Panel 5 

of Washington’s conflicted China policy, it

would be difficult for any Chinese leaders to

justify taking Washington’s side in peninsula

issues at this time.

As noted above, China and the United

States do not hold similar views concerning the

threats certain countries pose to international

peace and stability, even less to China’s own

national security. Given present circumstances,

China may see little verifiable benefit in signing on to the U.S. position; conversely, Beijing

might even hold that doing so would actually

undermine its own interests by creating suspicion, mistrust, and other long-term problems

in places where it now has none. Looked at

from this angle, it could even be argued that

the United States poses a bigger threat to China

than North Korea does. Since the advent of the

U.S. war on terrorism, the United States has

steadily expanded its military presence in

Central Asia and undermined Chinese diplomatic efforts in the region, even as it has pursued an increasingly aggressive campaign

against terrorist states. For Beijing, the specter

of American military encirclement and possible

U.S. policies that seek China’s containment

looms large. The fear that aggressive American

action could destabilize the Korean Peninsula

(with China bearing the brunt) also increasingly is a cause for concern.

Still, if dancing to Washington’s tune is

not the answer for China, neither is ignoring

impending crisis on the peninsula. Just as

Beijing would regard a destabilized North Korea

as a real threat, it also would fear the consequences of a nuclear-armed North Korea, albeit

for different reasons than Washington. China

would probably be able to accept Pyongyang’s

having some limited nuclear capability—after

all, Beijing does not fear a strike from

Pyongyang. For China, the fear is that nuclear

weapons in Pyongyang would fuel proliferation

in Asia, with Tokyo, Seoul, and maybe even

Taipei deciding that, even with a missile defense

shield, having their own nuclear deterrents

would be the only guarantee of security. This

would be of great concern to China, and while

such a scenario may seem farfetched to outside

observers, it may not be so to Beijing.

China’s Way Ahead

Ultimately, China may be spurred to

action by a different set of motives than the

United States. It clearly recognizes that it must

do something to control things on the Korean

Peninsula. Moreover, for all its differences with

Washington, there is no doubt about Beijing’s

wanting better U.S.-China relations. The challenge is in choosing an approach that poses

minimal risk to Chinese interests while maximizing chances of gaining the advantages that

China seeks, including maintaining a cordial,

working relationship with Pyongyang. A multilateral approach seems the best tactic, but even

here Beijing must be careful. It cannot afford

to get caught up in events that could ultimately

lead to China’s finding itself thwarted by U.S.

influence or in the embarrassing situation of

having to take the lead in blocking a United

Nations (UN) vote that could lead to a binding

resolution—clearly, absent any telling change

in the current situation, for Beijing, Korean

Peninsula issues must be kept clear of the UN

Security Council. By the same token, China

cannot afford to take a wholly passive approach

that leaves it vulnerable to accusations that it is

oblivious to human rights issues or to security

issues of concern to its neighbors in Asia.

The most plausible option for Beijing is a

multilateral approach that enables it a chance

to play a dominant role while simultaneously

providing ample political cover—something

like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

+ 3, multi-party talks that include Russia, or

some similar North Asian coalition. Such a

course would be highly attractive to China’s

leaders. Involving concerned states that are

nonthreatening to North Korea could make it

easier to mollify North Korean leaders’ fears

about their continued survival and persuade

them to modify their rhetoric and scale down

their demands—perhaps even persuade

Pyongyang to make a positive overture. It

could make it easier to bring European Union

countries on board in support of Beijing’s

initiatives. It also, in Beijing’s view, might

make it easier to negotiate with North Korea a

workable, enforceable inspection and verification regime concerning weapons of mass

destruction acceptable to the greater global

community. This would have the advantage of

keeping Pyongyang calm by keeping the United

States at arms length and undercutting its

demands for a more aggressive approach. An

additional advantage for China is that this sort

of initiative could help improve Beijing-Seoul

cooperation, drawing them closer together on a

number of fronts, perhaps even weakening the

U.S.-Korean alliance a little bit. If played correctly, it could reduce U.S. influence in the

region while enhancing Chinese prestige, with

relatively little diplomatic risk.

