POLICY ISSUE 

Information

August 8, 2016 SECY-16-0094 

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: Victor M. McCree 

Executive Director for Operations 

SUBJECT: STAFF STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE UNCONTESTED

HEARING FOR ISSUANCE OF COMBINED LICENSES FOR THE

WILLIAM STATES LEE III NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 

(DOCKET NOS. 52-018 AND 52-019) 

PURPOSE: 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has completed its review of the 

application for two combined licenses (COLs) to authorize construction and operation of the 

William States Lee III Nuclear Station (WLS) Units 1 and 2, located in Cherokee County near 

Gaffney, South Carolina. This subsequent COL (SCOL) application references the AP1000 

Design Control Document (DCD), Revision 19. 

The staff presents this information paper in accordance with the revised Internal Commission 

Procedures dated March 24, 2016. Issuance of this paper follows the issuance of the final 

safety evaluation report (FSER) on August 1, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16160A414). On December 31, 2013, the 

CONTACTS: Brian Hughes, NRO/DNRL 

301-415-6582 

Patricia Vokoun, NRO/DNRL 

301-415-3470 

 
Commissioners - 2 -

agency issued the WLS final environmental impact statement (EIS) (NUREG-2111, Volumes 1, 

2 and 3 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML13340A005, ML13340A006, and ML13340A007, 

respectively)). The draft COLs for WLS Units 1 and 2, and the draft Summary Record of 

Decision are referenced in this Commission paper (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML16175A483, 

ML16196A384, and ML16064A266, respectively). This paper does not address any new 

commitments or resource implications. 

This paper serves as the staff’s primary pre-filed testimony for the uncontested (mandatory) 

hearing for issuance of the COLs for WLS Units 1 and 2. This paper, with its references, also 

provides the information requested to support the Commission’s determination that the staff’s 

review has been adequate to support the findings set forth in Title 10, “Energy,” of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 52.97, “Issuance of combined licenses,” and 10 CFR 51.107, 

“Public hearings in proceedings for issuance of combined licenses; limited work 

authorizations.” 

In accordance with the Internal Commission Procedures, this paper focuses on non-routine 

matters. Non-routine matters, with regard to areas of particular importance in supporting the 

findings related to 10 CFR Part 51, “Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic 

Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions,” and Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and 

Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” are matters that relate to unique features of the facility 

or novel issues that arose as part of the review process. 

SUMMARY: 

This paper addresses each of the findings in 10 CFR 52.97(a) and 10 CFR 51.107(a) and 

provides an adequate basis for the Commission to conclude that each of these findings can 

be made for the WLS Units 1 and 2 COL application (COLA). This paper focuses on 

non-routine matters, such as unique features of the facility or novel issues that arose as part 

of the review process. This paper does not address routine aspects of the safety and 

environmental review process. 

BACKGROUND: 

I. Application History 

Application, Ownership, and Location 

In a December 12, 2007, letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML073510494), Duke Energy 

Carolinas, LLC (DEC or the applicant), which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Duke Energy 

Corporation, submitted a COLA to the NRC for two Westinghouse Electric Company 

(Westinghouse) AP1000 pressurized water reactors pursuant to the requirements of 

Sections 103 and 185(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), and 

10 CFR Part 52. These reactors will be identified as WLS Units 1 and 2, and will be located 

in the eastern portion of Cherokee County in north central South Carolina, approximately 35 

miles southwest of Charlotte, North Carolina, approximately 25 miles northeast of 
The Commissioners - 3 - 

Spartanburg, South Carolina, and approximately 7.5 miles southeast of Gaffney, South 

Carolina. DEC will be the licensed owner and operator of WLS Units 1 and 2. 

DEC is a limited liability company duly organized and existing under the laws of the state of 

North Carolina. It is engaged in the business of generating, transmitting, distributing, and 

selling electric power and energy. It is a “public utility” under the laws of North Carolina and 

subject to the jurisdiction of the North Carolina Utilities Commission with respect to its 

operations in that state. The company also transacts business and is an “electrical utility” 

under the laws of the state of South Carolina; accordingly, its operations in that state are 

subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission of South Carolina. DEC owns 

and operates regulated electrical facilities, including seven nuclear units licensed by the 

NRC, as well as electrical distribution and transmission facilities. 

DEC most recently updated the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA on April 11, 2016 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML16124A854). The publicly available portions of the application are 

available in ADAMS and on the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/newreactors/col/lee.html. There are portions of the application that contain nonpublic 

information, including the security plan, which contains Safeguards Information (SGI). The 

SGI portion of the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA is located on the NRC’s secure local area 

network. 

In addition, the applicant submitted a request for the associated material licenses under 

10 CFR Part 30, “Rules of General Applicability to Domestic Licensing of Byproduct 

Material;” 10 CFR Part 40, “Domestic Licensing of Source Material;” and 10 CFR Part 70, 

“Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.” 

Additional information about the applicant and ownership appears in Part 1 (General and 

Administrative Information) of the COLA. Additional information about the site location and 

characteristics appears in Part 2 (Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)), Chapters 1 and 2, of 

the COLA. 

Referenced Design Certification and Design Certification Amendments 

The WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA references the AP1000 certified design, as amended in DCD 

Revision 19. Westinghouse was the applicant for design certification of the AP1000 amended 

design. The Revision 19 design (ADAMS Accession No. ML11171A287) was certified in 

Appendix D, “Design Certification Rule for the AP1000 Design,” to 10 CFR Part 52. The NRC 

staff issued the FSER for this DCD (ADAMS Accession No. ML112061231) in August 2011 and 

subsequently published the FSER as Supplement 2 to NUREG-1793, “Final Safety Evaluation 

Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard Design,” in September 2011, Volumes 1 

and 2 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML11293A087 and ML11292A141, respectively). On 

December 30, 2011, the NRC published the AP1000 design certification amendment final rule 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML113480014) in the Federal Register (FR). 
The Commissioners - 4 - 

Subsequent Combined License 

The staff followed the design centered review approach which is described in Regulatory Issue 

Summary 2006-006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML053540251). In this approach, the first COLA 

for a given design is designated the reference COL (RCOL) application and subsequent COLs 

are designated SCOL applications. The staff performs a single review of information 

documented in an RCOL application and, if identical information (designated as “standard”) 

appears in a later SCOL application, the staff confirms that the appropriate information 

submitted by the SCOL applicant is identical to that previously reviewed for the RCOL 

application. The staff also evaluates any site-specific differences to ensure that they do not 

adversely affect the SCOL application analysis. 

SECY-11-0110, “Staff Statement in Support of the Uncontested Hearing for Issuance of 

Combined Licenses and Limited Work Authorizations for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, 

Units 3 and 4 (Docket Nos. 52-025 and 52-026),” discusses how initially the Bellefonte Units 3 

and 4 (Docket Nos. 52-014 and 52-015) COLA and later the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 

(Vogtle) Units 3 and 4 COLA were designated as the RCOL application for the AP1000 design 

center (ADAMS Accession No. ML110600264). 

The WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA is designated as an SCOL application in the AP1000 design 

center and contains some of the same information initially evaluated in the FSER for the Vogtle 

Units 3 and 4 COLs. In addition, the staff applied the design centered review approach in 

Chapter 21, “Design Changes Proposed In Accordance With ISG-11,” of the FSER in 

conducting its evaluation of the five requests by the applicant to depart from the AP1000 

certified design. These five departure requests were identical to departure requests in the Levy 

Nuclear Plant (Levy) Units 1 and 2 COL review, where Levy acted as the RCOL for these 

issues. 

In this paper, the staff does not discuss issues addressed under the Bellefonte Units 3 and 4, 

Vogtle Units 3 and 4, or Levy Units 1 and 2 COLA reviews that the staff recognized as 

“standard” matters under the design centered review approach and that are also applicable to 

the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA. The FSER for the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA identifies matters 

from the Bellefonte Units 3 and 4, Vogtle Units 3 and 4, and Levy Units 1 and 2 COLAs 

determined to be “standard” and applicable to the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA, and the FSER 

discusses them in Section 1.2.3. 

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 

To support the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) in providing an 

independent review and report to the Commission regarding the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA, 

the staff presented the results of its safety review to the ACRS AP1000 subcommittee on 

October 21–22, 2015. The staff presented the results of its WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA safety 

review to the ACRS full committee on December 3–4, 2015. The ACRS issued its final 

report fulfilling the requirement of 10 CFR 52.87, “Referral to the Advisory Committee on 

Reactor Safeguards,” on December 14, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15348A196). The 

ACRS conclusions and recommendations and the staff’s response are discussed further in 

later sections of this paper. 
The Commissioners - 5 - 

II. Outreach 

Public Meetings 

Before the NRC docketed the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA, the staff held a public outreach 

meeting in Gaffney, South Carolina, on August 30, 2007, to explain the safety and 

environmental review of the anticipated COLA, to describe opportunities for public 

participation in the review process, and to take questions from the public. 

The NRC staff held two scoping meetings on May 1, 2008, in Gaffney, South Carolina, to 

discuss the environmental scoping process and to give members of the pubic an opportunity 

to provide comments on environmental issues that the NRC should consider during its 

review of the application (ADAMS Accession No. ML081410109). 

On June 17, 2010, the NRC staff held a public scoping meeting in Gaffney, South Carolina, 

to solicit public input regarding the scope of the environmental review as it pertained to the 

addition of Make-Up Pond C (ADAMS Accession No. ML101800423). Make-Up Pond C is a 

proposed off-site reservoir that would serve as a source of supplemental cooling water for 

WLS. 

After issuing the draft EIS, NUREG-2111, "Draft Environmental Impact Statement for 

Combined Licenses (COLs) for William States Lee III Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2," 

Volumes 1 and 2, December 13, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML11343A010 and 

ML11343A011 respectively), the staff held two public meetings in Gaffney, South Carolina on 

January 19, 2012. These meetings were held to provide an overview of the draft EIS and to 

accept public comments on the document. 

In total, NRC staff conducted approximately 80 public meetings and public teleconferences 

during the review of the application. 

Federal Register Notices 

The NRC published the following FR notices, as required for licensing process key 

milestones. 

• After receiving the COLA on December 12, 2007, the agency published notice of the 

receipt on February 1, 2008 (73 FR 6218).

• The NRC staff published a notice of docketing the COLA on February 29, 2008 

(73 FR 11156). 

• On March 14, 2008, the NRC published a notice of intent to prepare an EIS and to 

conduct scoping (73 FR 15009). 

• On April 28, 2008, the NRC published a notice of hearing and opportunity to petition 

for leave to intervene (73 FR 22978). 
The Commissioners - 6 - 

• On February 21 and 28, as well as November 14 and December 5, 2011, the NRC 

published notices of availability of the application in accordance with Section 182(c) 

of the AEA, and 10 CFR 50.43(a)(3) (76 FR 72725, 75566, 71608, and 77021, 

respectively). 

