Environm

ental 

North Americ

2030 

an

 Outlook to 

Commission for Environmental Cooperation
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Date: July 2010

Original language: English

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Cover: Satellite image showing the nighttime lights of 

North America, from the North American Environmental 

Atlas, a striking indicator of the presence and impact of 

humans upon the land.
July 2010

North American 

Environmental 

 Outlook to 

2030 

Commission for Environmental Cooperation

Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental

Commission de coopération environnementale

Table Of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations 5

Executive Summary/Reader’s Guide 7

1 Introduction 11

2 Approach 13

3 Meta-Forces 17

3.1 Socio-political Developments 17

3.2 Global Environmental Changes 18

4 Drivers 23

4.1 Demographic Patterns 23

4.2 Economic Activity 25

4.3 Technology 26

5 Pressures 29

5.1 Introduction 29

5.2 Resource Extraction, Production and Use 29

5.2.1 Energy Resources 29

5.2.2 Water 33

5.2.3 Agricultural Products 34

5.2.4 Forest Products 36

5.2.5 Marine Fishery Products 36

5.3 Waste Generation and Return Flows to the Environment 38

5.3.1 Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions 38

5.3.2 Criteria Air Contaminants 40

5.3.3 Return Flows and Water Pollution 40

6 State: Changes In Environmental Conditions 43

6.1 Introduction 43

6.2 Climate 43

6.3 Land Cover and Land Use 45

6.4 Air Quality 47

6.5 Water Quality and Quantity 49

6.6 Biodiversity 46

7 Impacts: How Environmental Change Affects Socio-Economic Conditions 53

7.1 Introduction 53

7.2 Population Living in Areas Facing Severe Water Stress 52

7.3 Health Effects of Urban Air Pollution 54

7.4 Climate Change Impacts 55

8 Conclusions 57

 References 59

Annex 1: Key Studies 61

Annex 2: Data Tables 65
4
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 5

Acronyms and Abbreviations

BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China

CEC Commission for Environmental Cooperation

CO2 carbon dioxide

CO2eq CO2-equivalents

DALYs Disability Adjusted Life Years (the sum of years of potential life lost due to premature 

 mortality and the years of productive life lost to disability)

DPSIR model Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response model

EIA Energy Information Administration (information agency concerned with energy, part of 

 the US Department of Energy)

FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

FTA Free Trade Agreement

GDP gross domestic product (either as measured overall or per capita)

GEO4 Fourth Global Environment Outlook report, produced by the 

 United Nations Environment Programme

 GEO4 MF GEO4 Markets First scenario

 GEO4 PF GEO4 Policy First scenario

 GEO4 SeF GEO4 Security First scenario

 GEO4 SuF GEO4 Sustainability First scenario

GHG greenhouse gas

IEA International Energy Agency

IEO reference scenario in International Energy Outlook 2008 (EIA)

IMAGE Integrated Model for the Assessment of the Greenhouse Effect 

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

JPAC Joint Public Advisory Committee (CEC)

MSE Mean Species Abundance

NAAEC North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation

NAALC North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NOx nitrogen oxides

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

 OECD ppGlobal scenario featuring comprehensive global policy package

 OECD 450ppm scenario with atmospheric GHGs stabilized at 450 ppm CO2eq

POPs persistent organic pollutants 

ppm parts per million

SOx sulfur oxides 

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNPD United Nations Population Division

WEO reference scenario in World Energy Outlook 2008 (OECD/IEA)
6
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 7

Executive Summary 

/ Reader’s Guide

Photo : Ryan Drake-Stoker
8

This report summarizes recent research concerning the major forces and underlying trends that are likely to shape the environment of 

North America in 2030. The intention of this report is not to present a prediction of the future. Rather, it is to consider the possibilities 

that the future might hold in light of the environmental and social stresses facing North America and the world at this time. 

The report has been produced in response to a request by the Council of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). 

It complements the CEC’s 2008 report, The North American Mosaic (CEC 2008), which focused on recent environmental trends and 

divided issues by subject or medium—air and atmosphere, biodiversity and ecosystems, pollutants, and water. This allows for the 

telling of a coherent story for each issue, but can hide the interconnections among issues. This report takes a more systems approach, 

following a Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response model. Thus, it follows more directly from the discussion paper prepared for 

the June 2008 conference, North America 2030: An Environmental Outlook, hosted by the CEC’s Joint Public Advisory Committee (Stratos Inc. and IISD 2008), upon which it expands. Together, these and other initiatives are intended to assist the CEC in the 

consideration and development of its work program by highlighting possible areas for cooperative action to support environmental 

mitigation, adaptation and innovation strategies across all three countries.

Several factors restrict the scope of this report. First, as a review, it is necessarily limited to available work to-date. Second, because 

it takes a North American perspective, the choice was to focus primarily, although not exclusively, on cases where consistent and 

comparable information is available for Canada, Mexico, and the United States. This precluded using some country-specific data, 

which provide greater within-country detail and may differ from similar data presented in international data sets. Third, there are 

numerous aspects of the environment for which historic data are available, but for which there has been no effort to make forwardlooking projections. Fourth, each of these restrictions is exacerbated by the desire to include quantitative information as much as 

possible. Finally, most studies, including those explored here, have tended not to consider in detail the possibility of dramatic, albeit 

imaginable, surprises that would alter their projections significantly.1

The review draws heavily on two recent global studies—the United Nations Environment Programme’s Global Environmental 

Outlook 4 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030, which provide 

projections for a range of environmental issues. These are complemented by more issue-specific studies at the global level—e.g., 

the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the United 

Nations Population Division’s World Population Prospects and the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2008—as 

well as select national studies and other available literature. The key messages that come out of the review can be grouped into three 

categories:

1 Examples would be a sustained oil price shock or the interruption of international oil supplies, an “albedo flip” accelerating the melting of arctic ice, 

a disease pandemic, or technological breakthroughs.

Executive Summary / Reader’s Guide
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 9

There is a range of variation in the projections for 

many environmental issues and their drivers.

The studies reviewed here, and the various scenarios within these 

studies, differ in terms of their assumptions about the choices we 

make, either as individuals or as society. A wider range of variation in both the assumptions and the outcomes points to aspects 

where our actions can make a more significant impact to the 

year 2030. Those issues with the greatest variation in projections 

across the scenarios include:

•	 Energy use and associated emissions

•	 Water use and treatment of wastewater

Significant changes, stemming from major challenges, can be expected in a number of environmental issues and their drivers.

Significance here refers not only to the magnitude of a change, 

but also to its direction and persistence, the extent to which 

it approaches or exceeds critical thresholds, and the impacts 

it has upon society. The most important challenges are likely 

to include:

•	 Continued and accelerated warming, particularly in

	 the Arctic

•	 Continued loss of terrestrial biodiversity

•	 Persistence of elevated levels of ground-level ozone

	 in urban areas

There exist important gaps in the current knowledge base concerning environmental futures.

Recognizing that attempting to predict the future is a fool’s 

errand, there is still much to be learned from considering the 

possibilities. To the extent that important issues have not 

received attention, they are less likely to receive consideration in 

the actions we take, including the policies we develop. Among 

those issues that deserve greater attention are:

•	 The growth in urban and built-up land area

•	 Freshwater quality and groundwater availability

	 and quality

•	 The specific economic and health effects of

	 environmental change

•	 The impact of consumption in North America on the

	 environment in other regions, and vice versa

These point to an interlinked set of actions for consideration—

addressing those changes that are amenable to policy action in 

the near term, preparing for those changes that are almost inevitable over the short term but are amenable to policy action in the 

longer term, and strengthening our knowledge concerning those 

changes about which we know the least.

1

2

3
10

1

Photo: Katherine A. Virag
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 11

CHAPTER 1 

Introduction

North America’s environmental future is not pre-ordained. A range 

of possible scenarios have been posited for the continent’s environment in 2030. A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in collaboration with the Centro de Investigacíon y 

Docencia Económicas and the Conference Board of Canada, states 

that the continuation of current trends, absent changes in policy and 

behavior:

will result in a substantially degraded North American environment in 2025... The expense of protecting coastal 

areas against saltwater intrusion could become prohibitive, forcing abandonment of some of North America’s 

most valuable real estate. Large parts of the western United States and northern Mexico could become uninhabitable as surface and groundwater disappears and the land 

dries out. Water scarcity and migration pressures could lead 

to conflict within and between North American countries. 

Extraction of oil and other resources in response to growing 

North American and foreign demand could irreparably 

damage some of North America’s most beautiful ecosystems. Habitat degradation and loss of native species could leave 

our grandchildren with a much-diminished natural inheritance. (Vadgama, Nitze et al. 2008, p. 37)

The same study notes, however, that (p. 38) “this dire forecast does 

not necessarily have to come to pass.

This report reviews and summarizes recent research concerning 

the major forces and underlying trends related to the environment 

in North America. It presents current expert opinion on these 

matters as reflected in such global studies as the United Nations 

Environment Programme’s Fourth Global Environmental Outlook

(UNEP 2007), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development’s OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030 (OECD 

2008), the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 

on Climate Change (IPCC 2007), and the Millennium Ecosystem 

Assessment (MA 2005), as well as regional and national studies. The 

focus is on the future—to where these forces and trends might take 

us in the coming years, acknowledging the uncertainties in making

projections. Thus, it is meant to complement more formal state 

and trends reports, such as the recently released North American 

Mosaic (CEC 2008). It has a time horizon of 2030, recognizing that 

our actions, both historically and in these next two decades, will 

influence the environment into the further future.

The present report aims to be holistic, if not comprehensive. 

The most significant changes expected to occur over this period are 

highlighted. At the same time, the existence of a range of possibilities 

for the future, reflecting the inherent difficulties in projecting 

the future and varying assumptions made in developing these 

projections, receive specific attention. Finally, consideration is given 

to those areas where there is a lack of consistent and comparable 

information, but which warrant more attention.

The remainder of the report is organized as follows:

•	 Chapter 2 summarizes the approach that has been adopted for

this report, considering the choice of the key studies reviewed, as 

well as the choice of how to present the results.

•	 Chapter 3 reviews meta-forces in the form of socio-political

developments and global environmental changes.

•	 Chapter 4 provides an overview of the drivers influencing the 

outlook for the environment in North America.

•	 Chapter 5 describes the resulting pressures on the North American environment, in terms of what we take from the environment 

and what we return to it.

•	 Chapter 6 then sets out the anticipated changes in the state of the 

environment in North America.

•	 Chapter 7 presents the main anticipated socio-economic impacts

of environmental change.

•	 Chapter 8 presents the report’s conclusions.

•	 Annex 1 provides additional background on the key studies

included in this review.

•	 Annex 2 presents tables with the detailed data underlying the

figures and text presented in the body of the report.

The focus is on the future—

to where these forces and 

trends might take us in the 

coming years, acknowledging 

the uncertainties in 

making projections. 
12

2

Photo: Iain Sarjeant
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 13

CHAPTER 2 

Approach

The intention of this report is not to present a prediction of the 

future. Rather it is to consider the possibilities that the future might 

hold, in a quantitative fashion where possible, in light of the social 

and environmental stresses facing North America and the world at 

this time. Homer-Dixon (2008) emphasizes three aspects of these 

stresses—convergence, synergy, and complexity. We are facing 

a convergence of multiple stresses; the effects of these stresses are 

a result, not of any one of these, but rather the synergy among them; 

and because of the complexity of the systems involved, the resulting 

changes are often unpredictable.

This places an obvious burden on those who would wish to 

anticipate environmental change, particularly if their efforts include 

quantitative estimates. Any projection, particularly one reaching 

several decades into the future, is subject to considerable uncertainty. 

In some areas there remain data gaps and disagreements over the 

historical record and the current state and trends of key variables.2

Looking to the future, our understanding of social, economic and 

environmental systems remains incomplete. Finally, much of what 

the future will look like is dependent upon the choices we make, both 

as individuals and as society. These factors, along with the dubious 

record of past efforts, has led Smil (2008), among others, to question 

the value of most such quantitative projections.

Given the above, it is not surprising that there have been limited 

attempts to paint detailed, quantitative pictures of the future of the 

environment. Still, these efforts continue, even as the researchers 

involved profess greater humility, increasingly emphasizing the 

value they provide for decision-making today rather than their ability 

to predict specifically what the future will hold. It is fair to say that 

most experts would agree with Smil (2008, p. viii) when he states:

Better understanding and heightened awareness should 

help us lessen the impact of unpredictable events, even prevent some whose timing might have been anticipated...

They should also improve our efforts at moderating or 

reversing deleterious trends at a stage when changes are tolerable and sacrifices reasonable.

This report does not make any new projections, but rather brings 

together the results of recent studies. In choosing which studies to 

emphasize, a number of factors have been considered. First, studies 

differ with respect to their standing in the scientific and political 

communities. Second, many studies examine only a single issue or 

small number of them. This makes it more difficult to recognize 

key interrelationships, which can point to synergies and tradeoffs in 

addressing environmental issues. Third, studies differ in terms of 

their analytical approaches, geographic extent and resolution, time 

horizons and indicators—all which can make comparisons across 

studies difficult. Finally, comprehensive sets of the data required to 

make comparisons across countries, such as those desired for this 

report, were not always available.

Based upon these criteria, the quantitative results presented 

are drawn primarily from two recent studies: the Organization for 

Economic Cooperation and Development’s Environmental Outlook 

to 2030 (OECD 2008) and the United Nations Environment 

Program’s Fourth Global Environmental Outlook, GEO4, (Rothman, 

Agard et al. 2007; UNEP 2007). The reasons for doing so include:

• 	 Both studies benefit from the engagement and contribution of

the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

•	 Both studies address a range of environmental issues and do so

in an integrated fashion.

•	 Both studies use a similarsuite of modelsto make their projections

and present a similar set of indicators.

•	 Detailed results for Canada, Mexico, and the United States as

individual entities have been made available for both studies.

It should also be noted that the two studies complement each 

other in that the OECD Environmental Outlook (OECD) developed a 

baseline scenario with a number of policy variants, while UNEP’s 

Global Environmental Outlook 4 (GEO4) explored four plausible 

futures, none of which was to be seen as a reference case. Box 1 

summarizes the main scenarios from these studies and further 

details on the studies themselves can be found in Annex 1.

These are complemented by more issue specific studies at the 

global level—e.g., the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007), the Millennium 

Ecosystem Assessment (MA 2005), the United Nations Population 

Division’s World Population Prospects (United Nations 2007) and 

World Urbanization Prospects (United Nations 2008), and the 

International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2008 (OECD/

IEA 2008). In addition, select national studies and other available 

literature has been reviewed. Annex 1 contains more detailed 

information on these studies, including key assumptions.

2 The North American Mosaic (CEC 2008, p. 5) notes that “many measurements are not available at the national level, let alone in comparable 

forms across North America.” Vadgama, Nitze et al. (2008, pp. 58-59), in particular, bemoan “the paucity of baseline data on North American biodiversity 

and ecosystem dynamics in particular.”
14

It is recognized that these choices precluded using a number of 

country-specific data sets. These could provide greater within country 

detail and, at times, present data that differ from those presented in 

international data sets. Given the scope of the present study, however, 

it was felt that inter-country comparability was necessary. This does 

point to the potential value of greater consistency and integration 

of environmental monitoring and foresight across Canada, Mexico, 

and the United States.

In addition to the selection of studies, we had to make a further 

choice related to the presentation of the information gathered for 

this report. Many studies, for example the North American Mosaic

(CEC 2008), present information on a case-by-case basis for a set 

of environmental issues. This allows for the telling of a coherent 

story for each issue, but can hide the interconnections among issues. 

Furthermore, in most cases, a common set of key drivers underlies 

the trends for these issues.

Thus, for this report, a Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response 

model was determined to be more appropriate (Figure 1). A variation 

of the original DPSIR model (Smeets and Wetering 1999) is most 

explicitly reflected in the conceptual frameworks used in UNEP’s 

GEO4 (UNEP 2007, p. xxii), but is also apparent in the structure of 

the OECD Environmental Outlook and in the conceptual framework 

of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA 2005, p. vii).

Any projection, particularly one 

reaching several decades into the 

future, is subject to considerable 

uncertainty...much of what the 

future will look like is dependent 

upon the choices we make, 

both as individuals and as society.

The basic logic of the DPSIR framework is that Drivers lead to 

Pressures being exerted on the environment. These cause changes in 

the State of the environment and result in Impacts for both natural 

and social systems. Societal Responses feed back to the Drivers, 

Pressures, State, or Impacts directly. In this report, Responses are 

addressed only to the extent that they are reflected in some of the 

policy and behavioural assumptions underlying the different 

scenarios. We have introduced a slight variation to reflect the 

importance of key socio-political developments and global environmental changes, which do not fit easily into the traditional DPSIR 

framework, but are expected to influence the future environment 

of North America. These are the subject of the next section of 

this report.

figure 1 :the DPSIR framework

responses

socio-political

developments

drivers

pressures

state

impacts

demographic

change

economic

activity

resource extraction and use

waste generation and return flows to the environment

climate

land cover and land use

air quality

water quality and quantity

biodiversity

human health

specific economic activities

technological

change

global environmental

change

Approach
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 15

Box: Scenarios in the OECD Environmental Outlook and UNEP’s GEO4

The OECD Environmental Outlook is built around a baseline scenario, referred to here as the OECD Baseline. Bakkes, 

Bosch et al. (2008, p. 18) describe this as “a stylised picture of the environmental developments in the next decades. 

Its hypothesis is no new policies in response to environmental pressures—as well as no new policies on subsidies in 

agricultural production and on tariffs in agricultural trade (Bakkes and Bosch 2008, p. 18).” Various policy ‘variants’ 

are explored related to, for example, local and regional air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, and agricultural 

support. These include comprehensive policy packages and separate climate change options. In this report we focus 

on the more stringent variants—the global comprehensive policy package, referred to here as OECD ppGlobal, 

and the climate change option reflecting policies needed to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases 

at 450 parts per million by volume of carbon dioxide equivalents, referred to here as OECD 450ppm, as these provide 

the largest contrast with the baseline scenario.

The four scenarios in UNEP’s GEO4 have fundamentally different assumptions about changes in individual 

behaviour and public policies. Briefly, in:

•	Markets First (GEO4 MF) – reliance on market forces to bring about improvements for the environment and human 

well-being; this emphasizes technological solutions to environmental problems. Lip service is paid to sustainable 

development policies.

•	Policy First (GEO4 PF) – strong policies to improve human and environmental well-being are implemented, 

primarily in a top-down fashion. Social and economic considerations prevail over environmental considerations.

•	Security First (GEO4 SeF) – or ‘Me First’; the focus is on power and wealth generation for the rich.

•	Sustainability First (GEO4 SuF) – there is a persistent push for the implementation of sustainable development 

policies from all sectors of society. There is a strong emphasis on equity; and equal weight given to environmental 

and socio-economic policies.
16

3

Photo: Tarina Peterson
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 17

CHAPTER 3 

Meta-Forces

The countries of North America and the region as a whole do not 

exist in isolation. The future of North America will both influence 

and be influenced by developments on the international stage. In this 

section, we review a number of these under the general categories of 

socio-political developments and global environmental changes. 

3.1 Socio-Political Developments

Within North America, the signing of the Free Trade Agreement 

between Canada and the United States (FTA) in 1988, followed by 

the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 with 

Mexico, along with its supplements—the North American Agreement 

on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North American 

Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)—have heralded a 

period of increasing interdependence between Canada, the USA, 

and Mexico. Trade among the three countries has tripled in the 

15 years since NAFTA was signed to nearly $1 trillion in 2008, 

integrating the North American economy to a greater extent 

than ever before. In 2005, the NAFTA partners launched the 

Security and Prosperity Partnership to strengthen their collaboration 

in a number of areas, including energy, emergency management, 

the compatibility of their regulations, food safety, environmental 

protection, and border security.

This pattern of growing interdependence has also been seen 

at the global scale. The growth in international trade over the last 

15 years has brought greater integration in the world’s capital and 

product markets, the rapid rise of multinational companies based 

in emerging economies and greater prosperity for hundreds of 

millions of people. Most notable has been the emergence of new 

actors on the world stage, often characterized as the BRICs—Brazil, 

Russia, India, and China, or more recently the BRIICS, with the 

addition of Indonesia and South Africa. Over the next 25 years, 

the BRICs, which already account for 14 percent of global GDP at 

purchasing-power parity (PPP), are likely to become a much larger 

force in the world economy because of their high economic growth 

rates and large populations. Some experts predict that in the next 

forty years China and India could become, respectively, the 

dominant global suppliers of manufactured goods and services while 

Brazil and Russia would become similarly dominant as suppliers 

of raw materials (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003).