Still, in the final analysis, China’s strategy

is hostage to Pyongyang’s ability to see reason.

Beijing is more likely to maintain its current

course and try a strategy like the one explored

above if Kim Jong Il and company are willing

to compromise and give Beijing face and

support in its efforts. Continued North Korean

intransigence and a worsening of conditions on

the peninsula, however, will probably force

China to buy into the U.S. approach eventually

and to move toward more complete cooperation with the United States on Korean Peninsula issues. The challenge for Beijing will be in

assessing the costs of working with Washington

and trying to collect on the bill.

Notes1 American Broadcasting Company News Online, poll,

Chinese Would Support North Korea in War Against U.S.,

June 16, 2003, accessed at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/

newsitems/s881118.htm>. 2 Department of State, Supporting Human Rights and

Democracy: The U.S. Record 2002–2003 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003).

No. 201, August 2003 Strategic Forum 5 

in the final analysis,

China’s strategy is

hostage to Pyongyang’s

ability to see reason

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE

Robert A. Silano

Director of Publications

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

books, monographs, and reports on national security

strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy.

For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also

produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research
Panel 2 

nuclear devices, if China received assurances of

no first use from North Korea and guarantees

that Tokyo and Seoul would not seek to acquire

nuclear devices to offset Pyongyang’s nuclear

advantage. For Beijing, the real horrors of

nuclear proliferation in Asia lie in the specter of

a nuclear-armed Japan and, in a worst-case

scenario, Taiwan.

China also tends to view Pyongyang’s

security concerns in a more sympathetic light

than do observers in Washington, Tokyo, and

even Seoul. Beijing tends to be more understanding of Pyongyang’s rhetoric and seemingly

excessive behavior, interpreting these as the

manifestations of a (perhaps unstable) regime

that is hard pressed by economic and political

problems, convinced that it is beset by enemies

seeking its demise, probably increasingly cognizant of its fragility, and fearful for its own

survival. To some extent, China buys into the

hypothesis that North Korea is paranoid because

it really does have so many enemies: Beijing

has often suggested that the United States

perpetuates its difficult relationship with North

Korea through Washington’s unceasingly hostile, rigid stance toward Pyongyang.

Historical Burdens

Chinese interlocutors also tend to express

a sense of responsibility for the North Korean

state, a sentiment that often falls on disbelieving ears in other countries but nevertheless has

credence in China’s historical and cultural

context. Chinese-Korean relations are built on

a complex political and cultural history that

dates back hundreds of years. Throughout

much of the 19th century, China heavily influenced Korean governance—in many cases

directly manipulating the appointment of

senior ministers in the Korean court—and

acted as Korea’s interlocutor and mediator with

the outside world, especially in Korea’s early

dealings with the United States. In fact, Qing

Dynasty officials, for good or for ill, were the

primary intermediaries in the process that

produced the first formal agreement between

the United States and Korea, a commerce treaty

signed in 1882. Chinese influence continued

throughout the 20th century, from Yuan Shihkai’s meddling in Korean military affairs during China’s early Republican period to Mao

Zedong’s sending aid, in the form of “Chinese

volunteers,” to support a fellow communist

state and ally in 1950.

Since 1950, successive Communist Chinese

political and military leaders have consistently

affirmed China’s close relationship with sister

communist state North Korea; the 1961 ChinaNorth Korean pact on friendly cooperation and

mutual assistance remains in force today. To be

sure, there is much debate over whether China

would actually honor this agreement should

there be a full-scale crisis. But until such a

moment occurs, the answer is unknowable,

even for Beijing. The fact that the agreement

exists affects Chinese behavior to a degree.

Beijing must continuously guard against being

maneuvered into an irrevocable position. China

does not have an adversarial relationship with

North Korea and does not want one.

But Chinese-North Korean relations are

no longer as simple as they were in the Cold

War years. Politics, economics, the world, and,

most of all, China have all changed greatly

over the past several decades. North Korea,

however, has not changed; it remains isolated,

failing, belligerent, and, increasingly, a diplomatic, as well as economic, deadweight on

China. The result is that Chinese-North Korean

relations have become more conflicted and

contradictory, making Beijing’s choices regarding Pyongyang tougher and, to all indications,

leaving Chinese public opinion regarding

North Korea divided, or at least unclear.

