PERSPECTIVES FROM ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, 

AND COLOMBIA

Hemispheric Security: 

 A Perception from the South

Pedro Villagra Delgado

Security Issues and Challenges 

to Regional Security Cooperation: 

A Brazilian Perspective

Luis Bitencourt

Ideas for Constructing a New Framework 

of Hemispheric Security

Henry Medina Uribe

July 2003
ii

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ISBN 1-58487-132-6
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

1. Hemispheric Security: A Perception from the South

Pedro Villagra Delgado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. Security Issues and Challenges to Regional Security 

Cooperation: A Brazilian Perspective

Luis Bitencourt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3. Ideas for Constructing a New Framework 

of Hemispheric Security 

Henry Medina Uribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

v

FOREWORD

This is another in the Special Series of monographs derived from 

the March 2003 conference on “Regional Security Cooperation in the 

Western Hemisphere” that was cosponsored by the Strategic Studies 

Institute of the U.S. Army War College, the North-South Center of 

the University of Miami, and the U.S. Southern Command. This 

monograph, with a Preface by Ambassador Ambler Moss, includes 

three short, but interesting and important papers presented at the 

conference. Ambassador Pedro Villagra Delgado, the Coordinator 

for Strategic Projects in the Argentine Foreign Ministry; Dr. Luis 

Bittencourt, Director of the Brazil Project at the Woodrow Wilson 

Center and Professor at Georgetown University; and Major General 

Henry Medina Uribe, a former Director of the Colombian War 

College and an advisor to the Ministry of Defense, present distinctly 

differing views regarding regional security cooperation for now and 

into the future.

These perspectives reflect the uncertainty, confusion, and 

frustration of the conference. Participants generally agreed that 

Colombia is a paradigm of the failing state that has enormous 

implications for the stability, democracy, prosperity, and peace 

of the Western Hemisphere. However, they did not agree that the 

interdependent regional community should join in a cooperative 

effort to help a neighbor in need. Moreover, they did not agree 

regarding the threat, nor on a unified ends-way-means strategy that 

would contribute directly to achieving desired hemispheric stability 

objectives. This disarray demonstrates a pressing need to pursue the 

debate, and to develop a moral position and structural framework 

from which individual countries can cooperate meaningfully and 

cooperatively against contemporary nontraditional and nonmilitary 

threats to basic security and sovereignty. 

The Strategic Studies Institute and the North-South Center are 

pleased to offer these perspectives on regional security as part of our 

ongoing attempt to recognize and respond to the strategic realities of 

the current security situation in the Western Hemisphere. This kind 
vi

of dialectical engagement is critically important to the vital longterm interests of the United States, Colombia, the region, and the 

entire global community. 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
vii

PREFACE

This monograph in our series on “Building Regional Security in 

the Western Hemisphere” includes three presentations that were 

made at the March 2003 conference in Miami. They include a high 

ranking Argentine diplomat, a leading Brazilian scholar, and a retired 

Colombian general officer. As might be expected, these individuals 

perceive the need for regional security cooperation from somewhat 

different perspectives.

Yet, despite their differences, these writers express some significant 

common perceptions. First, none of them offers a panacea or quick fix 

solution to the regional stability-security issue--or even suggests that 

any short-term solution is possible. That judgment is important as the 

United States focuses on the need to develop a realistic ends, ways, 

and means stability strategy to begin the implementation of a viable 

Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005.

Second, implicitly at least, each supports the idea that even though 

there is no traditional military threat from external enemies, “new” 

threats are present that must be addressed. As an example, they 

agreed that the terrorist threat requires close regional coordination, 

and that it dictates the need to enhance multilateral cooperation. But 

as Ambassador Delgado points out, 

We [must start] thinking of ways of joining efforts and scarce 

resources for the benefit of our common welfare. . . . We should 

not forget that the priorities of millions of Latin Americans pass 

through their struggle to feed themselves and their families . . . 

and to solve the increase in public insecurity and crime that 

plagues their daily lives . . . Doing so should not be incompatible 

to fighting terrorism at the same time.

This is a sensible and pragmatic approach. 

In that connection, all three agreed that there is a lack of a common 

view regarding precisely “What is a threat?” and “What is security?” 

This is the heart of the stability problem in Latin America. These 

authors acknowledge that the traditional definition of security and 

threat is no longer completely valid. They understand that a more 

realistic concept includes the protection of national sovereignty 
viii

against unconventional internal causes and attackers. They also 

recognize that a close linkage exists among security, development, and 

democracy. Nevertheless, with the exception of General Medina, they 

were reluctant to take a broadened definition of national security to its 

logical conclusion. That is, to correspondingly broaden and integrate 

the roles of the national security forces into an internal sovereignty 

protection mission. Colombians now understand that that role is what 

makes stability, development, and democracy possible.

Finally, all three are at least implicitly aware of the inability of 

individual Latin American nations to keep the Colombian crisis 

contained within Colombia. They acknowledged that significant 

spillover into Colombia’s neighbors is occurring, and that it can only 

increase. That understanding, plus an acknowledged need to give 

more attention to political, economic, and social issues that have a 

bearing on the regional security situation, return us to the first points 

of this discussion. It takes us to the need for a hemispheric architecture 

that can deal cooperatively and effectively with the insecurity and 

instability threats that have meaning for us all.

The security-stability equation in Latin America is extremely volatile 

and dangerous. In terms of the kind of environment that is essential to 

the entire North American strategy for the hemisphere, that stability 

situation is deserving of much more attention than it has had in the 

recent past. If the reader has not already been thinking about these 

issues, this monograph is a good place to start. If the reader has been 

considering these problems, this monograph provides a point from 

which to recapitulate. The North-South Center is pleased to join with 

the Strategic Studies Institute in offering this contribution to better 

regional understanding.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.

Director

The Dante B. Fascell 

 North-South Center

University of Miami

1

HEMISPHERIC SECURITY:

A PERCEPTION FROM THE SOUTH

Pedro Villagra Delgado

Introduction.

Return to democratic rule in the Southern Hemisphere since 

the early 1980s had many positive effects. Among them, that the 

principles espoused domestically by all of our societies started to 

be reflected in our foreign policies, particularly towards the other 

countries of the region. That produced a positive synergy to promote 

the values we shared.

Rivalries that had plagued prospects for building better relations 

in the continent for decades were reduced to their proper context, 

and our neighbors started thinking as partners. That led to a change 

of paradigm among the countries of the region in matters of defense 

and security.

Mechanisms for political coordination and for the peaceful 

resolution of regional crises were created. An example of such 

coordination on matters affecting hemispheric security was 

the Contadora process. In the 1990s many initiatives followed, 

establishing hemispheric mechanisms that included the United 

States, Canada, and Caribbean States. These coordinated efforts to 

create a better environment for all were thus truly continental.

But we live in a crisis world, both in the field of international 

security as well as on social and economic matters. Latin America 

has been badly hit by those crises. However, in matters of defense 

and security, we still have comparative advantages when measured 

against other regions of the world.

This is evident regarding the countries of the so-called Southern 

Cone, where the present deep socio-economic crisis can still be 

contrasted with the excellent relations among all countries and where 

a climate of peace and cooperation is the rule in matters of security 

and defense. Therefore, we should persist in the efforts made in the 

last 2 decades to build a cooperative security system which protects 

the values we all share.
2

If we are to construct a better security climate in the Americas, we 

need the will and determination to achieve results. That will requires 

a concerted collective effort to provide for a free, prosperous, and 

just region. Each of its component countries will benefit immensely 

from the results of such effort.

If we consider the matters that most endanger security in our 

region, we would realize that they are not traditional or military. On 

the contrary, we could reasonably conclude that many of them are 

rooted in weak institutions. That contributes to the lack of adequate 

response by those areas of government which should address issues 

like corruption, drug-trafficking, organized crime, and poverty. 

Institutions such as the judiciary, police, law enforcement, and social 

welfare, must be strengthened in our region if we are ever to achieve 

those goals of economic and social development which are the best 

antidote to security crisis.

The security we should promote is that which furthers our 

best values and not only that of traditional territorial conceptions. 

Democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, welfare 

based on economic and social development, rule of law both at the 

national and international level, free trade, and nonproliferation, 

should benefit from the security environment we intend to create. 

Our foreign policy should also be based on those values. That is a 

realistic vision, as the possibility of achieving our goals will increase 

if the world respects, shares and promotes our own values. It is not 

ANY world order which will suits us, but only that where those 

values have their rightful place.

Our priority in matters of security and defense should continue 

being excellent relations with our neighbors, and we should strive 

to provide to our people the highest levels of economic, social, and 

spiritual welfare achievable in freedom. 

Democracy and Integration.

The two basic pillars for this paradigm change are democracy 

and economic and political integration. Representative democracy, 

by its very nature, requires transparency, debate, accountability of 

those in public office, rule of law, etc. All those elements contribute 
3

to a practice of building consensus, both in the respective society and 

abroad in their foreign relations.

One of the dangers to stability, and therefore to security, is 

representative democracy at risk. In the hemisphere we have created 

mechanisms to act in cases where democratic institutions falter. We 

should develop the will and the means to use those mechanisms 

speedily when situations become critical. The strengthening of 

democracy in our hemisphere is essential for the construction of the 

kind of societies our peoples hope for. We should therefore strive to 

protect it effectively and collectively.

This benefits security and defense as the environment on these 

matters for any country is bettered if its neighbors are democracies. 

Democracies do not start wars of aggression against other 

democracies. It is an old axiom, but also a tested truth.

Economic integration is the other fundamental pillar upon which 

the climate of peace and cooperation prevailing in South America 

is based upon. The Southern Cone Common Market Customs 

Union (MERCOSUR) is made up of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 

Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and associate members. It presupposes 

adherence to certain values and the Summit held in Ushuaia in 1998 

established what we call “the democratic clause.” This was later 

extended to the whole of the Americas through the Democratic 

Charter adopted in Lima in September 2001.