This economic globalization has been accompanied by technological advances in communications, increases in travel and an 

unprecedented sharing of cultures. There have also been significant 

developments in international governance. In the environmental 

arena, this is best evidenced by the number of agreements covering 

such topics as climate change, biodiversity, and the transboundary 

movement of hazardous waste. Overall, though, it is fair to say 

that the international institutions, laws and financing mechanisms 

created to protect the global environment remain less well-developed 

and have had less of an impact than their economic counterparts, 

such as the WTO, even given the difficulties with the current round 

of negotiations.

There is currently significant uncertainty about the nature of these 

and other socio-economic developments over the next few decades. 

Different assumptions about how these will play out are in fact one of 

the fundamental elements of the frameworks used to define the sets of 

scenarios developed for UNEP’s GEO4, as well as the IPCC’s Special 

Report on Emissions Scenarios (IPCC 2000) and the Millennium 

Ecosystem Assessment (MA 2005). As the information summarized 

in this report will illustrate, these assumptions strongly influence the 

future of the global and North American environments.

Key points:

•	 NAFTA has deepened and is expected to continue to deepen North

America’s economic integration.

•	 North American integration is occurring against a background of

increasing globalisation of trade, finance, technology and culture.

The countries of North America

and the region as a whole

do not exist in isolation.
18

3.2 Global Environmental Changes

North America’s continued development will increasingly take 

place against a backdrop of global environmental change. By global 

environmental change, we are specifically referring to changes that 

are global in scope and drive environmental and socio-economic 

trends on the continent. In an increasingly interdependent world, 

North America cannot insulate itself from such changes. Even where 

they do not affect the North American environment directly, they 

may do so indirectly by increasing resource competition, exacerbating 

regional political and economic tensions and creating new patterns of 

migration. Furthermore, through its own activities, e.g., the release 

of transboundary pollutants and the importation of a wide range of 

products and resources whose environmental costs are concentrated 

at the point of production, North America is a significant contributor 

to these changes.

Among the most notable of the global environmental changes are 

climate change, biodiversity loss, the spread of invasive species and 

infectious diseases, the depletion of stratospheric ozone, the 

appearance of transboundary pollutants (including persistent 

organic pollutants), the decline of marine fisheries, and increasing 

desertification and land degradation.These changes are manifestations of how a growing human population is using the Earth’s 

resources more intensively. Here we briefly review some of these 

changes. Their specific implications for North America are dealt 

with in more detail in later sections.

Climate Change

Numerous studies have explored the potential implications of a 

changing climate. These most recently culminated in the release 

of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 

Climate Change (IPCC 2007). More recently, the governments of 

Canada and the United States have also recently released studies, 

which are heavily based on the IPCC reports (Committee on Environment and Natural Resources National Science and Technology 

Council 2008; Lemmen, Warren et al. 2008).

These studies indicate that the clearest manifestation of climate 

change will be an accelerating rise in the Earth’s mean temperatures, reaching around 0.3 ̊C per decade by 2030. This average hides 

important regional differences, with some parts of North America, 

particularly the Arctic, exceeding the global mean warming by a 

significant amount (IPCC 2007). This rate is one to which the world is 

essentially already committed as a result of greenhouse gases already 

emitted to the atmosphere since the start of the Industrial Revolution. 

As such, there is little difference across scenarios in this regard over 

the period to 2030. This includes the scenarios presented in this 

report from the OECD Environmental Outlook and UNEP GEO4.3

At the same time, the amount of emissions emitted between now 

and 2030 will have an impact on the climate well beyond that date.

The effects of climate change will be complex and pervasive, 

and are already becoming evident. Based upon its review of recent 

evidence, the IPCC (2007, pp. 31-33) states that:

•	 there is high confidence that natural systems related to snow,

ice and frozen ground (including permafrost) are affected;

•	 there is high confidence that a number of effects on hydrological

systems are occurring, including: increased runoff and earlier 

spring peak discharge in many glacier- and snowfed rivers, and 

warming of lakes and rivers in many regions, with effects on 

thermal structure and water quality;

•	 there is very high confidence that recent warming is strongly

affecting terrestrial biological systems, including such changes 

as earlier timing of spring events, such as leaf-unfolding, bird 

migration and egg-laying; and poleward and upward shifts in 

ranges in plant and animal species;

•	 there is high confidence that there has been a trend in many

regions towards earlier ‘greening’ of vegetation in the spring 

linked to longer thermal growing seasons due to recent warming;

•	 there is high confidence that observed changes in marine and

freshwater biological systems are associated with rising water 

temperatures, as well as related changes in ice cover, salinity, 

oxygen levels and circulation; and

•	 other effects of regional climate changes on natural and human

environments are emerging, although many are difficult to 

discern due to adaptation and non-climatic drivers.

Key points:

•	 North America is a major contributor to global environmental

change but will also be impacted by this change.

•	 The adverse environmental and socio-economic effects of climate

change are expected to intensify over the next 25 years, primarily 

through changes in the availability of water in many regions and 

the rising incidence of extreme weather events.

•	 Biodiversity losses are increasing, with adverse consequences on

the capacity of ecosystems to provide services.

•	 Invasive species are expected to continue spreading, with significant

adverse environmental and economic consequences.

•	 The stratospheric ozone layer should recover fully but not until

the second half of the century.

•	 Transboundary air and water pollution will remain problematic and

may be exacerbated by climate change in spite of declines in emissions 

in some regions.

•	 Most marine fisheries are overexploited and many have already

started to decline, but debate remains about their future.

•	 Land degradation remains a global problem; although it is less

pronounced in North America, it may have indirect effects on 

the region.

3 If anything, these scenarios likely underestimate the increases in global mean temperature. This is because both relied on the same model, IMAGE, which 

used a median estimate for climate sensitivity from the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report, 2.5 ̊C for a double of atmospheric GHG concentration over 

pre-industrial levels; this estimate was raised to 3.0 ̊C in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report.

Meta-Forces
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 19

Looking to the future, Figure 2, reproduced from the Synthesis 

report of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, provides illustrative 

examples of impacts associated with varying degrees of global 

average temperature change. These are mostly adverse and are 

expected to continue to intensify as the temperature rises. Lesser 

developed and developing countries are expected to be among the 

most adversely impacted.

Climate change, for example, is expected to exacerbate the current 

stresses on water resources in large parts of the globe, including 

North America, arising from population growth, urbanization and 

economic and land-use change. Widespread losses of glaciers and 

reductions in snow cover over recent decades are projected to accelerate 

throughout the 21st century, reducing water availability, hydropower 

potential, and changing the seasonality of flows in regions supplied 

by meltwater from major mountain ranges. This trend will have 

profound adverse effects where irrigated agriculture depends on 

consistent and adequate replenishment of the aquifers and waterways 

with consequent implications on food production.

Beyond 2050 and into the next century, scientists have expressed 

concerns over sea-level rise as a result of the accelerated melting of 

land-based glaciers and the thermal expansion of the oceans. While 

the rate at which seas may rise remains the subject of debate, experts 

do agree that its consequences for coastal populations would be 

far-reaching and require the relocation of millions of people.

Many of the most severe and costly impacts of climate change will 

be associated with extreme climatic events and associated natural 

disasters. Weather-related events, such as floods, droughts and 

storms, already account for 75 percent of natural disasters. Climate 

scientists expect to see an increase in weather-related disasters over 

the coming decades (McBean 2008).

The above reflects the consensus expressed in the IPCC’s Fourth 

Assessment Report. Since its release, however, there has been a debate 

among climate scientists as to whether it understates the rate at which 

the climate may change in the future. The recent reinterpretation of 

paleo-climatic data and the unprecedented melt of the Arctic Ocean 

icepack in 2007 and 2008, for example, have led some (e.g., Hansen 

2008) to warn that the Earth may already be reaching tipping points 

where positive feedbacks amplify initial changes. 

Biodiversity Loss

Ongoing global biodiversity loss has decreased the capacity of many ecosystems to provide services. Current 

documented rates of extinction are estimated to be roughly 100 times 

greater than typical rates in the fossil record. Of the major vertebrate 

groups that have been comprehensively assessed, over 30 per cent of 

amphibians, 23 per cent of mammals and 12 per cent of birds are 

threatened worldwide (Ash and Fazel 2007). 

Global biodiversity loss is likely to continue to 2030, with the 

largest losses expected in sub-Saharan African, parts of South 

America, and some areas in Asia and the Pacific (Ash and Fazel 

2007). Future global biodiversity loss is likely to mainly come 

from pressures from agriculture and infrastructure. Forestry, 

biofuels production, and climate change impacts will also have 

significant impacts through to 2030 (OECD 2008). 

Invasive Species and Infectious Diseases

Invasive species are a major contributor to the loss of biodiversity. 

This worldwide issue has a significant impact on the global economy. 

Invasive species contribute to the loss of traditionally available 

resources, losses in food production, disruption of water transport, 

and increased costs for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, water management and human health (OECD 2008). The impacts associated with 

invasive species are very likely to continue, due in large part to the 

expected growth in global trade and travel.

Stratospheric Ozone

Although emissions of ozone-depleting substances have decreased 

over the last 20 years, the largest recorded ‘hole’ in the stratospheric 

ozone layer occurred in 2006 over the Antarctic. It is estimated that 

the ozone layer over the Antarctic will recover, but not until some 

time between 2060 and 2075 (Kuylenstierna and Panwar 2007). 

This timing will depend, in part, on the extent and effect of the 

current exemptions provided for some ozone-depleting substance.

Stratospheric ozone depletion has implications for human health 

and the environment. UV-B radiation affects many physiological 

and biochemical processes involved with growth, pigmentation and 

photosynthesis. Increasing UV-B radiation affects skin cancer rates, 

eyes and immune systems. Arctic ecosystems are particularly at 

risk to UV-B radiation because of the extensive wetlands and many 

shallow ponds and lakes, not to mention the extended periods of 

daylight in the Arctic summer (Kuylenstierna and Panwar 2007).

North America’s 

continued development 

will increasingly take 

place against a 

backdrop of global 

environmental change.
20

Figure 2: Examples of Impacts Associated with Global Average Temperature Change

0 1 2 3 4 5 ̊C

†Significant is defined here as more than 40%. ‡Based on average rate of sea level rise of 4.2 mm/year from 2000 to 2080.

Global average annual temperature change relative to 1980–1999 (°C)

(Source: Figure 3.6 from IPCC, 2007, p. 51)

Explanation: Illustrative examples of global impacts projected for climate changes (and sea level and atmospheric CO2

where relevant) associated with different amounts of increase in global average surface temperature in the 21st century. 

The black lines link impacts; broken-line arrows indicate impacts continuing with increasing temperature. Entries are 

placed so that the left-hand side of text indicates the approximate level of warming that is associated with the onset of 

a given impact. Quantitative entries for water scarcity and flooding represent the additional impacts of climate change 

relative to the conditions projected across the range of SRES scenarios A1FI, A2, B1 and B2. Adaptation to climate change is 

not included in these estimations. Confidence levels for all statements are high. The right panel gives the WG II references 

for the statements made in the left panel, where ES = Executive Summary, T = Table, B = Box and F = Figure. Thus B4.5 

indicates Box 4.5 in Chapter 4 and 3.5.1 indicates Section 3.5.1 in Chapter 3.

Meta-Forces

water

WGII 3.4.1, 3.4.3

3.ES, 3.4.1, 3.4.3

3.5.1, T3.3, 20.6.2, ES.B5

4.ES, 4.4.11

T4.1, F4.4, B4.4, 6.4.1, 

6.6.5, B6.1

4.ES, T4.1, F4.2, F4.4

4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 

4.4.6, 4.4.10, B4.5

19.3.5

5.ES, 5.4.7

5.ES, 5.4.2, F5.2

5.ES, 5.4.2, F5.2

6.ES, 6.3.2, 6.4.1, 6.4.2

6.4.1

T6.6, F6.8, ES.B5

8.ES, 8.4.1, 8.7, T8.2,

T8.4

8.ES, 8.2.2, 8.2.3, 8.4.1,

8.4.2, 8.7, T8.3, F8.3

8.ES, 8.2.8, 8.7, B8.4

8.6.1

ecosystems

food

coasts

health

Increased water availability in moist tropics and high latitudes

Decreasing water availability and increasing drought in mid-latitudes and semi-arid low latitudes

Hundreds of millions of people exposed to increased water stress

 Up to 30% of species at Significant† extinctions

 increasing risk of extinction around the globe

Increased coral bleaching Most coral bleached Widespread coral mortality

 Terrestrial biosphere tends toward a net carbon source as:

 ~15% 40% of ecosystems affected

Increasing species range shifts and wildfire risk

 Ecosystem changes due to weakening of the meridional

 overturning circulation

Complex, localized negative impacts on small holders, subsistence farmers and fishers

Tendencies for cereal productivity Productivity of all cereals

to decrease in low latitudes decreases in low latitudes

Tendencies for some cereal productivity Cereal productivity to

to increase at mid- to high latitudes decrease in some regions

Increased damage from floods and storms

 About 30% of

 global coastal

 wetlands lost‡

 Millions more people could experience

 coastal flooding each year

Increasing burden from malnutrition, diarrhoeal, cardio-respiratory and infectious diseases

Increased morbidity and mortality from heat waves, floods and droughts

Changed distribution of some disease vectors

 Substantial burden on health services
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 21

Transboundary Pollutants

Already, Arctic residents and wildlife are subject to exposure from 

persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and heavy metals originating 

outside North America (Kuylenstierna and Panwar 2007). The 

increases in mean temperatures due to climate change in the Arctic 

have been implicated as a significant contributor to increasing levels 

of POPs and other toxics as the volatile toxics are liberated from 

the warming soils, waters and fens of the Arctic (INAC 2003). At the 

same time, air pollution from Asia (including toxic substances such 

as mercury) is now being detected on the West Coast of the continent 

(Wilkening, Barrie et al. 2000; Akimoto 2003).

While transboundary waterborne contamination is less well 

understood, there may be implications for North America if transoceanic water currents deliver higher concentrations of toxicants 

from overseas sources. Similarly, with the melting of the polar 

icecap, previously unanticipated Arctic water currents may deliver 

or contribute overseas contaminants to receptors in Alaska and 

the Canadian northern territories.

Marine Fisheries

There is general agreement that marine fisheries have been subject 

to increased exploitation in recent decades, the total catch from 

marine fisheries has stabilized or declined slightly since the late 

1980s, and that there has been a trend of ‘fishing down marine food 

webs’, i.e., an increasing share of the catch being species from lower 

trophic levels (Pauly, Watson et al. 2005; FAO 2007). There remains 

some debate, however, concerning the overall level of exploitation 

of marine fisheries and their future, particularly as trends vary by 

region. In its most recent State of the World’s Fisheries, the FAO notes 

some stabilization of the share of overexploited, depleted, and fully 

exploited stocks in the first part of this decade after significant 

increases since the mid-1970s, even as the share of underexploited 

and moderately exploited stocks continues to fall (FAO 2007). 

Recent evidence has also pointed to a significant decline in the level 

of discards in the past decade (Kelleher 2005). Meanwhile, Worm, 

et al. (2006, p. 790), based upon a consideration of both the level 

of exploitation and species diversity, argued that a continuation of 

current trends would imply a “global collapse of all taxa currently 

fished by the mid–21st century.” This conclusion has, not 

surprisingly, engendered a certain amount of debate (Murawski, 

Methot et al. 2007; Worm, Barbier et al. 2007).

Land Degradation and Desertification

Driven by increasing human population and economic development, the most dramatic land use changes over the last 20 years have 

been in forest cover and composition, expansion and intensification 

of cropland, and the growth of urban areas. Land degradation and 

desertification are changes that have had, and will continue to have, 

profound implications for human health, theenvironment and the 

global economy (Dent 2007). Although these trends are less of a 

concern in North America, particularly in Canada and the United 

States, they can still have an indirect effect on the region.
22

4

Photo: Greenstone Girl
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 23

CHAPTER 4 

Drivers

4 Note that after the release of the initial draft of this report, the UNPD released updated population projections in the spring of 2009. These are not 

reflected in this report.

5 Further details on the work of the UNPD are provided in Annex 1.

In the context of the studies reviewed here, drivers, alternatively 

referred to as driving forces or indirect drivers, represent those forces 

that lead to activities that directly affect the environment. The most 

commonly cited drivers reflect the traditional IPAT formulation—

Impact = Population * Affluence * Technology (Chertow 2001). These 

are often complemented by other socio-political and cultural factors. 

In this section, we summarize recent projections related to demographic patterns, economic activity, and technology. 

4.1 Demographic Patterns

Key points:

•	 North America’s population is projected to increase by 60–135 million

people between 2005 and 2030 or by 14–31 percent. 

•	 North America’s population is projected to become increasingly urban.

•	 The population distribution between countries is expected

to remain roughly constant and North America’s percentage 

of world’s population will fall slightly from around 6.7 to 6.4 percent.

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

OECD ppGlobal

OECD 450ppm

UNPD Low variant

UNPD Medium variant

UNPD High variant

Millions of Persons

 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

550

600

500

450

400

Everything else being equal, a larger population will put greater 

pressure on the environment. At the same time, other demographic 

factors can play a role. Thus, it is important to go beyond the size of the 

population to also consider issues such as migration, urbanization, 

and the age structure of the population.

Total Population4

The population of North America was just over 435 million in 2005: 

32 million (7.4 percent) in Canada, 300 million (68.7 percent) in the 

United States, and 104 million (23.9 percent) in Mexio—repesenting 

6.7 percent of the global population (United Nations 2007). The 

GEO4 and OECD scenarios project the population of North America 

to increase by approximately 18–21 percent between 2005 and 2030, 

resulting in a total of 515–530 million persons in 2030 (see Figure 3 

and Table A2.1). The OECD scenarios all indicate the same rates of 

population growth, whereas there is some variation across the GEO4 

scenarios. This reflects the fact that population growth was an exogenous assumption in the former and was calculated endogenously 

in the latter. These projections are in line with the most recent 

Figure 3: Total Population, North America
24

medium projection of the UN Population Division (UNPD).5 The 

low and high projections of the UNPD define a wider range, an increase of 14–31 percent over this period, implying the addition of 60 

to 135 million people in North America by 2030.

This rate of growth is a bit less than that projected for the rest of the 

world; still North America’s share of the total global population is 

expected to decline only marginally over this period. Within the 

continent, the population growth rate in Mexico is slightly higher 

than Canada or the USA at present. By 2030, however, the studies 

project all three countries to have similar growth rates, with some 

scenarios even indicating lower growth rates in Mexico. The net 

effect is that the share by country of the total North American 

population is not expected to change significantly.

Migration

International migration is notoriously difficult to project, but several 

studies do include basic assumptions about their future patterns. 

Mexico is one of the countries with the highest levels of net emigration at the present time, particularly to the United States, and this is 

expected to continue. The UNPD estimates that an average of 360,000 

Mexicans will emigrate each year between 2005 and 2010, many of 

these going to the USA.6

 Canada and the United States experience 

significant levels of net immigration; the UN estimates these as 

approximately 200,000 and 1,200,000 persons per year, respectively. 

In its projections, the UN assumes that these levels will remain fairly 

constant until 2030. The GEO4 PF and GEO4 SuF scenarios provide 

similar results. In GEO4 MF, which assumes significantly more open 

borders, the levels of emigration from Mexico and immigration to 

Canada and the USA are projected to be more than 30 percent higher. 

Alternatively, in the GEO4 SeF scenario, which assumes ‘thicker’ 

borders, these are projected to be approximately 25 percent lower.

Urbanization

In 2005, the majority (just under 80 percent) of the North American 

population lived in urban centers—80, 81 and 76 percent in Canada, 

Mexico, and the United States, respectively. In its Medium Variant,7

the UNPD projects this to increase in all three countries, such that 

nearly 86 percent of North Americas will live in urban areas in 2030. 

Significantly, this implies an absolute decrease in the rural populations in all three countries, by 5 percent in Canada, 17 percent in the USA, and 12 percent in Mexico. The GEO4 scenarios show the same pattern at the North American level in 

Canada and the United States. In Mexico, however, because of 

slightly higher projections of population growth and slower 

rates of urbanization, rural populations are expected to increase 

by 14 to 17 percent even as their share of the total population 

declines.

