SECRETARY 

DECISION ITEM: 

TITLE: 

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 

January 11, 2016 

COMMISSION VOTING RECORD 

SECY-15-0098 

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING RELATED 

TO ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF 

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT (PRM-50-106) 

The Commission acted on the subject paper as recorded in the Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SAM) of January 11, 2016. 

This Record contains a summary of voting on this matter together with the individual vote 

sheets, views and comments of the Commission. 

Enclosures: 

1. Voting Summary 

2. Commissioner Vote Sheets 

cc: Chairman Burns 

Commissioner Svinicki 

Commissioner Ostendorff 

Commissioner Baran 

OGG 

EDO 

PDR 
VOTING SUMMARY - SECY-15-0098 

RECORDED VOTES 

APPROVED DISAPPROVED ABSTAINING N/P* COMMENTS DATE 

Chrm. Burns x x 12/16/15 

Comr. Svinicki x x 12/21/15 

Comr. Ostendorff x x 8/2015 

Comr. Baran x x 9/29/15 

*Not Participating 
Commissioner Comments on SECY-15-0098 

Chairman Burns 

I approve publication of the Federal Register notice denying PRM-50-106 (Enclosure 1 to 

SECY-15-0098) and issuance of the letters to the petitioners (Enclosure 2 to SECY-15-0098), 

subject to the attached edits. 

Commissioner Svinicki 

I approve publication of the Federal Register notice denying PRM-50-106 (Enclosure 1 to 

SECY-15-0098) and issuance of the letters to the petitioners (Enclosure 2 to SECY-15-0098), 

subject to the attached edits. 

Commissioner Ostendorff 

No comments 

Commissioner Baran 

I approve the staff's recommendation denying the petition for rulemaking and publishing the 

Federal Register notice and letters to the petitioners, subject to the attached edits. 
VOTING SUMMARY - SECY-15-0098 

RECORDED VOTES 

APPROVED DISAPPROVED ABSTAINING N/P* COMMENTS DATE 

Chrm. Burns x x 12/16/15 

Comr. Svinicki x x 12/21/15 

Comr. Ostendorff x x 8/2015 

Comr. Baran x x 9/29/15 

*Not Participating 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

Chairman Burns 

SECY-15-0098: Denial of Petition for Rulemaking 

Related to Environmental Qualification of Electrical 

Equipment (PRM-50-106) 

Approved X Disapproved Abstain Not Participating -- --

COMMENTS: Below X Attached X None 

I approve publication of the Federal Register notice denying PRM-50-106 (Enclosure 1 to 

SECY-15-0098) and issuance of the letters to the petitioners (Enclosure 2 to SECY-15-0098), 

subject to the attached edits. 

Entered in STARS 

Yes x 

--

No December 2015 

Date 
..;;..S~G.;;:;.B...-E~d~it.;;...s ______________________ [7590-01-P] 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

10 CFR PARTS 50, 52, 54, AND 100 

[Docket Nos. PRM-50-106; NRC-2012-0177] 

Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a petition for 

rulemaking (PRM) submitted by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) and 

Mr. Paul M. Blanch (collectively, the petitioners) on June 18, 2012. The petitioners requested 

that the NRC amend its regulations to clearly and unequivocally require the environmental 

qualification of all safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections and other ancillary electrical 

equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture intrusion during normal 

operating conditions, severe weather, seasonal flooding, and seismic events, and post-accident 

conditions, both inside and outside of a reactor's containment building. The NRC is denying this 

petition because the current regulations already address environmental qualification in both mild 

and design basis accident conditions of electrical equipment located both inside and outside of 

the containment building that is important to safety, and the petition does not provide significant 

new or previously unconsidered information sufficient to justify rulemaking. 

DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-50-106, is closed on [INSERT DATE 

OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]. 
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0177 when contacting the NRC about the 

availability of information regarding this petition. You may access publicly-available documents 

related to the petition, using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search on the 

petition Docket ID NRC-2012-0177. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; 

telephone: 301-287-3422; e-mail: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact 

the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONT ACT section of this document. 

• NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): 

You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection 

at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select "ADAMS Public 

Documents" and then select "Begin Web-based ADAMS Search." For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 

301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in 

the SUPPLEMENT ARY INFORMATION section. 

• NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the 

NRC's PDR, Room 01-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Margaret Ellenson, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington , DC 20555-0001 , telephone: 

301-415-0894; e-mail: Marqaret.Ellenson@nrc.gov. 

2 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 

I. The Petition. 

II. NRC Analysis. 

Ill. Determination of Petition. 

I. The Petition. 

On June 18, 2012, the NRC received a petition for rulemaking filed jointly by the NRDC 

and Mr. Paul Blanch (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12177 A377). The petitioners requested that 

the NRC amend its regulations in parts 50, 52, 54, and 100 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) to clearly and unequivocally require the environmental qualification of all 

safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections and other ancillary electrical equipment that 

may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture intrusion during normal operating conditions, 

severe weather, seasonal flooding, and seismic events, and post-accident conditions, both 

inside and outside of a reactor's containment building. 

On September 27, 2012 (77 FR 59345), the NRC published a notice of receipt in the 

Federal Register, and the PRM was docketed as PRM-50-106. The NRC did not request public 

comment on PRM-50-106. 

II. NRC Analysis. 

The petitioners raised three issues in support of their request that the NRC amend the 

regulations related to environmental qualification of electrical equipment at nuclear power 

plants. The three issues and the NRC's responses to each issue are presented in this section. 

3 
Issue 1: Through the issuance of Generic Letter (GL) 82-09, the NRC staff limited the 

scope of 10 CFR 50.49 based on the location of the electrical equipment. 

The petitioners stated that as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island, the NRC 

strengthened the regulatory requirements for electrical equipment by, among other things, 

revising § 50.49(e) to add paragraph (6) to address the possibility of electrical equipment 

submergence. The petitioners asserted that § 50.49( e )(6), as written, did not limit or restrict its 

applicability based upon the location of the equipment, but that the NRC staff limited this 

applicability through a question and answer (Q&A) set in GL 82-09, "Environmental Qualification 

of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment," dated April 20, 1982 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML031080281 ): 

Q. For equipment qualification purposes, what are the staff requirements concerning 

submergence of equipment outside containment? 

A. The staff requires that the licensee submit documentation on the qualification of 

safety-related equipment that could be submerged due to a high energy line 

break outside containment. 

The petitioners asserted that the problem with this excerpt from GL 82-09 is that 

safety-related cables and wires outside containment are routinely submerged in water not only 

during high energy line breaks (HELBs ), but also during a reactor's normal operation. The 

petitioners argued that the 1979 Three Mile Island accident and laboratory testing have shown 

that moisture intrusion and submergence of electrical cables and wires significantly increase the 

probability of failure, which also causes the failure of connected components such as 

emergency core cooling system motors and pumps, valves, controls, and instrumentation. The 

petitioners asserted that the safety implications from the failure of a safety-related cable inside 

4 
containment submerged by an accident, outside containment submerged by a high energy line 

break, or outside containment submerged by nature, are identical-the safety function is lost. 

NRC Response to Issue 1: 

The regulations at § 50.49, "Environmental qualification of electric equipment important 

to safety for nuclear power plants," isare applicable to electrical equipment located outside 

containment as well as inside. The January 21, 1983, Federal Register Notice of the final § 

50.49 rule ( 48 FR 2730) made this clear by noting that nuclear power plant equipment important 

to safety must be able to perform its safety functions throughout its installed life, and that this 

requirement applies to equipment inside as well as outside containment. (See 48 FR 2731 .) 

The Q&A referenced by the petitioners is itself premised on the applicability of§ 50.49 to 

important to safety electrical equipment outside of containment. Regardless of its location 

inside or outside containment, if any important to safety electrical equipment is near enough to a 

high energy line (e.g., steam line, feedwater, blow-down, charging, or letdown lines) that the 

equipment's performance could be adversely affected by a rupture of that line, § 50.49 requires 

that the equipment be qualified to withstand any environmental conditions that may result from 

such an event. Section 50.49 was established to impose additional requirements beyond those 

established by§ 50.65, "Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at 

nuclear power plants;" 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, "General Design Criteria [GDC] For Nuclear 

Power Plants;"

1 and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power 

Plants and Fuel Processing Plants." The additional requirements in § 50.49 apply to important 

to safety electrical equipment that could be subject to postulated design basis events (DBEs) 

that could affect: 1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; 2) the capability to 

1 The GDC pertains to water cooled nuclear plants and establishes the minimum requirements for their 

principal design criteria (36 FR 3256; February 20, 1971 , as amended). 

5 
shut the reactor down safely and keep it safe; or 3) the capability to prevent or mitigate 

accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to NRC emergency 

planning guidelines. As the cited GL 82-09 Q&A indicates, a HELB was the most probable such 

DBE involving submergence outside of containment for which the NRC staff believed that a 

power reactor's important to safety electrical equipment must be environmentally qualified. 

The NRC agrees with the petitioners that safety-related cables and other electrical 

equipment must be fully able to function, not only within an operating environment affected by a 

HELB under § 50.49, but also over the entire length of its system, even those portions not 

exposed to a HELB. Criterion 18 of 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, requires that electric power 

systems important to safety be designed so that important areas and features permit 

appropriate periodic inspection and testing. Example areas and features specified are the 

following: wiring, insulation, connections, and switchboards. Criterion 18 also requires the 

systems to be designed with a capability to test periodically the operability and functional 

performance of the components of the systems and the operability of the system as a whole. 

As the petitioners rightly point out, designing the entirety of an electrical safety system 

for inspectability and testability is essential because "[i]t matters little if the portion of a safetyrelated cable· inside [or] outside containment in a high energy line break area survive[s] if 

another portion of that same cable routed underground fails due to submergence." It is also 

important to note that the NRC's design and qualification requirements for underground or 

inaccessible wires, cables, and ancillary equipment are inspected and enforced. The NRC's 

inspection procedures direct that inspections of electrical equipment at risk of flooding or 

exposure to moisture be conducted annually. 

The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that GL 82-09 has restricted the 

applicability of§ 50.49's regulatory requirements for safety-related equipment according to its 

6 
location. Generic letters do not have the legal authority of a final rule promulgated after due 

public notice and comment, as was § 50.49. The Q&A in GL 82-09 does not exempt any safetyrelated equipment that could be submerged, inside or outside containment, from the 

environmental qualifications (EQ) requirements of§ 50.49. The purpose of the GL 82-09 Q&A 

cited by the petitioners was simply to clarify that under § 50.49, licensees must submit 

information on the EQ of important to safety equipment that could be submerged due to a high 

energy line break outside containment. The applicabilhy of § 50.49 is not limited to a HELB, 

although after more than 30 years of operating experience and risk analysis, a HELB remains 

the most probable DBE involving submergence outside containment that meets the § 50.49 

criteria for the subset of DBEs that could result in a severe accident. The clarifying Q&A was 

important because the GL was providing information in the event of a HELB, not describing the 

entire universe of postulated design basis accidentsDBEs to which § 50.49 could apply. 

Issue 2: Safety-related cable subject to submergence, condensation, or moisture 

located in a "mild environment" should not be exempted from the environmental qualification 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. 