Consider, for example, the reported results

of a survey released in June 2003 by the China

State Survey Institute (SSIC), a newly formed,

quasi-governmental organization associated

with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.1

This survey suggested that a majority of China’s

people would support Beijing’s siding with

Pyongyang in any open clash with the United

States, including armed conflict. At the same

time, surveys done by Beijing University’s 

Research Institute on Korean Peninsula Issues

suggest that 80 to 90 percent of Chinese would

oppose China’s involvement, in a war on the

peninsula. Critics of the SSIC survey say most

respondents had not been asked to consider the

consequences that such a decision would have

on Chinese-South Korean relations, in particular, or the economic and diplomatic implications this might have for China, in general.

They suggest such omissions skewed the survey

and created a false conclusion that popular

focus remains on “traditional ally and close

neighbor” North Korea. Similarly, there are

questions about whether the Beijing University

survey populations were representative of thinking among the Chinese population as a whole.

Limited Leverage

Thus, for Beijing, the task becomes a

tricky one of undertaking public diplomacy

that casts China in a positive light as an

important, helpful broker while simultaneously

allowing it to remain flexible and to tread a

fine line that avoids direct involvement or a

perceived commitment to any side. While

engaged in this balancing act, Beijing must

also ensure that it neither loses credibility with

Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul nor angers

Pyongyang to a point where China undermines

whatever ability it now possesses to influence

North Korean behavior.

This is not simply artful dodging on

China’s part. Outside observers tend to assume

that Beijing occupies the dominant position in

the bilateral relationship, that it can impress its

will upon Pyongyang, and that it has the leverage—military and economic—to back up its

demands. But Beijing’s actual degree of dominance and the efficacy of the levers that it can

bring to bear are, in both contexts, problematical and unclear. China exercises what might be

termed soft power influence over Pyongyang.

By providing economic support and helping

buttress North Korea against an otherwise

hostile world, China enhances its credentials

with Pyongyang and, by extension, its ability to

use moral suasion to exert measured political

pressure on a regime generally unresponsive to

outside influences. China is probably aided in

this by the fact that the Kim Jong Il regime

No. 201, August 2003 Strategic Forum 2 

Howard M. Krawitz, a senior foreign service officer, wrote this piece while in residence as a distinguished

visiting research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

Comments and questions regarding this piece may be directed to Mr. Krawitz by e-mail at ndu-inssresearch@ndu.edu.

Chinese-North Korean

relations have become

more conflicted and

contradictory, making

Beijing’s choices tougher 
Panel 2 

nuclear devices, if China received assurances of

no first use from North Korea and guarantees

that Tokyo and Seoul would not seek to acquire

nuclear devices to offset Pyongyang’s nuclear

advantage. For Beijing, the real horrors of

nuclear proliferation in Asia lie in the specter of

a nuclear-armed Japan and, in a worst-case

scenario, Taiwan.

China also tends to view Pyongyang’s

security concerns in a more sympathetic light

than do observers in Washington, Tokyo, and

even Seoul. Beijing tends to be more understanding of Pyongyang’s rhetoric and seemingly

excessive behavior, interpreting these as the

manifestations of a (perhaps unstable) regime

that is hard pressed by economic and political

problems, convinced that it is beset by enemies

seeking its demise, probably increasingly cognizant of its fragility, and fearful for its own

survival. To some extent, China buys into the

hypothesis that North Korea is paranoid because

it really does have so many enemies: Beijing

has often suggested that the United States

perpetuates its difficult relationship with North

Korea through Washington’s unceasingly hostile, rigid stance toward Pyongyang.

