of the 

motor case hardware. While this phase does not contain the explosive hazard 

of the propellant manufacturing and operating phases, there is still a major 

uncertainty, with regard to capability of removing the insulator from a single 

Segment motor case. This operation has never been demonstrated before. 

Finally, one must recognize the lack of experience in building a single 

segment motor of this size. As has been previously pointed out, the entire 

history of comparable experience consists of four rocket motors at least one 

of which did not operate properly. The satisfactory scaleup of present 

experience and the reduction of that technology to routine practice must 

constitute a very large uncertainty in scheduling and costs. 

With regard to adequate reliability to support a manned program, both 

concepts can provide the needed reliability. It should be remembered there 

are many weapons systems currently in use which use solid propulsion and are 

manned rated. Typically these systems are launched from aircraft or from 

weapons carriers on which men are present. While in general, the proximity of 

the propulsion to the men occurs for a short period of time, it is that period 

of time during which the motor is being pressurized and subject to leakage of 

joints and other transient phenomena which is most critical. The history of 

reliability and safety of these systems has been outstanding. 

Furthermore, the question of manned versus unmanned risk must be given 

very careful consideration. It is clearly evident from the circumstances in 

which the country now finds itself that the reliability of unmanned systems 

must be as high as it can be made. The value of payloads and launch 

facilities and the strategic value to national security is so high that 

nothing less than the best available technologies will be acceptable for those 

missions also. 

Ouestion: 

Based on the Challenger and Titan investigations, has industry's 

understanding of solid rocket motors been dramatically increased to where more 

reliable motors can be manufactured? Will there ever be a solid rocket motor 

that is "fail safe" for the two minutes it burns during space shuttle flight? 

Answer: 

While it is true that the most recent Titan failure and the most recent 

shuttle failure of propulsion elements were solid motors, it is clear from the 

record of the failure investigation of both failures that the failures were 

the result of management and policy error rather than a lack of understanding 

or inadequate technology. As we pointed out above, in the case of the shuttle 
143 

failure, the flaw in the design was clearly ider.tified and understood long 

before the shuttle flight was destroyed. The design of the shuttle joints did 

not meet the sealing industry's standard requirements for configuration or 

deformation during loading and it violated all previous experience in this 

regard. The solid propulsion industry was never given an opportunity to 

evaluate, criticize, or participate in corrective action with regard to this 

element until after the failure had occurred. 

With regard to the Titan failure, it must be noted that current activity 

is underway to inspect and identify acceptable segments and rejectable 

segments based on inspection techniques and technologies which were certainly 

available two years ago. An understanding of the importance of case to 

insulation bond integrity and the need to perform inspections to ascertain 

this integrity is not new. Such inspections have been conducted routinely on 

Department of Defense strategic and tactical motors for the past fifteen 

years. It should be noted, however, that the use of steel motor cases on both 

of these space boosters makes the inspections more difficult than the use of 

composite motor cases as has been the practice in the strategic motors and also for the filament wound case of the STS SRM. It is our understanding that 

no such inspections were performed on the Titan segments and only a sampling 

of segments for the shuttle rocket motor were so inspected. Once again, we 

must emphasize, that this is not a matter of understanding, but a matter of 

policy which was negotiated between the supplier and the government. 

The influence of temperature on the performance of elastomeric O-ring 

seals was thoroughly explored in the middle-seventies by Hercules and the Air 

Force as a result of random failures at -65'F during static testing of 

Sidewinder motors that had previously been qualified without failure. This 

investigation identified the role of the material properties and the rotation 

of joints which was very similar in concept to the behavior and findings 

relative to the shuttle joint. Material testing of the O-rings identical in 

concept to that which has currently been done for the shuttle O-rings was 

performed at that time and the findings published. Hence, some of the 

industry at least, and some of the Air Force at least, were thoroughly aware 

of the nature and solutions for this type of sealing problem. This experience 

was eventually reported by Hercules to the NASA Redesign Team in March of 1986 

at an informal meeting at the Marshall Space Flight Center, after the 

Challenger failure. 

It is worth noting that in the very recent past, the prior two failures of 

the Titan launcher, a failure of a Delta launcher, a failure of the Atlas 

launcher, and a failure to orbit of a shuttle main engine all were liquid 

system failures. The often quoted advantage of liquid systems in providing an 

operational test mode on the launch pad prior to launch appears not to be 

exercised or not to have the claimed advantage in preventing flight failures. The failure of a shuttle main engine, which created a dangerous abort to orbit 

situation, also threatened both lives 2nd mission. In addition there have 

been two starts and shutdowns on launch pad with the crew in place which must 

be considered as liquid system failures on the shuttle. All of this points 

out that space flight still includes a significant risk to life and property 

whether it be from solid motors or from liquid systems. And neither at this 

time can guarantee a 100% fail safe condition during the boost to orbit. In 

fact, our review of solid and liquid Propulsion history shows very similar 

reliabilities for both. 
The concept of fail safe must be distinguished clearly from the concept of 

fail free. Fail safe implies that if the motor's performance falls outside of 

acceptable limits, some corrective action can be taken such that life and 

perhaps property of the system can be protected. The approach used by liquid 

propulsion is to turn off the flow of fuel to the combustion chamber thereby 

stopping the combustion process and shutting down the thrust. This can be 

fail safe if the problem lies downstream of the fuel valves and if the 

resulting loss of thrust does not create a subsequent failure mode. 

h"ni1e it has not been practiced for space motor propulsion, a system for 

st0ppir.g the thrust of solid iotors has been in use for defense systems for 

xany years. The system is called thrust termination or thrust reversal. It 

involves the use of port openings in the forward end of the motor which can be 

opened on command, thus rapidly dropping the internal pressure in the aotor 

and creating a neutral thrust condition, or under soae circmstances, actually 

reversing the thrust of the motor. If this system were applied to space 

boosters, the logic for generating a thrust termination signal could be based on a variety of out of specification or out of tolerance conditions during che 

operation of the shuttle boosters. 

The appearance of new jets of gas at the forward end of the motor 

certainly creates a new condition for the orbitor and tanks, however, it is 

clearly a final resort eiergency and under these conditions some damage to 

orbitor and tank can be tolerated, provided it does not cause destruction. 

The jets would be directed away from the primary incidence on other 

coa,ponents, and the time during which the jets are active is only a few 

rrilliseconds until the solids are ejected. It appears feasible to conduct 

such a thrust teraination without a subsequent destruction of the orbitor or 

tarks. 

Finally, a corrment on the possibility for designing and building aore 

reliable solid rocket motors. A solid rocket motor is fundamentally a very 

simple machine with alaost no moving parts and with literally centuries of 

evolutionary development behind it. In its modern form, it has become more 

complicated by virtue of steerable nozzles, pulse starts and stops and other 

erhancements to make it aore versatile. However, we now have also a large 

inventory of high performance aaterials and insulators with which to build and 

defend the structure and xechanism. We believe that we have the materials and 

can obtain the knowledge required to make the motor as reliable as it is 

needed. 

