United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 21-3367

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375 Slane Chapel Road, LLC

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Stone County, Missouri, et al.

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin

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 Submitted: June 15, 2022

Filed: November 22, 2022

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Before LOKEN and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and MENENDEZ, District Judge.*

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Joseph and Yvonne Cordell own 375 Slane Chapel Road, LLC (“375”), a

limited liability companythat owns and operates a substantial vacation home adjacent

to Table Rock Lake in Stone County, Missouri. When the Cordells’ personal use of

*The Honorable Katherine M. Menendez, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
the home declined, 375 applied in October 2020 for a conditional use permit (“CUP”)

to rent out the property to short-term renters on platforms such as Airbnb. A CUP is

required by Art. 4, § 25 of the Stone County Zoning Regulations (the “Short-Term

Rental Regulation”). After a November 17 hearing at which 375 presented testimony

and exhibits in favor of the application and Marlin Constance, a nearby property

owner, spoke in opposition, the Stone County Planning & Zoning Commission

approved the application by a 7-6 vote. Constance appealed the Commission’s

decision to the Stone County Board of Adjustment. See Stone Cty. Zoning Reg., Art.

27, §§ 1(F), 3. After a hearing on April 13, 2021 at which those supporting and

opposing 375’s application appeared, the Board of Adjustment voted 3-0 to reverse

the Planning & Zoning Commission’s decision and deny 375 a CUP.

On May 12, 375 filed separate actions in state and federal court to overturn the

Board of Adjustment’s decision. In the Western District of Missouri, 375 filed this

federal action, alleging that the Short-Term Rental Regulation is unconstitutionally

vague on its face and as applied to 375 because, by using the word “may,” the

regulation gives the Board of Adjustment unbridled discretion. One hour later, 375

filed a certiorari action in the Circuit Court of Stone County against the Board of

Adjustment under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 64.870, alleging that the Board’s decision was not

supported by competent and substantial evidence, and that the Board unlawfully

applied the Short-Term Rental Regulation in a disparate and discriminatory manner

in violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Missouri

Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Mo. Const. art. 1, § 2. 

Defendants promptly moved to dismiss this lawsuit, arguing, as relevant here, 

that 375’s federal claims are “barred by the Younger abstention doctrine.” Invoking

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the district court granted the motion,

abstained from adjudicating the federal complaint in deference to “the parallel state

court proceeding,” dismissed 375’s complaint without prejudice, and subsequently

denied 375’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. 375 appeals these

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rulings. Concluding that the district court misinterpreted the “exceptional

circumstances” warranting Younger abstention as defined in SprintCommunications

v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78, 82 (2013), we reverse. 

I. The Abstention Landscape

In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that, absent “extraordinary

circumstances,” “the possible unconstitutionality of a [state]statute ‘on itsface’ does

not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it.” 401 U.S.

at 54. Though Younger reversed a federal court injunction of a state criminal

prosecution, the Court later “clarified and expanded” the scope of the Younger

abstention doctrine to include limited types of civil cases. See Minn. Living

Assistance, Inc. v. Peterson, 899 F.3d 548, 551 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139

S. Ct. 1195 (2019) (citing cases); 17B Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice

& Procedure § 4254 (3d ed. 2022 Supp.). In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v.

Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), where an attorney challenged the

constitutionality of ongoing state attorney disciplinary proceedings, the Court

explained that “[t]he policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal

judicial proceedings when importantstate interests are involved,” such asthe state bar

disciplinary proceedings at issue. Id. at 432-34. Applying Middlesex, federal courts

in subsequent cases considered what are called the three “Middlesex factors” in

deciding whether to abstain: whether there is an “(1) ongoing state judicial

proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) provides an

adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81 (cleaned up). 

In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans

(“NOPSI”), the Court altered this analysis when it emphasized that “only exceptional

circumstances justify a federal court’s refusal to decide a case in deference to the

States.” 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989). The Court explained that the requisite

“exceptional circumstances” are limited to three types of state civil and criminal

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proceedings: (1) “pending state criminal prosecutions,” (2) certain “civil enforcement

proceedings” warranting abstention, and (3) “civil proceedings involving certain

orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their

judicial functions.” Id. In NOPSI, the Court reversed the lower courts’ decision to

abstain in a federal case seeking judicial review of a city council’s rate-making

decision because review of that decision was also pending in state court:

[I]t has never been suggested that Younger requires abstention in

deference to a state judicial proceeding reviewing legislative or

executive action. Such a broad abstention requirement would make a

mockery of the rule that only exceptional circumstancesjustify a federal

court’s refusal to decide a case in deference to the States. . . . [W]e have

never extended [Younger] to proceedings that are not ‘judicial in

nature.’ . . . The Council’s proceedings in the present case were not

judicial in nature.

