A popular Government, 

without popular information or the mean

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Traged

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignoranc

And a people who mean to be their ow

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power wh

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
TRANSITION: 

Dynamics of Continuity and 

Change 

ROBBIN LAIRD 

McNair Paper 38 

March 1995 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STU

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Washington, DC 
ra Editors: Jonathan W. Pierce, Mary A. Sommerville 

[] Editor for this volume: Mary A. Sommerville 

[] Secretary: Laura Hall [] Circulation Manager: Myrna Morga

INSS publishes McNair Papers to provoke thought and inform 

issues of U.S. national security in the post--Cold Wax era. These 

present current topics related to national security strategy and po

resource management, international affairs, civil-military relati

technology, and joint, combined, and coalition operations. 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, ar

authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 

Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Clea

release; distribution unliraited. 

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted wi

permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studi

ton, DC. A courtesy copy of reviews and tearsheets would be ap

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 2

ISSN 1071-7552 
2. KEY PUBLIC ATTITUDES UNDERLYING 

THE DEFENSE SYNTHESIS ............ 

. THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT ..

Challenges to the French Framework ...... 

The Place of France .................. 

4. THE CHALLENGE OF ECONOMIC 

MODERNIZATION ................ 

5. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE 

MODERNIZATION DEBATE ........... 

6. FRAMING A POLICY OF TRANSITION o . 

. KEY ELEMENTS OF TRANSITION IN 

FRENCH SECURITY POLICY .......... 

The Nuclear Forces .................. 

The Proliferation Challenge ............. 

Conventional Forces, Multilateralism, and 

Peacekeeping .................... 

8. CONCLUSION ...................... 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ................... 
Dynamics of Continuity and Chan

INTRODUCTION 

Since 1989, French defense and security policy ha

undercut by changes in the external environment and do

pressures to deal with the challenge of economic modemi

The Soviet revolution of 1989, the reunification of Germa

collapse of the Soviet Union, and the experience of c

warfare during the Gulf War--all have challeng

assumptions and realities underlying the Gaullist sy

Above all, the French position on security independence h

put into question. The main hope has been for a Eu

Alliance to supplant the American one over time in the 

a gradual process of change within Europe---but change 

been gradual within Europe. The European Union is cha

by discontent within Western Europe. A new Central Eur

emerged that has yet to find its place in European or 

politics. A new Russia is emergent in which nationa

defining an assertive role for the Russians within Europe

the same time the economic weakness of Russia limits its 

to play such a role. 

Notably, the election of President Clinton has added 

challenge. The French have grown used to an assertive Am

role within Europe and have defined their role in 

counterbalancing the challenge of the United States. A

this definition of the French role persists (the French 

treatment of the GATT debate is typical of this definition 

French role), many senior French govemment officials ar

concerned about the withdrawal of the United States from 

engagement within Europe than with the m
Clearly the young French joumalist was shocked 

realistic response. Moriollon added: "I have just retu

the United States and know what I am talking about.

In response to the changing environment, the 

Government has promoted a de facto policy of tra

French foreign and security policy. But the transitio

only partial in nature: the Balladur government is a co

government. Power is shared between the Preside

Prime Minister in the actual conduct of foreign an

policy. In addition, the Balladur govemment is itself 

among right and center right parties. There is no clear 

on the definition of a new French synthesis of fo

security policy. Perhaps the election of the new Presi

R6publique in 1995 will lead to an explicit redefini

Gaullist synthesis or its replacement by something ne
FRENCH DEFENSE 

AND SECURITY POLICY 

The classic Ganllist synthesis of French defense and s

policy emphasized four priorities: 

• French independence of action 

• French nuclear deterrence to protect French territo

freedom of action 

• French participation in the Atlantic Alliance b

within the integrated military command 

• French military intervention and arms sales to p

French interests in the Middle East and Francophone Afr

This synthesis rested in turn on several fundamental re

• The United States was committed to the deterre

Soviet expansionism and saw permanent military presence 

Western Europe as a means to do so. 

• There was a Soviet Union over which the Com

Party leadership exercised comrol of an empire. 

• Germany was divided between East and West. 

French European policy focused upon reconciliatio

Germany and building of a European Union of like-minde

European states. French Atlantic policy sought to influe

United States by pursuing an "independent" course wit

Alliance. This meant case-by-case support or criticism 

United States. But the existence of the Soviet threat ensur

the United States would stay in Europe to counter that 

regardless of French diplomatic maneuvers or actions. 

d6tente policy toward the Soviet Union permitted Fra

define an "independent" course within Europe to coun

West Germans and the Americans in their own relations w

Soviet Union. French African policy permitted France to 
France to act as a counterweight to some extent to 

States and the Soviet Union in the region as well. 
UNDERLYING 

THE DEFENSE SYNTHESIS 

Underlying the Gaullist defense synthesis have been pe

French public attitudes supporting a policy of n

independence. There are five essential characteristics of 

public support for France's independent defense policy.' 

• First, the French continue to see defense as a requ

for public support and have continued to sense a nee

relatively high level of defense expenditure (figure 1). 

• Second, the French public supports a policy of 

engagement by French forces. The public supports the 

force as a tool of state power and the defense of national i

(figure 2). 

• Third, the French public sees France's defense po

being Alliance-centered. The only real debate is over wh

should be more European or Atlantic in orientation (figu

• Fourth, the French public believes overwhelmin

nuclear weapons are a necessary component in French 

policy (figure 4). 

• Fifth, nuclear weapons remain a strongly su

element in the French consensus, but there is a strong 

they do not protect against all types of aggression that Fr

likely to encounter. In other words, there is a growing rea

that nuclear weapons provide for only a partial defense of 

interests (figure 5). 

' All the polls in this section are taken from French MoD data as of f

5 
30 

20 

10 

0 ' ' ' ' 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 

1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 

Figure 2. Would support the use of French force

following reasons... 

100 

80 

60 

40 

20 

0 

I Sept 1987 [ May 1988 July 1990 I May 1991 I May 1

"ro'-'~'~r'"O'os'a'~ " ~ " O i, ~ S 7" I ' 

To Protect French Lives Abroad BB' 67 ] 65 : 73 

To Destmoy a Terrorist Cell • 70 70 74 , 76 

To SuR3ort t~e UN [] I '. 82 '. 8
35 

30 

25 

20 

15 

10 

, -r1983119~i198s:19~, , 1987 1988 1989 1990 1~1 

Atlantic AIliance -BI 36 i 37 134 38 138 37 36 37 45 

European AIliance4~i 22 I 25 ~ 26 23 24 ] 27 t 26 ! 19 27 

Neutrality .i 27 i 22 24 27 ! 23 :, 23 i 26 i 26 ! 18 

Figure 4. The role of nuclear weapons in 

French national defense 

% of Support in Public Opinion 

8O 

6O 

40 

20 

0 

1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 

1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 

[] £)ont Nee

[] Need 
1991 1993 

1990 1992 
ENVIRONMENT 

CHALLENGES TO THE FRENCH 

FRAMEWORK 

The Soviet revolution of 1989, the reunification of Germa

dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War all l

serious alteration of the reality upon which the Gaullist sy

was built. Not surprisingly, reality has changed more 

than recognition that the Gaullist assumptions and approac

not fit easily into the new post Cold War world. 

The unification of Germany happened more quick

most observers expected. With the emergence of th

Germany, the French had to adjust their policy and sort o

instincts toward the building of a common policy with t

Germany. For the French, the Germans are central 

formers defining of their own role within Europe. 