ITEM 4: THE NRC RECOMIGNDATICNS 

Ouestion: 

Would you please comment on the NRC recommendations, especially those 

recormendations concerning the need for a better defined and more thorough 

test program and the establisbnent of all priority criteria by which to evaluate the tests. 

w: 

The recommendations of the NRC panel contain remarkable agreement to the 

recormendations ar.d corments that Hercules has given both NASA and the NRC 
panel at various times during the past year. We agree totally in substance 

and detail with the statements contained therein. 

We particularly agree with the comments relative to contingency planning 

and parallel development of alternative concepts for a field joint that closes 

under pressure, and for a new nozzle-to-case joint that avoids the additional 

leak paths and bolts that are included in the baseline design. 

On the issue of the insulation at the case field joint, Hercules remains 

concerned that the proposed baseline is sensitive to processing variables, and 

cannot be verified after assembly is completed. The risk is that a defect 

will remain after completion of this bond that can initiate a failure mode 

that has not been evaluated during the development and qualification test 

program. For this reason we agree with the NRC recommendation that the vented 

configuration be evaluated with equal emphasis and urgency. 

It has been our position that the vigorous pursuit of alternatives from 

the baseline concept would be enhanced by the addition of another contractor 

with uninhibited and undistracted resources dedicated to the success of the alternative. Only within this environment can the alternatives be assured an 

equal evaluation. 

The Space Transportation System represents a very significant investment 

in money, talent, and lives by this country into a space capability. However, 

we in the industry recognize it remains developmental in nature, a 

characteristic that cannot be expected to change in the near future. Neither 

do we have the luxury of discarding the current system concept and beginning 

anew. Therefore, the NRC Panel recommendation for pre-planned changes and 

periodic incorporation of incremental improvements is the correct operational 

strategy to protect and extend the value of the investment already made. 

We agree that heaters are an extremely undesirable feature to add to the 

Shuttle Booster Motor and that a complete and final solution to the system of 

materials comprising the joint and seals will not require such heaters. 

The NRC Panel discussion of vented and unvented insulation at the field 

joints is pertinent. In Hercules experience the unvented designs have 

inevitably incurred a flaw which resulted in failure. As the NRC panel points 

out, tests with imposed flaws are particularly important for determining the 

adequacy of this design concept. Difficulties are the inability to predict in 

advance all of the possible defects and flaws that could occur, and of the 

fact that there exists today no acceptable method of inspecting this adhesive 

joint after assembly is completed. 

The vented design, however, uses the cool gas already present inside the 

motor prior to firing to insulate the seals, and prevents the mixing of hot and cool gas by a variety of engineered devices which are inspectable prior to 

assembly and are not modified by the assembly process. Since these engineered 

features are large in comparison to the size of possible defects in an adhesive bond, it is technically feasible to conduct a post-assembly 

inspection to assure the quality and condition of the assembly. To Hercules' 

knowledge there has never been a failure of a field joint designed according 

to these principals when combined with a sealing mechanism that closes upon 

pressurization. 
Nozzle ablatives were also under study before the Challenger failure. 

Changes which have resulted include process modifications and design 

modifications which now will be evaluated in fullscale static firings. As the 

NRC Panel pointed out, this is one area that requires a full duration firing 

test. However, not necessarily a fullscale test. NASA currently does not 

have a subscale solid propulsion development motor that can be used to 

evaluate technology or design changes. We feel this is a serious deficiency 

in view of the cost of development tests for a fullscale shuttle motor, and 

like the NRC Panel, we recommend that NASA proceed promptly to develop and 

qualify such a subscale test and evaluation motor. We are prepared to compete 

for this task which could be based on derivatives of existing motor hardware. 

As we have noted above, an important part of the testing program is a 

thorough exploration of the extreme values of loading and environmental 

variables in fullscale special tests such as the joint evaluation simulator 

and in particular, a special task to evaluate the effect of high temperature 

gas flow in the ports in the center port of the motor on the heat exchange to 

the field joints between the motor segments. This particular test is of 

special value in answering the question of whether such joints should be 

vented or unvented and we recommend that further testing with this test motor 

to evaluate a variety of concepts and the total range of possible defects that 

might occur in the assembly of the different design concepts. 

It is in this phase of analog and fullscale testing that participation by 

others in the propulsion industry should be encouraged in order to provide a 

thorough evaluation of the test data and to participate in the identification 

of optum solutions as testing reveals the needs for further improvement. Such 

participation certainly need not be associated or identified with competition 

for subsequent motor development or production contracts. Certainly in the 

eventuality that schedule slippage is required to provide the necessary 

credibility for the redesign concept, the ability of others in the industry to 

support evaluation both theoretically and experimentally should be reviewed. 

Finally, the use of fullscale tests, whether they be simulations, analogs, 

or actual motor firings is frequently directed toward verification of 

analytical models which are then in turn used to validate the design for 

various combinations of load and environment. This function of the tests is 

only valid if the predictions of the model are known prior to the tests. The 

comments of the NRC panel in this regard are exactly correct. That is, that 

the model must be thoroughly exercised and the predictions therefrom declared 

in complete and full documentation prior to the conduct of the test. If the 

"predictions" of the model can only be made after the test because some 

element of the test observation is used to make the prediction, then clearly 

the model is not independent and unable to satisfy the requirements of 

predicting behavior under other circumstances. While this situation 

frequently does exist in the early phases of the program as certain phenomena 

are adjusted for differences between fullscale and subscale behavior, the 

condition must be resolved prior to the validation of those models in the 

final qualification test series. 

58375 
147 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you very much. Mr. Sides, let’s hear from 

you, please. 

Mr. SIDES. Thank vou. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. We have su6mitted a concise statement for the record. I 

would like to take this opportunity in the interest of time to briefly 

summarize our formal testimony. 

We made our statement available to your committee, the press 

and all of the participants of this panel. I would appreciate it if 

your committee report would print our statement in its entirety. 

My name is Jim Sides and I am senior vice president and general 

manager of Atlantic Research Corporation’s Propulsion Division, 

headquartered in Gainesville and Alexandria, Virginia and 

Camden, Arkansas. 

We propose to produce our redesigned SRM at ARC’S ultramodern facility in Arkansas, where we made in 1986 more composite 

propellent than any other facility in the United States. The kind of 

propellent we produce in Arkansas is similar to that used in past SRM production. And we are currently producing this kind of solid 

rocket propellent at the rate of one and a half million pounds per 

month. Over the last year, we have produced enough of this propel- lent to load 15 SRMs. 

