COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Clements, Kelsey and Beales 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

RONALD PATRICK COBBINS 

 

v. Record No. 1771-07-2 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DECEMBER 2, 2008 

 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY 

Leslie M. Osborn, Judge 

 Melissa Fraser (Gravitt & Gravitt, P.C. on briefs), for appellant. 

 Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General 

(Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 In the trial court, Ronald Patrick Cobbins pled guilty to various offenses and later 

unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his pleas. He argues on appeal the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his pleas. Cobbins also argues the trial court made 

erroneous rulings prior to his guilty pleas. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Cobbins’s motion to withdraw his pleas, we affirm his convictions without addressing 

his challenge to the trial court’s prior rulings. 

I. 

In April 2006, the grand jury indicted Cobbins for robbery, use of a firearm during a 

robbery, malicious discharge of a firearm in an occupied building, and possession of a firearm by 

a convicted felon. Claiming indigency, Cobbins was appointed counsel. His first attorney quit 

citing an irreconcilable “personality conflict between defense counsel and the accused” making it 

impossible for the attorney to fulfill his duties. Cobbins again presented a claim of indigency, 
and the trial court appointed substitute counsel. After various continuances, the case was 

scheduled for a jury trial on February 5, 2007. A few days before trial, Cobbins’s counsel 

represented to the court that the parties had entered into a written plea agreement and Cobbins 

wished to address the court prior to signing the agreement. Counsel added that he did not know 

what Cobbins intended to say. The court took a lengthy recess for counsel and Cobbins to 

confer. 

After the recess, Cobbins stated he wanted to retain private counsel. He recently entered 

into an agreement to sell his house, Cobbins alleged, and would eventually have enough money 

to hire counsel. He sought a continuance of the trial date for an indefinite time period to close 

the house sale and hire new counsel. The court denied the motion to continue. 

After again conferring with counsel, Cobbins decided to plead guilty to the charge of 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and to offer Alford guilty pleas to the remaining 

charges.1

 Cobbins offered the Alford guilty pleas, counsel advised the court, because Cobbins 

“does not wish to take the chance with a jury trial.” 

The trial court conducted the routine colloquy to confirm that Cobbins offered the pleas 

freely and voluntarily. Cobbins stated he understood “beyond a shadow of a doubt” what he was 

doing. The prosecutor proffered evidence that Cobbins demanded money from the victim. 

When she refused, Cobbins dragged the victim into his bedroom and fired a handgun into the 

bedroom ceiling. The victim turned over the money and ran away. Police later arrested Cobbins 

 1

 When offering an Alford plea, a defendant asserts his innocence but admits that 

sufficient evidence exists to convict him of the offense. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 

25, 37-38 (1970); see also Parson v. Carroll, 272 Va. 560, 565, 636 S.E.2d 452, 454-55 (2006) 

(describing effect of Alford plea in Virginia). Virginia courts “treat Alford pleas as having the 

same preclusive effect as a guilty plea.” Perry v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 410, 412, 533 

S.E.2d 651, 652 (2000) (citation omitted). As a result, they are often termed “‘Alford’ pleas of 

guilty.” Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 168, 655 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2008); see also Zigta 

v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 149, 151, 562 S.E.2d 347, 348 (2002) (using the phrase “Alford

plea of guilty”). 

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and found a handgun in his possession, a spent shell casing on his bedroom floor, and a bullet 

hole in his bedroom ceiling. The prosecutor also proffered Cobbins’s prior felony conviction 

order. 

When the trial court questioned Cobbins about the Alford pleas, Cobbins said he did not 

“want to take a chance” on a jury trial given his displeasure with counsel and the weight of the 

evidence against him. The trial court accepted the Alford pleas, ruling that “the evidence as 

presented by the Commonwealth would be overwhelming and substantially negates the 

defendant’s claim of innocence” leading Cobbins to rightly conclude “it was in his best interest 

to enter this Alford plea of guilty.” The trial court entered a conviction order, ordered a 

presentence report, and scheduled a sentencing hearing. 

