Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-182 | July 13, 2020 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Valerie K. Boots

Katelyn Bacon

Marion County Public Defender Agency 

- Appellate Division

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Catherine Brizzi

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dorothy Goodpaster,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 13, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-182

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Dylan Vigh, Judge 

Pro Tempore

Trial Court Cause No.

49G12-1905-CM-21495

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Following a bench trial in Marion Superior Court, Dorothy Goodpaster 

(“Goodpaster”) was convicted of Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-182 | July 13, 2020 Page 2 of 7

while intoxicated (“OWI”) endangering a person and sentenced to 180 days 

suspended to probation. Goodpaster appeals and argues that the evidence is 

insufficient to support her conviction. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the evening of May 30, 2019, Goodpaster went to an American Legion 

outpost, where she drank alcoholic beverages. On her way home, Goodpaster 

was involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle at Rockville Road and 

Rockville Avenue in Indianapolis. Officer Adam Jones (“Officer Jones”) was 

dispatched to the scene of the accident, where he encountered Goodpaster 

receiving medical treatment in an ambulance. 

[4] Upon entering the ambulance to speak with Goodpaster, Officer Jones 

immediately noticed the smell of alcohol coming from her person. He also 

observed that her eyes were glassy and bloodshot. As he questioned 

Goodpaster, Officer Jones noticed that Goodpaster appeared to be intoxicated. 

He therefore advised her of her Miranda rights, after which she admitted that 

she had been driving at the time of the accident. She claimed, however, to only 

have drunk one alcoholic beverage that night. Officer Jones decided not to ask 

Goodpaster to perform field sobriety tests, as he did not know if she had 

sustained a head injury that might affect her performance on such tests. Instead, 

after reading her the implied consent law, he asked Goodpaster to use a 

portable breath test, to which she consented. The test indicated that Goodpaster 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-182 | July 13, 2020 Page 3 of 7

was intoxicated. Officer Jones then asked Goodpaster to consent to a blood 

draw, and she gave her consent. Officer Jones took Goodpaster to Eskenazi 

Hospital, where registered nurse Holly Hepworth (“Hepworth”) drew two vials 

of blood from Goodpaster. Officer Jones was present during the blood draw. 

Officer Jones took the blood samples, sealed them, and placed them in storage 

in the police property room. 

[5] Indianapolis Marion County Forensic Services Agency forensic scientist 

Savannah Chris (“Chris”) later took the blood samples from the Indianapolis 

Metropolitan Police Department property room and analyzed them for the 

presence of alcohol. Chris’s tests indicated that Goodpaster’s blood had an 

alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.114 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of 

blood. 

[6] On May 31, 2019, the State charged Goodpaster with Class A misdemeanor 

operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. A bench trial was 

held on October 15, 2019. At trial, Goodpaster objected when the State offered 

into evidence the laboratory report showing Goodpaster’s blood alcohol 

concentration equivalent, claiming that the State had failed to lay a proper 

foundation. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the matter under 

advisement and instructed the parties to submit briefing on the issue of the 

admissibility of the report. 

[7] On December 9, 2019, the trial court issued an order admitting the laboratory 

report into evidence and finding Goodpaster guilty as charged. On December 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-182 | July 13, 2020 Page 4 of 7

19, 2019, the trial court sentenced Goodpaster to 180 days, all suspended to 

probation, and also suspended her driver’s license for sixty days. Goodpaster 

now appeals. 

Standard of Review

[8] Goodpaster claims that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to prove 

that she was intoxicated or endangered a person. 

When reviewing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to 

support a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge 

the credibility of the witnesses; instead, we respect the exclusive 

province of the trier of fact to weigh any conflicting evidence. We 

consider only the probative evidence supporting the verdict and 

any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from this 

evidence. We will affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable 

inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a 

reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied (citing 

McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005)). 

Discussion and Decision

[9] To convict Goodpaster of Class A misdemeanor OWI, the State was required 

to prove that she operated a vehicle while “intoxicated” and that she did so “in 

a manner that endangers a person.” Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2. 
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I. Intoxicated 

[10] Goodpaster first claims that the State failed to prove that she was intoxicated. 

“Intoxicated” means under the influence of alcohol so that “there is an 

impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a 

person’s faculties.” Ind. Code § 9-13-2-86. 