MERCOSUR changed the perception that each member had of 

the others to one of partnership in which gains for one benefit all. 

It brought economic gains in terms of increased trade and better 

opportunities for investment, but MERCOSUR is not limited 

to economic advantages. Better and deeper relations among its 

members in the political, institutional, cultural, and social fields were 

established. Security and defense also benefited. In an integration 

process rivalries give way to coincidental interests. Neighbors 

no longer seen as competitors become partners. The former rival 

becomes the new ally.

When neighbors are seen as potential security risks, the 

natural approach to security will be to establish mechanisms to 

provide defense against possible threats. When neighbors are 

seen as partners, security approaches tend to be shared concerns 
4

and, eventually, means. In our part of the world, we have built 

an environment in which we do not feel threatened by any of our 

neighbors, and we know we are not a threat or a security concern to 

any of them, either.

Coinciding interests in most fields among countries involved in 

an integration process do not have to erase each country’s unique 

history and culture. Integration does not entail the elimination of 

national diversity which enriches us all, but it strengthens the whole 

while respecting the individualities of such diversity.

In the field of defense and security, the logic behind MERCOSUR 

led to a pattern of cooperation and dialogue which also included 

these matters. The former “national security paradigm” was replaced 

by a new “cooperative security” approach. Military institutions 

gradually reasserted themselves in the exercise of their specific 

functions in accordance with the usual practice of representative 

government prevailing in the Western world.

Thus, instead of thinking how we could defend ourselves from 

possible or assumed aggressive intentions from our neighbors, 

we started thinking of ways in which the future could be faced in 

partnership, joining efforts and scarce resources for the benefit of 

our common welfare.

This vision covered the whole spectrum of relations among 

our countries. Security and defense issues followed economic and 

political developments in our societies and were also included in this 

new conception. Democracy and transparency, as well as economic, 

cultural and infrastructure integration, led to the elimination of 

mistrust. As we have seen in Europe, integration is not possible with 

countries which you consider to be security risks or even potential 

enemies.

In the so-called Southern Cone of South America, these processes 

were very rapid. Any observer who may compare the situation 

in which we found ourselves in the 1970s with the one prevailing 

today, surely would be favorably surprised.

A clear example of that changed environment in the field 

of security and defense is the Declaration of the MERCOSUR, 

with Bolivia and Chile as a Zone of Peace. The signatories of this 

Declaration can and should project the harmony among us which 
5

the text reflects, in actions that may contribute to peace and stability 

in the world through the United Nations (UN).

As an example, Argentina has established, with Brazil and Chile, 

a number of political mechanisms for coordination of policy on 

matters related to defense and security. This has led to initiatives like 

the Common Methodology for Measuring Defense Expenditures 

prepared by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 

Caribbean (ECLAC), on request by and with the cooperation of 

Argentina and Chile.

Latin America as a whole is also, by the will of all the countries of 

the region, an area free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). No 

nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons are found in our territories, 

and, more importantly, no reasons exist to have them.

New Scenarios.

These basic tenets are not only not in contradiction with the 

international scene after September 11, 2001, but are today more 

relevant than ever. Neither the terrorist attacks nor the economic 

crisis has changed the fundamental values which we must defend, 

and we should not lose sight of that when designing a new approach 

on security and defense for the Americas. All countries in our 

hemisphere share the conviction on the need to combat international 

terrorism and proliferation of WMD that so much worries the 

world.

In the wake of September 11 attacks, most political analysis on 

strategic issues has concentrated on international terrorism as the 

main threat the world will face for the next decades. The shock 

and horror that those attacks produced, as well as the political 

and economic consequences of them, cannot be ignored. They are 

affecting us all in a number of ways. If this threat is to be dealt with 

effectively, international cooperation will be essential.

Twice in the 1990s Argentina has been the victim of international 

terrorism, and we have been pioneers in the promotion of 

mechanisms to combat both this scourge and the proliferation of 

WMD. On nonproliferation, we promoted, together with Brazil, 

initiatives which made of our region a nuclear weapons free zone, 
6

and it was also an Argentine initiative which led to the Mendoza 

Declaration on a chemical weapons free zone. The Inter-American 

Committee to Combat Terrorism (CICTE) was also created within the 

Organization of American States (OAS) by an Argentine initiative in 

1998, 2 years before the terrorist attacks of 2001.

The climate of interstate cooperation prevailing in our continent 

and the defense of our values can only further the cause against 

terrorism and the international cooperation needed to successfully 

fight this scourge.

But this very real threat has tended to blur the existence of 

other risks for international stability not associated with violence, 

particularly on our continent, such as poverty, financial crisis, lack of 

development, and endemic and pandemic illnesses. These represent 

a daily and present risk for millions of people around the world 

and may contribute also to international turmoil. Facing these other 

dangers of a nonmilitary nature will certainly require nonmilitary 

answers.

Argentina yields to no one on its commitment to fight terrorism, 

and we are convinced that we should do our best to ensure it does 

not plague our continent. What we should avoid, though, is believing 

that terrorism is the only or most imminent threat to our countries. 

We should not forget those brutal attacks and should do all in our 

power to avoid their repetition, but we should not build our security 

with our sight only on international terrorism.

We should not forget that the priorities of millions of Latin 

Americans pass through their struggle to feed themselves and 

their families, to get housing, clothing, or health care, and solve the 

increase in public insecurity and crime that plagues their daily lives. 

Most of the citizens in our countries perceive these as more real and 

imminent threats. We must, through the right policies, cooperate to 

eradicate these fears. Doing so should not be incompatible to fighting 

terrorism at the same time.

But even if these problems have an impact on security, it is clear 

that they require to be addressed through social and economic 

responses.
7

Hemispheric Institutions.

Political mechanisms have been created in the context of the OAS 

to deal with hemispheric security matters, in particular for analysing 

the shape the existing instruments or those which should be created 

to address new challenges should take.

For instance, the Committee on Hemispheric Security is the 

appropriate body where this debate should take place because 

all countries of the region are represented there at the political 

level, which their legitimate elected governments determine to be 

adequate. It has the advantage of the infrastructure of OAS, which 

is a formidable tool that the region should use more fully and more 

often.

Actions and policies which may be designed through the 

Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS) could and should benefit 

from other OAS bodies with specific expertise and competence on 

matters which may be important to take into account when focusing 

on questions which may impact on security. As way of example: 

the Inter-American Human Rights Committee is ideally suited to 

address human rights issues; the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 

Commission (CICAD) to address those on drug-trafficking and 

drug-addictions; CICTE on matters of terrorism; the Inter-American 

Economic and Social Council in questions of its competence.

On hemispheric security issues, the OAS has delivered extremely 

useful outputs such as the Declarations of Santiago in 1995 and San 

Salvador in 1998 on confidence-building measures, which represents 

a road map on the subject. It remains valid today and should be fully 

implemented by all countries. In the Southern part of the continent, 

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have gone way beyond the measures 

included in those texts, implementing confidence building measures 

of the third generation.

The CHS has a mandate from the Summit of the Americas and 

the OAS General Assembly since 1998 to identify the means of 

revitalise and strengthen institutions of the inter-American system 

related to hemispheric security. We must seize the opportunity 

this mandate provides to review and/or confirm the validity of the 

existing instruments before the new scenarios, as well as to imagine 
8

what else is needed.

In the committee a consensus exists on the need to recognize 

the close link among security, development, and democracy. Even 

if possibilities of interstate conflict have dramatically been reduced 

in our continent as a result of 2 decades of good efforts towards 

that goal, it remains important to reinforce mechanisms which may 

be used to overcome disputes and thus prevent situations from 

escalating.

In those endeavours, we should keep in mind that countries 

in our hemisphere have general common interests which can be 

identified and addressed jointly, but at the same time each country 

and region confronts different challenges of their own, which require 

specific recipes to solve.

We all shall have a unique opportunity to start chartering the 

road to the future of hemispheric security in the Inter-American 

Conference to be held in Mexico in May 2003. We must ensure that 

in whatever new designs we venture, the defense of our principles 

and values remain at the top of the agenda.

New Threats.

In the world at large, and in the Western hemisphere in particular, 

the last few years have seen an increased concern with the so-called 

“new threats to security.” The positive interstate climate previously 

described has contributed to the view that the continent does not 

face traditional threats to security and defense and should therefore 

focus on new ones.

But within that broad definition, phenomena of such a 

diverse nature as drug trafficking, organized crime, illicit traffic 

of small weapons, terrorism, illegal migrations, extreme poverty, 

environmental hazards, economic crisis, and corruption are 

included. That may have the effect of significantly expanding the 

concept of security and, at the same time, making it much fuzzier.

The tendency to broaden the concept of “security” to include 

problems of socio-economic nature, and at the same time blur the 

distinction between that concept and that of “defense,” make it 

extremely important to be careful not only when identifying which 
9

are those “new threats,” but also which are the adequate means to 

respond to them. We should avoid defining every social, economic, 

and political phenomena primarily as a “security threat,” because a 

bad diagnosis would hardly lead to a good cure.

Adding to the confusion, some of the approaches to these 

problems seem to look more to find new roles for the armed forces 

than to provide the most effective remedies to the phenomena 

in question. Saddling the armed forces with roles which are not 

those for which they are conceived just because of a supposed 

lack of specific tasks at a given historical moment, runs the risk of 

denaturalizing their specific role of defense. The region ́s past bears 

witness to the dangers of such a logic.

It is up to the democratically elected authorities of each country 

to determine which roles the armed forces should play. The armed 

forces may respond to some of these “new threats” and most likely 

not to others. They could surely provide logistical support in 

some cases to those agencies more able to implement the required 

response, depending on the type of threat we are dealing with. The 

capacity of the most adequate agency to deal with each case should 

be strengthened.

There is no question that the challenges of the “new threats” 

(many of them not so “new,” by the way) should be faced through 

the most appropriate means that each country disposes, according 

to its circumstances and law. In most cases, those best means would 

not have a military nature. We should not mix those “new threats” 

originating in illicit activities (drug trafficking, terrorism, etc.), with 

those with socio-economic roots (poverty, illegal migrations, etc.), or 

with those created by nature (hurricanes, floods, etc.), or man-made 

(environmental disasters).

