UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

COMMISSIONERS: 

Stephen G. Burns, Chairman 

Kristine L. Svinicki 

William C. Ostendorff 

Jeff Baran 

________________________________________ 

 ) 

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT ) 

YANKEE, LLC and ENTERGY NUCLEAR ) Docket No. 50-271-LA 

OPERATIONS, INC. ) 

 ) 

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) ) 

________________________________________ ) 

CLI-15-20 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

The State of Vermont has appealed LBP-15-4,1 an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 

decision that denied the state’s request for hearing and petition to intervene in this license 

amendment proceeding.2 We affirm the Board’s decision for the reasons we provide below. 

 

 

1 LBP-15-4, 81 NRC 156 (2015). 

2 The State of Vermont’s Notice of Appeal of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board’s January 28, 

2015 Memorandum and Order Denying the State’s Request for Hearing and Petition to 

Intervene (Feb. 23, 2015); The State of Vermont’s Brief in Support of Atomic Safety and 

Licensing Board’s January 28, 2015 Memorandum and Order Denying the State’s Request for 

Hearing and Petition to Intervene (Feb. 23, 2015) (Vermont Appeal). 
- 2 - 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. The NRC’s Emergency Response Data System 

Because both Vermont’s proffered contention and the Board’s decision center on an 

NRC communications system called the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), we begin 

with an overview of the ERDS and associated NRC regulations. ERDS is a “direct electronic 

data link between computer data systems used by licensees of operating reactors and the NRC 

Operations Center.”3 The system is a method of “assembling and transmitting to the NRC near 

real time data from a licensee during an alert or higher emergency classification.”4 ERDS 

automatically collects and transmits a “selected set of parametric reactor data”5 and 

supplements other communications methods (e.g., voice communication) between licensees 

and the NRC.6

Following the Three Mile Island accident in March 1979, the NRC sought to “improve the 

reliability and timeliness of data transmission and ensure that any reactor unit in distress can be 

suitably monitored.”7 ERDS began as a voluntary program among nuclear power reactor 

licensees—with about half of the then-operating reactor units participating—but in 1991 the 

NRC issued section VI to Appendix E, requiring participation in the program.8 The ERDS rule 

sought to assure that “a reliable and effective communication system” is “in place at operating 

 

3 See Emergency Response Data System, Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,178, 40,178 (Aug. 13, 

1991) (ERDS Final Rule). 

4 See id. at 40,180. 

5 See id. at 40,182. 

6 See id. at 40,178-79, 40,182-83. 

7 See Emergency Response Data System, Proposed Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,095, 41,098 (Oct. 9, 

1990) (ERDS Proposed Rule). 

8 See ERDS Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,178; 10 C.F.R. pt. 50, app. E, sec. VI; see also 10 

C.F.R. § 50.72(a)(4) (specifying ERDS activation requirements). 
- 3 - 

power reactors” to “allow the NRC to monitor critical parameters during an emergency.”9 The 

NRC did not require licensees to monitor more parameters than were already being monitored 

at each facility, however.10 Nor has ERDS ever been intended to “portray every detail of a 

nuclear power reactor in an emergency situation.”11 Licensees are required to activate ERDS 

“as soon as possible but not later than one hour after declaring an Emergency Class of alert, 

site area emergency, or general emergency.”12

In issuing the ERDS rule, the NRC required the participation of “all operating nuclear 

power facilities except Big Rock Point,” whose facility configuration did not “make available as 

transmittable data a sufficient number of parameters for effective participation.”13 Further, the 

ERDS rule itself and its Statements of Consideration make clear that the rule is inapplicable to 

those “nuclear power reactor facilities . . . that are permanently or indefinitely shut down.”14

The NRC allowed state governments to request an ERDS link from the NRC. Although it 

neither required nor solicited state participation in the ERDS, the NRC permitted states to 

establish an “ERDS interface” with the NRC through a Memorandum of Understanding.15 As 

 

9 ERDS Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 40,178. 

10 See id. at 40,184; see also 10 C.F.R. pt. 50, app. E, § VI.1 (“When selected plant data are not 

available on the licensee’s onsite computer system, retrofitting of data points is not required.”). 

11 See ERDS Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 40,179. 

12 10 C.F.R. § 50.72(a)(4). 

13 See ERDS Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 40,178. 

14 See id.; see also 10 C.F.R. pt. 50, app. E, § VI.2 (“Except for Big Rock Point and all nuclear 

power facilities that are shut down permanently or indefinitely, onsite hardware shall be provided 

at each unit by the licensee to interface with the NRC receiving system.”). The ERDS rule 

applies to reactor units shut down only temporarily for maintenance and those authorized only 

for fuel loading or low power operations. See ERDS Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 40,178; ERDS 

Proposed Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. at 41,095-96. 

15 See ERDS Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 40,180; Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) 

Implementation, NUREG-1394, Rev. 1 (June 1991), app. J at J-2. 
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relevant here, in 1997 Vermont and the NRC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding in 

which the NRC agreed to provide Vermont with access to ERDS “data related to plant 

conditions during emergencies at commercial nuclear power plants in Vermont.”16

B. Procedural Background 

1. Entergy’s License Amendment Request

This adjudicatory proceeding stems from Entergy’s request for an amendment to its 

license for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. By letter dated March 24, 2014, 

Entergy proposed changes to the Site Emergency Plan to reduce the on-shift and Emergency 

Response Organization staffing.17 Entergy requested the amendment as part of its “transition 

from an operating facility to a permanently defueled facility.”18 Entergy explained that upon the 

docketing of certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel 

from the reactor vessel, the Vermont Yankee license “will no longer authorize operation of the 

reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel.”19 Entergy described its 

proposed staffing reductions as “commensurate with the reduced spectrum of credible accidents 

in [a] permanently defueled condition.”20

 

16 Notice, Final Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission and the State of Vermont, 62 Fed. Reg. 6281, 6281-82 (Feb. 11, 1997). 

17 Wamser, Christopher J., Site Vice President, Entergy, letter to U.S. NRC Document Control 

Desk (Mar. 24, 2014) (ADAMS accession no. ML14085A257) (License Amendment Request). 

18 Id. at 1. 

19 See id.; see also 10 C.F.R. § 50.82(a)(2). The certifications have since been filed. See 

Wamser, Christopher J., Site Vice President, Entergy, letter to U.S. NRC Document Control 

Desk, “Certifications of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations and Permanent Removal of 

Fuel from the Reactor Vessel” (Jan. 12, 2015) (ML15013A426). 

