Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 

House of Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office

GAO 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:00 a.m. 

Tuesday, July 9, 2002 HOMELAND SECURITY 

New Department Could 

Improve Biomedical R&D 

Coordination but May 

Disrupt Dual-Purpose 

Efforts 

Statement of Janet Heinrich 

Director, Health Care—Public Health Issues 

GAO-02-924T 
Page 1 GAO-02-924T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss one component—

the potential effect on biomedical research—of the proposed creation of 

the Department of Homeland Security. Since the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax incidents, there has been 

concern about the ability of the federal government to prepare for and 

coordinate an effective public health response to such events, given the 

broad distribution of responsibility for that task at the federal level. Our 

earlier work found, for example, that more than 20 federal departments 

and agencies carry some responsibility for bioterrorism research, 

preparedness, and response and that these efforts are fragmented.1

The President’s proposed Homeland Security Act of 20022

 would bring 

many of the federal entities with homeland security responsibilities, 

including biomedical research and development, into one department. 

Title III of the proposed legislation would transfer responsibility for 

certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear research and 

development programs and activities to the new department.3

 Much of the 

research in these areas is sponsored by or conducted at the Department of 

Health and Human Services’ (HHS) National Institutes of Health (NIH). 

The proposal would also transfer the Laboratory Registration/Select Agent 

Transfer Program—which controls biological agents with the potential for 

use in bioterrorism—from HHS’s Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC) to the new department. 

In order to assist the Subcommittee in its consideration of this extensive 

reorganization of our government, my remarks will focus on the potential 

effects of a reorganization on biomedical research under Title III of the 

President’s proposal. My testimony today is based largely on our previous 

and ongoing work on homeland security,4

 as well as a review of the 

proposed legislation. 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness 

Activities, GAO-01-915 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2001). 

2

H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002). 

3

These changes are primarily covered by Sections 301, 302, and 303 of the President’s 

proposed legislation. 

4

See Related GAO Products at the end of this testimony. 
Page 2 GAO-02-924T 

In summary, the proposed Department of Homeland Security would be 

tasked with developing national policy for and coordination of the federal 

government’s civilian research and development efforts to counter 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. GAO has 

consistently stated that there is a need for a strategic plan and better 

coordination of existing research and development programs. The new 

department could improve coordination of the biomedical research and 

development efforts. We are concerned, however, that the proposed 

transfer of control and priority setting for research from the organizations 

where the research would be conducted could be disruptive to dualpurpose programs,5

 which have important synergies that need to be 

maintained. Transferring control over these programs, including priority 

setting, to the new department has the potential to disrupt some programs 

that are critical to basic public health responsibility. The President’s 

proposal is not sufficiently clear on how both the homeland security and 

the biomedical research objectives would be accomplished. Because the 

select agent program’s mission fits with homeland security, its transfer to 

the new department is appropriate. 

In response to global challenges the government faces in the coming years, 

we have a unique opportunity to create an extremely effective and 

performance-based organization that can strengthen the nation’s ability to 

protect its borders and citizens against terrorism. There is likely to be 

considerable benefit over time from restructuring some of the homeland 

security functions, including reducing risk and improving the economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness of these consolidated agencies and programs. 

Realistically, however, in the short term, the magnitude of the challenges 

that the new department faces will clearly require substantial time and 

effort, and will take additional resources to make it fully effective. 

The Comptroller General has testified that the Congress should consider 

several very specific criteria in its evaluation of whether individual 

 5

In this testimony, dual-purpose programs refer to biomedical research and development 

programs that are applicable to both bioterrorism and other health research. For example, 

NIH supports research to expand knowledge of factors that play a decisive role in 

determining antibiotic resistance, virulence, and invasiveness of pathogens, as well as 

those events or processes critical to initiating infection or influencing the severity of 

disease. This knowledge is useful for both intentional and naturally occurring diseases. 

Background 
Page 3 GAO-02-924T 

agencies or programs should be included or excluded from the proposed 

department.6

 Those criteria include the following: 

• Mission Relevancy: Is homeland security a major part of the agency or 

program mission? Is it the primary mission of the agency or program? 

• Similar Goals and Objectives: Does the agency or program being 

considered for the new department share primary goals and objectives 

with the other agencies or programs being consolidated? 

