SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ANP Compound at Kandahar Generally Met Contract 

Terms but Has Project Planning, Oversight, and

Sustainability Issues

July 22, 2010
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page i

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

July 22, 2010

Lieutenant General John R. Allen

Acting Commander, U.S. Central Command 

General David Petraeus

Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force

Lieutenant General Robert L. Van Antwerp

U.S. Army Chief of Engineers and 

Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV

Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of a performance audit of a contract and three task orders funded by 

the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and implemented by the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE) to complete four co-located projects referred to as the Joint Regional Afghan Security 

Forces Compound (JRAC). This report includes one recommendation to enhance compliance with 

USACE quality assurance and control procedures and two recommendations to improve guidance on

implementing austere construction standards that will increase the likelihood that the Afghans will be 

able to maintain facilities, such as JRAC, without assistance from the United States.

A summary of this report is on page ii. This performance audit was conducted by the Office of the 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181 

and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. When preparing the final report, we considered 

comments from the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers. Both concurred with the report’s recommendations. These comments are reproduced in 

appendices II and III, respectively. 

John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page ii

 Special inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

i

.

`

 

What SIGAR Reviewed 

One objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own security by 

housing, training, and equipping up to 134,000 Afghanistan National Police (ANP) by October 2011. The Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) provided $45 million to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to fund a

firm fixed-price contract and three firm fixed-price task orders to construct a compound consisting of a regional logistics 

center, a National Civil Order Police battalion, a Uniform Police regional headquarters, and a Border Police command 

center. Referred to as the Joint Regional Afghanistan Security Forces Compound (JRAC), the compound is located outside 

the Kandahar Airfield in Kandahar Province. USACE’s Afghanistan Engineer District (AED)-South has primary oversight 

responsibilities for construction activities. This report addresses the contract’s and each task order’s cost, outcome, and 

oversight; and the sustainment of JRAC. To accomplish these objectives, SIGAR reviewed relevant contract documents such 

as statements of work, contract modifications, and quality assurance and quality control records in light of applicable 

criteria described in the Federal Acquisition Regulation and USACE quality assurance guidance. SIGAR interviewed officials 

from CSTC-A, AED-South, AED-North, and performed a site inspection in November 2009 and follow-up fieldwork in March 

2010. SIGAR conducted work in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan, from October 2009 to July 2010 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

What SIGAR Found 

Three of the four JRAC projects experienced delays ranging from 6 to 12 months. The fourth project was delayed 2 years

due in part to a land dispute between CSTC-A and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration that led to its re-location at

the JRAC site. In addition to nearly $280,000 in USACE expenses related to the project’s re-location, the prime contractor 

has filed a request for equitable adjustment for $665,000 in additional costs. AED-South noted that all four JRAC projects 

are scheduled to be turned over to Afghan authorities by the end of July 2010. SIGAR’s inspection of completed work 

revealed no apparent construction issues. 

Inadequate project planning and oversight affected all four projects. USACE staff did not prepare a master plan for JRAC 

that fully integrated the four projects. As a result, JRAC had some redundant power, water, and sewer systems and varying 

heating and cooling systems. In addition, an armory for one project was constructed adjacent to a barracks for another 

project. In terms of project oversight, AED-South did not fully adhere to USACE quality assurance procedures, which raises 

the risk that non-visible construction problems could decrease the useful life of the project, increase operations and 

maintenance (O&M) costs, and possibly compromise occupant safety. SIGAR found that AED-South and the four prime 

contractors did not adequately document the results of site inspections, whether required quality assurance and control 

testing had taken place, or whether mandatory three-phase inspections occurred.

CSTC-A officials stated that the government of Afghanistan does not have the financial or technical capacity to sustain 

Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) facilities in the near term once they are completed. To address sustainment, 

USACE intends to award two, 5-year contracts for operation and maintenance of the ANSF facilities throughout Afghanistan

at an estimated cost of $800 million. These contracts include provisions for developing ANSF’s sustainment capabilities.

Finally, SIGAR noted that CSTC-A guidelines on “austere” construction standards do not include several items that could 

help promote the long-term sustainability of U.S.-constructed facilities such as JRAC, including further details on heating 

and cooling options and electrical and plumbing fixtures.

SIGAR Audit-10-12 July 2010

ANP Compound at Kandahar Generally Met 

Contract Terms but Has Project Planning, 

Oversight, and Sustainability Issues

What SIGAR Recommends

SIGAR is making one recommendation to enhance compliance with USACE’s quality assurance and control procedures and 

two recommendations to increase the likelihood that the Afghans will be able to sustain the facilities without assistance 

from the United States. (1) SIGAR recommends that the Commanding General, USACE, direct AED-South to ensure that 

future projects adhere to USACE quality assurance and quality control procedures. (2) SIGAR recommends that the 

Commanding General, CSTC-A, update current austere construction guidance to include more detailed instructions 

regarding heating and cooling systems. (3) SIGAR further recommends that the Commanding General, CSTC-A, provide 

additional austere construction guidance regarding appropriate electical, plumbing, and other fixtures for facilities. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, USACE and CSTC-A concurred with the recommendations.