International cooperation, at the hemispheric, regional and 

subregional levels, is essential to provide the best and most 

efficient answers to these threats. Those will go, depending on the 

phenomenon, from adequate socio-economic policies which address 

the root causes, to prevention, law enforcement, and repression, if 

appropriate or needed.

To respond to these new threats, the strengthening of institutional 

mechanisms, judiciary, and police, as well as combating poverty and 
10

want through socio-economic development, may represent the best 

bet for success.

Different circumstances among the various countries of the 

hemisphere should also be taken into account. General rules which 

intend to address problems everywhere may prove wrong. For 

instance, drug trafficking in some countries may represent a defense 

problem which affects the very existence of the state and the effective 

control of its territory. In those cases, it may be necessary to use all 

means available, including the armed forces. In most other countries 

it may be more efficient to strengthen social and health prevention 

policies, reduce demand, and improve the judiciary and police.

The legitimate authorities of each of our countries need to identify 

the phenomena which constitute a “threat” to their security, as well 

as the best means to address them according to their nature, their 

circumstances, and their legal framework. It is, in many respects, a 

political question which requires a political answer. Sometimes the 

armed or the security forces may have a role to play―and sometimes 

not.

Conclusion.

Building confidence among the countries of the hemisphere 

is essential to strengthen defense and security throughout our 

geography. Progress and deep positive changes on this area have 

been particularly remarkable in the last 2 decades among countries 

in the so-called Southern Cone. We should strive to expand and 

deepen the process to truly reach all countries of the region.

 To achieve this result, a radical change in the mutual perceptions 

among all countries involved is needed. From considering neighbors 

as rivals today they are considered partners. From considering those 

neighbors as potential risks, now all countries consider each other’s 

risks as their own.

Representative democracy and integration have played a crucial 

role to make this change of attitude possible. Their health and 

strength are essential for the process to continue. What today best 

guarantees our security is not the acquisition or development of 

sophisticated or powerful arms systems, but the excellent relations 
11

of friendship and partnership we have with all of our neighbors, the 

transparency and dependability that democratic regimes provide to 

each other, the growing links on all fields, and the firm belief that the 

changes we underwent in the last 2 decades are not circumstantial 

in nature but based on shared long-term interests, values, and 

understandings. We do not feel threatened by any of our neighbors, 

and we know we are not a threat any of them.

The new security we should build is that which protects the values 

our society shares. We should create and implement mechanisms 

capable of defending those values such as representative democracy, 

human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law, as well 

as traditional territorial conceptions. Regional security should serve 

collectively to protect us from whatever threatens the basic values 

we share and which constitute the essence of good governance: to 

provide for our peoples the highest degree of social, economic, and 

spiritual welfare which we are capable of achieving.

At the end of the day, the task the nations of this continent have 

ahead is to build a consensus on which are the basic values we are 

ready to defend and on the best means, consistent with those values, 

that we are ready to agree on to defend them individually and 

collectively. Those basic notions should be pillars of what should be 

the new paradigm of hemispheric security.

13

SECURITY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES TO

REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION:

A BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVE

Luis Bitencourt

Brazil and Regional Security.

Over the last 50 years, Brazil has been a key player in Latin 

American security arrangements. During the Cold War, Brazil’s 

participation was vital in producing a sophisticated adaptation of 

U.S. regional security strategy, the “Doutrina de Segurança Nacional” 

(National Security Doctrine), which at that time was quite influential 

for most Latin American countries. This doctrine and its Hispanic 

variations paved the way for a relatively unified response to what 

was at the time perceived to be the universal threat of “communist 

subversion.” These “doctrines” also provided the military regimes 

installed in most Latin American countries with a rationale and a 

sense of legitimacy for their permanence in power.1

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Brazil has been recast as a key 

regional player. In this new strategic reality, Brazil has been even 

more emphatically than in the past functioning as a buffer between 

the usually bold U.S. interpretation of regional security issues and 

the distinct security perceptions of the other countries in the region.

Paradoxically, Brazil’s strategic aspirations have never included 

casting itself in these roles. Moreover, if there is any generalization 

to be made regarding the Brazilian perspective on regional security, 

it is one of apparent lack of interest on regional security issues.

Indeed, when regional security is at stake, Brazilians at least 

those bestowed with official authority usually adopt a calculated 

blasé attitude, seeking to downplay the problem by invoking the 

nonintervention principle and favoring multilateral and negotiated 

solutions. Overall, this approach has worked to counterbalance the 

usually muscular U.S. approach to security issues. On occasion, 

however, it has also hindered efforts to modernize existing regional 

security arrangements, which have come under increased criticism 

during the 2 last decades.
14

The Difficult Modernization of the Inter-American System. 

Criticisms of the existing hemispheric security arrangements 

appeared in the aftermath of the Malvinas/Falkland War and 

gained substance in the aftermath of the Cold War. Of course, 

questions regarding the validity or the role of the Inter-American 

Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA)2 in the conflict between 

Argentina and Britain are debatable because of the rather difficult 

characterization of England as the aggressor in that opportunity. 

In relation to the Cold War, however, critics sustained that 

arrangements3 and organizations,4 which were generated a halfcentury ago within the context of a bipolar world, should be adapted 

to new global security demands. Moreover, during the Cold War, 

American influence made security the driving force of international 

relations and affected both the domestic politics and relations among 

Latin American nations. 

Nonetheless, despite these criticisms and even widespread 

agreement on the obsolescence of the inter-American security system, 

no initiative to modify it has prospered. Previous efforts to ignite a 

debate around the modernization of the system in the Organization 

of the American States (OAS) and the Defense Ministerials have 

languished, resulting in no important redefinition of policies. 

Three reasons explain the difficulty of reforming the system. 

First, no consensus exists on which concept of security is adequate 

for the region. Second, the countries of the region do not perceive 

any common threats. Third, Latin American countries have been 

ambivalent and guarded in their relations with the United States on 

matters of international security.

As for the conceptual question, we must realize that much of the 

difficulty arises from the subjective and multifaceted nature of the 

term “security.” Indeed, security is a highly subjective concept both 

at the individual and at the state levels. For the individual, security is 

a psychological, intuitive reaction that may or may not be consistent 

with reality. For the state the notion of security is an outgrowth of 

a political structure that attempts to act, successfully or not, as the 

filter for the society. 

The individual level of this multifaceted concept of security5 may 
15

refer to any threat against citizens’ rights and include economic, 

environmental, or even cultural dimensions. Consequently, many 

experts have been advocating the adoption of a redefinition of 

security, which incorporates these new threats for citizens. Whereas 

some have suggested the broadening of the original concept, others 

recommend using descriptors to modify the term depending on 

the nature of the perceived threat such as “citizen security” or 

“environmental security.”6

In terms of how it is defined by the state, security is a concept 

closely associated with the perception of sovereignty. Yet, also the 

notion of sovereignty is characterized by the same imprecision and 

subjective interpretations that plague security.7

Therefore, the lack of a common perception over what may 

be threatening the region has provoked many interpretations of 

what defines security. None have motivated any form of collective 

effort on the issue and multilateral attempts to address the interAmerican security system have in turn collided with these multiple 

interpretations. Such a theoretical barrier has stymied the debate 

even before the real security problems can be discussed: how to 

incorporate the distinct security interests of the Caribbean nations, as 

well as those of major South American countries in one agreement.

 While this paper does not intend to dispute the concept of 

security, we need to understand the rationale behind the argument. 

For example, environmental expert Jessica Mathews8 has called for 

the adoption of a new conceptualization of national security. She 

argues that since the 1970s the original notion of national security 

has expanded to include an economic dimension in response to the 

perception that United States was becoming more vulnerable vis-àvis other countries’ economic policies. Matthews states, 

Global developments now suggest the need for another 

analogous, broadening definition of national security . . . The 

assumptions and institutions . . . in the postwar era are a poor 

fit with these new realities. Environmental strains . . . transcend 

national borders. The once sharp division between foreign and 

domestic policy is blurred . . . 8

Mathews’ argument is powerful and does a good job summarizing 
16

the reasons to redefine national security, which has correctly 

been considered as the core concept for international security. 

In addition, her point regarding the vulnerability of countries’ 

territorial borders is well well-taken. However, there is a serious risk 

exists in considering that porous borders have made sovereignty 

less important for nation-states. The opposite is true; the sensation 

of reduced control over what is happening inside a country’s own 

borders has led governments to be more nervous about limits to 

exercising their sovereignty domestically. 

Finally, many countries in the region still grapple with the 

various influences and vestiges of national security doctrines cast 

during periods of authoritarian rule. Indeed, most Latin American 

and Caribbean countries were governed by authoritarian military 

regimes during the Cold War―following the U.S. lead and support―

that developed sophisticated frameworks for national security. 

These national security doctrines provided substance for the 

region’s defense organization and a rationale for the military’s 

engagement in the political realm. By providing all-encompassing 

prescriptions for the government―including defense, and security, 

as well as typically civilian matters―these doctrines powerfully 

affected the bureaucratic organization and decisionmaking models 

of regional states. Following the transition to democracy, these 

old policy recommendations would maintain varying degrees 

of influence, depending on the nature of the country considered. 

Indeed, the transition to democracy included the resolution of two 

main and interconnected issues: the construction of democratic 

and reliable institutions, and the creation of mechanisms to assure 

that the military would return to its traditional responsibilities. 

Neither task would be easily or quickly accomplished in most Latin 

American and Caribbean countries, a region where these remain to 

be sensitive and carefully negotiated issues. In this sense, the ability 

to break with old ideas has been easier than to escape from them and 

generate new ones.

