U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

88–193 PDF 2003

HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL

OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY,

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 20, 2002

Serial No. 107–223

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

DOUG OSE, California

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. RUSSELL GEORGE, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

BONNIE HEALD, Deputy Staff Director

CHRIS BARKLEY, Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on August 20, 2002 ........................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Dalton, Patricia, Strategy Director, General Accounting Office ................... 112

Gardner, Major General Gregory, Kansas Adjutant General ....................... 5

Hainje, Richard, Director, Region VII, Federal Emergency Management

Agency ............................................................................................................ 139

Jaax, Jerry, associate vice provost for research compliance, university

veterinarian, Kansas State University ....................................................... 50

Knowles, Terry, deputy director, Kansas Bureau of Investigation .............. 61

Lane, James, undersheriff, Ford County Sheriff’s Department ................... 73

Maynard, Otto, president, chief executive officer, Wolf Creek Nuclear

Operating Corp. ............................................................................................. 91

McCue, Kerry, director, Ellis County EMS .................................................... 23

Moser, Michael, MD, MPH, director, Kansas Department of Health and

Environment, Division of Health ................................................................. 17

Stafford, Kevin, special agent in charge, Kansas City Field Office, Federal

Bureau of Investigation ................................................................................ 96

Teagarden, George, livestock commissioner, Kansas Animal Health Department ........................................................................................................ 56

Williams, Raymond, president, chief executive officer, Sumner Regional

Medical Center .............................................................................................. 28

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Dalton, Patricia, Strategy Director, General Accounting Office, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 115

Gardner, Major General Gregory, Kansas Adjutant General, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 8

Hainje, Richard, Director, Region VII, Federal Emergency Management

Agency, prepared statement of .................................................................... 141

Jaax, Jerry, associate vice provost for research compliance, university

veterinarian, Kansas State University, prepared statement of ................ 53

Knowles, Terry, deputy director, Kansas Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 63

Lane, James, undersheriff, Ford County Sheriff’s Department, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 75

Maynard, Otto, president, chief executive officer, Wolf Creek Nuclear

Operating Corp., prepared statement of ..................................................... 93

McCue, Kerry, director, Ellis County EMS, prepared statement of ............. 25

Moran, Hon. Jerry, a Representative in Congress from the State of Kansas, prepared statement of ........................................................................... 3

Moser, Michael, MD, MPH, director, Kansas Department of Health and

Environment, Division of Health, prepared statement of ......................... 18

Stafford, Kevin, special agent in charge, Kansas City Field Office, Federal

Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of ......................................... 98

Teagarden, George, livestock commissioner, Kansas Animal Health Department, prepared statement of ................................................................. 58

Williams, Raymond, president, chief executive officer, Sumner Regional

Medical Center, prepared statement of ....................................................... 30

(1)

HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?

TUESDAY, AUGUST 20, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, FINANCIAL

MANAGEMENT AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Abilene, KS.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in the

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library Auditorium, 200 S.E.

Fourth Street, Abilene, KS, Hon. Stephen Horn (chairman of the

subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Horn and Moran.

Staff present: Russell George, staff director/chief counsel; David

Bartel, chief of staff; Bonnie Heald, deputy staff director; Chris

Barkley, assistant to the subcommittee.

Staff present for Mr. Moran: Kip Peterson and Travis Murphy.

Mr. HORN. A quorum being present, this hearing of the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and

Intergovernmental Relations will come to order.

On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the most devastating attacks ever committed on U.S. soil. Despite the damage and

enormous loss of life, the attacks failed to cripple this Nation. To

the contrary, Americans have never been more united in their fundamental belief in freedom and their willingness to protect that

freedom. The diabolical nature of those attacks and then the deadly

release of anthrax sent a loud and clear message to all Americans:

We must be prepared for the unexpected. We must have the mechanisms in place to protect this Nation and its people from further

attempts to cause massive destruction.

The aftermath of September 11th clearly demonstrated the need

for adequate communications systems and rapid deployment of

well-trained emergency personnel. Yet despite billions of dollars in

spending on Federal emergency programs, there remain serious

doubts as to whether the Nation is equipped to handle a massive

chemical, biological or nuclear attack.

Today, the subcommittee will examine how effectively Federal,

State and local agencies are working together to prepare for such

emergencies. We want those who live in the great State of Kansas

and the good people of cities such as Abilene, Topeka and Kansas

City to know they can rely on these systems, should the need arise.

2

We are fortunate to have witnesses today whose valuable experience and insight will help the subcommittee better understand the

needs of those on the front lines. We want to hear about their capabilities and their challenges. And we want to know what the Federal Government can do to help. We welcome all of our witnesses

and look forward to their testimony.

Mr. MORAN. Let me begin by thanking Chairman Horn for bringing his subcommittee and this important field hearing to the Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum in Abilene. It is a fitting

tribute that we would discuss issues such as homeland security and

defense at this location.

It was President Eisenhower who had the foresight to advocate

for an interstate highway system. The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways now stretches for more

than 46,000 miles and was part of Eisenhower’s vision for nationwide defense should the United States face the prospect of atomic

war.

Eisenhower faced a threat very similar to the one we face today.

The cold war, for which he prepared, was not won by a single decisive battle—it was not conventional or quick. It was a war that required detailed preparation and determination by every aspect of

society—from the armed services, from elected officials and from

everyday Americans. Just as Americans did not waver from their

convictions to stop the spread of communism during the cold war,

today, during this War on Terror, we must not waver from our conviction to stop the spread of terrorism.

Today, our enemies, the battlefields and the tactics of this war

are much different from those in the past. But, the cause is the

same. We fight, as Eisenhower fought, for the cause of freedom and

the promise of peace.

We are here today to discuss the preparations we have made and

the steps we will take to defend our way of life from those who

would do us harm. We have a distinguished group of witnesses

with us here today whose experience and insight is invaluable.

Thank you for joining us. I look forward to your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jerry Moran follows:]

3

4

5

Mr. HORN. We have read your testimony and it would go in automatically when we call on you and that would be in the report that

goes to the Committee on Government Reform and then is part of

a major report to the House of Representatives, so all your words

that you have written will be taken and now we just need to get

a summary of what those words are.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL GREGORY GARDNER,

KANSAS ADJUTANT GENERAL

Mr. GARDNER. As the Adjutant General of Kansas, I serve in

three roles; as commander of the Kansas Army and Air National

Guard, Director of Emergency Management and since September

11th the Director of Homeland Security. Our department’s two missions are to provide military capability for the Nation and protect

life and property in the State. The Constitutional State and Federal roles caused confusion over time with the military. There are

basically three primary ways to employ the Guard. State duty

under Governor control using State dollars, Title 10 duty under

Federal control, using Federal dollars and Title 32 duty under Governor control, using Federal dollars. We have served around the

world in Title 10 in the last seceral years in 6 continents and 30

countries. Title 32, under Governor control is how we served at the

airports, borders, in counter drugs and security. This is absolutely

the best way for us to perform the homeland security mission. It

provides advantages that other Title 10 status does not do.

For example, when a family member has a problem, we can swap

out the Guradsman. The same with an employer. If an employer

calls and says we will out of business if you don’t come back, we

can swap the Guardsman out. We can train the guardsmen in their

home unit and maintain combat readiness and it also is a lower

cost way of doing business and finally, we’re not restricted by the

Posse Comitatus law and are able to do law enforcement. For all

these reasons, we believe the Title 32 is the best way to do the

homeland security mission.

The role of the National Guard has seen a lot of debate nationally. Some have said why don’t you make homeland security a primary or only mission? That would be the worst possible thing Congress could do. To date, beyond the Civil Support Teams and the

National Guard counter-drug program, no Federal funds have been

focussed on equipping or training National Guard forces for Homeland Security missions to support local responders preparing for biological chemical or nuclear attack. Some level of Federal funding

needs to be dedicated specifically for this Federal mission performed in the States.

The Governors employ The Guard usining approximately 250,000

man-days per year State status. Combatant commanders use 2 million man-days per year around the world. Our readiness to do the

war fighting mission around the world is what enables us to do the

mission at home so we don’t want you to give away that war fighting mission. Some say there’s too much to do; therefore, the Guard

shouldn’t be able to do them both. Well, actually, the Guard has

done both simultaneously throughout history and since September

11th we have 60,000 guardsmen on duty: 40,000 serving in Title

10; 13,000 serving in Title 32 status and 8,000 in serving State

6

duty. That meant that at any one time only 13 percent of 450,000

in the Guard was being used. That allows us to rotate the people

in peacetime and surge for the major theater of war.

Civil support teams, you have given the Nation 32. We respectfully request you give one to every State and because that’s a

unique mission that is not maintained by the active duty military.

We need your continued support to maintain the attention and dollars. Anytime you have a unique mission, it is unlikely to get the

highest priority from the military.

As to Posse Comitatus, that law basically reflects our American

belief in the limits on an active duty military in representative democracy. The law prohibits the Army and Air Force from enforcing

civil law. It doesn’t apply to the National Guard because it is one

of the missions prescribed for us in the Constitution; to execute the

laws of the Nation. In Posse Comitatus, my comments are please

leave it the way it is. The spirit of the law is correct. It’s anathema

to a freedom-loving America to alter the spirit of this law.

Emergency management. We have been preparing for terrorism

for almost a decade. Osama bin Laden was the culprit in a Kansas

Emergency Management exercise in 1993. Since then we have been

preparing for terrorism without much money. Funds from the

Nunn-Luger and the MMRS and HHS have been very helpful in

preparing us but that provides only spotty capability in our State

and left the rest of the State uncovered.

The DOJ grants. We identified a $20 million equipment requirement. We got $2.3 million in the first 3 years. This year $4.1 million is coming and equipment coverage has expanded. The program

is improving but the best thing about that grant is it’s 100 percent

Federal.

From EPA water treatment facilities, $460,000 for four Kansas

plants. That covers 35 percent of the population but leaves the

rural part of our State completely uncovered and the rules of that

grant language don’t allow it in the rural areas.

Federal distribution, dollars that come from grants. Most of them

have come directly to cities or directly to locals. As you can see, all

of Nunn-Luger and MMRS, HHS, DOJ, 97 percent of the DOJ

grant funds went directly to locals. However, Kansas is a rural

State. Fifty percent of our State is served by volunteer or part-time

emergency managers and first responders and so a regional approach is the most effective way to distribute the dollars in Kansas.

What we ask is that you let the Governors distribute the dollars

based on our State’s strategic plan.

Matching funds. We match every dollar we have from emergency

management and State funds to FEMA funds now. We don’t have

anymore State funds available to match and are unlikely to get

more because of the status of the State budget. Without being pejorative, I would like to share a perspective. If terrorism is a response to our Nation’s foreign policy, then perhaps terrorism dollars and preparedness should be primarily a Federal responsibility.

Bottom line, please give us 100 percent Federal dollars and if you

can’t, use a broad definition of what soft or in kind matches are so

that we can actually do something with it.

7

First responders include law enforcement, fire and EMS. We

would like you to broaden that definition to ‘‘emergency’’ responders, like Public Health, Emergency Management and Public Works.

Bioterrorism. Dr. Moser is going to testify on that. His leadership

has been crucial working with us and improving the responsiveness

in Kansas for bioterrorism incidents. CDC money was very, very

useful in Kansas. We can still use more and one final comment

about medical. In the Air Natinal Guard As we have medical

squadrons, at least one in every State around the country and they

have capability to respond. They are training now in what we call

the Emergency Medical Support or EMEDs. It’s a module system

that allows them to respond locally to help in disaster providing

emergency and primary care occurring and resuscitative emergency

care. As you grow these modules, you can provide greatly needed

hospital capacity in a disaster and what I would like you to do is

not listen to me out in the States. Please ask the Surgeon General

of the Air Force to come and testify to you about that. Lieutenant

General Carlson will tell you that starting in the States so that

EMEDs can support locals in our homeland is what he thinks we

should do.

Finally, we support the President’s proposal on homeland security, and appreciate the House’s fast passage of that legislation. We

hope the Senate will follow suit. We appreciate the inclusive approach of Governor Ridge and the Office of Homeland Security to

date. They have been absolutely tremendous. We feel like our

voices are being heard in the States from that office, creating a national strategy, instead of a Federal strategy was a perfect example. Finally in summary, please employ the National Guard and

Title 32 status. It is the best way to do homeland security. Keep

us in both of our constitutional missions, both the State and Federal mission. Provide 100 percent Federal grants and let the Governors determine what the distribution is. Thank you, sir. Do you

have any questions?

