1 

1 

2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

4 + + + + + 

5 BRIEFING ON THE STATUS OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM 

6 FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT 

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8 TUESDAY, 

9 MAY 17, 2016 

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11 ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 

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13 The Commission met in the Commissioners' Hearing 

14 Room at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North, 

15 11555 Rockville Pike, at 9:00 a.m., Stephen G. Burns, Chairman, 

16 presiding. 

17 

18 

19 COMMISSION MEMBERS: 

20 STEPHEN G. BURNS, Chairman 

21 KRISTINE L. SVINICKI, Commissioner 

22 WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF, Commissioner 

23 JEFF BARAN, Commissioner 

24 
 2 

1 ALSO PRESENT: 

2 ANNETTE VIETTI-COOK, Secretary of the Commission 

3 MARIAN ZOBLER, Associate General Counsel 

4 

5 NRC STAFF: 

6 MICHAEL JOHNSON, Deputy Executive Director for 

7 Reactor Preparedness Programs and Fukushima 

8 Steering Committee Chairman 

9 JACK DAVIS, Director, Japan Lessons-Learned 

10 Division, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

11 GREGORY BOWMAN, Deputy Director (Acting), Japan 

12 Lessons-Learned Division 

13 MOHAMED SHAMS, Chief, Hazards Management Branch, 

14 Japan Lessons-Learned Division 

15 TROY PRUETT, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, 

16 Region IV 

17 

18 EXTERNAL PANEL: 

19 ANTHONY PIETRANGELO, Chief Nuclear Officer, Nuclear 

20 Energy Institute (NEI) 

21 KEN CANAVAN, Director of Plant Technology, Electric 

22 Power Research Institute (EPRI) 

23 RANDY BUNT, Chairman of the BWROG Fukushima Response 

24 Committee, Southern Nuclear Company 
 3 

1 PAUL GUNTER, Director, Reactor Oversight Project, 

2 Beyond Nuclear 

3 

4 

5 P R O C E E D I N G S 

6 9:00 a.m. 

7 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Good morning and welcome 

8 panelists today to the NRC staff and the members of the public. The 

9 purpose of today's meeting is to discuss the status of action that's taken 

10 by the NRC in response -- and the industry in response to the lessons 

11 learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, including a discussion of 

12 progress on NRC's Tier 1 activities and the status of open Tier 2 and 

13 Tier 3 recommendations. 

14 We'll begin with presentations from the external panel, 

15 which includes Anthony Pietrangelo, Chief Nuclear Officer of the 

16 Nuclear Energy Institute; Ken Canavan, Director of Plant Technology, 

17 Electric Power Research Institute; Randy Blunt from Southern Nuclear 

18 Company, chairman of the BWR Owners Group, Fukushima Response 

19 Committee; and Paul Gunter, Director of the Reactor Oversight Project 

20 of Beyond Nuclear. 

21 Following the external panel, we'll have a brief break 

22 and then hear from the NRC staff. I look forward to the presentations 

23 and discussions this morning. Before we begin, do any of my 

24 colleagues have any opening remarks? If not, we'll start with Mr. 
 4 

1 Pietrangelo with the presentations on the external panel. 

2 MR. PIETRANGELO: Thank you Chairman, 

3 Commissioners, good morning. In summary, we continue to make 

4 good progress on implementing the Fukushima lesson learned. I'll 

5 touch on a couple of items in the presentation we think are very well 

6 aligned with completion in 2016 and some issues we're still trying to 

7 wrestle. 

8 Going to Slide 2, we will largely complete with FLEX 

9 implementation in the industry by the end of this year, and with respect 

10 to the pool instrumentation orders, completion by the end of this year 

11 with BWR Mark I and II vents complete in 2018 and '19 as previously 

12 laid out. 

13 We're continuing to focus on FLEX inspections. I think 

14 we know that last time here that we want to make sure that all the work 

15 we've done in the previous five years to get our common understanding 

16 of what it takes to implement the requirements and the orders carries 

17 through to the field inspection and implementation by licensees. 

18 We fully support the staff on the disopsition of the Tier 

19 2 and 3 actions, made excellent progress there. We are committed to 

20 completing the majority of the mitigating strategy assessments before 

21 the rulemaking. That I think is consistent with our bias reactions since 

22 the Fukushima event in 2011, and the rulemaking really aligns a lot of 

23 the significant activities that have been undertaken by and the NRC. 

24 There's a few issues to discuss, which I'll touch on briefly. 

25 Next slide, please. Here's the detailed 

26 implementation on FLEX status. 58 units will be complete, are already 
 5 

1 complete. 29 are finishing up this year. There will be an additional 13 

2 that are substantially complete but I'm still dealing with the exception of 

3 a severe accident capable event. That's 100 sites including -- or 100 

4 units including Watts Bar II. 

5 Next slide please. FLEX inspections. The big thing 

6 with the inspection process, and I think we noted this last fall, is there's 

7 a lot of work that's been done. But we've seen in the past instances 

8 where a lot of that work is reinterpreted in the inspection process. 

9 So we want to make sure that the knowledge transfer 

10 from the folks that have been working on it in the agency here as well 

11 as in the industry is transferred out to the field. So what was maybe a 

12 couple of 100 people working on the implementation guidance and the 

13 rules and requirements etcetera, now it's thousands of people who are 

14 expected to implement this going forward. 

15 So there's a big knowledge transfer that has to take 

16 place. We're committed to doing that in the right way. We've actually 

17 established a task force that will meet with some of the folks here 

18 tomorrow on the inspection process. We're trying to promote 

19 consistency and implementation in the industry. 

20 I suspect we'll establish a frequently asked question 

21 panel, if you will, on the industry side to share lesson learned. If there's 

22 questions on it, interpretations of the guidance in the field, we'll have 

23 people who have already been working on these things for the last five 

24 years ready to answer questions and share that with the staff. 

25 So we're trying to get out in front of this as best we can. 

26 The industry task force does represent the entire fleet of plants. So 
 6 

1 we've got every company playing on that, and we want to make sure 

2 that we're learning from the inspections and making adjustments as 

3 necessary. 

4 I also want to make a point about the use of FLEX 

5 equipment here. We all know what its beyond design basis functions 

6 are for mitigation. But we are starting to use and will use more 

7 frequently FLEX equipment as an additional layer of defense in depth 

8 for more traditional things we do. 

9 We've actually submitted two white papers to the staff 

10 on getting credit for the use of FLEX and notices of enforcement 

11 discretion and in the significance determination process. I think that's 

12 just the tip of the iceberg of where we intend to apply the FLEX 

13 equipment. 

14 I think it's a win-win overall because it will get this 

15 equipment hooked up and used and more familiarized with the plant 

16 staffs, as well as the inspectors seeing us use that equipment in 

17 different applications, beyond waiting for the beyond design event to 

18 run out and do this. So again I think it's a win-win overall. 

19 Next slide, please. This is the projected schedule of 

20 the mitigation strategy assessments. Again, before the final rule is 

21 issued we'll have basically completed most of the MSAs for flooding this 

22 year, and on path with seismic for about two-thirds by the end of 2017. 

23 You can see the rest there. 

24 This is the major part of the licensee work this year is 

25 conducting these mitigation strategy assessments against the 

26 reevaluated hazards. They did a lot more detail in the staff's 
 7 

1 presentation, but we're well on our way to completing the bulk of these 

2 assessments this year. 

3 Next slide. For the seismic SRAs, the current focus is 

4 for those plants in what we call Path 5 of the -- where their GMRS or 

5 their ground motion response spectra was greater than two times the 

6 safe shutdown earthquake. We think the proposed rule has sufficient 

7 language in it to allow a risk-informed approach there. 

8 We have to keep in mind that we're utilizing the seismic 

9 PRA results to assess the potential reduction for only the extended loss 

10 of AC power and the loss of ultimate heat sink. That's the focus of 

11 those. 

12 For plants that are less than the two times the SSE or 

13 the safe shutdown earthquake, we do think there's a limited benefit that 

14 we'll get out of those seismic PRAs and if their mitigating strategies 

15 assessments are done right, it will demonstrate the effectiveness of 

16 those using a deterministic approach there. 

17 Next slide. On the flooding integrated assessments, 

18 we put a lot of time into the external flooding assessment guidelines 

19 and provided that last month to the agency for endorsement. This 

20 looks like the methodology, trying to reduce some of the conservatisms 

21 in the initial methods. 

22 Again, we're utilizing the mitigating strategies for the 

23 local intense precipitation hazard, and in this one, again we don't see a 

24 significant flood risk reduction expected by performing these integrated 

25 assessments, given that the MSAs will have been done previously. 

26 We are trying to strike some balance of protection in 
 8 

1 mitigation with this integrated assessment as we go through the 

2 process. It's a limited number of plants that will be using that full 

3 methodology. 

4 Turning to the next slide on the proposed rule, we think 

5 again the rule incorporates and all of the requirements from 2012 and 

6 beyond. We are focused on the codification of the existing 

7 requirements and their integration. This is the beyond design basis 

8 framework, regulatory framework. I think this really did address 

9 Recommendation 1, that the task force came up with initially. 

10 We support issuance of the rule in 2017. We provided 

11 comments in February. There's a couple of issues, the implementation 

12 schedule, although I think we're on a good path to work those out. We 

13 don't want to be in a position where we're asking for exemptions from 

14 the rule as these mitigating strategy assessments are completed, when 

15 we know how long they're going to take now. 

16 So we'd rather have the rule reflect that versus go for 

17 exemptions later. The change control process, we believe it should be 

18 different from what we do for design basis materials. So we're still 

19 working with the staff on that, and there's a couple of nits I think in the 

20 reevaluated hazard methodology that we're still working through. 

21 But overall, I think the alignment on what we thought 

22 was going to be in the proposed rule and the final rule and what the 

23 staff drafted. So in summary, we've had significant safety 

24 enhancements. We're well on our way to completing the 

25 implementation of the Fukushima lessons learned. 

26 We've had a focus on safety throughout and I'm very 
 9 

1 proud of the fact that the industry has maintained a very high safety 

2 record in performance, both with reliability and safety, as we've been 

3 implementing the Fukushima lessons learned. 

4 2016 is a critical year for completion of a lot of our 

5 enhancements. I said it last fall and I'll say it again. We're still not 

6 done yet though. There's a still a lot of work to do with the mitigating 

7 strategies assessments, some of the reevaluated hazard work. So 

8 there's still work to do and in particular focus on the inspection process. 

9 We are committed to maintaining the focus on our 

10 equipment and these safety enhancements going forward, and again 

11 we intend to utilize the FLEX equipment for other applications to 

12 improve defense in depth and safety. Thank you very much. 

13 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Thank you. Mr. Canavan. 

14 MR. CANAVAN: Well good morning, and thank you 

15 for having me here today to share some thoughts on both the lessons 

16 learned and some perspectives on some of the future research that we 

17 see. I'm going to sprinkle my lessons learned sort of around the 

18 presentation. Hopefully, it's not too distracting. 

19 So before I get into the body of the slides, let me share 

20 one observation that I had in actually the hours and days after 

21 Fukushima, which was when Fukushima occurred, as with most severe 

22 accident type situations, there was a scarcity of information. As that 

23 information started to become available, there was an interesting thing 

24 that I noticed, that some folks understood the severity of the events 

25 more than others. 

26 One community that understood the severity of those 
 10 

1 events almost immediately was the risk analysis people at the sites and 

2 at other organizations throughout the nuclear industry. In the United 

3 States, we have a large community of risk analysis practitioners, which 

4 is unusual. 

5 We have those because -- as a result of Generic Letter 

6 8820 issued in 1988 in response to post-TMI actions. That generic 

7 letter required each utility to perform an individual plant examination for 

8 severe accident vulnerabilities. 

9 One of the stated goals of that generic letter was to 

10 develop an understanding of severe accident behavior. These are 

11 actions that NRC took that I think provided unique benefit to the U.S. 

12 nuclear industry when you think about it. 

13 With that appreciation of severe accidents came 

14 improvements in the form of hardware modifications, human 

15 performance improvements, changes to procedures, severe accident 

16 guides all came out of that effort, and you know, in retrospect positioned 

17 the U.S. nuclear industry better to handle off-normal events. 

18 Next slide. So what's happened since Fukushima? 

19 Well, since Fukushima, EPRI and others have performed a significant 

20 body of technical work, too much to really talk about all of it today. So 

21 I summarized a few of it, put it into categories in the blue, immediate 

22 actions, short-term actions and sort of a longer-term understanding. 

23 And I'm going to cover some of the highlights. The 

24 items in red I have some slides on, and like I said, I'll cover a few of the 

25 highlights, my personal favorites actually. So without further ado but 

26 before moving on, another lesson learned from Fukushima is that the 
 11 

1 spent fuel pool and in fact the nuclear plants are very rugged structures. 

2 When we look at that, that's supported by the fact that 

3 all available evidence currently indicates that after the seismic event, 

4 which was the fourth largest recorded seismic event and located just 

5 100 miles away, all of the safety systems operated as designed, and 

6 research activities to date continue to support the ruggedness of both 

7 the fuel pool and the plant. 

8 In the area of immediate response, EPRI assisted 

9 TEPCO, a long-term EPRI member, in understanding severe accidents 

10 and analysis of the spent fuel pools, looking at potentials for re-criticality 

11 and quickly helping to design a system to treat water. 

12 The shorter-term actions occurred in the months and 

13 years after the accident, include updates to severe accident technical 

14 basis document, which serves as one input to the severe accident 

15 guidelines that the owners groups will talk about in just a little bit, as 

16 well as development of strategies to mitigate radiological releases and 

17 accelerated seismic activities. 

18 Some of the long-term research activities were listed 

19 on the previous slide, and we'll discuss them as we walk through the 

20 presentation. But for seismic, the post-Fukushima era, we accelerated 

21 our existing seismic program, accelerated and expanded to look at 

22 improving and understanding of the seismic hazard or the ground 

23 motion, all the way from the seismic source through ground motion 

24 attenuation and site amplification, to understand the true seismic 

25 hazard at the site. 

26 Then once understanding the seismic hazard of the 
 12 

1 site, evaluating components both for the impact of high frequency 

2 motions and to better understand component performance and seismic 

3 events, commonly referred to as fragility analysis. 

4 And all of that's to better understand and then to 

5 mitigate seismic risk. Again, first is an understanding. Then there's a 

6 mitigation. 

7 Next slide, please. So shortly after Fukushima, 

8 TEPCO engineers were very interested in all the research performed 

9 after Three Mile Island, as we can all understand, another notables 

10 accident, and EPRI had just completed a draft archive of the 30-year 

11 body of scientific work that had been performed, and the draft was 

12 provided to TEPCO, and that draft eventually became an EPRI report. 

13 I'll cite it here, 1022186, Technical Foundations of 

14 Reactor Safety, Revision 1. But that contains a large body of that 30 

15 years of scientific work. The reason why I mention that is because the 

16 Fukushima technical evaluation continues on a similar vein. 

17 So work continues in that area now, to collect that 

18 information again, and to make sure that it's available both to develop 

19 a deep understanding of Fukushima, to support sound technical 

20 decision-making in the future. 

21 One of the lessons learned in that document that I 

22 always find very -- those documents because there are several, a 

23 Phase 1 and a Phase 2, and several other supporting documents. But 

24 one of the most interesting things I always find about that document 

25 that's not well known is the fact that Unit 2, which is estimated to have 

26 the least amount of core damage and also had no hydrogen explosion, 
 13 

1 is actually the largest contributor to the radiological release. 

2 So if you look at that chart that we see a lot of, that 

3 NNSA chart that shows the radiological release in a picture, that's 

4 largely due to Unit 2. 

5 Next slide, please. So accident tolerant fuels. What 

6 would the nuclear industry be like if we had no zirconium in the core, 

7 and while there are several definitions of accident-tolerant fuel, they all 

8 share a common element, which is an increased ability to tolerate a loss 

9 of active cooling for a longer duration than the existing zirconium 

10 system. 

11 A longer duration means more time for prevention and 

12 more time for mitigation, or it means less hydrogen or minimal fission 

13 product release. So overall it would look a lot different. There's a lot 

14 of different strategies for fuel systems, and a lot of things to consider 

15 when designing new fuel. 

16 But two of EPRI's favorites are the molybdenum 

17 cladding concept, which is actually a Zircaloy-cladded molybdenum 

18 both on the inside and outside, because if you think about it, if you take 

19 molybdenum, and you clad it with zirc on the inside and outside, a very 

20 thin layer. You don't have a lot of zirc, but you do have the water and 

21 fuel still seeing zirconium, so you don't change chemistry or physical 

22 properties as much. 

23 Silicon carbide fuel channels, which again replaces 

24 zirconium with a silicon carbide. Both have higher melting points, both 

25 have higher resilience and strength. There are other concepts, but this 

26 is part of the longer-term research that we see as being potentially a 
 14 

1 game-changer for the nuclear industry. EPRI's role in this is to 

2 accelerate the collaboration and the development. 

3 Not one entity will not develop new fuel on its own. It's 

4 quite an endeavor. But the goal would be for test assemblies to be 

5 available in the early 2020's. 

6 Next slide, please. So in summary, there's a 

7 significant body of research and development that's been completed 

8 since Fukushima by EPRI and others, and much has been l earned and 

9 implemented and the global nuclear industry is safer as a result. I do 

10 want to close with one additional thought, that as we look at future 

11 research and development, it falls into two bins really. 

12 One is the continuous improvement type of work and 

13 through improved understanding and implementation of those 

14 learnings, we get better performance in terms of both safety and 

15 economics. But also -- and the items in this bucket are things like 

16 learning on severe accidents, external hazard analysis in other areas. 

17 But there's a second bin that provides a more 

18 significant step change such as the accident tolerant fuel we just 

19 discussed, as well as things like severe accident prognostics that would 

20 allow us to faster than real time simulate accidents and be able to both 

21 prevent and mitigate better, and things like a new reactor technology 

22 such as molten salt reactors, which I'm hoping is a subject of a future 

23 Commission brief. That's the end of my prepared comments. 

24 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Thank you. Mr. Bunt. 

25 MR. BUNT: Yes. Thank you for allowing me to 

26 present today and present on behalf of the BWR Owners Group and 
 15 

1 our chairwoman, Lisa Hill, who's not able to be here. Do you want to 

2 go over a few topics and go to the next slide, talking about the lessons 

3 learned and were we stand and what's remaining for the BWR fleet 

4 going forward. 