I will have to add the same caveat as my friends have, as far as 

our comment on the baseline redesign. Our involvement was comparable to what I have heard Aerojet, UTC and Hercules state. 

We do believe that the Morton Thiokol/NASA joint redesign and 

the test program for that redesign, address the failure modes encountered in the Challenger disaster. Nevertheless, we foresee the 

possibility for assembly and case reuse problems. 

Some of the questions, Senator Hollings, that you asked this 

morning were very astute. With regard to those problems, the new 

clevis and tang joint does have a high rir;k of O-ring and hardware 

damage. With regard to case reuse, my concern is that Morton Thiokol 

and NASA have substituted a complex design for the simple tang 

and clevis joint. And the more complex design, the capture feature, has tolerances that are so close that repeated use of the motor case 

is doubtful. 

To avoid these and other problems, ARC has selected, as part of 

our Block I1 study, a single bolted joint design which was the original design work done by NASA Langley. We have expanded on 

their design. The most significant feature of our design is that the bolted 

design closes on pressurization. It seals itself on pressurization. We 

have a model of this design sitting on the floor. I think it pretty much speaks for itself, but I will comment briefly on it. 

Our design, and I would like to answer your questions on it, is 

basically what you can see. Bolts and a face seal using metal 0- 

rings are as the basic concept of our design. It has been made possible due to recent improvements in technology and manufacturing techniques. These improvements were not really available to the designer when the solid rocket motor was originally designed and selected 

many years ago. We now have the techncilogy also for asbestos-free 

insulation which reduces the inert weight of each motor by over 
148 

4300 pounds. And, further, we can reduce inert weight by another 

600 pounds by new manufacturing methods which will extend the 

motor case segments to twice the length of the current one. The 

double-length case eliminates the need for factory joints. 

We strongly believe that our bolted joint constitutes the lowest 

technical risk. 

One disadvantage of the bolted joint is increased weight, but our 

asbestos-free insulation and a double-length case more than offset 

any weight penalty. 

I might add that I consider the replacement of the asbestos-containing insulation in this rocket motor, as well as other components that contain asbestos, to be a priority concern and does represent a serious threat to the shuttle schedule. Manufacturers of 

components that contain asbestos in this country are rapidly dealing with trying to get out of the business, for obvious reasons. 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude my summary by emphasizing my 

company's willingness to set aside propriety interest and work 

openly with our industry for improvements in solid rocket motor 

flight safety. 

What we would like this committee to consider is that the 

United States Government structure an alternative program in 

such a way that two teams of two or more companies could create 

competitive designs. 

The winning design team could then compete within itself for 

production, possibly on a leader/follower basis. Such an approach, 

Mr. Chairman, would focus all of our technical resources in this industry on the program without compromising the legal requirements for competition. 

' 

I look forward to answering your questions, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement follows:] 
STATEMENT OF JAMES R. SIDES, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, 

PROPULSION DIVISION, ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Comnittee, thank you very 

much for this opportunity to sumrire what we strongly believe are the 

advantages of the Atlantic Research Corporation redesign of the Shuttle solid 

rocket motor. Throughout my testimony, I shall call this motor the "SRM." 

My name is James Sides. I am the Senior Vice President and General 

Manager of ARC's Propulsion Division located in Gainesville and Alexandria, 

Virginia, and Camden, Arkansas. We propose to produce our redesigned SRM at 

ARC's ultramodern facility in Arkansas, where we made, in 1986, more composite 

propellant than any other facility in the United States. The kind of 

propellant we produce in Arkansas is similar to that used in past SRM 

production, and are currently processing this kind of solid rocket propellant 

at a rate of 1.5 million pounds per month. Over the last year, we have 

produced enough of this propellant to load over 15 SRMs. 

In our Block I1 Design Study submitted to the George C. Marshall Space 

Flight Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on 

December 31, 1986, we provided detail about our plans to expand our Arkansas 

facility to produce redesigned SRMs for the NASA shuttle program, and our 

plans to move the boost segments to Florida or California. 

But the detail your Comnittee is most interested in is our proposed 

redesign, a model of which we have brought to this Comnittee room. and two 

exhibits of which are attached to nly testimony. In your letter of invftation 

dated December 23, 1986, you also asked me for our considerations on the 

proposed test program, and other related matters. 

Let IIE initially respond to your request for cmnt on our proposed 

Shuttle solid rocket motor design. 
In our Block I1 design study, we proposed the SRM bolted flange joint and 

a double-length case segment. Before we selected this solution, we evaluated 

all segmented and monolithic SRM design concepts with emphasis on joints and 

seals. We devoted particular attention to eliminating those deficiencies 

identified in the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 

Challenger Accident. as well as those identified through a detailed review of 

SRM literature and in NASA's very helpful August 14, 1986 SRM briefing to 

industry. In this context, Atlantic Research wishes to thank NASA for its 

open door policy. NASA officials have been very helpful to us as we conducted 

our research on Block 11, and we appreciate the open door reception we have 

been given personally by NASA Administrator James Fletcher, and Marshall Space 

Flight Center Director J. R. Thompson, Rear Admiral Richard Truley. NASA's 

Associate Administrator for Space Flight. 

The bolted joint concept was selected by Atlantic Research for three 

reasons. First, the bolted design eliminates joint rotation at the sealing 

surfaces. Second. the bolted design provides simple, straight forward 

assembly techniques. Third, the bolted design will support the requirement of 

19 reuses. 

Bolted joints have been successfully used for many years in a variety of 

applications beginning with high pressure and temperature steam systems, 

liquid engfne environments such as those seen in the Space Shuttle Main 

Engine, and finally in nuclear reactor applications. Bolted joints were 

successfully used in many solid rocket motor applications in the formative 

years of this industry, being replaced only to permit lighter joints for 

weight critical applications. The bolted joint with metallic seals does not 

require pressure actuation. 

The bolted joint concept selected was thoroughly designed and analyzed by 

NASA Langley Research Center. We have worked closely with NASA Langley and 

feel that our combined design and analysis efforts have resulted in a joint 

that will assure Shuttle flight integrity. Like NASA Langley, we are 

convinced that the bolted joint will make a superior and mre reliable primary 

sealing surface during maximum pressurization. 

2 
151 

Atlantic Research Corporation's Block 11 design concept features, in 

addition, a double-length case and improved performance, non-asbestos 

insulation. The Block I1 case length will equal the current casting segment 

length, eliminating case-to-case factory joints. The weight savings produced 

by these features more than compensates for the increased weight of the bolted 

flange joints. Decreased inert weight of 4,954 pounds and increased 

propellant weight of 1,839 pounds will allow mare than 1,000 pounds of Space 

Shuttle payload increase. 

We were briefed by NASA on the Morton Thiokol-NASA modified design. We 

have not had an opportunity to analyze the design in the detail NASA and 

Morton Thiokol have, but in the spirit of your request for OUP comnent, we 

believe the failure modes encountered in Olallenger have been addressed. 