Historical Burdens

Chinese interlocutors also tend to express

a sense of responsibility for the North Korean

state, a sentiment that often falls on disbelieving ears in other countries but nevertheless has

credence in China’s historical and cultural

context. Chinese-Korean relations are built on

a complex political and cultural history that

dates back hundreds of years. Throughout

much of the 19th century, China heavily influenced Korean governance—in many cases

directly manipulating the appointment of

senior ministers in the Korean court—and

acted as Korea’s interlocutor and mediator with

the outside world, especially in Korea’s early

dealings with the United States. In fact, Qing

Dynasty officials, for good or for ill, were the

primary intermediaries in the process that

produced the first formal agreement between

the United States and Korea, a commerce treaty

signed in 1882. Chinese influence continued

throughout the 20th century, from Yuan Shihkai’s meddling in Korean military affairs during China’s early Republican period to Mao

Zedong’s sending aid, in the form of “Chinese

volunteers,” to support a fellow communist

state and ally in 1950.

Since 1950, successive Communist Chinese

political and military leaders have consistently

affirmed China’s close relationship with sister

communist state North Korea; the 1961 ChinaNorth Korean pact on friendly cooperation and

mutual assistance remains in force today. To be

sure, there is much debate over whether China

would actually honor this agreement should

there be a full-scale crisis. But until such a

moment occurs, the answer is unknowable,

even for Beijing. The fact that the agreement

exists affects Chinese behavior to a degree.

Beijing must continuously guard against being

maneuvered into an irrevocable position. China

does not have an adversarial relationship with

North Korea and does not want one.

But Chinese-North Korean relations are

no longer as simple as they were in the Cold

War years. Politics, economics, the world, and,

most of all, China have all changed greatly

over the past several decades. North Korea,

however, has not changed; it remains isolated,

failing, belligerent, and, increasingly, a diplomatic, as well as economic, deadweight on

China. The result is that Chinese-North Korean

relations have become more conflicted and

contradictory, making Beijing’s choices regarding Pyongyang tougher and, to all indications,

leaving Chinese public opinion regarding

North Korea divided, or at least unclear.

Consider, for example, the reported results

of a survey released in June 2003 by the China

State Survey Institute (SSIC), a newly formed,

quasi-governmental organization associated

with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.1

This survey suggested that a majority of China’s

people would support Beijing’s siding with

Pyongyang in any open clash with the United

States, including armed conflict. At the same

time, surveys done by Beijing University’s 

Research Institute on Korean Peninsula Issues

suggest that 80 to 90 percent of Chinese would

oppose China’s involvement, in a war on the

peninsula. Critics of the SSIC survey say most

respondents had not been asked to consider the

consequences that such a decision would have

on Chinese-South Korean relations, in particular, or the economic and diplomatic implications this might have for China, in general.

They suggest such omissions skewed the survey

and created a false conclusion that popular

focus remains on “traditional ally and close

neighbor” North Korea. Similarly, there are

questions about whether the Beijing University

survey populations were representative of thinking among the Chinese population as a whole.

Limited Leverage

Thus, for Beijing, the task becomes a

tricky one of undertaking public diplomacy

that casts China in a positive light as an

important, helpful broker while simultaneously

allowing it to remain flexible and to tread a

fine line that avoids direct involvement or a

perceived commitment to any side. While

engaged in this balancing act, Beijing must

also ensure that it neither loses credibility with

Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul nor angers

Pyongyang to a point where China undermines

whatever ability it now possesses to influence

North Korean behavior.

This is not simply artful dodging on

China’s part. Outside observers tend to assume

that Beijing occupies the dominant position in

the bilateral relationship, that it can impress its

will upon Pyongyang, and that it has the leverage—military and economic—to back up its

demands. But Beijing’s actual degree of dominance and the efficacy of the levers that it can

bring to bear are, in both contexts, problematical and unclear. China exercises what might be

termed soft power influence over Pyongyang.

By providing economic support and helping

buttress North Korea against an otherwise

hostile world, China enhances its credentials

with Pyongyang and, by extension, its ability to

use moral suasion to exert measured political

pressure on a regime generally unresponsive to

outside influences. China is probably aided in

this by the fact that the Kim Jong Il regime

No. 201, August 2003 Strategic Forum 2 

Howard M. Krawitz, a senior foreign service officer, wrote this piece while in residence as a distinguished

visiting research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

Comments and questions regarding this piece may be directed to Mr. Krawitz by e-mail at ndu-inssresearch@ndu.edu.