For more information contact: SIGAR Public affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background 2

JRAC Experienced Construction Delays but No Apparent Construction 

 Quality Issues 5

A Master Plan Was Not Prepared and Project Oversight Did Not 

 Comply with USACE Standards 13

JRAC Is Not Sustainable Without Continued U.S. Assistance 18

Conclusion 20

Recommendations 20

Comments 21

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 22

Appendix II: Comments from the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 24

Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 28

TABLES

Table 1: JRAC Project Descriptions 4

Table 2: JRAC Project Completion Dates and Award Amounts 5

Table 3: Modifications to Contract W917PM-06-C-0007 6

Table 4: Modifications to Task Order W917PM-07-D-0017 0001 8

Table 5: Modifications to Task Order W917PM-07-D-0017 0003 10

Table 6: Modifications to Task Order W917PM-07-D-00015 0006 12

Table 7: Description of the Three-Phase Inspection Process 17

Table 8: Documented Preparatory and Initial Inspections 18

FIGURES AND PHOTOS

Figure 1: Location of JRAC 3

Photo 1: Interior View of the RLC Warehouse 7

Photo 2: RLC Kitchen Stove and Exhaust Fan 7

Photo 3: Completed ANCOP Barracks 9

Photo 4: ANCOP Power Plant Generators 9

Photo 5: UP Dining Facility 11

Photo 6: UP Administrative Buildings 11

Photo 7: Construction Outside BP Barracks 13
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page iv

ACRONYMS

AED-North/South Afghanistan Engineer District-North/South

ANCOP Afghanistan National Civil Order Police

ANP Afghanistan National Police

ANSF Afghanistan National Security Forces

BP Border Police

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

DFOW Definable Feature of Work

DLQAP District Level Quality Assurance Plan

JRAC Joint Regional Afghanistan National Security Forces Compound

O&M Operations and Maintenance

RLC Regional Logistics Center

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

UP Uniformed Police

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 1

ANP Compound at Kandahar Generally Met Contract Terms but

Has Project Planning, Oversight, and Sustainability Issues

One objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to ensure the successful design and construction of 

facilities supporting the fielding of Afghanistan National Police (ANP) forces throughout Afghanistan.1

From a reported size of 95,000 personnel in December 2009, the ANP is expected to rise to 134,000 

personnel by October 2011. To meet the infrastructure needs of this growing force, the Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has helped fund a country-wide building program to 

support the national, regional, and district-level operations of the ANP.

2 CSTC-A relies extensively on 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to provide contract award and monitoring services through its 

two district offices: Afghanistan Engineer District (AED)-South,

3 based in Kandahar, and AED-North,

based in Kabul.

Funded at a total cost of approximately $45 million by CSTC-A and built under the direction of USACE, 

the Joint Regional Afghanistan Security Forces Compound (JRAC) encompasses four separate ANP 

projects: a Regional Logistics Center (RLC), an Afghanistan National Civil Order Police’s (ANCOP) 

battalion, the Uniform Police’s (UP) regional headquarters, and the Border Police’s (BP) zone 

command.

4 USACE awarded a firm fixed-price contract5 for the RLC project and firm fixed-price task 

orders for construction of the ANCOP, UP, and BP projects.6

 1 Under the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, the ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan National Civil 

Order Police, Afghan Border Police, the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, and additional specialized police 

with responsibilities that include criminal investigation, counterterrorism, and customs.

2 The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and CSTC-A is a joint command under a single commander. However, 

because CSTC-A distributes and manages all U.S.-provided funding to support ANSF, this report refers to CSTC-A.

3 AED-South was created in August 2009, in response to a growing workload that could not be managed by AED’s 

single district office in Afghanistan. Due to the timing of the split, project oversight for the JRAC project has 

involved both AED-South and AED-North personnel.

4 In September 2009, AED-North awarded a contract to Technologists, Inc., to construct a regional office building 

for the Ministry of Interior on land within the compound. At the time we completed our fieldwork in March 2010, 

only site preparation activities had been initiated. For the purpose of this report, we limited analysis to the four 

projects originally designated for inclusion in the compound.

5 Firm fixed-price contracts and task orders provide for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of 

the contractor’s cost experience in performing the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor 

maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. 

6 These task orders were awarded under two indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts managed by USACE. 

An indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract may be used when the government cannot predetermine, above 

a specified minimum, the precise quantities of supplies or services that the government will require during a fixed

contract period, and it is inadvisable for the government to commit itself to more than a minimum quantity.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 2

This report is one in a series of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) 

performance audits that examine contract outcomes, costs,7 and oversight. This report addresses 

(1) whether the JRAC was constructed within the terms of the contracts, including schedule and cost; 

(2) whether USACE oversight of construction was conducted in accordance with the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR), USACE requirements, and oversight provisions of the contract; and (3) what plans are 

in place to sustain these facilities once they are turned over to the Afghan government.

To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed relevant contract and task order files, including statements 

of work, modifications, and quality assurance/quality control records. We examined criteria and 

guidance in the FAR and the AED-South’s District-Level Quality Assurance Plan (DLQAP) dated August 3, 

2009.

8 We interviewed officials from CSTC-A, AED-South, and AED-North, and conducted a full site 

inspection of the compound on November 5, 2009, and follow-up fieldwork in Kandahar in March 2010, 

including a drive through review of construction progress. We conducted our work in Kabul and 

Kandahar, Afghanistan, from October 2009 to July 2010 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Appendix I presents a more detailed discussion of our scope and 

methodology.

BACKGROUND 

Located in a walled facility outside the Kandahar Airfield, which is used by the United States and 

coalition forces, the compound is expected to support about 1,150 police personnel. Construction 

started in May 2008 and all four JRAC projects are expected to be turned over to Afghan authorities by 

the end of July 2010. See figure 1 for a map showing the location of JRAC.

 7 Throughout this report, we use “cost” to refer to the total funding CSTC-A provided for this compound.

8 Although JRAC construction was initiated prior to the publication of this plan, the plan is modeled on the AED 

plan that applied to JRAC construction activity before August 2009.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 3

Figure 1: Location of JRAC

Source: SIGAR. Inset from AED-South.

As shown in table 1, with the exception of RLC, which serves as a logistics center, each JRAC project 

provides the same basic set of buildings and support services but for different elements of the ANP. 
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 4

Table 1: JRAC Project Descriptions

Project Description

RLC The RLC project includes a building to repair, service, and maintain vehicles 

and other equipment and a warehouse to receive, store, and issue all 

necessary supplies and equipment. Other project elements include 

headquarters and administrative buildings, dining facilities, and 

independent power, water, and sanitary systems. The facility can house

about 40 personnel.

ANCOP This project includes construction of enlisted and senior officer barracks, 

administration and training buildings, a dining facility, and power, water, 

and sewer systems to be shared with the UP and BP facilities. The facility 

can house about 325 personnel.