Specifically, the primary "0" ring should not lose its "squeeze" as a result 

of joint rotation due to motor pressurization in the new design. We further 

believe that the "capture feature" addresses this failure mode. 

We are, nevertheless, concerned about two new problems created by this 

fix. First, the new clevis and tang joint has a higher risk of "0" ring or 

even hardware damage. Although we feel any potentially catastrophic defects 

should be picked up by leak check, the need for rework might be great and 

expensive. Second, the interference fit between the capture feature and the 

clevis may result in metal damage which will preclude reusing the case 

hardware the required 19 times. 

Morton Thiokol 's verification program calls for only two full-scale 

development and two qualification motors prior to the next Shuttle flight. 

Therefore, with such limited full-scale firings, it is essential that a great 

quantity of reliable data be collected on each of the four planned tests. 

These results should be extensively reviewed and analyzed. 

For the test related to our bolted flange redesign, we are proposing a 

more rigorous program. Atlantic Research Corporation has designed and 

produced the overwhelming majority of man-rated solid rocket propulsion 

systems for the U.S. Department of Defense, and we are used to extensive test 

programs. 

3 
What we are proposing is a test program that would require exposure to 

maximum pressures and temperatures three times longer than the current NASA 

joint test. For our Block I1 SRM, we reconmend a series of component. 

subscale, and full scale tests to develop and verify our improved SRM, 

component tests of the case, case and nozzle field joint, insulation. the 

nozzle itself, and the igniter. Subscale testing will include 40-inch 

diameter segmented motor firings designed to verify the bolted flange field 

joint performance under 25-second exposure to maximum SRM pressures and 

temperatures. We will complete the verification with full scale firings of 

four development and four qualification motors. 

To provide a viable alternative to the current redesign, Atlantic 

Research Corporation submitted on January 13, 1987 to NASA Marshall Space 

Flight Center a proposal to demonstrate the SRM bolted joint concept. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude ~r(y testimony by reiterating an 

idea we surfaced on July 31, 1986 before Congressman Jack Brooks' Conittee on 

Government Operations. We proposed a team approach to the solution of the 

Shuttle SRM program. It seemed to me then, and it appears just as true today, 

that there ought to be some way by which all the talents of the American solid 

rocket industry can focus on this problem of imnense national importance. 

All of us again here today are capable of designing, making and testing a 

Shuttle SRM. Atlantic Research, for 

example, is particularly strong in the areas of low cost propellant production 

and loading, asbestos-free insulation, and in the design of man-rated systems 

where reliability is essential. 

But each of us has particular strengths. 

What we would like this Conittee to consider is an acquisition strategy 

similar to a recent Department of Defense strategy. Contractor teams would 

jointly develop the design on a cooperative basis. Both members of the 

winning team would then be qualified to competitively produce the final 

design. This approach assures a broad technical base, separate production 

facilities, and built-in competition. Such an approach, Mr. Chairman, would 

focus all of our technical resources on the program without compromising the 

legal requirement for competition. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to address any question, as 

well as questions from those of any member of your Conittee. 

Attachments: A. Case Field Joint. B. Case-to-Nozzle Joint, and 

C. Photograph of Exhibit 
153 

A. CASE FIELD JOINT 

51 L CONFffiURATlON FACTORY JOINTS 

B. CASE-TO-NOZZLE JOINT 
154 

ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORPORATION 

PROPULSION DIVISION 7511 vVELLI'UO-CU PD OAINE5bI.-E vICG Nfi 22365-1619 703 602 6C30 

13 February 1987 

United States Senate 

Comnittee on Comrce, Science, and Transportation 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Attention: The Honorable Donald W. Riegle, Jr. 

Chaivmn, Subcomnittee on Science, 

Technology, and Space 

Dear Senator Ri egl e : 

SRM flight safety is a national imperative, and we have made a comnittment to 

participate in the Space Shuttle Program. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to the Subcomnittee. ARC believes 

Responses to your questions are attached. If additional information is 

desired, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Yours very truly, ++* ,~QJT~~ARCH CORPORATION 

\James R. Sides 

Senior Vice President and 

General Manager 
OUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD 

1. On March 31st, Dr. Fletcher will provide this Subcomnittee with a LongTerm Procurement Plan for solid rocket boosters. 

indicate whether or not a Block I1 solid rocket motor will be procured. 

Q. If NASA decides to proceed with a competitive Block 11 procurement, 

is there a consensus on this Panel that any Second Sourcing decision 

should be delayed until the Block I1 motor is designed, developed, 

tested and flown? 

At that time, NASA will 

If a Second Source were pursued, would each of you bid if it were a 

fixed price contract? 

A. ARC recomnends that NASA and this comnittee consider an acquisition 

strategy for the Space Shuttle SRM similar to a recent Department of 

Defense approach. Contractor teams would jointly develop an 

improved design on a cooperative basis. Both members of the 

contractor team would then be qualified to competitively produce the 

final design. This approach assures a broad technical base, 

separate production facilities, and built-in completion. 

ARC would bid on a second source program under the right business 

conditions. 

is a cost reimbursable contract. 

We observe that the current baseline redesign program 

2. There has been mrch discussion today concerning the scope, timing, and 

schedule of the proposed solid rocket booster test program. 

Q. Based on your experience, how many full-scale , qualification motor 

tests should be run prior to the first flight? 

A. As recommended in our Block I1 study report, we proposed to complete 

the verification of our bolted flange design with full-scale firings 

of four development and four qualification motors. 

the number of tests of the baseline redesign, we believe the NASA 

test program will address the failure modes encounted in the 

Challenger disaster. However, due to the limited number of these 

tests (four full-scale tests scheduled prior to the next scheduled 

Shuttle flight), it is essential that a great quantity of data be 

collected, reviewed, and analyzed on each subscale, simulator, and 

full-scale test. 

success criteria be established for each test. 

With regard to 

It is also important that pretest predictions and 

0. Do you feel the new horizontal test stand at Morton Thiokol can 

duplicate the loads and conditions associated with the actual flight 

experience? 
156 

A. ARC cannot answer this question because we have never seen the new 

horizontal test stand at Morton Thiokol. nor have we ever been 

briefed on its capabilities. 

cannot be realistically duplicated in horizontal or vertical test 

stands. Since flight safety will rely on analysis of SRM structural 

behavior under flight loads, analytical methods and predicted design 

safety margin should be carefully reviewed. 

Based on your experiences with solid rocket motors, are there any 

non-destructive examination techniques that can be used to verify 

the structural integrity of the redesigned solid rocket motors and 

the bands between the case and the insulation? 

Me are concerned that flight loads 

Q. 