• Leverage Effectiveness: Does the agency or program being considered for 

the new department promote synergy and help to leverage the 

effectiveness of other agencies and programs or the new department as a 

whole? In other words, is the whole greater than the sum of the parts? 

• Gains Through Consolidation: Does the agency or program being 

considered for the new department improve the efficiency and 

effectiveness of homeland security missions through eliminating 

duplications and overlaps, closing gaps, and aligning or merging common 

roles and responsibilities? 

• Integrated Information Sharing/Coordination: Does the agency or program 

being considered for the new department contribute to or leverage the 

ability of the new department to enhance the sharing of critical 

information or otherwise improve the coordination of missions and 

activities related to homeland security? 

• Compatible Cultures: Can the organizational culture of the agency or 

program being considered for the new department effectively meld with 

the other entities that will be consolidated? Field structures and 

approaches to achieving missions vary considerably between agencies. 

• Impact on Excluded Agencies: What is the impact on departments losing 

components to the new department? What is the impact on agencies with 

homeland security missions left out of the new department? 

In the President’s proposal, the new Department of Homeland Security 

would be responsible for conducting a national scientific research and 

development program, including developing national policy and 

coordinating the federal government’s civilian efforts to counter chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons or other emerging terrorist 

threats. The new department would carry out its civilian health-related 

biological, biomedical, and infectious disease defense research and 

development through agreements with HHS, unless otherwise directed by 

 6

U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has 

Merit, but Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success, GAO-02-886T (Washington, D.C.: 

June 25, 2002). 
Page 4 GAO-02-924T 

the President. As part of this responsibility, the new department would 

establish priorities and direction for programs of basic and applied 

research on the detection, treatment, and prevention of infectious diseases 

such as those programs conducted by NIH. 

NIH supports and carries out biomedical research to study, prevent, and 

treat infectious and immunologic human diseases. Infectious diseases 

include those caused by new, emerging, and reemerging infectious agents, 

including those that are intentionally introduced as an act of bioterrorism. 

The emphasis of antiterrorism research supported by NIH has been in four 

areas: (1) design and testing of new diagnostic tools; (2) design, 

development, and clinical evaluation of therapies; (3) design, 

development, and clinical evaluation of vaccines; and (4) other basic 

research, including genome sequencing.7

The President’s proposal also would transfer the select agent program 

from HHS to the new department. Currently administered by CDC, this 

program’s mission is ensuring the security of those biologic agents that 

pose a severe threat to public health and safety and could be used by 

terrorists. The proposal provides for the new department to consult with 

appropriate agencies, which would include HHS, in maintaining the select 

agent list and to consult with HHS in carrying out the program. 

 7

Genome sequencing reveals the lineup of paired chemical bases that make up a pathogen’s 

DNA, which contains the genetic code and transmits the hereditary pattern. Sequence 

information can be exploited in many ways, including demarcating genes, locating 

therapeutic targets, and identifying mutations that contribute to drug resistance. 
Page 5 GAO-02-924T 

The proposed Department of Homeland Security would be tasked with 

developing national policy for and coordinating the federal government’s 

civilian research and development efforts to counter chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear threats. The new department also could improve 

coordination of biomedical research and development efforts. In addition 

to coordination, the role of the new department would need to include 

forging collaborative relationships with programs at all levels of 

government and developing a strategic plan for research and development. 

We have previously reported that the limited coordination among federal 

research and development programs may result in a duplication of efforts.8

Coordination is hampered by the extent of compartmentalization of efforts 

because of the sensitivity of the research and development programs, 

security classification of research, and the absence of a single 

coordinating entity to help prevent duplication. For example, the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency was unaware of U.S. Coast Guard plans to develop methods to 

detect a biological agent on an infected cruise ship and therefore was 

unable to share information on its research to develop biological detection 

devices that could have been applicable to buildings infected this way. 

The new department would need to develop mechanisms to coordinate 

and integrate information about ongoing research and development being 

performed across the government related to chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear terrorism, as well as harmonize user needs. 

Although the proposal tasks the new department with coordinating the 

federal government’s “civilian efforts” only, the new department also 

would need to coordinate with DOD because DOD conducts biomedical 

research and development efforts designed to detect and respond to 

weapons of mass destruction. Although DOD’s efforts are geared toward 

protecting armed services members, they may also be applicable to the 

civilian population. Currently, NIH is working with DOD on biomedical 

research and development efforts, and it is important for this collaboration 

to continue. An example of NIH and DOD’s efforts is their support of 

databases to compare the sequences and functions of poxvirus genes. 