Age Distribution

A significant ageing of the population is expected throughout the 

region. In 2005, persons 65 years or older represented 13.1, 12.3 and 

5.8 percent of the population on in Canada, the USA and Mexico, 

respectively. By 2030, these figures are expected to increase to 23.2, 

19.4, and 12.3 percent. Meanwhile, the percent of the population under 15 is expected to decline, most rapidly in Mexico.8

 These changes 

are reflected in the shifts in the dependency ratios, the ratio of persons under 15 and over 64 to the number of people between ages 15 

and 64, who traditionally make up the majority of the work force. 

6 The same figures are provided for all of the UNPD variants. The OECD Environmental Outlook does not provide any information on migration. 7 This is the only UNPD variant for which data are available. The OECD Environmental Outlook does not provide any information on urbanization. 8 In the UNPD High variant, which includes higher fertility rates, these values increase very slightly in Canada and the USA.

Canada

USA

Mexico

Millions of Persons

 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

40

60

65

55

50

45

Figure 4: Dependency Ratios, by country

Drivers
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 25

This rises in Canada and the US; in Mexico it continues to fall for part 

of the period before leveling off and beginning to rise after 2025 

(see Figure 4).

4.2 Economic Activity

Key points:

•	 North America’s economic growth is expected to remain robust

to 2030. 

•	 North America will continue to be a major player in the world

economy.

•	 Average per capita incomes is projected to rise in all three countries,

but Mexico’s will continue to lag behind the US and Canada.

As with population, everything else being equal, a larger economy 

puts more pressure on the environment through greater demand for 

material inputs from the environment and larger amounts of 

by-products discharged to it. There is also a strong correlation 

between income per capita and individual consumption. Finally, 

the make-up of the economy is significant, as different sectors can 

have different levels of impact per unit of activity.

Total Economic Activity

Figure 5 and Table A2.2 present projections of total Gross Domestic 

Product from the GEO4 and OECD scenarios, as well as the 

reference scenarios in the International Energy Agency’s World 

Energy Outlook 2008 (OECD/IEA 2008) and the US Energy 

Information Administration’s International Energy Outlook 2008

(US EIA 2008).9

 The North American economy is projected to see a 

70 to 130 percent increase between 2005 and 2030, reflecting average 

annual growth rates of between 2.2 and 3.4 percent. The OECD, 

WEO 2008, and IEO 2008 scenarios show the lowest rates of growth. 

This reflects, in part, the assumption of no policy changes, even those 

that might stimulate growth, in these scenarios. In the most recently 

published WEO 2008 scenario, it also reflects lowered expectations 

for growth given the financial upheavals and increases in energy 

prices in recent years. Note that the policy actions assumed in the 

OECD ppGlobal and OECD 450ppm scenarios have only a minimal 

effect on projected GDP. More significant differences are seen across 

the GEO4 scenarios, with the GEO4 MF and GEO4 PF scenarios 

projecting the highest rates of growth of all the scenarios presented. 

While these scenarios represent the mainstream consensus, it is 

important to note that some experts, e.g., Homer-Dixon (2008), 

do not believe that the implied doubling in energy and material 

throughput required can be achieved.

North America is projected to remain a major player in the 

world economy. Its share of total world GDP in 2005 was just under 

24 percent. This is expected to remain above 20 percent in 2030 in 

the GEO4and OECD scenarios; in the IEO 2008 and WEO 2008 

scenarios, which assumes relatively faster growth in the developing 

world, the share falls to 16–18 percent. Within the region, the United 

States will continue to be the dominant player, with little change 

from its current 85 percent share of the North American market in 

all projections. The studies do differ in one aspect, though; the GEO4 

scenarios are relatively less optimistic about growth in Mexico and 

more optimistic about growth in Canada and the United States than 

the other studies.

9 Further details on these studies are provided in Annex 1.

Figure 5: Total GDP, North America

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

OECD ppGlobal

OECD 450ppm

IEO 2008

WEO 2008

Billions of Dollars

 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

25 000

30 000

15 000

20 000

10 000

0

35 000

(Note: All figures in year 2000 US$ using PPP-based exchange rates)
26

GDP per Capita

Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP/cap) is projected to increase 

considerably between 2005 and 2030 in all three countries of North 

America (see Figure 6 and Table A2.3). The range of growth projected 

does vary significantly by country and scenario, however, from a 40 

percent increase for Canada and the United States in the WEO 2008 

scenario to a doubling for Mexico in the OECD and IEO 2008 scenarios. In general, the OECD and IEO 2008 scenarios are more optimistic 

concerning growth in Mexico and less optimistic about growth in 

Canada and the United States. Only in these scenarios is any real convergence seen in GDP per capita. Still, even in the most optimistic case, 

Mexican GDP per capita is projected to be only slightly more than 35 

percent of that in the United States, compared to 27 percent in 2005.

Sectoral Makeup of Economic Activity

Figure 7 and Table A2.4 present information on the sectoral 

breakdown of economic activity as measured by share of total GDP. 

The values shown in Figure 7 represent an average across the four 

GEO4 scenarios. The differences across the scenarios were minimal; 

also, this study provided a more disaggregated view of the economy 

than the OECD Environmental Outlook or other studies. 

The results show that dramatic shifts in the sectoral makeup of 

economic activity within each country are not expected to occur 

between now and 2030. Services currently dominate in each country 

and continue to increase their share, particularly in the United States, 

where they approach 70 percent of the economy. The share of economic 

output produced in the next largest sector, Manufactures, remains 

fairly constant. The ICT (Information and Communications 

Technology) and Materials sectors are projected to see an increase 

in their shares in all countries, but these start from a small base. 

Somewhat steep declines are foreseen for the shares of Agriculture 

and Energy. Given the overall growth of the economies, however, 

even these declines in share do not necessarily translate into absolute 

declines in the size of these sectors.

4.3 Technology

Key points:

•	 New technologies are expected to transform societies over the

coming decades at least as much as they have over the past decades.

•	 The net effect of technological change on the environment is unclear

and will vary by issue.

Technology is a fundamental determinant of humanity’s impact on 

the environment. If demographic and economic factors largely 

determine the magnitude of our desires, then it is technology that 

determines how we meet them.

Technological change can reduce environmental pressures 

through greater efficiency, allowing for reductions in the use of 

resources and the production of wastes to meet the same level 

of demand. At the same time, these decreases in pressure per unit 

of demand can lead to increases in overall pressures if they result in 

Figure 6: GDP Per Capita, by Country

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

OECD ppGlobal

OECD 450ppm

IEO 2008

WEO 2008

USA

CANADA

MEXICO

Thousands of Dollars

 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

80

60

40

20

0

(Note: All figures in year 2000 US$ using PPP-based exchange rates)

Drivers
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 27

increased demand; this is commonly referred to as the “rebound 

effect.” An example at the individual level would be an increase in 

the amount of driving after the purchase of a more fuel-efficient car 

that costs less to run. At asocietal level, technological progress has 

been key to the growth of both the size of the population and the 

size of the economy. Technological change can also lead to increased 

pressures when it creates new products and demands (e.g., electronic 

equipment and associated “e-waste”). Finally, it can have positive 

effects on one aspect of the environment, but negative effects on 

another. For example, the use of biofuels can reduce the emissions 

of greenhouse gases, but they can place increased pressure on land 

resources, often at the direct expense of biodiversity. In many cases, 

therefore, the aggregate effects of technological change are ambiguous 

or uncertain.

In most projections of environmental change, assumptions about 

technological change are imposed exogenously. In general, the OECD 

Baseline assumes that:

•	 New technologies will transform societies over the coming

decades at least as much as that they have over the past decades, 

even if the specific areas of technological development change.

•	 Technological change is environmentally neutral. That is,

technology does not, by itself, reduce environmental impacts.

Its policy variants, e.g., OECD ppGlobal and OECD 450ppm, 

however, do include the possibilities of accelerated technological 

changes as consequences of policy actions.

The GEO4 scenarios are somewhat more explicit in identifying 

different developments with respect to the levels of investment in 

technological change, the emphasis of these investments, and the 

access and availability of new technologies. Briefly:

•	 In GEO4 MF, there are high levels of investment, dominated by 

the private sector. The emphasis is on economic efficiency and 

profit. Access depends on the ability to pay.

•	 In GEO4 PF, there are high levels of investment, with governments 

playing a larger role. A balance is struck between economic 

efficiency and environmental improvements. Technology transfer 

and diffusion are actively promoted.

•	 In GEO4 SeF, investments are lower. There is more focus on the 

military and on security. Access to key technologies is closely 

guarded.

•	 In GEO4 SuF, there are high levels of investment from a range of 

sources. The emphasis is toward environmentally benign technologies. Technology transfer and diffusion are actively promoted, 

including the encouragement of more open-source activities.

Neither study assumes the appearance of any truly revolutionary 

technological breakthroughs between now and 2030.

Of course, when it comes to quantitative modeling, these general 

assumptions must take the form of changes in such specific factors 

as energy and water use efficiency, pollutant emission coefficients, 

agricultural yields, and the costs of certain resources and their 

availability. These can also include assumptions about the rates 

of change in overall economic productivity. The details of these a

ssumptions are not provided here, but are reflected in the results 

presented elsewhere in this report.

Figure 7: Sectoral Breakdown of Total GDP, by country

Agriculture

Energy

ICT

Manufacturing

Materials

Services

Share of Total GDP

2005

2030

2005

2030

2005

2030

 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Mexico USA Canada

(Note: All figures in year 2000 US$ using PPP-based exchange rates)
28

5

Photo: Eric Yip
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 29

CHAPTER 5 

Pressures 

5.1 Introduction

Humanity is perpetually interacting with and transforming the 

natural environment. Our existence depends on the exploitation of 

natural resources. Eventually, these resources are returned to the 

environment, often in the form of what are termed “pollutants” 

because of their negative impacts.

These flows to and from the environment are the pressures that 

lead to changes in the state of the environment. Their magnitude 

and nature are largely determined by the drivers discussed in the 

previous section, that is the size and composition of the population, the level and character of economic activity, and the available 

technology. Thus, the differences seen in the projections of those 

drivers will be reflected in the range of projections of the pressures presented in this section. Existing and assumed environmental 

regulations related to, for example, emissions of greenhouse gases 

and criteria air contaminants also influence the future evolution 

of these pressures.

This section reviews what the studies say about how a number of 

these flows may change in North America over the next few decades. 

In terms of resource extraction, production and use, we focus on 

energy resources, water, agricultural products, forest products, 

marine biota and other resources, notably minerals. With respect to 

the generation of wastes and return flows, we include greenhouse 

gas emissions, criteria air contaminants, and water (amount and 

pollutants). Ideally, international trade would be considered in each 

case, as it allows for the geographic separation of the extraction, 

production, use and disposal of many resources. This was only possible for a few issues, however, notably energy and food, even as it is 

recognized that North America is a significant net importer of many 

products, e.g., from marine fisheries (FAO 2007).

Finally, note that there do exist a number of aggregate indicators of environmental pressure. These include the ecological 

footprint (Ewing, Goldfinger et al. 2008), the human influence 

and human footprint indices (Sanderson, Jaiteh et al. 2002),10 and 

a measure of the human impact on marine ecosystems (Halpern, 

Walbridge et al. 2008). While these provide interesting insights, to 

date there have not been systematic attempts to project these into the 

future at a regional or national level. Thus, these are not considered 

in this report.

Humanity is perpetually interacting with and transforming 

the natural environment. Our 

existence depends on the exploitation of natural resources.

5.2 Resource Extraction, Production and Use

Key points:

Energy

•	 Forecasts of future energy use and production range widely, depending

on the policy assumptions made. 

•	 Driven by US demand projections, the region will remain a net energy

importer. Canada and Mexico will continue to be net energy exporters.

•	 Although demand for alternative energy sources, such as biofuels

and wind, will increase over the time period, fossil fuels will continue 

to dominate primary energy use.

•	 Energy intensity, i.e., energy use per unit of economic activity, is

projected to decline with improved efficiencies, structural changes 

in the economy, and technological advancements.

Other resources

•	 Most scenarios posit a continued high use of water in the future.

•	 North America will remain a large net exporter of agricultural products.

•	 The production of wood products is expected to increase by 65 to 85

percent by 2030.

•	 Landings from marine fisheries bordering North America are

expected to increase except in the Northwest Atlantic.

5.2.1 Energy Resources

Energy Production

All three countries in North America are significant primary energy 

producers, although the models examined for this study reflect considerable differences in primary energy production scenarios at the 

national level. At the most general level, it appears that oil and natural gas production will fall within the United States, natural gas and 

nuclear production will increase in Mexico, hydro production will 

increase in Canada, and the production of other renewables will increase across all three countries. More specifically, Canadian energy 

production is expected to continue to grow through to 2030, 

with total oil production projected to increase as a direct result of 

growing oil sands production (NEB 2007). Overall US energy production is also expected to increase through to 2030 (EIA 2007). Coal 

production is projected to outpace all other fuels, reflecting both 

very large domestic supplies and an increase in demand. 

Energy Use

There have been numerous projections of energy use for North 

America, both at the national and international level. In addition to 

the results presented in from the GEO4 and OECD scenarios, this 

section also considers those provided in the reference scenarios of 

the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2008

(OECD/IEA 2008) and the US Energy Information Administration’s 

International Energy Outlook 2008 (US EIA 2008), as these provide 

comparable data for all three countries of North America.11

10 See also http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/wildareas/.

11

Further details on these studies are provided in Annex 1.
30

The studies depict a wide range of possibilities for energy use 

in North America to 2030. Figure 8 and Table A2.5 show that total 

energy use is projected to rise until 2015 in all scenarios, but 

afterwards these begin to differ significantly. In the GEO4 SuF and 

the OECD 450ppm scenarios, total energy use declines back to levels 

close to these seen in 2005. Alternatively, the GEO4 MF and GEO4 

SeF scenarios project increases of over 40 percent between 2005 and 

2030.

In each scenario, the projected increases in total energy use are 

largest in Mexico, which sees more than a doubling in GEO4 MF and 

a 50 percent increase even in GEO4 SuF. Even so, the United States 

is projected to continue to dominate the continent, maintaining 

a greater than 80 percent share of total energy use in North America 

all scenarios.

Comparisons of data show that North America, as a whole, will 

continue to be a net importer of energy resources. This is primarily 

a function of energy consumption projections for the United States. 

Canada and Mexico will continue to be net energy exporters.

The scenarios also show a wide variation in the evolution of 

per capita energy use (Figure 9 and Table A2.6), Per capita energy 

use is currently five times higher in the United States and Canada 

than in Mexico. This difference is projected to fall as all scenarios 

indicate increases in per capita energy use in Mexico, but either 

lower increases or decreases in the United States and Canada, 

depending on the scenario. Still, even in the scenario with the 

greatest convergence, the OECD ppGlobal scenario, per capita energy 

use in Mexico is still just over one-third of that in the USA in 2030.

Energy intensity, i.e., energy use per unit of GDP, is projected to decline in all three countries in all scenarios, 

but does so more rapidly in the United States and Canada than in Mexico (Figure 10 and Table A2.7). The most 

significant decreases are seen in the GEO4 SuF and OECD 

450ppm scenarios in Canada and the United States. These 

are on the order of 50 percent. A final result of note is 

that in all of the GEO4 scenarios, the energy intensity of the US 

economy is lower than that of Mexico’s in 2030. Canada is projected 

to continue to have the highest energy intensity in all scenarios. 

These results need to be understood in context, however: a significant 

amount of the energy use in Canada and Mexico is related to energy 

production for export.

Table A2.5 presents data on energy use by fuel from the various 

studies. Figure 11 shows these as percentages for North America 

as a whole. Fossil fuels—coal, oil and natural gas—are expected to 

continue to dominate the North American energy mix in 2030. They 

currently make up 85 percent of primary energy use. In the GEO4 

SuF, OECD ppGlobal, and WEO scenarios, this falls slightly and it 

does even more significantly in the OECD 450ppm scenario. This 

primarily reflects differences projected in the shares represented 

by coal vis-à-vis modern biofuels and solar and wind. In all other 

scenarios their share increases beyond the 2005 level. Even the most 

optimistic scenarios (OECD ppGlobal and 450ppm) project the 

contributions of renewable sources of energy at less than 25 percent. 

As with the shares of the economy represented by different sectors, 

given the overall increases in energy use projected, declines in shares 

do not necessarily imply absolute decreases in energy use for a particular fuel.

Figure 8: Total Primary Energy Use, North America

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

OECD ppGlobal

OECD 450ppm

IEO 2008

WEO 2008

Exajoules

 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

180

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

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CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 31

Figure 9: Per Capita Primary Energy Use, by Country

Figure 10: Primary Energy Use per Unit GDP, by Country

Canada

USA

Mexico

2030

Gigajoules per Capita

2005 GEO4 MF GEO4 PF GEO4 SeF GEO4 SuF OECD OECD OECD IEO 2008 WEO 2006 Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Megajoules per Dollar

Canada

USA

Mexico

2030

2005 GEO4 MF GEO4 PF GEO4 SeF GEO4 SuF OECD OECD OECD IEO 2008 WEO 2006

 Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm
32

Figure 11: Share of Primary Energy Use by Fuel, North America

Figure 12: Share of Final Energy Use by Sector, North America

2005 GEO4 MF GEO4 PF GEO4 SeF GEO4 SuF OECD OECD OECD IEO 2008 WEO 2006 Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

2030

Solar & Wind

Modern Biofuels

Traditional Biofuels

Hydro

Nuclear

Natural Gas

Oil

Coal

2005 GEO4 MF GEO4 PF GEO4 SeF GEO4 SuF OECD OECD OECD

Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

2030

Other

Transportation

Services

Residential

Industry

(Note: IEO 2008 data for Hydro includes all renewables)

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CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 33

These patterns of change are reflected in the projections for the 

individual countries, but there are some differences worth noting. For example, Canada is expected to see a larger contribution 

from hydro than the United States or Mexico, but the latter are 

projected to see greater increases in solar and wind.

Figure 12 and Table A2.8 provide information on the projections 

for total final energy use by sector from the OECD and GEO4 

scenarios.12 Transportation currently has the largest share in all 

countries, reflecting its importance in energy demand; this share is 

expected to increase slightly by 2030. Services are also projected to 

represent an increasing share of final energy use. These trends are 

more pronounced in Mexico and Canada, with the compensating 

decreases in shares primarily being seen in the industrial sector in Canada and the residential sector in Mexico. Once again, it 

is important to remember that with increasing overall energy use, 

a decline in the share for a particular sector can still represent an 

absolute increase in energy use.

5.2.2 Water

Freshwater withdrawals13 in North America currently exceed 600 

billion cubic meters per year (see Figures 13 and 14 and Table A2.9). 

On a per capita basis, Canada (1439 cubic meters per person in 

2005) and the United States (1833 cubic meters per person) extract 

significantly more water than does Mexico (548 cubic meters per 

person). For North America as a whole, extractions are dominated by 

agriculture (approximately 45 percent) and electricity production 

(around 40 percent). Canada withdraws significantly more water for 

electricity than agriculture; this is the reverse in Mexico, with the 

United States somewhere in between.

The OCED and GEO4 scenarios suggest the possibility of a wide 

range for futures with respect to water withdrawals. The OECD 

Baseline scenario projects an increase of approximately 10 percent 

in total water withdrawals in North America, with the fastest growth 

occurring in the domestic and manufacturing sectors; agriculture 

is actually expected to see an absolute decline in water use. In the 

OCED ppGlobal and OECD 450ppm scenarios, there is no overall 

increase, almost entirely due to lower demands from the electricity sector. The GEO4 scenarios present a much larger range, from 

a decrease of more than 30 percent to an increase of almost 40 percent. The largest absolute differences between the scenarios also 

appearing in the electricity sector. In both the OECD and GEO4 

scenarios, this is primarily a reflection of the differences in energy 

use between the scenarios, but also of improvements in the efficiency 

of water use, driven in part by assumptions of more consistent and 

comprehensive pricing of water, including the reduction of water 

use subsidies. The differences in population growth and overall 

economic activity also play a role.

The OECD scenarios shows decreases in per capita water withdrawals in Canada and the United States, and very slight increases in 

Mexico, with some overall convergence by 2030. These trends differ 

across the GEO4 scenarios, with significant convergence suggested 

in the GEO4 PF and GEO4 SuF scenarios.

