T he H o no rable Ly nn S. A d el m an, U ni t ed Stat es D i st ri ct Jud ge f o r t he * E ast ern D i st ri ct of W i sconsi n, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

D ERRI CK L O FT IS ,

Petitioner-Appellant ,

v.
V I CT O R A L MA GER , Warden

Respondent-

Appellee

. No. 09-16884

D.C. No. 1:07-cv-010603- JAH- L SP
OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ea ste rn

Di str ic t of

Ca lif or nia J ohn A. Houston, District J udg e, Presiding

Argued and Submitted F e br ua ry 16 , 2 01 2— San F ra

nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia
Filed De cembe r 11, 2012
Be fore : A. Wallace Ta shima and B arr y G. Silverman, Circuit J udg es, and Ly

nn S. Adelman, District J udg e. * Opinion by

J udg e Ade lman; Concurre nce by

J udg e Silverman; Di sse nt b y

Judg e Ta sh imaL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Hab e as Co r pus The pa nel af firmed the district c ourt’s denia l of a 28 U.S.C. § 2 2 54 habea s corpus pe tition challeng ing a no contest plea

to second de g ree murder that petitioner alleg ed
w a s n o tkn o w i n gan d

v o l un t ar y.
J udg e Ade lman wrote that , althoug h Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and its state ana logs require that a plea be supported by

a fa ctual basis, the state t ri al cour t’s failure to find one for

L oftis’s plea–una ccompa nied by protestations of inn oc e nc e –d id n ot p re se nt a c on sti tut ion a l i s s u e c ogniza ble unde r § 2 2 5 4

. Inth is c a s e , p e ti ti o n e r ’ s p le a w a s n o t m a de under Al for d or a state analogthat would trig g er a fact u al ba sis re qu ir e me nt.
J udg e S ilverman concurr ed only in the result. He ag ree d with J udg e Ta shima that a fa ctual basis is required for an Al for d plea or the no contest pl ea entere d in this case pursua nt to Pe op lev . W

est , 477 P.2d 409 (Cal. 1970) (Cali fo rn ia’s Al for d analog ). I f a tria l court fa ils to establish a factua l basis, J udg e Silverman would look to a pre -sentenc e re port prepa red by the probation de partment to see whe ther the e rror was ha rmless. Her e, the a

nswer is yes bec ause the report c o n ta in s f

a c ts to s u

p p o rt t h e p le a
. Ju d g e Si lv e r

ma nnext would deter

mine whether

the fa cts set forth in the probation
re po rt e sta bli sha fa c tua l ba sis fo r t

he ple a un de r C a lif

or nia law, and w ould conclude that they did in this case
.L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 3

Judg e Ta sh ima dis se nte d b e c a us e L of tis ’s W est plea wa s tantamount t o a claim of innoce nce, a nd the trial cour

t thus vio late d c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d f e de ra l la w whe n it

fa ile d to ide nti fy any fa c tua l ba sis fo r the ple a
. Judg e Ta sh ima wo uld hol dthat this error ha d a substantial and injurious ef fec t on the proc eeding s beca

us e n othing in the r ecor d sug g ests that L oftis acted w ith knowledg e that he w as enda ng eringhuman life.

CO UN SEL
Daniel J. Brode rick, F eder al Def ender , Caroly

n M. Wi g g in, Assistant Fede ral De fende r, S acr amento, California , for Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt.
Ka ma la D. Ha rr is, Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l, M ic ha e l P. F arr e ll, Se nio r A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, Jus ta in P . Ri le y , De puty Attorney Gene ral, Kathleen A. Mc Kenna , Supervi sing Deputy Attorney Gene ral, for

the Respondent-A

ppellee.

OP IN ION
ADEL MAN, District Judge: Petitioner-Appellant Der

rick L oftis seeks a writ of habe as corpus c h alleng ing his California conviction of sec ond deg ree murder. The district c ourt denied the pe tition, butwe issued
a c e rt if ica te of a pp e a la bil ity re g ard ingwh e the r t

he re wa s a sufficie nt fac tual basis to support L oftis’s no contest plea and whether his plea wa s knowingand voluntary . We now a ff ir m.L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

4
I. F ACTS AND BACK GR OUND
Th e pe rt ine nt f

a c ts, a s se t f

or th i n th e state a

pp e llate c ourt ’s op ini on , a

re a s f oll ow s:
On Fe bruar

y 27, 2004, [L ofti s ] and Richar d Ba nuelos rec eived a

tel ephone call from 15-y ear -old Celena V. She informed them she wanted to buy

an eight-ball of cr

y stal methamphetamine. They went to pick her up and sh e g ot i nto the ve hic le. T he y dr ov e to the Ho lid ay

L od g e , whe re de fe ndant k e pt h is bagof methamphe tamine. [L oftis] and Celena
wer e in a r o o m alone. Celena boug ht the methamph etamine f

rom defe ndant for $100, the n s he smo ke d a

nd sn or te d s ome of

it. [L oftis] also consumed some wi th her. [L of ti s ] an d Ce le n a h a d b e e n in th e r o o m for about 45 minutes wh en Celena be g an to “g et ‘cr azy ’ by

fre akingou t , g etting hot a nd sh akin g .” B anu e los c a lle d a nd a sk e d [L of

tis ] if they wer e re ady

to go. B anuelos a

rrived and the thre e of the m left tog ether . They went to [ L oftis’s] residen ce and B anuelos g ave Celena some milk.

L e sli e Sa iz arr ive d at th e re sid e nc e . [L of tis ] wanted to g o to the Palace casino t o look for his girlf riend. A lthough Cele na had not improved, [L oftis] did not take her to the hospital just down t he stree t beca use “it neve r c r o s s e d h is mi n d

. ” In s te a d , th e f o ur o f them g ot in the vehicle a

nd drove towa

rd the Palace . [L oftis] noticed Celena was notL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 5

breathing. He shook h er and told the others he wa nte d to take he r to t

he ho sp ita l, b ut S a iz said [“N]o, ... she was [ d ead.” ] They had decide d not to seek medica l car e because they fea red g oing to jail. They

stopped on a grave l road a nd Saiz and Banue los took Ce l en a out of the car , laid her on the g round and cove red h er w ith tumbl ewe eds. [L oftis] did not ge t out beca use he w as fee ling too sick to move. Th e y dr ov e on to t he Pa la c e to me e t [L of

tis ’s ] g irlfriend.
Once at the Palac e, [L oftis] play ed sl ot machines a

nd m et up with his girlf riend. They went home and [L oftis] was sick the whole day

and nig ht. [ L oftis] thought the methamphetamine must have been ba d si n ce he also g ot sick. The followingnight, Cele na’s parents filed a missing per son repor

t. About a m o n t h later, Celena’ s body

was found and a f

ew da y s after that [L oftis] was interviewe d. He f irst denied any involvement in Celena’s d ea th, then stated she ha d overdo sed. He then g ave the pr e c e din ga c c ount.
Pe op le v . Lo

fti s , No

. F 05 06 76 , 20 07 WL12 48 49 2, at *1 (C a l. Ct. App. May

1, 2007).

Initially char g ed wi t h m urder

in the death of

Celina V., alongwith four other

cou nts, L oftis later a g ree d to plead no contest to se cond deg ree murder in exchang e for dismiss al of th e o th er ch ar ges
. T h e s t at e t ri al co urtco n d u ct eda t h o ro u ghL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

6 plea c olloquy , ens uringthat L oftis understood the natur e of the cha rg es, the pe nal ties he fa ced a nd the rig hts he was relinquishing. T he followingexchang e then oc curr ed:
“ TH E CO UR T: F a c tua l ba sis

. “[DEFEN SE COUNSE L ]: Your Honor , purs ua nt t o Pe op le ve rs us Wes t [(1 97 0) 3 Ca l. 3d 59 5, de fe nd ant] i s e nte ri ng thi s p le a to avoid the possi b ility

of beingconvicted of first degree murder.

“ T H E CO U RT : I s th at c o r r e c t, [P r o s e c u to r ]?

“ [PROS ECUTOR ] : T hatis corr ect , it’ s Pe op le
ve rs us Wes t.

“ TH E CO UR T: Ok ay . The Court wi ll a c c e pt, wi ll b e wi lli ngto a c c e pt i t pu rs ua nt t o Pe op le
ve rs us Wes t.
Id. at *3. The trial c ourt then ver ified that L oftis understood his no c onte st p le a

and a c cept ed it. A t no po int did L of tis procla im his i nnocence or otherwise pr otest. The trial c ourt later se ntence d L oftis to 15 y ear s to life in prison.

L of tis a pp e a le d, arguin gthat the tr ia l c ourt fa ile d to
e s t a b l i s ha f a c tu a l b a s i s f

o r h i s n o c o n t e s tp l e a
. S p e c i f i c a l l y, he argue d th at th e re c or d f a ile d to pr e se nt s uc h a

ba sis beca use there was no e vidence that he intended to kill Celena and no evide nce that he engag ed in an inher ently dang erous felo n y w h e n h e s o ld th e me th amp h e ta mi n e to Ce le n a
. The state appellate court ag ree d that a fa ctual basis wa s nece ssary as a matter of Califor

ni a law but f

ound that any

err or wa sL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 7

h arm l es s b ec au s e t h e r ec o rdco n t ai n edfa c t s s up p o rt i n g a findingthat L oftis kne w that his failure to see k medical c are for Cele na plac ed her life i n dang er a nd, there fore , constituted “implied mal i ce m urder ” under California law . The California Supreme Court denied L oftis’s petition for re view.