UP This project includes construction of enlisted and senior officer barracks, 

administation buildings, a dining facility, and logistics and maintenance 

buildings. The facility can house about 210 personnel.

BP This project includes construction of enlisted and senior officer barracks, 

administation buildings, an armory, a dining facility, and training and 

warehouse buildings. The facility can house about 575 personnel.

Source: SIGAR analysis of project documents.

Based in Kabul, a USACE ANP program manager with broad oversight responsibility for ANP projects and 

a USACE project manager worked with CSTC-A staff to define JRAC project requirements.9 One key 

input for this process was a facilities development plan for the ANP prepared by a contractor working for 

CSTC-A.10 This plan linked the ANP’s operational needs to a comprehensive plan for facilities 

development. A USACE contracting officer incorporated the project requirements into a scope of work,

issued the requests for proposals, and managed the selection process for each procurement. After 

contract award, contract/task order modifications were overseen by an Administrative Contracting 

Officer and Contracting Officers’ Representatives who approved modifications and payment invoices 

based on their warrant authorities.11

 9 The program manager and project manager continue to provide general project oversight and customer 

interface.

A Resident Engineer/Project Engineer and Quality Assurance 

Representatives located in AED-South’s nearby Kandahar Area Office provided day-to-day project 

oversight.

10 See ANP: ANSF Comprehensive Plan for Facilities Development, dated October 31, 2007, and, according to 

CSTC-A officials, updated periodically since then.

11 A Resident Engineer, Project Engineer, or Quality Assurance Representative can serve as a Contracting Officer’s

Representative if they receive the required training.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 5

JRAC EXPERIENCED CONSTRUCTION DELAYS BUT NO APPARENT CONSTRUCTION QUALITY 

ISSUES

The JRAC projects experienced significant construction delays compared to the original completion 

dates due to a range of factors, including a land dispute and customs delays. The most significant delay 

occurred on the RLC project, which was completed 2 years after its original completion date due, in part, 

to a land dispute between CSTC-A and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. CSTC-A’s project 

costs increased for three of the four projects; however, these cost increases were attributable to USACEinitiated scope changes. Table 2 shows the status of schedule and cost for JRAC’s four projects.

Table 2: JRAC Project Completion Dates and Award Amounts 

Project Original 

Completion Date

Scheduled /Actual 

Completion Date

Original Award 

Amount

Current Award 

Amount

Percentage 

Completea

RLC Sept. 3, 2007 Oct. 22, 2009 

(act.)b

$5.4 million $6.4 millionc 97

ANCOP Nov. 16, 2009 June 30, 2010

(act.)

$15.2 million $15.6 milliond 99

UP Aug. 16, 2009 Mar. 28, 2010 

(act.)

$10.2 million $10.2 million 100

BP July 29, 2009 July 15, 2010f $13.7 million $13.7 millione 82

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract and task order modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management 

System Reports dated March 8, 2010, and May 17, 2010.

Notes:

a Percentages are as of May 17, 2010.

b Project completed 2 months before an extended completion date of December 3, 2009.

c Original award amount increased by $1 million to provide additional life support services, de-mining and 

topography services at a new construction site, and expected costs to cover a request for equitable adjustment 

filed by the prime contractor for costs associated with a change in construction sites.

d Original award amount increased by $421,000 to add security perimeter lighting and changes related to site 

drainage and sewage.

e Original award amount increased by $12,000 to add a road to the project.

f

All four JRAC projects are planned for transfer to Afghan authorities by the end of July 2010.

RLC Project Costs Increased Due to Site Re-Location

According to USACE records, the project was completed in October 2009 or over 2 years after the 

original completion date. The total projected cost to CSTC-A was $6.4 million or nearly $1 million higher 

than the original contract amount of $5.4 million because of a land dispute that led to the project’s relocation to JRAC. This re-location led to associated scope changes initiated by AED-South and a request 

for equitable adjustment filed by the prime contractor. According to an AED-South document, as of May 

17, 2010, the project was 99 percent complete and AED-South had made payments of more than

$5.5 million toward the total cost of the contract.

This competitively bid firm-fixed price contract was awarded May 27, 2006, to an Afghan construction 

firm (Farham Construction) on a lowest-price basis with a notice-to-proceed date of June 10, 2006, and 

an original scheduled completion date of September 3, 2007. Work initially started in 2006 at a site
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 6

located near the Kandahar Airfield; however, a land rights dispute with the U.S. Drug Enforcement 

Administration led to RLC’s addition to JRAC in July 2008.

12

AED-South issued five contract modifications after May 2006 that raised total construction costs to 

CSTC-A by more than $279,000. The modifications provided additional contractor housing at the outset 

of the contract and adjusted the original scope of work to accommodate the re-location of the RLC 

project to the JRAC site. In addition to these costs, the prime contractor has filed a request for equitable 

adjustment for more than $665,000 as compensation for additional road work and utility modifications 

required to adapt the RLC project to the JRAC site. These modifications were in addition to the required 

modifications identified by USACE as summarized in table 3. CSTC-A and USACE officials noted that the 

contractor’s request has been approved and should be paid once funds have been located.

Table 3: Modifications to Contract W917PM-06-C-0007

Modification Date Signed Purpose Cost/Schedule Change

P0001 Aug. 22, 2006 Provide additional life 

support housing

Costs increased by more 

than $175,000

P0002 May 3, 2007 Change to appropriations 

data description

No change

P0003 Jan. 8, 2008 Change to incorporate a 

Defense Federal 

Acquisition Regulation 

provision

No change

P0004 July 16, 2008 Lift suspension of work

caused by land rights 

issue, extend completion 

date, and increase 

number of required parts

Costs increased by over 

$10,000 and extended 

the scheduled completion 

date to Dec. 12, 2009

P0005 July 24, 2008 Demine and provide 

topography services at 

the JRAC site

Costs increased nearly 

$94,000

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract, modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management System reports.

