In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-19-00132-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 89th District Court

Wichita County, Texas

Trial Court No. 187,526-B

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel and Womack, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

THOMAS WAYNE EVANS, Appellant

V.

SANDRA LYNN EVANS, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Thomas Wayne Evans (Thomas) appeals the trial court’s final decree 

of divorce. In three issues, Thomas argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

(1) ordering that he pay spousal maintenance to appellee Sandra Lynn Evans (Sandra), 

(2) ordering that he pay spousal maintenance in excess of the statutory limit, and 

(3) not ordering that he was entitled to reimbursement for improvements made to 

Sandra’s separate property. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by ordering spousal maintenance but that the trial court ordered the spousal 

maintenance in excess of the statutory limit and because we conclude that Thomas 

failed to provide sufficient evidence that he was entitled to reimbursement, we reverse 

and remand in part and affirm in part. 

II. BACKGROUND

After more than eighteen years of marriage, Thomas filed his petition for 

divorce pleading that the marriage had become “insupportable because of discord or 

conflict of personalities.” Sandra filed a general denial and a counterpetition 

requesting, among other relief, that the trial court order that Thomas pay post-divorce 

spousal maintenance. Trial was to the court.

A. Sandra’s Testimony

Sandra testified at trial. Sandra said that she owned a house that was her 

separate property on Rose Street in Burkburnett. According to Sandra, she acquired 
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the house in a previous divorce on August 9, 1999. She further stated that Thomas 

had moved into the house in April 1999 but that he did not begin helping with house 

payments until July 1999—Thomas and Sandra married on August 21, 1999. Sandra 

said that after their marriage, she and Thomas began to pay the Rose Street house 

payments from community funds. By Sandra’s account, two years after the couple 

married, and because it was required under her previous divorce decree, she and 

Thomas refinanced the house in both of their names, but the deed remained in her 

name. 

Regarding her plans for housing, Sandra averred that a tax appraisal had 

recently valued the Rose Street house at $114,000, that she had currently listed the 

house for sale at $145,000, and that there remained $49,000 in debt on the house. She 

said that she would expect to have roughly $96,000 in proceeds when she sold the 

Rose Street house; that she expected those proceeds would go toward the purchase of 

a new home; and that, given realtor fees and closing costs, she was “going to barely 

have enough to pay for [the new] house.” 

According to Sandra, Thomas had made “[m]inor improvements” on the house 

since the couple married, including having new carpet laid, installing a new stove and 

a new dishwasher, and putting a new steel roof on the house, which she testified cost 

between $8,000 and $10,000. Sandra stated that these improvements were paid for 

from the couple’s joint checking account that contained community funds, including 

monies from an income tax return and from both of their jobs. But Sandra admitted 
4

that some of the money that went into the joint checking account came from an 

inheritance that Thomas received after the couple married. Sandra said, however, that 

she did not know how much money Thomas had inherited and placed into their joint 

bank account because he had “kept everything hush, hush, and [she] was never told 

exactly how much money he was given.” She also stated that she had never seen a 

will or even a check demonstrating that any of the monies in their shared account 

were Thomas’s separate property. 

Sandra said that other improvements had been made on the house since 

Thomas received his inheritance. Specifically, Sandra averred that Thomas had 

painted the ceiling and helped put down linoleum in the kitchen and that, together, 

they had built and decorated a workshop. By Sandra’s account, Thomas and her 

brothers provided the labor to build the workshop, which has running water and 

electricity. She admitted that some of the money to build the workshop came from 

Thomas’s inheritance. The couple had opened a fine and performing arts studio in 

the workshop; Thomas taught on one side of the workshop, and Sandra taught on the 

other. Sandra referred to the studio as the couple’s joint business.

Sandra testified that she drove a 2014 GMC Acadia that was worth $18,000 but 

that the payoff for the vehicle was $23,000 and that the note on the vehicle was in 

both her and Thomas’s names. Thus, Sandra asked the trial court to order that 

Thomas be required to help pay her “almost $500 car payment” each month. Sandra 

said that Thomas drove a 2006 Chevrolet Colorado that was titled in his name alone,
5

and she asked the court to award the Colorado and any debt associated with it to 

Thomas. By Sandra’s account, the couple also owned a 2006 Chrysler PT Cruiser. 

She wanted the court to order it sold and to order that the proceeds be divided

between herself and Thomas. Sandra further asked the court to order that Thomas 

assume any debt on his Wichita Falls Teachers Credit Union credit card, which she 

said had a balance of about $6,000. 

