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THE UKRAINIAN MILITARY AND CIVILMILITARY RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD 

WAR ERA 

Oleg Strekal

INSS Occasional Paper 2 

November 1994 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

US Air Force Academy, Colorado 
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 The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air 

Force, the Department of Defense or the US Government. This report is 

approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

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 Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded 

to: Director, Institute for National Security Studies, HQ USAFA/DFE, 2354 

Fairchild Drive, Suite 4K25, US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO 

80840. 
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FOREWARD 

 We are pleased to publish this second volume in the Occasional Paper

series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies. This 

monograph represents a departure from our norm (there being, however, only 

one previous edition by which to judge “norm”) as we present our first nonAmerican author, and one who prepared this paper not as part of a major INSSsponsored research effort, but for a conference. 

 INSS is co-sponsored by the National Security Negotiations Division, 

Plans and Operations Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (USAF/XOXI) 

and the Dean of the Faculty, US Air Force Academy. The primary purpose of 

the Institute is to promote research done within the DOD community in the 

fields of arms control, national security, and area studies. INSS coordinates and 

focuses outside thinking in various disciplines and across services to develop 

new ideas for USAF policy making. The Institute develops research topics, 

selects researchers from within the military academic community, and 

administers sponsored research. We also host conferences and workshops 

which facilitate the dissemination of information to a wide range of private and 

government organizations. INSS is in its third year of providing valuable, costeffective research to meet the needs of the Air Staff. 

 This paper highlights a potential source of unrest and instability in the 

second largest country in Europe, one that is nominally also one of the world’s 

greatest nuclear power. Mr Oleg Strekal, a Ukrainian journalist serving a 

fellowship in Germany, presents a timely and first-hand look at the Ukrainian 

military, its goals and problems, and its relations with civil society in a Soviet 

successor state in the post-Cold War era. This paper is the outgrowth of a paper 
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presented by Mr Strekal at a conference in Washington, DC, in August 1994 

entitled “Dimensions of European Security.” The conference was co-hosted by 

INSS and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, a leading German security 

studies research center in Ebenhausen, Germany. Mr Strekal points out that the 

re-orientation of Ukraine’s foreign policy from a “Russia-restraining” approach 

to one of closer military cooperation with Russia has created a sense of political 

disorientation and demoralization within the military. Despite valid reasons for 

such a shift--seeking an outlet for Ukrainian military industrial goods, for 

example, or procuring a security partner--this could nevertheless lead to a 

dangerous situation wherein Ukraine’s military becomes simultaneously more 

involved with domestic politics and less able to defend the country against 

military threats. Furthermore, Ukrainian history is replete with examples of 

misplaced trust in Russia as an ally. He enumerates several steps that could 

forestall that situation, to include military reforms and revised foreign policy 

objectives. 

 Thank you for your interest in INSS and its research products. We 

hope we are meeting a need for this type of analysis and reflection, and we look 

forward to publishing these papers on a regular basis. 

JEFFREY A. LARSEN, Lt Colonel, USAF 

Director, Institute for National Security Studies 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Since independence, Ukraine has based its military policy on two general aims. 

First, it wishes to diminish the threat of the army’s disobedience and prevent its 

involvement in national political affairs--including using force against civilians 

Second, it wants to develop the army as an instrument to protect the country, 

integrating it as a major factor in Ukraine’s national security system. 

 The current political philosophy of the country continues to reflect 

these aims; however, the emphasis has changed. The army is no longer 

perceived to be a security challenge as it was during the first stages of Ukraine’s 

independence. Rather, Ukraine’s leadership is primarily concerned with 

strengthening the army’s ability to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial 

integrity of the country. 

 Despite the government’s diminished preoccupation with the potential 

threat of the military to domestic security, the Ukrainian army continues to 

present a challenge to national interests. In addition to the army’s inability to 

defend Ukraine from outside military aggression, it also poses the challenge of 

weapons proliferation and miniaturization of the economy, and of a growing 

dependence on Russia, both as a security partner and as a purveyor of social 

welfare needs. In these ways the Ukrainian military endangers the society it is 

meant to protect. 

 The military’s current involvement in the political life of the country 

remains insignificant. The country is endangered, however, by the potential 

demoralization and breakdown of discipline within the army. This has already 

led to increased crime (not only within the army, but by servicemen against 

civilians), weapons smuggling to organized crime elements, and commercial 

speculations involving military facilities and finances. The army is demoralized 

because it lacks appropriate tasks. Its mission has changed significantly since 
8

the first years following independence, from defense against potential outside 

(primarily Russian) aggression, to reliance on Russia as a security partner and 

provider of necessary social welfare goods. This change came about following 

the new government’s accession to power in 1994. The result is a Ukrainian 

military that is becoming more independent from the Ukrainian state in terms of 

economic and business activities. 

 The Ukrainian government must recognize that while military 

cooperation with Russian is more lucrative than military confrontation, there are 

still basic needs that it must provide to the army to prevent over-reliance on its 

big neighbor. A more accurate threat assessment would lead to a reduction in 

the size of Ukraine’s army, thereby insuring better care of the smaller force. 

Political and civil control of the military must concentrate on the most acute 

problems, to include lawlessness, black marketeering, and collaboration with 

paramilitary forces. This can be accomplished by simultaneously strengthening 

civil control over the military, and increasing the army’s reputation and prestige 

within society. 

 The Ukrainian state must recognize that true sovereignty rests on 

economic and social pillars as well as military. Overemphasis on military 

independence is understandable for a new state, but must be gradually corrected. 

In this way Ukraine can maintain its political independence from Russia while 

providing a quality way of life to a military that serves to protect that 

independence. 

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY 
9

Lieutenant General Paul E. Stein 

Superintendent 

Brigadier General Ruben A. Cubero 

Dean of the Faculty 

HEADQUARTERS, US AIR FORCE 

PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE 

Major General Robert E. Linhard 

Director of Plans 

Colonel Richard B. Wallace 

Chief, National Security Negotiations Division 

USAF INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES 

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Larsen 

Director 

Lieutenant Colonel Kent Esbenshade 

Department of English, USAFA 

Series Editor 

Ms Francesca Duncan 

Editor 

Mrs Debra Porter 

Directorate of Education/Graphics Division, USAFA 

Cover Design 

The Ukrainian Military: Instrument for Defense 

or Domestic Challenge?

Introduction 
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 The problems of building Ukraine’s military have always 

attracted the attention of the country’s government and its different 

political forces. Nevertheless, establishing the armed forces as a 

keystone of state-building has moved quickly beyond the political, 

social, and psychological aspects of Ukrainian statehood. 

 Ukraine has based its military policy on two general aims: 

diminishing the threat of the army’s disobedience and preventing its 

involvement in internal political affairs--including using force against 

civilians--and developing the army as an instrument to protect the 

country, integrating it as a major factor of Ukraine’s national security 

system. 

 The current official military policy reflects these 

aims; however, the emphasis has changed. The army is no longer 

perceived to be a security challenge as it was during the first stages of 

Ukraine’s independence. Rather, Ukraine’s leadership is primarily 

concerned with strengthening the army’s ability to guarantee the 

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. 