Chinese-North Korean

relations have become

more conflicted and

contradictory, making

Beijing’s choices tougher 
Panel 2 

nuclear devices, if China received assurances of

no first use from North Korea and guarantees

that Tokyo and Seoul would not seek to acquire

nuclear devices to offset Pyongyang’s nuclear

advantage. For Beijing, the real horrors of

nuclear proliferation in Asia lie in the specter of

a nuclear-armed Japan and, in a worst-case

scenario, Taiwan.

China also tends to view Pyongyang’s

security concerns in a more sympathetic light

than do observers in Washington, Tokyo, and

even Seoul. Beijing tends to be more understanding of Pyongyang’s rhetoric and seemingly

excessive behavior, interpreting these as the

manifestations of a (perhaps unstable) regime

that is hard pressed by economic and political

problems, convinced that it is beset by enemies

seeking its demise, probably increasingly cognizant of its fragility, and fearful for its own

survival. To some extent, China buys into the

hypothesis that North Korea is paranoid because

it really does have so many enemies: Beijing

has often suggested that the United States

perpetuates its difficult relationship with North

Korea through Washington’s unceasingly hostile, rigid stance toward Pyongyang.

Historical Burdens

Chinese interlocutors also tend to express

a sense of responsibility for the North Korean

state, a sentiment that often falls on disbelieving ears in other countries but nevertheless has

credence in China’s historical and cultural

context. Chinese-Korean relations are built on

a complex political and cultural history that

dates back hundreds of years. Throughout

much of the 19th century, China heavily influenced Korean governance—in many cases

directly manipulating the appointment of

senior ministers in the Korean court—and

acted as Korea’s interlocutor and mediator with

the outside world, especially in Korea’s early

dealings with the United States. In fact, Qing

Dynasty officials, for good or for ill, were the

primary intermediaries in the process that

produced the first formal agreement between

the United States and Korea, a commerce treaty

signed in 1882. Chinese influence continued

throughout the 20th century, from Yuan Shihkai’s meddling in Korean military affairs during China’s early Republican period to Mao

Zedong’s sending aid, in the form of “Chinese

volunteers,” to support a fellow communist

state and ally in 1950.

Since 1950, successive Communist Chinese

political and military leaders have consistently

affirmed China’s close relationship with sister

communist state North Korea; the 1961 ChinaNorth Korean pact on friendly cooperation and

mutual assistance remains in force today. To be

sure, there is much debate over whether China

would actually honor this agreement should

there be a full-scale crisis. But until such a

moment occurs, the answer is unknowable,

even for Beijing. The fact that the agreement

exists affects Chinese behavior to a degree.

Beijing must continuously guard against being

maneuvered into an irrevocable position. China

does not have an adversarial relationship with

North Korea and does not want one.

But Chinese-North Korean relations are

no longer as simple as they were in the Cold

War years. Politics, economics, the world, and,

most of all, China have all changed greatly

over the past several decades. North Korea,

however, has not changed; it remains isolated,

failing, belligerent, and, increasingly, a diplomatic, as well as economic, deadweight on

China. The result is that Chinese-North Korean

relations have become more conflicted and

contradictory, making Beijing’s choices regarding Pyongyang tougher and, to all indications,

leaving Chinese public opinion regarding

North Korea divided, or at least unclear.

Consider, for example, the reported results

of a survey released in June 2003 by the China

State Survey Institute (SSIC), a newly formed,

quasi-governmental organization associated

with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.1

This survey suggested that a majority of China’

people would support Beijing’s siding with

Pyongyang in any open clash with the United

States, including armed conflict. At the same

time, surveys done by Beijing University’s 

Research Institute on Korean Peninsula Issues

suggest that 80 to 90 percent of Chinese would

oppose China’s involvement, in a war on the

peninsula. Critics of the SSIC survey say most

respondents had not been asked to consider the

consequences that such a decision would have

on Chinese-South Korean relations, in particular, or the economic and diplomatic implications this might have for China, in general.