The French must deal with a new Germany. Would t

Germany be a panner with France as the old West Germa

been.'? Was there a psychology of national renewal that 

lead to German national egoism and an inability to 

psychologically with the other Europeans? Or would t

Germany define its role in a more adversarial manner? 

it seek to become an overtly national competitor with F

Would such nationalism, torpedo the West European consl

process? 

Soon after the new Germany emerged, the Soviet 

collapsed. There was a close connection between t

processes. The Soviet Union was an empire directe

Moscow. With the collapse of communism in Germa
pg

Germany reopened the European question. Easter

disappeared; Central Europe reemerged. How woul

states of Central Europe and the former Soviet Unio

West European and Atlantic Institutions? With the colla

Soviet Union what would be the role of the United 

Europe writ large? Rather than assuming that the ta

counterbalance the United States within the Western 

how could France be certain the United States wou

constructively engaged in European affairs? 

As the United States embraced the new opportuni

wake of the Revolution of 1989, the French adm

worried that the Americans might leave Europe too qu

thereby undercut the European construction process. T

States is perceived as critical to nurturing further succ

European development process, but French policy has 

been at odds over how best to deal with the United 

Europe simultaneously. 

The Soviet upheaval challenged both France's tra

relationship and the approach to the West European co

process. How would France deal with the new Germ

with the Americans redefining themselves and ad

challenges posed by the new states of Central Europ

former Soviet Union? The classic GauUist approach ha

no easy answers to such core questions. 

No factor has been of greater significance in pu

French over the barrier to discuss the necessity for ch

the Gulf War. The United States led a Western 

coalition in the war against Iraq. This military coordin

central to success in the Gulf War and showed the imp

having exercised forces in common within the Allia

performance of new technologies and the new conce

American forces (notably air-land battle) brought home 
pp

Moreover, the dynamics of the Atlantic Alliance have c

Threats from the East have become challenges for devel

The residual military challenge remains, however, es

when coupled with new challenges from North Africa 

Middle East. In short, the new strategic environment has 

the essentials of the Gaullist synthesis in three ways: 

• French independence was rooted in a specific 

framework. The French did not have to build this allianc

there. Now independence is exercised by creating mu

actions, not assuming their pre-existence within a multi

alliance. 

• The value and meaning of nuclear weapons ha

decisively altered by the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

weapons remain important but not as a central force pr

French territory from deliberate attack by a Soviet leaders

on geopolitical hegemony. 

• French military intervention and arms sales now 

a new peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and counter-prol

environment. The pursuit of classic state goals becom

clear in the new multilateral and multinational setting 

European and Mediterranean security environments. 

THE PLACE OF FRANCE 

Developments since 1989 have challenged France in a nu

ways. The end of the Cold War has meant the end of the 

role of France in the Alliance and its relationship with th

Union. The reopening of the European question 

fundamental ways has called into question the key ins

shaping West European development and the special 

France in its relationship with West Germany in dominati

institutions. The collapse of the superpower competition 

the United States in a special relationship with Europe, 
g

Migratory, economic, cultural, and military challenges 

South add significant dimensions to the challenge of 

Europe--notably the Western part of Europe--to the p

War world. 

There is a growing literature in France dealing 

variety of challenges ~.o the French place in the wor

debate adds up to a significant shift in 

perceptions--France is increasingly viewed at best as 

ranking power within a continent with an uncertain fu

global economic and political system undergoing 

transition. How should France find its bearings in th

How should France focus its energy upon the redefinit

role and orientation of the key West European institut

which France is associated? 

Given the propensity of the French for broad in

debates, discussion at the conceptual level is not to be d

as a political factor. Indeed, many of the tracts w

politicians in France as well as their broad 

pronouncements address the French challenge in the 

context of the historic transition, rather than at a tec

level about the transition of French foreign and securi

There are three basic positions staked out on the broad 

the place of France in the new period of human history 

have entered: 

• There are those who argue that France has a sp

to play in reshaping the Western response to the post-C

challenges. Because of France's strong sense of nation

and the strength of the French state and culture, Franc

more cohesively than many others in this confusing 

human history. As Alain Minc has argued, the world h

into a period of a "new Middle Ages" and France ha

strengths that can allow it to play a key role in s
during the initial period of employment in an enterprise

would not act as the instrument of intervention. The s

would hand those functions back to private actors) 

• There are those who argue that France has a role 

the extent to which Western Europe has a role. To the e

which Western Europe can shift to a more effective econo

to shape a more significant multinational capability 

European level, European interests can be articulated, pr

and protected) 

• There are those who wam that the forces of fear 

the institutional rigidity of French institutions might 

France's role significantly in the world. Chaos can ove

France and reduce it to a situation of stagnation, decl

entropy. + 

tAlain Minc, Le nouvear age (Paris: GaUimard, 1993), especially ch

"La grac~ fran~dse." 

2 Guy Sormon, Le Capital, suite etfins (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 389. 

One of the most articulate analysts who argues this position is Chris

l~..tienne, L'exception frar~aise (Paris: Armand Colin, 1992) and 

contre le capitalisme (Paris: Armand Colin, 1993). 

+ For two treatments of this trend (who argue that the trend needs to be 

however difficult the challenge) see Alain Duhamel, Les peursfranFai

l~litions Flammaxion, 1993) and Alain Peyrefitte, La France en ddsar

lespeurs et l'espoir (Paris: l~ditions de Fallois, 1992). 
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION

France in the New Europe 

The French debate about the new Europe and the role o

is focusing increasingly upon the broad challenges 

modernity and the evolution of the post-Cold War world 

French model of development (especially as formulated u

Fifth Republic). In part, this is a debate about 

exceptionalism. Is the French model of development in 

war world viable? Are there unique qualities to the Fre

of life that will persist in the competitive world of th

global economy? 

One key aspect of the debate is about the viability o

society and the French/West European approach t

protection measures in the years ahead, x Is French soc

rigid? Is it too hierarchical? Is French society too rigid 

of social protection measures that have been implemente

social peace in a conflictual society? 

Certainly this debate is not new. Indeed, at least s

mid-18th century French intellectuals have been debati

variant of these fundamental questions. But this i

i One French analyst has argued that Western Europe faces a sta

either continue current social protection methods or see 

unemployment. This choice will induce serious political conflict 

French polity. B6atrice Majnoni d'Intignano, L Protection soci

~ditions de Fallois, 1993). Also, the first published group of ess

Ecole nationale d'administration reflecting the working seminars of 

focus upon the labor market and social innovation problem. Poliqu

contre le ch~mage et l'exclusion et mutations de l'action sociale 

documentation Fran~aise, 1994). 

15 
perspective. This is an important manifestation of the 

nature of social debate in a period of global interd

The media and its images are increasingly becoming 

of reality testing in social and political debates. 

One of the most significant dimensions of the de

French society entails the question of the vi

appropriateness of the French educational system to po

conditions. What kind of educational training is most a

to the new period of economic and organizational dev

How should such training be administered? To wh

what venues? 