Shortly thereafter, Cobbins retained private counsel and filed a motion to withdraw his 

guilty pleas. In support of his motion, Cobbins testified that he entered those pleas because “that 

was the only way that I felt that I could buy time in order to get a lawyer to try to fight this thing 

properly.” He was simply “buying time,” Cobbins explained, so he could circuitously get the 

continuance the trial court had denied him. 

Asked about his defense to the charges, Cobbins stated only that some evidence (which 

he did not disclose) would impeach the victim’s testimony and “other issues” might also help 

exonerate him. The trial court denied Cobbins’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and 

imposed sentences on his four convictions. 

II. 

On appeal, Cobbins claims the trial court erred in not allowing him to withdraw his guilty 

pleas and not granting his earlier motion for a continuance for the purpose of securing private 

counsel. We hold the trial court did not err in refusing Cobbins’s motion to withdraw his pleas 

and, consequently, the trial court’s ruling prior to the pleas cannot be appealed. 

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 A. MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS

 The Virginia Supreme Court in Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 52 S.E.2d 872 

(1949), made the “seminal statement” of Virginia law governing “the denial by a trial court of a 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Justus v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 143, 152, 645 S.E.2d 284, 

288 (2007). Parris held that a timely motion should not be denied “if it appears from the 

surrounding circumstances that the plea of guilty was submitted in good faith under an honest

mistake of material fact or facts, or if it was induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence and 

would not otherwise have been made” so long as “any reasonable ground is offered for going to 

the jury.” Parris, 189 Va. at 324-25, 52 S.E.2d at 873-74 (emphasis added). To warrant 

withdrawal of the guilty plea, therefore, the motion must be “made in good faith and sustained by 

proofs” justifying a trial on the merits. Justus, 274 Va. at 153-54, 645 S.E.2d at 288 (quoting 

Parris, 189 Va. at 325-26, 52 S.E.2d at 874); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 284, 289, 

657 S.E.2d 164, 166 (2008).2

The Parris standard thus requires the defendant (i) to establish a good-faith basis for 

making the guilty plea and later seeking to withdraw it, and (ii) to proffer evidence of a 

reasonable basis for contesting guilt. Justus, 274 Va. at 155-56, 645 S.E.2d at 289-90. The first 

requirement protects the integrity of the judicial process by precluding defendants from using a 

guilty plea as a subterfuge to manipulate the court. The second requirement defeats motions to 

withdraw which would result in an essentially futile trial. As Parris explained, a trial court’s 

discretion to grant the motion “will rarely, if ever, be exercised in aid of an attempt to rely upon 

 2 Parris does not require a showing that the guilty plea was involuntary in any 

constitutional sense or the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, the 

“presumptions that would favor the Commonwealth in a habeas proceeding” do not apply “when 

the case remains within the jurisdiction of the trial court to permit the withdrawal of a guilty 

plea.” Justus, 274 Va. at 154, 645 S.E.2d at 289. For this reason, a good-faith guilty plea could 

be entered ill-advisedly (but nevertheless voluntarily) and still be a permissible candidate for a 

motion to withdraw so long as the Parris criteria are satisfied. Id.

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a merely dilatory or formal defense.” Id. at 153, 645 S.E.2d at 288 (quoting Parris, 189 Va. at 

323-34, 52 S.E.2d at 873-74).3

The decision to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea rests “within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and is to be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case.” 

Parris, 189 Va. at 324, 52 S.E.2d at 873. “As in other cases of discretionary power, no general 

rule can be laid down as to when a defendant will be permitted to withdraw his plea.” Zigta v. 

Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 149, 153, 562 S.E.2d 347, 349 (2002) (quoting Parris, 189 Va. at 

325, 52 S.E.2d at 874). Appellate review under an abuse-of-discretion standard, “if nothing else, 

means that the trial judge’s ‘ruling will not be reversed simply because an appellate court 

disagrees.’” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743 (citation 

omitted), adopted upon reh’g en banc, 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 870 (2005). “Only when 

reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Tynes v. 

Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 17, 21, 635 S.E.2d 688, 689 (2006) (citation omitted). 

Applied to this case, these principles support the trial court’s discretionary decision to 

deny Cobbins’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. By his own admission, Cobbins pled guilty 

in an attempt to “buy time” to get what he really wanted: yet another continuance of his trial so 

he could dismiss his second lawyer and hire a third. The guilty pleas served as a subterfuge 

designed to manipulate the court, against its better judgment, into unwittingly continuing the trial 

 3

 Cobbins asserts that requiring him to proffer a reasonable defense in support of a 

motion to withdraw his pleas violated his “right to due process” under the United States and 

Virginia Constitutions. See Appellant’s Br. at 8. Cobbins, however, never made this argument 

in the trial court. Rule 5A:18 precludes appellants from raising for the first time on appeal 

“grounds asserted as a ‘basis for reversal’ of the trial court’s judgment.” Blackman v. 

Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 633, 642, 613 S.E.2d 460, 465 (2005). Cobbins does not argue 

that any exception to Rule 5A:18 applies, and we will not invoke one sua sponte. See Edwards 

v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 761, 589 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2003) (en banc), aff’d by

unpublished order, SCV No. 040019 (Va. Oct. 15, 2004). 

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date. Because Cobbins acted in bad faith, he could not justly expect the trial court to reward his 

duplicitous conduct. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying his motion to withdraw his 

pleas.4

 B. DENIAL OF MOTION TO CONTINUE

 Cobbins argues the trial court violated Code § 19.2-159.1(B) by failing to grant his 

continuance so that he could secure private counsel. See generally London v. Commonwealth, 

49 Va. App. 230, 236, 638 S.E.2d 721, 724 (2006). That issue, however, is not properly before 

us on appeal. 

An “Alford plea is a variation of a guilty plea,” United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 

611 (4th Cir. 1990), and has “the same preclusive effect as a guilty plea” for purposes of appeal, 

Perry v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 410, 412, 533 S.E.2d 651, 652-53 (2000) (citation 

omitted); see Clauson v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 282, 294, 511 S.E.2d 449, 455 (1999). 

Because guilty pleas constitute “a waiver of all defenses other than those jurisdictional,” Savino 

v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 539, 391 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1990) (citation omitted), absent a 

jurisdictional defect, “no appeal will lie because there is nothing to appeal,” Mason v. 

Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 1098, 254 S.E.2d 116, 121 (1979). 

Consequently, no appellant can “complain of any non-jurisdictional defects that occurred 

prior to his guilty plea.” Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 91, 501 S.E.2d 134, 138 (1998); 

Terry v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 192, 197, 516 S.E.2d 233, 235-36 (1999) (en banc). We 

thus decline to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Cobbins’s motion 

 4

 The Commonwealth also argues Cobbins failed to proffer any “reasonable defense” to 

the charges, Justus, 274 Va. at 154, 645 S.E.2d at 289, because he presented “no affidavits, alibi 

witnesses, or even any explanation” in support of his requested not-guilty plea, Coleman, 51 

Va. App. at 293, 657 S.E.2d at 168. We need not address this issue, however, because Cobbins 

fails to satisfy the threshold good-faith requirement under Parris. “In this case, as in all others, 

we seek to decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest ground available’ from the record.” Kirby v. 

Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 691, 702 n.2, 653 S.E.2d 600, 693 n.2 (2007) (citations omitted). 

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for a continuance. Cobbins waived appellate review of this issue by pleading guilty to the charge 

of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and by offering Alford guilty pleas to the 

remaining charges. 

III. 

 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cobbins’s motion to withdraw his 

guilty pleas. The entry of those pleas precludes Cobbins from challenging the trial court’s earlier 

denial of his motion for a continuance. For these reasons, we affirm his convictions. 

 Affirmed.