A. The following non-destructive examination techniques can and are 

used to verify structural integrity: (1) proof tests of pressure 

vessels, (2) x-ray of propellant grains, (3) ultrasonic 

inspections to check for unbonds, and (4) leak tests to verify seal 

integrity . 

3. There has been and continues to be much discussion about the technical 

merit of monolithic solid rocket motors versus Segmented solid rocket 

booster motors. 

Q. Have you done trade studies of the technical merit of monolithic 

motors versus segmented motors? What are the trade-offs? 

A. Our trade studies on the technical merit of monolithic motors versus 

segmented motors highlight the following trade-offs: (1) Even 

though joint reliability of the monolithic motor is higher than that 

of the segmented motor, overall r e l i a b i l i t y o f the monolithic 

approach is somewhat lower due to technical uncertainties assoclated 

with the propellant grain, propellant bond system, and insulation 

for the monolithic motor. (2) ARC estimates that the monolithlc 

approach will produce a 2,050 pound increase in payload capabilfty 

over the segmented approach, due to lower inert weight and increased 

propellant loading. (3) Total life cycle cost of the monolithlc 

approach is estimated to be 72 percent higher than the segmented 

approach, due to increased handling, test, transportation. and 

facilities cost. (4) 

monolithic configuration, due to its propulsive nature if 

accidentally ignited. 

showed that, on balance, the segmented approach is decisively 

superior to the monolithic approach. 

Shipping safety is a critical issue for the 

For these four reasons, our trade studies 

Q. Do either offer the reliability required to support a manned 

program? 

A. ARC believes that a segmented SRM with improved field joints offers 

the most reliable approach for manned flight. 
Q. Based on the Challenger and Titan investigations, has industry's 

understanding of solid rocket motors been dramatically increased to 

where more reliable motors can be manufactured? Will there ever be 

a solid rocket motor that is "fail safe" for the two minutes it 

burns during space shuttle flight? 

A. Atlantic Research has been producing reliable, man-rated rocket 

motors longer than any other member of the American solid rocket 

motor industry. 

causes of the Challenger tragedy, our understanding regarding the 

reliability of solid rocket motors has not been dramatically 

increased. 

Thus, while we learned a great deal about the 

One simply cannot guarantee the "fail safe" nature of any rocket -- 

solid or liquid -- as well as any other component of the shuttle, or 

any other sophisticated aerospace system. We believe, however, that 

we could manufacture a Shuttle solid rocket motor as reliable as our 

many thousands of man-rated rocket motors we have produced in the 

last quarter century. 

4. You are familiar with the National Research Council Panel's technical 

assessment of the proposed redesign and comnents on the need for 

contingency planning and a better defined and mre thorough test program. 

Q. Would you please comment on the NRC recommendations, especially 

those reconmendations concerning the need for a better defined and 

more thorough test program and the establishment of a priori 

criteria by which to evaluate the tests? 

A. We agree that a better defined and more thorough test program is 

needed. 

confirm predictions, not to find out what will happen. Thus, a 

priori criteria must be established by which to evaluate the 

engineering tests. 

We believe the purpose of an engineering test should be to 

We particularly agree with the NRC recomnendation (bottom of page 2 

of their report to NASA Administrator James Fletcher dated 

January 15, 1987) in which they state: "The (National Research 

Council 's) Panel still believes that contingency planning should 

include the design, fabrication, and testing of a case field joint 

that closes under pressurization.'' The bolted flange design 

selected by Atlantic Research Corporation for our Block I1 effort 

does close under pressurization. 
158 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you. I will just give you a little news that 

you may not have heard or may not necessarily want to hear, and 

that is the latest weather report is to the effect that we may have 

15 inches of snow coming in. 

What I think it means is that I think people are going to have a 

hard time making their way home. And so we are going to, in very 

short order, I think, conclude today, not because we wouldn’t like 

to take more time, but because I think in the interests of everybody’s wellbeing here that has got some distance to travel, that 

people ought to do that before the snow gets any deeper than it 

now is. 

I want to say two things. I will ask generally then, if this is acceptable to the subcommittee, that we will put the questions in the 

record. We are going to ask our witness in the next panel to come 

back another day because I don’t want to do a bobtailed session on 

that. However, Dr. Stever’s statement will be included in today’s 

hearing record. I want to get the careful review of what the independent group has to say in terms of their assessment of this. And 

I do not want to hurry it, and I will not hurry it. 

I want to say one thing with respect to your involvement, however, in the redesign of the O-ring area, and also the Block I1 activity. 

Senator Hollings and I together put into the appropriation last 

year money precisely for this purpose. And it became law and the 

money is being dispensed. And it was for two reasons. Part of it 

was to be used for Block I1 design alternative work, and part of it 

was to be used to support the redesign team decisions. 

And it was very clear that we wanted both things done because if 

we miss on the first go-around, you know, I am not sure what our 

future is in the second. The point is, both of these things have to be 

done and done properly. 

So it was clearly our intent in providing that money that you 

should be involved in a meaningful way in the redesign of this 

joint. And I don’t mean informally or casually or what have you. 

We wanted the full brain power of this industry to have a chance 

to focus along with the principal players that have been involved 

on precisely this question, so that we get it right and so that we 

really apply ourselves as a nation; that we have all the talent focused on this thing so that we made the best bottom-line judgment 

that we can, at the same time that we start down the track on this 

alternative design approach. 

So you ought to be involved on more than an informal basis. It 

was the intent that you should be. It was the intent that you would 

be paid to be. And I am frank to say to you that I want your best 

brain power on that problem because we have got to get it right. 

And I think in this case the more brains, the better. 

It is not like having 25 people cooking a meal in one kitchen, but 

I think we have got to really understand that we have had the 

kind of cross-checks of intelligence and capability that this industry possesses as a whole on a matter of this kind of critical importance to the country because we have to get it right. 

So, in any event, I just say that to you. Mr. Dorsey, let us hear 

from you and then after we have, we will submit what questions 

we have for the record and we will finish for the day. 
159 

Mr. DORSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My statement will be 

brief. 

I have submitted a longer statement for the record and with your 

permission, I will give an abstract of that at this time and I request 

that my more detailed statement be placed into the record. 

Senator RIEGLE. It will be. 

Mr. DORSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you mentioned, I am 

Edward Dorsey of Morton Thiokol, and I am the vice president and 

general manager of the Space Division, located in Utah. 

In the Block I1 studies that we performed, the subject I am addressing at this time, one of the first things that we did was to 

make a review of the industry experience, both with the monolithic 

and segmented motors. And we made that review because we recognized that significant changes from past design practice and experience do add some degree of uncertainty to a new design. 

More specifically, if you look at the history of the aerospace business, and I don’t care whether it is the solid rocket motors, jet engines, airplanes, tanks, trucks, you name it, the very successful designs come by through a process of evolution, testing, experience 

and refinement. 