Figure 13: Water Withdrawals by Sector, North America

2005 GEO4 MF GEO4 PF GEO4 SeF GEO4 SuF OECD OECD OECD

Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Billion cubic meters

2030

Manufacturing

Electricity

Domestic

Agriculture

12 Similar data are available from the IEO2008 and WEO2008 studies, but the use of different categorizations of fuels and sectors would confuse 

the comparisons. It is not expected that including these would change the basic messages. 

13Note that water withdrawal is the total amount of water that is taken from the terrestrial part of the water cycle. Consumption is understood as the part 

of the withdrawal that does not return to the terrestrial water cycle. The ratio of consumption to withdrawal can differ by sector, so these results must be 

used carefully in comparisons with other data that use water consumption as the key measure of water use.
34

Figure 14: Per Capita Water Withdrawals, by Country

Canada

USA

Mexico

2030

2005 GEO4 MF GEO4 PF GEO4 SeF GEO4 SuF OECD OECD OECD Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0

Thousand cubic meters

5.2.3 Agricultural products

The previous section noted the significant role that the agricultural 

sector plays in water demand. The sector is also a dominant user 

of land, a topic to which we will return in a later section, as well as 

other resources such as fertilizers. In this section, we focus on the 

size of this sector in terms of the demand for, and production of, 

agricultural products.

Figures 15 and 16 and Tables A2.11–A2.13 provide results from the 

GEO4 scenarios for agricultural production and demand.14 Total production in North America already exceeds a billion metric tons. Approximately 90 percent is in the form of non-animal products, slightly less in Canada and the United States and slightly more in Mexico. 

A similar distribution is shown in the demand for agricultural 

products. Note, however, that a portion of the demand for, and 

therefore production of non-animal products, is for their use in the 

production of animal products. In 2005, the shares of total 

agricultural demand represented by demand for feed were 41, 30 and 

21 percent for Canada, the United States and Mexico, respectively. 

These country differences also help to explain why in Figure 16 the 

differences across countries in per capita food availability, a reasonable proxy for food consumption, are smaller than the differences 

in per capita demand for agricultural products. This reflects the 

fact that animal products, which require a substantial amount of 

non-animal products for their production, make up a larger share 

of food consumption in Canada and the United States compared 

to Mexico.

Production is also seen to exceed total demand. This reflects the 

fact that the continent is a net exporter of agricultural products. 

This pattern holds at the national level, with the only exception 

being that the demand for animal products slightly exceeds their 

production in Mexico. This is the case even though the per capita 

demand for animal products, as well as non-animal products, 

is lower in Mexico compared to Canada and the United States. 

According the GEO4 scenarios, total agricultural production is projected to increase by anywhere from 60–75 percent, with the largest 

percentage increases occurring in Mexico where there is more than 

a doubling of production. Meanwhile, total demand is also projected 

to increase, but only by 45–55 percent. Again, the greatest increases 

are expected in Mexico. This difference in the growth of production 

compared to demand implies an increase in net exports from 

the continent.

Looking across the scenarios, GEO SeF indicates slower growth 

in both production and demand. This is also reflected in the per 

capita food availability that increases by less than 10 percent in this 

scenario, versus 15–20 percent in the other scenarios, with the most 

striking differences being seen in Mexico. The GEO4 SeF scenario 

actually projects a further divergence in per capita food availability between Mexico and Canada and the United States. It should 

be noted, though, that the convergence is only minimal in the 

other scenarios.

14The OECD scenarios do provide some results on agricultural production, but are only a subset of those presented in GEO4. Also, the OECD scenarios 

do not provide data on demand for agricultural products. Some indication of the shifts in agricultural production in the OECD scenarios can be seen 

in Section 6.3 of this report, which looks at land cover.

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CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 35

Figure 15: Total Agricultural Production and Demand, North America

Non-Animal Products

Animal Products

Millions of Metric Tons

Production

Demand

Production

Demand

Production

Demand

Production

Demand

Production

Demand

 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000

GEO4 MF 2000

2030 

GEO4 PF GEO4 SeF GEO4 SuF

Figure 16: total Per Capita Agricultural Demand and Food Availability, by Country

2000 GEO4 MF GEO4 PF GEO4 SeF GEO4 SuF

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

Demand in kg/person/yr; Availability in kcal/person/day

Canada Total Demand

Canada Food Availability 

USA Total Demand

USA Food Availability 

Mexico Total Demand

Mexico Food Availability 

2030
36

5.2.4 Forest products

As with agriculture, this section will focus on the demand for, and 

production of forest products. The implications in terms of land 

cover by forest are addressed later in this report. 

Compared to agriculture, there is less information available 

about forest products in the studies reviewed. GEO4 does, however, 

provide projections for the production of selected wood products.15

These data are shown in Figure 17 and Table A2.13. For North 

America as a whole, production is projected to grow significantly, 

by approximately 65–85 percent between 2000 and 2030, depending 

upon the scenario. The highest growth rates, in all but the GEO4 SeF 

scenario, are seen in Canada, where they are similar to those in the 

United States. Mexico, on the other hand, is projected to see a 5–10 

percent decline across the scenarios, reflecting a greater emphasis on 

agricultural production.

One issue that is of particular concern in Mexico is illegal logging. 

The International Tropical Timber Organization cites estimates of 

5–7 million cubic meters of illegally harvested roundwood, compared 

to total roundwood production of 45.5 million cubic meters in 2003 

(ITTO 2006, p. 256). GEO4 does not indicate to what extent illegal 

logging has been considered in its projections.

5.2.5 Marine Fishery Products

Increased consumption is also reflected in the demand for products 

from marine fisheries. A map of the marine FAO regions is shown in 

Figure 18. Five of these—FAO 18 - Arctic Sea, FAO 21 - Northwest 

Atlantic, FAO 31 - West Central Atlantic, FAO 67 - Northeast Pacific, 

and FAO 77 - East Central Pacific—border on North America.

Figure 19 and Table A2.14 present projections of the total 

landings16 for each of these FAO regions, except the Arctic Sea.17

Across the four FAO regions, an increase of 15–20 percent is expected 

over the period 2000–2030 for each of the scenarios other than GEO4 

SuF (see Table A2.14). In this case, the total landings remain almost 

unchanged. This reflects lower population growth as well as strong 

efforts to restore marine ecosystems in this scenario. These trends 

differ significantly by region, however. The most dramatic increase 

is projected for the Northeast Pacific. Meanwhile, the Northwest 

Atlantic is projected to see a decline in landings by as much as 55 

percent. This represents a continuation of the declines seen in this 

region in recent years.

15The specific products are given as fuelwood, charcoal, pulpwood, particles, sawlogs, veneer, and other. Regional projections were not made of demand 

for forest products in GEO4; no projections of production or demand for forest products were made for the OECD Environmental Outlook. 16This includes the harvest of all marine organisms, not just fish. See Alder et al. (2007) for further details.

17Due to lack of data, it is not possible at this time to confidently model fishing activity and depletion in the Arctic (personal communication, Jackie Alder). 

Figure 17: Production of Selected Wood Products

Millions of Cubic Meters

2000 

GEO4 MF 

GEO4 PF 

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600

2030

Canada

USA

Mexico

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CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 37

Figure 19: Landings from Marine Fisheries

Figure 18: World Map with Marine FAO Regions Delineated

Million Metric Tons

 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

FAO 21

Northwest

AtlantiC

FAO 31

West Central

Atlantic

FAO 67

Northeast

Pacific

FAO 77

East Central

Pacific

2030 2030 2030 2030

2000

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

2000

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

2000

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

2000

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

ARCTIC SEA

18

ARCTIC SEA

18

NE PACIFIC

67

NW PACIFIC

61

W CENTRAL

PACIFIC

71

E CENTRAL PACIFIC

77

SW PACIFIC

81

SE PACIFIC

87

ANTARCTIC (S PACIFIC)

88

ANTARCTIC (S INDIAN OC)

58

W INDIAN OCEAN

51

E INDIAN OCEAN

57

ANTARCTIC (S ATLANTIC)

48

NW ATLANTIC

21

NE ATLANTIC

27

MED & BLACK SEA

37

W CENTRAL

ATLANTIC

31

E CENTRAL

ATLANTIC

34

SW ATLANTIC

41

SE ATLANTIC

47
38

5.3 Waste Generation and Return Flows 

to the Environment

Key points:

•	 Projections of future greenhouse gas emissions vary greatly depending

on the policy assumptions made. Scenarios range from a 40 percent 

increase to a 25 percent decline.

•	 Emissions of key air pollutants are expected to decline but these

projections are also highly sensitive to policy assumptions.

•	 The absolute amounts of untreated water discharges are expected

to increase.

•	 Nitrogen fluxes, a major source of water pollution, are expected

to increase in Canada, decline in the United States and remain 

constant in Mexico.

5.3.1 Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions

Figures 20 and 21 and Table A2.15 summarize the projections of 

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the GEO4 and OECD scenarios. 

These include all of the gases considered under the Kyoto Protocol. 

Per capita emissions in Canada and the United States are currently 

among the highest in the world. North America as a whole contributed approximately 20 percent of total global emissions in 2005. Energy 

use was the dominant source in all three countries, although in Mexico land use18 was responsible for nearly 40 percent of that country’s 

emissions.

Future levels of GHG emissions will be driven by a number 

of factors, perhaps most importantly energy use. Thus, it is not 

surprising that the scenarios show a wide range of possibilities, 

reflecting what was seen with energy use. Depending upon the 

scenario, GHG emissions in North America are projected to rise 

from 2005–2030 by as much as 40 percent in the GEO4 MF and SeF 

scenarios or decline by as much as 25 percent in the GEO4 SuF and 

OECD 450ppm scenarios. These declines in the latter scenarios may 

seem dramatic, but they are in line with or even not as steep 

as what is already being discussed at the political level in the United 

States and Canada.

On a per capita basis, the United States and Canada will continue 

to far exceed Mexico’s GHG emissions. The levels of per capita 

emissions are projected to increase in all three countries in the 

largely unregulated GEO4 MF, GEO4 SeF, and OECD Baseline 

scenarios, but also in the GEO4 PF scenario. None of these scenarios indicate any real convergence between per capita emissions 

in Canada and the United States vis-à-vis Mexico. Somewhat more 

convergence is projected in the other scenarios as the levels fall much 

further in Canada and the United States than in Mexico.

Energy use is projected to continue to be the dominant source 

of GHG emissions, with a significantly increasing share in Mexico 

in most of the scenarios. This is matched by a reduced share from 

land use, although not necessarily an absolute decline in emission. 

In Canada, the opposite is expected to occur, with some significant 

increases in the share of emissions attributable to land use.

18This primarily reflects land-use conversions and non–energy-related emissions from agriculture.

Figure 20: Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions, North America

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

OECD ppGlobal

OECD 450ppm

Petagrams Carbon

 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0

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CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 39

Figure 22: NOx Emissions from Energy Use and Industrial Processes, North America

Figure 21: Per Capita Greenhouse Gas Emissions, by Country

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

OECD ppGlobal

OECD 450ppm

Teragrams Nitrogen

 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

8.0

6.0

4.0

2.0

0

Canada

USA

Mexico

2030

2005 GEO4 MF GEO4 PF GEO4 SeF GEO4 SuF OECD OECD OECD

Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

10

8

6

4

2

0

Megagrams Carbon
40

5.3.2 Criteria Air Contaminants19

A number of air pollutants are of particular concern to human health 

and the environment. These include nitrogen oxides (NOx

), sulfur 

oxides (SOx

) and small particulate matter (PM). Figures 22 and 23 

and Tables A2.16 and A2.17 present projections for emissions of the 

first two of these from energy use and industrial processes. As with 

GHG emissions, there are striking differences across the scenarios, 

reflecting the sensitivity of emissions to policy choices. Experts 

expect decreases in SOx

 emissions for North America as a whole, 

but this may be as little as 12 percent or as much as 85 percent for the 

period 2005–2030. NOx

 emissions are expected to fall in most scenarios by as much as 75 percent over the same period. In the GEO4 

SeF scenario, however, they are projected to rise by 16 percent.

Canada and the United States have significantly higher per 

capita emissions than does Mexico at the present time. Aside from 

the GEO4 SeF scenario, a large degree of convergence is expected 

for NOx

 emissions as these fall in Canada and the United States in 

all the other scenarios, while they increase or fall less dramatically 

in Mexico. This is even more dramatic for SOx

 emissions, where the 

GEO4 scenarios actually project per capita emissions in Mexico to 

exceed those in Canada and the United States by 2030.

5.3.3 Return Flows and Water Pollution

To date, there has been little or no work to develop future projections 

related to water pollution. Data are provided in GEO4 on projections for total return flows of water, both treated and untreated. 

The OECD Environmental Outlook, meanwhile includes estimates 

of river nitrogen flux—nitrogen exported to coastal waters from 

sewage and non-point sources, primarily agriculture.

19As discussed in more general terms previously, there are differences between data provided by the IMAGE model and those that may be extracted 

from national data sets.

Figure 23: SOx Emissions from Energy Use and Industrial Processes, North America

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

OECD ppGlobal

OECD 450ppm

Teragrams Sulfur

 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

8.0

6.0

4.0

2.0

0

Figure 24 and Table A2.18 present the projections from GEO4 

for return flows of treated and untreated water from the domestic and manufacturing sectors. As of 2000, most return 

flows from the domestic sector were treated in Canada and 

the United States, but less than 30 percent were in Mexico. The 

United States also treated more than 70 percent of the return 

flows from the manufacturing sector; in Canada and Mexico, 

these figures were much lower, approximately 40 percent and 

15 percent, respectively. Looking out to 2030, the shares of the 

return flows that are treated are projected to remain around the same 

or increase in each sector, depending on the scenario. Since the total 

return flows increase in line with the total extractions, though, the 

total amount of untreated flows are projected to increase by 25–60 

percent, 11–65 percent, and 31–168 percent in Canada, the United 

States, and Mexico, respectively. These large ranges point to the potential for policy to have a significant impact.

The data on river nitrogen fluxes, as projected in the OECD 

Baseline and OECD ppGlobal scenarios are shown in Figure 25 

and Table A2.19. No estimates were made for the OECD 450 ppm 

scenario. In 2000, these fluxes totalled over 2500 thousand 

kilograms, with agriculture being the dominant source in Canada 

and the United States; in Mexico, the fluxes from agriculture 

and sewage were of the same magnitude. Looking out to 2030 for 

North America as a whole, they fluxes are expected to increase only 

slightly in the OECD Baseline scenario and fall by over 20 percent 

in the OECD ppGlobal scenario. This is primarily due to changes in 

the United States. In Canada, nitrogen fluxes are actually expected 

to increase by 70 and 30 percent in the OECD Baseline and OECD 

ppGlobal scenarios, respectively, almost entirely due to increases 

from agriculture. In Mexico, decreases in the agricultural sector are 

approximately balanced by increases from sewage.

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CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 41

Figure 25: River Nitrogen Fluxes

Figure 24: Return Flows of Treated and Untreated Water

Thousand Kilograms

2000

OECD

Baseline

OECD

ppGlobal

2000

OECD

Baseline

OECD

ppGlobal

2000

OECD

Baseline

OECD

ppGlobal

 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000

Canada USA Mexico

2030 2030 2030

Non-point Agriculture

Sewage

Million Cubic Meters

2000

MF

PF

SeF

SuF

2000

MF

PF

SeF

SuF

2000

MF

PF

SeF

SuF

 0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000

Canada USA Mexico

Untreated

Treated

2030 2030 2030
42

6

Photo: Brian Wallace
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 43

CHAPTER 6 

State: Changes in Environmental Conditions 

6.1 Introduction

In 1990, Turner et al. (1990) produced a book entitled The Earth 

as Transformed by Human Action, with the subtitle Global and 

Regional Changes in the Biosphere over the Past 300 Years. Our goal 

in this section is somewhat more limited in scope—how might we 

expect the meta-forces, drivers, and pressures described in the 

previous sections, as well as those that have come before, to transform 

the environment of North America over the next few decades. This 

section reviews what the OECD Environmental Outlook, GEO4 and 

other recent studies conclude on this topic. Given its importance to 

other aspects of changes in the environment and the extent of recent 

scientific attention it received, we begin with climate. We then 

consider projections related to land cover, air quality, water quality 

and quantity, and biodiversity.

Please note that the uncertainties discussed in the previous 

sections related to the size of the meta-forces, drivers and pressures 

are further compounded here by uncertainties in our understanding 

of the workings of the natural system. In addition, due to lags in the 

response of natural systems, a number of the changes in state are 

driven by previous changes in the size of the meta-forces, drivers and 

pressures, and the full effect of changes in these over the period to 

2030 will become apparent only after that time.

6.2 Climate

Key points:

•	 Average temperatures are projected to increase across North America,

with the highest increases occurring at high latitudes and in winter.

•	 Precipitation patterns are expected to change but considerable

uncertainty remains over the scope of these changes. The same 

is true for extreme weather events.

•	 Glaciers and sea ice are losing mass more quickly than anticipated,

making an ice free summer in the Arctic more likely before 

mid-century. 

•	 Climate change is expected to exacerbate other environmental

changes (e.g., air quality, forest cover, biodiversity, water availability).

Section 3.2 discussed climate change as a key aspect of global 

environmental change. Here we focus on the North American 

context, emphasizing changes in temperature, precipitation, extreme 

events, and the implications for snow and ice cover. Even so, 

this overview will hide important differences within the region. 

The specific implications of these changes on other aspects of the environment (for example, biodiversity) and socio-economic systems, like 

human health, will be addressed in their respective sections.

Temperature

The IPCC projects that the United States and Canada, with the 

possible exception of the Atlantic offshore area, will see warming 

over the next few decades. The amount of warming is expected to be 

1 to 3 ̊C over the norm for the period 1980–1999 (Field, Mortsch et 

al. 2007). Studies in Canada indicated that the temperature increases 

will be greatest in the high Arctic, and greater in the centre of the 

country than along the east and west coasts. Warming is expected 

to be greatest during the winter months. The frequency of extreme 

warm summer temperatures (exceeding 30 ̊C) is expected to increase, 

while extreme cold days are projected to decline significantly 

(Karl, Meehl et al. 2008; Lemmen, Warren et al. 2008).

While climate models imply that temperature changes will be less 

pronounced in lower latitudes than in higher latitudes, the changes 

expected in Mexico are still projected to be noticeable. The IPCC 

estimates for Central America and Mexico are for increases of 

0.4–1.1 ̊C in the dry season and 0.5–1.1 ̊C in the wet season by 2020 

compared to the period 1980–1999 (Magrin, Gay García et al. 2007).

Precipitation

In the 21st century, precipitation over North America is projected 

to be less frequent but more intense. This increase in storminess is 

projected to be accompanied by greater extreme wave heights along 

the coasts (CENR 2008).

Annual total precipitation is projected to increase across Canada 

during the current century. Due to enhanced evapotranspiration 

driven by higher temperatures, many regions will experience a 

moisture deficit despite greater amounts of precipitation. Seasonal 

changes in precipitation will generally have greater regional-scale 

impacts than the annual totals. Precipitation is expected to decline 

in the summer in south-central Prairies and southwestern BC. This 

means less available precipitation during the growing season in 

important agricultural regions (Lemmen, Warren et al. 2008).

Most climate models project an increase in winter precipitation 

in the northern tier of the United States and a decrease in portions 

of the Southwest during the 21st century. Summer precipitation is 

projected to decrease in the Northwest of the contiguous United 

States and increase in Alaska; it is uncertain whether summer 

precipitation will increase or decrease over large portions of the 

interior United States (CENR 2008).

...the full effect of changes in [metaforces, drivers and pressures] over 

the period to 2030 will become 

apparent only after that time.
44

The uncertainty of projections of precipitation remains high 

for Mexico. The projected time-averaged precipitation decrease is 

accompanied by more frequent dry extremes in all seasons. The 

projections for the dry season looking out to 2020 range from 

decreases of seven percent to increases of seven percent; the range 

for the wet season is from a decrease of ten percent to an increase of 

four percent (Magrin, Gay García et al. 2007).

Extreme Events

Future trends in extreme events remain very uncertain. Hurricane 

rainfall and wind speeds are projected to increase in response to 

human-caused warming, although there is less confidence in the 

projected changes in the number of tropical cyclones. The apparent increase in the proportion of very intense storms 

since 1970 in some regions is much larger than simulated 

by current models for that period, highlighting the uncertainty 

associated with this issue. Trends in other extreme weather events 

that occur at small spatial scales—such as tornadoes, hail, lightning, 

and dust storms—cannot be determined at the present time due to 

insufficient evidence (Karl, Meehl et al. 2008).