Based on the criteria described in the contract’s statement of work and related technical specifications, 

we made a visual inspection of the scope and completeness of site preparation and grading; the road 

network, parking, and street lighting; water systems; sanitary systems; power station; general purpose 

warehouse; vehicle maintenance building; vehicle refueling station; small arms maintenance building;

 12 Details on the nature and scope of the RLC land dispute case were not available because the case dates back to 

2006 and the staff involved have left Afghanistan; the contract files we reviewed did not address the matter. 

USACE officials noted that the dispute was likely caused by confusion over whether CSTC-A or USACE was 

responsible for determining land rights before beginning construction. USACE officials noted that responsibility for 

determining land rights was resolved in November 2009 when U.S. Forces-Afghanistan issued a Fragmentary Order 

that made USACE responsible for verifying/confirming with the Afghan Ministry of Interior that appropriate land 

rights are obtained prior to initiating construction activities.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 7

and ammunition supply point. We found no indications of poor construction or non-conformance with 

the statement of work and related technical specifications. Photos 1 and 2 provide examples of 

completed RLC construction.

Photo 1: Interior View of the RLC Warehouse

Source: SIGAR, November 5, 2009.

Photo 2: RLC Kitchen Stove and Exhaust Fan

Source: SIGAR, November 5, 2009.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 8

ANCOP Project Is Behind Schedule

According to USACE officials, the ANCOP project was completed on June 30, or over 7 months past its

original completion date at a total cost to CSTC-A of $15.6 million—nearly $421,000 higher than the 

original task order amount due to work scope changes initiated by AED-South. This competitively bid 

task order was awarded on April 27, 2008, to a Turkish construction firm (Metag Construction) on a 

lowest-price basis with a notice-to-proceed date of May 25, 2008, and an original completion date of 

November 16, 2009. According to an AED-South document, as of May 17, 2010, AED-South had made 

payments of more than $15.4 million toward the cost of the task order.

The project’s original contract price was $15.2 million. AED-South issued three task order modifications 

that raised total construction costs by nearly $421,000 to pay for additional work outside the scope of 

the original task order and moved the completion date to March 1, 2010. Table 4 shows the 

modifications to the task order.

Table 4: Modifications to Task Order W917PM-07-D-0017 0001

Modification Date Signed Purpose Cost/Schedule Change

1A June 25, 2009 Road and perimeter 

wall modifications

No change

02 Nov. 9, 2009 Add security perimeter 

lighting

Costs increased by 

nearly $337,000

P00003 Jan. 3, 2010 Change site drainage 

and sewage

Costs increased by 

$84,000 and 

completion date 

extended to Mar. 1, 

2010

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract, modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management System reports.

Based on the criteria described in the contract’s statement of work and related technical specifications, 

we made a visual inspection of the site’s preparation, water system, sewer treatment plant, electric 

power plant, fuel tanks, electric distribution system, trash point, and road network and parking. We 

found no indications of poor construction or non-conformance with the statement of work and related 

technical specifications. Photo 3 shows a completed ANCOP barracks; photo 4 shows the power plant 

generators installed to support the ANCOP, UP, and BP projects.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 9

Photo 3: Completed ANCOP Barracks

Source: SIGAR, November 5, 2009.

Photo 4: ANCOP Power Plant Generators

Source: SIGAR, November 5, 2009.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 10

UP Project Completed Behind Schedule 

According to USACE officials, the UP project was completed on March 28, 2010, or 7 months after the 

original completion date at a total cost to CSTC-A of $10.2 million. This competitively bid task order was 

awarded on June 5, 2008, to a Turkish construction firm (Metag Construction) on a lowest-cost basis 

with a notice to proceed date of August 21, 2008, and an original completion date of August 16, 2009.

According to an AED-South document, as of May 17, 2010, the project was 100 percent complete and 

AED-South had made payments of more than $10.1 million toward the total cost of the task order.

AED-South issued two contract modifications that moved the scheduled completion date to March 1,

2010, but did not change the contract price. A task order modification was not filed to extend the 

construction completion date to March 28. Table 5 summarizes the modifications to the task order.

Table 5: Modifications to Task Order W917PM-07-D-0017 0003

Modification Date Signed Purpose Cost/Schedule Change

1A Aug. 18, 2009 Change construction 

completion date

Scheduled completion 

date changed to Nov. 

16, 2009

2A Feb. 7, 2010 Change construction 

completion date

Scheduled completion 

date changed to Mar.

1, 2010

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract, modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management System reports.

Using the criteria described in the contract’s statement of work and related technical specifications, we

made a visual inspection of the booster pump house, sanitary system, electrical distribution system, refueling point and fuel storage areas, dining facility and trash point, road network and parking, barracks 

and shower/toilet facility/laundry room, small arms maintenance facility, and ammunitions supply point.

We found no indications of poor construction or non-conformance with the statement of work and 

related technical specifications. Photos 5 and 6 provide examples of completed construction.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 11

Photo 5: UP Dining Facility

Source: SIGAR, November 5, 2009.

Photo 6: UP Administrative Buildings

Source: SIGAR, November 5, 2009.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 12

BP Project Is Behind Schedule 

According to USACE officials, the BP should be completed by July 26, 2010, or almost 1 year past the 

original completion date. The total cost to CSTC-A for the project is $13.7 million, $12,000 higher than 

the original task order due to work scope changes initiated by AED-South. This competitively bid task 

order was awarded on May 29, 2008, to a U.S. construction firm (ICC International) on a lowest-cost 

basis with a notice-to-proceed date of August 3, 2008, and an original completion date of July 29, 2009.

According to an AED-South document, as of May 17, 2010, the project was 82 percent complete and

AED-South had made payments of more than $11.7 million toward the total cost of the contract.

AED-South issued four contract modifications that raised total construction costs by $12,000 to pay for 

additional work beyond the scope of the original task order and moved the scheduled completion date 

to July 15, 2010. Table 6 summarizes the modifications to the contract.