And when we looked into that, the assessment we made on the 

monolithic motor was influenced by the fact that there was very 

little experience with very large monolithic motors. A shuttle segment weighs 300,000 pounds. 

In the entire history of the solid rocket motor business, not only 

in this country but, of course, in the entire world, there have only 

been four motors larger than a single shuttle segment which have 

ever been built and static tested. The entire industry history is four 

such motors. 

Of those, the largest one of those when it was static fired, there 

were ballistic anomalies in the pressure trace of the motor. It did 

not deliver the ballistic performance that was predicted. And it 

simply illustrates the fact that in any new design or development, 

the design does not always turn out as intended by the design engineers. 

You have to go through a process of testing experience. If anomalies or difficulties are found, then you have to correct those and 

test again. We also would note that those four motors, the only 

four that ever existed larger than a single shuttle segment, were 

cast with propellent and static fired in place. 

There is no aerospace experience whatsoever with the transportation, vehicle assembly and flight of very large monolithic motors. 

Based upon that and the belief that the design or the evolution 

that we are on is a very good evolution, we concluded that a segmented design is, in fact, the lowest risk approach for the Block I1 

solid rocket motor because we can use the development, production, tests, transportation and launch facility experience and capabilities that exist. 

Also, the Block I1 joint design, whatever it may be, can inherit 

some confidence in the analysis and testing from the very experiences that we are going through right now for the redesign of the 

space shuttle joint. Those analysis methods, and there has been 

much development in that, and the test techniques, the develop- 
160 

ment of the specialized test facilities, can carry over to substantiate 

and verify similar hardware designs in the future. 

Also, I would like to comment about the schedule aspects of that. 

If one thinks about the attention and scrutiny that any new rocket 

motor, whether it be monolithic or segmented, would get, and the 

kind of test program, all the way from materials to subscale to special vehicles to full-scale full duration motors, and the design reviews that will take place, our assessment is that the first development static test of any new design where there is some significant 

change, you are looking at the first static test in about 33 months, 

and that with design certification, we are probably looking at a 

number of full-scale motors to be fired after that, there would be 

approximately a total time of 56 months, followed by delivery of 

the first flight set of motors. 

So our assessment is, Number 1, it is best to build upon the experience that the industry has. Number 2, there is very little experience with large monolithic motors. Number 3, a segmented motor 

of whatever joint design is the preferred choice. And Number 4, 

that realistically we are looking at a period of time of, say, 30 to 33 

months for the first test of any new design. 

We have completed a very detailed report outlining these findings, have submitted it to NASA, as pointed out by Mr. Thompson. 

That plus the other four reports are under review. 

Mr. Chairman and members, that concludes my remarks. 

[The statement follows:] 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD G. DORSEY, JR., VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, 

SPACE DIVISION, MORTON THIOKOL, INCORPORATED; WASATCH OPERATIONS 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, I am Edward G. 

Dorsey, Jr., Vice President and General Manager of the Space Division of Morton 

Thiokol, Inc. located in Brigham City, Utah. 

I am pleased to appear before this Committee to discuss the alternative Shuttle 

Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) designs that were developed in the Block I1 SRM Conceptual Design Studies. I will review the results of Morton Thiokol’s study and the con- siderations which led to the recommended Block I1 SRM concept. As the development and production contractor for the Space Shuttle SRM, Morton Thiokol has 

previously completed the complex tasks of development, verification, production, 

and flight for this important element of the Space Transportation System. We have 

drawn on this experience to develop concepts for a Block I1 SRM. 

The objective of the study was to identify a Block I1 SRM concept that may offer 

performance and/or reliability and safety margin improvements. 

Groundrules for the Block I1 SRM Conceptual Design Studies were established to ensure compliance with existing STS requirements for the high performance solid 

rocket motor (HPM) while allowing flexibility for design concepts that offered potential improvements in reliability, performance, and cost. The Block I1 SRM studies 

were conducted in parallel with the ongoing qualification of the Redesigned Solid 

Rocket Motor (RSRM) and requirements were adjusted to agree with the applicable new criteria. In addition, previous NASA studies have projected increased payload 

capability for the Space Shuttle flown in a “heads-UP)’ trajectory with a new thrusttime history provided by the SRM. The higher thrust requirements to meet the 

heads-up criteria for the SRM were included as a desirable goal for Block I1 SRM 

concepts as long as reliability and safety were not compromised. 

Concepts for a Block I1 SRM were required to eliminate asbestos-filled insulation 

and were open to alternate designs to improve reliability and performance, such as case changes, different propellants, modified burn rate, etc. Limitations were placed on SRM changes such that the outside geometry would not alter the physical interfaces with other Space Shuttle elements and would have minimum impact on the 

aerodynamic and dynamic characteristics of the Space Shuttle vehicle. Morton Thiokol’s criteria for selecting among the Block I1 SRM options were prioritized to: (1) 
161 

assure system reliability; (2) maintaidincrease performance; and (3) enhance cost 

effectiveness. 

Our study recognized that significant changes from demonstrated successful solid 

rocket industry experience would add uncertainty for system safety, reliability, performance, cost, and development risk (schedules and cost). For this reason a review 

of industry experience was completed early in the study and was a factor in selecting the preferred motor configuration. 

Three large solid rocket motors, containing more than 50,000 lbm of propellant, 

have been developed, qualified, and brought to production and flight status: the 

Shuttle SRM, the Peacekeeper Stage I motor, and the Titan booster motor. The unitary propellant grain of a Shuttle SRM segment weighing approximately 300,000 

lbm is the largest cast in a production program. 

Large monolithic motors have been fabricated in previous technology demonstration programs. For the largest of these motors, 1.65 million lbm propellant grains were cast and the motors tested in-place which avoided transportation issues. Three 

tests were conducted with marginal results due to difficulties with the propellant 

grain in the third test. A single demonstration test of a 156-inch diameter motor is 

the only other experience for casting solid propellant grains larger than a Shuttle 

SRM segment. 

Our assessment of a monolithic Shuttle SRM concept was influenced by this lack 

of industry experience. This concept requires casting unitary propellant grains 

almost four times the weight and length of a current Shuttle segment. Questions 

relative to the ability of manufacturing processes to control the integrity of the propellant grain and other critical features exist because the monolithic SRM represents a substantial departure in scale from previous successful experience. From a 

programmatic viewpoint, less confidence can be placed in the success of key demonstrations that are necessary at full scale including: ballistic reproducibility and 

motor pair thrust balance; consistency in processing and casting propellant to 

produce acceptable mechanical properties with control of voids and porosity; and insulation quality and bonding integrity during extended motor processing. 

A Block I1 SRM concept is best assured of success if it builds on a substantial base 

of experience. Segmented designs can benefit from the production and operations 

with the Shuttle SRM and other large motor programs. No large deviation is re- quired from demonstrated facilities, processes, transportation systems, and launch 

site handling approaches if a new segmented design is selected. 