II. DI SCU SSIO N
I t is ax iomatic that habea s relief lies only for violations of the Constitut ion, la

ws, or treaties of the United States; err ors o f s tate la

w w il l n o t s u f

f ic e
. E.g. , Es te llev . M c Gu ire , 50 2 U .S. 62 , 6 7– 68 (1 99 1) . Co nsequently , w e mus t deter mine whether L oftis’s fac tual basis claim ra ises a fe dera l constitutional iss ue.
T h e C o n s t i tu t i o nre qu i re s th ata p l eab e kn o wi n g, intelligent, and voluntary

. E.g. , Boyk in v. Alabama , 3 95 U. S. 238, 244 (1969). The rec ord must sho w t hat the def endant voluntarily

re l i n q u i s h ed h i s p ri v i l ege aga i n s t s el finc ri min atio n, his ri g ht t o tr ia l by jur y and his ri g ht t o confr ont his a ccuse rs, e.g. , United States v. Esc amilla-Rojas , 640 F.3d 1055, 1062 ( 9th Cir. 20 1 1), cert. de nied , 81 U.S.L .W. 3161 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2012), and that he under stood the nature of the c harg es an d t h e conse quence s of his plea, e.g. , Tanner v. Mc

Daniel , 493 F.3d 1135, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2 0 0 7) ; L itt lev . Crawf

or d , 449 F.3d 1075, 1080 ( 9th Cir. 2006).
Be y ond these e ssentials, the Constitution “does not impose strict require ments on the mecha nics of plea proce eding s.” Escamill a-Rojas , 640 F.3d at 1062 (citing Brady v. United States , 397 U. S. 742 , 747 n. 4 ( 19 70 )) . Wh ile Fe d. R. Crim. P . 11 and its state anal o gs require additional safe guards, v i o lations of such rules do not ordina rily rende rL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

8

a plea constitutionally infirm and thus vulnerable to c ollatera l attack. S e e, e.g. , United States v. Timmrec k, 441 U.S. 780, 78 3– 84 (1 97 9) ; se e als o Es te lle , 502 U.S. at 68 n.2.
Am on g the re qu ir e me nts imp os e d on tr ia l ju dg e s b y ru le – b ut n ot t

he Con sti tut ion

– is the fi nd ingof

a fa c tua l ba sis

. See, e .g. , H

i g ga s o n v

. Clark , 9 8 4 F.2d 203, 208 ( 7th Cir. 1993) (“ Putti nga fa ctual basis for the plea on the rec ord has be c ome fa

mil iar as a r e su lt o f s tatut e s and ru le s, no t a s a result of c onstitut ional compuls i o n.”). A ccor dingly , habea s courts have held that, unless a plea is acc om p anied by protestations of innoce n ce or other “ specia l circumstanc es,” the Constitut ion does not require state j udg es to find a f actua l basis. E.g. , Ro dr igu e

z v . R ic k e tts , 777 F.2d 527, 528 ( 9th Cir. 19 85 ); se e als o Me

y e rs v . G ill is , 93 F.3d 1147, 1151 (3d Cir. 19 96 ) ( “ Put sim

ply , the Du e Pr oc e ss Cla

us e of the F ourt e e nth Amendment to the United States Constituti o n does not
re qu ir e an o n- the -r e c or d d e ve lop me nt of the fa c tua l ba sis supporting a

guilty plea be fore entry

o f t h e plea , and the failure of a state cour

t to elicit a fac tual basis befor e ac cepting a guilty plea doe s not in it self provide a g round for habea s c o r p u s r e li e f un d e r 2 8 U

. S. C. § 2 2 5 4.”). Cf. W ille tt v . S tate of Ga. , 608 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1979) (holdingthat under North Caroli na v . A lfo rd, 4 0 0 U

. S. 2 5 ( 1 9 7 0 ) , “whe n a defe ndant pleads guilty while claiming his or her innoc ence , the cour t com m its constitut ional err or in ac ceptingthe plea unless the plea is shown to have a fa ctual basis”)

. L oftis cannot obtain habe as re l ief be cause the state trial court’s f ailure to find a fac tual basis for his no conte st plea –
unacc ompanied by

protest ati ons of innocenc e – does not pr e se nt a c on sti tut ion a l is su e c og niza ble un de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 2254. See, e .g. , Bo nior v . Co ne rly , 416 Fe d. App’x 475, 476 (6th Cir. 2010) (holdingthat a prisoner ’s claim that ther eL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 9

was a n insufficient fa ctual basis to s upport his no contest plea to lesser c harg es wa s not cog nizable i n fede ral ha beas
c or pu s) ; Gree n v. Koerner , 3 12 F e d. Ap p’ x 105 , 1 08 (1 0th Cir. 2009) (holdingthat a prisoner ’s claim that the state court lacke d a fa ctual basis to support a no c ontest plea did not, by itself, prese nt a basis to invalidate her plea in a f

eder al habe as c or pu s a c tio n) ; Fo otev . W

ar d , 207 F e d. Ap p’ x 927 , 9 30 (1 0th Cir . 2 006) ( ho ldi ngthat on ly if the de fe nd ant c la ims innocenc e does he obtain the adde d protec tion of Al for d ); Kirk v. Cline , No. 09-3187-WEB , 2011 W L 5 5 9 7 362, at *8 (D. Ka n. Nov. 17, 2011) (c ollectingcase s and noting that the

“ du e pr oc e ss c la

us e does no t re qu ir e mor e of a fa c tua l ba sis
or other more stringe nt sta ndards for a no contest plea than a guil ty ple a ” ); s e e als o Post v. Bradshaw , 621 F.3d 406, 426–27 (6th Cir. 2010 ) (notingthat failure to find a fa ctual ba sis fo r a no co nte st ple a wo uld be a vio latio n o nly

of state law, not cognizable in habeas) , cert. de nied , 131 S. Ct . 2902 (2 01 1)

. I t is the re fo re unne c e ssa ry to d e c ide wh e the r t

he state appellate court unre asonably deter mined th at the re cord supplied an ade quate f

actua l basis for L oftis’s plea.
Our cases have not endorse d the proposition that a fa ctual basis is require d for a no contest plea even when conside ring
c la im s r a is e d

un d e r Ru le 1 1 o nd ir e c t a

p p e al. See United States v. Manc inas-Flores , 588 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (“ Th e fa c tua l ba sis re qu ir e me nt d oe s not a pp ly to n olo ple a s. SeeFe d. R. Crim. P . 11(b)( 3). This is so because a def endant pleadingn o l o contende re takes no position on whether he committed the elem en t s of the off ense, a nd the cour

t there fore has no re ason to examine whether , in fac t, he did.”);
se e als o Al

for d , 400 U.S. at 36 n.8 (noting that while a c ourt may n o t under Rule 11 ac cept a guilty plea a bsent a fa ctual ba sis , “ the re is n o s imi lar r e qu ir e me nt f or ple a s o f n olo
c onte nd e re , s inc e it w a s th ou g ht d e sir a ble to p e rm itL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

10
de fe nd ants to p le a d n olo wi tho ut m akin gany inq uir y int o their ac tu a l gu il t” )

. N o o n e s u g g e s ts th at R u le 1 1 ( b ) ( 3), which re quires a f

actua l basis for guilty

pleas – but not no
c onte st p le a s –

is unc on sti tut ion a l.
J udg es Tashima and Silverman contend that L o ft is’s citation to Pe op lev . W

est , 477 P.2d 409 (1970) in connec tion with his no cont es t plea wa s sufficient to trig g er Al for d ’s fa c tua l ba sis re qu ir e me nt. I t is true tha t w e have pr e vio us ly
sa id i n d ict a tha

t W est “is the California e quivalent of a n Al for d plea.” Do e v . W

oo dfo rd, 508 F.3d 563, 566 (9th Cir. 20 07 ); see a lso Roe v . Flores-Ortega , 528 U.S. 470, 473 (200 0) (“ Th e ple a

wa s e nte re d p ur su ant t o a Ca lif or nia ru le permitting a

defe ndant both to deny

committing a c rime and to a dmit that there is suf

ficient evidenc e to convict him. See Pe op lev . W

est , 3 Cal. 3d 5 9 5 , 477 P.2d 409 (1970).”)

. Howeve r, the de fenda

nt in Doepleaded gu ilty , 508 F.3d at 565, rathe r than no c ontest, and his pri m ar y complaint was that his plea wa s involuntary beca use he l acke d sufficie nt t i me to decide , id. at 569–72. We did not discuss the sufficie ncy

of the fa ctual basis or a ny protes tations of innocenc e.
In the prese nt case , L oftis entere d a plea of no conte st not a tr a dit ion a l Al

for d plea (i.e, a

plea of guilty by one who continues to claim innoce nce)