 However, despite the government’s diminished preoccupation 

with the potential threat of the military to national security, the Ukrainian 

army continues to present a challenge to national interests in the 

following areas: 

• The inability of the army to defend Ukraine from outside 

military aggression, 

• The challenge of weapons proliferation and militarization of the 

economy, and 
11

• The problem of using the army as an instrument to deepen 

Ukraine’s dependence on Russia. 

As a result of the shift in military policy and the military’s challenge to 

national interests, the Ukrainian military endangers the society it is 

meant to protect. 

1. The Army as a Security Pillar: Ukraine’s Initial Intentions 

 Ukrainian officials discussed creating an independent Ukrainian 

army even before the state became independent. The Declaration on 

State Sovereignty adopted by the Parliament of the Ukrainian SSR on 

July 16, 1990, defined the building of the army as a major task and a 

natural right of the future Ukrainian independent state.1

 The declaration 

was designed not to actually create an army, but rather to legitimize 

Ukraine’s intentions to have armed forces separate from those of the 

Soviet Union. Moreover, by announcing the right to maintain its own 

army, Ukraine took a significant step toward independence from the 

USSR. 

 The military coup in Moscow in August 1991 and fears that 

Soviet troops on Ukraine’s territory would act aggressively against the 

Ukrainian state forced the official leadership in Kiev to subordinate these 

troops to the control of Ukrainian authorities. Ukraine also announced as 

its own the Soviet military property on the soil of the newly independent 

state. 

 In order to diminish tensions within the army and to limit the 

possibility of using the military against civilians, the Ukrainian 

Parliament guaranteed equal rights and protection to servicemen of all 
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nationalities. To provide effective control over the military, Ukrainian 

officials urged the units of the former Soviet Army to take the Ukrainian 

oath in January 1992.2

 Establishing control over the military units helped ease rival 

political factions toward compromise. The idea of creating a Ukrainian 

army appeared to be the basis for political compromise and cooperation 

between the official leadership (communists-turned-nationalists) and the 

opposition (national-democrats). Both officials and opposition leaders 

agreed upon the army’s role in restraining possible “Russian imperial 

claims” toward Ukraine. President Kravchuk and national-democratic 

leaders called upon the people of Ukraine never to forget the lessons of 

history, which confirmed that militarily weak Ukraine always gave up its 

independence to Russia. 

 Military reforms began as the state created the legal basis for the 

Army’s existence and function. In two years, the Ukrainian Parliament 

adopted a series of documents on military issues, including the Concept 

for Defense and Military Building in Ukraine, the laws “On Ukraine’s 

Defense,” “On Armed Forces,” “On Social and Legal Protection of 

Servicemen and their Families,” “On Military Duty and Military 

Service,” and more than 20 related documents.3

 These reforms continued 

with the creation of the Ministry of Defense and a command system for 

the military groupings. 

 Ukraine’s military policy also concentrated on the problems of 

developing military cooperation with neighboring countries. Close 

political and military ties within the region were supposed to create the 

atmosphere of mutual confidence, which would serve as the basis for the 

creation of a peaceful security environment for Ukraine. To this end, 
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Ukraine tried to demonstrate that its intent to maintain its non-bloc status 

would not impede political-military cooperation in the region.4

 The most intensive dialog on these issues was between Ukraine 

and the East European countries, especially Poland, Hungary, and 

Czechoslovakia. Although military cooperation with those countries did 

not solve Ukraine’s problems of arms production and military security, 

the political meaning of such cooperation was significant: it confirmed 

that Ukraine would reorient itself to Europe and start participating in 

European affairs. 

 The countries of the Visegrad group were also interested in 

active bilateral relations with Ukraine.5

 The existence of a militarily 

stable and predictable Ukraine diminished possible threats to Eastern 

Europeans along shared borders. In addition, the dependence of Eastern 

European militaries on Soviet-made military equipment and spare parts 

forced the Visegrad group to remain partners with Ukraine, which has 

the capability to produce this equipment and spare parts.6

 By the summer of 1994, Ukraine had signed agreements on 

military cooperation with all neighboring countries, except Russia. 

 Since Ukraine considered Russia the major source of military 

troubles,7

 the Ukrainian leadership tried to counterbalance the Russian 

challenge by developing military ties with the countries of the West. 

Ukraine signed agreements on cooperation with the Defense Ministries 

of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain.8

 The western 

dimension of Ukraine’s military policy was part of a broader foreign 

policy goal of “coming back to Europe.” Ties to the West, however, 

were established at the expense of attention to the East, particularly 

Russia.9
14

 Fears of military attack led Ukraine to start building its own 

army on the second day of independence. Today this army is the second 

largest in Europe. In addition to the armed forces, Ukraine also keeps 

Border Guard troops, the National Guard, and troops of Civil Defense 

and special police forces, trained as paratroopers.10

 The government in Kiev, as well as the political opposition, 

recognized existence of a direct military threat to Ukraine. Their 

perceptions differed only in degree of probability and scope. 

Government officials saw local clashes as a greater threat, primarily in: 

• Political instability “in some neighboring regions”; 

• The existence of territorial claims (especially Russia’s) in 

Ukraine; 

• Powerful armed forces “in some states,” which have enormous 

offensive potential; and 

• Ethnic, social, and religious conflicts, which might provoke 

military clashes. 11

Opposition leaders, on the other hand, were concerned about a full-scale 

military threat.12 Parliament thus voted down the first draft of the 

Military Doctrine in November 1992, deeming the draft “too pacifistic” 

and citing several shortcomings. The document did not include a 

definition of “probable enemy” nor statements concerning the status of 

nuclear weapons or the ban on establishing foreign military bases on 

Ukraine’s soil. 

 Ukraine’s official Military Doctrine, adopted in October 1993, 

met Parliament’s initial demands. Establishing foreign bases was 

prohibited, nuclear weapons received official status as Ukraine’s 
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property, and the definition of “probable enemy” was incorporated into 

the text of the Doctrine.13 The document defines the main principles of 

Ukraine’s military policy in the following terms: 

• War could not serve as a means for solving interstate disputes; 

• Reasons for military conflicts between states could be political, 

territorial, ethnic, and religious; 

• Ukraine would have no territorial claims to another state; 

• Ukraine’s probable enemy would be the state “whose consistent 

policy constitutes a military danger for Ukraine, leads to 

interference in internal matters, and encroaches on its territorial 

integrity or national interests”; and 

• Ukraine would maintain non-block status and a keen interest in 

creating the pan-European security system.14

 With the adoption of the Military Doctrine, the Ukrainian 

Parliament stated that the Ukrainian army will include 450 thousand 

troops, constituting 0.8 percent of the country’s population.15 The 

Government announced in the beginning of 1994 that the problems of 

military reform in Ukraine were solved and the armed forces were 

capable of defending the country from any kind of aggression.16

2. The Doubtful Defender 

 Under the current circumstances, the problem of the Ukrainian 

army as a security challenge has little to do with the probability of a 

military coup or with the risks of local units moving out of the military 

command and political control structure. On the contrary, the Ukrainian 
16

army seems to be manageable, and the highest military officials have 

expressed loyalty to the Ukrainian state.17 Thus, the army’s challenge 

lies in quite another direction: the armed forces in Ukraine are illprepared to protect the country effectively. This shortcoming includes 

military-organizational, political-military, ideological, and moral aspects. 