Table 6: Modifications to Task Order W917PM-07-D-0015 0006

Modification Date Signed Purpose Cost/Schedule Change

1A Feb. 18, 2009 Add additional road Costs increased by 

$12,000

2A Oct. 9, 2009 Change construction 

completion date

Completion date 

changed to Nov. 16, 

2009 

3 Jan. 24, 2010 Change construction 

completion date

Completion date 

changed to Mar. 1, 

2010

1E April 14, 2010 Change in construction 

completion date

Completion date 

changed to July 15, 

2010

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract, modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management System reports.

Compared with other JRAC projects, the BP project was further behind due, in part, to problems getting

construction materials through Afghan customs that were not experienced by AED-South’s other 

contractors. For example, AED-South officials stated that pre-fabricated building components were held 

at the Pakistan border for 17 weeks due to the contractor’s unwillingness to pay bribes to Afghanistan

customs officials. USACE officials noted that they typically respond to such cases by appealing to both 

CSTC-A and the U.S. Embassy in the hope that pressure from these sources will resolve the issue. As a 

result of these and other delays, the BP project was not as far along as the other projects at the time of 

our inspection. Based on the criteria described in the contract’s statement of work and related technical 

specifications, we made a visual inspection of the partially completed buildings. We found no 

indications of poor construction or non-conformance with the statement of work and related technical 

specifications. Photo 7 shows construction progress at a BP barracks.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 13

Photo 7: Construction Outside BP Barracks

Source: SIGAR, November 5, 2009.

A MASTER PLAN WAS NOT PREPARED AND PROJECT OVERSIGHT DID NOT COMPLY WITH 

USACE STANDARDS

A master plan to integrate the four JRAC projects into a joint compound with shared power, water, and 

sewer systems, or a common approach to meeting heating and cooling needs, was not developed.

13 In 

the absence of such a plan, JRAC had some redundant power, water, and sewer systems; various heating 

and cooling systems; and other construction issues. Although we found no visible construction 

deficiencies, ineffective project oversight raises the risk that non-visible problems could exist. Although 

project-specific quality assurance and quality control plans were developed, we found numerous 

deficiencies with AED-South’s quality assurance reports and a general lack of documentation regarding 

required quality assurance and control testing and three-phase inspections.

14 AED-South and AED-North 

officials noted that these oversight deficiencies occurred during a time when staff resources in 

 13 As noted earlier, a facility-level analysis of JRAC’s operational requirements along with a detailed site plan were 

prepared by a CSTC-A contractor in October 2007 and updated through February 28, 2010. This analysis, however, 

did not include a master plan that integrated the operations of four projects.

14 The three-phase (preparatory, initial, and final) inspection process provides a means for ensuring that all

construction activities, including those involving subcontractors, suppliers, and testing laboratories, comply with 

the latest applicable contract drawings, specifications, certified or approved submittals, and authorized changes to 

the contract.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 14

AED-South were particularly short and a hand-off of project oversight responsibilities occurred between 

AED-North and AED-South.15

A Master Plan to Integrate the Four Projects Was Not Developed

A master plan for a compound such as JRAC should include a comprehensive review of all four projects,

including the identification of possible efficiencies to be gained from project interdependence. These 

efficiencies would include shared infrastructure such as water, sanitation, and power that benefit from 

“economies of scale.” Planning would also identify the advantages of similar construction types and 

building systems that would simplify operations and maintenance and provide lower life-cycle costs for 

the facilities.

Due to the lack of a master plan, the RLC project was built with its own water, sanitation, and power

systems.16 In addition, the compound includes multiple heating and cooling systems that are more 

difficult to maintain and stock with replacement parts. For example, the RLC has unit heaters; ANCOP 

has an evaporative cooling system; and UP will use wood burning stoves, ceiling fans, and self-contained 

heating and cooling systems in various locations. The BP project is scheduled to have ceiling fans, unit 

heaters, self-contained heating and cooling systems, and a forced-air, evaporative cooling system in its 

dining facility. Finally, we noted that BP’s armory is adjacent to an ANCOP barracks.17 AED-South

officials noted that a blast wall would need to be constructed to correct this oversight.

Quality Assurance and Quality Control Oversight Deficient in Several Respects

The implementation of USACE’s key quality assurance and quality control oversight requirements were

not properly documented, raising concerns that these steps were not adequately performed or were not 

performed at all. AED-South and AED-North officials noted that these documentation and oversight 

deficiencies occurred during a period of inadequate staffing levels and the creation of a new districtlevel office.

USACE’s quality assurance system centers on the district-level quality assurance plan (DLQAP) for 

construction that each of the Corps’ district offices prepares using a common model. AED-South issued 

its DLQAP on August 3, 2009, to mark its creation as a separate district office. Prior to the creation of 

AED-South, the plan developed by USACE’s district office in Kabul was in effect. Key oversight 

requirements described in these plans include the need for (1) supplemental quality assurance and 

quality control plans for each construction project prepared by USACE and contractor staff, 

 15 AED-South was established as a separate district on August 3, 2009, in response to a growing workload that AED 

headquarters in Kabul could not manage alone. This likely slowed construction progress because certain oversight 

responsibilities and program files had to be transferred from AED-North to AED-South. AED-South staffing in 

August 2009 was about 40 individuals compared with an authorized staffing of 299. Currently, AED-South has 

approximately 235 staff, and USACE officials noted that contract management and oversight has improved as a 

result.

16 The ANCOP task order, however, required that this project provide for a common power, water, and sewer 

system to support the UP and BP projects.

17Generally, an armory is a building where arms and military equipment is stored.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 15

respectively;

18 (2) quality assurance and quality control reports that are typically prepared on a daily 

basis by USACE and contractor staff; (3) quality assurance and quality control testing; and (4) threephase inspections conducted by contractor staff and overseen by USACE quality assurance staff to 

ensure that each project’s definable features of work (DFOW)19 meet all statement-of-work and 

technical requirements.