They suggest such omissions skewed the survey

and created a false conclusion that popular

focus remains on “traditional ally and close

neighbor” North Korea. Similarly, there are

questions about whether the Beijing University

survey populations were representative of think

ing among the Chinese population as a whole.

Limited Leverage

Thus, for Beijing, the task becomes a

tricky one of undertaking public diplomacy

that casts China in a positive light as an

important, helpful broker while simultaneousl

allowing it to remain flexible and to tread a

fine line that avoids direct involvement or a

perceived commitment to any side. While

engaged in this balancing act, Beijing must

also ensure that it neither loses credibility with

Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul nor angers

Pyongyang to a point where China undermine

whatever ability it now possesses to influence

North Korean behavior.

This is not simply artful dodging on

China’s part. Outside observers tend to assume

that Beijing occupies the dominant position in

the bilateral relationship, that it can impress its

will upon Pyongyang, and that it has the leverage—military and economic—to back up its

demands. But Beijing’s actual degree of dominance and the efficacy of the levers that it can

bring to bear are, in both contexts, problematical and unclear. China exercises what might be

termed soft power influence over Pyongyang.

By providing economic support and helping

buttress North Korea against an otherwise

hostile world, China enhances its credentials

with Pyongyang and, by extension, its ability to

use moral suasion to exert measured political

pressure on a regime generally unresponsive to

outside influences. China is probably aided in

this by the fact that the Kim Jong Il regime

No. 201, August 2003 Strategic Forum 2 

Howard M. Krawitz, a senior foreign service officer, wrote this piece while in residence as a distinguished

visiting research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

Comments and questions regarding this piece may be directed to Mr. Krawitz by e-mail at ndu-inssresearch@ndu.edu.

Chinese-North Korean

relations have become

more conflicted and

contradictory, making

Beijing’s choices tougher 
Panel 5 

of Washington’s conflicted China policy, it

would be difficult for any Chinese leaders to

justify taking Washington’s side in peninsula

issues at this time.

As noted above, China and the United

States do not hold similar views concerning the

threats certain countries pose to international

peace and stability, even less to China’s own

national security. Given present circumstances,

China may see little verifiable benefit in signing on to the U.S. position; conversely, Beijing

might even hold that doing so would actually

undermine its own interests by creating suspicion, mistrust, and other long-term problems

in places where it now has none. Looked at

from this angle, it could even be argued that

the United States poses a bigger threat to China

than North Korea does. Since the advent of the

U.S. war on terrorism, the United States has

steadily expanded its military presence in

Central Asia and undermined Chinese diplomatic efforts in the region, even as it has pursued an increasingly aggressive campaign

against terrorist states. For Beijing, the specter

of American military encirclement and possible

U.S. policies that seek China’s containment

looms large. The fear that aggressive American

action could destabilize the Korean Peninsula

(with China bearing the brunt) also increasingly is a cause for concern.

Still, if dancing to Washington’s tune is

not the answer for China, neither is ignoring

impending crisis on the peninsula. Just as

Beijing would regard a destabilized North Korea

as a real threat, it also would fear the consequences of a nuclear-armed North Korea, albeit

for different reasons than Washington. China

would probably be able to accept Pyongyang’s

having some limited nuclear capability—after

all, Beijing does not fear a strike from

Pyongyang. For China, the fear is that nuclear

weapons in Pyongyang would fuel proliferation

in Asia, with Tokyo, Seoul, and maybe even

Taipei deciding that, even with a missile defense

shield, having their own nuclear deterrents

would be the only guarantee of security. This

would be of great concern to China, and while

such a scenario may seem farfetched to outside

observers, it may not be so to Beijing.