20 License Amendment Request at 1.
- 5 - 

As part of its license amendment request, Entergy submitted an analysis evaluating 

whether the “proposed post-shutdown minimum on-shift staff” could “implement all emergency 

tasks.”21 The analysis assessed the adequacy of the proposed staffing to perform necessary 

emergency tasks in light of the reduced number of “postulated accidents that will be applicable 

in the permanently defueled condition.”22 For each of the various accident scenarios studied in 

the staffing analysis (e.g., fuel handling accident, general emergency with radioactive release 

beyond the site boundary, design basis threat ground assault), Entergy identified the tasks to be 

performed and the on-shift positions responsible for each task.23 Where “multiple tasks were 

assigned to an individual in their role,” the analysis included Time Motion Studies evaluating 

“the timing of the tasks . . . to ensure that they could be performed by the individual in series 

within any specified time requirements.”24

In evaluating whether the proposed on-shift staff adequately could perform the 

emergency tasks for each of the evaluated accident scenarios, Entergy identified those 

positions and tasks it considered no longer applicable to a facility with a permanently shutdown 

and defueled reactor.25 Among these various identified tasks, Entergy explained that in a 

permanently shutdown and defueled condition the Vermont Yankee facility would not need to 

have an operational ERDS communications link to the NRC, and therefore the task of activating 

 

21 See id., Attach. 4, Analysis of Proposed Shutdown On-Shift Staffing at 4. 

22 See id. 

23 See id., Attach. 4 at 17-45. 

24 See id., Attach. 4 at 10, 46-62. 

25 See id., Attach. 4 at 7-8, 12-14. 
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the ERDS link was not included in the staffing analysis as one of the on-shift crew tasks to be 

performed in an emergency.26

The NRC Staff published a notice of Entergy’s license amendment request in the 

Federal Register, providing an opportunity to submit comments and to request a hearing.27 

Vermont filed comments on the proposed license amendment.28 Subsequently, Vermont filed 

its request for hearing and petition to intervene.29

2. Vermont’s Contention

Vermont proffered one contention for hearing. The contention did not address Entergy’s 

proposed changes in the on-shift or Emergency Response Organization staffing. Instead, 

Vermont focused on the assumption that “the ERDS link to the NRC will not be operational in 

the permanently shut down and defueled condition.”30 Vermont’s contention sought 

continuation of the ERDS data link with the NRC or an alternate means of obtaining similar data. 

The contention in full reads as follows: 

Entergy has failed to ensure a Radiological Monitoring System that will provide 

the information that the State needs to assess Vermont Yankee conditions as 

part of the State’s protective action decision-making process, and Entergy has 

thus failed to demonstrate that its license amendment request (1) will not 

significantly reduce the margin of safety or significantly increase the 

consequences of an accident previously evaluated as required by 10 CFR 

 

26 See id., Attach. 4 at 8. 

27 See Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses 

Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations, Notice, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,539, 42,539-42, 

42,546 (July 22, 2014). 

28 The Vermont Public Service Department filed two comments, both dated August 21, 2014 

(Vermont Comment 1, ML14239A029; Vermont Comment 2, ML14239A030). 

29 Vermont Department of Public Service Notice of Intention to Participate, Petition to Intervene, 

and Hearing Request (Sept. 22, 2014; filed through the NRC’s E-Filing system Sept. 24, 2014) 

(Petition for Hearing); see also LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 162-64 (declining to dismiss petition as 

untimely). 

30 See Petition for Hearing at 4. 
- 7 - 

§ 50.92; (2) will provide adequate protection for the public health and safety as 

required by 10 CFR § 50.57(a)(3); and (3) will comply with the requirements of 

10 CFR § 50.47 to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective 

measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.31

Vermont claimed that while many of the parameters ERDS transmits would not be 

“needed once Vermont is in a permanently shut down and defueled condition, other ERDS 

parameters are still needed.”32 Vermont argued that “[w]ithout timely access to the spent fuel 

pool, radiological, and meteorological data” made available through ERDS to the state’s 

radiological response organizations, “the State would need significantly more time to obtain 

accurate data needed for State protective action recommendations.”33 Vermont requested a 

hearing to “put forward testimonial evidence on the potential consequences of that delay.”34

As set forth in its petition, Vermont seeks either that (1) “the ERDS link to the NRC be 

retained during Vermont Yankee’s permanently shut down and defueled period” or (2) “an 

alternate means similar to ERDS be made available to provide [an] equivalent Radiation 

Monitoring System, Meteorological information, and Containment parameters relevant to the 

spent fuel pool conditions for as long as fuel remains within the spent fuel pool.”35

Both the Staff and Entergy opposed admission of Vermont’s contention on several 

grounds. Both claimed that the contention falls beyond the scope of the proposed license 

amendment.36 Both also argued that the contention constitutes an impermissible challenge to 

 

31 See id. at 3-4. 

32 See id. at 4. 

33 See id. at 5. 

34 Id. 

35 Id. 

36 See NRC Staff’s Answer to Vermont Department of Public Service Notice of Intention to 

Participate, Petition to Intervene, and Hearing Request (Oct. 20, 2014), at 9-12, 14-15 (Staff 

Answer Before Board); Entergy’s Answer Opposing the State of Vermont’s Notice of Intention to 
- 8 - 

the ERDS requirements in Appendix E to Part 50, which exempt permanently shutdown nuclear 

power facilities.37 Entergy additionally claimed that the contention fails to raise a genuine 

material dispute with the application and lacks the necessary factual or expert support.38 The 

Staff further argued that the contention is not material to the findings that the NRC must make 

on the license amendment.39

3. The Board’s Conclusions in LBP-15-4 

Although the Board found that Vermont had submitted a timely petition and had standing 

to intervene, a Board majority found Vermont’s contention inadmissible as a collateral challenge 

to an NRC regulation—specifically, the ERDS rule.40 The Board found the relief Vermont 

sought to be “inconsistent” with the regulations regarding ERDS, which exempt “all nuclear 

power facilities that are shut down permanently” from the need to provide an ERDS interface 

with the NRC.41 In the Board’s view, Vermont effectively seeks to impose on Entergy 

requirements “more stringent” than the ERDS regulations because Vermont seeks to require 

Entergy—even now that the Vermont Yankee reactor is permanently shut down and defueled—

to maintain an ERDS link with the NRC or to “create another ERDS-like system.”42 In reaching 

its conclusions, the Board examined the language, regulatory history, and regulatory framework 

 

Participate, Petition to Intervene, and Hearing Request (Oct. 3, 2014), at 14-15 (Entergy Answer 

Before Board). 