This debate has become increasingly evident in 

media as well. For example, in a cover story in L'E

gap between educational preparation and the job m

underscored. Several graphics were presented that und

gap between jobs likely to be created in the next 10 ye

preparation provided by the French educational sys

author concluded that "the demand for education wil

take new forms--probably less initial education 

continuous education. ''2 

An important aspect of the debate about societal de

entails the question of the need to cope with migratory 

on France and Westem Europe. How should France d

in the context of the expansion of the European Uni

migration of peoples from areas south and east of Euro

does it mean to be a citizen in the new social conte

obligations does the citizen have? What will be the 

social protection system in dealing with migratio

migrants gain jobs at the expense of native citize

2 "Les carri~res de demain: quels dipl6mes pr6parer," L'Expres

1994. 127. 
y

It is important to note that virtually all French analys

dynamics of economic transition underscore the need to 

a key role for the state, but there is a strong sense 

reformers of the need to change dramatically the role of t

As the analysts of the major reassessment to date of th

the state in France said, "It is necessary to conceive and 

out the reality of a state of the new type, adapted to 

economic and social age as well as relevant to the orga

of the new Europe. ''3 

The key judgment of most analysts of the renovatio

French state is the need to shift the state from an exc

interventionist and tutorial role to one of providing for n

adjustments of infrastructure and broad guidance of 

economic conditions. The need is to shift the state aw

the details of bureaucratic management and excessive inte

in the private sector to playing a role of the facilitator for 

Many of the analysts of reform note that France as a 

size county with significant social division requires a stro

As a commentator on the French assessment in Entrepris

noted, the French analysts in this project compar

American analysts of a similar project on the Unite

emphasized a much more important role for the state in 

economic environment. 4 The American model of a we

and a strong society works relatively well for a co

empire; it would not work well for a medium-size cotmt

to fred its way in a very fluid situation within a contine

3 Yves Cannac, Pour un ~tat moderne (Paris: Plon, 1993), 18. 

4 Benjamin Coriat and Dominique Tadd6i, editors, Enterprise Fran

Le Livre de Poche, 1993) 
MODERNIZATION DEBATE 

How does one connect the requisites for social, econo

organizational change with political change? There is a 

literature that addresses the dynamics of change within th

electorate. The main thrust of this analysis is to under

growing disaffection of the French electorate with lr

French political institutions, but there is a remaining at

to the constitution of the Fifth Republic) 

The growing shifts in French public opinion prov

basis for a potential shift in the French party sys

structures. For example, in an August 1994 issue of Le 

comparison was made of French voting behavior in the 

1994 elections for the European parliament. The e

committed to "institutional France" declined from 27.8 

to 18.6 percent and overall the willingness to protest gre

than 50 percent of the electorate abstained, and more t

thirds of those who did vote cast their support outsid

traditional party candidates (figure 6). 

One analyst underscored that the French e

increasingly believes that the French polity does not d

control the economic fate of France. 2 The emergence o

belief within the electorate provides the basis for a 

judgment about the role of the state and its rightful f

These shifts in public opinion, however, provide 

1See, for example, Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau, Les comp

politiques (Paris: Armand Colin, 1992). 

2 For one of the most insightful treatnaents by a well known politi

and specialist on public opinion see Roland Cayrol, Le grand malente

l~ditions du Seuil, 1994). 

19 
6o i 

5O 

40 

3O 

2O 

10 

0 P 

t989 1994 

potential basis for shifts in how France is governed an

French plutocracy operates. 3 Current political trend

there are four broad alternatives emerging in the Frenc

modernization debate. 4 

• Rejection of France's "overemphasis" upon th

compete in the world at large. Here an emphasis is 

French values and the French way of life. Closing th

immigration and a rejection of European integratio

issues in defining this French position. The state wo

3 Franqois Bazin and Joseph Mac~-Scaron, Le Politocrates: Vie

coutumes de la classe politique (Paris: l~ditions du Seuil, 1993). 

4 One of the paradoxes of the dynamics of political change in Fra

around the potential significance of one of the key institutions 

Republic---qhe presidency--as a force for change. As Jean-Marie 

has noted, there is a key French paradox. 'q'o lead a process 

recomposition as well as to respond to the need for change, for fl

permanent renewal of the society in front the political system, o

upon the institution which symbolizes and incarnates the rigidity o

itself--the president of the R6publique. It is he which could 

political changes at the time of his election and which can afterwa

the changes or consolidate rigidities." Jean-Marie Colombani, La 

Mitterrand (Paris, Flammarion, 1992), 231. 
py

• Emphasize incremental reform of the role of the s

its management of social and economic change. Gradu

role of the state would be diminished vis-a-vis the soc

economy. But there would be no decisive effort to dra

political forces to reconstruct the political system to 

decisively how the French economy and society operate

• Emphasize the need to reconstruct in a fundame

the operation of French society and the economy. H

disaffection of the French public with French institution

be drawn upon in an effort to reconstruct the political sy

new political center would be created by drawin

disaffected members of the left and the right. A 

responsible state would remain but the level of interventi

economy and society would be drastically reduced. 

It is difficult to understate the significance of t

presidential election and the follow-on effects of 

administration. As Cayrol argued, "In our system of pol

election of the president is a key passage point wh

problems of political leadership become focused and w

political alliances of the next few years are designed and 

in response to the needs, fears and hopes of the French

s There are left-wing and right-wing versions of this. For an express

left-wing version, see Andr~ Gauran, Ch3mage demande traitemen

(Paris: l~,ditions Balland, 1994). Gauran was a special advisor to t

Minister B~r6govoy. For a right-wing version of the paternalistic sta

to reform society, see Jacques Chirac, Une nouvelle France: R3flexion

Nil Editions, 1994) 

6 ! would generally place both Balladur and Delors in this political 

but both have proclivities for the second tendency as well. I would 

BaUadur but perhaps even more Delors have the potential to play the 

Colombani identified above for the new President. 

7 Roland Cayrol, Le grand malentendu (Paris, l~ditions du Seuil, 19
TRANSITION: 

The Balladur Government 

The Balladur Government represents the second p

cohabitation in the Mitten-and Presidency, at period that 

very different than the first one. The Conservativ

governing in transition with a clear sense that they would 

Presidency in the 1995 election. 

Unlike the first cohabitation, President Mitterran

clearly not run again. Also, the Socialist Party was r

scandals and badly defeated in the elections to the 

Assembly. Nonetheless, the President remained the he

French state and the figure formally in charge of Frenc

and security policy. 

The Balladur govenmaent has come to power in 

challenging time for any French govemment. E

difficulties abound; political limits are real. The Prime 

is more aware than many in the French political clas

nature of the profound changes in the world forcing a re

of France's role in the world and its sense of itself. T

focus of his government is first survival politically 

transformation of France. Balladur is well aware of the 

cohabitation, of his governing coalition and of the dyn

change within Europe. He approaches the question o

and security policy from the standpoint of changing 

domestic politics. In particular, security policy is not 

special priority by Balladur but is part of the context of 

rethinking and reorientation of France's role in the wor

For Balladur, France must think of itself as a med

power, the illusion of grandeur must be avoided, and Fra

also more realistic about its objectives within the West. 

23 
which combine into a future European Community. He 

insistent that France takes more seriously the need to in

East within the European Community as a project for 

construction. There will be, inevitably, different sp

different levels of European interaction, but he does n

as reaching a crescendo in any point soon in some comp

superstate. Indeed, he is very critical of such an obje

During his participation in the European Commu

summits, the Prime Minister has underscored the need f

of the Community. He has argued for a shift in the b

power between the Commission and the Council of 

The Council as a representative of the governmen

member states must play a much greater role. The GAT

has accentuated the French debate about EC institution

Many French critics of GATT have focused their fire o

of the Commission in conducting negotiations without 

the "real interests" of key member states, like Fr

Germany. 

In part, Balladur's objection to the European id

socialists is that it is utterly unrealistic. He often make

that France should be more flexible, as Germany has b

past. Germany has policies toward Russia, the United S

France. It does not confuse a European priority with Fr

the need to have a comprehensive East-West policy. Fr

become more realistic about the need to have more d

relations. 

Above all, this means coming to terms with the 

Saxons." With regard to the British, the European 

Major and Balladur are not all that far apart. Unfortu

BaUadur, the weakness of Major undercuts his ability t

a useful ally for dealing with the Germans and the E

United States is viewed by Balladur to be an importan
economic policy in order to protect their interests. 