. See Mancinas-Flores , 588 F.3d a

t 681 (“An Al

for d ple a dif fe rs fr om a

no lo p le a in that a def endant pleadingnolo contender e take s no position
on guilt or innocenc e, wher eas a defe ndant enter ing a

n Al for d plea takes t h e position that he is not guilty .”); Stephanos Biba s, Harmonizing Substanti ve- Criminal-L aw Values and Cri mi na l Pro c e du re : t

heCa s eof A lfo rd

an d No lo C

on te nd e re Pleas , 88 Cor

ne ll L

. Re v. 13 61 , 13 73 (2 00 3) (“ [D]e fe nd ants wh o p le a d n olo c onte nd e re sim ply re fu se to ad

mit guil t, whil eL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 11

d ef en d an t s m ak i n g Al

for d p l e a s a f f i r m at i v e l y p r o t e s tth e ir innocenc e.”) . As J udg e Ta shima acknow ledg es, Al for d permits the cour

t to acce pt a def

endant’ s nolo c ontender e plea
and tr eat him

a s if he we re guil ty , w ith out in qu ir y int o h is actua l guilt. See400 U.S. at 36 & n.8. Analy sis of Al

for d , W est and Ca lif

or nia and Ni nth Cir c uit
case s makes cle ar t h at the citation to W est duringL oftis’s ple a c oll oq uy did no t trans fo rm L of

tis ’s no c onte st p le a

int o an Al for d plea. The issue befor e the Supreme Court in Al for d was whe ther a

guilty p l ea from a pe rson who cla imed innocenc e should be a cce pted. The Court noted its previous decisions holding that t rial cour ts “may impose a prison sentenc e af

ter acce pting a plea of nolo contender e, a ple a by which a de fenda

nt does not express ly

admit his guilt, but nonetheless wa ives his r ight to a trial and a uthorizes the court fo r p ur p o s e s o f th e c a s e to tr e at h im

a s if h e w e r e gu il ty .” 40 0 U .S. at 35 . T he Court state d th at:
Th e s e c a s e s w o u l d

b e d i r e c t l y

i np o i n tif Alford ha d simply

insisted on his pl ea but
re fu se d to a dmi t th e cri me. T he fa c t th at hi s plea w a s d e n o mi n ate d

a p le a o f gu il ty r ath er than a plea

of nolo contendere i s of no constitutional significa

nce with respec t to the iss ue no w b e fo re us , f

or the Con sti tut ion

is
c on c e rn e d w ith the pr a c tic a l c on se qu e nc e s, not the formal c ateg orizations, o f state law. Thus, wh i l e most pleas of guilty consist of bo th a wa ive r o f t

ri a l and an e xpre ss a dmi ssi on

of guil t, t he latte r eleme nt i s n ot a co n s ti tuti o n a l r e qu is it e to th e im p o s it io n of criminal pena lty . An individual acc u s ed of crime ma

y voluntarily , knowing ly , andL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

12 understanding ly

consen t to the imposit ion of a pri s o n s entenc e eve n if he is unwilling or
un a ble to a dmi t his pa

rt ic ipatio n in the acts constituting the c rime.
Nor c an we perc eive a

ny materi al di ffe renc e be tw e e n a

pl ea that r e fu se s to a dmi t commission of the criminal ac t and a plea containinga prote station of innocenc e whe n, a s in the ins tant c a se , a de fe nd ant i nte lli g e ntl y conclude s that his interests require entry of a gu i l ty p l eaan d th e r ec o rdb ef

o re th e j u d ge contains strongevidenc e of actual guilt. Here the State had a

strongcase of first-de g ree murder ag ainst Alford. Whether h e realized or disbelieved his g

uilt, he insisted on his plea beca use in his view he had absolutely nothing to ga in by

a tr i al and much to g ain by pleading . Be cause of the ove rwhe lming
e videnc e a g a ins t hi m, a

tr ia l w a s p re c ise ly what neither Alford nor his attorney d esired. Confronted with the c hoice be tween a trial for first -d egre e murde r, on the one hand, and a plea of guilty to second-de g ree murder, on the other, Alfor d quite rea sonably chose the latter
and the re by lim ite d th e max imum pe na lty to a 30 -ye ar t e rm . Wh e n h is p le a is view e d in light of the evidenc e a gainst him, which substantially

neg ated his clai m of innocenc e and which fur

ther provide d a mea

ns by which the ju d ge could test whe ther the ple a wa s beingintelligently enter ed, its va lidity cannot be ser iously

questioned. In view of the strong fac tual basis for the ple a demonstrated by theL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 13

State and Al fo rd ’s c le arl y e xpre sse d d e sir e to e nter i t des pit e his pr of e sse d b e lie f i n h is innocenc e, we hold that the trial judg e did not
c omm it c on sti tut ion a l e rr or in a c c e pti ngit.
Id. at 37–38 (interna l citations and footnote omitted).
Whil e Al for d did no t e xplicit ly

ho ld t hat a fa c tua l ba sis
was c onstitut ionally

nece ssar y , lower f

eder al cour

ts have dr aw nf r o m t h e a b o v e la n gu a g e th e r e qu ir e me n t t h at if a defe ndant pleads guilty

while claiminginnocence t h e trial court must find a fa ctual basis. See, e .g. , W illet , 608 F.2d at 540. Bu t c

f. Higgason , 984 F.2d at 207 (“ Al for d tells us that str on ge vi den c e on

the re c or d c an s ho w that a ple a is
vo luntary ; it

do e s n ot h old

that on ly strongevidenc e on the
reco rd pe rm its a

fi nd ingof

vo luntari ne ss. An d it

c e rt a inl y do e s n o t i mp l y th at th e f

a c tu a l

- b a s i s r e qu i r e m e n t o f F e d . R. Crim. P. 11(f) and it s state-lawcounter parts come s from the Constit ution.”). This requir ement is b as ed on the conc ern that a de fe nd ant who ple a ds guil ty wh ile simultane ou sly
c l a i m i n gi n n o c e n c e m ay n o t b e a c t i n gf r e e l y an d v o l un t ar i l y. S ee W i l let , 608 F.2d at 540 (noting the “‘importanc e of protec ting the innocent and of i nsuring that guilty pleas a re a p ro d u cto f f re e a n d i n t el l i gen tch o i c e ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Al for d , 400 U.S. at 38 n. 1 0 ). By fi nding a fac tual basis, the trial judge resolves the conflict be tween the waiver of trial and the claim of innoce nce. See id. Whe n a de fe nd ant p le a ds guil ty or no c onte st w ith out c la imi ng in no c e nc e or oth e rw ise makingstatements ca lling into question the voluntariness of h i s p l ea , h o we v er , th er e i s n o s u ch co n fl i ct fo r t h e t ri al j u d ge to r e so lve , a

nd the fi nd ingof

a fa c tua l ba sis is n ot e sse nti a l to
vo luntari ne ss. In th e pr e se nt c a se , L of tis ma de no state me nts trig g eringthe conc erns r aised in Al for d

.L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

14

J u d g e T a sh im a no te s tha t R au en al s o s ai d a W est p l ea “all o w s a 1 d e fen d a n t t o p le a d gu ilt y in o rd e r to tak e a d v a n ta g e o f a p le a b a rg a in whi l e s t i l l as s er t i ng hi s or her i nn ocenc e. ” I d. a t 73 4. T h a t a W

est pl ea al l ows a de f

en dan t t o pl ead g u i l t y w h i l e as s er t i n g i n n oce n ce doe s n ot cha ng e t he f

act t hat Lof

t i s pl eaded no cont es t wi t hout eve r m ak i ng such
an a sserti o n. F urthe r, as A l f o rd no te d , t h e C o n stitutio n is co n c e rn e d w ith the p ra c tica l co n se q u e n c e s o f t h e d e fen d a n t’s p le a , no t t h e m a n n e r in whi ch i t m ay b e f

o rma l l y cat ego ri zed und er s t at e l aw. 40 0 U

. S. at 37

. I n o t her word s, we shoul d f o cus o n whether Lo f

t i s’ s p l ea rai sed t he co ncerns i d ent i f i ed i n A l f o rd no t t h e lab e l C a lif

o rn ia c o u rts m igh t p la c e up o n it

. Nor c an a ba

re r efe renc e to Pe op lev . W est , s u ch as occur red dur ing the plea c olloquy here , car

ry with it an implied assertion of innoce nce, a ctivatingthe additional protec tions of Al

for d . “ W est did no t a c tua lly

inv olv e a c la im of innoce nce but a ddresse d t he validity of a ple a to an unchar g ed lesser offe nse entered pursuant to a plea barg ain.” People v . Rauen , 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 732, 734 n.1 (Cal

. App. 2011); se e als o In re Alv ernaz , 83 0 P.2 d 74 7, 75 2 (C a l.

1 1992) (charac terizing a W est ple a a s “ a ple a of no lo contende re, not admitting a fac tual basis for the plea” ). W est a pp ro ve d th e pr a c tic e of

ple a ba rg a ini ngto a le sse r c ha

rg e in order to avoid exposure to gr eate r pena lti es
. I n this sense, W est re se mbl e s Al

for d beca use the motive in Al

for d wa s a lso to avo id mor e se ri ou s pe na lti e s. But W est ’s foc us was on validatingthe pra ctice of plea ba rg aining gen er all y . The decision re lied in part on Brady v. U nited States , 3 97 U. S. 74 2 ( 19 70 ), in whic h th e Sup re me Court app ro ve d a ple a to a lesser char g e motivated by

the desire to avoid a hig her pe na lty , b ut W

est never even me ntioned Al

for d , which had
co m e down a fewwee ks previous. Thus, W est is more an analogof Bradythan of Al for d

. Whil e some California ca s es casually ref er to W est and Al for d pleas interc hang eably , others dra w a distinction. See,L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 15

e.g. , In reMi lls , N o. C06 66 48 , 2 01 1 WL40 05 39 4, at *4 (C a l. Ap p
. 3 D i s t