37 See Staff Answer Before Board at 12-13; Entergy Answer Before Board at 15; 10 C.F.R. pt. 

50, app. E, § VI.2. 

38 See Entergy Answer Before Board at 15-18. 

39 See Staff Answer Before Board at 15-16.

40 See 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(a) (“no rule or regulation of the Commission . . . is subject to attack by 

way of discovery, proof, argument, or other means in any adjudicatory proceeding of this part”). 

41 See LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 167 (quoting 10 C.F.R. pt. 50, app. E, § VI.2). 

42 See id.
- 9 - 

of the ERDS regulations.43 The Board rejected Vermont’s alternate interpretations of the ERDS 

rule exemption.44

Judge Wardwell dissented. In his view, the “exemption clause” for shutdown power 

facilities in Appendix E, Section VI.2 applied only to those “plants . . . already shut down at the 

time of the rulemaking and not to plants at which an ERDS was later installed” and that now are 

terminating operations.45 He reasoned that the text in Appendix E only concerns “the initial 

installation, startup, operation, and maintenance of the ERDS,” not whether or when an installed 

system can be disconnected.46 Judge Wardwell described the exemption as intended merely to 

exclude the then-shutdown plants, “whose spent fuel had been cooling . . . for a period of time,” 

from having to comply with the rule’s mandate “to install, implement, and maintain an ERDS.”47

Judge Wardwell therefore concluded that the exemption for plants “that are shutdown 

permanently or indefinitely” does not apply to Vermont Yankee or other plants with “previously 

installed” ERDS connections that now have terminated reactor operations permanently.48 In 

turn, he concluded that Vermont’s contention does not challenge the ERDS rule.49 Judge 

Wardwell went on to find Vermont’s contention otherwise admissible for hearing.50

 

43 See id. at 167-73. 

44 See id. at 167-72. 

45 See id. at 177 (Wardwell, J., dissenting) (concluding that, at a minimum, two interpretations of 

the exemption provision are possible). 

46 See id. at 182. 

47 See id. at 181. 

48 See id. at 188. 

49 See id.

50 See id. at 190-91. 
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Both the majority and dissenting opinions address a recent NRC Staff-generated 

memorandum (referenced as the “Lewis Memorandum” or “Lewis Memo”) whose express intent 

was to clarify the ERDS requirements for those plants that have permanently ceased 

operations.51 Issued to the NRC regions, the Lewis Memorandum states that the Appendix E, 

Section VI requirements involving ERDS do not apply to power reactor licensees that have 

submitted a certificate of permanent cessation of operation.52 The memorandum goes on to 

specify that a licensee of a permanently shutdown facility may “retire ERDS without prior NRC 

approval” if its emergency plan “does not describe ERDS or its use during an emergency.”53 

For those licensees whose emergency plan describes ERDS or its use during an emergency, 

the memorandum outlines a process for retiring ERDS. The memorandum states that such 

licensees “would need to process a change” to their emergency plans pursuant to 

10 C.F.R. § 50.54(q)(3).54

Section 50.54(q)(3) allows a licensee to make changes to an emergency plan without 

prior NRC approval if the licensee completes and retains an analysis demonstrating that the 

revised emergency plan satisfies a two-part test: (1) the plan as changed must continue to meet 

the requirements in Part 50, Appendix E and the standards in section 50.47(b); and (2) the 

changes must not reduce the effectiveness of the plan.55 The Lewis Memorandum states that a 

 

51 See Memorandum from Lewis, Robert J., Division of Preparedness and Response, Office of 

Nuclear Security and Incident Response, “Emergency Response Data System at Plants that 

Have Permanently Ceased Operations” (June 2, 2014) (ML14099A520) (Lewis Memorandum). 

52 See id. at 1. 

53 Id. 

54 Id. 

55 “Reduction in effectiveness” means a reduction in the “licensee’s capability to perform an 

emergency planning function in the event of a radiological emergency.” See 10 C.F.R. 

§ 50.54(q)(1)(iv); see also id. § 50.54(q)(1)(iii). 
- 11 - 

licensee accordingly may, without NRC prior approval, revise its emergency plan to remove the 

reference to the ERDS data link to the NRC if the licensee performs the section 50.54(q)(3) 

screening analysis and concludes that the two-part test is satisfied. If a licensee concludes in 

its section 50.54(q)(3) analysis that a particular change would reduce the effectiveness of an 

emergency plan, then the licensee cannot implement the change without prior NRC approval 

and must seek a license amendment to change the emergency plan. 

In February 2015, while this case was pending, the NRC granted the license amendment 

(License Amendment 261), approving Entergy’s proposed changes to the Vermont Yankee site 

emergency plan to reduce the on-shift and Emergency Response Organization staffing.56 The 

Staff found that the proposed staffing changes met the emergency plan standards in 10 C.F.R. 

§ 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 and also provide 

reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures “can and will be taken in the event of 

a radiological emergency, commensurate with the reduced spectrum of credible accidents in the 

permanently shutdown and defueled condition.”57

On February 23, 2015, Entergy submitted to the NRC a revised Vermont Yankee 

emergency plan (Revision 55).58 Revisions included the on-shift and Emergency Response 

Organization staffing reductions authorized by License Amendment 261, as well as several 

emergency plan changes for which Entergy had performed a section 50.54(q)(3) screening 

 

56 See Kim, James, NRC, letter to Entergy, “Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station – Issuance 

of Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License Re: Changes to the Emergency Plan” 

(Feb. 4, 2015) (ML14346A065) (License Amendment). 

57 See id. at 22. 

58 See McKenney, Michael P., Emergency Planning Manager, Entergy, letter (with attachments) 

to Document Control Desk, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Emergency Plan Change, 

Revision 55” (Feb. 23, 2015) (ML15076A074) (Revision 55 to EP). 
- 12 - 

analysis and concluded that they would not require prior NRC approval.59 Retiring ERDS and 

removing ERDS from the emergency plan were among the emergency plan changes Entergy 

made pursuant to section 50.54(q)(3).60

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Timeliness 

As an initial matter, Entergy opposes Vermont’s appeal as untimely.61 The appeal was 

due on February 23, 2015.62 Vermont attempted to file its appeal approximately 30 minutes 

prior to the midnight deadline on February 23, 2015, but encountered technical difficulties 

submitting its brief through the NRC’s Electronic Information Exchange (EIE).63 Vermont 

nonetheless sent a copy of its brief to the other participants by e-mail prior to the filing deadline. 