Snow and Ice

The speed at which climate change will reduce snow and ice cover 

is a key uncertainty that has been a major focus of the commentary 

since the release of the fourth IPCC Assessment. Several scientists 

have argued that the IPCC projections were unduly conservative and 

that the west Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets were vulnerable to 

even small additional warming, which could lead to a much faster 

sea-level rise (Hansen 2008). As the climate warms, snow cover is 

projected to continue to decrease. Glaciers and terrestrial ice sheets 

are projected to continue to lose mass as increases in summertime 

melting outweigh increases in wintertime precipitation. This will 

contribute to sea level rise. Widespread increases in thaw depth are 

projected over most permafrost regions, with costly implications for 

existing and new infrastructure (CENR 2008).

According to the IPCC, results from multiple model simulations 

indicate that an Arctic Ocean free of summer ice is likely by the end 

of the century, with some models suggesting that this could occur 

as soon as 2040. As Figure 26 shows, there has been a persistent 

downward trend in the minimum sea ice extent (as registered 

annually in September) in the past few decades, with the past five 

years having the least amount of ice cover since satellite monitoring 

began in 1978.

Figure 26: Extent of Arctic Sea Ice in September Million Square Kilometers

 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008

9.0

8.5

8.0

7.5

7.0

6.5

6.0

5.5

5.0

4.5

4.0

(Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center (http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/ - accessed 31 October 2008)

State: Changes in environmental conditions
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 45

6.3 Land Cover and Land Use

Key points:

•	 North America may see a small net decline in total forest area

although scenarios vary. This decline will be most pronounced 

in Mexico.

•	 Scenarios concerning changes in agricultural land use vary

substantially and are sensitive to assumptions made about 

government policy.

•	 Urban land is likely to increase in all three countries, but there

has been little specific work on this at the continental scale.

Changes in land cover and land use will be driven by a number of 

factors. As population grows and urbanization proceeds more land 

will be converted to built-up areas. Shifts in the demand for and 

production of agricultural and forest products will lead to changes 

in the extent of crop and managed forest land. Policies to protect 

biodiversity may result in more land being set aside for nature. 

Policies related to carbon sequestration and bioenergy production 

will affect both forest and agricultural land. On top of this, the 

changing climate itself will have impacts irrespective of our policy 

choices as biogeoclimatic zones shift and yields change. In this 

section we examine what recent studies have had to say about the 

extent of forests, agricultural land and urban and built-up areas.

Forests

Forests currently cover 45 percent of the land area in North America

—62, 32, and 23 percent in Canada, the United States, and Mexico, 

respectively. Figure 27 and Table A2.20 show projections for changes 

in forest area between 200020 and 2030 projected by the GEO4 and 

OECD scenarios. In the GEO4 PF, GEO4 SeF, GEO4 SuF, and OECD 

baseline scenarios, the continent as a whole is projected to experience 

a small net decline (up to 1.25 percent) in total forest area as the loss 

of mature forests exceeds the gain from the regrowth on abandoned 

land or timber plantations. The OECD Baseline scenario projects 

relatively less loss of mature forest as well as less regrowth, but 

the net effect is similar. The other scenarios, GEO4 MF, OECD 

ppGlobal and OECD 450ppm, present a significantly different 

picture. Here, the balance between regrowth and loss of mature 

forests is such that there is a small net gain (0.5–1.0 percent) of total 

forests. One expected effect of climate change is that the northern 

tree line will move northward and to higher elevations (CENR 2008).

The most significant changes are expected in Mexico, where 

anywhere from just under 10 percent to nearly 60 percent of mature 

forests are projected to be lost, depending upon the scenario. Furthermore, it is the only one of the three countries that is projected to see a net 

decline in regrowth forests in most scenarios. Magrin, Gay García et 

al. (2007) argue that this loss in forest cover will be accelerated by 

climate change, with most of the semi-arid vegetation in central and 

northern Mexico being replaced by the vegetation of arid regions.

20Land cover data and categories will differ between information provided by IMAGE model and national data. For example, the IMAGE forest area for 

Canada indicates, for 2000, an area 165 million ha larger than the estimated forest and other wooded land (402 million ha), as reflected in Canadian 

national data sets.

Figure 27: Changes in Forest Area 2000–2030

Mature Forest

Regrowth Forest

CANADA 2030

 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 OECD OECD OECD

 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

USA 2030

 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 OECD OECD OECD

 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

MEXICO 2030

 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 OECD OECD OECD

 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

250

200

150

100

50

0

-50

-100

-150

-200

-250

Thousand Square Kilometers
46

Meanwhile, in Canada and the United States, there is a fairly 

striking difference between the OECD Baseline scenario and the 

other scenarios. It is only in the former that a net loss is projected in 

both countries. The projection of a net loss in the United States is in 

line with estimates from the US Department of Agriculture, which 

notes that for the first time in a century, the United States is starting 

to see a reduction of its forested land base due to private landowners selling their land to developers. They go further to project that 

more than 50 million acres of non-federal forests will be converted to 

urban and development use in the next 50 years, with a net loss of 20 

million acres after conversion of pastureland to forest is considered 

(Alig et al. 2003).

Agricultural Land

Figure 28 and Table A2.21 provide information on the extent of 

agricultural lands. In 2000, these accounted for 7, 45, and 55 percent 

of the land in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, respectively. 

The division between food crops and grass and fodder differ significantly across the three countries, with significantly more land 

devoted to grass and fodder in Mexico and the United States than 

in Canada. Also, only Mexico was assumed to have had significant 

areas devoted to biofuel crops in that year.

The divergent projections to 2030 from the GEO4 and OECD 

scenarios project important differences between the countries. The 

GEO4 and OECD Baseline scenarios project an overall expansion 

of land devoted to agriculture, by as much as 9 percent. In the GEO4 

scenarios, this is due to increased areas for grass and fodder; in the 

OECD Baseline scenario, expansion of areas devoted to food crops 

are the main driver. The OECD ppGlobal and OECD 450ppm 

scenarios expect a small net loss of agricultural land (less than 2 percent), even as more land is devoted to biofuel crops.

In Mexico, slight increases are projected in cropland, but very 

large increases in land devoted to grass and fodder in the GEO4 

scenarios, much of this at the expense of forests. The change in grass 

and fodder is much smaller in the OECD scenarios. Significant 

increases in grass and fodder and a contraction in cropland are 

expected in the GEO4 scenarios other than GEO4 SeF, particularly 

in GEO4 MF, which assumes a significant decline in many agricultural subsidies. This, in conjunction with the increased levels of 

agricultural production discussed earlier, implies an increase in the 

intensification of agriculture. The OECD scenarios paint a different 

picture, however, indicating expansion of cropland and decreases 

in land devoted to grass and fodder. The projections for Canada 

also vary across the scenarios, although except for the GEO4 MF 

and GEO4 PF scenarios, there is general pattern of more area 

devoted to both food crops and also grass and fodder. In all three 

countries, the greatest expansion of biofuels is projected in the more 

sustainability-oriented scenarios, i.e., GEO4 SuF, OECD ppGlobal, 

and OECD 450ppm.

Figure 28: Changes in Agricultural Area 2000–2030

2030 CANADA 

 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 OECD OECD OECD

 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

2030 USA 

 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 OECD OECD OECD

 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

2030 MEXICO

 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 OECD OECD OECD

 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

400

300

200

100

0

-100

-200

Thousand Square Kilometers

Food Crops

Grass & Fodder

Biofuel Crops

State: Changes in environmental conditions
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 47

In addition to the extent of agricultural land, it is also important 

to consider the quality of the land, recognizing the impact this can 

have on yields. One measure of this is the risk of erosion from water. 

Figure 29 and Table A2.22 provide an indication of how this risk 

might change. The United States presently has the most agricultural 

land at risk of erosion, reflecting its larger extent of agricultural land 

in general. The OECD Baseline scenarios project fairly significant 

increases in all three countries by 2030, with smaller increases in its 

policy scenarios. In the GEO4 scenarios, Canada and the United States 

are expected to experience increases only in SeF, reflecting, in part, 

the expansion of agricultural land in these scenarios. Mexico, however, which is projected to see an expansion of agricultural land in all 

scenarios, also sees this accompanied by significant increases in soil 

erosion risk. In addition, Magrin, Gay García et al. (2007) point to the 

potential of climate change to exacerbate problems such as salinization and desertification of agricultural lands.

Urban and Built-up Land

Neither GEO4 or the OECD Environmental Outlook provide explicit 

estimates of the change in urban and built-up land, although these 

can be expected to grow along with the overall population. One 

estimate is that urban land will increase from 3.1 percent of the 

conterminous United States to 8.1 percent in 2050 (Nowak and Walton 2005). This implies a rate of expansion that exceeds the growth of 

the urban population itself, indicating a further reduction in urban 

density and an increase in the opportunities and problems associated 

with the growth of metropolitan areas.

6.4 Air Quality

Key points:

•	 A decline is expected in particulate matter but a slight increase

in ground-level ozone in urban areas.

Air pollution in urban areas has been a key concern in the past, as 

well as a target of significant regulation. The OECD scenarios present 

a mixed picture for future urban air pollution in North America.21

With respect to particulate matter22 throughout North America they 

project a continued improvement. In the OECD Baseline scenario, 

average concentrations are projected to fall by nearly one-quarter in 

the United States between 2000 and 2030, and close to one-half in 

Canada and Mexico, although the absolute levels remain higher in 

Mexico than Canada or the United States (see Figure 30 and Table 

A2.23). In the OECD ppGlobal scenario the decreases are even larger. 

These translate into lower exposure of the urban population to high 

levels of particulate matter (see Figure 31 and Table A2.24). This is 

primarily related to a reduction in key emissions, e.g. sulfur oxides, 

driven largely by stronger regulatory policies targeting urban air 

pollution.23 There is some concern, though, that air quality will be 

negatively impacted by an increase in wildfire frequency due to 

climate change. For example, boreal forest fires in Alaska and 

Canada are expected have consequences for air quality in the central 

and eastern United States (Ryan et al. 2008).

The outlook is somewhat less sanguine for ground-level ozone, 

however. The OECD Baseline scenario projects a slight increase in 

average concentrations in urban areas in Canada and the United 

States, and almost no change in Mexico (see Figure 30 and Table 

A2.23).24 The net result is a slight increase in the share of the urban 

population being exposed to higher levels of ozone concentrations 

(see Figure 31 and Table A2.24). A warmer climate is expected to 

contribute to increased ozone levels (Field, Mortsch et al. 2007), 

but was not included in these estimates, implying these are likely 

conservative estimates.

21GEO4 did not include projections for air quality.

22Measured as micrograms per cubic meter of PM10, i.e., particulate matter smaller than 10 microns in diameter. 23The OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030 describes different scenarios for assessing the emissions outlook for each country. The baseline, or reference 

scenario, accords with OECD knowledge of enacted legislation as of 2008, and assumes the difference in regulation between countries is maintained over 

the period of the scenario. As OECD countries, Canada, Mexico, and the United States are treated similarly in the policy scenarios. In the policy scenarios,

regulatory differences are generally eliminated by the year 2030. See chapter 8 (pp. 177–195), for discussion of air pollution and policy scenarios. On p. 189, 

they indicate that “The policy simulations model development towards—but not quite reaching—maximum feasible reduction of air pollutants (as defined 

by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis). To keep the policies realistic, albeit ambitious, the model assumes that eventual emission 

levels for each country remain 3 to 14 percent above what could be achieved with Maximum Feasible Reduction (MFR).” On p. 190, they note that: “The speed 

of implementation of emission control options is assumed to range between 15 and 30 years. The implementation is assumed to take at least 15 years; large 

point sources and transport will see enhanced emission controls introduced first, with other, diffuse sources being addressed typically a decade later.” 

24No results are provided for ozone levels in the OECD policy scenarios.
48

Figure 29: Agricultural Area with High Risk of Soil Erosion Risk from Water 

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

OECD ppGlobal

OECD 450ppm

Million Square Kilometers

 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0

USA

Canada

Mexico

Figure 30: ANNUAL MEAN CONCENTRATIONS OF Particulate Matter and tropospheric OZONE in Urban Areas, by country

50

40

30

20

10

0

Canada

USA

Mexico

2000 2030 OECD Baseline 2030 OECD ppGlobal 2000 2030 OECD Baseline

Particulate Matter (μg per cubic meter) Ozone (ppb)

Mean Concentration in Urban Areas

(PM10 in μg/m3; ozone in ppb)

State: Changes in environmental conditions
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 49

6.5 Water Quality and Quantity

Key points:

•	 Increased water stress is expected across several parts of North

America.

•	 Water quality may also be adversely affected by climate change.

No studies were found that took a detailed quantitative look at future 

water quality in the region. Still, a number of studies did consider 

the potential impact of various factors. The International Joint 

Commission (IJC 2006) noted that if shoreline development and 

urban sprawl go unabated around the Great Lakes, there will be a 

further degradation of water quality through increased runoff, air 

pollution, groundwater contamination, and reduced fish and wildlife habitat and wetlands. Various studies indicate that as a result of 

climate change, water shortages are projected to become more 

frequent in many parts of North America (e.g., southern Ontario, 

many regions of British Columbia, and the southwestern United 

States) (CENR 2008; Lemmen, Warren et al. 2008). It is also considered very likely that the trend toward reduced mountain snowpack 

and earlier spring snowmelt runoff peaks will continue across much of 

the western US (Lettenmaier, Major et al. 2008) and western Canada 

(Lemmen, Warren et al. 2008). This trend can be expected to lower 

water flows during the summer, with potentially adverse effects on 

agriculture. Increased water temperatures can be expected to have a 

negative impact on aquatic ecosystems and water quality across the 

continental United States. Water quality is also sensitive to changes 

in precipitation patterns. Expected increases in intense rain events 

will tend to result in the introduction of more sediment, nutrients, 

pathogens, and toxics into water bodies. However, most water quality 

changes are likely attributable to causes other than climate changes, 

such as pollutant loadings (Lettenmaier, Major et al. 2008). 

6.6 Biodiversity

Key points:

•	 North America may see a furtherloss of 3 to 6 percent in mean terrestrial

species abundance by 2030.

•	 Marine species in regions adjoining North America’s coasts are

expected to decline by slightly larger amounts.

•	 No projections were found related to freshwater biodiversity.

Changes in biodiversity are driven by a host of factors. Thus, in 

many ways, change in biodiversity acts as an integrated indicator 

of environmental impact. Furthermore, given its importance in the 

provision of ecological goods and services, it can also be seen as 

an indicator of the potential impacts of environmental degradation on human society. Vadgama, Nitze et al. note, however, that 

“given the paucity of baseline data on North American biodiversity 

and ecosystem dynamics, in particular, caution is required when 

projecting both the degree of change attributed to specific drivers 

and the resultant future condition. Nonetheless, it is possible to 

identify driver trajectories that point to likely biodiversity scenarios 

Figure 31: North American Urban Population Exposed to Various Levels of Particulate Matter and Ozone

2000

2030 OECD

Baseline

2030 OECD

ppGlobal

Percentage of North American Urban Population Exposed

Ozone Particulate Matter (PM10)

 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2000

2030 OECD

Baseline

 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

PM10

<20 

20-30 

30-50 

50-70 

>70 

Ozone

<2 

2-4 

4-6

6-8

Exposure levels

μg/m3
50

at the ecosystem level” (2008, p. 58-59). In this section, we present 

results from recent studies that have attempted to do so for terrestrial 

and marine biodiversity. No projects were found related to freshwater biodiversity.

Terrestrial Biodiversity

Vadgama, Nitze et al. (2008) identify land use changes and the fragmentation of habitats, climate changes, the introduction of invasive 

species, and nitrogen deposition, which in turn are driven by underlying drivers related to population growth and economic activity, 

as key factors in driving changes in terrestrial biodiversity. With 

respect to climate change, warming will continue to result in shifts of 

species’ ranges to the north and to higher altitudes, a particular 

problem for species that require higher-elevation habitat and that 

may have no options for migration (CENR 2008). Species’ shifts will 

alter the structure, function and services of ecosystems. Ecosystem 

alternation will be enhanced where highly disturbed regions are 

colonized by invasive vegetation (CEC 2008). Vadgama, Nitze et al. 

(2008, p. 69) go on to note that, in general: 

Some species—those that are habitat or dietary specialists or have small range sizes—will have the least ability to adapt to the changing conditions.... Conversely, 

other groups of organisms such as microbes, insects, and 

invasive plants that reproduce rapidly and in large numbers are likely to be able to capitalize on the changes and 

become serious threats to native biodiversity, agricultural systems, and even human health.

The same study goes ahead (p. 84) to predict that, “in 2025, North 

American ecosystems will be a composite of stalwart natives and 

eager transplants.” 

One of first efforts to make systemic projections of changes 

in terrestrial biodiversity was by Sala et al. (2000). More recently, a consortium of research institutes have developed the 

notion of mean species abundance (MSA), which attempts to 

capture the degree to which biodiversity, at a macro-biotic scale, 

remains unchanged. If the indicator is 100 percent, the biodiversity is similar to the natural or largely unaffected state. 

The MSA is calculated on the basis of estimated impacts of various 

human activities on biomes. A reduction in MSA, therefore, is less 

an exact count of species lost than an indicator that pressures have 

increased (OECD 2008).

The North American continent has already seen a significant 

decrease in terrestrial biodiversity estimated at around 25 percent 

in the year 2000, using mean species abundance as the measure (see 

Figure 32 and Table A2.25). The conversion of natural land for agricultural purposes has been the primary cause, but the expansion of 

human infrastructure, e.g. roads, has also played a significant role. 

Canada has experienced less decline, reflecting its large landmass and 

relatively small population.

A further loss of another 4–6 percent is expected in North America by 2030, with more significant losses, particularly in Mexico—

one of the most biologically diverse countries on Earth. The major 

contributing factors to this further decline are climate change and 

expanding infrastructure—urbanization, transportation networks, 

Figure 32: Declines in Mean Terrestrial Species’ Abundance, by Country

Drivers for Change: AGRICULTURE CLIMATE CHANGE INFRASTRUCTURE OTHER

Decline from 'Natural' State

2000

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

OECD ppGlobal

OECD 450ppm

2000

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

OECD ppGlobal

OECD 450ppm

2000

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

OECD ppGlobal

OECD 450ppm

 0 -5% -10% -15% -20% -25% -30% -35% -40% -45%

Canada USA Mexico

2030 2030 2030

State: Changes in environmental conditions
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 51

25 See footnote 14.

construction related to resource exploitation and other elements of 

human settlement. There is some further decrease due to the expansion of agriculture, but this occurs almost exclusively in Mexico. 

Looking closely at the results, it can be seen that the direct impact 

of climate change on biodiversity will be hard to address in the 

short term. Policies related to the development of infrastructure, 

however, can have a significant effect over this period. A key policy 

issue underlying the results presented here is that of protected areas, 

not only their extent, but also the actual degree of protection offered.

Marine

The increases in fishing pressure and nitrogen loadings, along with 

other environmental pressures will have a major negative impact on 

marine biodiversity. Vadgama, Nitze et al. (2008, p. 55) note that by 

2025, three-quarters of the US population will live in coastal areas. The 

warming of the oceans with climate change will cause some species 

to shift their locations; those that cannot move within the time 

frame in which these changes are occurring, e.g., coastal reefs and 

associated species, will be adversely affected. A more recent concern 

is the extent to which marine ecosystems will be affected by ocean 

acidification resulting from the increasing levels of carbon dioxide 

being absorbed by ocean waters (CENR 2008).

The Fisheries Centre at the University of British Columbia has 

developed a marine equivalent to the MSA, the depletion index (DI) 

(Alder, Guénette et al. 2007). This indicator takes into account both 

the actual declines in biomass and the capacity of different species 

to respond to fishing pressure. Figure 33 and Table A2.26 present 

estimates of the changes in DI for four of the FAO marine areas 

bordering North America for the GEO4 and OECD baseline 

scenarios.25 These show an already substantial level of depletion, 

particularly in the Northwest Atlantic. While most scenarios 

show further depletion in all regions, the GEO4 Sustainability First 

scenario indicates some recovery in all but the East Central Pacific. 