Regarding her monthly expenses, Sandra testified that she spent $150 a month 

on gas and $200 a month on groceries. She averred that she did not know what her 

monthly utilities would cost until she moved into a new home, but that she was asking 

the court to order $240 for monthly utility bills, which she said was half of the 

amount she and Thomas spent on monthly utilities on the Rose Street house. Sandra 

stated that she incurred more than $350 monthly related to medical co-pays, 

counseling, physical therapy, and over-the-counter medications and that she was 

asking the court to consider these amounts in her request for spousal maintenance. 

Sandra said that she did not expect to need more than $10 a month for clothing 

purchases, but she would need roughly $30 a month for haircuts. She also said that

she would need $200 a month to pay down the credit cards that she would be 

assuming. According to Sandra, she received $586 monthly from her ex-husband’s 

retirement, and she believed that after subtracting that from her total monthly 

expenses, she would need roughly $1,122 a month to pay for her living expenses. 
6

Sandra testified that she had undergone twenty-one surgeries in the six years 

leading up to trial, including having had multiple herniated discs removed and

replaced with artificial discs, as well as having a spinal stimulator implant, two 

abdominal surgeries, and two shoulder surgeries. She also explained that she had 

permanent nerve damage on her left side and that she suffers from severe neuropathy. 

According to Sandra, the Social Security Administration deemed her disabled in 

August 2015, but some of these surgeries occurred since receiving that designation. 

She also stated that she had not paid into Social Security because she had previously

been either self-employed or a teacher. Therefore, the only benefit she received from 

the disability designation was Medicare. Since applying for Medicaid, she received 

$100 monthly in food stamps, and she believed in the near future that Medicaid would 

pay her Medicare premiums. 

Sandra said that the only way that she had been able to afford her monthly 

expenses during the pendency of this case was through assistance from family 

members and charities. She also said that even though the trial court had recently 

entered orders for Thomas to pay temporary spousal maintenance, he had not fully 

complied with the orders and still owed her between $800 and $1,300. Sandra averred 

that Thomas earned $4,185.68 a month and that she was asking the court that 20% of 

that amount be awarded to her as permanent monthly spousal support given her 

disabilities. 
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Sandra testified that Thomas had become abusive towards her after she 

“caught him with his co-worker at school” in 2013. Specifically, Sandra said that 

Thomas was mentally and physically abusive toward her, that he had “put hands on” 

her four times, and that the abuse made the marriage unbearable. 

B. Thomas’s Testimony

Thomas testified that he inherited $50,000 when his father passed away, that he 

had only received $47,000 of that inheritance, and that $40,000 was deposited into a 

joint bank account the couple had opened and used for the sole purpose of building 

the workshop. Thomas claimed that the $7,000 that came later was actually a loan 

from his mother for putting a new roof on the house and installing a carport, but in 

other testimony, Thomas said that the $7,000 “was part of [his] inheritance to start 

with.” And Thomas claimed that his mother paid the Rose Street house payments 

“[e]very month” during the four years before trial because he and Sandra had a hard 

time making ends meet. Thomas asked the court to order that Sandra be entitled to 

all proceeds from the sale of the house in lieu of spousal support and any entitlement 

to his retirement account. Thomas agreed that he grossed $4,185.68 and netted

$3,667 monthly from his teaching job. 

Thomas denied that he had ever physically abused Sandra. Instead, Thomas 

said that Sandra had once hit him with her car, but he chose not to press charges. He

also said that she once attacked him with a tree branch, but he evaded her. Thomas 

also disputed that he had ever committed infidelity during the marriage. When 
8

confronted with a letter that he had written Sandra in which he apologized for having 

an “inappropriate relationship at work,” Thomas said that Sandra’s definition of 

inappropriate relationship included talking to another woman and that he was 

attempting to utilize her language in an effort to prevent “hours and hours of 

bantering” about him having talked to a female co-worker. 

Thomas admitted that he did not have a copy of his father’s will showing that 

he had inherited the money deposited into the account used for building the 

workshop, nor did he have any paperwork to demonstrate when the money was 

deposited, how much may have been deposited, and where the money was deposited. 

Instead, Thomas said that his testimony was the only evidence he had that the money 

used to pay for building the workshop was his separate property. 

C. The Trial Court’s Judgment

In the final divorce decree, the trial court granted the divorce, dissolving the 

marriage on the grounds of insupportability. The court ordered that Sandra was

awarded the GMC Acadia (and its related debt) and that she was entitled to 50% of

Thomas’s retirement benefits accrued during the marriage. The trial court also 

ordered that Thomas was not entitled to reimbursement for improvements made to 

the Rose Street house and that Thomas was to pay spousal maintenance in the 

amount of $900 monthly for an indefinite period or until the death of one of the 

parties, the remarriage of Sandra, the abeyance of Sandra’s disability, or the entry of a 

new court order. 
9

In one of its findings of fact, the court found that Thomas’s monthly gross 

income “[was] greater than $4,500.” The court also found that the Rose Street house 

was Sandra’s separate property as she acquired it prior to the marriage and that there 

was insufficient evidence to show Thomas was entitled to any reimbursement for the 

improvements on the house. This appeal followed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Spousal Maintenance

In his first issue, Thomas argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

ordering that he pay spousal maintenance. Specifically, Thomas argues that Sandra 

was awarded sufficient property to meet her minimum reasonable needs. 