The next day Vermont obtained technical assistance from the NRC EIE Help Desk and was able 

to file is brief via the EIE.64 Based on the affidavit of Vermont’s counsel, we find that Vermont 

had good cause to believe its EIE connection to the NRC was in working order on the day its 

appeal was due and that Vermont otherwise acted in good faith and with reasonable diligence. 

The other litigants also were not prejudiced by the hours of delay in the EIE filing. We accept 

the appeal. 

 

59 Id. 

60 See id., Attach. 9.2, 10 CFR 50.54(q) Evaluation, Vermont Yankee ERDS (revised analysis 

dated Jan. 26, 2015), at pp. 5-6 of 7. 

61 See Entergy’s Answer Opposing the State of Vermont’s Appeal of Atomic Safety and 

Licensing Board’s January 28, 2015 Memorandum and Order Denying the State’s Request for 

Hearing and Petition to Intervene (Mar. 20, 2015), at 8-10 (Entergy Brief). 

62 See LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 176 (majority opinion); 10 C.F.R. § 2.311(b). 

63 See Affidavit of Aaron Kisicki Regarding the Late Electronic Filing of the State of Vermont’s 

February 23, 2015 Notice of Appeal and Supporting Brief (Feb. 24, 2015), at 1 (ML15055A276). 

64 Id. at 1-2. 
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B. Contention Admissibility Requirements 

A request for hearing must “set forth with particularity” the contentions a petitioner seeks 

to litigate.65 The NRC’s contention admissibility rules are found in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1). They 

are intentionally strict. For each contention, the petitioner must state the issue of law or fact to 

be raised or controverted and a brief explanation of the basis for the contention.66 Contentions 

cannot be based on speculation but must have “some reasonably specific factual or legal 

basis.”67 Our rules thus require a petitioner to state the alleged facts or expert opinions that 

support the petitioner’s position and on which the petitioner intends to rely in litigating the 

contention at hearing.68

The petition also must demonstrate that the issue raised in the contention falls within the 

scope of the proceeding and is material to the findings that the NRC must make.69 A 

contention, therefore, must provide sufficient information to show a genuine dispute with the 

applicant on a material issue of law or fact.70 A petitioner must refer to the specific portions of 

the application that the petitioner disputes, along with the supporting reasons for each dispute; 

or, if the petitioner believes that an application fails altogether to contain information required by 

law, the petitioner must identify each failure and provide supporting reasons for the petitioner’s 

 

65 See 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1). 

66 Id. § 2.309(f)(1)(i)-(ii). 

67 See Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), CLI-03-14, 

58 NRC 207, 213 (2003) (citation omitted). 

68 10 C.F.R. § 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(v). 

69 Id. § 2.309(f)(1)(iii)-(iv). 

70 Id. § 2.309(f)(1)(vi). 
- 14 - 

belief.71 We generally defer to Board decisions on contention admissibility unless we find an 

error of law or abuse of discretion.72

C. Admissibility of Vermont’s Contention 

On appeal, Vermont challenges the Board’s interpretation of the ERDS regulations.73 In 

particular, Vermont argues that the rule’s exemption for permanently shutdown nuclear power 

facilities “applied only to shut down plants as of 1991,” to exempt those plants from the 

requirement to install and implement ERDS.74 Vermont argues that the ERDS regulations 

neither allow nor “even contemplate[] termination of the ERDS feed under any 

circumstances.”75 Vermont therefore argues that the majority erred when it found Vermont’s 

contention a collateral attack on the ERDS regulations.76 Vermont also argues that the Staff 

prematurely issued the license amendment without first reviewing Entergy’s section 50.54(q)(3) 

analysis on whether removing ERDS would reduce the effectiveness of Entergy’s emergency 

plan.77 Entergy and the NRC Staff oppose the appeal.78

 

 

71 Id. 

72 See FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), 

CLI-12-8, 75 NRC 393, 397 (2012). 

73 See Vermont Appeal Brief at 5-11. 

74 See id. at 9-10. 

75 Id. at 11. 

76 Id. at 5, 16. 

77 See id. at 5, 17, 19. 

78 See Entergy Brief; NRC Staff’s Brief in Opposition to the State of Vermont’s Appeal of 

LBP-15-4 (Mar. 20, 2015) (Staff Brief). 
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1. Scope of the License Amendment Proceeding

Before turning to Vermont’s arguments on appeal, we first address a key issue that the 

Board majority did not reach—the limited scope of this proceeding. Both the Staff and Entergy’s 

primary argument in opposing Vermont’s contention before the Board was that the contention 

raises issues beyond the scope of this proceeding.79 We agree. 

In challenging Entergy’s license amendment application, Vermont seeks to have 

Vermont Yankee retain its “ERDS link to the NRC.”80 Alternatively, Vermont seeks another 

“means similar to ERDS” that will provide data “equivalent” to the radiological, meteorological, 

and spent-fuel-pool-related data that Vermont states it was able to obtain through ERDS.81 Yet 

Entergy’s license amendment application did not include a request to terminate the Vermont 

Yankee ERDS link to the NRC. As Vermont itself acknowledges, the license amendment 

request “made no apparent change” to the section of the emergency plan that addressed the 

ERDS link and that specified the plant’s “continuous ERDS connection with the NRC Operations 

Center.”82 Nor did the NRC Staff’s issuance of the license amendment serve to allow Entergy to 

delete ERDS from its emergency plan or to remove the system. In granting the license 

amendment, the Staff made clear both that the license amendment request had not included a 

request to disconnect the ERDS link and that the Staff was not “providing prior approval for the 

removal of ERDS” at Vermont Yankee.83

 

79 See, e.g., Staff Answer Before Board at 1, 9-12; Entergy Answer Before Board at 14-15. 

80 See Petition for Hearing at 5. 

81 Id. at 5. 

82 See Vermont Appeal at 11 (citing § 7.10 of the Vermont Yankee emergency plan). 

83 See License Amendment, Attach., Safety Evaluation Related to Amendment No. 261 at 27 

(responding to Vermont’s comments on proposed amendment). 
- 16 - 

To be sure, Entergy deleted the reference to ERDS in the emergency plan and retired 

the Vermont Yankee ERDS—effective February 5, 2015—but only after completing an analysis 

under section 50.54(q)(3).84 In its analysis, Entergy concluded that (1) the applicable 

emergency plan regulations under 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(b) and Appendix E to Part 50 would 

continue to be met even without ERDS and (2) removing ERDS would not reduce the 

effectiveness of the Vermont Yankee emergency plan.85 In short, the challenged license 

amendment did not affect the status of the ERDS link at Vermont Yankee. 