This reflects, among other things, the lower levels of exploitation 

in this scenario. As for the Northwest Atlantic Region, relatively 

small increases in depletion risk are projected in three of the GEO4 

scenarios, with improvements projected not only in GEO4 SuF but 

also in the OECD Baseline scenarios.

Figure 33: Changes in the Calculated Marine Species Depletion Index from Historic Levels

Depletion Index

 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 -30 -35 -40 -45 -50

FAO 21

Northwest

AtlantiC

FAO 31

West Central

Atlantic

FAO 67

Northeast

Pacific

FAO 77

East Central

Pacific

2030 2030 2030 2030

2000

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

2000

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

2000

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

2000

GEO4 MF

GEO4 PF

GEO4 SeF

GEO4 SuF

OECD Baseline

(Note: Negative values indicate increases in depletion risk)
52

Photo by Harry Mills

7

Photo: Harry Mills
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 53

CHAPTER 7 

Impacts: How Environmental Change

Affects Socio-economic Conditions

7.1 Introduction

The environmental changes described above can be expected to have 

significant impacts on socio-economic conditions in North America 

and elsewhere. Given the complexity of the relationships between 

human and natural systems, though, there have been only limited 

attempts to make quantitative estimates of the socio-economic 

impacts of environmental change. In part, this is because these 

impacts will be mediated by many other factors, not the least by 

the meta-forces and societal changes noted earlier, along with the 

human capacity for adaptation. It should also be noted that no 

studies have truly ‘closed the loop’ by factoring the feedback from 

environmental change into the socio-economic changes that themselves drive environmental change.

Still, there have been increasing efforts in this realm. Here we 

review recent estimates related to water stress and the health effects 

of urban air pollution. We complement this with a presentation of 

potential impacts related to climate change.

7.2 Population Living in Areas Facing

 Severe Water Stress

Key points:

•	 All scenarios project an increase in the number of persons living

in areas facing water stress in North America even as the absolute 

percentage falls. The range is from an additional 3 to 70 million 

persons.

•	 Mexico will see the most consistent increase, ranging from 12 to

17 million persons.

As with any resource, an increase in the demand for freshwater without 

a concomitant increase in supply will result in increased competition. 

This is explored in GEO4 and the OECD Environmental Outlook 

to 2030 using the concept of water stress, which considers the relationship between annual withdrawals and renewable supplies. Estimates 

for 2005 indicate that approximately 40 percent of North Americans, 

or 170 million people, live in river basins facing severe water stress.26

This includes more than 50 percent of the Mexican population and 

much of the southwestern United States. The values are much lower 

in Canada.

26 Severe water stress is defined as a situation where withdrawals exceed 40 percent of renewable resources. It is assumed that the higher the levels of water 

stress the more likely that chronic or acute water shortages will occur.

Figure 34: Water Stress, by Country

Millions Percentage

Canada 

 2005 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 OECD OECD

 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal

USA

 2005 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 OECD OECD

 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal

Mexico

 2005 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 GEO4 OECD OECD

 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Millions of Persons

Percentage of Population

2030 2030 2030
54

In the OECD Baseline and ppGlobal scenarios, the percentage 

is projected to stay roughly the same from the present to 2030, but 

this still implies an additional 20 to 30 million people facing severe 

water stress by that date (see Figure 34 and Table A2.27). The reduced 

demands, even when combined with the slower population growth 

projected by the GEO4 PF and GEO4 SuF scenarios, are not able to fully 

counteract the expected negative impacts of climate change.27 An 

additional 3 to 8 million persons will face severe water stress by 2030 

according to these scenarios, even as the percentage falls. The faster 

population growth and increased demands considered in GEO4 

SeF lead to projections of closer to 50 percent of the population of 

North America—more than 240 million persons, or 70 million more 

than at present—living in river basins that face severe water stress.

7.3 Health Effects of Urban Air Pollution

Key points:

•	 Significant reductions are expected in morbidity and mortality

related to particulate matter.

•	 Significant increases are expected in morbidity and mortality

related to ground-level ozone. This is primarily due to a lack of 

improvement in ozone levels and the growth in urban populations 

and increases in the number of elderly.

The changes in exposure to particulate matter and ground-level 

ozone discussed earlier can be expected to lead to shifts in mortality 

and morbidity associated with these pollutants. Figure 35 and Table 

A2.28 present estimates of the magnitude of these changes from the 

OECD Baseline and ppGlobal scenarios. Significant decreases are 

expected in mortality and morbidity from causes related to particulate matter from 2000 to 2030. The OECD Baseline scenario projects 

a reduction around 50 percent in North America and the projection of 

the OECD ppGlobal scenario approaches 95 percent. These reductions are seen in all three countries.

With respect to ground-level ozone, however, the lack of improvement in exposure levels, combined with the increase in total 

urban populations and the rising average age of the population, 

are expected to lead to increasing rates of mortality and morbidity. 

In the OECD Baseline scenario, the only one for which estimates are 

provided, North America is projected to experience a 3- to 4-fold 

increase in mortality rates and 5- to 6-fold increase in morbidity 

rates. All three countries are similarly affected.

Figure 35: Health Effects from Urban Air Pollution

Mortality - Deaths per million inhabitants in urban areas

Morbitity - DALYs lost, per million inhabitants in urban areas

2000

OECD

Baseline

OECD

ppGlobal

2000

OECD

Baseline

OECD

ppGlobal

2000

OECD

Baseline

OECD

ppGlobal

 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200

PM10 Mortality

PM10 Morbidity

Ozone Mortality

Ozone Morbidity

Canada USA Mexico

2030 2030 2030

27As we saw in Section 3.2, the scenarios differ little in their projection of actual changes in climate and, therefore, in total water availability, 

over the period to 2030. Thus, the differences in water stress primarily reflect differences in withdrawals.

Impacts: Socio-economic Impacts of Environmental Change
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 55

7.4 Climate Change Impacts

Key points:

•	 Climate change is expected to have potentially significant impacts

on human health as well as on society and the economy.

Figure 2 presented general examples of impacts associated with 

increasing temperatures related to climate change. As noted, 

though, the effects of climate change will be manifested in more 

ways than just temperature changes. Furthermore, the magnitude of 

these effects will differ by region, as will the vulnerability of different 

regions and sectors of society. A number of studies have considered 

the potential socio-economic implications of climate change in 

North America. While the severity of these impacts, and therefore 

their socio-economic costs, may be difficult to estimate in many 

cases, the nature of the impacts is easier to identify. Here, we 

summarize some of the key conclusions from these studies. 

On balance, the socio-economic impacts of environmental change 

are expected to be negative, but this will differ significantly across 

sectors and regions (Ruth, Coelho et al. 2007). These are separated 

into impacts on human health and other socio-economic impacts, 

reflecting the categories used in many of the studies considered.

The negative impact of strained 

water resources on agricultural production throughout 

North America is expected to 

be in the billions of dollars. 

Impacts on Human Health

•	 More intense and prolonged heat waves are likely (UNEP 2007).

There is likely to be a substantial increase in health risks from 

heat waves in the Midwestern states because of demographic 

shifts yielding more vulnerable populations and an infrastructure no longer adequate to withstand severe heat (Ebi and 

Meehl 2007).

•	 Increased smog episodes can be expected in some locations

(UNEP 2007). In the eastern United States, ozone-related deaths 

from climate change could increase by approximately 4.5 percent 

from the 1990s to the 2050s (Field, Mortsch et al. 2007). Health 

problems would be exacerbated in cities subject to atmospheric 

inversions, such as Mexico City (Magrin, Gay García et al. 2007).

•	 An increase inwater- and food-borne contamination, and diseases

transmitted by insects (such as Lyme disease, West Nile virus 

and hantavirus pulmonary syndrome) may occur in some locations (UNEP 2007). This would include an increase in the 

population at risk from malaria and dengue fever in Mexico

(Magrin, Gay García et al. 2007).

•	 Many cities of Latin America, which are already vulnerable to

landslides and mudflows, are very likely to suffer the exacerbation 

of extreme events, with increasing risks/hazards for local 

populations (Magrin, Gay García et al. 2007).

Other Socio-economic Impacts

•	 In northern Canada and Alaska, climate-induced changes in

permafrost, sea ice, lake ice and snow cover have large and 

costly implications for infrastructure maintenance and design 

(Lemmen, Warren et al. 2008).

•	 Climate change will continue to exacerbate existing stresses on

the forest industry (Lemmen, Warren et al. 2008). Climate change 

is expected to extend the forest fire season (Field, Mortsch et al. 

2007), while warmer temperatures overall will facilitate the spread 

of forest pests, such as the pine beetle. 

•	 There is expected to be a mixed impact on fisheries, with coldwater fisheries likely to be negatively affected, showing gains in 

the north and losses in the southern portions of ranges, while 

warm-water fisheries may gain (Field, Mortsch et al. 2007).

•	 Impacts on agriculturewill likely be mixed across NorthAmerica.

Drought is projected to occur more frequently in the Canadian 

Prairies, the West Coast, and the southwestern United States 

(Lemmen, Warren et al. 2008). The negative impact of strained 

water resources on agricultural production throughout North 

America is expected to be in the billions of dollars (Ruth, 

Coelho et al. 2007). At the same time, initial, moderate climate 

change is projected to increase yields from rain-fed agriculture, 

specifically in parts of the United States and Canada (Field, 

Mortsch et al. 2007).

•	 Transportation along the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic coasts will

be impacted by increased damages from coastal storm events, 

aggravated by slowly-rising sea levels. A drop in water levels in 

the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence will impact shipping lanes 

and hydroelectric production (Field, Mortsch et al. 2007).

•	 Increasing windstorms and projected sea-level rise, will affect

coastal tourism revenues (Magrin, Gay García et al. 2007).

•	 Declines or shifts in species’ populations and distributions, and

other changes, will present unique challenges for many Arctic 

Aboriginal communities in maintaining and protecting their 

traditional and subsistence ways of life (Lemmen, Warren et 

al. 2008).
56

Photo: Ryan Drake-Stoker
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 57

chapter 8 

Conclusions

The future is, and always will be, the realm of the unknown. Still, there is much to be gained from trying to understand the range of 

possibilities, not only to prepare for what may be ahead but, just as importantly, to take action to chart a course toward more desirable futures. 

In this report, we have reviewed what recent studies have had to say about the future of the North American environment projected to the year 

2030. Although two decades hence, the year 2030 is well within the planning and policy horizons of many segments of society. The decisions 

we make today, and those we have made in recent years, will go a long way toward determining the kind of environment and the related social, 

economic and environmental challenges that will exist at that time.

Trying to see into the future is fraught with uncertainties. These include not only uncertainties about the workings of natural and social 

systems, but also about the choices that will be made by individuals and society as a whole. Thus, it is not surprising that there are only 

a limited number of studies that have made the attempt to examine the future of the environment in a structured fashion. Those that we 

have reviewed address the issue of uncertainty, in part, by positing plausible scenarios of the future. These are not predictions, but instead 

represent conditional projections based upon current knowledge and sets of assumptions about a range of developments, most importantly, 

societal choices. 

Recognizing the limited set of available studies and the limitations in projecting the future in general, some key messages can still be 

drawn from this review. These can be grouped into three categories:

There is a range of variation in the projections for many environmental issues and their drivers.

The studies reviewed here, and the various scenarios they present, differ in terms of their assumptions about the choices we make, both as 

individuals and society. A wider range of variation, in both the assumptions and the outcomes, points to aspects where our actions can make 

a more significant impact out to the year 2030. Those issues with the greatest variation in projections across the scenarios include:

•	 Energy use and associated emissions

•	 Water use and treatment of wastewater

Significant changes, representing significant challenges, can be expected in a number of environmental issues 

and their drivers

Significance here refers not only to the magnitude of a change, but also to its direction and persistence, the extent to which it approaches or 

exceeds critical thresholds, and the impacts it has upon society. The most important challenges are likely to include:

•	 Continued and accelerated warming, particularly in the Arctic

•	 Continued loss of terrestrial biodiversity

•	 Persistence of elevated levels of ground-level ozone in urban areas

There exist important gaps in the existing knowledge base concerning environmental futures

Recognizing that attempting to predict the future is a fool’s errand, there is still much to be learned from considering the possibilities. 

To the extent that important issues have not received attention, they are less likely to receive consideration in the actions we take, including 

the policies we develop. Among those issues that deserve greater attention are:

•	 The growth in urban and built-up land area

•	 Freshwater quality and groundwater availability and quality

•	 The specific economic and health effects of environmental change

•	 The impact of consumption in North America on the environment in other regions and vice versa

These point to an interlinked set of actions for consideration—addressing those changes that are amenable to policy action in the 

near-term, preparing for those changes that are almost inevitable over the short-term but are amenable to policy action in the longer-term, 

and strengthening our knowledge concerning those changes about which we know the least.
58
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 59

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CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 61

Annex 1 

Key Studies

Organization for Environmental 

Cooperation and Development

Environmental Outlook to 2030

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 

OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030 was released in spring 2008 

(OECD 2008) and a further background report was released shortly 

thereafter (Bakkes, Bosch et al. 2008).28

The OECD Environmental Outlook is built around a baseline reference scenario (OECD Baseline), which is described as:

a stylised picture of the environmental developments in the 

next decades. Its hypothesis is no new policies in response 

to environmental pressures—as well as no new policies 

on subsidies in agricultural production and on tariffs in agricultural trade. (Bakkes and Bosch et al. 2008, p. 18)

Various policy package (pp) ‘variants’ are explored that relate to, for example, local and regional air pollution, greenhouse 

gas emissions, and agricultural support. These include “policy 

packages with successively broadening participation: OECD only; 

OECD+BRIC and OECD+BRIC+Rest of the World” and separate climate change options (Bakkes, Bosch et al. 2008, p. 19). In this report 

we focus on the more stringent variants: the OECD+BRIC+Rest of the 

World comprehensive policy package, referred to here as OECD 

ppGlobal, and the climate change option reflecting policies needed 

to stabilize atmospheric concentration at 450 parts per million by 

volume of carbon dioxide equivalents, referred to here as OECD 450 

ppm, as these provide the largest contrast to the OECD Baseline.

The OECD is careful to note that the OECD ppGlobal scenario:

does not attempt to reflect an “ideal” or “comprehensive” package of environmental policies. Instead, it reflects 

a combination of a limited set of policies that: a) cut across 

many of the main environmental challenges identified 

in the Outlook; and b) can be simulated in the modelling 

framework used for the Outlook. It does not, however, include

any policies explicitly aimed at protecting biodiversity or enhancing agricultural technology uptake, 

for example. The EO policy package has been designed to 

be reasonably politically and practically realistic in 

terms of its scope, phasing the policies in over time, and 

with some consideration of regional capacity. (OECD 2008, 

p. 438)

The OECD 450ppm variant is described as follows:

This policy simulation is chosen to demonstrate the level of effort required to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of GHG at 450 ppm CO2

eq (referred to below as 450 

ppm) and limit global mean temperature change to near 

2 ̊C over the long-term. It provides insights into possible 

mitigation costs for this aggressive mitigation pathway. 

It simulates an emission reduction pathway across all 

world regions in a “least-cost” manner across all sources (and sinks) of greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to 

cost and effectiveness, the simulation also reviews the 

technologies needed to achieve this aggressive stabilisation 

target (see Chapter 17). This allows us to understand what 

technologies and sources of greenhouse gases are expected to 

offer the most cost-effective means of reducing emissions significantly over the coming decades. The tax that was applied 

for this simulation increases from US$2.4 per tonne of CO2

eq 

in 2010 to US$155 in 2050 (in constant 2001 US$). (OECD 2008, 

p. 155)

The OECD presents a synopsis of key environmental impacts by 

region for the various policy variants explored (Bakkes, Bosch et al. 

2008, p. 29). This is reproduced below.

28Special thanks is extended to Rob Visser of the OECD and Jan Bakkes of the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, who provided us with 

detailed model runs including data not explicitly presented in either of these published reports.
62

Climate change

Temperature change 

and rate of temperature 

change

atmosphere

Excess mortality

attribuable to urban 

air pollution by PM10

biodiversity

Mean Species

Abundance

forests

Change in natural

forest area

land use

Change in agricultural

land area

nutrient loading

Agricultural nitrogen

losses and nitrogen

load at river mouths

fresh water

Population living in

areas under severe

water stress

legend

increase of a large problem in the context of internationally articulated objectives

intermediate situations, including hotspots or situations getting worse before getting better

significant decrease in problem

inconclusive

Baseline

ppOECD

ppOECD + BRIC

ppGlobal

450 ppm

Baseline

ppOECD

ppOECD + BRIC

ppGlobal

Baseline

ppOECD

ppOECD + BRIC

ppGlobal

Baseline

ppOECD

ppOECD + BRIC

ppGlobal

Baseline

ppOECD

ppOECD + BRIC

ppGlobal

Baseline

ppGlobal

Baseline

ppGlobal

Notes: NAM = North America; EUR = OECD Europe; JPK = OECD Asia; ANZ = OECD Pacific; BRA = Brazil; RUS = Russia & Caucasus; SOA = South Asia; 

CHN = China Region; MEA = Middle East; OAS = Other Asia; ECA = Eastern Europe & Central Asia; OLC = Other Latin America & Caribbean; AFR = Africa; 

BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China. 

nam eur jpk anz bra rus soa chn mea oas eca olc afr World

Table A1.1: Synopsis of Environmental Impacts by Regional Cluster in OECD Environmental Outlook

Source: OECD Environmental Outlook modelling suite, final output from IMAGE cluster (given in Bakkes and Bosch et al. 2008, p. 29)

Annex 1: Key Studies
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 63

United Nations Environment Programme

Global Environmental Outlook 4: 

Environment for Development

The United Nations Environment Programme’s GEO4: Environment 

for Development was released in October 2007 (UNEP 2007). Chapter

 9 - “The Future Today” was the primary forward-looking chapter in 

this assessment (Rothman, Agard et al. 2007).29

GEO4 does not include a baseline reference scenario. Rather, it 

presents four scenarios with fundamentally different assumptions 

about changes in individual behaviour and public policies. These are 

as follows:

•	 Markets First: the private sector, with active government support, 

pursues maximum economic growth as the best path to improve 

the environment and human well-being. Lip service is paid to 

the ideals of the Brundtland Commission, Agenda 21 and other 

major policy decisions on sustainable development. There is 

a narrow focus on the sustainability of markets rather than on 

the broader, human-environment system. Technological fixes to 

environmental challenges are emphasized at the expense of other 

policy interventions and some tried-and-tested solutions.

•	 Policy First: government, with active private and civil sector 

support, initiates and implements strong policies to improve 

the environment and human well-being, while still emphasizing 

economic development. Policy First introduces some measures 

aimed at promoting sustainable development, but the tensions 

between environment and economic policies are biased towards 

social and economic considerations. Still, it brings the idealism 

of the Brundtland Commission to overhauling the environmental 

policy process at different levels, including efforts to implement 

the recommendations and agreements of the Rio Earth Summit, 

the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), and 

the Millennium Summit. The emphasis is on more top-down approaches, due in part to desires to make rapid progress on key 

targets.

•	 Security First: government and private sector compete for control in efforts to improve, or at least maintain, human well-being 

for mainly the rich and powerful in society. Security First, which 

could also be described as “Me First,” has as its focus a minority: 

rich, national and regional. It emphasizes sustainable development 

only in the context of maximizing access to and use of the 

environment by the powerful. Contrary to the Brundtland 

doctrine of interconnected crises, responses under Security First 

reinforce the silos of management, and the UN role is viewed 

with suspicion, particularly by some rich and powerful segments 

of society.

•	 Sustainability First: government, civil society and the private 

sector work collaboratively to improve the environment and 

human well-being, with a strong emphasis on equity. Equal 

weight is given to environmental and socio-economic policies, and 

accountability, transparency and legitimacy are stressed across all 

actors. As in Policy First, it brings the idealism of the Brundtland 

Commission to overhauling the environmental policy process 

at different levels, including strong efforts to implement the 

recommendations and agreements of the Rio Earth Summit, 

WSSD, and the Millennium Summit. Emphasis is placed on 

developing effective public-private sector partnerships not only 

in the context of projects but also that of governance, ensuring 

that stakeholders across the spectrum of the environment-development discourse provide strategic input to policy making and 

implementation. There is an acknowledgement that these processes 

take time, and that their impacts are likely to be more long-term 

than short-term (Rothman, Agard et al. 2007, pp. 400-401).