A spouse in a divorce proceeding is eligible to seek spousal maintenance if that 

spouse lacks sufficient property to meet minimum reasonable needs and cannot 

support herself due to an incapacitating physical or mental disability. See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 8.051(2)(A); In re Green, 221 S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex. 2007); In re Marriage of 

Elabd, 589 S.W.3d 280, 283 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, no pet.). The term “minimum 

reasonable needs” is not defined in the Family Code, nor are there cases defining the 

term. Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d 850, 860 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.).

Rather, the minimum reasonable needs for a particular individual is a fact-specific 

determination that should be made by the trial court on a case-by-case basis. Id.

Section 8.054(a)(1) of the Texas Family Code generally limits a trial court’s 

award of spousal maintenance based on the length of the marriage. See Tex. Fam. 
10

Code. Ann. § 8.054(a)(1); Green, 221 S.W.3d at 647; Elabd, 589 S.W.3d at 283. But 

under section 8.054(b), if the spouse seeking maintenance is unable to support herself 

through appropriate employment because of an incapacitating physical or mental 

disability, the trial court may order spousal maintenance for an indefinite period of 

time as long as the disability continues. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.054(b); Green,

221 S.W.3d at 647; Elabd, 589 S.W.3d at 283. Additionally, Section 8.056 provides 

that the obligation to pay future maintenance terminates on the death of either party, 

the remarriage of the obligee, or if, after a hearing, the trial court determines that the 

obligee “cohabits with another person with whom the obligee has a dating or

romantic relationship in a permanent place of abode on a continuing basis.” Tex. 

Fam. Code Ann. § 8.056; Green, 221 S.W.3d at 647; Elabd, 589 S.W.3d at 283.

We review a trial court’s award of spousal maintenance for an abuse of 

discretion. Elabd, 589 S.W.3d at 283. Under the abuse of discretion standard, legal 

and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds for asserting 

error, but they are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. Id.; Dunn v. Dunn, 177 S.W.3d 393, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2005, pet. denied).

Here, Thomas does not challenge that Sandra is disabled or unable to work.1 

Rather, Thomas argues that Sandra received a sufficient amount of the marital estate, 

1At trial, Thomas agreed multiple times that Sandra is “physically disabled.”
11

including the Rose Street house and 50% of his retirement, to meet her needs. The 

gist of Thomas’s argument is that because she left the marriage with nearly $100,000 

worth of assets, she can afford to pay for her roughly $1100 monthly deficiency and 

thus spousal maintenance is improper. Thomas does not cite any authority to support 

his position. 

We conclude that the trial court had sufficient evidence to order spousal 

maintenance. After detailing her monthly living expenses, Sandra testified that even 

after receiving $586 monthly from her previous husband’s retirement, she would still 

need roughly $1,122 a month to cover her necessary living expenses. Further, Sandra 

testified that this deficient amount did not include a monthly rent or mortgage 

payment and that the proceeds from the sale of the Rose Street house would go 

directly into the purchase of a new home so that she did not have a house payment. 

Sandra said that after the sale of the Rose Street house, given realtor fees and closing 

costs, she was “going to barely have enough to pay for [the new] house.” Thus, the 

trial court heard evidence that Sandra had not included the costs of stable housing in 

her request for spousal maintenance because she intended to cover those costs with 

the proceeds from the sale of the house and that she would continue to incur her

monthly deficit despite the fact that she was selling the Rose Street house.

We also reject Thomas’s argument that because Sandra was awarded half of his 

retirement, she has sufficient resources to cover her monthly needs. Indeed, Thomas 

testified that his retirement annuity would not begin to pay out for another twelve to 
12

fifteen years. Thus, the benefits that Sandra will receive in the future will not support 

her during the time between the divorce and when Thomas begins to draw from his 

retirement. And the trial court expressly stated in the decree that when Sandra begins 

to receive benefits from Thomas’s retirement, “that circumstance shall be a 

consideration in any petition to modify spousal support filed by Thomas.” Thus, the 

trial court considered the financial impact of both Sandra and Thomas receiving his 

retirement in the future. See Deltuva v. Deltuva, 113 S.W.3d 882, 888 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2003, no pet.) (“While Barbara received the majority of the marital estate, the 

court could have reasonably concluded that her funds would be exhausted before her 

earnings matched her reasonable minimum monthly expenses.”). We overrule 

Thomas’s first issue.