He clearly rejects the goal of military integratio

NATO--indeed, he is not an enthusiastic supporter 

European integration, as that is normally understood

rejects a too binding concept of Europe, why would h

such a concept for military integration with the United 

"The integration of the Atlantic Alliance was design

American preponderance in mind. It corresponded t

epoch. But if the Alliance is to be reorganized, the in

of military forces can be organized in the same manner a

the cold war. ''1 He does however see the need to reform 

more generally to coordinate Westem actions and to pre

greater cooperation with the East. The Spanish mode

operation of NATO is close to what he has in mind fo

participation---the inclusion of the Defense Plannin

(DPC) but without military integration. 

The views of the Ministry of Defense under Defense 

Leotard are clearly oriented towards French membersh

DPC and trying to use tile DPC to reshape the role of N

an increasingly European-oriented defense organizat

strong American participation. Minister Leotard has und

a much more active French role within NATO. As he 

radio broadcast, "The Ministry of Defense and the Gene

will involve themselves in the military committee of NAT

actions are taken which could concem France and its 

forces. ''2 

Such an orientation has led to France attend its first 

of NATO defense ministers in 28 years in Septemb

E. Balladur, Dictionnaire de la rdforme, Fayard, Paris, 1992, 164

2 "M. Leotard envisage reventualite d'un retrait des casques 

printemps,"Le Monde, December 21, 1993, 4. See also, "L'OTAN e

renforcent lear action conjointe," Le Monde, December 16, 1993, 1
meetings on a casebycase basis, but he acknowled

France recognized "a new willingness on the part of N

evolve. It is possible that tomorrow, in other situations

again find ourselves around the (NATO) table." 3 

By redefining NATO's mission as largely 

peacekeeping, the French can help reshape NATO. The

United States moving in a much more flexible way 

Senior French officials could easily embrace National 

Advisor Lake's treatment of the question of multilatera

the national military interest. "We should act mult

where doing so advances our interests and we sh

unilaterally when that will serve our purpose." The poi

French and American approaches in practice might dove

closely in the future as the U.S. rethinks its role within 

But the integrated command per se is viewed as an an

mechanism overcome by events. According to a senio

official, "No one would use the integrated command 

Bosnia--no one suggests that the Greeks and Turks will 

key role" But the integrated command will continue to 

a bank against which assets can be drawn on a case 

basis. 

The French military perceives itself to be operatin

entirely on a multilateral basis. There is a clear accep

multilateral cooperation in the military sphere---its oper

the Gulf War, Cambodia, and Bosnia are all multil

character. These operations are, however, radically diffe

one another in terms of the political context and need f

of cooperative control. The main concern the milita

3 Reuters, "France backs delay in ending Bosnia arms embargo," Sep

1994. 
has worked, and NATO is capable of reform, 5 and this 

the focus of attention should be. But the Ameri

perceived as naive to believe that they can radically cha

presence within Europe and assert the same leadership 

conducted during the Cold War. 

For Balladur, there is a privileged relationship with G

but it is unlikely that a Franco-German alliance wil

France's interests alone. France has three possible appro

dealing with Germany in the future. First, there co

continuation of European integration around a Franco

core with much greater German role. Such an integrativ

will be much less focused upon a superstate and more f

character. Also, an expansion eastward of the Comm

probably critical to such a federal solution, but the Frenc

have to accept a more subordinate role and the German

have to see a continued need to have a good working rel

with France. In some ways, the manner in which the 

and the French governments are dealing with the fra

crisis is suggestive of such an approach. 

4 Indeed, interviews with the French military underscores high conc

are with the uneven conduct of LI.N-. operations and other specific p

the new peacekeeping interests of France and the West. 

s It is surely a reflection of Delors sensitivity to his political role in F

led him to note in a 1993 Brussels speech, "rhere is no doubt that NA

most effective machinery for international cooperation on defense a

in Europe. It is the ultimate insurance policy against a nuclear 

conventional attack on the territory of its Member States. At the sa

ensures American presence in Europe and provides a forum for Ir

dialogue on all issues affecting security in the broad sense of the t

an effective crisis management capability, an integrated command str

even its own military resources, such as AWACS. It is therefore an 

element of stability which its members are reluctant to abandon." 
Franco-German rivalry or differentiation would emerge

Third, if this rivalry became explicit, new power 

would be pursued. The British, and the French migh

balance Germany. The U.S. role in balancing the 

relationship with Russia might emerge as central in Br

French perceptions of the need to contain German pow

Balladur is acting on the first alternative, antici

second, but is preparing for the third if need be. He sim

not believe in a Franco-German creation of the Europe

This clearly distinguishes from his cohabitation partner, 

Mitterrand. 

In short, it is the mixture of EC and NATO develo

well as considerations of the operations of French 

concrete political-military situations in the future whi

Balladur's approach. First, the EC must be reformed. 

of the Council of Ministers must be expanded. Politic

will be deepened by an inner core of European states, m

France-Germany-Italy-Spain-Benelux. The process of 

union will encompass greater cooperation in security and 

policy. This cooperation will lead to a Eurocorps North 

German core) and Eurocorps South (France-Sp

becoming operational military arms of the European U

At the same time, the expansion of the political uni

these lines will enhance Europe's ability to cooperate 

United States within NATO. The role of NATO will co

be especially important in dealing with the Russian chall

the Balladur administration is willing to cooperate wit

on a variety of Russian issues, notably on safe an

dismantlement (SSD) and comprehensive threat reductio

But the role of the European Union (EU) is critica

in shaping the French relationship to Russia. How 

United States come to terms with the EU role in 
py p

European security. "The EC was the economic arm o

Now NATO will become the security ann of the new 

relationship." 

The question of enlargement is critical here as well

French centrists, the enlargement of EU and NATO 

components of the same effort. But the United Stat

push for NATO extension without coming to terms wit

Notably, the first expansion will be in 1995-1996 to

neutrals. Conditions are being laid down in this proce

will shape the inclusion of the Central European stat

future. In this process, there is resenlment that the Uni

in discussing NATO enlargement seems to ignore the 

this issue upon the EU enlargement issue. 

For the French government, the question of NATO e

clearly takes second place to the question of the develo

the European Union and the issues of EU expansion. 

central debate about the role of European institutions i

French economic and cultural development, the questi

expansion of the EU has become a debate about the 

France itself. As the contest for the presidency accelera

fall of 1994, the key candidates to succeed President M

staked out their positions on European development. Th

public overwhelmingly rejects a federalist notion of Eu

with it the inclusion of the new European states within 

framework. 

In a series of speeches in the fall of 1994, Prime 

Balladur staked out the position most likely to refle

policy in the years ahead He laid out a position in fa

moderate reform of the French state, to take place w

context of a Europe of cooperation for the willing. 

argued that those members of the EU ready to engage i

and security cooperation and ready to enter a curren
p 

without regard to the question of the capability of these 

enhance the security of the European Union, rather 

undermine it. 

The Balladur plan for European stability announced 

and repeated throughout 1994, is a statement of condit

inclusion in the evolving structures of the EU. States not 

members of the EU need to address minority rights. 

states would seek to cooperate with nonmember states to 

their intemal developments and to assist in legal and 

transitions whereby minority rights would be respected

unwilling or unable to do so would, by their behavio

themselves incapable of rapid inclusion within the EU. 

The Franco-German summit in fall 1994 revealed p

differences between the French and the Germans on the 

of how rapid the inclusions of the new states might becom

French have insisted that some sort of balance be drawn 

the expansion to the east and the challenges from the 

Europe. 6 

In short, the question of enlargement of NATO and 

have become inextricably intertwined within the domestic 

about the future of French development itself. The dip

room for maneuver by the new President of France 

decisively shaped by how effectively or not France pro

its path of economic modernization and developmem. H

many instances of French and Western security policy, d

and foreign policy become closely interconnected in sha

post-Cold War structures. 