The petitioners argued that rulemaking is necessary to ensure that electrical cables and 

wires will be properly qualified for environmental conditions they may experience during normal 

operation (i.e., a mild environment) as well as in an accident. The petitioners claimed the need 

.for rulemaking and clarification of§ 50.49 to address cables that may be exposed to non-mild 

environments during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The petitioners noted that 

electrical cables and wires "are prone to accelerated failure rates when submerged in water or 

exposed to high humidity unless designed and qualified for these environmental conditions." 

The petitioners stated that the NRC prioritized the inspection of cable penetrations after the 

7 
1979 Three Mile Island accident based on the probability of their impairment, mostly due to 

submergence and moisture. The petitioners argued that "[i]f these conditions cause a high 

probability of impairment following an accident, then it is logical to assume that these conditions 

produce a similar outcome in the absence of or prior to an accident as well." In support of their 

case for a rulemaking to address this impairment, the petitioners also referenced a 1996 study 

by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (ADAMS Accession No. ML031140264) and three 

studies by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), "Plant Support Engineering: Life Cycle 

Management Planning Sourcebooks: Medium-Voltage (MV) Cables and Accessories 

(Terminations and Splices)," EPRI Product ID: 1013187; "Plant Support Engineering: Aging 

Management Program Development Guidance for AC and DC Low-Voltage Power Cable 

Systems for Nuclear Power Plants," EPRI Product ID: 1020804; and "Plant Support 

Engineering: Aging Management Program Guidance for Medium- Voltage Cable Systems for 

Nuclear Power Plants," EPRI Product ID: 1020805. The EPRI documents are available for 

download from www.EPRl.com . 

Also in support of their request for rulemaking to extend § 50.49 requirements to 

electrical equipment in mild environments, the petitioners contended that the NRC's 

requirements state only that safety systems should remain functional and do not provide 

conditions or acceptance criteria for degraded cables. 

NRC Response to Issue 2: 

The NRC agrees that § 50.49 does not apply to reactor cables and electrical equipment 

exposed to mild environments. This section of the rule applies EQ requirements only to 

important to safety cables and electrical equipment that may be exposed to non-mild 

environments during accident conditions. The purpose of the final § 50.49 rule ( 48 FR 2730; 

8 
January 21, 1983) was to codify accepted industry standards and NRC guidance for the EQ of 

safety-related electrical equipment, and non-safety-related equipment relied on by safetyrelated equipment, that must perform a safety function under design basis accidentDBE 

conditions. 

The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that § 50.49 should be amended to 

extend EQ requirements to important to safety cables and electrical equipment exposed to 

submergence or moisture intrusion in mild environments. The existing rule specifically exempts 

from these requirements equipment exposed only to a "mild environment," and aswhich is 

defined in§ 50.49(c), a mild environment is an environment that would at no time be 

significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal plant operation, 

which includesincluding anticipated operational occurrences. 

All important to safety equipment whether in mild or non-mild environments are subject 

to the maintenance and quality assurance requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of 

maintenance underffi the maintenance rule(§ 50.65).:.-_and 10 CFR part 50, appendix 8. In 

additionFurthermore, all important to safety equipment at plants with construction permits 

beyondissued after May 21, 1971 , are also subject to the design and quality requirements in 

10 CFR part 50, appendix A. In addition to the above requirements. all safety-related 

equipment is also subject to the quality assurance criteria requirements of 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix B. Therefore, important to safety equipment in mild environments exposed to 

su.bmergence, condensation, and moisture intrusion, the kind of degradation of concern to the 

petitioners, arais subject to tAeseveral existing requirements set f-orth in the maintenance rule 

(§ 50.65); quality assurance requirements (10 CFR part 50, appendix B); and the GOG 

( 10 CFR part 50, appendix A). For important to safety equipment that could be subject to 

environmental conditions that may result as a consequence of a design basis accident, § 50.49 

establishes additional requirements beyond those stipulated in § 50.65; 10 CFR part 50, 

9 
appendix A; and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B. The maintenance rule(§ 50.65) establishes 

requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants. Under 

§ 50.65(a)(1 ), licenses are required to monitor the condition or performance of structures, 

systems, or components (SSCs) in a manner providing reasonable assurance that the intended 

SSC functions can be fulfilled. Section 50.65(b) describes the types of SSCs subject to its 

requirements. The maintenance rule (§ 50.65) applies to safety and non-safety SSCs that 

includes the following: SSCs used in the plant's emergency operating procedures or relied 

upon to mitigate accidents or transient unsafe conditions; SSCs whose failure could prevent 

safety-related SSCs from fulfilling their safety-related function; or SSCs whose failure could 

cause a reactor scram (unplanned action to stop the fission reaction) or the actuation of a 

safety-related system. With this encompassing scope, the maintenance rule (§ 50.65) already 

covers the equipment specified in the petition (i.e., all safety-related cables, wires, splices, 

connections, and other ancillary electrical equipment that maybe subjected to submergence 

and/or moisture intrusion). Section 50.65 covers this equipment under any normal or unusual 

operating or post-accident conditions, whether these conditions include severe weather, 

seasonal flooding, or seismic events, or whether the SSCs are inside or outside of containment. 

The rule also covers the petitioners' specified systems and components whether or not they are 

exposed to submergence in water, condensation, wetting, and other environmental stresses 

during routine operation and infrequent events (e.g., flooding). 

In its April 2012 Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.218, "Condition-Monitoring Techniques for 

Electric Cables Used In Nuclear Power Plants" (ADAMS Accession No. ML 103510447), the 

NRC described a programmatic approach and acceptable techniques for monitoring the 

condition of electric cable systems and their operating environments. As authority for this 

guidance, RG 1.218 cited 10 CFR part 50, Criterion XI, "Test Control," of appendix B. 

10 
Criterion XI specifies that power reactor licensees must have a program to assure that all testing 

required to show that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed. 

The test program must include, as appropriate, operational tests of SSCs during 

nuclear power plant operation. Test procedures must include provisions for assuring that all 

prerequisites for the given test have been met, that adequate test instrumentation is available 

and used, and that the test is performed under suitable environmental conditions. Test results 

under Criterion XI must also be "documented and evaluated" to ensure that this Criterion's 

requirements have been satisfied. In addition, for important to safety cables and electrical 

equipment located in an area meeting the definition of a mild environment in § 50.49, 

10 CFR part 50, appendix A, GOG 4 requires that this equipment be designed to manage the 

conditions it will experience during normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated 

accidents. It is important to note that Criterion XI is only one of 18 criteria that are applicable to 

a quality assurance program for the electrical equipment at issue in this petition. Appendix B 

criteria establish quality assurance requirements for the design, manufacture, construction, and 

operation of all important. to safety-related equipment, and all activities affecting its functions, 

including not only testing, but designing, purchasing, fabricating, handling, shipping, storing, 

cleaning , installing, inspecting, operating, maintaining, repairing, and modifying this equipment. 

Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," also requires licensees to have measures assuring that 

conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Examples of such 

conditions are the following: failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material 

and equipment, and nonconformances. For significant conditions adverse to quality, including 

the potential failure of electrical equipment to function as designed, licensees must determine 

the cause of the 

11 
condition and "assure" that corrective action is taken to preclude a repetition of the adverse 

condition. The identified condition, its cause, and the corrective action taken to prevent its 

recurrence must also be documented and the appropriate levels of management informed . .JD. 

addition. for important to safety cables and electrical equipment located in an area meeting the 

definition of a mild environment in § 50.49, 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, GDC 4 requires that 

this equipment be designed to manage the conditions it will experience during normal operation, 

maintenance. testing, and postulated accidents 

The NRC does not agree that its existing regulations do not require sufficient protection 

of important to safety electrical equipment against expected or potential environmental 

conditions it experiences during its period of service. Regardless of whether a cable, switch, or 

other piece of electrical equipment must be environmentally qualified under§ 50.49, it must 

meet maintenance, design, and quality assurance requirements established by § 50.65; 

10 CFR part 50, appendix A; and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B (for safety-related equipment), to 

provide adequate protection for public health and safety. And regardless of whether the 

equipment is environmentally qualified, it is subject to the same degree of NRC oversight in the 

form of inspections and enforcement. A rulemaking to require the environmental qualification of 

all electrical equipment exposed only to mild environments is, therefore, unnecessary. 

Moreover, the 1996 DOE study and three EPRI studies cited by the petitioners are well 

known to the NRC and do not constitute significant new information justifying a rulemaking. The 

NRC recognized the concern regarding the reliability of low-voltage power cable systems at 

reactors that the petitioner references and acted accordingly. Among other things, the NRC has 

revised its inspection procedures to ensure annual inspections of underground bunkers and 

manholes in a continuing repeated cycle beginning with those containing the most 

risk-significant cables. The NRC also issued RG 1.218, describing a programmatic approach 

12 
and acceptable techniques for monitoring the condition of electric cable systems and their 

operating environments. Furthermore, the NRG also performs research focused on potential 

cable degradation in submerged environments. The goal of this research is to further enhance 

the NRC's understanding of the extent to '.vhich, if at all, cables are susceptible to degradation 

when in a submerged environment. 

The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' contention that the NRC's requirements do not 

provide conditions or acceptance criteria for degraded cables. Any requirement for safety: 

related systems to remain functional for a specified operating life is a design requirement, and 

any failure of the equipment before the end of that operating life would be a violation of tRethat 

design requirement. Therefore, taken together, GDC 2, 4, and 18 in 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix A, the maintenance requirements under§ 50.65, and the quality assurance testing 

requirements in 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, Criterion XI, effectively provide an enforceable 

acceptance criterion for the continued use of cables or any other electrical equipment degrading 

during normal operation. Criterion XI states that the measured rate of degradation must not 

impair the equipment's ability to function in an emergency, even if the emergency were to occur 

on the last day of the performance period specified in the equipment's design requirement. 

Guidance for the implementation of this criterion is further articulatedprovided in the 

same-August 25, 2009, NRC staff regulatory resolution issue protocol, "Cable Performance 

Issues at Nuclear Power Plants" (ADAMS Accession No. ML092220419), which the petitioners 

cited as documentation of the NRC's requirements on cable and wire submergence issues. The 

NRC staff position in that protocol is: ( 1) licensees should monitor cables within the scope of 

the maintenance rule (§ 50.65) at an appropriate frequency to demonstrate that they can 

perform their design functions when called upon; and (2) cables must be designed to fulfill their 

intended design function in the environment to which they are subject. Under the protocol. i1f 

13 
cables have been exposed to conditions for which they are not designed or qualified, tRe 

protocol says, the licensee must demonstrate, through adequate testing or condition monitoring, 

that the cables can perform their intended design function for the duration of the qualified period 

specified in the license. 

The NRC also inspects underground cables through established inspection procedures. 

In particular, Inspection Procedure (IP) Attachment 71111 .06, "Flood Protection Measures" 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML 11244A012), specifically directs NRC inspectors to perform an 

annual review of cables located in underground bunkers! or manholes. The IP Attachment atse 

directs inspectors to select bunkers! or manholes subject to flooding that contain multiple train 

or multiple risk-significant cables, and inspect those that contain more risk-significant cables 

before inspecting those with less risk-significant cables. The IP notes that inspectors should 

rotate through the bunkers! or manholes until all are inspected; and then the cycle should be 

recommenced. The IP Attachment also clarifies that these inspections may be in addition to 

those for the aging management programs of plants with renewed licenses. Where "significant 

moisture" is identified at such plants, inspectors are to verify that the licensee takes action to 

keep the cables dry and assess cable degradation in accordance with the licensee's aging 

management program for inaccessible power cables . 