5 So we'll give you a brief status of where we stand from 

6 our FLEX strategies, then go over severe accident hardware and 

7 containment vent systems, our procedures, both the severe accident 

8 and the emergency operating procedures and our aids, the TS, 

9 Technical Support Guideline documents going forward. And then what 

10 are we doing in support of what Tony had already mentioned about the 

11 mitigating strategies rule and other elements associated with that. 

12 So next slide, please. So updated status of where we 

13 stand with the strategies. Industry-wide, BWR fleet has followed the 

14 industry lead and we are very closed to being finished by the end of this 

15 year in the primary elements that make up the FLEX strategies. 

16 We will have a few outstanding items for the vent to 

17 enhance that going forward after the summer of '16, and that will take 

18 us into the '18 time period. Many units will be coming in '17 and early 

19 '18, in accordance with that rule, to enhance their venting associated 

20 with that. 

21 Approximately about a third of the fleet of the BWRs 

22 will submit their final integrated plans for a document in their closure of 

23 FLEX by -- in 2016. The remainders will be submitting those after their 

24 enhancements to the vents per the schedule that's outlined. 

25 We expect two plants to have their FLEX inspections 

26 in the 2016 time period, which will lay the foundation for where we're 
 16 

1 going forward for the inspections for the BWR fleets in the future years. 

2 Most of those inspections will come after their FIPs are done, so there 

3 will be a little -- the tail end of those inspections, where the PWRs will 

4 be the main focus with that. 

5 Also looking to establish how the mitigating strategies 

6 assessments, both for flooding and seismic are working and the BWR 

7 fleet is in line with the schedule that Tony had already presented for 

8 most of the flooding to be done in 2016, and then the seismic to be 

9 spread out in '16 and '17. 

10 Next slide, please. To go into the order of the 109 for 

11 the Mark I and Mark II units that are specifically out there, with the 

12 hardware part which is the Phase 1 part of that order complete by the 

13 2018 time period, and then Phase 2, the strategy completed by '19. 

14 Many sites will be doing the strategy earlier than that, 

15 but their commitment is in the '19 time period. The impact is that it will 

16 have their hardware installed by mid-2018, in compliance with that order 

17 and the agreed-to schedule. The strategy part is the water addition 

18 and the water management that we'll see. 

19 We expect to see the staff evaluation for that integrated 

20 plans by this summer. Those integrated plans were submitted last 

21 year at the end of the year in December. 

22 A very concentrated effort between the staff and the 

23 industry to have a consolidated or a very typical submittal on that. So 

24 all the sites followed the template. Very good was done for across the 

25 industry and having the templates, and trying to look like an industry 

26 when we submitted our reports as independents. 
 17 

1 So we expect to see closure when we go forward with 

2 these activities through inspections that will happen in the '18 to '20 time 

3 period. Following the compliance with that, we expect to see the 

4 integrated plans and the safety -- or the staff assessments to be basis 

5 for those inspections going forward. So that's how we see this 

6 hardened vents activity going forward. 

7 So next slide, please. So this is a brief status of where 

8 we stand in the procedure suite of activities for the Owners Group, 

9 broken into the three categories of the procedures. The emergency 

10 operating procedures. The bulk of those lessons learned have been 

11 submitted. They're out there in the current revision, Revision 3. 

12 A full implementation of that revision is expected by 

13 mid-2017. The majority of the lessons learned required for the FLEX 

14 support from the direct application will be -- have already been 

15 implemented at the majority of sites in further compliance of their 2016 

16 FLEX materially complete. 

17 For the severe accident guidelines, the Owners Group 

18 committed in their letters last year to be upgraded by the middle of '17 

19 for the Rev 3, and they're also -- most units are complying to have that 

20 done for their vent order, the 109 order compliance also. So their 

21 schedule is ahead of their compliance for a few plants but the majority 

22 of plants are there. 

23 Several plants, a couple of plants have already had 

24 that implementation done as of 2016. For our technical support 

25 guidelines, these are the calculational aids that allow the TSC staff, the 

26 Technical Support Center staff, to have more tools and also the 
 18 

1 operating crews to have more tools into how to evaluate. 

2 Those are out -- have been issued and workshops 

3 have been held in the U.S. this year and there will be more next year, 

4 and they also were held internationally for the BWR fleets in 2015. So 

5 that's an example of where we're spreading the lessons learned. 

6 Those were enhanced through activities and also 

7 support from both EPRI and from DOE in some of the activities that 

8 support that from a code standpoint and evaluations that go forward. 

9 Next slide, please. For the proposed rule out there, 

10 the BWRs are in line with the rest of the industry following the same 

11 industry schedule. We don't anticipate any changes or any delays that 

12 will happen because of the BWR fleets in complying with the rule 

13 language and very supportive of that. 

14 So we do expect, you know, our documentation 

15 enhancements needed for the mitigating strategies, as we do that work 

16 in advance of the rule coming out across the industry. Also, how will 

17 the demonstrations and procedures be impacted from FLEX going 

18 forward, and then what is the full documentation required for the 

19 rulemaking going forward, being that most of the compliance will have 

20 already taken place prior to the rule coming out. 

21 So those are where we see, very consistent with the 

22 rest of the industry, the BWR. This is where you asked for the 

23 information. 

24 Next slide, please. In summary, we feel that the BWR 

25 fleet will be materially complete with FLEX, so that we will be able to 

26 cope with the mitigation of any external events. 
 19 

1 Currently, the bulk of the fleet are there. Also the 

2 enhancement through the added wet well venting capability and the 

3 water addition and water management strategies will be implemented 

4 starting in 2016, through the agreed-to schedule. 

5 Then we expect to, as I mentioned before, comply with 

6 the mitigating strategies rulemaking along with the rest of the industry 

7 in a consolidated approach. That's the end of my comments. Thank 

8 you. 

9 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Thank you. Mr. Gunter. 

10 MR. GUNTER: I'd like to thank you for the invitation 

11 and open my comments today with an observance that yesterday 

12 Michael Mariotte with Nuclear Information Resource Service passed 

13 away at his home in Maryland, surrounded by his loving family. I'm 

14 sure a number of you know, knew Michael and certainly we in the public 

15 interest community are going to miss him. 

16 Our concern today turns to some examples of the 

17 Fukushima lessons that have been unlearned in the United States. 

18 Defense in depth is being whittled away, and sacrifice to the U.S. 

19 nuclear industry's increasingly fragile economics. 

20 We'll focus on the example of the post-Fukushima 

21 regulatory treatment of containment and emergency planning 

22 components, as it pertains to one specific biological hazard generated 

23 in a severe nuclear accident, radioactive iodine. 

24 Next slide, please. Quite simply, the pressure 

25 suppression containment system for the GE Mark I and Mark II boiling 

26 water reactor is too small to contain the dynamic energy of a severe 
 20 

1 accident. This inherent design flaw has been known since 1972, yet 

2 we continue to see piecemeal approaches and voluntary industry 

3 initiatives to allow operators the option to deliberately defeat the 

4 containment design function in hopes of saving it from permanent 

5 rupture during a severe accident. 

6 Fukushima demonstrated a 100 percent containment 

7 failure rate for the same containment venting system that is currently 

8 deployed on nearly one-third of the U.S. nuclear reactor fleet. 

9 Next slide, please. Radioactive iodine is one of the 

10 more manageable radioactive isotopes generated by nuclear accidents. 

11 It's a relatively short half-life of eight days constitutes a biological hazard 

12 for about 80 to 160 days. 

13 It can be effectively retained and contained along with 

14 other radioactive isotopes by state-of-the-art engineered radiation filters 

15 on hardened containment vents to reduce the uncontrolled radioactive 

16 releases to the environment and population exposures. 

17 Emergency planning can be enhanced by providing 

18 safe and effective doses of prophylactic potassium iodide, as is used in 

19 common table salt. Pre-distributed in advance to saturate the thyroid 

20 gland, particularly in young children for protection from radiogenic 

21 diseases of the thyroid. 

22 However, in the aftermath of the Fukushima 

23 catastrophe, the public interest community has witnessed both of these 

24 beneficial aspects for defense in depth dismantled and obstructed by 

25 the nuclear industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

26 Next slide, please. On January 9th, 2013, senior 
 21 

1 management for the NRC staff presented its broad-based consensus 

2 to recommend that the Commission order, the installation of external 

3 engineered radiation filters on severe accident-capable hardened vents 

4 on the GE Mark I and Mark II's, and the staff studied judgment using 

5 established regulatory practice and guidance, the use of filter vents 

6 when used in conjunction with containment spray and reactor cavity 

7 flooding, as already added by the NEI guidance at reactors in response 

8 to the September 11th attacks, represented a cost beneficial and 

9 substantial safety improvement. 

10 The nuclear industry lobby and its champions in 

11 Congress vehemently opposed adding the filters to the containment 

12 vents, maximizing decontamination in the small containment by 

13 increased water spray and reactor cavity flooding was preferable and 

14 sufficient. 

15 However, the NRC staff focused their defense in depth 

16 concern without the benefit of the external filtration on the uncertainties 

17 regarding the effectiveness of internal decontamination in the extremely 

18 cramped containment that still needed analysis and provided 

19 performance requirements. 

20 In anticipation of the Commission vote on adding filters 

21 in March 2013, UBS, the global Swiss banking giant that handles 

22 nuclear corporation finances, predicted "we increasingly believe that 

23 the NRC may not require these added precautions, given the added 

24 stress this places on the incumbent portfolio, as well as the fragile state 

25 of affairs among existing units." 

26 UBS concluded that while not overwhelming, the 
 22 

1 additional cost would add insult to injury for an industry in difficult 

2 economic environment. The Commission majority vote rejected its 

3 staff's recommendation for engineered filters and issued an order for 

4 just the containment vent and directed staff and industry to develop 

5 other non-specific severe accident confinement strategies, such as the 

6 industry favored adding and managing of more water in containment. 

7 The Commission directed staff to pursue a proposed 

8 public rulemaking to solicit further stakeholder comments on radiation 

9 filtration, and develop the performance requirements for what industry 

10 now describes as severe accident water addition and management. 

11 That proposed rulemaking, renamed containment protection release 

12 reduction, would never happen. 

13 There would be no public comment or independent 

14 expert opinion on the benefit of engineered filters and as a result, as 

15 the NRC staff had described in its earlier concerns, no NRC or 

16 independent vetting of performance requirements on industry severe 

17 accident water addition. 

18 Next slide, please. In our view, the protection of the 

19 American public from the GE containment design vulnerabilities is a 

20 least cost base case scenario in favor of industry's hands-off approach 

21 to its fragile economics. 

22 Next slide, please. In the meantime, the Japanese 

23 reformed nuclear regulation authority essentially adopted the NRC staff 

24 recommendation for external engineered filters as a prerequisite for 

25 restart of the boiling water reactors there. By August 2015, AREVA 

26 had announced delivery of its 14th filtered containment vent system for 
 23 

1 installation in Japanese reactors, initiated by Hitachi-GE. 

2 TEPCO has since completed installation of redundant 

3 filtration units on its Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant that are 

4 both above grade for flood qualification and redundantly below grade 

5 for seismically qualified backup systems. 

6 Next slide. Moreover, it's our concern that even an 

7 NRC order doesn't constitute what the public might think an order 

8 should. The NRC can in fact -- the order can be undone with a request 

9 for an extension to comply without a single public meeting. 

10 Ironically, New Jersey's Oyster Creek Nuclear Station, 

11 the first Mark I in the world, Fukushima's prototype, as well as the first 

12 unit in line for compliance with the order, also received the first waiver 

13 from compliance following this summer's scheduled refueling outage 

14 and restart for fall 2016. 

15 The NRC staff waived Oyster Creek's compliance until 

16 after Exelon plans to permanently close the reactor on December 31st, 

17 2019. None of Exelon's proffered compensatory actions addressed 

18 the post-fuel damage requirement in the order. Based on this 

19 precedent, other industry waiver requests are now anticipated. 

20 Next slide, please. Though recommended by the 

21 Kemeny Commission in October 1979, the NRC would not propose 

22 optional voluntary stockpiling of potassium iodide within the ten mile 

23 EPZ until 2001. 

24 Next slide, please. As of today, 25 of 34 eligible states 

25 are participating in NRC's voluntary initiative for voucher distribution 

26 within the ten mile EPZ. However, according to public health surveys, 
 24 

1 the current KI emergency plan is ineffective, as only 5.3 percent of 

2 residents respond to the voluntary pickup. 

3 Next slide, please. The American Thyroid Association 

4 has repeatedly appealed to the NRC to expand the distribution of KI by 

5 direct delivery to all residents within 50 miles and wider stockpiling out 

6 to 200 miles. 

7 Next slide, please. Moreover, the Canadian Nuclear 

8 Safety Commission required that by December 31st, 2015, pre9 distribution of KI by direct delivery to every resident within the six mile 

10 primary evacuation zone around Canadian nuclear power plants would 

11 be completed. The Canadians have further expanded public 

12 awareness for KI out to 31 miles from their nuclear power stations. 

13 Next slide, please. The chief lesson from Fukushima 

14 for us, according to Japan's National Diet's Fukushima-Dai-ichi Nuclear 

15 Accident Independent Investigation Committee, determined that the 

16 catastrophe was profoundly man-made and the result of regulatory 

17 capture. 

18 The combination of willful negligence, the collusion of 

19 government regulator and industry to advance corporate production 

20 and financial agendas over public safety and regulatory deferral of 

21 enforceable standards to voluntary industry initiatives adds up to a 

22 recipe for the next disaster. Thank you. 

23 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Thank you. I will begin the 

24 questioning this morning with Commission Baran. 

25 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Well thank you all for 

26 being here. I appreciate your comments. In the last few years, five 
 25 

1 U.S. reactors have permanently shut down and three more have 

2 announced plans to close. Licensees are actively considering shutting 

3 down an additional four units of Clinton, Quad Cities and Fort Calhoun 

4 in the near-term. 

5 I want to get the panel's thoughts about how these 

6 announcements will affect compliance with post-Fukushima safety 

7 requirements. Paul noted just a couple of minutes ago that Oyster 

8 Creek, which plans to shut down in 2019, was granted an extension on 

9 implementing Phase 1 of the order requiring severe accident-capable 

10 hardened vents. 

11 Essentially, Oyster Creek got an exemption from the 

12 requirement to install a wetwell vent by fall of this year. Recently, 

13 Entergy submitted a request for an extension for Fitzpatrick to comply 

14 with the mitigating strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation 

15 orders. 

16 Paul, let me start with you. If NRC gets similar 

17 requests for other plants in the future related to vents or another 

18 requirement, how do you think NRC should evaluate such a request? 

19 MR. GUNTER: Well you know, thank you for that. 

20 It's our concern that the NRC has to draw a line in terms of what an 

21 order means, and you know, clearly in the case of Oyster Creek, when 

22 the order was issued the agency had provided Exelon with an 

23 opportunity to address the NRC's calendar date schedules for 

24 compliance, and then they took a pass on that. 

25 It wasn't until later that they announced that they would 

26 seek an extension to comply on a schedule change that, you know, 
 26 

1 disingenuously puts the reactor, you know, takes them through an 

2 exemption process without any public oversight or transparency. 

3 I think that, you know, clearly in terms of the severity of 

4 the Fukushima disaster and its consequences, we're asking the NRC to 

5 hold the line on the orders that it issues and its schedule, and I think 

6 that's reasonable. 

7 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Well, let me explore that 

8 a little bit with you. So what do you think the standard should be in a 

9 situation like that? How do we weigh or how do you think NRC should 

10 weigh the length of time the plant will be open and would be benefitting 

11 from a safety enhancement with, you know, with the benefit of a safety 

12 enhancement? 

13 How do we weigh that? You know, if the plant would 

14 close a month or six months or a year after a particular safety 

15 enhancement came on line, how do you think we should weigh that? 

16 MR. GUNTER: I think one clear guideline would be no 

17 more refueling cycles. I mean right now we're looking at Oyster Creek 

18 going through one plus fuel cycles, and I don't think that it's reasonable 

19 to extend that kind of undue risk to public health and safety. 

20 COMMISSIONER BARAN: I'm interested in what the 

21 rest of the panel thinks about this issue. Tony or Randy, do you have 

22 thoughts about how NRC should approach extension or exemption 

23 requests related to the post-Fukushima requirements at plants that are 

24 shutting down? 

25 MR. PIETRANGELO: On a case-by-case basis. 

26 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Anything beyond that? I 
 27 

1 mean so that's -- I think that's basically the approach right now. The 

2 NRC's staff's taking a case-by-case look at it. 

3 MR. PIETRANGELO: I think that's appropriate 

4 because the circumstances are different for each site. You have an 

5 exemption process specifically to deal with case-by-case things like 

6 that. So I would exercise that process. 

7 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Do you think there are 

8 any, and I want to hear Randy's thoughts on this too, if he has any, are 

9 there key factors you think the NRC staff should be looking at when 

10 they're evaluating these on a case-by-case basis? 

11 MR. PIETRANGELO: I think you have to look at the 

12 magnitude of risk and the time exposure. 

13 COMMISSIONER BARAN: And time exposure, you 

14 mean how long the plant will be operating? 

15 MR. PIETRANGELO: Yeah. 

16 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Ken, I didn't mean to 

17 exclude you. 

18 MR. CANAVAN: Yeah. I just wanted to add to 

19 Tony's comment. So all forms of electrical generation have some form 

20 of hazard associated with them. So if we assume Oyster Creek's 

21 replaced by coal-burner or another generation like gas unit, are carbons 

22 produced? There are health effects from other sources of electrical 

23 generation, and you can do trade-offs with period of time and exposure 

24 to the hazard and other health effects from other forms of generation. 

25 MR. BUNT: To address your question, I think you do 

26 have to consider the time constant here and the total time constant of 
 28 

1 the activity that was being requested. So if you look at the end date 

2 for this particular application of the 109 order, the end date was summer 

3 of '18, which had already been evaluated from a risk standpoint. 

4 So the extension time then has to be looked at, the 

5 consequences of the event, and also the mitigating actions that were 

6 put in place and what were there. Those all have to be factored in on 

7 a case-by-case basis as Tony mentioned, along with a risk impact and 

8 the other economics that Ken had mentioned, as well as other hazards 

9 that are dominant by having a plant shutdown or have something 

10 prematurely done. 

11 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Any closing thoughts 

12 from any of you on this topic? I'll ask the staff about this too and we'll 

13 get their thoughts. Randy and Ken both discussed the development of 

14 accident-tolerant fuel, and this question for both or either of you. When 

15 do you think it's likely that these technologies would be ready for NRC 

16 review? 