The license amendment request does refer to ERDS, but solely in regard to the 

assumption that after the permanent shutdown of the reactor it would no longer be necessary 

for the on-shift staff to activate ERDS. Entergy sought the license amendment because it 

intended to cease reactor operations and defuel the reactor and accordingly all of Entergy’s 

proposed staff reductions relate to Vermont Yankee in a “permanently defueled condition.”86 As 

such, the staffing analyses submitted with the request contained assumptions regarding the 

spectrum of credible accidents or events and the emergency tasks that would still be 

applicable—or no longer applicable—at a facility with a permanently shutdown and defueled 

reactor.87 In this vein, Entergy assumed that maintaining the ERDS link would not be required 

at a permanently defueled facility and in turn that the specific on-shift staff “task of ERDS 

activation” would no longer be relevant.88

 

84 Entergy Brief at 6. 

85 See Revision 55 to EP, at Attachment 9.2, Section 50.54(q) Evaluation (Jan. 26, 2015), at pp. 

5-6 of 7. 

86 See License Amendment Request, Cover Letter at 1. 

87 See, e.g., id., Attach. 4 at 4-15. 

88 See id., Attach. 4 at 8; see also, e.g., id. at 21, 27, 33, 39.
- 17 - 

While Vermont took issue with Entergy’s assumption that it could disconnect ERDS after 

ceasing operations and defueling, Vermont’s contention did not challenge the proposed staffing 

reductions. Vermont’s petition neither claimed that more on-shift positions would be necessary 

to allow for timely ERDS activation nor conversely, that without the automatic ERDS mode of 

data transmission more on-shift staff would be necessary to perform emergency tasks. In short, 

Vermont's contention did not seek to litigate the sufficiency of the proposed staffing reductions. 

Vermont’s subsequent efforts in its reply brief to tie its interest in the ERDS data to the 

proposed staffing in the license amendment were both late and unsupported.89 Vermont neither 

explained nor otherwise supported claims that the proposed “on-shift staff reductions . . . can 

only be justified by the elimination of ERDS” or that the “staffing reductions proposed by Entergy 

will result in . . . the effective elimination of ERDS.”90 Additionally, Vermont provided no basis 

for its argument that the license amendment would “permit Entergy to discharge several 

employees whose training and experience are essential to ERDS operation.”91

Notably, by its very nature ERDS does not require a dedicated “operator” for the duration 

of emergencies because the system automatically collects and transmits plant data; the 

“acquisition and transmission of data [does] not require human intervention after the system is 

activated.”92 Moreover, Vermont Yankee’s ERDS connection to the NRC was a continuous 24-

 

89 “In Commission practice, and in litigation practice generally, new arguments may not be 

raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Louisiana Energy Services. L.P., (National Enrichment 

Facility), CLI-04-25, 60 NRC 223, 225 (2004). 

90 See Vermont Reply Before Board at 2-3; see also id. at 6-7 (“the proposed staff reductions 

are premised upon the elimination of ERDS” and “the loss of ERDS . . . [is] a result of the 

proposed staffing reductions”). 

91 See id. at 14; see also Vermont Appeal at 16-17. 

92 See ERDS Proposed Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. at 41,096. And the “task” of activating ERDS 

(referenced in the license amendment request) is not an extensive procedure; by regulation 
- 18 - 

hour connection and therefore the task of activating ERDS in an emergency would not have 

been necessary unless the system had become disconnected and needed to be reconnected. 

Regardless, Vermont’s contention did not propose that merely to perform the single task of 

activating ERDS or the task of verifying that the ERDS connection was active would require 

more on-shift staff than proposed in the license amendment. Several different positions at 

Vermont Yankee could perform the “verification” of the ERDS connection to the NRC.93 In fact, 

Entergy’s counsel repeatedly stated that none of the labor reductions proposed in the license 

amendment depended on the elimination of ERDS, and that “Vermont Yankee does not require 

any staff . . . to operate ERDS” during an emergency.94 Vermont provided no facts or expert 

opinion to suggest otherwise. 

Judge Wardwell, nonetheless, found the contention to be within the scope of the 

proceeding and concluded that the proposed reduced staffing levels “are, in part, directly 

related” to Entergy’s plans to remove ERDS.95 Judge Wardwell based his view on Entergy 

counsel’s statement that it would cost an estimated $680,000 for Entergy to maintain “all of the 

IT equipment and support personnel” necessary to continue the ERDS “technology 

infrastructure” until 2020 (when Entergy plans to transfer all of the fuel out of the spent fuel pool 

and into an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)).96 But equipment and 

 

activation must be “performed as soon as possible” but at most within one hour of an 

emergency declaration. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.72(a)(4). 

93 See, e.g., Revision 55 to EP, ERDS Section 10 C.F.R. 50.54(q) Evaluation, Attach. 9.2 at p. 2 

of 7.

94 See id. at 35, 45; see also id. at 56 (“the staff that are being reduced[] have nothing to do with 

the operation of ERDS”). 

95 See LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 190-91 (Wardwell, J., dissenting). 

96 See id. at 191 & n.68; Tr. at 38. 
- 19 - 

personnel costs relating to testing, updating, and otherwise maintaining the ERDS hardware 

and software on a long-term basis are a different matter than the staffing levels necessary to 

respond in an emergency. And in any event, as noted above, the license amendment was not 

the basis for Entergy’s removal of ERDS at Vermont Yankee. 