"Le sommet franco-allemand face au d6fi de la coordin

l'61argissement," Les Echos, November 29, 1994, 8; "Paris et Bonn 

relaneer la machine europ&nne," La Tribune Desfoss~s, November 

2-3. 
FRENCH SECURITY POLICY 

THE NUCLEAR FORCES 

The nuclear weapons issue has been altered fundamenta

end of the East-West divide and the collapse of the Sov

With a hostile empire poised to threaten Westem Eu

weapons of mass destruction, the European NATO 

little choice but to rely on the United States for 

umbrella. Three basic postures were used to achieve 

• The non-nuclear West European states who

NATO planning mechanisms and through participati

integrated command of NATO, sought to influence U.S

making in a crisis. 

• The British path, whereby a special relationship 

London and Washington was helped along in case of cri

British possessing their own nuclear weapons. Th

argued that their variant of the second decisionmaki

theory was designed to persuade Soviet leaders not t

that intimidating the Americans into nonuse would do 

for British leaders. 

• The French approach, where nuclear weapon

provide independence for Paris in a crisis and to allow t

to not be subject to an American-Soviet bargain n

nuclear weapons and to fight a conventional war in 

general confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw 

at the end of the day, French weapons came down to a

trigger trying to influence American calculations about 

of an East-West war. 

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of the 

of these three West European approaches has been c

31 
of nuclear weapons is marginal to sorting specific e

influence by the Russians within Europe. 

The weakness of Russia as a state has raised the qu

how to influence behavior of states at Russia's periph

how Russia ought to defend itself. Many of the 

suggested in the Russian strategic debate have revolve

the role of nuclear weapons in shaping the post-Soviet 

agenda with Europe, Asia and the United States. This 

largely a defensive approach, not characterized by an 

heighten the sense of nuclear threat to Western Europe. 

The French situation is somewhat different than the 

but the question of the relevance of nuclear weapons a

role is at stake as well. Even though the French defi

threats and of their role in the Alliance allowed the

flexibility than the British, their approach to nuclear weap

as wedded as the British to having a Soviet enemy 

American ally. 

The key difference with the British lies largely in th

maintaining a broader array of security interests than Br

Africa and the Mediterraneanqthat can credibly be lin

new role for nuclear weapons within the French a

Indeed, the French are restructuring their military f

augment their flexibility and capability in dealing with 

interventions, notably under international aegis. The 

now becomes, what is the role of nuclear weapons in 

situation? 

If one looks at French behavior rather than co

reinterpretation what one finds is a clear emphasis u

priority of conventional forces in regions of direct or vita

to France. But what is the relationship between requirem

intervention and the threat from weapons of mass des

notably in the Mediterranean basin? This question is e
situation. The key concern of the French policy ma

built the French nuclear program was to ensure tha

would not become the conventionai military battlegroun

Soviet and American superpowers. It was a t

nonwar--to persuade the Soviets that nuclear weapo

inevitably be used. 

This approach is not easily transferred to the new si

the Mediterranean basin. The task in this situation is 

direct threats to European territory and to French vital 

by blocking proliferation and augmenting the capacity o

forces to intervene. Rather than being able to ensure t

would be nuclear, the task now is ensure that it would 

How does one develop credible altematives in dea

proliferant states in the Mediterranean basin to persu

from ever using their nuclear weapons against 

intervention forces? This is a question focusing upo

use, not nonuse to persuade a potential belligerent state n

its nuclear weapons. This is not classic French nuclear 

and debate has already started in France about this an

the French approach. Although there is a clear consen

the need to remain a nuclear power, there is debate ab

approach France should take toward nuclear deterren

new post cold war system. 

Several key realities shape French policy in the peri

• France has reduced significantly the planned e

of its warhead arsenal. The main modality for warhead 

has been in the planned expansion of the SLBM inven

addition, the planned expansion of the tactical nuclear 

has been deferred as well (figures 7 and 8). 
1983 

Projected 1991 

Projected 1983 

0 200 400 600 800 10

Figure 8. 1993 force structure: 651 warheads 

700- 

600- 

500- 

400- 

300- 

200- 

100- 

OLaunchers Warheads 
g 

into the conflict. 

• The French Government has increased th

available to the Atomic Energy Commission to ma

testing site in the South Pacific) There is a clear conse

the need to maintain this site for the indefinite futu

money used by the French to support their test site 

Polynesia is also a key element of maintaining French 

presence in the region and as such is seen to be 

supporting wider goals than simply sustaining th

program. 

• To lead to the reduced necessity for testing, 

trying to move ahead on its nuclear weapons simulation 

(PALEN). But French experts have noted that several 

nuclear tests would be necessary to put in place the 

system over the next few years. 

The main debate now revolves around what doc

force structure France needs in the period ahead. T

French doctrine focused upon massive retaliation a

Soviet Union in a strategy of the "weak to the strong." 

focus is upon the need to deter the "mad. ''2 But how 

this and what weapons do you need to perform this tas

The shift in the nuclear challenge as the French 

been articulated quite well by Pierre Dabzies, former h

Fondation des Etudes de Defense Nationales. 'qhe tr

Overall, the Atomic Energy Commission received a 5.9 percen

credits in 1994 compared to 1993. This compares with the 199

reductions ot' 4.1 percent in program authorizations and 5.7 percen

in payment credits. The 1992 budget reduced the military-appli~t

of the CEA by 9.5 percent. The center-right government has thus 

previous government's decisions in this area. 

2 For example, see "La force de frappe veut garder ses ailes,

October 20, 1983, 11. 
py

is to maintain the current force structure and levels 

indefinite future. Modemization would occur, but the lan

force at the Albion Plateau would be abandoned. The 

force would be modernized progressively to the M45 a

the M5 and the air component would be modemized 

acquisition of an air-launched missile of double the rang

current ASMP (air-sol moyenne port(e, 100-300 k

range). The second altemative is to reduce the nuclear ar

the sea-based component) and to develop powerful 

conventional weapons do carry out some current 

missions. To develop this capability requires inter

cooperation. The third alternative would be to adapt the 

force to the new geostrategic context. This would req

acquisition of counter-force weapons of the most modem 

order to dissuade the new potential aggressors which wo

the nuclear club. 

The main weapon system involved in the debat

deterrence of the "mad" is the tactical nuclear system

France need an longer-range air-launched system in the 

threaten third world nuclear states? Does counter-prol

policy for France require the acquisition of nuclear syste

a specific counter-military role? 

The French White Paper released in spring 1994 ar

the nuclear challenge in the new situation as follows: 

3 Pierre Dabezies, Ddfense Nationale, December 1993, 55. 

The French Air Force Chief of Staff has argued that "The airborne m

the most advantages in terms of versatility, flexibility and preci

strongly supports its central role as the second component of the Fren

force structure. 
warning doctrine. The credibility of our nuclear det

posture lies in the possession of means sufficiently flexib

diversified to provide a range of differentiated options 

head of state when the time comes. The nuclear arsena

be able to adapt to the evolving international situation, n

to the state of the adversaries defenses. With regar

principle of sufficiency, the number of submarines at se

be correlated with the level of threat as well. 