17 MR. CANAVAN: There's been discussions of well 

18 accident-tolerant fuel is a wide area. There are several different 

19 systems that are being discussed. All have pros and cons, difficulties 

20 in manufacture. These things haven’t been done. All those caveats 

21 in place, it looks like early 2020's. 

22 So some time in that time frame. Test fuel assemblies 

23 or test pins would be available for insertion. Currently, that's the 

24 thought. Prior review would be us submitting something to the NRC in 

25 the 18s or 19s I would assume. 

26 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Okay. Do you anticipate 
 29 

1 any challenges for NRC in being prepared to review those? 

2 MR. CANAVAN: Yes. 

3 COMMISSIONER BARAN: And talk a little bit about 

4 that please. 

5 MR. CANAVAN: Well with all new technology, you 

6 know, this is a system and one of the things I missed in my notes was 

7 it's a cradle to grave type of thing, which is one of the reasons why 

8 molybdenum with coated Zircaloy is a preferred system. Every time 

9 you change something, you'll move other dynamics. 

10 So you'll have other chemistry effects if you use 

11 different materials. Most people don't know that silicon carbide is 

12 actually soluble in water only a little bit, but still soluble and what are 

13 those long-term impacts. So I think, you know, careful review would 

14 be required in the first of a kind technology, which always creates some 

15 challenges for the regulatory environment. 

16 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Do you think, and I know 

17 this is a little bit of prognostication, but would you anticipate that the first 

18 technologies we received here for review would be ones where you 

19 didn't have a change in chemistry or not a very significant change or not 

20 necessarily coming in that order? 

21 MR. CANAVAN: As a researcher, I would hope that 

22 regulatory thoughts didn't play too significantly in the technology 

23 chosen. But in reality it does. So again, the molybdenum concept 

24 that's coated with Zircaloy on both sides is a very positive one, because 

25 it doesn't change those chemistries. It changes things less. 

26 So one of those things I think when making a submittal 
 30 

1 or one of the considerations would be things that don't change the 

2 regulatory regime as much. 

3 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Randy, do you have any 

4 thoughts you might add? Okay. 

5 MR. GUNTER: Commissioner Baran, can I just add 

6 one more comment to your original question? I think it's important to 

7 recognize that an order modifies the operating license of these nuclear 

8 facilities, and that's a critical legal question, and you know, it needs to 

9 be redressed through the legal process. 

10 So I think it's disingenuous to essentially avoid an order 

11 on a schedule change when in fact there is this obligation to meet the 

12 modified operating license. 

13 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Thanks. Thank you Mr. 

14 Chairman. 

15 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Thank you. Commissioner 

16 Baran covered an area I was interested in at the beginning with respect 

17 to the process that Mr. Gunter and others spoke to. I will return first to 

18 Mr. Canavan. I was interested in your comment with regard to the 

19 contribution of radioactive release from the Fukushima accident. 

20 That is mostly Unit 2, and yet unit -- I think what I 

21 understood you to say, Unit 2, relatively speaking, was less -- if that's 

22 the right way of saying, less damaged or more integral. Could you just 

23 refresh me as to what the reason or what the understanding of that is, 

24 that was? 

25 MR. CANAVAN: I can walk you through some of the 

26 statuses very quickly and again, no one has seen where the cores are. 
 31 

1 This is all based on modeling and simulation, although to date we're 

2 fairly confident in that simulation. 

3 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Sure, sure. 

4 MR. CANAVAN: Unit 1, 1F1, lost core cooling very 

5 early. It's expected that about 10 to 12 hours into the accident the 

6 melted core exited the vessel and is in the containment. Unit 3 

7 similarly lost cooling late, but also for a sustained period of time and 

8 again, some of the core is expected to be exited the vessel. 

9 However for Unit 2, while again this is all based on 

10 modeling, it would appear that the cores would be in the vessel 

11 according to modeling. So it hasn't exited the vessel, yet the timing 

12 and releases correspond with the largest radiological contamination 

13 actually line up with that NNSA diagram that we all see. 

14 Largely, that's probably a result of extremely high core 

15 temperatures at the same time that a drywell headlift occurred. So it's 

16 suspected that pressure in the containment, the hardened vent or the 

17 vents were not utilized at that time. Containment exceeded twice 

18 design at that point. 

19 The drywell bolt stretched and the head relieved. 

20 Fission products were relieved off the top of the structure, and that 

21 resulted in the contamination that we see, combined with adverse 

22 weather conditions. It was raining. 

23 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay, thanks. Let me stick 

24 with you for a moment. Can you tell me a little bit more about the 

25 international benchmarking efforts and analysis activities that are going 

26 on with respect to evaluation of the accident, and what the nature of 
 32 

1 your participation for EPRI is? 

2 MR. CANAVAN: Well, various organizations have 

3 done their own simulations using their own codes or other predictive 

4 methodologies, and EPRI participates through a number of forums, 

5 IAEA and some others, WG Risk in Europe, to discuss some of the 

6 outcomes of our analysis and compare and contrast. 

7 I think largely benchmarking efforts have been 

8 between -- in the U.S. between the MAAP code, which is an EPRI9 owned severe accident code, and MELCOR which is a U.S. DOE code. 

10 Those comparisons have been the subject of much effort and a lot of 

11 work. The international ones are really in their earlier stages of 

12 comparison. 

13 CHAIRMAN BURNS: All right, thanks. So I want to 

14 turn to you with respect to a couple of issues -- with respect to the 

15 rulemaking effort that's underway. 

16 One of the things you noted and I'd appreciate a little 

17 more granularity on this, is that you noted that the change control 

18 process with respect to I think the FLEX equipment or the beyond 

19 design basis strategies, ought to be different. 

20 I'd like you to explain that a little more and compare 

21 that to what I'll call the normal process or what I call the norm or what I 

22 can at least conceive of as the norm for operating reactors. 

23 MR. PIETRANGELO: So for operating reactors, we 

24 have 10 CFR 50.59, changes, tests and experiments. You do a 

25 licensing check basically of the change or experiment you're making to 

26 determine if you have an unreviewed safety question. 
 33 

1 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Right. 

2 MR. PIETRANGELO: Okay. There's criteria 

3 established in that rule. If you exceed the criteria, you come in for a 

4 license amendment. You ask for prior NRC approval before you 

5 implement the change. So that's what we do for the traditional design 

6 basis material. This is beyond design basis, so I think it's wrong to 

7 apply the same tests to it. 

8 We think it should be something less than that. One 

9 idea was to say that the licensee evaluate the change, keep the record 

10 at the plant for inspection. So I think when the NRC's conducting its 

11 baseline inspections it can see whatever changes were made and 

12 whether they agree with the evaluation that there's still compliance with 

13 the rule. 

14 So it's very, very simple. There is no submittal made. 

15 It's just an evaluation that the plant staff does, the licensee does that's 

16 available for inspection. So that's kind of the other end of the 

17 spectrum. Is there a 50.59 like process? 

18 I haven't heard of one yet, but I think for the kind of 

19 safety significance of these beyond design basis things, I think the 

20 approach where the licensee evaluates it and keeps the record for 

21 inspection is probably appropriate for this category. 

22 CHAIRMAN BURNS: And how -- what is it that 

23 assures, that maintains the fidelity of the equipment or processes that 

24 were intended to implement the design basis? 

25 MR. CANAVAN: Yeah. There's -- 

26 CHAIRMAN BURNS: It's 50.59. It's saying wait, 
 34 

1 there's not a requirement in 50.59 that those processes, 50.59 the 

2 licensee does the evaluation. We know I think historically on close 

3 calls, it may be submitted to the NRC. We know that 50.59 doesn't 

4 require that. 

5 MR. CANAVAN: I think that would still be in place for 

6 the areas where the interfaces with the safety systems, where the 

7 connections are made for the FLEX equipment. Those would still be 

8 subject to 50.59. But for all the rest of those things on the mitigation 

9 strategies, I think the licensee can evaluate that and keep the record of 

10 the change. 

11 We could submit like we do for FSAR updates, 

12 50.71(e), a record of those changes that were done and a short basis 

13 for why we think we're still in compliance and that could be subject to 

14 inspection. So it would be a much less burdensome process for this. 

15 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. Mr. Gunter, do you 

16 have any thoughts on that or reactions? 

17 MR. GUNTER: I think there's -- I think there's a real 

18 foggy situation here between license amendments and 10 CFR 50.59 

19 that are -- we would appreciate more clarity by providing public with 

20 standing. 

21 CHAIRMAN BURNS: One other thing kind of I want 

22 to talk about is the process and had some discussions in some of my 

23 plant visits is the question of the credit for use of FLEX equipment and 

24 other applications. I know there have been a couple of instances 

25 where it hasn't worked out. 

26 Well, it isn't the credit but in term of the application or 
 35 

1 indication of the FLEX equipment, if you will, hasn't worked out as well 

2 as properly intended or thought. I would appreciate what -- give me an 

3 idea of what it is that we're crediting or how does that -- how would that 

4 work and again ensuring this overall fidelity in terms of undertaking 

5 activities at the plant. 

6 MR. CANAVAN: Right. So I put them in two 

7 categories. The first category is what you can use the FLEX 

8 equipment for. I'd say in a qualitative way, modeling it in the PRA or 

9 anything like that. So it's just kind of another layer of defense in depth 

10 that you could apply to whatever the situation is. 

11 Two white papers we've submitted to the staff for 

12 consideration and discussion are notices of enforcement discretion and 

13 the significance determination process. That's the more short-term 

14 applications. Longer term, I think there is discussions already on how 

15 you would model FLEX in the PRA. 

16 We believe that's going to take longer to work through 

17 to determine what's acceptable for that. But in the interim, we think we 

18 can use a lot of these qualitative applications. They're not like 

19 Regulatory Guide 1174 or it's an amendment you submit, none of that. 

20 This is using FLEX equipment. I think one of the 

21 cases you may have heard of chairman is a specific licensee used it as 

22 defense in depth during an outage using the FLEX equipment. I think 

23 that's a terrific application. It allows the plant to have to get their 

24 equipment out in the field, hook it up, get familiar with it, in addition to 

25 the normal surveillance it's going to get. 

26 So the more familiarization you can get with equipment 
 36 

1 that's not going to be used very often, I think is a win-win. For the staff 

2 and the residents and the regions to see the licensee utilize that 

3 equipment is a good thing. 

4 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Thanks, and my last question 

5 Mr. Bunt. Regarding mitigation strategies for the U.S. BWR fleet, it is 

6 expected to materially complete by the end of 2016. So for -- give me 

7 some flavor for BWR Mark I's and II's. What will be in place at the end 

8 of 2016? 

9 MR. BUNT: I understand. What will be in place will 

10 be their procedures, their connection points for those equipment. The 

11 thing that won't be in place is their enhancements to their wetwell 

12 venting. The majority of these sites already have hardened wetwell 

13 vents that they installed as part of their generic letter back in the 90's. 

14 They all have venting capabilities and procedural compliance on how to 

15 do that. 

16 So what wouldn't be done is the material or the 

17 equipment and the enhancements that are done under the 109 order, 

18 which would come in at a later date. 

19 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay, thank you. 

20 Commissioner Svinicki. 

21 COMMISSIONER SVINICKI: Thank you Mr. 

22 Chairman, and I want to thank all the presenters for being here today. 

23 My colleagues have covered a number of issues that I was interested 

24 in exploring. I think I'll begin by turning to the two questions that 

25 Chairman Burns asked, but I am having some difficulty in bringing the 

26 two concepts together. This is for Mr. Pietrangelo. 
 37 

1 On the one hand, the Chairman asked about change 

2 control and these are my words, not yours, so I'm paraphrasing. It 

3 seems that the industry is setting an expectation that they would like to 

4 have some kind of a graded regulatory treatment for change control on 

5 some of the mitigating strategies measures and equipment. 

6 But at the same time then he -- the Chairman's next 

7 question was about perhaps crediting for the existence of some of these 

8 strategies and equipment. I know you mentioned that as further 

9 defense in depth. 

10 But it seems to me a reasonable person could hear that 

11 as on the one hand I want a lighter regulatory footprint, and on the one 

12 hand, I want to have some kind of underlying acknowledgment of this 

13 equipment for fundamental issues within the design basis. 

14 So do you acknowledge that it could be heard that way, 

15 and if so why is it not that that you're advocating for? 

16 MR. PIETRANGELO: I think you've characterized it 

17 very, very well. I think you have a new rule that requires us to have 

18 these mitigation strategies in place with all this equipment, backed up 

19 by the National Response Centers. We want to leverage that 

20 equipment to improve safety in certain situations during normal 

21 operations. 

22 So the lighter regulatory touch, I think, is for any 

23 changes in the mitigation strategies the rule requires, as I think 

24 appropriate, for the beyond design basis part of the framework. For 

25 the existing framework, we're just simply using the equipment as 

26 additional safety measures. 
 38 

1 So I don't see a conflict there myself, but I could 

2 understand how it could be construed that way. 

3 COMMISSIONER SVINICKI: Well I suspect, and I 

4 can explore this with the NRC staff, but in some of the discussions 

5 you're having with them, I suspect this is a core issue for them, and that 

6 something that is going to be credited, although I don't like that term, 

7 maybe acknowledged in underlying or incorporated into underlying risk 

8 analyses, I think that it is likely that that will bring with it then a heavier 

9 regulatory treatment of whatever it is that you're crediting in other risk 

10 analysis. 

11 So I think that's going to -- I think a lot of this resolution 

12 is going to turn on that question is how much is enough, and I think if it 

13 were, you know, the equipment exists. Don't get me wrong. I've been 

14 to a lot of plants. I've gone and looked at it and it's substantial and it's 

15 physical and you can go look at it. 

16 So I would understand a mindset that said but it is here, 

17 and it would be usable and used in the event. But on the other hand, 

18 I know this sounds profoundly bureaucratic to say, but if it is credited in 

19 certain analyses, I think that will have to be a consideration in the 

20 regulatory treatment for change control and configuration management 

21 and other measures, knowing that it is beyond the design basis and I 

22 understand that. 

23 But I think it gets a little murky, you know, once we start 

24 kind of having it not design basis, it's beyond design basis and yeah, 

25 for some fundamental analysis of risk and hazard, we're going to credit 

26 its use and existence. I don't know. It's just tricky. It's uncharted 
 39 

1 territory and that's really all I'm saying. I don't know the answer. I 

2 don't think the staff has made up its mind one way or another. 

3 MR. PIETRANGELO: My only caution is don't make it 

4 harder to improve safety. 

5 COMMISSIONER SVINICKI: I think it's likely we can 

6 begin with that as a mutual objective for the NRC and the industry. 

7 Since we can't solve that one, I'll turn to Mr. Canavan. One of the 

8 things that we have an opportunity to do here is to do a validation of 

9 modeling and simulation. 

10 You had a slide, I think it was Slide 4, that talks about 

11 embarking on a long-term in depth technical understanding of the 

12 accident. A lot of our severe accident codes, and the Chairman 

13 touched on this, are based on our expectation of the behavior of 

14 materials and systems. 

15 Does this long-term in depth technical understanding, 

16 it seems to me this could be a multi-decade kind of research plan. Is 

17 it taking that kind of shape? 

18 MR. CANAVAN: I think there are -- there's probably a 

19 multi-decade research plan, but there's also on-ramps and off-ramps to 

20 that that are sooner. So there have been some -- I mentioned that the 

21 technical evaluation project, if you go to the first report of that, which is 

22 publicly available by the way, and you flip through the executive 

23 summary, you'll note that there's a simulation line that has what we think 

24 occurred during the event via simulation, and then there's the actual 

25 data points that are plotted. 

26 And when the data fits well, we know the conclusions 
 40 

1 that are modeled in the code are probably accurate. So we can -- we 

2 have an understanding already of how to model and simulate. We 

3 have a very good match, actually, of the core dynamics that occur. 

4 There are some things we don't know yet that we make educated 

5 guesses on, based on the prevalence of data. 

6 For example, did a safety relief valve fail at a certain? 

7 Did the head of the drywell lift to produce the consequence that we 

8 talked about earlier in radiological terms? 

9 So improving that understanding and refining those 

10 models and getting higher fidelity is part of the process, and as we learn 

11 more about Fukushima and as the Japanese do more and more work 

12 to get into the containments and then into the vessels and then 

13 eventually remove core debris, we will continually learn lessons that will 

14 continually refine those models. 

15 Are those models good enough now to do quite a bit of 

16 work? Yes, I believe so. I believe that they're substantially the 

17 containment and the core models are very good. 

18 COMMISSIONER SVINICKI: In terms of the core, if 

19 refinement comes through having physical data points, when does one 

20 begin to draw physical data out of Fukushima, and I'm reflecting on the 

21 fact that the Three Mile Island damaged core ended up in Idaho. I did 

22 work out there, not on the core but I had a chance to see detailed video 

23 surveys and things that were produced. 

24 If you really want to validate a model, being able to 

25 have access to the physical thing is how you can know whether your 

26 models are at all close. When might the nuclear science and 
 41 

1 technology sector begin to draw any type of data like that from 

2 Fukushima? I guess that's what I mean by a multi-tech study saying it 

3 will take a long time to ever be able to have access to that. 

4 MR. CANAVAN: Well, since you're familiar with TMI, 

5 it took many, many years to get all the way into the core, and if you're 

6 familiar with TMI and you go to the site and the control room of Unit 2, 

7 there's actually a cutaway mockup of the core. You can see how it 

8 melted and relocated. 

9 It wasn't until they actually physically saw that and 

10 mapped it. They actually mapped it with a laser to get that, to get that 

11 model. That provided a lot of insight. 

12 So I think it's a discovery process, and we don't 

13 normally like those. But it is a discovery process where as we move 

14 in, as radiation dies down and we're able to get closer into the 

15 containment and then eventually the cores, we'll learn more and more 

16 as we go. 

17 For example, we'll learn if the head relieved when we 

18 can inspect the head bolts. We'll learn more about whether a safety 

19 valve failed when we can see it. So for now, we strongly believe that 

20 the safety valve failed due to severe accident loads in Unit 2, but we're 

21 not positive. So we will have to -- and I meant Unit 3. 

22 But we will eventually see. So I think it's a journey is 

23 the best answer. 

24 COMMISSIONER SVINICKI: Well, I think that for the 

25 community of practitioners, there will be a tension dynamic between our 

26 desire to have access to data and information with the need of those 
 42 

1 who are doing the decommissioning will seek to have a timely 

2 decommissioning and proceeding along. 