For the reasons outlined above, we agree with Entergy and the Staff that Vermont’s 

proffered contention does not (1) fall within the scope of this license amendment proceeding or 

(2) raise a genuine dispute on a material issue regarding the proposed staffing reductions in the 

application.97 Indeed, even if the license amendment had been denied, Entergy still could have 

sought removal of ERDS through the section 50.54(q)(3) analysis process. Entergy could have 

performed its section 50.54(q)(3) analysis regarding the ERDS at any point after certifying that it 

had ceased operations and defueled the reactor, regardless of the timing of the license 

amendment request or its issuance.98

2. The ERDS Rule Exception in Appendix E

In addition to the conclusions reached above, we also agree in substantial part with the 

majority’s reading of the ERDS rule exception. That is, to the extent that Vermont argues that 

the ERDS regulations require Entergy to maintain ERDS “until all spent fuel currently in the 

spent fuel pool is transferred to dry cask storage” or alternatively requires Entergy to “establish” 

 

97 See, e.g., Entergy Brief at 21-22, 23-24; Staff Brief at 9. 

98 Vermont’s petition also offered little support for its claims regarding the impact of the loss of 

ERDS data and the State’s need for near real-time data. With no further elaboration, the State 

indicated only that it would “need significantly more time to obtain accurate data” to make 

protective action recommendations. See Petition for Hearing at 5. The petition incorporated by 

reference public comments that the State Nuclear Engineer and Decommissioning Coordinator 

had submitted on the license amendment request. See Vermont Comment 1. These comments 

stated that while many ERDS parameters would no longer be relevant with the reactor shut 

down, many would still be meaningful; Vermont provided no specific examples or other 

description of potential harm. We therefore agree with the Staff that Vermont’s claims are 

“vague” and lacking in factual or expert support. See Staff Brief at 27-30; see also Entergy Brief 

at 22-23.
- 20 - 

a “comparable or better communication system with the State,” we agree that Vermont misreads 

the ERDS requirements given the exception for shutdown facilities.99 We need not reach all 

aspects of the majority and dissent’s dispute over the ERDS rule, but focus on the points most 

relevant to Vermont’s contention. 

At issue is the ERDS rule exception in Appendix E for “nuclear power facilities that are 

shut down permanently or indefinitely.”100 Neither the rule itself nor its history defines what is 

meant by “shut down permanently.” The Board rejected Vermont’s interpretation that 

“permanently shut down” means a facility that has moved all of its spent fuel “from the fuel pool 

into the ISFSI pad offsite.”101 The Board also rejected Vermont’s arguments that the ERDS rule 

exception was intended as a “one-time” exception, applicable only to those facilities with 

permanently shutdown reactors when the NRC issued the rule in 1991.102 Rather, the Board 

read the exemption as applying to facilities that have permanently ceased reactor operations 

and permanently defueled their reactors.103

Vermont claims that “there is no indication in the regulation that it was intended to allow 

licensees that had already set up an ERDS system to terminate its feed to the NRC upon 

achieving permanently defueled status.”104 We consider the exemption in light of the 

considerations that led to the rule. ERDS as a supplementary communications system was 

conceived in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident. The key concern behind ERDS was 

 

99 See Vermont Appeal at 3; see also id. at 6-11. 

100 See 10 C.F.R. pt. 50, app. E, § VI.2. 

101 See Tr. at 22; LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 168-70 (majority opinion). 

102 See LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 171. 

103 See id. at 169-70. 

104 See Vermont Appeal at 9-10. 
- 21 - 

the NRC’s ability (as part of its oversight and support role) to monitor a “reactor accident”—a 

“reactor unit in distress.”105 The rule history also stressed the need for accurate “near real-time 

data” to allow the NRC to have quick access to “key information about what is taking place at 

the reactor during an accident, particularly during the critical early hours.”106 ERDS is intended 

to help the NRC “provide the right recommendation at the right time . . . . in the event of a 

reactor accident.”107 As the Board describes, the history contains no mention of spent fuel 

pools.108

Moreover, the NRC has not interpreted the rule as a one-time exception or special 

“waiver” applicable only to those plants that at the time still had spent fuel in pools but no longer 

had operating reactors. Subsequent NRC generic communications regarding ERDS have been 

addressed to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those license 

holders that have “ceased operations” and “have certified that fuel has been permanently 

removed from the reactor vessel.”109 And while the rule does not address the removal of ERDS, 

in practice the NRC has allowed licensees that have permanently defueled their reactors to 

remove ERDS, as the Staff described.110 Further, as the Staff noted in its brief, the plants that 

 

105 See ERDS Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 40,179, 40,182; ERDS Proposed Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 

at 41,098. 

106 See ERDS Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 40,183. 

107 See id. at 40,179. 

108 See LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 168-69 (majority opinion). 

109 See NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2009-13, “Emergency Response Data System 

Upgrade from Modem to Virtual Private Network Appliance” (Sept. 28, 2009), at 1 

(ML092670124); NRC Information Notice 2008-15, “Emergency Response Data System Test 

Schedule Revised” (Aug. 12, 2008), at 1 (ML081900401). 

110 See Staff Brief at 4-5. 
- 22 - 

were shut down before the ERDS implementation deadline did not install ERDS though they 

stored spent fuel in their spent fuel pools for years after the ERDS implementation deadline.111

Compared to a reactor accident, a spent fuel pool accident is a slower-moving event with 

far fewer parameters for a licensee to monitor, fewer kinds of potential accidents, and more time 

available to take mitigative and corrective actions. Moreover, without an operating reactor in the 

picture, the entire focus of the licensee’s staff can be on the spent fuel pool. And once a reactor 

has shut down, the potential for a release from a spent fuel pool will diminish with time as the 

decay heat of the fuel drops, given that no fresh spent fuel will be added to the pool. It is 

reasonable, therefore, to read the rule exemption as applying to facilities that have permanently 

shut down reactor operations and defueled their reactors, as the Board found. 

To the extent, then, that Vermont argues that licensees with permanently shut down and 

defueled reactors must maintain an ERDS for as long as their facilities still have fuel in a spent 

fuel pool, we agree with the Board that Vermont’s contention collaterally challenges the ERDS 

rule by seeking to impose more stringent requirements on non-operating plants than the rule 

intended.112 Both the most plausible reading of the rule exemption and the rule’s history (which 

focuses on timely information to monitor reactor accidents) do not support such an 

interpretation. 