THE PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE 

There is no strong French tradition of thinking a~ut pro

as a key problem for French diplomatic or defens

Indeed, for a considerable period of time some French 

considered the possibility of proliferatiorv--albei

limits--to be a useful instrument to stabilize global 

Furthermore, France avoided the diplomatic entrapmen

control negotiations for a long time. Arms control wa

be an instrument of superpower control over France th

be contained as threat and not embraced as an oppol'tu

It is only very recently that some literature on pro

has begun to appear in French. Two recent additions a

by a French expert on the United States and on expo

policy 7 and a comprehensive atlas by two prominen

5 See, for example, a French work that suggests the centrality of m

ideas of Walzer within the French strategic identity by Michel Man

face aux SS20 (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1983). 

6 See my essay with Dinah Louda on French arms control policy 

Laird, ed., West European Arms Control Policy (Durham, NC: Duk

Press, 1990). 

Marie-H¢l~ne Labb6, La prolifdration nucldaire en 50 quest

Jacques Bertoin, 1992) 
gppy 

issues. 

The coming of the Gulf War posed a direct threat to 

The general challenge of proliferation was raised by t

invasion of Kuwait and the response of the Amer

coalition against lraq. President Mitterrand directly reje

use of French nuclear weapons in this theater of operatio

action poses a continuing challenge to those who 

desirable to have an effective nuclear threat to p

proliferators in the Mediterranean basin. 9 

Furthermore, Mitterand has endorsed French particip

the Nonproliferation Treaty largely on the grounds of t

build a comprehensive diplomatic solution to problems p

nuclear proliferation. But the French are only in the earl

of sorting out diplomatic responses. The illness of the P

and the coming French elections will almost certainly d

dramatic shift in French policy to seek diplomatic solutio

nuclear proliferation problem. 

At the same time, there is growing awareness of the 

deal with the problem of nuclear proliferation. The Frenc

Paper focused much of its attention on the new 

environment upon the challenge of dealing with prolife

weapons of mass destruction. According to the White P

' G4rard Chaliand and Michel Jan, Atlas du nucMaire: Civil et milita

Payot, 1993). 

9 There is also a growing ecological awareness in France that suggest

to deal with proliferation in the Mediterranean basin. As a Med

power, France is directly affected by the pollution in the region. H

nuclear response make any sense ecologically? In other words, 

growing possibility that ecological versus s~ategic consciousness wi

more significant in shaping French policy on the issue of proliferatio

in the Mediterranean basin. 
is posed both for the defense of our territory and for 

French forces deployed abroad. This challenge concerns 

of the European countries and the Atlantic Alliance. 

The risks generated by various forms of proliferatio

not be dealt with simply by a single response. It requ

range of responses, combing measure of "preven

international sanctions, the exercise of deterrence and f

the employment of certain means of defense pro

understood. 

A balance must be sought in military strategy to de

response to these new threats, between the exerci

deterrence, the actions of prevention and interdiction 

possible defenses. In the area of the anti-missile struggl

study of which concerns at this stage the capacity 

defense and detection, notably of space based detection. 

development of certain systems of air defense, some of 

have already begun, and of antimissile system is also s

and will be encouraged. Given the diversity of forms 

these threats can take, principally by diversified laun

missiles and especially ballistic missiles priority will be 

in this domain to the study of a concept and the means 

enlarged air defense. 

The threat of proliferation does not follow a s

geographical or political logic. It requires to be dealt w

a global level. It necessitates international cooperation. 

march for agreements which are progressively 

constraining at the legal level must be accompanied by a

upon or coordinated policies. These policies can not be s

among states holding sensitive technologies but must be 

between these states and those which are tempted 

proliferation policy. 

Also suggestive of the new French consciousne
quasi-official or de facto acquisition of the know-how to 

nuclear arms by several countries (Pakistan, Israel, Sout

Brazil, India, etc.) have been increasing for a long time th

proliferation. More recently, the proliferation of the ballist

of deliver promoted in part by Chinese exports has le

proliferation of strategic and tactical armament of uncerta

but with a clear increase in the overall level of global de

capacity. Some countries (North Korea, Iraq and Iran) ar

an obvious effort to develop the means to master 

technologies. Experts also worry about Algeria whi

because of its geographic proximity represent for us in t

the biggest danger. 

The disintegration of the USSR has substantially incr

risks for four key reasons: 

; The independence of three nuclearized 

republics--Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan----and the 

proliferation of the centers of decision making which ha

already occurred or could occur in the future 

• The absence of the reliable control of tactical nu

arms on the territory of the ex-Soviet Union; 

• The uncertainties that affect in the mid-term the 

of the Ukrainian strategic nuclear arsenal; 

• The dispersion of the nuclear scientific potential 

Soviet Union due to the deterioration of economic and s

conditions in Russia. 

The increased risks of nuclear proliferation associated 

disintegration of the former Soviet Union can not be disa

from the risks of ballistic missile proliferation .... A

tactical nuclear arms goes, the experts are alarmed 

conditions in which some nuclear weapons are kept, pa

artillery shells whose appearance is similar to a conventi

President Boris Yeltsin has promised to destroy these s

these shells have not been identified or controlled specifi

their operational use can not be prohibited by the operat

elaborate technical code for control. 
in an irresponsible manner. 

Furthermore, the same reasoning applies to the proli

low and high-technology conventional weapons. The re

military budgets in the developed world can only pressu

industrialists to be less cautious in selling their arm

conflicts (Lebanon, ex-Yugoslavia, etc.) has shown the 

of modem weapons and their destructive quality. 

The protection which highly sophisticated systems (a

satellites, warning and detection systems) can provide 

threat of ballistic missile or chemical aggression 

Specialists underscore the prohibitive costs of defensi

and their ability to provide for only limited protec

example, the United States has reduced in a substantia

hopes in this field. Defensive systems would not on

credibility of nuclear deterrence but would also not 

defend against all types of aggressions coming from ev

the world. They would not be able to protect against 

chemical terrorism as well. 

Nonetheless, one should not panic in recognizing th

These risks exist largely today as risks and assumption

should not underestimate them. Nor should one neglect 

to prevent them militarily if the measures taken at the 

and scientific level were to fail. 1° 

CONVENTIONAL FORCES, 

MULTILATERALISM, AND PEACEKE

Nuclear forces remain critical to French thinking abou

~0 Arthur Paecht and Patrick Blakany, coordinators, Rapport d'lnfo

la politique militaire de la France et son fmancement (Paris: T

Assembly, July 1993), 21-23. 
y py y p

normal power instrument for Europe in the construc

common identity, u 

For the Balladur administration, there has been 

emphasis upon the new context within which French con

forces are operating. As such, the administration ha

clear that the enhancement of the mobility of French f

their ability to operate in multilateral settings are 

objectives of the rethinking of the role of conventiona

The White Paper 

The French White Paper underscored the change

following language: 

A true conversion must gradually be carried out in the r

conventional weapons. From now on, it is their use outsi

nuclear context properly speaking that prevails, even i

necessary, especially at the beginning of the next centu

foresee possible situations where we would contribu

multinational interventions in crises involving either re

nuclear powers or, on a more long-term basis, th

emergence of a major threat against Western Europe. 

The principle that nuclear deterrence must by no me

discarded is, of course, maintained, but it will come sec

the capability of participating in the settlement of re

crises. This means that conventional facilities will henc

be defined fwst of all by their aptitude as such to contrib

necessary by force, to the prevention, limitation or settl

of regional crises or conflicts that do not involve the r

extreme escalation. If this latter case presents itself, thes

facilities will resume their traditional function in the dete

maneuver, by giving concrete expression to our will to d

u See the speech by Balladur before the Higher Defense School Ma
Our examination of the different contingencies req

the use of our forces shows that in a great majority of 

they will have to act far from our frontiers. The antici

objective is that with the exception of those whose pr

function in all circumstances is to ensure the security 

national territory and its approaches, all the forces must b

to intervene abroad, with the strength and in the time 

compatible with the nature of the crisis or conflict. 