Military-Organizational Aspects

 In the fall of 1993, the Parliamentary Commission on Defense 

and National Security publicly expressed its fears concerning the 

defensive capabilities of Ukraine’s army.18 The head of the 

Parliamentary Commission, Valentyn Lemish, used several arguments in 

this regard: 

• Military units do not receive new military applications and 

equipment, while existing techniques and weapons become nonusable (the condition of military jets, for instance, constitutes a 

mere 4 percent readiness level); 

• The scarcity of oil and gasoline postponed military exercises 

throughout Ukraine;19

• The lack of training fields for air defense and air forces makes 

these troops incapable of fighting; 

• The military budget does not include the costs of ordering new 

weaponry, expenses for research, nor the development of a new 

system of arms;20 and 

• Some steps intended to restructure the Army (such as 

reorganization of the Kiev Military District, the unification of the 
17

Air Force and Air Defense Forces, etc.) hurt the defense 

capability of the military.21

 Ukraine still deploys troops in the manner it inherited from the 

Soviet Union, concentrating its most advanced troops along the western 

borders of the country. Yet even though Ukraine did not change this 

former structure, it recognized that its possible enemy would be to the 

east of its borders.22 This is especially true of air defense; however, no 

sufficient air defense system exists along the Ukrainian-Russian border.23 

Moreover, the Ukrainian Air Force continues to use an “identification 

friend or foe” system similar to that of the Russian military, making it 

extremely difficult, in fact, to determine friend from foe. The absence of 

any system to protect the border with Russia (especially weak is the 

protection of the Azov and Black Seas) means the absence of a 

comprehensive early-warning system against a possible attack from the 

East.24

 The Military Doctrine of Ukraine states that the armed forces 

have the task of defending against any state or coalition of states, air and 

space strikes, and from naval invasions.25 If Ukrainian troops are to fight 

an undefined enemy, the tasks listed in the Military Doctrine represent a 

major problem in training the armed forces. Moreover, this doctrine 

leads to the squandering of financial and material resources for the 

unrealistic task of developing responses to any imaginable threat.26

 The source of military danger to Ukraine is well known. The 

definition of the probable enemy in the Military Doctrine, as well as in 

numerous statements of Ukrainian politicians, make it clear that Russia 

could pose the greatest military threat to Ukraine. Nevertheless, 
18

Ukrainian military units are not trained to defend against an attack 

launched by a specific aggressor.27

 The concept of a Ukrainian armed force does not take into 

account that a stand-off with the Russian army would mean dealing with 

a military that possesses nuclear, chemical, biological, and high-tech 

weapons. For example, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 

does not exclude Russia’s right for a preventive nuclear strike. On the 

other hand, Russian military strategy in the “near abroad” is based on 

using rapid reaction forces (such as airborne troops). Ukraine, however, 

lacks mobile units for an adequate response to such an attack. 

 Positioning its forces is also a problem, for Ukraine finds itself 

surrounded by Russian military bases. The Russian 14th Army is 

stationed in Pridnestrovie. The Russian-controlled Black Sea Fleet 

(about 12,000 servicemen) is based in Crimea.28 Russian troops are very 

active in Caucasus and are concentrating in Krasnodarsky Kraj of the 

Russian Federation. Finally, the Belarussian military (in addition to 25, 

000 Russian troops stationed in Belarus) has become a Russian ally, 

since Belarus signed the Collective Security Treaty with Russia, agreeing 

to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.29 In case of an escalation 

of a Ukrainian-Russian conflict, Ukraine has to expect military strikes 

from every possible direction, while lacking the capacity to respond to 

them properly. 

 Finally, because the majority of Ukraine’s officers corps are 

ethnic Russians, such an army might hesitate to fight against any kind of 

“Russian imperialism.” 

Political-Military Aspects 
19

 Not only the national interests of Ukraine, but military reform 

itself, have suffered from the politics of that reform. Disputes over the 

division of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), nuclear disarmament, and attitudes 

toward military cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent 

States (CIS) all undermine efforts to reform the military. 

 The partitioning of the BSF and Ukrainian concessions to Russia 

made in this regard demonstrated the weakness of Kiev’s position vis-àvis Moscow. The softening of Ukrainian claims on the BSF (from the 

whole fleet, to 50 percent, to 10-15 percent, to attempts to sell the fleet as 

payment for debts to Russia) only hardened Russia’s policies toward 

Ukraine.30 Moreover, under pressure from Russian military officials, 

Ukraine agreed to allow Russia to establish a base for its fleet in Crimea. 

By so doing, Ukrainian leadership ignored its own ban on positioning 

foreign troops on Ukraine’s soil, which is the basic principle of the 

Ukrainian Military Doctrine.31 The result was a political blow to the 

central Ukrainian government in Crimea, and local politicians and public 

leaders blamed Ukrainian authorities for giving in to the “Russian 

Glory.” 

 The controversies in Ukrainian policy over nuclear disarmament 

endangered national security in two major ways. First, Ukraine’s 

intentions to improve operational control over ballistic missiles 

inadvertently caused a direct military counter-threat to it. Responding to 

these intentions, Russian military officials incorporated into the text of 

the Russian Military Doctrine a paragraph that defined attempts to 

interfere with, or to damage the command and control systems of, 

Russian strategic troops located abroad as a direct military threat to 

Russian Federation.32 The second aspect of the nuclear issue deals with 

the reaction of the international community. Speculations over strategic 
20

weapons postponed Ukraine’s integration into the world community, 

while Western leaders considered just such an integration the most 

effective pillar for Ukraine’s national security.33

 Changing attitudes of Ukrainian leadership toward military 

cooperation within the CIS also tend to damage the country’s political 

image and national interests. During the first two years of independence, 

Ukraine was extremely cautious about any cooperation within the 

military structure of the CIS because of fears that such cooperation 

would lead to the subordination of the Ukrainian army under Russiandominated CIS structures. Ukraine viewed remaining a non-bloc country 

as a basic guarantee against any move toward instituting its military into 

the Commonwealth. The Ministry of Defense decided at that time to 

create an “independent army,” remaining outside the influence of any 

policies of the CIS or Russia.34

 Such caution, however, had some disadvantages. It ignored the 

prospect that military cooperation between Russia and CIS would be a 

decisive factor in diminishing a possible military threat from the Russian 

Federation. In fact, the numerous attempts of the Ukrainian leadership to 

escape from the orbit of Russian influence in political, economic, and 

military terms caused general political tensions between the two 

countries and raised mutual suspicions about each side’s military goals. 

 Implementing the policy of neutrality proved to have dual logic. 

Ukrainian officials, while rejecting any possibility of joining a Russianled military union, made it clear that they would join a Western military 

coalition in case of military aggression.35 Moreover, Ukrainian leaders 

expressed their intention to see Ukraine among NATO members in the 

years to come and tried to sell to the West the vision of Ukraine as a 

“belt of military stability against any turbulence in the East.”36
21

 This dual logic fueled Russian fears of being isolated from 

Europe. As for the West, such logic contributed to the image of 

Ukrainian policy as something unpredictable and unstable. Because of 

controversies concerning CIS and non-bloc status, Ukraine found itself 

between two security structures: NATO and the CIS.37 Indeed, the 

country appeared to be an “undesirable guest” for both of these 

structures. 

