alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 500.20 Conspicuousness.

The statement of net quantity of contents shall appear in conspicuous and easily legible boldface type or print in distinct contrast (by typography, layout, color, embossing, or molding) to other matter on the package; except that a statement of net quantity blown, embossed, or molded on a glass or plastic surface is permissible when all label information is so formed on the surface.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-10383 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus
ALTONIO O’SHEA DOUGLAS, also known as Tony, Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:92-CR-141-10-Y

_____________________________________

April 15, 1999 Before POLITZ, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Altonio (Tony) O’Shea Douglas, federal prisoner # 23798-077, appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion for modification of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Douglas argues
that the district court abused its discretion by improperly considering the e ffect of a two-level
enhancemen t under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm. It was not an abuse ofdiscretion for the district court to consider the effect of § 2D1.1(b)(1) in denying Douglas’ motion.

See United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas , 105 F.3d 981, 982 (5th Cir. 1997).
AFFIRMED.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,     Respondent     v.   NATHANIEL THOMAS, III,     Petitioner 

No. 348 MAL 2015   Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 9th day of September, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

is DENIED.
#### De Forest Sears, Appellant, v. David Crapo, et al., Respondents.

Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs, together with $10 motion costs.
#### William Szekely, Respondent, v. Cinopera, Inc., Appellant.

Present — Peek, P. J., Glennon, Callahan, Van Voorhis and Shientag, JJ.
#### Ena Kunzer v. Edward J. Kunzer.

Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals or for reargument denied, with $10 costs. Concur — Peck, P. J., Cohn, Breitel, Bastow and Rabin, JJ. [See *ante,*p. 1022.]
EXHIBIT 23

# CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by
reference in the Registration Statements of Pavilion Bancorp, Inc. on Form S-8 (File No.
333-86636) and Form S-3D (File No. 333-112651) of our report dated March 9, 2007 on
the 2006 Consolidated Financial Statements of Pavilion Bancorp, Inc., which report is
included in the 2006 Annual Report on Form 10-K of Pavilion Bancorp, Inc.

/s/ PLANTE & MORAN,
PLLC

PLANTE & MORAN PLLC

Auburn Hills, MichiganMarch
16, 2007
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7518

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus FREDDIE DOUGLAS WIDENER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (CR-90-251, CA-98-2012-AW) Submitted: March 11, 1999 Decided: March 17, 1999 Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Freddie Douglas Widener, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph Lee Evans, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on August 17, 1998, the district court’s records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on August 18, 1998. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the order is entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v. Murray , 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-45 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 PER CURIAM: Freddie Douglas Widener seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting the Government’s motion to dismiss, dismissing his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998), and denying his motion to amend the § 2255 motion. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Widener , Nos. CR-90-251, CA-98-2012-AW (D. Md. Aug. 18, 1998). * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Lead Independent Director Fee Schedule



 Exhibit 10.1 
 Lead Independent Director Fee Schedule 
 Effective May 11, 2007, the Compensation Committee of the Corporation
increased the Lead Independent Director’s annual fee from $10,000 to $15,000.
#### Larry Silberberg, as Trustee under an Agreement between Flo Luxenberg and Others and Eagle Converting Company, a Partnership, Respondent, v. Ruth Lipton, as Executrix of Conrad Lipton, Deceased, et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

No opinion. Present — Peck, P. J., Glennon, Dore, Cohn and Van Voorhis, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Cornelius McAdoo, Petitioner, v Glenn S. Goord, as Commissioner of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.

[820 NYS2d 666]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent Commissioner of Correctional Services which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

As the result of an ongoing investigation, petitioner was required to submit a urine sample for testing. The sample twice tested positive for the presence of cannabinoids and petitioner was thereafter charged in a misbehavior report with using a controlled substance. He was found guilty of the charge following a tier III disciplinary hearing and the determination was affirmed on administrative appeal. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

We confirm. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the urinalysis testing procedures set forth in 7 NYCRR 1020.4 were properly followed. The chain of custody of the sample was sufficiently established as the correction officer who conducted the test stated that he had possession of it at all times *(see Matter of*
      *1059
      *Odome v Goord,*14 AD3d 975, 975-976 [2005]). The misbehavior report, positive urinalysis test results and related documentation, together with the testimony of the officers who requested and conducted the test, provide substantial evidence supporting the determination of guilt *(see Matter of Molina v Selsky,*21 AD3d 1238, 1238-1239 [2005]; *Matter of Feliciano v Selsky,*17 AD3d 951, 952 [2005]). In addition, the in camera testimony of the officer familiar with the ongoing investigation indicates that there was a reasonable basis for the test and, given that the determination was not based upon the confidential testimony, there was no need to independently assess the credibility of the confidential information *(see Matter of Hemphill v Selsky,*26 AD3d 548, 549 [2006]). Petitioner’s remaining claims have not been preserved for our review.