These searchable databases enable researchers to select targets for 

designing antiviral drugs and vaccines, and serve as repositories for 

 8

U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations,, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001). 

Proposed Department 

Could Improve 

Coordination of 

Research and 

Development 

Programs 
Page 6 GAO-02-924T 

information on well documented poxvirus strains to aid in detection and 

diagnosis. 

The President’s proposal could help improve coordination of federal 

research and development by giving one person the responsibility for a 

single national research and development strategy that could address 

coordination, reduce potential duplication, and ensure that important 

issues are addressed. In 2001, we recommended the creation of a unified 

strategy to reduce duplication and leverage resources, and suggested that 

the plan be coordinated with federal agencies performing the research as 

well as with state and local authorities.9

 Such a plan would help to ensure 

that research gaps are filled, unproductive duplication is minimized, and 

that individual agency plans are consistent with the overall goals. 

We are concerned about the implications of the proposed transfer of 

control and priority setting for dual-purpose research programs. For 

example, some research programs have broad missions that are not easily 

separated into homeland security research and research for other 

purposes. We are concerned that such dual-purpose research activities 

may lose the synergy arising from their current placement. 

The President’s proposal would transfer the responsibility for civilian 

biomedical defense research and development programs to the new 

department, but the programs would continue to be carried out through 

HHS. These programs, now primarily sponsored by NIH, include a variety 

of efforts to understand basic biological mechanisms of infection and to 

develop and test rapid diagnostic tools, vaccines, and antibacterial and 

antiviral drugs. These efforts have dual-purpose applicability. The 

scientific research on biologic agents that could be used by terrorists 

cannot be readily separated from research on emerging infectious 

diseases. For example, research being carried out on antiviral drugs in the 

NIH biodefense research program is expected to be useful in the 

development of treatments for hepatitis C. NIH biodefense research on 

enhanced immunologic responses to protect against infection and disease 

is critical in the development of interventions against both naturally 

occurring and man-made pathogens. 

 9

GAO-01-822. 

Transfer of Control 

Over Dual-Purpose 

Research and 

Development Raises 

Concern 
Page 7 GAO-02-924T 

The proposal to transfer to the new department responsibility for research 

and development programs that would continue to be carried out by HHS 

raises many concerns. Although there is a clear need for the new 

department to have responsibility for setting policy, developing a strategy, 

providing leadership, and coordinating research and development efforts 

in these areas, we are concerned that control and priority-setting 

responsibility will not be vested in those programs best positioned to 

understand the potential of basic research efforts or the relevance of 

research being carried out in other, nonbiodefense programs. For 

example, NIH-funded research on a drug to treat cytomegalovirus 

complications in patients with HIV is now being investigated as a 

prototype for developing antiviral drugs against smallpox. 

There is the potential that the proposal would allow the new department 

to direct, fund, and conduct research related to chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and other emerging threats on its own. This raises 

the potential for duplication of effort, lack of efficiency, and an increased 

need for coordination with other departments that would continue to 

carry out relevant research. Design and implementation of a research 

agenda is most efficient at the level of the mission agency where scientific 

and technical expertise resides. Building and duplicating the existing 

facilities and expertise in the current federal laboratories needed to 

conduct this research would be inefficient. 

The proposal would transfer the Laboratory Registration/Select Agent 

Transfer Program from HHS to the new department. The select agent 

program, recently revised and expanded by the Public Health Security and 

Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,10 generally requires 

the registration of persons and laboratory facilities possessing specific 

biologic agents and toxins—called select agents—that have the potential 

to pose a serious threat to public health and safety. Select agents include 

approximately 40 viruses, bacteria, rickettsia, fungi, and toxins. Examples 

include Ebola, anthrax, botulinum, and ricin. The 2002 act expanded the 

program’s requirements to include facilities that possess the agents as well 

as the facilities that transfer the agents. 

The mission of the select agent program appears to be closely aligned with 

homeland security. As we stated earlier, one key consideration in 

 10Pub. L. No. 107-188, §§ 201-204, 116 Stat. 594, 637-647 (2002). 