Ideological and Moral Aspects

 One of the Ukrainian leadership’s first decisions on military 

issues was to de-politicize the army. The institution of political 

commissars was dissolved and political activity within the military was 

prohibited. Servicemen were ordered to postpone party membership 

until the end of their military service. Nevertheless, it became obvious 

that denying party membership and political activity in the army would 

not solve the problem of the army’s low “combat spirit” and the problem 

of poor morale of soldiers and officers.38

 To increase the patriotism of the army and to strengthen the 

“feeling of mission” among the servicemen, the Social-Psychological 

Service was established within the Ministry of Defense. The basic task 

for this Service could be defined as the “Ukrainization of the Ukrainian 

army.” This concept meant replacing Soviet military tradition with 

Ukrainian military history and tradition, as well as language.39

 However, the process of the army’s Ukrainization, while 

absolutely necessary, was too drastic and one-sided. The patriotic 

education of servicemen dwelled exclusively on the history of Ukrainian 

Cossacks and on the struggle of the Ukrainian Rebel Army during World 
22

War II. Completely ignored was the history of the Soviet Army, the 

previous staple of officer education. The pressure to learn the Ukrainian 

language quickly alienated, at least psychologically, Russian-speaking 

officers. 

 This rapid Ukrainization contributed, paradoxically, to the 

negative sentiments within the army. The morale of the Ukrainian 

officers was unbelievably low. According to a poll taken by the Union 

of Ukrainian Officers in the spring of 1993, 10 percent of the officers 

were ready to betray Ukraine at any moment. Thirty-three percent stated 

that they took the Ukrainian oath because they had homes in Ukraine; 27 

percent explained that the main reason for serving in the Ukrainian army 

was the stability of Ukraine. The poll also demonstrated that 

approximately 40 percent of high-ranking military officials supported the 

idea of a common CIS army.40 In general, low morale accounts for lack 

of discipline in the army, a high level of crime and corruption, and 

unwillingness of servicemen to develop their professional skills. 41

 The social status of Ukrainian servicemen also remains dismally 

low. As Minister of Defense General Radetzky stated, the social status 

of the officers is lower than that of coal miners and bus drivers. The low 

social prestige of military service is the major reason young people avoid 

serving.42 Questioning its officer corps, the Ministry of Defense has 

discovered that 93 percent of Ukrainian officers are not satisfied with 

their living standards, 88 percent are aware of the lack of social 

acceptance, and 57 percent expressed dissatisfaction with military 

service.43

 Military service has become increasingly unattractive to young 

conscripts. Every year, the number of deserters from the army amounts 

to several thousand. The number of those who escape recruitment is 
23

even higher. According to figures compiled by the Ukrainian Institute 

for Youth Problems, 60 percent of the conscripts who ignored the 

obligation to join the military said the lack of basic human rights in the 

military was the primary reason for not joining. 

3. Ukrainian Military And Weapons Proliferation 

 The West is primarily concerned with the nuclear aspects of 

Ukraine’s problems with weapons proliferation. The trilateral agreement 

signed in Moscow in January 1994 by the United States, Russia, and 

Ukraine was seen as a significant Western success in disarming Ukraine 

of nuclear weapons. The Western strategy toward Ukrainian weapons 

was based on traditional non-proliferation approaches: 

• Elaborating a common Western policy toward the issue, using 

the framework of interstate diplomacy and the network of 

international organizations, especially the European Union and 

NATO; 

• Putting political pressure on Ukraine, including the threat of 

international isolation; 

• Targeting the nuclear missiles of NATO members on Ukraine’s 

nuclear assets as well as making it clear to Ukrainian officials 

that their country could face the danger of nuclear deterrence;44

and 

• Implementing intensive intelligence activities within Ukraine. 

 Of course, there were some new elements in the counterproliferation policies: 
24

• Attempts to create a friendly security environment and to 

diminish Ukraine’s fears of direct military threat45 and 

• Financial assistance, through the Nunn-Lugar program, for safe 

dismantling of nuclear warheads and missiles, for retraining 

engineers and technicians from the military-industrial complex, 

and for establishing more effective export control in Ukraine.46

 Ukraine’s bilateral relations with individual Western countries in 

the field of nuclear disarmament proved more effective than its relations 

with international organizations, particularly NATO. Central to these 

relations is the problem of non-proliferation payments. Ukraine 

recognized that it is more effective to ask for payments from individual 

states rather than from international institutions. 

 These non-proliferation activities have resulted in the withdrawal 

of some nuclear warheads from Ukraine. Although these withdrawals 

eased the West’s major concerns, serious proliferation-related problems 

remain: 

• Disappointed with Western security guarantees, Ukraine’s 

leadership still favors the principle of self-defense as a major 

security guarantee for the country. The new Ukrainian 

leadership is skeptical about the West’s willingness to 

incorporate Ukraine into Western collective security structures. 

Officials in Kiev are pessimistic about NATO’s reforms and the 

prospect of NATO’s expansion.47 On the other hand, it was 

Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine’s current president, who persuaded 

Parliament not to speed up the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. 
25

• Western assistance is considered insignificant; it covers only a 

few percent of Ukrainian needs. Ukraine needs $6 billion to 

improve the safety of nuclear reactors, and the West has 

promised only $200 million. The same disproportion is true for 

dismantling nuclear missiles, deactivating liquid missile fuel, and 

retraining personnel. 

• The West is perceived as Ukraine’s competitor in the militaryindustrial field, which is not conducive to equal partnership. In 

Ukraine, the principle of self-defense along with the principle of 

self-survival means the Ukrainian government will attempt to get 

hard currency by any appropriate means. 

• Finally, Western sensitivity over nuclear issues convinced 

Ukraine’s leaders that they could influence the West by using the 

nuclear lever. Ukraine’s exploitation of “the power of the gun” 

complicated the disarmament processes in the country. 

However, Western behavior in the field of arms control and 

counterproliferation--such as deliveries of weapons to Greece 

and Turkey and keeping US nuclear forces in Europe as a 

deterrent to non-nuclear threats48--has fueled Ukrainian desires to 

act more assertively in weapons-related areas. 

 These problems lead to the possibility of continued weapons 

proliferation. The context for this proliferation lies in the functioning of 

the Ukrainian military-industrial complex and the intent of the military 

leadership to reach self-sufficiency by providing the military with 

essential weapons. Politically, this issue is significant because Ukraine 

still tries to deter Russia by military means in order to protect and 

strengthen its own independence. 
26

4. Ukraine’s Military-Industrial Complex 

 Ukraine inherited about 30 percent of the Soviet military 

industry, which included between 50 and 60 percent of all Ukrainian 

enterprises. Since Ukraine’s independence, its leaders have intended to 

reorient this huge military-industrial potential toward the production of 

civil goods.49 However, the leadership’s attitude toward conversion of 

military industry started to change at the beginning of 1993. Several 

factors accounted for this shift. The country’s economic decline 

endangered the very existence of the military industry, which has several 

million employees. The deficit of hard currency pressed Ukrainian 

officials to look for products that would be competitive on the world 

market, and the military-industrial complex was considered the best 

provider of such goods. Finally, the acute need to produce weapons for 

the Ukrainian army created an “anti-conversion” process within the 

military industry. 