• On December 12, 2011, the NRC published a notice of the availability of the draft 

EIS for public comment and notice of public meetings to present an overview of the 

draft EIS and to accept public comments on the document (76 FR 79228). 

• On December 17, 2013, the NRC published a notice of availability of the final EIS 

(78 FR 77508). 

Consultations 

In accordance with Section 657 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the NRC consulted with the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (ADAMS Accession No. ML082190569). As part of its 

environmental review in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as 

amended, (NEPA) and other applicable statutes, including the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 

and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the staff consulted with and obtained input 

from appropriate Federal, State, Tribal, and local organizations. 

Adjudicatory Actions 

On April 28, 2008, the NRC published in the FR a notice of hearing and opportunity to petition 

for leave to intervene in the WLS Units 1 and 2 COL proceeding (73 FR 22978). In response to 

this notice, the NRC received one petition to intervene. On September 22, 2008 (LBP-08-17; 

ADAMS Accession No. ML082660504), and April 29, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML091270627), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) issued memoranda and orders 

denying all eleven proposed contentions. One contention, regarding the greenhouse gas 

analysis in the application’s environmental report, was deemed inadmissible by the ASLB but 

was referred to the Commission for review pursuant to 10 CFR 2.323(f). The Commission 

declined to review the ASLB’s decision in an order issued November 3, 2009 (CLI-09-21; 

ADAMS Accession No. ML093070690). 

Following the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan in March 2011, a petition to 

suspend all reactor licensing decisions and certain aspects of ongoing licensing proceedings 

was filed in the WLS proceeding and in other proceedings on April 14, 2011. The Commission 

denied the suspension petition, but granted the intervenors' request for a safety analysis to the 

extent that the NRC would conduct a short-term and long-term lessons-learned analysis of the 

Fukushima accident (CLI-11-05, ADAMS Accession No. ML11252A847). A contention related 

to the Fukushima accident subsequently was filed in this proceeding on August 11, 2011. The 

ASLB dismissed the contention as premature in an order issued on October 18, 2011 (LBP-11-

27; ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A126). On November 30, 2011, the ASLB declined to 

reinstate the contention (LBP-11-36; ADAMS Accession No. ML11334A040). The Commission 

upheld the ASLB’s decision in LBP-11-27 on March 16, 2012 (CLI-12-07; ADAMS Accession 

No. ML12076A194). 

A petition to suspend final reactor licensing decisions related to continued on-site storage of 
The Commissioners - 7 - 

spent nuclear fuel was filed in the WLS proceeding and other proceedings on June 18, 2012. 

On July 10, 2012, a motion to reopen was filed in the WLS proceeding, along with a motion to 

file a new contention regarding on-site waste disposal. The Commission directed that the 

contention be held in abeyance on August 29, 2012 (CLI-12-16; ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12242A332). On August 26, 2014, the Commission issued an order directing the ASLB to 

dismiss this contention (CLI-14-08; ADAMS Accession No. ML14238A222). 

A contention, motion to reopen, and suspension petition concerning safety issues related to 

disposal of spent nuclear fuel were filed in the WLS proceeding and other proceedings on 

September 29, 2014. The Commission denied the contention, motion to reopen, and 

suspension petition on February 26, 2015 (CLI-15-04; ADAMS Accession No. ML15057A277). 

On January 28, 2015, a petition was filed to supplement the final EIS in the WLS proceeding 

and other proceedings to reference the “Continued Storage” generic EIS. The Commission 

denied this petition on April 23, 2015 (CLI-15-10; ADAMS Accession No. ML15113A295). A 

hearing request, intervention petition, and motion to reopen seeking admission of a “placeholder” contention regarding the NRC’s reliance on the Continued Storage Rule and generic EIS 

were filed on April 22, 2015. The Commission denied these requests on June 9, 2015 (CLI-15-

15; ADAMS Accession No. ML15160A179). 

Currently, all contested issues in this proceeding have been resolved. 

III. Review Process/Methodology

The key processes and methodologies used to ensure quality, consistency, and completeness 

in preparation of the FSER and final EIS are described in the following documents: 

NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for 

Nuclear Power Plants (LWR [Light Water Reactor] Edition)” (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML070660036). The principal purpose of the standard review plan (SRP) is to ensure the 

quality and uniformity of staff safety reviews. The staff uses the SRP as a routine tool for 

evaluating the safety of nuclear power plant designs. The SRP, comprehensively updated in 

2007, is the most definitive basis available for evaluating whether an application meets the set 

of regulations established by the Commission. Each section of the SRP outlines the specific 

regulations that will be met when the review is complete, including the general design criteria 

from Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50, 

“Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.” Section 1.9.2 of the applicant’s 

FSAR identifies the departures from the SRP associated with the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA. 

This listing does not include SRP departures associated with the AP1000 DCD that have been 

incorporated by reference. 

NUREG-1555, “Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power 

Plants: Environmental Standard Review Plan.” This guidance, including a 2007 update that 

addresses environmental reviews for COL applications, includes environmental SRPs that NRC 

staff uses when conducting environmental reviews of applications related to nuclear power 

plants, in accordance with the NEPA and the NRC’s NEPA implementing regulations in 

10 CFR Part 51. (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1555/) 
The Commissioners - 8 - 

NUREG-2157, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel,” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14198A440). The NRC prepared a final generic 

EIS that provides a regulatory basis for the final rule entitled “Continued Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel.” As directed by 10 CFR 51.23(b), the impacts assessed in NUREG-2157 are 

deemed to be incorporated in an EIS for a COLA. 

SRM-SECY-12-0025, “Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to 

Lessons Learned from Japan’s March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami,” 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML120690347). This staff requirements memorandum (SRM) 

provides direction to the staff on implementing the Commission-approved recommended actions 

to be taken in response to Fukushima lessons learned.

Design-Centered Review Approach, SECY-06-0019, “Semiannual Update on the Status of 

New Reactor Licensing Activities and Future Planning for New Reactors” (ADAMS

Accession No. ML053530315). Under the design-centered review approach, the Office of New 

Reactors (NRO) has used, to the extent practicable, a “one issue-one review-one position” 

strategy to optimize the review effort and resources needed to perform these reviews. Within 

the AP1000 design center, the staff has conducted one technical review for each reactor design 

issue and is using this one decision to support the review of multiple COLAs. 

“Addressing Construction and Preconstruction Activities, Greenhouse Gas Issues, 

General Conformity Determinations, Environmental Justice, Need for Power, Cumulative 

Impact Analysis, and Cultural/Historical Resources Analysis Issues in Environmental 

Impact Statements,” internal NRC NRO memorandum, December 10, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100760503). This guidance assisted the staff in addressing certain aspects 

of the environmental reviews for early site permit (ESP) and COLAs that: (1) had evolved since 

the last update to NUREG-1555 (in 2007) or (2) had been identified in conducting the first 

several reviews of ESP and COLAs.

Regulatory Guides. Regulatory guides (RGs) provide guidance to licensees and applicants on 

implementing specific parts of the NRC’s regulations, techniques used by the NRC staff in 

evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the staff in its review 

of applications for permits or licenses. 

The WLS COL FSAR Appendix 1AA, “Conformance with Regulatory Guides,” supplements the 

detailed discussion presented in the referenced AP1000 DCD Appendix 1A, “Conformance with 

Regulatory Guides.” 

Interim Staff Guidance. For areas in which the existing SRP does not contain review 

guidance, the staff prepared and used interim staff guidance (ISG) documents. ISGs are found 

at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/isg/. The ISGs clarify technical review 

approaches and address questions related to processes and licensing. The staff used the 

following ISGs in the WLS Units 1 and 2 COL review, and indicated below is the FSER 

section(s) to which each ISG primarily relates: 
The Commissioners - 9 - 

• DC/COL-ISG-1, “Interim Staff Guidance on Seismic Issues of High Frequency Ground 

Motion,” dated May 19, 2008; see FSER Sections 3.7.1, 3.7.2, and 19.55 

• DC/COL-ISG-3, “PRA Information to Support Design Certification and Combined 

License Applications,” dated June 11, 2008; see FSER Sections 19.55, 19.58, 

and 19.59 

• DC/COL-ISG-7, “Assessment of Normal and Extreme Winter Precipitation Loads on 

the Roofs of Seismic Category I Structures,” dated June 23, 2009; see FSER 

Section 2.3.1 

• DC/COL-ISG-8, “Necessary Content of Plant-Specific Technical Specifications,” dated 

December 9, 2008; see FSER Section 16.1 

• DC/COL-ISG-11, “Finalizing Licensing-Basis Information,” dated November 2, 2009; 

see FSER Sections 1.2.3 and 1.3 

• DC/COL-ISG-15, “Post-Combined License Commitments,” dated October 7, 2009; 

see FSER Sections 1.4.4 and 1.5.5 

• DC/COL-ISG-16, “Compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) and 10 CFR 52.80(d),” 

(nonpublic), dated June 9, 2010; see FSER Section 19A 

• DC/COL-ISG-20, “Seismic Margin Analysis for New Reactors Based on Probabilistic 

Risk Assessment,” dated March 15, 2010; see FSER Section 19.55 

• DC/COL-ISG-22, “Interim Staff Guidance on Impact of Construction of New Nuclear 

Power Plants on Operating Units at Multi-Unit Sites,” dated February 7, 2011; see 

FSER Section 1.4.4

• JLD-ISG-2012-01,“Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with 

Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External 

Events,” dated August 29, 2012; see FSER Section 20.1

• JLD-ISG-2012-03,“Compliance with Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool 

Instrumentation,” dated August 29, 2012; see FSER Section 20.2

• NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, “Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants,” dated 

November 2011; see FSER Section 13.3 

Office Instructions. In its review, the staff followed administrative guidance contained in a 

number of office instructions. These internal documents address a range of procedural matters, 

including the staff’s process for issuing requests for additional information (RAI); handling 

audits; ensuring the qualification and training of technical staff and managers; ensuring 

consistency between staff offices; and overseeing interactions with applicants, intervenors, and 

public stakeholders. 
The Commissioners - 10 - 

New and Significant Review Process. The staff has developed a generic process to address 

circumstances in which there is an extended delay between the issuance of the final EIS for a 

particular license application review and the start of that proceeding’s mandatory hearing phase 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13199A170). This process provides guidance to the environmental 

staff on identifying potentially new and significant information after the draft EIS or final EIS is 

issued in order to determine its significance, and to consider whether this information requires 

supplementation of the draft EIS or final EIS in accordance with 10 CFR 51.72(a) or 10 CFR 

51.92(a). For example, the staff applied this process to the recent Memorandum and Order, 

CLI-16-07 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16125A150), issued by the Commission on May 4, 2016.