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Carpinello, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-2283

_____________________________

LYNNE FREMONT,

Appellant,

v.

BRANDSMART USA and

TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO.,

Appellees.

_____________________________

On appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.

Geraldine B. Hogan, Judge.

June 4, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WETHERELL, RAY, and WINSOR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Kimberly A. Hill for Appellant.

Scott H. Silver and Steven H. Preston for Appellees.
### SUBCHAPTER III—URBAN INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES
### SUBCHAPTER XX—REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN GROUP HEALTH PLANS FOR CERTAIN STATE AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES
### Part A—Development of a National Urban Policy
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 231 (Thursday, December 2, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70164-70165]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-26568]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Declaration of Disaster <greek-i>3635]


State of Florida; Amendment <greek-i> 3

    In accordance with a notice received from the Department of 
Homeland Security--Federal Emergency Management Agency--effective 
November 3, 2004, the above numbered declaration is hereby amended to 
extend the deadline for filing applications for physical damages as a 
result of this disaster to January 3, 2005.
    All other information remains the same, i.e., the deadline for 
filing applications for economic injury is June 27, 2005.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 59002 and 
59008.)


[[Page 70165]]


    Dated: November 18, 2004.
Herbert L. Mitchell,
Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
[FR Doc. 04-26568 Filed 12-1-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
Home > NRC Library > ADAMS Public Documents

# Package:  Amendment No. 2 To Certificate Of Compliance No. 1030 For The NUHOMS HD-32PTH Storage System.

Accession Number: ML14288A427

Date Released: Wednesday, October 22, 2014

Package Contents

The following links on this page are to Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) files. To obtain a free viewer for displaying this format, see our Plugins, Viewers, and Other Tools.
    - ML14288A433 - Letter To J. Bondre re:  Amendment No. 2 To Certificate Of Compliance No. 1030 For The NUHOMS HD-32PTH Storage System. (5 page(s), 10/14/2014)
    - ML14288A473 - Enclosure 1: Certificate Of Compliance No. 1030 [Letter To J. Bondre re:  Amendment No. 2 To Certificate Of Compliance No. 1030 For The NUHOMS HD-32PTH Storage System]. (4 page(s), 10/14/2014)
    - ML14288A485 - Enclosure 2: Final Safety Evaluation Report [Letter To J. Bondre re: Amendment No. 2 To Certificate Of Compliance No. 1030 For The NUHOMS HD-32PTH Storage System]. (13 page(s), 10/14/2014)
    - ML14288A500 - Enclosure 3: Technical Specifications [Letter To J. Bondre re: Amendment No. 2 To Certificate Of Compliance No. 1030 For The NUHOMS HD-32PTH Storage System]. (60 page(s), 10/14/2014)

Privacy PolicySite Disclaimer
§ 1615.5 Labeling requirements. ( a ) *Care labels.* All items of children's sleepwear shall be labeled with precautionary instructions to protect the items from agents or treatments which are known to cause deterioration of their flame resistance. If the item has been initially tested under § 1615.4(g)(4) after one washing and drying, it shall be labeled with instructions to wash before wearing. Such labels shall be permanent and otherwise in accordance with rules and regulations established by the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
( b ) [Reserved]
[40 FR 59903, Dec. 30, 1975, as amended at 61 FR 1116, Jan. 16, 1996]
§ 1015.19 Decisions on requests for exemption from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). ( a ) The Commission generally will not decide whether material received with a request for exemption from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) is entitled to be withheld until a request for production or disclosure is made for that information. The determination will be based on the most authoritative judicial interpretations available at the time a request for disclosure or production is considered. Any reasonably segregable portion of a record will be disclosed to any person requesting such record after deletion of any portions determined to be exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). The requester will be given a brief description of any information found to be exempt.
( b ) If material received with a request for exemption from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) is found to be disclosable, in whole or in part, the person submitting the material will be notified in writing and given 10 calendar days from the receipt of the letter to seek judicial relief. In no event, however, will the material be returned to the person submitting it.
#### In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Herman L. Bitterman, Deceased. Jacob L. Bitterman et al., Appellants; Robert Garlock et al., Respondents.