Issue 3: Although GDC 2 and 4 of the NRC's regulations require that cables be able to 

perform their design function when subjected to anticipated environmental conditions, the NRC 

does not apply these and other GDC to the 57 plants with construction permits issued before 

May 21 , 1971, the effective date of the GDC rule (36 FR 3256; February 20, 1971 ). 

Citing the August 25, 2009, NRC staff regulatory issue resolution protocol, "Cable 

Performance Issues at Nuclear Power Plants," the pet_itioners asserted that this statement 

' 14 
defined the NRC's governing regulations on submerged cable performance as explicitly 

including GDC 2 and GDC 4. The GDC 2 requires reactor SSCs that are important to safety be 

designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform 

their safety functions. The GDC 4 requires that these SSCs be designed to accommodate the 

effects of and be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal 

operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents. 

The petition stated that although these GDC may contain appropriate regulatory 

requirements for the qualification of electrical cables and wires, the NRC has determined that 

these requirements are not to be applied to the majority of reactors. The petitioners noted that, 

at the time the petition was submitted, at least 57 of the nation's 104 operating reactors had 

construction permits that were issued prior to the May 21, 1971, the effective date of the GDC 

rule, and that the Commission, through guidance to the NRC staff, has determined that the GDC 

do not need to be applied to these 57 reactors. 

NRC Response to Issue 3: 

The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' suggestion that the 57 plants that received 

construction permits prior to May 21 , 1971, are not operating safely with appropriately qualified 

important to safety equipment. In 1992. A.§fter more than 15 years of analysis, the NRC staff 

recommended that the Commission retain current policy that no exemptions from or specific 

backfits for the GDC are required for plants with construction permits issued before that date. In 

its September 18, 1992, Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML003763736), the Commission endorsed the NRC staff's recommendation to not apply the 

GDC to plants with construction permits issued prior to the effective date of the GDC 

rulerecommended Option 1 of SECY 92 223, "Resolution of Deviations Identified During the 

Systematic Evaluation Program" (ADAMS Accession No.ML122568290). This 

15 
Optionrecommendation was based on the documented results of the NRC staff's evaluations of 

representative designs of 10 of the 57 plants against the design requirements of a 1975 

Standard Review Plan for reactor license applications based on the approved GDC. 

As the petitioners themselves noted in their petition, the SRM saffiexplained that at the 

time the GDC were promulgated, the Commission had stressed that they were not new 

requirements and were promulgated to articulate more clearly the licensing requirements and 

practice in effect at that time. The Commission stated that while compliance with the intent of 

the GDC is important, each plant licensed before the GDC were formally adopted was evaluated 

on a plant:-specific basis, determined to be safe, and licensed by the NRC. Furthermore, the 

Commission acknowledged determined that currentexisting regulatory processes arawere 

sufficient to ensure that plants continue to be safe and comply with the intent of the GDC. As 

the petitioners also noted, the Commission went on to say that backfitting these 57 plants to 

meet the GDC would provide little or no safety benefit while requiring an extensive commitment 

of resources. The petitioners have not provided any significant, new, or previously 

unconsidered information to justify a new rulemaking or to reverse this NRC position. 

Ill. Determination of the Petition. 

In accordance with§ 2.803, the NRC is denying PRM-50-106 because: 

1) The NRC disagrees with the petitioners assertion that GL 82-09 has restricted the 

applicability of§ 50.49's regulatory requirements for safety-related equipment according to its 

location. This regulation is applicable to electrical equipment located outside containment as 

well as inside.Section 50.49 imposes additional requirements beyond those of§ 50.65, 

1 O CFR part 50, appendix/\, and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, for important to safety equipment 

subject to design basis accident conditions. Section 50.49 explicitly excludes important to 

16 
safety electrical equipment subject only to mild environments. The petitioners have not 

provided significant and new information sufficient to justify a rulemaking to change this position. 

2) Section 50.49 explicitly excludes important to safety electrical equipment subject only 

to mild environments. The petitioners have not provided significant new information sufficient to 

justify a change to this rule. A rulemaking to require the environmental qualification of all 

electrical equipment exposed only to mild environments is unnecessary because existing NRC 

regulations require sufficient protection of important to safety electrical equipment against 

expected or potentia~ environmental conditions it experiences during its period of service.-+Ae 

petitioners have not provided any ne1.v information or previously unconsidered reasons that 

§ 50.49 should be amended to extend EQ requirements to important to safety cables and electrical 

equipment exposed to submergence, condensation, or moisture intrusion in mild environments. The 

maintenance rule (§ 50.65), applicable 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, CDC and 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix B, quality assurance regulations, provide functional requirements through maintenance, 

design, and quality assurance for important to safety equipment in mild environments both inside 

and outside of the containment building. 

3) With regard to the reactors that received construction permits prior to May 21, 1971 , 

the Commission determined in response to SECY-92-223 that these plants are operating safely 

with appropriately qualified important to safety equipment, and that no specific backfits of the 

GDC to these plants were required. 

---The petitioners have not provided any significant, new, or previously unconsidered 

information justifying a rulemaking to apply the GDC to the 57 reactors that received 

construction permits prior to May 21, 1971. 

17 
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this __ day of _____ , 2015. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

18 
Paul M. Blanch 

135 Hyde Road 

W. Hartford, CT 06117 

Dear Mr. Blanch: 

I am responding to your submittal of June 18, 2012, by which you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) a petition for rulemaking (PRM) (NRC Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 12177 A377). You asked the 

NRC to amend its regulations related to the environmental qualification of electrical equipment 

in nuclear power plants by changing the following parts of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations ( 10 CFR): 

• 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities" 

• 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants" 

• 10 CFR Part 54, "Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power 

Plants" 

• 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria" 

Specifically, you requested that the NRC revise its regulations "to clearly and unequivocally 

require the environmental qualification of all safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections 

and other ancillary electrical equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture 

intrusion during normal operating conditions, severe weather, seasonal flooding, and seismic 

events, and post-accident conditions, both inside and outside of [a reactor's] containment 

[building]." 

The NRC docketed the petition as PRM-50-106 and published a notice of receipt in the Federal 

Register on September 27, 2012 (77 FR 59345). The notice of receipt did not seek public 

comment on the petition. 

After reviewing your petition, the NRC has determined that the petition has not provided an 

adequate basis upon which the NRG could act to amend its regulations as requested. The 

agency is, therefore, denying your petition. This letter outlines the reasons for the denial. A 

more detailed discussion of the reasons for denial can be found in the enclosed Federal 

Register notice, which the NRC will submit to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. 

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.49(e)(6), which you referred to in your petition, establishes 

environmental qualification requirements for electrical equipment in non-mild environments 

during accident conditions. Generic Letter 82-09 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031080281 ), which 

you also referenced in your petition, does not limit the applicability of 10 CFR 50.49 based on 

the location of the equipment. In addition, the NRG has other regulations in place that address 

environmental qualification and maintenance of electrical equipment in non mild environments. 
P. Blanch - 2 -

The NRC also has regulations to address the oversight of electrical equipment that is important 

to safety. These regulations include 10 CFR 50.4965, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, and 

Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 (for safety-related equipment). Finally, with regard to the 

reactors that received construction permits prior to May 21 , 1971 , after more than 15 years of 

careful and well-documented NRC staff review, the Commission determined in 1992 that these 

plants are operating safely with appropriately qualified important-to-safety equipment, and that 

no specific backfits of the General Design Criteria to these plants were required. The 

submittedinformation in the petition does not warrantsupport reversal of that determination. The 

NRC considers the has regulatory programs in place to ensure appropriate oversight of 

environmental qualification, maintenance, and oversighttesting of electrical equipment te-9e 

v-efj'-important to the safe operation of nuclear power plants. 

For the reasons discussed above, the NRC considers this petition closed. 

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Margaret Ellenson, Project 

Manager, by calling 301-415-0894 or by e-mailing Margaret.Ellenson@nrc.gov. 

Enclosure: 

Federal Register notice 

Sincerely, 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

Secretary of the Commission 
C. Jordan Weaver 

Natural Resources Defense Council 

1152 15th St NW., Suite 300 

Washington, DC 20005 

Dear Mr. Weaver: 

I am responding to your submittal of June 18, 2012, by which you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) a petition for rulemaking (PRM) (NRC Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 12177 A377). You asked the 

NRC to amend its regulations related to the environmental qualification of electrical equipment 

in nuclear power plants by changing the following parts of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations ( 10 CFR): 

• 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities" 

• 10 CFR Part 52, "licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants" 

• 10 CFR Part 54, "Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power 

Plants" 

• 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria" 

Specifically, you requested that the NRC revise its regulations "to clearly and unequivocally 

require the environmental qualification of all safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections 

and other ancillary electrical equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture 

intrusion during normal operating conditions, severe weather, seasonal flooding, and seismic 

events, and post-accident conditions, both inside and outside of [a reactor's] containment 

[building]." 

The NRC docketed the petition as PRM-50-106 and published a notice of receipt in the Federal 

Register on September 27, 2012 (77 FR 59345). The notice of receipt did not seek public 

comment on the petition. 

After reviewing your petition, the NRC has determined that the petition has not provided an 

adequate basis upon which the NRG could act to amend its regulations as requested. The 

agency is, therefore, denying your petition. This letter outlines the reasons for the denial. A 

more detailed discussion of the reasons for denial can be found in the enclosed Federal 

Register notice, which the NRC will submit to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. 
C. Weaver - 2 -

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.49( e )(6), which you referred to in your petition, establishes 

environmental qualification requirements for electrical equipment in non-mild environments 

during accident conditions. Generic Letter 82-09 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031080281 ), which 

you also referenced in your petition, does not limit the applicability of 10 CFR 50.49 based on 

the location of the equipment. In addition, the NRG has other regulations in place that address 

environmental qualification and maintenance of electrical equipment in non mild environments. 

The NRC also has regulations to address the oversight of electrical equipment that is important 

to safety. These regulations include 10 CFR 50.4965, Appendix A to 1 O CFR Part 50, and 

Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 (for safety-related equipment). Finally, with regard to the 

reactors that received construction permits prior to May 21, 1971, after more than 15 years of 

careful and well-documented NRC staff review, the Commission determined in 1992 that these 

plants are operating safely with appropriately qualified important-to-safety equipment, and that 

no specific backfits of the General Design Criteria to these plants were required. The 

submittedinformation in the petition does not warrantsupport reversal of that determination. The 

NRC considers the has regulatory programs in place to ensure appropriate oversight of 

environmental qualification, maintenance, and oversighttesting of electrical equipment te-l3e 

veFY-important to the safe operation of nuclear power plants. 

For the reasons discussed above, the NRC considers this petition closed. 

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Margaret Ellenson, project 

manager, by calling 301-415-0894 or by e-mailing Margaret.Ellenson@nrc.gov. 

Enclosure: 

Federal Register notice 

Sincerely, 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

Secretary of the Commission 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

AFFIRMATION ITEM 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

COMMISSIONER SVINICKI 

SECY-15-0098: DENIAL OF PETITION FOR 

RULEMAKING RELATED TO ENVIRONMENTAL 

QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 

(PRM-50-106) 

Approved XX Disapproved Abstain Not Participating -- -- --

COMMENTS: Below XX Attached XX None 

I approve publication of the Federal Register notice denying PRM-50-106 (Enclosure 1 to 

SECY-15-0098) and issuance of the letters to the petitioners (Enclosure 2 to SECY-15-0098), 

subject to the attached edits. 