 In 1993, about 40 percent of the state budget supported the 

military-industrial complex. At the same time, the cost of social 

programs constituted only 20 percent of budget spending.50 

Nevertheless, during the last months of the year, almost all programs for 

the conversion of the military industry were postponed because the 

industry renewed its efforts to produce weapons.51 At the same time, 

Ukraine elaborated its program to produce firearms and other kinds of 

weapons. One indication was Ukrainian Minister of Defense Vitaly 

Radetzky’s November 1993 visit to enterprises of the military-industrial 

complex. During this trip, General Radetzky stated that Ukraine should 

create its own military-industrial complex, capable of providing the 
27

armed forces with all kinds of weapons and equipment.52 Another 

indication was that research in the field of rocket and cosmic weapons 

was underway at Ukraine’s scientific centers in Kharkov and 

Dnepropetrovsk.53

 The costs of revitalizing industry have led to increasing hyperinflation in Ukraine, strengthening of state control over industry, and 

increasing deficit of commercial products on Ukraine’s internal market. 

Moreover, Ukraine’s economy faces additional risks, including: 

• A possible arms race in the region, 

• The proliferation of high tech weapons production, and 

• The proliferation of arms at the local level. 

 As for the arms race, Ukraine intends to maintain the second 

largest army in Europe and rejects disarmament. The Ukrainian military 

is looking for a modern weapons system with space-based elements, 

missiles, and high-precision weaponry. The Department on Disarmament 

in the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed to enhance 

strategic deterrence using Ukrainian-made intercontinental missiles with 

advanced conventional warheads.54 To not destroy ICBM silos, to arm 

strategic bombers with advanced missiles, and to keep part of its nuclear 

weapons are issues for discussion within the Ukrainian government. 

These ideas are strongly supported by national-democratic and 

nationalist political opposition parties, as well as by the general public. 

 The goal of keeping powerful and well-armed forces could 

provoke an arms race with Russia and would undermine the process of 

disarmament in Europe. Until now, Ukraine has partly respected several 

international agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
28

(NPT), Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and Missile 

Technology Control Regime (MTCR). But mitigating against these 

agreements are the principles of balance of power incorporated into both 

the Ukrainian and Russian Military Doctrines. 

5. Arms Exports

 The second risk related to the militarization of the economy 

concerns arms export and weapons proliferation. Strong competition in 

the world’s weapons market (Ukraine faces competition with Russia as 

well as the West) has forced Ukraine to look into exporting arms to 

politically unstable or even aggressive regimes. Ukraine has established 

its own network for arms export and, in so doing, does not fully 

recognize international rules and bans. Moreover, the Ukrainian 

military, while not knowing who would use the weapons, traded 

conventional arms on the black market and signed contracts with 

commercial firms. 55

 Ukraine’s contract with Iran is a case in point. The first 

contracts on weapons deliveries to Iran, signed in the middle of 1992 and 

causing negative reaction in the West (particularly in the US), proved 

that Ukraine did not take into consideration the political consequences of 

such attempts.56 As for civil cooperation with Iran, Ukrainian 

government officials and their Iranian counterparts have discussed the 

prospect for cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, specifically the 

possibility of sending Ukrainian atomic specialists to Iran. 

 Another possible area of Ukrainian contribution to weapons 

proliferation lies within the CIS. While political significance was the 

greatest motivator in military cooperation with Eastern Europe, contacts 
29

with the CIS are aimed primarily at the creation and production of 

Ukrainian weapons. 

 While Ukraine inherited a powerful military-industrial complex, 

employing 40 percent of its working population, the majority of the 

enterprises did not produce the final products. Ukraine also played a 

small part in scientific efforts aimed at creating new weapons systems in 

the military industry of the former USSR. For example, the level of 

Ukraine’s participation in creating and modernizing an air defense 

system was five percent; in producing military jets (MIG) three percent, 

(10 percent for Sukhoi fighters); in producing artillery systems, zero 

percent; and in producing tanks, 20 percent.57 However, Ukraine was, 

and remains, the leader in missile-related technology, especially 

guidance systems, navigation electronics for combat vessels and 

submarines, and radar for military jets. 

 Thus, without cooperation in the framework of the CIS, the 

problem of providing the Ukrainian army with modern weapons 

appeared insoluble. For this reason, General Vitali Radetzky, Ukraine’s 

Minister of Defense, defined several spheres of military cooperation with 

CIS countries: 

• Creating production of a weapons system, 

• Using military test-fields for joint testing of new weapons, 

• Modernizing weapons, 

• Exchanging technical documentation, and 

• Transporting military equipment and technology outside of 

customs regulations. 58
30

 Such cooperation could well mean the restoration of the militaryindustrial complex of the former USSR. However, while the Soviet 

Union was previously the only exporter of arms, the CIS would include 

several exporters in the former Soviet Republic. For Ukraine, whose 

leadership has emphasized military cooperation with non-Russian states 

of the Former Soviet Union, the variety of exporters increases the risk of 

high-tech proliferation. Since Ukraine has signed agreements with 

Kazahkstan and Uzbekistan on the common development of high 

technology in the field of space exploration, this risk has become a 

reality.59

6. Weapons Smuggling

 The third risk, represented by developments in the Ukrainian 

army and military industry, is the proliferation of weapons and explosive 

materials in the country as well as the illegal export of weapons to “hot 

spots” on the territory of the FSU.60

 Each year Ukrainian officials confiscate between 10 and 12 

thousand weapons from Ukrainian citizens. These weapons may come 

from outside of the republic or are stolen from militia men, nondepartmental guards, or others. One source is the army, whose loosened 

discipline, unsatisfactory provision, and weak protection of weapons 

stockpiles lead to the increased levels of arms in society. Consequently, 

the number of attacks on sentries and ammunition depots--for the 

purpose of capturing submachine guns and explosives--has increased 

drastically. In most cases, the thieves are people involved in guarding 

the weapons. For instance, all crimes of this type in the Black Sea Fleet 

were perpetrated by sentries and warrant officers. 
31

 Commercial and defense organizations have taken the 

opportunity to grow richer. Some cases of illegal exports involve small 

companies organizing the transportation of large lots of weapons. This 

activity is aimed at delivering weapons to conflict areas within 

Azerbaijan and Georgia, and warring parties themselves often directly 

order these weapons. Increasingly, too, officials from defense plants 

receive tempting propositions to sell secret products manufactured 

exclusively on orders of the Ministry of Defense. On the local level, new 

enterprises producing light arms and ammunition attract growing 

attention from criminals and black marketers. 

 The absence of control over this massive weaponry market leads 

to the rise of internal terrorism. The republic is flooded with a wave of 

attacks against representatives of governmental institutions and threats to 

executives, people’s deputies, and even the President himself. 

Investigations into these attacks reveal that, in most cases, the violence is 

not politically motivated. However, cases in which the violence is 

politically provoked also have appeared. Members of the Ukrainian 

paramilitary study procedures designed to protect weapons at military 

locations then try to corrupt soldiers and officers who are in charge of 

safekeeping these weapons. The weapons, should they be stolen by 

paramilitaries, could endanger the peaceful balance in some Ukrainian 

regions, especially in Crimea. 

 To sum up, Ukraine’s challenges related to weapons 

proliferation are likely to be the following: 

• First, Ukraine could be a state which possesses and develops 

conventional weapons of mass destruction and the means for 
32

their delivery in order to maintain some kind of balance of power 

with Russia. 