. S e p t

. 9 , 2 0 1 1 ) ( “ T h e s u p e r i o r c o urtc o r

r e c tly fo un d M i l l s e n t e r e d h i s p l e a o n th e m i s t ak e n b e l i e f th a t a W est ple a a llo we d h im to ma int a in h is i nn oc e nc e ; W est did
n o t inv o lv e a c la im o f inn o c e n c e b u t in s te a d a d dr e s s ed the validity of a ple a to an unc harg ed lesser offe nse ente red purs ua nt t o a ple a ba rg a in. ” ); People v . W

ampler , N o. C06 06 49 , 2 01 0 WL

14 35 04 0, at *2 n. 2 ( Ca l. A pp . 3 Di st. Apr. 1 2 , 2010) (notingthat while pleas in whic h the d e f e n d an t c o n ti nu e s to ma inta in inn o c e n c e ar e s o me times
re fe rr e d to a s W

est p l e a s , th e y ar e r e a l l y Al for d p l ea s ). J u d ge Tashima cor

rec tly notes that these de cisions are nonprec edential. The y do, howeve r, indicate that California law does not clea

rly equate W est and Al for d such that as a

fede ral habea s court we should ex tend the additional prote ctio ns of Al for d to any case in which W

est is me ntioned during the plea colloquy . In any

event, a s discussed in n o t e 1 above, the validity of a ple a under the Constit ution doe s not turn on how it is formally

cate g orized under state law. Al for d , 400 U.S. at 37 . T hu s, it is als o irr e le va nt that un de r C a lif

or nia law n olo pleas a re tre ated like guilty

pleas. S

ee C al

. Penal Code § 1016(3).
J udg e Ta shima ar gu es that even if a W est plea is not
e qu iva le nt to a

c la im o f i nn oc e nc e , it

at le a st q ua lif ie s a s a “spec ial circ umstance.” Rodriguez , 7 77 F.2d at 528. Ho we ve r, the on ly

sp e c ia l circumsta

nc e we ide nti fi e d in Rodriguez

was “ a def

endant’ s s pecif

ic protestation of innocenc e, which mig ht impose on a st at e co urt the constitutional duty

to make inqui ry and to determine if there is a factual basis for the plea.” Id. Simi larly , Banks v. McG ougan , 717 F.2d 186, 188 (5th Cir.1983), the ca se upon which Rodriguez p r i m ar i l y r e l i e d , s p o k e o f a s i tu at ionin wh ic h “ the state jud g e is p ut o n n oti c e that the re may be so meL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

16
need f or such a n inquiry (as, for e x ample, whe n the ac cused
asser ts h is inn o c e n c e )

. ” We h av e f o un d n o c a s e in w h ic h a fede ral ha

beas c ourt has extend ed t h e fac tual basis rule of Al for d to a situation such as in the prese nt case wher e the defe ndant pleade d no contest without assertinginnocenc e or m akingother stateme nts about the fac ts which ca lled the validity of his plea into question.

F ina lly , Jud g e Tashima

c onte nd s th at United States v. Vidal , 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) , supports the proposition that a def

endant who ple ads pursua nt to Pe op le v . W

est contests fa ctual guilt. I n Vidal , we c onsidere d o n direc t appeal whether

a def endant’ s California convic tion for dr i v i n ga s t o l e nv e h i c l e qu a l i f

i e d a s ana g g r av at e d

f e l o n y, supporting a

n 8-leve l sentenc ing guideline enha nceme nt un de r U .S. S.G . § 2L 1. 2( b) (1 )( C) . The de fe nd ant p le d guil ty in exchang e for

the dismissal of an o t h er count, and the descr iption of the fac ts suppor ting the char g e in his plea for m s t at e d o n l y “Pe op lev . W

est .” Id. at 1075. We held first that be c a us e the Ca lif

or nia statut e at is su e a lso a pp li e d to
acc essories a fter the fac t it did notcate g ori cally descr ibe a “g ener ic” theft offe nse. Id. at 1077–86. We then conclude d that un de r t

he mod if ie d c ate g ori c a l a

pp ro a c h th e re c or d d id
no t pe rm it a fi nd ing that the de fe nd ant ple d guil ty to g e ne ri c theft, as the ple a for

m contained no f

actua l basis permitting such a f inding. Id. at 1088–89. In so holding, we discusse d W est pleas a nd noted that t h e “C alifornia Supre me Court subsequently char acte rized a Pe op lev . W est plea a s a plea

of nolo contender e that does not establish factual guilt.” Id. at 1089. Thus, we s ai d t h at “unless the rec ord of the ple a proce ed i ngref

lects that the de fenda

nt admitted to facts, a W est ple a , w ith out mo re , d oe s n ot e sta bli shthe re qu isi te fac tual predic ate to support a se ntence enhanc ement.” Id.L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 17

Uni t ed St at es v

. Sav age , 54 2 F.3d 95 9 (2d C i r. 20 0 8 ), whi ch Jud ge 2 T ashi m a al so ci t es, i s si m i l arl y dis t i n g u ishab l e. I n Savage , t he co urt de cli ne d t o i m p o se a senten ce en ha nc em en t und er the m o d i f i ed ca t eg o r i cal ap p ro ac h b ec au se the d efen d an t ’ s A l f o rd plea did no t est ab l i sh t he req uisi t e fac t s. We did not hold i n Vidal

tha t W est pleas a

re the same a s Al for d pleas or that a fa ctual basis is constitutionally require d for a valid W est plea. We held o n ly

that without a fac tual basis permitting a

deter m i n ation of whe ther the pr ior
co n v ic ti o nqu a li f

ie d a s ana g g r av ate d

f e lo n y , th e s e nte n cing guideline enha

nceme nt could not be applied. Thus, Vidal there fore cannot bear the weig ht J udg e Ta shima place s upon it. 2

III . C ON CL USI ON
Be cause L oftis did not enter an Al for d plea, the state cour

t wa s und e r n o o bli g atio n, un de r t he fe de ra l Co ns tit

uti on , to find a fa ctual basis. L oftis provides no other re ason t o find his plea unknowingor involuntary . Acc ordi n gl y , he is not entitled to habea s relief

. AF F IRMED.

SI L VE RMA

N, Cir c uit

Judg e , c on c ur

ri ngin t he re su lt:
Chi e f Jud g e Ko zins ki r e c e ntl y de signated a

se pa ra te opinion of his, not as a dissent or a partial c oncurr ence , but as a “disa g ree [m ent] with everyone.” Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder , — F.3d —, 2012 WL5077137 (9th Cir. October 19, 2012). I chuckle d at the time, but not any more. Inow find my self in the position of ag ree ing w ith the result rea ched by J udg e Ade lman aff

irming the d enial of a

writ of habe asL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

18

c or pu s, but on ly with the result; ag ree ing w ith the portion of J udg e Ta shima’s dissent demonstratingthe constitutional require ment of a f

actua l basis t o s up port a Pe op lev . W estty p e n o co n t es tp l ea ; b u tu l t i m a t el y d i s agr ee i n g wi thJ u d ge Ta sh ima a bo ut whe the r t

here was , in de e d, a

fa c tua l ba sis in thi s case for se cond degree murder unde r California la w.
Istart with J udg e Ta shima. I ag ree with him that a fa ctual basis is require d for a

n A l ford p l ea or a no c ontest plea enter ed pursuant to Pe op lev . W est , 477 P.2d 409 (Cal. 1970), California’s a

nalogue to Al

for d . A s J ud g e Ta sh ima

c og e ntl y show s , a co urt takinga no conte st or Al for d-t y pe ple a mus t satisfy itself that there is a fac tual b as i s t o believe that the defe ndant i s, indeed, guilty of t he cr ime for whic h he will be convicted. Afac tual basis i s constitutionally require d beca use of the importa

nce of p ro t ec ting the innoc ent and assuringthat the plea is the pr oduct of fr ee a nd intelligent choice

. Nor th C

ar oli na v . A lfo rd, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970).
Her e, the tria l court fa iled to establish a factual ba sis at the t ime it acc epted L oftis’s no contest pl ea. T hat er ror g ives rise to the next questi on: Whether a re viewingcourt may look to a pre-sente nce r eport pre pare d by the probation department to s e e wh e the r t

he erro r wa s h arm le ss –

that is , to a sc e rt a in whether the re port contains fa cts that support the plea . The
answe r to that question is y es, and L oftis do es n o t argue otherwise. See U

nited States v. Mancinas-Flore s , 588 F.3d 67 7, 68 1– 83 (9 th C ir . 2 00 9) ; Carty v . Nelson , 426 F.3d 1064, 10 74 –7 5 ( 9 thC i r
. 2 0 0 5 )

. Inan y e v e n t , th e r e ar e n o c l e a rl y established Unite dStates Supreme Court dec isions to t he
c o n tr ar y.
The fina l question is whether the f acts set f orth in the probation re port establish a fa ctual basis for second de g reeL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 19

T he C our t of

Ap peal wr ot e: 1

C al i f

o rni a l aw reco gni zes t hree theori es of s eco nd d egree m urder, one o f

w hi ch i s i m p l i ed m al i ce m urder. ( Peopl e v. Rober t son ( 2004) 34 Cal

. 4t h 156, 164 [ mal i ce i s i mp l i ed whe n t he ki l l i ng res ul t s f r om an i nt ent i o nal act , t he n at ural co nsequenc es of whi ch are dange r ous t o l i f

e, whi ch act was del i bera t el y per f ormed b y a p ers o n w ho kno ws t hat hi s co nd uct end angers t he l i f e o f ano t her and who act s wi t h co nsci o us d i sr egard fo r lif e ].)