[11] Impairment may be established by: (1) the consumption of a significant amount 

of alcohol; (2) impaired attention and reflexes; (3) watery or bloodshot eyes; (4) 

the odor of alcohol on the breath; (5) unsteady balance; and (6) slurred speech. 

Outlaw v. State, 918 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), opinion adopted, 929 

N.E.2d 196 (Ind. 2010). 

[12] Here, Officer Jones testified that Goodpaster smelled of alcohol and had glassy, 

bloodshot eyes. He also testified that, based on his experience, he believed her 

to be intoxicated and that the portable breath test confirmed his belief. This is 

sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Goodpaster was intoxicated. 

See Woodson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 135, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that a 

police officer may offer an opinion on intoxication and that a conviction may 

sustained on the sole testimony of an arresting officer), trans. denied (citing 

Wright v. State, 772 N.E.2d 449, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). 1

1 As part of her sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, Goodpaster argues that the trial court erred by admitting 

the laboratory report because the State did not properly establish that Goodpaster’s blood was drawn under 

the supervision of a physician or under a protocol prepared by a physician, as required by Indiana Code 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-182 | July 13, 2020 Page 6 of 7

II. Endangerment

[13] Goodpaster also contends that the State failed to prove that she operated her 

vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangered a person. To prove 

endangerment, the State must prove that the defendant was operating the 

vehicle in a condition or manner that could have endangered any person, 

including the public, the police, or the defendant. Staten v. State, 946 N.E.2d 80, 

84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied (citing Outlaw, 918 N.E.2d at 381). The 

endangerment requirement does not require that the State prove a person other 

than the defendant was actually in the path of the defendant’s vehicle or in the 

same area in order to obtain a conviction. Id. “An officer does not have to wait 

until the defendant crosses the centerline and adds another victim to the 

statistics of those who have died in drunk driving accidents.” Id. Instead, it is 

sufficient that the defendant’s condition renders driving unsafe. Id.

[14] Goodpaster does not deny that she was involved in a head-on collision with 

another vehicle. But she claims that the State presented no evidence that she 

section 9-30-6-6(a). Because the Officer Jones’s testimony was sufficient to establish Goodpaster’s 

intoxication, the admission of the laboratory report was, at most, harmless error. 

Moreover, in Boston v. State, 947 N.E.2d 436, 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), we held that the fact that a blood 

sample was taken at a licensed hospital shows that the test “employ[s] the ‘technical adherence’ to a 

physician’s directions or to a physician’s protocol required by our evidentiary rules for the admission of blood 

test results.” Id. at 444. Here, there is no question that Eskenazi Hospital is a “licensed hospital” for purposes 

of I.C. § 9-30-6-6. Thus, the fact that Nurse Hepworth drew Goodpaster’s blood at this licensed hospital is 

sufficient to establish that it was done in accordance to a physician’s protocol. See id. The trial court therefore 

properly admitted the laboratory report, which showed that Goodpaster had a blood alcohol concentration 

equivalent of 0.114. Evidence that a person had, at the time of the alleged violation an alcohol concentration 

equivalent of at least 0.08 is prima facie evidence of intoxication. Temperly v. State, 933 N.E.2d 558, 567 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied (citing Ind. Code § 9-13-2-131). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-182 | July 13, 2020 Page 7 of 7

was at fault in the accident and that, therefore, there is no evidence that she 

endangered a person. We disagree. 

[15] The State presented evidence that Goodpaster displayed outward signs of 

impairment. Officer Jones testified that Goodpaster appeared to be intoxicated, 

and the breath test confirmed this. More importantly, Goodpaster was involved 

in a head-on collision on a city street. We think that the trial court, acting as the 

trier of fact, could reasonably conclude from this that the accident was at least 

partially attributable to Goodpaster’s intoxication.2 There was sufficient 

evidence from which the trial court could conclude that Goodpaster operated 

her vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangered a person. 

Conclusion

[16] The State presented evidence sufficient to prove that Goodpaster operated a 

vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangered a person. We therefore 

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

[17] Affirmed. 

Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur. 

2 Goodpaster’s citation to Temperly, 933 N.E.2d at 568, is unavailing, as it was stipulated in that case that the 

defendant did not cause the accident at issue and that the other driver drove his vehicle into the path of the 

defendant’s vehicle. There is no such stipulation here.