alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Andrew Lastuvka, Respondent, v Kim E. Pearson et al., Respondents, and P.C. Richard & Son Long Island Corporation et al., Appellants.

[820 NYS2d 630]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants EC. Richard & Son Long Island Corporation, EC. Richard & Son, LLC, EC. Richard & Son Service Company, Inc., and A. J. Richard & Sons, Inc., appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Whelan, J.), dated May 3, 2005, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, the motion is granted, the complaint and all cross claims are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellants, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

The plaintiff was riding on a motorcycle when it allegedly was "clipped” by a jeep operated by the defendant Kim E. Fearson, which allegedly forced the plaintiff to leave the roadway and slide onto a grassy area beyond a curb and strike a wooden post of a sign erected by the appellants.

The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the appellants, alleging that his injuries were caused by the placement of the sign, which had been negligently erected without municipal approval. The appellants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them. The Supreme Court denied the motion. We reverse.

The appellants established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by demonstrating that the proximate cause of the accident was the manner in which the subject vehicles *501were operated. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the placement of the sign was a proximate cause of the accident (see *Tomassi v Town of Union,*46 NY2d 91 [1978]; *Ficarra v Parker,*8 AD3d 333 [2004]; *Thomas v Halmar Bldrs. of N.Y.,*290 AD2d 502 [2002]). Miller, J.P., Schmidt, Mastro and Lunn, JJ., concur.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 Michael V. Shustek, as Chief Executive Officer of Vestin Mortgage, Inc., the
sole Manager of Vestin Fund III, LLC (the Registrant), and Lance K. Bradford,
as Chief Financial Officer of Vestin Mortgage, Inc., hereby certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §1350, that  (1)
    
    the Registrants Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended
September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), fully complies with
the applicable requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Registrant. Dated: November 15, 2004
    
    /s/ Michael V. ShustekMichael V. Shustek*Chief Executive Officerof Vestin Mortgage, Inc.,Manager of the RegistrantDated: November 15, 2004
    
    /s/ Lance K. BradfordLance K. Bradford*Chief Financial Officerof Vestin Mortgage, Inc.,Manager of the Registrant
 * Michael V. Shustek and Lance K. Bradford function, respectively, as the
equivalent of the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Registrant for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.
#### In the Matter of Louis Kliegman et al., Appellants, against Joseph D. McGoldrick, as State Rent Administrator, Respondent.

Proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to review a determination of the respondent, State Rent Administrator, which establishes the maximum rent of an apartment in a building owned by appellants at $64.25 a month. The administrator found that the maximum rent on March 1, 1943, was $55; that 15% is to be added thereto under the equalization adjustment of May 1,1953, and that an additional $1 is to be added for a television aerial. Appellants contend that the maximum rent on March 1, 1943, was $60, as appears from the registration certificate filed with the Federal rent office by the then owner of the premises. The proof is that on March 1, 1943, the premises were under a lease calling for $60 a month, but the lease instrument further provided that the tenant might pay $55, and did actually pay $55. The proof further establishes that after the equalization adjustment regulations came into effect on May 1, 1953, the appellants demanded $70 a month from the tenant, and that upon refusal appellants brought a summary proceeding in the Municipal Court of the City of New York where, in reliance upon the registration certificate, the court granted a final order in favor of appellants. Thereafter, the local rent administrator determined the maximum rent to be $64.25. In a second dispossess proceeding brought by the appellants, the determination fixing the maximum rent at $64.25 was before the court and the proceeding was dismissed. Petitioners appeal from an order denying the petition and dismissing the proceeding. Order unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements. No opinion. Present — MacCrate, Acting, P. J., Schmidt, Beldock, Murphy and Ughetta, JJ.
Order entered January 15, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-01067-CR

JIMMY DEWAYNE HILL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F09-53582-W

ORDER

The Court REINSTATES the appeal.

On October 30, 2014, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding the status of 

the clerk’s record and appellate counsel. On November 14, 2014, we received the clerk’s record, 

but we note that it does not contain the trial court’s certification of appellant’s right to appeal. 