H e re , t h e p r o b a tio n re p o rt c o n ta ine d fac ts supp o rt i ng a f

i nd i ng t hat de f

end ant k new t he
con s equ en ce s of

h i s f ai l u r e t o s ee k me di ca l c are f or C el ena pl ace d he r li f

e i n dan ger
. H e obse r ved h er a d v e r s e r e a c t i o n a n d h e r c o n t i n u i n g c o n d i t i o n
. He sugges te d t aki ng her t o t he ho spi t al and t heref o re re co gni zed t he ser i o usnes s o f her s i t uat i o n. T he fac ts al s o s h ow def

en dan t ac t ed wi t h con s ci ou s di s r eg ar d f or C e le n a ’s l ife. H e kn e w sh e w a s ill a n d d id no thin g to h el p h e r
. Th e h o s p i t a l w a s o n l y a s h o r t d i s t a n c e f r om hi s ho use. H e and hi s co ho rt s si m p l y t o o k C el ena al o ng murder unde r Californ i a l aw. The answe r to this question be g ins and

e nd s w iththe pr inc ipl e tha t th e Ca lif

orni a c ourt s are the ex posit or s o f C a lif or nia law. Th e Ca lif

or nia c ourt s te ll us wh at Ca lif

or nia l aw c ov e rs ; w e do n’ t te ll them

. Bradshaw v. R ichey , 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (“ We have repe atedly

held that a state court’s inter pretation of state law, including one announce d on direc t appea l of the cha lleng ed conviction, binds a fe dera l court sitt i n gin habea s corpus.” ). In th is c a se , th e Ca lif

or nia Court of Ap pe a l re vie we d the fa c ts se t f or th i n the pr ob atio n r e po rt and , a na ly zingCa lif

or nia
c a se s and inte rp re tin gCa lif or nia law, c on c lud e d th at th os e fac ts would suppor t a conviction of second-de g ree murder under the California Pena l Code. 1L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

20

i n t h e v eh i cl e wh en t h ey h ea ded t o t h e Pal ac e ca s i n o. W hen she qui t breathi ng, de f end ant m ent i o ned t he hos pi t al t o hi s cohor t s but he made no real ef f ort t o get her t here. O n t he way t o t he casi no , t hey sto p p ed t he vehi cl e, placed C el ena’ s b o d y on t he road si d e and
co vered i t wi t h t um b l ewee d s. W hen t hey arri ved at t he
c a sin o , d e fen d a n t p la ye d slo t m a c h ine s. In su m , w h ile C el ena was exp eri encin g a viol ent react i o n t o t he met hamphet ami ne and wa s obvi ous l y ai l i ng , ev en whe n s he qui t bre at hi ng , def endan t cons ci ous l y di s r ega r ded h er l i f e- t h r ea t en i n g c on di t i on a n d de pr i v ed h er of
m e d ic a l ca re , kn o w in g he w a s p la c ing he r lif e in d anger.

“ [ T ] he com mo n l aw does not di s t i ng ui s h bet ween homi ci de by ac t an d hom i cide by om i s s i on. ” ( P e o p le
v. Bur den (1 9 7 7 ) 7 2 C a l. A p p
. 3 d 6 0 3 , 6 1 8 ; see also P eo p l e v

. D ell i n g er (1 9 8 9 ) 4 9 C a l. 3 d 1 2 1 2 , 1 2 2 0 .) P as s i ve conduct or om i s s i ons may s at i s f y t he act us r eas c o m p o n e n t o f m u rd e r w h e re the p e rs o n is un d e r a d u ty t o act

. ( See P eo

p l e v

. P ro t o

p a p p a s (1 9 8 8 ) 2 0 1 C a l. A p p
. 3d 15 2 , 16 8 [do ct o r’ s f ai l ure t o ass i st hi s p at i ent af t er i nap p rop ri at el y a d m i ni st eri ng anest hesi a]; P e o p le v. B u rd en , su

p ra , at p p . 6 2 0

– 6 2 1 [fa the r’s fa ilure to fee d his c h ild ].) D e fen d a n t o w e d C e le n a a d u ty t o a c t. H e creat ed t he subst ant i al ri sk b y s el l i n g h e r t he
m e tha m p h e ta m ine . H e o b se rv e d he r se rio u s re a c tio n to t he dru g a nd kn ew s he was s t i l l s i ck whe n s he ent er ed t he vehi cl e. O nce she was i n the vehi cl e wi t h de f end ant and t he ot her s , sh e had no o t her acces s t o hel p. A t t hat p o i nt , she was ent i rel y de p end ent on d ef end ant and t he
o t he rs f o r assis t an ce
. W e b eli ev e these circum st an ce s, w h ic h p la c e d C e le n a in g ra v e p e ril, re su lted in a d u ty
o n d e fen d a n t’s p a rt to a c t. (S e e , e.g ., H e a lt h & S a f. Code § 11704, s u bd. ( 1) [ dr u g de al er l i abi l i t y ; pe r s on wh o k n ow i n g l y pa r t i c i pa t e s i n ma r k e t i n g of i l l ega l
con t r ol l ed s u bs t an ce s i s l i abl e f or ci v i l da mag es ; pe r s on may r eco ve r d amages f or i nj ur y r es ul t i ng f

r om an i nd i vi d ual ’ s use of

i l l egal co nt ro ll ed s ub st ance];L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 21

Wi l l i am s v

. St at e of

Cal i f or ni a ( 1983) 34 Cal

. 3d 18, 23 [n o a ff irm a tiv e d u ty t o a c t ab se n t sp e c ia l re la tio n sh ip unl ess act o r has creat ed a s i t uat i o n of p eri l i ncreasi ng risk o f ha rm ]; M c G e ttig a n v . B a y A re a R a p id T ra n sit D ist. (19 9 7 ) 57 C al

. A p p
. 4th 1 0 1 1 , 10 2 1

– 1 0 2 2 [s am e]; R es t

. 2d T o rt s §31 4A , comm ent d. [ dut y t o prot ect p e r s o n a g a ins t un re a so n a b le risk o f ha rm e x te n d s to risk s a risin g o u t o f t h e a c to r’s o w n c o n d u c t].)

P e o p le v . L o

fti s , 2 0 0 7 W L 1 2 4 8 4 9 2 a t *5

– 6 (fo o tno te c iti n g to C A LC R IM N o
. 52 0 and C A LJ IC N o
. 8.31 om i t t ed ). That is the end of

the matter. Al

for d req u i res that the
rec ord conta in a fa ctual basis for the plea, not pro o f beyond
a re asonable doubt. United Sta t es v. Nee l , 547 F.2d 95, 96 (9th Cir. 1976) (pe r cur iam).
For these rea sons, I

concur in affir ming the district c ourt’s denial of ha

beas r elief.

T AS HIMA , C i rc u i tJ u d ge, d i s s en t i n g:
Irespe ctfully

dissent. Derrick L oftis committed a d es p icable a ct when he sold drug s to a y oungg irl. But that
a c t, p lus the fa c t th at th e g ir l late r d ie d in hi s prese nc e , is insufficient to support a murde r convic tion. Given the nature of L oftis’ plea, the stark dis connec t betwee n the fa cts and the p le a r a is e s a s u b s ta n ti a l c o n s ti tuti o n a l i s s u e
. L oftis’ W est plea wa s tantamount to a cl ai m of innoce nce, a nd the trial
c ourt thu s v iol ate d c le arl y est abli sh e d f e de ra l la w whe n it failed to identify any fac tual basis for the plea. This error had
a su bs ta nti a l and inj ur iou s e ff

e c t on the pr oc e e din g s b e c a

us e no thi ngin t

he re c ord s ug g e sts that L of tis a c te d w ithL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

22

T hi s repo rt , of co urs e, was not b ef o re t he co urt at t he p l ea- t aki ng. B ut 1
c o n siste n t with the sta te a p p e llate c o u rt’s re lian c e o n it a n d the m a jo rity’s
re lia n c e o n it , b y re fer e n c e , s ee M aj

. o p
. at 4

– 5 , I refer t o i t as the m o st
com pl et e r ecoun t i ng of t he f act s i n t hi s ca s e.

P eo p l e v

. W est , 47 7 P

. 2 d 40 9 (Ca l

. 19 7 0 ). 2 knowledge that he wa s endang eringhuman life. I would, thus, gr ant L oftis’ habe as petition.

I
Ac c or din gto t

he state c ourt

pr ob atio n r e po rt , L of

tis 1
a dmi tte d to po lic e tha

t he so ld c ry sta l meth

to f if te e n- y e ar- old Celena V ., and th at af

t er she consumed the c ry stal meth she

“ be g an to g e t ‘ c razy ’ by fre akin g o ut, ge tting hot and shaking .” Richard Ba

nuelos g ave Celena some milk. Celena did not improve, but L oftis, Ba nuelos, L eslie Saiz, and Celena he aded to a

casino. On the way

there , L oftis noticed that Celena w as not breathing, attempted to w ak e her up by sh akin ghe r, and

tol d th e oth e rs that he wa nte d to tak e he r t o a hospital, to which Saiz responded that she was alre ady dead. Saiz and B anuelos then took he r body o u t o f t he ca r and c ov e re d it

wi th t umb le we e ds . L of

tis , B anu e los , a

nd Sa iz continued on to the ca sino. Celena’s b o d y was discove red about a month later

. L oftis was cha

rg ed with murder , and eve ntually enter ed a plea of no contest to second- deg ree murder. T here was no written plea

ag ree ment, L oftis did not complete a wr itten plea form, and the pa

rties neve r stipulated to a fa ctual basis for the plea. When the c ourt ask ed t h e parties to supply a fa ctual basis for the plea at the plea colloquy , L oftis’ attorney stated that L oftis was plea ding “ pursuant to Pe op lev e rsu s W est .” 2L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 23

Si mi l ar l y , Lof

t i s’ p l ea wa s ba s ed on “ av oi d[ i n g ] t h e pos s i bi l i t y of 3 bei n g c on v i ct ed of

f i r s t de g r ee mu r der

. ” M aj

. op. a t 6. L oftis’ conviction was aff irmed on appea l, and the district court de nied his fede ral ha beas pe tition.