121Z/115 

Entered on "STARS" 
KLS Edits 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

10 CFR PARTS 50, 52, 54, AND 100 

[Docket Nos. PRM-50-106; NRC-2012-0177] 

Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial. 

(7590-01-P) 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a petition for 

rulemaking (PRM) submitted by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) and 

Mr. Paul M. Blanch (collectively, the petitioners) on June 18, 2012. The petitioners requested 

that the NRC amend its regulations to clearly and unequivocally require the environmental 

qualification of all safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections and other ancillary electrical 

equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture intrusion during normal 

operating conditions, severe weather, seasonal flooding, and seismic events, and post-accident 

conditions, both inside and outside of a reactor's containment building. The NRC is denying this 

petition because the current regulations already address environmental qualification in both mild 

and design basis accidentevent conditions of electrical equipment located both inside and 

outside of the containment building that is important to safety, and the petition does not provide 

significant new or previously unconsidered information sufficient to justify rulemaking. 
DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-50-106, is closed on [INSERT DATE 

OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0177 when contacting the NRC about the 

availability of information regarding this petition. You may access publicly-available documents 

related to the petition, using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.requlations.gov and search on the 

petition Docket ID NRC-2012-0177. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; 

telephone: 301-287-3422; e-mail: Carol. Gallaqher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact 

the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONT ACT section of this document. 

• NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): 

You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection 

at http://www.nrc.gov/readinq-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select "ADAMS Public 

Documents" and then select "Begin Web-based ADAMS Search." For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 

301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in 

the SUPPLEMENT ARY INFORMATION section. 

• NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the 

NRC's PDR, Room 01-F21 , One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Margaret Ellenson, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001 , telephone: 

301-415-0894; e-mail: Margaret.Ellenson@nrc.gov. 

2 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 

I. The Petition. 

II . NRC Analysis. 

Ill. Determination of Petition. 

I. The Petition. 

On June 18, 2012, the NRC received a petition for rulemaking filed jointly by the NRDC 

and Mr. Paul Blanch (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12177 A377). The petitioners requested that 

the NRC amend its regulations in parts 50, 52, 54, and 100 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) to clearly and unequivocally require the environmental qualification of all 

safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections and other ancillary electrical equipment that 

may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture intrusion during normal operating conditions, 

severe weather, seasonal flooding, and seismic events, and post-accident conditions, both 

inside and outside of a reactor's containment building. 

On September 27, 2012 (77 FR 59345), the NRC published a notice of receipt in the 

Federal Register, and the PRM was docketed as PRM-50-106. The NRC did not request public 

comment on PRM-50-106. 

II. NRC Analysis. 

The petitioners raised three issues in support of their request that the NRC amend the 

regulations related to environmental qualification of electrical equipment at nuclear power 

plants. The three issues and the NRC's responses to each issue are presented in this section. 

3 
Issue 1: Through the issuance of Generic Letter (GL) 82-09, the NRC staff limited the 

scope of 10 CFR 50.49 based on the location of the electrical equipment. 

The petitioners stated that as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island, the NRC 

strengthened the regulatory requirements for electrical equipment by, among other things, 

revising § 50.49( e) to add paragraph (6) to address the possibility of electrical equipment 

submergence. The petitioners asserted that § 50.49( e )(6), as written, did not limit or restrict its 

applicability based upon the location of the equipment, but that the NRC staff limited this 

applicability through a question and answer (Q&A) set in GL 82-09, "Environmental Qualification 

of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment," dated April 20, 1982 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML031080281 ): 

Q. For equipment qualification purposes, what are the staff requirements concerning 

submergence of equipment outside containment? 

A. The staff requires that the licensee submit documentation on the qualification of 

safety-related equipment that could be submerged due to a high energy line 

break outside containment. 

The petitioners asserted that the problem with this excerpt from GL 82-09 is that 

safety-related cables and wires outside containment are routinely submerged in water not only 

during high energy line breaks (HELBs), but also during a reactor's normal operation. The 

petitioners argued that the 1979 Three Mile Island accident and laboratory testing have shown 

that moisture intrusion and submergence of electrical cables and wires significantly increase the 

probability of failure, which also causes the failure of connected components such as 

emergency core cooling system motors and pumps, valves, controls, and instrumentation. The 

petitioners asserted that the safety implications from the failure of a safety-related cable inside 

4 
containment submerged by an accident, outside containment submerged by a high energy line 

break, or outside containment submerged by nature, are identical-the safety function is lost. 

NRC Response to Issue 1: 

The regulations at § 50.49, "Environmental qualification of electric equipment important 

to safety for nuclear power plants," isare applicable to electrical equipment located outside 

containment as well as inside. The January 21, 1983, Federal Register Notice of the final § 

50.49 rule ( 48 FR 2730) made this clear by noting that nuclear power plant equipment important 

to safety must be able to perform its safety functions throughout its installed life, and that this 

requirement applies to equipment inside as well as outside containment. (See 48 FR 2731.) 

The Q&A referenced by the petitioners is itself premised on the applicability of§ 50.49 to 

important to safety electrical equipment outside of containment. Regardless of its location 

inside or outside containment, if any important to safety electrical equipment is near enough to a 

high energy line (e.g., steam line, feedwater, blow-down, charging, or letdown lines) that the 

equipment's performance could be adversely affected by a rupture of that line, § 50.49 requires 

that the equipment be qualified to withstand any environmental conditions that may result from 

such an event. Section 50.49 was established to impose additional requirements beyond those 

established by§ 50.65, "Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at 

nuclear power plants;" 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, "General Design Criteria [GDC] For Nuclear 

Power Plants;"1 and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power 

Plants and Fuel Processing Plants." The additional requirements in§ 50.49 apply to important 

to safety electrical equipment that could be subject to postulated design basis events (DBEs) 

1 The GDC pertains to water cooled nuclear plants and establishes the minimum requirements for their 

principal design criteria (36 FR 3256; February 20, 1971, as amended). 

5 
that could affect: 1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; 2) the capability to 

shut the reactor down safely and keep it safe; or 3) the capability to prevent or mitigate 

accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to NRC emergency 

planning guidelines. As the cited GL 82-09 Q&A indicates, a HELB was the most probable such 

DBE involving submergence outside of containment for which the NRC staff believed that a 

power reactor's important to safety electrical equipment must be environmentally qualified. 

The NRC agrees with the petitioners that safety-related cables and other electrical 

equipment must be fully able to function, not only within an operating environment affected by a 

HELB under§ 50.49, but also over the entire length of its system, even those portions not 

exposed to a HELB. Criterion 18 of 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, requires that electric power 

systems important to safety be designed so that important areas and features permit 

appropriate periodic inspection and testing. Example areas and features specified are the 

following: wiring, insulation, connections, and switchboards. Criterion 18 also requires the 

systems to be designed with a capability to test periodically the operability and functional 

performance of the components of the systems and the operability of the system as a whole. 

As the petitioners rightly point out, designing the entirety of an electrical safety system 

for inspectability and testability is essential because "[i]t matters little if the portion of a safetyrelated cable inside [or] outside containment in a high energy line break area survive[s] if 

another portion of that same cable routed underground fails due to submergence." It is also 

important to note that the NRC's design and qualification requirements for underground or 

inaccessible wires, cables, and ancillary equipment are inspected and enforced. The NRC's 

inspection procedures direct that inspections of electrical equipment at risk of flooding or 

exposure to moisture be conducted annually. 

The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that GL 82-09 has restricted the 

applicability of§ 50.49's regulatory requirements for safety-related equipment according to its 

6 
location. Generic letters do not have the legal authority of a final rule promulgated after due 

public notice and comment, as was § 50.49. The Q&A in GL 82-09 does not exempt any safetyrelated equipment that could be submerged, inside or outside containment, from the 

environmental qualifications (EQ) requirements of§ 50.49. The purpose of the GL 82-09 Q&A 

cited by the petitioners was simply to clarify that under§ 50.49, licensees must submit 

information on the EQ of important to safety equipment that could be submerged due to a high 

energy line break outside containment. The applicability of§ 50.49 is not limited to a HELB, 

although after more than 30 years of operating experience and risk analysis, a HELB remains 

the most probable DBE involving submergence outside containment that meets the § 50.49 

criteria for the subset of DBEs that could result in a severe accident. The clarifying Q&A was 

important because the GL was providing information in the event of a HELB, not describing the 

entire universe of postulated design basis accidentsDBEs to which § 50.49 could apply. 

Issue 2: Safety-related cable subject to submergence, condensation, or moisture 

located in a "mild environment" should not be exempted from the environmental qualification 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. 

The petitioners argued that rulemaking is necessary to ensure that electrical cables and 

wires will be properly qualified for environmental conditions they may experience during normal 

operation (i.e., a mild environment) as well as in an accident. The petitioners claimed the need 

for rulemaking and clarification of§ 50.49 to address cables that may be exposed to non-mild 

environments during normal, abnormal, and accident eonditions. The petitioners noted that 

electrical cables and wires "are prone to accelerated failure rates when submerged in water or 

exposed to high humidity unless designed and qualified for these environmental conditions." 

The petitioners stated that the NRC prioritized the inspection of cable penetrations after the 

7 
1979 Three Mile Island accident based on the probability of their impairment, mostly due to 

submergence and moisture. The petitioners argued that "[i]f these conditions cause a high 

probability of impairment following an accident, then it is logical to assume that these conditions 

produce a similar outcome in the absence of or prior to an accident as well." In support of their 

case for a rulemaking to address this impairment, the petitioners also referenced a 1996 study 

by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (ADAMS Accession No. ML031140264) and three 

studies by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), "Plant Support Engineering: Life Cycle 

Management Planning Sourcebooks: Medium-Voltage (MV) Cables and Accessories 

(Terminations and Splices)," EPRI Product ID: 1013187; "Plant Support Engineering: Aging 

Management Program Development Guidance for AC and DC Low-Voltage Power Cable 

Systems for Nuclear Power Plants," EPRI Product ID: 1020804; and "Plant Support 

Engineering: Aging Management Program Guidance for Medium- Voltage Cable Systems for 

Nuclear Power Plants,'' EPRI Product ID: 1020805. The EPRI documents are available for 

download from www.EPRl.com . 

Also in support of their request for rulemaking to extend § 50.49 requirements to 

electrical equipment in mild environments, the petitioners contended that the NRC's 

requirements state only that safety systems should remain functional and do not provide 

conditions or acceptance criteria for degraded cables. 

NRC Response to Issue 2: 

The NRC agrees that§ 50.49 does not apply to reactor cables and electrical equipment 

exposed to mild environments. This section of the rule applies EQ requirements only to 

important to safety cables and electrical equipment that may be exposed to non-mild 

environments during accident conditions. The purpose of the final § 50.49 rule ( 48 FR 2730; 

8 
January 21, 1983) was to codify accepted industry standards and NRC guidance for the EQ of 

safety-related electrical equipment, and non-safety-related equipment relied on by safetyrelated equipment, that must perform a safety function under design basis accidentDBE 

conditions. 