Mr. HORN. Thank you. That’s a very fine presentation. You have

given us some other things to deal with. I’ll get the Surgeon General over if he likes it but we’ll see.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gardner follows:]

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Mr. HORN. Now, we have to the next fine person. Dr. Michael

Moser is director of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Division of Health.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MOSER, MD, MPH, DIRECTOR, KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, DIVISION OF HEALTH

Dr. MOSER. Good morning. Congressman Moran, Chairman

Horn, members of the audience. I am Dr. Michael Moser and I

serve as Director of Health for the Kansas Department of Health

and Environment. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. As

Director of Division of Health for the Department of Health and

Environment, I serve as State health officer for Kansas. In addition, Governor Bill Graves has appointed me to serve as the Executive Director for the Kansas Public Health Preparedness and Response to Bioterrorism Program. I serve as chairman of the Kansas

Bioterrorism Coordinating Council and I represent the Department

of Health and Environment and the Kansas Commission on Emergency Planning and Response. I believe you have my written testimony.

At this time I would like to highlight the following points. First,

Federal financial and technical assistance over the past 3 years

have been critical in helping Kansas to improve the preparedness

of our public health system to respond to the threat of biological

terrorism. Second, public health preparedness for the effective response to terrorism is a long term mission. It will require long term

Federal assistance, both financial and technical. Three, dual function capacity development should be a central tenet of our Nation’s

strategy for public health preparedness. Virtually all modalities

that are necessary for effective public health response to bioterrorism can also support more effective public health action to address

the leading causes of disease, illness and injury. Development of

these modalities for preparedness should be integrated with the

overall public health infrastructure. Four, partnership with other

organizations is at the center of the preparedness strategy of the

Department of Health and Environment. We are working in partnership with local organizations, particularly local public health departments and hospitals, and with State agencies such as the Department of the Adjutant General, the Kansas Bureau of Investigations, the Department of Animal Health and our State’s institutions of higher learning. We also want to work in partnership with

Federal agencies—with historic partners such as the Department of

Health and Human Services, with new partners such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and with partners to be such as the

Department of Homeland Security. At this point I will conclude my

prepared testimony. Thank you for your attention. If you have

questions for me, I’ll do my best to respond.

Mr. HORN. Thank you. That’s very precise.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Moser follows:]

18

19

20

21

22

23

Mr. HORN. We now have Kerry McCue, who is the director of

Ellis County Emergency Medical Service. Mr. McCue.

STATEMENT OF KERRY MCCUE, DIRECTOR, ELLIS COUNTY

EMS

Mr. MCCUE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Moran

and distinguished guests. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to speak with you this morning. I’m currently the Director

of Ellis County Emergency Medical Services. Our county is much

like the community of Abilene. Ellis County is a rural Kansas county with a population of approximately 27,500. We have major

transportation systems, both an interstate highway and railways

that transact. Because of these transportation systems, many of

our public service agencies have become regional resources.

Existing Federal training and grant programs such as hazardous

materials training have greatly benefited many of Ellis County

agencies. However, much more is needed to allow these agencies to

insure successful management of devastating events involving biological, chemical and nuclear agents. The need is not only monetary. Personal protective equipment and testing equipment is essential. It is not realistic for every community to have testing

equipment. However, every community must have available to it

testing equipment so that questionable substances can quickly and

accurately be tested. When first responders are presented with hazardous situations, they must have the ability to identify the source

and contain it, thus reducing the possibility of loss of life.

Traditionally, we have provided our staff with training on how

to treat patients that have become suddenly ill or injured. We have

also provided the very basics on the treatment of patients affected

by biological, chemical and nuclear agents. Traditional training is

no longer adequate.

With the events of last year, the changing terrorist threat to our

country and communities, we as an EMS provider, along with other

public safety providers, must ensure that our personnel have the

appropriate equipment and training to function effectively when

such devastating events occur. I believe there are several obstacles

preventing public service agencies from obtaining such training

and equipment. The first obstacle is available manpower. EMS, like

many other health care professions, is significantly short of personnel. Recruitment and retention of qualified personnel has become

a major source of concern for every administrator nationwide. Second, most first responding agencies in rural areas of the Nation

must compete for limited funds available to local governmental

bodies for equipment. Such lack of support to purchase necessary

equipment has led providers to utilize equipment that is adequate

to handle basic day-to-day emergency situations and not for significant terrorist events. Third, our current training programs have to

focus more on responders awareness and treatment of victims of

terrorist activities. Communication systems must allow responding

agencies to communicate with each other.

A tornado in a neighboring community last summer pointed out

to the first responders here in Kansas how inadequate our communication systems were. If this would have been a terrorist attack

utilizing biochemical or nuclear agents we could have lost citizens,

24

responding public service personnel, simply because they could not

adequately communicate. With the reality of terrorist events, new

alliances will have to be formed. Chemical and biological nuclear

attacks will create major public health problems, problems that

will overwhelm the health care system as we know it. Such alliances can only be developed with cooperative efforts of the Federal,

State and local government to insure commitment for adequate

funding and infrastructure to exist.

Local agencies struggle with equipment, technological advances

and short useful life spans of equipment. Technology advances so

quickly that frequently the equipment that agencies purchase is

outdated when it is delivered. More significant is the fact that

equipment purchased through grant programs outdate or passes by

the manufacturer’s recommended expiration date with no mechanism to replace it.

And finally, recent implementation of Medicaid fee schedules for

ambulances has dramatically affected the funding for many of

these problems in the EMS industry. Decreases in patient revenues

hamper any organization’s ability to compete with outside market

forces for qualified personnel, purchasing needed equipment and to

provide quality training. So how can the Federal Government help

local EMS providers? By providing more grants specifically targeting EMS providers; by providing grants and funding programs that

encourage cooperative arrangements between all public service

agencies; by providing grants and funding programs that are less

restrictive and provide for replacement of equipment; address the

negative impact of the Medicare fee schedule on rural ambulance

service and increase availability of Federal training programs at

local and regional locations.

In conclusion, I would like to thank this committee and the Federal Government for taking the time to address these issues. If

there are any questions I would be very happy to answer them.

Again, thank you for your time.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much. We will go through a number

of questions after the next presentation.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McCue follows:]

25

26

27

28

Mr. HORN. The next presentation is Raymond Williams III, the

president and chief executive officer of the Sumner Regional Medical Center. Glad to have you with us.

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND WILLIAMS, PRESIDENT, CHIEF

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SUMNER REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Moran, everybody in

the room. I’m pleased to have the opportunity to share my perspective on the emergency issues facing our country’s hospitals. I’m especially pleased to be a voice for the rural hospitals across America

as we meet the daily challenge of caring for our sick and injured

24 hours a day, 7 days a week, every day of the year.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th and the subsequent anthrax attacks have changed our American view of safety and security and have also changed Sumner Regional’s view also of its

emergency preparedness response. Over the past 111⁄2 months, the

Nation’s hospitals have focussed on strengthening our national security and emergency readiness. Hospitals have been upgrading

their existing disaster plans as has Sumner Regional. I’m personally involved in that responsibility at Sumner Regional; have

learned a great deal about our planning process. I would like to

note our effort to replace our current disaster plan with the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System. The American Hospital Association has reported that the hospitals continue to tailor

the plans to suit the needs of their communities in the face of new

and more ominous threats of terrorism, particularly terrorist use of

the chemical, biological or radiological agents.

While a voluntary use of HEICS will be welcome, I think strong

consideration should be given by the Federal Government in mandating its use without exception. The point I will stress throughout

this testimony is that, given the profound threat terrorism imposes

to the citizens of the United States, I believe we need a clear and

direct Federal direction with financial support to achieve the posture Americans deserve. I don’t believe we have that now.

Another observation from our experience at Sumner Regional is

the woeful lack of information and guidance on how a community

hospital should be prepared for terrorism. The closest information

we could find was what we needed for a hazardous material incident or event and quite frankly, we can’t meet those needs.

Additional areas Sumner Regional and perhaps other rural hospitals need to address and find funding for includes but is not limited to such things as portable negative air machines and HEPA

filters, large volume water purification equipment and I could go

on and on. The initial observation from our experience at Sumner

Regional was the readily apparent fact that we didn’t have the

funds to acquire structural improvement, to pay for equipment purchases, to pay for increased medical supply inventory and for training needed to better posture the staff at Sumner Regional in its

new environment.

While we, health care professionals in rural communities, recognize the principal focus of homeland security is on urban areas, I

believe there’s a value in recognizing that America is small and

rural. This may be especially true if urban communities are threatened from terrorism attacks. Rural hospitals may be critical instiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:51 Jul 29, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\88193.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
29

tutions for emergency preparedness if urban hospitals are incapacitated or overwhelmed with casualties. If rural hospitals are to be

expected to care for the mass casualties of a major event for any

reason, I believe it is imperative that our institutions be given

greater attention with capital funding to prepare for such events.

Focussing our emergency planning to include terrorism, we are

finding it more difficult to definitively quantify the planning itself.

We were able to gain some insight through an American Hospital

Association survey on emergency preparedness and Sumner

Regional’s involvement with the State sponsored bio-terrorism exercise, ‘‘Prairie Plague 2002.’’ These helped to some degree to truly

appreciate the limiting factors in our plans; i.e., the need to have

a decontamination facility, and we didn’t have one. We need better

communication with local health departments, law enforcement,

EMS, the news organizations. We need an offsite location to treat

medical emergencies. We didn’t have the supplies or staff necessary

for such a treatment site. We didn’t have personal protective equipment necessary for such an event. We clearly need to address security needs to protect our staff and provide organization for treatment.

Today, hospitals are not stocked with suitable personal protective

equipment to protect clinicians and other health care workers from

exposure in the event of biological or chemical attack, particularly

one involving an unknown agent. This is true of Sumner Regional

and I regret to report to you that we do not have one piece of personal protective equipment. Of equal concern is our need to provide

training for the use of PPE once specific equipment requirements

are identified and we will have to fit appropriate staff members for

such equipment. Both the time for fitting and training will take

needed staff time away from patient care and customer services.

Hospitals should have a minimal level of decontamination for ambulatory and non-ambulatory patients; the ability to ramp-up

quickly for a media event and access to a regional decontamination

facility for a larger event. This, too, is true at Sumner Regional and

I regret to report to you that we do not have decontamination facilities on the Sumner Regional campus.

While we’re working better at the local level, there’s a general

agreement that duplication of equipment and supplies and training

must be controlled. We don’t have the money to support every

agency conducting and performing their own training, nor do we

have the personnel, time or staff to send to numerous training

courses or facilities to obtain that basic material.

I believe I have really covered the essence of my testimony and

wouldn’t want to jeopardize someone else’s and I’ll conclude my

comments but I really appreciate the opportunity to be with you

today. Thank you very much.

Mr. HORN. Well, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

Mr. HORN. We’ll now begin the questioning by your Congressman, who will ask a number of questions.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and I appreciate the witnesses testimony. This perhaps is a question to General Gardner and Dr. Moser. Have we given thought in Kansas as

to what would be a likely terrorist scenario? Have we narrowed

down the events that we ought to be preparing to respond to or is

this simply looking at all possibilities for terrorist attack in our

State?

Mr. GARDNER. We have been preparing for some years for a multiple of possible events. I don’t think there is any one particular

one. We have been preparing for foreign animal disease, which

would have a great economic impact on the State and Nation—foot

and mouth disease, for example. We have also prepared for bioterrorism kinds of incidences, each year exercising with a different

highly likely scenario. So I don’t think we can pick one. I think you

have to prepare for a multiple of them and you have to build plans

that allow you to respond to anything that comes.

Dr. MOSER. General Gardner has covered, I think, the critical

points. I would simply note that the Centers for Disease Control,

several years ago, published a list of the highest priority edition for

public health and bioterrorism preparedness. Under our CDC funding we have focused activity on developing capacity for that response. However, I think General Gardner’s point on the need to

maintain a flexible capacity is absolutely critical. Unlike our dayto-day war with biological organisms, our enemies in the war on

terrorism are intelligent enemies and they are likely to be changing

their capacities as fast as we are developing our capacity to respond. Therefore, it is essential that we develop capacities that are

capable of flexibility and deployment against whatever it is that

our enemies throw at us rather than being locked into a limited set

of scenarios that an enemy can work around.

Mr. MORAN. I appreciate your answers, but it does seem to me

that the magnitude of tasks that you all face in that regard is

just—is huge, is tremendous. It’s always useful to be able to

prioritize to see this is where we’re going to focus but in this area,

it just seems to me there’s a myriad of potentialities that you have

to be prepared for and I struggle with that. I mean I think we

spent a lot of time in Congress dealing with the issue of security

in our airplanes and on airlines and yet, I have no belief that’s necessarily where the next attack by a terrorist organization would

occur and yet, we cannot take the risk of not being prepared and

I do know that we have restricted resources available. Problem is,

I think most Kansans probably believe that Kansas is not a likely

target for a terrorist attack and I’m often asked the question,

you’ve got to be prepared to take, to reduce our risk but what does

that mean? How are we supposed to live our lives and it seems to

me that involves, in some way, prioritizing something that is very

difficult to prioritize. Is there an ability to put a scale of one to ten

kind of where we were before September 11th and where we are

now in Kansas in regard to ability to respond?