3 However, an opportunity to inform our knowledge 

4 about something like this is rare, we hope never again. So I think it 

5 would be deeply regrettable if we couldn't begin with a very conscious 

6 plan of what are those key opportunities to glean these kind of accident 

7 insights, and if those can be somehow communicated to those who 

8 have the primary responsibility for decommissioning. 

9 Like I said, that will be in some tension. So I think that 

10 I would hope that the international R&D community would come 

11 together to realize that there will be some very significant opportunities 

12 here, and if that -- that should be communicated, I would hope, to those 

13 who are planning and executing the decommissioning at the site. 

14 MR. CANAVAN: Yes. TEPCO is very interested in 

15 that, and they pursue capturing that information and sharing it as they 

16 go, as well as participating in the international communities that are 

17 trying to capture data and model and simulate. 

18 COMMISSIONER SVINICKI: Thank you, and Mr. 

19 Bunt, if I have a moment, I was just going to ask. You provided a fairly 

20 detailed status on a number of implementation activities. But 

21 specifically on severe accident hardened containment vent systems, 

22 what would be the key schedule uncertainty or, if you will, the long pole 

23 in the tent in completing those activities on the schedules currently 

24 projected? 

25 Sometimes it's design, sometimes it's procurement. 

26 Is there anything there that you would identify as having the greatest 
 43 

1 association with schedule uncertainty for completing those plant 

2 modifications as currently projected? 

3 MR. BUNT: Thank you. The longest pole for half the 

4 plants is design. I believe the other half of the plants are really 

5 modifying what they already have to some degree. So our going in 

6 there, going forward, design is well underway. We're sharing the 

7 lessons learned from the early design plants to the later ones. So we 

8 are -- 

9 COMMISSIONER SVINICKI: Has that been official? 

10 It strikes me that the plants have gone to it. It's extremely plant-specific 

11 and they have to look at the impact of the integrated system and things 

12 like that. So is there much benefit in sharing design lessons between 

13 the plants, or are they so plant-specific? 

14 MR. BUNT: There is several elements that are good 

15 for the sharing from the missile capability to some of the structural 

16 impacts for where people are putting their vents, to the procurement of 

17 radiation monitors or the indication systems. 

18 So we have periodic every two week or every monthly 

19 calls within the industry to share their issues or their concerns. But 

20 there is a lot of plant-specific design elements that go into when you run 

21 the codes for your particular design of your plant site. 

22 But the overarching guidance on how you would 

23 address some of the unknowns or some of the other areas within the 

24 design process, we're doing that collectively as a BWR fleet. 

25 COMMISSIONER SVINICKI: Okay, thank you. I'm 

26 sorry, Mr. Chairman. I went over by a bit. 
 44 

1 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Thank you, Commissioner. 

2 Commissioner Ostendorff. 

3 COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF: Thank you, 

4 Chairman. Thank you all for being here and for your presentations, 

5 very helpful. I appreciate the questions of my colleagues. Very 

6 thoughtful. I want to start out just maybe by reacting to a comment I 

7 think Mr. Pietrangelo made, and I think you're talking about the use of 

8 FLEX equipment during an outage. Is that -- 

9 MR. PIETRANGELO: That's one example. 

10 COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF: Yeah. So I just -

11 - every now and then there's something. That resonated with me for 

12 the following reason. Early on, the S5W Westinghouse submarine 

13 reactor plants had an emergency cooling system, and that emergency 

14 cooling system was routinely used -- well, the design of the system was 

15 to provide flow, be it natural circulation in the event of loss of all AC 

16 power. 

17 Yet that system was also used routinely when the 

18 plants were cooled down during an upkeep or refit period, and the 

19 operators got experience, I think -- I'm looking at Pat Castleman back 

20 there, you were on an S5W submarine in your first, back in, yeah. 

21 So we use this a lot just during the upkeep periods, and 

22 I think it enhanced the operator awareness of how the system operated. 

23 You actually operated the valves, the temperature indications. I had to 

24 -- over my 16 years of sea duty, I had to use a system once for real life 

25 casualty. 

26 I know that I was glad to have had the actual routine 
 45 

1 operating experience of having used it under non-emergency situations 

2 before it was presented as engineering directing issues in a very critical 

3 situation. So I just -- I'm not sure what it's worth, but just it's an analogy 

4 that I personally, from operating and maintaining submarines, think 

5 that's a good thing to enhance operator awareness and familiarity with 

6 the system. 

7 MR. PIETRANGELO: Just to add a little bit, I think the 

8 arena we're talking about here is compensatory measures for 

9 something that's going on in the plant. This equipment's all the same 

10 across the industry. We've got EPRI collecting data, failure data on 

11 the surveillances we're doing on this equipment, so that we can later on 

12 start to model it in the PRAs with some actual data and not just on 

13 assumptions. 

14 I think, you know, to your point, getting your hands on 

15 it, using the hooking up is a very, very positive thing, and I don't want to 

16 get hung up on the treatment as required by rule. We have EPRI 

17 development preventive maintenance templates for these pieces of 

18 equipment. 

19 So we've already got a pretty good program in place 

20 for that. I don't see why it should be different to support comp 

21 measures in some of these other areas. 

22 COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF: Thank you. I'm 

23 going to stay with Mr. Pietrangelo here. In your Slide 4 inspections, I 

24 think your last bullet you indicated there's a concern with potential for 

25 growth in inspection scope without careful management oversight. Do 

26 you have any details or specifics there or things that are of concern? 
 46 

1 MR. PIETRANGELO: Not at this point Commissioner. 

2 It's just based on experience, and I think I used the maintenance rule 

3 example last time I was here. You know, we got a rule. We had five 

4 years to implement it. Tremendous industry effort along with the NRC 

5 to get ready to implement it, and then when it went to the field for the 

6 baseline inspections, the average was four Level 4 violations after all 

7 that preparation work. 

8 The concern is really based on there's a whole different 

9 set of people that's going to have to implement now and interpret the 

10 new rules and guidance, etcetera, that weren't engaged with the front 

11 end of this. We're keeping around this task force just to maintain that 

12 knowledge level. 

13 I know NRR has plans to do the same thing with 

14 valuable lessons learned within JLD. So it's just a big effort. It's new 

15 piece of the regulatory framework, subject to interpretation. So I don't 

16 have any specific examples for you at this point. It's just we want to 

17 make sure that we capture the operating experience and let all the other 

18 licensees in on it, and share it with the NRC on a regular basis, so that 

19 the implementation is smooth. 

20 COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF: Well I encourage 

21 you that if there are issues that come up, that that be raised to our staff. 

22 Does anyone else want to comment on that? Okay. Mr. Canavan, let 

23 me ask on the EPRI experience here. 

24 I set the clock back to 2012 at this table. When 

25 Commissioner Svinicki and I were here, the number of Fukushima 

26 issues that come out of SECY-11-0137, looking at the Tier 1, Tier 2, 
 47 

1 Tier 3. Seismic were some of the hardest issues at that time. 

2 There was discussions four years ago at this table 

3 about concerns on being able to conduct the seismic hazard 

4 reevaluations based on lack of seismic human capital expertise. What 

5 can you say about how would you characterize the health and welfare 

6 of the seismic expert community at this point in time? 

7 MR. CANAVAN: They are very tired. To be in all 

8 frankness, that's actually not that far from the truth. My staff, and I 

9 know the NRC staff puts a lot of work into continuing to solve some of 

10 the more difficult seismic research issues. It's time-consuming. It's a 

11 process that tends to evolve. 

12 So for example, we look at hazards. We determine 

13 that hazards may have increased in certain areas, but only in a certain 

14 part of the curve they're a high frequency motion. So we go into a high 

15 frequency motion testing program that's quite extensive in, you know, 

16 express delivery. 

17 So we're working very hard to get that research 

18 completed. The research gets completed. We understand the 

19 impacts on equipment very well. But then we start looking at 

20 structures, and because there's a -- the models originally built for 

21 analyzing structures don't handle high frequency motions very well. 

22 So now there's another. So it's a discovery process 

23 that has continued until recently, and it's been since Fukushima that 

24 we've been looking. So I would say that the burden, the demand 

25 remains high and we continue to work very hard on the next set of 

26 issues. 
 48 

1 COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF: Do you think as a 

2 result of Fukushima, and I'll also throw in there the Dominion Resource 

3 August of 2011 earthquake in southern Virginia, do you think that in 

4 2016 there is greater consensus on the approach for seismic than there 

5 was before Fukushima, or the seismic hazards? 

6 MR. CANAVAN: I think so. I think we're moving in 

7 the right direction, and I think we're getting better understanding about 

8 seismic motion. However, it is an evolving area. It continues to move. 

9 One of -- and actually I'm going to answer a different 

10 question if I might, which is what one of my worries is that we continue 

11 to analyze issue after issue, and we generally just position those issues 

12 to an understanding of higher capacity or significant robustness of the 

13 structures. 

14 There's a lot of resource spent in evaluating what 

15 seems to be a smaller hazard. I know we need that understanding to 

16 understand the risk from seismic events. However, there are other 

17 hazards as well. 

18 So we need to balance resources with what we think 

19 the commensurate risk is with the hazard, and in seismic, we probably 

20 put a lot of resource in right now for a hazard that's sort of lower. 

21 COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF: Okay. 

22 MR. CANAVAN: Or has been show in the past to be 

23 lower. I should be more clear. 

24 COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF: Okay. Mr. Bunt, 

25 from the experience of the BWR Owner Group arena, has NRC kept up 

26 with promulgation of guidance in a time period to facilitate 
 49 

1 implementation of the various orders? 

2 MR. BUNT: Yes. We've worked very diligently with 

3 the staff on getting guidance out and getting frequently asked questions 

4 for the BWR fleet. We've issued several guidance documents and 

5 position papers that support the order. 

6 We have had a lot of professional conversations, some 

7 candid discussions and come up with a reasonable working element, 

8 realizing where each one of the groups come from. Just recently, as 

9 part of the Phase 2 work with the 109 order issued a Revision 1 that got 

10 endorsed and had a very concise and documented template for the 

11 implementation of that. 

12 I believe it's speeding up the NRC's review of that, so 

13 that we'll get the evaluations in a timely manner to support our design 

14 elements. 

15 COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF: Okay. Thank 

16 you all for being here. Thank you, Chairman. 

17 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Thank you. I want to thank the 

18 panel again for their presentations and the discussion this morning, and 

19 we'll take a brief break. We'll reconvene at about 10:25 and hear the 

20 staff presentations at that point. 

21 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the 

22 record at 10:16 a.m. and resumed at 10:26 a.m.) 

23 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. We'll call our meeting 

24 back to order. And we'll now have a presentation from the NRC Staff. 

25 We'll discuss progress on implementing Tier 1 

26 recommendations and overview of the Staff's assessment on some Tier 
 50 

1 3 recommendations. As well as a status update on the remaining Tier 

2 2 and 3 recommendations. 

3 And the Staff will also discuss plans for NRC oversight 

4 of post Fukushima safety enhancements. And I'll turn it over to Deputy 

5 Executive Director for Operations, Mike Johnson. Mike? 

6 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. Good morning, 

7 Chairman and Commissioners. We appreciate the opportunity to 

8 report on -- report to you on the statues of our Fukushima lessons 

9 learned activities. 

10 As a result of the March 2011 accident at Fukushima, 

11 we began a race. And at that time we recognized that it wasn't a sprint, 

12 and it wasn't a solo activity or individual sport. It was really a long 

13 distance relay. 

14 And we anticipated that at times the terrain would be 

15 rough. We anticipated that sometimes we would see adverse weather. 

16 We knew fatigue would set in due to the length of the 

17 race and the struggle associated with it. We knew there would be 

18 distractions that we'd need to persevere if we were going to be 

19 successful. 

20 Well, five years into that race here we are. We've 

21 come quite a distance. We've made -- the industry has made 

22 numerous safety improvements that have been implemented at the 

23 facilities. Plants are safer because they are better prepared to deal 

24 with extreme natural hazards. 

25 And they're better prepared for other design 

26 basis -- beyond design basis events. And as the previous panel 
 51 

1 discussed, I think they're safer because there are margins associated 

2 with being able to deal with design basis events. 

3 We've made substantial progress. The progress that 

4 we made is really a testament to the dedicated and capable folks on the 

5 staff and in the industry. 

6 And through active stakeholder engagement, external 

7 stakeholder engagements. And engagement for example with the 

8 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 

9 I would note we keep count, at this point we've had over 

10 250 public meetings. So, we've had an active engagement with those 

11 stakeholders. 

12 We've also benefitted greatly from our collaboration 

13 with our international partners in a variety of interactions. We've had 

14 active engagement in the International Atomic Energy Agency and 

15 through Nuclear Energy Agency activities as well. 

16 And so, I would say we're on the final leg of the race. 

17 And the end is within sight. Most of the safety enhancements directed 

18 by the Commission will be realized by the end of 2016. Of course we'll 

19 give you a detailed description of where we are in each of those 

20 individual enhancements. 

21 And so we've made great progress. But I want to 

22 emphasize that there's still work that remains. And we'll talk about that 

23 work that remains as well. 

24 And it remains that we need to be focused and 

25 provided leadership both on the part of the NRC and the industry in 

26 order to be ultimately successful. Slide two, please. 
 52 

1 Our approach in addressing the lessons learned from 

2 the accident has evolved substantially, I would say, from the issuance 

3 of the Near Term Task Force report in 2011. For every box on this 

4 slide, starting with the Near Term Task Force, we learned from the 

5 efforts that proceeded it. 

6 And when it was appropriate, we modified our actions 

7 based on new information. And based on lessons that we learned from 

8 performing our activities. 

9 For example, the original hardened vent orders. With 

10 those orders we expanded to address severe accident conditions. And 

11 to acknowledge the importance of water addition and containment 

12 during those circumstances. 

13 Ultimately, we added nine additional recommendations 

14 from the Near Term Task Force report. And expanded the scope of 

15 several others. In some instances we combined issues and in other 

16 instances we looked at what was recommended. 

17 We did an evaluation. We considered actions that 

18 were planned or implemented based on Tier 1 and Tier 2 items. And 

19 we decided not to pursue additional action. 

20 And of course at the end, the Commission put its -- you 

21 put in place, made a decision on each of those actions as we've moved 

22 forward. And we've been implementing those actions. 

23 We continue. We will continue to learn as we 

24 complete our post-Fukushima actions. And we'll continue to make 

25 changes, propose changes as appropriate as we go forward. Next 

26 slide, please. 
 53 

1 This slide is really intended to provide on a single 

2 picture if you will, the work that we've done. And the work that remains 

3 as we move forward on implementing the Near Term Task Force 

4 recommendations again as modified by the Staff, approved by the 

5 Commission. 

6 Our focus today really is on the actions that remain to 

7 be closed. We're going to discuss the progress made thus far and the 

8 pathway, our pathway for closing those items. 

9 But I don't want to lose sight of the fact that a number 

10 of the items, many of the items on this slide as indicated in blue, have 

11 already been closed. Next slide, please. 

12 And so I want to turn to the folks at the table, introduce 

13 them briefly. Starting with Jack Davis, who is the Director of the Japan 

14 Lesson's Learned Division. And Jack will provide an update on the 

15 status of lessons learned activities, particularly to Tier 1 activities. 

16 Mohamed Shams, all the way to my right, is the Chief 

17 of the Hazard Management Branch. He'll provide an overview of the 

18 status of flooding and hazard -- flood and seismic hazard reevaluations. 

19 Greg Bowman, who is the Acting Deputy Director for 

20 the JLD, will discuss the status of Tier 2 and Tier 3 recommendations. 

21 And last but not least, Troy Pruett, who is the Director of the Division of 

22 Reactor Projects in Region VI, will discuss the regional activities. And 

23 in particular transition to long term oversight. 

24 And so with that, I'll turn to Jack. 

25 MR. DAVIS: Thanks, Mike. And good morning 

26 Chairman and Commissioners. I'm happy to be here again to report 
 54 

1 up to you the status of where we're at with these activities since we've 

2 last met several months back. 

3 As Mike said, we continue to be on or ahead of 

4 schedule on all the activities. And we have a clearly defined path 

5 forward for the remaining items that go beyond the 2016 time frame. 

6 If I can have the next slide? Yes, that, thank you. 

7 So, starting at the top there, just I'll run some through 

8 some of the stats for you just so you know where we're at. As you 

9 heard from the industry for mitigation strategies, we're approaching 75 

10 percent in compliance. 

11 We'll have the remainder coming due this year. And 

12 in fact we've already started verification inspections on several of the 

13 facilities that Troy's going to talking to you in more detail, gives you a 

14 flavor of the things we've been finding out there. 

15 The spent fuel pool instrumentation order, about 85 

16 percent are in compliance now. And again, with the reminder due the 

17 end of the year. And we're also doing the verification inspections of 

18 those in conjunction with the mitigation strategies inspections. 

19 The hardened vents, you heard Randy talk about 

20 almost a third will have phase one, which is the wet wall vent, this year. 

21 We're expecting about 75 percent next year. And then the remainder 

22 by the 2018 backstop date. 

23 And likewise for phase two. They're coming in on a 

24 staggered scheduled. But again, most plants will be in compliance 

25 with that order. About a year ahead of the backstop date of 2019 that 

26 the Commission set. 
 55 

1 With regard to the reevaluated seismic and flooding 

2 work, again by design this goes past the 2016 time frame. We're 

3 making good progress in that area. 

4 The majority of the plants will have completed their 

5 mitigation strategy assessments as we call them by the end of this year. 

6 And again Mohamed is going to go into a lot more detail. He'll give you 

7 the break out of some of the areas that we're having somewhat of a 

8 challenge with. 

9 On emergency staffing and communications, the 

10 assessments and upgrades are in place for most licensees. And 

11 again, the few that are remaining will be done by the end of the year. 

12 We see no problem with them making that date. 

13 On rulemaking, we recently published the proposed 

14 rule for comment. We received a lot of comments. We're in the 

15 process of looking at those comments, trying to address those 

16 comments. 

17 We are on track to deliver the final rule to the 

18 Commission by the end of the year. We don't see any problem with 

19 making that date. On the next slide I'll talk a little bit more detailed 

20 about some of the comments that we had. 

21 In 2015 we took the insights as you had instructed us 

22 to do on the Tier 1. And we started applying those to the Tier 2 and 

23 Tier 3 items. And we were able to adjust our schedules to get to an 

24 earlier disposition of those items. 