China’s Way Ahead

Ultimately, China may be spurred to

action by a different set of motives than the

United States. It clearly recognizes that it must

do something to control things on the Korean

Peninsula. Moreover, for all its differences with

Washington, there is no doubt about Beijing’s

wanting better U.S.-China relations. The challenge is in choosing an approach that poses

minimal risk to Chinese interests while maximizing chances of gaining the advantages that

China seeks, including maintaining a cordial,

working relationship with Pyongyang. A multilateral approach seems the best tactic, but even

here Beijing must be careful. It cannot afford

to get caught up in events that could ultimately

lead to China’s finding itself thwarted by U.S.

influence or in the embarrassing situation of

having to take the lead in blocking a United

Nations (UN) vote that could lead to a binding

resolution—clearly, absent any telling change

in the current situation, for Beijing, Korean

Peninsula issues must be kept clear of the UN

Security Council. By the same token, China

cannot afford to take a wholly passive approach

that leaves it vulnerable to accusations that it is

oblivious to human rights issues or to security

issues of concern to its neighbors in Asia.

The most plausible option for Beijing is a

multilateral approach that enables it a chance

to play a dominant role while simultaneously

providing ample political cover—something

like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

+ 3, multi-party talks that include Russia, or

some similar North Asian coalition. Such a

course would be highly attractive to China’s

leaders. Involving concerned states that are

nonthreatening to North Korea could make it

easier to mollify North Korean leaders’ fears

about their continued survival and persuade

them to modify their rhetoric and scale down

their demands—perhaps even persuade

Pyongyang to make a positive overture. It

could make it easier to bring European Union

countries on board in support of Beijing’s

initiatives. It also, in Beijing’s view, might

make it easier to negotiate with North Korea a

workable, enforceable inspection and verification regime concerning weapons of mass

destruction acceptable to the greater global

community. This would have the advantage of

keeping Pyongyang calm by keeping the United

States at arms length and undercutting its

demands for a more aggressive approach. An

additional advantage for China is that this sort

of initiative could help improve Beijing-Seoul

cooperation, drawing them closer together on a

number of fronts, perhaps even weakening the

U.S.-Korean alliance a little bit. If played correctly, it could reduce U.S. influence in the

region while enhancing Chinese prestige, with

relatively little diplomatic risk.

Still, in the final analysis, China’s strategy

is hostage to Pyongyang’s ability to see reason.

Beijing is more likely to maintain its current

course and try a strategy like the one explored

above if Kim Jong Il and company are willing

to compromise and give Beijing face and

support in its efforts. Continued North Korean

intransigence and a worsening of conditions on

the peninsula, however, will probably force

China to buy into the U.S. approach eventually

and to move toward more complete cooperation with the United States on Korean Peninsula issues. The challenge for Beijing will be in

assessing the costs of working with Washington

and trying to collect on the bill.

Notes1 American Broadcasting Company News Online, poll,

Chinese Would Support North Korea in War Against U.S.,

June 16, 2003, accessed at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/

newsitems/s881118.htm>. 2 Department of State, Supporting Human Rights and

Democracy: The U.S. Record 2002–2003 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003).

No. 201, August 2003 Strategic Forum 5 

in the final analysis,

China’s strategy is

hostage to Pyongyang’s

ability to see reason

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE

Robert A. Silano

Director of Publications

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

books, monographs, and reports on national security

strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy.

For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also

produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research
Panel 5 

of Washington’s conflicted China policy, it

would be difficult for any Chinese leaders to

justify taking Washington’s side in peninsula

issues at this time.

As noted above, China and the United

States do not hold similar views concerning the

threats certain countries pose to international

peace and stability, even less to China’s own

national security. Given present circumstances,

China may see little verifiable benefit in signing on to the U.S. position; conversely, Beijing

might even hold that doing so would actually

undermine its own interests by creating suspicion, mistrust, and other long-term problems

in places where it now has none. Looked at

from this angle, it could even be argued that

the United States poses a bigger threat to China

than North Korea does. Since the advent of the

U.S. war on terrorism, the United States has

steadily expanded its military presence in

Central Asia and undermined Chinese diplomatic efforts in the region, even as it has pursued an increasingly aggressive campaign

against terrorist states. For Beijing, the specter

of American military encirclement and possible

U.S. policies that seek China’s containment

looms large. The fear that aggressive American

action could destabilize the Korean Peninsula

(with China bearing the brunt) also increasingly is a cause for concern.