The present effort to redesign the SRM will verify the reliability of a new field 

joint concept before Space Shuttle flights resume. Subsequent production and flight 

operations will accumulate an expanding demonstrated database. Block I1 SRM con- cepts that can benefit from this experience in manufacturing and operations will 

have additional credibility for successful development and reliable flight perform- ance. 

A segmented design is recommended for the Block I1 SRM. The selected configuration and component designs were chosen to provide a payload increase for the 

Space Shuttle based on performance estimates using the exchange ratios provided 

for the study. A payload increase can be provided with no significant change in 

design reliability for the Block I1 SRM by using a higher performance propellant. A 

steel case material is selected to ensure reusability and maintain the cost benefits 

demonstrated from recovery and refurbishment of large metal components in the 

Shuttle program. A new case configuration is proposed with the potential for improvement in the integrity of assembly joints. 

After balancing the factors of seal gap control, structural integrity, ease of manu- facturing and assembly and inert weight impact, a clevis joint was selected for 

Block I1 over several bolted configurations that were evaluated. The Block I1 clevis 

joint includes a capture feature barrier seal plus primary and redundant clevis seals 

to ensure sealing reliability. The design includes the leak check and alignment features necessary for assembly and verification of the integrity of the mated joints. The Block I1 clevis design, shown in Figure 1, will inherit much of the experience 

and knowledge developed in the Redesigned SRM qualification efforts. Valid analytical models supported by confirming tests are easily applied to its design and the 

similar sealing concepts will be completely demonstrated in the present test program. Other advantages of the clevis joint concept have been demonstrated in cur- rent Shuttle hardware. Joint dimensions can be held to very tight tolerances. Reusability of a clevidtang joint has been demonstrated via tests and actual refurbishment of SRM flight hardware. The improvements proposed in the Block I1 clevis 

joint preserve these advantages and further increase the reusability of the hard- ware. 
162 

THIN LlllE OR MASTIC 

TYPE ADHESIVE 

CLEVIS INSULATION 

SILR(BR (V48) 

Figure 1. Block II SRM Field Joint Configuration 

Because the motor maximum design pressure is 10 percent higher to meet "headsup" performance requirements the Block I1 clevis joint is configured to a more robust version of the Redesigned SRM joint. Dimensions are strategically increased 

and a higher strength steel is specified. The joint is offset from the membrane line 

of action to reduce the gap openings. The joint has improved structural safety factors and seal gap control. 

An insulation configuration is selected that is bonded across the case field joint at 

assembly and thereby prevents combustion gases from reaching the joint seais. This 

J-seal is fabricated as an integral part of the insulation on the tang side of the joint. 

The aft leg of the J-seal is configured to assure that it will maintain contact with 

the insulation on the clevis side of the joint at assembly. As the segments are mated 

the J-seal leg is pressed into contact with the clevis insulation and seals the gap 

between. This seal is assured by an adhesive that bonds the J-seal to the mating 

clevis insulation. 

For the Block I1 SRM an integral one-piece aft dome and conical fixed nozzle 

housing is used to close the aft end of the case and provide structural support for 

the movable nozzle. The welded configuration that is selected is shown in Figure 2 

along with an alternative two-piece bolted configuration. This steel component is 

fully insulated and combined with the forward section of the nozzle to form an aft 

closure subassembly which eliminates the present nozzle-to-case joint. This aft closure subassembly is attached to the aft segment after the propellant is cast and 

cured. The aft closure is assembled to the aft segment at the factory using a tang 

and clevis structural joint that is identical to the Block I1 SRM field joints. 
163 

Block II Alternate. Bolted Joint 

Figure 2. A1; Dome and Nozzle Fixed Housing Structural ConfiguraHOn 

The recommended Block I1 SRM concept is largely compatible with the existing 

infrastructure for development, production, and operation of the SRM. Elements of 

this infrastructure include the management, engineering, and production team; 

analysis tools; component test equipment; motor test facilities; review procedures; 

quality assurance and NDE systems; safety assessments and procedures; material 

suppliers and subcontractor teams; production facilities and tools; manufacturing 

plans and documentation; logistics system; storage facilities; transportation system; 

launch site facilities and ground support equipment; launch support team; recovery 

equipment; disassembly facilities; and refurbishment facilities and equipment. Being 

able to utilize these capabilities provides a significant cost benefit for a future Block 

I1 SRM program. 

SUMMARY 

Our study concluded that a segmented design is the lowest risk concept for a Block 11 SRM. Consistent motor performance and hardware quality have been demonstrated in production of large segmented solid rocket motors up to the size of a Shuttle SRM segment. This approach can lower development costs by using the production, test, transportation, and launch facilities that are currently ready for full 

operation. 

The Block I1 SRM joint design can inherit confidence from the present qualifica- tion program for the redesign of the Shuttle SRM joint. The analysis methods and 

test techniques can carry over to substantiate similar hardware designs. A new SRM design can contribute to increased Shuttle performance, if desired. 

Our Block I1 SRM concept, using a new steel case design, component enhancements, 

and a higher performance propellant offers potential for increased payload capabil- ity while retaining the cost benefit of reusing major motor components. 

A realistic assessment of the development and verification schedule for a Block I1 

SRM suggests a first development static test in 33 months, and design certification 

after 56 months, followed by delivery of the first flight sets of motors. 

This concludes my prepared testimony. I appreciate this opportunity to appear 

before the Committee. Let me assure you that as individuals and as a corporation, we at Morton Thiokol share your dedication to ensuring the success of our Space Transportation System. Thank you. 
164 

Senator RIEGLE. I want to thank everyone on this panel for your 

testimony and for your patience today. I want to say to my colleages on this committee as well that I appreciate the very substantial involvement that we have had today as a subcommittee. 

And I think just in concluding that you have seen today the fact 

that we have turned a new page in this situation and in the relationship between NASA on these issues and the Senate. 

We are new teams on both sides of the table, for the most part, 

and we intend to continue in the vein that we have started today, 

and that is a constructive, active, working partnership. 

And so we will be talking with you and we want to hear from 

you as we go along because we are after the same goal. And it is 

only by working that way that we are really going to get there. 

So I thank you, and the committee stands in adjournment. 

[Whereupon, at 1:33 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[The following information was subsequently received for the 

record:] 
165 

STAEbENT OF H. GUYFORD STEER, CHAIR", PANEL CN TECRNIW EVALUNTTON OF 

'IHE REIESI(TJ OF 2HE SPACE SHUITIE SOUD ROCKET BOOSTER, NATIONAL WEARC4 

COWCIL 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to appear 

before you today in my capacity as Chairman of the National 

Research Council's Panel. Prof. James Mar, Vice-chairman of the 

Panel, and Dr. Myron F. Uman, Project Director for the NRC, 

appear with me. The Panel was organized at NASA's request in response 

to a recommendation of the Presidential Commission for the 

accident investigation, chaired by William Rogers. Our study 

began in June, 1986 and will conclude with a final report after we review the data on the performance of the SRBs during the 

next flight. (The list of members is Attachment A.) 