25 And following the Commission's approval, we've 

26 closed all group one items now. And just recently closed group two. 
 56 

1 And again, we're on track to close the remaining group three items by 

2 the end of this year. And again, Greg will provide you more information 

3 on that. 

4 So, really what we have left with Fukushima now, 

5 where our real focus is, is the seismic, the flooding, the vent work. 

6 We're completing our safety evaluations for all of this work so we have 

7 a durable record from a regulatory standpoint. 

8 And then of course we've been over the last couple of 

9 months, perhaps even a year, transitioning some of the activities back 

10 to the line. And of course transitioning to oversight. 

11 And I would mention, you know, you heard Tony talk 

12 about he's concerned about inspections. We've been doing a lot of 

13 lessons learned, a lot of acknowledgment management with the 

14 Regions. They've been hand in hand with us throughout this process. 

15 So, if we can have the next slide, please. So, just a 

16 little bit of detail on some of the comments we got. We received about 

17 20 comment letters. 

18 And these included hundreds of individual comments. 

19 Many of the comments are going to help us further improve the clarity 

20 of the rule and get a higher quality product that can get approved. 

21 The four common areas that I've show here, it's really 

22 to give you a flavor of some of the comments that we're receiving. And 

23 also, some of the ones that perhaps have a little bit of a stickiness to 

24 them that we have to take pause and think about before we move 

25 forward with. 

26 So, starting with the loss of all AC power. There's a 
 57 

1 bit of a disagreement I guess between commenters on the concept of 

2 the loss of all AC power. 

3 In mitigation strategy we talked about it in terms of you 

4 lose offsite power concurrently with losing your emergency diesel 

5 generators. But, we allowed them to take credit for inverters for motor 

6 control centers and so on, as long as those items could be protected 

7 from the external hazards. 

8 The language that we had in the Orders we carried 

9 through to the Rule. So, some people have challenged us to say that 

10 well, that's not a strict interpretation to the loss of all AC power, right? 

11 Because you're using inverters, you really haven't from the DC busses, 

12 and you're turning it into AC. 

13 We feel that, you know, the strict interpretation of that 

14 we can still deal with. And we still have contingencies for that where 

15 they have portable equipment that they can take readings from. And 

16 they have alternate means of powering this equipment if those 

17 particular centers weren't available. 

18 And again, as I said before, that we specifically looked 

19 to make sure that for instance if we had flooding and you were going to 

20 flood out your distribution center, well, that's not acceptable to us. So, 

21 I think we can just clarify the Rule language somewhat more. And I 

22 think we would be okay in that area. 

23 On multi-source term dose assessment, we received a 

24 comment from industry that the backfit justification that we had for that 

25 was not sufficiently developed to justify the backfit. We went back. 

26 We took a look at what they had provided to us. 
 58 

1 And we feel that the initial look perhaps, there's some 

2 validity to that concern. If that stands, if that conclusion is 

3 substantiated, then perhaps a voluntary regulatory approach may be 

4 appropriate. Because we still feel that there's significant safety added 

5 by having these particular multi-source term assessments. 

6 We received regulatory commitments from all 

7 licensees back in 2014 that they were going to do this. So, we don't 

8 really see an issue with relaying on a different regulatory tool if we need 

9 to go the voluntary route. 

10 On reevaluated hazards, we received comments that 

11 the Rule language could be improved to better reflect the means of how 

12 we're addressing reevaluated hazards. And then also to incorporate 

13 risk informed approach for these hazards. 

14 We feel that we're very receptive I guess to the risk 

15 informed approach. We've done risk informed approaches with the 

16 mitigation strategies Order. And really, we believe that it's already 

17 there in the Rule. We think it's just another way for them to be saying 

18 that -- what we're already currently allowing. 

19 Nevertheless, we think that maybe the best approach 

20 here would be to put in the statements of consideration to have better 

21 clarification that risk informed approaches would be an acceptable way 

22 of dealing with some of the hazards. And then on the clarification 

23 points, we would just take those comments and put them into the Rule 

24 language itself. 

25 With the change control, I heard a lot of discussion with 

26 the previous panel on change control. We receive comments 
 59 

1 suggesting that NRC should include some more rigor, some more 

2 specific requirements in the Rule. 

3 Currently, we have it set, as you heard Tony talking 

4 about that the plants can do an evaluation. They would keep that 

5 onsite. It's certainly inspectible by the agency at any time it wants to 

6 look at those things. 

7 And we felt that that was the best way to deal with the 

8 beyond design basis nature. The fact that it's a very flexible approach 

9 so that it's really at the highest level of the strategy. 

10 That's really concerned about that they not change. 

11 And then the other things that they can change them below if they follow 

12 the normal process, would be acceptable to us. 

13 There certainly are pros and cons to putting more detail 

14 into the Rule that say here's some more explicit criteria to use. And 

15 we're going to have to go through that. 

16 We haven't even had a chance really yet to work this 

17 up the chain of leadership to get some different ideas about how we 

18 might do this. We have some options. And we're going to present 

19 those and then we'll figure out how it goes before we owe you the Rule 

20 at the end of the year. 

21 And finally, on implementation, it's another key area I 

22 think for consideration of the Rule. We have a lot of moving parts right 

23 now. A lot of different schedules with things coming into compliance. 

24 So, to -- the more that we can anticipate that and the 

25 more that we can design in if you will, the flexibility in the Rule, the better 

26 off we're going to be. Where we can avoid unnecessary burden, you 
 60 

1 know, of having people coming in and asking for an exemption when 

2 we already know that they're going to be on a certain schedule. 

3 So, we're trying to build that into the Rule as well with 

4 the language. And with that, I'll turn it over to the next speaker. 

5 MR. SHAMS: Thank you, Jack. Good morning 

6 Chairman and Commissioners. It is my pleasure to be here today 

7 reporting on seismic and flooding. And what we're doing on these 

8 activities. 

9 My first slide, I thought to put up a flow chart to describe 

10 the overall picture of how we're proceeding with flooding and seismic. 

11 It is more for the benefit of someone that might not be as familiar with 

12 the Commission is with this activity. 

13 So, last year the Commission directed the Staff to 

14 develop an action plan to ensure that the mitigation strategies address 

15 both the timely completion of the 50.54(f) letters and the insurance that 

16 the mitigation strategies addressed the reevaluated hazard. This slide 

17 provides the overview for that plan. 

18 The action plan consisted of two, as you can see, two 

19 parallel paths. One associated with ensuring that the mitigation 

20 strategy is developed in response to Order EA-12-049 can be 

21 implemented under the reevaluated hazard conditions. 

22 The other path is associated with completing the 

23 50.54(f) letters and to identify opportunities for further safety margins. 

24 The NRC and the industry are proceeding aggressively along those 

25 both paths. 

26 Developing the necessary guidance. And completing 
 61 

1 the associated assessments. I would say that the NRC Staff has clear, 

2 well-defined approaches for completing both actions. 

3 I also want to take an opportunity to indicate that as the 

4 Commission directed us in carrying out the 50.50(f) letter assessments, 

5 we always seek opportunities to focus the scope on those plants that 

6 would benefit from the safety enhancements. 

7 For example, last year we rescreened the plant's doing 

8 the SPRAs. And the Staff informed the industry that only 20 sites need 

9 to complete these detailed seismic probabilistic risk assessments. 

10 Also, with the revised guidance and flooding, we 

11 anticipate that fewer than 10 plants would need to do integrated 

12 assessments. The original count was more like 50 plants would be 

13 doing that. 

14 The remaining sites will either screen out from further 

15 evaluations or perform limited scope evaluations to complete the 

16 information request. Next slide, please? 

17 So, getting to the specifics and the statistics of what 

18 we've done. What we can see on the slide is that the Staff and industry 

19 have made substantial progress in completing the flooding and the 

20 seismic hazard reevaluations. 

21 In the seismic areas as we can see, all licensees 

22 completed the hazard reevaluation. And the Staff provided feedback 

23 on the adequacy of the reevaluated hazards. 

24 Licensees with an increase in hazard completed an 

25 interim act evaluation known as the expedited approach. And it's 

26 intended to ensure adequate seismic margin existed while the detailed 
 62 

1 risk assessments are underway. 

2 We've issued staff assessments for all central and 

3 eastern United States sites. And we are on schedule to issue the 

4 remaining three Staff assessments for the western U.S. sites. And that 

5 should be completed by the end of this year. 

6 In the flooding review area, with the exception of two 

7 sites requiring assistance from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, all 

8 sites have submitted their reevaluated flood hazard information. And 

9 the Staff is providing feedback on the acceptability of that hazard. 

10 To date we've issued 51 letters asserting the 

11 acceptability of the hazards submitted by the licensees. The remaining 

12 ten sites needed additional time to implement the U.S. Army Corps of 

13 Engineers information or to finalize calculations or licensee initiated site 

14 layout changes. 

15 The Staff expects for the remaining ten sites, we expect 

16 to provide feedback letters for the majority of them by the end of this 

17 year. There maybe one by -- in next year. 

18 We can also see on the slide, at the bottom right corner 

19 that work remains in documenting the flood reviews and staff 

20 assessments. To date we've issued only 15 staff assessments for 25 

21 percent of the sites. 

22 And I should say that this was done by design as part 

23 of our recovery plan for the flood reviews. Over the past nine months, 

24 we have directed the Staff's efforts to focus on issuing hazard letters in 

25 lieu of Staff assessments to provide the licensees with the needed 

26 information to proceed with their mitigation strategies assessments. 
 63 

1 And as a result of this movement, the vast majority of 

2 licensees are now able to and on track to complete their mitigation 

3 strategies assessments. In the coming months we will shift our focus 

4 back to issuing the remaining Staff assessment. And we will do so in 

5 an expedited manner. Next slide, please. 

6 As I indicated, we're proceeding down two parallel 

7 paths for both the seismic and flooding reviews. This slide captures 

8 the ongoing activities in the flooding review area to support both the 

9 mitigation strategies and the closure of the 50.54(f) letter. 

10 In addition to the progress and the hazard as I indicated 

11 on the previous slide, the Staff and the industry have made significant 

12 strides in developing the guidance necessary to complete the remaining 

13 assessments. 

14 And the Staff recently endorsed their revision to the 

15 industry's guidance for mitigation strategies NEI 12-06 in order to 

16 provide guidance to the licensees for performing the mitigation 

17 strategies assessments or MSAs at the reevaluated hazard level. 

18 All licensees will perform this evaluation. And the 

19 majority of them will complete it by the end of 2016. In fact Mr. 

20 Pietrangelo indicated this morning that 50 of them will be completed by 

21 the end of this year. 

22 I should say that last April we've actually received the 

23 first submittals of the MSAs. So, licensees are not waiting until the end 

24 of the year. They've already been submitting them to us. And we're 

25 in the process of reviewing them right now. 

26 To support the 50.54(f) letter, the other path, the 
 64 

1 industry submitted a revised integrated assessment -- guidance, also 

2 known as the Phase One Guidance. As directed by the Commission, 

3 this guidance provides a graded approach for performing integrated 

4 assessments such that the integrated assessments are focused on 

5 those plants where there is the greatest opportunity for additional safety 

6 enhancements. 

7 This graded approach will enable most licensees to 

8 demonstrate an effective plant response to the reevaluated hazard by 

9 submitting a focused evaluation. The limited number of sites needing 

10 to submit integrated assessments will complete them by the end of 

11 2018. 

12 In terms of endorsing the Phase One Guidance, the 

13 Staff has issued a public document, it's a draft guidance to endorse this 

14 Phase One Guidance. The Staff also met with the ACRS and 

15 discussed the Guidance and received feedback a couple of weeks ago. 

16 After addressing the public comments and the ACRS, 

17 the Staff will finalize its endorsement of the Guidance. And will inform 

18 the Commission in June prior to implementation. 

19 Another guidance document that we've been working 

20 on is the so called Phase Two Guidance. That's the Guidance on 

21 carrying out additional actions as necessary based on the integrated 

22 assessment results. 

23 We're progressing well on this Guidance as well. 

24 We're on track to complete it in October. And again, inform the 

25 Commission of its completion. Next slide, please. 

26 This slide outlines the steps in the seismic hazard 
 65 

1 reevaluation process to support, to gain the two activities, mitigation 

2 strategies assessments and the 50.54(f) letter. We're taking an 

3 approach that's similar to the flooding reevaluation approach. 

4 Again, in support of the 50.50 letter closure, since we 

5 met with the Commission last time, the Staff has endorsed the industry's 

6 guidance for performing high frequency and spent fuel pool 

7 confirmation. And the industry is proceeding to complete these 

8 confirmations on schedule. 

9 With respect to the mitigation strategies, again similar 

10 to flooding, all licensees will complete this assessment to ensure that 

11 the strategies can be implemented under the reevaluated hazard. 

12 In January of this year, the Staff endorsed Appendix H 

13 to NEI 12-06, which provides guidance to most licensees on performing 

14 this strategies assessment. And as we've seen this morning on the 

15 chart that Mr. Pietrangelo presented, the majority of licensees will be 

16 done by the middle of next year completing this assessment. 

17 I should indicate that a number of licensees are aiming 

18 to leverage insights from their probabilistic risk assessments into their 

19 mitigating strategies assessment. The guidance for those sites are 

20 under development. 

21 It has been a focused area for the Staff and the industry 

22 over the past few months. NEI plans to submit this guidance to the 

23 Staff in the third quarter of this year. And that's intended to support the 

24 schedule for the final mitigation of beyond design basis events rule. 

25 Also, in terms of Phase Two, the Staff is also working 

26 on the seismic guidance in that area. And we plan to submit it to the 
 66 

1 Commission along with the flooding guidance in October. 

2 With that, I'll turn the briefing over to Greg to talk about 

3 Tier 2 and Tier 3 recommendations. 

4 MR. BOWMAN: Thank you, Mohamed. As we 

5 discussed at our last commission meeting in November, Committee 

6 resolution on the open Tier 2 and Tier 3 recommendations has been a 

7 high priority for the Staff over the last year. 

8 We provided SECY-15-0137 to the Commission back 

9 in October with proposal for resolving each open item. And our goal in 

10 developing that paper was to identify disposition plans for each open 

11 recommendation in a timely and efficient manner while ensuring a 

12 strong technical and regulatory basis exists for our ultimate disposition 

13 approach. 

14 As we discussed in SECY-15-0137, the majority of the 

15 open Tier 2 and Tier 3 recommendations were evaluations to determine 

16 if there's a need for specific regulatory action, like issuance of an order 

17 or 50.54(f) letter, rather than a recommendation -- excuse me, there 

18 were evaluations determined that there was a need to take regulatory 

19 action rather than a recommendation to actually take a regulatory 

20 action. 

21 So, given that, our focus has been on completing those 

22 evaluations and identifying whether additional regulatory action is 

23 needed beyond what's already been done. When we briefed you on 

24 SECY-15-0137, we discussed that the recommendations fit into three 

25 groups. 

26 Group one recommendations were those we believed 
 67 

1 could be closed. Group two recommendations were those where our 

2 initial assessment identified what we felt was a sufficient closure basis. 

3 But where we felt there would be benefit to additional interaction with 

4 stakeholders before finalizing that assessment. 

5 And the group three recommendations were those that 

6 we felt required additional evaluation or development before we were 

7 ready to provide the Commission with our closure recommendation. 

8 As you know, the Commission approved the Staff's 

9 plan for the open Tier 2 and Tier 3 recommendations earlier this year, 

10 including the closure of the group one recommendations. 

11 Since that time we've completed our evaluation of the 

12 group two recommendations. Incorporating insights from our 

13 interactions with ACRS, the public and the ongoing state of the art 

14 reactor consequence analysis. 

15 We provided our final assessment to the Commission 

16 on these recommendations at the end of March. And they are now 

17 closed. 

18 In the next few slides I'll discuss our basis for closing 

19 the group two recommendations. And then I'll provide a brief status 

20 update and next steps for the group three recommendations. 

21 Before I do that, I did want to take a minute to highlight 

22 the fact that we completed an evaluation of these modified, or 

23 potassium iodine distribution practices as part of SECY-15-0137, since 

24 that issue came up on the previous panel. 

25 As part of that evaluation we considered the 

26 radiological impacts in Japan from the Fukushima accident as 
 68 

1 documented in a number of recent studies. We ultimately concluded 

2 that insights from the accident did not call into question the KI 

3 distribution practices in the U.S. 

4 So we recommended and Commission approved 

5 closure of that recommendation. Next slide, please. 

6 So this is the first group two recommendation and it 

7 came from ACRS. ACRS recommended that we assess the need to 

8 upgrade certain reactor and containment instrumentation such that it 

9 can survive the conditions that might exist during a beyond design basis 

10 event. 

11 In SECY-15-0137 we discussed that based on the 

12 results of our initial assessment, there will be only a small additional 

13 safety benefit from opposing new requirements in this area. The 

14 primary factors in that conclusion included insights from the mitigation 

15 of beyond design basis events rulemaking. 

16 And post Fukushima safety enhancements, which in 

17 addition to providing new capabilities to prevent core damage, also help 

18 ensure continuity of important instrumentation from the onset of an 

19 event at least until core damage begins. 

20 Our initial assessment also considered existing 

21 guidance for treatment of instrumentation that may be impacted by 

22 severe plant conditions. This guidance includes provisions for the use 

23 of alternate instrumentation if primary instrumentation becomes 

24 unavailable, treatment of instrumentation uncertainties that may exist in 

25 environmental conditions, the use of computational aides when direct 

26 measurement of plant parameters can't be obtained, and actions to take 
 69 

1 if conditions in the plant degrade such that there is no reliable 

2 instrumentation. 

3 Our more recent interactions with ACRS and other 

4 stakeholders have further supported our initial assessment and led to 

5 our final assessment, which closed the recommendation. The primary 

6 change from the initial to a final assessment with the addition of further 

7 discussion of the approaches that licensees would use in the event 

8 installed instrumentation is unavailable due to environmental 

9 conditions, including the use of analytical technics. 

10 It also reflects recent developments associated with 

11 the Severe Accident Management Guidelines. Including the submittal 

12 of SAMG-related commitment letters from power reactor licensees, and 

13 the Staff's progress in developing the oversight program for SAMGs. 

14 Our recent paper also notes that we will continue with 

15 ongoing work to update guidance that could be used on a voluntary 

16 basis by the industry if they choose to make instrumentation 

17 enhancements. Next slide, please. 

18 The next group two recommendation came from the 

19 Near Term Task Force recommendation 5.2. And it involved an 

20 evaluation of the need for hardened vents on containments other than 

21 Mark I's and Mark II's. 

22 SECY-15-0137 provided a containment by 

23 containment initial assessment of this recommendation along with 

24 plants to obtain input from external stakeholders and the ACRS before 

25 finalizing that assessment. 