* * * * *

There is no contention here that the Louisiana courts’ review [of

the Council’s decision] involves anything other than a judicial act . . . .

As a challenge to completed legislative action, NOPSI’s suit . . . is,

insofar as our policies of federal comity are concerned, no different in

substance froma facial challenge to an allegedly unconstitutionalstatute

or zoning ordinance -- which we would assuredly not require to be

brought in state courts.

Id. at 368, 370, 372 (cleaned up). In reversing, the Court applied its long-standing

principle that “federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of

jurisdiction that has been conferred,” a principle that “do[es] not call into question,

the federal courts’ discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief.” 

Id. at 358-59 (citations omitted).

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Over two decades later, reviewing administrative action being challenged in

federal and state court, the Supreme Court again reversed a circuit court abstention

order, this time by our court, in Sprint Communications v. Jacobs. In an opinion by

Justice Ginsburg, the unanimous Court, citing NOPSI, emphasized that “federal

courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction. Abstention

is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same

subject matter.” 571 U.S. at 72. Rather, Younger extends only to the three

“exceptional circumstances” the Court identified in NOPSI – state criminal

prosecutions, civil enforcement proceedings, and “civil proceedings involving certain

orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial

functions.” Id. at 78, citing NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368, and two prior cases NOPSI cited

to define the third limited class of cases. Noting that our court had relied on the

Middlesex factors to support abstention, the Court explained that the Middlesex

factors are “additional factors appropriately considered . . . before invoking

Younger,” id. at 81, to be considered after the NOPSI category has been satisfied:

Divorced from their quasi-criminal context, the three Middlesex

conditions would extend Younger to virtually all parallel state and

federal proceedings, at least where a party could identify a plausibly

important state interest. That result is irreconcilable with our dominant

instruction that, even in the presence of parallel state proceedings,

abstention fromthe exercise of federal jurisdiction isthe “exception, not

the rule.” In short, to guide other federal courts, we today clarify and

affirm that Younger extends to the three “exceptional circumstances”

identified in NOPSI, but no further.

Id. at 81-82 (citations omitted). Applying this directive, we held in Minnesota Living

Assistance, 899 F.3d at 552, that determining whether Younger abstention is

appropriate requires a three-part inquiry:

First, does the underlying state proceeding fall within one of the three

“exceptional circumstances” where Younger abstention is appropriate?

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Second, if the underlying proceeding fits within a Younger category,

does the state proceeding satisfy what are known as the “Middlesex”

factors? And third, even if the underlying state proceeding satisfies the

first two inquiries, is abstention nevertheless inappropriate because an

exception to abstention applies?

The district court’s decision to abstain is reviewed for abuse of discretion. “Whether

Younger abstention is appropriate is a question of law, and the district court abuses

its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Id. at 551 (citations omitted). 

II. Discussion

Citing Minnesota Living Assistance, the district court correctly recognized

“that a federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a case [under

Younger] if there is a parallel state proceeding which fits into one of three narrow

categories.” But the court fell off the proper analytical path when it quoted the third

category as paraphrased in Minnesota Living Assistance -- “a proceeding implicating

a state’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts,” 899 F.3d at 552

-- instead of the third category as carefully defined in NOPSI and quoted verbatim in

Sprint -- “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance

of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” 491 U.S. at 368. 

The district court’s definition of what we will call Category 3 shares the flaw

in relying exclusively on the Middlesex factors identified by the Supreme Court in

Sprint -- it “would extend Younger to virtually all parallel state and federal

proceedings . . . where a party could identify a plausibly important state interest.” 

571 U.S. at 81. The two cases cited by NOPSI as examples of Category 3 make clear

that its focus is institutional -- “the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial

functions” -- not simply the State’s interest in enforcing a particular court order.

NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368. Both involved challenges to the process by which a State

compels compliance with the judgments of its courts. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,

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335-36 (1977), involved the state courts’ ability to enforce a civil contempt order;

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1987), involved the state courts’

ability to enforce a posting of bond pending appeal. See 430 U.S. at 335; 481 U.S.

at 3-6.

The parties’ briefs on appeal focused almost entirely on the Middlesex factors,

skipping over the first inquiry which a party seeking Younger abstention mustsatisfy. 

When asked at oral argument which of the three NOPSI categories applies, counsel

for Defendants said categories “two and three are both potential candidates to be

applied in this situation.”1 We conclude neither category applies and therefore the

district court erred in abstaining under Younger. 

A. Category 2. The second NOPSI category, a “civil enforcement

proceeding,” is limited to cases involving state proceedings that are “akin to a

criminal prosecution” “in important respects.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.

