alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 8b
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 8b appear at 68 FR 51353, Aug. 26, 2003.

§ 8b.22 Academic adjustments. ( a ) *Academic requirements.* A recipient to which this subpart applies shall make such modifications to its academic requirements as are necessary to ensure that such requirements do not discriminate or have the effect of discriminating, on the basis of handicap, against a qualified handicapped applicant or student. Academic requirements that the recipient can demonstrate are essential to the instruction being pursued by such student or to any directly related licensing requirement will not be regarded as discriminatory within the meaning of this section. Modifications may include changes in the length of time permitted for the completion of degree requirements, substitution of specific courses required for the completion of degree requirements, and adaptation of the manner in which specific courses are conducted.
( b ) *Other rules.* A recipient to which this subpart applies may not impose upon handicapped students other rules, such as the prohibition of tape recorders in classrooms or of dog guides in campus buildings, that have the effect of limiting the participation of handicapped students in the recipient's education program or activity.
( c ) *Course examinations.* In its course examinations or other procedures for evaluating student's academic achievement, a recipient to which this subpart applies shall provide such methods for evaluating the achievement of students who have a handicap that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills as will best ensure that the results of the evaluation represents the student's achievement in the course, rather than reflecting the student's impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills (except where such skills are the factors that the test purports to measure).
( d ) *Auxiliary aids.* ( 1 ) A recipient to which this subpart applies shall ensure that no handicapped student is denied the benefits of, excluded from participation in, or otherwise subjected to discrimination because of the absence of educational auxiliary aids for students with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills. A recipient shall operate each program or activity to which this subpart applies so that, when viewed in its entirety, auxiliary aids are readily available.
( 2 ) Auxiliary aids may include taped text, interpreters or other effective methods of making orally delivered materials available to students with hearing impairments, readers in libraries for students with visual impairments, classroom equipment adapted for use by students with manual impairments, and other similar services and actions. Recipients need not provide attendants, individually prescribed devices, readers for personal use or study, or other devices or services of a personal nature.
#### § 238.0 Bait advertising defined.[1]

Bait advertising is an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or service which the advertiser in truth does not intend or want to sell. Its purpose is to switch consumers from buying the advertised merchandise, in order to sell something else, usually at a higher price or on a basis more advantageous to the advertiser. The primary aim of a bait advertisement is to obtain leads as to persons interested in buying merchandise of the type so advertised.

###### Footnotes -
  238.0

[1] For the purpose of this part “advertising” includes any form of public notice however disseminated or utilized.
#### § 1301.2 Purpose.

The purpose of this rule is to ban those refuse bins which come under the scope of this ban because they present an unreasonable risk of injury due to tip-over that can result in serious injury or death from crushing.
§ 455.6 State exemptions. ( a ) If, upon application to the Commission by an appropriate State agency, the Commission determines, that— ( 1 ) There is a State requirement in effect which applies to any transaction to which this rule applies; and
( 2 ) That State requirement affords an overall level of protection to consumers which is as great as, or greater than, the protection afforded by this Rule; then the Commission's Rule will not be in effect in that State to the extent specified by the Commission in its determination, for as long as the State administers and enforces effectively the State requirement.
( b ) Applications for exemption under subsection (a) should be directed to the Secretary of the Commission. When appropriate, proceedings will be commenced in order to make a determination described in paragraph (a) of this section, and will be conducted in accordance with subpart C of part 1 of the Commission's Rules of Practice.
**Exhibit 10.25**

**SUMMARY OF THE COMPANY’S NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTORCOMPENSATION**

Non-employee directors are paid $2,000 for each Boardmeeting attended in person, $1,000 per Board meeting conducted by telephone,$1,500 for each Audit Committee meeting attended, whether in person or byphone, $1,000 for each Compensation Committee, Nominating Committee or SpecialCommittee meeting attended in person and $500 for each Compensation Committee,Nominating Committee or Special Committee meeting conducted by telephone. Inaddition, the Chairman of the Audit Committee is paid an additional fee of$8,000 per year and the Compensation Committee Chairman is paid an additionalfee of $4,000 per year for their services as such. All directors are reimbursedfor their reasonable expenses related to attendance at meetings.

