J-S10009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ROBERT FELTS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2090 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0901423-2001

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED JUNE 6, 2023

Robert Felts appeals from the order dismissing his fourth petition for 

relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On June 16, 2001, Felts and Zachary Alston entered the residence of 

Charles Jackson, where Jackson’s brother, Robert Lee Jackson (“Robert”), and 

Robert’s fiancée, Mary Francois Jackson (“Mary”), were guests. Felts and 

Alston demanded to know where “it” was, but none of the victims knew what 

“it” was. The perpetrators eventually brought the three victims to the 

basement, where a scuffle ensued, and Jackson was shot and killed and Felts

was shot in the left leg. Felts and Alston escaped from the house. Marcus 

Gibson, who was waiting in a vehicle outside the residence, drove Felts to the 

hospital following the shooting. Subsequently, at the hospital, Robert 
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identified Felts as one of the culprits. Thereafter, Detectives Richard Harris 

and George Pirrone interviewed Felts, who gave an inculpatory statement to 

police, admitting that he participated in the robbery, but did not shoot the 

victim. Felts also identified Alston and Gibson as the other individuals involved

in the incident. The police arrested Felts and the Commonwealth charged him

with numerous crimes.

The matter proceeded to a jury trial in 2003. Robert identified Felts as 

one of the perpetrators, and Gibson testified that Felts was one of the coconspirators. Further, Felts’s counsel conceded that Felts was inside the home 

and urged a finding that Felts committed third-degree murder, rather than 

first-degree murder. The jury found Felts guilty of first-degree murder, three 

counts of robbery, burglary, conspiracy, a violation of the Uniform Firearms 

Act, possession of an instrument of crime, and two counts of recklessly 

endangering another person. The trial court sentenced Felts to an aggregate 

sentence of life imprisonment. This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence, 

and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Felts, 855 A.2d 130 (Pa. Super. 2004) (unpublished 

memorandum), appeal denied, Commonwealth v. Felts, 860 A.2d 121 (Pa. 

2004). 

Felts filed three prior PCRA petitions, all of which were denied or 

dismissed. This Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Felts, 175 A.3d 379

(Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 182 A.3d 439 
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(Pa. 2018); Commonwealth v. Felts, 60 A.3d 572 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Felts, 965 A.2d 293 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 973 A.2d 1005 (Pa. 

2009).

On May 16, 2018, Felts filed, pro se, the instant PCRA petition, followed 

by a supplemental petition. The PCRA court appointed Felts counsel, who filed 

an amended petition, as well as supplemental petitions. Felts’s petition is 

premised upon newly-discovered evidence of previously undisclosed pattern 

and practice of misconduct by Philadelphia Police Department detectives, 

which Felts claims established that the detectives in this case used 

unconstitutional methods in obtaining his confession and victim statements.

The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice. Thereafter, the PCRA court 

dismissed the petition without a hearing. This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Felts raises the following question for our review:

Did the PCRA [c]ourt err in finding, without a hearing, that 

[Felts’s] claim that the Commonwealth failed to disclose evidence 

that Det[ective Jeffrey] Piree had a history of misconduct and 

evidence of an unconstitutional interrogation pattern and practice 

utilized by homicide detectives in [Felts’s] case was not timely 

filed and/or otherwise lacked merit? 

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

This Court’s standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s dismissal of a 

PCRA petition is whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the 

evidence of record and is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 

23 A.3d 1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011). Further, there is no absolute right to 
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a PCRA hearing, and we review dismissal “to determine whether the PCRA 

court erred in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact 

and in denying relief without an evidentiary hearing.” Commonwealth v. 

Burton, 121 A.3d 1063, 1067 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (citation omitted).

Under the PCRA, any PCRA petition “shall be filed within one year of the 

date the judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 

A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, 

including discretionary review in ... the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at 

the expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s 

timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not 

address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely 

filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

Here, Felts’s judgment of sentence became final on December 16, 2004, 

after the time to seek review with the United States Supreme Court expired. 

See Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 995 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Accordingly, Felts had until December 16, 2005, to file a timely PCRA petition. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Hence, Felts’s fourth PCRA petition, filed on 

May 16, 2018, was untimely under the PCRA.

However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition 

where the petitioner can explicitly plead and prove one of three exceptions: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution 
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or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws 

of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court 

to apply retroactively.

Id.

Here, Felts invokes the newly-discovered facts exception, which 

requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts 

upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those 

facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence 

demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his 

own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have 

learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. 

This rule is strictly enforced. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations 

omitted). Due diligence does not require “perfect vigilance nor punctilious 

care, but rather it requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner, based on the 

particular circumstances, to uncover facts that may support a claim for 

collateral relief.” Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 170 A.3d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. 

2017) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 

618, 638 (Pa. 2017) (holding “the presumption that information which is of 

public record cannot be deemed ‘unknown’ for purposes of subsection 

9545(b)(1)(ii) does not apply to pro se prisoner petitioners.”) (emphasis in 

original)). Moreover, courts must analyze the nature of the underlying claim
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for the limited purpose of determining whether the newly-discovered facts 

alleged are based on information that is relevant to that claim. See

Commonwealth v. Shannon, 184 A.3d 1010, 1017 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(noting that while “we need not find a ‘direct connection’ between the newlydiscovered facts and the claims asserted by a petitioner, the statutory 

language requires there be some relationship between the two”).

Felts argues that newly-discovered facts of an undisclosed pattern and 

practice of misconduct by homicide detectives who investigated his case

violated his right to due process and a fair trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 9, 32.

Felts contends that police misconduct has usually been kept secret and is not 

available to the public; however, in April 2018, his wife learned about the “Do 

Not Call” list.

1 See Appellant’s Brief at 13, 17-18. Felts claims that once he 

was aware of the list, he investigated misconduct committed by the detectives

involved in his case, and, therefore, he exercised due diligence in filing the 

PCRA petition. See id. at 13-14, 18-21. Citing to Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S., 83 (1963), Felts asserts the Commonwealth failed to timely disclose that 

a number of detectives regularly participated in a specific pattern of 

misconduct, including targeting the vulnerable, threatening witnesses and 

____________________________________________

1 Specifically, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office compiled the “Do Not 

Call” list, which listed police officers whom the district attorney’s office tried 

to keep off the witness stand because of a wide range of wrongdoing, including 

lying and racial bias. See https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/29-

problem-cops-named-in-philadelphia-district-attorneys-do-not-calllist/203166/ (last visited May 4, 2023).
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suspects, physical abuse, manipulation, and fabrication of evidence. See id.

at 15-16, 18, 21-22.

Felts highlights that Detective Piree, who took Robert’s statement, has 

a history of misconduct, specifically for playing part in maliciously prosecuting 

three innocent individuals. See id. at 21-27, 29-30. Felts baldly complains 

that the other detectives in this case followed this improper pattern and 

practice of misconduct, which tainted the entire investigation and prosecution. 

See id. at 27. To that end, Felts argues that Detectives Harris and Pirrone

coerced his inculpatory statement at the hospital and forced him to sign the 

statement. See id. at 27-28. Felts notes that although the trial court denied 

his motion to suppress, it raised a concern about the voluntariness of his 

inculpatory statements because the detectives took the statement in the 

hospital. See id. at 33-34. Further, Felts maintains that Gibson’s statement 

to detectives was not written verbatim and omitted information, and 

detectives wrote Mary’s statement and she signed it without reading it. See 

id. at 28-31. 

Felts asserts that this evidence was material and would have resulted in 

a different result had it been disclosed prior to the jury trial, as it would have 

undercut his confession as well as the witnesses’ testimony. See id. at 32, 

34, 35; see also id. at 32-33 (claiming that he would have called all the 

detectives who worked on the case as witnesses at trial to establish their 
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practice of coercing confessions and statements). Felts seeks an evidentiary 

hearing or the vacating of his convictions. See id. at 36.