20 Quality assurance reports, quality control reports, and USACE’s Resident 

Management System database provide the key means for determining whether planned oversight 

actions, as detailed in the supplemental quality assurance plans and quality control plans, were actually 

carried out.

The DLQAP notes that a unique quality assurance plan must be developed for every construction 

project. These plans serve as “supplements” to the DLQAP and are referred to as supplemental quality 

assurance plans. These plans should include information on (1) quality assurance staffing, (2) DFOWs, 

(3) milestone dates for the project , and (4) quality assurance surveillance responsibilities and quality 

assurance testing to include type and frequency. We reviewed the supplemental quality assurance 

plans for each JRAC project and found that they met all DLQAP requirements with the exception that 

they did not include details on the number and nature of planned quality assurance tests needed to 

ensure that the contractor’s quality control testing was accurate and reliable. In the absence of testing 

plans, AED-South lacked reasonable assurance that contractor-conducted quality control tests were 

adequate.

Supplemental Quality Assurance Plans Met Requirements but Did Not Provide Testing Details

We reviewed the quality control plan developed for each JRAC project and found that they generally 

adhered to DLQAP standards. These plans should describe how the contractor will implement a quality 

control system to guide construction activities throughout the life of the project. Their main purpose is 

to ensure all construction activities comply with the requirements of the scope of work and technical 

specifications. The DLQAP says that the USACE resident office must review and approve the quality 

control plan before construction work is initiated. The plan should include (1) the contractor’s quality 

control organization, (2) personnel listing, (3) details on the submittal process, (4) testing plan, (5) threephase inspection plan, (6) details on the construction and design deficiencies tracking system, (7) 

reporting procedures, and (8) a list of DFOWs. 

Quality Control Plans Generally Adhered to Standards

 18 The purpose of a quality assurance system and plans is to verify the effectiveness and accuracy of the 

contractor's control over the quality of work required by the contract. The project engineer has the responsibility 

for proper implementation of the quality assurance program, which ensures that the quality control system is 

effectively serving this purpose.

19 A DFOW is a task that is separate and distinct from other tasks and has separate control requirements. For 

example, concrete slabs would require separate tasks for formwork, reinforcement, embedded items, placement, 

finishing, and curing.

20 Other elements of USACE’s quality assurance system include contractor work order submittals, contractor 

invoice submissions, payment requests based on percentage of work completed, contractor performance 

assessments, and a “lessons learned” tracking system.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 16

In our review of the quality assurance reports prepared for the RLC, ANCOP, UP, and BP projects (for the 

8 weeks from April 15, 2009, to June 15, 2009),

Quality Assurance Reports Were Perfunctory and Lacked Detail

21 only about 10 percent of these required data fields 

were addressed, on average. As described in the DLQAP, USACE quality assurance representatives

should visit the construction sites as often as practical. Each visit must be documented with a quality 

assurance report following a prescribed “checklist” format to ensure that a series of data fields are 

addressed even if the answer is “not applicable.” Key data fields that should be addressed include the 

contractor’s quality control activities, developments that may lead to a change order, disagreements 

with the quality control report, progress of work and the cause/extent of delays, results of quality 

assurance inspections and testing, and Quality Assurance Representative comments relating to specific 

DFOWs. 

Compared with the quality assurance reports we reviewed, the quality control reports for all four JRAC 

projects for the same 8-week period addressed substantially more required data fields. We found that, 

on average, 60 percent of the required data fields (such as work performed each day, quality control 

tests performed and results, and three-phase inspection activities conducted) were completed or were 

listed as “not applicable.” This does not suggest, however, that completed fields always included 

accurate information. For example, we noted that even basic information such as the recorded 

temperature was not always consistent for quality assurance and quality control reports filed for the 

same day.

Quality Control Reports Were Incomplete or Not Detailed

AED-South failed to adequately document the extent, nature, and results of required quality assurance 

and quality control tests conducted for each of JRAC’s four projects. We found no specific references in 

quality assurance reports that any quality assurance testing had taken place during the 8-week period 

we reviewed.

Evidence of Quality Assurance and Control Testing Was Lacking

22

We found no specific references to quality control tests in the quality control reports filed for the 8-

week period we reviewed. Additionally, we received updated Resident Management System listings of 

quality control tests conducted for each JRAC project; however, these March 9, 2010, data reports

showed quality control tests as “awaiting results,” or “not performed,” or “quality assurance verification 

pending.” These reports also showed that the recorded number of quality control tests varied widely 

among projects. For example, RLC recorded 44 quality control tests, ANCOP recorded 14, UP recorded 

3, and BP recorded 193. 

Furthermore, we found that AED-South did not systematically capture information on 

quality assurance tests; therefore, the option to review a related Resident Management System report

did not exist.

 21 We selected this time period because it was the mid-point of JRAC construction activities.

22 We reviewed (1) a sample of quality assurance reports, (2) a sample of quality control reports, and (3) Resident 

Management System reports, current through March 9, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 17

Documentation of Three-Phase Inspections Lacking

AED-South did not document its three-phase inspections as required by the DLQAP. As described in the 

DLQAP, the three-phase system provides a means for ensuring that all construction activities, including 

those involving subcontractors, suppliers, and testing laboratories, comply with the latest applicable 

contract drawings, specifications, certified or approved submittals, as well as authorized changes to the 

contract. Table 7 provides a summary of each step in the three-phase inspection process.

Table 7: Description of the Three-Phase Inspection Process

Phase Description

Preparatory This phase is performed before beginning work on each feature of work. It 

includes a review of contract requirements to ensure materials, sample panels, 

and equipment conform to contract requirements, and so control testing, 

including procedures, is finalized. This phase also includes an examination of 

the new work area to verify that already completed work conforms to contract 

requirements and that all required materials are already approved, on hand, 

and properly stored. The Quality Assurance Representative should be notified 

at least 48 hours in advance of each preparatory activity. Preparatory 

inspections should be documented in the daily quality assurance report.