The Panel is charged with providing the Administrator 

with an independent technical evaluation of the progress of the 

redesign at intervals in the program. We do not have the heavy 

responsibility of approving or disapproving designs or other 

decisions in the program; that responsibility rests with the 

appropriate government authority, NASA, which is free to accept 

our recommendations or not. While our assignment makes us critics and critics tend to dwell on problems, our intention is 

to play a constructive role, to help NASA produce a safer and 

more reliable SRB. 

We provide our evaluations in reports to the 

Administrator. Three reports have been issued thus far. (Copies 

of the reports, dated August 1, 1986; October 10, 1986; and 

January 15, 1987, respectively, are Attachments B, C, and D.) 

findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the 

reports. 

to service at the earliest possible date. To meet the goal, the 

redesign team has adopted a baseline design aimed at correcting 

inadequacies of the previous design that affect safety. Only 

safety-related "mandatory" changes will be made for the next 

flight. We concur with this approach but recommend that NASA 

establish a program to continue to evaluate and improve the 

SRB's reliability after flights are resumed. 

Since the Shuttle program began, capabilities for 

estimating loads and evaluating stresses and structural 

integrity have improved. To assure the highest degree of 

safety, stress analyses of the booster and its parts should be 

carefully reviewed and, as appropriate, recalculated using the 

best data and most up-to-date models. This is already being 

done with the aft skirt, which cracked during a recent structural test, and the aft strut, which connects the SRB to 

the External Tank at the lower end of the rocket. 

the schedule reflects an assumption that each test will produce 

results that are expected and understood; there is little room in the schedule for modifying the design if that becomes 

necessary. It is prudent, therefore, for NASA to plan for 

contingencies, particularly for aspects of the design for which 

substantial uncertainies remain: the case field joint, 

case-to-nozzle joint, and configurations of insulation at both 

joints. 

In my testimony today, I shall briefly summarize the 

NASA's goal is to return a safe and reliable Shuttle 

The test program itself is success-oriented. That is, 
166 

The baseline case field joint employs a capture 

feature to restrict the relative motion of the gap that the 

O-rings must seal. We agree that the design will significant 

constrain the motion. Concerns remain, however, including 

assembly and disassembly of loaded sednents and refurbishina 

Y 

n new design for reuse. NASA's backup design uses the previok 

joint with stiffener bands wrapped around the outside of each case. It is also possible to make a joint that inherently has no relative motion of its parts, but it cannot be made using 

existing hardware. The lead time to make test hardware with a no-motion joint is long; we believe that the cases should be 

ordered as a contingency. 

baseline design of the case-to-nozzle joint, which incorporates a large number of new bolts and bolt holes, hence complicated 

stress patterns and potential leak paths. Uncertainties about 

the design of the nozzle and case-to-nozzle joint are now 

greater that for the case joint. Furthermore, the redesigned 

nozzle will not be tested until late in the program. These 

factors highlight the importance of developing contingency 

designs in this area. Alternative designs may require new 

The program currently has no alternative for the 

forgings . to bond facing surfaces during assembly. These bonded or 

unvented designs are intended to prevent combustion gases from 

reaching the O-ring seals. Alternative, vented designs allow 

gases to reach the seals but assure that the gases have cooled. 

A number of designs of both types are being tested. The details 

of these designs are likely to continue to change; additional 

tooling should be obtained to enhance the flexibility of the 

program. 

Materials for which contingencies should be in the 

program include ablatives in the nozzle, O-rings, and rust 

inhibiting grease. 

The layup of nozzle ablative materials has been 

redesigned because of problems experienced in the past. Tests 

of the new design, which has no back-ups, will not be performed 

until late in the verification program. 

New O-ring materials, which have better low 

temperature characteristics, have been found not to work as 

hoped because of interactions with the grease used on the case to inhibit rust. NASA therefore intends to use the previous 

O-ring materials with heaters to maintain an appropriate 

temperature. We are concerned with this development for several reasons and have urged NASA to look for or develop an alternative grease as soon as possible. 

Procedures must be instituted to control the 

properties and quality of materials for the test and 

verification program as well as for building the flight 

articles. Thiokol appears to be working in this direction. 

The baseline designs of joint insulation use adhesives 
167 

Quality control is also essential for assuring that 

the insulating liner is bonded to the metal case. has been developing advanced techniques for evaluating these 

bonds nondestructively. We have urged NASA to learn from tbat 

experience and the Agency appears to be working on the problem. 

The proof of the redesign depends on the results of 

the verification program. Since that program is just getting 

underway, it is premature to judge the relative safety and 

reliability of the new design. The verification program relies on both test and analysis. When performing verification tests, 

the redesign team should make predictioris of the outcomes and 

establish criteria for successful verification beforehand. When 

relying on computational models to verify the design, tests 

should be conducted to validate the models. 

While we continue to see progress in the definition of 

the total test program, it is difficult to relate the objectives 

of each of the numerous tests to specific design requirements or to develop a sense of the coherence of the test program as it 

supports the development effort. Thiokol has staff working on a layout of the test program as a function of program 

requirements. 

The capacity for testing full scale hardware is being 

expanded. The new horizontal test stand capable of simulating 

dynamic loads experienced at launch and during flight is a major 

and welcomed addition to the program. Additional test hardware 

has been committed to the Joint Environment Simulator (JES) and 

Transient Pressure Test Article (TPTA) so the rate at which 

studies can be conducted on these test facilities can eventually 

be increased. The results of the tests conducted thus far on the JES have demonstrated the value of this type of test, even though it simulates only the first 0.6 seconds of the firing. 

If additional hardware does not result in an increased test 

rate, another JES facility should be built at Thiokol. 

Finally, it is important to remember that a solid fuel 

rocket can only be fired once. As a consequence, its 

manufacture must be diligently controlled so that each one is as much like another as possible. The test program would not be 

meaningful otherwise. As it is, the expense of testing the 

motors in full scale, full duration firings limits the amount of 

data from which the reliability of the design can be accurately 

judged. Confidence in the reliability of the redesign would be 

enhanced if additional full scale, full duration firings, 

particularly with structural deformations to simulate dynamic 

loads, were added to the program before t:he next flight. 

I would like to conclude my testimony by expressing 

the Panel's appreciation for the cooperation and assistance 

provided by NASA and Thiokol personnel and by others outside the 

program whom we have consulted. The redesign team is working 

hard and deserves praise for its dedication and accomplishments 

to date. 

your questions. 

The Air Force 

My colleagues and I will be happy to try to answer