Here, Felts does not meet the newly-discovered fact exception, because 

he did not adequately demonstrate any connection between the alleged newlydiscovered facts of Detective Piree’s actions in other cases and the underlying 

substantive issues raised in this case. See Shannon, 184 A.3d at 1017 

(noting that while a direct connection is not needed, the appellant must show 

“some relationship” between his underlying claim and the newly-discovered 

fact). In this case, Detective Piree was only minimally involved in this case, 

as he did not testify at trial and merely took Robert’s statement identifying 

Felts as one of the perpetrators. See N.T., 5/25/22 at 4 (wherein the trial 

court notes that “the only tangible evidence of said misconduct relates to 

officers that were only minimally involved in this case, if at all, and who did 

not testify at trial.”). Felts does not cite to any place in the record where 

Robert indicated that Detective Piree forced him to identify Felts as one of the 

perpetrators or sign his statement. In any event, Robert testified at trial and 

explicitly stated that when he saw Felts at the hospital, he “knew he was the 

one.” N.T., 1/30/03, at 136; see also id. at 99-100 (wherein Robert stated 

he made a positive identification of Felts as one of the perpetrators).

Therefore, Felts fails to properly invoke the newly-discovered facts exception, 

as he does not explain how Detective Piree’s conduct in other cases was 

relevant to his case. See Shannon, 184 A.3d at 1017.
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Furthermore, Felts does not make even a tenuous connection between 

Detective Piree’s misconduct in other cases and the other detectives who 

worked on this case or establish that any alleged misconduct by the other 

detectives affected his 2003 trial. In effect, as the PCRA court found, Felts is 

merely attempting to relitigate his motion to suppress his inculpatory 

statement. See N.T., 5/25/22, at 4. Here, Felts fails to argue or demonstrate 

that Detectives Harris and Pirrone, who took his inculpatory statement, were 

identified in the “Do Not Call” list or had committed other misconduct. 

Significantly, not only did Felts admit to entering the home armed with a 

handgun and identify Alston and Gibson as the other individuals involved in 

the conspiracy, but his trial counsel also conceded that he was in the house 

during the murder at trial. See N.T. 1/31/03, at 156-65; see also N.T., 

2/3/03, at 39 (wherein Felts’s trial counsel stated that Felts never denied that 

he was in the house at the time the murder occurred). Moreover, Detective 

Harris further testified that Felts confessed to his participation in the murder 

without any urging by the detectives. See N.T., 1/31/03, at 178.

Likewise, Felts fails to establish that Detectives Harris and Griffin, who 

took statements from Gibson and Mary, had committed misconduct. Although 

Gibson explicitly testified that the detectives failed to include in his statement 

that he and Felts were planning to buy birthday presents for his daughter on 

the day in question, see id. at 40-41, he indicated that nothing else was 

missing from the statement and he explicitly identified Felts as one of the 
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conspirators. See id. at 41-52, 55-56. Moreover, Mary also testified at trial, 

but could not provide an identification of Felts. See N.T., 1/30/03, at 162-63. 

Mary further indicated that she did not read her statement before signing it, 

see id. at 181-83, but she never testified that the detectives fabricated any 

part of her statement. Accordingly, Felts’s speculative argument does not 

invoke the newly-discovered facts exception, as he fails to establish that the 

other detectives engaged in misconduct, let alone did so in his case. See 

Shannon, 184 A.3d at 1017.

In light of the foregoing, Felts filed an untimely PCRA petition and did 

not properly invoke the newly-discovered facts timeliness exception. 

Consequently, because there are no issues of material fact, the PCRA court 

properly dismissed Felts’s fourth PCRA petition without a hearing. See 

Burton, 121 A.3d at 1067.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/6/2023