As for the difficulties posed by the varied perceptions of threats 

to the region, the current situation in Latin America is relatively 

calm in terms of both real and potential conflicts.9 Border disputes 

have been settled and domestic conflicts, which in the recent past 
17

led to insurgencies and even to civil wars, have either been resolved 

or taken on by the recently installed democracies.10 Of course, in 

the absence of reliable mechanisms, even minor issues can explode 

into serious conflicts, like the 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru11

or the tension resulting from the dispute between Honduras and 

Nicaragua.12 However, even these two examples were solved or 

at least entrusted to international mediation. However, terrorism, 

which some had intended to paint as the common threat capable 

of bonding together all the countries of the region, does not 

encourage collective military responses. It encourages intelligence 

sharing, but this is supposed to be a discreet exchange between 

taciturn individuals and not trumpeted colloquiums among public 

organizations. 

Some of the current initiatives mention major contingencies, such 

as natural disasters (Hurricane Mitch is the preferred example), as 

a justification for renewed security regimes. Yet this argument has 

two serious problems that impair its efficacy as a regime overhauling 

motivator. First, contingencies are, per definition, unforeseen events, 

emergency situations that do not underscore the maintenance of 

permanent security organizations. Second, contingencies have 

always happened, i.e., they are not a new variable pressuring for the 

modernization of the security system. Once there is an organization 

in place, it may be useful to address a contingency affecting a region; 

but environmental contingencies or unanticipated humanitarian 

disasters are not enough to justify the creation of permanent 

organizations. 

An additional problem for the modernization of the regional 

security system paradoxically is posed by the fact that almost all the 

countries in the region are democracies. As such, they are slower and 

certainly less aligned and uniform in constructing and expressing 

their respective post-transition (from the previous authoritarian 

regimes) perspectives towards regional security. Moreover, these 

democracies are still fragile, and they have been challenged by 

many latent or manifested problems. Haiti, Colombia, Venezuela, 

and Argentina are among the most recent victims of domestic 

turmoil that could potentially upset regional security. Haiti required 

the extreme measure of foreign military intervention; although 
18

unresolved, the situation is under control. Colombia remains the 

most serious security problem in the region, where guerrillas and 

drug traffickers threaten the country as well as its neighbors. Finally, 

the Cuba situation is still the most irregularly shaped piece in the 

regional puzzle.13 When the United States broke diplomatic relations 

in 1961, imposing a comprehensive economic embargo against Cuba 

(1962) was seen as compatible with the political climate of the Cold 

War. Yet both the logic and the impact of the embargo were always 

harshly questioned in the region. Currently, from a multilateral 

standpoint, the integration of Cuba with the hemisphere seems 

increasingly important. 

The third challenge in reforming the inter-American security 

system is related to influence exerted by the United States as 

the dominant world power, as well as its location in the same 

geopolitical system of Latin American countries. The United States 

has manifested its control over the region, indirectly by serving as a 

political and ideological model that inspired historical and political 

changes throughout the previous century, and directly by clearly 

positioning itself in a way to reduce the influence of extra-hemisphere 

powers or even by intervening militarily. The recognition of such an 

inevitable influence by the United States upon the region has made 

many Latin America countries overly cautious in their discussions 

on multilateral hemispheric security arrangements.

Consequently, feeling that any redefinition of the hemisphere 

collective security arrangements could end even more favoring 

American influence over the region, many Latin American countries 

are not attracted to initiatives on the theme and prefer to leave the 

situation as it is. The memory of the long, overwhelming, and quite 

often suffocating American supremacy in the region, under the 

justification of the Cold War, is still fresh among Latin American 

decisionmakers.

The Cold War affected perceptions on both sides and still 

influences much of the security debate within the Americas. For 

example, under the pressures of preserving international security in 

a bipolar world, U.S. foreign policy did not distinguish between the 

different countries in the region, placing them in the same category 

vis-à-vis U.S. national interest. In the aftermath of the Cold War, 
19

these blocking perceptions must give way to more sophisticated 

and nuanced approaches regarding the different capabilities and 

stakes of the countries in the region. Finally, the end of the Cold War 

has mutually affected the perceptions of U.S. and Latin American 

policymakers in ways apart from interregional relations. While the 

major powers were concerned with building up military forces and 

stockpiling nuclear warheads in an East versus West competition, 

Latin American countries were focused on domestic disputes 

over political power. For the major powers, the end of the Cold 

War meant a transition towards a less threatening international 

environment―the reduction of nuclear stockpiles so downsizing 

of armed forces came as a natural consequence. For most of the 

Latin American countries, however, the end of the Cold War meant 

the end of military dictatorships and the beginning of democratic 

governments. 

This also explains why Latin American military forces were so 

exasperated when the first U.S. security strategy after the end of the 

Cold War suggested that Latin American countries should downsize 

their armed forces because of the end of the Cold War. They could 

only interpret as they effectively did that such a strategy was a 

provocation and represented American interference in their internal 

affairs.

The United States always has exercised great autonomy in 

defining the regional security agenda. More recently, in 1995 the 

United States launched the Defense Ministerial of the Americas 

(DMA). Embedded in this initiative was the proposition to redefine 

hemispheric security in a more cooperative manner. In essence, 

this brought a new methodology for the establishment of security 

arrangements based on the identification of common interests 

and opportunities as opposed to the traditional methodology of 

perceived threats. The most practical aspect of this new methodology 

included an invitation for Latin American and Caribbean countries 

to participate in the definition of a new hemispheric security agenda. 

With this goal, the DMA was launched and since then has been 

meeting on a biannual basis. However, from the beginning reactions 

from the most important Latin American countries have been 

enthusiastic in form but cautious in substance. After the the Cold 
20

War years, Latin American countries were understandably reluctant 

to jump into new security associations with the United States.

Nevertheless, when Bush replaced Clinton as U.S. President 

in 2001, his administration did not share these idealistic and 

multilateralist perceptions on the region, and subsequently the 

idea of cooperative security lost its steam as a regional security 

objective. Instead, unilateralist faith was trumpeted to the world 

and echoed within Latin America as well, along with U.S. decisions 

regarding the Kyoto Protocol and the international crime tribunal. 

The fight against terrorism and the war against Iraq completely 

magnetized the attention of U.S. decisionmakers to the detriment of 

the Hemisphere.

As a net result of these circumstances, prejudices, and 

asymmetries, the countries in the region have demonstrated a 

markedly different appetite for discussing novel regional defense 

arrangements. For some countries, such as those of the Caribbean 

region, response to an American invitation to create a different 

security arrangement for the entire region would seem attractive 

and could possibly include a welcome injection of military aid.

Similarly, countries like Colombia, attempting to combat the 

synergistic effects of a guerrilla conflict and a drug war, were 

pleased to welcome both a new security arrangement and military 

aid. Others, like Chile and Argentina, would show enthusiasm 

although to a lesser extent than their regional neighbors but for 

different reasons. Both apparently have redefined the missions of 

their militaries to limit their activities in the political realm. They 

welcome broader security engagements that could help to legitimize 

their new domestic arrangements. While their strategies were 

different, the result was similar: to push the military away from 

domestic politics.14 From the Brazilian perspective, engaging in 

efforts to join into new regional security arrangements was anything 

but urgent or attractive.

A Brazilian Perspective.

A country’s perspective on security is shaped by subjective and 

objective factors and may be elucidated through the observation of 

consistency in its organizations, regimes, or decisions. The most 
21

characteristic trait of Brazil’s approach to regional security issues 

and particularly to security cooperation has been its tendency to 

downplay regional security issues. There are three major reasons for 

this. 

First, Brazilians do not pay much attention to regional security 

because overall they do not feel threatened. Brazilians are proud 

because they have lived in peace with their ten neighbors for over 

a century, and Brazil’s borders are well-established and settled. 

Therefore, Brazilians see Brazil as a status quo country, i.e., Brazil is 

satisfied with its geopolitical circumstances. For example, during the 

1970s Golbery do Couto e Silva and Carlos de Meira Mattos inspired 

many militaries with their ideas of geopolitical determinism, 

according to which Brazil was destined to be a superpower, thanks 

to its geopolitical characteristics. From a security perspective, 

the Amazon region, and what is perceived as international 

“covetousness” over that region,15 is the only theme that ignites 

concern among Brazilians. 

The second reason to downplay regional security issues draws 

from external as well as domestic motivations. The external 

motivations spring from a double concern with the role of the United 

States in the region. Brazilians think that an emphasis on regional 

security issues will exacerbate the effect of the already overwhelming 

U.S. influence in the region. In this sense, Brazilians believe that 

American policymakers tend to exaggerate the relevance of security 

issues in the region to the detriment of more meaningful themes 

such as trade and economic development. Brazilians also believe 

with some reason that in dealing with security issues, Americans 

resort to the use of force far too soon, in an overwhelming and 

arrogant manner which may be harmful for negotiated solutions 

within the region. 

Domestic motivations derive from the delicate process of power 

transition from the military to civilians at the end of the dictatorship. 

When the authoritarian military regime ended in Brazil in 1984 after 

20 years of domination, security was purposefully downplayed in 

the domestic political realm simply as a way to reduce the military 

relevance within the domestic affairs. This aspect carried such 

importance that in the new Federal Constitution passed in 1988, 
22

Brazilians exorcised the expression “national security” and replaced 

it with “national defense.” The National Security Council became 

National Defense Council, and the previously all powerful General 

Secretariat of the National Security Council (SG/CSN Secretaria Geral 

do Conselho de Segurança Nacional) became the Advising Secretariat of 

the National Defense Council (SADEN).16

Attempts were made to eliminate the possibility that attention 

to national security matters would give to the military an excuse to 

maintain its exaggerated influence in the political realm. “National 

security” meant “national security doctrine,” the body of doctrine 

that lent unity and consistency to the military.17 As a result of these 

domestic influences, Brazil was not interested in pushing for a 

hemispheric debate on security, which could bring relevance to 

military issues.

Another influential formative contribution to the Brazilian 

perspective on regional security issues came with the end of the 

Cold War. At the end of this period, there was pressure for the 

redefinition of regional security arrangements, as well as some 

peculiar reactions in Brazil. In the early 1990s, U.S. initiatives to 

reorganize hemispheric security faced an unenthusiastic Brazil. 