Mr. GARDNER. I think what many miss is that we have actually

been preparing long before September 11th and the progress has

just continued. It’s accelerated since September 11th and probably

43

the most important thing that September 11th has done, which is

really what Y2K did as well, was it created interest and commitment of effort from more than the few agencies assigned to that responsibility. For example, when we hosted the Prairie Plague Exercise that Dr. Moser referred to, 103 of the 105 counties were represented, and 99.976 percent of the population of Kansas. Prior to

that the largest exercise was maybe one-fifth that size, so since

September 11th the whole Nation has come on board in the preparedness for terrorism. I don’t know if you can put a number figure to it, but it certainly has helped in our preparedness.

Mr. MORAN. Let me put words in Mr. Williams’ mouth, if I

might. I assume something you can tell us or prepared indicated

in your testimony is that with Medicare reimbursement being what

it is, your ability to expand your role, to have the financial resources to do even more things, is limited.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Congressman, I couldn’t have said that any better. Shall I stop?

Mr. MORAN. Well, it’s always nice to be agreed with, but I assume that’s a significant issue that we, as Members of Congress—

I mean we’re focused on terrorism, but there’s a broader issue here,

and it’s true of emergency medical services as well. Since such a

large portion of the Kansas population are senior citizens, Medicare

has a huge role to play in financing the providing of medical services and the inability of Medicare to pay for the cost of the services

that you are expected to provide already just has to create a tremendous burden upon a community hospital in expanding their

role.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Indeed, it does. Over the last 10 years we have

watched the Medicare reimbursement go lower and lower to the

point that today we find most every hospital in Kansas getting paid

below its cost, and it’s gotten to the point where we have had, if

we had any cash reserves set aside to buy equipment, to provide

training or what have you, those funds are no longer there. They

are all depleted by trying to cover the insufficient reimbursement

from Medicare and Medicaid and that’s really why the picture that

I painted a little bit earlier was so bleak and we need to have some

quick solutions to that area because I really don’t think that whatever we get in the way of grant dollars that are coming down, and

greatly appreciated, that they are going to be sufficient to sustain

the effort.

One of the things that I recently found out is, for example, the

personal protective equipment. If you needed a Level I suit in the

emergency room, that suit’s life expectancy is apparently about 5

years, so 5 years from now, if we had one, we would have to buy

another one and that continues on and on.

Mr. MORAN. In that regard, Mr. McCue, the training, what happens if someone presents themselves either at Mr. Williams’ hospital or with your first responders claiming that they have come in

contact with a biological agent or they have smallpox. Do we have

a different procedure by which we handle that circumstance if

someone shows up in your waiting area or you respond to someone’s home and the claim is that they are infectious? What do we

do?

44

Mr. MCCUE. Well, unfortunately, much like Mr. Williams, our

staff is not properly protected. We do not have the appropriate personal protective equipment at this point to function in that environment and therefore, those first initial responders are going to

be exposed to whatever it is and at that point it will be treated as

a hazardous materials situation so we’ll call the local fire department, who is the only agency in our community that does have the

appropriate protective equipment to handle that and essentially

work very closely with them to contain and decontaminate the situation. It becomes problematic then when you transport that patient

to the hospital to make sure that they have the appropriate protective issues so that you don’t contaminate that whole facility.

Mr. MORAN. Do you have any idea, Mr. Williams, whether your

circumstances are different than a larger hospital in Wichita, Topeka or Kansas City? Would they have the additional equipment

than a community hospital in other places in Kansas have?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I do have a sense of that. I have had the honor

of serving on the Kansas Hospital Association’s new Hospital

Emergency Preparedness Committee, and we have responsibilities

for urban and suburban and certainly rural hospitals, and the committee has been meeting just since the beginning of the year and

we’re addressing—really asking those same questions. Each of us

all feels the same way; that is, that even if we have some capacity,

it is not sufficient from the standpoint that you really don’t, as Mr.

McCue commented, really don’t want any patient to contaminate

another caregiver or another patient and so that whole area of decontamination is very time consuming, very labor intense and if

you had ten casualties, it would take quite awhile to get them decontaminated.

Mr. MORAN. Although the chairman was kind enough not to be

sworn in, I also work under the time constraints that you do so,

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity and looking forward

to your questions.

Mr. HORN. I think the one where I really feel the most, do you

feel the Federal Government and the grants that have been made

so far are helpful to that or do we need to do it in a different way

and we will have some of this in the witnesses later, but since you

are here, what do you feel on this?

Mr. GARDNER. From my perspective, the grants have certainly

helped. They have built some islands of responsiveness and capability but haven’t covered the whole State and unless you have an

unlimited pot of money, if it all goes direct to locals, it will take

an unlimited pot of money so we hope that you will extend 100 percent of the money and let the Governors use that regionally based

on a plan and strategy for the whole State.

Mr. HORN. Do we have for those of you that have the responders,

particularly, either first or later, do we have compacts between

counties, between regions? Some have in these particular hearings

said maybe we ought to have a little more regionalism. Well, a lot

of that was talked about in the 1930’s and the 1940’s and 1950’s

but does that make any sense or——

Mr. GARDNER. The emergency management aspect allows us to

do that with other States. We have similar statutes in Kansas that

allow us to do that.

45

Dr. MOSER. Under the Centers for Disease Control Public Health

Preparedness Program, in cooperation with the association of local

health departments for Kansas, we have set aside funds that will

encourage the development of inter-local agreements between counties where the counties find it helpful for their preparedness activities to work together in cooperation. Regionalization, as I’m sure

Congressman Moran knows and some other members of the audience also know, can be an explosive question for rural areas. Our

approach has been—and the Centers for Disease Control has been

supportive of this—to encourage this activity and to make some

funds available to help support it for public preparedness but not

to impose it rather to support inter-local agreements if they come

from the bottom up, but not to impose them from the top down.

Mr. HORN. We have had a lot of people say that we need to do

something differently and obviously it’s the unexpected we have to

deal with, and we’ll have others that will get to that in terms—let’s

just take this example. You have a human germ of some sort. It

can be of a foreign nature to do that. It can be somebody in our

own country that we could have that; people that are not happy

about research can cause millions of dollars of damage by destroying some of that research and so we have had a whole series of

things here. Now, the question would be, when somebody seems to

be in some situation where they are coming into the emergency

rooms and hospitals and so forth, do we have the laboratories in

terms of community colleges, universities, even high schools and

all, what are we going to do to examine what has happened in that

individual? It could be in very rural places where you don’t have

the laboratory facilities that are easily at hand.

Dr. MOSER. First off, I would say that we are constantly in the

process of improving. What I tell people is that Kansas will always

respond. We are prepared and we will respond. What we’re working on is doing a better job of responding. With the assistance of

the Centers for Disease Control, we have upgraded the State public

health laboratory to full Biosafety Level III capacity. We’re now

working on increasing the volume capacity under that BSL–3. We

are also in discussions with the Centers for Disease Control about

establishing additional satellite or surge capacity for that activity

in both the north central portion of the State and the south central

portion of the State. I would just say those are still under discussion. We believe that this is an important part of our preparedness

capacity. Combining with elements of the rest of the State’s preparedness capacity—the Highway Patrol, for example—has been

particularly helpful. In some cases the Air National Guard has

been involved. We have arrangements to rapidly move a specimen

from locations further out in the State to our testing facility in Topeka or, if needed, all the way to Atlanta. I believe General Gardner made mention in his written testimony to an instance during

the anthrax crisis where we had a large volume of specimens that

could best be handled in Atlanta. The Air National Guard flew

those to Atlanta where the capacity was greater. I hope that’s responsive. If not, tell me.

Mr. HORN. This is very helpful and I happened to grow up on a

farm and we need to make sure that the people way down from the

urban hospitals, we have to know how to get there and reach them.

46

Dr. MOSER. Our approach, and I would have to say my personal

philosophy, is that if one Kansan is vulnerable, we are all vulnerable. I understand the desire of people in the big cities to be protected. I support that entirely, but not at the expense of the people

of rural Kansas. What we are striving for is a comprehensive public

health and preparedness capacity where someone who lives in Abilene or Garden City or Mayetta need not feel that, because they

live in a rural area or a smaller city, they are less protected. That

is certainly our goal.

Mr. HORN. Any other thoughts on that?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, if I could go back to your question

about the effectiveness of the Federal grants that are currently

coming our way or already in place. I think that the spirit of America and spirit of Kansans can readily demonstrate the value of that

support from the Federal Government. In Sumner County, in Cowley and Harper, who is two counties adjacent to Sumner County,

we’re starting to meet in a bilateral forum in which the directors

of emergency management, directors of health departments, the

hospital administrators, EMS people, the law enforcement, etc., are

actively involved in discussion, actively looking for ways to collaborate and to make sure that those precious dollars, when they get

down to the local level, are effectively used and I really believe that

a lot of that is due to the leadership that we have at the Federal

Government and certainly with Governor Graves and Dr. Moser

and all of the folks at State level have been very sincere and very

clear in their expectations that we all have to work together to rapidly improve our abilities so this is very encouraging. Thank you.

Mr. HORN. Any other thoughts there? Let me pose this one.

When we started these hearings in Nashville, Tennessee and we

worked with the Vanderbilt University, the medical school and

very fine hospital and so forth, and we found out that when you

go through an exercise that the civilian helicopters that would

bring people in to the hospital get down on the roof and so forth

and when you put in the military in Tennessee, and you have a lot

of this in Kansas, that the helicopters they had and the frequencies

weren’t there. You could not talk between the civilian groups and

the military groups. What are we doing on that, General?

Mr. GARDNER. That’s a big dollar bill.

Mr. HORN. Can we go to a small little Radio Shack maybe and

not have to have an $8 million——

Mr. GARDNER. I think two of the most important concepts for

Congress are do we have a standard protocol like ASCII was in

computers so that they can connect and second, will you please

keep the frequencies available so they can be used for emergencies.

Those are the two most important concepts for Congress. Interoperative communications are absolutely critical to our ability to

respond.

Mr. HORN. Now, that would be for the military and the health

groups. Do we have, just as maybe you have had it for years between the sheriff, the police and so forth?

Mr. GARDNER. We have similar problems with those agencies as

well. We have a State—this is the post-September 11th, after our

inability in Kansas, we did put together a State-wide group to work

47

on interoperative communications. It’s making progress. It’s a

tough problem.

Mr. HORN. Well, is it just money or is it that we have on the frequency situation that either one part of America has more frequencies than other parts of America? I can remember when I was

the university president in southern California that we had exercises with the Sheriff and everybody else and it turned out all the

frequencies seemed to be on the East Coast and I don’t know if

that’s changed or what, but we need to look at that at a national

level as well as a regional level.

Mr. GARDNER. I’m probably not the best person to answer that

question other than to say that I know there are a limited number

of frequencies and Congress has some level of control over them

whether they are sold or not sold, who they are maintained for the

exclusive use of, so between that and the standard way to connect

all those communication elements is the answer.

Mr. HORN. Well, is there a different set of frequencies that is

coming on in terms of just how you parcel out frequencies?

Mr. GARDNER. I don’t think I’m qualified to answer your questions, sir. Sorry.

Mr. HORN. Well, I’m just technically wondering if we ought to

find out from the Federal Communications Commission, and I’m

glad you mentioned the thought of someone to get the frequencies

up for auction and that sounds good that you want to get more

money in the Treasury, but it’s nonsense when you need communication to get from one place to the other and it’s a lot more important than getting a few bucks for the Treasury, so I’m just wondering if your professional groups, health directors and all the rest,

are they sort of making resolutions? I remember heading a national

organization, you go out there and you have all sorts of things you

send to your friendly senators and representatives and so forth.

What about the health?

Dr. MOSER. I think that in terms of technical knowledge on this

topic, I have to step behind the general. In terms of the criticality

of the question, of its importance, there is absolutely no question

in our minds. Certainly in our discussions with our colleagues in

the hospitals, in my conversations with folks in the emergency

management community, with law enforcement, this is a pervasive

concern and question. On the other hand, it’s been my perception

and I think the perception of other people who are working on this

that it needs to be solved jointly, State-wide. I’m not smart enough

to tell you that it requires a Federal action. Maybe it does. I just

don’t know that. But it’s clear that for us to be prepared to deal

with the threat of terrorism and quite honestly, to deal with a

number of other threats to the health and well-being of Kansans,

interoperable, intercommunications capacity between law enforcement, between first responders of all kinds, between emergency

management, between public health, between hospitals, is absolutely vital and I can only reinforce more what the general has said

about our perception of the importance of moving forward on that.

Mr. GARDNER. To your question specifically, the Adjutant General Association of the United States, and the National Emergency

Management Association of the United States and the National

Governor’s Association all have a policy that supports the things

48

that I talked about and address the problem with some more details.