• Second, to improve its financial situation, Ukraine could actively 

participate in arms export and the export of dual- and missilerelated technology 

• Third, Ukraine is faced with the question of the technical safety 

of nuclear warheads. Officials in Kiev accused Russia of 

ignoring its duty to provide the appropriate technical service to 

the warheads. Because Ukraine lacks expertise to maintain the 

warheads properly, Russia could always use the nuclear risks as 

a lever in any disputes with Ukraine. 

 These potential challenges are not fatal, and the Western 

community could respond to them in a number of ways. Of course, these 

activities should be combined with traditional Western efforts in the 

fields of diplomacy, political consultations, and implementing 

international agreements. Western approaches could include: 

• Facilitating defense spending reductions through the Partnership 

for Peace (PFP) framework. These attempts should be 

reciprocated by the Western side because of Ukraine’s fears of 

being disarmed at a time when others keep their weapons.61

• Assisting Ukraine’s government in its export control efforts. 

The first steps in this dimension would probably include 

establishing an appropriate balance between secret and 

unclassified information. Until now, any information on arms 

exports remains top secret. Ukraine’s government threatens to 
33

charge with criminal irresponsibility anybody who reveals 

figures concerning Ukraine’s arms export. 

• Involving Ukraine in the spheres of military technology as well 

as projects for space exploration. As for the latter, both NASA 

and the European Space Agency have taken the first steps to 

evaluate technical cooperation with Ukraine. Military 

cooperation, however, remains underdeveloped. Ukrainian 

attempts to raise this question through the NACC and through 

bilateral consultations with Western militaries have been 

unsuccessful. The PFP, which concentrates primarily on 

cooperative military projects with Eastern Europe, also fails to 

provide a better perspective on this issue. 

• Participating more actively (through consultations, financial aid, 

economic and technological assistance) in converting Ukraine’s 

military industry. To overcome reluctance to cooperate, it is 

necessary to fight stereotypes shared by Ukrainian leaders that 

the West has an enormous advantage because of the decline in 

the Ukrainian military industry.62

• Facilitating the creation of institutions of civil society which 

could bring independent expertise to bear on Ukraine’s military 

policies. In fact, there are no independent agencies in the 

country for such purposes. Society’s control over the military 

activities of the government does not really exist. 

 It remains to be seen, however, whether the West would be 

capable of solving Ukrainian-Russian security dilemmas or, at least, of 

diminishing Ukraine’s fears of losing its independence to Russia. So far, 
34

these fears have been the most serious reasons for Ukraine’s “love of the 

bomb.” 

7. Military Ties With Russia: Influencing The Political 

Environment 

 During three years of independence, Ukraine has tried several 

different approaches to orienting the relations of its armed forces with 

Russia. 

 At the first stages of its independence, Ukraine used its army to 

distance itself from Russia and strengthen its independent statehood visà-vis Russia.63 Later on, Ukrainian leadership considered the army a 

major object of Russian blackmail. This was especially true with respect 

to nuclear weapons, since Russia did not carry out its duties regarding 

technical service of and maintaining nuclear warheads.64 Under the 

current circumstances, the army has become an instrument for 

establishing closer ties with Russia. In this regard, the real challenge to 

the Ukrainian Army is the possibility of unequal political cooperation, 

with Ukraine making significant political concessions to Russia. 

 Ukraine, in fact, has made several overtures toward Russia. The 

country has rejected its previous reluctance to cooperate within the CIS. 

The Ukrainian Minister of Defense agreed to take part in the meetings of 

the CIS Council of Ministers of Defense and accepted the possibility of 

Ukraine’s participation in the activities of the CIS Staff on military 
35

cooperation.65 Later on, Ukraine agreed to joint Ukrainian-Russian 

efforts to protect the external borders of the CIS. Quite a number of 

officials from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense were receptive to the 

idea of creating a common military space on CIS territory. These 

officials included even General Konstanin Morozov, the former 

Ukrainian Minister of Defense, who, in opposition to military ties with 

Russia, once said that the Ukrainian army was going to use Russian 

satellites for the purposes of military intelligence.66

 The most powerful force arguing for more intensive cooperation 

with Russia is the military-industrial lobby within Ukraine’s executive 

and legislative branches. Since the beginning of 1993, the 

representatives of Ukrainian and Russian military industries have 

cooperated successfully on numerous projects.67 In the first half of 1994, 

both countries were working on a basic bilateral agreement concerning 

cooperation in the military-industrial field. 

 Today, high ranking Ukrainian politicians wish to cooperate 

closely with Russia, including military cooperation. As a matter of fact, 

key positions in the Ukrainian government and Parliament are currently 

occupied by representatives of the Communist, Socialist, and Agrarian 

parties, whose programs are aimed at re-establishing previous ties with 

Russia.68 The July 1994 election of President Leonid Kuchma, whose 

electoral program was based primarily on reinforcing Ukraine-Russian 

cooperation, made the pro-Russian drive the core element of Ukraine’s 

official policies. President Kuchma first intends to restore economic ties 

with Russia in the military-industrial field, whose industries are better 

prepared and have greater capabilities for cooperation than the civil 

sector. 
36

 Several questions remain open in this regard. What would be the 

extent of Ukrainian-Russian military cooperation? Would it include 

peacekeeping in the CIS, joint military exercises, joint use of some 

military units (the Black Sea Fleet, for instance69)? Would this 

cooperation include strategic aspects, with Ukraine taking part in 

developing a strategic early warning system and in modernizing ballistic 

missiles for the Russian army? 

 Not unexpectedly, political and military liaisons would sooner or 

later create the problem of collective security on the territory of the 

former Soviet Union.70 So far, Ukraine has agreed to a CIS security 

system primarily because of the “non-collectivism” of such a system. In 

the past, collective security in the CIS has been seen as Russiadominated system, in which every participant implements Russian 

orders.71 But the new Ukrainian leadership interprets the term 

“domination” in a way which has little to do with earlier fears of losing 

Ukrainian independence to Russia. One reason is that the economic and 

social decline as well as the collapse of the idea of Ukrainian statehood 

has forced Ukrainian authorities to look elsewhere for help--from 

anybody.72

 This assistance could bring some advantages to the Ukrainian 

army in terms of meeting military threats to Ukraine. It is well known, 

for instance, that nationalistic political forces in Romania have claimed 

parts of Ukraine’s territory. Moreover, the island Semen in the Black 

Sea, which belongs to Ukraine, has become the subject of Romania’s 

official territorial claims.73 In this situation, Romania could represent a 

security challenge to Ukraine. However, considering Ukrainian plans to 

cooperate militarily with Russia, Russia could broaden the role of the 

14th army in Pridnestrovye to include restraining possible Romanian 
37

aggressiveness toward Ukraine. Moreover, if the Black Sea Fleet were 

put under joint Ukrainian-Russian command at the disposal of the two 

countries, this Fleet could well serve as another deterrent to Romanian 

territorial claims. 