Brazilian decisionmakers were concerned that the redefinition of 

hemispheric security arrangements under such tremendous U.S. 

influence might limit Brazil’s strategic options. Since unilaterally 

breaking its bilateral agreements for military cooperation with the 

United States in the late 1970s, Brazil has been able to create a more 

diversified set of alliances. To establish a “wrong” association with 

the United States could prove to be costly in the future. Moreover, 

Brazilian decisionmakers were not exactly certain what would 

constitute a “right” security relationship with the United States.

In addition, the transformation of the long rivalry between Brazil 

and Argentina into a model of cooperation was also important. For 

many years Argentina had been the dominant factor in Brazil’s 

military plans as its only potential war hypothesis (and viceversa). The new model designed by the civilian governments in 

Argentina and Brazil stopped the nuclear weapons race between 

the two countries and launched the foundations of the MERCOSUR. 

Nevertheless, it also produced an identity crisis for the military. 

Therefore, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, Brazil’s 
23

regional strategic rationale was also changing. Since 1985, the 

military had been struggling to maintain the last remnants of its 

political influence but had paid little attention to its professional role; 

at stake was military involvement in the political realm. Therefore, 

the relevance of military forces for Brazil’s security conception was 

never at issue. After 1990, however, because military planning had 

been so focused on Argentina, the military felt that its very existence 

could be questioned leading to an even more important loss of 

political space. 

Interestingly, the Colombian crisis as well as the Plan Colombia

would help the Brazilian military to redesign its mission. On the 

one hand, the apparent incapacity of the Colombian government to 

curb guerrilla and drug related violence prompted the military to 

consider the prospects of the conflict spilling over Brazilian borders. 

On the other hand, strong U.S. participation in Plan Colombia fueled 

the usual Brazilian concern regarding the American involvement 

in the region. As a result, the Army promoted a rapid relocation 

of military units from Southern Brazil to the Amazon18 region 

while the Air Force responsible for the System for Surveillance of 

the Amazon (SIVAM) could justify its sophisticated radar system 

under an entirely distinct strategic rationale. Brazilian authorities 

even mentioned the prospects of sharing information gathered by 

SIVAM with neighboring countries; however, effective moves in this 

direction are yet to be made. 

The Sources of the Brazilian Perspective. During the last decade 

Brazil underwent a remarkable transformation in its governmental 

structures responsible for decisions related to security. Despite these 

transformations, the Ministry of Foreign Relations (Itamaraty) was 

able to maintain the most influential position in the government 

on issues related to security and defense. The military and even 

Congress are not particularly enthusiastic about dealing with 

international security matters. Although Congress plays a major 

role when approving foreign treaties and agreements with the 

exception in high profile instances, Brazilian congressmen are 

not greatly interested in foreign policy or international security.19

From a bureaucratic perspective, it is interesting to observe that 

the continued predominance of Itamaraty in issues related to 
24

international security has resulted in remarkable consistency in 

Brazil’s positions. However, it also works to slow the possibility of 

changing positions to keep pace with the challenges presented by 

increasingly globalized international security problems. 

This situation was profoundly shaken during Fernando Henrique 

Cardoso’s two terms as President. Cardoso emphasized Itamaraty’s 

role and assigned several career diplomats to “nondiplomatic” key 

positions in the administration. Yet, simultaneously he pressured for 

a modernization in Brazil’s foreign policy attempting to secure for 

Brazil a more prominent role in the international scene. 

According to this philosophy, he also promoted extraordinary 

changes in Brazil’s defense perspective. Cardoso launched the first 

policy of defense in Brazil’s history,20 established a Ministry of 

Defense, and assigned a civilian to head it. Additionally, during 

his tenure, Brazil would change its position towards two regimes 

critically important for international security: Brazil joined the Missile 

Technology Control Regime and signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

Finally, Brazil emphatically has been underscoring multilateral 

approaches to international security issues while declaring its 

interest in occupying a seat in an expanded UN Security Council. 

Another attempt to show leadership in the region was Brazil’s 

initiative to gather the South American presidents for a summit in 

Brasilia in August 2001. President Cardoso used the opportunity 

to motivate the presidents of South American countries to tighten 

their relations by exploring border opportunities to plan joint 

infrastructure projects. At the same time, President Cardoso 

brokered the idea of promoting a stronger association among the 

South American countries as opposed to Latin American countries 

because they share a more evident identity. 

Nevertheless, Brazil did not advance any idea of promoting 

subregional security arrangements in association with this 

opportunity. Even within MERCOSUL, which has been a 

stronger and perennial association, Brazil has been everything but 

enthusiastic in promoting initiatives to bring military issues into the 

realm of the existing trade arrangements. It is true that Brazil and 

the other MERCOSUL members have reaffirmed their commitment 

to disarmament and to the nonproliferation of weapons of mass 
25

destruction as well as noted the efforts of the ad hoc Group for 

the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) 

and Toxin Weapons. They also celebrated the ratification of the 

Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by all South 

American countries and stressed the relevance of initiatives to 

achieve transparency in conventional arms transfers. Yet, mainly 

cautioned by Brazil, MERCOSUL has stopped short of promoting 

more ambitious military associations in the region. 

The Brazilian Perspective on Terrorism. Of course, an analysis 

on Brazil’s perspective on regional security issues would be 

incomplete without the consideration of Brazil’s position towards 

the international terrorism and the terrorist attack of September 11, 

2001, against the United States. In the aftermath of the attack, many 

Latin American scholars and journalists stated that the episode 

had forever changed the regional security landscape.21 These 

commentators believed that such an attack would have immediate 

effects on the regional concepts and organizations associated with 

international security.

Nevertheless, reality has proved quite different. The September 

11 attack was extraordinary for its humanitarian, tactical, and, 

particularly, its terror dimensions. While it has changed the U.S. 

mindset about the meaning of its own homeland security and 

motivated a series of operations, it has not had the same effect for 

the entire region. To date, regional responses to the September 11 

attack have relied very little on the existing inter-American security 

framework in terms of its accepted definitions, agreements, and 

organizations.22

In this case, Brazil’s reaction was surprisingly fast and vigorous, 

assuming a leading role at the OAS to motivate Latin America and 

the Caribbean to issue an immediate condemnation to the attack 

and to international terrorism.23 Ten days later, on September 21, 

following a Brazilian proposition, the OAS declared the attack to be 

directed against all members of the organization based on Article 

Three of the Rio Pact (IATRA).

Interestingly, this move meant a revival to IATRA, which was 

considered by many to be an outdated. Only a few days before the 

terrorist attack, on September 7, 2001, President Vicente Fox had 
26

announced that Mexico would reconsider its association to the Rio 

Pact because the treaty was more suited to the context of the Cold 

War than to the current security challenges. 

While Fox’s decision came as a surprise for policymakers and 

scholars, it was not because they believed the IATRA was still a 

functional treaty up to that date, no serious expert would have 

disagreed that the IATRA and regional security organizations were 

in need of serious restructuring. The surprise was caused, first, by 

the fact that the country announcing that decision was Mexico, a 

nation historically averse to addressing regional security initiatives. 

Second, scholars and policymakers alike were shocked by the fact 

that, although commentary on the IATRA’s obsolescence was 

frequent, no formal proposition for revising it had been submitted 

yet. Therefore, Fox’s announcement could have potentially ignited 

a revision process of the region’s multilateral security framework 

and garnered Mexico a leadership role in the context of subregional 

security.

Consequently, if by threatening to leave IATRA, Fox was 

envisioning a relatively better strategic position for Mexico in the 

Western Hemisphere, Brazil’s proposal after the terrorist attack 

worked to bury his intentions.25 From the Brazilian perspective, 

when Fox announced that Mexico was considering leaving the 

essentially defunct IATRA, he challenged Brazil’s presumed regional 

leadership.26 When Brazil successfully invoked the IATRA just a 

few days later, it led to the reinstatement of Brazil’s presumed but 

never officially recognized “low-profile leadership” in subregional 

affairs.27

Shortly after having countered Mexico’s strategic gains, Brazil 

rushed back to its familiar and cautious approach to regional 

security issues. Consistent with the usual style of its diplomacy, 

Brazil issued a series of declarations aimed at downplaying the 

importance of terrorism for the region. For example, a few days 

after the OAS approved the invoking of the IATRA in response to 

the terrorist attacks, Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Relations, Celso 

Lafer, emphasized that the region should not over-react to the 

events of September 11 and that the acts should be “put in the right 

perspective.” In addition, when the Triple Frontier region (Argentina, 
27

Brazil, and Paraguay) was mentioned in the international press as a 

possible sanctuary for terrorists, Brazilian authorities acted quickly 

to demonstrate the lack of any evidence linking that region to the 

attacks. Brazilian officials were obviously interested in avoiding 

the possibility that U.S. focus on terrorism would hinder other 

relevant themes on the regional agenda such as trade and economic 

development. 

Conclusion.

Brazil’s perspective on regional security cooperation is 

particularly important because of the present crisis in the interAmerican security system. Within the multilateral arena, after its 

most recent progress regarding nonproliferation regimes, Brazil’s 

usually balanced positions towards international security problems 

have fostered admiration and respect. Within the regional arena, 

Brazil’s empathy towards the security concerns of the countries in 

the region has placed it in an important role regarding initiatives to 

modify the existing system.

As such, there has been a consistent approach based on a peculiar 

perspective towards regional security matters. The most peculiar 

aspect of this perspective has been a guarded reception to ventures 

interested in promoting regional security cooperation. Indeed, 

Brazilians have not immediately or enthusiastically embraced 

initiatives to reshape the existing regional security arrangements, 

which in some sense have contributed to counterbalance the 

enormous U.S. influence on regional security issues and worked 

to render legitimacy to resulting arrangements. However, this 

perspective has worked to undermine initiatives aimed at rapidly 

modifying the existing collective security arrangements in the 

hemisphere.