Mr. HORN. Well, the Sheriff’s organization, I’ve learned over the

years, have quite a wallop from the Members of Congress. Everybody knows they are a sheriff. Mr. McCue.

Mr. MCCUE. It’s a very good question and to take it to the local

level from the State level, in my written testimony I provided, I

give you a perfect example of how inadequate our systems are. We

traditionally at the local level have been concerned about just being

able to talk to those people in our own county, if you will, or city

so you may have public service agencies on three different frequencies in that jurisdiction. Last summer we had that experience.

We had a national disaster, tornado in a small neighboring community. We had several agencies coming into that community that

could not talk to each other. We could not know who was there, or

what their resources were. We could not transmit victim information; where are they, how many. We could not even relate safety

information to other agencies. It’s a huge problem at the local level

and it needs to be, as General Gardner said, unfortunately, it’s a

large dollar solution but everybody at the local level needs to be

able to talk interactively along with those people at the State level.

Mr. HORN. I just have more one question. That is water. What

are we doing looking at the water supply? When I was in Europe

with a congressional group, I just happened to be there and at that

time four of these idiots were trying to poison the Rome reservoirs.

They caught them, but what are we doing to be preventative in our

water supplies?

Mr. GARDNER. I know that EPA has provided four grants for

Kansas and four major metropolitan areas in water treatment

plants to help with security and other related issues. I think we’re

less concerned about the contamination of major water bodies because it takes so large a quantity to do that. We would probably

recognize if somebody backed up five or ten dump truck loads full

of chemicals to put it in a reservoir so we’re more focused on the

water treatment plants and security that actually relates to the

hazardous materials that are used for some of that process, like

chlorine tanks. A breach could cause massive casualties in the population. There’s much about what they could do at that plant than

actually affecting the water. It’s more difficult to do it at that level.

It’s easier to do it at the entrance to a water supply to a particular

building that holds a lot of people.

Mr. HORN. Dr. Moser.

Dr. MOSER. I introduced myself as head of Division of Health and

the Department of Health and Environment. There is a Division of

Environment and I know from conversation with the director of

that division that they have undertaken activities to encourage and

provide technical assistance to public water facilities around the

State on improving security. Now, in some cases, because there

were only those four grants that General Gardner described, this

has led to relatively low tech solutions. But even so, these are improving the security of public water facilities in Kansas. Even if it’s

putting a fence around a treatment plant where a fence with a lock

on it didn’t exist before, that’s a step in the right direction. Again,

we are hopeful of continuing that progress and I’m sure that the

49

Division of Environment and its director could address this point

in more detail for you.

Mr. HORN. OK. Any other questions?

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I chair a subcommittee on Veteran’s

Affairs Health Care and one of the things I learned since September 11th is that the Veteran’s Administration has a role to play in

providing health care services in times of national emergency. It responded in New York City. We don’t have any witness from the

VA, but I was interested in knowing if we have—if Kansas has a

relationship with its VA Hospitals such that they are a component

of response in providing medical services?

Dr. MOSER. Pursuant to the Federal requirements under the

CDC public health grant and the Resources Health Services Administration Services [HRSA] Hospital Planning grant, we have included the Veterans hospitals in our discussions. Governor Graves

has appointed a representative of the veterans hospitals in Kansas

to both of those advisory bodies and that individual is participating

in our discussions. I would say the communication is two-way. One,

what can we do to help the VA in their preparedness activities to

serve veterans. Two, what can they do to help the State of Kansas

better serve the needs of the people of Kansas. I think they are certainly part of the process in our overall hospital planning.

Mr. MORAN. Thank you for your answer.

Mr. HORN. I think it’s an excellent point to bring in the VA. If

there is ever a livewire cabinet member, it is the current Secretary

of Veteran’s Affairs. He is a mover and I think we ought to make

sure that he has regional people as well as the individual at VA

Hospitals and all the rest and there’s a lot of things that in an

emergency, that’s going to help, just like our military hospitals, I

would hope, about that. I don’t know if the Adjutant General has

thought about that, but if it becomes a real mess, we’ll need every

bit that is available and we ought to have the VA in from now on.

Dr. MOSER. I should note that Governor Graves also appointed

an individual from the base hospital at Ft. Riley to be part of our

hospital and public health advisory committees. We are trying to

achieve linkage with the active duty military as well as with the

reserves.

Mr. HORN. We stopped to visit Ft. Riley yesterday and I was very

impressed with what goes on there. Any other questions?

Mr. MORAN. No, thank you.

Mr. HORN. If not, we will go to the next panel and our next panel

is going to be witnesses talking about agricultural bioterrorism. We

have Mr. Jaax, we have Mr. Teagarden, we have Mr. Knowles and

Mr. Lane. We did the second to last and next will be Federal assistance programs but now we’re talking about agricultural bioterrorism. Given the tremendous agricultural efforts of people in

Kansas, we want to have those feelings and if you will raise your

right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. HORN. When we call on you, your full statement automatically goes into the record. Then we will go down the line and when

the fourth one finishes have questions from Mr. Moran and myself.

So if we now can start with Mr. Jaax, we’re delighted to have you

50

here. Mr. Jaax is the associate vice president for research compliance, university veterinarian, Kansas State University.

STATEMENT OF JERRY JAAX, ASSOCIATE VICE PROVOST FOR

RESEARCH COMPLIANCE, UNIVERSITY VETERINARIAN, KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Mr. JAAX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Moran. I appreciate the opportunity to testify in front of the subcommittee.

Prior to coming to KSU, in a previous life I served in various programs for medical defense against chemical and biological agents,

and in biological arms control compliance, counter proliferation,

and cooperative threat reduction efforts with the Former Soviet

Union so I got a first hand look at biological warfare programs both

from the medical side and from the proliferation angle. I think it’s

important to understand that chemical and biological agents are

completely different, completely different entities. A chemical attack will usually be a Hazmat event that would enable a response,

whereas the biological attack would probably be a prolonged public

health event and preparation for one of those events would not necessarily mean that you were prepared for the other.

Mr. HORN. You want to identify what Hazmat means because a

lot of people don’t know that.

Mr. JAAX. The use of hazardous materials. That would be typical

first responders that would respond to an emergency. The biological

threat is obviously very complex and technological issues and environmental factors may very well limit their usefulness. When you

get into the highly contagious agricultural agents, some of those

technological issues may be more easily overcomeable. Certainly we

know that in the Former Soviet Union that they had offensive BW

programs that went into incredible dimensions, perhaps up to 60

scientists and technicians involved in offensive biological warfare

programs there. We also believe there may have been as many as

10,000 of those 60,000 working in agricultural programs and, of

course, the great question is where are those people that were associated with the programs and that, of course, forms the nut of the

proliferation problem associated with those programs.

I think that here in this country we had a paradigm shift associated with awareness of the public as far as biological weapons are

concerned. Even the most casual observer would recognize that biological agents are at least a potential threat to humans, but I don’t

think that recognition flows so freely to people regarding the vulnerability of the agricultural sector to biological attack. John

Wefald, President of Kansas University, is fond of saying the great

engine of our national prosperity here in this country is our ability

to produce safe, plentiful and inexpensive food and any sort of disruption to that sort of supply would obviously have great impacts

upon our economy. Time constraints limit my ability to talk about

specific agricultural agents, but I think it’s safe to say that foot and

mouth disease is the one that I think is gaining the most attention.

I would say, however, that the recent outbreak of foot and mouth

disease in the United Kingdom cost the United Kingdom 25 billion

pounds as far as their economy is concerned. It is also my belief

here in this country that a well coordinated and concerted attack

by knowledgeable opponents could probably cause that much of a

51

loss within days of the attack being perpetrated here and obviously

you have other kinds of issues associated with diseases that might

have potential as well as just those that would affect agricultural

agents.

I would like to delineate some of the issues associated with the

bioterrorist threat and these are measures that we can have to try

to counter them. We need to develop coordinated partnerships between State, Federal and local industry to upgrade our local, regional and national awareness. National and regional agra-threat

assessments must be performed and continually refined to ensure

proper focus for research programs and development of effective

counter measures. We have to enhance our critical research infrastructure, such as biocontainment laboratories and facilities that

will allow targeted, applied research into plausible threat pathogens in a safe and controlled environment. These specialized facilities will not only allow us to find ways to counter these types of

threats, but would also provide critical surge capacity if an outbreak occurs.

On an agent-by-agent basis, we must develop and deploy effective and reliable rapid diagnostics, and forward surveillance systems, and new treatments and vaccines. Obviously, it’s one thing

to be prepared to respond, but if you don’t have an adequate response or mitigation strategy, then that response becomes meaningless in some ways.

We need to develop and refine mitigation strategies, such as carcass disposal plans that would be targeted for certain geographic

areas and potential targets so that we can effectively contain and

minimize the impact of any potential outbreak and we need to develop and institute effective education, training, planning and response capabilities for all stakeholders involved to include public

health, law enforcement, military, Federal, State and local officials.

The good news is that the effective countermeasures against specific biological threats can reduce risk and they can also serve as

deterrents. The bad news is that developing these countermeasures

and capabilities requires substantial investment. With adequate facilities and resources, we can build resource programs that will

help address those plant and animal threats that are most concerned here in the agricultural heartland. Since most agraterrorist

agents are naturally occurring in other parts of the world, these

programs will also benefit us that these would help with natural

or accidental introductions of that pathogen. We at Kansas State

University are striving to build new programs and we are refocusing research efforts to aid existing programs that will try to help

us aid against these threats. The inherent capabilities of the Land

Grant system and a major research university are especially useful

in programs that will would help us to counter these significant

agraterrorist challenges. As background information, I am furnishing a copy of the testimony of Dr. Wefald in October 1999 for the

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capability where he testified about this very issue and I think that it does underscore the

prescient, long-standing commitment of the university to try and

find ways to help protect us.

It’s my very firm opinion that we have to take a long view of the

biological threat. This is not something that’s going to go away next

52

month, next year, or even in the next decade. The Defense Science

Board recently stated that, ‘‘Biodefense is the single most significant challenge to U.S. sovereignty.’’ I think those are big words and

I think they are something we have to take seriously. There are

those who would say we should refrain from discussing these

threats and our possible vulnerabilities. However, I believe Representative Shays has touched the heart of the matter when he recently said, ‘‘Better to be scared by the improbable possibility, than

to be unprepared for the catastrophic reality,’’ and I think we can

ill-afford to disregard that advice because the fact is, our agricultural infrastructure is certainly vulnerable and I think we need to

find ways to protect it. I appreciate the opportunity to testify and

thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaax follows:]

53

54

55

56

Mr. HORN. We now have Mr. Teagarden and he is the livestock

commissioner, Kansas Animal Health Department, State of Kansas.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE TEAGARDEN, LIVESTOCK

COMMISSIONER, KANSAS ANIMAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT

Mr. TEAGARDEN. Thank you, Chairman Horn. I’m not going to

read my testimony, but I just want to stress a few things and try

to keep this brief. Dr. Jaax has mentioned a couple of things, and

Dr. Moser, that I had in my testimony also. I think to start out

with, I’m sure that Congressman Moran has explained to you the

importance of agriculture in Kansas. Very, very important to our

economy here. Terrorist action or an accidental introduction of a

disease like foot and mouth would wreck us, our entire State and

our Nation’s economy. I think that if the terrorists really want to

get into the United States, they don’t bomb buildings. They get

through our agriculture industry, food production and they have us

big time so I think that’s something that a lot of people haven’t

been aware of that potential there and haven’t been concerned

about. A lot of people don’t think that terrorists will come to the

heartland, to Kansas, through the Midwest because of the low population, but if want to call it big time emergency damage, that’s

where they will come.

Mr. HORN. I agree with you and we have put all the testimony

given for the report to go to the House of Representatives and it’s

very clear that you are right on what you’re saying.

Mr. TEAGARDEN. I don’t think that we can prevent the intentional introduction of a disease agent to our livestock or agricultural industry or for that matter, any other thing in the United

States. I think they have pretty well proven that they can do whatever they might want to. Introduction of a disease would be extremely easy, a disease that could really damage us, but I think we

can be prepared to respond quickly, to bring that under control and

eradicate that disease and I think that’s what we have to address

is being ready and capable of that response.

The United Kingdom last year, they weren’t prepared to respond

to that outbreak of foot and mouth and it consumed their country

for better than 10 months. Their agricultural industry over there

was—I don’t know when they will ever recover. It will be many

years, but they weren’t ready and capable of responding quickly

and it overwhelmed them. Dr. Moser and Dr. Jaax both have spoken about research and laboratory capabilities. I think that’s very

evident today in our systems, in the Federal system and our State

systems, that we need more capacity in our laboratories. We need

to spread out the Federal laboratories and do some of that work in

our local laboratories such as Kansas State University or different

laboratories around the country and do a lot of that work. Our Federal laboratories, like I said, just do not have the capacity and the

capabilities to do that and research is very, very important. Foot

and mouth disease, in my opinion, hasn’t been researched much in

this century or last century. Our protocols right now to combat foot

and mouth disease are the same as they were in 1925. I have a

book on my shelf in my office that was printed in 1925 and we do

the same thing today. We have—there’s got to be some better ways.