 Finally, close military ties with Russia could also lead to 

softening the Ukrainian-Russian military stand-off in Crimea as well as 

solving the problem of protecting the Ukrainian-Russian state border.74

 The need to look for external assistance represents the most 

acute problem of Ukrainian military history--the problem of a reliable 

ally. The Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654, which was the first concession of 

Ukraine’s independence to Russia, was signed by hetman Bohdan 

Khmelnytzky to gain an ally to rid Ukraine of Polish occupation. Today 

the urgent need still exists for an economic and financial, militaryindustrial, and security ally who would share (even only symbolically) 

the burdens of Ukrainian state-building.75 The problem is, however, 

whether the historical pattern of Ukraine-Russian relations would repeat 

itself in the modern situation, i.e., whether Ukraine, choosing Russia as 

an ally, would later on find this ally as a master. 

Conclusion 

 The potential threat of the former Soviet Army used to be 

described in terms of the armed forces involving themselves in politics 

and military officials participating in coups. Although there is some 

evidence of the army’s political activity in Ukraine, the military’s 

involvement in the political life of the country remains insignificant. 

Modern Ukraine does not face the challenge of the army moving out of 

political control. Rather, the country is endangered by the possibility of 
38

the army’s demoralization and by the decline of discipline within the 

military. So far, the results speak for themselves: 

• Increasing crimes within the army and crimes against civilians 

committed by servicemen, 

• Weapons delivered to criminals and paramilitary forces, and 

• Commercial speculations with military facilities and finances. 

 The main reasons for the high degree of the army’s 

demoralization have been the lack of appropriate tasks for the military 

and the strict independence of the army on the controversies in Ukrainian 

political affairs. 

 During the first two years of the country’s independence, the 

armed forces were oriented toward a possible military threat from Russia. 

Because of this plan, Ukraine maintained at the end of 1993 about 700 

thousand men under arms.76 But it was incapable of providing social 

protection, appropriate living standards, and modern weapons for these 

men. Moreover, these underpaid and underarmed servicemen were, in 

many cases, supposed to fight against the country of their ancestors. 

 The new Ukrainian political leadership which came into power 

in the first half of 1994 intends to replace the “Russia-restraining” 

approach with military cooperation with the Russian Federation. These 

shifts in policies toward Russia have led to remodeling the functions of 

Ukraine’s army. Such political inconsistency has created a feeling of 

uselessness among the servicemen. If the political disorientation of the 

army were to continue, the processes of demoralization and the 

disintegration of military units would transform the armed forces into an 

uncontrolled institution (both politically and militarily), which would 
39

endanger the day-to-day life of Ukrainian society while not carrying out 

the duty to defend the country from a military attack. As of today, the 

army is becoming more and more independent from the Ukrainian state 

in terms of economic and business activities, while significant amounts 

of military property have been sold to private persons and firms without 

any payments to the state budget. 

 To prevent such a transformation, several urgent steps are 

necessary. First, the Ukrainian leadership must elaborate a realistic 

perception of the threats to the country, including elimination of the 

former overestimates of the Russian military challenge. The concept of 

military cooperation with Russia should be treated as more profitable for 

Ukraine than military competition with the Russian Federation. As for 

contacts between the two militaries, the Ukrainian military could learn 

military strategy, tactics, and defense planning from Russian military 

specialists. Russian military institutes and academies could be used to 

educate Ukrainian officers. 

 Second, the Ukrainian army must be reduced in size to a level 

where it would be capable of meeting military challenges to Ukraine and 

still cover the basic needs of its people, particularly social guarantees. A 

comprehensive state program for retraining dismissed officers is needed. 

Without such a program, real reforms within the military are not likely to 

begin. Even before starting the process of troop reduction, the Ukrainian 

leadership must view Ukraine’s independence from other than a military 

perspective. In Ukraine’s situation, the protection of the state’s 

independence lies in the economic and social realm, as well as the 

military realm. Although the military pillar of Ukraine’s independence is 

important, its significance should not be overestimated. This tendency is 

the result of Soviet military psychology, habits of a Ukrainian military 
40

leadership, and nationalistic concepts of the Ukrainian military 

superpower. There is a need to gradually eliminate these false 

perceptions. 

 Third, political and civil control over the military should be 

concentrated on diminishing the most acute challenges, such as weapons 

proliferation, violent crime, black marketing, and collaboration with 

paramilitaries. Those problems not only hurt the defense capabilities of 

the army, but they also contribute to forming a negative image of the 

army in Ukrainian society and abroad. In fact, the country should 

strengthen civil control over the military, facilitating the integration of 

the armed forces into society. Consequently, military reforms should be 

aimed first at increasing the army’s reputation and prestige within 

society. 

 Finally, while facilitating military cooperation with Russia, the 

Ukrainian leadership should keep Ukrainian national interests protected 

as well as separate from Russian interests. In this regard, it is unlikely 

that Ukraine should have any military interests in Central Asia, although 

Russia may ask for more active Ukrainian involvement there. If that 

involvement occurs, Ukrainian civil and military officials should beware 

of transforming Ukrainian-Russian military cooperation into an 

instrument for expanding Ukraine’s political dependence on its military 

collaborator. 
41
42

ENDNOTES 

1

 See the full text of the Declaration in Golos Ukrainy, February 11, 1993, page 

2. 2

 Kuzio, Taras. “Nuclear Weapons And Military Policy In Independent 

Ukraine”. the Harriman Institute FORUM, vol. 6, #9, May 1993, pages 3-5. 3

 Durdinetz, Vasyl. “The Modern Ukraine And Security In Europe”. Golos 

Ukrainy, June 25, 1993, pages 2-3. 4

 Kharchenko, Igor. “The Prospects Of Ukraine’s National Security.” Nonpublished report. George Marshall Center for Security Studies, GarmishPartenkirchen, June 1993, page 8. 5

 The Visegrad group includes Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 

Hungary. It is a loose alliance of like-minded states with no formal 

commitments. [Editor’s note] 6

 Reich, Alfred, “Central-European Europe Is Looking For NATO 

Membership,” Sposterigach Kich, #41 - 42, 1993, page 26. 7

 Goncharenko, Olexander, Oleg Bodruk, et al. “The Concept For Ukraine’s 

National Security: Current Problems And Prospects For Development”. 

Viysko Ukrainy, Vo. 4-5, 1993, pages 6-12. 8

 ‘The Orientations Of Military Institution”. Uriadovy Kurier, March 3, 1994, 

page 4. 9

 Ibid. 

10 Ukraine inherited from the soviet Union a powerful military grouping: 19 

military divisions with close to 6,500 tanks, 7,500 armored vehicles, 3,300 

artillery systems, 1,080 combat aircrafts. In addition to the regular army, 

Ukraine planned to have at the beginning of 1996 60,000 servicemen in the 

National Guard and 40,000 servicemen in the Border Guard troops. See: 

“Die Ukraine im Spannungsfeld zwischen nationaler Selbstbestimmung und 

sicherheitpolitischem Risiko,” Amt fr Studien und bungen der 

Bundeswehr, Bergisch Gladbach, 1992, page 22. 11 See the interview with General Kostyantyn Morozov in Kyivska Pravda, 

November 27, 1992, page 3 12 See the interview with President Kravchuk in Izvestia, April 6,1994, pages 1-

2. 13 See the full text of Ukraine’s Military Doctrine in Narodna Armia, October 

26, 1993, page 2. 14 Ibid. 