IV. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Reports 

The ACRS review of the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA resulted in a letter to the Commission dated 

December 14, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15348A196), concluding in part, that there is 

reasonable assurance that WLS Units 1 and 2 can be built and operated without undue risk to 

public health and safety and that the Commission should approve the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA 

subject to the approval of generic issues identified by the applicant, which affect standard 

content material for the AP1000. The generic issues identified by the ACRS are the five 

technical exemption requests and departures discussed in this paper and resolved on the Levy 

docket. Consistent with the design centered review approach, Levy acted as the RCOL for 

these issues, and the ACRS review of these exemption requests resulted in a letter to the 

Commission dated April 18, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16102A149), for Levy Units 1 and 

2 (discussed in SECY-16-0076). The ACRS report fulfills the requirement of 10 CFR 52.87 that 

the ACRS report on those portions of the application which concern safety. 

The ACRS conclusions are summarized below: 

• There is reasonable assurance that WLS Units 1 and 2 can be built and operated 

without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. 

• Site seismic inputs requiring a departure from the AP1000 certified design have been 

adequately addressed by the applicant and the staff, and this departure should be 

approved. This departure is discussed in the Unique Facility Features or Novel Issues 

and the Exemptions and Departures sections of this paper. 

• The departure providing for a consolidated Technical Support Center (TSC) for the WLS 

Units 1 and 2 should be approved. This departure is discussed in detail in the 

Exemptions and Departures section of this paper. 

• The location exception for a consolidated Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) should 

be approved. A detailed discussion relative to the relocation of the EOF is discussed in 

the Unique Facility Features or Novel Issues section of this paper. 

• The DEC COLA for WLS should be approved following approval of generic changes 

which are pending submittal and which affect standard content material for the 

AP1000. These generic changes are discussed in the Exemptions and Departures 

section of this paper. 
The Commissioners - 11 - 

The ACRS review of the Levy Units 1 and 2 COLA resulted in a letter to the Commission dated 

April, 18, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16102A149), concluding in part: 

• Five exemptions to the AP1000 certified design have been included in the Levy Units 1 

and 2 COLA. The exemptions are needed to enable the certified design to perform 

intended functions and should be approved. 

As indicated in the ACRS letter on the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA, dated December 14, 2015, 

other COL applicants referencing the AP1000 certified design will also include the exemptions in 

accordance with the design center review approach described in that letter. 

V. Near-Term Task Force Recommendations Regarding the Evaluation of Fukushima 

Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Events and the Review of the Application. 

SECY-12-0025, “Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons 

Learned from Japan’s March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML12039A103) and its associated SRM (ADAMS Accession No. ML120690347) 

address the requirements and regulatory actions resulting from the Fukushima Near-Term Task 

Force (NTTF) Tier 1 recommendations. The NRC staff determined that the three NTTF Tier 1 

recommendations below were applicable to the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA. 

1. Recommendation 4.2: Equipment covered under 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) – Order 

licensees to provide reasonable protection for equipment currently provided pursuant to 

10 CFR 50.54 Conditions of licenses, (hh)(2) from the effects of design-basis external 

events and to add equipment as needed to address multiunit events while other 

requirements are being revised and implemented. 

2. Recommendation 7.1: Spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation – Order licensees to 

provide reliable SFP level instrumentation. 

3. Recommendation 9.3: Emergency preparedness regulatory actions (staffing and 

communications) – Order licensees to do the following until rulemaking is complete: 

• Determine and implement the required staff to fill all necessary positions for 

response to a multi-unit event. 

• Provide a means to power communications equipment needed to communicate 

onsite (e.g., radios for response teams and between facilities) and offsite 

(e.g., cellular telephones and satellite telephones) during a prolonged station 

blackout. 

The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s submittals relative to the three NTTF Tier 1 

recommendations in FSER Chapter 20, “Requirements Resulting from Fukushima Near-Term 

Task Force Recommendations.” A discussion of the remaining Tier 1 recommendations and 

why they did not apply to the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA review appears in the introduction to 
The Commissioners - 12 - 

Chapter 20 of the FSER. The draft licenses for WLS Units 1 and 2 contain license conditions to 

address Recommendations 4.2, 7.1, and 9.3. 

Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 4.2, Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis Events 

In SECY-12-0025, the NRC staff indicated its intent to review information provided by COL 

applicants to describe their mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events. The 

AP1000 standard design includes passive design features that provide core cooling, 

containment, and SFP cooling capabilities for 72 hours, without reliance on alternating current 

(ac) power. The AP1000 design also includes equipment to maintain required safety functions 

in the long term (beyond 72 hours to 7 days). As such, provisions related to obtaining sufficient 

offsite resources to sustain these functions indefinitely must be addressed. The corresponding 

staff review for WLS Units 1 and 2 appears in Section 20.1 of the FSER. 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s description of mitigating strategies for WLS Units 1 and 

2 to determine if the strategies provide assurance of core cooling, containment, and SFP 

cooling capabilities in the event of a beyond-design-basis external event resulting in an 

extended loss of ac power event. The staff finds that the approach for mitigating 

beyond-design-basis external events described in the COLA for WLS Units 1 and 2 is consistent 

with NRC Order EA-12-049, “Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for 

Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events,” and both general and AP1000-

specific NRC guidance (including Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 12-06, “Diverse and Flexible 

Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,” Appendix F, as endorsed by the NRC staff). 

Therefore, the staff concludes that the mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external 

events described for WLS Units 1 and 2 are acceptable. 

The staff proposes to include License Condition (20-1), “Mitigation Strategies for 

Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,” to verify the implementation of the mitigating strategies 

for beyond-design-basis external events at WLS Units 1 and 2. 

Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 7.1, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation 

SECY-12-0025 states that the staff will request all COL applicants to provide information 

regarding SFP instrumentation through the review process. The corresponding staff review for 

WLS Units 1 and 2 appears in Section 20.2 of the FSER. The NRC issued an RAI requesting 

that the applicant address this recommendation. The applicant provided the Westinghouse 

Technical Report, “Response to NRC Orders EA-12-051 and EA-12-063, and Background 

Information for Future Licensees on AP1000 Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, Redacted” 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13023A265). The report adequately identified aspects of the 

AP1000 certified design that addressed requirements for arrangement, environmental 

qualification, power supply, and display, and provided additional information about accuracy and 

recalibration following an extended loss of ac power. The applicant incorporated key aspects of 

the additional recalibration information into Section 9.1.3 of the FSAR. The applicant provided a 

license condition to address the maintenance and training requirements. 

The staff proposes to include License Condition (20-2) to verify the implementation of NTTF 

Recommendation 7.1. 
The Commissioners - 13 - 

Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness Communications and 

Staffing 

SECY-12-0025 states that the staff will request all COL applicants to provide information 

regarding emergency preparedness communications and staffing through the review process. 

The corresponding staff review for WLS Units 1 and 2 appears in Section 20.3 of the FSER. 

The NRC issued an RAI dated April 25, 2012, to the applicant, concerning implementation of the 

Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 9.3 in the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA. In response, the 

applicant proposed a license condition to address the 10 CFR 50.54(f) request for information 

letters sent to existing licensees–including COL applicants–regarding communications and 

staffing for NTTF Recommendation 9.3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340). This license 

condition was subsequently revised in the license application. As part of its proposed license 

condition, the applicant committed to perform assessments for NTTF Recommendation 9.3 

using NEI 12-01, Revision 0, “Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response 

Staffing and Communications Capabilities,” confirmed by staff to be an acceptable method for 

licensees to employ when responding to the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters regarding NTTF 

Recommendation 9.3. The applicant proposed the license condition on communications and 

staffing in Section C of License Condition 12 in Part 10 of the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA. The 

staff reviewed the applicant’s proposed license condition and revised the timeframe of the 

completion of this license condition to be consistent with the schedules provided in section (a) of 

10 CFR 52.99, “Inspection during construction; the inspection, test, analysis, and acceptance 

criteria (ITAAC) schedules and notifications; NRC notices,” and section a of 10 CFR 52.103, 

“Operation under a combined license.” The staff proposes to include License Condition (20-3) 

to verify the implementation of NTTF Recommendation 9.3. 

DISCUSSION: 

I. Excluded Matters 

This paper does not discuss matters that were previously addressed and resolved in the context 

of other reviews undertaken as part of the 10 CFR Part 52 process. Such excluded matters 

include issues addressed under the AP1000 design certification amendment review. 

Also excluded from consideration in the uncontested hearing are substantive issues within the 

scope of contentions admitted and adjudicated during the COL contested proceeding. As 

described above, there are currently no contested issues in the proceeding. 

II. Exemptions and Departures 

Part 7 of the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA requested 7 exemptions and identified 13 departures 

from the AP1000 certified design. Three of the departures are unique to the WLS Units 1 and 2 

COLA. The other departures are common to other AP1000 COLAs. Five of these departures 

(those discussed in Chapter 21 of the FSER) mirror ones that were first proposed in the Levy 

Units 1 and 2 COLA. These five departures also contain changes to the AP1000 Tier 1 

information or technical specifications (TS). As such, exemptions are required in accordance 
The Commissioners - 14 - 

with 10 CFR Part 52 Appendix D, Section VIII in order for the staff to find them acceptable. The 

remaining two exemption requests are similar to other exemptions requested by other COL 

applicants and approved by the Commission. 

Exemptions from NRC Regulations 

The staff evaluated and found acceptable the following seven exemptions from NRC regulations 

associated with the review of the application. 

Description Regulation Location of 

Evaluation in FSER 

COLA organization and numbering. 

10 CFR Part 52, 

Appendix D, 

Section IV.A.2.a 

Section 1.5.4 

Special nuclear material control and 

accounting (MC&A) program description. 

10 CFR 70.22(b), 

70.32(c), 74.31, 

74.41, 74.51 

Section 1.5.4 

Containment cooling changes in regard to 

passive core cooling system condensate 

return. 

10 CFR Part 52 

Appendix D, 

Section III.B 

Section 21.1 

Main control room dose. 

10 CFR Part 52 

Appendix D, 

Section III.B 

Section 21.2 

Main control room heatup. 

10 CFR Part 52 

Appendix D, 

Section III.B 

Section 21.3 

Combustible gas control in containment. 

10 CFR Part 52 

Appendix D, 

Section III.B 

Section 21.4 

Source range neutron flux doubling block 

permissive. 

10 CFR Part 52 

Appendix D, 

Section III.B 

Section 21.5 

a. Exemptions similar to those granted to COL holders 

COLA Organization and Numbering 

The exemption request for COLA organization and numbering is substantively the same 

as the exemption request by Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station 

(Summer) Units 2 and 3. For this request, the applicable regulation requires that a 

COLA referencing a certified design include a plant specific DCD using the same 

organization and numbering as the generic DCD. In support of its exemption request, 

the applicant asserted that complying with this requirement would be less efficient and 

indicated that a modified organization is needed to address the topics identified in 
The Commissioners - 15 - 

RG 1.206, “Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition),” 

and NUREG-0800 and to include plant-specific discussions. The staff’s reasoning in 

finding this exemption acceptable is the same as that used to address the corresponding 

exemption request considered in the Vogtle and Summer COL reviews and is described 

in SECY-11-0110 and SECY-11-0115 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML110600264 and 

ML111320113). 