In accordance with the Company’s 2000 Director StockOption Plan, any non-employee director first elected to the Board will receivea stock option award of 50,000 shares. Each year, as of the Annual Meeting ofStockholders, each non-employee director will receive a stock option award of15,000 shares.

----
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3527 

To amend the Commodity Exchange Act to clarify the definition of swap 

dealer. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 30, 2011 

Mr. HULTGREN (for himself, Mr. BOREN, Mrs. BIGGERT, Mr. DOLD, Mr. 

JOHNSON of Illinois, Mr. LANCE, Mr. KINZINGER of Illinois, Mr. MANZULLO, and Mr. SCHOCK) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture 

A BILL 

To amend the Commodity Exchange Act to clarify the 

definition of swap dealer. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protecting Main Street 

5 End-Users From Excessive Regulation’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF THE DEFINITION OF SWAP 

7 DEALER. 

8 Section 1a(49) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 

9 U.S.C. 1a(49)) is amended to read as follows: 


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2 

•HR 3527 IH

1 ‘‘(49) SWAP DEALER.— 

2 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘swap deal3 er’ means any person who is engaged in the 

4 business of entering into swaps, and— 

5 ‘‘(i) holds itself out as a dealer in 

6 swaps; 

7 ‘‘(ii) makes a market in swaps; or 

8 ‘‘(iii) engages in any activity causing 

9 the person to be commonly known as a 

10 dealer or market maker in swaps, 

11 provided however, in no event shall an insured 

12 depository institution be considered to be a 

13 swap dealer to the extent it offers to enter into 

14 a swap with a customer in connection with orig15 inating a loan to the customer. 

16 ‘‘(B) INCLUSION.—A person may be des17 ignated as a swap dealer for a single type or 

18 single class or category of swap or activities and 

19 considered not to be a swap dealer for other 

20 types, classes, or categories of swaps or activi21 ties. 

22 ‘‘(C) EXCEPTION.—In determining wheth23 er a person is a ‘swap dealer’ within the mean24 ing of subparagraph (A), no consideration shall 


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3 

•HR 3527 IH

1 be given to any transaction entered into for the 

2 person’s own account for the purpose of— 

3 ‘‘(i) hedging or mitigating commercial 

4 risk; or 

5 ‘‘(ii) achieving the person’s own trad6 ing or investment objectives. 

7 ‘‘(D) DE MINIMIS EXCEPTION.—The Com8 mission shall exempt from designation as a 

9 swap dealer an entity that enters into swap 

10 dealing transactions with or on behalf of the 

11 person’s customers if the aggregate gross no12 tional amount of the outstanding swap dealing 

13 transactions entered into over the course of the 

14 preceding calendar year does not exceed 

15 $3,000,000,000 (or such greater amount as the 

16 Commission may establish as market conditions 

17 warrant), multiplied by the sum of 1 and the 

18 percentage (if any) by which the Consumer 

19 Price Index for all Urban Customers published 

20 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the De21 partment of Labor changed for the 12-month 

22 period ending the preceding April 30.’’. 

Æ 


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#### § 311.2 Stayed or invalid parts.

If any part of this rule is stayed or held invalid, the rest of it will remain in force.
### §12857. Authorization of appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated for assistance payments under this subchapter $520,665,600 for fiscal year 1993 and $542,533,555 for fiscal year 1994, of which such sums as may be necessary shall be available in each such fiscal year for use under section 12852(e) of this title. Any amount appropriated under this section shall be deposited in the Fund and shall remain available until expended, subject to the provisions of section 12858 1 of this title.

(Pub. L. 101–625, title III, §308, Nov. 28, 1990, 104 Stat. 4133; Pub. L. 102–550, title I, §182(b), Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 3736.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 12858 of this title, referred to in text, was in the original "section 311", and was translated as reading "section 309", meaning section 309 of Pub. L. 101–625, to reflect the probable intent of Congress, because Pub. L. 101–625 does not contain a section 311.