26 Our initial assessment considered a substantial 
 70 

1 information that was available pre-Fukushima studies on containment 

2 performance such as the Containment Performance Improvement 

3 Program from the 1980s. 

4 We also considered the post-Fukushima Mitigating 

5 Strategies Order, EA-12-049. This includes requirements for 

6 maintenance of the containment function under extended loss of AC 

7 power conditions. 

8 This Order applies to licensees of all containment types 

9 and addresses the primary objective of the initial Mark I and Mark II 

10 containment vent order specifically to remove heat and pressure from 

11 the containment. 

12 For example, for Mark III containment types, 

13 compliance with the Mitigating Strategy Order requires licensees to put 

14 in place measures to remove heat from the containment, generally 

15 through repowering suppression pool cooling equipment using portable 

16 power supplies. 

17 Finally, insights from the graph containment protection 

18 and release reduction regulatory basis for Mark I and II containments 

19 supports the finding that any risk benefit resulting from enhanced 

20 venting capabilities for other containments would likely be orders of 

21 magnitude below the quantitative health objectives. 

22 Meaning that we would not be able to justify such 

23 action as a cost beneficial substantial safety benefit under the backfit 

24 rule. 

25 Since providing the Commission with our initial 

26 assessment, we've enhanced that assessment based on interactions 
 71 

1 with the ACRS and the public. And we've also incorporated insights 

2 from the ongoing SOARCA study for Sequoyah, an ice condenser plant, 

3 in additional analysis we've done for Mark III containments. 

4 As with the previous recommendation, the work we've 

5 done since completing our initial assessment, further supports the 

6 staff's initial conclusion that further regulatory action in this 

7 recommendation is not warranted. Next slide, please. 

8 The final group two recommendation, recommendation 

9 six, came from the Near Term Task Force. And it recommended that 

10 the staff evaluate the need for enhancements for control and mitigation 

11 of hydrogen inside containments in an adjacent structure based on 

12 insights from the accident. 

13 In evaluating this recommendation, we were able to 

14 take advantage of significant information available from previous 

15 studies as well as from a recent international effort to study hydrogen 

16 control practices. 

17 As with the previous recommendation the October 

18 SECY paper provided a containment by containment initial assessment 

19 of this recommendation. And we concluded that additional study is 

20 unlikely to identify the need for further regulatory action. 

21 That conclusion was based in part on existing 

22 requirements in 10 CFR 50.54 for containment hydrogen control. And 

23 the fact that the mitigating strategies order provides a layer of defense 

24 against core damage and the resulting hydrogen generation that didn't 

25 exist before the Fukushima accident. 

26 Our initial evaluation also considered a number of 
 72 

1 containment specific factors. For example, in the case of Mark III and 

2 ice condenser containment types, compliance with the Mitigating 

3 Strategies Order includes provisions for repowering hydrogen ignitors 

4 from portable power supplies. 

5 The analysis we've done have shown that the 

6 availability of the hydrogen ignitors can significantly improve 

7 performance of the containment under severe accident conditions. 

8 Finally, as with the previous recommendation, studies 

9 completed for the containment performance and release reduction 

10 rulemaking show that imposition of additional requirements in this area 

11 beyond those already in place, wouldn't be justified under the backfit 

12 rule. 

13 So, we've enhanced our initial assessment based on 

14 interactions with ACRS and the public. And we've also incorporated 

15 insights from the ongoing SOARCA analysis for Sequoyah, and some 

16 additional analysis for Mark III containments. 

17 As with the previous two recommendations, the work 

18 we've done since our October paper further supports the staff's initial 

19 assessment that this recommendation should be closed. Next slide, 

20 please. 

21 So, in addition to our focus on the group two 

22 recommendations, we've also been working on completing our 

23 evaluation of the group three recommendations, which are listed on this 

24 slide. 

25 In our October SECY paper we described a four step 

26 screening process for evaluation of external hazards other than seismic 
 73 

1 and flooding. We're nearing the completion of a paper that will provide 

2 the Commission with the results of the second step of that process, 

3 which will identify a list of hazards that will require additional review. 

4 We held a public meeting on that subject in early April. 

5 And we recently met with the ACRS full committee and subcommittee. 

6 We plan to provide our paper to the Commission at the end of this 

7 month. And then our overall assessment of that issue at the end of the 

8 year. 

9 We've also been working on developing an approach 

10 that can be used going forward to systematically assess new 

11 information related to external hazards. This project is related to Near 

12 Term Task Force recommendation 22, although it's been expanded to 

13 include more than just seismic and flooding hazards as was originally 

14 envisioned. 

15 We've begun developing a proposal to address this 

16 recommendation. And we're planning to engage with stakeholders, 

17 including the public, the industry, other governmental organizations and 

18 the ACRS in the coming months. Our approach for resolving this 

19 recommendation is due to the Commission at the end of this year. 

20 The final group three recommendation involves an 

21 assessment of the need for real time radiation monitoring in the 

22 emergency planning zones and onsite. We've been actively evaluating 

23 this recommendation since October and we're on schedule to have the 

24 final assessment completed by the end of this year. 

25 So, in summary we're on track to complete our 

26 evaluation of all the group three recommendations later this year 
 74 

1 consistent with the initial plans we provided to the Commission. And 

2 with that I'd like to turn to -- I'd like to thank the Commission first for the 

3 opportunity to brief you on this important activity, and turn the 

4 presentation over to Troy to discuss oversight activities. 

5 MR. PRUETT: Thanks, Greg. Good morning, 

6 Chairman and Commissioners. Today, I'll be discussing the Regions' 

7 role in oversight. The NRC Staff conducted onsite audits to review 

8 technical issues and observe modifications to the plant. Following 

9 notification by a licensee that compliance has been achieved, the NRC 

10 Staff will complete a safety evaluation to document its assessment of 

11 licensee's final integration plan for compliance. This safety evaluation 

12 will be used to provide regulatory assurance and support completion of 

13 the NRC inspection activities. TI-191 is being used to verify 

14 compliance. 

15 Staff from JLD, who are responsible for the safety 

16 evaluations, will be assisting the Regions in the initial inspections. 

17 Additionally, Headquarters staff may all assist in the inspections. 

18 Cross-regional teams are being utilized during the initial inspections in 

19 each Region. The Staff is using cross-regional panels, along with 

20 established process, such as the significance determination process, to 

21 disposition any performance issues identified with these inspections. 

22 A draft Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix O is out for 

23 industry comment. In it's current form, Appendix O would have a 

24 detailed risk evaluation performed if one of the three safety functions of 

25 core cooling, spent fuel pool cooling, or containment is unavailable for 

26 more than 72 hours. So what that will do is kick it out to a Phase 3 
 75 

1 analysis. Next slide, please. Inspections will be scheduled shortly 

2 after the Staff issues the safety evaluation for each plant. And just as 

3 a side note, that's about four to six months from the time we get the 

4 safety evaluation in-house. That gives us time to notify the licensees 

5 through traditional processes that we're planning an inspection activity. 

6 A pilot inspection was completed at Watts Bar in 2015. 

7 More recent inspections have been completed at North Anna, 

8 Robinson, and Cook. The majority of inspections conducted under 

9 TI-191 will be completed in 2017. Inspection issues to date have 

10 involved the adequacy of procedures for storing and testing FLEX 

11 equipment, calculations for room heat-up following a loss of ventilation, 

12 and labels marking deployment locations or hall paths. All of the 

13 observations have either been minor or of very low safety significance 

14 or green. With more plants coming into compliance with the new 

15 requirements, inspection and oversight activities will increase from this 

16 point forward. 

17 The Staff has developed a transition to oversight plan. 

18 The transition plan outlines roles and responsibilities and ongoing 

19 activities. The plan ensures consistent implementation through 

20 engagement and alignment of management. For example, 

21 cross-regional panels and cross-regional participation in development 

22 of programmatic tools. The plan provides for enhanced knowledge 

23 transfer opportunities. For example, visits to sites and the response 

24 centers, training at regional counterpart meetings, and bi-weekly calls. 

25 And the plan also provides for development of knowledge management 

26 tools. Those involve training modules and the development of a 
 76 

1 SharePoint site to exchange knowledge items. 

2 Once all initial inspections have been completed, a 

3 longer term inspection process will be developed using TI-191 as a 

4 basis and incorporating any lessons learned. Normal processes will 

5 be used for long term oversight, such as the Baseline Inspection 

6 Program under the Reactor Oversight Process. The Staff is currently 

7 conducting training and creating a conduit for sharing information 

8 among the Regions and other NRC Staff. We are also working with 

9 industry representatives to prepare for our onsite activities. 

10 A number of related activities are ongoing with long 

11 term oversight. For example, the Staff is developing the oversight 

12 program for the National SAFER Response Centers using the vendor 

13 inspection program. Findings at the SAFER Response Centers are 

14 expected to be dispositioned by issuing Notices of Nonconformance to 

15 the vendor overseeing the facility. The Staff plans to develop the 

16 inspection approach for the hardened vent order and for any changes 

17 made to the mitigation strategies in response to the reevaluated 

18 flooding or seismic hazards. 

19 All licensees submitted commitment letters in 2015 to 

20 integrate severe accident management guidelines, or SAMGs, into their 

21 emergency response procedures. The NRC Staff will review the 

22 generic BWR and PWR SAMGs, implement the necessary training for 

23 Staff, and revise inspection guidance. Changes to inspection 

24 guidance for site specific SAMGs should be completed by December 

25 2020. That's all my comments, Mike. I'll turn it over to you. 

26 MR. JOHNSON: Thanks, Troy. Slide 19, please. So 
 77 

1 as you can see, we have achieved significant progress on implementing 

2 the safety enhancements as a result of the Fukushima accident. As 

3 outlined in the presentation, we're on track to ensure that the majority 

4 of those safety enhancements are in place by 2016, the end of 2016. 

5 As we -- finishing with the point that I made at the start, our work's not 

6 done. Hopefully we've reemphasized the importance that we push to 

7 the finish line those activities in seismic and flooding, for example, that 

8 we do the transition to oversight, that we capture knowledge as we go 

9 forward. 

10 We're going to continue to monitor research activities 

11 and work that might be coming from other Lessons Learned activities 

12 as they happen in our country and around the world. We'll continue to 

13 engage effectively with stakeholders, as I think we have in the past, to 

14 solicit their input and consider them in our activities. We're going to 

15 continue to stay attuned to what happens in the international community 

16 and make adjustments, proposed changes should they be warranted. 

17 So, again, I think we've made good progress, we'll continue to stay 

18 engaged as we go forward as a result of the items that have been raised 

19 as a result of the lessons -- associated with the Fukushima Lessons 

20 Learned, to ensure that we do in fact make plants safer. This 

21 concludes the Staff's briefing and we look forward to the question that 

22 you may have. 

23 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Thank you, Mike. And, again, 

24 we'll begin questions with Commissioner Baran. 

25 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Well, thanks everyone for 

26 your work and for your presentations. One of the ongoing Tier 3 efforts 
 78 

1 is focused on developing a system for proactively evaluating new 

2 external hazard information on a routine basis. The goal is basically to 

3 actively seek out new scientific information that may deepen and refine 

4 our understanding of external hazards. I think it's an important effort, 

5 particularly in light of the expected impacts of climate change on some 

6 hazards, like flooding, extreme temperatures, and drought. Greg 

7 provided a brief update on the status of this work, but I would be 

8 interested in hearing a little bit more about where we are on that. I 

9 know you have all year to do it, but I'm curious about where we are. 

10 MR. BOWMAN: Yes. So, we are in the, sort of the 

11 early phases of developing the process and we don't have internal 

12 alignment yet on how it will look. Our thoughts right now, we have a 

13 framework put together that would consist of essentially three 

14 components. The first being knowledge management, where we take 

15 the Lessons Learned from Recommendations 2.1 and 2.3, we take the 

16 things we've learned about plant response to those hazards and 

17 incorporate them into sort of a -- sort of memorialize them so we can 

18 use them going forward. 

19 The second component would be to sort of either 

20 establish new or reestablish relationships with other federal agencies 

21 and with the industry that are involved in hazard assessment. Things 

22 like -- groups like NOAA, the Army Corps of Engineers, EPRI, to support 

23 us going forward in that initiative. As part of that, we would be looking 

24 to establish routine interactions with those organizations so that we can 

25 gain insights from the work they're doing. 

26 And then the third component of it would be sort of the 
 79 

1 implementation component of the process, where we take new hazard 

2 information in, we screen it against established criteria, we decide if 

3 further regulatory action is needed. So those are the three main 

4 components we're looking at. We do have some work left to do sort of 

5 to align internally and then to get input from external stakeholders 

6 before we're ready to propose an approach to the Commission. 

7 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Okay. Well, thanks for 

8 that update. I think there are at least two approaches one could take 

9 to assessing external hazards. One is to do a periodic reevaluation 

10 after a set number of years. And another approach is what you all are 

11 looking at right now, which is, is there a way to do it on a more ongoing 

12 basis? It sounds like, based on the work you've done to date, 

13 that -- well, I'll just ask it as a question. Does it look like doing this on 

14 more of an ongoing basis is going to be a feasible thing to accomplish? 

15 MR. BOWMAN: I think it is feasible. There are a 

16 number of challenges, though. I mean, I'll give one example and then 

17 Mo might have additional examples, but the tools that we have available 

18 to us to assess hazards are not fully developed for all types of hazards. 

19 You heard that our work in seismic has benefitted greatly from the fact 

20 that that was a very well developed field. Flooding is not quite at the 

21 same place. And so, going forward, we're going to be challenged, I 

22 believe, in the maturity of those tools and applying them going forward. 

23 So that will be a challenge. I think it's feasible for us to develop an 

24 approach, but we want to make sure that that approach is consistent, 

25 predictable, and not overly resource burdensome. 

26 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Okay. 
 80 

1 MR. BOWMAN: So, I think it's feasible. I think there 

2 are challenges that are going to require attention from the management 

3 team at the NRC. 

4 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Well, I'm looking forward to 

5 seeing what you come up with over the next several months. I really 

6 appreciate that you're doing this work, I think it's important and I think 

7 it's an interesting approach that's a little different than what people were 

8 originally suggesting -- 

9 MR. BOWMAN: Right. 

10 COMMISSIONER BARAN: -- here, but it may have 

11 some real benefits of going that way. Mike, I also wanted to follow up 

12 on the discussion I had with the first panel about how announcements 

13 of plant shutdowns will affect compliance with post-Fukushima safety 

14 enhancements or requirements. On the first panel, we talked a little bit 

15 about the example of Oyster Creek essentially getting an exemption 

16 from the requirement to install a wetwell vent. I just mentioned 

17 Fitzpatrick recently submitted a couple of requests. Are we expecting 

18 to receive more exemption or extension requests of this type, either for 

19 the vent requirements or for other post-Fukushima requirements? 

20 MR. JOHNSON: Thanks, Commissioner. I don't really 

21 know whether or to what extent we might get additional requests for 

22 relaxations. I would say certainly it's possible or feasible that we 

23 would, but we don't know of any today. But, if I can just go forward 

24 then with that notion, one of the things that I want to point out, as I was 

25 listening to the discussion in the previous panel, is that for the majority 

26 of plants that we know about between now and 2018, the majority of 
 81 

1 those will be in compliance with the mitigating strategies rule, for 

2 example, with the spent fuel pool instrumentation order. So, those 

3 plants we know about. 

4 For plants that have to put in vents, severe accident 

5 capable hardened vents, those orders become effective around, or 

6 those implementation dates are around 2018-2019, which is when 

7 those plants would be shutting down. So we have a good understanding 

8 about the folks who are on the plate, if you will, with respect to their 

9 intentions. And I think because we, for example, had built into the 

10 mitigating strategies rulemaking actually provisions for plants in 

11 decommissioning, once that rule is effective, we'll be in a stable place 

12 from a regulatory perspective dealing with those, should they happen 

13 after that fact. 

14 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Right now, in the absence 

15 of having gone final on the mitigating strategies rule, can you talk to us 

16 a little bit about how the Staff evaluates these exemption or extension 

17 requests? 

18 MR. JOHNSON: Sure, Commissioner. If I could, I'm 

19 going to ask Jack to do most of that discussion. I do want to point out 

20 that, as you are aware, because you made this point actually in the 

21 earlier panel, it is a case-by-case evaluation. When we look at what is 

22 requested, it's often plant specific. When we look at what we would 

23 consider, in fact, it is plant specific, case specific. And so, because 

24 plants give us lots of leeway typically for those requests, we have 

25 enough time to look at what their rationale is, what their justification is, 

26 what compensatory things they might be doing, and that enables us to 
 82 

1 be very thoughtful and deliberate about making a decision. So, Jack, 

2 do you want to add to that? 

3 MR. DAVIS: Sure, thanks, Mike. Yes. And I think it's 

4 important to point out too that really we've had two sets, if you will, of 

5 different kinds of exemptions. From the mitigation strategy order, the 

6 majority of those, all of them, I take it back, all of them have been just 

7 to extend some time for them to complete it. It's still meeting the 

8 backstop date. The few that go beyond there are related to the plant 

9 shutting down. So for the -- you mentioned Oyster Creek, I think it's 

10 important to recognize, we look at those very seriously, we expect them 

11 to have compensatory measures in place to essentially accomplish the 

12 same thing they would have accomplished with the order. 

13 In Oyster Creek's case, in particular, the wetwell vent 

14 that they currently have, they still have to be able to operate those 

15 valves, open and close that vent without any mode of force, without any 

16 a/c power. So they had to have additional commitments put in place 

17 to have, like, nitrogen bottles, for instance. Those questions that we 

18 asked of them were all done in the public's eye. So the RAIs that went 

19 out, their responses that came back, were all publically available. 

20 So we take it very serious, we do it on a one-off basis, 

21 and we have to make some engineering judgment as to, as Mike said, 

22 they're shutting down right around the time that the plant would have to 

23 be in compliance anyway, does it really make sense to have them do 

24 that upgrade or is it better to go with a compensatory measure? 

25 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Some of these 

26 requirements, including the vent requirement, were determined by the 
 83 

1 Commission to be necessary for adequate protection of public health 

2 and safety. How does that effect play into the Staff's evaluation of an 

3 extension or exemption request? 