II
A
When a def

endant plea ds g uilty , he wa ives “[s] ev er al fe de ra l c on sti tut ion a l ri g hts ,” inc lud ing “ the pr ivi le g e a g a ins t c o mp u ls o r

y s e lf

- in c r im in ati o n [, ]

. . . th e r igh t to tr ia l b y ju r y [, and] . . . the rig ht to con fr o n t o n e’s a ccuse rs.” Boyk in v. Alabama , 3 95 U. S. 2 38 , 243 (1 96 9) . A w a ive r o f t he se ri g hts
m u s t be voluntary

and intellige nt. Id. at 24 2–43 ; se e als o B r a d y v. United States , 3 9 7 U

. S. 7 4 2 , 7 4 8 ( 1 9 7 0 )

. “ Ce n tr al to t he ple a and the fo un datio n f

or e nte ri ngjud g me nt a g a ins t the def endant is the de fenda

nt’s admission in open court that he committed the ac ts charg ed in the indictment.” Id

. In Nor th C

ar ol ina v . A lfo rd, 4 00 U. S. 25 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea a ccompa

nied by p ro t es t at i o n s o f i n n o ce n ce m ay b e ac ce p t ed o n l y i f t h e j u d ge “test[s] whether

the plea w as bein g intelligently enter ed” by ensuringthat there is a fac tual bas i s fo r the pled c harg e. Id

. at 38. Alford ha d been i n d i cted f or first-de g ree murder a

nd pled guilty

to second-degre e murde r. Id. at 26–27. At the plea he aring, h e t es tified that he did not commit the murder but w a s pl e a din gguil ty to a vo id t he thr e at of

the de ath p e n a l ty. Id. at 28. Be fore the cour t acc epted the guilty

plea, 3 a police of

fi ce r s ummarized the state’s c ase, a nd two other witnesses testified that “ shortly befor e the killing Alford took his gun fr om h is h ou se , s tate d h is i nte nti on to k ill the vic tim ,L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

24
and re turned home w ith the declar ation that he had car ried out the killing.” Id. On appe al, Alford a rgued that his ple a wa s invalid beca

use it was the pr oduct of fe ar a nd coer cion. Id. at 29. The Court explained that Alfo rd’s protestation of inn oc e nc e pr e se nte d apo te nti a l pr ob le m, b e c aus e “[o] rdinarily , a judg ment of convic tion res t ing on a plea of guilty is justified by

the def endant’ s admission that he committed the crime char g ed ag ainst him a nd his c onsent that judgme nt be enter ed.” Id. at 32. When Alford a sserted that he wa s inno c e nt, he cr e ate d “ a fa c tua l and

le g a l di sp ute betwee n him and the State” a s to his guilt. Id. T his was pr ob le matic be c a

us e the a dmi ssi on

of guil t is “ no rm a lly ‘ce ntral to the plea an d the foundation for enter ing judgme nt.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Brady , 397 U.S. at 738) (i n t er nal alterations omi tted). “ W

ith ou t m or e , it might be arg ued that the conviction . . . wa s invalid, si n ce his assertion of innocenc e neg atived any admission of g u i l t . . . .” Id. (empha sis added).
The “ more” that made Alf ord’s guilty

plea va lid was that wh e n th e ple a

wa s “ vie we d in

light of th e ev ide nc e a g a ins t him, which substantially

neg ated his claim of innocence and wh ic h fur the r pr ov ide d a mea

ns by wh ic h th e jud g e c ou ld t e st wheth e r t he ple a wa s b e ingint e lli g e ntl y

e nte re d, its va lid ity cannot be seriousl y q u es t ioned.” 400 U.S. at 37- 38 (citing McCarthy v . United States , 394 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1969))

. The c ited portion of McCarthy explains that Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which re quires the court to determine that t h ere is a fac tual basis for a guilty plea be fore enter ing jud gment, “is desig ned to protec t a def endant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an under standingof the nature of the c harg e but without rea liz ing that his conductL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 25

does not ac tually fall wit hin the charg e.” McCarthy , 3 94 U. S. at 467 (interna l quotation marks o m i t t ed). The ref ore, when a def endant pleads guilty , but protests his innocence , the trial court e nsures t h at the plea is intelli g ent by

deter mining that there is a fac tual basis for the plea. Al for d , 400 U.S. at 38;
see also U

nited States v. King , 257 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 20 01 ); United St ates v. Nee l , 547 F.2d 95, 96 (9th Cir. 1976).

B
L oftis pled no contest under California lawand cited Pe op lev . W

est

. This plea was sufficie nt to trigg er the fac tual basis require ment under Al for d

. 1
The United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court a ll int e rp re t a ple a purs ua nt t o Pe op lev . W

est to m e an th at th e de fe nd ant do e s n ot a dmi t fa c tua l guil t but pl e a ds to a vo id a mor e ser io us punis hme nt. See Roe v. Flore

s-Ortega , 528 U.S. 470, 473 ( 2000) (noting in dicta that a Pe op lev . W est ple a “ pe rm it[s] a

de fe nd ant b oth to d e ny c omm itt inga

c ri me and

to a dmi t that th e re is
su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to c onvic t hi m” ); Do e v . W oo dfo rd, 508 F.3d 563, 566 n.2 (9th Cir 2007) (notingthat a People v

. W est plea “ d o es n o t require an admission of guilt and is the California e quivalent of a n Alford ple a ” ); In re Alv ernaz , 830 P.2d 747, 752 ( C al

. 1 9 92) (de scribinga Pe op lev . W est plea as a “ plea of

nolo contender e, not admitting a fac tual basis for the plea” ).
Our holdi ngin United States v. Vidal , 5 04 F .3 d 1 07 2 ( 9th Cir . 2 00 7) (e n b anc ), is depe nd e nt o n th e pr e mis e tha t a de fe nd ant d oe s n ot a dmi t f a c tua l gu ilt wh e n he ple a ds guil tyL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

26

Simil arl y , al t ho ugh t he t wo unp ub l i shed decis i o ns ci t ed in J u d ge 4 A d e lm a n ’s o p inio n m e n ti o n tha t W est pl ea s a r e n ot i den t i ca l t o A l f o rd pl ea s be ca u s e t h ey do n ot i n v ol v e cl ai ms of i nno cenc e, n ei t h er de ci s i on p ursuant to Pe op lev . W

est

. Inth at c a s e , th e d e f

e n d an t ple d guilty to a cr ime, and wa s subject to a sente ncing
e n h an c e me n t f

o r a p r io r o f

f e n s e. Id. at 1074–75. For that pr ior of fe ns e , the de fe nd ant ha d ple d guil ty purs uan t to Pe op lev . W

est and no reci t at i o n of the fa ctual basis for defe ndant’s plea

appeare d o n the written plea and wa iver of rig hts form. Id. at 1075. Ins te a d, a s in thi s c a se , “ on ly

‘ P e o p l e v . W e st ’ [w a ]s e nte re d in

the se c tio n th at r e qu e sts a descr iption of facts supportingany char g es.” Id. The e n banc
c ourt he ld t hat th e re c or d f

or the pr ior

of fe ns e “fai ls to establish the fa ctual pre dicate f or [the defe ndant]’s plea of guilty pursuant to Pe op lev . W est .” Id. at 1087 . T hi s is beca use “unle ss the rec ord of the plea proce edingref lects that the def endant a dmitted to facts, a W est p le a , w it

h o u t m o re, do e s no t e sta

bli shthe re qu isi te fa c tua l pr e dic ate to s up po rt a sentenc e enha

nceme nt.” Id. at 1089.
These prec edents e stablish that, when a de fenda nt pleads guilty in Ca lifornia state court pursua nt to Pe op lev . W

est , the trial court must ensure that the defendant’s plea i s intelligent by ensuringthat there is a fac tual basis for the ple a. Moreove r, the California prec edent cited by J udg e Ade lman is not to the contrary

. For

example, People v . Rauen c or re c tly
no te d th at “ W

e st d i dnot actually

involve a cla im of innocenc e,” 133 Ca l. Rptr. 3d 732, 734 n.1 (Ct. App. 2011). But more importantly , that court also stated that a W est plea, “also refe rre d to as an Al

for d plea, ba sed on North C

arolina
v . A lfo rd, allows a de fenda nt to plead guilt y i n o rd er to take advanta g e of a plea barg ain while still asser ting his or

h er innocenc e.” Id . at 734 (c itation omit ted). 4L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 27

hol ds t hat a W

est p l ea d o es no t trigger A l f o rd ’ s f act ual i nq ui ry re q u ire m e n t. S e e In re M ill s , 2011 W L 4005394, a t * 4 ( Cal

. Ct

. App. 2 0 1 1 ); P eo p l e v. W

am pl er , 2010 W L 1435040, a t * 2 n

. 2 ( Cal

. Ct

. App. 2 0 1 0 ). M o re o v e r, the se d e c isio n s c a n n o t info rm o u r a n a lysis o f C a lif o rn ia la w b e c a u se u n p u b li s h e d d e c is io n s o f t h e C a li fo r n ia in te r m e d ia te a p p e ll a te
co urt s are not p reced ent ia l – th ey canno t be rel i ed on as aut ho ri t at i ve p ro n o u n c e m e n ts o f C a lif o rn ia law

. See Cal

. Rul e of Co ur t 8. 11 15 ( “ an opi ni o n o f

a Cal i f or n i a Cour t of

Appea l

. . . t h at i s n ot c er t i f i ed f or p ub l i cat i o n .
. . m ust not b e cited o r re li ed on b y a co urt or p art y i n any o t her act i o n”).