United Nations, Department of Economic

and Social Affairs, Population Division

World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and 

World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision

Every two years the Population Division of the United Nations 

Department of Economic and Social Affairs prepares national-level 

population estimates and projections. Since 1988, it has also provided these data separately for urban and rural populations. The most 

recent versions are the World Population Prospects: The 2006 

Revision (United Nations 2007) and World Urbanization Prospects: 

The 2007 Revision (United Nations 2008). The data in the latter 

are consistent with those in the medium variant of the 2006 global 

population estimates and projections.

The 2006 Revision includes eight projection variants and three 

AIDS scenarios (United Nations 2007). These differ with respect to 

assumptions around fertility, mortality, and international migration. 

Of these, the most commonly referenced, and the ones presented in 

the main body of this report, are three variants that differ only in 

terms of their fertility assumptions:

•	 Medium-variant: total fertility in all countries is assumed to converge eventually toward a level of 1.85 children per woman.

•	 High-variant: fertility is projected to remain 0.5 children above

the fertility in the medium variant over most of the projection 

period.

•	 Low-variant: fertility is projected to remain 0.5 children below

the fertility in the medium variant over most of the projection 

period.

29 Special thanks is extended to the various modelling groups who have kindly provided detailed model runs including data not explicitly presented in 

the published report. These groups include the Fisheries Centre at the University of British Columbia, the Netherland Environmental Assessment Agency, 

the International Food Policy Research Institute, the Centre for Environmental Systems Research of the University of Kassel, the Frederick S. Pardee Center 

for International Futures at the University of Denver, and the UNEP-World Conservation Monitoring Centre

Annex 1: Key Studies
64

In these variants, mortality is projected on the basis of models 

of changing life expectancy produced by the United Nations 

Population Division. These produce smaller gains over time as 

higher life expectancy is achieved. The future path of international 

migration is set on the basis of past international migration estimates 

and consideration of the policy stance of each country with regard to 

future international migration flows. In general, though, projected 

levels of net migration are held constant over most of the projection 

period (United Nations 2007). The UN indicates that “estimates 

of the proportion of the population living in urban areas and the 

population of cities are derived on the basis of national statistics,” but 

is not clear on what the future projections for these proportions are 

derived (United Nations 2008, p. 1).

International Energy Agency

World Energy Outlook 2008

The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an autonomous body 

within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Each year it releases a World 

Energy Outlook. Since 1998, the even–number-year reports present 

new sets of comprehensive projections and the odd–number-year 

reports address more specific issues in detail. The results presented 

in this report are derived from the World Energy Outlook 2008

(OECD/IEA 2008).

The main projections presented in WEO2008 relate to a Reference Scenario. This scenario indicates “what would happen if, among 

other things, there were to be no new energy-policy interventions by 

government beyond those already adopted by mid-2008” (OECD/

IEA 2008). These do include policies that may have yet to be fully 

implemented (OECD/IEA 2008, p. 59). The study does include other 

analyses related to oil and gas supply prospects and climate policy 

options, but detailed results are not presented, so they have not been 

considered in this report.

The principal assumptions underlying the Reference Scenario 

relate to population, economic activity, energy prices and energyrelated technologies. The population assumptions are taken from the 

most recent UN projections (see description above). Assumptions 

about economic growth are developed building on information from 

a number of sources, including the International Monetary Fund 

and the World Bank. Similarly, assumptions related to energy prices 

and technology draw upon other, more detailed analyses. These are 

then used to drive the IEA’s World Energy Model to produce the 

projections presented in the report (OECD/IEA 2008).

US Energy Information Administration

International Energy Outlook 2008

Each year, the Energy Information Administration, an independent 

statistical and analytical agency within the US Department of 

Energy produces an International Energy Outlook. This complements 

the US-focused Annual Energy Outlook. The results presented in 

this report are derived from the International Energy Outlook 2008

(US EIA 2008).

The main projections presented in IEO2008 relate to a Reference 

Case. This is “based on US and foreign government laws in effect 

on 1 January 2008. The potential impacts of pending or proposed 

legislation, regulations, and standards are not reflected in the projections, nor are the impacts of legislation for which the implementing 

mechanisms have not yet been announced” (US EIA 2008, p. ix). 

In addition to the Reference Case, four other cases are considered. 

These differ based upon assumptions related to economic growth 

and energy prices, reflecting the uncertainty in these parameters. 

Since the most detailed results are presented for the Reference Case, 

this is the scenario focused on in this report.

The principal assumptions underlying the Reference Case relate 

to population, economic activity, energy prices and energy-related 

technologies. The population assumptions are taken from the most 

recent UN projections (see description above) for all countries other 

than the United States; these are provided by US-based studies 

(US EIA 2008, p. 117). Assumptions about economic growth 

are drawn from independent studies (p. 106). Similarly, 

assumptions related to energy prices and technology draw upon other, more detailed analyses. These are then used to drive the a suite of 

models in order to produce the projections presented in the report.
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 65

Annex 2

Data tables

The following tables summarize projections for 2030 from the GEO4 and OECD scenarios, as well as the reference scenarios in the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2008 (OECD/IEA 2008), the US Energy Information Administration’s International Energy 

Outlook 2008 (US EIA 2008), and the high, medium, and low population projections from the United Nations Population Division.

The scenarios are GEO4 MF (Markets First), GEO4 PF (Policy First), GEO4 SeF (Security First), GEO4 SuF (Sustainability First), OECD 

ppGlobal (comprehensive global policy package), and OECD 450ppm (GHGs stabilized at 450 ppm).

Note: Total may occasionally differ slightly from direct sums because of rounding.

Table A2.1: Total Population (millions of persons)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD UNPD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm Low Medium High

Canada 32 39 38 37 38 39 39 39 37 39 42

USA 300 362 354 347 348 363 363 363 342 366 391

Mexico 104 127 129 130 127 130 130 130 118 128 139

NORTH AMERICA	 436	 528	 521	 514	 513	 532	 532	 532	 497	 533	 572

Note: Data normalized to 2005 values from UNPD.

Table A2.2: Total GDP (billions of US dollars)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm IEO 2008 WEO 2008

Canada 990 2,184 2,188 1,851 1,961 1,707 1,699 1,702 1,780 1,636

USA 10,996 25,825 25,786 23,432 23,003 20,778 20,746 20,760 20,204 18,551

Mexico 983 2,071 2,104 1,885 1,889 2,459 2,446 2,448 2,534 2,299

NORTH AMERICA	 12,969	 30,080	 30,078	 27,168	 26,853	 24,944	 24,891	 24,910	 24,518	 22,486

Note: All values in year 2000 US$ using PPP-based exchange rates. Data normalized to 2005 values from WEO 2008. IEO 2008 and WEO 2008 values are from reference scenarios.

Table A2.3: GDP Per Capita (thousands of US dollars)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm IEO 2008WEO 2008

Canada 30.7 56.1 57.9 50.3 52.3 43.7 43.5 43.6 45.5 41.8

USA 36.7 71.3 72.8 67.5 66.1 57.3 57.2 57.2 55.2 50.7

Mexico 9.4 16.3 16.3 14.6 14.8 18.9 18.8 18.9 19.8 17.9

Note: All values in year 2000 US$ using PPP-based exchange rates. Data normalized to 2005 values from WEO 2008. IEO 2008 and WEO 2008 values are from reference scenarios.
66

Table A2.4: Sectoral Shares of Total GDP (%)

 Projections to 2030

 GEO4

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF

Canada

Agriculture 2.4 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3

Energy 7.3 4.6 4.1 5.0 4.4

ICTech 4.9 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.7

Manufactures 25.9 26.5 26.6 26.2 26.5

Materials 2.2 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.2

Services 57.4 59.0 59.2 58.9 58.9

USA

Agriculture 1.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1

Energy 2.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1

ICTech 7.9 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.3

Manufactures 20.3 18.9 18.9 19.8 18.5

Materials 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.4

Services 66.9 69.3 69.3 68.0 69.7

Mexico

Agriculture 4.4 2.2 2.5 2.6 3.1

Energy 6.7 3.8 3.5 4.1 3.2

ICTech 6.2 7.5 7.5 7.8 7.8

Manufactures 28.0 30.1 30.2 30.9 30.4

Materials 2.2 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.1

Services 52.5 53.3 53.2 51.5 52.5

Annex 2: Data Tables
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 67

Table A2.5: Primary Energy Use (petajoules)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm IEO 2008WEO 2008

Canada	

Coal 1,171 716 270 1,054 59 1,343 267 270 1,559 757

Oil 4,077 6,406 5,375 5,820 3,552 4,578 3,887 3,138 4,712 4,270

Natural Gas 3,376 6,728 6,063 5,912 4,580 3,388 2,955 2,711 4,681 5,090

Nuclear 1,004 447 515 576 439 883 668 978 999 1,223

Hydro 1,309 1,695 1,687 1,580 1,579 1,579 1,379 1,444 3,335 1,406

Traditional Biofuels 488 469 404 414 310 310 367 338 496

Modern Biofuels 42 341 580 381 1,459 1,459 621 1,118 475

Solar and Wind 5 160 238 138 280 280 574 274 250

Total	 11,472	 16,963	 15,132	 15,874	 12,258	 12,258	 10,717	 10,272	 15,287	 13,966

USA

Coal 23,264 28,847 19,031 36,260 8,646 34,281 16,964 14,608 31,203 26,520

Oil 39,893 58,659 49,517 55,848 36,200 46,006 39,331 31,929 46,483 36,903

Natural Gas 21,328 41,328 39,900 34,265 30,570 23,865 21,374 26,087 22,991 21,682

Nuclear 8,846 3,653 4,221 4,480 3,959 7,846 9,551 8,888 6,971 10,480

Hydro 981 1,269 1,250 1,178 1,176 1,125 1,040 1,083 6,736 1,086

Traditional Biofuels 2,813 2,029 1,794 1,868 1,469 3,229 2,855 2,636 3,831

Modern Biofuels 286 1,055 1,879 895 4,778 3,316 7,389 10,660 3,934

Solar and Wind 483 2,118 3,776 1,300 6,652 4,700 14,879 5,887 2,982

Total	 97,894	 138,958	 121,369	 136,094	 93,451	 124,367	 113,382	 101,778	 114,384	 107,416

Mexico

Coal 366 736 438 952 181 746 439 372 509 825

Oil 4,348 8,259 6,914 7,595 4,176 7,140 5,776 5,046 6,900 5,207

Natural Gas 1,850 5,120 4,591 4,171 4,190 4,533 3,337 3,116 4,434 4,443

Nuclear 118 140 187 170 134 164 214 216 87 116

Hydro 100 168 166 183 178 186 171 179 405 135

Traditional Biofuels 326 542 482 511 381 405 364 331 166

Modern Biofuels 22 195 342 161 887 813 1,323 1,387 333

Solar and Wind 266 591 1,078 436 1,377 464 2,257 819 541

Total	 7,395	 15,750	 14,198	 14,180	 11,505	 14,450	 13,882	 11,467	 12,336	 11,766

NORTH AMERICA

Coal 24,802 30,299 19,738 38,267 8,886 36,370 17,670 15,251 33,272 28,102

Oil 48,318 73,324 61,807 69,263 43,928 57,724 48,994 40,113 58,095 46,379

Natural Gas 26,554 53,176 50,555 44,348 39,341 31,785 27,666 31,914 32,106 31,216

Nuclear 9,968 4,239 4,923 5,225 4,532 8,892 10,433 10,082 8,058 11,819

Hydro 2,390 3,132 3,102 2,941 2,934 2,810 2,590 2,706 10,477 2,626

Traditional Biofuels 3,627 3,040 2,681 2,793 2,160 4,054 3,585 3,306 4,493

Modern Biofuels 349 1,591 2,801 1,437 7,125 4,530 9,332 13,165 4,742

Solar and Wind 755 2,869 5,092 1,874 8,309 5,437 17,710 6,981 3,772

Total	 116,762	 171,670	 150,699	 166,148	 117,214	 151,602	 137,980	 123,517	 142,007	 133,148

Note: Data normalized to 2005 values from WEO 2008. IEO 2008 and WEO 2008 values are from reference scenarios. IEO 2008 data for Hydro includes all renewables.
68

Table A2.6: Per Capita Primary Energy Use (gigajoules)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm IEO 2008WEO 2008

Canada 355 436 401 432 327 327 274 263 391 357

USA 326 384 343 392 269 343 312 280 312 293

Mexico 71 124 110 109 90 111 107 88 96 92

Note: Data normalized to 2005 values from WEO 2008. IEO 2008 and WEO 2008 values are from reference scenarios.

Table A2.7: Primary Energy Use per Unit GDP (megajoules)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm IEO 2008WEO 2008

Canada 11.6 7.8 6.9 8.6 6.3 7.5 6.3 6.0 8.6 8.5

USA 8.9 5.4 4.7 5.8 4.1 6.0 5.5 4.9 5.7 5.8

Mexico 7.5 7.6 6.7 7.5 6.1 5.9 5.7 4.7 4.9 5.1

Note: GDP measured in year 2000 US$ using PPP-based exchange rates. Data normalized to 2005 values from WEO 2008. IEO 2008 and WEO 2008 values are from reference scenarios.

Table A2.8: Final Energy Use, by Sector (petajoules)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

Canada

Industry 2,616 3,351 2,909 2,913 2,302 2,391 2,296 2,057

Residential 1,419 2,001 1,902 1,841 1,558 1,797 1,767 1,627

Services 1,310 1,964 1,801 1,801 1,426 1,654 1,632 1,388

Transportation 2,331 3,889 3,475 3,950 2,763 3,452 3,349 2,773

Other 186 225 199 215 161 238 233 195

Total	 7,862 11,431 10,286 10,721 8,210 9,532 9,277 8,040

USA

Industry 15,096 20,717 17,339 17,862 12,995 18,322 17,620 15,481

Residential 12,259 16,610 15,558 15,458 12,597 14,990 14,681 13,299

Services 9,033 13,609 12,476 12,763 9,775 12,939 12,694 10,705

Transportation 27,166 40,273 35,552 42,901 28,699 35,974 34,959 28,720

Other 658 906 794 832 580 929 903 744

Total	 64,212 92,116 81,720 89,817 64,645 83,154 80,858 68,949

Mexico

Industry 1,282 2,857 2,429 2,531 1,875 2,639 2,536 2,217

Residential 815 1,602 1,497 1,428 1,172 1,021 993 879

Services 156 425 407 366 297 715 698 564

Transportation 1,608 3,636 3,221 3,492 2,276 3,473 3,367 2,689

Other 121 286 253 252 187 185 180 143

Total	 3,982 8,806 7,809 8,068 5,807 8,033 7,774 6,492

NORTH AMERICA

Industry 18,994 26,925 22,677 23,306 17,172 23,352 22,453 19,755 

Residential 14,493 20,214 18,958 18,728 15,327 17,808 17,441 15,805 

Services 10,499 15,998 14,685 14,930 11,498 15,308 15,024 12,657 

Transportation 31,105 47,798 42,248 50,343 33,738 42,899 41,675 34,182 

Other 965 1,418 1,247 1,299 928 1,352 1,316 1,082 

Total	 76,056 	 112,353 	 99,814 	 108,606 	 78,662 	 100,719 	 97,909 	 83,481

Note: Data normalized to 2005 values from OECD Baseline.

Annex 2: Data Tables
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 69

Table A2.9: Water Use, Total by Sector (millions of cubic meters) and Per Capita (cubic meters)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

Canada

Agriculture 3,929 3,995 3,558 4,677 4,022 4,017 3,999 3,979

Domestic 5,930 6,892 5,115 8,062 4,537 6,638 6,623 6,628

Electricity 30,279 45,077 5,604 48,944 3,314 26,543 19,465 18,892

Manufacturing 6,186 10,076 9,522 10,153 9,691 6,307 6,158 6,178

Total	 46,324	 66,040	 23,800	 71,836	 21,565	 43,505	 36,245	 35,678

	 	 (1,435)	 (1,696)	 (630)	 (1,953)	 (575)	 (1,114)	 (928)	 (914)

USA

Agriculture 244,572 227,179 175,543 255,180 233,128 237,434 237,409 237,194

Domestic 51,866 61,190 45,678 72,098 39,708 61,221 61,197 61,208

Electricity 211,671 279,124 55,450 323,355 37,538 234,600 190,334 187,025

Manufacturing 27,570 50,967 46,901 55,011 45,835 39,136 38,899 38,902

Total	 535,679	 618,459	 323,571	 705,644	 356,210	 572,391	 527,839	 524,328

	 	 (1,787)	 (1,708)	 (914)	 (2,034)	 (1,024)	 (1,577)	 (1,455)	 (1,445)

Mexico

Agriculture 35,767 37,073 33,301 54,912 44,819 29,753 29,767 29,721

Domestic 4,996 12,797 9,941 13,321 6,493 17,516 17,345 17,373

Electricity 16,077 39,632 16,943 42,560 11,571 34,501 26,879 24,763

Manufacturing 287 667 635 697 486 582 573 574

Total	 57,127	 90,169	 60,820	 111,490	 63,369	 82,352	 74,563	 72,431

	 	 (548)	 (711)	 (472)	 (861)	 (498)	 (635)	 (575)	 (558)

NORTH AMERICA

Agriculture 284,268 268,247 212,402 314,769 281,970 271,204 271,175 270,895

Domestic 62,792 80,878 60,734 93,481 50,739 85,375 85,166 85,209

Electricity 258,027 363,833 77,997 414,859 52,423 295,644 236,678 230,680

Manufacturing 34,043 61,710 57,058 65,861 56,012 46,025 45,629 45,654

Total	 639,130	 774,668	 408,191	 888,970	 441,144	 698,248	 638,648	 632,438

Note: Data normalized to 2005 values from OECD Baseline. Per capita values in parentheses.
70

Table A2.10: Agricultural Production (thousands of metric tons)

 Projections to 2030

 GEO4

 2000 MF PF SeF SuF

Canada

Animal Products 12,098 20,774 19,916 19,329 20,650

Non-Animal Products 77,950 125,547 121,839 127,933 133,958

Total	 90,048	 146,321	 141,755	 147,262	 154,608

USA

Animal Products 112,282 190,990 186,630 182,645 194,750

Non-Animal Products 727,446 1,200,466 1,169,469 1,112,784 1,232,444

Total	 839,728	 1,391,456	 1,356,099	 1,295,429	 1,427,194

Mexico

Animal Products 13,740 30,164 32,394 29,234 31,007

Non-Animal Products 131,490 257,458 256,543 235,851 267,770

Total	 145,230	 287,622	 288,937	 265,085	 298,777

NORTH AMERICA

Animal Products 138,120 241,928 238,940 231,208 246,407

Non-Animal Products 936,886 1,583,471 1,547,851 1,476,568 1,634,172

Total	 1,075,006	 1,825,399	 1,786,791	 1,707,776	 1,880,579

Table A2.11: Agricultural Demand (thousands of metric tons)

 Projections to 2030

 GEO4

 2000 MF PF SeF SuF

Canada

Animal Products 11,310 16,236 16,419 14,908 15,713

Non-Animal Products 63,332 98,293 96,916 90,318 95,752

Total	 74,642	 114,529	 113,335	 105,226	 111,465

USA

Animal Products 109,502 161,724 163,209 148,779 152,204

Non-Animal Products 635,014 958,790 944,833 915,014 928,385

Total	 744,516	 1,120,514	 1,108,042	 1,063,793	 1,080,589

Mexico

Animal Products 15,731 27,033 28,815 24,861 27,183

Non-Animal Products 105,817 187,772 192,902 169,029 183,137

Total	 121,548	 214,805	 221,717	 193,890	 210,320

NORTH AMERICA

Animal Products 136,543 204,993 208,443 188,548 195,100

Non-Animal Products 804,163 1,244,855 1,234,651 1,174,361 1,207,274

Total	 940,706	 1,449,848	 1,443,094	 1,362,909	 1,402,374

Annex 2: Data Tables
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 71

Table A2.12: Agricultural Demand (kg/person/year) and Food Availability (kcal/person/day)

 Projections to 2030

 GEO4

 2000 MF PF SeF SuF

Canada

Total Demand 2,426 2,941 3,001 2,861 2,970 Food 

Availability 3,610 4,077 4,114 3,828 4,083

USA

Total Demand 2,612 3,095 3,129 3,066 3,106 Food 

Availability 3,802 4,448 4,487 4,198 4,419

Mexico

Total Demand 1,229 1,693 1,722 1,497 1,653 Food 

Availability 3,173 3,779 3,735 3,333 3,708

Table A2.13:Production of Wood Products (thousands of cubic meters)