The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that § 50.49 should be amended to 

extend EQ requirements to important to safety cables and electrical equipment. exposed to 

submergence or moisture intrusion in mild environments. The existing rule specifically exempts 

from these requirements equipment exposed only to a "mild environment," and aswhich is 

defined in§ 50.49(c), a mild environment is as an environment that would at no time be 

significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal plant operation, 

which includesincluding anticipated operational occurrences. 

All important to safety equipment whether in mild or non-mild environments afe--i§ 

subject to the maintenance and quality assurance requirements for monitoring the effectiveness 

of maintenance under-ff:l the maintenance rule (§ 50.65).:. and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B. In 

addition Furthermore, all important to safety equipment at plants with construction permits 

beyond issued after May 21, 1971, are_§ also subject to the design requirements in 

10 CFR part 50, appendix A. In addition to the above requirements. all safety-related 

equipment is also subject to the quality assurance requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B. 

Therefore, important to safety equipment in mild environments exposed to submergence, 

condensation, and moisture intrusion, the kind of degradation of concern to the petitioners, areis 

subject to tAe-several existing requirements set forth in the maintenance rule (§ 50.65); quality 

assurance requirements (10 CFR part 50, appendix B); and the GOG (10 CFR part 50, appendix 

~ For important to safety equipment that could be subject to environmental conditions that 

may result as a consequence of a design basis accidentDBE, § 50.49 establishes additional 

9 
requirements beyond those stipulated in § 50.65; 10 CFR part 50, appendix A; and 10 CFR part 

50, appendix B. 

The maintenance rule (§ 50.65) establishes requirements for monitoring the 

effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants. Under§ 50.65(a)(1 ), license s are 

required to monitor the condition or performance of structures, systems, or components (SSCs) 

in a manner providing reasonable assurance that the intended SSC functions can be fulfilled. 

Section 50.65(b) describes the types of SSCs subject to its requirements. The maintenance 

rule (§ 50.65) applies to safety and non-safety SSCs that includes the following: SSCs used in 

the plant's emergency operating procedures or relied upon to mitigate accidents or transient 

unsafe conditions; SSCs whose failure could prevent safety-related SSCs from fulfilling their 

safety-related function; or SSCs whose failure could cause a reactor scram (unplanned action to 

stop the fission reaction) or"th~ actuation of a safety-related system. With this encompassing 

scope, the .maintenance rule (§ 50.65) already covers the equipment specified in the p.etition 

(i.e., all safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections, and other ancillary electrical 

equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture intrusion). Section 50.65 

covers this equipment under any normal or unusual operating or post-accident conditions, 

whether these conditions include severe weather, seasonal flooding, or seismic events, or 

whether the SSCs are inside or outside of containment. The rule also covers the petitioners' 

specified systems and components whether or not they are exposed to submergence in water, 

condensation, wetting, and other environmental stresses during routine operation and infrequent 

events (e.g., flooding). 

In its April 2012 Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.218, "Condition-Monitoring Techniques for 

Electric Cables Used In Nuclear Power Plants" (ADAMS Accession No. ML 103510447), the 

NRC described a programmatic approach and acceptable techniques for monitoring the 

10 
condition of electric cable systems and their operating environments. As authority for this 

guidance, RG 1.218 cited 10 CFR part 50, Criterion XI, "Test Control," of appendix B. 

Criterion XI specifies that power reactor licensees must have a program to assure that all testing 

required to show that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed. 

The test program must include, as appropriate, operational tests of SSCs during 

nuclear power plant operation. Test procedures must include provisions for assuring that all 

prerequisites for the given test have been met, that adequate test instrumentation is available 

and used, and that the test is performed under suitable environmental conditions. Test results 

under Criterion XI must also be "documented and evaluated" to ensure that this Criterion's 

requirements have been satisfied. IR e88iti@R, f@r im~@FteRt t@ safety easies eR€i eleetrieal 

aeei8eRts. It is important to note that Criterion XI is only one of 18 criteria that are applicable to 

a quality assurance program for the electrical equipment at issue in this petition. Appendix B 

criteria establish quality assurance requirements for the design, manufacture, construction, and 

operation of all important to safety-related equipment, and all activities affecting its functions, 

including not only testing, but designing, purchasing, fabricating, handling, shipping, storing, 

cleaning, installing, inspecting, operating, maintaining, repairing, and modifying this equipment. 

Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," also requires licensees to have measures assuring that 

conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Examples of such 

conditions are the following: failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material 

and equipment, and nonconformances. For significant conditions adverse to quality, including 

the potential failure of electrical equipment to function as designed, licensees must determine 

11 
the cause of the condition and "assure" that corrective action is taken to preclude a repetition of 

the adverse condition. The identified condition, its cause, and the corrective action taken to 

prevent its recurrence must also be documented and the appropriate levels of management 

informed. In addition for important to safety cables and electrical equipment located in an area 

meeting the definition of a mild environment in § 50.49. 10 CFR part 50. appendix A. GDC 4 

requires that this equipment be designed to manage the conditions it will experience during 

normal operation. maintenance. testing. and postulated accidents. 

The NRC does not agree that its existing regulations do not require sufficient protection 

of important to safety electrical equipment against expected or potential environmental 

conditions it experiences during its period of service. Regardless of whether a cable, switch, or 

other piece of electrical equipment must be environmentally qualified under§ 50.49, it must 

meet maintenance, design, and quality. assurance requirements established by§ 50.65; 

10 CFR part 50, appendix A; and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B (for safety-related equipment), to 

provide adequate protection for public health and safety. And regardless of whether the 

equipment is environmentally qualified, it is subject to the same degree of NRC oversight in the 

form of inspections and enforcement. A rulemaking to require the environmental qualification of 

all electrical equipment exposed only to mild environments is, therefore, unnecessary. 

Moreover, the 1996 DOE study and three EPRI studies cited by the petitioners are well 

known to the NRC and do not constitute significant new information justifying a rulemaking. The 

NRC recognized the concern regarding the reliability of low-voltage power cable systems at 

reactors that the petitioner references and acted accordingly. Among other things, the NRC has 

revised its inspection procedures to ensure annual inspections of underground bunkers and 

manholes in a continuing repeated cycle beginning with those containing the most 

risk-significant cables. The NRC also issued RG 1.218, describing a programmatic approach 

12 
and acceptable techniques for monitoring the condition of electric cable systems and their 

operating environments. Furthermore, the NRG also performs research focused on potential 

cable degradation in submerged environments. The goal of this research is to further enhance 

tho NRC's understanding of tho extent to which, if at all, cables are susceptible to degradation 

when in a submerged environment. 

The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' contention that the NRC's requirements do not 

provide conditions or acceptance criteria for degraded cables. Any requirement for safety: 

related systems to remain functional for a specified operating life is a design requirement, and 

any failure of the equipment before the end of that operating life would be a violation of the 

design requirement. Therefore, taken together, GDC 2, 4, and 18 in 10 CFR part 50, 

appendix A, the maintenance requirements under § 50.65, and the quality assurance testing 

requirements in 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, Criterion XI, effectively provide an enforceable 

acceptance criterion for the continued use of cables or any other electrical equipment degrading 

during normal operation. Criterion XI states that the measured rate of degradation must not 

impair the equipment's ability to function in an emergency, even if the emergency were to occur 

on the last day of the performance period specified in the equipment's design requirement. 

Guidance for the implementation of this criterion is further articulatodprovided in the 

same August 25, 2009, NRC staff regulatory resolution issue protocol, "Cable Performance 

Issues at Nuclear Power Plants" (ADAMS Accession No. ML092220419), which the petitioners 

cited as documentation of the NRC's requirements on cable and wire submergence issues. The 

NRC staff position in that protocol is: ( 1) licensees should monitor cables within the scope of 

the maintenance rule (§ 50.65) at an appropriate frequency to demonstrate that they can 

perform their design functions when called upon; and (2) cables must be designed to fulfill their 

intended design function in the environment to which they are subject. Under the protocol. i1f 

cables have been exposed to conditions for which they are not designed or qualified, tfle 

13 
protocol says, the licensee must demonstrate, through adequate testing or condition monitoring, 

that the cables can perform their intended design function for the duration of the qualified period 

specified in the license. 

The NRC also inspects underground cables through established inspection procedures. 

In particular, Inspection Procedure (IP) Attachment 71111 .06, "Flood Protection Measures" 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML 11244A012), specifically directs NRC inspectors to perform an 

annual review of cables located in underground bunkerst or manholes. The IP Attachment aJse 

directs inspectors to select bunkerst or manholes subject to flooding that contain multiple train 

or multiple risk-significant cables, and inspect those that contain more risk-significant cables 

before inspecting those with less risk-significant cables. The IP notes that inspectors should 

rotate through the bunkerst_Q[_manholes until all are inspected; and then the cycle should be 

recommenced. The IP Attachment also clarifies that these inspections may be in addition to 

those for the aging management programs of plants with renewed licenses. Where "significant 

moisture" is identified at such plants, inspectors are to verify that the licensee takes action to 

.keep the cables dry and assess cable degradation in accordance with the licensee's aging 

management program for inaccessible power cables . 

Issue 3: Although GDC 2 and 4 of the NRC's regulations require that cables be able to 

perform their design function when subjected to anticipated environmental conditions, the NRC 

does not apply these and other GDC to the 57 plants with construction permits issued before 

May 21 , 1971, the effective date of the GDC rule (36 FR 3256; February 20, 1971 ). 

Citing the August 25, 2009, NRC staff regulatory issue resolution protocol, "Cable 

Performance Issues at Nuclear Power Plants," the petitioners asserted that this statement 

defined the NRC's governing regulations on submerged cable performance as explicitly 

including GDC 2 and GDC 4. The GDC 2 requires reactor SSCs that are important to safety be 

14 
designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform 

their safety functions. The GDC 4 requires that these SSCs be designed to accommodate the 

effects of and be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal 

operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents. 

The petition stated that although these GDC may contain appropriate regulatory 

requirements for the qualification of electrical cables and wires, the NRC has determined that 

these requirements are not to be applied to the majority of reactors. The petitioners noted that, 

at the time the petition was submitted, at least 57 of the nation's 104 operating reactors had 

construction permits that were issued prior to the May 21, 1971, the effective date of the GDC 

rule, and that the Commission, through guidance to the NRC staff, has determined that the GDC 

do not need to be applied to these 57 reactors. 

NRC Response to Issue 3: 

The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' suggestion that the 57 plants that received 

construction permits prior to May 21, 1971, are not operating safely with appropriately qualified 

important to safety equipment. In 1992. A§.fter more than 15 years of analysis, the NRC staff 

recommended that the Commission retain current policy that no exemptions from or specific 

backfits for the GDC are required for plants with construction permits issued before that date. In 

its September 18, 1992, Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML003763736), the Commission endorsed the NRC staff's recommendation not to apply the 

GDC to plants with construction permits issued prior to the effective date of the GDC rule 

recommended Option 1 of SECY 92 223, "Resolution of Deviations Identified During the 

Systematic Evaluation Program" (ADAMS Accession No.ML12256B290). This Option 

recommendation was based on the documented results of the NRC staff's evaluations of 

15 
representative designs of 10 of the 57 plants against the design requirements of a 1975 

Standard Review Plan for reactor license applications based on the approved GDC. 