Still, if dancing to Washington’s tune is

not the answer for China, neither is ignoring

impending crisis on the peninsula. Just as

Beijing would regard a destabilized North Korea

as a real threat, it also would fear the consequences of a nuclear-armed North Korea, albeit

for different reasons than Washington. China

would probably be able to accept Pyongyang’s

having some limited nuclear capability—after

all, Beijing does not fear a strike from

Pyongyang. For China, the fear is that nuclear

weapons in Pyongyang would fuel proliferation

in Asia, with Tokyo, Seoul, and maybe even

Taipei deciding that, even with a missile defense

shield, having their own nuclear deterrents

would be the only guarantee of security. This

would be of great concern to China, and while

such a scenario may seem farfetched to outside

observers, it may not be so to Beijing.

China’s Way Ahead

Ultimately, China may be spurred to

action by a different set of motives than the

United States. It clearly recognizes that it must

do something to control things on the Korean

Peninsula. Moreover, for all its differences with

Washington, there is no doubt about Beijing’s

wanting better U.S.-China relations. The challenge is in choosing an approach that poses

minimal risk to Chinese interests while maximizing chances of gaining the advantages that

China seeks, including maintaining a cordial,

working relationship with Pyongyang. A multilateral approach seems the best tactic, but even

here Beijing must be careful. It cannot afford

to get caught up in events that could ultimately

lead to China’s finding itself thwarted by U.S.

influence or in the embarrassing situation of

having to take the lead in blocking a United

Nations (UN) vote that could lead to a binding

resolution—clearly, absent any telling change

in the current situation, for Beijing, Korean

Peninsula issues must be kept clear of the UN

Security Council. By the same token, China

cannot afford to take a wholly passive approach

that leaves it vulnerable to accusations that it is

oblivious to human rights issues or to security

issues of concern to its neighbors in Asia.

The most plausible option for Beijing is a

multilateral approach that enables it a chance

to play a dominant role while simultaneously

providing ample political cover—something

like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

+ 3, multi-party talks that include Russia, or

some similar North Asian coalition. Such a

course would be highly attractive to China’s

leaders. Involving concerned states that are

nonthreatening to North Korea could make it

easier to mollify North Korean leaders’ fears

about their continued survival and persuade

them to modify their rhetoric and scale down

their demands—perhaps even persuade

Pyongyang to make a positive overture. It

could make it easier to bring European Union

countries on board in support of Beijing’s

initiatives. It also, in Beijing’s view, might

make it easier to negotiate with North Korea a

workable, enforceable inspection and verification regime concerning weapons of mass

destruction acceptable to the greater global

community. This would have the advantage of

keeping Pyongyang calm by keeping the United

States at arms length and undercutting its

demands for a more aggressive approach. An

additional advantage for China is that this sort

of initiative could help improve Beijing-Seoul

cooperation, drawing them closer together on a

number of fronts, perhaps even weakening the

U.S.-Korean alliance a little bit. If played correctly, it could reduce U.S. influence in the

region while enhancing Chinese prestige, with

relatively little diplomatic risk.

Still, in the final analysis, China’s strategy

is hostage to Pyongyang’s ability to see reason.

Beijing is more likely to maintain its current

course and try a strategy like the one explored

above if Kim Jong Il and company are willing

to compromise and give Beijing face and

support in its efforts. Continued North Korean

intransigence and a worsening of conditions on

the peninsula, however, will probably force

China to buy into the U.S. approach eventually

and to move toward more complete cooperation with the United States on Korean Peninsula issues. The challenge for Beijing will be in

assessing the costs of working with Washington

and trying to collect on the bill.

Notes1 American Broadcasting Company News Online, poll,

Chinese Would Support North Korea in War Against U.S.,

June 16, 2003, accessed at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/

newsitems/s881118.htm>. 2 Department of State, Supporting Human Rights and

Democracy: The U.S. Record 2002–2003 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003).

No. 201, August 2003 Strategic Forum 5 

in the final analysis,

China’s strategy is

hostage to Pyongyang’s

ability to see reason

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE

Robert A. Silano

Director of Publications

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

books, monographs, and reports on national security

strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy.

For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also

produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research