#### Amendments

1992—Pub. L. 102–550 amended section generally. Prior to amendment, section read as follows: "There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this subchapter $250,000,000 for fiscal year 1991 and $521,500,000 for fiscal year 1992. Any amount appropriated under this section shall be deposited in the Fund and remain available until expended, subject to the provisions of section 12858 of this title."

1 See References in Text note below.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 362 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 362

   To redesignate the Federal building and United States Courthouse 
 located at 200 East Wall Street in Midland, Texas, as the ``George H. 
 W. Bush and George W. Bush United States Courthouse and George Mahon 
                          Federal Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 20, 2011

 Mr. Conaway (for himself, Mr. Gohmert, Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas, Mr. 
   Hall, Mr. Barton of Texas, Mr. Culberson, Mr. Brady of Texas, Mr. 
   McCaul, Ms. Granger, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. Paul, Mr. Hinojosa, Mr. 
Flores, Mr. Neugebauer, Mr. Smith of Texas, Mr. Olson, Mr. Canseco, Mr. 
 Marchant, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Farenthold, Mr. Carter, and Mr. Sessions) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To redesignate the Federal building and United States Courthouse 
 located at 200 East Wall Street in Midland, Texas, as the ``George H. 
 W. Bush and George W. Bush United States Courthouse and George Mahon 
                          Federal Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REDESIGNATION.