 

 

111 Id. at 3; see also LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 168 n.68. 

112 See Vermont Appeal at 9 (questioning “whether plants that already have ERDS in place 

should be allowed . . . [to] eliminat[e] those systems”); id. at 11-12 (“Once the spent fuel is 

transferred to dry cask storage . . . access to ERDS data is no longer necessary”); id. at 17 (the 

“heart of the State’s contention” involves whether “NRC regulations . . . require[s] continued use 

of ERDS at a defueled facility”). 
- 23 - 

3. The Section 50.54(q)(3) Process

On appeal, Vermont asserts that its contention does not collaterally challenge the ERDS 

rule but instead addresses “when and how a licensee can terminate ERDS operation.”113 

Specifically, Vermont states that its contention “draws attention to Entergy’s failure” to meet the 

threshold test in section 50.54(q)(3) for revising an emergency plan.114 Citing to the Lewis 

Memorandum and to section 50.54(q)(3), Vermont repeatedly stresses that Entergy cannot 

remove the ERDS provision in the emergency plan “unless and until” it “demonstrates” that 

ERDS “removal will not reduce the effectiveness” of the plan.115

All of the litigants, the Board majority, and Judge Wardwell agree that Entergy did not 

have the discretion to remove ERDS without first performing and meeting the two-part screening 

test in section 50.54(q)(3).116 In other words, all parties agree that Entergy could not terminate 

the ERDS link without first demonstrating that the removal of ERDS would not reduce the 

effectiveness of Vermont Yankee’s emergency plan. 

As we earlier described, the Staff as a policy matter determined and recently clarified in 

the Lewis Memorandum that a section 50.54(q)(3) analysis should be completed to remove 

ERDS if the facility’s emergency plan includes ERDS, as Vermont Yankee’s plan did. This 

precaution is intended precisely to prevent a licensee from unilaterally removing ERDS when 

the licensee’s plan might rely on ERDS to provide “assessment data to the emergency response 

organization,” which the memorandum specifies is an emergency planning function.117 The 

 

113 See Vermont Appeal at 16. 

114 See id. 

115 See id. at 15; see also id. at 4-5, 12-16. 

116 See, e.g., LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 173; id. at 177-78, 186 (Wardwell, J., dissenting). 

117 See Lewis Memorandum at 2. 
- 24 - 

Lewis Memorandum outlines that if an emergency plan refers to ERDS at all a licensee seeking 

to remove ERDS is expected to “perform and retain an analysis that concludes that the removal 

of ERDS is not a reduction in effectiveness” in the plan.118

In its appeal, Vermont does not dispute that Entergy may discontinue ERDS if it justifies 

through a section 50.54(q)(3) analysis that without ERDS the emergency planning requirements 

will still be met and that there will be no reduction in the effectiveness of the emergency plan.119 

At the time of the Board’s oral argument, Entergy had not yet completed its section 50.54(q)(3) 

analysis regarding ERDS.120 But as we earlier noted, Entergy has since completed its analysis 

and provided it to both the NRC and to Vermont. Vermont therefore now has had the 

opportunity to review Entergy’s analysis, and it may challenge the accuracy and sufficiency of 

that analysis through an NRC section 2.206 petition, as we outline further below. 

Although Vermont’s intervention petition did not refer to the section 50.54(q)(3) process, 

the State’s appeal now largely centers on it. Vermont’s main stated concern is whether Entergy 

adequately demonstrated that the emergency plan without the ERDS component meets 

emergency planning requirements and does not reduce the effectiveness of the plan.121 

Vermont also claims that the Staff prematurely issued the license amendment on February 4, 

2015, “despite no indication from Entergy that it had conducted the necessary § 50.54(q)(3)” 

analysis or “evidence that [the Staff] reviewed the impact of ERDS termination” on the plan’s 

 

118 See id.; see also Vermont Appeal at 19. 

119 See Vermont Appeal at 4-5, 11-16. 

120 See, e.g., LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 173 (majority opinion) (citing Tr. at 44). 

121 See Vermont Appeal at 3-5, 12-17, 19. Vermont first referred to the section 50.54(q)(3) 

analysis in its reply brief before the Board. See Vermont Reply Before Board at 9-12. Vermont 

claimed that it was “likely that Entergy’s analysis, if done properly” would not satisfy the 

analysis’s two-part test. See id. at 12-13. 
- 25 - 

effectiveness.122 Vermont’s appeal questions “whether the NRC was correct in granting” the 

license amendment without first reviewing the section 50.54(q)(3) analysis and “whether 

Entergy was allowed to apparently terminate” the ERDS “feed to the NRC prior to submission of 

the [section 50.54(q)] analysis for NRC staff review.”123

We address these arguments in turn. First, as discussed above, the section 50.54(q)(3) 

analysis by its own terms allows a licensee to revise an emergency plan without prior NRC 

approval if the screening criteria are met. Once Entergy completed the analysis and concluded 

that the criteria were satisfied, it did not have to wait for NRC authorization to remove ERDS. 

Entergy was required to submit and did submit to the NRC a summary of its analysis (Entergy 

actually submitted the entire analysis) within 30 days of removing ERDS. 

 Second, as we earlier outlined, the license amendment did not authorize or cause the 

removal of ERDS. The section 50.54(q)(3) analysis therefore did not need to be submitted as 

part of the amendment request. And in any event, Vermont’s contention did not present a 

supported and material challenge to the license amendment, which only authorized particular 

staffing changes.124

Third, Vermont may challenge Entergy’s section 50.54(q)(3) analysis. Entergy’s analysis 

addresses whether the removal of ERDS (1) complies with emergency planning requirements in 

Appendix E and the planning standards in section 50.47(b); and (2) reduces the effectiveness of 

 

122 See Vermont Appeal at 4. 

123 See id. at 5. 

124 The Board also found Vermont’s arguments regarding the section 50.54(q)(3) analysis to be 

impermissibly late. See LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 173-74. We agree. As the Board noted, 

petitioners cannot use a reply brief to introduce wholly “new arguments not presented in the 

initial petition.” See id. at 174 n.103 (citing USEC Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-10, 

63 NRC 451, 476 (2006); LES, CLI-04-25, 60 NRC at 224-25). We note, additionally, that 

Vermont’s appeal fails to address or otherwise acknowledge the Board’s rejection of the section 

50.54(q)(3) claims as untimely. 
- 26 - 

the Vermont Yankee emergency plan.125 As part of its analysis, Entergy explains that it will 

continue to have plant data displayed on Plant Display System screens at various locations.126 

Entergy concludes that “the retirement of ERDS would not reduce the effectiveness of [Vermont 

Yankee’s] ability to communicate plant data to State response organizations.”127 If in Vermont’s 

view Entergy’s analysis is incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise does not satisfy the section 

50.54(q)(3) two-part test, Vermont can challenge the analysis through our 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 

petition process. As the Board noted, section 2.206 “provides a process for stakeholders ‘to 

advance concerns and obtain full or partial relief, or written reasons why the requested relief is 

not warranted.’”128

The Board also outlined other avenues Vermont can take, including contacting the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Given that FEMA “takes the lead” in the 

oversight of offsite emergency planning and response,129 Vermont may contact FEMA to 

 

125 See Revision 55 to EP, Attachment 9.2, Vermont Yankee ERDS, 10 CFR 50.54(q) 

Evaluation, at 2-6 (of 7). 