Recently, on three occasions, Brazil reacted in a rather unusual 

manner to regional security challenges. First, after the September 

11 terrorist attacks against the United States, Brazil urged to 

invoke the IATRA in support to the Americans. Second, during 

the recent Venezuelan crisis, the Brazilian government worked 

actively to find a cooperative arrangement that could help solve 
28

the Venezuelan standoff. Finally, in February 2003 Brazil issued a 

note favoring peaceful solutions for the crisis between the United 

States and Iraq, aligning with Russia, France, and Germany against 

the bellicose American attitude towards Iraq. Although it is quite 

early to speculate conclusively, these few cases certainly indicate a 

remarkable tendency towards an evolution of Brazil’s perspective 

in favor of a more active role towards international security. This 

tendency is consistent with Brazil’s declared interest in reshaping and 

securing a seat at the U.N. Security Council but does not necessarily 

endorse efforts to modify at least at a pace that Brazilians do not 

think is cautious enough the existing regional security arrangements 

in the Americas.

ENDNOTES

1. See Miguel Manrique, La Seguridad en las Fuerzas Armadas Venezolana,

Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1996. 

2. In 1947, encouraged by U.S. interest in organizing collective security 

arrangements, American states (with the exception of Canada and Caribbean 

countries) signed the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA). 

IATRA’s Article Three establishes that an armed attack against one signatory 

will be interpreted as an attack against all American states; thus each one of the 

signatories is committed to help the attacked state exercise the right of legitimate 

defense, as defined by the U.N. Charter (Article 51). Since it was signed, IATRA 

has been invoked 18 times. 

2. For a detailed analysis of the existing security arrangements in the 

hemisphere, see Luis Bitencourt, “Latin American Security: Emerging Challenges,” 

The Global Century: Globalization and National Security, Richard L. Kugler and Ellen 

L. Frost, eds., Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001, pp. 895-

914.

3. Three organizations are particularly relevant for the definitions of 

hemispheric security: the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), the Organization 

of American States (OAS), and the Inter-American Defense College (IADC). The 

oldest organization related to the defense of the hemisphere is the Inter-American 

Defense Board (IADB). The Inter-American Defense College (IADC) is designed to 

prepare civilian and military officers to assume leadership positions at the national 

level within the hemisphere. Attendance is open to all hemispheric governments 

(except Cuba) regardless of whether they are IADB members or not. The IADC has 

served as a useful tool for networking and provides scope for a broad interchange 
29

on issues related to military-civilian relations and democratic culture. In addition, 

two other initiatives have prospective relevance: the Defense Ministerial of the 

Americas meetings and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. The Defense 

Ministerial of the Americas process started in 1995, under a U.S. initiative to 

provide a forum for discussing security issues. It meets on roughly a biennial 

basis. The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, within the U.S. National 

Defense University, was created in September 1997, and is particularly dedicated 

to building civilian expertise on security matters throughout the region. 

4. It is interesting to note that the concept of national security adopted in the 

Western world acquired an institutional status only in relatively recent times 

during World War II. Prior to this conflict, the closest definition was the concept 

of national interest. During the years following the end of the war, “national 

security” not only acquired a legal status within the United States with the 

National Security Act in 1947 but it was transformed into the defense doctrine for 

the entire Western Hemisphere. According to the Carnegie Council on Ethics and 

International Affairs, 

few Americans used the term before the Japanese attack on 

Pearl Harbor. By the time the war ended, however, national 

security was challenging the older concept of national interest for 

preeminence within the community of experts and policymakers 

involved in U.S. foreign policy. The circumstances of the Cold 

War determined the outcome of that competition. By 1950, 

national security was established as the leitmotif of U.S. foreign 

policy, with its own lexicon and supporting institutions. During 

the next four decades, national security completely eclipsed 

national interest as the standard for understanding, debating, and 

justifying American actions abroad. Preoccupation with national 

security transformed the policy-making process and altered the 

tone and substance of American politics. 

As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed in June 1990: ‘“The cold war 

changed us . . . . We became a national security state.” Carnegie Council on Ethics 

and International Affairs Newsletter, March 1999.

5. Probably the first “new concept” to appear in the current international 

security environment was the that of environmental security. The 1972 United 

Nations Conference for Human Environment (Stockholm) led to an intensification 

of the debate on changes to the environment “threatening the future of 

humankind.” With the emergence of concerns over global climatic change 

(including ozone depletion), acid rain, forest devastation, and environmental 

policy have garnered space on the public agendas of many countries. 

6. Stephen D. Krasner, for example, mentions four meanings of sovereignty. 
30

Interdependence sovereignty relates to the ability of states to control movements 

across their borders. Domestic sovereignty refers to the ability of states to control 

the behavior of their citizens. Westphalian or Vattelian sovereignty is related to 

the power of states to control what is inside of their own boundaries, without the 

intervention of others. International or legal sovereignty draws on the mutually 

shared recognition of states as juridically independent territorial entities. For 

further details, see “Abiding Sovereignty,” paper prepared for the workshop on 

“El Estado del Debate Contemporáneo en Relaciones Internationales, Universidade 

Torcuato Di Tella,” Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 27-28, 2000. 

7. Jessica Mathews, “The Environment and International Security,” World 

Security: Challenges for a New Century, Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas, eds., 

New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. 

8. Monica Serrano, “Latin America,” The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey, 

Paul B. Stares, ed., Tokyo, Japan: Center for International Exchange, 1998, p. 332, 

selects four major factors influencing the security of Latin America (which are not 

very different in the Caribbean countries):

the persistence of a relatively predictable regional order; the 

persistence of fragmented state institutions that undermine the 

capacity of governments to effectively control their territory and 

to maintain a firm monopoly over the use of organized violence; 

a shift in the region’s understanding of sovereignty and the 

principle of intervention; and the emergence of a new security 

agenda that has come to highlight the interdependence that 

exists between internal and external dimension’s of each state’s 

security. 

9. Writing in 1989, Jack Child identified 17 conflicts that originated from 

different causes in South America. See “Geopolitical Conflict in South America,” 

Georges Fauriol, ed., Security in the Americas, Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press.

10. In this case, the swift action of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United 

States as guarantors of the 1942 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro was essential to stop the 

hostilities. The Military Observer Mission, Ecuador/Peru (MOMEP) is probably 

the best regional example of a successful multinational peacekeeping operation. 

11. By the end of 1999, tension heightened between Honduras and Nicaragua 

over the definition of maritime boundaries in the region. The situation was 

reaching a dangerous level and could have resulted in confrontation. The 

Organization of American States (OAS) assigned a Special Representative, 

Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, a retired U.S. diplomat, to help reduce the tensions 

in the region. In the final days of December, in Miami the Foreign Ministers of 
31

Honduras and Nicaragua began conversations that culminated with an agreement 

signed in February 2000. The two parties agreed on establishing a military-free 

zone, pushing the boundaries to where they were in September 1999, and letting 

the situation to be decided by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. 

In the end, the contentious situation helped to reinforce the role of the OAS in 

hemispheric security matters.

12. In 1991, everybody was expecting that Cuba would derail from the 

Communist track in the wave of the Soviet Union’s dismantling that led the 

Cuban economy to shrink by more than 60 percent. Instead, Fidel Castro pledged 

Socialism or Death. The results were a worsening in U.S.-Cuban relations. From 

1991 to 1996 many incidents related to Cuban attempts to flee the island tarnished 

these already bad relations. Then, President Clinton in 1996 declared his support 

for the Helms-Burton Law, which established punitive measures for foreign 

companies that did business in Cuba. In response, Canada, the European Union, 

and other countries with companies or subsidiaries in Cuba declared the HelmsBurton Law to be in violation of international norms and law. For more details, 

see James Rohrbaugh, Timeline of Important Events in Cuba-United States Relations: 

1959-Present, at http://www/earlham.edu/www/polsci/ps17971/weissdo/timeline2.hml. 

13. The Chilean military turned to traditional missions after having secured 

its budgetary and salary objectives. The Argentine military found its interest in 

peacekeeping, and through such engagements assisted in rebuilding its heavily 

damaged self-esteem that had resulted from its defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands 

War. Lately, Argentina has voiced its desire to be considered a “U.S. non-NATO 

ally,” which has not translated into any real change but seems symbolically 

meaningful. For more on this issue, refer to Federico Luis Larrinaga, “Argentina, 

a New U.S. Non-Nato Ally: Significance and Expectations,” Naval War College 

Review, Vol. LIII, No. 2, 2000. 

14. For example, the Amazon is the only Brazilian region to be mentioned 

specifically as a defense objective in Brazil’s Policy of Defense. See Luis Bitencourt, 

“The Importance of the Amazon Basin in Brazil’s Evolving Security Agenda,” in 

Environment and Security in the Amazon Basin, Joseph S. Tulchin and Heather 

Golding, eds., Washington, DC, 2002. 

15. In 1990, President Fernando Collor de Mello dismantled this body and 

transferred some of its functions to the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, which 

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso extinguished in 1999, at the outset of its 

second tenure. Interestingly, Cardoso’s reorganization made his Cabinet more 

similar and somewhat more powerful that the one of the military dictatorship. 

General Alberto Cardoso, his Chief of the Cabinet of Institutional Security, 

commanded the intelligence agency, and coordinated anti-drug traffic efforts 

and the anti-violence plan, in addition to being the Secretary of Brazil’s Defense 

Council. In short, he controlled the activities corresponding to those of the SNI 
32

(the national intelligence service of the military) and of the SG/CSN. 

16. The “national security doctrine” was a doctrinal body developed by the 

Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG-War Superior College) and exerted extraordinary 

influence during the military dictatorship (1964-1984). The “national security 

doctrine” provided the military with a consistent explanation for their intervention 

in the political power arena, with an ideological anti-Communist framework, with 

a decisionmaking model, and with a general organization for the state apparatus. 