Special Nuclear MC&A Program Description 

The MC&A program exemption request is similar to exemptions granted to other COL 

applicants for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4, Summer Units 2 and 3, Enrico Fermi Nuclear 

Plant (Fermi) Unit 3, and South Texas Project (STP) Units 3 and 4. The applicable 

regulations in 10 CFR Part 70 and 10 CFR Part 74, “Material control and accounting of 

special nuclear material,” require that a special nuclear material license application 

describe an MC&A program and that the applicant establish, implement, maintain, and 

follow an MC&A program. These regulations contain an exclusion for licensees 

governed by 10 CFR Part 50 but not 10 CFR Part 52. The applicant noted that when 

reviewing the MC&A program there is no reason to treat reactors licensed under these 

two parts differently. The staff’s reasoning in finding this exemption acceptable is the 

same as that used to address the corresponding exemption request considered in the 

STP COL review and is described in SECY-15-0123 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15316A408). 

b. Exemption requests common to other COL applicants referencing the AP1000 design 

The following departures concern five generic issues which affect standard content material 

for the AP1000. The applicant incorporated in the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA the same 

information that Duke Energy Florida incorporated into the Levy Units 1 and 2 COLA 

regarding these departures. The staff’s reasoning for finding these departures acceptable is 

the same as that used to address the corresponding departures in the Levy Units 1 and 2 

COLA review (discussed in SECY-16-0076 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12188A087)). 

Containment Cooling Changes in Regard to Passive Core Cooling System Condensate 

Return 

The applicant revised Tier 1 information by adding components to the condensate return 

system used to direct water that has condensed on the containment shell to the incontainment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) during accident scenarios. This 

change adds intermediate gutters at the top and bottom of the polar crane girder and at 

the containment shell intermediate ring stiffener. It blocks drain holes that were in these 

structures and adds dams where needed to collect condensate. It adds downspouts 

from these gutters to the IRWST. It also modifies the gutter drip lip so that condensate 

is not lost between the containment wall and the gutter. This change would increase the 

fraction of condensate returning to the IRWST when there is steam in containment and 

enable the passive core cooling system to more effectively perform its design functions. 
The Commissioners - 16 - 

The applicant’s request also proposed changes to the generic TS Surveillance 

Requirement regarding the downspout screens. 

Main Control Room Dose 

Westinghouse, vendor for the AP1000 design, identified the need to update the designbasis accident (DBA) analyses in order to show compliance with the main control room 

(MCR) habitability regulatory requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General 

Design Criterion (GDC) 19, “Control Room,” because: (1) the analyses did not account 

for the MCR emergency habitability system (VES) filter direct dose in the control room 

and (2) the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) radiation monitor 

setpoints for control room ventilation system actuation did not account for all DBA 

release scenarios. The applicant also chose to revise the analyses that estimated the 

MCR dose contribution from direct radiation and skyshine. The applicant determined 

that a comprehensive change was necessary to correct the errors in the certified design. 

The applicant provided revisions to the AP1000 DBA dose analyses that affect both the 

MCR and offsite dose results. The applicant revised Tier 1 information and generic TS 

to reflect the revised DBA dose analyses and design changes 

Main Control Room Heat Up 

Westinghouse identified additional heat sources in the control room that were not 

accounted for in the original analysis that may challenge the ability of the plant to meet 

control room habitability requirements and equipment qualification limits. The AP1000 

design normally uses the nonsafety-related VBS to provide heating, ventilation, cooling, 

and filtration to the MCR when power is available. During events where VBS is 

unavailable, however, the VES uses a combination of bottled air and passive heat sinks 

to maintain the MCR in a habitable state. As a result of development of the detailed 

AP1000 design, the applicant identified that the VES is not capable of maintaining the 

MCR in an acceptable condition for human performance during certain transients. 

During events where the MCR is isolated and VES is actuated, but offsite power is 

available to power other plant equipment, the heat loads in the MCR exceed those set 

forth in the certified design. Considering the above, the applicant determined that a 

revised approach to evaluate the heat load in the MCR was required. The applicant 

revised Tier 1 information and a generic TS to reflect, in part, a design change to add a 

load shedding arrangement to some of the MCR heat loads and a revision of the heat 

loads in the MCR and associated equipment rooms to reflect revised analyses. 

Combustible Gas Control in Containment 

The ITAAC currently contained in the AP1000 DCD for control of containment hydrogen 

concentration for beyond-design-basis accidents was based on the original AP600 and 

AP1000 design. The applicant determined that changes during the development of the 

current detailed design have resulted in inconsistencies between the design and the 

ITAAC acceptance criteria. The applicant revised the ITAAC acceptance criteria for (1) 
The Commissioners - 17 - 

the primary vent paths through the ceilings of the passive core cooling system 

valve/accumulator rooms and (2) the proximity of these paths to the containment shell. 

Source Range Neutron Flux Doubling Block Permissive 

According to 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(3), “Safety Systems,” applicants for a COL must comply 

with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std. 603–1991, “IEEE 

Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,” and the 

associated correction sheet dated January 30, 1995. Operating bypasses are 

addressed in Clause 6.6 of the standard. Under certain conditions, it may be acceptable 

to bypass a safety function. All of the conditions that permit bypassing the function must 

exist before the bypass is activated. If an operating bypass has been activated and 

plant conditions change so that the bypass is no longer permissible, the safety system 

must automatically do one of three things: restore plant conditions so that bypass is 

permissible, remove the active bypass, or initiate the safety function. 

In the AP1000 certified design, safety functions are initiated by the protection and safety 

monitoring system (PMS). All of the protective actions initiated by the PMS in Revision 

19 of the AP1000 DCD comply with IEEE Std. 603–1991, Clause 6.6, “Operating 

Bypasses,” with one exception. The exception is the manually activated operating 

bypass of the safety function called the boron dilution block from the source range 

neutron flux doubling logic. The boron dilution blocking function is normally activated 

when neutron flux doubles too quickly while reactor power is in the source range. Boron 

dilution cannot lead to inadvertent criticality above a certain temperature, a plant 

condition that permits bypassing the block. The AP1000 design of the PMS flux 

doubling logic for the boron dilution block did not meet the operating bypass 

requirements of IEEE Std. 603–1991 because no permissive conditions, as required, 

were programmed into the PMS to permit the block of the flux doubling logic. The 

applicant made required changes for the PMS source range neutron flux doubling logic 

to comply with the requirements of IEEE Std. 603–1991, Clause 6.6 and changed 

generic TS to add the appropriate permissive. 

10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section VIII.A.4 states that exemptions from Tier 1 information are 

governed by the requirements of 10 CFR 52.63(b) and 10 CFR 52.98(f). 10 CFR Part 52, 

Appendix D, Section VIII.C.4 states that an applicant may request an exemption from the 

generic TSs or other operational requirements. The Commission may grant such a request only 

if it determines that the exemption will comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 52.7, “Specific 

Exemptions.” 

The staff has determined that, as required by Section VIII.A.4 of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52, 

the exemptions from Tier 1 information described above: (1) are authorized by law, (2) present 

no undue risk to the public health and safety, (3) are consistent with the common defense and 

security, (4) have special circumstances that outweigh the potential decrease in safety because 

of reduced standardization, and (5) do not significantly reduce the level of safety at the 

applicant’s facility. The staff has also determined, pursuant to Section VIII.C.4 of Appendix D to 
The Commissioners - 18 - 

10 CFR Part 52, that the generic TS portions of these exemption requests: (1) are authorized 

by law, (2) present no undue risk to the public health and safety, (3) are consistent with the 

common defense and security, and (4) demonstrate the existence of special circumstances. 

Therefore, the staff grants the applicant the requested exemptions. The staff’s evaluation of 

these exemption requests appear in FSER Chapter 21. 

Departures from AP1000 Design Control Document Revision 19 

The staff evaluated and found acceptable the applicant’s proposed departures from information 

in the AP1000 DCD Revision 19, presented in the table below. Part 7, Section A, of the COLA 

describes and justifies the departures and evaluates each departure against the criteria in 

Section VIII.B.5 of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 to determine whether the applicant could 

implement the departure without NRC approval. Part 7 of the COLA also identifies the affected 

FSAR sections and provides a summary, justification, and evaluation of each departure. 

The departure (DEP) designated in the table below as “STD,” is standard for COL applicants 

adopting the AP1000 design. Of the remaining departures designated as “WLS,” three 

departures, WLS DEP 2.0-1, WLS DEP 3.8-1 and WLS DEP 18.8.1 are unique to the WLS 

Units 1 and 2 COLA. The other departures are common to multiple COLAs. 

Description Location of 

Evaluation in FSER 

STD DEP 1.1-1. Administrative Departure for organization and 

numbering for the FSAR sections. 1.5.4 

WLS DEP 1.8-1. Corrects an inconsistency in regulatory citation in 

an interface description. 1.5.4 

WLS DEP 2.0-1. WLS site-specific foundation response spectra 2.0.2 

WLS DEP 3.2-1. Adds downspouts to the condensate return portion 

of the Passive Core Cooling System. 21.1 

WLS DEP 3.8-1. WLS passive earth pressures 3.8 

WLS DEP 3.11-1. Departure revising the “Envir. Zone” numbers for 

SFP level instruments. 20.2 

WLS DEP 6.2-1. ITAAC Acceptance Criteria for the in containment 

vents are revised to reflect the current plant configuration 

21.4 

WLS DEP 6.3-1. Quantification of the term “indefinitely” as used in 

the DCD for maintenance of safe shutdown conditions using the 

passive residual heat removal heat exchanger (PRHR HX) during 

non-loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) accidents. 

21.1 

WLS DEP 6.4-1. MCR operator dose. 21.2 

WLS DEP 6.4-2. MCR Heatup. 21.3 
The Commissioners - 19 - 

Description Location of 

Evaluation in FSER 

WLS DEP 7.3-1. Modification of the engineered safety features to 

provide an operating bypass for the boron dilution block to meet the 

requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991 in accordance with 10 CFR 

50.55a (h), “Protection and safety systems.” 

21.5 

WLS DEP 8.3-1. Class 1E voltage regulating transformer current 

limiting features. 8.3.2 

WLS DEP 18.8-1. Emergency Response Facility locations 18.2 

STD DEP 1.1-1 – This departure identifies instances where the renumbering of FSAR sections 

is necessary to effectively include content consistent with RG 1.206, as well as NUREG-0800. 

This departure requires NRC approval. 