Initial This phase is performed at the beginning of each DFOW, once a representative 

sample of work is completed. The initial phase provides a check of preliminary 

work to ensure compliance with contract requirements. The initial phase 

should be repeated for each new crew working on-site, or for any item that

does not meet acceptable specified quality standards. The Quality Assurance 

Representative should be notified at least 48 hours in advance of each initial 

activity.

Follow-up This phase is performed continuously, until the activity is completed, to verify 

that control procedures provide a product in compliance with contract 

requirements. Adjustments to procedures may be required based on the 

findings and testing. The Quality Assurance Representative will perform spot 

checks and enter the results into quality assurance reports.

Source: District Level Quality Assurance Plan, AED-South.

As described in table 8, we found no documented evidence of a preparatory inspection for at least 80 

percent of the DFOWs we reviewed. With regard to initial inspections, we found no documented 

evidence that an inspection had been conducted for at least 95 percent of all DFOW’s. We did not 

analyze the third phase of the inspection process because DLQAP guidance notes that this phase should 

be continuous and documented in quality assurance and quality control reports over long periods of 

time. However, we noted that RMS data updated through March 9, 2010, showed the “number of final 

follow-ups held” as zero for all DFOWs for all JRAC projects. 
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 18

Table 8: Documented Preparatory and Initial Inspections

Project (Number of 

DFOWs)

Documented 

Preparatory Inspections 

Documented Initial 

Inspections 

Number of 

Inspections

Percentage 

of DFOWs

Number of 

Inspections

Percentage 

of DFOWs

RLC (61) 12 20 2 3

ANCOP (77) 7 9 4 5

UP (75) 0 0 0 0

BP (120) 20 17 5 4

Source: SIGAR analysis of AED-South paper records and reports from the Resident Manager System.

JRAC IS NOT SUSTAINABLE WITHOUT CONTINUED U.S. ASSISTANCE

CSTC-A officials stated that the government of Afghanistan does not have the financial or

technical capacity to sustain Afghanistan National Security Forces facilities once they are completed.

According to the AED program manager for operations and maintenance, two new operations and

maintenance contracts for ANSF facilities will be awarded by July 29, 2010. These contracts will

cover ANA and ANP facilities in northern and southern Afghanistan for up to $450 million and 

$350 million, respectively. According to the program manager, these contracts will be for 1 base year 

plus 4 optional years. These indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts will have task

orders for operations and maintenance activities written against the contracts at specific locations.

According to the program manager for operations and maintenance, a total of 663 ANSF sites will be 

covered over the life of these contracts. For those sites that are not completed, they will be added to 

the contract with task orders as warranted.

According to the AED official program manager for operations and maintenance, the new contracts will

require a training program for Afghan workers in all aspects of operations and maintenance. The

program will be expanded with each additional year to include all regions in Afghanistan. According to

the program manager, CSTC-A plans to transfer responsibility for all operations and maintenance for the 

ANSF facilities to the government of Afghanistan by 2013. The contractor will train Afghans to support 

these functions. The Ministry of Defense will begin taking responsibility in selected locations beginning 

in 2010 with all locations phased in over time. The additional option years for the contracts are included 

if all of the ANSF facilities are not turned over by 2013.

A key development that will influence the ability of ANP personnel to provide operations and 

maintenance support without U.S. assistance is the country-wide move toward “austere” construction 

standards for ANSF facilities as embodied in an August 16, 2009, memorandum issued by CSTC-A.23

 23 JRAC construction was initiated before the standards were issued; however, efforts were made to incorporate 

the standards into on-going construction.

 

Examples of austere standards in the memo include plain concrete floors instead of tiled floors, metal 

trusses and metal covering for roofs instead of structural steel trusses, surface-mounted interior 
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 19

electrical wiring to increase ease of access for repairs and upgrades, surface-mounted interior plumbing

to increase ease of access, dedicated areas for hand-washing laundry with clothes lines for drying, and 

the use of ceiling fans and electrical heaters.

According to CSTC-A, these standards are an attempt to provide uniform guidance to help ensure the 

long-term sustainability of U.S.-funded construction in Afghanistan. However, our analysis of related 

documents and recommendations by AED-South staff indicated that current guidance could be 

improved by including further details on heating and cooling options and other decisions relating to 

electrical and plumbing fixtures. For example,

• Current guidance suggests that ceiling fans and electrical heaters should be used in enlisted 

soldiers barracks while combination heating/cooling units (commonly described as “split-packs”) 

should be used for flag officer and visiting officer quarters. The memo is silent or ambigious in

regard to standard heating and cooling solutions for special cases such as dining facilities, 

communication units with sensitive equipment, and hospitals and clinics that may have unique 

requirements. 

• Current guidance does not address other refinements such as whether fire-heated stoves are an 

approriate alternative, whether baseboard heating is more efficient than stand-alone electrical

heaters, or whether ceiling fans provide sufficient cooling given regional variations in weather.

24

• Current guidance also does not address a number of issues relating to the use of fixtures such 

as:

• Trough-style, metal wash basins rather than individual porcelain sinks.

• Positive-stop faucets with non-moveable neck or rubber hose necks as opposed to 

moveable- neck type faucets. 

• Externally mounted, solid-tube, short shower heads instead of flexible-neck systems 

that can be easily torn off.

• Chain and spring door closers instead of pneumatic door closers.

• Elimination of window screens or the use of hinged or magnetic attachment screens to 

prevent cutting of screens to throw out garbage or run television cables to antennas.

• Improved and sturdier mounting of light fixtures to prevent abuse by Afghan police who 

may hang items from them.