Uni t ed St at es v. M an ci na s
- F l ore s , 5 88 F. 3d 677 ( 9t h Ci r
. 200 9), ci t ed 5 b y J u d g e A d e lm a n , i s o f l itt le re le v a n c e
. M an ci na s
- F l ore s w as a di r ect
c r i mi n a l a pp e a l i n wh i c h t h e de f e n da n t ar g u e d a vi ol a t i on of F e d. R. Cr i m. P

. 11 ; i t was not a ha b e a s case bro ught by a s t at e p ri soner rai si ng c o n stitutio n a l i ssu e s. F u rth e r, M an ci na s
- F l ore s ’ ci t at i o n t o t he A d vi sory C o m m itt e e ’s 1 9 6 6 no te is o u t o f d a te

. A l f o rd was not de ci d ed unt i l f o ur y ears l at er, i n 19 7 0

. T hus, t he A d vi sory C o m m i t t ee’ s 1 9 7 4 note, ci t i ng A l f o rd , r ec og n i ze s t h at “ [ a] pl ea of n ol o c on t en der e i s , f

or pu r pos es of p uni shment, t he same as t he p l ea o f gui l t y
. ” Fe d

. R

. C ri m
. P

. 11 , ad vi sory co m m i t t ee no t e (19 7 4 ). J udg e Ade lman also stresses th at the def endant in W

est did not ex plicitly

procla im innoce nce, and thus c oncludes that
a W est p l ea is dist inguisha

ble from a

n Al for d plea. Nothing in Al for d , howeve r, req u i res a

n express protestation of innocenc e. Indeed, the Ni n th Circuit has not lim ited the Al for d rule to ple as acc ompanied by claims of innoce nce, but ins te a d h a s h e ld that “th e du e pr oc e ss c la us e do e s n ot i mpo se on a state c ourt the duty to establish a fa ctual basis for a guilty pl ea a bsent specia l circumstanc es.” Rodriguez v. Ri c k e tts , 777 F.2d 527, 528 ( 9th C i r. 1 985) (pe r cur iam). 5 Gi v en th e u n i fo rm i ty

o f p u b l i s h e d au th o ri ty

equ at i n g W

est and Al for d pleas, it is clear that, e ven if a W est plea we re notL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

28

T h e Se con d a n d Fi f t h Ci r cu i t s h av e al s o r ec og n i ze d t h at a c l ai m of 6 inn o c e n c e is no t a p re -re q u isite to the a p p li c a tio n o f A l f o rd

. T hus, t he Se co nd C i rcui t has no t ed t hat “ [t ]he di st i ngui sh ing feat ure of an A l f o rd p le a is t h a t th e d e fen d a n t d o e s n o t co n firm the fac tua l b a sis o f t h e p le a .” Uni t ed St at es v

. Sav age , 5 4 2 F.3d 95 9 , 96 2 (2d C i r. 20 0 8 ). A nd i n B an ks
v. M cGougan , 717 F. 2d 186 , 188 ( 5t h Ci r
. 198 3), t he Fi f t h Ci r cui t ag r eed
w ith the ho ld ing s fro m fi v e o the r c irc u its t h a t “ab s e n t sta te m e n ts inc o n siste n t with gu ilt , state c o u rts a r e n o t c o n stitutio n a lly re q u ire d to
es t abl i s h a f

act ual b as i s f

or t he pl ea of

gu i l t

. ” T he B a n ks c o u rt the n he ld t hat i nq ui ry i s re q u ire d where t he st at e judge “i s p ut on no t i ce t hat t here may be s om e need f

or s uch an i nqui r y
. ” Id

. N o ne o f t hese f o rmulat i o ns of t he A l f o rd r ul e r equi r es an ex pres s cl ai m o f i nn ocenc e. equivalent to a c laim of innocenc e, it at least qualifies a s such a “spe cial cir cumstance .” 6

2
The fa ct that L oftis ple d no contest rather than guilty does not alter the outc o m e. As ex plained above , Al for d require s the trial j u d ge t o ensure that there is a fac tual basis for a guil ty ple a wh e n a def

e nd ant p ro te sts his inn oc e nc e be c a us e the protest under

mines the “e x press a dmission of guilt” that is “norma lly

centr al to the plea a

nd the foundation for enter ing judg ment.” 400 U.S. at 32, 37. B y co n t ra st, the Court expl ained that if Alford ha d enter ed a nolo c ontender e plea, whic h “has been vie wed not as a n express admission of guilt but as a conse n t b y t h e def endant that he may

be punished as if he wer e guilty ,” the Court could simply treat him as if he we re guilty

. Id. at 36 & n. 8, 37 ; see also id. at 37 (equating “ a plea

that ref uses to admi t commission of the criminal ac t” with a g

uilty plea a ccompa

nied by b oth a protestation of innoce nce a nd “strongev idence of fa ctual guilt”). Ther efor e, whe n a def endant e nters a p l ea that
or din ari ly inc lud e s an a dmi ssi on of guil t and simult ane ou slyL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 29

protests his innocence , the trial cour t may acc ept the plea only if it determines that ther e is a factual basis for the char g e.
L oftis’ no contest plea

under Pe op lev . W

est was unlike the classic nolo c ontender e plea discussed in Alford be c a

us e in California a nolo c ontender e plea “admits ever y element of the cr ime char g ed and is the l eg al equivalent of a ve rdict and is tantamount to a finding .” People v . W allace , 93 P.3d 1037, 1043 (Cal. 20 0 4 ) (internal quotation marks and c itations omitted). In California, a nolo c ontender e plea is the same a s a guil ty ple a “ fo r a ll purp os e s, ” and “ up on a pl ea of nolo
c onte nd e re , th e c ourt

sh a ll f ind the def e nd ant guil ty .” Ca l. Pe na l Co de § 1 01 6( 3) . Wh e n a de fe nd ant e nte rs a

no lo
c onte nd e re ple a , the c ourt is r e qu ir e d b y

state law t o “asc erta in whether the defe ndant completely understands that a ple a of no lo c onte nd e re sh a ll b e c on sid e re d the s ame a s a plea of guilty .” Id. “[T] he Constituti on is conce rned w it h the pra ctical conseque nces, not the f

ormal categ orizations, of state law.” Al for d , 400 U.S. at 37. In C al i fornia, the prac tical conseque nces of

a nolo contende re ple a ar e identica l to the prac tical conseque nces of a guilty plea. Be cause an ordina ry California nolo conte ndere plea admits a factual basis for the plea, f or Al for d purp os e s it

is the same a s a guil ty

ple a . B ut, by addin g a citation to Pe op lev . W est to either plea , a defe ndant cr eate s a “dispute betwee n him a nd the State.” Id.L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

30

J u d g e A d e lm a n ’s re lian c e o n u n p u b lishe d o u t-o f- c irc u it d e c isio n s, s ee 7 M aj. op
. at 8– 9 , i s al so unavai l i ng ( e v e n a ssuming t hat s uch d eci si o ns s houl d be gi ven an y wei gh t ) becau s e t he nol o cont ender e pl eas i nv ol ved i n t hos e c as es wer e n ot t he s ame as and, t hu s , di d not ha ve t he s ame l ega l
s i gn i f i can ce as a W

est pl ea. at 32. O th e r

w i s e , th e d e f

e n d an t ’ s e xp r e s s r e f

e r e n c e to 7 Pe op le v . W

e st wh e n e nte ri nghis ple a

be c ome s me anin g le ss.
I n sum, when a de fenda

nt enters a

plea whic h, alth o u gh admitting fa ctual guilt, si multaneously p r o te s ts h is innocenc e, the trial cour

t must ensure that the plea is intelli g ent by deter mining that ther e is a fa ctual basis for the plea, reg ardle ss of the nomenc lature. L oftis ent er ed a plea which
a dmi ts f a c tua l guil t, b ut s imu lt ane ou sly pr ote ste d h is i n n o ce n ce b y

ci t i n g Pe op lev . W

est

. T h e tr ia l c o urt v iola ted clea rly established law unde r Al for d wh e n, under th e se circ umstances, it failed to deter mine the ex istence of

a fa ctual basis for L oftis’ plea.

III
A
T h e California

Court of Appea l assumed that the trial court c ommitt ed er

ror, but dete rmined that the e rror was ha rm le ss. Ev e n whe n a state c ourt de te rm ine s th at an e rr or is ha rm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t, wh ic h the state c ourt did
no t do in t

his c a se , th is C ou rt “ ne e d n ot c on du c t an a na ly sis
un de r A ED PA o f whe the r t he state c ourt ’s ha

rm les sn e ss deter mination on direct re view . .