WLS DEP 1.8-1 – This departure corrects an inconsistency in DCD Tier 2 Table 1.8-1 (Sheet 6 

of 6), Item 13.1. This item references 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix O, for features that may affect 

plans for coping with emergencies as opposed to 10 CFR 52.137(a)(11). There is no change in 

substantive requirements, only a clarification of the reference to the applicable regulation. This 

departure does not require NRC approval. 

WLS DEP 2.0-1 – This departure addresses the WLS site-specific foundation response spectra, 

which exceeds the AP1000 Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra (CSDRS) and hard 

rock high frequency (HRHF) spectra. A site-specific analysis was performed to demonstrate the 

adequacy of the standard design for the WLS site. This departure requires NRC approval. 

WLS DEP 3.2-1. This departure adds downspouts and downspout screens to the condensate 

return portion of the Passive Core Cooling System. The proposed changes increase the 

amount of condensate available in the In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) 

after the initiation of a design basis event compared to the design described in the AP1000 DCD 

Revision 19. This departure requires NRC approval. 

WLS DEP 3.8-1– This departure addresses the WLS site-specific lateral earth pressure on 

below-grade walls (assuming full passive earth pressures), which exceeds the AP1000 design 

pressure evaluated and documented in the AP1000 DCD. A site-specific analysis was 

performed to demonstrate that actual WLS site-specific lateral pressures are bounded by the 

AP1000 certified design. This departure requires NRC approval. 

WLS DEP 3.11-1 – This departure corrects an inconsistency in a DCD table. The 

environmental zone numbers for three SFP level instruments are being revised to accurately 

reflect their actual location; the location of the SFP instruments are not being changed from the 

designed location. This departure does not require NRC approval. 

WLS DEP 6.3-1 – This departure deals with the quantification of the term “indefinitely” as used 

in the DCD for maintenance of safe shutdown conditions using the PRHR HX during non-LOCA 

accidents. This departure does not require NRC approval. 
The Commissioners - 20 - 

WLS DEP 6.4-1 – This departure improves the mitigating capabilities of the MCR Habitability 

System and addresses the MCR dose analysis errors. The MCR dose to the operators slightly 

decreases for the limiting DBA large-break loss-of-coolant accident and the analysis shows that 

the results do not exceed the GDC 19 requirements of 5 rem. This departure requires an 

exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, which requires 

compliance with Tier 1 requirements of the AP1000 DCD and the generic TSs. This departure 

requires NRC approval. 

WLS DEP 6.4-2. – This departure ensures that the MCR emergency habitability system can 

perform its design, functions including maintaining an environment suitable for MCR habitability 

and equipment qualification. This departure requires an exemption from the requirements of 10 

CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, which requires compliance with Tier I requirements of 

the AP1000 DCD and the generic TSs. This departure requires NRC approval. 

WLS DEP 7.3-1. – This departure modifies the engineered safety features to provide an 

operating bypass for the boron dilution block to meet the requirements of IEEE 603-1991 in 

accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(h), “Protection and safety systems.” This departure requires 

an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, which 

requires compliance with generic TSs of the AP1000 DCD. This departure requires NRC 

approval. 

STD DEP 8.3-1 – This standard departure involves the applicant’s use of breakers and fuses to 

provide the isolation function instead of current limiting devices in Class 1E voltage regulating 

transformers. It is the same as the departure that the staff previously evaluated for the Vogtle 

and Summer COLAs. This departure does not require NRC approval. 

WLS DEP 18.8-1– This departure addresses emergency response facility locations. The 

referenced DCD states, "The TSC is located in the control support area (CSA)." This is not the 

case for WLS. The TSC location is moved to a central location such that a single TSC can 

serve both WLS Units 1 and 2 as identified in the Emergency Plan. This departure does not 

require NRC approval. 

A detailed discussion and justification for each exemption request is provided in Part 7 of the 

WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA. 

III. Unique Facility Features or Novel Issues 

Safety Matters 

a. Emergency Operations Facility 

DEC has filed a request to have the WLS EOF located in the Charlotte General Office in the 

Energy Center at 526 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina, which is currently used as 

the EOF for DEC’s existing nuclear facilities at McGuire Nuclear Station, Catawba Nuclear 
The Commissioners - 21 - 

Station, and Oconee Nuclear Station.1 NRC approval prior to implementation is required in 

accordance with Appendix E, IV.E.8.b of 10 CFR 50 because the location of the Charlotte EOF 

is greater than 25 miles from the affected reactor sites. This is the first COL action that involves 

the Commission’s express approval of a consolidated EOF for a new facility as part of the final 

review in a COL action. 

In part 10 of the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA, the applicant proposed License Condition 4, 

“Emergency Planning Actions,” to demonstrate the integrated capability and functionality of the 

EOF. The staff refers to this as License Condition (13-7). 

License Condition (13-7) requires that: 

Prior to fuel load, DEC will demonstrate the integrated capability and functionality 

of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for activation and operation of the 

facility to respond to emergency events at WLS and one additional nuclear site 

that is supported by the EOF. Integrated communication and data capability and 

functionality will include the Technical Support Centers for WLS and one 

additional nuclear site, and other Federal, State, and local coordination centers 

as appropriate. 

The staff’s review of DEC’s request and its evaluation of License Condition (13-7) are described 

Chapter 13.3 of the SER. The staff concluded that the EOF would not impede the ability of the 

respective COL applicants and organizations with emergency response responsibilities, such as 

Federal, State, and local governments, from performing their duties. The staff also concluded 

that the centralized EOFs would continue to provide reasonable assurance that adequate 

protective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a radiological emergency. 

b. Seismic Design 

The seismic design of the AP1000 standard plant is based on the CSDRS as addressed in 

AP1000 DCD, Revision 19, Section 3.7.1.1. The AP1000 DCD also includes HRHF spectra and 

respective evaluation of structures, systems, and components that demonstrate that the HRHF 

input is non-damaging. In accordance with the AP1000 DCD, these HRHF spectra are an 

alternative spectra for evaluation of site-specific ground motion response spectrum (calculated 

at the plant foundation). Because the WLS site-specific horizontal and vertical spectra exceed 

the CSDRS and HRHF spectra, the applicant needed to request a departure from AP1000 

certified design (WLS DEP 2.0-1). 

Because the exceedances required additional evaluations in accordance with the AP1000 DCD, 

the applicant performed additional evaluations on nuclear island (NI) seismic Category I and 

 

1 DEC and Duke Energy Progress, Inc. have submitted a license amendment request (LAR) seeking approval to 

integrate the EOFs for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 

1; and H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 into the EOF in Charlotte, North Carolina. Although the WLS 

Units 1 and 2 COLA and the LAR are being processed in parallel, given the current review schedules, it is anticipated 

that the COLA will be decided significantly before the LAR. 
The Commissioners - 22 - 

adjacent seismic Category II structures, primary components, piping systems, and electromechanical equipment to demonstrate that the high frequency exceedances of the DCD are 

non-damaging and are therefore adequately addressed in the design. 

The staff’s review of WLS DEP 2.0-1, which is documented in Sections 3.7.2.4, 3.9.2, 3.10.4, 

and 3.12.4 of the FSER, thoroughly considered the range of evaluations and inputs supporting 

the applicant’s site-specific analysis. The staff reviewed the site-specific analysis performed by 

the applicant pertaining to the NI seismic Category I and seismic Category II structures and 

determined that the AP1000 forces adequately bound the site-specific forces on NI seismic 

Category I structures, and that no physical interaction occurs between NI seismic Category I 

and adjacent seismic Category II structures. Similarly, the staff reviewed the analysis 

performed by the applicant with respect to primary components such as component supports 

and nozzles and piping packages which demonstrated that the forces and stresses induced by 

the site-specific response spectra are adequately enveloped by the AP1000 forces and 

stresses, respectively. Further, AP1000 DCD Appendix 3I, which identifies potential high 

frequency sensitive equipment, was used by the applicant to identify WLS specific equipment 

for which high frequency amplification was important. The staff review concluded that the 

applicant adequately demonstrated that the test response spectra for representative high 

frequency sensitive equipment bound the site-specific required response spectra (RRS). 

Additionally, based on its supplemental evaluations to Appendix 3I for the WLS Units 1 and 2 

COLA, the applicant committed to ensure that the future qualification testing for high frequency 

sensitive equipment identified in WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA Appendix 3I will envelope the WLS 

site-specific RRS. 

Following careful consideration of these multiple aspects of the applicant’s site-specific 

evaluations, including RAIs and an audit of the applicant’s structural analysis, the staff found 

that WLS DEP 2.0-1 is acceptable because the applicant’s site-specific evaluations 

demonstrated in each of these respects that the AP1000 DCD design is adequate for use at the 

WLS site and that these evaluations are consistent with the guidance in NUREG-0800, Sections 

3.7.2, 3.9.2, 3.10, 3.12, and DC/COL-ISG-1. In conclusion, the staff found that the applicant 

has provided sufficient information to satisfy the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, 

GDC 2, “Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena;” 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 

S, “Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants;” and 10 CFR 100.23, “Geologic 

and Seismic Siting Criteria.” 

Environmental Matters

c. Make-Up Pond C 

The WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA initially proposed a two-pond off-stream water storage system 

using existing Make-Up Ponds A and B. These impoundments were created in the late 1970s 

during the initial construction phase of the unfinished Cherokee Nuclear Station. Make-Up Pond 

B was to be used in low water conditions as the backup to Make-Up Pond A, which draws water 

from the Ninety-Nine Islands Reservoir. The Ninety-Nine Islands Reservoir, an impoundment of 
The Commissioners - 23 - 

the Broad River formed by Ninety-Nine Islands Dam and adjacent to WLS, is also the water 

source for the Ninety-Nine Islands Hydroelectric Project. The reservoir was built 

for hydroelectric power (not flood control), and has run-of-the river reservoirs with no significant 

storage capacity. WLS Units 1 and 2 would have to operate within the minimum release 

constraints of the Ninety-Nine Islands Hydroelectric Project License. 

During normal flow periods on the Broad River, WLS would withdraw all of its operational water 

requirements from Ninety-Nine Islands Reservoir through the intake into existing Make-Up Pond 

A. DEC anticipated this would be the normal withdrawal scheme employed greater than 95 

percent of the time. DEC initially proposed that WLS would proportionally withdraw its 

consumptive water requirements from Ninety-Nine Islands Reservoir and Make-Up Pond B as 

the Broad River flow drops below normal flow. 

The EIS review team (NRC and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)) looked at the WLS 

Units 1 and 2 COLA water data and found that the 2002-2007 drought years were not included 

in the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA’s water balance calculations. The review team recognized that 

under DEC’s anticipated withdrawal plan, low water flows at certain times of the year, while not 

violating the Environmental Protection Agency’s proportional flow limitation (5 percent mean 

annual flow) in regulations implementing Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), would 

have resulted in impacts to aquatic biota and downstream water users. 