4 MR. JOHNSON: Well, so this is another one I'll start 

5 and then, if you guys want to join in, please do. So even at the time 

6 when the orders were effective, adequate protection basis, we 

7 recognize that there would be time necessary for licensees to come into 

8 compliance with those, because they needed to do designs, if you will, 

9 or purchase equipment, do training, and all of those things. So, we 

10 always recognized that there would be some amount of time needed. 

11 Relaxation requests are adjusting that period of time based on what 

12 they might encounter on a plant specific basis. 

13 And so, we think it's reasonable, actually, if it can be 

14 justified, to grant those adjustments. So we're not determining 

15 whether or not they come into compliance, we're determining how long 

16 it takes. And then, someone mentioned, I think on an earlier panel, 

17 we'd be looking at, among other things, the risk and the exposure 

18 period, compensatory actions, and a number of things that we 

19 considered in granting those. 

20 MR. DAVIS: Yes. I would just add, Commissioner, 

21 that, in the case of Oyster Creek, they still have to comply with the order, 

22 just because we extended the time, right? So, let's say they shut 

23 down, then they need to come with an exemption request and we 

24 needed to evaluate that to determine whether we would allow that to 

25 occur. In other plants similar to that, if they're shut down, they still have 

26 a component, right, that they'd have to protect, and that's the spent fuel. 
 84 

1 So, it's not just that we're allowing them to not have to comply with the 

2 order, it's the timing of when they would comply with it. And we look at 

3 that on a case-by-case basis. 

4 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Well, and I don't want to get 

5 in and spend a lot of time on the kind of semantic element of it, but if we 

6 have a plant, Oyster Creek we'll just take as example, a plant that's 

7 planning to shut down in a certain year -- 

8 MR. DAVIS: Yes. 

9 COMMISSIONER BARAN: -- 2019, and they get an 

10 extension on the wetwell requirement until after the point they're shut 

11 down, whether we call that an extension or we call it an exemption, I 

12 mean, practically speaking, it's going to be the same thing, right? I 

13 mean, they're going to have to shut down by that point, I don't think 

14 anyone thinks at that point we're going to require them to put in a wet 

15 well after the plant's shut down, right? I mean, that's -- 

16 MR. DAVIS: Yes. But you wouldn't need it at that 

17 point either, right? 

18 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Right. But, I mean, 

19 that's -- 

20 MR. DAVIS: But you would still have -- 

21 COMMISSIONER BARAN: That's kind of my point, 

22 right? 

23 MR. DAVIS: -- other components of -- 

24 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Is that for all practical 

25 purposes, the extension is an exemption, it's saying that, for this plant 

26 shutting down in a few years, you don't need to do a wetwell vent. 
 85 

1 MR. DAVIS: If they chose to stay in operation, they 

2 would have to -- 

3 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Oh, well that's a fair point. 

4 MR. DAVIS: -- it would be required, right? 

5 COMMISSIONER BARAN: If the announcement 

6 turned out not to -- 

7 MR. DAVIS: Right. 

8 COMMISSIONER BARAN: -- be effectuated, then 

9 that -- 

10 MR. DAVIS: And then there's other components of that, 

11 I think is the key point. Like, for instance, on mitigation strategies, and 

12 they still have certain pieces of the order that they would still have to 

13 comply with, even though they're in a shutdown state, because they still 

14 have fuel onsite. So, it's not a complete -- again, that's why it has to 

15 be looked at and they have to ask for rescission or relaxation of certain 

16 components. 

17 COMMISSIONER BARAN: I'm a little over on time, but 

18 I just want to ask one thing. It came up a little bit, I think, maybe on the 

19 first panel. If additional requests for an exemption or extension or 

20 relaxation, however we're talking about it, are submitted for other plants 

21 that are shutting down, will the Staff consider seeking public comment 

22 on those? 

23 MR. JOHNSON: So, we don't, as you well know, as a 

24 part of that process, seek public comment. I would hasten to add that 

25 we've provided, and I tried to illustrate the high level of stakeholder 

26 interaction that we've had from the time the orders were issued, from 
 86 

1 the time we were crafting guidance for how those orders would be 

2 implemented, through interactions that we've had with licensees as 

3 we've tweaked guidance based on lessons learned, and in fact, 

4 someone made the point, when we issue an RAI, those are publically 

5 available. So there's good public visibility, there's not a formal way in 

6 our process today by which we would go beyond that. There is a 2.206 

7 process that could be used by individuals who want to request action of 

8 the Agency. We've seen that used in a number of instances and would 

9 encourage folks to continue to use that if they see fit. 

10 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Well, and I'll wrap up, these 

11 are pretty significant decisions and I would imagine that, for many of 

12 them to be pretty significant stakeholder interest. Even if we're not 

13 required to seek public comment, even if we haven't done so as a matter 

14 of practice in the past, is there any reason we shouldn't think about 

15 doing that going forward in cases of significant exemptions that would 

16 have significant stakeholder interest? 

17 MR. JOHNSON: So, I would just say in response to 

18 your question that, we will look, we look to try to provide as much 

19 visibility as we can through the process. There are downsides, there 

20 are concerns that we would have by engaging in sort of a protracted 

21 interaction as a part of the decision process on some of these actions. 

22 So, personally, I'm comfortable with where we are, we could make sure 

23 through additional actions that we provide greater visibility if there were 

24 a concern that that's not the case. 

25 COMMISSIONER BARAN: Okay. Well, it's 

26 something to think about, we can talk about it down the road. Thanks. 
 87 

1 Mr. Chairman? 

2 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. Thank you. One of the 

3 questions I would have is, and we talked about in the first panel and as 

4 well as in the Staff presentations, talk about ongoing engagement in the 

5 international community in terms of research, other types of activities 

6 that are ongoing that contributed to further understanding of the 

7 Fukushima Dia-ichi accident, as well as strategies to basically respond 

8 to it or to prevent or mitigate such actions. 

9 Are there particular deliverables, I would say, over the 

10 next few years we're looking at, obviously I think and Commissioner 

11 Svinicki talked in the discussion we had on things like looking at some 

12 of the research on the fuel will obviously of necessity have to extend 

13 out a number of years. But are there particular deliverables we're 

14 looking for from IAEA or from the NEA or even bilaterally that might 

15 inform us? Thanks. 

16 MR. LEE: Thank you. 

17 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Just identify yourself for the 

18 record and -- 

19 MR. LEE: Richard Lee from Office of Research. First 

20 is that I want to say the MELCOR code is an NRC code, it's not a DoE 

21 code. In terms of international efforts, the -- 

22 CHAIRMAN BURNS: It's our brand. 

23 (Laughter.) 

24 MR. LEE: The NEA just finished what Steve was 

25 participating in, the so-called -- I have to read it --it's the Senior Expert 

26 Group on Safety Research Opportunity Post-Fukushima. The report 
 88 

1 will be coming out sometime in June. And they have identified two 

2 issues that in the near term, between three to four years, that they will 

3 look into that will have a bearing on how to advise the Government of 

4 Japan on the forensic. Those two activities have to do with the study 

5 of the field debris using similar debris and analysis. That is to help 

6 them, how do you develop tools for decommissioning? 

7 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. 

8 MR. LEE: That will be useful for them because when 

9 we do the analysis, the predictions of the fuel behavior is different, but 

10 when the cool down, it's completely different. It's a very difficult 

11 material to cut, as we have learned from TMI. Another one has to do 

12 with -- the second activity has to do with getting rid of the contaminated 

13 water in the buildings, especially the turbine buildings, in all the three 

14 units, so they can stage the recovery, that the staff can work in a 

15 reasonable dose environment. 

16 So, those two activities are proposed for the next three 

17 to five years. During that period, they will also try to, how do you call 

18 it, fine tune what type of information that during the decommission that 

19 the TEPCO can look for that can help us to evaluate our severe accident 

20 analysis code worldwide. So those are the two activities near term that 

21 NEA will propose by the regulatory agency from Japan. 

22 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. 

23 MR. LEE: Another thing is that the U.S. DOE also 

24 established a bilateral so-called Civilian Nuclear Working Group, that 

25 we do track. And one of the activities has to establish an international 

26 framework for doing the forensic, just like the TMI international efforts. 
 89 

1 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. Thanks very much. 

2 That's helpful. One of the other things I'll ask, with respect to 

3 international evaluations, I think as you know, last year, I think, around 

4 the time of the General Conference at the IAEA, the IAEA's report on 

5 the accident was issued. I think we had done sort of at least a survey 

6 on it with respect to comparability or whether, I think, there's a match in 

7 terms of actions to staff, or at least the Commission had looked at. Is 

8 there anything more you would want to say on that in terms of where 

9 we are? I don't know, in terms of any further look with respect to that 

10 or insights we've had from that report? 

11 MR. BOWMAN: So we have completed our evaluation 

12 of the report and we did not identify any gaps or any areas where we 

13 felt additional regulatory action was warranted based on insights from 

14 the report. I think, as you know, we had representatives from the NRC 

15 participating on the working groups that developed the report itself, so 

16 I think -- 

17 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Yes. 

18 MR. BOWMAN: -- we were pretty well informed on 

19 what the report was going to say. And we had things pretty well 

20 captured when the report ultimately came out. 

21 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. And, Greg, while we're 

22 there, with respect to -- this is a question I think Commissioner Baran 

23 touched upon, about trying to create a framework for ongoing 

24 evaluation of hazards and natural hazards versus a periodic. What do 

25 we know about in terms of other regulatory bodies and what they do? 

26 My guess may be that they have gone, given their other framework for 
 90 

1 licensing and oversight to this periodic review or whatever. 

2 MR. BOWMAN: So, I don't know if where we are in the 

3 process we've had a chance to gain insights from what the international 

4 community does. But I think it's a very fair point that, other regulatory 

5 bodies have extensive experience doing PSRs, for example, and we 

6 can gain insights from that as we move forward and develop our 

7 process. So that's a very fair point, I think. 

8 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. It's an interesting 

9 concept, because on the one hand, what I've also heard in terms of 

10 what some of them like about our process is the notion of the back-fit 

11 experience of it and use of the back-fit rule, which they may not 

12 necessarily be able to apply during the, for example, ten year period or 

13 the five year period. 

14 MR. BOWMAN: And I guess the one thing I would point 

15 out is, we developed the process for evaluation of other hazards. One 

16 of the things we're thinking is, not making it -- we're thinking it might not 

17 be an ongoing review, a stand-alone ongoing review, but an ongoing 

18 review plus a periodic look at what we've compiled over the last X 

19 number of years, so we can see if cumulatively things have changed. 

20 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. 

21 MR. BOWMAN: So it's more than just a continuum, it's 

22 points in -- 

23 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Or if you have stop points or -- 

24 MR. BOWMAN: That's correct. 

25 CHAIRMAN BURNS: -- hold points in the process? 

26 MR. BOWMAN: Yes. 
 91 

1 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. I think that's going to be 

2 interesting. And I know that's a good issue to work on. One of the 

3 things I think Tony Pietrangelo mentioned, and I think in some of the 

4 Staff presentations as well, is this notion of an effective knowledge 

5 transfer and knowledge management, particularly as you get to a point 

6 where we've been in, let's say the last four to five years, we've been 

7 particularly in an implementation of additional requirements or 

8 evaluations or the like. Those are now coming behind us, partly 

9 because the requirements are there, they need to be implemented, they 

10 will be implemented. What do you see as a, and reflecting on what I 

11 think I heard Tony say, what do you see as particular challenges in that 

12 transfer? And how do you intend to manage that? 

13 MR. DAVIS: So, one of the things that we see as 

14 potentially a challenge is, the group of folks that have been involved on 

15 the industry side have been, they're Fukushima leads, if you will, and 

16 they have a group of people that do the Fukushima work, allowing the 

17 regular plant folks to keep their focus on safety. As they're 

18 transitioning back to the line and we're starting to get into inspections, 

19 those folks now have to pick up where the Fukushima guys left off, if 

20 you will. And so, we're concerned that the knowledge there is not 

21 necessarily transferring perhaps as quickly as we would like. 

22 So, we've already been in communications with 

23 industry and we're talking about having a workshop later this year where 

24 we can kind of influx them, if you will, with the understanding of what 

25 we know, because we've been in the trenches for quite a few years. 

26 We're doing the similar thing with the TI. After so many of the TI, we're 
 92 

1 going to step back and take a look and say, okay, is there any Lessons 

2 Learned here? We're doing the same thing with the SEs, we're about 

3 four or five SEs in now and we want to have a workshop and kind of 

4 work through, what are some of the things that we're seeing on either 

5 side? 

6 We've been doing a lot of the work, again, as I 

7 mentioned before, with the Regions. We've been bringing them all 

8 along throughout this process. In fact, they've helped us a lot of times 

9 with the audit process. So they're already very, very familiar with what 

10 Fukushima is, what beyond design basis things are, and how we're 

11 going to inspect to those. So, we feel pretty comfortable from that 

12 perspective. But, again, there are some challenges with perhaps 

13 pockets as we move forward. 

14 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. I mean, one of the things 

15 is, looking back at the Three Mile Island accident, as we sit here today 

16 and a few of us were around at the time, but is there something -- in 

17 reflecting on this, do I wish I knew something better about what we did 

18 or what we were trying to get at about TMI today, is there anything like 

19 that, because you almost have -- it seems to me it may be worthwhile 

20 asking the question of ourselves, what are we still asking ourselves 

21 about in terms of TMI or understanding what we did at that time and 

22 does that help inform how we might sort of capture that knowledge or 

23 capture -- 

24 MR. DAVIS: I mean, certainly, you saw from Mike's 

25 presentation that throughout this process we've continually adjusted 

26 ourselves. We're in a continuing learning mode, so as we learn new 
 93 

1 information, we say, perhaps what we originally thought might have 

2 been might have been something of value is not as much, we adjust 

3 ourselves. And I think what Tony said and what Commissioner 

4 Ostendorff said about using this equipment in other capacities helps us 

5 to better understand and integrate it, if you will, and be ready for, if that 

6 time ever happened, it would be tragic, but if it ever happened, we'd be 

7 ready for it. 

8 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. And last question, I'll 

9 ask -- 

10 MR. JOHNSON: Can I just -- on that -- 

11 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Sure. 

12 MR. JOHNSON: -- also note that we have, in fact, 

13 reaching back over the years, captured sort of the higher level 

14 learnings, if you will, in preparing for the unknown, keeping a 

15 questioning attitude, those kinds of things. And those are captured 

16 actually in documents that we've written, published, they are already a 

17 part of our NUREG knowledge capture series, if you will. We've done 

18 seminars for the Staff. And when I look internationally, there have 

19 been similar sorts of activities. Those are a part of the very practical 

20 detail things that we've done, like writing essays, like doing hand-offs 

21 along the way, the kinds of things that Jack and Troy talked about. So 

22 it's all of that stuff, I think, that we have to continue to do as we go 

23 forward. 

24 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. And if my colleagues will 

25 indulge me, what I was going to ask Troy is, if you could just give maybe 

26 some better detail in terms of what the Temporary Instruction focuses 
 94 

1 on? What are we asking our inspectors to go look at or how to 

2 accomplish that? I think that would help others in the audience and me 

3 as well. 

4 MR. PRUETT: Sure. So the first thing is the safety 

5 evaluation that the Staff prepares informs the inspection team as to 

6 what activities need to be looked at. And in practice, they go out, they 

7 discuss the strategies with the licensee's teams, they do field 

8 walk-downs, they'll watch simulations to make sure things can be 

9 hooked up, they do inventories, they have all the right equipment, they'll 

10 go out to the SAFER Centers, but the onsite storage centers. In some 

11 cases, they observe testing and maintenance of the equipment. They 

12 compare the procedures back to the operator's use, they can take the 

13 procedures back to the technician's understanding of how the 

14 equipment operators and how it will be deployed at a high level. They 

15 also look at emergency preparedness, communication links. I don't 

16 think that will leave anything out. 

17 Most of my team leaders, at least in Region IV, our 

18 team leaders went out with the audit teams on a few occasions to 

19 understand how the process was evolving. We're using the same core 

20 team to do all of the inspections in Region IV, plus the Resident 

21 Inspector from each site. And our team leaders, before they start in 

22 Region IV, they go out and participate in the team inspections at the 

23 other sites. So, John Mateychick, who is one of my team leaders, was 

24 at Cook recently doing the inspection up there, and my other team 

25 leader, Ryan Alexander, will be at, I forget which site, somewhere in 

26 Region II, in a couple of weeks doing the same kind of thing. 
 95 

1 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Okay. Thanks very much. 

2 Commissioner Svinicki? 

3 COMMISSIONER SVINICKI: Well, thank you for your 

4 presentations. And my colleagues have asked some good questions, 

5 but I'll just make some comments and ask some questions in no 

6 particular order. But, I guess, I think I will start, Mike, with your context 

7 and kind of scene setter, a brief overview of how we got to where we 

8 are today. It's hard not to step back and reflect on that a little bit. I 

9 think you mentioned over 250 public meetings, if I jotted down the 

10 number correct. 

11 I hesitate to tell this story, because people who have 

12 smartphones, some in the audience are going to pull out their 

13 smartphones and do this as soon as I say it, but someone pointed out 

14 to me just yesterday that if you go to Google Search, I have the Google 

15 app on my phone, but if you go to Google Search and click on an image 

16 search, if you type in the search chain, public meeting Japan, so that's 

17 it, there's no nuclear, there's no Fukushima, an interesting thing comes 

18 up. It is almost entirely, at least the first couple of pages, are pictures 

19 of NRC Commission public meetings. 

20 I don't -- that might be maybe a commentary on other 

21 public meetings in Japan, but it's interesting to me that -- so the thing 

22 is, the very first picture, Commissioner Ostendorff, you and I are in it. 

23 It's a picture of this side of the table at a Commission meeting. Not that 

24 I go Googling for image searches that yield images of me, there's 

25 people like Dave Skeen and others in there, but I think that's -- now, 

26 that may have to do -- someone's going to email me later today about 
 96 

1 like Google search algorithms and the fact that it was me who searched 

2 and someone Google has a big portfolio on me and knows that I want 

3 to have the return be a picture of me, which I actually don't want. And 

4 that may all be true, but I think it has been quite an evolution and 

5 development. 

6 To this day, some have a very singular focus on the 

7 Near Term Task Force, but the truth is, we've had at this point many 

8 hundreds of NRC analysts and experts that have contributed to the 

9 NRC's regulatory response to the events in Fukushima over the course 

10 of the last number of years. Every stage in this process has posed a 

11 unique set of challenges, I think, for the NRC. Different challenges, 

12 some the same, for the industry, but I'm more focused on what's the 

13 long pole in the tent for us. So I see this moment in time, as reflected 

14 in all of your presentations, is that really important inflection point where, 

15 for years we have been in issue identification, exploration, analysis, 

16 coming up with whether or not there was a regulatory response, what 

17 that should be. 