 24 For example, summer tempartures in Kandahar can exceed 120 degrees Fahrenheit while summer highs in Kabul 

are generally 30 degrees lower. 
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 20

CONCLUSION

All four JRAC projects experienced delays. More important, however, was the lack of a master plan for 

the compound, which contributed to redundant life support systems, different heating and cooling 

solutions that will be more difficult to operate and maintain than a common system, and the 

construction of an armory opposite a police barracks raising significant safety concerns if the building is 

used for its intended purpose. Further, lax enforcement and documentation of key USACE quality 

assurance and quality control requirements raise the risk that non-visible construction problems could 

exist that may decrease the useful life of the project, increase long-term operations and maintenance 

costs, and possibly compromise occupant safety.

With regard to future operations and maintenance costs, the United States has already committed to 

pay an estimated $800 million to support all ANSF facilities over the next 5 years. These support 

contracts include provisions for training Afghans to take over these responsibilities by 2013. The 

adoption of more austere building standards would reduce operations and maintenance costs and 

improve the chances that the Afghans will be able to assume full responsibility for operations and 

maintenance sometime in the near future. CSTC-A’s current guidance on austere standards represents 

an excellent start, but is incomplete and could be improved.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We are making three recommendations to enhance compliance with USACE’s quality assurance and 

control procedures and increase the likelihood that the Afghans will be able to sustain the facilities 

without assistance from the United States.

To help ensure that contractors deliver current and future construction projects in compliance with all 

contract specifications, we recommend that the Commanding General, USACE:

(1) direct AED-South to ensure that future projects adhere to USACE’s established quality assurance 

and quality control procedures.

To reduce operations and maintenance costs and improve the long-term sustainability of U.S.-funded 

ANSF projects in Afghanistan, we recommend that the Commanding General, CSTC-A, in consultation 

with AED-South, AED-North, and other applicable implementing partners:

(2) review and update current guidance on austere construction standards to include more detailed 

guidance regarding heating and cooling options for various types of facilities, with the option to 

allow for appropriate regional differences. 

Based on our review of CSTC-A’s austere construction guidance, we further recommend that the 

Commanding General, CSTC-A:

(3) include additional guidance regarding appropriate electrical, plumbing, and other fixtures for 

facilities. 
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 21

COMMENTS

CSTC-A and USACE provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments are 

reproduced in appendices II and III, respectively. CSTC-A concurred with our two report 

recommendations related to updating existing guidance on austere construction standards in 

Afghanistan. USACE concurred with our recommendation that greater focus be placed on adhering to 

established USACE quality assurance and quality control procedures. CSTC-A and USACE also provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

Both CSTC-A and USACE commented on our observations on the construction of an armory next to a 

barracks. CSTC-A indicated that the armory was constructed for “securing weapons and not 

ammunition,” implying no safety concern. In contrast, USACE stated that they identified this concern 

prior to our site inspection and that discussions are on-going with CSTC-A regarding the option of 

installing 20-foot high concrete (“Alaskan type”) barriers between the two areas. We note that this 

matter needs to be resolved soon because AED-South officials said the facilities will be transferred to 

Afghan authorities by the end of July 2010.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 22

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s review of a contract and three task orders funded by the Combined Security Transition 

Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and implemented by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to 

complete four co-located projects collectively referred to as the Joint Regional Afghanistan National 

Security Forces Compound (JRAC). This report addresses (1) whether JRAC was constructed within the 

terms of the contract, including schedule and cost; (2) whether USACE oversight of construction was 

conducted in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), USACE requirements, and 

oversight provisions of the contract; and (3) what plans are in place to sustain these facilities once they 

are turned over to the Afghan government.

To examine project outcomes, including schedule and cost, we met with officials from CSTC-A and the 

Afghanistan Engineer District (AED)-South and AED-North. We reviewed the final contract and task 

order award documents including statements of work, notices to proceed, and modifications. We 

conducted a site inspection of JRAC on November 5, 2009 and follow-up fieldwork in Kandahar in March 

2010, including a drive through review of construction progress. We used computer-processed data 

from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Resident Management System to determine the progress and 

payments made to date for each contract we reviewed. In addition, the Resident Management System 

provided information on issues and challenges for each contract. We verified information in the system 

with hard-copy contract files. 

To examine the contracting process, project oversight, and relevant internal controls, we met with 

officials from CSTC-A, AED-South, and AED-North. We reviewed criteria and guidance in the FAR and the 

AED-South District Level Quality Assurance Plan (DLQAP) for construction, dated August 3, 2009, to 

determine if the contracting process and oversight of the contract met requirements. This August 2009 

guidance replicates the district-level plan in place when USACE had only one district office in 

Afghanistan. Additionally, we reviewed the AED guidance to determine the roles and responsibilities for 

AED personnel. For each JRAC project, we reviewed the quality assurance and quality control plans and 

compared them to DLQAP guidance for compliance with USACE standards. We reviewed related quality 

assurance and quality control reports for an 8-week period (April 15 through June 15, 2009) for 

adherence with standards. We selected this time period because it approximates the mid-point in JRAC 

construction activities. Our reviews of quality assurance/quality control plans and quality 

assurance/quality control reports were performed independently by two SIGAR engineers who 

discussed and reconciled any assessment differences. Finally, we reviewed whether three-phase 

inspections were conducted for each definable feature of work listed for each project.

To examine U.S. government efforts to transfer the project to the government of Afghanistan and 

provide for its sustainment, we met with officials from CSTC-A, AED-North, and AED-South to determine 

what sustainment plans the government of Afghanistan has in place and updated information provided 

in earlier SIGAR reports relating to operations and maintenance contracts for Afghanistan National 

Security Forces throughout the country.

This report is one in a series of SIGAR performance audits focused on reconstruction contract outcomes, 

costs, and oversight. We conducted work in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan, from October 2009 to 

July 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 23

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. The audit was conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended.
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 24

APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM THE COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMANDAFGHANISTAN
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 25
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 26
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 27
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 28

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 29
SIGAR Audit-10-12 Contractor Performance and Oversight Page 30

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-08I).
_________________________________________________________________________________

SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide 

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy 

and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

Reports and Testimonies SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all released 

reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

Abuse in Afghanistan allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and

Reconstruction Programs reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202