Despite the end of the military regime in 1984 and its subsequent disengagement 

from the political process, civilian control over national security issues would only 

begin to take shape over 10 years, with the issuing of the Policy of Defense in 1996 

and the creation of the Ministry of Defense in 1998. 

17. In addition to the modernization of the existing Border Platoons and the 

creation of new ones, the Army built headquarters for the 5th Border Special 

Battalion, in São Gabriel da Cachoeira, Amazonas, and for the 1st Jungle Infantry 

Brigade, in Boa Vista, Roraima. The 16th Motorized Infantry Brigade was 

transferred from Santo Angelo, Rio Grande do Sul, to Tefé, Amazonas, to become 

the 16th Jungle Infantry Brigade. And the 33rd Jungle Campaign Artillery Group 

was created in Boa Vista, Roraima. From 6,000 troops stationed in the Amazon 

up until 1990, the Army currently has 23,000 troops distributed in 62 Amazon 

locations, and this number is planned to grow to 26,000.

18. There have been two important exceptions here, so far insufficient to 

show a change in the tendency. First, propelled by the Ministry of Defense, the 

Congress organized in 2002 a seminar to debate Brazilian defense, which had the 

participation of scholars and policymakers. The seminar was able to shed some 

light on defense issues and showed that manifestations of strong nationalism, 

especially among retired military, still produce echoes in Brazilian politics. 

Second, based on nationalistic arguments somewhat related to defense, the 

Brazilian Congress did not approve the agreement between Brazil and the United 

States for the use of Alcântara launching site by American rocket launchers. 

19. During the military dictatorship (1964-84), Brazilian “national security” 

was organized upon a secret document, the “National Strategic Concept,” which 

was the basic document for military planning and was consolidated by the General 

Secretariat of the National Security Council (SG/CSN).

20. See, for example, Gabriel Aguilera Peralta’s “La Seguridad Regional 

Centroamericana: Entre el Imaginarion de La Paz y la Realidad del 11 Septiembre,” 

Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 

2002, mimeo. See, also, Marcos Robledo’s, “Tendencias Globales de la Politica 

Internacional. Una Aproximación a los Atentados contra Estados Unidos,” Fuerzas 

Armadas y Sociedad,. Santiago, Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias 

Sociales, No. 3 y 4, Julio-Deciembre 2001, pp. 4-11. See also Isabel Jaramillo 
33

Edwards’, “Los Atentados Terroristas al WTC y el Pentágono: Punto de Inflexión 

en las Relaciones Interamericanas,” Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad. , Santiago, Chile: 

Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, No. 3 y 4, Julio-Deciembre 2001, 

pp. 14-29.

21. Along with this idea, see also Robert Jervis, “An Interim Assessment of 

September 11: What Hhas Changed and What Has Not,” Political Science Quarterly, 

Spring 2002, The Academy of Political Science, pp. 37-54. Also Rubens Barbosa 

(“Os Estados Unidos pós 11 de setembro de 2001: Implicações para o Brasil,” 

Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, ano 45, No. 1, 2002) concludes that “the 

post-September 11 world has not changed, yet the world political agenda was 

modified by the terrorists’ action in itself as well as by the demonstration of will 

and power of the most powerful nation of our age” (p. 72). 

22. Declaración de La Asamblea General de la OEA, Septiembre 11, 2001, 

Comunicado de Prensa C-005/01/OAS. Coincidentally, the attack was perpetrated 

at the same moment as the OAS General Assembly was having a meeting in Lima, 

Peru, with the presence of Secretary Colin Powell. This fact gave immediately a 

political and diplomatic status within the OAS to the attacks, which propelled 

their unusually swift and consensual official condemnation. 

23. Vigésima tercera Reunión de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones 

Exteriores /OEA/ Ser.F/II.23-RC.23/RES.1/01, September 21, 2001. 

24. In September 2002, a year after his first announcement, Fox confirmed that 

Mexico would effectively quit the IATRA. Yet, at this time, not many people paid 

attention to his announcement.

25. Of course, this undeclared dispute between minor powers for subregional 

leadership is irrelevant if we consider the real stakes both for Brazil and Mexico, 

when compared to those for the United States, but it reveals the distinct 

perspectives within existing regional multilateral arrangements.

26. In addition to these changes, President Fox would have to quietly swallow 

a considerable reduction in the interest on the part of the Bush administration for 

a bilateral U.S.-Mexico agenda including, for example, the killing of the prospects 

for a more friendly U.S. immigration policy towards Mexican illegal immigrants 

in the United States. 

35

IDEAS FOR CONSTRUCTING A NEW FRAMEWORK

OF HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

Henry Medina Uribe

The idea of the North-South Center of the University of Miami, the 

U.S. Army War College, and the U.S. Southern Command to provide 

this stage to discuss productively the necessity of a new point of view 

in the relations between the great power of North America and the 

countries of Latin America, as well as the environment of security 

necessary to build said relations, is excellent and compelling. It takes 

into account that the realities of the world today demand a profound 

change and the acceptance of the risks that such change implies. 

Whatever effort that we make is meritorious, if with it we block 

the process of the accelerating dehumanization of society, within 

a hegemonic and increasingly unequal world. The challenge must 

be accepted with decision, intelligent vision, careful planning and 

proper global strategy.

Within this world of imperfections, the Latin American dream, 

according to Michael Mendelbaum, is to achieve peace, the full 

exercise of democracy, and the construction of open markets 

that will make our development viable. Nevertheless, this seems 

impossible within the present weakness of our states, the socioeconomic polarization, the increasing state of violence that we are 

experiencing, and the progressive deterioration of our quality of 

life.

One of the principal concerns of Latin America is to provide 

solutions for the lamentable state of security in which we live, 

which limits our opportunities for real development and denies our 

military institutions the possibility of intensifying their efforts in 

more beneficial tasks that would be reflected in the construction and 

consolidation of our nations.

It is not true that our security crisis is a result of geographic, 

geopolitical, genetic circumstances, or ethnic deformities. The 

current situation of the region, and in particular of Colombia, is the 

foreseeable result of long-standing sociopolitical events, which are 

still susceptible to correction. Of what use to us are properties that 
36

we cannot enjoy, roads that we cannot travel, schools that children 

cannot attend, centers of art that the fear of a car bomb prevents 

us from visiting, communication media that generate permanent 

anguish and show us violence as an increasing factor in human 

evolution, whole societies asking themselves if living is worth the 

pain. All this seems to give credence to Hobbes when he affirms that 

man devours man.

The benefits of peace and development that we all expected as 

a consequence of the fall of communism have not been seen, and 

rather, the fear of death with each kilometer or on each corner 

overtakes us, because the terrorist threat is more inhumane, diffuse, 

and incoherent, as well as difficult to pinpoint and anticipate.

The present challenge is to build states that fulfill the fundamental 

function of creating, sustaining, and developing the necessary 

conditions for a dignified, secure and prosperous life of all citizens. 

The question that arises is: How to achieve the coordinated actions of 

the political, economic and social sectors in a way that they integrate 

the aspirations of society, the functions of the State and the actions 

that fall within the competence of the police and the military? Or, 

in other words, how can the fundamental aspects of development, 

security and defense be integrated synergistically?

In this context, security cannot be seen as a variable, independent 

and isolated from political, economic, and social sectors. Therefore 

its treatment in the hemispheric environment should be defined by 

the following five aspects, which I will try to develop in a summary 

form. For their efficacy and their execution, they ought to be 

interactive:

1. Democratic consolidation and institutional strengthening of 

states;

2. Common interests, reciprocity, and mutual respect;

3. More productive and equitable commercial relations;

4. Restructuring of military institutions; and,

5. Collective security of a democratic nature.

1. Democratic Consolidation and Institutional Strengthening of States. 

An environment of security and development cannot exist in a 
37

weak state. For that reason, it is necessary to establish strong public 

institutions, with wide legitimacy and presence in the totality of the 

respective territories, in such a way that facilitates the construction 

of effective states, capable of achieving the objectives that justify 

them.

In our case, it is necessary to strengthen the states of the region 

so that they can effectively protect the most precious good, which 

is the life of their citizens, and at the same time create the proper 

environment to develop a better quality of life, without damaging 

the well-being of future generations. It is a fact that secure citizens 

build a stronger state.

We cannot expect to achieve a just and long-lasting peace built 

on factors of inequity. Neither can we believe in solutions arising 

from violence and terrorism. Both restrict democracy, limit liberty, 

and take space away from politics. Unfortunately, in some areas, we 

have become accustomed to the fact that in the political arena the 

most respected and effective means of expression are the voices of 

rifles.

The full support of the institutions of the state, an individual 

and collective obligation of society, is a basic prerequisite for the 

reign of justice and the achievement of peace. In order to achieve it, 

good government and the mobilization of all minds in concert with 

the principles, values, and interests that gave birth to the respective 

nations are indispensable. In the particular situation of our Latin 

American region, it is necessary to form a critical mass that can 

force change in political methods, to obtain greater legitimacy and 

governability.

In order to strengthen our states, it may be necessary to pay high 

costs, even arriving at the renegotiation of the social contract and the 

acceptance of a social debt that the states ought to be ready to pay.

2. Common Interests, Reciprosity, and Mutual Respect. In spite of 

the great asymmetries in technological and military economies 

among the United States and the countries of Latin America, the 

coordination, the union, and the equitable and joint search for 

solutions to common problems are indispensable. For the United 

States, it constitutes a great strategic wager; for Latin America, it is 
38

the most convenient option. The future of the hemisphere depends, 

in great part, on the capacity to work as a team.

It is commonly accepted that a state is completely secure only when 

it is in the middle of secure states. Today’s reality in Latin America is 

that we share the quality of insecure states, and that this quality can 

affect the United States in an increasingly negative way. Faced with 

the realities of terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money 

laundering, and refugees, it is only logical to strengthen bilateral, 

regional, and hemispheric cooperation. Additionally, these factors 

of insecurity transcend the economic, social, and political aspects 

that stop development of our potential.