As the petitioners themselves noted in their petition, the SRM sak:i-explained that at the 

time the GDC were promulgated, the Commission had stressed that they were not new 

requirements and were promulgated to articulate more clearly the licensing requirements and 

practice in effect at that time. The Commission stated that while compliance with the intent of 

the GDC is important, each plant licensed before the GDC were formally adopted was evaluated 

on a plant specific basis, determined to be safe, and licensed by the NRC. Furthermore, the 

Commission acknowledged determined that currentexisting regulatory processes ar:ewere 

sufficient to ensure that plants continue to be safe and comply with the intent of the GDC. As 

the petitioners also noted, the Commission went on to say that backfitting these 57 plants to 

meet the GDC would provide little or no safety benefit while requiring an extensive commitment 

of resources. The petitioners have not provided any significant, new, or previously 

unconsidered information to justify a new rulemaking or to reverse this NRC position. 

Ill. Determination of the Petition. 

In accordance with§ 2.803, the NRC is denY,ing PRM-50-106 because: 

applicability of§ 50.49's regulatory requirements for safety-related equipment according to its 

location. This regulation is applicable to electrical equipment located outside containment as 

well as inside. Section 50.49 imposes additional requirements beyond those of§ 50.65, 

10 CFR part 50, appendix A, and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, for important to safety equipment 

subject to design basis accident conditions. Section 50.49 explicitly excludes important to 

safety electrical equipment subject only to mild environments. The petitioners have not 

provided significant and new information sufficient to justify a rulemaking to change this position. 

16 
2) Section 50.49 explicitly excludes important to safety electrical equipment subject only 

to mild environments. The petitioners have not provided significant new information sufficient to 

justify a change to this rule. A rulemaking to require the environmental qualification of all 

electrical equipment exposed only to mild environments is unnecessary because existing NRC 

regulations require sufficient protection of important to safety electrical equipment against 

expected or potential environmental conditions it experiences during its period of service. +fie 

petitioners have not provided any new information or previously unconsidered reasons that 

§ 50.49 should be amended to extend EQ requirements to important to sarety cables and electrical 

equipment e:>Eposed to submergence, condensation, or moisture intrusion in mild environments. The 

maintenance rule (§ 50.65), applicable 10 CFR part 50, appendi:>E A, CDC and 10 CFR part SO, 

appendi:>E B, quality assurance regulations, provide functional requirements through maintenance, 

design, and quality assurance for important to safoty equipment in mild environments both inside 

and outside of the containment building. 

3) With regard to the reactors that received construction permits prior to May 21 , 1971 , 

the Commission determined in response to SECY-92-223 that these plants are operating safely 

with appropriately qualified important to safety equipment, and that no specific backfits of the 

GDC to these plants were required. 

The petitioners have not provided any significant, new, or previously unconsidered 

information justifying a rulemaking to apply the GDC to the 57 reactors that received 

construction permits prior to May 21, 1971 . 

17 
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this __ day of _____ , 2015. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

18 
Paul M. Blanch 

135 Hyde Road 

W. Hartford, CT 06117 

Dear Mr. Blanch: 

I am responding to your submittal of June 18, 2012, by which you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) a petition for rulemaking (PRM) (NRC Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 12177 A377). You asked the 

NRC to amend its regulations related to the environmental qualification of electrical equipment 

in nuclear power plants by changing the following parts of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations ( 10 CFR): 

• 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities" 

• 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants" 

• 10 CFR Part 54, "Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power 

Plants" 

• 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria" 

Specifically, you requested that the NRC revise its regulations "to clearly and unequivocally 

require the environmental qualification of all safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections 

and other ancillary electrical equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture 

intrusion during normal operating conditions, severe weather, seasonal flooding, and seismic 

events, and post-accident conditions, both inside and outside of [a reactor's] containment 

[building]." 

The NRC docketed the petition as PRM-50-106 and published a notice of receipt in the Federal 

Register on September 27, 2012 (77 FR 59345). The notice of receipt did not seek public 

comment on the petition. 

After reviewing your petition, the NRC has determined that the petition has not provided an 

adequate basis upon which the NRG could act to amend theits regulations as requested. The 

agency is, therefore, denying your petition. This letter outlines the reasons for the denial. A 

more detailed discussion of the reasons for denial can be found in the enclosed Federal 

Register notice, which the NRC will submit to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. 

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.49(e)(6), which you referred to in your petition, establishes 

environmental qualification requirements for electrical equipment in non-mild environments 

during accident conditions . Generic Letter 82-09 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031080281 ), which 

you also referenced in your petition, does not limit the applicability of 10 CFR 50.49 based on 

the location of the equipment. In addition, the NRG has other regulations in place that address 

environmental qualification and maintenance of electrical equipment in non mild environments. 
P. Blanch - 2 -

The NRC also has regulations to address the oversight of electrical equipment that is important 

to safety. These regulations include 10 CFR 50.4965, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, and 

Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 (for safety-related equipment). Finally, with regard to the 

reactors that received construction permits prior to May 21, 1971, after more than 15 years of 

careful and well-documented NRC staff review, the Commission determined in 1992 that these 

plants are operating safely with appropriately qualified important-to-safety equipment, and that 

no specific backfits of the General Design Criteria to these plants were required. The submitted 

information in the petition does not warrant support reversal of that determination. The NRC 

considers thehas regulatory programs in place to ensure appropriate oversight of 

environmental qualification, maintenance, and testingoversight of electrical equipment te-be 

ver-y important to the safe operation of nuclear power plants. 

For the reasons discussed above, the NRC considers this petition closed. 

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Margaret Ellenson, Project 

Manager, by calling 301-415-0894 or by e-mailing Margaret.Ellenson@nrc.gov. 

Enclosure: 

Federal Register notice 

Sincerely, 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

Secretary of the Commission 
C. Jordan Weaver 

Natural Resources Defense Council 

1152 15th St NW., Suite 300 

Washington, DC 20005 

Dear Mr. Weaver: 

I am responding to your submittal of June 18, 2012, by which you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) a petition for rulemaking (PRM) (NRC Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 12177 A377). You asked the 

NRC to amend its regulations related to the environmental qualification of electrical equipment 

in nuclear power plants by changing the following parts of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations ( 10 CFR): 

• 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities" 

• 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants" 

• 10 CFR Part 54, "Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power 

Plants" 

• 1 O CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria" 

Specifically, you requested that the NRC revise its regulations "to clearly and unequivocally 

require the environmental qualification of all safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections 

and other ancillary electrical equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture 

intrusion during normal operating conditions, severe weather, seasonal flooding , and seismic 

events, and post-accident conditions, both inside and outside of [a reactor's] containment 

[building]." 

The NRC docketed the petition as PRM-50-106 and published a notice of receipt in the Federal 

Register on September 27, 2012 (77 FR'59345). The notice of receipt did not seek public 

comment on the petition. 

After reviewing your petition, the NRC has determined that the petition has not provided an 

adequate basis upon which the NRG could act to amend thefts regulations as requested. The 

agency is, therefore, denying your petition. This letter outlines the reasons for the denial. A 

more detailed discussion of the reasons for denial can be found in the enclosed Federal 

Register notice, which the NRC will submit to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. 
C. Weaver - 2 -

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.49(e)(6), which you referred to in your petition, establishes 

environmental qualification requirements for electrical equipment in non-mild environments 

during accident conditions. Generic Letter 82-09 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031080281 ), which 

you also referenced in your petition, does not limit the applicability of 1 O CFR 50.49 based on 

the location of the equipment. In addition, the NRG has other regulations in place that address 

environmental qualification and maintenance of electrical equipment in non mild environments. 

The NRC also has regulations to address the oversight of electrical equipment that is important 

to safety. These regulations include 10 CFR 50.4965, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, and 

Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 (for safety-related equipment). Finally, with regard to the 

reactors that received construction permits prior to May 21, 1971, after more than 15 years of 

careful and well-documented NRC staff review, the Commission determined in 1992 that these 

plants are operating safely with appropriately qualified important-to-safety equipment, and that 

no specific backfits of the General Design Criteria to these plants were required. The submitted 

information in the petition does not \.varrant support reversal of that determination. The NRC 

considers thehas regulatory programs in place to ensure appropriate oversight of environmental 

qualification, maintenance, and oversight testing of electrical equipment to be very important to 

the safe operation of nuclear power plants. 

For the reasons discussed above, the NRC considers this petition closed. 

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Margaret Ellenson, project 

manager, by calling 301-415-0894 or by e-mailing Margaret.Ellenson@nrc.gov. 

Enclosure: 

Federal Register notice 

Sincerely, 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

Secretary of the Commission 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

Commissioner Ostendorff 

SECY-15-0098: Denial of Petition for Rulemaking 

Related to Environmental Qualification of Electrical 

Equipment (PRM-50-106) 

Approved x Disapproved Abstain Not Participating 

COMMENTS: Below Attached None x 

Entered in STARS 

Yes x 

--

No 

Sign~ 

Date 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

Commissioner Baran 

SECY-15-0098: Denial of Petition for Rulemaking 

Related to Environmental Qualification of Electrical 

Equipment (PRM-50-106) 

Approved XX Disapproved Abstain Not Participating - - --

COMMENTS: Below XX Attached XX None 

I approve the staff's recommendation denying the petition for rulemaking and publishing 

the Federal Register notice and letters to the petitioners, subject to the attached edits. 

Entered in STARS 

Yes X 

No Date 
JMB Edits 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

10 CFR PARTS 50, 52, 54, AND 100 

[Docket Nos. PRM-50-106; NRC-2012-0177) 

Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial. 

[7590-01-P] 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a petition for 

rulemaking (PRM) submitted by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) and 

Mr. Paul M. Blanch (collectively, the petitioners) on June 18, 2012. The petitioners requested 

the NRC amend its regulations to clearly and unequivocally require the environmental 

qualification of all safety-related cables , wires, splices , connections and other ancillary electrical 

equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture intrusion during normal 

operating conditions, severe weather, seasonal flooding, and seismic events, and post-accident 

conditions , both inside and outside of a reactor's containment building. The NRC is denying this 

petition because the current regulations already address environmental qualification in both mild 

and design basis accident event conditions of electrical equipment located both inside and 

outside of the containment building that is important to safety, and the petition does not provide 

significant new or previously unconsidered information sufficient to justify rulemaking. 
location. Generic letters do not have the legal authority of a final rule promulgated after due 

public notice and comment, as was-§ 50.49 was. The Q&A in GL 82-09 does not exempt any 

safety-related equipment that could be submerged , inside or outside containment, from the 

environmental qualifications (EQ) requirements of§ 50.49. The purpose of the GL 82-09 Q&A 

cited by the petitioners was simply to clarify that under§ 50.49, licensees must submit 

information on the EQ of important to safety equipment that could be submerged due to a high 

energy line break outside containment. The applicability of§ 50.49 is not limited to a HELB, 

although after more than 30 years of operating experience and risk analysis , a HELB remains 

the most probable DBE involving submergence outside containment that meets the § 50.49 

criteria for the subset of DBEs that could result in a severe accident. The clarifying Q&A was 

important because the GL was providing information in the event of a HELB, not describing the 

entire universe of postulated design basis .aeGiGeAtsDBEs to which § 50.49 could apply. 

Issue 2: Safety-related cable subject to submergence, condensation, or moisture 

located in a "mild environment" should not be exempted from the environmental qualification 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. 

The petitioners argued that rulemaking is necessary to ensure that electrical cables and 

wires will be properly qualified for environmental conditions they may experience during normal 

operation (i.e., a mild environment) as well as in an accident. The petitioners claimed the need 

for rulemaking and clarification of§ 50.49 to address cables that may be exposed to non-mild 

environments during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The petitioners noted that 

electrical cables and wires "are prone to accelerated failure rates when submerged in water or 

exposed to high humidity unless designed and qualified for these environmental conditions ." 