Present — Peck, P. J., Glennon, Callahan, Van Voorhis and Shientag, JJ.
NO. 07-11-0111-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL B 

JANUARY 17, 2012 

BRYAN KEITH JERRELL, 

 Appellant 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Appellee 

_____________________________ 

FROM THE 320TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; 

NO. 50,264-D; HONORABLE DON R. EMERSON, PRESIDING 

Memorandum Opinion 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

 Appellant Bryan Keith Jerrell was adjudicated guilty of indecency with a child by 

exposure after pleading true to allegations he violated his probation, and he was 

sentenced to four years incarceration in the Department of Criminal Justice. He argues 

that 1) his punishment is cruel and unusual because he is mentally retarded, and 2) 

there is no evidence to support an order to pay attorney’s fees. We modify the 

judgment and, as modified, affirm it. 

 
2 

Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

In his first issue, appellant contends that sentencing him to incarceration in an 

adult prison when he functions at the level of a seven-year-old constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment. Appellant did not raise this issue to the trial court.1 The failure to 

do so waives the issue. Ham v. State, No. 07-09-00331-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS

8572, at *15 (Tex. App.–Amarillo October 27, 2011, no pet.). 

Imposition of Attorney’s Fees as Costs 

In his other issue, appellant claims the trial court erred in ordering him to pay 

costs which included attorney’s fees because there is no evidence that he is capable of 

paying them. Appellant was ordered to pay costs in the judgment, and the clerk’s bill of 

costs included $600 in attorney’s fees. The record shows that appellant had appointed 

counsel for trial and that he had no means to pay an attorney on appeal. When the 

record does not show that the defendant is financially capable of paying attorney’s fees, 

the trial court errs in ordering reimbursement in the judgment. See Mayer v. State, 309 

S.W.3d 552, 556-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

 Accordingly, we modify the judgment to delete any obligation to pay attorney’s 

fees in the amount of $600 and, as modified, affirm it. 

 Brian Quinn 

 Chief Justice 

Do not publish.

 1

In his motion for new trial, appellant alleged that his mental functioning rendered him unable to 

intelligently enter a plea and made him incompetent for trial and that he was deprived of effective 

assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel’s failure to raise those issues.
### §10712. Report by Attorney General

Not later than October 1, 2002, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Federal Judicial Center, shall transmit to the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the effectiveness of the Institute in carrying out the duties specified in section 10702(b) of this title. Such report shall include an assessment of the cost effectiveness of the program as a whole and, to the extent practicable, of individual grants, an assessment of whether the restrictions and limitations specified in sections 10706 and 10707 of this title have been respected, and such recommendations as the Attorney General, in consultation with the Federal Judicial Center, deems appropriate.

(Pub. L. 98–620, title II, §213, Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3346; Pub. L. 107–179, §1, May 20, 2002, 116 Stat. 580.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2002—Pub. L. 107–179 substituted "Not later than October 1, 2002" for "On October 1, 1987".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Oct. 1, 1985, see section 216 of Pub. L. 98–620, set out as a note under section 10701 of this title.
#### § 260.14 Refillable claims.

It is deceptive to misrepresent, directly or by implication, that a package is refillable. A marketer should not make an unqualified refillable claim unless the marketer provides the means for refilling the package. The marketer may either provide a system for the collection and refill of the package, or offer for sale a product that consumers can purchase to refill the original package.

# Example 1:

A container is labeled “refillable three times.” The manufacturer has the capability to refill returned containers and can show that the container will withstand being refilled at least three times. The manufacturer, however, has established no collection program. The unqualified claim is deceptive because there is no means to return the container to the manufacturer for refill.