 Projections to 2030

 GEO4

 2000 MF PF SeF SuF

Canada 199,285 387,419 395,052 328,606 356,366

USA 542,672 1,006,393 995,730 905,434 920,718

Mexico 33,282 31,480 30,629 30,329 31,079

NORTH AMERICA	 775,239	 1,425,292	 1,421,411	 1,264,369	 1,308,163

Table A2.14: Landings from marine fisheries (metric tons)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2000 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline

FAO 21 - Northwest Atlantic 45,214,710 29,160,437 28,813,609 29,677,933 20,585,983 22,204,592

FAO 31 - West Central Atlantic 30,113,839 32,565,967 33,768,594 31,570,750 23,327,667 31,785,157

FAO 67 - Northeast Pacific 41,078,411 74,546,821 74,065,241 72,963,461 59,553,825 74,934,509

FAO 77 - East Central Pacific 41,871,201 49,983,896 50,340,469 54,803,132 53,361,712 56,201,079

Total	 158,278,161	 186,257,121	 186,987,913	 189,015,276	 156,829,188	 185,125,337
72

Table A2.15: Greenhouse Gas Emissions from energy and land use and Industrial processes (petagrams Carbon) and Per Capita Emissions (megagrams Carbon)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

Canada

Energy Use 0.170 0.247 0.199 0.250 0.123 0.182 0.118 0.095

Industrial Processes 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009

Land Use 0.022 0.052 0.056 0.054 0.050 0.048 0.034 0.027

Total	 0.204	 0.311	 0.263	 0.311	 0.173	 0.240	 0.163	 0.132

	 	 (6.34)	 (9.59)	 (8.11)	 (9.61)	 (4.45)	 (6.38)	 (4.46)	 (3.54)

USA

Energy Use 1.877 2.504 1.996 2.670 1.249 2.338 1.647 1.412

Industrial Processes 0.085 0.130 0.104 0.105 0.073 0.105 0.098 0.091

Land Use 0.224 0.316 0.240 0.269 0.229 0.282 0.167 0.152

Total	 2.186	 2.947	 2.340	 3.039	 1.550	 2.725	 1.913	 1.655

	 	 (7.48)	 (10.07)	 (8.00)	 (10.39)	 (4.39)	 (7.70)	 (5.52)	 (4.76)

Mexico

Energy Use 0.110 0.228 0.180 0.211 0.113 0.194 0.155 0.122

Industrial Processes 0.008 0.015 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.012 0.011 0.009

Land Use 0.068 0.060 0.093 0.060 0.065 0.050 0.046 0.042

Total	 0.186	 0.281	 0.279	 0.260	 0.184	 0.256	 0.212	 0.171

	 	 (1.78)	 (2.74)	 (2.72)	 (2.54)	 (1.45)	 (1.95)	 (1.61)	 (1.32)

NORTH AMERICA

Energy Use 2.157 2.981 2.376 3.133 1.486 2.714 1.921 1.632

Industrial Processes 0.105 0.160 0.130 0.128 0.089 0.127 0.119 0.109

Land Use 0.314 0.404 0.390 0.365 0.330 0.380 0.249 0.220

Total	 2.576	 3.544	 2.899	 3.609	 1.920	 3.221	 2.289	 1.960

Note: Data normalized to 2005 values from OECD Baseline. Per capita values in parentheses.

Annex 2: Data Tables
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 73

Table A2.16: NOx Emissions from Energy Use and Industrial Processes (teragrams Nitrogen),

and Per Capita (megagrams Nitrogen)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

Canada

Energy Use 0.561 0.478 0.404 0.640 0.257 0.317 0.115 0.237

Industrial Processes 0.018 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.014 0.013 0.014

Total	 0.579	 0.500	 0.424	 0.660	 0.276	 0.331	 0.128	 0.251

	 	 (17.94)	 (12.84)	 (11.22)	 (17.94)	 (7.35)	 (8.49)	 (3.27)	 (6.42)

USA

Energy Use 5.278 4.375 3.682 6.128 2.308 3.406 1.170 2.565

Industrial Processes 0.125 0.157 0.144 0.145 0.125 0.122 0.109 0.117

Total	 5.403	 4.532	 3.827	 6.273	 2.433	 3.528	 1.279	 2.682

	 	 (18.02)	 (12.52)	 (10.81)	 (18.08)	 (6.99)	 (9.72)	 (3.53)	 (7.39)

Mexico

Energy Use 0.429 0.552 0.472 0.531 0.248 0.292 0.135 0.230

Industrial Processes 0.034 0.050 0.047 0.050 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.042

Total	 0.463	 0.602	 0.518	 0.581	 0.291	 0.335	 0.176	 0.272

	 	 (4.45)	 (4.74)	 (4.03)	 (4.49)	 (2.28)	 (2.58)	 (1.35)	 (2.09)

NORTH AMERICA

Energy Use 6.268 5.405 4.558 7.299 2.813 4.016 1.420 3.032

Industrial Processes 0.178 0.229 0.211 0.215 0.186 0.178 0.163 0.173

Total	 6.446	 5.634	 4.769	 7.514	 2.999	 4.194	 1.583	 3.205

Note: Data normalized to 2005 values from OECD Baseline. Per capita values in parentheses. There are differences between data provided by the IMAGE model and those that may be extracted from national 

data sets.

Table A2.17: SOx Emissions from Energy Use and Industrial Processes (teragrams Sulfur),

and Per Capita (megagrams Sulfur)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

Canada

Energy Use 0.853 0.343 0.220 0.411 0.075 0.374 0.058 0.187

Industrial Processes 0.122 0.053 0.046 0.062 0.032 0.043 0.030 0.037

Total	 0.974	 0.396	 0.266	 0.473	 0.108	 0.417	 0.089	 0.224

	 	 (30.20)	 (10.17)	 (7.04)	 (12.86)	 (2.87)	 (10.67)	 (2.27)	 (5.74)

USA

Energy Use 5.481 1.397 0.992 2.147 0.521 5.923 1.221 3.472

Industrial Processes 0.177 0.081 0.070 0.097 0.049 0.117 0.110 0.111

Total	 5.658	 1.479	 1.062	 2.245	 0.570	 6.040	 1.331	 3.583

	 	 (18.87)	 (4.08)	 (3.00)	 (6.47)	 (1.64)	 (16.65)	 (3.67)	 (9.87)

Mexico

Energy Use 0.818 0.707 0.526 0.807 0.179 0.402 0.101 0.263

Industrial Processes 0.467 0.758 0.641 0.803 0.396 0.149 0.061 0.130

Total	 1.284	 1.465	 1.167	 1.610	 0.576	 0.552	 0.162	 0.393

	 	 (12.32)	 (11.55)	 (9.06)	 (12.43)	 (4.52)	 (4.25)	 (1.25)	 (3.04)

NORTH AMERICA

Energy Use 7.151 2.447 1.738 3.366 0.775 6.700 1.381 3.922

Industrial Processes 0.765 0.892 0.756 0.962 0.478 0.309 0.202 0.278

Total	 7.916	 3.339	 2.495	 4.328	 1.253	 7.009	 1.583	 4.200

Note: Data normalized to 2005 values from OECD Baseline. Per capita values in parentheses.
74

Table A2.18: Return Flows of Treated and Untreated Water, by Sector (millions of cubic meters)

 Projections for 2030

 UNEP-GEO4

 Treated? 2000 MF PF SeF SuF

Canada

Domestic Untreated 93 118 88 338 78

 Treated 4,575 5,781 4,291 6,563 3,806

Manufacturing Untreated 3,187 5,318 3,382 5,473 3,827

 Treated 2,307 3,851 5,283 3,766 4,993

Total	 Untreated	 3,280	 5,436	 3,470	 5,811	 3,904

	 	 Treated	 6,882	 9,633	 9,574	 10,328	 8,798

USA

Domestic Untreated 2,374 1,093 816 5,214 709

 Treated 42,410 53,537 39,966 59,155 34,743

Manufacturing Untreated 7,059 13,218 854 15,326 1,514

 Treated 17,709 33,161 41,826 34,735 40,196

Total	 Untreated	 9,433	 14,311	 1,669	 20,540	 2,223

	 	 Treated	 60,120	 86,699	 81,792	 93,890	 74,939

Mexico

Domestic Untreated 5,449 12,079 9,383 14,783 5,833

 Treated 2,183 7,577 5,886 5,679 4,141

Manufacturing Untreated 112 250 224 263 168

 Treated 19 43 56 44 46

Total	 Untreated	 5,561	 12,329	 9,607	 15,046	 6,001

	 	 Treated	 2,202	 7,621	 5,942	 5,723	 4,187

NORTH AMERICA

Domestic Untreated 7,916 13,290 10,287 20,335 6,620

 Treated 49,168 66,896 50,143 71,397 42,689

Manufacturing Untreated 10,358 18,787 4,460 21,062 5,508

 Treated 20,036 37,056 47,165 38,544 45,235

Total	 Untreated	 18,273	 32,076	 14,746	 41,397	 12,128

	 	 Treated	 69,204	 103,952	 97,308	 109,941	 87,924

Table A2.19: River Nitrogen Fluxes, by source (thousands of kilograms) Projections for 2030

 OECD

 2000 Baseline ppGlobal

Canada

Non-point Agriculture 185 345 271

Sewage 46 47 27

Total	 	 	 231	 392	 298

USA

Non-point Agriculture 1526 1362 1032

Sewage 424 485 299

Total	 	 	 1950	 1847	 1330

Mexico

Non-point Agriculture 170 112 156

Sewage 166 238 200

Total	 	 	 336	 350	 356

NORTH AMERICA

Non-point Agriculture 1881 1819 1458

Sewage 636 770 525

Total 2517 2589 1984

Annex 2: Data Tables
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 75

Table A2.20: Forest Area (square kilometers) 

 Projections of Changes from 2000 to 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2000 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

Canada*	

Mature Forest 5,686,715 -94,852 -14,063 -39,157 -6,350 -89,885 -46,379 -15,919

Regrowth Forest 178,187 138,024 121,181 76,840 92,543 30,499 71,075 97,969

Total	 5,864,902	 43,173	 107,119	 37,683	 86,193	 -59,386	 24,696	 82,050

USA

Mature Forest 2,597,172 -46,667 -125,185 -179,028 -120,964 -95,557 -17,579 -33,077

Regrowth Forest 325,850 217,438 188,766 200,346 110,861 78,980 126,962 45,261

Total	 2,923,022	 170,771	 63,581	 21,318	 -10,103	 -16,577	 109,383	 12,184

Mexico

Mature Forest 427,310 -169,854 -246,287 -170,998 -190,646 -38,256 -42,370 -39,650

Regrowth Forest 17,408 -4,790 -9,417 -1,024 -1,416 -188 110 -6,028

Total	 444,718	 -174,644	 -255,704	 -172,021	 -192,062	 -38,444	 -42,261	 -45,678

North America

Mature Forest 8,711,197 -311,372 -385,535 -389,183 -317,960 -223,698 -106,328 -88,646

Regrowth Forest 521,445 350,672 300,530 276,162 201,987 109,291 198,146 137,202

Total	 9,232,642	 39,300	 -85,005	 -113,021	 -115,973	 -114,407	 91,818	 48,556

Note: Normalized to data from OECD Baseline. Regrowth Forest includes growth on abandoned land and timber plantations.

* Land cover data and categories will differ between information provided by IMAGE model and national data. For example, the IMAGE forest area for Canada indicates, for 2000, an area 165 million ha 

larger than the estimated forest and other wooded land (402 million ha) as reflected in Canadian data sets.

Table A2.21: Agricultural Area (square kilometers)

 Projections of Changes from 2000 to 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2000 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

Canada	

Food Crops 522,299 -46,925 -11,194 60,799 10,073 162,833 61,609 16,133

Grass and Fodder 149,355 9,493 12,307 16,998 21,408 23,977 6,761 -3,787

Biofuel Crops 0 0 0 0 4,072 7,657 22,069 26,110

Total	 671,654	 -37,432	 1,113	 77,798	 35,553	 194,467	 90,439	 38.456

USA

Food Crops 1,792,543 -176,110 -52,629 19,987 -60,743 226,365 11,198 9,188

Grass and Fodder 2,289,263 115,679 150,405 121,006 218,101 -77,004 -121,089 -106,965

Biofuel Crops 0 0 0 0 39,394 1,193 20,843 94,070

Total	 4,081,806	 -60,431	 97,776	 140,993	 196,752	 150,554	 -89,048	 -3,707

Mexico

Food Crops 274,255 11,381 16,725 19,846 14,135 30,746 14,477 -1,870

Grass and Fodder 787,793 269,178 391,225 244,964 294,068 7,189 4,802 -7,492

Biofuel Crops 8,265 220 5,942 -2,683 18,688 26,232 54,557 72,183

Total	 1,070,313	 280,779	 413,892	 262,127	 326,891	 64,167	 73,836	 62,821

NORTH AMERICA

Food Crops 2,589,097 -211,654 -47,098 100,633 -36,535 419,944 87,284 23,451

Grass and Fodder 3,226,411 394,350 553,937 382,968 533,577 -45,838 -109,526 -118,244

Biofuel Crops 8,265 220 5,942 -2,683 62,154 35,082 97,469 192,363

Total	 5,823,773	 182,916	 512,781	 480,918	 559,196	 409,188	 75,227	 97,570
76

Table A2.22: Agricultural Area with High Risk of Soil Erosion Risk from Water (millions of square kilometers)

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2000 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline pp Global 450ppm

Canada 3.25 2.92 3.18 3.96 3.14 4.83 4.31 3.64

USA 28.21 27.57 29.38 30.60 28.71 33.60 30.65 29.11

Mexico 8.00 10.12 11.06 10.15 10.27 9.17 9.26 9.06

NORTH AMERICA	 39.47	 40.61	 43.62	 44.70	 42.13	 47.61	 44.22	 41.81

Note: Normalized to OECD Baseline in 2000.

Table A2.23: Annual Mean Concentrations of Particulate Matter and Ozone in Urban Areas, by Country

 Projections for 2030

 OECD

 2000 Baseline ppGlobal

Canada

Particulate Matter (PM10) (μg per cubic meter) 21.4 11.4 5.9

Ozone (ppb) 34.8 35.7

USA	

Particulate Matter (PM10) (μg per cubic meter) 25.8 18.8 9.3

Ozone (ppb) 40.2 41.3

Mexico

Particulate Matter (PM10) (μg per cubic meter) 47.1 25.4 15.1

Ozone (ppb) 42.5 42.3

NORTH AMERICA (weighted averages)	

Particulate Matter (PM10) (μg per cubic meter) 29.6 19.5 10.2

Ozone (ppb) 40.2 41.0

Note: Population-weighted averages across urban areas of more than 100,000 persons (OECD 2030).

Table A2.24: North American Urban Population Exposed to Various Levels of Particulate Matter 

and Ozone

 Projections for 2030

 OECD

 2000 Baseline ppGlobal

 (%) (%) (%)

Particulate Matter (PM10)	

<20 μg per cubic meter 22 76 93

20-30 μg per cubic meter 51 9 7

30-50 μg per cubic meter 13 15 0

50-70 μg per cubic meter 7 0 0

>70 μg per cubic meter 7 0 0

Ozone (O3

)

<2 μg per cubic meter 4 1

2-4 μg per cubic meter 14 12

4-6 μg per cubic meter 51 57

6-8 μg per cubic meter 31 30

Note: Percentage of population living in urban areas of more than 100,000 persons (OECD 2030).

Annex 2: Data Tables
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 77

Table A2.25: Declines in Mean Terrestrial Species Abundance, by contributing factor

 Historic Decline Projections of Changes from 2000 to 2030

 from ‘Natural’ GEO4 OECD

 State as of 2000 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal 450ppm

 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

Canada

Agriculture 5.9 -0.5 -0.1 0.5 0.1 1.4 0.5 0.1

Climate Change 1.5 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.3 1.7 1.6 1.5

Infrastructure 2.3 1.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.2 1.3 1.4

Other 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 0.6 0.7 0.8

Total	 11.9	 4.6	 3.7	 4.2	 4.0	 4.8	 4.1	 3.8

USA

Agriculture 23.3 -1.7 -0.3 0.1 0.0 1.5 -0.4 -0.4

Climate Change 1.7 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.7 1.9 1.9 1.7

Infrastructure 7.6 3.0 0.6 0.9 0.5 2.4 2.9 2.7

Other 5.1 1.1 0.8 2.9 -0.1 0.3 0.2 0.8

Total	 37.6	 4.9	 3.5	 6.2	 3.1	 6.0	 4.6	 4.8

Mexico

Agriculture 18.9 3.5 4.3 3.5 4.8 2.1 1.8 1.7

Climate Change 2.1 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.0 2.3 2.1 1.9

Infrastructure 9.6 3.8 0.1 1.3 -0.1 3.4 3.2 3.2

Other 3.5 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.8 1.6 1.8

Total	 34.1	 10.0	 7.1	 7.7	 7.6	 8.6	 8.7	 8.5

NORTH AMERICA (weighted averages)

Agriculture 14.9 -0.6 0.2 0.6 0.5 1.5 0.2 0.0

Climate Change 1.7 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.5 1.9 1.8 1.6

Infrastructure 5.4 2.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 1.9 2.2 2.1

Other 3.6 1.3 1.1 2.0 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.9

Total (weighted averages)	 25.5	 5.4	 4.0	 5.5	 4.0	 5.7	 4.7	 4.7

Note: Normalized to OECD Baseline in 2000.

Table A2.26: Changes in the Calculated Marine Species Depletion Index from Historic Levels

 Projections for 2030

 GEO4 OECD

 2000 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline

FAO 21—Northwest Atlantic -47.10 -49.30 -49.20 -49.40 -42.20 -33.80

FAO 31—West Central Atlantic -17.62 -23.43 -23.90 -22.35 -15.70 -22.60

FAO 67—Northeast Pacific -36.40 -42.40 -41.80 -40.70 -28.00 -43.00

FAO 77—East Central Pacific -19.60 -29.90 -29.90 -29.90 -29.80 -29.90

Note: Positive changes in DI indicate reduction in depletion risk while negative changes indicate increase in depletion risk.
78

Table A2.27: Water Stress (millions of persons affected and percentage of total population)

 Projections for 2030

 UNEP-GEO4 OECD

 2005 MF PF SeF SuF Baseline ppGlobal

Canada 3.3 3.9 0.1 3.6 0.1 4.0 0.2

 (10.2%) (10.0%) (0.3%) (9.8%) (0.3%) (10.2%) (0.5%)

USA 114.4 150.7 109.8 161.1 108.2 129.9 125.6

 (38.2%) (41.6%) (31.0%) (46.4%) (31.1%) (35.8%) (34.6%)

Mexico 56.2 73.9 71.9 77.6 68.7 71.7 70.3

 (53.9%) (58.2%) (55.9%) (59.9%) (54.0%) (55.2%) (54.2%)

NORTH AMERICA (weighted averages)	 173.9	 228.5	 181.8	 242.3	 176.9	 205.6	 196.1

	 	 (39.9%)	 (43.3%)	 (34.9%)	 (47.2%)	 (34.5%)	 (38.7%)	 (36.9%)

Note: Normalized to OECD Baseline in 2005.

Table A2.28: Health Impacts of Urban Air Pollution

 Projections for 2030

 OECD

 2000 Baseline pp Global

Canada	

PM10 Mortality 58 0 0

PM10 Morbidity 418 0 0

Ozone Mortality 11 49

Ozone Morbidity 76 615

USA

PM10 Mortality 121 58 6

PM10 Morbidity 926 379 37

Ozone Mortality 28 85

Ozone Morbidity 213 997

Mexico

PM10 Mortality 106 70 17

PM10 Morbidity 1135 575 143

Ozone Mortality 9 51

Ozone Morbidity 97 801

NORTH AMERICA (weighted averages)	

PM10 Mortality 113 56 8

PM10 Morbidity 924 388 56

Ozone Mortality 23 75

Ozone Morbidity 179 926

Note: Mortality values in deaths per million inhabitants in urban areas. Morbidity values in Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) lost per million inhabitants in urban areas.

Annex 2: Data Tables
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 79
80
CEC – North American Environmental Outlook to 2030 81
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