18 And, yes, the Commission has shaped some of those, 

19 I think, in some instances. I voted to adopt your recommendation, 

20 others of my colleagues have not, and we ended up doing something 

21 different. At times, I've been part of the majority that indicated that, 

22 although the Staff considered many things, the appropriate regulatory 

23 response was something different. I think that's actually indicative not 

24 of a weakness in this process, but a strength in it. If the Commission 

25 were merely here to pass through everything the Staff developed, that 

26 would be a very different NRC than it is. 
 97 

1 The preponderance of things have been adopted, and 

2 many things didn't require the Commission's endorsement at all, they 

3 fall under the delegated set of Staff actions. Where things are going to 

4 fundamentally change the regulatory framework, the Commission of 

5 course has been involved in those. And I think that a lot of good work 

6 has been. It's interesting, we've had turnover on our side. When Jack 

7 came in, I thought, boy, we are asking this individual to come in and this 

8 is a difficult, awkward time for a hand-off. It had more to do with an 

9 important opportunity for your predecessor, but I want to credit you and 

10 many other individual contributors at NRC and, Jack, you did step in at 

11 an important time. 

12 But the challenge, or one of the key challenges I see 

13 now is, we've done all this identification and analysis, decisions have 

14 been made, and as a body of decision making, it reflects what we 

15 thought needed to be changed and areas where we thought we were 

16 well served by what we had. And I would remind people that the Near 

17 Term Task Force, in general, felt that we were well served in terms of 

18 what we had. I don't think that they were calling for a fundamental sea 

19 change in NRC's regulatory philosophy. 

20 So we've had the intervening years, many, I think at 

21 this point probably hundreds of thousands of hours of NRC Staff 

22 analysis, and we've had a chance to shape that. But the truth for 

23 anyone who knows how NRC regulates is that, now as we move into 

24 compliance oversight and inspection of this body of decisions and then 

25 the manifestation of those decisions, it's going to come down to 

26 individual NRC inspectors, men and women in the field at these plants, 
 98 

1 a lot of the guidance and interpretation falls on their shoulders. And 

2 so, I appreciate the acknowledgment for all of the gentlemen sitting on 

3 the other side of the table that you and other supervisors who report to 

4 you will play a very outsized role in making sure that there is coherence 

5 between -- you've been here at Headquarters, except for Troy, 

6 appreciate you coming here today, you've been here to observe the 

7 development of the evolution of where we are, very much up close. 

8 But we can't leave those people to kind of figure it out 

9 on the ground. And so I hear -- I appreciate that the previous panel 

10 identified this as a challenge. I hear from you that we're well along in 

11 our thinking about it, but I think that will require a very active 

12 management and supervision. And so, I think that's what the 

13 knowledge management comes down to, is this, maybe not a capturing 

14 of knowledge, but making sure that there's a transfer of knowledge. 

15 And I appreciate and, again, am comforted, that you're on top of that. 

16 I would turn to Mo on flooding, because people haven't 

17 asked you a whole lot about it. So, I was at a U.S. nuclear power plant, 

18 doesn't matter which one, a few months ago, and they were giving a 

19 status on their compliance with Fukushima actions, as a lot of them do 

20 when I visit. And there was a discussion about their flooding 

21 assessment and they said, we're still getting input on the XYZ Dam. 

22 And I said, well, what state is it in? And I don't happen to know. And 

23 more relevant, I said, and how far away from this plant is that dam? 

24 And it was over 900 miles away. 

25 Now, I don't know if you're a hydrologist, I'm not a 

26 hydrologist, but I think as a lay person, do you share my difficulty in 
 99 

1 wrapping my mind around how a dam failure 900 miles away impinges? 

2 I can create hypotheticals, I'm like any other creative person, my mind 

3 can try to figure -- I realize a lot of these are river systems and so we 

4 have to look at it that way, but then I try to think about it and say, if that's 

5 the level of conservatism, perhaps it just reflects uncertainty in 

6 conservatism. It does affect how one would approach a periodic 

7 review of hazards. Because the one way to handle the need to 

8 constantly relook at something is to look at it less frequently, but with 

9 an abundance of conservatism. Because then, the need to reanalyze 

10 it would need to be something that fell entirely outside of that bubble. 

11 And I guess, I'll let you speak to the 900 mile away 

12 dam, but I do want to say, this is the other -- so I see two key challenges. 

13 One is the knowledge transfer. The other one is, the fact that, as we 

14 move forward, we really need to understand, as we've learned all along, 

15 that every action we've taken then has an effect on whether or not 

16 regulatory action is probably needed on other actions. And I don't want 

17 to draw -- I think in anything we look at in the mitigation of severe 

18 accidents, if you implement some measures, other measures are then 

19 less recommended than they otherwise would be. 

20 And I see the whole of the last five year journey as 

21 reflecting that idea, is that Tier 1 made Tier 2 and Tier 3 -- I know that 

22 our most persistent critics might say, well, time went by and NRC thinks 

23 that the public's forgotten about this and that's why Tier 2 and Tier 3 are 

24 getting short shrift. I don't share that view at all. And, I think, it does 

25 require some study of all that we've done, but the fact that items in Tier 

26 2 and Tier 3 are less recommended on the basis of the Tier 1 actions, I 
 100 

1 think we knew that all along, and so, this isn't something that happened 

2 accidentally five years later. Okay, Mo, I've got one minute. What 

3 about -- why does that dam 900 miles away make a difference? 

4 MR. SHAMS: So, I'm not a hydrologist, let's start with 

5 that. I would say, it's just the amount of water behind that dam, the fact 

6 that it is 900 miles away, it still has an impact on the site. I do share 

7 the view that, it does lend itself to a certain perception of a level of 

8 conservatism that we are looking and we are implementing and 

9 calculating these hazards. And that goes without saying for flooding, 

10 just the probabilistic risk assessment framework is not at hand yet, and 

11 it's several years away if not a decade. 

12 COMMISSIONER SVINICKI: And I can't remember 

13 whether this site needed input from the Corps of Engineers. I know 

14 some sites need that. Can I just ask you quickly, do we have -- do 

15 those sites get good transparency into that data? I had heard a couple 

16 of years ago that the Corps didn't want certain information underlying 

17 the inputs about flooding hazards to be shared with licensees or, 

18 frankly, anyone outside the government. It does raise, I'm the only 

19 non-lawyer on this Commission or someone without a law degree, but 

20 it raises issues of if I can convict you on evidence that I don't allow you 

21 to see, there's a kind of a, what I would call as a non-lawyer, a due 

22 process issue there. Have we resolved that? 

23 MR. JOHNSON: So, Commissioner, Andy Campbell is 

24 at the podium. He's been in the teeth of this issue and so if he can talk 

25 to your question? 

26 MR. CAMPBELL: Commissioner Svinicki, I'm Andy 
 101 

1 Campbell, I'm the Deputy Director of the Division of Site Safety and 

2 Environmental Analysis. And I've led all of the visits, except for the 

3 initial ones, to the Army Corps sites. We interact with them weekly. 

4 We set up a process that allowed the licensees to ask any question they 

5 wanted through an early meeting, before they got their hydrographs 

6 from the results. And through interactions, if they had additional 

7 questions, we've provided opportunities for them to submit those to the 

8 Army Corps. 

9 It is important to recognize that it is not only the Army 

10 Corps, but all the organizations that are responsible for dams, protect 

11 certain information that in the wrong hands could be detrimental to 

12 property and life. And that includes dams in Canada, by the way. So, 

13 we work through a process of working with the Army Corps, making 

14 sure the licensees have an opportunity to get any and all the information 

15 that they want to be able to take the hydrographs and the other 

16 associated information and do the flooding analysis for their sites. 

17 It's an ongoing process, we're working currently on the 

18 last site, which is on the Columbia River. That involved treaty 

19 negotiations with the Army Corps and Canada, because that's all under 

20 the U.S.-Canada treaty on the Columbia River. And, yes, a large dam 

21 900 miles away can cause a lot of damage. And that's the kind of 

22 information that is protected. Now, the screening process that we use 

23 eliminated thousands, no, I'll say tens of thousands of dams that are in 

24 the National Inventory of Dams from further consideration in all the 

25 watersheds that we've looked at. In the end, there are only a handful 

26 of dams that are of concern, and they are the very big ones, or they're 
 102 

1 very close. 

2 So, that's the kind of thing you have to keep in mind 

3 when you're discussing, and I'm careful not to talk about any particular 

4 dam or river system or what the flooding could be, but those are the 

5 kinds of considerations. I will point out that the review that we've done 

6 is consistent with what the Army Corps does, what the Bureau of Rec 

7 does, what FERC does, and we've had a lot of cooperation with those 

8 agencies in this process. And the licensees have been able to see all 

9 that information. It's just the transfer of information of a particular 

10 nature to licensees or to anybody outside that sphere is controlled. 

11 COMMISSIONER SVINICKI: Okay. Thank you, Mr. 

12 Chairman, I'm over my time. 

13 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Thank you, Commissioner. 

14 Commissioner Ostendorff? 

15 COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF: Thank you, 

16 Chairman. Thank you all for being here and for your work and the work 

17 of your teams. I'll also echo Commissioner Svinicki's thanks to Troy 

18 for representing the Regions here and it's just very good to see you, 

19 Troy. Not surprisingly, I'm going to follow my colleague Commissioner 

20 Svinicki in doing some reflection here for, I think, some important 

21 reasons. 

22 That we were the two that were here when this started 

23 off and, at least I'll be here another few weeks, but this is my last chance 

24 publically to thank the Staff for all their work on all the Fukushima 

25 issues, whether it be at Headquarters or in the Regions, but also to 

26 provide just some individual Commissioner perspectives on this. 
 103 

1 Because I think it is important to take stock of where we are today in 

2 2016. And I'm going to make a couple of comments, some of which 

3 are to add my voice to that of Kristine Svinicki’s here. 

4 I remember very clearly when, in the week after 

5 Fukushima, when the Commission voted to not shut down nuclear 

6 power plants in the United States because we believed they were safe. 

7 I think that gets, that whole historical fact gets missed in many 

8 discussions today. Along with Commissioner Svinicki, I was here 

9 when the Commission unanimously endorsed having a Near Term Task 

10 Force effort to look at areas that we ought to look at. But not just say, 

11 yes, go out there and immediately implement everything that this Task 

12 Force does. 

13 And I think that has been mischaracterized in a number 

14 of Congressional hearings. The Commission did not go forth and say, 

15 go tell us what to change in our regulations. It says, go look at those 

16 areas and recommend what areas of our regulatory process and 

17 substantive regulations should we explore based on what we know in 

18 2011 on Fukushima. That has been mischaracterized so many times, 

19 I felt it was important to try to clarify it today. These are areas to look 

20 at and then we'll decide what regulatory actions, if any, are appropriate. 

21 That's probably the most single significant inaccuracy I've seen in the 

22 press the last five years. 

23 In July 2011, I remember Bill Borchardt was sitting 

24 exactly in your spot, and I said, Bill, what were the key Lessons 

25 Learned, and Chairman Burns hit on this briefly in his questions today, 

26 what were the key Lessons Learned from our experience as a regulator 
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1 based on Three Mile Island? And I remember very clearly Mr. 

2 Borchardt saying, a lot of things were ordered by the NRC, a lot of those 

3 activities added safety value, a lot of them did not. And it was that, a 

4 lot of them did not, that kind of resonated with Commissioner Svinicki 

5 and I and led in the fall of 2011, when SECY-11-0137 came out, when 

6 Marty Virgilio had your job, that we led to this Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3. 

7 And I completely agree with Commissioner Svinicki 

8 that we knew at that time that all things are not created equal here, there 

9 are some that were really of safety significance, some that we needed 

10 to look at, but would not rise to that same urgent safety issue. And 

11 that's exactly how it's played out. Yet, there are those critics of the 

12 NRC who would suggest that we didn't do all the stuff that was listed 

13 line item, 35 separate areas in the, if I remember right, in the Near Term 

14 Task Force report. Well, there was a reason for that. 

15 I'm not going to ask this question, Mike, but I think you'll 

16 at least nod your head, I'm not trying to ask a leading question, I do 

17 have a law degree, I'm not an experienced attorney, but in a leading 

18 question format, I think that there's been, if you look at the amount of, 

19 I'm going to use this as a visual, this amount of work, effort done by the 

20 Near Term Task Force report, and I magnify that by probably a factor 

21 of at least a hundred of the number of hours and effort expended by the 

22 NRC Staff to look at all of this, but to more fully explore various areas. 

23 Is that a fair characterization? 

24 MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 

25 COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF: Okay. And so, 

26 that plays into this not being a static approach, it's a dynamic approach. 
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1 And I think that dynamic approach has served this Agency 

2 extraordinarily well. It's evolved with time as knowledge has been 

3 learned and as new things looked at and as risk assessments have 

4 changed. And the fact that we've made some decisions in 2013, and 

5 2014, and 2015 that were backing off maybe some things we thought 

6 might originally be appropriate is not a bad news story, I would say it's 

7 a good news story and it confirms that we've used solid science, 

8 engineering practices, analytical methods to assess the risk and used 

9 that to inform our decision making. Again, that piece has also been 

10 mischaracterized a number of times in the press. 

11 The communications piece, and I appreciate that you 

12 talked about the 250 meetings and I look at my service at the 

13 Department of Energy, Department of Defense, and Commissioner 

14 Svinicki's talk about the Google hits on public meetings, and in talking 

15 to colleagues in the international community over the last five years and 

16 two months since Fukushima, it's been my personal view that we could 

17 not have been more transparent. That there's no other country that's 

18 been as transparent as the United States in discussing these issues 

19 and engaging stakeholders. 

20 At the end of the day though, I expect our professional 

21 staff, the technically competent staff, to take all of that into account and 

22 to be able to render decisions. And I think you have. And in 

23 preparation for a recent speech, I looked at the number of votes I've 

24 cast on SECY papers on Fukushima, along with Commissioner Svinicki, 

25 it's 25. And all of our votes are on the websites. I think the record of 

26 public meetings is very open and transparent. 
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1 So for the American public, even though there may be 

2 times when people will disagree with decisions we've taken, and that's 

3 a fair comment and I'm not asking for everybody to agree with us, but 

4 at least I think it's a fair statement to say that there's been transparency 

5 as to how we've arrived at those decisions. And whether somebody 

6 agrees or not, you can at least see how individual Commissioner came 

7 out on different SECY papers. And I think that's a real strength. 

8 The last, I'd say, six or eight, maybe ten or 15, 

9 Congressional testimonies that I've had an opening statement for, I've 

10 been proud to say that I think we're in a good place on Fukushima 

11 issues and that we have relied upon solid principles of science and 

12 engineering. I feel that way today and I have confidence that years 

13 from now, when you look back upon your legacy at the NRC, you'll be 

14 able to say that's the case. And I also acknowledge there's a lot of 

15 work left to be done, as Mike Johnson said. 

16 Earlier, people have commented, and I'm going to do a 

17 little sidebar here, but I think it's important, on the concept of periodic 

18 safety reviews, and I've recently discussed these on the international 

19 trip with other international regulators just last week over in Spain. I 

20 am not a critic of the periodic safety review process, but I think when 

21 people ask, Ostendorff, why don't you do that in the United States, I'd 

22 say, well, here's why. And it's been, look at our Baseline Inspection 

23 Program, look at the Resident Inspector's report to Troy Pruett and 

24 Mark Dapas and Kriss Kennedy down at Region IV. 

25 Seldom is that rigorous Baseline Inspection Program, 

26 from my experience, fully replicated elsewhere. It's not a criticism, it's 
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1 just, I think, an accurate observation. Look at our Component Design 

2 Basis Inspection Programs, where every three years, every plant has a 

3 detailed focus area on engineering performance specifications, that 

4 looks in an ongoing fashion with a deep-dive at a particular aspect of 

5 plant safety. Our Reactor Oversight Process. I could go on and on 

6 down the path, I won't do that, but I'd say that for other countries, 

7 periodic safety reviews work well for them and I respect that, I think our 

8 systems work well for us. And it's not a -- when one looks at what we 

9 do in the United States, you have to look at the details and do a 

10 deep-dive on what we do for our inspection program, otherwise, there's 

11 not -- I don't think you'll have an accurate comparison. 

12 Mike, I would encourage you, now this is not something 

13 you need Commission direction for and that need not capture this in the 

14 SRM, but I think it's important at some point in time, you and Vic McCree 

15 can do this, I think it's important to consider capturing the Lessons 

16 Learned from Fukushima, regulatory Lessons Learned, not the details, 

17 but more the process, the high level senior leadership engagement that 

18 you're uniquely equipped to lead in your position as having lead the 

19 Fukushima Steering Committee for so many years and so forth. 

20 The other piece that -- the second sidebar I'll offer is, I 

21 don't think there's been a full articulation, by industry or the NRC or I'll 

22 use the phrase nuclear enterprise, of the importance of operator training 

23 in all this. We don't talk about that enough and I don't think industry 

24 talks about it enough either. And I know that a few years ago, I don't 

25 know if Commissioner Svinicki will recall, at one of these meetings, 

26 there was a question about, well, we don't know that operators would 
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1 carry out these steps. Remember that? Where there's a debate 

2 maybe three years ago on this topic? 

3 And I think that was -- any question is a fine question, 

4 but I think it did not get fully answered from the standpoint that I have 

5 complete confidence as a former nuclear plant operator on submarines 

6 for many years that the operators in the U.S. industry are highly 

7 qualified, are proficient, they're ongoing training every X number of 

8 weeks, there's a very strong aspect of their preparation to deal with any 

9 casualty. And I think that's one piece that has not received the visibility 

10 that's appropriate. Okay. I'm going to stop there, but I appreciate you 

11 listening to one Commissioner's perspectives. I thank you for all that 

12 you and your teams have done. Thank you, Chairman. 

13 CHAIRMAN BURNS: Thank you, Commissioner. And 

14 before we close, any other comments from my colleagues? Well, 

15 thanks. I'm pleased we've had this opportunity to discuss the progress 

16 to date on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Lessons Learned activities, as well 

17 as the plans for the actions that remain before us to be completed, to 

18 hear the perspectives of both the Staff as well as other external 

19 stakeholders on these issues. Again, we appreciate the informative 

20 presentations today and with that, we'll stand adjourned. 

21 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the 

22 record at 11:58 a.m.)