# Example 2:

A small bottle of fabric softener states that it is in a “handy refillable container.” In the same market area, the manufacturer also sells a large-sized bottle that consumers use to refill the smaller bottles. The claim is not deceptive because there is a reasonable means for the consumer to refill the smaller container.
§ 503.4 Net quantity of contents, numerical count. To clarify the requirement for declaration of net quantity in terms of count for the purpose of §§ 500.6 and 500.7 of this chapter, the following interpretation is rendered. ( a ) When a consumer commodity is properly measured in terms of count only, or in terms of count and weight, volume, area, or dimension, the regulations are interpreted not to require the declaration of the net content as “one”, provided the statement of identity clearly expresses the fact that only one unit is contained in the package. Thus the unit synthetic sponge, the unit light bulb, and the unit dry cell battery do not require a net quantity statement of “one sponge,” “one light bulb,” or “one dry cell battery.” However, there still exists the necessity to provide a net quantity statement to specify weight, volume, area, or dimensions when such are required. For example, the synthetic sponge which is packaged, requires dimensions such as “5 in. × 3 in. × 1 in.” A multicomponent package or a package containing two or more units of the same commodity shall bear the net quantity statement in terms of count, and weight, volume, area, or dimensions as required. This interpretation does not preclude the option to enumerate a unit count on a single packaged commodity if so desired.
( b ) [Reserved]
[34 FR 18087, Nov. 8, 1969]
No: IV-14-013 June 20, 2014

CONTACT: Victor Dricks 817-200-1128

Lara Uselding 817-100-1519

 

 NRC Names New Senior Resident Inspector at Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has selected Frances Ramirez as the new senior resident 

inspector at the Waterford 3 nuclear plant located in Killona, La.

“Frances Ramirez’s technical and regulatory experience will assist the NRC in 

carrying out its mission to protect people and the environment by ensuring the safe 

operation of the Waterford plant,” said NRC Region IV Administrator Marc Dapas.

Ramirez joined the NRC’s Region III office in Lisle, Ill. in September 2002, 

after graduating from the University of Puerto Rico with a bachelor’s degree in 

chemical engineering. Most recently, she served as the resident inspector at 

Braidwood nuclear plant in Braceville, Ill. She was also the resident inspector at 

LaSalle nuclear plant in Marseilles, Ill. 

Each U.S. commercial nuclear power plant has at least two resident inspectors. Ramirez joins 

resident inspector Chris Speer. They serve as the agency’s eyes and ears at the facility, conducting 

inspections, monitoring significant work projects, and interacting with plant workers and the public.

The Waterford 3 resident inspectors can be reached at 985-783-6253.
#### § 1305.4 Artificial fireplace ash and embers as banned hazardous products.

On the basis that airborne asbestos fibers present the hazards of cancer such as lung cancer and mesothelioma to the public, artificial fireplace ash and embers containings respirable free-form asbestos are banned hazardous products.
Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

ORDER

Sean Hightower v Department of Transportation

Docket No. 348224

LC No. 18-000256-MD

Mark J. Cavanagh 

Presiding Judge

Jane M. Beckering

Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

Judges

The Court on its own motion, orders that the April 16, 2020 opinion is hereby AMENDED. 

The opinion is modified on section II with minor, non-substantive changes to eliminate an incomplete 

sentence. The opinion is amended as follows:

The old opinion read: to Hightower’s brief on appeal, “once it is determined that a 

disability exists, the 180-day provisions is automatically invoked.” 

The new opinion reads: According to Hightower’s brief on appeal, “once it is determined 

that a disability exists, the 180-day provisions is automatically invoked.”

In all other respects, the April 16, 2020, opinion remains unchanged.

______________________________

Presiding Judge
#### Samuel G. Owen and R. H. Oakley, plaintiffs in in error, v. The State of Nebraska, defendant in error.

Claims Against the State: actions on: jurisdiction. The state cannot be sued, on claims for supplies furnished on its credit, by original action. The only mode by which the courts can acquire jurisdiction in such cases is by appeal from the decision of the auditor and secretary of state.

Error to the district court for Lancaster county. Heard upon demurrer to petition before Pound, J., who sustained the same, and rendered judgment dismissing the cause for want of jurisdiction.

*Harwood <& Ames,*for plaintiffs in error.

*George H. Roberts, Attorney-General,*and *T. M. Ma/rguett,*for the State

Lake, J.

The action in the court below was an original proceeding to recover $875.32, money alleged to be due from the state to the plaintiffs as assignees of a large number of accounts for supplies, etc., furnished on the credit of the state by the persons from whom they were received.

The case falls within the rule that the state cannot be sued upon claims by original action, but only by appeal from the decision of the auditor of public accounts and *109secretary of state. It follows, therefore, that the district court was without jurisdiction, and its judgment dismissing the action must be affirmed.

Judgment accordingly.