. was c ontrary to or an unrea sonable a

pplication of cle arly established federa l law.” Pulido v. Chrones , 629 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2 010)L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 31

J u dg e Si l v er man ar g u es t h at w e mu s t de f er t o t h e Cal i f

or n i a Cour t of 8 A p p eal ’ s harm l ess err o r a n a ly si s. T hi s i s co nt rary t o t he rul e, how ever, t hat “ we a pp l y t he Br ec ht t e st w itho u t re g a rd fo r th e sta te c o u rt’s har ml es s nes s det er mi nat i on. ” Pu l i do , 6 2 9 F .3 d a t 1 0 1 2 . T h is p rin c ip le appl i es ev en whe r e t he har ml es s nes s det er mi nat i on i nv ol ves , as i s of t en the c a se , the a p p lica tio n o f sta te la w
. S ee , e.g ., L a w so n v

. B o rg , 60 F. 3d 6 0 8 , 6 1 2 (9 th C ir. 1 9 9 5 ) (a d d re ssin g d e no v o w h e the r th e ju ry’s
co nsi d erat i o n of ext ri nsi c evi d ence b eari ng on i nt ent t o co m m i t rob b ery was h arm l ess ). A s Jud ge Sil verm an reco gni zes, we d ef er t o s t at e co urt i n t er pr et at i on s of

s t at e l aw , bu t , i n t h i s ca s e, t h er e i s n o s u ch i n t er pr et at i on of s t at e l aw t o def

er t o. T he har ml es s nes s ques t i on i s si mp l y wh et her t her e i s suf

f i ci ent ev i dence i n t he r ecor d t o s uppo r t a s econd- degr ee m u rd e r c o n v ic tio n
. C om pa r e B r ad s ha w v. R i chey , 546 U

. S. 74, 76 ( 2005) ( per cur i am) ( hol di ng t hat a f eder al ha beas cour t mus t def er t o a s t atec o u rt inte rp re ta tio n o f th e tra n sfe rr e d inte n t d o c trine a s a p p lied to a sta te
m urder st at ut e). ( c i t i n g Fry v. P liler , 5 51 U. S. 1 12 , 1 19 -2 0 ( 20 07 )) ; s e e als o Merolillo v. Y

ates , 663 F.3d 444, 454- 55 (9th Cir. 2011).

Instead, whe n evaluating a constitutional err or i n a plea

takingon habea s, we a sk “whe ther the state court’s err or . . . had a ‘ substantial and injurious effe ct’ on [petitio ner].” Buck ley , 4 4 1 F. 3 d

at6 9 7 (qu o t i n g Brecht v . Abramson , 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). When a trial court f

ails to ensure a factual ba sis for an Alford p l e a o n d i r e c t a p p e a l w e a sk whether there is “ [s] ufficie nt e vidence indicating guilt ” a nd

“ ne e d n ot c onvin c e [our se lve s] of guil t be y on d a

re a so na ble doub t.” King , 2 57 F .3 d at 10 22 ; see also Nee l , 547 F.2d at 96. Acc ording ly , if there is insufficient evidenc e indi ca ting L oftis’ guilt, the failure to esta blish a fac tual basis for his plea ha d a su bs tan ti a l and

inj ur iou s e ff

e c t on him

. See B uckle

y , 441 F.3d at 698 (holding that the er ror ha d a “substantial a

nd inj ur iou s e ff

e c t” on pe tit ion e r becaus e it c a us e d h im t o rec eive a longe r sentenc e). 8L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

32
B
In California, second- deg ree “[m] urder is th e u nlawful kil lin gof a human b e ing

. . . w ithma lic e a fo re tho ught. ” Ca l. Penal Code § 187. Ther e ar e three ty pes of se cond degree murder: ( 1) “unpr emeditat ed m urder with express malice,” (2) “implied malice murder,” and (3) “sec ond deg ree fe l o ny murder.” Pe op lev . S

wai n , 9 0 9 P .2d 994, 998 (Cal. 1996). Th e fi rs t ty

pe c le arl y do e s n ot a

pp ly in t his c a se . A s I

e xpla in below, ther e is insufficient e vidence supporting a sec onddeg ree murder c onviction under e ither an implied m al i ce or a f e l o n y mur d e r

th e o r y.
1 “[A] ki ller ac ts with im pli ed malice only when a cting with an awa

rene ss of e nd

ange ring hum an lif

e .” People v

. Knoller , 158 P.3d 731, 739 (Cal. 200 7 ). In Knoller , the Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court re ve rs e d anint e rm e diate a pp e llate court whic h had held that a theory of implied malice “c an be based si m p l y

on a def

endant’ s awa

rene ss of the risk of
cau s i n g serious bodily injury to another .” Id. at 73 2; se e als o People v . Phillips , 414 P.2d 353, 363 (Cal. 1966) (a pproving
se c on d- de g re e mur de r i ns tr uc tio n th at th e kil lin gmus t r e su lt from the de fenda

nt’s act, “ the natura l conseque nces of which
are dang erous to life, which ac t is deliberately perf ormed by a per son who k

no ws that hi s c on du c t endangers th e l ife of another ”) ( emphase s added) , overruled on othe r g r o unds by People v . Flood , 957 P.2d 869, 882 (Cal. 1998).
Unde r these standa

rds, the trial c ourt did not have a sufficie nt fac tual basis to c onclude that L oftis was aw are that his actions endang ere d Ce l en a’s life. Assuming, without deciding , that this Court can rely on the probation report thatL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 33

was produc ed af

ter the ple a colloquy , nothing in the pr obation repor t supports a finding of guilt. Accordingto the probation
re po rt , a ft e r C e le na

ing e ste d th e c ry sta l me th, sh e be g an to g et “‘ c razy ,’ by fre akingout, ge tting hot and shaking.” There is absolutely

no indication that L oftis knew at that point that Celena’ s life was in da

ng er. L ater , in the car , L oftis “told the oth e rs he wa

nte d to take he r t o th e ho sp ita l,” but “ Sa iz sa id
no , th at sh e was g on e (d e a d) .” Thus , o nc e L of tis demonstrated a

n awa rene ss that Celena’s life was in dang er he believed that he c ould no longe r take any action to save he r l if e be c a us e sh e wa s a lr e a dy

de a d. Th e fa c t th at L of

tis wanted to take Celena to the hospital whe n he r ea l i zed the
sever ity of her condition sug g ests that he had not r ecognized that her life was in dang er when she w as ill earlier in t he evening

. See P eople v . W hisenhunt , 1 86 P.3 d 49 6, 52 7 ( Ca l. 20 08 ) ( ho ldi ngtha

t th e re wa s n o subst anti a l e vid e nc e to support a theor

y of implied malice murder i n a case in which te sti mony ind ic ate d tha

t the de fe nd ant w a s in iti a lly “ va gue ly
conce rned a

bout [ the victim] ’s condition,” and “did not become seriously

conce rned a

bout [ the vi ctim] ’s condition until seve ral hours later

. . . at which point .

. . he immediately ” soug ht medical help)

. 2
The State doe s not argue that the f acts in this case support an implied malice theor

y of sec ond-degree murder. Instead, th e State argues that the probation report supports a the ory under which the ac tus reus of the murder was L oftis’ failure to act af ter providing Celena with drug s. The State doe s not explai n h ow this theory

maps onto any

of California’ s three ty pes of second-de g ree murder. Se e Swa in , 909 P.2d at 998. An d th e State do e s n ot c ite any statut e or c a se su pp or tin gitsL O FT I S V

. A L MA GER

34

E ven as s umi ng t hat , as t he s t at e c our t f ound, L o f

t i s coul d hav e been 9 convi ct ed bas ed on an o mi s s i on – whi ch r equi r es an un derl y i ng dut y t o act

– t here i s st i l l nothi ng i n t he reco rd t o i nd i cat e t hat Lo f t i s f ai l ed t o act and kn ew t hat hi s f

ai l ur e e ndang er ed C el ena ’ s l i f e. con te n ti o nth at t

h is th e o r y is s u f f ic ie n t f o r a s e c o n d

- d e g ree murder c onviction. 9
Th e S t at e ’ s ar gum e n t i s c l o s e s t t o ar gu i n g th at th e r e is a sufficie nt fac tual basis for second-de g ree felony murder. B ut in order to b e convicted based on sec ond-degree felony
mur de r, the de fe nd ant h a d to c omm it a n “ inh e re ntl y d an ger o u s fe l o n y , ” w h i ch i s “a no ff en s e c a rryi n g a h i gh probability

that death will re s u l t

. ” People v . Patterson , 778 P.2d 549, 55 3, 558 (Cal. 1989) (inter nal quotation marks omi tte d) . “ In d e te rm ini ngwh eth er a fe lony is i nh e re ntl y d an g e r o u s , th e c o urtl o o k s t o th e e l e m e n t s o f th e f e l o n y in the abstract , not the particula r fa cts of t h e ca s e, i.e., not to t he defe ndant’s spec ific conduc t.” People v . Hans en , 885 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Cal. 1994) (inter nal quotation m ar ks omitt ed), overruled on othe r grounds b y P eople v . Sarun Chun , 203 P.3d 425, 442 (Cal. 2009). The State ha s not ci t ed , an d we
are not awar e of, a

ny California c ase which has he ld that furnishingcry stal meth, or any other fe lony

for which there is a fac tual basis in this case , is inhere ntly dang erous for the purpose of the s econd deg ree felony murder r ule. Compare, e.g. , People v . Jame

s , 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7, 23 (Ct. App. 1998) (manufa cturingmeth is a

n inhere ntly dang erous f

elony ). Nor does the State a

rgue that this Cou rt s h o uld establish that f ur n i s h i n gc r

ys t a l m e thi s ani n h e r e n t l y d an g e r o u s f e l o n y. Ac c or din g ly , th e State ’s a lte rn ate the or y fa ils

.L O FT I S V

. A L MA GER 35

Lo f t i s al so separatel y cl ai m s t hat hi s p l ea was not i nt el l i gent and 10

v ol u n t ar y
. I w ou l d di s mi s s a s u n ex h au s t ed an y cl ai m t h at h i s pl ea w as n ot i ntell i ge nt and vo l un t ary t ha t i s no t b ase d o n his A l f o rd a rg u m e n t. IV
Be cause Iconclude that there is insufficien t evidence indicatingL oftis’ guilt, the trial court’ s failure to establish a fac tual basis for his plea had a substantial a

nd injurious
e ff e c t. Iwould t h er efore re verse the district court’s 10 judgme nt denying the petition for writ of ha beas c orpus and
rema nd with directions to issue a condition al writ rele asing L oftis from custody , unless, within a rea sonable period of time, the State rec ommences pr ocee dings a g ainst L o ft i s . I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.