Strategic mobility is then a decisive element of succ

depends on two factors: the aptitude of the forces to inte

in distant places and the availability of adequate transpo

Apart from their specific operational capabilities, 

would have to be examined, the aptitude of the forc

intervene in distant places will depend on their availa

their organization and the nature of the resources to brin

play in the theater of operations. 

Immediate availability in fact only concerns a 

number of professional units destined to form the In'st ec

of a rapid deployment force, while the other echelons c

gradually brought into action, depending on how the situ

evolves. On the whole, advance warnings and deadlines 

rise in power will be proportionate to the gravity of the 

The organization of the forces must be such as to m

possible to split them up into elementary cells which m

reassembled on demand, into coherent groups having a

capabilities of command, action, support and assis

required for the intervention. The principle of modularit

be the condition for the efficiency of the entire organiza

12 The French White Paper (Ministry of Defense: Paris, 1994), 52. 
The projection of power properly speaking is destin

check the escalation of a conflict by producing an imme

impression of superiority rather than taking the risk of a 

conventional war. The range of actions covers the imme

deployment of combat planes, missiles and land forces o

first echelon up to the subsequent dispatch of reinforcem

including heavy equipment. 

The NATO Context 

The effort to reframe the role of French conventional fo

led to change in the assessment of the political contex

which French forces are to operate. As mentioned above

forces operate increasingly almost entirely within inte

settings and are seen as needing to be organized to in

well as blend with other states in pursuing international 

The Bosnian conflict has had an important impact o

thinking about the framework for the use of their conv

forces. The sense that there is a near term altemative t

has disappeared among key French governmental 

Typical of the position of French center right is the repo

French national assembly cited earlier. In this rep

coordinators of this report made a number of key 

concerning the situation facing French forces today 

relationship with NATO: 

The question of France's military alliances, which was fr

between 1966 and 1990, needs a substantial debate an

quick definition of a new orientation, given the multiplic

of conflicts in Europe and the obvious necessity to bu

European defense instrument, in particular in the context o

very long term US withdrawal. 

The question is not to debate about the usefulne

American presence in Europe, but to avoid too rapid 

disengagement. 
g g

French conventional forces: 

The French have recognized that the dramatic changes 

European security environment have made NATO 

important, not less so as they originally perceived .... 

particularly may be the case in peace operations, which a

to be the most likely venue for the employment of F

forces for the foreseeable future. Consequently, the F

have insisted on increasing the power and importance 

Military Committee in Article IV missions, at the expe

Major NATO Commands. This has resulted in the Chief 

French Military Mission to the Military Committee atte

as a participant, vice as an observer, for the first time 

1966 when France left the integrated command structure.

as the French military have returned to high level d

discussions in NATO, so, too, the French military 

participate in a standing multinational structure in peacet

Johnsen and Young added that new initiatives on t

part indicate the extent of change in French policy to

Alliance and how the French seek to reorganize th

conventional forces within the Alliance: 

The In'st example concerns command and control 

EUROCORPS. The EUROCORPS was a joint initiat

President Mitterrand and German Federal Chancellor H

Kohl that emerged from the Franco-German Summit 

t3 Arthur Paecht and Patrick Blakany, coordinators, Rapport d'Info

la politique militaire de la France et son financement (Paris: T

Assembly, July 1993). 

14 William T. Johnsen and Thomas-DareR Young, French Pol

NATO: Enhance Selectivity, Vice Rapprochement (Carlisle Barrac

Army War College, September 1994), 10. 
German view appeared vindicated when, according to 

reports, on January 21, 1993, an agreement signed by the 

of Staff of the Bundeswehr, General Klaus Naumann; 

SACEUR, General John Shalikashvili; and Admiral La

placed the EUROCORPS under the operational command 

control) of the SACEUR for the conduct of NATO mis

Thus, not only are French forces assigned to the EUROCO

anchored within a multinational structure, but French f

could fall under the command of the SACEUR for wa

operations should nations so decide, with all the peac

implications this implies. 

The issues of NATO command and control and F

forces in Article IV missions continued their evolution 

at the January 199a NATO Summit, France agreed to 

initiatives for Partnership for Peace (PFP) and Combined

Task Force (C/JTF). While Paris agreed, in principle, to 

concepts, implementation of the initiatives has not 

without expressions of French reluctance. For example, w

PFP, Paris insisted that the Planning Coordination Cel

nerve center of PFP) could not be under control of SAC

at SHAPE, but only located at "Mons" and answerable 

North Atlantic Council in Brussels. Additionally, 

manifested its long-held suspicions of the SACEUR d

discussions concerning the development of the term

reference for C/JTF. 15 

Key Dimensions of Change 

Not only has the perceived context changed, but the F

focusing upon how to enhance the real capabilities o

forces within that context as well. The Balladur govern

reversed a downward slide in French defense spendi

administration is trying to hold the line of defense spe

ts Ibid., !0-11. 
forces more capable of joint operations over longer d

Indeed, it is striking how each of the services---not un

United States--4s staking out its priority role within the 

and power projection mission. 

In addition to rethinking, the French are clearly actin

an international context to shape diplomatic outcome

French have provided the most soldiers to the U.N. 

Bosnia. Their experience in Bosnia has led to a close 

relationship with the British. During the Cold War, th

had a close working relationship with the German Arm

the sector they operated in West Germany, but had m

contact with the British. In Bosnia, the two armies have 

closely together within the context of the UN along the 

many NATO approaches to joint operations. 16 

The French have also acted in Rwanda. Indeed, 

French led U.S. action, not the other way around. 

Minister Jupp6 clearly had in mind the use of Frenc

trying to trigger U.S. actions. Interviews with senio

officials during the preparation phase for the use of Fren

clearly underscored concern that the military had with th

within which they would be used. The military insisted 

intervention be clearly defined and actions taken to en

French forces could be protected from attack by in

forces. 

As a result of their actions rather tha

conceptualization, the French have become leaders in th

of rethinking the nature of the role of conventional forc

new international context. For the longer term, the Fr

interested in peacekeeping as a means of building a E

~ See for example, Xavier Gautier, Morillon et les casques bleus: U

impossible? (Paris: Edition 1, 1993). 
peacekeeping operations that drag France into a p

military operation. Similar to the American preoccupa

Vietnam, the French are shaped decisively by Alge

second legacy is the long-standing French experien

military intervention in Africa. The French are experi

rapid intervention to shape political events within Af

have built forces and operational capabilities to do this v

The French approach to military power is to co

strong sense of legitimacy in the use of power for limite

with a need to split that power between serving the int

continental and maritime defense. Like the British, th

focus upon their maritime interests, to the South a

primarily. Like the Germans, the French focus up

continental security interests as well. But unlike either th

or the Germans, the French try to combine both inter

single military policy. 

The role of peacekeeping for the French is to try to 

the ability of Europe to act to defend its own intere

French have limited intervention forces to offer to this e

do have forces well trained in low-intensity combat op

At the same time, the relationship with the United States 

crilical to anything larger than low-intensity operatio

relatively short duration. 