126 Id. at 2, 5-6 (of 7). 

127 Id. at 6 (of 7). 

128 LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 175 (quoting St. Lucie, CLI-14-11, 80 NRC at 179). Our decision today 

should not be interpreted as a review or endorsement of either the Lewis Memorandum or 

Entergy’s section 50.54(q)(3) analysis. Here, no litigant contests the Lewis Memorandum’s 

specific instruction that a licensee of a permanently shut-down facility that seeks to remove 

ERDS—and whose emergency plan includes ERDS—should perform and retain a section 

50.54(q)(3) analysis that shows that the removal of ERDS will not reduce the effectiveness of 

the emergency plan. 

129 See Memorandum of Understanding Between Federal Emergency Management Agency and 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 58 Fed. Reg. 47,996, 47,998 (Sept. 14, 1993), codified at 

Appendix A to 44 C.F.R. Part 353. 
- 27 - 

“endeavor to show that, without ERDS-like data, the State’s emergency plan is no longer 

adequate.”130

In sum, Vermont’s concerns regarding ERDS do not give rise to an admissible 

contention appropriate for resolution in this license amendment proceeding. As the Board’s 

decision outlined and our decision reiterates, Vermont has other avenues outside of this 

adjudication in which it can raise its concerns and pursue relief. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons given in this decision, we affirm the Board’s ruling in LBP-15-4. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 For the Commission 

NRC SEAL 

 /RA/ . 

 Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

 Secretary of the Commission 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, 

this 1st day of October, 2015.

 

130 See LBP-15-4, 81 NRC at 175. FEMA, in fact, already has expressed an interest in the 

ERDS issue at Vermont Yankee. FEMA observers of a Vermont Yankee Combined Functional 

Drill held in March 2015 specifically assessed “the impact of ERDS data not being directly 

forwarded to the State.” See Coons, Albert, FEMA, e-mail to Richard Kinard, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (Mar. 19, 2015) (ML15097A528) (forwarding e-mail regarding FEMA 

observation of drill). In their view, the impact “will be minimal and will not affect reasonable 

assurance.” See id. Although “[d]irect transmission [via] ERDS is more efficient,” FEMA 

personnel concluded that the “state staff found viable methods to transmit the same data” and 

that during the drill “the state received access to all required information including full system 

parameter displays, meteorological data displays, radiation monitor displays” and “data obtained 

from Licensee dose assessment.” Id. FEMA evaluators concluded that these methods 

“effectively supplanted the ERDS data stream.” FEMA nonetheless intended to make 

recommendations to the state in regard to further improving its data transmission methods. See 

id. We intimate no view on the FEMA evaluators’ conclusions regarding the impact of the 

removal of ERDS at Vermont Yankee. We note only that FEMA, in its oversight role over offsite 

emergency planning, specifically has sought to confirm that the removal of ERDS at Vermont 

Yankee will not affect a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can 

and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. 
Additional Views of Commissioner Baran 

I concur in the Commission’s decision that, as a legal matter, the Board is correct that 

the State of Vermont’s contention is not admissible. I write separately to note that my 

agreement with the decision should not be read as an endorsement, as a policy matter, of the 

current ERDS regulation. I am sympathetic to the State of Vermont’s view that licensees should 

maintain those aspects of ERDS that transmit spent fuel pool conditions or are relevant to a 

potential spent fuel pool accident until the spent fuel is removed from the pool or there is no 

reasonable risk of a zirconium fire. The NRC Staff is currently conducting a decommissioning 

rulemaking. During this effort, it would be useful for the Staff to seek public comment on 

whether Section VI.2 of, Appendix E should be revised, the potential costs of maintaining a 

reduced-scope ERDS after the shutdown of a reactor, and the potential benefits to state and 

local emergency preparedness programs of maintaining ERDS until all fuel is removed from the 

spent fuel pool. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE, LLC ) Docket No. 50-271-LA 

 AND ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. ) 

 ) 

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) ) 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that copies of the COMMISSION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CLI-15-20 have 

been served upon the following persons by the Electronic Information Exchange. 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 

Mail Stop: T-3 F23 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

E. Roy Hawkens, Chairman 

Roy.Hawkens@nrc.gov

Dr. Michael F. Kennedy 

Michael.Kennedy@nrc.gov

Dr. Richard E. Wardwell 

Richard.Wardwell@nrc.gov 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of the General Counsel 

Mail Stop: O15D21 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Beth Mizuno, Esq. 

Jeremy Wachutka, Esq. 

Brian Harris, Esq. 

Daniel Straus, Esq. 

Edward Williamson, Esq. 

John Tibbetts, Paralegal 

beth.mizuno@nrc.gov

jeremy.wachutka@nrc.gov

brian.harris@nrc.gov

daniel.straus@nrc.gov 

edward.williamson@nrc.gov

john.tibbetts@nrc.gov 

Nicole Pepperl, Law Clerk 

Nicole.Pepperl@nrc.gov 

Vermont Department of Public Service 

112 State Street – Drawer 20 

Montpelier, VT 05620-2601 

Aaron Kisicki, Esq. 

Kyle Landis-Marinello, Esq. 

aaron.kisicki@state.vt.us

kyle.landis-marinello@vermont.gov 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Commission Appellate 

 Adjudication 

Mail Stop: O-7H4M 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

ocaamail@nrc.gov
DOCKET NO. 50-271-LA 

COMMISSION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CLI-15-20

2 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of the Secretary of the Commission 

Mail Stop: O-16C1 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Hearing Docket 

hearingdocket@nrc.gov

Entergy Services, Inc. 

101 Constitution Ave., NW 

Washington, DC 200012133 

Susan Raimo, Esq. 

sraimo@entergy.com

 

[Original signed by Brian Newell ] 

 Office of the Secretary of the Commission 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland 

this 1st day of October, 2015