The future asks and demands a change in the policy of the United 

States towards Latin America. For the convenience of both, relations 

ought to be sustained by the force of reason, reciprocity, and mutual 

respect, rather than by imposition, intimidation, or threat. We ought 

to construct a shared long-term vision, based on the great interests 

that unite us, rather than on the few that can separate us.

An important aspect in the new environment of relations between 

the countries of the hemisphere is the revision of the Inter-American 

Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This treaty, designed to oppose 

the external military threats to the continental security, ought to be 

rethought in light of current threats, no longer external, but now 

rising and operating from within, generally because of factors that 

we are responsible for.

Inside this general framework fits the possibility of achieving 

sub-regional agreements, under the umbrella of the United States, 

within the specific and common characteristics of the signatory 

countries, as is the case of narco-trafficking in the Andean countries, 

or of the natural or man-made disasters in the Caribbean countries. 

It seems to me that a propitious scenario to treat this situation in a 

thoughtful manner is the Special Conference on Security which will 

take place in Mexico this year.

A good example to mention is the Inter American Convention 

against Terrorism, signed by 30 American countries as a response 

to the acts of September 11, 2001. Within this context of cooperation 

and shared vision of the future, there are sufficient indications to 

think that the policy of the United States towards Latin America 
39

ought to be concentrated more on the social and the economic than 

on the military and the political.

3. More Productive and Equitable Commercial Relations. The 

accelerated, irreversible, and frequently unbalanced process 

of globalization makes the world each day smaller and more 

interdependent. In this reality it is impossible for Latin America 

to achieve the desired levels of development to diminish the socioeconomic breaches that characterize us, if beforehand we cannot 

achieve more equitable commercial relations and bigger incentives 

for the legal products of the region. 

An important mechanism for this purpose is the Area of Free 

Commerce of the Americas, currently in negotiation among 34 

countries. The spirit of the agreement is to incorporate itself as an 

instrument for correcting imbalance, promoting the productivity of 

the economies of the hemisphere, and at the same time permitting 

leverage toward the attainment of more egalitarian societies.

Within this proposal, it is necessary to look for mechanisms to 

strengthen trade between the societies of Latin American and U.S. 

markets, in critical areas like agricultural products, which would 

increase their purchasing capacity and could make the U.S. markets 

more dynamic.

In global terms, we cannot forget the weight of the amortization 

of external debt on Latin American countries, and its repercussions 

on the development of its societies, in the marginalization, in the 

deterioration of the quality of life and the growth of violence. From 

the social point of view, it is doubtful that this theme will be part of 

the hemispheric agenda in the next few years.

4. Restructuring of Military Institutions. The struggle for the 

survival of capitalism and democracy in the face of the communist 

threat occupied almost 40 years in the lives of the military institutions 

of the region. The armed forces of our countries were redesigned, 

organized, and trained for this mission. Having overcome the threat, 

it is necessary to execute a new process of restructuring to adapt 

them to the challenges of today.

We need to add effectiveness to efficiency so that the states 
40

have in their military forces more effective instruments to support 

the implementation of public policies. The foregoing demands 

the design of a new institutional dialogue in order to configure 

military institutions that go further than the protection of a territory, 

government, or political position. In practice they should remain more 

engaged in what the political charters of our countries command in 

reference to a just society, the protection of human dignity, peace, 

the conservation of the environment, and the attainment of a better 

quality of life for all the human beings that we ought to protect.

Since wars are to win and not to continue forever, we need to 

discover the causes of our frustrations in the limited success of our 

intentions. U.S. aid with respect to equipment, training, information, 

and joint strategic design will always be necessary and important 

in order to face the common enemy. But its impact could be 

significantly greater if it were extended to the following areas, with 

the understanding that the modifications of a material order ought 

to be anticipated by transformations in spirit and attitude:

• Featuring the construction of a new military culture and 

education, intimately linked with and corresponding to the 

national will.

• Emphasizing the study of military strategy, its connection 

with social, economic, and political aspects, and its immediate 

impact on operational and tactical fields.

• Generating and administrating resources for defense in the 

strategic environment.

• Evaluating efforts and results in the light of national objectives 

and interests.

5. Collective Security of a Democratic Nature. Until now, the 

concept that has reigned in Latin American countries is that of 

national security, where the principal effect has been directed to 

the protection of the state from external threats. Nevertheless, the 

realities of today that worry us and convene us in this seminar 

move me to attempt a discussion about the necessity to build a new 

architecture of the concept of security for the American hemisphere, 
41

within some parameters that are not easy to reconcile.

The actions of the threats that intimidate us, like terrorism, 

narco-trafficking, violence, the increase of corruption and its effects 

on the growing inequality, and consequential impoverishment of 

our societies, are general factors that generate a self-destructive 

downward spiral. Their solution requires a new plan of collective 

security that could very well be inside the framework of the 

principles that brought about the creation of the Organization of 

American States (OAS).

In order that the strategy of collective security be coherent, 

deterrent, and credible, it must be removed from the purely warlike 

context, must widen its sphere, and it must understand the situation 

in the complexity of its causes and the dynamic that they generate. 

Moreover, it must take into account that the valiant and, upon 

occasion, heroic efforts the military forces of our countries are 

making are important and necessary, but never sufficient to clear up 

such a desolate panorama.

In order to define objectives, select ways, and accommodate 

means for a strategy of collective security for the region, it is 

necessary to adopt beforehand a philosophical line that orients our 

thoughts. My recommendation is to gather together the proposals 

made in the discussion of the subject in the United Nations since 

1994; the “Framework Treaty of Democratic Security,” signed in 

1995 in Central America; and the position of Canada during the 

Thirtieth General Assembly of the OAS in Windsor, in June 2000; to 

discuss with a judicious will such concepts in order to reduce their 

heterogeneity, to make them more precise, and frame them within 

the realities of our hemisphere.

One of the aspects to revise within such discussions is the 

function of military institutions. Their role cannot be relegated to a 

third order, but rather they should be restructured so as to achieve 

their potential in fulfilling their coercive and contributory duties 

towards the goals of democracy and the rule of law.

Some analysts warn that the United States is skeptical about 

the concept of human security. Nevertheless, as is affirmed in one 

of the working papers published by the North-South Center of the 

University of Miami, the U.S. delegation in Windsor declared that 
42

the concept of human security is compatible with the values and 

interests of the United States and cites the priorities expressed by 

President Franklin Roosevelt: human dignity, democracy, human 

rights, and responsibility of institutions toward their citizens.

To the degree that we achieve the integration of forces in the 

region, that we can make less hateful the differences, that we better 

understand the value of life over material riches, we will have more 

secure societies, an environment more favorable for sustainable 

development, and military institutions more effective in the defense 

of our mutual interests from the threats that the future may bring. 

Success depends on our own commitment.
43

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

LUIS BITENCOURT is Director of the Brazil project at the Woodrow 

Wilson International Center for Scholars and Professor at Georgetown 

University. He worked for 28 years as a civil servant, occupying 

several top-level positions in the Brazilian government. He has also 

worked for the United Nations as an Electoral Officer/Regional 

Coordinator in East Timor, as a member of the Team of Electoral 

Experts in Tajikistan, and as a rapporteur for the UN Commission 

on Intervention and Sovereignty. Dr. Bitencourt has written 

extensively about Brazil, hemispheric relations, and international 

security. A former Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the 

Catholic University in Brasilia, Dr. Bitencourt has lectured widely at 

institutions such as the National Defense University, UN Institute for 

Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Universidad Autónoma 

de México, and the Universidade de Sao Paulo, among others. His 

publications include O Poder Legislativo e os Serviços Secretos no Brasil: 

1964/1990 (1992); “Brazil’s Growing Urban Insecurity: A Threat to 

Brazilian Democracy?” (2003); “The Importance of the Amazon 

Basin in Brazil’s Evolving Security Agenda,” in Joseph S. Tulchin 

and Heather A. Golding, eds., Environment and Security in the Amazon 

Basin (2002); “Globalization Impact in the Hemisphere’s Security,” in 

Richard Kugler and Ellen Frost, eds., The Global Century: Globalization 

and National Security (2001); and “Army Modernization: A Silent 

Revolution,” in Jane’s Defense Weekly (June 21, 2000). He holds a 

Ph.D. in political science.

HENRY MEDINA URIBE is Defense Attaché of Colombia in 

Canada. Previously, he served as Director of the Superior School 

of War of Colombia. He has worked for the Military Institution of 

Colombia for 40 years, first as an Officer for Engineers and later as 

Logistics Officer in the Army. General Medina was an instructor 

of parachute jumping, a parachutist, a member of the antiguerillas 

special forces, and a Commander of the Companies of Battalions 

and of the Logistics Brigade of the Army. He was also Chief of the 

Planning Office and Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense. 
44

General Medina studied at the U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. In the civil academic 

field, General Medina obtained the level of economist from Atlantic 

University at the level of Captain. He has two MBAs, one from the 

Instituto de Empresas de España and the other from the Florida 

Institute of Technology. 

PEDRO RAÚL VILLAGRA DELGADO is Coordinator for Strategic 

Projects in Argentina’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A career diplomat, 

he joined the Argentine Foreign Service as Third Secretary, after 

graduating with honors from the Argentine Foreign Service Institute 

in 1978. From 1980-88, Ambassador Villagra served at the Permanent 

Mission of Argentina to the United Nations and from 1992-96 as 

Consul General in London. At the Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires, 

he served as head of the Division for International Security, Nuclear, 

and Space Affairs at the Legal Advisers Office from 1996-2001. In 

2001, he was appointed as Chief of Cabinet to the Foreign Minister. 

He has participated and headed numerous Argentine delegations 

to international negotiations and conferences. Ambassador Villagra 

teaches public international law at the University of Buenos Aires 

and lectures and writes on matters relating to international security, 

nonproliferation, and disarmament. He received his law degree from 

the Universidad Nacional de Tucuman Law School and obtained a 

Master in Laws (LLM) in public international law at King’s College, 

University of London.