57

There’s got to be some vaccine research we might be able to use

to help us in that regard. I think the one thing that the Federal

Government can do if we have an outbreak of a foreign animal disease is allow us the opportunity to respond. In other words, do not

make things complicated as far as getting money and support and

help to the individual States. I don’t think the Federal Government, with USDA Veterinary Services, has the manpower anymore

to combat a disease. It will be up to the States to do their own

work, but just keep it simple. We’re going to cause a great damage

when we have an outbreak of foreign animal disease and we have

to be prepared to help our producers and our consumers overcome

that problem. Thank you.

Mr. HORN. I have been on various delegations to the European

parliamentarians and recently a group of us were in Russia with

the DUMA, 40 Members and obviously we got into these issues and

they are trade issues and some of them are absolutely phoney, like

the poultry bit they are holding up off St. Petersburg and Georgia.

Millions of dollars go down the drain on that because people say

oh, you know, we can’t get that chicken and all because this, this

and this is done. Over the last 10 years we’ve tried to tell the parliamentarians in the European Parliament, can’t you get a national

academy of science where the people of scientific value have done

what the truth is and not the propaganda and so we face that with

our trade and the English foot and mouth disease doesn’t really

help very much when that goes on. It ricochets into the United

States. And we need to get this—and they agreed. They said, you

know, we have to have a decent academy of sciences, like our own

academy does.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Teagarden follows:]

58

59

60

61

Mr. HORN. Mr. Knowles, we’re delighted to have you here. The

FBI has done a lot and I’m sure the Kansas Bureau of Investigation will be involved in that.

STATEMENT OF TERRY KNOWLES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,

KANSAS BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. KNOWLES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and welcome to the State of Kansas. Truly the KBI, we do follow the leadership of the FBI and we work as a State-wide law enforcement

agency. We work in full partnership with a number of the Federal

law enforcement agencies and the Joint Terrorism Task Force

around the State at Wichita, Topeka and Kansas City.

On page 2 of my statement I detail the status of terrorist-related

investigative activity that we as a KBI have been involved in and

when I say we, I’m talking really in part for Kansas law enforcement. We have conducted over 300 terrorist related preliminary inquiries and if it requires further investigation, we hand that off to

the Joint Terrorism Task Force for their consideration. We have

made and participated in over 41 arrests in the State of Kansas for

INS, primarily on visa violations. What I would like to address and

followup what my good friend and partner, George Teagarden, he

talked about the impact of a foreign animal disease and exactly

what would law enforcement’s role be in first responding and then

I’ll get to the prevention aspect.

There was an incident that occurred, a false rumor, foot and

mouth disease in Holton here in March of this year. Following that

incident we did an assessment, what would law enforcement have

done had that been a real event. It would have required 12 road

blocks, 36 officers per shift, roughly 96 commissioned officers per

day for a minimum of 60 days. Now, the livestock commissioner is

empowered through the Legislature, by the Governor. He will be in

charge of those quarantines. In addition to those 12 road blocks

that we would be operating for a minimum of 60 days until it’s

fully eradicated, we would have to close off 62 roads coming into

the State of Kansas and virtually stop all movement of livestock.

Now, that is a major undertaking.

Now, we would be ably assisted by the National Guard, but if

you look at the resources that would be committed well beyond the

daily public safety response of law enforcement, it would virtually

bankrupt Kansas law enforcement, our resources and ability to do

that. The Kansas Attorney General, Carla Stovall asked the KBI

to look at bioterrorism threats to Kansas agriculture and define our

responsibilities. Having done that, I’m at the point of saying that

if it occurs, we’re already losing and our focus has to be on prevention. Now, the KBI, much like a number of law enforcement agencies; specifically the FBI, we are switching to a more intelligence

driven, prevention type of operations. To do that, we have created—we are part of what we call the Kansas Law Enforcement Intelligence Network. It’s a computer-driven intelligence base available to all 345 law enforcement agencies in the State of Kansas.

Now, to have this system—that’s where local officers could enter

data, access data, make inquiries, say, in Ford County, whether or

not some suspicious activity is going on. Is it occurring in other

parts of the State here. This system is—we’re probably, if I said we

62

had ten agencies on board of the 345, it will be another 18 months

before we have that system fully operational as an intelligencedriven or preventative type system or network for Kansas law enforcement. Not for the KBI but for Kansas law enforcement. We

will need Federal assistance to make that happen or we can sit

back and let the 18 months kind of grind away as we presently are.

Making the shift to an intelligence-driven investigative operation

is a major diversion from the way we have done business in law

enforcement over the past 25 or 30 years where we responded after

the fact. If we develop sources or intelligence data, it was always

directed at the solution of a case or at some narrow objective.

Today we’re looking at trying—you asked the question in the first

panel, what are the threats. They are so broad that we’re trying

to shift our intelligence capability to meet that demand and figure

out where they would strike in the State of Kansas and if the Commissioner is correct and they come at our livestock, which is 8 to

10 billion a year, we will be devastated here, so our focus as a

State agency will be on prevention and intelligence-based to prevent those occurrences. I will be very glad to answer and respond

to questions later on, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Knowles follows:]

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

Mr. HORN. OK. We now have Undersheriff James L. Lane, Ford

County Sheriff’s Office.

STATEMENT OF JAMES LANE, UNDERSHERIFF, FORD COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT

Mr. LANE. Chairman Horn, Congressman Moran, I, too, am honored to offer my thanks by testimony regarding the readiness of

our community. Historic Dodge City, much like Abilene, is the

county seat of Ford County. The Ford County Sheriff’s Office has

a part with 12 full-time commissioned patrol officers and ten additional commissioned officers. The county is approximately 1,100

square miles with a population of about 35,000 people. Now, I

would also like to add at any given time there may be in excess

of 300,000 head of live cattle on the ground and I make that statement just to underscore that our community is completely reliant

upon the agriculture industry and so I will speak with emphasis

on our major concern, which is the biological threat.

I want to say that our local emergency preparedness committee

is active in all aspects of terrorism planning and I believe that we

are far short of having all the tools that we need. However, our

community has developed partnerships with the agriculture industry and we have developed a comprehensive multi-jurisdictional response plan for such an attack and we are confident that it’s one

of the few plans in the Nation that is derived at the local level. We

have completed the Domestic Preparedness Plan or are in the process of equipping local first responders to the greatest extent possible with the $44,000 that we have received in Federal grant moneys. Without these dollars we would be significantly less prepared.

We have devoted a great deal of time and effort in trying to identify the consequences of such an attack and our response to it, and

I think we have had some success in that. So having a fairly good

understanding of the consequences and the underlying costs it

could echo, it is critical to focus on prevention. Previously, I mentioned that we had a plan locally for dealing with such an incident

and we learned a great deal in that planning process. We learned

a great deal about our community, and we really learned a lot

about the impact that agriculture has on it. I think we understand

what the local response will be. Maybe, with the exception of the

FBI and the USDA, we’re unclear at how some other Federal agencies will respond to our community. We also have a question if

maybe they understand the industry. We now understand the

movement of livestock in the State and especially locally and we

know that it is paramount to stop the spread of disease. When a

quarantine is implemented, it will severely tax local government

and it will devastate our private industry locally. We know that the

quarantine will lead to many consequences within our community

in addition to the ones I just mentioned. We know that there may

be some problems that arise with the National Guard in getting

them commissioned. There’s some questions to that we are trying

to get answered as far as can we take National Guardsmen and

commission them to do the police function, especially if we have a

situation of civil unrest as a result of a quarantine. Last but not

least, we understand the economic impact for Kansas and the rest

of the United States and probably the world. We have encountered

74

a few problems in the planning process. We found that there’s

somewhat of a lack of communication between Federal, State and

local levels of government in the emergency preparedness. I think

it’s getting much better. I think that we have all, or we all understand now, that we’re in this together and we have to have that

partnership to have any success. I am concerned that local law enforcement may not always know what level of homeland security

we’re on. There is some confusion in terms of the rules and responsibilities and response of other agencies to any terrorist attack at

our level. I think there must be more effort put forth in educating

not only Federal agencies but all agencies about the agricultural

community. Undoubtedly that’s best accomplished by the USDA

and I speak for our Sheriff and the emergency manager and other

first responders in our community do support the President’s proposal consolidation of responding agencies under the Department of

Homeland Security. I think that when we can look for a single

point for education and funding and training and technical support,

including the intelligence and technology, that we can begin to

promptly focus on prevention and implement logical response

plans.

In summary, understanding that the Federal resources are not

unlimited, we would offer the following statements in terms of assistance that we ask for in meeting our communities needs. No. 1

is continued funding for education and training in communities so

that planning begins in those communities. For the frontline defense and identification of diseases, Dr. Jaax referred to that in

labs so that we understand the disease better. For primary and

secondary responders and equipment and in research efforts. We

need funding in technology for intelligence gathering and dissemination, as Mr. Knowles referred to, and I think at the local level

we have a real need for funding an emergency operations center so

that if we do have to respond in such a way that our emergency

operation center has the technology to deal with the problem at

hand. Equipment funding for equipment for first responders and

maybe physical security for the industry, I don’t know that needs

to be mandated, but we may have better success if there is an opportunity.

No. 2, we need a single source of information so that we understand the roles and responsibilities of responding agencies and second, we have a library of assistance so that communities know

what funding is available to them and that may all be best accommodated through homeland security.

No. 3, we need to develop partnerships with private industry. We

need to have joint training between local, State, Federal responders

and the industry and No. 4, we want to emphasize prevention on

every level, including research, education, planning intelligence,

rapid and appropriate response. Thank you for your consideration.

Mr. HORN. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lane follows:]

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

Mr. HORN. We’ll now go to questions and the gentleman from

Kansas can begin the questions.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the opportunity.

I learned something—I learn something everyday and I learned

something from all you today, but I generally have had the same

response when people talk to me about ago-terrorism in Kansas

that I don’t know how we can prevent it, but we’ve sure got to be

able to respond quickly; that it is an issue of response and Mr.

Teagarden highlighted that, but the additional piece of information

is prevention that comes through intelligence activities and I can

see absolutely the importance of increasing our capability of learning about the potential, the acts of potential terrorists in advance

so it is not just response but it’s also prevention through intelligence. I have always thought that we didn’t have the ability in

Kansas to protect every farm, every feedyard and I don’t think we

do, but we do have the ability to know what people may be attempting to perpetrate and so I appreciate highlighting it helps me

explain to my constituents better what the opportunities are and

I would tell Chairman Horn that Kansas very much is a livestockproducing State. We’re often thought of as the ‘‘wheat’’ but the actual State product is derived, the largest portion comes from livestock. There’s no congressional district in the country more so than

the first district of Kansas that has cattle on feed so this is a huge

issue and the potential for our State’s health and the health of its

economy is tremendous.

Mr. Jaax, you are a national expert and one thing I want to highlight is that people who are knowledgeable about this topic, you

have to be on the top ten list and I want to make sure that you

have the sense that national leaders, those involved in the issue of

agraterrorism are utilizing your expertise. Is that true?

Mr. JAAX. Thank you for those comments. I think that one of the

key elements of this whole discussion is recognizing that

agraterrorism is certainly a very significant subset of the overall

bioterrorist threat and I think that resources like the ones that I

represent at Kansas State and the land grant statutes are very important in trying to help us come up with national plans for how

we would respond to various agents. I want to re-emphasize when

you’re talking about response and how we would protect ourselves

and it goes back to a question that you asked, Mr. Chairman, of

the first panel, which was what should we be worried about and

I think that very thoughtful and accurate risk assessments associated with plausible threats, if we can find ways to counter them,

if we have adequate counter measures, then we can strike off those

of the more ominous threats until we can reduce the risk associated with an input, but to go back to your question, sir, I think

that clearly the national authorities are looking for help because

this is such a huge problem, especially on the biological front because it is so complicated and is so regionalized because the threats

are different everywhere. I think that they are coming to people

like me and certainly to organizations like the one—like Kansas

State to try to help to find effective countermeasures and strategies

for dealing with this, but the fact is there’s only so much—there

are only so many resources to go around and the threats are many.

86

Mr. MORAN. Well, thank you for your efforts. I was interested in

your testimony, Mr. Knowles, about the number of investigations

related to these kinds of potential acts. One thing that caught my

attention is the role that apparently the INS is asking the KBI to

play and I’m confused by that because I assume that INS violations

are violations of Federal law. What role does the KBI have in responding to an INS request for investigation?