Subsequent to the review team’s initial review, DEC revised its water balance calculations to 

incorporate the 2002-2007 drought years. Revision of the water balance led DEC to the 

proposal of an additional offsite reservoir (known as Make-Up Pond C) as supplemental storage 

to Make-Up Pond A and Make-Up Pond B. 

From May 24, 2010, through July 2, 2010, the NRC staff conducted a supplemental scoping 

process to obtain additional public insights and inform of the NRC’s review of DEC’s supplement 

to the Environmental Report (ER) (ADAMS Accession No. ML092810257). The primary change 

to the ER was the alternative evaluation process and addition of proposed Make-Up Pond C. 

The review team reviewed DEC’s ER supplement. The supplement included an evaluation of 

deepening Make-Up Pond B, raising the dam height of Make-Up Pond B, releasing water from 

upstream reservoirs, and three possible locations for Make-Up Pond C in the vicinity of the WLS 

Nuclear Station. 

The creation of Make-Up Pond C would inundate most of the London Creek stream network and 

forested valley, converting approximately 600 acres to a supplemental water reservoir to be 

managed as a cooling water supply. Make-Up Pond C would alone impact 12.46 miles of 

streams, 3.55 acres of wetlands, and 17.58 acres of open water. Impacts to streams would 

account for most of the WLS project’s aquatic impacts. The proposed compensatory mitigation 

plan entails a sizeable stream restoration and preservation effort at two separate locations. This 

mitigation plan evolved as details were worked out through the USACE permitting process as 

the mitigation design matured. For example, the South Carolina Department of Natural 
The Commissioners - 24 - 

Resources recommended that Duke pursue other available mitigation opportunities in lieu of 

utilizing mitigation bank credits. 

Through careful consideration of the potential impacts of the Make-Up Pond C plans, the review 

team determined that the proposed disturbance of approximately 1,100 acres needed to build 

the reservoir and buffer around Make-Up Pond C, would alter the nature of the terrestrial and 

aquatic habitats and wildlife resources in the London Creek watershed. The review team 

determined that the related terrestrial impacts of habitat loss and wildlife mortality, disturbance, 

and displacement would be substantial and mostly permanent in nature. Creation of Make-Up 

Pond C also would alter the functionality of the London Creek corridor as a wildlife travel 

corridor, particularly for some migrant songbirds, many of which are of conservation priority in 

South Carolina. 

The review team also determined that impounding the London Creek stream network and 

building the Make-Up Pond C supplemental water reservoir would replace an existing creek 

system with a deep water lake habitat, resulting in a clearly noticeable and permanent change in 

aquatic resources in London Creek and its tributaries. Although the aquatic resources found in 

London Creek are not unique to the region, the habitat type is becoming increasingly rare as 

development in the region increases. In time, the aquatic habitat of the new reservoir would be 

valuable for other reasons, but it would not mitigate the loss of adjacent terrestrial habitat within 

the region. 

As a result of its review, the review team determined that the construction of Make-Up Pond C 

would have MODERATE aquatic and terrestrial impacts. The impacts would noticeably alter 

these resources, but the important aspects of these attributes would not be destabilized as 

habitat and wildlife resources found in the London Creek watershed are also found in other 

areas in the upstate Piedmont region. Similarly, though the stream ecosystem in the watershed 

will be impacted by the construction of Make-Up Pond C, it will be transformed into a deep water 

ecosystem which would have aquatic ecological value. 

The impacts to waters of the United States resulting from the construction of Make-Up Pond C 

necessitated a landscape-scale compensatory mitigation project to comply with USACE 

mitigation requirements intended to offset the project’s impacts. To meet this need, DEC plans 

to accomplish a stream restoration and preservation effort at two separate locations: the 

privately-owned Turkey Creek Tract, and the Woods Ferry Tract in the Enoree Ranger District of 

Sumter National Forest. The Turkey Creek Tract will have a perpetual conservation easement. 

The Turkey Creek Tract offers an opportunity for mitigation that is substantial enough to provide 

regional benefits in the form of preservation and buffer enhancement. The goals of Woods 

Ferry Tract restoration effort are to reconnect streams to their respective floodplains, reduce 

sedimentation and stabilize stream banks, improve in-stream and adjacent habitats, and 

improve water quality. While these restoration efforts are expected to mitigate the 

environmental impacts of Make-Up Pond C, the impacts to the resource areas would remain 

MODERATE as the stream ecosystem will be transformed into a deep water ecosystem. 

As part of its permitting process, USACE collaborated with the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) to 

develop details and implement mitigation requirements. USFS prepared an EIS to comply with 

NEPA regarding its own federal action to issue a Special Use Permit to DEC to complete the 
The Commissioners - 25 - 

aforementioned compensatory mitigation work in the national forest. The USACE served as a 

cooperating agency in the preparation of the USFS’s “Final Environmental Impact Statement: 

Chester County Stream and Riparian Restoration/Enhancement Project, Chester County, South 

Carolina,” dated November 19, 2014. This USFS final EIS contains an environmental review of 

DEC’s planned compensatory mitigation work in the national forest. The USFS issued its 

Record of Decision on July 1, 2015, resulting in issuance of the Special Use Permit to DEC. 

The USACE issued its Record of Decision and a Department of the Army permit to DEC for the 

WLS on September 29, 2015, allowing DEC to move forward with the mitigation plan 

implementation. Special Condition H, “Compensatory Mitigation,” of the permit defines the 

implementation and monitoring requirements for this exceptional mitigation plan. The mitigation 

measures and requirements ultimately imposed in the USFS and USACE permits remain fully 

consistent with the analysis and conclusions in the WLS final EIS. 

The NRC staff followed its processes to ensure a hard look at the environmental impacts of the 

construction and operation of WLS, in particular the novel nature of the Make-Up Pond C 

development and the extensive compensatory mitigation plan. In so doing, the NRC conducted 

a timely additional scoping process that further informed its review and preparation of the final 

EIS. NRC also worked effectively with USACE as a cooperating agency on the EIS to take 

advantage of the USACE’s areas of expertise and permitting requirements to develop a 

document that served both agencies’ regulatory needs and ultimately supported USFS’s work 

as well. In sum, the analysis and conclusion in the final EIS reflected appropriate evaluation of 

the water supply needs of the WLS project and the associated impacts and mitigation 

measures, while also enhancing consistency and efficiency in the decision making of the NRC 

and other agencies under NEPA and related environmental requirements. 

IV. Findings 

10 CFR 52.97(a)(1) 

(i) The applicable standards and requirements of the AEA and the Commission’s 

regulations have been met. 

The NRC staff reviewed the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA and evaluated it against the 

applicable regulations in 10 CFR Parts 20, 26, 30, 31, 32, 40, 50, 51, 52, 55, 70, 73, 74, 100, 

and 140. The staff performed this evaluation using applicable portions of both the safety and 

environmental SRPs, ISG documents, RGs, bulletins, NUREGs and generic letters. Based 

on the NRC staff’s review, documented in the FSER and the final EIS, and the conclusions of 

the ACRS, the NRC staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing COLs for WLS Units 1 

and 2, the applicable standards and requirements of the AEA and the Commission’s 

regulations have been met. 

(ii) Required notifications to other agencies or bodies have been duly made. 

As required by Section 182c. of the Atomic Energy Policy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 

CFR 50.43(a), on December 15, 2011, the NRC notified the Public Service Commission of 
The Commissioners - 26 - 

South Carolina, the North Carolina Utilities Commission and the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission of the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA (ADAMS Accession No. ML112450014, 

ML112450028 and ML112450007). 

In accordance with Section 182c. of the Act, as amended, the staff also published notices of 

the application in the FR on November 18, November 25, December 2, and December 9, 

2011 (FR 71608, 72725, 75566, and 77021). 

Based on the staff’s notifications to regulatory agencies and the public notices described 

above, the staff concludes that, for the purposes of issuing COLs for WLS Units 1 and 2, 

required notifications to other agencies or bodies have been made. 

(iii) There is reasonable assurance that the facility will be constructed and will operate in 

conformity with the licenses, the provisions of the AEA, and the Commission’s 

regulations. 

The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant to ensure that the plants will be 

constructed and will operate in conformity with the license, the applicable provisions of the 

AEA, as amended, and applicable regulations. This includes the FSAR and other portions of 

the application, including general and financial information; TS; the emergency plan; 

requests for departures and exemptions; the quality assurance (QA) plan; and the security 

plan. 

In areas where the staff found that the information submitted initially was incomplete or 

insufficient to allow the staff to reach a reasonable assurance conclusion, the staff issued 

RAIs to the applicant to obtain sufficient information. The staff reviewed applicant responses 

to ensure that the additional information provided was sufficient to support the staff 

conclusion. Where necessary, the applicant provided multiple supplemental responses. As 

necessary, the staff also conducted audits of the applicant’s records and calculations and 

performed its own confirmatory calculations to confirm applicant statements. 

In some cases, the staff’s finding of “reasonable assurance” required the imposition of 

license conditions or ITAAC as part of the licenses. The draft COL lists the license 

conditions and ITAAC. The basis for each license condition and ITAAC appears in the 

technical evaluations in the WLS Units 1 and 2 COL FSER and the AP1000 DCD FSERs 

referenced by the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLA. 

On the basis of the staff’s review of the application discussed in this paper and documented 

in the FSER and final EIS, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing COLs for WLS 

Units 1 and 2, there is reasonable assurance that the facility will be constructed and will 

operate in conformance with the licenses, the provisions of the AEA, as amended, and the 

Commission’s regulations. 
The Commissioners - 27 - 

(iv) The applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage in the activities 

authorized. 

Technical Qualification. The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant regarding 

technical qualifications. The review included an evaluation of the applicant’s operating 

experience, organizational structure, and QA program. The applicant holds 10 CFR Part 50 

licenses for Catawba Units 1 and 2, McGuire Units 1 and 2, and Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 and 

has demonstrated its ability to build and operate nuclear power reactors. The applicant has 

demonstrated the ability to choose and manage the oversight of nuclear steam supply system 

vendors, architect-engineers, and constructors of nuclear-related work. Thus, the NRC staff 

concludes that the applicant has the capability to subcontract, to procure, to schedule, and to 

manage the work associated with the detailed design (including licensing), procurement, and 

construction of WLS Units 1 and 2. The staff’s review of the applicant’s organizational 

structure concluded that the management, technical support, and operating organizations are 

acceptable. The staff reviewed the QA program and found it acceptable. 

The staff’s evaluation of this information appears in Sections 1.4 and 13.1 and Chapter 17 of the 

FSER. Based on the staff’s evaluation of the applicant’s experience with licensing and 

operating nuclear power plants, its operating organization, and its QA program, the staff finds 

that the applicant is technically qualified to hold a 10 CFR Part 52 license in accordance with 

10 CFR 52.79(a)(1)(iv). 

Financial Qualifications, Decommissioning Funding Assurance, Foreign Ownership, 

Control, or Domination (FOCD), and Nuclear Insurance and Indemnity 

The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant about financial qualifications, 

decommissioning funding assurance, foreign ownership, and nuclear insurance and indemnity. 