On January 15, 2015, we received the trial court’s findings that appellant filed a waiver of the 

right to counsel and that no hearing was conducted on the motion for judgment nunc pro tunc 

that is the subject of this appeal. Accordingly, appellant is pursuing the appeal from the trial 

court’s November 4, 2014 nunc pro tunc order pro se.
We ORDER the trial court to prepare and file, within TEN DAYS of the date of this 

order, a certification of appellant’s right to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a), (d); Cortez v. 

State, 420 S.W.3d 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

We DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to send appellant paper copies of the 4-volume 

reporter’s record filed on August 27, 2014, the clerk’s record filed on November 14, 2014 and 

the supplemental clerk’s record filed on January 15, 2015.

We note that appellant tendered a pro se brief on September 10, 2014. The brief does not 

contain citations to the record. Accordingly, we ORDER appellant to filed, by MARCH 10, 

2015, an amended brief that complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. If appellant 

does not file his amended brief within the time specified, the appeal will be submitted on the 

deficient brief subject to the provisions of Texas Rule of Appellate 38.9. See also Lott v. State, 

874 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to the 

Honorable Tracy Holmes, Presiding Judge, 363rd Judicial District Court; Felicia Pitre, Dallas 

County District Clerk; and to the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send a copy of this order, as well as the clerk’s and reporter’s 

records as set out above, to Jimmy Hill, TDCJ No. 1719333, Boyd Unit, 200 Spur 113, Teague, 

Texas 75860.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
### SUBCHAPTER I—GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND REPORTS
§ 500.5 Name and place of business of manufacturer, packer or distributor. ( a ) The label of a consumer commodity shall specify conspicuously the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor. Where the consumer commodity is not manufactured by the person whose name appears on the label, the name shall be qualified by a phrase that reveals the connection such person has with such commodity; such as “Manufactured for ______,” “Distributed by ______,” or any other wording that expresses the facts.
( b ) The requirement for declaration of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor shall in the case of a corporation be deemed to be satisfied only by the actual corporate name, which may be preceded or followed by the name of the particular division of the corporation. In the case of an individual, partnership, or association, the name under which the business is conducted shall be used.
( c ) The statement of the place of business shall include the street address, city, state, and zip code; however, the street address may be omitted if it is listed in a readily accessible, widely published, and publicly available resource, including but not limited to a printed directory, electronic database, or Web site.
( d ) If a person manufactures, packs, or distributes a consumer commodity at a place other than his principal place of business, the label may state the principal place of business in lieu of the actual place where such consumer commodity was manufactured or packed or is to be distributed, unless such statement would be misleading.
( e ) Standard abbreviations may be used in complying with the requirements of this section.
[59 FR 1872, Jan. 12, 1994, as amended at 80 FR 71689, Nov. 17, 2015]
#### § 295.10 Special reporting and auditing requirements.

Each award by the Program shall contain procedures regarding technical, business, and financial reporting and auditing requirements to ensure that awards are being used in accordance with the Program's objectives and applicable Federal cost principles. The purpose of the technical reporting is to monitor “best effort” progress toward overall project goals. The purpose of the business reporting system is to monitor project performance against the Program's mission as required by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) mandate for program evaluation. The audit standards to be applied to ATP awards are the “Government Auditing Standards” (GAS) issued by the Comptroller General of the United States (also known as yellow book standards) and the ATP program-specified audit guidelines. The ATP program-specific audit guidelines include guidance on the number of audits required under an award. In the interest of efficiency, the recipients are encouraged to retain their own independent CPA firm to perform these audits. The Department of Commerce's Office of Inspector General (OIG) reserves the right to conduct audits as deemed necessary and appropriate.

[62 FR 64686, Dec. 9, 1997. Redesignated at 63 FR 64415, Nov. 20, 1998]
#### § 1117.7 Confidentiality of reports.

The confidentiality provisions of section 6 of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2055, apply to reports submitted under this part. The Commission shall afford information submitted under this part the protection afforded to information submitted under section 15(b), in accordance with section 6(b)(5) of the CPSA and subpart G of part 1101 of title 16 of the CFR.
#### § 260.17 Source reduction claims.