The petitioners stated that the NRC prioritized the inspection of cable penetrations after the 

7 
January 21 , 1983) was to codify accepted industry standards and NRC guidance for the EQ of 

safety-related electrical equipment, and non-safety-related equipment relied on by safetyrelated equipment, that must perform a safety function under design basis accidentDBE 

conditions. 

The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that§ 50.49 should be amended to 

extend EQ requirements to important to safety cables and electrical equipment exposed to 

submergence or moisture intrusion in mild environments. The existing rule specifically exempts 

from these requirements equipment exposed only to a "mild environment," aflG-.as.which is 

defined in§ 50.49(c),a mild environment--i-s-..£§._an environment t~at would at no time be 

significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal plant operation, 

wAiffi--includi.!Jges anticipated operational occurrences. 

All important to safety equipment whether in mild or non-mild environments are subject 

to the maintenance and quality assurance requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of 

maintenance under the maintenance rule(§~ 50.65L and 10 GFR part 50, 

appendix B. In additionFurthermore, all important to safety equipment at plants with 

construction permits GeyooG-issued after May 21 , 1971 , are also subject to the design and 

TM1l!Y..requirements in 10 GFR part 50, appendix A Furthermore In addition to the above 

requirements, all safety relatedsafety-related equipment afeis also subject to the quality 

assurance criteria requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B. Therefore, important to safety 

and safety related equipment in mild environments exposed to submergence, condensation, 

and moisture intrusion, the kind of degradation of concern to the petitioners, afe!§ subject to the 

several existing requirements~ set forth in the maintenance rule (§ 50.65)_; and GOG (10 GFR 

part 50, appendix ,A) for equipment important to safety and the quality assurance criteria 

requirements (1 O GFR part 50, appendix B) for safety relatoo-eqyWment ; and the GOG 

(10 GFR part 50, appendix/\). For important to safety equipment that could be subject to 

9 
environmental conditions that may result as a consequence of a design basis accident 

evemDBE, § 50.49 establishes additional requirements beyond those discussed above. 

stipulated in § 50.65; 10 CfR part 50, appendix/\; and 10 CfR part 50, appendix B. 

The maintenance rule(§ 50.65) establishes requirements for monitoring the 

effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants. Under§ 50.65(a)(1 ). licenses are 

required to monitor the condition or performance of structures. I - -- -- - ---- - - - - - - - --1 Commented [rgk1]: Start new paragraph with prior J sentence "The maintenance rule .: and delete space __ _ 

systems , or components (SSCs) in a manner providing reasonable assurance that the 

intended SSC functions can be fulfilled . Section 50.65(b) describes the types of SSCs subject 

to its requirements . The maintenance rule (§ 50.65) applies to safety and non-safety SSCs that 

includes the following: SSCs used in the plant's emergency operating procedures or relied 

upon to mitigate accidents or transient unsafe conditions; SSCs whose failure could prevent 

safety-related SSCs from fulfilling their safety-related function; or SSCs whose failure could 

cause a reactor scram (unplanned action to stop the fission reaction) or the actuation of a 

safety-related system . With this encompassing scope, the maintenance rule(§ 50.65) already 

covers the equipment specified in the petition (i.e., all safety-related cables , wires , splices , 

connections , and other ancillary electrical equipment that may be subjected to submergence 

and/or moisture intrusion). Section 50.65 covers this equipment under any normal or unusual 

operating or post-accident conditions, whether these conditions include severe weather, 

seasonal flooding , or seismic events, or whether the SSCs are inside or outside of containment. 

The rule also covers the petitioners' specified systems and components whether or not they are 

exposed to submergence in water, condensation, wetting, and other environmental stresses 

during routine operation and infrequent events (e.g., flooding). 

In its April 2012 Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.218, "Condition-Monitoring Techniques for 

Electric Cables Used In Nuclear Power Plants" (ADAMS Accession No. ML 103510447), the 

NRC described a programmatic approach and acceptable techniques for monitoring the 

10 
condition of electric cable systems and their operating environments. As authority for this 

guidance, RG 1.218 cited 10 CFR part 50, Criterion XI , "Test Control ," of appendix B. 

Criterion XI specifies that power reactor licensees must have a program to assure that all testing 

required to show that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed. 

The test program must include, as appropriate, operational tests of SSCs during 

nuclear power plant operation. Test procedures must include provisions for assuring that all 

prerequisites for the given test have been met, that adequate test instrumentation is available 

and used, and that the test is performed under suitable environmental conditions . Test results 

under Criterion XI must also be "documented and evaluated" to ensure that this Criterion's 

requirements have been satisfied . ~Gditt@4ter i~p@rtel9t t@ se~e!)· G~~l~s ~~9 aje~ ____ - i_ Commented [rgk2] : Move sentence to end of paragraph. 

It is important to note that Criterion XI is only one of 18 criteria that are applicable to 

a quality assurance program for the electrical equipment at issue in this petition. Appendix B 

criteria establish quality assurance requirements for the design, manufacture, construction, and 

operation of all ~nt to safetysafety-related equipment, and all activities affecting its 

functions, including not only testing, but designing, purchasing , fabricating , handling, shipping, 

storing, cleaning, installing, inspecting, operating, maintaining, repairing , and modifying this 

equipment. Criterion XVI , "Corrective Action," also requires licensees to have measures 

assuring that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected . Examples of 

such conditions are the following : failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective 

material and equipment, and nonconformances. For significant conditions adverse to quality, 

including the potential failure of electrical equipment to function as designed, licensees must 

determine the cause of the condition and "assure" that corrective action is taken to preclude a 

11 
repetition of the adverse condition. The identified condition, its cause, and the corrective action 

taken to prevent its recurrence must also be documented and the appropriate levels of 

management informed. In additi_on fotillJ..R2IjaOl to safety cable§ and electric.al equipment 

!Qcated in an are~ogJhe definition of a milcL.eOY.iLQDJ1l8~Q.49 10 CFR part 50 

iWMndix A GDC 4. refil!ires t~at this equipment be designe_d to ma11a e the conditions it will 

The NRC does not agree that its existing regulations do not require sufficient protection 

of important to safety electrical equipment against expected or potential environmental 

conditions it experiences during its period of service. Regardless of whether a cable, switch, or 

other piece of electrical equipment must be environmentally qualified under§ 50.49, it must 

meet maintenance, design, and quality assurance requirements established by§ 50.65; 

10 CFR part 50, appendix A; and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B (for safety-related equipment), to 

provide adequate protection for public health and safety. And regardless of whether the 

equipment is environmentally qualified, it is subject to the same degree of NRC oversight in the 

form of inspections and enforcement. A rulemaking to require the environmental qualification of 

all electrical equipment exposed only to mild environments is, therefore, unnecessary. 

Moreover, the 1996 DOE study and three EPRI studies cited by the petitioners are well 

known to the NRC and do not constitute significant new information justifying a rulemaking. The 

NRC recognized the concern regarding the reliability of low-voltage power cable systems at 

reactors that the petitioner references and acted accordingly. Among other things , the NRC has 

revised its inspection procedures to ensure annual inspections of underground bunkers and 

manholes in a continuing repeated cycle beginning with those containing the most 

risk-significant cables . The NRC also issued RG 1.218, describing a programmatic approach 

and acceptable techniques for monitoring the condition of electric cable systems and their 

operating environments. Furthermore, the ~JRC also performs research focused on potential 

12 
cable degradation in Sl:lbmerged environments. The goal of this research is to fl:lrther enhance 

tfie NRC's 1:Jnderstanding of the extent to wt:OOh, if at all, cables are Sl:Jsceptible to degradation 

when in a s1:Jbmerged environment. 

The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' contention that the NRC's requirements do not 

provide conditions or acceptance criteria for degraded cables . Any requirement for 

safety-related systems to remain functional for a specified operating life is a design requirement, 

and any failure of the equipment before the end of that operating life would be a violation of tfie 

that design requirement. Therefore, taken together, GDC 2, 4, and 18 in appendix A of ~ 

part 50 (for plants that received construction permits after May 21 , 1971 ), appendix A, the 

maintenance requirements under§ 50.65, and the quality assurance testing requirements in 

Criterion XI of appendix B of .+Q...GF.R-part 50, appendix B, Criterion XI , effectively provide an 

enforceable acceptance criterion for the continued use of cables or any other electrical 

equipment degrading during normal operation. Criterion XI states that the measured rate of 

degradation must not impair the equipment's ability to function in an emergency, even if the 

emergency were to occur on the last day of the performance period specified in the equipment's 

design requirement. 

Guidance for the implementation of this criterion is fl:lrther articl:Jlatedprovided in the 

same-August 25, 2009, NRC staff regulatory resolution issue protocol, "Cable Performance 

Issues at Nuclear Power Plants" (ADAMS Accession No. ML092220419L the petitioners cited 

as docl:Jmentation of the NRC's reql:Jirements on cable and wire Sl:lbmergence issl:Jes. The NRC 

staff position in that protocol is: (1) licensees should monitor cables within the scope of the 

maintenance rule (§ 50.65) at an appropriate frequency to demonstrate that they can perform 

their design functions when called upon; and (2) cables must be designed to fulfill their intended 

design function in the environment to which they are subject. Under the protocol. lif cables have 

been exposed to conditions for which they are not designed or qualified, the protocol says, the 

13 
licensee must demonstrate, through adequate testing or condition monitoring, that the cables 

can perform their intended design function for the duration of the qualified period specified in the 

license. 

The NRC also inspects underground cables through established inspection procedures. 

In particular, Inspection Procedure (IP) Attachment 71111 .06, "Flood Protection Measures" 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML 11244A012), specifically directs NRC inspectors to perform an 

annual review of cables located in underground bunkersl...ill_manholes. The IP Attachment alw 

directs inspectors to select bunkers/ ...ill_ manholes subject to flooding that contain multiple train 

or multiple risk-significant cables , and inspect those that contain more risk-significant cables 

before inspecting those with less risk-significant cables. The IP notes that inspectors should 

rotate through the bunkers! ...ill_ manholes until all are inspected; and then the cycle should be 

recommenced . The IP Attachment also clarifies that these inspections may be in addition to 

those for the aging management programs of plants with renewed licenses. Where "significant 

moisture" is identified at such plants, inspectors are to verify that the licensee takes action to 

keep the cables dry and assess cable degradation in accordance with the licensee's aging 

management program !for 1naccossiblo J:lOWor cables . 

Issue 3: Although GDC 2 and 4 of the NRC's regulations require that cables be able to 

perform their design function when subjected to anticipated environmental conditions , the NRC 

does not apply these and other GDC to the 57 plants with construction permits issued before 

May 21 , 1971 , the effective date of the GDC rule (36 FR 3256; February 20, 1971 ). 

Citing the August 25, 2009, NRC staff regulatory issue resolution protocol, "Cable 

Performance Issues at Nuclear Power Plants," the petitioners asserted that this statement 

defined the NRC's governing regulations on submerged cable performance as explicitly 

including GDC 2 and GDC 4. The GDC 2 requires reactor SSCs that are important to safety be 

14 

Commented [DC3]: This 1s the current program but the 

scope may change and the edit 1s consistent with the above 

sentence 
designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform 

their safety functions. The GDC 4 requires that these SSCs be designed to accommodate the 

effects of and be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal 

operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents. 