The staff evaluated information pertaining to the total cost of WLS Units 1 and 2, consisting of 

engineering, procurement, construction costs, owner’s costs, financing costs, inflation, and 

information pertaining to funding sources for the owner. Applicable regulations and guidance 

considered by the staff included 10 CFR 50.33; 10 CFR 50.75; 10 CFR 52.97(a)(1)(iv); 10 CFR 

Part 50, Appendix C, “A Guide for the Financial Data and Related Information Required to 

Establish Financial Qualifications for Construction Permits and Combined Licenses;” and 

NUREG-1577, “Standard Review Plan on Power Reactor Licensee Financial Qualifications and 

Decommissioning Funding Assurance.” Based on the financial information provided by the 

applicant, the NRC staff concludes that the owner of WLS Units 1 and 2 has demonstrated that 

it possesses or has access to the financial resources necessary to meet estimated construction 

costs and related fuel cycle costs. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the applicant is 

financially qualified to construct WLS Units 1 and 2 and to engage in the activities authorized by 

the licenses. The applicant is a utility and will generate and distribute electricity and recover the 

cost of electricity through cost-of-service based rates established by the North Carolina Public 

Utility Commission, South Carolina Public Service Commission, and Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission; therefore, the applicant is not subject to financial qualifications for operations 

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.33(f)(2). Based on information provided by the applicant, staff also 

concludes that the applicant meets all decommissioning funding assurance requirements. 
The Commissioners - 28 - 

Staff evaluated the applicant for FOCD issues, and concludes that it does not know or have 

reason to believe that the applicant is owned, controlled, or dominated by a foreign interest, and 

conforms to the guidance provided in the SRP for FOCD and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 

50.38. The applicant also meets the nuclear insurance requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 

the indemnity requirements of 10 CFR Part 140, “Financial Protection Requirements and 

Indemnity Agreements.” 

The staff’s evaluation of this information appears in Chapter 1 of the FSER. In summary, the 

applicant meets all requirements associated with financial qualifications, decommissioning 

funding assurance, FOCD, and nuclear insurance and indemnity. 

(v) Issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to 

the health and safety of the public. 

The NRC staff reviewed the application to assure that issuance of the licenses will not be 

inimical to the common defense and security or to public health and safety. 

Specifically, the staff evaluated the applicant’s analysis and conclusions about site specific 

conditions, including the geography and demography of the site; nearby industry, and 

transportation infrastructure; site meteorology; site hydrology; and site geology, seismology, and 

geotechnical engineering to ensure that issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to public 

health and safety. The review also evaluated the design of structures, components, equipment, 

and systems to ensure safe operation, performance, and shutdown when subjected to extreme 

weather, floods, seismic events, missiles (including aircraft impacts), chemical and radiological 

releases, and loss of offsite power to the extent not already resolved by the incorporation of the 

AP1000 design. The review confirmed that radiological releases and human dose during both 

normal operation and accident scenarios will remain within regulatory limits, which supports the 

staff’s conclusion that issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to public health and safety. 

The review determined that the security measures to be implemented at the site are adequate 

to protect the facility in accordance with NRC security regulations, which supports the staff’s 

conclusion that issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to the common defense and 

security. Also, the staff is not aware of any information presenting inimicality or foreign 

ownership, control, or domination concerns. The applicant is based in the United States. DEC 

is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of North Carolina. All 

members of the senior management and the Board of Directors for Duke Energy Corporation 

are United States citizens. 

The review also determined that operational programs identified by the applicant are sufficiently 

described to assure the staff of compliance with regulations. 

The NRC staff’s evaluation addressed the operational programs identified in the 

SRM, dated February 22, 2006, on SECY-05-0197, “Review of Operational Programs in a 

Combined License Application and Generic Emergency Planning Inspections, Tests, Analyses, 

and Acceptance Criteria,” as well as additional operational programs, including a cybersecurity 

program, and a program for handling special nuclear material (SNM), and an SNM 
The Commissioners - 29 - 

transportation physical security program. The staff’s review of the applicant’s emergency 

planning information concluded that the emergency plan is acceptable and supports the staff’s 

conclusion that issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to public health and safety. 

On the basis of the staff’s review of the application, as discussed in this paper and the 

referenced documents, the staff concludes that issuance of the COLs for WLS Units 1 and 2 will 

not be inimical to the common defense and security or to public health and safety. 

(vi) The findings required by Subpart A of Part 51 of this chapter have been made. 

As discussed below, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing a COL for 

WLS Units 1 and 2, the environmental review has been adequate to support the findings set 

forth in 10 CFR 51.107(a). 

10 CFR 52.97(a) (2): 

The staff concludes that there are no acceptance criteria from ITAAC in the referenced standard 

DC that the applicant has asserted are met. Therefore, no Commission finding under this 

section is required for the purpose of issuing COLs for WLS Units 1 and 2. 

10 CFR 51.107(a): 

(i) Determine whether the requirements of Sections 102(2) (A), (C), and (E) of NEPA 

and the regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51 have been met. 

The staff reviewed the application and evaluated it against the applicable regulations in 10 CFR 

Parts 50, 51, 52, and 100. The staff performed this evaluation using applicable portions of 

NUREG-1555, issued in 2000 and updated in 2007, and ISG documents, RGs, and generic 

letters. The staff addressed supplemental guidance providing additional information on 

contemporary and evolving issues from the memorandum dated December 10, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100760503). 

In accordance with NEPA Section 102(2) (A) (42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (A)), the staff prepared the 

final EIS (NUREG-2111) based on its independent assessment of the information provided by 

the applicant and information developed independently by the staff, including through 

consultation with other agencies. The staff’s technical analysis used a systematic, 

interdisciplinary approach to integrate information from numerous fields, including the natural 

and social sciences. Consequently, the staff concludes that its review comports with the NRC’s 

requirements in Appendix A, “Format for Presentation of Material in Environmental Impact 

Statements,” to 10 CFR Part 51. 

In accordance with NEPA Sections 102(2)(C)(i–v) (42 USC § 4332(2)(C)(i–v), the final EIS for 

the WLS Units 1 and 2 COLs addresses (1) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 

(2) unavoidable adverse environmental effects, (3) alternatives to the proposed action, (4) the 

relationship between local short-term uses of the environment and the maintenance and 
The Commissioners - 30 - 

enhancement of long-term productivity, and (5) irreversible and irretrievable commitments of 

resources that would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 

As supported by correspondence presented in Appendix F to the final EIS, the staff concludes 

that it fulfilled the requirement of NEPA Section 102(2) (C) by consulting with and obtaining 

comments from other Federal agencies with jurisdiction by law or special expertise (see 42 

USC § 4332(2) (C)). The USACE fully participated with the NRC in preparing this EIS as a 

cooperating agency and participated collaboratively on the review team under the Commission’s 

Memorandum of Agreement with the USACE. 

The staff concludes that the final EIS demonstrates that the staff adequately considered 

alternatives to the proposed action to the extent that it involves unresolved conflicts concerning 

alternative uses of available resources, consistent with the requirements of NEPA Section 

102(2)(E) (42 USC § 4332(2)(E)). The alternatives considered in the final EIS include the noaction alternative, energy alternatives, alternative sites, system design alternatives, and 

mitigation alternatives for severe accidents. 

For the reasons given above, the staff also concludes that its review comports with the NRC’s 

requirements in Appendix A, “Format for Presentation of Material in Environmental Impact 

Statements,” to 10 CFR Part 51. The staff concludes that environmental findings in the final EIS 

constitute the “hard look” required by NEPA and have reasonable support in logic and fact. 

(ii) Independently consider the final balance among conflicting factors contained in the 

record of the proceeding with a view to determining the appropriate action to be 

taken. 

Section 10.6.3 of the final EIS provides the staff summary of the cost-benefit assessment. The 

staff concludes that “the building and operation of proposed WLS, with mitigation measures 

identified by the review team, would accrue benefits that most likely would outweigh the 

economic, environmental, and social costs. For the NRC-proposed action (i.e., NRC-authorized 

construction and operation), the accrued benefits would also outweigh the costs of construction, 

preconstruction, and operation of the proposed WLS units.” 

(iii) Determine, after weighing the environmental, economic, technical, and other benefits 

against environmental and other costs, and considering reasonable alternatives, whether 

the COL should be issued, denied, or appropriately conditioned to protect environmental 

values. 

As noted above, in its final EIS, the staff considered the cost-benefit analysis, including the need 

for power, as well as reasonable alternatives. Based on that analysis, the staff recommends 

that the COLs be issued. The staff based its recommendation on (1) the WLS Units 1 and 2 

COLA ER, (2) consultation with Federal, State, Tribal, and local agencies (3) the staff’s own 

independent review, (4) the NRC staff’s consideration of public comments and, (5) the 

assessments summarized in the final EIS, including the potential mitigation measures identified 

in the ER and in the final EIS. In addition, in making its recommendation, the staff determined 

that none of the alternative sites assessed is environmentally preferable or obviously superior to 
The Commissioners - 31 - 

the WLS site. The NRC staff also determined that none of the reasonable energy alternatives 

and none of the reasonable system design alternatives were environmentally preferable to 

those proposed. 

The NRC’s determination is independent of the USACE’s determination of a “least 

environmentally damaging practicable alternative” under the CWA Section 404(b)(1) guidelines 

and its required public interest review (PIR). The USACE’s independent regulatory permit 

decision documentation referenced relevant analyses from the EIS and, as necessary, included 

a supplemental PIR; CWA Section 404(b)(1) evaluation; cumulative impact analysis; 

compensatory mitigation plan that is in accordance with 33 CFR Part 332, “Compensatory 

Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources;” and other information and evaluations that may be 

outside the NRC’s scope of analysis and not included in the final EIS, but that are required by 

the USACE to support its permit decision. 

(iv) Determine, in an uncontested proceeding, whether the National Environmental 

Protection Act review conducted by the NRC staff has been adequate. 

The staff conducted an independent evaluation of the application; developed independent, 

reliable information; and conducted a systematic, interdisciplinary review of the potential 

impacts of the proposed action on the human environment and of reasonable alternatives to the 

applicant’s proposal. Before developing the draft EIS, the staff issued a notice of intent to 

conduct scoping and invited public participation. The staff also provided opportunities for 

governmental and general public participation during the public meeting on the draft EIS and 

used publicly available guidance in the development of its final EIS. 

The staff considered the purpose of and need for the proposed action, the environment that 

could be affected by the action, and the consequences of the proposed action, including 

mitigation that could reduce impacts. The final EIS considered the no-action alternative, energy 

alternatives, alternative sites, system design alternatives, and the potential impact of 

conservation measures in determining the demand for power and consequential need for 

additional generating capacity. The final EIS compared the alternatives to the proposed action. 