Mr. KNOWLES. We participated in a number of investigations on

those visa violations where INS is the lead agency. We will provide

the assistance, whether it be in terms of the interviews or the arrest. Obviously the violation would fall for the Federal Government

and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. We merely support whether it be a

investigation or the apprehensions in those investigations. The

KBI, through our history, has been an agency that assists other—

whether it be Federal or local or county agency, we will assist as

they request. Now, we work, as I indicated, on the partnership on

the Joint Terrorism Task Force. We are a full partner but the FBI

will play a lead role along with the U.S. Attorney’s Office so it’s not

the State violation that we’re focussing on. We are simply a partner in the investigation.

Mr. MORAN. Are those investigations, when you talk about visa

violations, are they in addition to being visa violations, is there

some thought that there’s potential terrorist activity associated

with the person involved?

Mr. KNOWLES. In some cases and what we do, once we conduct

a preliminary inquiry, we’ll forward those on to the Joint Terrorism

Task Force for further investigation. A lot of our investigations in

that respect are a response to calls from the public. We do that preliminary inquiry to see, is it valid, is the information—is it not generic and is it specific enough for some type of either an arrest or

a confrontational interview and that’s what we pass on to the task

force.

Mr. MORAN. You also, Mr. Knowles, indicated or mentioned in

your testimony about crop dusting.

Mr. KNOWLES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORAN. Crop dusting is an integral part of our agricultural

economy. Are there things we need to be doing more? Have we

struck the right balance in regard to that activity?

Mr. KNOWLES. When the President raised that issue nationally,

shortly after September 11th, about the threat of this type of aircraft, we looked inward. We didn’t have a data base. We did not

know the extent of pilots or aircraft within the State of Kansas.

Since then, KBI—we have had a face-to-face interview with all pilots, with all owners and we have a data base. There are 180 such

aircraft in the State of Kansas and 130 pilots or owners and it’s

very cooperative. They wanted to come to us. We were getting all

types of calls about suspicious aircraft, low flying aircraft and now

we have a good handle on that and I think the first handle talked

about the progress from September 11th. We now have—if we have

a complaint, we can go right to the source and identify the aircraft

and/or the pilot.

Mr. MORAN. Have you also identified the pilot schools, pilot

training in Kansas?

87

Mr. KNOWLES. To some extent. Trying to be proactive with what

was going on, whether it was in Florida or Arizona. We certainly

did not want it to happen in our State and going back to this idea

of prevention and intelligence gathering, we’re asking those pilots

to, when some suspicious activity—if something is not quite correct,

if you have a question about somebody’s motive for learning to fly

a crop duster, let us know and we’ll help you with that, but yes,

since that occurred, crop dusting is now on our scope and it’s in our

data bank.

Mr. MORAN. The Law Enforcement Center at Yoder, has that

course work—this may be a question for the Undersheriff as well.

As the course work changed in regard to what law enforcement officers are taught, trained?

Mr. KNOWLES. Being under oath, the other director, as you know,

he’s the former director of the Kansas Law Enforcement Training

Center in Yoder here. If I could defer to our director and see if he

might have a thought in that direction. Would that be permissible,

Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HORN. Certainly.

Mr. KNOWLES. And I would introduce the director of the KBI,

Larry Welch, who is the former director of the Kansas Law Enforcement Training Center in Yoder, Kansas.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much. I did know that Deputy Director Knowles was going to figure out a way to get me up here.

Congressman Moran, the answer to your question is while the

basic certification course at the Kansas Law Enforcement Training

Center at Yoder has not changed significantly because of the events

or the aftermath of September 11th, they have reached out and

added courses and training in what we would call in-service training seminars throughout the State of Kansas. But as far as basic

training for certification of Kansas law enforcement officers, I must

answer the question that they haven’t really significantly changed

the core curriculum but considerable training has been done by the

Academy, by seminars and schools throughout the State and indeed by others.

Mr. MORAN. I appreciate your answer and I also appreciate the

efforts of the KBI not only in the area of terrorism but just the full

plate that you have in our State to try and combat a number of

law enforcement and therefore, problems for our citizens.

Mr. WELCH. Congressman, if I might interrupt and embellish

just a bit on the question that you asked of the deputy director regarding why specifically we were so involved in the INS matters,

it’s actually primarily a matter in that particular situation of manpower on the part of Immigration. They don’t have enough

agents—this office in Kansas City covers half of Missouri and all

the State of Kansas. They were woefully undermanned after September 11th and it started out primarily simply as a matter to provide manpower for them to assist in arrests on visa violations and

it kind of extended from there.

Mr. MORAN. I appreciate that answer and I asked the question

because the INS struggles greatly in performing its duties, not only

in our State, but nationwide and it’s an issue that we care lot

about in Kansas about their ability to enforce the law and I was

interested in how the KBI became engaged with the INS. Let me

88

ask the undersheriff in Ford County or southwest Kansas, do our

cattle feeders do anything different today than they were prior to

September 11th that related perhaps to this issue of intelligence?

Mr. LANE. I think so. I think we’ve seen—at least in our community, I can speak for a number of biosecurity measures put in place.

I think that there are some cost prohibitive things that have not

been done and also, considering the vast expanse of a typical

50,000 head feedyard over three or 400 acres of land is difficult to

put under surveillance so I think that there is a good attempt at

implementing biosecurity measures, I think in Mr. Teagarden’s recommendation early on, that a lot of them started addressing those

issues and we have seen some success in our area. That’s emphasizing cleanliness in equipment, scrutinizing shipping papers so

that an infected animal may not come in from another State or another country.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Teagarden—my final question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Teagarden, would you walk you through the scenario of the belief that if there’s foot and mouth disease in feedyards in Kansas,

what should happen and who plays what role in that response?

Mr. TEAGARDEN. You want to take a deep seat first? If a feedlot

operator or a cowboy out in the feedlot found some unusual disease

symptom that they weren’t familiar with, they would notify probably their own veterinarian within that feedyard. If that veterinarian thought there was something that looked like a foreign animal

disease, they would call our department or USDA and we would

send out a trained foreign animal disease diagnostician. All of our

veterinarians on our staff and State have been to a special school

at Plum Island for foreign animal disease.

Mr. MORAN. Is that vet, is he placed somewhere close to southwest Kansas or somebody that comes from Topeka?

Mr. TEAGARDEN. No. Stationed from Dodge City. From Kingman

to Dodge City is about 21⁄2 to 3 hours for one of our vets that would

cover Dodge City so we would go out, collect samples, ship them

as quick as we could get them to Plum Island. If our vet that was

out there thought it was highly likely, we would activate our emergency plan to at least a Level III at that time. In other words, get

people together, start the system. We have a media team that

would be ready to send out notices to the media about what the situation was, where it was at, so on and so forth. We would go into

action. We have been planning for an outbreak of foreign animal

disease for roughly 4 years now and we have—it’s not a complete

plan and never will be, but we’ve got it down to where we kind of

know the first indication, true indication that we have a foreign

animal disease, we’re going to go into action and we believe in Kansas that the only way to combat an outbreak is to hit it with all

we’ve got. We’re going to declare war on a disease, such as foot and

mouth, because that’s the only way we’ll get ahead is hit it hard

and hope we can stop it.

Mr. MORAN. You indicated the sample would be sent to Plum Island. Is that the efficient way of doing it?

Mr. TEAGARDEN. That’s the only place we can get a true definitive diagnosis at the time and that’s why we need more laboratory

capabilities.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Jaax.

89

Mr. JAAX. I would like to weigh in on that one also. I think that

in my testimony I talked about foreign diagnostics and, obviously,

the faster you find out that you have a problem, the more confident

you can be in your response and those responses can be done in

a very straightforward way. The situation with foot and mouth, as

I understand it with Plum Island, is that those reagents that are

necessary to make that diagnosis really don’t require the kind of

containment that’s available at Plum Island, but it’s a situation

where they don’t want a false/positive made and have the responsibility for that in the field. I think under pre-September 11th circumstances perhaps that was completely understandable, but 36,

48 hours in a foot and mouth outbreak is a lot of time and I don’t

think that we can afford the luxury of finding out days after diagnosis could be made that we have foot and mouth disease here so

I’m very strongly in support of having those forward diagnostics so

that we can find out very quickly that we have an outbreak and

again, with a very highly contagious virus like foot and mouth disease, it can spread explosively so it’s very important to get your

arms around it as fast as you can.

Mr. MORAN. Does that capability currently exist in Kansas to do

the test?

Mr. JAAX. If we had the reagents we could do it.

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much, panel.

Mr. HORN. I just have a couple of questions here. Throughout

some of your testimony you talked about the West Nile. Can you

define that for me, Mr. Jaax?

Mr. JAAX. West Nile virus is a viral disease that originated in

sub-Saharan Africa. It is co-anodic, which means it affects both

animals and man. I think it’s a great example of those crossover

diseases that we would be concerned about that would go beyond

just human disease or just animal diseases. We have vectors in this

part of the country, all across the country and those vectors are,

in this case, would be mosquitoes that could transfer and serve as

reservoirs for the disease. You know, not each foreign animal disease or each bioterrorism event would have to be an outbreak

event. It could be a much more insidious disease, like this one, and

there are clearly other diseases out there that would serve as a

useful model, but West Nile has become endemic in the United

States. It was not found here before, I believe, the last 21⁄2 years.

One of the things that’s interesting about West Nile, in my view,

is the current lack of meaningful communication between the veterinary public health community and the traditional public health

community. This disease was recognized by a veterinarian pathologist in New York sometime before the official diagnosis was made

and with a co-anodic agent they may show up in animal populations prior to their manifestation in human populations, so it’s

important that we build that linkage of our public health infrastructure, which I think is a very positive step associated with the

September 11th event as far as our national public health is concerned.

Mr. HORN. How does that get transmitted from Africa to New

York City and is it a food?

Mr. JAAX. No. Well, they don’t know how West Nile got here and

there’s all kinds of speculation you could make regarding it. May

90

very well have come with someone who was inflicted, with some

person because what happens with the disease is that a mosquito

would bite an infected animal or person and then would then again

transmit that to another person or to an animal.

Mr. HORN. Is that what is going on in Louisiana?

Mr. JAAX. Absolutely. Yes, sir.

Mr. HORN. Now, Texas presumably is No. 1 in cattle. Has anything happened as a result of all this?

Mr. JAAX. With West Nile?

Mr. HORN. Yes, or others like that.

Mr. JAAX. Well, there are clearly diseases that would have the

same sort of mechanism but those are, luckily, the most severe

ones we don’t have in this country that would affect cattle. To my

knowledge, West Nile is not a serious pathogen in food animals. It

is a serious horse pathogen and people who have horses are right

to be concerned about that and it is a human pathogen but again,

it’s not a significantly serious disease unless you are one of the unfortunate people who happens to get it.

Mr. HORN. Or your horses.

Mr. JAAX. Absolutely.

Mr. HORN. I’m curious about Texas now. Everybody says they

have the most cattle. Then there’s an argument here on who is two

and three.

Mr. JAAX. We’re right in there somewhere.

Mr. HORN. Well, is Nebraska No. 2 and then Kansas three or is

it Kansas two and Nebraska three? It’s like the football game.

We’ve got the coverage now.

Mr. JAAX. I would defer to Mr. Teagarden on that.

Mr. HORN. Well, I would like to get that figured out just for the

Guinness records.

Mr. MORAN. I’m probably the one who could answer, Mr. Chairman. I’m not under oath.

Mr. HORN. And you will say?

Mr. MORAN. Kansas.

Mr. HORN. I want to just, Larry, before you leave, just if you

don’t mind, take the oath.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. HORN. Any other questions? Well, it’s a wonderful panel we

have had here who have a lot of scientific knowledge and that’s a

good thought. Thank you very much for coming.

We have one last panel and that is Otto Maynard, President and

Chief Executive Officer of the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.;

Kevin Stafford, Special Agent in charge of the Kansas City Field

Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Patricia Dalton, Strategic

Issues, U.S. Office, and Richard Hainje, Director, Region 7.

Let’s start here with Mr. Otto Maynard, president and chief executive officer of the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.

Mr. MAYNARD. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. When we call on you, your whole written presentation

goes in the record at this point and we would like you to summarize it.

91

STATEMENT OF OTTO MAYNARD, PRESIDENT, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.

Mr. MAYNARD. Thank you very much. My name is Otto Maynard,

President and Chief Executive Officer of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. We operate the Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Station near

Burlington in Coffey County for three of our owners, which is

KG&E, a Westar Energy Co., Kansas City Power and Light, a

Great Plains Energy Co., and Kansas Electric Power Cooperative.

I’ll start out by pointing out that I am not a government agency.

I know that for sure because I pay taxes and fees rather than receiving taxes and fees, but to be successful, I have to interact and

coordinate with a number of local, State and Federal agencies.