The petition stated that although these GDC may contain appropriate regulatory 

requirements for the qualification of electrical cables and wires , the NRG has determined that 

these requirements are not to be applied to the majority of reactors . The petitioners noted that, 

at the·time the petition was submitted, at least 57 of the nation's 104 operating reactors had 

construction permits that were issued prior to the May 21 , 1971 , the effective date of the GDC 

rule, and that the Commission, through guidance to the NRG staff, has determined that the GDC 

do not need to be applied to these 57 reactors. 

NRC Response to Issue 3: 

The NRG disagrees with the petitioners' suggestion that the 57 plants that received 

construction permits prior to May 21 , 1971 , are not operating safely with appropriately qualified 

important to safety equipment. In 1992, fter more than 15 years of analysis, the NRG staff 

recommended that the Commission retain the current policy that no exemptions from or specific 

backfits for the GDC are required for plants with construction permits issued before that date. In 

its September 18, 1992, Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML003763736), the Commission endorsed the NRG staff's recommendation to not apply the 

GDC to plants with construction permits issued prior to the effective date of the GDC rule.ea 

Option 1 of SECY 92 22J, "Resolution of Deviations Identified During the Systematio Evaluation 

Pfegram" (ADAMS l\coession t'>Jo.ML122568290). This Option was based on the dooumented 

results of the NRG staffs evaluatioAS-Bf.fef)resentative designs of 1 O of the 57 plan~&t 

15 
the design requirements of a 1975 Standard Review Plan for reactor license applications eased 

on the approved GDC. 

As the petitioners themselves noted in their petition, ti he SRM saHiexplained that at the +- - - { Formatted: Indent: First line: 0.5" 

time the GDC were promulgated, the Commission had stressed that they were not new 

requirements and were promulgated to articulate more clearly the licensing requirements and 

practice in effect at that time. The Commission stated that while compliance with the intent of 

the GDC is important, each plant licensed before the GDC were formally adopted was evaluated 

on a plant specific basis, determined to be safe, and licensed by the NRC. Furthermore, the 

Commission acknowledged determined that GHfffiAt existing regulatory processes arewere 

sufficient to ensure tha"t plants continue to be safe and comply with the intent of the GDC. 

Finally. the Commission determined that these plants are operating safely with appropriately 

qualified important to safety equipment and that no specific backfits of the GDC to these plants 

were required As the petitioners also noted, the Commission went on to say that 13ackfitting 

these 57 plants to meet the GDC would provide little or no safety 13enefit while requiring an 

extensive commitment of resources . The petitioners have not provided any significant, new, or 

previously unconsidered information to justify a new rulemaking or to reverse this NRC position. 

Ill. Determination of the Petition. 

In accordance with§ 2.803, the NRC is denying PRM-50-106 because: 

1) The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that GL 82-09 has restricted the 

applicability of§ 50.49's regulatory requirements for safety-related equipment according to its 

location. This regulation is applicable to electrical equipment located outside containment as 

well as inside.Section 50.49 imposes additional requirements 13eyond those of§ 50.65 , 

10 CfR part 50, appendix A, and 1 O CfR part 50, appem:lix B (for safety related equipment), for 

16 

) 
important to safety ecil:lipment Sl:l9ject to design basis accident~ conditions . ~.+oR §(HQ 

e*f)lieitl) sHGl1;1aes irn13si=ter=1t ts sefsty sleetrieel e~1;1i13rneir21t swl&jeGt sr=1ly ts rnila eFP'irnr;irner;its . 

TAQ-~krners fl~-fl@t 13rsvi~~oo-t'900-fle"' ir=1f~rrnatis~~i€ier=1t t@ jwstify a 

~~. 

2) Segtipn 50.49 e~licitly excludes ir:nportant to satet~lectrical equipm~nt subject m 

toJI!ild environment_s_,___lb_e §!JL[QD~~s ha~41Ql..Pr9\'[d~~j_g,nificant ar:id new informat[on 

syfficL~nU,Q_j~st~ chanqe to this ruleuJleruq,l<l£1gJ_o cba ggQ;:~~'-A rulemaking to 

require the environmental qualification of all electrical equipment exposed only to mild 

environments is unnecessary because existing NRC regulations require sufficient protection of 

important to safety electrical equipment against expected or potential environmental conditions 

it experiences during its period of service. The petitioneFs have not prnvided any new 

information or previo1:Jsly unconsidered reasons that§ 50.49 should be amended to extend EO 

reciuirements to important to safety cables and electrical equipment exposed to submeFgence, 

condensation , or moisturn intFusion in mild en·1irnnments. The maintenance Fule (§ 50.65), 

applicable 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, GOG and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, quality 

assurance regulations (for safety related egl:lipment), provide functional reciuirements throl:lgh 

maintenance, design, and quality assurance for important to safety equipment in mild 

envirnnments both inside and outside of the containment building. 

3) With regard to the reactors that received construction permits prior to May 21 , 1971 , 

the Commission determined in response to SECY-92-223 that these plants are operating safely 

with appropriately qualified important to safety equipment, and that no specific backfits of the 

GDC to these plants were required. 

_he p~titioners have n9t ~rg'{jded any significant, ne~ . or previous!y unconsidered 

information justifying a rulemaking to apply the GDC to the 57 reactors that received 

construction permits prior to May 21 , 1971 . 

17 

- Commented [rgk4]: Move up into Section 3) discussion 
JMB Edits 

Paul M. Blanch 

135 Hyde Road 

W. Hartford, CT 06117 

Dear Mr. Blanch: 

I am responding to your submittal of June 18, 2012, by which you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) a petition for rulemaking (PRM) (NRC Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 12177A377). You asked the 

NRC to amend its regulations related to the environmental qualification of electrical equipment 

in nuclear power plants by changing the following parts of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR): 

10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities" 

10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications , and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants" 

10 CFR Part 54, "Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power 

Plants" 

10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria" 

Specifically, you requested the NRC revise its regulations "to clearly and unequivocally require 

the environmental qualification of all safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections and other 

ancillary electrical equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture intrusion 

during normal operating conditions, severe weather, seasonal flooding , and seismic events, and 

post-accident conditions , both inside and outside of [a reactor's] containment [building] ." 

The NRC docketed the petition as PRM-50-106 and published a notice of receipt in the Federal 

Register on September 27, 2012 (77 FR 59345). The notice of receipt did not seek public 

comment on the petition. 

After reviewing your petition, the NRC has determined that the petition has not provided an 

adequate basis upon which the NRG om:1ld aot to amend its regulations as requested. The 

agency is, therefore, denying your petition. This letter outlines the reasons for the denial. A 

more detailed discussion of the reasons for denial can be found in the enclosed Federal 

Register notice, which the NRC will submit to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. 

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.49(e)(6), which you referred to in your petition, establishes 

environmental qualification requirements for electrical equipment in non-mild environments 

during accident conditions. Generic Letter 82-09 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031080281 ), which 

you also referenced in your petition, does not limit the applicability of 1 O CFR 50.49 based on 

the location of the equipment. In addition, the NRG has other regulations in plaoe that address 

~alifioation and maintenanoe of eleotrical equipment in non mild environments. 

The NRC also has regulations to address the oversight of electrical equipment that is important 
P. Blanch - 2 -

to safety. These regulations include 10 CFR 50.4965 , Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, and 

Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 (for safety-related equipment). Finally, with regard to the 

reactors that received construction permits prior to May 21 , 1971 , after more than 15 years of 

careful and well-documented NRC staff review, the Commission determined in 1992 that these 

plants are operating safely with appropriately qualified mportant to safety e_g~if?'!l~~t.. ~n_sj Jl:i_aJ __ - -1 Commented [rgkl]: Term is not hyphenated in the 

no specific backfits of the General Design Criteria to these plants were required . The submitted Lregulation.:__ 

information in the petition does not waffaffi-.support reversal of that determination. However, 

+!he NRC considers the environmental qualification, maintenance, and oversight of electrical 

equipment to be very important to the safe operation of nuclear power plants. 

For the reasons discussed above, the NRC considers this petition closed. 

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Margaret Ellenson, Project 

Manager, by calling 301-415-0894 or by e-mailing Marqaret.Ellenson@nrc.gov. 

Enclosure: 

Federal Register notice 

Sincerely, 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

Secretary of the Commission 

_] 
C. Jordan Weaver 

Natural Resources Defense Council 

1152 15th St NW., Suite 300 

Washington, DC 20005 

Dear Mr. Weaver: 

I am responding to your submittal of June 18, 2012, by which you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) a petition for rulemaking (PRM) (NRC Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 12177A377). You asked the 

NRC to amend its regulations related to the environmental qualification of electrical equipment 

in nuclear power plants by changing the following parts of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR): 

1 O CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities" 

1 O CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants" 

10 CFR Part 54, "Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power 

Plants" 

1 O CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria" 

Specifically, you requested the NRC revise its regulations "to clearly and unequivocally require 

the environmental qualification of all safety-related cables, wires , splices, connections and other 

ancillary electrical equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture intrusion 

during normal operating conditions, severe weather, seasonal flooding, and seismic events, and 

post-accident conditions, both inside and outside of [a reactor's] containment [building]." 

The NRC docketed the petition as PRM-50-106 and published a notice of receipt in the Federal 

Register on September 27, 2012 (77 FR 59345). The notice of receipt did not seek public 

comment on the petition. 

After reviewing your petition, the NRC has determined that the petition has not provided an 

adequate basis upon which the NRG could act to amend its regulations as requested. The 

agency is, therefore, denying your petition. This letter outlines the reasons for the denial. A 

more detailed discussion of the reasons for denial can be found in the enclosed Federal 

Register notice, which the NRC will submit to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. 
C. Weaver - 2 -

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.49(e)(6), which you referred to in your petition, establishes 

environmental qualification requirements for electrical equipment in non-mild environments 

during accident conditions. Generic Letter 82-09 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031080281 ), which 

you also referenced in your petition, does not limit the applicability of 10 CFR 50.49 based on 

the location of the equipment In addition, the NRG has other re9ulations in 13lace that address 

environmental qualification and maintenance of electrical equi13ment in non mild environments. 

The NRC also has regulations to address the oversight of electrical equipment that is important 

to safety. These regulations include 10 CFR 50.49, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, and 

Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 (for safety-related equipment). Finally, with regard to the 

reactors that received construction permits prior to May 21 , 1971 , after more than 15 years of 

careful and well-documented NRC staff review, the Commission determined in 1992 that these 

plants are operating safely with appropriately qualified mportant to safet~ equipment!_ ~n_sj _t~a_t 

no specific backfits of the General Design Criteria to these plants were required . The submitted 

information in the petition does not waffaflt-fil!Q.QQ.!1_reversal of that determination. However, 

+1he NRC considers the environmental qualification, maintenance, and oversight of electrical 

equipment to be very important to the safe operation of nuclear power plants. 

For the reasons discussed above, the NRC considers this petition closed. 

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Margaret Ellenson, project 

manager, by calling 301-415-0894 or by e-mailing Margaret.Ellenson@nrc.gov. 

Enclosure: 

Federal Register notice 

Sincerely, 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

Secretary of the Commission 

_ - {Comment~[rgk2] : Term is not hyphenated ;;;-the 

regulation 

l