The staff considered any adverse environmental effects that could not be avoided should the 

proposed action be implemented, the relationship between short-term uses of the human 

environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any 

irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources that would be involved in the proposed 

project. 

The NRC filed the draft EIS with the Environmental Protection Agency for its review consistent 

with the requirements of Section 309, “Policy Review,” of the Clean Air Act (see 

42 U.S.C. 7609). The staff considered all comments received on the draft EIS and, in 

Appendix E to the final EIS, described the manner in which each comment was dispositioned. 

On these bases, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing the COLs, it conducted a 

thorough and complete environmental review sufficient to meet the requirements of NEPA and 

adequate to inform the Commission’s action on the COL request. 
The Commissioners - 32 - 

V. Other Aspects of the Staff Review Not Tied to Specific Findings 

a. Severe Accident Management Guidelines 

The staff identified an additional area of interest related to a recent Commission decision about 

the draft rule on mitigation of beyond-design-basis events (SECY-15-0065 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15049A213)). In the draft rule, the staff proposed to require implementation of severe 

accident management guidelines (SAMGs). In the associated SRM, the Commission approved 

publication of the draft rule for public comment subject to the removal of the proposed 

requirements for SAMGs (ADAMS Accession No. ML15239A767). 

SAMGs were an industry initiative and remain voluntary for most licensees. However, the 

AP1000 design certification rule incorporates the AP1000 DCD, which specifies implementing 

the AP1000 severe accident management guidance on a site-specific basis. This is a condition 

of license for current AP1000 COLs (Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and Summer Units 2 and 3). For 

consistency within the AP1000 design center, one of the proposed license conditions for Levy 

Units 1 and 2 (discussed in SECY-16-0076) and the WLS Units 1 and 2 is the implementation of 

site-specific SAMGs. 

COLs referencing other certified designs have addressed SAMGs differently. By reference, the 

Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) design certification rule incorporates the 

ESBWR DCD, which specifies that a severe accident management program will be developed 

by each COL holder that references the ESBWR DCD. Consequently, implementation of 

site-specific SAMGs is a condition of the Fermi license. On the other hand, the Advanced 

Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) design certification rule incorporates the ABWR DCD, which 

specifies a COL action item. Applicants referencing the ABWR design must address 

procedures and training related to accident management. The COL for STP Units 3 and 4 

references the ABWR design and includes a commitment to implement accident management in 

the STP FSAR (ADAMS Accession No. ML15124A421). The staff accepted this in the STP 

FSER and no license condition was proposed (ADAMS Accession No. ML15232A128). 

b. Non-Concurrence Involving NHPA 

In the course of the environmental review, a non-concurrence was filed that was identical to the 

non-concurrence filed during the Levy Units 1 and 2 review. The non-concurrence concerned 

the environmental review and related NHPA and ESA consultations regarding a general license 

to construct and operate an independent spent fuel storage installation. Staff, management, 

and the non-concurring individuals agreed to a resolution of the concern and the non-concurring 

staff ultimately concurred on the document. The non-concurrence concern was resolved 

consistent with the resolution of the identical non-concurrence filed during the Levy Units 1 

and 2 review. In accordance with Management Directive 10.158, the resolution of the 

non-concurrence is documented in NCP-2016-007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16214A211), 

which is nonpublic because it contains deliberative process and attorney-client privileged 

information. 
The Commissioners - 33 - 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. 

 /RA/ 

Victor M. McCree

Executive Director

for Operations 

Enclosure: 

NCP-2016-007 
The Commissioners - 33 – 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. 

 /RA/ 

Victor M. McCree

Executive Director

for Operations 

Enclosure: 

NCP-2016-007 

ADAMS Accession Number: ML16216A079 *Concurred via e-mail SECY-012 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

OFFICE PM:DNRL:LB4 PM:DNRL: EPB LA:DNRL: LB4 PM:DNRL:LB4 Tech Editor 

NAME BHughes PVokoun RButler BOrders QTE * 

DATE 07/25/16 07/27/16 07/18/16 08/02/16 07/15/16 

OFFICE BC:DNRL:EPB BC:DNRL:LB4 D:NRO:DCIP D:NRO/DEIA D:NRO/DSEA 

NAME AFetter JDixon-Herrity MCheok * MMayfield* 

(RCaldwell for) 

SFlanders* 

(SDevlin for) 

DATE 08/02/16 08/02/16 07/20/16 07/26/16 07/20/16 

OFFICE D:NRO/DSRA D:NRR/DIRS D:NSIR/DSP D:NSIR/DPR OGC 

NAME JMonninger * CMiller 

(ABowers for) CJohnson MBailey * MWright 

DATE 07/20/16 07/21/16 07/20/16 07/26/16 07/29/16 

OFFICE D:NRR/DE D:NMSS D:DNRL D:NRO EDO 

NAME JLubinski * CErlanger * FAkstulewicz 

(SLee for) JUhle VMcCree 

DATE 07/20/16 07/20/16 08/02/16 08/02/16 08/ 08 /16 
REFERENCES 

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Final Safety Evaluation Report for Combined 

Licenses for William States Lee III Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2,” May 31, 2016 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML16160A414). 

2. NRC and USACE, NUREG-2111, “Final Environmental Impact Statement for Combined 

Licenses (COLs) for William States Lee III Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Volumes 1, 2, 

and 3,” December 31, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML13340A005, ML13340A006 and 

ML13340A007). 

3. NRC, “Combined License, William States Lee III Nuclear Station Unit 1,” Duke Energy 

Carolinas, LLC., Draft, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16175A483). 

4. NRC, “Combined License, William States Lee III Nuclear Station Unit 2,” Duke Energy 

Carolinas, LLC., Draft, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16196A384). 

5. NRC, “Summary Record of Decision for William States Lee III Nuclear Station Units 1 and 

2,” Draft, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16064A266). 

6. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 51, “Environmental Protection 

Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions.” 

7. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and 

Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.” 

8. DEC, Letter from Bryan J. Dolan to R. William Borchardt, Director Office of New Reactors 

(USNRC), “Application for Combined License for William States Lee III Nuclear Station 

Units 1 and 2” December 12, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073510494). 

9. NRC, “Westinghouse AP1000 Design Control Document Revision 19,” June 13, 2011, 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML11171A287). 

10. NRC, “Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard Plant 

Design,” August 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112061231). 

11. NRC, “Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard Plant 

Design,” Volume 1, Supplement 2, September 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML11293A120). 

12. NRC, “Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard Plant 

Design,” Volume 2, Supplement 2, September 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML11293A199). 

13. Federal Register Notice, Final Rule, AP1000 Design Certification Amendment, 

December 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113480014). 

14. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-006, “New Reactor Standardization Needed to 

Support the Design-Centered Licensing Review Approach,” May 31, 2006 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML053540251). 
15. SECY-11-0110, “Staff Statement in Support of the Uncontested Hearing for Issuance of 

Combined Licenses and Limited Work Authorizations for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, 

Units 3 and 4 (Docket Nos. 52-025 and 52-026),” August 9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML110600264). 

16. SECY-11-0115, “Staff Statement in Support of the Uncontested Hearing for Issuance of 

Combined Licenses for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3 (Docket Nos. 

52-027 and 52-028)” August 19, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111320113). 

17. SECY-15-0123, “The Staff Statement in Support of the Uncontested Hearing for Issuance 

of Combined Licenses for the South Texas Project, Units 3 and 4,” September 30, 2015 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15316A408). 

18. ACRS, “Report on the Safety Aspects of the DEC, LLC, Combined License Application for 

William States Lee III Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2,” December 14, 2015 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML15348A196). 

19. NRC, “Staff Statement In Support of the Uncontested Hearing for Issuance of Combined 

Licenses for the Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 52-029 and 52-030),” 

June 10, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12188A087). 

20. NRC and USACE, “Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Combined Licenses (COLs) 

for William States Lee III Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2,” ADAMS Accession 

Nos. ML11343A010 and ML11343A011, December 13, 2011. 

21. EPA, “Environmental Impact Statements; Notice of Availability,” Federal Register, 

75 FR 49486, August 13, 2010. 

22. NRC, “Notice of Availability of Combined License Applications,” Federal Register, 

76 FR 71608, 76 FR 72725, 76 FR 75566, and 76 FR 77021, November 18, November 25, 

December 2, and December 9, 2011. 

23. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, 42 USC 4321 et seq. 

24. NRC, NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for 

Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition,” March 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070660036). 

25. NRC, NUREG-1555, “Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear 

Power Plants: Environmental Standard Review,” available at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1555/. 

26. NRC, NUREG-2157, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of 

Spent Nuclear Fuel,” September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14198A440). 

27. NRC, SECY-06-0019, “Semiannual Update of the Status of New Reactor Licensing 

Activities and Future Planning for New Reactors,” January 31, 2006 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML053530315). 
28. NRC, “Addressing Construction & Preconstruction Activities; Greenhouse Gas Issues, 

General Conformity Determinations, and Environmental Justice, Need for Power, 

Cumulative Impact Analysis, and Cultural/Historical Resources Analysis Issues in EIS,” 

December 10, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100760503). 

29. NRC, “Staff Process for Determining if a Supplement to an Environmental Impact 

Statement is Required in Accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 

51.92(a) or 51.72(a),” November 24, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13199A170). 

30. SECY-12-0025 – “Proposed Orders And Requests For Information In Response To 

Lessons Learned From Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake And Tsunami,” 

February 17, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12039A111). 

31. Staff Requirements – SRM-SECY-12-0025 ─ “Proposed Orders And Requests For 

Information In Response To Lessons Learned From Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku 

Earthquake And Tsunami,” March 9, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120690347). 

32. NRC, CLI-12-09, “Memorandum and Order,” March 30, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12090A531). 

33. Westinghouse, Technical Report, “Response to NRC Orders EA-12-051 and EA-12-063, 

and Background Information for Future Licensees on AP1000 Spent Fuel Pool 

Instrumentation, Redacted,” January 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13023A265). 

34. Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 12-01, Revision 0, “Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design 

Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities,” May 2012 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML12125A412). 

35. NRC, Regulatory Guide 4.7, “General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations,” 

Washington, DC, 1998. 

36. SECY-15-0065, “Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,” 

April 30, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15049A213). 

37. SRM-SECY-15-0065, “Staff Requirements – SECY-15-0065 – Proposed Rulemaking: 

Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150-AJ49),” August 27, 2015 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML15239A767). 

38. NRC, “Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Combined Licenses for South Texas 

Project, Units 3 and 4,” September 29, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15232A128). 

39. ACRS, “Exemptions to the AP1000 Certified Design Included in the Levy Nuclear Plant 

Units 1 and 2 Combined License Application,” April 18, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML16102A149). 

40. NRC, CLI-16-07, “Memorandum and Order,” May 4, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML16125A150).