B. Spousal Maintenance Amount

In his second issue, Thomas argues that the trial court erred by finding that he 

made in excess of $4,500 a month and thus the ordered $900 in monthly spousal 

maintenance exceeds the statutory limit. We agree. 

The amount of spousal maintenance is confined by statutory limits. Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 8.055(a). Under Section 8.055(a), the amount of maintenance awarded 

by the trial court cannot be more than the lesser of $5,000 or twenty percent of the 

paying spouse’s average monthly gross income. Id. 

The trial court in this case found that Thomas’s average monthly gross income 

“is greater than $4,500” and ordered that Thomas pay $900 (which would be twenty 
13

percent of $4,500) monthly to Sandra as spousal maintenance. But the evidence does 

not support that Thomas’s monthly gross income “is greater than $4,500.” Even 

though Thomas testified that in the past he had held part-time employment in 

addition to his employment as a schoolteacher, he said that he currently was making 

only his salary at the school and that the income was fixed at $4,185.68 per month. 

Not only was this evidence not contradicted, but Sandra too testified that Thomas’s 

monthly gross income was $4,185.68. Thus, the maximum amount of spousal 

maintenance that the trial court could have imposed was $837.14.

Because the amount of maintenance awarded by the trial court is discretionary

only within the statutory limits, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court relating 

to the amount of spousal support awarded and remand for a new trial on the amount 

of spousal maintenance to be awarded to Sandra. See id.; see also Deltuva, 113 S.W.3d at

889 (declining to modify the trial court’s judgment when there was not undisputed

evidence of the length of time spousal maintenance should have been ordered to last);

In re Marriage of Franklin, No. 10-13-00007-CV, 2013 WL 4799063, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Waco Aug. 29, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that trial court imposed a spousalmaintenance amount greater than statutory limits under Section 8.055(a) and 

remanding to trial court to re-address spousal maintenance amount while affirming 

trial court’s judgment in all other respects). We sustain Thomas’s second issue. 
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C. Reimbursement

In his third issue, Thomas argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

not awarding him reimbursement for the improvements to the Rose Street property. 

We disagree. 

A claim for reimbursement may include capital improvements to property 

other than by incurring debt. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.402(a)(8). Reimbursement for 

funds expended by a marital estate for improvements to another marital estate shall be

measured by the enhancement in value to the benefited marital estate. Id. § 3.402(d). 

The enhanced value is determined by the difference between the fair market value of 

the property before and after the improvements. Matter of Marriage of McCoy & Els,

488 S.W.3d 430, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). The party 

claiming reimbursement bears the burden of establishing the net benefit to the payee 

estate, proving that expenditures were made, and that the expenditures are 

reimbursable. Id. at 434; Zeptner v. Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d 727, 737 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2003, no pet.). Evidence of the cost of improvements alone is not sufficient to 

prove enhanced value. McCoy & Els, 488 S.W.3d at 435; see also Anderson v. Gilliland, 

684 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. 1985) (rejecting cost as a measure of reimbursement). We 

review a trial court’s decision concerning a claim for reimbursement for an abuse of 

discretion. Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1988).

Here, the trial court found that Thomas presented “insufficient evidence to 

support his claim that his separate estate should be reimbursed for funds or assets 
15

expended by his separate estate for the benefit of the community.” Thomas testified 

that he used funds he believed to be his separate property that he had received from 

an inheritance to improve the Rose Street house, which is Sandra’s separate property. 

In fact, Thomas and Sandra both testified to improvements made to the house during 

the marriage. Thomas also testified that the amount of funds he expended was 

$47,000. But Thomas did not present any evidence to show that any enhanced value

of the Rose Street house resulted from the improvements. Thus, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion by finding that Thomas presented insufficient evidence that 

he was entitled to reimbursement because Thomas only presented evidence of the 

cost of improvements to the house. See Bell v. Bell, No. 12-04-00244-CV, 2005 WL 

1538275, at *7 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 30, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that 

husband was not entitled to reimbursement because there was no evidence that 

repairing septic system to house owned by wife separately was a capital improvement 

to the septic system or the home). We overrule Thomas’s third issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having sustained Thomas’s second issue that the trial court abused its 

discretion in its calculation of the amount of spousal maintenance to be awarded, we 

reverse the judgment of the trial court only as to the amount of spousal maintenance 

and remand this proceeding to the trial court for a new trial solely on the amount of 

spousal maintenance to be awarded. Having overruled Thomas’s first and third

issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.
16

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack

Justice

Delivered: April 9, 2020