It is deceptive to misrepresent, directly or by implication, that a product or package has been reduced or is lower in weight, volume, or toxicity. Marketers should clearly and prominently qualify source reduction claims to the extent necessary to avoid deception about the amount of the source reduction and the basis for any comparison.

# Example:

An advertiser claims that disposal of its product generates “10% less waste.” The marketer does not accompany this claim with a general environmental benefit claim. Because this claim could be a comparison to the advertiser's immediately preceding product or to its competitors' products, the advertiser should have substantiation for both interpretations. Otherwise, the advertiser should clarify which comparison it intends and have substantiation for that comparison. A claim of “10% less waste than our previous product” would not be deceptive if the advertiser has substantiation that shows that the current product's disposal contributes 10% less waste by weight or volume to the solid waste stream when compared with the immediately preceding version of the product.
§ 1615.2 Scope and application. ( a ) This Standard provides a test method to determine the flammability of items as defined in § 1615.1(d).
( b ) All items as defined in § 1615.1(d) are subject to requirements of this standard.
( c ) The flammability standards for clothing textiles and vinyl plastic film, parts 1610 and 1611 of this chapter, are superseded by this part insofar as they apply to items defined in § 1615.1(d).
[40 FR 59903, Dec. 30, 1975, as amended at 64 FR 34533, June 28, 1999]
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In the Interest of E.G., a Child

Appellate case number: 01-19-00035-CV

Trial court case number: 2016-03159J

Trial court: 314th District Court of Harris County

Appellants, A.G. and S.C., have filed notices of appeal of the trial court’s Final 

Decree for Termination, signed on December 31, 2018. And, the notice of appeal of S.C. 

reflects that she is indigent and may proceed on appeal without payment of costs. See

TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(a), (b)(1).

The clerk’s record was due to be filed in this Court by January 14, 2019. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 28.4(a)(1), 35.1(b). On January 16, 2019, the Clerk of this Court notified the 

trial court clerk that a clerk’s record had not been filed and directed the trial court clerk to 

file the clerk’s record no later than January 28, 2019. Neither a clerk’s record nor a 

motion for an extension of time has been filed. Accordingly, the trial court clerk is

ordered to file, at no cost to appellants, a clerk’s record in this appeal within 10 days 

of the date of this order. No extensions of time will be granted.

1 See id. 28.4(b)(2), 

35.3(c).

If the clerk’s record is not filed as directed, we may abate the appeal and remand 

the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the reason for the failure to 

file the clerk’s record in this appeal.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Julie Countiss

  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: ___January 31, 2019____

 

1 Because this appeal involves the termination of the parent-child relationship, this Court is 

required to bring the appeal to final disposition within 180 days of the date the first notice 

of appeal was filed, so far as reasonably possible. See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2, reprinted 

in TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. F app.
/lruu 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 

October 10, 2014 

Kevin Schlemmer 

Chief of the Air Service Analysis Division 

Office of Air Service Analysis 

Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, W86-309 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

Dear Mr. Schlemmer: 

On behalf of the Paducah Area Chamber of Commerce, please accept our sincere 

appreciation for taking time from your busy schedule to meet with our business and 

community leaders during our recent trip to Washington, D. C. 

Your insight and guidance on issues that are important to the Paducah I McCracken 

County business community and to the Purchase Region are invaluable to us as we strive 

to provide employment opportunities and a healthy economy for area residents. (Priority 

Projects list enclosed) 