    The Federal building and United States Courthouse located at 200 
East Wall Street in Midland, Texas, known as the George Mahon Federal 
Building, shall be known and designated as the ``George H. W. Bush and 
George W. Bush United States Courthouse and George Mahon Federal 
Building''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the Federal building and United States 
Courthouse referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference 
to the ``George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush United States Courthouse 
and George Mahon Federal Building''.
                                 <all>
```
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 230 (Wednesday, December 1, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Page 69923]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-26478]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL-7844-1]


Jehl Cooperage Company Inc. Superfund Site; Notice of Settlement

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency.

ACTION: Notice of settlement.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Under section 122(h)(1) of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has entered into an Agreement for Recovery of 
Past Cost (Agreement) at the Jehl Cooperage Company Inc Superfund Site 
(Site) located in Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee, with Unocal. EPA 
will consider public comments on the Agreement until January 3, 2005. 
EPA may withdraw from or modify the Agreement should such comments 
disclose facts or considerations which indicate the Agreement is 
inappropriate, improper, or inadequate. Copies of the Agreement are 
available from: Ms. Paula V. Batchelor, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Region 4, Superfund Enforcement & Information Management 
Branch, Waste Management Division, 61 Forsyth Street, SW., Atlanta, 
Georgia 30303, (404) 562-8887.
    Written comment may be submitted to Paula V. Batchelor at the above 
address within 30 days of the date of publication.

    Dated: November 16, 2004.
Rosalind Brown,
Chief, Superfund Enforcement & Information Management Branch.
[FR Doc. 04-26478 Filed 11-30-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
#### Jennifer Russo, Appellant, v Arlene Ross et al., Respondents.

[821 NYS2d 101]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Weiss, J.), dated August 23, 2005, as granted the motion of the defendant Arlene Ross, and that branch of the separate motion of the defendants Daniel Correa and Jose I. Correa, which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs payable by the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs, the motion of the defendant Arlene Ross, and that branch of the motion of the defendants Daniel Correa and Jose I. Correa which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted *387against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) are denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

The defendants failed to satisfy their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see *Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955 [1992]). The defendants’ examining orthopedist, who examined, inter alia, the plaintiffs knees, merely stated in his affirmed medical report that there was “full range of motion,” and the defendants’ examining neurologist, who examined, among other things, the plaintiffs cervical spine, merely stated in his affirmed medical report that the cervical spine had “full range of motion.” These experts failed, however, to set forth the objective test or tests performed at arriving at the conclusions that the plaintiff had full range of motion of both knees and the cervical spine *(see Nembhard v Delatorre,*16 AD3d 390 [2005]; *Black v Robinson,*305 AD2d 438 [2003]). Since the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in the first instance on the threshold issue of serious injury, it is unnecessary to reach the question of whether the plaintiffs papers were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Nembhard v Delatorre, supra; Coscia v 938 Trading Corp.,*283 AD2d 538 [2001]). Miller, J.P., Ritter, Luciano, Spolzino and Dillon, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Michael Ferraina, Appellant, v Ontario Honda, Respondent. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

[820 NYS2d 174]

Kane, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed April 14, 2005, which ruled that claimant did not sustain an occupational disease and denied his claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

As an infant, claimant was diagnosed with hypophosphatemia rickets and received medical treatment for that condition *644throughout his life, including leg braces, medication and surgery to correct the deformity of both lower legs when he was 12 years old. When claimant was 16 years old, corrective surgery was recommended for both upper legs. However, claimant did not undergo the upper leg procedure until he developed stress fractures in his femurs at age 20. Asserting that the stress fractures were related to his duties as an auto mechanic for the employer, claimant filed this claim for workers’ compensation benefits. A Workers’ Compensation Law Judge found that claimant sustained an occupational disease and awarded benefits. Upon review, the Workers’ Compensation Board reversed, prompting this appeal by claimant.

In a claim for workers’ compensation benefits based upon occupational disease, the claimant must establish a recognizable link between his or her condition and a distinctive feature of his or her employment *(see Matter of Palmer v State Univ. of N.Y. Upstate Med. Univ.,*14 AD3d 737, 738 [2005], *lv denied*5 NY3d 717 [2005]; *Matter of Bates v Marine Midland Bank,*256 AD2d 948, 948-949 [1998]). While claimant’s treating physician opined that the cause of his stress fractures was attributable 50% to his preexisting condition and 50% to the repetitive weight-bearing required in his employment, the employer’s medical consultant concluded that claimant’s injuries were not causally related to his job duties but, rather, were entirely attributable to the progression of his preexisting condition.

Initially, we note that the Board specifically credited the employer’s witnesses, finding that claimant’s job duties were not as rigorous as testified to by claimant. Moreover, the Board noted that the employer’s medical consultant demonstrated that he thoroughly considered claimant’s medical history and job duties in reaching his conclusions. On the other hand, claimant’s physician appeared to be unfamiliar with the details of claimant’s employment or other activities and did not rule out the possibility that claimant’s stress fractures could have been caused by his normal activities. According deference to the Board’s credibility determinations and recognizing that it is within the province of the Board to accept or reject any portion of the medical evidence presented, we decline to disturb the Board’s decision despite the existence of some evidence which could support a different result *(see Matter of Baker v Orange Heating & Cooling,*9 AD3d 517, 518 [2004]; *Matter of Guarino v Natslock & Natlock,*278 AD2d 633, 634 [2000]).

Crew III, J.P., Peters, Spain and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMR MOHSEN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

MORGAN STANLEY & CO. INC.; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55606 

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-07358-MWF-AS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 9, 2017**

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Federal prisoner Amr Mohsen appeals pro se from the district court’s 

judgment dismissing his action alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act (“RICO”) and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 15 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-55606 

2010) (dismissal based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 

926 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal based on the applicable statute of limitations). We 

may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thomson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 

1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Mohsen’s action was proper on the basis of claim preclusion 

because Mohsen’s claims were raised or could have been raised in a previous 

action between the parties or their privies that resulted in a final adjudication on 

the merits. See Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713-14 

(9th Cir. 2001) (discussing claim preclusion elements under federal law); see also 

Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cty., 69 F.3d 321, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(recognizing the court’s ability to overlook waiver and raise sua sponte claim 

preclusion).

The district court did not err by taking judicial notice of documents filed in 

Mohsen’s criminal case. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without 

converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment). 

Mohsen’s request for oral argument, set forth in his opening brief, is denied. 

Mohsen’s request to reassign this case to a different district court judge, set 

forth in his reply brief, is denied. 

AFFIRMED.
#### § 312.9 Enforcement.

Subject to sections 6503 and 6505 of the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, a violation of a regulation prescribed under section 6502 (a) of this Act shall be treated as a violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)).