15 Narodna Armia, October 26,1993, page 1. 16 Press-conference of Ukrainian President and the Minister of Defense. 

Ukrainian television-1, March 23, 1994. 17 Radetzky, Vitaly. “Ukrainian Armed Forces Are Capable Of Fighting,” 

Narodna Armia, October 28, 1993, page 1. 
43

 18 Lemish, Valentyn. “Defense And Democracy.” Demokratychna Ukraina, 

October 10, 1993, page 2. 19 During 1993, Ukrainian officials were discussing the idea of whether to sell to 

Russia several strategic bombers, because Ukraine was incapable of their 

maintenance. 20 On the other hand, the army faces the lack of theory and strategy for its 

functioning. The first conference on the army’s strategy, tasks and the 

methods of actions was held in March 1994, more than two years after the 

armed forces were organized. Ukrainian Television - 7, March 11, 1994. 21 Lemish, Valentyn. Op. cit. 

22 Moshes, Arkady. “Three Armies - Three Reforms.” Novoe Vremya, 

Moscow, Vol. 19, 1993, page 19. 23 Concerning the need for such a system, see: Tvaining, David, “The concept 

of Ukraine’s defence.” Viysko Ukrainy, Vol. 5, 1993, page 15. 24 Authors conversations at the Ukrainian State Committee for the Protection of 

Borders, December, 1993. 25 The text of Military doctrine of Ukraine, Narodna Armia, October 26, 1993, 

page 2. 26 Kostenko, Grigory. “The Doctrine Of National Security”. Narodna Armia, 

January 11, 1993, page 2. 27 “Nuclear By A Whim Of History: Ukraine’s New Military Doctrine.” 

International Defence Review, Vol. 2, 1994, page 6 28 “Russisch Truppe in der fruheren UdSSR.” Suddeutsche Zeitung, January 21, 

1994, page 8. 29 “Ukraine’s Army Is More Reliable Than Its Economy.” Khreshchatyk, April 

22, 1994, page 3. 30 “As for the Black Sea Fleet.” Narodna Armia, April 2, 1994, page 1. 31 See the text of Ukraine’s Military Doctrine in: Narodna Armia, October 26, 

1993, page 2. 32 “The Basic Provisions Of The Military Doctrine Of Russian Federation.” 

Izvestia, November 18, 1993, pages 1,4. 33 “Christopher Mission To Kiev Was Unsuccessful.” Izvestia, October 27, 

1993, pages 1, 2. 34 See the interview with General Kostyantyn Morozov in Nezavisimost, 

February 6, pages 4-5. 35 Author’s conversations with General Morozov, January, 1993. 36 From the conference “Security in Europe: The Central-European 

Component,” Kiev, June-July, 1993, pages 15-17. 37 See the interview with the Head of Parliamentary Commission on Foreign 

Affairs Mr. Dmytro Pavlychko in Ukraina Moloda, November 15, 1993, page 

5. 
44

 38 Morozov, Kostyantyn. “Ukrainian Patriots Serve In The Army.” Narodna 

Armia, May 20, 1993, page 1. 39 Ukraine’s Minister of Defense General Radetzky expressed his concerns on 

the military education in Ukraine and the moral sentiments in the army during 

the meetings with the representatives of Ukraine’s military-education system 

in July 1994. Ukrainian Radio World Service, July 9, 1994 40 The results of the poll ere published in Golos Ukrainy, April 22, 1993, page 2. 41 Moshes, Arkady. Op. cit., page 18. 

42 See the interview with General Radetzky in Narodna Armia, October 28, 

1993, pages 1-2. 43 See the results of the questioning in Kievskie Vedomosti, May 25, 1993 page 

3. 44 Stephen J. Blank. “Russia, Ukraine and European Security.” Strategic 

Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, May 1993, pages 

2-3. 45 “Alliance Policy Framework On Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass 

Destruction,” Atlantic News, #2631, (annex) 11 June 1994. 46 “Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and 

programs.” Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, USA, May 1994, page 

14. 47 See the interview with the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Olexander 

Moroz in Kievskie Vedomosti, 15 July 1994, page 3. 48 See Mendelson, Jack. “New threats to the NPT and the ABM treaty.” Arms 

Control Today, Vol. 24, #3, April 1994, page 2. 49 Author’s conversations with Deputy Minister of the military-industrial 

complex and conversation with Mr. Valery Kazakov in February 1993. 50 Nezavisimost, January 12, 1994, page 3. 51 See the interview with the former Ukrainian Vice Prime-Minister Volodymyr 

Lanovyi in Vechimy Kyiv, November 20, 1993, page 2. 52 See the statement of General Radetzky in Narodna Armia, November 30, 

1993, page 1. 53 See the interview with Mr. Igor Devkach, member of the Parliamentary 

Commision on Defense And National Security, in Narodna Gazeta, #41, 

1993, pages 1,5. 54 See Vechirny Kyiv, November 20, 1993, page 3. 55 See Kievskie Vedomosti, July 14, 1994, pages 1, 4. 56 For more details, see Strekal, Oleg. “Waffenexport: Die Ukrainische 

Variante.” Europaische Sicherheit, Vol. 8, 1993, pages 398-400. 57 See Lemish, Valentyn, op.cit. 

58 Olinyk, Oleg. “Militarymen Are Looking For The New Cooperation.” 

Uriadovy Kurier, January 11, 1994, page 3. 
45

 59 “The Orientations Of Military Institution.” Uriadovy Kurier, March 3, 1994, 

page 4. 60 The author was provided with the following information by the officials of 

Ukraine’s military counterintelligence and the Ministry of internal affairs. 61 Author’s conversations with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys 

Tarasiyk, December 1993. 62 News Program, Ukrainian Radio World Service, 20 July 1994. 63 Pyrozhkov, Sergiy. “The National Interests Of Ukraine.” Viche, Kiev, Vol. 

11, 1993, pages 11-23. 64 “Ukraine Did Not Join The NPT”. Narodna Armia, February 10, 1994, page 

1. 65 See the statement of General Rabetzky in Narodna Armia, November 28, 

1993, page 1. 66 Author’s conversations with General Morozov, January 1993. 67 Author’s conversations with Deputy Minister of military-industrial complex 

and conversations with Valery Kazakov in February 1993. 68 Pihovshek, Vyacheslav. “The Future Political Face Of Ukraine’s 

Parliament.” Khreshchatyk, April 26,1994, pages 1,6. 69 “United Command For BSF.” RFE/RL Daily Report, #116, June 21, 1994, 

page 2. 70 See the interview with the Secretary of CIS Council of Ministers of Defense 

General Leonid Ivashov in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 17, 1994, page 3. 71 Author’s conversations with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys 

Tarasiyk in December 1993. 72 “Ukraine Moves To Strengthen Ties To Russia.” The Wall Street Journal 

Europe, April 18, 1994. page 6. 73 Author’s conversations with the Head of Presidential Office for International 

Affairs Antin Buteiko, June 1994. 74 For details, see page 9 in this article. 

75 Although Russia is aware of paying Ukraine’s bills, Russian politicians are 

waiting for the changes in Ukraine’s political elites as these changes could 

bring people who support the integration with Russia. See: Karaganov, 

Sergei. “Ukraine As An Apple Of Discord.” Moskovskie Novosti, April 3-

10,1994, page 5A. 76 Interview with Igor Derkach, op cit.