Another factor contributing to French rethinking a

role of their conventional forces is consideration of the 

the French defense industries. Rather than merely as

nation-centric approach to French defense industry, th

clear recognition that it can survive only if it works in a 

European contexts In a report for the French 

11 See, for example, "Armement: le Livre blanc prSne des conc

eurot~ennes," Les Echos, February 24, 1994, 8-9. 
Group (WEAG) toward that end. French officials inten

launch projects within the WEAG in such areas as 

research resources and assets, introducing competition 

existing test bed facilities, carrying out joint requiremen

and adopting common management methods. 19 

The French commitment to the European defense 

became especially visible in summer 1994 when the E

marched on the Champs Elysde during the July 14th 

celebrations. This was the "first time that German a

been there since the Allied invasion of Europe ended 

goose-step down the avenue by Adolf Hitler's We

'[These] are the sons of those who showed up in 1940 

and shot at us,' observed Pierre Lefranc, a spoke

veterans. ''2° 

In a not unrelated development, the French and 

governments announced their commitment to build a j

for mobile operations for the Eurocorps. At th

International Meeting of the Ground Armaments Indus

in Paris in June 1994, the French government announce

AMX-10 would be eventually replaced by the new join

German venture. 

Although the main emphasis has been upon the 

promote European defense cooperation, there is still a 

for trans-Atlantic cooperation as well. In the areas of b

management and in developing joint counter-pro

capabilities, French officials have underscored the 

n L'avenir des industries lides 6 la ddfense (Pads: La documentation 

1993). 

19 Giovanni de Briganti, "French set out to revamp European industr

News, October 3-9, 1994, 1 and 37. 

2o "Iron Cross, Velvet Glove," Newsweek, July 25, 1994, 26. 
growth areas of the late 1990s. The embryonic 

electronic battlefield technology makes it especially att

a focal point for building new transatlantic cooperatio

Challenges from the South 

The various themes discussed throughout this pap

together in many respects in considering evolvin

perspectives on challenges from the South. The dyn

change in North Africa, notably within Algeria, pose a 

strongly perceived challenge within France on several 

First, there is concem with the impact of instability 

Africa on migration within Southern Europe, notably 

France. Migratory pressures in the context of alre

unemployment within France and Italy is an explosiv

mix within Southern Europe. 

Second, the Islamic challenge to the concept of t

within French culture is also significanL A key them

paper is that the French society, economy, and polity is 

of great change. One of the most significant aspec

change is to the classic separation of church and state 

by the revolutionary tradition within France as well as 

of the nature of the nation and of the citizen within 

nation. For example, if an Islamic minority claims th

introduce a distinct set of religious values into public e

or that same set of values challenges the loyalty of the 

a secular state, what would be the fate of the French c

the nation? And of the role of the state as the custodi

concept? 

Third, political instability within Algeria can see t

21 Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 26, 1994, 83. 
from Algeria and enhace the position of the extremi

radicalism of the Algerian revolution might be played o

this time by Algerian against Algerian. Such a p

conflict might lead to the ascension to power of a 

regime capable of threatening France itself over tim

French have paid special attention to the possible acqu

such a regime of some tools associated with weapon

destruction. The political challenge conjoined with the 

of mass destruction threat could create a radically new 

for France and Southem Europe vis-a-vis North Africa

most specialists such a threat is not an immediate one

govemment officials such as Foreign Minister Jupp6 w

to pursue policies that reduce the possibility of such a w

scenario from occurring. 

The challenge from the south is also an area w

tensions between a nationalist and multilateral orientati

seen in French policy. For the fight, there are signific

that seek to protect the nation against the cultural, pol

military threat of Islam. For the supporters of th

political leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, there is a clear re

the integration of the Islamic minority within the Fren

For the other articulate spokesman of conservative conc

regard to immigration and the evolution of the 

nation--Philippe de Villiers---the concern is less 

rejection of Islamic minorities than a wish to se

integrated along the classic lines of the French citizen 

obeisance to the concept of France) 2 

At the same time, for the govemment of Franc

growing emphasis on trying to develop a multilateral 

22 See, for example, "M. de Villiers tente de f~drer ses r~seaux da

patti," Le Monde, November 19, 1994, 9. 
Mediterranean and to build an overall Westem ap

dealing with Mediterranean security issues. 
The French have increasingly emphasized the inte

aspects of their security policy. The role of nationa

remains important within the French concept, but more 

the task has been seen to use national assets to influ

evolution of the European and regional security contex

The French expect the United States to remain a s

player in global security policy, in general, and within E

particular. But there is an expectation that the U.S. 

contract over time as the United States deals with 

challenges and proximate security challenges---e.g., Ha

expense of more distant security problems) and Bosni

The task for France is to try to maintain means fo

defense, but in such a way as to try to maximize the inf

France within Europe and the alliance and with the Uni

and the Mediterranean region. Given the severe limi

resources available for French and European defense, p

to be framed carefully and judiciously. Policy 

evolutionary, not revolutionary. Increasingly, French 

policy will be flamed within the context of the Frenc

about economic and political modemization. 

Within the context of East-West confrontation associ

the Cold War, France tried to balance three priorities

deterrence for national defense, conventional forc

contribution to the defense of NATO against the Sovi

and modest intervention forces for Africa and others. 

end of the Cold War and the classic East-West conf

French conventional forces are being reorganized t

maximize the capability of France to influence inte

interventions. Nuclear forces are being drawn down, b

continued emphasis upon the role of nuclear deterrenc

defense of France's vital interests. 

53 
threats to Europe and as barriers to intervention o

Europe. 

Given the French commitment to nuclear deter

French government wishes to pursue a policy of nonpr

that accentuates the roles and responsibilities of the fiv

nuclear powers in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea

The French have difficulties with the current overem

the French see it) upon the early completitio

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the ex

focusing upon a more comprehensive expansion of the 

The United Nations Security Council is seen to 

especially important role in trying to shape the int

regime(s) necessary to deal with proliferation. Indeed, 

of developments converge on providing challenges to t

the Security Council Bosnia, Korea, the NPT rev

Rwanda. The French see the convergence of these cha

simultaneous challenges to the viability of the sole int

organization capable of playing a global management 

Proliferation is seen as a challenge to NATO 

development of the European component of the Allianc

U.S. interest in dealing with proliferation is seen 

component of the interest of the United States in mai

global presence and indeed maintaining a viab

intervention capability. For the Europeans, the direct th

the Mediterranean basin will provide a direct thre

Europearv--not American territory and the emergen

threat will provide a challenge to the formation of a 

response. 

But the ability of France to sustain a robust fo

security policy will depend on the ability of the new Pr

be elected next year to lead a process of political and 

reform. Reforms will come at the expense of money av
European construction. Proliferation will require a polic

than focusing upon a narrow concept of territorial defe

fate of French participation in a general alliance/

counter-proliferation policy will be tied to the abili

French political system to continue the evolution 

opinion and support beyond a narrow definition of 

interest--to the fate of a broader European and Wester

of development. 
Analysis, where he supports the work of the cong

commission on the roles and missions of the U.S. Arme

In previous assignments he worked on foreign and secur

affairs. He specializes in European and Russian secur

and has authored many books and articles on this to

Laird received his Ph.D. from Columbia University 

where he also taught for a number of years. 

57 
Normandy, 25 July 1944. 

The following is a complete listing of published McNa

For information on availability of specific titles, contact the C

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, Fort 

McNair, Washington, DC 30219-6000 (telephone: commercia

1913; DSN 335-1913). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, Febru

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Reg

1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Con

Monarch?, October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 

5. Martin C. Libicki, WhatMakes Industries Strategic, Novem

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in 

World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Sovi

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplo

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic 

lnsurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Indu

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Na

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, lran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, Ju

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zea

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf an

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land 

March 1992 
Storm Case Study, July 1993. 

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the Unit

Charter Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jeff

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy

Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battle~eld Technolo

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? 

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," 

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, Novembe

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, an

Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? November 1993

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Fail

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold Wa

Structure, February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations 

Cot~ict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and C

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Asses

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 1

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm an

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Ce

Impossible Dream, January 1995. 
Continuity and Change, March 1995. 
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