If the Paducah Chamber can ever be of assistance to you, please contact Chamber 

President Sandra Wilson at 270-443-1746 x 812 or swilson@paducahchamber.org 

Sincerely, 

Deborah Edmonds, Chair 

Board of Directors 

9u- ?~fz;;zJ- Joe Tarantino, Chair 

2014 D. C. Fly-In Committee 

300 SOUTH 3RD STREET • P.O. BOX 810 • PADUCAH, KENTUCKY 42002-0810 

270.443.1746 • FAX 270.442.9152 • info@paducahchamber.org • www.paducahchamber.org
§ 318.4 Timeliness of notification. ( a ) *In general.* Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section (exception for law enforcement), all notifications required under § 318.3(a)(1) (required notice to individuals), (a)(3) (required notice to media), and (b) (required notice by third party service providers), shall be sent without unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days after the discovery of a breach of security.
( b ) *Timing of notice to FTC.* All notifications required under § 318.5(c) (regarding notice to FTC) involving the unsecured PHR identifiable health information of 500 or more individuals shall be provided contemporaneously with the notice required by paragraph (a) of this section. All logged notifications required under § 318.5(c) (regarding notice to FTC) involving the unsecured PHR identifiable health information of fewer than 500 individuals may be sent annually to the Federal Trade Commission no later than 60 calendar days following the end of the calendar year.
( c ) *Burden of proof.* The vendor of personal health records, PHR related entity, and third party service provider involved shall have the burden of demonstrating that all notifications were made as required under this part, including evidence demonstrating the necessity of any delay.
( d ) *Law enforcement exception.* If a law enforcement official determines that a notification, notice, or posting required under this part would impede a criminal investigation or cause damage to national security, such notification, notice, or posting shall be delayed. This paragraph (d) shall be implemented in the same manner as provided under 45 CFR 164.528(a)(2), in the case of a disclosure covered under § 164.528(a)(2).
**
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, CoreyHenry, certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2019-2(the “Exchange Act periodic reports”); 

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports; 

4. Basedon my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement inall material respects; and 

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria forasset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included inthis report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwisedisclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Wells FargoBank, N.A. and Computershare Trust Company, N.A. 

 
By: 
/s/ Corey Henry
Name: Corey HenryTitle: President and Chief Executive Officer Santander Drive Auto Receivables LLC, as Depositor (senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)Date: March 31, 2023**
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 233 (Monday, December 6, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Page 70468]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-26702]



[[Page 70468]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-1560-DR]


Georgia; Amendment No. 4 to Notice of a Major Disaster 
Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Directorate, Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Georgia (FEMA-1560-DR), dated September 24, 2004, and 
related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 1, 2004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Magda Ruiz, Recovery Division, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2705.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the 
Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of 
Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, Jesse F. 
Munoz, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer 
for this declared disaster.
    This action terminates my appointment of James N. Russo as Federal 
Coordinating Officer for this disaster.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) 
are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community 
Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis 
Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, 
Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management 
Assistance; 97.048, Individuals and Households Housing; 97.049, 
Individuals and Households Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 
Individuals and Households Program--Other Needs, 97.036, Public 
Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of 
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 04-26702 Filed 12-3-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-10-P
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### Part E—Children With Serious Emotional Disturbances
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v J.W. Hardy, II, Also Known as J.W. Hardy, Jr., Appellant.

[821 NYS2d 533]

Appeal from a judgment of the Orleans County Court (James P. Punch, J.), rendered February 28, 2005. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting *1318him, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 220.06 [1]). Defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because he agreed to waive his right to appeal only if he was sentenced to the “Willard program,” and he was not so sentenced. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court stated at the time of the plea that it would sentence defendant to the Willard program if it appeared at sentencing that such a sentence was appropriate, and defendant waived his right to appeal. The record further establishes that the court was advised at sentencing that defendant was ineligible for that program. We thus conclude that defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal was knowingly and intelligently entered *(see People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; *People v Kemp,*94 NY2d 831, 833 [1999]; *People v Moissett,*76 NY2d 909, 910-911 [1990]). By pleading guilty, defendant forfeited his contention concerning nonjurisdictional defects in the indictment *(see People v Cox,*275 AD2d 924, 925 [2000], *lv denied*95 NY2d 962 [2000]). In any event, the valid waiver by defendant of the right to appeal encompasses that nonjurisdictional challenge *(see generally People v Verrone,*266 AD2d 16, 18 [1999]). We have examined defendant’s remaining contention and conclude that it lacks merit. Present — Gorski, J.P., Martoche, Smith and Pine, JJ.