Prior to September 11, 2001, all the nuclear power plants had

professional security forces in place. At Wolf Creek we had at that

time, still have a very highly trained, well armed security force.

Many of the security officers are ex-military, ex-law enforcement

and we exercise them in a number of different scenarios to provide

the protection for our plant against any type of attack that might

be conceived.

The other thing that we had prior to September 11th was an

emergency plan. We are required to have an emergency plan. That

plan provides for the overall communication, coordination and response to any type of event or issue affecting Wolf Creek that could

have some potential implication on the health and safety of the

public. That was all in place prior to September 11th. After September 11th, we further enhanced the security by adding additional security officers, additional patrols and many other things

that were put in place to provide heightened awareness and heightened security force. We got excellent cooperation from the local

sheriff, Kansas Highway Patrol, Kansas National Guard and since

September 11th we have also had excellent cooperation with the

U.S. military. A number of exercises, round table discussions, scenarios have been played out so that we very clearly understand

what other roles and responsibilities are, what the roles and responsibilities of other agencies and what the response capabilities

are and exactly how we would utilize each other’s resources in the

event there was something in the way of a terrorist attack potentially impacting Wolf Creek.

I would also like to acknowledge that after September 11th we

got excellent cooperation from a number of Federal agencies. Of

course, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. You know, Region IV

of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the lead Federal

agency in issues affecting Wolf Creek and they provided us with excellent communication throughout this last year, provided us information that we needed to be aware of and in making sure that we

were doing the things that were prudent in protecting the health

and safety of the public. Also had excellent cooperation from a

number of other agencies; KBI, the FBI, the FAA, a number of

agencies, some of which we had not coordinated or worked with

that much before.

One of the reasons I believe it was easy for us to establish some

relationships, to get this level of cooperation is because of the emergency plan that we had in place for issues potentially affecting

Wolf Creek. That plan provides, as I said before, for coordination

92

and communication, a common level of threat assessment, so to

speak, so that everybody understands nationwide what level of

issues that we may be talking about and everybody can understand

what the roles and responsibilities are with already established

communications so that we knew who to talk to. We have facilities

in place at various locations so that the coordination can occur so

that each agency can do their own. I want to make it clear that

events or issues affecting Wolf Creek, that we do not direct Federal, State or local agencies. Our primary responsibility is taking

care of the plant and in taking care of whatever the issue is that

may be affecting that and providing high quality time and communication and recommendations to the local, State and Federal agencies so that they can perform their role in also protecting the

health and safety of the public.

One last item I want to touch on, the one area that has been

some confusion since September 11th gets into the funding. Of

course, everyone would like to have increased security, increased

availability of a lot of things. These do cost money and at times

there were issues about who pays for that such that the National

Guard, or whoever, was able to pay their folks and take care of

that. I believe it’s imperative that the burden of funding and sharing of that cost needs to be equally distributed among us all because the atacks from terrorists are against the American people,

all of us and our way of life, not just a different industry or a different city and I believe it’s important that the burden of that be

shared. If it is not equally shared, then the terrorists have the ability to control our economy by picking on various segments, such

that you are no longer able to have free competition. Again, I appreciate the opportunity and glad to answer questions.

Mr. HORN. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maynard follows:]

93

94

95

96

Mr. HORN. Now we have Kevin Stafford, special agent in charge

of Kansas City Field Office for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

STATEMENT OF KEVIN STAFFORD, SPECIAL AGENT IN

CHARGE, KANSAS CITY FIELD OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION

Mr. STAFFORD. Good afternoon, Chairman Horn, Congressman

Moran and guests. It’s an honor to appear before you today to discuss the issue that is being undertaken by the FBI and law enforcement community in general in connection with prevention of

terrorism and related threats posed by incendiary, biological, chemical or nuclear agents.

By way of background, Kansas City Field Office investigative territory encompasses an area of approximately 650 miles from just

east of Jefferson, Missouri to the west border of Kansas and includes approximately 865 law enforcement entities. This entire

area is protected by approximately 134 FBI agents and 102 support

personnel. With this vast geographic area and significant differences in crime problems, effective law enforcement levels requires leveraging personnel through mutual cooperation and assistance. In this regard, we have started the Heart of America Joint

Task Force in September of this past year to address and prevent

acts of terrorism. The task force has 18 participating agencies with

34 full-time investigators. While oversight and intelligence is focused in Kansas City, the task force includes investigators physically located in Topeka, Garden City, Wichita as well as Jefferson

City and Springfield, Missouri. Additionally, an executive board

made up of chief law enforcement executives from the Federal,

State, county and municipal agencies has been established and provide a forum for the exchange of intelligence and to provide guidance regarding policy matters and direction of the task force.

To facilitate the exchange of sensitive or classified information,

security clearances have been provided to all members of the executive board. The Joint Terrorism Task Force is also supported by the

Kansas Domestic Terrorism Working Group and Missouri Terrorism Working Group, which were formed in 1997 for the purpose of

sharing timely information regarding terrorism. These groups are

comprised of approximately 50 State, county and local law enforcement agencies. With respect to combating terrorism, the Kansas

City office, with the cooperation and support of 14 bomb squads,

form the Kansas/Missouri Bomb Technician Working Group. Given

the expenses associated with equipping individuals in this area,

this group is specifically organized to share specialized tools, training and intelligence regarding terrorist groups and devices. I’m

proud to note this group is nationally recognized and has provided

services to the National Institute of Justice, Office of Science and

Technology and the Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office, Technical Support Working Group in testing and evaluating a

new incendiary device disrupter system and is presently assisting

in the development or robotic disarming technology.

Kansas City Field Office has and continues to conduct periodic

training. Since December of the past year, we have provided and

participated in 32 training events with respect to preparedness or

potential terrorist acts and to unified response from law enforceVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:51 Jul 29, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\88193.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
97

ment. Recently the Kansas City office was selected as one of five

sites for a regional computer forensics laboratory which has been

named The Heart of America Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory, a partnership to any FBI, Federal, State and municipal law

enforcement agencies to provide examination of criminal investigations and prosecutions. By combining the extraordinary talents and

resources of law enforcement agencies at all levels, the ability to

investigate acts of terrorism will be significantly enhanced.

The Kansas City Field Office has also been selected as one of

only 20 sites for the initiation and development of Cyber Crimes

Task Force. The establishment of this task force would be a powerful tool in the fight against terrorism, white-collar crime, violent

crime, and national infrastructure protection matters. The Kansas

City Field Office has an active InfraGuard program where special

agents maintain liaison with the owners and operators of the Nations critical infrastructures.

Mr. Chairman, my remarks have been brief and have been

meant to merely highlight the counter terrorism initiatives undertaken by the Kansas City Field Office and law enforcement within

Kansas and the Western District of Missouri. While the FBI, both

nationally and within the Kansas City Field Office, have significantly increased our resources toward protecting our country

against further terrorist attacks, the FBI cannot do such alone. As

you can see, after the terrible events of September 11th, the law

enforcement community has risen to the occasion by providing significant, tangible, real-time cooperation and communication

throughout the State of Kansas and the Western District of Missouri. Through these efforts we have established a well-developed

and coordinated law enforcement capability to address and prevent

acts of terrorism. However, despite our best efforts, it is impossible

for a law enforcement agency to guarantee to its legislative oversight that future terrorism will not occur. What we can guarantee

is that men and women of the FBI, the Kansas City Field Office,

and our law enforcement partners throughout Kansas and Missouri

are serious and devoted to the role of protecting our area and our

Nation against future hostilities. This concludes my remarks.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. HORN. Thank you, and we have had very good relationships

with the FBI in both Y2K and computers within the executive

branch and now terrorism so thank you for all your doing. We appreciate it.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stafford follows:]

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

Mr. HORN. Now we’ve got Ms. Dalton, who is the strategy director for the General Accounting Office. The General Accounting Office is headed by the Comptroller General of the United States,

Dave Walker. He’s done a wonderful job and he’s got a great crew

and we always ask them to come to these hearings because we

want them, since they have over 58 reports, and you can get it, just

send them a letter and they have been into the terrorist bit for several years and so we want Ms. Dalton. There’s always something

we missed and that’s why I always put you here. You have a broad

picture on what should we have done that we didn’t do.

STATEMENT OF PATRICIA DALTON, STRATEGY DIRECTOR,

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Ms. DALTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Moran. It

is a pleasure to be here in Kansas to discuss these critical issues.

The challenges posed by homeland security exceed the capacity and

authority of any one level of government. Protecting the Nation

against these unique threats calls for truly an integrated approach

bringing together the resources of all levels of government and the

private sector and we have certainly heard today many aspects of

the roles and response of both State and local government. In my

testimony today, I would like to focus on challenges facing us of establishing a leadership structure, defining roles, developing performance goals and measures and deploying the appropriate tools

to best achieve and sustain national goals.

President Bush has taken a number of important steps to enhance the country’s homeland security efforts, including creating

the Office of Homeland Security, proposing the Department of

Homeland Security and most recently putting forth a national

strategy. Both the House and the Senate have worked diligently on

these issues and currently are deliberating many current proposals

related to homeland security. The proposals to create a statutorily

based Department of Homeland Security hold promise to strengthen leadership in this area and specifically call for coordination and

collaboration with State and local governments and the private sector. Many aspects of the proposed consolidation of homeland security programs are in line with previous GAO’s recommendation and

show promise toward reducing fragmentation and improving coordination, both among levels of government and the private sector.

For example, the new department would consolidate Federal programs for State and local planning and preparedness from several

agencies and place them under a single organizational umbrella.

Based on prior work, we believe that the consolidation of some

homeland security functions makes sense and will, if properly organized and implemented over time, lead to more efficient, effective

and coordinated programs, better intelligence sharing and more robust protection of people, borders and critical infrastructure.

However, implementation of a new department will be an extremely complex task, and in the short term, the magnitude of the

challenges that the new department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and as the Comptroller General has previously testified, will take additional resources to make it effective

in the short term. The proposals also may result in other concerns

such as maintaining a proper balance in programs with dual purVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:51 Jul 29, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\88193.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
113

pose missions, whether they be public health, research activities or

food safety.

The recently issued National Strategy for Homeland Security

provides additional clarification of roles and responsibilities. It lays

out four strategic objectives; preventing terrorist attacks within the

United States, reducing vulnerability to terrorism and minimizing

damage and recovery from attacks, the strategy provides for strong

State and local roles. However, challenges will remain in defining

appropriate inter-governmental roles. Achieving national preparedness hinges on creating effective and real partnerships, not with

Federal. Decision makers have to balance national interest of prevention and preparedness with unique needs and interests of local

communities. A one-size-fits-all Federal approach just simply will

not work. Our fieldwork at Federal agencies should be conceived as

national, not Federal in nature. And at local governments for this

commitment signifies a shift is potentially underway in the definition of roles and responsibilities between Federal, State and local

governments. These changes may have far reaching consequences

for homeland security and accountability to the public.

The challenges posed by the new threats are prompting officials

at all levels of government to rethink long-standing divisions of responsibility for such areas as fire safety, services, infrastructure

protection and airport security. In many areas proposals under consideration would impose a stronger Federal presence in the form of

new national standards or assistance. For instance, Congress is

currently considering mandating new vulnerability assessments

and protective measures on local communities for drinking water

facilities. Another area which we heard about today, first responders, reflects a dramatic upturn in the magnitude and role of the

Federal Government in providing assistance and standards for fire

service training, equipment and exercises.

Governments at the local level are also moving to rethink roles

and responsibilities to address the unique scale and scope of the

contemporary threats from terrorism. In our case studies, five metropolitan areas, we have identified several common forms of regional cooperation and coordination. These include special task

force or working groups, improved collaboration among other public

health entities, increased planning, mutual aid agreements and

communications improvements.

Performance goals and measures are also needed in homeland security programs. As the national strategy and related implementation plans evolve, we would expect clearer performance expectations to emerge. Given the need for a highly integrated approach

to the homeland security challenge, national performance goals and

measures may best be developed in a collaborative way involving

all levels of government and the private sector.

Communication is one example of an area in which standards

have not yet been developed, and other first responders have continuously highlighted that standards are needed. That’s what we

have heard today. The national strategy calls for the proposed Department of Homeland Security to develop such a national communication plan to establish protocols, processes and the standards for

technology acquisition.

114

Finally, the choice and the design of the policy tools the Federal

Government uses to engage and involve other levels of government

in the private sector in enhancing homeland security will have important consequences for performance and accountability. Governments have a variety of policy tools, including direct grants, regulations, tax incentives, and information-sharing mechanisms, available to motivate other levels of government or the private sector to

address security concerns. The choice of policy tools will affect sustainability of efforts, accountability and flexibility, and targeting of

resources.