Mission of Select 

Agent Program Is 

Aligned with New 

Department 
Page 8 GAO-02-924T 

evaluating whether individual agencies or programs should be included or 

excluded from the proposed department is the extent to which homeland 

security is a major part of the agency or program mission. By these 

criteria, the transfer of the select agent program would enhance efficiency 

and accountability. 

The President’s proposal would address some shortcomings noted earlier 

in this statement. Better coordination could reduce wasteful duplication 

and increase efficiency. The mission of the select agent program is aligned 

with the new department and, therefore, the transfer of the program would 

enhance efficiency and accountability. However, we are concerned about 

the broad control the proposal grants to the new department for 

biomedical research and development. Although there is a need to 

coordinate these activities with the other homeland security preparedness 

and response programs that would be brought into the new department, 

there is also a need to maintain the priorities for current dual-purpose 

biomedical research. The President’s proposal does not adequately 

address how to accomplish both objectives or how to maintain a prioritysetting role for those best positioned to understand the relevance of 

biomedical research. We are also concerned that the proposal has the 

potential to create an unnecessary duplication of federal research 

capacity. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may 

have at this time. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at 

(202) 512-7118. Robert Copeland, Marcia Crosse, and Deborah Miller also 

made key contributions to this statement. 

Concluding 

Observations 

Contact and 

Acknowledgments 
Page 9 GAO-02-924T 

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership 

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-901T. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership 

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-900T. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership 

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2002. 

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but 

May Complicate Priority Setting. GAO-02-893T. Washington, D.C.: June 

28, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, but 

Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002. 

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but 

May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO-02-883T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but 

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving 

National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership 

Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and 

Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: 

November 7, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide 

Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001. 

Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA’s Role in Strengthening Federal 

Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. 

GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001. 

Related GAO Products 

Homeland Security 
Page 10 GAO-02-924T 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts. 

GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in 

Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: 

November 15, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health Preparedness Programs. GAO-02-

149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities. GAO-01-

915. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and 

Inventory Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. 

Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001. 

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness. 

GAO/HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation 

Should Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. 

Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public 

Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: 

March 16, 1999. 

National Preparedness: Technologies to Secure Federal Buildings. GAO02-687T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2002. 

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private 

Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland 

Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002. 

Public Health 

Combating Terrorism 
Page 11 GAO-02-924T 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the 

Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local 

Preparedness. GAO-02-550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National 

Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to 

Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National 

Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance 

State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2002. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Should Clarify Expectations for 

Medical Readiness. GAO-02-219T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001. 

Anthrax Vaccine: Changes to the Manufacturing Process. GAO-02-181T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2001. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Clarify Expectations for 

Medical Readiness. GAO-02-38. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in 

Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-02-162T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Antiterrorism 

Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. 

Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s 

Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2001. 
Page 12 GAO-02-924T 

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs 

Further Improvement. GAO-01-666T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal 

Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, DC: April 24, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs 

Further Improvement. GAO-01-463. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and 

National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in 

Coordinating Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. 

Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied 

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. GAO-01-

14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: 

March 21, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are 

Poorly Managed. GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-59. Washington, D.C.: 

March 8, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are 

Poorly Managed. GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36. Washington, D.C.: 

October 29, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and 

Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk 

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. 

Washington, D.C.: September 14, 1999. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical 

and Biological R&D Programs. GAO/NSIAD-99-160. Washington, D.C.: 

August 16, 1999. 
Page 13 GAO-02-924T 

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is 

Unclear. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response 

Equipment and Sustainment Costs. GAO/NSIAD-99-151. 

Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is 

Unclear. GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat 

Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness 

Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.: 

November 12, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 

Domestic Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.: 

October 2, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. GAO/TNSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize 

and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.: 

April 9, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs 

Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. 

Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997. 

Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration 

Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837. 

Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001. 

Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing 

States for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001. 

Disaster Assistance 
Page 14 GAO-02-924T 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key 

Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832. 

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2001. 

Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO-02-467T. 

Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002. 

Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP. 

Washington, D.C.: August 2001. 

Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views on Key Management 

Issues Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.: 

May 25, 2001. 

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High 

Risks. GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000. 

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission 

Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO-AIMD-97-146. 

Washington, D.C.: August 29, 1997. 

Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal 

Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.: 

June 7, 1995. 

Government Reorganization: Issues and Principles. GAO/T-GGD/AIMD95-166. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1995. 

Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and 

Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: 

June 22, 1998. 

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go 

Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996. 

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions. 

GAO/AIMD-95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995. 

Budget and Management 

Grant Design 

(290218)