592, 604 (1975). That is, civil proceedings that are “quasi-criminal” in nature. 

Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81. In deciding this question, the Court in Sprint asked: (1) was

the action commenced by the State in itssovereign capacity? (2) Wasthe proceeding

initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff for some wrongful act? (3) Are there other

similaritiesto criminal actions, such as a preliminary investigation culminating in the

filing of formal charges? See id. at 79-80. 

We conclude that, without question, neither the administrative zoning

proceeding, nor the on-going certiorari proceeding seeking judicial review of the

Adjustment Board’s decision, was quasi-criminal in nature. There is no state

enforcement proceeding here, no action initiated by “the State in its sovereign

capacity.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 80. 375, a private company, initiated the civil

1NOPSI Category 1 unquestionably does not apply asthis case does not involve

a criminal proceeding. Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78.

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administrative proceeding to obtain a needed permit. This private action is not “akin

to a criminal prosecution.” Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604. 375’s federal complaint does

not allege that a government authority investigated 375’s activities or lodged a formal

complaint against 375. Defendants argue, without citing any authority, thatCategory

2 applies because Stone County might have begun enforcement proceedings had 375

not applied for a CUP. Counsel at oral argument could not identify a principle that

would limit thistheory of “exceptional circumstances,” and other courts have refused

to apply the doctrine in similar circumstances. See Titlemax of Del., Inc. v.

Weissmann, 24 F.4th 230, 237 (3d Cir. 2022) (“possibility of contempt” proceedings

does not trigger Younger abstention). Abstention is “the exception, not the rule,” and

Younger abstention is limited to the three NOPSI “exceptional categories.” Sprint,

571 U.S. at 82. Here, the NOPSI Category 2 shoe does not fit. 

B. Category 3. The third NOPSI category is limited to “civil proceedings

involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to

perform their judicial functions.” 491 U.S. at 368. The district court’s decision that

this case falls within Category 3 reflected its flawed definition of the scope of this

category. The court concluded that “this particular state court proceeding is

sufficiently judicial in nature to ‘implicate the state’s interest in enforcing the orders

and judgments of its court’” because judicial appeal of an action applying zoning

regulationsis “quasi-judicial in nature,” and “Missouri’s ability to administer zoning

and land use-related matters is an important state interest implicating principles of

comity and federalism.” In support, the court cited Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Fort

Smith, 163 F.3d 475 (8th Cir. 1998), a decision that applied the Middlesex factors

without addressing whether the case fell within at least one of the NOPSI categories. 

At oral argument, Defendants argued that Category 3 applies because planning

and zoning land-use issues are quintessential matters of state law and therefore

federal courts should not interfere with these proceedings. Like the district court,

Defendants focus on interference with matters of state interest, a Middlesex factor

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that is only addressed if NOPSI Category 3 is satisfied. Defendants emphasize that

“the State Action is ongoing and judicial in nature.” But this ignores the Supreme

Court’srepeated reminder that parallelstate court proceedings do not detractfromthe

“virtually unflagging obligation” of federal courts “to exercise the jurisdiction given

them.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 77. 

Category 3 is limited to civil proceedings involving orders “uniquely in

furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Category

3 does not include “a state judicial proceeding reviewing legislative or executive

action,” such as denying 375 a zoning permit. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368; see FCA US,

LLC v. Spitzer Autoworld Akron, LLC, 887 F.3d 278, 290 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[t]he

Ohio administrative proceeding [at issue] has no relation to . . . orders that are

uniquely in furtherance of the judicial function of the Ohio courts.”). Nor is Category

3 triggered simply because the state civil administrative proceeding involves a

quintessentially state-law matter such as zoning and land-use planning. See, e.g.,

Cavanaugh v. Geballe, 28 F.4th 428, 432-35 (2d Cir. 2022) (probate proceedings);

Cook v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2018) (family law); Boerschig v.

Trans-Pecos Pipeline, L.L.C., 872 F.3d 701, 705 n.2 (5thCir. 2017) (eminent-domain

proceedings). Because this parallel federal action does not interfere with “the state

courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions,” it does not fall within the narrow

parameters of NOPSI Category 3 and therefore does not deprive the district court of

jurisdiction. 

The Judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded to the

district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.2 On remand,

given the parallel state court proceeding, we urge the district court to focus on the

2As we conclude the district court erred in dismissing 375’s Complaint without

prejudice, we need not address the court’s denial of 375’s motion for post-judgment

relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

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Supreme Court’s reminder that a decision not to abstain “do[es] not call into question,

the federal courts’ discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief.” 

NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 358-59; cf. Window World, Int’l, LLC v. O’Toole, 21 F.4th 1029,

1034 (8th Cir. 2022). 

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