In conclusion, although we have taken a number of important

steps, many challenges do remain. Our government partnerships

will be critical to meeting those challenges. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton follows:]

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

Mr. Horn. Our last presenter is Richard Hainje, Regional Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Thank you for

coming again. We have had you in Nebraska.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD HAINJE, DIRECTOR, REGION VII,

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Mr. HAINJE. We didn’t have that discussion about Nebraska versus Kansas at that meeting. Thank you, Chairman Horn. Thank

you, Congressman Moran, for this opportunity. I’m pleased to be

with you here today to discuss the challenges facing emergency

managers and first responders in their efforts to be better prepared

to respond to acts of terrorism. FEMA is a Federal agency responsible for leading the Nation in preparing for and responding to and

recovering from disasters. The Federal Response Plan forms the

heart of our management framework and lays out the process by

which inner agency groups work together and respond as a cohesive team to all types of disasters. It is successful because it’s built

upon existing professional disciplines, delivery systems and relationships among the participating agencies. The National Strategy

for Homeland Security proposed by President Bush builds on the

experience of the Federal Response Plan to develop one all-discipline, all-hazard plan to cover events of national significance and

clarify the roles and responsibilities of different levels of government.

FEMA Region VII takes an active role in preparing the response

to a terrorism event. It is our responsibility to coordinate Federal,

regional and State terrorism planning training and exercise activities. Prior to September 11th, the President tasked the Director of

FEMA with creating the Office of National Preparedness. The mission of the Office of National Preparedness is to provide leadership

in coordinating and facilitating all Federal efforts to assist all State

and local first responders and emergency management organizations with planning, training, equipment and exercises. To further

these efforts, the President has requested $3.5 billion in the 2003

budget to support first responder initiatives. These funds would

help them plan, train, acquire needed equipment and conduct exercises in preparation for terrorist attacks and other emergencies. In

the recent past 2002 supplemental, Congress provided FEMA with

$100 million for State and local governments to update and enhance existing emergency operation plans. The funds for the planning initiative will be allocated to the States and other State level

entities on the basis of population. These comprehensive plans will

form the foundation for the work to be done in 2003 and prepare

first responders for terrorist attacks. A unique challenge that a biological or chemical scenario would present for the first responder

community emphasizes the need for effective planning. With a covert release of a biological agent, the first responders will be physicians or animal control workers instead of the traditional first responders with whom we have a long term relationship at FEMA.

Across the government we are working to enhance our ability to

detect biological attacks, better link to public health and emergency

response communities, and train and equip traditional first responders to respond to bioterrorism. The President’s proposal to

create a Department of Homeland Security would strengthen the

140

linkages that are critical to our capacity to respond to terrorism.

Consequently, the structure of this newly proposed department recognizes that FEMA’s mission and core competencies are essential

components of homeland security. For this reason, Congress can

continue to be assured that the Nation will be prepared for acts of

terrorism and will coordinate its efforts with the entire first responder community.

Terrorism creates tremendous challenges. In recent years we

have made strives to increase cooperation between the various response communities. At FEMA, the creation of the Office of National Preparedness and our emphasis on training, planning, equipment and exercises will enable us to better focus our efforts and

will help our Nation be better prepared for the future. The proposed Department of Homeland Security will integrate these capabilities into a broader whole that will help our Nation respond to

the terrorist threat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be

happy to answer any questions.

Mr. HORN. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hainje follows:]

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

Mr. HORN. Ms. Dalton, looking at your testimony, you noted the

following: ‘‘In addition, as you know, the Intergovernmental Law

Enforcement Sharing Act of 2001, (H.R. 3483),’’ which I had sponsored, the last I knew Mr. Chambliss proposal was going through

judiciary and I don’t know where any of this is right now. All I do

know is that the FBI and local law enforcement need that authority in order to get intelligence sharing and maybe there’s some way

we can get the FBI or whatever or the Comptroller General to say

hey, it’s about time to get this rolling, if it isn’t rolling. So I’m not

sure exactly what they are doing but we need to do it.

Ms. DALTON. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. In the proposals for the

new Department of Homeland Security, I believe all of them do

provide for an intelligence sharing component. How that finally is

structured, obviously the verdict is still out, but I think there’s a

broad recognition that intelligence sharing is going to be critical to

defending our country and our people against terrorist attacks.

Mr. HORN. So that’s sitting in the Senate right now.

Ms. DALTON. It currently is. My understanding, it has gone

through the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and scheduled to go to the floor when the Senate returns.

Mr. HORN. Thank you. Gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Maynard, have Federal regulations involving the security of nuclear power plants

changed since September 11th?

Mr. MAYNARD. Yes. The regulations themselves have not. We

have been issued orders that provide increased requirements, defined specific levels of numbers of people, types of things we had

to be able to defend against. That document itself is safeguarded

so it’s difficult to go into the details of that, but we did have—orders came that all nuclear power plants had to make some changes

to their plans.

Mr. MORAN. Do you have an obligation to notify law enforcement

of some event?

Mr. MAYNARD. Yes, we do. In fact, at any suspicious event, we

have communications in place where we do notify local law enforcement and also through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission it will

be handled either by the FBI, whichever agency is most appropriate for that type of item. In fact, one of the things talked about

earlier is airplanes flying around and if there’s any suspicious activity, a call is made and the response is quite rapid.

Mr. MORAN. Is there a no-fly zone over a nuclear power plant?

Mr. MAYNARD. Yes and no. There is no longer a restricted area.

For a short time there was a restricted area that was published

that did not allow any type, any airplanes within a ten-mile radius.

Now there is a notice to airmen out that notifies all pilots to not

fly directly over any nuclear power plant or any other industrial

structure, including other types of power plants as well and definitely no loitering around or sight-seeing around them.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Hainje, FEMA, I asked earlier about the VA. Is

there any working relationship between FEMA and the Department of Veteran’s Affairs in regard to VA responding to emergencies?

Mr. HAINJE. I wouldn’t classify myself as an expert on the background with the VA response, but the way the Federal Response

153

Plan works is in any emergency and prior to any emergency, for

planning purposes, we have emergency support functions. One of

those is Disaster Medical Services and we work with the public

health as the lead on that and certainly they would draw in and

they work with their partners in the VA. So basically as a Federal

agency response under the Federal Response Plan, Public Health

would be the lead on the medical side and then they would draw

in other Federal resources to help and assist.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Stafford, can you help me at all prioritize where

we, at least from a law enforcement perspective, ought to be focussing our efforts at terrorist prevention? Congress, as I said earlier,

spends a lot of time on airport and airline security. We have talked

a bit about nuclear power plants. Mr. Horn asked about the public

water supply. Is there—certainly we had a long discussion on the

introduction of biological agents into agriculture. Is there any kind

of way to prioritize where law enforcement ought to be focussing

its efforts?

Mr. STAFFORD. As you alluded to earlier, fortunately Kansas has

a high coal electric production capability. We have tremendous telecommunications, transportation, water, financial. So most of what

we spend our time on is looking at intelligence that we have collected, analyzing it and disseminating it to the appropriate regulatory agencies, but unfortunately, I can’t provide anymore insight

than anybody else. The Bureau does not get into providing physical

security. Most of the nuclear power facilities—as a matter of fact,

theirs is so good at Wolf Creek, I was denied access for about 15

minutes when myself and a SWAT team went out there for a tour.

They have an outstanding security force. Unfortunately, that’s not

necessarily consistent among all other areas like a coal production

plant I went to in Garden City. Their security was not quite anywhere near the standards of Mr. Maynard’s so there is not the consistency probably there should be among the different types of key

assets within——

Mr. MORAN. Have you increased your intelligence capabilities?

Mr. STAFFORD. We have primarily utilized the Joint Task Force

on Terrorism. We traditionally only had access to those intelligence

basis within our unit. As I indicated, we have 18 different agencies.

Some of those agencies have actually brought their computers into

our space so we can gain immediate access through their employees

and our space. Other agencies, all we have to do is make a phone

call and we can gain access into their intelligence systems.

Mr. MORAN. There’s been some criticism, suggestion about the inability of the FBI or the failure of the FBI to communicate from

region to region. Is that different today than if it was a problem,

is it less of a problem?

Mr. STAFFORD. It’s definitely less of a problem through the joint

leaders of task forces.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Maynard, to give you the chance, it does seem

like perhaps we have highlighted nuclear power generation. Is

there anything you would like to point out about others who generate electricity as well, kind of important things we ought to be

aware of and not just nuclear that would be a problem?

Mr. MAYNARD. Well, I believe as a Nation we have to be careful

that we don’t get focused on one industry or one activity and put

154

all our efforts on that. Nuclear power plants certainly get highlighted as targets, but it’s also one of the best defended, most robust-built facilities around. We have other infrastructure items and

other industries; petro chemical, pharmaceutical. There’s a lot of

different other industries that may not have that same level of security and for a Nation to focus totally on one that may already

have it and not focus on some of the others, I think, would be a

mistake so I think we need to take a big picture look.

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, sir. Thank you all.

Mr. HORN. Ms. Dalton, in your testimony you say that in leadership by statute will ensure among others things that it’s held accountable to Congress and the American people but without performance measures such as national standards to ensure that all

first responders receive proper training and equipment, how could

anyone determine whether the department is doing a good job despite all the PR and so forth, so what is your feeling on that on

getting the standards in there?

Ms. DALTON. I think establishing performance standards, performance goals and performance measures is certainly one of the

critical next steps that we need to take as a country to ensure that

we have established clearly what we want to accomplish, how we

want to accomplish it and ultimately determine whether or not we

have in fact accomplished it. By forming the Department of Homeland Security, certainly that provides a focal point in leadership

and does enhance accountability to that extent, but it’s important

to take it to the next step which is clearly stated in the National

Strategy of establishing performance measures and standards and

then as I said, holding ourselves accountable to them. So, that will

be the next step, and it’s part of an evolving response to the events

of September 11th.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Hainje, you fit right in there because you and

GAO agree that national standards are necessary if we’re going to

have a successful national homeland security strategy. I remember

Mr. Albaugh, the Director of FEMA, has also stressed the importance of nationwide standards. Is FEMA working on setting these

standards and if so, how can we see them?

Mr. HAINJE. I think we are working for the guarantee of minimum capability at each State and some of the issues that will be

resolved there will be as we receive plans from the States under

the planning grant that are coming up, plans that will be more

elaborate as to how they intend to proceed within their States and

then try to give guidance as that process goes along. Well, the Office of National Preparedness was given the issue, if you will, of

supporting the development of comprehensive response plans that

hopefully will help with some standardization. There also has been

assignment to FEMA. Ron Miller, the Chief Information Officer of

FEMA is being asked to work on standardization and interoperability of communications equipment and that’s an issue that keeps

coming up and something that I worked with in my former life

also, where we tried to make a State-wide compatible interoperable

system so Project Safecom is something that numerous agencies at

the Federal level are working together on and Ron Miller from

FEMA is the lead on that. And then also trying to improve and

make even more standard the training that is provided to first reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:51 Jul 29, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00158 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\88193.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
155

sponders and I guess those are some of the areas where we’re trying to work a little bit toward standardization.

Mr. HORN. Thank you. I’m now going to thank the people that

really put this together and it isn’t easy to have long distances and

everything else. The staff director, chief counsel of the subcommittee is Mr. Russell George, which will probably be one of his last

ones because he’s been confirmed to be the Inspector General of the

agency; Dave Bartel, is he here? Chief of Staff. There he is. He’s

the gentleman that looks like he’s Secretary of State. For you Kansans, he is a Kansan and he was Nancy Kassebaum’s Chief of Staff

and the minute she retired, pulled him back out of the Senate and

I think we can probably make a few comments about foot and

mouth disease in terms of Senate versus the House and we were

delighted to have Dave come over and be my Chief of Staff. He’s

done a great job for Kansas and California. Now, of course, I come

from Long Beach, California where it’s called Iowa by the Sea and

there was a lot of Kansans in there, too, at the turn of the century

and then to my left here and your right is Bonnie Heald, the Deputy Staff Director and the gentleman trying to get all microphones

going and everything is Chris Barkley, the assistant to the subcommittee. Michael Sazonov is not with us today but he’s the staff

assistant also for this; and Mr. Moran’s staff were very helpful, Kip

Peterson and Travis Murphy; and the person that really was very

kind to us in terms of this auditorium and the Eisenhower situation is Daniel Holt and his staff and I had a chance to talk with

him yesterday for a couple of hours and if there was ever an encyclopedia of modern history in the second world war and the General Eisenhower so we appreciate—Dan, are you out there somewhere? This is a wonderful area and auditorium and I gather the

former president, of course, will be here to announce all that and

our court reporter is Kathy Bonfiglio. We thank you all for that.

Jerry, in particular, we’re delighted. I know Members of Congress

this time are out usually campaigning. I would hope he doesn’t

have to campaign very much.

Mr. MORAN. Always, sir.

Mr. HORN. That’s right. So thank you very much and we’re delighted to be here. We’re adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

156

157

158

159

160

Æ